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Introduction

The field of political-economy dates back at least as far as Adam Smith over 200 years ago. The early political-economists made the first systematic attempts to examine the interconnections between the emergence of the new industrial system -- which changed the way in which resources were produced and consumed -- and the advent of bourgeois democratic states -- which made critical decisions as to how those resources were to be distributed. Although the study of political-economy throughout the 19th century implied no particular political ideology, by the 20th century it came to be associated with radical critiques of society, especially by Marxists. And it is largely true that, until recently, only left-leaning social scientists and social workers in the U.S. discussed economics and politics as two inextricably related spheres of human activity.

Now, once again, political-economy is fashionable among the Gilders and the Galbraiths, as well as the Gordons. Spurred by an "ideological" presidency, for the first time in recent memory the debate over our social priorities is taking place within a broader examination of the nature of the U.S. political economy, its assumptions and goals, its intended and unintended consequences.

The events of the last three years have shaken many social workers from the reverie of technique and forced them to face the harsh dawn of government cutbacks in programs for human welfare, accompanied by increasingly sharp attacks on the premises and goals of the unfinished U.S. welfare state. Whereas radicals and reformers within social work have long made the connection between political-economic developments and social policies explicit in their practice, for many in the human services political and economic events were simply a distant backdrop whose impact on the structure and delivery of services was indirect, unclear and often abstract. This is no longer so. Social workers in clinical practice now attend workshops on the impact of unemployment; income maintenance services have established closer ties with labor unions to help the "new poor"; administrators are renewing coalitions with other service providers and their allies within economically besieged communities. Finally, social workers are becoming increasingly involved in electoral politics: as candidates, campaign staff and as directors of voter registration projects.

It is impossible, therefore, for a discussion of the current and future state of social work and social
the relationship of both to the broader political economy. This special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare is designed to begin that discussion by identifying several key aspects of this relationship and by stimulating further debate on these and other questions.

The opening essay by Dr. Harold Lewis, Dean of Hunter College School of Social Work, provides an analysis of the relationship between the economic issues which will dominate the 1980's and their impact on the definition of social work services. Lewis argues that these services have attributes as commodities just as any product of work in a political-economic system. He explores the meaning of the commodity attribute for services in such areas as quality of service, utilization of service, and evaluation and proposes some directions for policy makers and service providers in the decade ahead.

The essays by Abramowitz and Kingsor examine the impact of political-economic factors in the area of social policy formulation. Abramowitz critiques the assumptions and contradictions of "supply-side economics" specifically in terms of their relationship to and impact upon social welfare program outlays. Although most social workers "know" that Reaganomics has hurt those in society least able to bear the pain, her article will provide the conceptual ammunition needed to refute those who claim the current Administration's policies are "working". Yes, Abramowitz argues, they are working precisely as intended -- now, let's examine what those intentions are, especially in regard to their impact on the people with whom we work.

Kingson, who recently served as staff to the Bipartisan Commission on Social Security Reform, contributes an excellent "case study" of the application of different economic assumptions to the creation of social policy in the political arena. His analysis of different approaches (coercive and voluntary) to retirement policy not only illustrates the impact of economic decisions on a specific, vulnerable population, it also serves as a model for future policy analysis efforts.

The essays by Rose, Perlman and Haggstrom explore various aspects of the development and delivery of social work services within the U.S. political economy. Each author assumes one influence of the U.S. political economy on social services is the "commoditization" of the service recipient. Rose examines how this affects policies and programs in mental health aftercare. He critiques existing policies and practices and the underlying philosophy behind the "deinstitutionalization movement." Rose points to the theories of Paulo
Freire as a guide for an alternate form of service provision.

Like ex-mental patients, members of citizen action groups have often been forced to adopt prescribed roles and have often developed a self-identity imposed upon them by more powerful economic and political forces. Perlman presents mini-portraits of such individuals and reveals the diverse motivations behind their participation. In the second half of her essay, Perlman looks for the "meaning" behind this diversity and evaluates the relevance of existing theories to the experiences of the citizen action groups she observed. She concludes by describing those characteristics of action organizations which produce the greatest change in participants' consciousness and, like Rose, looks to the work of Freire (and others) as a possible model for organizers.

Haggstrom's controversial essay also demands that we reexamine certain fundamental assumptions about our practice, assumptions which have been shaped by the structure of the political economy (via funding patterns) and by the ideology generated by the U.S. pattern of political-economic development (via our conceptions of science and the helping process). He asks us to look at the possibility that some of our programs and practices not only do not achieve their stated outcome goals, but that they exacerbate the problems they are intended to solve or produce new, unforeseen problems. His concluding suggestions about education, research and service delivery are sure to stimulate further discussion of the issues he raises.

The final two articles focus on how political-economic factors influence the individual and group behavior of social workers themselves. Longres analyzes those factors which heighten or diminish the degree of alienation experienced by service providers. His essay is significant for several reasons:

(a) it reinforces our examination of the work aspect of social work, including the negative features of work in a profit-motivated economy;
(b) it reformulates the problem of so-called "worker burnout" -- with its emphasis on "internal" factors -- to one which addresses how the features of the external environment (agency, community, political-economic system) affect practice in the human services;
(c) it reawakens our awareness that the concept of alienation originated with an analysis of how the political-economy of capitalist nations shaped social relationships and behavior.
While Longres' article looks at how individual social workers respond to pressures from the political-economic environment, this issue's concluding essay examines how social workers collectively have been influenced by the structural and ideological constraints of our political-economic system in their creation of an organized profession. Instead of answering the oft-stated query "Is social work a profession?" Wenocur and Reisch question the assumptions and motivations behind the professionalizing impulse itself. The essay critiques existing explanations for the phenomenon of professionalization and develops a political-economic model to analyze the emergence of a professional enterprise in social work. It is the authors' intentions to provide a perspective from which the current situation of social work can be assessed and, thereby, to "enhance the capacity of social workers to find socially progressive alternatives, and in concert with other progressive groups, eventually to create a different social reality."

We hope that all the essays which follow will inspire debate and serve as a prologue to such action.

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The decade ahead is going to be dominated by economic issues. All signs point to continued inflation, continued high levels of unemployment, cyclical troughs and declining peaks in the overall economy, energy shortages and increasing financial pressures, particularly on those families living on minimal or below-poverty level budgets. Stresses in management of basic requirements for maintenance of health, housing, education and transportation will burden middle income, blue collar and the working poor family. In this context, funding of social services will be tight, relative to need. It seems useful, for these reasons, to place our discussion within an economic framework, to view social work services as a commodity, and to consider how the anticipated market conditions of the 80's will affect this commodity, including how these conditions will impact on the producers, the consumers and the distributors of these services.

Social work services have distinctive attributes as commodities. In the past they have rarely been available on a competitive basis. Usually, particular services are to be had from one or at most a few sources in the community. Even when associated with tangible services, such as day care, homemaker or foster care, social work services are labor-intensive. The average consumer finds it difficult to evaluate their quality and to appreciate what constitutes an appropriate quantity to meet a specific need. Most social work services are provided by tax-supported sources. Rarely are the costs for producing a service covered by consumer payments.

Social work services materialize in the act of being rendered. There is no "service" in the resources allocated for their provision. Nor is there a "service" in the consumer's experienced needs. Only when provider resources and consumer needs come together in an actual transaction, does a "social work service" as commodity, evolve. Thus,

* Social work services are those generated by social work interventions, constituting one of the broad range of social services.

**Originally presented at the Annual Conference of Large Agency Supervisors and Associate Directors, Family Service Association of America in Toronto, Canada, Fall, 1980.
Unlike most commodities in our economy, social work services exist only in the process of their formation. They have no existence apart from it. For this reason, one cannot inventory social work services in the traditional sense. One cannot go to a bin and count how many of these and how many of those services are on hand to be used to meet current demand. Counting available resources may suggest the potential available for providing a service, but hardly constitutes a count of the "service." The availability of a resource is no assurance of its use in a transaction that produces a service. Unhappily, the transient nature of this service allows it to disappear without too much notice of its absence by persons other than those directly involved in its production and consumption. Inventories of unsold cars convey a far more dramatic message of uneconomic productive policies and practice than do the absences of transactions that produce social work services.

This commodity is short lived. Not only does the transaction create it, it also absorbs it én-toto. The only evidence after the fact that the commodity was created and used is in a depletion of resource and a change in consumer condition. Thus, if the quality of the commodity is to be evaluated directly, what transacts in the need-provision exchange must be observed in process. Ex-post-facto evaluations inevitably face the complex problem of isolating particular effects in situations involving matrices of causal influences. The implications that flow from this attribute will be considered further. Suffice it to note that in an inflationary situation with resources shrinking relative to need, protecting the quality of this service is difficult. Unlike the faulty brake or slipping automatic shift, there is no recall possible to correct for manufacturer's error. Since there is no clear product that can be demonstrated to be at fault, it is more convenient to fault a program that provides the service than the particular methods that are used to create it.

Like all commodities, social work services have use value as well as exchange value. As is true of any human service, the use value is largely determined by consumers' judgments of costs relative to satisfactions obtained as a result of participating in its creation. The exchange value, on the other hand, relies more heavily on judgments of providers. What alternate uses can be made of an equal investment of resources, largely determine its exchange value. From the consumer's perspective, the better quality for equal cost, the more use value one can assign to the commodity. From the provider's perspective, the less costly the resource, other things being equal, the more economic the exchange value. Given these considerations, it is important to note that the persons creating the social work service -- the worker and the consumer -- are most often dependent on relatively disinterested parties for the crucial decisions as to the quality and quantity of service to be subsidized.
Finally, it is also important to recognize the logic that applies to the analysis and understanding of this commodity's relationship to the satisfaction of specified needs. The intention of service, in all but a few instances, is to enhance the potential for constructive choices on the part of the consumer of the service. The major sought-after outcome for the consumer is the meeting of a need in such a way as to diminish as far as possible the consumer's dependency on the service when confronted with a similar need in the future. Thus, the service is not only expected to have a fixed, determined effect as an outcome. It is also expected to change probabilities in the consumer's capacities for coping, in a wide range of social functioning areas. We readily admit that none of our evaluative procedures based on statistical aggregates of individual units can tell us what will happen in a particular case served, or in the next case to be served. But beyond this probability issue which our literature has discussed in detail, there is another, more fundamental probability issue. When seeking help consumers bring with them to the service creating transaction a variety of potentials in relation to behavior, reasoning, valuing, etc., all interdependent. As a result of the service, changes in the distribution of these potentials should provide some measure of the nature and scope of the service impact. The most demanding aspects of a service transaction, for which professional social work skills are required, are located in this problematic area, the influencing of potential. Nevertheless, "before and after" degrees of potentials are hardly susceptible to measurement by available procedures. We have yet to adequately describe these potentials, let alone agree on a procedure for counting them. For example, when does self-awareness, which may be an important indicator of a person's potential for constructive interpersonal relationships become excessive self-preoccupation, an indicator for an opposite potential? To arrive at an acceptable definition of self-awareness, self-preoccupation, and excessive narcissism, we need to know much more than we now do about these qualities. Moreover, given the bio-psycho-social influences on their development, counting such quixotic qualities can prove as futile as counting melting ice cubes. The results, inevitably are watered-down statistics.

Complicating the measurement task is the intentional nature of social work service. Service normally is shaped by the efforts of its creators to achieve particular effects. It would be necessary to determine what was to be altered, in relation to what were non-targeted potentials and to understand their interactions, before concluding whether a particular intervention produced a particular change in potential for acceptable social functioning. This fundamental expectation denies the possibility of simple causal explanations.

There are additional ways in which social work services differ from other commodities. For our purposes, the attributes identified provide a sufficient basis for exploring the central focus of this
discussion: How will the inflationary resource squeeze of the 80's impact on the profession and our service programs? Issues affecting access to social work services, the quality of these services, their utilization and their evaluation will be considered using the framework provided by the definitions of the social work commodity.

Access to Social Work Services

During the past two decades the monopolistic character of social work service programs was breached. Private entrepreneurship detected profit to be made in the delivery of health and welfare services. Large corporate interests contracted to manage and provide social work services otherwise only available from public or not-for-profit voluntary agencies. Labor unions and management moved to provide a range of protective and supportive social work services to employees at their work site or in their communities. Private practice, self-help and mutual aid concurrently expanded to offer alternative access to resources. For persons with means, and for those organized to exercise political and economic power, these developments opened up additional choices; for the most deprived, those who could not pay for social work service nor exercise influence through organizational power, little changed. An example may illustrate how the combination of limitations in knowledge, conflict in values and lack of control over access to social work services combine to further disadvantage the most disadvantaged, despite the expanded availability of sources for this particular commodity.

During the past two decades our society has been deeply involved in policy and practice debates on questions of life and death. With the availability of legal abortions, a major concern has been the determination of when life begins. With the development of artificial support systems that can sustain otherwise non-functioning vital organs, a major concern has been uncertainty as to when death has occurred. With respect to both issues, we are lacking in essential knowledge. But in these debates the most contentious issues have concern "moral rights." Differences as to what constitutes the right to life and the right to separate from life have highlighted deep seated, conflicting ideologies not readily reconcilable. In both instances, we are confronted with ethical dilemmas stemming from ambiguous situations in which choices must be made, when knowledge on which to base these choices is limited, and values are in conflict.

In this example, contending religious, political and professional groups have sought to define standards for allocating legal rights, each hoping to establish what are necessary obligations
that further their different views of the common good. As is usual in conflicts involving the allocation of legal rights, those more fortunately situated tend to focus the debate on issues affecting freedom-of-choice as the central value. For the disadvantaged, whose choices are restricted in any circumstance, distributive justice is the crucial value. Now, in relation to both issues the service sought and its associated social work intervention is available from a variety of sources, some public, some private, some profit oriented, some philanthropic, and some from informal self-help associations. Despite the high moral tone of the debates, the nitty-gritty problems of service delivery provide evidence of the impact of unemployment, racism, sexism, ethnocentrism and poverty on who will have access to the available resources. Each of the contending groups in the debate have to face up to the caste and class inequities that are inherent in the application of their proposed standards. In the final analysis, for those who can afford it, the non-monopolistic character of service availability represents choices and opportunities to exercise rights in a conflict-ridden area of social work service. For those who cannot afford it, or have no organizational clout, access hardly increases when a subsidized or fee-for-service profit-sector has been added to the group of social work service providers.

In the decade ahead, we should anticipate pressure to further breach the monopolistic control of social work services, largely increasing the choices available for those who can purchase the services they seek. For the most disadvantaged, it will take militant advocacy in the form of organized political pressure to obtain changes that will improve the amount and quality of social work services to which they can gain access.

The Quality of Social Work Service

When a product exists only in its use; when it is created in an exchange and has no material content apart from the processes through which it is realized, quality control is often synonymous with the control of the quality of those who participate in its creation -- the workers and the consumers. In the sixties and seventies, personnel recruited to work in the human service field expanded to include persons with various levels and kinds of educational preparation, and various attributes associated with life-styles and personal experience. The expectation was to improve on the quality of services, provide wider coverage to reach previously underserved populations, and concurrently make possible employment opportunities in the social services for persons whose inter-personal skills and systems sophistication were among their work-related, marketable talents. Increasing the pool of social work service personnel to include a wider range of competencies, however, has different
implications for quality of services in a period of expanding resources, as was anticipated in the sixties, and contracting resources as was actually experienced in the seventies. It does not require detailed explanation to appreciate the potential for reducing costs that exist when the quality of a commodity is not determined by an analysis of the product itself. In place of expanding coverage by employing lesser skills to service less complicated need as is possible in a period of resource growth, in a period of contracting resources the skilled worker is replaced with a worker having a lesser competence to deal with the more complicated needs. There was much evidence of this latter replacement process during the last decade. Despite the political rhetoric about who can help with what problems most effectively, one can assume the prevalence of traditional criteria for choosing one's helper when opportunity for choice is present. For those who can afford to pay for services, or can press for special considerations, self-selection of service providers is normally reflected in these consumer's choices of the usual educational reputational and credential evidences of competence. For the economically or situationally disadvantaged, who must accept the worker assigned to help them or be denied access to services, there are few choices. If the criteria usually used by those free to choose have merit in the case of those not free to choose, the change of service providers does not result in an expansion of service, but different quality of social work service or no service at all.

In the inflationary 80's we should expect pressure for reduced costs to continue. The difficulty in evaluating the product, rather than the persons who help create it and who use it, will be used to obfuscate the reduction in quality of services that tight funding will demand. It will require more, not less, organized effort to protect standards that offer safeguards against the dilution of service quality.

While we may welcome all efforts to open up the "black box" of practice to more thorough scrutiny, in times of contracting resources we can anticipate that funding for such studies will also be curtailed. Lack of knowledge does not inhibit those who attack social work services in order to reduce their costs and availability. It ought not inhibit those who would defend these same services when their experience and belief indicate these services to be necessary and helpful to people in need.

Utilization of Social Work Service

There is no assurance that a product that meets the highest standards for judging quality will necessarily be used and used effectively by a consumer. The fact that social work services are in part created by the consumer, and that this creation is totally absorbed in the process that brings it into being, tends
to becloud the utilization issue. There is nothing unique to social work services that can protect them from being abused, misdirected, insufficient for their intended purpose, or dysfunctional in certain contexts and at certain times. For this reason, the distinction between the quality of service and its utilization should be respected much more than is usually evidenced in discussions of "quality" in the literature. This distinction is of considerable importance when one considers the problems of accountability associated with this commodity.

Accountability in social work services concerns not only the quality of the product, and its utilization, but also the process of its production. As noted earlier, ability to observe and measure the process of its production is limited. Since the product itself is short-lived, and is totally absorbed in the process of its creation, its quality tends to be judged inferentially from the qualities of those who produce it. Utilization, similarly, is inferred from secondary evidence, gleaned from ex-post facto analyses of the behaviors and attitudes of its consumers. Understandably, to be fully accountable for the provision of social work services is an achievement that defies the prowess of ordinary mortals.

Inferring use from ex-post facto data runs the risk of equating utilization with success. It is misleading to conclude that a client failed to make appropriate use of marital counseling if the marriage is not made a happy one as a result. We all can cite instances of persons who used appropriately the services of able physicians but did not get well. While utilization and successful outcome are related, analogous to objectives and goals in organizational work, they are not the same. Yet this distinction is hard to maintain in the social work services, where the consumer helps in the creation of the product.

The seventies was mistakenly dubbed the decade of accountability. It turned out to be the decade of count-ability. What could not be qualified and counted was discounted. Since those imprecise personal forms of knowledge, feelings and emotions, could not be satisfactorily described and enumerated, changes in sorrow, pain, fear, joy, trust, self-confidence, compassion, happiness, etc., rarely were identified as indications of success, compared to such hard-data as is evidenced in improved skills and appropriate behaviors, the subjective soft-data did not count at all. In this way, we replicated those educational evaluations which measure success by what the student knows and can do while ignoring or downplaying what kind of person he will be. What Polanyi calls personal knowledge, while not readily amenable to quantitative manipulations so essential for measurement, is central to the intention of the social work service transaction, particularly if we are to focus on utilization as distinct from success.

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In the typical helping situation, whatever the mode of intervention, the helper seeks to exercise personal influence through a meaningful relationship. If one could visualize a completely dehumanized social work service transaction, it might conceivably be argued that feelings and emotions need not be considered. But in the transactions that depend on human interactions, what is utilized most are the gained knowledge and values which are absorbed and understood because their digestability was facilitated by the lubricating effects of deep, lasting feelings. To know with conviction, to appreciate with affection, to master with delight—these phrases convey the feelings generated by the relationship which makes the new and different palatable. One must wonder how long-lasting are achieved changes in behavior, skills and attitudes if the accompanying feelings are not constantly present to help reclaim and sustain changes.

Yet, in the decade of the 1970's, when our nation was blemished by immorality in high places and gross insensitivities to the pressures affecting the lives and welfare of large sectors of the disadvantaged populations, it was not surprising to find that feelings were ignored even in the efforts to understand the social work services. All things considered, the inflationary 1980's will produce more of the same, unless compelled by those whose feelings are most at stake, to do otherwise.

Evaluation

During the past decade it appeared that the measure of a program's success was to be determined by the success of the measure used to judge it. In the aftermath of *Girls at Vocational High* when some of social work's detractors were wondering out loud if casework was dead, the profession and many social agencies spent the next ten years trying to revive it. In the liberated 1960's, fields of practice responded to the mass protest movements by launching innovative programs. In the 1970's, the response to massive doubts about effectiveness of services was to innovate methods. In contrast to the relatively few approaches of the 1940's and 1950's—diagnostic, functional, problem-solving, Thomistic, the 1970's proliferated so many approaches most agencies and practitioners have come to view their preferences as eclectic. If measurement of the service commodity was complicated because of its transient, short-lived attributes, the eclectic nature of the intervention did little to simplify the measurement problem.

Possibly the most important lessons of the past decade with reference to efforts to evaluate human service programs are not to be found in the increased technical competencies of the evaluators. One need only consider the concerns of powerful sources that stimulated the press for evaluation, and the success
they achieved in their major objective, i.e. to contain the escalating costs of social services, to realize that however well-intentioned the evaluators, their function was not to reason why. If one asks why the military, after the catastrophies in Viet Nam, in the Bay of Pigs and in the deserts of Iran, were not subject to evaluative efforts that curtailed their funding, but were used to justify more spending for the military; or one wonders how our elected officials can justify rescue operations for Chrysler, Lockheed, Pennsylvania Railroad and more, where threatened bankruptcies testify to mismanagement or worse in their planning and operation, the answers given would not help alter the very different treatment experienced by health, education and welfare programs. The commodities produced by the former claimants on our nation's resources, and the political-economic interests that benefit from their production, simply will not tolerate doubts that would threaten their benefits. As every child knows, and as President Eisenhower reminded us in his departing advice to the nation, it is among those interests that one will find the current rulers of our nation's destiny. It may seem more convincing to argue that commendable utilization occurs when money allocated to elderly dependent clients of social agencies is used to provide them with warm mid-day meals and extra heat allowances, than when monies are spent on multi-million dollar weapon systems which the last President, as head of the Armed Forces, publically admitted would be obsolete for defense purposes by the time they are ready to "fly." But this logic has not impressed those allocating resources. Long ago, in the late 1940's, Gunn and Platt found in their study of the health field, that monies do not go where the need is greatest. The 1970's should have taught us our error in rushing to evaluate, when the prerequisites for sound evaluation had yet to be established. But our failure to avoid this error is understandable, if not excusable: those who controlled the purse-strings called the tune and, as suggested, ours was not to reason why. If in the 1980's, we continue to dance to this tune, and fail to orchestrate our own approach to the study of the commodity that we produce, mindful of its peculiar qualities, we ought not blind ourselves to the possible disservice that can be the consequence of our best, well-intended efforts at evaluation.

From this discussion of the impact of the threatening 1980's on access, quality, utilization and evaluation are there any suggestions that can help guide our practices, programs and policies so as to manage more successfully than in the 1970's?

The following is a suggested priority order in which effort should be invested by the profession and organizations providing social work services to counter the negative effects one can anticipate, given the scenario projected for the decade ahead. It is also proposed that one overriding principle should guide such efforts.
Clearly, issues of access should take precedence over issues of implementation. There will be risks and benefits involved in efforts to provide social work services to persons in need. We all desire that good be done and harm avoided in the provision of these services. But these ethical intentions hardly assure that justice will be done. Evidence suggests that a fair distribution of resources is not likely to occur without special provision to increase the opportunities to connect with service for the most disadvantaged, and to compensate in program design for deficiencies in different persons' capacities that limit utilization. As indicated, in the pressures to which fields of service responded during the past decade, justice was not a major priority, nor will it be so in the 1980's unless fought for by those most concerned to achieve it. The principle to be observed might be stated briefly as follows:

A fair distribution of burdens and benefits requires that unequal opportunities for access be so arranged as to increase the availability of services for the most disadvantaged.

Clearly, study of the service transaction itself, and the circumstances that influence utilization should take precedence over accountability efforts that focus primarily on success or failure measures. It is not possible to separate success measures from the ideological preferences of those who select them, nor to establish with scientific precision the causal state of our ignorance of the social work service creation process itself. Thus, evaluations that stress success over utilization are likely to provide very weak justifications for continuing or terminating different modes of intervention. Focusing on the service process and its utilization on the other hand, will provide opportunity for those most closely involved in service creation to contribute to an understanding of what is done, how it is done, and what impact it has on those most directly affected by it.

Finally, quality of service should be of greater concern than coverage, and for obvious reasons. Given the attributes of the commodity, in periods of tight budgets, the press for accountability tends to focus on reduced unit costs for service. Given the nature of the professional function in relation to the provision of social work services, under conditions of uncertainty as to success or failure, the inclination will be to employ the least expensive provider and maintain the same coverage, accepting a different quality service as a result. Unless concern for quality is given precedence, the silent disappearance of major elements that
determine what the social work services can achieve will be a costly default, burdening the most disadvantaged more than the advantaged.

This ordering is not intended to weight the relative importance of access, quality, utilization and evaluation as areas for attention at all times, under-all conditions. This ordering is intended to provide an essential counter-balance to contextual stresses that threaten the existence of necessary social work services.
FOOTNOTES

1. This scenario is based on conservative assumptions. It projects the current scene across the decade, assuming a relatively unchanged distribution of influences that shape national priorities. The analysis, on the other hand, is intended to contribute to a change in these priorities. If the purpose of the analysis is achieved, the scenario will be in error. The scenario anticipates a future we wish to avoid. For a related scenario see: S. M. Miller "Turmoil and/or Acquiescence for the 1980's?" Social Policy, May-June 1980, pp. 22-25.

2. Discussion of social services as commodities usually is associated with efforts to understand the political economy of social services. See, for example, Stanly Wenockur and Michael Riesch, Issues In Social Work: A Political Economic Perspective. (Unpublished Manuscript) and David M. Austin, the Political Economy of Social Benefit Organizations: Merit Goods and Redistributive Services," Draft of paper prepared for the Meeting on organizational theory and research related to human services, March 2-3, 1979, at the Center for Advanced Study on the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California.

3. Katherine M. Wood, "Casework Effectiveness: A New Look at the Research Evidence," Social Work, November, 1978, pp. 450-451. Prof. Wood's review of studies which, in part at least, were intended to evaluate social work practice, concludes with the observation that for a variety of reasons these studies offered little for social work theories about direct practice. Prof. Wood further notes, "It is difficult for the reader to determine specifics about clients, conditions, interventions and changes since the most essential details are lacking." This suggests another limitation that may be inherent in use of aggregate data -- i.e., It may not be possible to know what did happen in individual cases, not only what will happen.

4. See Florence Wexler Vigilante, Self-Preoccupation As A Predictor of Performance in Graduate Social Work Education (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Yeshiva University, School of Social Work, August, 1980) for one example of an effort to operationalize these concepts.
5. The concern of many within the profession, that the delivery system whereby the commodity was marketed also limited the access and quality of practice, served to rationalize proposals to promote an entrepreneurial model for service delivery. See in early discussion in Irving Piliavin, "Restructuring the Provision of Social Services," Social Work, Vol. 13, No. 2, January 1968, pp. 34-41. Also Alvin Shorr's editorial Social Work, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 1978, p. 2. For a more recent discussion of the uses of public monies to create private non-profit alternatives for service provision through contracting out, see Paul Terrell, "Private Alternatives to Public Human Services Administration." Social Service Review, March 1979, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 56-74.

6. NASW News, Vol. 24, No. 10, November, 1979, announcement of H.E.W. Children's Bureau Grant to NASW to perform research on the classification and validation of state merit system jobs, notes reasons for fearing that the widespread declassification of social service positions may have an adverse effect on the quality of service rendered. The separation of social services from income maintenance program concurrently established differential requisites for personnel in each function. Norman L. Wyers, "Whatever Happened to the Income Maintenance Line Worker?" Social Work, Vol. 25, No. 4, July, 1980, pp. 259-263; Irving Piliavin and Alan E. Gross, "The Effects of Separation of Services and Income Maintenance on AFDC Recipients," Social Service Review, 51, (September, 1977), pp. 389-406; and Final Report, the Task Force on the Future Relationship Between Publicly Funded Social Services and Income Support Programs, National Conference Social Welfare (Columbus, Ohio, 1979), will appear to be in agreement on important negative impact stemming from separation on the delivery and utilization of social service in public assistance agencies. The separation appears to separate clients from services as well.


8. In addition to further development of previous approaches evidenced in the psycho-social interactional and systems perspectives, the ecological, life mode, structural, behavioral and task-oriented perspectives are more recent additions.

Supply-side tax and spending policies have intensified poverty, unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities and organized labor. At the same time Reaganomics is shrinking and weakening the welfare state. To better understand and resist this conservative assault it is necessary to demystify the "economics" and "politics" of supply-side doctrine. This paper (a) defines the basic assumptions of supply-side economics; (b) identifies some of its problems and contradictions; (c) discusses its impact on the welfare state; and (d) analyzes it as part of a broader plan for coping with the current economic crisis. It argues that the supply-side tax cut not only lowers government revenues, but provides a justification for cutting domestic programs. Domestic cutbacks, in turn, are achieved by new laws that change program rules and regulations, transfer federal social welfare responsibility to the states, that weaken the political support for the programs themselves. This legislated conservative legacy will be more difficult to reverse than if the cuts were achieved by just lowering appropriations. As a domestic strategy, Reaganomics is part of a broader response to the current economic crisis that involves redirecting larger amounts of capital into the private sector and weakening the political strength of women, minorities and organized labor whose demands for an adequate standard of living have become too costly for business and government to absorb.

Supply-side economics is a disaster for the social services. The fiscal 1982 budget based on supply-side tax, spending and regulatory policies is intensifying poverty, unemployment and inequality, especially for women, minorities and the working poor. It reduces the availability and accessibility of increasingly
necessary social services and benefits, and creates job insecurity if not unemploy-
ment among social service workers who meanwhile are "battered" by rising caseloads
and troublesome decisions about who can and cannot be served (Lewis, 1980).

To cope with and resist the devastating effects of this conservative economic
document, we must first understand it. This paper hopes to demystify the "eco-
nomics" and "politics" of supply-side economics by (a) defining its assumptions,
(b) identifying some of its problems and contradictions, (c) discussing its im-
 pact on the welfare state, and (d) analyzing it as part of the Administration's
response to the current economic crisis.

WHAT IS SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMICS?

Supply-side economics is part of a broad attempt to deal with the economic
crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's. The attempt is not a new
one. Like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him, Reagan is trying to stimulate in-
vestment and production while reducing unemployment and inflation. The failure
of his predecessors to revive the sagging economy merely gave Reagan the oppor-
tunity to reject Keynesian economic policies on behalf of conservative economics
and ideology known today as supply-side economics or Reaganomics.

But neither is supply-side economics new. It is a modern day version of a
laissez-faire doctrine known as Say's Law, named for Jean Baptiste Say (1767-
1832), a French follower and popularizer of the work of Adam Smith. In brief,
Say's Law says that "supply creates its own demand" (Editors, 1981). That is,
in an unrestricted market, production (supply) can generate enough income (demand)
which when spent is just enough to clear the market of all goods and services pro-
duced. Moreover, unemployment and idle capacity, can automatically be elimi-
nated by an increase in production. Therefore policy aimed at stimulating the economy
need only be concerned with increasing production (or removing barriers to such
an increase). Everything else, including the demand for the resulting output will
take care of itself. Most economists accepted this doctrine until the 1930's when
it was discredited by the Great Depression and the work of British economist,
John Maynard Keynes.

Keynesian economics became the new orthodoxy after World War II. In contrast
to Say's emphasis on stimulating production, Keynes focused on the problem of in-
sufficient demand. Arguing that demand tends to fall short of potential output or
supply and that business produces only as much as it can sell, Keynes concluded
that a market economy could not sustain itself. Rather it was prone to periodic
crises of low production and high unemployment, such as the Depression of the 1930's.
To prevent this, Keynes recommended that government use its tax and spending powers
to stimulate demand incurring a deficit, if necessary. Indeed Keynes recommended
deficit spending as a good way to bolster demand. Once the economy reached the
point of full employment, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies could be used
to control inflation.

Contemporary supply-siders such as Jack Kemp, Norman Ture, P. Craig Roberts,
Arthur Laffer among others, reject "demand-side" theory. They favor Say's Law as
the best route out of the current economic crisis. The heart of their supply-side economics, the tax cut, is viewed as the critical stimulus to production (Roberts, 1981; Davenport, 1978). By lowering production costs and raising after-tax income, the tax cut is expected to encourage people to work more (overtime, moonlight, employment of additional family members); to save more (due to higher after-tax wages) and to invest more (due to higher after-tax income and corporate profits).

The supply-siders also maintain that reduced taxes need not increase the deficit nor require budget cuts. This is the message of the Laffer curve, a mathematical model of tax revenues which indicates that lowered tax rates will revitalize production and employment such that tax revenues will remain constant or even increase (Arenson, 1981a). In turn, the demand for unemployment insurance, food stamps and AFDC will fall permitting the budget to be balanced without massive budget cuts.

Finally supply-siders promise to control inflation by increasing supply without stimulating excessive demand. Once investments and greater productivity lower unit costs of production prices will fall. Any increase in demand caused by higher after-tax income will be less than the increased supply of goods and services thereby easing inflationary pressures.

Unlike Keynesians, supply-siders see high taxes and government regulations as part of the problem, not part of the solution. As barriers that raise the costs of goods, labor and capital and stymie production, government regulations must be removed.

Problems and Contradictions

Supply-side economics does not seem to be working. Among other things, its failure has been attributed to weak theoretical assumptions; a lack of correspondence with economic realities; and the effect of competing economic policy recommendations within Administration circles.

Supply-side theory predicts that lower taxes will encourage more work, saving and investment. But standard economic theory and the behavior of consumers and business indicate otherwise. Economic theory teaches that lower tax rates can make people work more (if they want a greater income) or less (since the same amount of money can be earned in less time or by fewer people) (Samuelson, 1970). Studies also show that changes in taxes cause little or no change in the hours people work, since institutional requirements more than personal preferences determine the length of the workday or workweek (Tabb, 1981). Likewise, the portion of income saved overtime has remained fairly steady despite tax fluctuations (Arenson, 1981a).

Businessmen and economists also question the supply-side prediction that lowered corporate taxes will stimulate greater business investment. The demand for a company's product and/or anticipated profits, not just lowered production costs significantly shape business investment decisions (Arenson, 1981b; Tabb, 1981). As the chief economist at Chase Econometrics observed, although "investment incentives do stimulate investment," they will take many years to improve productivity," and
"won't slow inflation quickly" (Arenson, 1981b). At the margin, says William Tabb, Professor of Economics at Queens College, "some productive investment may be forthcoming, but very little, and at an exceedingly high cost in lost tax revenues" (Tabb, 1981).

Supply-side failures also stem from the competition within administration circle between the supply-siders and the monetarists.1 Monetarists, the traditional fiscal conservatives, worry most about inflation and budget deficits. They favor restrictive fiscal and monetary policies designed to lower demand and squeeze inflation out of the economy. These deflationary policies conflict with the stimulative push of supply-side tax cuts and large military outlays causing Administration policies to contradict or cancel each other out.

Even the Administration had to acknowledge that a commitment to restrictive monetary policy imposed limits on its goals for economic growth (Fuebringer, 1981). More dramatically, plans to cut taxes and expand military budgets forced the Administration to raise its deficit estimates from a low of $42.5 billion to over $100 billion. These figures strain the Laffer-curve promise that tax cuts will revitalize the economy and permit the budget to be balanced. So does the deep recession (which many argue is due to the Administration's own restrictive monetary policy), record post-war unemployment rates and falsification of data used by the Administration, which created overly optimistic initial economic recovery forecasts (Greider, 1981).

As the impact of supply-side tax cuts, increased military spending and the deregulation of oil, gas and other prices ripples through the economy, prices will rise, undermining the original supply-side promise to control inflation (Alperovitz and Faux, 1981; Dollars and Sense, 1981). Although it involved sweeping cuts of property, not income taxes, California's Proposition 13 may be viewed as a pre-test of the supply-side tax cut. Neither a production boom, nor lower inflation rates resulted (Dollars and Sense, 1981).

Despite its inconsistencies and weaknesses, Reaganomics has already damaged the welfare state. Although Reagan's 1983 budget is currently stalled in Congress, the conservative legacy Reagan plans for the welfare state needs to be examined.

IMPLICATIONS OF REAGANOMICS FOR THE WELFARE STATE

Both the supply-side tax cuts and the social spending reductions involve more than lowered appropriations. Rather structural changes in the tax code and in the social welfare system are being legislated to achieve the twin conservative goals of a smaller federal government and a weaker welfare state. These changes, described next, may be difficult to reverse.

1. The monetarists include old guard Republicans such as Secretary of Treasury, Donald T. Regan; Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volker; and conservative economists such as Alan Greenspan, Arthur Burns, Herbert Stein and Milton Friedman.
Tax Cut

The Congressional Budget Office observed that the 1982 tax cut, "departed from all other post World War II legislation in its broad scope and the magnitude of its revenue effect" (CBO, 1982a). As a result, the federal government will have less money to spend. Between 1982-1987 government revenues are expected to increase at an annual rate of 6.9%, down from 13.6% for the previous five years. The share of the GNP claimed by the federal government through the tax system will drop steadily from 20.6% in 1982 to 17.7% in 1987, the smallest share since 1965 (CBO, 1982a). In the words of Treasury Secretary Regan, the tax cuts promise "to change the concept of how fiscal matters will be handled in Washington in decades ahead" (Newsweek, 1981b). They also promise to restructure the tax system: They contribute to an upward redistribution of income, make the tax system more regressive and promise to lower government revenues for many years to come.

On the grounds that they are more likely to save and invest, the tax cuts intentionally favor wealthy individuals and large corporations (Quinn, 1981; Wicker, 1982). Although 95% of U.S. families earn less than $50,000 a year, the new federal tax code cuts taxes of families making over $60,000 most sharply (Quinn, 1981). In 1982 the tax cut will be worth $120 to families earning $10,000 or less, but $15,000 for those earning $80,000 or more (CBO, 1982b; Pear 1982a). The new law reduces the maximum tax on unearned income, from 70% to 50% in 1982, eliminates inheritance taxes on estates worth $600,000 or less (99.6% of all estates) by 1987 (Fessler, 1981) and lowers corporate income taxes (Arenson, 1981b).

These and other tax code changes make the entire tax system more regressive. Between 1981 and 1987 the proportion of federal revenues raised by the more progressive personal income tax will fall from 47.1% to 44.9%; the corporate share will drop to 8.1%, down from 17% in 1970 and 24% in 1960 (Arenson, 1981b). Meanwhile, federal revenues raised from the regressive Social Security payroll tax will rise from 30.9% to 38.4% (CBO, 1982a). Ironically these tax changes which reduce tax burden of the wealthy most of all are justified by the recent middle-class tax revolts.

Finally, the tax cuts may be difficult to reverse since most politicians fear tax increases will lose them support at the polls. Lowered revenues mean less money to spend and have been a major justification for shrinking "big government" especially the unpopular welfare state.

Social Spending Cuts

Social spending cuts historically favored by conservatives as the best way to balance the budget are not strictly speaking part of supply-side theory as they do not directly stimulate production (Arenson, 1981a). But by reducing government revenues and increasing the deficit, the supply-side tax cut provides a powerful rationale for domestic budget cuts. As Walter Heller, former Kennedy advisor recently said, "for the present and indefinite future," lowered revenues means that "government's shelves are going to be bare of funds for new programs...and there's going to be relentless pressure for more and more spending cuts" (Newsweek, 1981b).
Less government spending, the argument goes, will lower inflation, shrink the federal deficit, and reduce the need for federal borrowing to finance it. Less government borrowing it is hoped will bring interest rates down, making more and cheaper money available for investment by private corporations.

In brief, lowered social spending is seen as essential to cut costs and to limit the federal government as a competitor with private enterprise for investment capital, believed to be scarce. In the eyes of Wall Street and many politicians, domestic cuts are needed to make room for more private economic activity (Cowan, 1982).

Such reasoning legitimized massive domestic budget cuts in fiscal 1982 and calls for even more in 1983. As early as October 1981, Stockman explained to the House Budget Committee that "twenty years of history aren't going to be corrected in twenty weeks. We're going to have to go at it again and again and again, until we establish fiscal sanity in this country" (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981b).

Like the tax cuts, domestic budget cuts involved more than reduced funding. They include a restructuring social welfare programs, if not the welfare state itself. Indeed, some dub Reaganomics as the end of the New Deal. Nobel Prize winner James Tobin (1981) calls Reaganomics "a conservative counter-revolution in the theory, ideology and practice of economic policy" and Treasury Secretary Regan says it is a "conservative revolution" against fifty years of welfare statesmanship (Newsweek, 1981c). David Stockman, spelled out the specifics of the "revolution" in a March 1981 television interview when he stated:

The idea that's been established over the last ten years that almost every service that anyone might need in life ought to be provided and financed by the government as a matter of rights is wrong. We reject that. We reject that notion (Rosenbaum, 1981a).

The Administration's domestic cutback strategies include (a) revising social welfare program rules and regulations, (b) transferring responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to the states, and (c) weakening resistance to such changes by reducing the economic security and reversing political gains fought for and won by women, minorities and labor since the 1930's. If successful, these strategies not only promise to shrink the social welfare system and make it more vulnerable to future cuts, but like the tax cuts they will be difficult to reverse.

Social Welfare Program Revisions. Cuts in social welfare programs involve more than spending reductions because the Administration wants to restructure the social welfare system and Congress cannot limit the costs of entitlement programs through the annual appropriation process. By law, everyone who is eligible for entitlement benefits is legally "entitled" to them, so the government must provide funds sufficient to cover the costs. The large middle class constituencies of many
of these so-called "uncontrollable" expenditures, makes them even more difficult for politicians to cut (Donnelly, 1982a). Only by restricting eligibility requirements and lowering benefits levels by law, can entitlement expenditures be "controlled."

This is exactly what the 1982 and 1983 budgets do. For example, in fiscal 1982, the administration saved $1.2 million in AFDC expenditures by denying eligibility to 408,000 families and leaving 279,000 with less aid (Donnelly, 1981; Weinraub, 1981). By lowering the Food Stamp income limit for a family of four, one million people lost their benefits. Another 145,000 people living in boarding houses and some 25,000 households with a member on strike also became ineligible for the food stamp subsidy (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981a). Other programs were similarly restructured. Even the popular Social Security program lost its $122 minimum benefit plan for new beneficiaries.

The 1983 budget contains still other proposals for structural changes such as reducing if not eliminating the Social Security cost of living adjustment (Donnelly, 1982a) and the replacing some Medicare and housing aid subsidies with vouchers which assist recipients to purchase private health care and housing in the open market (Pear, 1982e; Reinhold, 1982).

Non-entitlement programs such as day care centers, CETA jobs, training programs, and many community services were also cut, but in different ways. They were defunded or transferred from the federal government to the states (see below).

The restructuring of the social welfare system, like the tax code changes furthers the upward redistribution of income by taking more from the poor than from the well-to-do. Implemented, in part, to make more and cheaper capital available for private corporate investment, the social program cuts are aimed sharply at the poorest of the poor and disproportionately penalize them. The CBO reports that two-thirds of the total saving from lowered benefits in fiscal year 1983 will come from reductions affecting households with incomes under $20,000 a year; and 60% of all savings in federal grants to state and local governments come from programs designed to aid low-income families. Overall, families earning less than $10,000 will lose an average of $360 in federal benefits compared to $120 for those with income over $80,000 (CBO, 1982b).

The domestic budget cuts both shrink and weaken the welfare state. Instituting budget savings through statutory program changes rather than reduced appropriations, makes the changes more secure. Cuts secured through spending reductions alone can be reversed with additional funding at a later date, but new laws are more likely to persist (Pear, 1981; 1982b).

The cuts also weaken the political support for social programs by further isolating the poor from the working poor and the middle class. Tighter eligibility rules deny AFDC, Food Stamps, Public Housing and Medicaid benefits primarily to the working poor leaving only the poorest of the poor in Reagan's "safety net" (Pear 1982c; Donnelly, 1982b). In contrast, the budget spares middle class recipients from the deepest benefit cuts and the programs they use continue to grow while those for the
poor do not. Between 1981-1983, programs benefitting the middle class will grow 2.3% a year down from an annual real growth rate of 6.0% a year between 1973-1981. But programs for the poor will decline by 9.3% a year, compared to a real growth rate of 9.3% in the earlier period (Nordhaus, 1982).

Poorer, smaller in number, and with even fewer ties to the non-poor, social welfare program recipients and the programs on which they rely risk greater stigma, and even less popular support in budget battles yet to come.

Transfer of Federal Social Welfare Responsibility to the States. Block grant funding, first popularized by President Nixon, restructures the social welfare system by transferring responsibility for social welfare from the federal government to the states. Known as "New Federalism" by supporters and a return to "states rights" by critics, block grants give the states more control of and greater flexibility in the use of federal funds. As such, they are compatible with conservative opposition to big government.

Although Reagan got less than he sought, the fiscal 1982 budget consolidated almost 60 federal grant programs into nine block grants (Herbers, 1982). Funding was then cut more than 25% across the board. The fiscal 1983 budget proposes to "turnback" 43 more social programs worth $30.2 billion to the states and to convert AFDC and Food Stamps into block grants in exchange for federal responsibility for Medicaid (Reagan 1982). The "turnback" will be supported by a "trust fund" which transfers 28 billion dollars of federal excise taxes to the states.

The increased state autonomy these plans provide pleases state governors. Indeed, Reagan's block grants do not earmark funds, do not require states to match federal contributions or to use them to supplement rather than supplant local funds (Herbers, 1982). The 1983 "trust fund," Reagan explained can be used by the states to "preserve, lower or raise taxes." The states, he added, "can manage these programs as they see fit."

If they want to continue receiving federal grants in such areas as transportation, education, and social services, they can use the trust fund money to pay for the grants, or to the extent they choose to forgo the federal grant programs, they can use their trust fund money on their own, for those or other purposes (Reagan, 1982).

But this autonomy is not well financed. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, an independent federal agency, reported that in 1982, state and local governments will receive about 24% of their funds from Washington, down from a 1980 high of 31.7%. In one year the states fell back to 1971 levels of federal aid2 (Herbers, 1982).

2. Federal grants to states and local government was 11.5% of their own sources of revenues in 1955, 16.8% in 1960, 31.7% in 1980 and 29.8% in 1981 (Herbers, 1982).
Increased state autonomy over social welfare funding combined with less federal aid does not bode well for social welfare programs. It forces already ailing state treasuries to choose between economic development plans attractive to business and unpopular social programs, making the latter more vulnerable to present and future cuts. Following the fiscal 1982 cuts, a New York Times survey of 50 states found "no state is planning to increase spending to make up for all the federal cuts and most are making few moves to offset the effect on the poor" (Pear, 1982a). They simply cannot afford to.

Secondly, block grants combine previously separate programs into large single ones, causing each program to lose its visibility. But they still must compete with the others for declining state revenues (NASW, 1981a).

Finally, block grants and the 1983 "turnback" and "swap" proposals place administrative and fiscal responsibility for social welfare in the hands of state and local officials who historically have been less responsive than the federal government to the needs of minorities, women and the poor. And yet, the programs Reagan is decentralizing are some of the very ones that state officials indicate had been established as federal responsibilities because the states were not meeting needs perceived by Congress (Ayres, 1981; Mott, 1981).

The record on block grants introduced in the seventies suggest a continuation of this longstanding pattern. In April 1981 NASW reported that substate allocations for funds under Title XX social service block grants gave rural areas, blacks and poverty populations less than their proportionate share of these service dollars (NASW 1981b).

This is not surprising. It is no secret that during the post-war period, labor unions, civil rights, women's liberation, consumer advocacy and liberal reform groups received a better reception at the White House than at the State House. Neither is it surprising then that Reagonomics limits their ability to make and secure demands costly to business and government, and makes it more difficult for them to mobilize opposition to proposals for new and deeper social welfare cuts.

Weakening the Economic Security and Political Power of Women, Minorities and Organized Labor. Reaganomics involves domestic spending cuts, but also deregulation of business, the workplace and the environment. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), Consumer and Environmental Protection and other agencies are losing funds, staff and enforcement powers. Major civil rights laws are being challenged. The combined impact of the domestic budget cuts and this "deregulation" is to weaken programs and protections fought for and won by organized labor, civil rights, women's liberation and liberal reform groups since the 1930's.

Social welfare programs and government regulations protect workers and the poor against the risks, danger and inequities of living and working in a capitalist economy and provide a minimal level of economic security. Perhaps more significantly, the fight for these protections over the years was empowering. It strengthened a
sense of entitlement, increased the resolve to secure a growing share of what seemed to be an ever-expanding pie, and contributed to the formation of trade unions, civil rights and women’s liberation organizations. The groups pressured for a larger share of available resources and politicized the process of income distribution carried out through government tax and spending program and trade union collective bargaining.

As long as the economy grew and prospered, it was not difficult to accommodate the claims of all classes, and the social welfare programs helped assure social peace. But since the economic crisis surfaced in the mid-1970’s, demands for a rising standard of living by empowered groups have become too costly to both business and government. Today social welfare programs, government regulations and their politicized constituencies are all under attack (Weisskopf, 1981).

The victims are disproportionately female and minorities. The assault on the social welfare programs, the majority of whose beneficiaries are women, furthers the "feminization of poverty," already identified by the National Council on Equal Opportunities as a disastrous national trend (National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, 1981). The loss of jobs and services such as day care, abortion, family planning, among many other health and social services; the relaxation of anti-discrimination and affirmative action programs; and the shrinking of the public sector, for women, means more poverty, fewer jobs and greater household responsibility (Abramovitz, 1982).

Reaganomics strikes deeply at the institutions that support the economic security and independence of women. It is "sending women from the paid labor market back to unpaid labor in the home" and attacking the women’s movement which has challenged the patriarchial values and institutions designed to keep women "in their place" (Abramovitz, 1982).

Likewise, Reaganomics is lowering the standard of living for minorities. The recipients of programs spared by Reagan's first round of budget cuts were predominantly white. Only 8 percent of Americans receiving Social Security, 9 percent of those on Medicare and 9 percent receiving Veterans Benefits are black. In contrast, blacks who comprise 12 percent of all Americans, make up one-third of those on Food-Stamps, Medicaid and living in public housing and almost one half of all AFDC recipients. These programs were not considered part of the "safety net" and all were cut sharply in the fiscal 1982 budget and the one proposed for fiscal 1983 (Rosenbaum, 1981b).

This assault on the already low standard of living of minorities combined with relaxed enforcement of civil rights laws, and affirmative action programs, not only reverses gains won during the Civil Rights movement, but places civil rights groups on the defensive where they are less able to protect their constituencies.

Reaganomics also undermines the power of organized labor. With their standard of living threatened by repeated recessions and record unemployment rates, workers today are especially vulnerable to the threat of unemployment. Their economic insecurity is only increased by social welfare cuts, the loss of extended Unemployment Compensation and the Trade Re-adjustment Allowance, restricted eligibility to Food Stamps and its denial to families on strike. Greater unemployment and fewer social
welfare benefits makes joblessness a more effective mechanism of employer control over labor and weakens the bargaining strength of unions (Weisskopf, 1981; Saffire, 1982).

Reagan's hard-line approach to the air traffic controllers strike was widely interpreted as administration support for contract concessions by trade unions (Serrin, 1981). Since then, contract negotiations in the automobile, rubber, steel, airline, trucking and printing industries have included unprecedented wage cuts, freezes and other "takebacks" sometimes exchanged for promises of greater job security (Raskin, 1982). Some view labor's concessions as a turning point in labor-management cooperation, but others, including the Conference Board, a business research group, see them as a "fundamental shift in power to employers from unions"(Serrin, 1982).

Weakening the opposition then, is a third way in which Reaganomics increases the vulnerability of domestic programs, making them more difficult to defend against future cuts.

REAGANOMICS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

To fully understand and effectively resist the conservative assault on the welfare state, it is important to see that it is part of a broader attempt to deal with the economic crisis facing the United States since the mid-1970's (Weisskopf, 1981; Campen, 1981). As the discussion of supply-side economics shows, the conservative response to this crisis consists of strategies to redirect larger amounts of capital into the private sector. They include domestic policies that (a) redistribute income from the poor and middle classes to wealthy individuals and large corporations, and (b) curb the political strength of organized labor, minorities and women.

As has been shown Reagan's tax and spending policies redistribute income upward and reduce the share of the national product going to the poor and working class. Combined they promise to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. Commenting on Reaganomics, James Tobin recently wrote:

Here as in other democracies, governments have sought to arrest the momentum of inequality by free public education, social insurance, 'War on poverty' measures, and progressive taxation. The U.S. tax and budget legislation of 1981 is an historical reversal of this direction. The message is clear enough: Inequality of opportunity is no longer a concern of the federal government (Tobin, 1981).

Since the administration is asking organized labor, minorities and women to bear the brunt of its economic recovery program, it must try to forestall resistance and to delegitimize their demand for an improved standard of living. This helps explain the Administration's hard line toward these groups.

So does the need for public acceptance of austerity (such as wage concessions, small raises, and a generally lower standard of living). Recommending austerity as
a way to cope with the wider economic crisis is not unique to Reaganomics. It is implied in the "small is beautiful" and "planned shrinkage" arguments heard a few years ago and explicitly called for by Felix Rohatyn, a financier whom Stockman described as a "Democrat with a program that could make the loyal opposition seem thoughtful" (Newsweek, 1981a). Still head of New York City's Municipal Assistance Corporation, Rohatyn recommends that the austerity measures used to contain New York City's fiscal crisis (e.g., payroll cuts, wage restraints, and searches for new capital) be applied to the economic crisis of the nation (Rohatyn, 1978, 1982). To implement this program, it becomes necessary to curb the political power of those most likely to suffer its consequences and resist.

Especially since a basis for resistance exists. Despite the damage Reaganomics is producing in the welfare state and despite the increased vulnerability of domestic programs to future assaults, social benefits are widely viewed as an "entitlement," if not a true right. The tension between the conservative assault on the welfare state and popular expectations regarding entitlements can result in opposition to Reaganomics as well as to the next attempt to resolve the continuing economic crisis which may be less overtly conservative than Reaganomics but not necessarily less austere.

The implications of Reaganomics for social service workers should be clear. Our fate, like it or not, is still intimately tied to what happens to the poor and working classes. Like our clients, we are vulnerable to isolation and attack in a period of reaction such as this. Like our clients we are faced with hard choices ahead. For to cooperate with Reaganomics is to subscribe to an upward redistribution of income and to discourage the empowerment of our clients and ourselves. Since this violates our professions' commitment to self-determination and social justice, the most effective professional response to Reaganomics is to organize against it, as many have begun to do.

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REAGAN, PICKLE AND PEPPER:
THE BENEFIT REDUCTION VERSUS VOLUNTARY
APPROACH TO ENCOURAGING LATER RETIREMENT

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ABSTRACT

The degree to which benefit reduction and voluntary approaches to encouraging later retirement maximize four different and often conflicting policy objectives is assessed as are costs and benefits of these approaches to healthy and unhealthy older workers, minorities and women. While both approaches encourage later retirement, there are clear differences in the approaches in terms of meeting the goal of financing Social Security versus adequacy and social equity.

Economic problems between 1977 and 1983 resulted in a significant short-term financing problem in Social Security's Old Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund. These economic problems combined with a projected long-term deficit also helped create the conditions under which consideration of proposals to raise the normal age of retirement became politically feasible. Several years of political debate over alternative retirement age policy proposals culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. These Amendments include a provision which will encourage later retirement through benefit reductions resulting from gradually raising the age of eligibility for full

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retirement, spouse and widow(er)s benefits to 67 over a 27 year period, beginning in 2000. The Amendments also contain two provisions providing voluntary incentives to later retirement through changes beginning in 1990 which will liberalize the Social Security earnings test and increase the value of delaying retirement past the normal retirement age.

When this paper was initially written in 1981, proposals that would encourage later retirement had been put forth by the President, Congressman Pickle and Congressman Pepper. Those based on a benefit reduction approach (the Reagan and Pickle proposals) would have provided incentive for continued employment by reducing Social Security protections or benefits. Those based on voluntary approach (the Pepper proposals) would encourage later retirement by use of incentives that increase the value of Social Security and other pensions for later retirement, and by emphasizing the goal of expanding employment opportunities for older workers.

Proposals consonant with the benefit reduction approach were given the greatest attention because they produce large savings for Social Security. They were also most controversial because many argue that they compromise other equally essential retirement policy goals—adequacy and social equity; and also would produce disproportionate savings from the more economically vulnerable.

This paper analyzes the Reagan, Pickle and Pepper proposals of 1981. While these proposals are outdated, the analysis remains relevant for two reasons. First, elements of each of these proposals are similar to the retirement age policy changes enacted under the 1983 amendments. Second, the phasing in of the new normal retirement age does not begin until 2000. It seems quite possible that the debate over whether and how to raise the retirement age could be re-opened before 2000.

ORGANIZATION AND SUMMARY OF PAPER

This paper has two objectives. First, it assesses the degree to which benefit reduction and voluntary approaches maximize four different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1) providing work incentive for older workers, 2) income adequacy, 3) social equity—the similar treatment of persons in similar circumstances, and 4) meeting the financial commitments of the Social Security system. Particular attention is paid to the work incentive objective.
Second, this paper identifies the costs and benefits of these approaches to four groups of older persons: 1) healthy older workers, 2) unhealthy older workers,* 3) women and 4) minorities. This is accomplished within the context of the analysis identifying trade-offs among the approaches in terms of meeting policy objectives.

Before analyzing the three retirement age proposals advanced in 1981, several points need to be made about their categorization as part of either the "benefit reduction" approach or "voluntary" approach. While, as the reader will discern, the author has a preference for proposals that encourage work without also reducing benefits scheduled under current law, the terminology is simply a means of categorizing two fundamentally different ways of encouraging later retirement. Second, not everyone is in agreement over what they consider a benefit reduction to be. For example, some would argue that raising the normal retirement age under Social Security is not a benefit reduction, but merely an adjustment for increases in longevity that have occurred since 1940; or similarly, that small reductions in benefits promised under current law are not benefit reductions, but merely slow the growth of benefits. While these are not entirely unarguable points of view, the facts are that either type of change would reduce benefits relative to what is scheduled under current law; and therefore—in the author's opinion—are most appropriately classified under the benefit reduction approach. Third, it is clear that in many policy areas—including retirement policy—the use of the "stick" ("benefit reduction" approach) to meet policy objectives is often more appropriate than the "carrot" (the "voluntary" approach). In fact, the 1983 Amendments include changes in retirement age policy that draw from both these approaches—the phased-in gradual increase in retirement age to 69 representative of the benefit reduction approach and eventual liberalization the in earnings test and delayed retirement credit representative of the voluntary approach.

Two of the proposals (Pickle and Reagan) can be classified primarily under the benefit reduction approach. Enactment of the

* The term "unhealthy older workers" refers to workers with health problems who do not meet Social Security or SSI eligibility standards, yet whose health problems are sufficiently severe as to constrain their ability to continue or find employment. The severity of these health conditions ranges from those, that by themselves, would have a modest impact on the ability to work to those that virtually preclude work.
The Pickle Bill of 1981 would have encouraged later retirement by gradually increasing the normal age of retirement to 68 in the Social Security program. Enactment of the proposal advanced in 1981 but later withdrawn by the Reagan Administration would have encouraged later retirement by reducing the value of Social Security benefits, especially for persons retiring before age 65. The third proposal—the Pepper Older Worker Employment Incentives Act—is consistent with the voluntary approach. Enactment would have encouraged later retirement by increasing the value (relative to current law)* of Social Security benefits for postponed retirement and by the elimination of age discrimination and other barriers to the employment of older workers.

The paper begins with a brief review of the factors that have converged to make retirement age policy a national issue. Then, the three proposals are described. The major portion of the paper analyzes the impact of benefit reduction and voluntary approaches on the four policy objectives. The analysis is restricted primarily to non-private pension provisions and policies.

The basic argument developed in this paper is that later retirement can be encouraged quite adequately by either voluntary or "benefit reduction" approaches. The choice of approaches ultimately reflects the importance placed on the goal of reducing financial deficits in the Social Security system versus the goals of the adequate and socially equitable treatment of program participants. The benefit reduction approach does produce much more Social Security savings, but at the cost of significant reductions in benefits for groups that often experience limited employment opportunities—older women, minorities and older workers with health problems. The voluntary approach can encourage later retirement, but to create significant shifts in labor market activity through the use of voluntary incentives would probably require large increases in Social Security and general revenue expenditures at a time in which Social Security's financing was the central concern, it was not surprising that retirement age policy changes reflected the primacy of the financing goals.

* It should be noted that the proposed increase in the delayed retirement credit in the Pepper Bill is not sufficient to make the value of retirement between ages of 65 and 70 actuarially neutral. So while increasing the value of retirement after 65, the disincentive to work after 65 would still exist, though it would be smaller.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE RETIREMENT AGE ISSUE

Since the end of World War Two, increased early retirement has been one of the dominant trends in the economy. As reduced early retirement benefits became available under the Social Security program for workers retiring between the ages 62 and 64, growing numbers of men and women have accepted these benefits. In 1977 for example, 68 percent of retiring male workers and 78 percent of retiring female workers accepted reduced early retirement benefits. Labor force participation rates of men also reflect this trend. Between 1947 and 1980, labor force participation among men aged 55 to 64 dropped by about 19 percent, from 89.6 to 72.3 percent. The growing separation from the labor force of men aged 65 and over is even more dramatic. Labor force participation of this group is less than half of what it was in 1947--having declined from 45.8 percent to 19.1 percent. Reflecting the trend of married women entering the labor force, the labor force participation of women aged 55 to 64 has increased between 1947 and 1980 from 24.3 to 41.5 percent. This increase, while dramatic, is slightly smaller than the increased involvement of younger female cohorts, suggesting the possibility that the trend toward increased labor force participation among women may be somewhat offset in the older cohorts by the early retirement trend. In fact, among women aged 65 and over, labor force participation has remained fairly stable during these years, at about nine percent.

What explains the trend toward early retirement? There are two somewhat conflicting answers to this question. The first explanation suggests that the growing availability of early retirement benefits in Social Security and private pensions has encouraged workers to leave work before age 65. This is presently the dominant explanation and one of the implicit assumptions of approaches that would encourage later retirement through benefit reductions. The second perspective suggests that chronic unemployment in the American economy is a more fundamental explanation. This line of reasoning suggests that the early retirement option has been made widely available to older American workers as a means both of encouraging the retirement of older workers capable of continued employment and to ameliorate the unemployment of others. This perspective suggests that encouragement of later retirement cannot be accomplished simply through the use of employment incentives. As will be discussed in the conclusion, the ultimate outcome of current retirement age debate will be greatly influenced by the extent to which one of these perspectives predominates.

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The emergence of current concern over retirement age policy is clearly linked to issues of cost. At a time in which the older population is growing and living longer, serious questions have been asked about whether the country can afford to have retirement policies setting the normal retirement age at 65 and allowing—and in some cases—encouraging retirement well before 65. In fact, Congress has recently given its answer by changing the Social Security law to gradually phase in a new normal retirement age of 67 between 2000 and 2027. Another issue concerns whether the economy can afford the loss of capable and productive workers through early retirement.

Presently, 11.2 percent of the population is aged 65 and over. As the post-World War II babies reach retirement age, the aged are expected to grow as a percent of population to as much as 18.3 percent of the population by 2030 (Special Committee on Aging, 1980). The growth of the aged population is somewhat offset by decline in the under 18 population. Still Social Security seems likely to place a larger burden on the future working population. Also, assuming the continuance of present retirement patterns, labor shortages may materialize, especially during the period in which the war babies retire—though such shortages are far from certain.

The older population is also living longer. When the Social Security system paid out its first benefits—1940—life expectancy at age 65 was about 13 years. Today, it is 16.3 years, an increase of over 3 years. An Actuarial Note published by the Social Security Administration presents measures of the ratio of retirement expectancy to total work experience for the population. Using this ratio as a standard, the findings suggest that "retirement age in 1980 equivalent to age 65 retirement in 1940 is more than 69 years." By 2000, the equivalent age would be more than 71 and by 2025, more than 72 (Social Security Administration, June 1981). Assuming that age 65 continues as the normal retirement age, this lengthening of retirement relative to work results in an added burden on the future working population, which some argue will be substantially offset by the assumed growth of the economy. Others would also point out that as the economy grows (as it has since 1940), it is quite appropriate to choose—as the United States has—to increase the average number of years in retirement relative to the average number of years worked.

The combined trends of early retirement, a growing aged population, a shrinking working-age population and increasing life expectancies are the primary forces that drove the long-term
financial deficits of the Social Security system, that were projected prior to the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. The short-run problems projected before enactment of these amendments were primarily the result of the failure of the economy to operate as expected. Generally, between 1977 and 1983, inflation has been considerably higher than expected and wage increases (relative to inflation) lower. This resulted in higher than expected costs (because benefits increase to adjust for inflation) and smaller revenues (because payroll tax revenues increase with the growth of wages). The situation was aggravated by high rates of unemployment which also reduce the system's revenues. Fortunately, with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments, Social Security's cash programs are now in actuarial balance.

The retirement age issue emerged in a conservative political context. Congress having felt that it disposed with the distasteful issue of Social Security financing in 1977, was not pleased by the need to deal with it again. A major thrust of Congress since 1981 and the Reagan Administration has been to control the growth of social programs, of which Social Security is by far the largest. Consequently, as budget deficits deepened, it was increasingly tempting to view Social Security as a source of both present and future budget reductions. Approaches to encouraging later retirement through benefit reductions and voluntary incentives have emerged from and were acted upon within this context.

THREE APPROACHES

As mentioned, the Pickle and Reagan Administration proposals represented the "benefit reduction" approach to encouraging later retirement while the Pepper Bill represented the voluntary approach. Independent of the fact that they are not presently under active consideration—they are worthy of analysis. The analytic issues identified in this analysis will—in all likelihood—remain relevant to future retirement age debates. Also, the analysis is applicable to the retirement age changes made by the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. This analysis begins by identifying the major aspects of these proposals that have implications for a retirement age policy.
THE PICKLE BILL

As a part of a comprehensive legislative package concerned with Social Security financing (HR 3207), Congressman J. J. Pickle proposed in 1981 gradually increasing the normal eligibility age for retirement benefits to age 68, beginning with 1990. By 2000, age 68 would be the normal age of retirement within Social Security. Age 62 would be maintained as the earliest age of eligibility for early retirement benefits, but the value of early retirement benefits would be significantly reduced. Under present law, retirement benefits are reduced 5/9ths of one percent for each month of retirement before age 65—resulting in the actuarially fair treatment of persons retiring between ages 62 and 65. Under the Pickle Bill, benefits would be reduced 1/2 of a percent for each month of retirement before age 68. At the earliest age of retirement—62—retirees presently receive 80 percent of the normal retirement benefit (80 percent of the primary insurance amount—PIA). Under the Pickle Bill, their benefits would be reduced to 64 percent. Other sections of the Pickle Bill proposed the elimination of the earnings test for persons over 68 and the repeal of the delayed retirement credit as of 1983.* The bill is not presently before Congress.

The Pickle retirement age proposal is quite similar to those of several recent national study groups—the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security, the President's Commission on Pension Policy, the 1981 National Commission on Social Security. These proposals differed slightly in that they tended to suggest a later and lengthier phase-in period and also suggested a gradual increase in the early retirement age to 65. Because of the similarity between the Pickle Bill and these other proposals, much of the analysis of the Pickle proposal pertains to these other proposals as well. The analysis also applies to the change in retirement age recently enacted by Congress. Under the new law, the normal retirement age will ultimately be increased to 67 by 2027. Persons retiring at age 62 in 2022 and later will receive an early retirement benefit

* If the earnings test is repealed, there is little reason to maintain the delayed retirement credit since retirement after age 68 would neither be penalized nor rewarded. If the goal is actuarial neutrality—to avoid favoring persons retiring after age 68, the delayed retirement credit would have to be repealed.
with a 30% actuarial reduction (instead of 20% as is the case through 1999). Widows and spouse eligibility ages are also affected.*

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL

The Social Security financing package proposed by the President in May 1981 contained six proposals which would encourage later retirement primarily through benefit reductions. First, effective in 1982, the Administration proposed to more than double the reduction for early retirement by reducing the retirement benefits by 1.25 percent for each month of retirement between the ages of 62 and 65 as a means of producing savings and discouraging early retirement. Under this proposal workers retiring at age 62 would receive 55 percent of the normal retirement benefit.** Second, the elimination of dependent's benefits for the children of early retirees was proposed.

Third, the removal of all non-medical factors from the disability determination decision in Social Security and SSI for older workers was proposed. Under present law, age, education and previous employment are taken into account when determining disability for older workers.

Fourth, a change in the computation points for the average indexed monthly earning (AIME) from age 62 to 65 was proposed. This would discourage early retirement because it would result in the calculation of a smaller PIA for workers out of the labor force before age 65. This would also encourage continued work beyond age 65 because it would result in a reduction of benefits for most normal age retirees.

* Congressman Pickle was also sponsor of the retirement age provision that was enacted into law in the 1983 Amendments. The major differences between the 1981 Pickle proposal and the new are: Under the new law the age of eligibility for full retirement, spouse and widow(er)’s benefits is 67, instead of 68; the phase-in date begins later and the phase-in is longer; the retirement proposal in the new law saves less money than the 1981 Pickle proposal.

** Persons retiring at age 65 receive a benefit equivalent to 100% of the primary insurance amount (unless their right to a spouse benefit is larger).
Fifth, the Administration proposed to reduce Social Security benefits by approximately 10 percent to be phased in between 1982 and 1987 through a technical revision of the benefit formula. Rather than increasing the bend points in social security benefit formula by 100 percent of wage increases, the Administration proposed a 50 percent increase between 1982 and 1987.* Again, this might serve to encourage later retirement. Finally, to encourage employment beyond age 65, the Administration proposed elimination of the earnings test by 1985 (Select Committee on Aging, 1981a). Unlike the other five proposals, the elimination of the earnings test is consistent with the voluntary approach to encouraging later retirement.

Like the Pickle approach, the Reagan approach to discouraging early retirement and encouraging later retirement relied primarily on negative rather than positive incentives. The major thrust of the proposals was to discourage early retirement by reducing the benefits of early retirees and to encourage work past age 65 by a general reduction in the level of benefits for all future retirees.

**THE PEPPER OLDER WORKER INCENTIVES ACT OF 1981**

The Pepper Bill (HR 3397) represents a different approach to encouraging later retirement. In contrast with the two other proposals, it relied on positive rather than primarily negative incentives. A fact sheet developed by the House Select Committee on Aging lists the five major work-encouraging elements of the Older Worker Employment Incentives Act of 1981 as:

* The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)—perhaps best thought of as the monthly benefit received by a worker retiring at age 65—for a covered worker reaching age 62 in 1979 was equal to the sum of 90% of the first $180 of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, plus 32% of the next $905 of the AIME, plus 15% of the AIME in excess of $1085. The bend points refer to the dollar amounts at which the percentages changes, and are updated each year for changes in average wages. By 1981 these bend points were $211 and $1274, respectively. Indexing of the bend points by yearly changes in average wages helps assure that Social Security replaces a relatively constant proportion of prior earnings for successive cohorts of retirees. (The AIME is a measure of average monthly earnings over the worklife of an individual and is wage indexed to make dollars earned throughout a person's worklife roughly equivalent.)
1) The graduated increase in the delayed retirement credit. Workers retiring after 1981 are scheduled to have benefit increases of three percent per year for each year of delayed retirement between the ages of 65 to 70. Under the Pepper proposal the value of the delayed retirement credit would increase by one percent per year for each year of postponed retirement between ages 65 and 70, averaging five percent a year for workers choosing to retire at age 70.

2) The liberation, but not elimination of the earnings tests. Persons earning less than $4000 above the earnings exemption ceiling would be subject to a smaller marginal tax on their benefits (25 percent up to the first $2000 and 33 percent for the next $2000). After that the current marginal tax of 50 percent would be applied. The earnings limit and bend points would be wage indexed.

3) Elimination of all forms of age discrimination in employment by closing loopholes and exemptions in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

4) The provision of tax credits up to $3000 in the first year and $1500 in the second to employers hiring low income workers aged 62 and over.

5) A provision to amend the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to require continued accrual of pension benefits for older workers after the normal age of retirement.

The voluntary approach embedded in the Pepper Bill is distinguished from coercive approaches by both the utilization of measures that increase the availability of employment for older workers, the substitution of positive for negative incentives to encourage later retirement and the reality that it would produce considerably smaller savings for Social Security. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 contain voluntary incentives for later retirement, liberalizing the earnings test (a 33% marginal tax rate beginning in 1990) and increasing the delayed retirement credit gradually, beginning in 1990, from 3 to 8 percent.

**PROVIDING WORK INCENTIVES**

The extent to which the coercive and voluntary approaches are likely to encourage later retirement are examined in this section. Then, specific impacts on healthy older workers, unhealthy older workers, women and minorities are identified.
GENERAL IMPACT

Both the Reagan Administration proposal and the 1981 Pickle Bill relied primarily on benefit reductions to encourage later retirement and assumed that older workers are or will in the future be willing and able to work longer. In terms of encouraging continued employment until age 65, it would seem that the Reagan proposal offers the strongest motivation. At the time the proposal was advanced, average benefits of $580.70 a month were expected for persons retiring at age 62 in 1985. In contrast, under the Administration proposal, the average benefit anticipated at age 62 was $348.30. After age 65, the Administration proposal would continue to offer incentives to work since, on average, there would be an approximately 23 percent reduction in Social Security benefit levels which would make retirement more costly. Under the Pickle Bill, persons retiring at age 62 after the year 2000 would receive a benefit that would be, on average, about 16 percent less than under current law and persons retiring at age 65 would receive about 18 percent less. By reducing the benefits of persons retiring before age 68 by six percent a year and by eliminating the scheduled increase to three percent a year in the delayed retirement credit, the Pickle Bill would, relative to current law, seem to create a strong financial incentive to work until age 68.

Are benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement likely to work? Certainly, economic theory would suggest that both the Pickle and Reagan approaches would encourage later retirement by altering the work-leisure choices of future older workers. Increasing the reduction for early retirement would mean that the price of leisure relative to work would become more expensive. Also, there is an income effect that would discourage retirement. By increasing the cost of leaving work—that is, by reducing retirement benefits—workers have less "income" available for the purchase of retirement leisure.

Empirical verification can also be found in the retirement decision literature. Robert Clark and David Barker's (1981) review of this literature finds that all retirement decision research supports "the hypothesis that pension eligibility and higher levels of pension wealth lead to earlier retirement" although the incentive offered by social security pensions is probably less than that offered by private and special public employees pensions.

While it is generally agreed that Social Security benefit reductions will create an incentive for continued labor force
participation, the strength of this incentive is difficult to estimate. If it is true that most early retirees leave work voluntarily in response to public and private pension incentives, then it can be argued that a reversal of these incentives will also reverse the early retirement trend. In testimony supportive of the Reagan Administration proposal before the Select Committee on Aging, Rita Ricardo-Campbell—a Hoover Institution economist—pointed out that a recent Social Security Administration study by Julian Abbott shows "conclusively that more than 80 percent of men aged 62 to 64 years old are healthy enough to work" (Ricardo-Campbell, 1981). She refers to findings showing that 8 percent of white men and 13 percent of black men aged 60 to 64 in 1971 stated that health prevented them from working in 1969.* These data are used to suggest that it is the presence of the early retirement option, not problems of health or unemployment that explain the decline in labor force participation of older workers. Michael Boskin's findings based on a survey of five-thousand households are also supportive of this position. He finds the income effect of social security benefits to be the single most powerful inducement to retirement of workers ages 62 and over, and the best explanation of the declining labor force participation among men aged 55 and over (Subcommittee on Social Security, 1981).

There is, however, much data that suggests otherwise (Andrisani, 1977; Bixby, 1978; Kingson, 1981, 1981a; Parnes & Nestel, 1975; Sheppard, 1977). Virginia Reno's analysis of data from the Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries shows that among men aged 62 to 64 retiring in 1969, only 22 percent listed reasons suggesting their retirement was voluntary. In contrast, fully 54 percent listed health and another 20 percent employment problems as their reason (Reno, 1976). Analysis of the Social Security Administration's Retirement History Survey data shows that health was the main reason given for labor force withdrawal for nearly two-thirds of men aged 58 to 63 who were out of the labor force in 1969 (Schwab, 1976). While there is disagreement over the extent to which health is a cause of early retirement rather than an excuse, most analysis would agree that it is one of the major

* These findings can be interpreted differently. First, in 1969 these men were age 58 to 62 when health prevented them from working. The data do not show how many more men were prevented from working when they reached ages 62-64. Second, other findings from the study show that among men age 60 to 64 in 1971 health was reported as affecting the work of 35 percent of the whites and 42 percent of the blacks (Abbott, 1980).
variables (if not the major one) which influences the early retirement decision.

In reality, the retirement decisions of an individual is usually influenced by many factors—though one factor may be dominant. The early retirement decision is, therefore, probably best understood as influenced by health and income as well as other factors. A Department of Labor Study mandates by the 1978 Age Discrimination in Employment Act and recently released by the House Select Committee on Aging (1981b) suggests that a social security benefit reduction strategy will not greatly increase the labor force participation of older workers. Using a retirement decision model developed for the Department of Labor, projections of the impact of reducing Social Security benefits by ten and twenty percent on labor force participation of persons aged 60 to 70 in 1985, 1990 and 2000 show that the effect of benefit cuts were "surprisingly small in size and inconsistent in direction." The ten percent cut is estimated to result in an expansion of the labor force by only 64,000 in 2000 (Select Committee 1981b). These findings may indicate that benefit reductions without accompanying employment opportunities for older workers create strong incentives for continued work, but only those persons with continued employment opportunities are in a position to respond to these incentives. The rest can simply be expected to leave work accepting smaller Social Security pensions.

The Pepper Bill took a different approach to encouraging work until age 65. By maintaining current benefit levels for early retirement, the Bill provided relatively little new monetary encouragement to continue work until age 65. However, one unique aspect of the Bill is its implied recognition of the difficulties older workers, especially low income workers, experience finding employment. This is accomplished through a tax credit proposal to encourage employers to hire low income workers age 62 and over. This proposal could increase the supply of employment opportunities for older workers. There is, however, the possibility that given the availability of this tax credit, employers will substitute low wage older workers for low wage younger workers. After age 65, the bill provided additional incentives for continued work by a gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit, requiring continued accrual of pension benefits for workers over 65, eliminating age discrimination including mandatory retirement, and liberalizing the earnings test.

The Pepper approach assumes that a considerable number of older workers want to work longer and will if certain employment barriers are removed. A recent Harris Survey provides support for
this assumption (Louis Harris and Associates, 1979). The survey shows that 53 percent of currently retired workers reported that they would have preferred full- or part-time employment when they retired and that among workers aged 50 to 64, 51 percent would prefer not to retire and "only 15 percent plan to retire before the normal retirement age." However, it should be pointed out that what people report they would do in surveys, can vary considerably from what they might actually do given an appropriate employment opportunity.

Findings from the Department of Labor Age Discrimination in Employment Study (Select Committee on Aging, 1981b) also suggest that the Pepper approach would lead to an increase in labor force participation among older workers. The study estimates that the elimination of mandatory retirement "would result in 195,000 additional older men being in the labor force in 2000." Analysis that assumed a ten percent increase in future employer pension benefits when the normal age of retirement was below age 65, led to the conclusion that the labor supply of older workers in 2000 would increase by 49,100 under current age discrimination laws and by 67,700 if mandatory retirement is eliminated. While not directly testing the impact of increasing the delayed retirement credit in social security the findings imply that this approach would result in increased labor force participation among older persons—though of very modest proportion. The Pepper proposal which would liberalize, but not eliminate the earnings test, provided less incentive than the Reagan Administration and Pickle approaches which would eliminate the earnings test altogether.

Clearly, the impact of both benefit reduction and voluntary approaches to encouraging the employment of older workers is highly dependent on the economic context in which they would be implemented. If labor shortages materialize, then the market place can be expected to encourage continued employment of older workers by the reversal of private pension early retirement incentives, by the elimination of employment barriers for older workers, by the development of more part-time employment opportunities and by encouraging the development of flexible retirement options. The increase of employment opportunities combined with the implementation of either approach would offer a powerful incentive for continued employment. Similarly, high levels of inflation could affect the retirement decision in a manner that encourages later retirement. Again, the combination of inflation and either approach should provide significant incentives to retire later.
Either approach could also serve to legitimate later retirement. For example, by establishing 68 as the normal retirement age, the Pickle Bill would most clearly establish a new publicly sanctioned retirement age. But, the Reagan and Pepper bill would also indicate to the public that early retirement is becoming less acceptable and later retirement a national goal. The creation of public policy that established a goal of later retirement would probably modify retirement expectations, and employer pensions seem likely to respond by institutionalizing later retirement ages or encouraging later retirement.

Both approaches to encouraging later retirement are capable of leading to greater labor force participation among older workers. Positive and negative incentives do seem to work, though the magnitude of effect varies with particular plans. The magnitude of the impact of each approach would be largely conditioned by prevailing economic conditions.

An important question that needs to be examined now concerns the extent to which these approaches are likely to provide employment incentives for specific groups of older workers.

**IMPACT OF WORK INCENTIVES ON SPECIFIC GROUPS**

As has been pointed out, enactment of the Pickle, Reagan or Pepper proposals would have created some incentives for continued employment. The impact of these incentives on particular groups would vary greatly, depending upon the health and employment options available to these groups.

**HEALTHY WORKERS: WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS**

Healthy older workers* are probably in the best position to respond—by postponing retirement—to the incentives established through enactment of any of these proposals. The Reagan proposal would encourage healthy workers with employment opportunities to continue working until at least age 65, starting in 1982. The approach assumes that there is an adequate supply of jobs in the economy to meet the employment demands of older workers. However, in a high unemployment economy, older workers—like many younger ones—often lack employment opportunities. So, in the short-run,

* "Healthy older workers" refers to those older workers in good health or with health problems that do not represent an appreciable barrier to continuing or finding employment.
the Administration's proposal might have intensified the unemployment problems of some healthy older workers. The Pickle Bill would—like the Reagan proposal—encourage increased labor force participation in the future. Raising retirement age to 68 would also intensify the unemployment problems of future older workers in a below full employment economy. The development of early retirement and normal retirement opportunities both nationally and within particular industries has been partially motivated by high levels of unemployment. Retirement has frequently been used to reduce unemployment. In the absence of employment opportunities, even healthy workers willing and able to work, may be unable to respond to these incentives. A chief advantage for this group of healthy workers of the voluntary approach as exemplified by the Pepper Bill is that it expands the supply of jobs available to older workers. The elimination of age discrimination and tax credits to employers hiring low income older workers—as was proposed in the Pepper Bill—would, however, probably result in only a very modest increase in employment opportunities.

UNHEALTHY WORKERS: WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Currently, some workers—though not eligible for Social Security or SSI disability—have health problems that constrain their ability to find and/or continue employment. While these health problems are often not so severe as to prevent them from working, these problems—often in combination with other factors such as high unemployment—make them less competitive in the labor market. It is important, therefore, to examine the impact of retirement proposals on this group—unhealthy older workers.

The problem with the benefit reduction approach for this group is that to the extent that these workers are incapable of working due to health reasons, they simply cannot respond to the incentives that would be established. Of course, not all among this group are unable to work; however, on average, they are less attractive to employers and so their employment opportunities are limited.

Since health is the major reason given for early retirement, the Reagan proposals would have exacerbated the problems of a large portion of future early retirees. The proposal in the Reagan package to eliminate all non-medical factors from the Social Security disability determination process would have aggravated the employment problems of unhealthy early retirees. Age, vocational and educational factors are presently taken into
account when determining disability eligibility out of recognition of the special employment problems experienced by older workers with partial disabilities.

Raising retirement age to 68 would also have a similar impact on this group. A significant portion of older workers with health problems will remain unable to work until age 65, let alone 68, even if the demand for older workers greatly increases. Enactment of the Pickle Bill, while creating incentives to which some older workers with health problems could respond, would also have resulted in expanding the cost of health induced unemployment for many workers below age 65. In contrast, enactment of the Pepper Bill, while not likely to have a significant impact on the employment opportunities of the unhealthy group, would not have resulted in benefit reductions.

OLDER WOMEN: WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Older women are more dependent on the Social Security system for income than older men. The majority (52 percent) of older women over 65 are widows in contrast to 14 percent of men who are widowers. Older women are less likely to work than older men and, if they do, their earnings are likely to be less than men. For example, median income from earnings in 1976 was $4065 for couples, $2300 for unmarried men and $2040 for unmarried women (Women's Study Program, 1980). Income from Social Security is similarly distributed and in terms of private and special public-employee pensions, where present, their value tends to be considerably less for single women. Moreover, 60 percent of unmarried women compared to 46 percent of unmarried men and considerably fewer couples are entirely dependent on Social Security for their income.

Because of their increased dependence on Social Security income, it seems probable that given good health and the availability of employment, women are more likely than men to increase their work effort in response to the incentives established by both benefit reduction and voluntary approaches. Consequently, in terms of examining the impact of these proposals, the issue that needs to be addressed concerns the extent to which women are in a position to respond to these incentives.

In comparison with older male workers, older female workers are more likely to hold service industry occupations which pay less, to work part-time due to job discouragement (Women's Studies Program, 1980), to have less seniority and job security, to not be covered by an employer pension, to experience more unemployment.
and to have experienced less consistent paid work histories due primarily to child-rearing and other homemaking responsibilities. The intermittent labor force involvement of older women presents particular problems to newly single women facing the necessity of employment for the first time in many years or perhaps simply for the first time. Their lack of recent employment experience often combines with high levels of unemployment as well as age and sex discrimination to make labor force re-entry difficult.

In addition to increasing personal income, older women with employment opportunities may benefit from both approaches to encouraging later retirement in another way. As Shirley Campbell (1980) points out, to advance professionally, women are often required to sustain great work effort during the same time that they are under the heaviest child rearing responsibilities. She suggests that efforts to raise retirement age could result in "less pressure to become established while young." Also, it would seem that the gradual legitimization of a later retirement age might make mid-life labor force re-entry easier since employers would anticipate more years of post-training employment. These points are, of course, highly speculative and debatable.

In spite of these positives, benefit reduction approaches to later retirement do present many of the same problems for women as for health and unemployed older workers. Data from the Survey of New Beneficiaries (Reno, 1975) show 67 percent of non-married women and 52 percent of married women stating that either health, compulsory retirement or job discontinuance was the reason they left their last job within three years of becoming entitled to social security benefits in 1969. Among non-married women entitled at age 62, 41 percent report health reasons and 17 percent job discontinuance. Given the limited employment options for many women, it would seem that many women would not be in a position to respond to the incentives that would be created by either the benefit reduction or voluntary approaches, especially for the poorest and those with the most limited labor force histories.

MINORITIES: WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

Assuming the past and present are good predictors of the future, disadvantaged minorities—Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans and Pacific Asians—are also less likely to be in a position to continue employment in response to incentives to later retirement. Minority workers are more likely than whites to experience disabling health conditions (often
occupationally-related) during late middle age. For example, in 1976, while about 10 percent of social security (OASDI) recipients were black, about 15 percent of the disabled worker benefits went to blacks. Similarly, a 1977 survey of Spanish surnamed persons in five western states shows proportionately greater participation in the disability program among Hispanics (Social Security Administration Advisory Council Reports, 1979). Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Men show that black men who have withdrawn from the labor force before age 65 are more subject to work-limiting health conditions than white men (Sheppard, 1977). In her study of early labor force withdrawal of men aged 58 to 63, Karen Schwab (1975) observes:

   For black men, as for manual workers, health-imposed work limitations explain the disproportionate number out of the labor force.

   While accurate data are not available on the health conditions of disadvantaged minorities and sub-groups within these classifications, as Fernando Torres-Gil points out "it is generally accepted that minorities fall far behind in the level of health care needed to sustain their work careers up to normal retirement age" (1980). The combination of health problems and the interaction of these conditions with greater occupational requirement for physical exertion reduces the probability for continued employment of older minority workers.

   Life expectancies of minorities are generally shorter. However, the life expectancy gap at age 65 between whites and groups defined as disadvantaged minorities is slowly closing and has closed for some groups. For example, 1978 data show that at age 65 whites can expect to live 16.3 years and "others" 16.1 years (Brottman, 1981). Still, the proportion of minority populations reaching age 65 is considerably smaller than white. Whereas about 11.5 percent of the white population is 65 and over, about 7.8 percent of the black population and 3.8 percent of Hispanics are over 65. Life expectancy at birth are also considerably shorter—74 for whites and 69.2 for "others."

   Minority workers are also more likely to be low-wage workers, and have careers broken by periods of unemployment. They are likely to approach their later working years with considerably less employment security and pension protection. Assuming a labor market where jobs are scarce, the probability of their extending work in response to changing retirement age incentives is greatly constricted. Because of the shorter life expectancies, fewer
minorities reach the age at which these proposals would encourage later retirement. (This situation may change in the future). More importantly, once reaching these ages, the health status of disadvantaged minorities seems likely to limit their ability to continue working.

SUMMARY: WORK INCENTIVE IMPACTS

As has been discussed in this section, for various reasons the choice to continue working past age 62 or 65 is constricted for unhealthy older workers, women and minorities. On the other hand, healthy older workers with employment opportunities are in a position to respond positively to later retirement incentives. The chief differences between the two basic approaches in terms of encouraging work are 1) the benefit reduction approach (Pickle and Reagan) do not distinguish between workers who are capable of working and those that are not, whereas the voluntary approach does; 2) not only does the voluntary approach seek to encourage later retirement, but is also directed at expanding employment opportunities; and 3) the benefit reduction approach does not require substantial federal expenditures to encourage later retirement, whereas the voluntary approach does. Other differences can be seen when examining the impact of these approaches in terms of the goal of adequacy and social equity.

ADEQUACY AND SOCIAL EQUITY*

Benefit reduction approaches to encourage later retirement compromise the goals of adequacy and social equity. As previously mentioned the Pickle approach represents, on average, a 20 percent cut in Social Security benefits (over what is promised under the law when it was proposed) by 2000 when the new retirement age of 68 would be fully phased-in. Similarly, the Reagan proposal would have resulted in reductions beginning with 1982. The impact on persons claiming benefits at or before age 62 would be a one-third

* "Adequacy" refers to a program's effectiveness in meeting the needs of its covered population. "Social equity" refers to the standard that persons in similar circumstances should be treated in a similar manner. Social equity (or horizontal equity as it is also termed) is different from individual (or economic) equity—the principle that persons who pay more into a system (like Social Security) should receive large benefits. It is also different from "vertical equity" the principle that persons with a greater need should receive larger benefits.
reduction in benefits as compared with a 20 percent reduction under current law. For persons retiring after age 64, benefit reductions resulting from changing the benefit formula would, on the average, be 17 percent (Select Committee on Aging, 1981a). The potential cost* of benefit reductions resulting from benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement for unhealthy older workers, women and minorities is quite high. Income data shows that these groups are more likely to have low incomes in retirement and are, on a whole, not in a good position to sustain benefit cuts.

In contrast, the voluntary approach to encouraging later retirement supplements rather than compromises the adequacy goal, though in terms of the goal of adequacy the impact of the Pepper Bill would have been quite modest. For example, by encouraging job development through a tax credit, the Pepper Bill would increase the earnings possibilities for low income older persons. Also, the gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit would increase the adequacy of Social Security for some low and middle income older workers. Its focus on removing discriminatory employment practices complements the goal of adequacy.

In terms of the social equity—the similar treatment of persons in similar circumstances—the issue revolves around the reality that different groups of older workers face dissimilar work/leisure choices. Benefit reductions to encourage later retirement seems most fairly applied when used as a means of leveraging the continued employment of older workers with employment opportunities. However, where benefit reductions are applied to workers with no or very limited employment opportunities there are clear inequities. The employment opportunities for unhealthy older workers, minorities and women are more likely to be limited than those of other groups. Consequently, not only do the benefit reduction proposals establish inequities between particular individuals, but certain social groups are also likely to be systematically disadvantaged by this approach.

To a lesser extent, it can be argued that the voluntary approach also establishes inequities between individuals and between groups. Rather that using benefit reductions to encourage later retirement, the voluntary approach relies on benefit increases. The same argument made with respect to the use of

* "Cost" as used in this sentence refers to "costs to recipient," rather than to taxpayer.
benefit reductions applies then to the voluntary approach. Certain workers and specific groups are less likely to be in a position to take advantage of these incentives. This, too, represents an inequity although plainly it is not as harsh because no additional loss of benefits results from not responding to the incentive. Further, the aspect of the voluntary approach that seeks to create additional employment opportunities (especially for low income workers in the case of the Pepper Bill) is likely to be especially useful to minority, female and unhealthy older workers.

Closer examination of the Pickle and Reagan proposals identifies the potential impact of the benefit reduction approach on the adequacy of Social Security for women. As the following table shows under the Pickle Bill, the benefits of spouses, divorced and widowed women would eventually be reduced. For example, presently, the full spouse benefit for spouses who retire at age 65 is 50 percent of the PIA of the retired worker—that is, 50 percent of the normal retirement benefit for workers retiring at age 65. Under the Pickle Bill spouses electing to retire at age 65 would receive 41 percent of what the working spouse retiring at age 65 receives under current law.

The Reagan proposal also presents some specific problems for women. The proposal to change the computation points from age 62 to 65 is especially burdensome to women. Currently, the Social Security formula calculates the averaged index monthly earnings (AIME) of a worker by using an averaging period from age 21 to age 62 or from 1951 to age 62 whichever is shorter. After dropping out the lowest five years of earnings the average monthly indexed wage is computed. In general, persons with larger AIMEs are entitled to larger benefits. The Reagan proposal would have extended the averaging period by three years—thereby lowering the AIMEs of future beneficiaries whose benefits would be based on the new formula.

This would disproportionately disadvantage women. One problem presently confronting women is that Social Security does not provide credit for years out of the labor force to perform homemaking functions. Consequently, women often have many years of zero earnings. Lengthening the averaging would further depress Social Security benefits for most women with work histories (Grossman, 1981).

The Reagan early retirement program would have reduced the value of Social Security benefits for female workers retiring early, spouses and divorced spouses. Benefits for women retiring
at age 62 would be reduced from 80 percent to 55 percent of the PIA. Wives and divorced wives retiring at age 62 as the dependent of worker would have received 27.5 percent of the PIA as opposed to 37.5 percent under current law (Miller, 1981). The proportion of PIA received by widows would be unchanged, although formula changes would, of course, result in benefit reductions affecting widows and all other workers future retirees.

Another major social equity issue concerns the potential impacts of the benefit reduction approach on disadvantaged minorities. As previously discussed, primarily for reasons of health limitations, more physically demanding work and more limited employment opportunities, the choice to continue working past age 62 or 65 is generally more constricted for older minorities when compared to other older persons. Benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement seem likely to create new social inequities for older minorities. For example, a larger proportion of disadvantaged minorities would be forced to accept greatly reduced early retirement benefits under the Reagan Administration proposal. Also, the Pickle proposal which would have raised retirement age to 68 by 2000 would have had a similar negative impact on minorities.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spouse Benefits at ages</th>
<th>Widow(er)’s Benefits at ages</th>
<th>Non-disabled Widow(er)’s Benefits at ages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68 65 62</td>
<td>68 65 60</td>
<td>60 65 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Prior to 1979 Amendments*</td>
<td>50% 50% 37.5%</td>
<td>100% 100% 71.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Phased-in 1981 Pickle Bill</td>
<td>50% 41% 32%</td>
<td>100% 82% 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Reagan Proposal</td>
<td>50% 50% 27.5%</td>
<td>100% 100% 71.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Phased-in Law as Amended in 1983</td>
<td>50%# 41.7% 32.5%</td>
<td>100%# 91.9% 71.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*With one exception, prior to 2000, the PIA levels are the same under the Law as amended in 1983. The exception concerns disabled widow(er)’s benefits which will be increased to 71.5% of the PIA for ages 50 to 59, beginning in 1984.

#This percent of the PIA is reached at age 67 when the retirement age provision is fully phased-in.
MEETING THE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Prior to enactment of the 1983 Amendments, all but the most optimistic projections suggest that the combined Old Age Survivors Disability Insurance program (OASDI) trust funds had a long range deficit. Using the most widely accepted set of intermediate assumptions (Alternatives IIB) about the performance of the economy and demographic changes, the 1981 report of the Social Security Trustees Report projected an average deficit over the next 75 years of 1.82 percent of taxable payroll*—which represented about a 13% shortfall (Board of Trustees, 1981). Projections based on more pessimistic assumptions showed larger deficits. Ultimately, the cost programs were brought into actuarial balance by a combination of new revenue and benefit reductions.

Raising the normal age of retirement under Social Security was given active consideration (and ultimately included in the 1983 Amendments) primarily because of its ability to produce significant long-run savings. For example, the Social Security's Office of the Actuary (1981) estimated the following costs and savings as a percent of taxable payroll from enactment of the Pickle Bill retirement age provisions:

- Raising retirement age combined with eliminating the delayed retirement credit. 1.27 percent savings
- Elimination of the earnings test. .05 percent cost

In the long-run, the Pickle retirement age proposals could be expected to produce a savings of 1.22 percent of taxable payroll. There would of course, be no short-run savings from the bill because retirement age would not begin to be raised until 1990 and then only gradually. Also, there would be a slight increase in the cost of the Disability Insurance Program because recipients would be carried until age 68, rather than 65.

The other example of the benefit reduction approach to encouraging later retirement that has been used in this paper—the

* Taxable payroll includes all earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxation.

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Reagan Administration approach—would have produced even greater savings. The Office of the Actuary estimated the following long-run costs and savings as a percent of taxable payroll from enactment of the Reagan retirement age proposals:

- Increased actuarial reduction for early retirement: 0.71 percent savings
- Elimination of dependents benefits for children of retired workers aged 62 to 64: 0.02 percent savings
- Removal of non-medical factors from the social security disability determination process: 0.06 percent savings
- Changing the computation points from 62 to 65: 0.25 percent savings
- Increase the bend points in the social security benefit formula by 50 percent instead of 100 percent of wage increases between 1982 and 1987: 1.29 percent savings
- Eliminate the earnings test: 0.14 percent cost

The net long-run savings from the Reagan retirement age proposals would have been 2.19 percent of taxable payroll. Because some of these proposals would go into effect by 1982, the Reagan approach would have produced significant short-run as well as long-run savings. (Ultimately, the retirement age proposal included in the 1983 Amendments saved about 0.7 percent of taxable payroll).

By changing retirement expectations and behavior, the voluntary approach to encouraging later retirement can also be expected to produce long-run savings to the Social Security system. The exact amount of savings is difficult to predict because it is dependent on the degree to which positive incentives will change the retirement decision. If, for example, the Age Discrimination Employment Study projections are correct and the elimination of mandatory retirement would add almost 200,000 older workers to the workforce by 2000, then it is clear that the Pepper proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement would produce some small savings to Social Security since fewer would be collecting
their benefits and more would be paying taxes. Similarly, the Pepper proposals to encourage later retirement by providing a tax credit for the employment of low income older workers and requiring continued accrual of benefits for older workers after the normal age of retirement would also result in a very modest savings for Social Security by increasing the older labor force. (In 1983, a similar proposal to eliminate mandatory retirement was estimated as saving .03 percent of taxable payroll.) In terms of the long-run costs as a percent of payroll, the Office of the Actuary projected the following changes from the two Pepper retirement age proposals that would alter the Social Security law:

Graduated increase in the delayed retirement credit .02 percent cost
Liberalized earnings test .01 percent cost

There is, however, an additional indirect cost which is not measured in these cost estimates. Liberalizing the earnings test and delayed retirement credit has the distinct disadvantage of reducing the savings to Social Security in the future that results from any future increase in labor force participation among persons 60 and over. In the long-run the Pepper Bill would have a direct cost to Social Security of about .03 percent of taxable payroll. This would have been offset by savings from eliminating mandatory retirement. The tax credit proposal would have increased general revenue expenditures by an estimated 31 million dollars in fiscal 1982 (Select Committee on Aging, 1981c). As discussed, long-run savings to Social Security can be anticipated as a result of workers altering their retirement expectations and behavior; the magnitude of these savings is, however, difficult to predict.

Even under the most optimistic projections of the ability of voluntary incentives to alter the retirement decision, there are two reasons why it is unrealistic to expect voluntary approaches to produce nearly as much savings for Social Security as benefit reduction approaches. First, voluntary incentives are more expensive. Instead of eliminating benefits to encourage later retirement, the emphasis is on selective improvement of benefits to create work incentives. Second, and more importantly, the benefit reduction approach produces clear savings by reducing the financial commitment of the program to future retirees.
CONCLUSION

This paper has assessed the degree to which benefit reduction and voluntary approaches to encouraging later retirement meet four different and often conflicting retirement policy objectives: 1) providing work incentives for older workers, 2) income adequacy, 3) social equity and 4) financing social security. It also identifies the costs and benefits of these approaches to healthy older workers, unhealthy ones, women and minorities. Both of these approaches are potentially effective means of encouraging later retirement; however, each is associated with a different set of priorities in terms of meeting the goals of adequacy, social equity and containment of the Social Security financing.

Benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement compromise adequacy and social equity goals for the purpose of producing savings in Social Security. The reverse seems largely true of voluntary approaches. In short, while benefit reduction approaches to encouraging later retirement would produce greater savings in the Social Security program, they would do so in part, at the expense of older persons who experience limited opportunity for employment. On the other hand, voluntary approaches would not impact these persons negatively, nor are they likely to produce large savings.

The cost savings goal assumed primacy in the retirement age debate which culminated with the enactment of the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. The poor performance of the economy since 1977 makes it possible to consider social welfare policies in the 1980s that were politically unacceptable only ten years ago. Support for raising the normal age of retirement was justified by projected deficits in Social Security as well as the belief that the general decline in labor force participation of older workers during the past 35 years is a result of the increased availability of early and normal retirement benefits. Given this, certain prescriptions follow. To encourage later retirement age and reduce Social Security costs, simply raise retirement and/or reduce benefits for early retirees.

As this paper has suggested, evidence exists to challenge the belief that the great majority of older workers leave work voluntarily and in good health. Also, analysis of the development of early and normal retirement options within specific industries and in the Country as a whole suggests that historically retirement policy has been used as a means of reducing unemployment by enticing older workers out of the labor force in exchange for a pension. To the extent that older workers do not
have control over their retirement (or continued employment) decision, then reliance on benefit reduction means to encourage later retirement will result in faulty policy, because significant portions of the savings produced would come from some of the most vulnerable older persons.

In the absence of a general improvement in the employment opportunities for older workers and in the availability of disability benefits for older workers with health problems, voluntary approaches provide the only equitable means of encouraging later retirement. Such approaches do, however, seem likely to fall quite short in terms of meeting the objective of financing Social Security. Hence, the policy dilemma.

REFERENCES


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THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH AFTER CARE

by

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Essential to the development of a positive practice in mental health after-care is a precise formulation of clients' needs. Clarity about a statement of needs provides added information about anticipated obstacles to meeting those needs, both at the client and systemic levels. To accomplish this preliminary task, it becomes necessary to create what we refer to as a "problem definitional" level of theory. Problem defining theory mediates between more global theory, which establishes a larger context for understanding the broad policy issues and direct implications,* and the articulation of practice theory.

Problem definitional theory is a prerequisite to practice as it establishes both a direction and a baseline for evaluation of practice activities. At a programmatic level, it is necessary to recognize that all providers of services operate out of one or another approach to defining clients' needs (= problems) as well as a structure for delivering services. Properly construed, a service agency or organization is simultaneously a social system of interlocking roles/functions and the embodiment of an ideology or identifiable thought structure that frames the way the organization perceives social reality. These often underlying assumptions contour agencies perceptions of clients' existence, and establish the parameters of the functions they have to perform vis-à-vis one another (Warren et. al., 1974; Rose, 1972). The thought structure of an agency contains the problem definition or theoretical formulation that underlies all services and client-worker interactions. The thought structure also provides the formal and implied rationality for the infrastructure of the organization and for its location within the interorganizational network at the community level. As Warren and his co-authors state, the institutionalized thought structure constitutes,

a common frame of reference regarding the nature of social reality, of American society, of social problems, and of efforts at social change and human betterment.
(Warren, et. al., 1974, p. 19)

*For an elaboration of this approach, see Vicente Navarro, "Health and the Corporate Societies," Social Policy, Jan/Feb. 1975.
The thought structure or set of operating assumptions which typically characterize the commonly found health and social service agencies in most American communities is widespread: its hidden, but practiced beliefs assert the basic soundness and equity of U.S. society, its institutions, and patterns of behavior. The concealed social validation for our political economy and social structure is found in the overwhelming commonality in the way agencies define the needs/problems of their clients. Whether the client's assumed defect was in intellect, personality, discipline, values, family structure or neighborhood, one or more of these factors were taken to be the determinants of the client's social position in society. Agency responses, in the form of programs and service designs, for example, are often incapable of recognizing poverty as an inherent structural characteristic of our society; incapable of recognizing race, sex, age, or handicap as structurally and historically determined aspects or characteristics of American society. Problem definitional assumptions, validating inequity and/or discrimination, find their expression in paradigms of practice which carry with them practice technologies and assessment methods that turn out to be self-serving. They are incapable of critical reflection beyond the parameters of clients' defects. Rose's earlier research on the Community Action Program identified the same phenomena: in this case, agencies directed to engage in social change defined services delivered instead a common litany of individual defect modelled, and residual services (Rose, 1972).

The scope of commonality in problem definition across different types of agencies, operating in different service domains, in different cities was so typical that Warren et. al. referred to the pattern as an "institutionalized thought structure." (Warren et. al., 1974, p. 19). While agencies as different in their areas of special interest as the public schools, the urban renewal agency, the antipoverty program, the major mental health planning agency, and the health and welfare council were present in most communities, and had allocated various functions and tasks among them that differed widely, their locus of common understanding was in their operational paradigms of practice, all founded upon a set of basic assumptions invalidating their clients and validating the social system. (Warren et. al., 1974).

Upon closer examination, these agencies appeared to have established "legitimate" domains of domination locally, dividing the turf according to functions and prerogatives, claimed expertise, and professional leadership. What was found to exist was an informal, yet pooled hegemony over community activity and decision-making related to service design and delivery, a rather loosely orchestrated collaboration determined to protect individual agency turf from infringement or criticism.

Agreement among service providers at the level of basic assumptions about clients, and ultimate responsibility for problems, allows agencies to attribute program failure either to client defects ("blaming the victim," as it has become known) (Ryan, 1971), or to a form of quantitative rationality. This
latter dimension manifests itself in continuous demands for more funds, more staff, more local control over program decisions, etc. Funding agencies, from the vertical system or extra-community (Warren, 1963, Chapter 8) at the state or federal levels, most often share the institutionalized thought structure. In the unfolding of federal and/or state programs, vertical input rarely relates to problem definitions, especially so long as funding is available. During these periods, the nature of criticism, such as it was, assumed the problems that existed were related to lack of adequate coordination, insufficient comprehensiveness, and/or inappropriate representation on advisory boards, all examples of what we have referred to as administrative or management rationality. As fiscal constraint gradually increases, the demand for more effective coordination is joined by a growing interest in greater program monitoring and improving accountability mechanisms, introducing some strain between vertical system funding agencies and horizontal or local system providers of service.

When fiscal crisis continues unabated, however, the vertical system becomes more determined to locate measures of program effectiveness tied to cost containment. This trend has accelerated in public mental health care. Its pronounced manifestation is reflected in the increase of people whose training is in disciplines and/or professions outside the typical mental health-social service preparatory schools. As a result, incoming policy planners, program developers and managers, decision-makers have little commitment to the various particular forms of individual defect explanatory paradigms of the prevailing institutionalized thought structure. Corresponding to basic values espoused by State Bureaus of the Budget, or the Office of Management and Budget at the federal level, their focus has been on management by objectives, fiscal accountability mechanisms, cost containment and system development.

The "New Breed" of mental health policy makers, however, are not consciously predisposed against prevailing individual defect models, since their systems training and management outlook contains no ideological or substantive critique of the structure of society. Instead, their professional set of responsibilities initially leads them to accept local system institutionalized thought, and, later, to begin to question it on the basis of cost-effectiveness measures of program outcomes. Recidivism rates probably stand as the most critical evidence available, with lesser variables including average length of stay on inpatient services, altering discharge planning to avoid nursing home placements, etc.

Because all socially legitimated professional training accepts prevailing ideology uncritically (Berger and Luckmann, 1967), and extends it by posing the functions of the professions as technical problem solving (Marcuse: 1964 and O'Connor: 1973), the "new breed" simultaneously struggles to improve services that are cost-efficient while having no substantively new criteria for determining what services will either be of value to clients or cost efficient. This phenomenon - of increasing technical and
management systems without precise theoretical focus - creates the opening for a problem definitional level of theory, a conceptual articulation of needs that offers a new paradigm for service design, implications for practice and bases for evaluation and training.

Basic Statement of Needs

A large number of studies have been done over the years which describe the process of becoming a mental patient in a state psychiatric hospital. Perhaps the most detailed account, Asylums, by Erving Goffman (1963), demonstrated the connection between defining a problem in a particular fashion, in this case, seeing dysfunctional behavior as a medical entity, and fashioning an entire social system whose ultimate function is to confirm that definition and rule out all possible alternatives. An absolute prerequisite to the smooth operation of any institution is the process through which its incarcerated participants learn the new parameters and intestines of the social reality they must accept in order to survive.

In the mental hospital, patients must come to accept their situation or "problem" as mental illness, as a disease which they had somehow acquired which, from that point forward, dictates the realm of possibilities for them, as interpreted by hospital staff. Staff, in turn, must produce mental patients out of people in order for their own professional identities to make sense. Once the activity of production of the mental patient has occurred, thus validating staff and invalidating patients (by turning them into adaptive, objectified response units), the drama of ongoing social interaction simply reproduces the inequality, domination, and manipulation inherently built into practice of the medical model.

At the center of the process of becoming a mental patient is "decontextualization," the severing of the patient's subjectivity from the objective historical context that frames and contours human social life. Another way of looking at decontextualization is to see it as removal from social reality. The reduction to isolated, asocial existence is bounded not by history, but by a belief system committed to psychopathology, medical hegemony, and somatic interventions such as shock treatment, drugs, and pseudomedical examinations. Decontextualized experiences of daily life also become saturated with new language, the language of mental illness, which contains such concepts as symptoms, regression, decompensation, "acting out," etc. These are all terms used to reduce social reality to intrapsychic distortion. In place of living one's life, however painfully, one now "functions" more or less well, and according to a set of rules and standards which have no bearing on rehabilitation or return to community living, but rather reflect management priorities decided by staff to be in patients' best interests.

When examined closely, the behaviors necessary to becoming a good patient, especially years ago, are behaviors exactly opposite to those needed by a person to survive in the social world.
of community life. The good patient is docile, acquiescent, adaptive to commands both overt and subtle. She/he is overwhelmingly dependent upon staff, socially naive regarding rights and/or entitlements, and demoralized or frightened to be him/herself. After a time, the externally imposed new social order becomes incorporated subjectively — the problem definition coercively held out is tacitly accepted. But in the process, the patient undergoes an experience of anomie — of an abrupt withdrawal of norms and forms (universe of meaning) that communicated the exigencies of daily social life as she/he knew it before entering the hospital. The experience of such extraction of one's known universe of meaning is profound. Even conventional common sense communicates this to us when an significant threat of social change is raised in the common assumption that any departure from the routine represents absolute chaos. Rather than chaos, however, the hospital institutes systematic order, and the patient's experience of heightened anomie together with the hospital's rigid definition of reality combine to produce the mental patient. Any conscious or non-conscious effect at resistance, whether expressed behaviorally, emotionally or conceptually is understood to be part of the patient's symptom pattern, and thus brings about increased treatment responses designed to attain manageability or control.

So as one gains the knowledge and skills necessary to survive in and adapt to the world of the hospital, one loses those same capabilities for life in the community. Seeing oneself as sick, having lost the ability to link subjective experience to objective circumstances, and seeing the necessity to quickly perceive the expectations of power holders, the mental patient's potential for independent or interdependent social life in the community is thoroughly compromised. Patients' social being, or personhood, is overwhelmed by their patienthood; their active participation in the consciousness of historical/social reality is overwhelmed by their passive acquiescence to and acknowledgement of their own invalid state. They have been disconnected from ongoing social existence, almost as if their capacity to engage in the process of struggling to live meaningfully had been surgically severed. It is exactly this objective aspect of utter oppression, behaviorally and conceptually, that constitutes what is called "chronic disability," or "institutionalization." It is a prerequisite to understanding practice to comprehend the experience to which people have been subjected, and to see their histories in the hospitals as a central ingredient in designing practice activities with them.

The other aspect of daily life that converges to form the matrix of understanding how to define the problem properly is much easier to elaborate. It requires that we remember that the mental patient, before entering the hospital, during their stay, and after their release, is essentially like us — a human, and, therefore, social historical being. In this capacity, so estranged from them because of hospitalization, they have needs/interests exactly as we do. Simply put, those needs include: adequate, safe, supportive housing; nutritious food; adequate clothing; varying knowledge of their rights and entitlements to
benefits and programs; legal protection; and the choice to participate in socially meaningful interaction with others who treat them with dignity and respect. Ex-patients need these resources socially, as a person living in the community, and not psychiatrically, as a patient residing outside the hospital. As such, any effort to deliver social resources in a psychiatric manner constitutes a situation in which the person's needs may be met, but in a way which contradicts his/her interests.

At this point, a slight departure is necessary to further articulate the difference between needs and interests as these terms were used in the preceding paragraph. Statements of need are common enough among mental health and social agencies. What such statements rarely take into account is that the way in which they define needs and/or construct services is entirely confined by their institutional thought structures. Where those thought systems are premised on some assumption of the inherent defec-tiveness of their patients or clients, then the orientation towards defining needs will be confined to the parameters of their thought structure. In practice, this is commonly reflected in mental health providers' coupling psychiatric focus to community resources, or psychiatric determination of generic needs such as those outlined above: Sheltered housing has as its basis not some form of care for those unable to live independently, but rather the assurance that psychotropic medical regimens will be followed; Case management, rather than being built on advocacy and/or empowerment principles designed to guarantee the essential dignity and benefits needed, instead focuses on ensuring ongoing connection to mental health clinics and other treatment outlets. These psychiatrically oriented services, based on continued attribution of and re-inforcement for mental patienthood as an enduring identity, act against the interests of the former patient because they continue the pattern of enslaved dependence/hegemony, they disregard the exploitation inevitably built-in to profit housing arrangements, and they support passive dependence upon staff where it is not needed, thus manipulating the former patient into continued subservience.

The interests of former patients are quite different. They need the social resources described above delivered in a way which recognizes their hospital experiences as oppressive and debilitating, and works with them to increasingly regain their human vitality and activity in locating what they require. The true needs of the ex-patient are, therefore, complex in nature, reflecting the experience/existence of the ex-patient understood as a human being, not as a manufactured commodity/mental patient. Th use of the term "complex" here is intended: the needs interpreted in a way which recognizes the ex-patients' status as members of a class, are infused with the necessity to begin with material conditions - housing, food, health care, etc. - as a basis for understanding subjective responses. Put more simply, the ex-patient cannot be understood apart from his/her context, and that the form of self-expression used in any context is a crystallization of the social relations contained therein.
The behavior of the "chronic" ex-patient must be seen in two ways at the same time: it must be understood as a learned survival strategy, as historical baggage that the person brings with him/her from the hospital; and it must be seen as recapitulating and reflecting the self-confidence or self-image experience the person has as a result of the social relations she/he is and has been involved in over time. This latter dimension can be elaborated by seeing in the typical behavior patterns of the ex-patient the reciprocal functioning of the typical behavior patterns of the mental health professional; one cannot be understood apart from the other. When examining the ideological and organizational bases from and in which mental health theory and practice emerge, the larger context of social control, oppression and domination of both workers, confined to mental model paradigms, and their products – the institutionalized ex-patients – can be seen. Because the ideology and organizational environments are similar across states, the conditions for former patients discharged into communities across the country are quite similar. The ex-patients, then, while existing as individuals, simultaneously are essentially members of a class.

This issue is both complex and vital, and must be explained here at greater length. This will be done by drawing a distinction between what are referred to as essential aspects of former patients' lives and existential dimensions. Following the theoretical distinctions drawn above, the essential component or tendency in ex-patients' lives are the political and economic conditions which all endure in common that aggregate them as members of a common class. These conditions, in addition to the common base of long term hospitalization and its impact on self-confidence and self-image, and its effect on how reality is perceived (i.e., incorporation of the medical model), also has other constant characteristics: placement in profit-organized long term care facilities of one kind or another (varying by degree of regulation); dependency on third party payments for medical care; dependency upon continued eligibility and recertification for SSI or other forms of public assistance; and, most likely, continuation on psychotropic drugs. In this complex organization-infused and dominated existence, ex-patients are subjugated, exploited, and manipulated in common, as members of a class, and the contours of their daily lives are conditioned by these oppressive, coerced factors. Because this is so, and uniform, this dimension can be viewed as essential or political – it contains the objective parameters for subjective expression, and is the focus of the advocacy component of an advocacy-empowerment design.

This design is based on the assumption that objective, historical conditions contour the parameters of everyday life, and establish the bases for individual subjective experience and expression. The conditions exist, therefore, to create a bond between ex-patients, even the severely disabled, and ourselves. The bond is forged by acknowledging the essential human quality that comes from being part of history, from being socially alive, and, therefore, actually or potentially a creative participant in shaping the future. It is in this socially human crucible that
the enduring and inherent connection is made between political or essential life and personal or existential life.

Each of these aspects of every person is inextricably woven into the other, each a tendency without the capacity to lose its omni-present life. While both are present, however, they are not equally active participants in shaping daily life. Quite obviously, the historical/political dimension - bringing with it an ongoing political-economy, culture, ideology and social role structure - plays a pre-eminent role in determining the personal exigencies experienced by all of us. Particular patterns of self-expression, such as those manifested by ex-patients, reflect the particular forces which dominate existence: self-expression and personal experience, therefore, emerge as a social relational/political statement about each of us. Where the patterns of subjective experience and self-expression fully inculcate the political environment in its existential forms, our behavior functions to reproduce that environment and our place within it (mental patient, husband/wife, parent/child, for example). Where our form of self-expression is in conflict with the exigencies of the political environment, we pose a challenge or threat to it. Such a position requires some form of response from those political contexts invested in domination and control. The unwritten rule is that people must both behave appropriately, or according to the dictates of the social role structures of such a society, and must perceive reality in such a way that the behaviors they embody appear natural or normal. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann describe societal response to abandonment of this latter element, which they call a "conceptual machinery," similar in the individual to what we have earlier described in organizations as an "institutional thought structure":

Therapy entails the application of conceptual machinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institutionalized definitions of reality, or, in other words, to prevent the "inhabitants of a given universe from "emigrating." It does this by applying the legitimating apparatus to individual "cases". ... What interests us here, however, is the conceptual aspect of therapy. Since therapy must concern itself with deviations from the "official" definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual machinery to account for such deviations and to maintain the realities thus challenged. This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and a conceptual system for the "cure of souls." (Berger and Luckmann: 1967, pp. 112-113.)

Sharing in the common universe of meaning, as the background for our own socialization, creates the basis for shared action. The particular experience of the ex-patient, in the process of becoming a "mental patient," is an example of the political role of therapeutic enterprise in personal life.

Institutionalization, combining coercive physical relocation and rearrangement of thought to comply with a dictated reality,
extends the therapeutic mode of social control. Berger and Luckmann address this form of internal domination:

Such a conceptual machinery (therapy) permits its therapeutic application by the appropriate specialists, and may also be internalized by the individual afflicted with the deviant condition. Internalization itself will have therapeutic efficacy.... Successful therapy establishes a symmetry between the conceptual machinery and its subjective appropriation in the individual's consciousness; it resocializes the deviant into the objective reality. (1967: p. 114)

The behavior patterns of the institutionalized ex-patient reflect their resocialization into acceptable patterns of thought and action. Severed from the knowledge of the objective conditions of reality, and medicated beyond its emotional impact, the ex-patient serves the State successfully by assisting to decrease State budgets; by serving as the conduit for transferring public funds to the private profit sector; and by being the "beneficiary" of federal-state funding programs which transfer power to the federal level.

These characteristics, coupled with the more commonly acknowledged matters of material need and program responses in the forms of profit housing and therapeutic activities, become the objective universe that extends the worst aspects of hospital life into the community. The pervasive influence of these objective factors reinforces the demoralized self expressed existentially by the ex-patient. It is exactly this demoralized self, communicated as mental patient self-expression, that becomes the focus of treatment by most after-care provider systems. In the implementation of programs which, either overtly or subtly, are founded upon a medical/therapeutic definition of reality, providers reinforce the decontextualization of hospital life. Taking the mental patient to be the same as the person disassociates mental health and other social service workers from their responsibility for their own activity. Accountable to both a profession and to an agency which employs people socialized into professional roles and thought structures, the workers become as disconnected from their real activities - consciously understood and chosen - as are their products, the ex-patients. Where the absolute confrontation with the material or objective circumstances of daily life is not seen as the basis for subjective expression, the essential and the existential components of living are transposed. In this process of turning reality on its head, the expressions of self of the ex-patients are presumed to be the determinants of their objective situation. The "treatment" strategy accompanying this outlook thus asserts that the subjectivity of ex-patients, as manifest in their self-expression, becomes the target for intervention. Therapy, drugs, and all rehabilitation programs are premised on this peculiar, but all too understandable belief. This effort is directed to reshaping the subjectivity of former patients by improving their functioning within their existing social roles, thus reaffirming the very aspects of the person they find most abhorrent.
The alternative position follows another road entirely. It asserts the primacy of reconnection to objective circumstances as the central problem to be addressed, as an ever-present theme to be interwoven in every aspect of practice. Rather than conceal its nature in subjectivism, it demands that ex-patients be understood as social, historical beings. Validation, a central value of this position, derives its meaning from the concept of reconnection. People, not mental patients, exist in history as actual or potential producers or participants in their own lives. Validation is communicated through the processes of reconnecting people to their sociality, disconnecting them from their object-status as mental patients. Idiosyncratic or existential differences, while not denied, are relegated to secondary importance, as commonalities rise to the position of primacy, and essential aspects of daily life that bond people together become the data base for creating support networks among people.

The task of engaging people as producer/participants in comprehending and acting on their contextual environment differs dramatically from working to improve individual patient's functioning, even though both may claim to improve the quality of life and self-image of the former patient. One way to view the scope and depth of the difference is to examine the meaning of being a producer/participant as compared to being a consumer/attender. The producer/participant must come to know the active ingredients which compose her/his social world of immediate influence. The framework for development of such a view is open-ended, confined by limits in our practice and by the interaction of resources available and decisions to act. It implies a conscious strategy for action, not an acquiescence to dictates. Since each of us is immersed in social role behaviors and ideology, in varying degrees, we all actively and perhaps consciously engage in a process of becoming. It is important to see that we are not moving either toward some predetermined model of what a proper adult might be, and thus subject to manipulation, nor are we posing some rhetorical infinity such as "the liberated person." In contrast, each of us can come to increase our knowledge of our historical and immediate context, and with active support, strategically intercede into it as participants/producers of what the outcome might be. While a group of ex-mental patients can not transform their condition of poverty, knowing that poverty has much to do with their present situation can produce different outcomes from seeing their condition as the result of an incurable disease.

More conventionally, service providers would like their clientele to become more adroit consumers of services. Consuming mental health or social services, however adeptly, communicates an entirely different outcome than engagement in a process of participation as a producer. There is a striking parallel between consumers of services and consumers of commodities: both are out of control of what they consume; both stand outside the determinants of the process of production; both act in response to a definition of their needs outside their conscious control; and both are passive recipients of the interaction. Navarro describes the effect of consumption on identity in the following
way: consumption, whether of goods or services, is the residue allocated to workers and non-workers by capitalist production, from which the workers are removed as a source of power and control. Being coerced into consumption creates feelings of helplessness, malaise and pessimism. (Navarro: 1976, p. 114). Consuming services is a process through which the consumer must take on the problem definition of the provider, much like the situation described above in relation to in-patient care. The process of consuming the service consumes the person: the likelihood of the consumer transcending the given universe of meaning established by the provider is very little, indeed. Marcuse captures this activity of service provision and consumption in a manner which aptly describes the mental health clinic—former patient relationship:

To the degree to which they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express a false consciousness, responding to and contributing to the preservation of a false order of facts. (Marcuse: 1964, p. 145).

Marcuse's concern is with the diminishing capacity to develop critical analyses of society and its impact on peoples' thought and behavior, a concern which can be applied to mental health after-care.

In programs where people have been reduced to mental patients, where presentation of self and the essence of a person are presumed to be the same, both the person involved and the workers become flattened out. There is little to no room for creativity, for development, for change. The world of the possible becomes reduced to the situation at hand; stasis, paralysis, and demoralization occur. In a program which medicalizes poverty, exploitation, domination and abuse, the contrast between the given and the possible is collapsed or crushed. When the range of needs is defined in terms of medicalized interests, those needs which can be satisfied by this model are merged with those which cannot, creating a false universe of satisfaction or a defective or resistant patient. In this typical pattern, the concepts of patients and needs are "reduced," according to Marcuse, and these reduced concepts come to govern the analysis of human reality. The result is that these ideas convey a false consciousness—a concreteness isolated from the conditions which constitute its reality. In this context, the operational treatment of the concept assumes a political function. The individual and his (sic) behavior are analyzed in a therapeutic sense—adjustment to his (sic) society. Thought and expression, theory and practice are to be brought in line with the facts of his (sic) existence without leaving room for the conceptual critique of these facts. (Marcuse: 1964, p. 107).

Consuming mental health after-care services free from a conceptual critique of the objective reality of hospitalization and of post-hospital conditions is to consume a false reality. Living that false reality reaffirms the mental patient role, the
mental health worker role, and the set of institutions which created them. When we ask the question - who benefits? - we can see that the primary recipients are outside the equation. They include the profit accumulated by landlords and pharmaceutical industries; the savings sustained by the state governments; and the comforts extended to the professional hierarchies dominated by psychiatry.

What, then, is to be done? What is necessary is a practice paradigm which combines some a priori understanding of former patients' hospitalization experience together with a clear formulation of their needs - real, material needs - as residents of a community. It must seek to accept what former patients communicate about their lives as statements about their self-expression and their view of the perception of them held by powerful others in their past and present environments. It must devise ways of reflecting this shared communication back to the former patients in a critical manner, so that the interaction neither reinforces the oppressive reality nor reproduces it. To formulate such a practice requires a theory of practice consonant with the broader theory and problem definitional theory presented above, a practice, for example, based on the work of Paulo Freire (Freire: 1971). By applying Freire's "pedagogy" to former mental patients, we can more easily recognize the class nature of their oppression and develop strategies for change which do not replace one pattern of hegemony with another.

SOURCES


Seven Voices From One Organization: What Does It Mean?

by

Janice Perlman

It would be trite to say that citizen action means different things for different people; a cliche to say that it means different things simultaneously for the same person: yet both are overwhelmingly true. Listening carefully to the members of citizen action groups -- not the organizers, staff, or well-known leaders -- but simply the members, reveals the entire gamut of understanding and confusions; gratifications and frustrations; of hopes and fears.

The mini-portraits presented below represent a cross-section, members of a single citizen action organization at a single point in time. Exploratory interviews with members of similar groups in the citizen action tradition do not seem to contradict any of the patterns that emerge from this group, although there are certainly differences in degree and emphasis. Rather than using interviews randomly across organizations, it seemed stronger to present diverse views from within the same one so as to highlight the similarities and differences that emerged. The rough ordering from enthusiasm to disenchantment should not mask the strong presence of both in each interview, and the complex interaction between individual needs, personalities and political awareness.

VIEWS:

1. Born Angry

Betty Washburn* is a 61 year old Black woman who first came to the city in 1944 and has lived in her neighborhood for thirty years. She joined the NAACP at 21, the youngest age admissible, and later the National Council of Negro women. She has worked all her life as a cook and caterer; her husband was a "union man." She is a longtime member of "Citizen Action."

"Oh Lord, I think I was born angry. My mother said when I was a little girl in Texas, she didn't know what to do because we used to have to sit on the back of the bus and I used to say 'my money's just as good as theirs, why do I have to do this?' ... When she sent me to the store to get things, they'd sit up there and talk and wouldn't wait on me. Some Caucasian could come in and

*In order to preserve confidentiality, the name of the organization and all of the members are fictitious; and the names of the neighborhoods, city and state capital are used generically.
they'd wait on 'em and I'd go back home and say 'I'm not goin' back to the ol' store even again.'

"I've had a lot of fun in "Citizen Action"; I've changed a lot of people's minds. People always say 'You can't fight them, they're too big', but we did a lot of things. We went up against them (banks, oil companies, big business) on property taxes and found eleven buildings underassessed. It was so much fun when we went on this downtown tour of the business section, we were pointing out this building right here, and how much tax they do pay and should pay and who gets stuck with it... We learned that we have some power if you can get enough people together, you can get 'people power.' If you get enough folks working together you can go from the neighborhood to City Hall to the State Capital, and they said 'Oh, I didn't think it could be done.'

It had a good effect on me. I like people. I have no children. I lost one child. it was just a pleasure workin' with these people and seein' these new faces and talking to 'em, and it filled a vacancy in my life, too, after I lost my husband. It's so encouraging when you can do it, like when we got the big businesses to pay their fair share of the utilities. Boy, I was the happiest person in the world. I said, 'this one I did.' " (Laughs.)

2. Cold Waffles

Vera Gomez joined Citizen Action in 1976. She was from Denver originally and had been in Local 2 (Restaurant and Hotel Workers) since 1936. She is now retired and raising her grandchildren in her home of twenty years, but will have to sell it and move into an apartment.

"One day he (organizer) asked me, 'Vera, where did you learn to organize, was it in the union?' I said 'Nope, only thing I ever did was pay my dues; I learned to listen and then use plain old common sense, horse sense... You can win if you believe in what you're doing and I believe our government is going down hill unless we get some pretty strong people to fight it... You know people don't pay attention to the radicals, but they will listen if you give them a straight answer....'

"When we went to the State Capital we had 14 buses and 3000 people from all over the state; it was so moving that day. We were fighting for lifeline utility rates... the gal, Chair of the Ways and Means Committee, got real nasty when we went to talk to her. She never gives us a direct answer, you know, one time it's yes and one time it's no, and then it's something else. So, we went in there and said 'you've been waffling around long enough, we have something for you' -- we handed her a bag of cold waffles. They printed it in all the papers...."
'What keeps me going is the caring and the accomplishment. I'm not sitting here decaying like a lot of 'em are. Keeps my mind active... It's so important to me, cause I want to see change, not to fill somebody's pocket with money they don't need, but to help those who do, the poor people, those who's underprivileged... Those big shots from Washington get all these special rates and vacations. Standard Oil -- both oil companies -- have at least six sets of books. They just show the government the ones they want to cause it's such a big enterprise -- they're running the show.'

"Only three or four of us (friends in her neighborhood) signed up. It depends on the personality. I tried to speak to them but even the ones who are in Citizen Action won't show up for meetings lots of times. This really frustrates me when I know they should be there. But that's the way people are and I can't change them. As for me, I always wanted to be active in an organization. To me, Citizen Action was my salvation."

3. Cat Got Your Tongue

Maybel Pond, 54, is a janitor, the daughter of Black Oklaho-
ma farmhands who came to the city when she was fourteen years old. She is divorced, has raised nine children, takes care of her sick mother and an elderly man. She has been active in the local Baptist Church, and is a confirmed Democrat, though her parents were Republicans. She joined Citizen Action only two years ago and was recently elected area President.

"When I was growing up, there were so many children at the table, I never said anything. Sometimes I would whisper. My mother would say, 'what's wrong, cat got your tongue?'... When I first joined Citizen Action, I never spoke up. The meetings and actions were very educational and informing to me so I rarely missed any. It gave me a sense of accomplishing and doing something... made me feel I had a little input into what's happening, what can happen. I started talking out for the first time... Working with Citizen Action really brought me out; the actions made me feel enthused... (She is now planning to return to school.)

"I think people pay enough taxes and so forth, there should be some results right in there around where people live... (Also) when something affects people directly, they will be more likely to come out to do something... (She doesn't trust politicians to help locally because) I think once a person gets involved in politics and actually holding an office, they forget about the issues and things people really need. Why should I have to worry about my gas and electricity turned off when I read in the stock pages that such and such a company made $2 billion in profit and they refuse to pay higher utility rates?"
"Well, just people getting together and really working and doing something for themselves... it helps them. I see this as the way it's going to have to be done if there's even going to be a change where poor people will have a chance to get a little higher up on the ladder or better living conditions, whatever. We're really going to have to get out and get involved. I, for one, want to see it happen -- it seems that as long as you sit back and let them put it on you, the more they put on you...'

"I didn't know before what strength a group could have -- things that could help the neighborhood, the community and the state and nation, too, if it goes to that."

4. Something to look forward to

Mr. Weatherford and his wife are retired and live in an outlying residential area of the city, although when they were first married they lived in the Black ghetto near downtown. He is White; she is Black -- both worked as janitors and were in the union. He has been in Citizen Action for two or three years.

Mr. Weatherford: "We had never heard of Citizen Action before the nice young girl, Suzie, came 'round and rang our door in a long time... She was very polite; not often that young people treat you with respect nowadays... My wife has arthritis, so we didn't get out much, but since I joined Citizen Action, I've been to meetings all over the state. It is something to look forward to."

Mrs. Weatherford: "Before he used to be sick, stay home and complain. Now, he has something else to think about... Used to be every night and every day he was going downtown to some kind of meeting. Anytime Suzie called; he'd come just so long as she promised he'd never have to come back to night alone."

Mr. Weatherford: "I've learned a lot there. We went to the convention (statewide Citizen Action meeting) and to the state capital to get them to sign some bill -- I can't remember the number -- about lifeline. They want to go up on you and you're paying too much already -- that's lifeline. We go as a group and split up. I can't remember the name of the person (Senator) I went to see... he treated us very nicely, I didn't say nothing, we picked a leader to do the talking. I didn't understand most of it...'

"Now we're working on a library campaign. I've learned a lot in Citizen Action -- for example, I didn't know this city has a library commission with twelve members on it."

5. Dry and Dead

The following are excerpts from the more disenchanted members of the organization. There was so much repetition that they are grouped here together.
"At first I liked it very well. They was workin' pretty good and I liked it 'cause they was trying' to clean up the streets; get stop signs in; visitin' with the police chief; pullin' out the abandoned cars... at the meetin's the Whip lady would always explain a lot of deals to us and how things work and any information we wanted she'd explain it and I got a pretty good kick out of it. But, now, when I ask a question up there, they can't even give it to me. After they changed chair-ladies, I couldn't seem to get nothin' in my head what they means about the work of the Citizen Action. I been thinkin' to stop going; there ain't no stimulation in it... it's just as dry and dead as a thing can be." (Mr. Hamilton, 70 year old Deacon of the African Methodist Church, retired longshoreman -- worked and lived in the city since 1943.)

"At first I felt real great about our victories, tryin' to get the dope pushers off the streets and make 'em safe again, an all that, but, recently we haven't been doing very much. It makes you heartbroken... when there are disagreements at our meetings, people stay angry with each other, there hasn't been anything worked out... I haven't been going too much lately." (Donna Jones, Black, hospital assistant in hospital employees union, no church affiliation, 19 years in the city, 4 in her neighborhood.)

"When Lucy came to the door and told about the organization it really made me feel good. I wrote her a check and became a member that same day. She was so wonderful with us, and we was wonderful with her. Whatever she felt was right, she come told us and we also sat down and talked and we come together on those things. We was sure that if somethin' went on in our meeting that wasn't just right she'd look around and whisper and tell us that 'I don't think you do it like this, it's such and such a way... she was a great help to us, we just loved her just like she was one of us. Without Lucy we just haven't been doin' too good. Like now, we vote on things in the meetin's but if I disagree with something I won't say a word... there may be ten or fifteen against it and I go along because seems like there's no time anymore to talk out our differences... I would never do it again, all the work I did the past year and then somebody else gets all the credit." (Dolores Hawthorne, 66 years old, Black, Baptist Deaconess, retired cook -- worked in Louisiana and Texas prior to coming to the city twenty-three years ago.)

**Meaning**

Clearly "meaning" in this context has all of the uncertainty and subjectivity of the blind men's proclamations on the nature of the elephant. Although at one level it could be said that these people joined Citizen Action because of the "issues" (i.e. lifeline, dope pushers, on the street, abandoned cars, etc.) What keeps them in it seems to be some combination of four elements:

* * *
1. anger, sense of injustice, idealism drive toward action (redress of grievances)

2. loneliness, anomie, quest for community drive toward belonging (friendship)

3. impotence/ignorance, search for understanding, information and increased control drive toward knowledge

4. lack of dignity, of self confidence, need to feel useful, drive toward self-esteem

Each of these forces was expressed to some degree by every person interviewed but the emphasis ranged widely. For Betty Wasburn, anger is the major driving force; for Mr. Weatherford it is loneliness and boredom; for Mr. Hamilton, it is the insistence on learning or knowledge; for Mrs. Pond, the gaining of self-confidence. All of them seek a "free space,"* an arena in which dignity, not humiliation is the norm, in which it is safe to ask questions and admit doubts, and through which they gain respect, both internally and in the larger world.

The fact that these drives exist does not necessarily mean they will be fulfilled within Citizen Action or that other types of activities do not compete with community organizing as a way of fulfilling them. For example, anger can be vented through vandalism and violence, loneliness abetted through joining the Moonies, (or belongingness through mass suicide in Jonestown.) The neighborhood-level groups are merely one form of collection action.

Theories of collective action (Mancur Olson**) and resource mobilization (Gamson and Zald***) , however, have somewhat missed the point on most of these issues of needs and motivations. The "public goods dilemma" or "free-rider problem" as Olson calls it, is based on the non-divisability of certain benefits. Since stopping a freeway or getting lower utility rates benefits the non-participants in a community group as well as the participants, (and since there is no way to make participation mandatory as with the "closed shop" in labor organizing) there appears, according to this logic, to be no incentive for any one

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FIGURE 1 MOTIVATION THEORY: NEED HIERARCHY BY ABRAHAM MASLOW

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individual to make the effort. If that were the case, of course, there would not be hundreds, even thousands of community groups organizing around the country -- some of which do not even provide the individual incentives and rewards of ad books (membership discounts at local stores who support the organization). Also, there would not be members discussing the pros and cons in the terms quoted above.

The "resource-mobilization" reasoning argues that organizing is a rational approach for low income people to generate more goods and services and get a better deal, a fairer share. Since they did not have money or personal connections, their strength was in their numbers and in their potential for disruptive behavior. Emotional needs are not taken into account.

Both notions stem from a very rational view of people maximizing economic benefits, and thinking through alternative strategies prior to calculating their decisions. This was, in part a reaction to the "frustration-aggression" model which social scientists had long postulated as the basis for violence and revolution stemming from the deprived underclasses.* It was certainly a step forward from the "angry masses uprising" theory, but not very helpful in looking at the real complexities of meaning in citizen action.

What these few interviews suggest is both a more humanistic and more realistic perspective on the complexities of beliefs and behaviors. Abraham Maslow's work on the hierarchy of needs is valuable in this regard. He hypothesizes a scale of five types of needs: 1) physiological; 2) safety; 3) love and belongingness; 4) esteem (self-esteem and social esteem); and 5) self-actualization -- to become everything that one is capable of becoming. (See figure 1.)**

The notion is not that motivation for each stage proceeds only when the one below is totally fulfilled, but that at least a partial fulfillment of the more fundamental needs is necessary before a person's motivation toward the higher ones can be very strong.

In terms of community organizations such as Citizen Action, this helps explain two readily observable facts: first, that the members are not drawn from the poorest segments of the population (since they are too busy trying to deal with physiological necessities), and second, that most of the members are over fifty years old. Those in their twenties and thirties are starting careers and have little time for, or interest in, community organizing; then for the next two or three decades they

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are busy raising families. Only when they are retired or have moved on to part-time work can their interest in the fun and fulfillment of citizen action organizing come to the fore. As most members said, they had joined groups before (especially the church, labor unions, or the Democratic party) but had "never been active." Being working class, they generally did not have the options of child-care and babysitters, or a non-working parent, which often allow middle-class couples to be active civic participants as well as raise families.

For a citizen action organization not only to attract, but hold the membership of low or moderate income people, it is clear that all four incentives -- anger, community, information, and self-esteem must be operating. The one-shot, single issue group disappears as soon as its victory (or defeat) is definitive. Even a multi-issue organization based solely on actions and anger will very quickly reach the point of "what-have-you-done-for-me-lately" and disintegrate without some value content toward binding friendships, cultural roots, and re-creation of personal dignity.

Dignity is gained, or re-gained, through many aspects of the citizen action process, but particularly through 1) actions which de-mystify the authorities, and provide the sweet taste of power, and 2) internal participatory democracy which gives every member a chance to be heard, a chance to make mistakes (and to learn from these without humiliation) and to disagree with others (and to resolve these differences without rancor.)

As Oppenheimer defines it:

Participatory democracy involves two complementary notions that people are inherently capable of understanding their problems and expressing themselves about these problems and their solutions, if given a social context in which freedom of expression is possible. The second is that real solutions to problems require the fullest participation of people in these solutions, with development of freedom from dependency on authorities and experts.*

There is only one problem: there exists an inherent conflict between action and participatory democracy. Since both are necessary to vital community organizing, a real paradox emerges. If too much participation takes place things take too long, the group gets bored, meeting attendance may drop off, and people feel that "not enough is going on" as Mrs. Hawthorne complained. If too much action and too little participation goes on, people do not learn the meaning of those actions (as in Mr. Weatherford's case) and are objectified as "troops" to be deployed

against targets, or they do not get a chance to raise the ques-
tions they need answered, and thus are frustrated, angered, and
confused (as Mr. Hamilton expressed.) Oppenheimer summarizes it
well:

A paradox exists between the democratic content
of a group and the progress of the group towards a
measure of power in the community. Too much dis-
cussion we stop moving; too little and we are no longer
what we were. To achieve a goal we need unity
but to achieve unity it is sometimes necessary to
compromise, to gloss over some important issues --
which shall it be?*

Political awareness requires political discussion, but
political discussion can be divisive. Organizers who lived
through the 1960's saw the left fragment itself into impotence
over "the correct line." With most of them being middle-class,
white, educated males already committed to progressive politics
it was hard enough to find common cause. Imagine the difficul-
ties of doing this with a community group of mixed race, class,
age and political experience. Whereas it is easy to agree on
the negative -- stop the bulldozer, end relining, lower utility
rates, etc. -- it is much more difficult to agree on the posi-
tive -- start what? support who? being where? The time, ef-
fort, and needed sensitivity to carry this out seem over-
whelming.

On the other hand, without vision without clarity of pur-
pose, no movement is possible, no organization can sustain it-
self.** A movement needs four things: an analysis of how things
are, an explanation of how they got that way, a vision of how
they could be in the future, and a notion of how to get from
here to there. If there is no movement, then organizing the
30,000th person will take as much effort as organizing the 30th
person, and electing the 10th citizen action candidate as iso-
lated an effort as electing the first.

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*Oppenheimer, pp. 229. See also Democracy, A Journal of Politi-

**Wilhelm Reich, writing in Germany in 1931-32 observed, "unless
people have class consciousness, they will not stay mobilized,
from 'What is Class Consciousness" Sex-Pol Essays 1929-34,
Clearly, the Civil Rights and anti-war movements created such momentum in the 1960's and the "Moral Majority" supposedly has a similar momentum right now. If citizen action is to "catch on" at the national level, there will have to be the sense of channeled outrage and a collective vision of how to rectify the injustices which cause it. The bottom line of direct action organizing then must be growing awareness of the largest possible number of participants in every single campaign. Campaigns may fail and organizations may die, but the learning that people have internalized is for life. Once they own their new understanding, they can recreate their struggle, reform groups, remobilize their friends, etc.

The recent 18-month rent strike and eventual victory of the tenants in Co-op City provides a timely example of this. The residents were so well-organized, clear and militant that their opponents were stunned. They organized building captains in each building; floor captains for each floor; they ran their own printing press; and they knew the entire gamut of their rights and how far to push them. Why? Because these mostly elderly, Jewish tenants, (who had given up their rent-controlled apartments in the Bronx to find a retirement haven in Co-op City) had been through it all fifty years ago in the labor struggles, the communist or socialist political organizing of the 1930's. Although their skills of struggle had remained dormant all those years, they came right back as soon as they were needed.

This by no means implies that political education can be done through community organizations in the 1980's the way it was done in the labor organizations of the 1930's. It is almost a slogan, "you have to start from where people's heads are at," but this is brought home with stunning clarity when an organizer tries to tell the folk what they just did and what they are saying (about the little guy paying for the profits of the big corporations or about how the political parties are owned by the oil companies) is tantamount to socialism. In general, the folk do not come back. The McCarthy era has left its mark clearly enough, the media, especially television, have done the rest. Most group spokespersons when asked about ideology will say they are non-ideological, even anti-ideological. If anything, some will say they are populist.*

Going beyond the spokespeople and listening to the members talk about their view of the world, reveals that they are both more radical and more conservative than their staff and leadership. They are filled with inconsistencies and internal contradictions, but feel no need for consistency. Many will talk about "excess profit," "conflict of interest," "the power of numbers," "corporate ripoffs," etc. They often express outrage at the injustice of companies moving out of town, eliminating thousands of jobs and a much-needed tax base; or against the rampant speculation of landlords who buy and sell properties.

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for profits, evicting families without recourse. However, in the same breath they will say they believe in private property and in the absolute right of owners to do as they please with their buildings, or companies. They say "everyone should be free, this is a free country."

This type of mentality has been characterized by Hobsbawm as "pre-political thought," as contrasted with "political consciousness." Consciousness, he says is a "coherent viewpoint providing an interpretive framework for the understanding of relations between society, culture, and political economy." He goes on to say it suggests "volition in the development of a long-range political program and strategy as well as a set of tactics and immediate demands." In contrast,

Pre-political thought is less coherent, has little conception of long-range goals or programs, responds in a fragmented fashion to immediate grievances, and frequently sees little relationship between the concrete problem at hand and the larger social system.*

Wikler, in a study of consciousness among Vietnam veterans found many patterns of "pre-political thinking" similar to those among community organization members. She characterizes the components as 1) diffuse anger and strongly felt grievances, 2) political fragments rather than a coherent ideology, 3) spontaneous, sometimes anarchic behavior, 4) rudimentary notions of a system, and 5) disobedience.** Because of this relatively amorphous and contradictory political comprehension, some were extremely radicalized by their Vietnam experience. Some became defensive of the war and the U.S. role in the world, and some remained confused and unclear.

According to Leggett who did a similar study measuring the class consciousness of Detroit workmen, a 4-stage process can be traced from pre-political thinking towards class consciousness: 1) class verbalization -- the tendency to discuss topics in terms of class; 2) skepticism -- the belief that wealth had been allocated within the community to benefit primarily the middle class; 3) militancy, the pre-disposition to engage in aggressive action to advance the interests on one's class; and 4) equali-

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tarianism -- favoring a redistribution of wealth.* Al Heskin
has adapted this scale to a study of tenant consciousness and is
presently testing it in Los Angeles finding a much greater
receptivity than expected and more skepticism and militancy.**

The logical question this discussion leads to is whether or
not participation in a community organization affects the
development of political consciousness. No simple answer is
forthcoming. However, a few things are clear from the inter-
views conducted. First, that there is a great deal of pre-
selection in who joins a neighborhood organization. Not only do
relatively few people know about a given organization in any
community, but even among those who know intimately about it
(through friends, neighbors, or relatives ) many do not have the
time or inclination to join. Thus, any serious study of this
topic would have to match pairs of members and their most simi-
lar non-member acquaintances to begin to sort out the factors
accounting for this first level of difference. Second, for
those who are members, even most longtime members, it is clear
that their experience in the organization is only a minute part
of their lifetime process of political socialization. Their
previous experiences -- in their families, schools, churches,
labor unions, etc. -- play an overwhelming role in shaping their
view of the world. To use Berger's phrase, one's "social con-
struction of reality"***is already fairly established by the
time that person joins a community organization. Furthermore,
given that in Citizen Action very few people had succeeded in
bringing their friends, neighbors or family members into the
organization, there is very little support for a new definition
of reality even if the seeds are sown for this within the or-
ganization. One might argue that this can happen among new
friends made within the organization, but the vast majority of
those interviewed said they did not socialize with Citizen Ac-
tion members outside of the organization, and those who did so-
alyzed almost exclusively with the organizers or staff rather
than with other members. (In fact, both Mrs. Gomez and Mrs.
Hawthorne were rather disdainful of the other members.) This is
not true for all community organizations, but was revealing in
that it seems more often the case than not.

CONCLUSION

The above caveats notwithstanding, people do, in fact, learn
and re-interpret the world around them all the time as long as


**c.f. Al Heskin, "The History of Tenants in the U.S.: Struggle and Ideology", Dept. of City Planning, UCLA, Los Angeles, The Tenant Consciousness Study grant is from the NIMH Metro center.

they are alive. Participating in a community group, while perhaps not decisive, cannot fail to contribute to this reassessment process. This happens to a greater or lesser degree depending on three factors: action, interpretation, and internalization.

By action is meant that if a group does not engage in some activity or confrontation that challenges the normal course of things, they generate no new data for re-interpretation. In most citizen action organizations the fun of it all comes from the creative planning and execution of these actions -- they are the "spice" while doorknocking, fundraising, meetings, etc. are the "meat and potatoes".

Interpretation means two things. First, how much attention the organizational style gives to learning from both failures and victories to open discussion and analysis before and after actions, and to ongoing leadership development. Second, how well the leaders are able to interpret and explain to the membership the connections between what they saw happen and why. Making the victory is only part of the challenge, giving it meaning is equally important. If people perceive only a "black box" effect where you do "X" and "Y" results, they will never be able to own their own successes or re-create them in other circumstances.

Finally, internalization refers to the process by which the lessons learned from action and interpretation are incorporated into one's daily operating assumptions and reinforced in one's own home or neighborhood among trusted friends and relatives. In the absence of this, some members expressed the feeling of not really believing what they had just experienced; it seemed like such a different world, almost as if its reality disappeared when they left the group and went home.

In short, it appears that the greatest change in consciousness will occur in active groups which have indigenous leadership with some degree of ideological clarity, and a process of internal discussion within the organization, and a high degree of solidarity and friendship with friends, neighbors and relatives also in the organization.

As the citizen action movement has come of age, and as new insights have been gained regarding the issue of "meaning" and consciousness, some very interesting approaches have evolved to focus more attention on what Mike Ansars of Massachusetts Fair Share calls "value-based" rather than "issue-based" organizing. People feel concerned about the loss of traditional guidelines, culture, and values in their lives and are as able to talk about this as they are to complain about the garbage on the street or the needed stopsign on the corner. Some groups such as the South Bronx People for Change, and the Mutual Aid Project in Coney Island and Brooklyn are adapting Paulo Freire's methods of
bottom-up dialogue and consciousness raising* to their own styles of organizing. They work more in the Chavez tradition, whose approach among the farmworkers was to reinforce ties of culture, trust, and community, within the groups and its institutions, rather than in the Alinsky mode which focuses on the enemy -- "them" out there to create the sense of "we."**

M.A.P., for example, is setting up a series of cooperatively owned community "cafeterias" in which people can congregate, talk, eat good food at reasonable prices, and hold cultural events for their community. They are already running a cooperative food buying service, a food services training center, and an assistance service to groups interested in establishing worker community cooperative food enterprises. They take the Highlander Center in Appalachia as one of their organizing models.

The South Bronx People for Change works through a combination of theological reflection (the "why"); social analysis (the "what"); and community organizing (the "how"). Before they take any action each group goes through a lengthy process of discussion (half are in English, half in Spanish) including a needs assessment, recruitment, training sessions, and follow-up into action goals. They are as concerned with asking the right questions, and building a process of popular education as with "winning victories." They are planting the seeds of a movement in the South Bronx and are moving slowly and sensitively, turning negatives into positives along the route. The problem, as Nelson Rodrigues said, "is not apathy but powerlessness." What they deliver is a little hope. It is a matter of common sense, he says, "if you're going to the top of the mountain don't go naked and don't go alone."


**For this distinction, I draw upon conversations with William Friedland, Board Community Studies and Sociology, U.C. Santa Cruz.
A NOTE ON VOETHOGENIC HARM: THE POLITICS OF
SCIENCE AND THE PROFESSIONS

by

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Abstract: "voethogenic": helper-engendered.

If one wants to check out how good a new dog is in herding cattle, one has to find some cattle, send the dog after them, and observe what happens. That works because what the dog does and its outcome are so striking as to rule out all but one rough interpretation concerning what has given rise to what.

It is different with the helping of people.

If a physician prescribes a medication for several patients and they all get better, the getting better may have little or nothing to do with the medication since most illnesses get better (or worse) over time regardless of the medication. In other words, there is an alternative explanation to that of the effectiveness of the medication: the interpretation that the disease is self-limiting. The most certain way to tell whether the medication was effective would be if there were two identical groups of sick people only one of which received the medication. If, after a period of time, it were to turn out that the members of the group receiving the medication were more nearly free of the illness than members of the other groups, the physician could then reasonably conclude that the medication was effective.

The situation becomes even more difficult when one evaluates the talk-therapies (counseling, psychoanalysis, dynamic psychiatry, the work of clinical psychologists, caseworkers, marriage counselors, etc.). The problem of evaluating a medication continues since many psychological problems also get better or worse over time regardless of therapy. Thus, when the therapist feels that she or he has been helpful, there is another reasonable interpretation: that the person in therapy would have been just as well off without having had it. The talk-therapist, therefore, almost always needs the experimental-control-random-assignment-group approach in order to determine his or her effectiveness.
However, evaluation of the talk-therapies encounters a further obstacle that is uncommon among physicians. The obstacle is that it is very difficult to estimate which of the identical groups is better or worse off after a period of being helped.*

For one thing, anxiety may have declined in the group being helped—but a realistic analysis of the situations of those helped may reveal that they should have remained as anxious as they initially were. A person in great danger is not helped by becoming complacent. Further, the problems of group members being helped may simply have been displaced by different problems. If a therapist helps clients to become less anxious and the anxiety is succeeded by depression, it is difficult to know whether the helping has left those helped better off or worse off. Finally, judgements concerning the problems of people who go to talk therapists are notoriously of doubtful validity.

Consider, for example, the study reported by Robert J. Stoller and Robert H. Geertsma ("The Consistency of Psychiatrists' Clinical Judgements," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol. 137, #1, July, 1963, pp. 58-66.)

This study had 27 psychiatrists watch a half hour film of a third year medical student talking with a patient. They were all psychiatric faculty in the UCLA School of Medicine and were trying to create a criterion for use in examinations within the School. The film was such that they could see the patient from the perspective of the interviewer.

In rating 565 statements concerning the patient on a scale of 0 to 5, their inter-rater agreement (correlation coefficient) was only 0.37. The authors summed up the results as follows:

*However, physicians are not completely without difficulties in this area. See e.g., Phillip L. Rossman, "Organic Diseases Simulating Functional Disorder," in GP (Published by the American Academy of General Practice), Vol. 28, #2, August, 1963, pp. 78-83. Dr. Rossman, (of Los Angeles), reported on 115 patients who had symptoms common to both organic and psychiatric illnesses and who were referred for psychiatric treatment although it later turned out that their diseases were organic.
"psychiatrist-experts were unable to agree as to a patient's diagnosis, prognosis, psychodynamics, causes of her problem, the feeling she was consciously experiencing, or the feelings that were latent (unconscious)." (P. 64)

A number of other studies have produced results consistent with this outcome.


"Except for disorders of organic etiology and the distinction between psychosis and neurosis, the standard diagnostic classifications have provided low reliability." (P. 475)

If clinicians cannot agree on all these things, then a great proportion of their judgements must be invalid. How, then, can we use the judgement of clinicians or of clinically related researchers as to the status of those having been subjected to helping efforts by talk-therapists? This problem has rendered doubtful the interpretations of most outcomes of the hundreds of effectiveness studies of talk-therapies.

What, then, is left? Is there an outcome criterion which is valid? There remains, most convincingly, the criterion of relative mortality. If the helping helps people to live longer, then we can conclude (at least for most people, but not counting such exceptions as George Orwell and George Bernard Shaw) that the help has been effective.

It is for that reason that I have selected in evaluating talk therapies only and all random assignment-experimental-control studies in which the outcome criterion is mortality. Because very little competent medical research concerning effectiveness falls
outside mortality studies, except in such areas as the introduction of drugs, I have also used mortality as a criterion in evaluating medical practice. There are very few such studies. The following are representative of those few.

**First Effectiveness Studies**


During those three years, 343 cases were allocated at random either to (a) home care with a family, or (b) hospital treatment initially in an intensive care unit. The patients given hospital treatment were usually assigned to intensive care units for a minimum of 48 hours and otherwise cared for in the adjacent medical ward.

Of 169 patients randomly assigned to hospital care, 12 (7.1%) died within seven days. Of 174 patients randomly assigned to home care, 5 (2.9%) died within seven days. During the time between eight and twenty-eight days after treatment began there were no differences between the two groups in number of deaths.

These figures probably substantially underestimate the advantage of home care since an unknown number of patients who transferred during the experiment from home to hospital care were counted as having received home care when the data were analyzed. Such a category decision presumably related to an assumption by the researchers that patients were transferred from home to hospital care because they had become disproportionately ill at home.

I have discovered only one empirical analysis which sheds light on whether that plausible assumption is, in fact, correct. In a similar experimental-control-group-random-assignment study comparing (a) only medical treatment with (b) coronary bypass surgery, Murphy, et al. found no survival advantage to the surgery. (See Marvin L. Murphy, et al., "Treatment of Chronic Stable Angina", **New England Journal of Medicine**, Vol. 297, #12, September 23, 1977, pp. 621-627.) In the Murphy, et al. study, as in the Mather, et al., one, there were cross-overs from medical treatment to the experimental one and initial assumption of the exceptional
illness of those who crossed-over. The authors, however, when they examined the cross-overs, were unable to discover that they differed from those who remained in the medical treatment group. (P 625) If that were also to hold for the Mather, et al., study, those who crossed-over to hospital care should not have been classified in data analysis as belonging to the home care category. (The cross-over group resembled the hospital group, not the home care group, in mortality rate.) If we take that Mather, et al., mistake into account, it becomes clear that, in the Mather, et al., study, a patient randomly assigned to hospital care was substantially more than twice as likely to die within one week than would have been the case had he stayed at home.*

The Mather, et al., study, gave rise to a vigorous discussion among English physicians of the relative merits of home versus hospital care. That study had been attacked as unethical at its inception and was not generally accepted by "the medical community" after being published. The most common criticism was that only a little over 28 percent of the population of the study was randomized. In the remaining cases, it was not possible for both physician and patient to agree to the randomized treatment.

A follow-up report was published by Mather, et al., in 1976. (Mather, H.G., et al., "Myocardial Infarction: A Comparison between Home and Hospital Care for Patients" British Medical Journal, 1976, 1, 925-929). This paper added that after 300 days 20 percent of those receiving home treatment and 27% of those receiving hospital treatment had died.

In order to get further data, David Hill and associates received a Department of Health and Social Security support grant to make a randomized study of home and hospital care. This effort began in 1973. The outcome was published in Lancet in 1978 (Hill, J.D., et al., "A Randomized trial of home-versus-hospital care for patients with acute myocardial infarction").

*In 1971, Reuel A. Stallones reported that he and Robert Buechley "in analyzing mortality statistics from the states of the United States, found a strong positive correlation between the physician-population ratio and coronary disease." (Environment, Ecology, and Epidemiology, Pan American Health Organization Scientific Publication, No. 231, p. 9). Of course, no correlation demonstrates causation, but it may eventually turn out that part of such a relationship results from the greater prevalence of hospital care where physicians are concentrated.
management for patients with suspected myocardial infarctions", Lancet, I, 837). In this study, 76 percent of the patients were randomized into the study, thus warding off in it the most common criticism of the Mather, et al., study.

Hill and his colleagues reported that, after six weeks, the mortality from home care was 20%, that from hospital care, 18%. (I have not yet re-analyzed these data and do not know what the outcome of such a re-analysis would be.)

There have been no other home-versus-hospital studies done relating mortality to myocardial infarction which meet my criteria.

One indication of the orientation of the medical profession in England was the recommendation in 1975 that the number of coronary care units in hospitals be rapidly increased. (See Report of Joint Committee of British Cardiological Society and Royal College of Physicians, "The Care of the Patient with Coronary Heart Disease," Journal of the Royal College of Physicians, 1975, 10, 5).

The nature of the controversy in England may be reflected in the fact that many of the older physicians tended to prefer home care. Young physicians tended not to, perhaps because of possible recriminations if patients died unexpectedly. (See Aubrey Colling, Coronary Care in the Community, London: Croom Helm, 1977, p. 173).

Although the outcomes of these studies were available to physicians throughout the world, they appear to have had no other impact on publication, practice, or research. In the Soviet Union, organization to ensure early hospitalization was the ideal and, in the single recent book which has been translated into English, there are no references to home care or to the Mather, et al., and Hill, et al., studies in spite of a huge bibliography. (See E. I. Chazov, Ed., Myocardial Infarction: The Approach to Prevention, Diagnosis and Treatment in the Soviet Union, Littleton, Mass.: PSG, 1979).

The situation was similar in North America. For example, in a standard text, Emanuel Goldberger wrote, "All patients with an acute myocardial infarction or suspected myocardial infarction should be admitted to a coronary care unit (CCU)." (Treatment of Cardiac Emergencies, St. Louis: C.W. Mosby, 1977, 2nd Edition). There is also no mention of home care in the many other similar recent books which I have consulted. A recent bibliography on home care supported by the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (The Franklin Research Center: Home Health Care Programs: A Selected Bibliography. Hyattsville, MD, U.S. Department of HEW, 1979) contains no references to heart attacks or myocardial infarctions—or to the English evaluation studies.

However, a group sponsored by the World Health Organization (A Working Group for the World Health Organization: Coronary Care Outside Big Centers, Copenhagen, Regional Office for Europe, 1975), has a short section entitled "Care of the patient at home" (p. 8) which considers the possible utility of home care, especially for people distant from hospitals.

One could anticipate the reactions to the Mather-Hill studies by extrapolating from current practice. In England, where there is substantial home care, the outcomes reported are nonjudgmental. Mather, et al., did not make note of differences within the first week after the attack, but drew conclusions based on a later time when the differences were less striking. Where there is no legitimated practice of home care (as in the Soviet Union and the United States) the evaluation research has been mostly ignored.

The criticisms by cardiologists of the Mather-Hill studies tend to be ignorant of the nature and uses of evaluative research. Some go further to mis-report data.

That these failures of solid research to be utilized are not unprecedented can be illustrated by reference to a famous occurrence from the history of medicine.

Second Effectiveness Study

In the mid-Nineteenth Century, the lying-in department of the General Hospital in Vienna was one of the greatest of its kind in Europe. It had been divided into two separate clinics in 1833. When women in labor came in to deliver their babies, if they came at one time of the week they were assigned to the first clinic, at another time they went to the second clinic. Thus, unintentionally, women were randomly assigned to one or another of the two clinics.

Beginning in 1840, the first clinic was made available for the instruction of medical students only; the second clinic was available to midwife students only. Thus, different treatments had been assigned for each of the two roughly identical groups of women.
With this arrangement, the mortality rate of the first clinic suddenly rose to more than double that of the second clinic and remained far higher in subsequent years. Women became aware of this difference and many sought, unsuccessfully, to be admitted, against the rules, to the second clinic.

The deaths were from puerperal fever (childbed fever), a disease which, in 1846, resulted in the deaths of 11.44% of the women in the first clinic, but only 2.7% of the women in the second clinic.

Ignac Semmelweis*, a physician and surgeon who was in charge of the first clinic, realized that the difference in mortality rates had something to do with the differences between the clinics and tried to figure out what was the cause.

Semmelweis noted that the doctors, some assistants, and some medical students in the first clinic dissected the cadavers of women who had died and then examined the patients who remained alive. This sequence of events did not occur in the second clinic. He concluded in 1847 that the difference between the two clinics in mortality rates was caused by those who first dissected cadavers and then conducted manual examinations of the women in labor.

Semmelweis, therefore, put into effect a rule that all who examined women would first thoroughly clean their hands in a chlorine wash. The death rate in the first clinic promptly dropped to approximately that in the second. Through analysis of statistical trends, clinical and anatomical, and even animal, studies, Semmelweis provided adequate evidence for his causal hypothesis and for the effectiveness of his treatment.

He thereby had become the first person to demonstrate the efficacy of antisepsis in medicine, a discovery which governs surgical practice to this day.

*Semmelweis had taken his medical training in what was then the leading medical school in the world, in Vienna. Among many sources, the reader can consult Frank Slaughter's Immortal Magyar: Semmelweis, Conqueror of Childbed Fever, New York: Schuman, 150; or Gy. Gartvay and I. Zoltan, Semmelweis: His Life and Work, Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1968.
However, his work was either ignored or attacked. By 1859, more than a decade after his discovery had been demonstrated, his reports were largely forgotten or had excited very little interest in Europe and the United States, all places in which childbed fever was frequently epidemic. He could not even get his writings published in most of the important medical journals of his time. With few exceptions, all the great obstetrical authorities had rejected his ideas. When he published his major opus on the subject in October, 1861, the resulting reviews were mostly hostile. About three decades after Semmelweis's discovery, Pasteur announced the identity of the bacteria which caused puerperal fever. Only following that announcement, with Semmelweis dead and his work mostly unknown, dismissed, and distorted, did his method of averting childbed fever gradually win general acceptance. (He had also used antisepsis in surgery before its "discovery" by Lister.)

Semmelweis had suffered greatly from the rejection of his brilliant, tenacious, ingenious, and crucially important research. He died in 1865, mad.

These illustrations of the reception of effectiveness research are not generalizable only within the profession of medicine. Our next illustration is from a different helping profession.

Third Effectiveness Study

With the cooperation of thirteen selected social and health agencies, 164 older people in need of protective services were randomly assigned to receive, or not to receive, casework assistance during the year June, 1964, through May, 1965, at the Benjamin Rose Institute in Cleveland. The project director for this effectiveness study was Dr. Margaret Blenkner, professor and director of the Regional Institute of Social Welfare Research, the University of Georgia School of Social Work. Dr. Blenkner was nationally recognized in this area of research, having published eighteen studies prior to the final report on this one.

Four caseworkers provided help to those in the experimental group. Their average caseload was about 19 clients each. "All held master's degrees in social work and one had an additional third year of graduate social work training; all had more than fifteen years of experience." (See Blenkner, M.; Bloom, M. and Nielsen, M., "A Research and Demonstration Project of Protective Service", Social Casework, Vol. 52, Oct., 1971, pp. 483-499.)
The research team followed up the clients in the two groups year by year for four years after their original registration in the project. They accumulated data on comparative survival.

At the end of the first year, they found that, in the experimental group, 19 out of 76 clients had died (25%). In the control group, 16 out of 88 had died (18%). Thus, those who received intensive casework help were much more likely to have died than those who did not receive such help. Analysis of the data demonstrated that caseworkers had tended to institutionalize their clients and that the difference in institutionalization accounted for the entire difference.

By the end of the fourth year, however, the picture had changed significantly. By then, 48 out of 76 in the experimental group had died (63%) and 46 of 88 in the control group (52%). In other words, the clients in the experimental group had continued to die at a greater rate than had the clients who had received no special intensive help. However, the difference at the end of the fourth year was maintained entirely by noninstitutionalized clients. Institutionalization made no difference at the end of that length of time. (The differences in absolute numbers reflect the fact that 43 clients had crossed over into institutions during the final three years of the analysis.) (For these and other data, see Margaret Blenkner, Martin Bloom, Margaret Nielson, and Ruth Weber, Final Report: Protective Services for Older People, Cleveland: The Benjamin Rose Institute, 1974.)

Although there had been several previous studies relating help to mortality in casework and allied professions, all consistent with it in outcome, the Blenkner, et al., study was followed by no further such research. There was no subsequent publicized discussion except for that aroused by later publications by Joel Fischer, and I have no evidence that this and previous similar studies affected casework practice.*

*I anticipate that Margaret Blenkner, who died in 1973, will become the greatest heroine of social workers since Jane Addams. There are no candidate heroes of social workers.
Discussion

The outcomes of these three studies reflect the limited population of effectiveness research in the helping professions which meets my criteria. No study demonstrated that helping increases life span, although a few allowed for the possibility that life span was unaffected.

The lack of utilization of the research was also typical. The studies have tended to be ignored and distorted.

A striking illustration of the latter can be found in Katherine M. Wood's comforting report, "Casework Effectiveness: a new look at the research evidence" (Social Work, Vol. 23, #6, November, 1978, pp. 437-458). Wood entirely ignored the Blenkner, et al., analysis of noninstitutionalized clients, although it had been prominently published in two places and reported in publications by Joel Fischer, all sources of which Wood was cognizant. Fischer is the only person to have published a fair (although-superficial) account of the Blenkner et al., research. Typically, Fischer's account led to an acrimonious, but unenlightened, set of reactions from social workers. Wood's distorted discussion in Social Work was followed by a single published letter applauding her "definitive" article and maintaining that 'we have since moved past the question of whether or not direct social work is effective. The new and urgent question is how we can make this practice more effective." And, "It is a wonderful thing to be a social worker in this age..." (Social Work, September, 1979, p. 441.)

Given the reception of these studies, we may inquire next whether these effectiveness studies are significant enough to warrant attention. Let us consider them one by one.

The figures, of course, are small, and may not be widely generalizable. However, the significance results from the possibility that they are.

If we extrapolate from the Mather, et al., study to the United States, a change to home care, using the most conservative set of assumptions, would save more than eleven thousand lives annually during the first seven days following a heart attack. The saving in cost would be enormous.

There are no data which can lead us to estimate the number of lives which could have been saved had Semmelweis found a different
reception to his work. But the number of women dying during childbed fever epidemics sometimes reached 100 percent—and this in major hospitals throughout the western world.

The Blenkner, et al., study, generalized, would lead us to the conclusion that, of every 31 clients, five would be unnecessarily dead at the end of four years. That is, each worker with such a caseload would have killed, on an average, at least one client a year. Not even the average Sicilian Mafia member manages to affect mortality that much. If there were protective service workers adequate for the population in need of it (using Blenkner's estimate), the resulting loss of life through casework would exceed 40,000 a year. Of course, we do not know the population to which the Blenkner, et al., research can be extrapolated. Conceivably it could be the entire population of casework clients—there is no evidence to the contrary.

Assuming that these studies and the responses to them are representative and that they are significant, is it possible that they have not been given attention because they are simply inexplicable and to be regarded as anomalous phenomena unworthy of further attention?

Certainly the history of the Semmelweis discovery demonstrates its explicability and the value of taking it seriously, even though Semmelweis, himself, had been unable to demonstrate the underlying mechanisms of infection. Let us, therefore, next consider Mather, et al., and Blenkner, et al.

There has been substantial research supporting the conclusion that relocation of ill elderly people increases their mortality soon after relocation. (See, e.g., I. Wittels and J. Bilwinick, "Survival in Relocation," Journal of Gerontology, 29, 440-443, 1974). This research, contrary to the Blenkner, et al., opinion (but consistent with their data) demonstrate that it is not being in institutions, but becoming institutionalized, which results in higher mortality rates. Further, the patients taken to hospitals in the Mather, et al., study, were both ill and being relocated, and it was the older patients who disproportionately died in hospitals compared to homes.
Second, the studies are similar in that heart attack was the only cause of death in the one and allegedly the main cause of death (according to death certificates) in the other.*

Further, deaths in the Blenkner, et al., study occurred primarily in hospitals (47%) or other institutions (38%) in which iatrogenic illness is a considerable possibility. Let me briefly elaborate.

In 1981, Steel, et al., published the latest in a long series of studies of iatrogenic illness which have been conducted in many places by many research groups. (See "Iatrogenic Illness on a General Medical Service at a University Hospital," New England Journal of Medicine, March 12, 1981, 304: 638-642.) In this study, 36 percent of 815 consecutive hospital patients on a general medical service were conservatively estimated to have an iatrogenic (hospital-acquired) illness. In two percent of the 815 patients, the iatrogenic illness was believed to contribute to the death of the patient. That great an incidence of iatrogenic-related death would wipe out half of the mortality difference in the Mather, et al., study (although one should regard such comparisons with caution.) However, it would account for less of the difference observed in the Blenkner, et al., study even if caseworker intervention made it more likely that clients would go to such places (as seems evident from the data).

Further, it is likely that the Steel, et al., study underreported iatrogenic deaths since it apparently did not take into account the possibility of psychogenic deaths. For example, Jarvinen ("Can Ward Rounds Be a Danger to Patients with Myocardial Infarction?", British Medical Journal, February 5, 1955, pp. 318-320) reported five people who died during ward rounds in a short time at a Helsinki University Hospital and an additional patient who died shortly after an attack which began during ward rounds. If deaths had occurred at an expected rate, given the time spent

*One must, however, regard such death certificate figures as very uncertain in view of diagnostic problems. For example, Marizama, Danber and Kennel (in National Cancer Institute Monographs, 19: 405, 1966) looked at 1,362 death certificates coded as cardiovascular. They found that in only 12% of cases was the diagnosis "well-established," in an additional 40% was the diagnosis "reasonable," and in 48% of the cases the diagnosis was "probably incorrect" or "better replaced by another diagnosis." The debate continues in the medical journals.
on ward rounds, only one, or at most two, deaths would have oc-
curred then. ("Two deaths occurred when the patients were told
that the time for their discharge, so eagerly awaited, had come.")

A recent study indicates that even nonaffective speech, very
likely disproportionately to occur in the experimental groups of
the Mather-Blenkner-et al., studies, might increase the possibili-
ty of death from heart attacks.

James J. Lynch, et al., ("The Effects of Talking on the Blood
Pressure of Hypertensive Individuals," Psychomatic Medicine,
Vol.43, #1, February, 1981, pp. 24-33) studied the blood pressure
of 30 hypertensive and 15 normotensive people before, during, and
after they talked for two minutes in response to the suggestion,
"tell me about your work." All subjects showed increased blood
pressure while talking. "The patients with the higher pressure
tended to have the greater increase in blood pressure during talk-
ing." One patient went "from a pressure of 157/86 while sitting
quiet up to 200/120 while speaking and immediately down to 174/88
in the first resting quiet minute after talking."

It is certainly likely that more intensive help is accompanied
by more talk.

Possible explanations could be multiplied. For example, it
may be that, in the two studies, experimental treatment resulted
in an imposition of standards and norms on those being helped
which were alien and degrading to them, more so than in instances
of less intensive help.

But one mystery remains. How is it possible that the
Blenkner, et al., clients began to succumb so greatly in the ex-
perimental group years after the experiment was over? Is that not
inconceivable? Not at all. We can suppose that various subse-
quent helpers became aware of whether those helped had or had not
been in the experimental group and differentially treated them
(possibly with more intensively mobilized help for those who had
been members of the experimental group) on that basis.

Although these are only possible explanations for the outcomes
of the effectiveness studies, they do illustrate the fact that the
study outcomes cannot be considered worth rejection or being ig-
nored as beyond comprehension.

If the studies are representative, significant and comprehen-
sible, how then can we explain the contrast between the studies
and their utilization?
What May be Going On

A long time period between a discovery or invention and its adoption is not unknown. The cotton picker was invented in 1889, yet it was fifty-nine years before it became an innovation in 1948, long after the death of the inventor and during a time of labor shortage. (Keith Norris and John Vaizey, *The Economics of Research and Technology*, London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1973, p. 77). In the field of geology, the continental drift theory was proposed more than fifty years ago and generally accepted just recently. (See Seymour H. Mauskopf, Ed., *The Reception of Unconventional Science*, Washington, D.C.: 1979.) In this instance, acceptance awaited an adequate explanation for the phenomenon (as was also the case with Semmelweis).


My impression, based on examining the huge relevant literature, is that its main thrust concerning our question can be indicated by observations of three famous people and one who continues not to be well known:

1. Walter Bagehot: "One of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea."
2. Niccolo Machiavelli: "The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new."
3. Oliver Heaviside (when his important contributions to mathematical physics had been ignored for 25 years): "Even men who are not Cambridge mathematicians deserve justice."

4. T.H. Huxley: "Authorities, 'disciples,' and 'schools' are the curse of science and do more to interfere with the work of the scientific spirit than all its enemies."

To generalize, a discovery is more likely to be accepted if it does not violate basic assumptions and/or interests of those who become acquainted with it, if they perceive there to be an advantage for them from accepting or adopting it, and if it is explainable to those who become acquainted with it.

The effectiveness studies in the population meeting my criteria can be regarded, therefore, as discoveries which are unlikely quickly to be utilized in spite of their relevance to the life spans of millions of people and to annual expenditures of hundreds of billions of dollars.

Can anything be done about this paradox?

Some Things Which Might Be Considered for Eventual Trial

I make two recommendations as follows:

1. One might be able to affect the perceptions, and thereby eventually the practices, of helpers.

   It is characteristic that helpers and those who make helping policy are seldom informed by the perception of other groups relevant to the helping.

   Consider Semmelweis. When he discovered that the death rate in the first clinic was several times that in the second, he need not have looked for the cause of childbed fever. He could instead, have tried to have the hospital closed down (since he knew that women giving birth in the gutters were safer than were women giving birth in his clinic.) He could have changed the hospital so that the two clinics were the same--most easily by beginning also to teach only midwives in the first clinic. This change would immediately have resolved the problem. He could have deployed midwives and midwife students throughout the neighborhoods, taking into his clinic only women with complications so grave that their chance of living would be greater in his clinic than outside it.
He apparently conceived of none of these solutions although we can suppose that the women patients wanted some such alternative and that midwives would have been receptive to it. Truly, every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing! And professions and disciplines provide ways of seeing.*

If, today, we wish not to inform the public of the implications of presently known and possible future effectiveness research concerning the helping professions, an alternative which may yet become necessary, then we might begin by providing that "outside" perspectives become vividly and interminably available to those who are important in the formation of helping policy and related research, education, and funding. For example, it may be possible to ensure that representatives of organizations of consumers of health and other helping services be included in the decision-making processes of the helping professions. Others who should be "counted in" include chairpersons of legislative committees which are central to funding helping enterprises and key members of their staffs, directors of relevant foundations, leading epidemiologists, public health professionals, public health nurses, sociologists of the helping professions, philosophers of science, historians of organized helping, and so forth.

My second and final recommendation is so complex that I will only sketch it here, leaving a systematic presentation for some future time. It is as follows:

The unfortunate fate of effectiveness research concerning the helping professions is increasingly likely as time goes on as it is a reflection of broad and accelerating tendencies within U.S. society. We should, therefore, look outside the helping professions if we wish to ensure their increasing cost-effectiveness.

*A fact abundantly illustrated, but inadequately researched. That socialization and the resulting perceptions are helped along by supporting institutional arrangements may be indicated by the fact that the UCLA Biomedical Library possesses no copy of Ivan Illich's famous critique of medicine, Medical Nemesis (New York: Pantheon, 1976) but two copies of David F. Horrobin's Medical Hubris: A Reply to Ivan Illich (Montreal: Edan, 1977).
Let me unpack this notion a little.

Especially in this century there has been the gathering momentum of large bureaucratic organizations and the consequent incorporation of people into them from early years until the end of life. As David Riesman argued in *The Lonely Crowd* (*The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950; Abridged Edition, 1965), (although with an explanation different from mine) this has resulted in a transformation of human nature in the United States. As compared to now, a higher proportion of Americans in 1900 were value-oriented: directed by fundamental assumptions of what was right, good, true, and so forth. Now, a higher proportion of Americans are situation-oriented: not directed primarily by standards arising independently of the circumstances of their adult lives.

Students in colleges and universities have spent nearly their entire lives moving from structured situation to different structured situation within a single general context, in each situation changing to meet the expectations of those around them. After graduation, they usually continue to be situation-oriented for the remainder of their lives. The structures of science, research, and higher education have likewise shifted from entrepreneurship alone or in small groups and organizations in the direction of large organizations. The general drift of social change, resulting in a concommitant shift in human nature, is also reflected in science, research, technology, higher education, and so forth. This change has also shifted the incentive system for intellectual and scientific work. Publication in intellectual and scientific sources is almost entirely for advancement in large organizations (universities included), and not an outgrowth of a search for truth or understanding. Within the helping professions, publications has also been for career advancement rather than for most cost-effective help for those in need.

As publication has gone, so has gone the rest of the lives of researchers and helpers. One needs only to display presumed brilliance to those who can affect one's career, one need not be brilliant at all. (Being brilliant would get embarrassing within organizations which tolerate only mediocrity.) People who may be described as 'fits' move up; misfits move out and down or remain where they are. And value-oriented people are always misfits.
The history of fundamental discoveries and innovations is instructive in exhibiting the kinds of person who are likely to make such contributions:

1. Persons with an understanding of reasoning (usually as it occurs in science);
2. Persons in marginal roles;
3. Persons engaged in some kind of practice; and
4. Value-oriented people

The best single introduction to that history has been provided by Joseph Ben-David ("Roles and Innovations in Medicine," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXIV, #6, May 1960, pp. 557-568.)

Considerable marginality. Marginal people tend disproportionately to develop tuberculosis, schizophrenia, alcoholism, to become accident victims, to commit suicide, to die early, to be poor, but, also, marginal people disproportionately are creative, initiators of new ideas and practices, become eminent men and women of science and philosophy, and understand (without necessarily prospering from) the social world which they inhabit.

The rise of people who are situationally oriented has, in the arenas of intellect and science, resulted in increasing numbers of "gesture people"--people who intimate enough to succeed without ever having to accomplish anything worthwhile. Such people produce ideas or knowledge only when under surveillance--and the surveillance has to be omnipresent and searching and competent if they are ever to amount to much. They move from situation to situation chameleon-like. Lacking continuity of concern with any basic problem, they lack the promise of such concern and, hence, cannot accomplish things which require a long time perspective and tenacity. Despite the enormous increase in the number of scientists, researchers, academics, and members of related disciplines, professions, and authors of associated publications, there has emerged what must be described as pervasive pathological science. (See, for example, Felix Franks' Polywater, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981.)

That the situation in science was not perfect even in Max Weber's time can be inferred from his Science as a Vocation, addressed to students, in which he wrote: "Do you in all conscience believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity
after mediocrity, year after year, climb beyond you, without becoming embittered and without coming to grief?" (Quoted in Warren O. Haggstrom, The Scientific Community, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1965). For a contrary contented view of the state of affairs in science, one might consult "The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir" by Robert K. Merton (pp. 3-141 in Merton and Jerry Gaston, Eds., The Sociology of Science in Europe, Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977.) Merton reports a world which is belied by the relevant data and which I have never observed, although if one remembers very selectively and from the perspective of the science establishment one may be able to write such a utopian memoir. The appearance of knowledge races on. Knowledge limps far behind. And virtually no one is engaged in trying to distinguish the two. Intellectual production has come to mean throwing a few diamonds into a great pile of paste imitations with no jeweler available subsequently to sort things out. Since large organizations are usually stable, the perspectives attached to them also tend to remain stable. Situationally oriented people may remain in a single organization-related assumptive world for all their lives. As Felix Franks suggested in a different context, had such an approach been taken "in the very early days of technical development, we would now possess the most superior stone axes but little else." (Ibid., p. 188).

Thus, situation oriented people change from context to context within stable limits—they lose both the benefit of continuity in working on a single set of problems and they also lost the benefits of being likely to acquire original ways of seeing.

Those who move up tend to be situation-oriented people who have disproportionately acquired interpersonal skills, who proclaim, but shudder at realizing, such values as creativity, since realizing them would interfere with their plausibility and safety in the minds of those above them. And these plausible people themselves end up as gatekeepers to decisions concerning resource and incentive allocation. Value-oriented people, typically implausible, are ignored or punished. The fits make good entertainers, may tell interesting anecdotes lifted from others, are skilled at the character assassination of rivals in such a way that their tactics don't bounce back on them, and are basically always conforming and conventional except, maybe, in superficial symbolic matters.

These situation-oriented successful people scorn such value-oriented questions as:
What do you mean by that?
How do you know that?
Why is that important?
What fundamentally new is to be done?

in favor of such questions as:

Where will that get you?
What's in it for me?
What can I get away with?
Why not be successful?

Within the helping professions, value-oriented people are concerned primarily effectively to meet needs; situation-oriented people are primarily self-concerned. This difference is reflected in the history of the helping professions as it has developed since the beginning of this century.

The preponderance of types today (and the view of that in the minority) may be indicated by Graham Hughes' cynical statement that: "One cannot throw off moral obligations by entering a profession," and his observations concerning people whose only talent is a talent for suffocating talent.

With this brief introduction in mind concerning what I conceive to be the problem, I will now venture some modest specific recommendations:

1. Develop a marginal discipline for a certain kind of marginal person: selection, education, and support for value-oriented people who want to work on some important problem over long periods of time and who choose to do so in relating to all available relevant knowledge from all fields, experiments, and experiences. They would be complete generalists. They would follow Norbert Wiener's advice: "If a problem leads us into a new field in which we have no knowledge, we should acquire such knowledge. It is no excuse, when working on a problem, to say 'but that's not my field.'" (Reported in J.C. Barker, Scared to Death, London: Muller, 1968.)

2. Build on the fact that competent researchers and scientists increasingly circulate papers before publication. Move to the next step of not publishing until there is some reason to suppose that important published work can be separated out from the rest for the use of people who need to base their intellectual struggles on actual ideas and/or knowledge. Help "vanity publications" to emerge in which
people can pay to get their work in print. (Most publications would become vanity publications.)

3. Systematically fund efforts to sift out from what has been published that tiny portion which is important, including that which can adequately be substantiated by reasons and evidence. Reward those who originate important work, even if it remains obscure, controversial, or baffling.

4. Require that university and other teachers label what they teach as important knowledge or non-knowledge which is important—and that they be required frequently to defend their labels.

5. Drastically alter the criteria in accordance with which research is now evaluated. It is rare in the history of science that any important advance has been made by way of a single application of a methodology. The question should not be one of methodology application in one study, but one of emerging important knowledge by way of a variety of studies involving careful thinking and rigorous reasoning carried out over a long period of time within a research tradition. Thus, one should pay no attention to whether a thousand ordinary studies lean in one direction. Ordinary studies are invalid and unimportant and completely worthless except for career promotion. The recruitment of rigor should be made both within and among research studies—they are thinking and reasoning chains, they are never merely additive.

6. Thomas Kuhn, having examined the history of science, has concluded that the social sciences are not cumulative. It is similarly doubtful that the helping professions have made an overall progress for many decades. Even medicine, the most prestigious of the lot, has, for more than a decade, given rise to comments from its leaders such as that of Franz J. Ingelburger, Editor Emeritus of the New England Journal of Medicine:

"If the whole spectrum of medical care is included, ranging from a pat on the back to transplantation of the heart, it is doubtful that the benefit-harm ratio of personalized medical care has changed appreciably over the last 100 years." (Science, Vol. 200, 16 May, 1978, p. 946.)
But how can there be progress without first paying attention to what that is actually known is important and relevant? Concerning most matters, given where we are, we now have to legitimate the statement "we don't know," and reward those who frequently use it. With the resulting release from the heavy pseudo-facticity of pseudo-knowledge, the imagination will be unfettered. As people become drawn into working on important problems, one can try to design situations which they can enter and which are likely to advance their work. I suggest the creation and institutionalization of carefully designed non-competitive small discussion groups which meet at least weekly, and in which all members who honestly try hard to contribute are carefully respected. Progress, of course, will be messy, disorderly, will veer back and forth, will leap forward at some times and lag at others. But the participation of serious, disciplined value-oriented people in such surroundings will provide the best chance for important progress to emerge. This suggestion indicates the distance we have now gone from Kurt Lewin's important early study, "Group Decision and Social Change," in Theodore M. Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley, Eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York: Henry Holt, 1947.

7. Select for advanced education value-oriented people characterized by wonder, imagination, tenacity, intellectual courage, a willingness to look carefully at data which violate his or her assumptions, etc. Do not select on the basis of grades, scores on the Graduate Record or other examinations, reference letters which do not describe and illustrate the above mentioned personal characteristics. Advanced education, as anyone who has recently examined the works mentioned in *Dissertation Abstracts* can attest, should be reduced to a tiny proportion of the students now involved in it.

8. The review process in journals, by funding sources, in employing organizations, now provides little more than legitimation for fashionable prejudice. Particularly, initial plausibility unrelated to careful analysis should be eschewed.

For example, suppose someone were to propose to study and compare two groups in relation to the intelligence of their members. One group would be composed of stupid people who had recently received advanced degrees from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Cambridge University and Oxford in England. The
other group would be composed of brilliant nonliterate people from England and the United States. I anticipate that such a study would initially appear implausible enough not to be well received by funding sources. Yet, since intelligence and formal education are not associated (although IQ and formal education are), and since formal education is associated with training people not to see, I imagine that sustained attention to the possibility of such research might well improve its chances.

9. Advertise in the public media (including television and radio) for deviant young people willing to contribute with hard work and thinking to the future of the people of our society without the prospect of getting rich and/or famous. Help promising residents into appropriate courses of action.

10. Reduce reliance on measurement and counting as major sources of decisions.

Abraham Maslow commented: "If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." Operationalization has become a ready source of hammers which get in the way of adequate perception. Counting and measuring have been driving out thinking, have distracted attention from significance, and have disadvantaged millions of people who have thereby become unfortunately labelled.

11. The teaching of research in advanced programs should de-emphasize design and methodology. These are trivia which anyone can learn at any time. Instead, advanced students should be taught how to become detectives for the resolutions of lacks of understanding and of fuzzynesses and the evaluation of their significances. At present, students get tools (tractor, cultivator, fertilizer, combine, milking machine, etc.)--but they are not being taught how to farm.

12. Effectiveness research should, for the most part, involve random assignment. Such studies should be supported at far higher levels than is now done. It is true that helpers often suppose that randomization is unethical. But consider. The National Association of Social Workers published a summary of its Code of Ethics which includes the statement: "The social worker's primary responsibility is to clients." Similar norms have been proclaimed in the other helping professions. But, human suffering cannot be
reduced by helping unless we know its outcome. Research presently available gives poignancy to Thomas' statement that: "Suffering is only marginally more tolerable when inflicted with the best intentions." (The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis?, London: The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1976, p. 158.) Instead of a few sporadic ad hoc studies, evaluation research should be systematic, thoughtful, continuously supported, with knowledge from outcomes fed into the helping processes.

13. We should examine certain kinds of nonevents with tenacious care: things of consequence which reasonably could be expected to happen but didn't.

14. We should take a scientific approach to the evaluation of these recommendations and assumptions related to them.

Conclusion

The term, 'iatrogenic,' came to be used in medicine by virtue of the fact that 'iatros' is the Greek word for physician and 'genesis' means origin. Thus, iatrogenic illness is taken to be physician-originated illness. (This usage has been expanded somewhat in recent years.)

In this note, we have been concerned with helper-originated harm. Since the modern Greek transliteration of 'helper' is 'voethos', I suggest that we refer to helper-originated harm as voethogenic harm (of which iatrogenic disease is one variety).

The notion of voethogenic harm has not here been spelled out, although it has been illustrated. In particular, the above examples lead to an emphasis of sins of commission, not those of omission—even though the latter should make up a substantial part of the whole. We will elsewhere explicate the range of applications of this term.*

*This note has incorporated some reflections accompanying my study of the thinking involved in helping. This note, of course, is very preliminary, and will be extensively revised at a later time, after my work has further progressed. The last few pages are especially problematic. The note only reflects where I happened to be on one afternoon of August, 1981. For contributing to my research, I wish to express my appreciation to my wife, Raquel, who has taught me so much, and to my daughter, Marni, who has been my sole relentless critic.
This study is concerned with objective alienation experienced by social service workers. To help understand this phenomenon, a Marxian sociological perspective will be used.

Marxian theory assumes that humans are self-conscious productive beings. Marxists believe that nothing is more natural than those activities we call work, for it is only through creative labor that humans demonstrate their full potential. Marxists also assert that human productivity is social in nature in that it is done in coordination with others. Thus, an analysis of the reasons why people might find themselves in dehumanizing work circumstances must begin with understanding the ways in which productive activity is organized in a society. When work activities separate people from their creative capacities, when people do not control production and productive activities, it degrades their humanity. This organized degradation may be referred to as alienation. Marx concluded that 19th century capitalist social relations around the means of production were alienating.

Alienation may be understood along an objective-subjective continuum. "Objective alienation" refers to those conditions that inhere in the organization of work that separate people from control over productive activity. "Subjective alienation" refers to those feelings and attitudes that separation from control over productive activity may engender in people. The two are related but may vary independently of each other depending on a number of social and psychological conditions.

The twentieth century witnessed an increase in occupational categories whose relationship to production seemingly differed from nineteenth century working class occupations. Some have concluded from this that "post industrial" society had created a thriving middle class of unalienated labor (Wilensky, 1966; Bell, 1973). Others have argued that the duties and relationship to production of many of these "white collar" occupations closely
resembled that of the working class proletariat of which Marx spoke (Hills, 1951; Braverman, 1974; Edward, 1979).

Social service occupations are among these new middle class occupations. Especially among those with professional degrees, one hears claims of being part of a professional cadre, governed by collegiality, with a code of ethics and a unique knowledge base that protects practice from administrative domination (Greenwood, 1958). However, there is little empirical evidence to support this belief (Epstein and Conrad, 1968; Wagner and Cohen, 1978). For anyone familiar with the conditions of work that prevail, it would be difficult to conclude that work in the social services is free of alienation.

RESEARCH CONCERNS

This study follows the path of a small number of sociologists who attempted to test Marxian ideas using empirical methods (Archibald, 1976; Wright and Perrone, 1977; Thompson, 1979). Until recently, the work of Seeman (1959) and Blauner (1964) represented the major attempts to apply a Marxian perspective in this manner. Both, however, focused on the subjective aspects of alienation. Blauner also emphasized the division of labor as a function of technology, rather than social organization around the means of production. Similarly, a study by Murdia (1979) of social service workers in India emphasized the subjective aspects of their alienation and did not follow a Marxian approach.

The work of Braverman (1974) has particularly influenced this study. Using qualitative methods, he focused on the objective aspects of alienation. Thompson (nd), using data collected from survey research, tested some of Braverman's ideas and in so doing demonstrated the utility of such methods.

Thus, this study is concerned with objective alienation among social service workers. Two types will be operationalized. "Societal alienation" will refer to those degrading work conditions which derive from the conflict between the ideals of the welfare state and the ideals of capitalism. Organizational alienation will refer to those degrading conditions which derive from control over the organization and delivery of service by capitalist ideals and interests.

Two general hypotheses guide the study. It is hypothesized (1) that the closer social service workers find themselves to situations which conform to the ideals of a capitalist economy, the less they will experience societal and organizational alienation; and (2) that objective alienation will vary according to
class position and to the status one has within the social services.

METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE

A questionnaire was mailed to social service workers in a large metropolitan area of the northwest United States. The sample was not random and no claims will be made as to the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, the sample is large and representative of many who work in the social services. The sample includes the entire membership of NASW in the area. An accidental sample of MSW's not members of NASW is included. The sample includes the universe of social service workers in Adult and Family Services in the area and the universe of social service workers of various branches within the Children's Services Division. Finally, an accidental sample of workers in the juvenile court is included.

In all, some 1400 questionnaires were distributed. Of these, 518 usable questionnaires were returned by the date expected. Some indication of the representativeness of these 518 can be given. The same proportion of male to female NASW members is reflected in the usable as in the sent questionnaires. There appears to have been a significantly higher return rate among those with an MSW and within NASW. Since it is being predicted that those with greater status will experience less alienation, the sample should underestimate the extent of alienating circumstances among social service workers as a whole.

NASW members and private practitioners had questionnaires mailed directly to their homes. Questionnaires for public social service workers were distributed at work. Permission was obtained from agency heads with the agreement that respondents had the complete right to refuse to respond to any and all items.

The delicacy of many of the items on the questionnaire undoubtedly influenced the response rate, the responses given and the willingness to respond to particular items. One area especially affected was that on information about the respondent. Table 1 indicates a rather high no response to items that could identify the respondent.

Consistent with the hypothesis that objective alienation will vary as a function of integration into services, three types of independent variables may be described: class, status and conformity to capitalist ideals. While these are not completely separable, they are analytically distinct. Type of practice, private practice vs agency practice, may be thought of as a measure
of social class since private practitioners, according to Marxian theory, own and control the means of their service while agency workers sell their labor power in the market. The measure is not a pure one, however, for it includes those who work full-time and part-time as private practitioners, with many of the latter also working in agencies. Nevertheless, since this distinction is so important in Marxian theory it is important to explore it. Status or prestige differences may also be noted in the sample. A full 28% of the sample were men, some 55% had graduate degrees, 55% were affiliated with at least one professional association (usually NASW), and almost 30% were ACSW. Likewise, 23.5% held administrative and supervisory positions, 11.4% were titled "therapist" or "counselor," 20% held the lower level line worker position of "social worker" and 30% held titles of "caseworker" or "worker aide." Thus sex, educational attainment, professional membership and job title may all be thought of as measures of status within the social services. The third type of independent variable may be described as conformity with the ideals of capitalism. Private agencies are more compatible with capitalist ideals of "charity" than are public services which are more compatible with socialist ideals of "right." Over 23% of the sample worked in the private sector. Finally, unions pose a greater threat to capitalism than do professional associations; 38.4% of the sample were union members.

FINDINGS

A. Societal Alienation

The concept of societal alienation derives from Marxian theory on the social services. Social services are seen as an arena of class struggle with, on the one hand, social service workers having to regulate and control recipients (Piven and Cloward, 1971) and, on the other, having to represent and respect the demands of recipients (Corrigan, 1977). The conflicts produced by such a contradiction generate alienating conditions with which service workers must contend.

To operationalize this concept, respondents were given a series of descriptive phrases and were asked to indicate on a six point Likert type scale the degree to which the phrases described the conditions of their work. It is important to note that they were not asked to express sentiments or to express feelings of alienation which would be more in keeping with an operationalization of subjective alienation. The phrases included such descriptions as "stable funding," "clients who come willingly," "good community resources" and the like which were then coded in terms of degree of alienation.
A factor analysis of the items led to the construction of two indices as shown in Table 2. Only items with a factor loading greater than .40 were included. The first factor (hereafter, variable) incorporates four items and will be referred to as "community support" after the item that loaded most heavily on the factor and in keeping with the combined sense of the items. The second factor, incorporating two items, will be referred to as "market problems" and describes financial support for program and worker.

Table 2 indicates that social service workers experience a good amount of societally induced alienation. With the exception of one item, at least 20% of the social service workers note that they find themselves in situations that may be described as "high" and "very high" alienation, and in three of these this rises to over 30%. Thus, 20.2% describe situations of low community status, 23.2% describe a high lack of community support, 30.6% a high lack of stable funding, 42.3% very limited resources and 1.6% a high number of clients with severe economic problems, a problem intimately related to capitalism and generating much of the tension between welfare and capitalist ideals. Furthermore, on all but one of these the median response is over three indicating that the majority of respondents report a significant amount of alienation.

On only one of the six items making up the two indices is this pattern broken. On the item of personal job security, slightly more than 15% admit to high or very high alienation while the median response is 2.48 indicating that the majority did not feel particularly threatened by the possible loss of their position. This result is surprising and possible reasons for it will be explored in the conclusion of the paper.

B. Organizational Alienation

Organizational alienation refers to those micro-structural conditions that affect work in the social services and that derive from the way in which the social services are organized. The idea of organizational alienation represents the traditional Marxian concern with alienation from production and productive activity. Two points of clarification need to be made.

Social service workers cannot be said to produce a product, rather they give a service. Yet the similarity between those who produce and those who serve cannot be denied (Braverman, 1974:410-423). Thus the problem of alienation from "service activities" and from the "service" is a legitimate concern. Similarly, some may contend that social services are not organized on a capitalist
basis since, in general, their purpose is not profit. Especially in the public sector, one might conclude that the social services are organized on a socialist basis. A Marxist perspective on the function of the state would argue that government run and controlled services in a capitalist society would incorporate the organizational ideals of capitalism (Harrington, 1976). The result is that autonomous and creative mental activity is continuously separated from dependent, structured and routine activity in government agencies as well as in private, for profit enterprises. To the extent that social service work lacks autonomy, is controlled from without and routinized it is alienating.

Once again respondents were given a series of descriptive phrases and asked to indicate on a six point scale the degree to which the phrases described the conditions of their work. Table 3 shows twelve items making up an index of organizational alienation. This scale represents the first factor of an unrotated principle factor solution. As such it delineates the largest pattern of relationship in the data and defines the greatest amount of variation (Rummel, 1967). It is presented here in order to simplify a more complicated rotated factor solution. In addition, although such a large series of items leads to a significant loss in numbers, the separate rotated factor do not lead to any different conclusions. Thus, the factor may be thought of as a general measure of organizational alienation.

The results presented in Table 3 indicate a rather high amount of objective organizational alienation. On nine of the twelve items the median response is greater than 3.0 indicating that the majority of workers possess a substantial level of alienation. In addition, in 11 of the 12 items, at least 20% of the respondents indicate what might be described as high to very high alienation; in seven of these items, the percentage rises to over thirty.

C. Objective Alienation and Integration Into the Social Services

Table 4 assesses the relationship between the variable market problems, pertaining to job stability and program funding, and integration into the social services. No support for a hypothesis linking class, status or conformity to the ideals of capitalism with this type of objective alienation may be found. Not one of the eight measures tested reaches statistical significance.

Table 5 shows the relationship between community support and integration into the social services. No support is found for a hypothesis linking sexual status to this type of alienation. With
respect to all other measures, however, clear support for the hypotheses is shown.

Those in private practice report significantly less objective societal alienation stemming from problems of community support than those practicing in agencies. Those with graduate degrees report significantly less alienation than those with less than a graduate degree. Interestingly, no other variation according to education is evident. Those in professional associations and those with ACSW report significantly less alienation than those not in associations and without the title.

The findings with respect to job title prove somewhat unexpected. A curvilinear function appears evident. Those in administrative positions and those on the low level front line positions report significantly more problems of community support than do social workers and therapist/counselors. Indeed, therapist/counselors appear to experience significantly less alienation than any other category.

Those in private agency settings report significantly less alienation than do those working in public settings. Finally, those in unions report significantly more alienation than those not in unions.

Table 6 describes the relationship between objective organizational alienation and the integration of social service workers into social welfare. By definition, one should not expect private practitioners to report organizational alienation since they do not work in organizations. As noted previously, however, the measure of class position includes some part-time private practitioners who also work in agencies. Thus, while some private practitioners report organizational alienation, they report significantly less of it than people who only work in agency settings.

Those with a graduate degree report significantly less organizational alienation than those with less than a graduate degree. Those reporting membership in professional associations and those with the title ACSW indicate significantly less organizational alienation than those without these. Those in administrative positions report significantly less alienation than those in front line caseworker positions. However, those in positions of social worker and especially those in therapist/counselor positions do not appear to experience significantly more alienation than do the administrators and supervisors.
D. Multivariate Analysis

The results so far indicate that it is possible to talk of significant statistical relationships between the way in which social service workers are integrated into service activities and the experience of objective alienation deriving from problems in the organization of services and problems of community support. It remains to explore which among the various categories of integration contributes most to our understanding of these two types of objective alienation. By using a multi-variate technique, multiple classification analysis (MCA), the cumulative and relative importance of predictor variables may be assessed.

MCA requires that the dependent or criterion variable be measured on an interval scale (Nie, et al., 1975). Each of the items used in creating the indices was measured on a Likert type instrument which can be said to approximate an equal interval scale. An examination of the means, standard deviations, peakedness and skewedness of the distributions resulting from each of the two indices suggest that they are relatively normatively distributed. On this basis MCA will be undertaken.

MCA makes no requirements with respect to level of measurement of independent or predictor variables. Since it is based on analysis of variance techniques, however, it assumes orthogonality among the variables. When cell distribution is not equal, as is often the case in survey research, orthogonality may not be assumed and thus the existence of interaction effects must be carefully examined. While Tables 7 and 8 do not present the analysis of interaction effects, the reader should note that in no instance were significant effects uncovered.

MCA accepts up to five predictor variables. After analysing the cross-tabulations among the seven independent variables that related significantly, it was decided to submit three predictor variables: type of setting, education of worker, and job title. The other variables appeared so completely related to these that further analysis of them seemed unnecessary. For instance, union membership was, by definition, a function of working in a public agency; ACSW completely a function of educational attainment; professional association membership highly related to education and to working in a private agency. Type of practice would have made an important fourth variable but owing to the small number of exclusively private practitioners in the sample a more in-depth analysis was not possible.
I. Community Support and Integration Into Social Services

Table 7 summarizes the results of an MCA analysis and the analysis of variance on which it is based. The reader should note that the \( n \) is 414 representing a loss of 20% of the sample. In assessing this loss, it should be realized that the analysis leaves out the some thirty who work exclusively as private practitioners. The remaining losses derive from no response on either the predictor or criterion variables. Examining the reduction in \( n \)'s suggests a rather equal loss among all categories of predictor variables with the exception of those with graduate degrees. It appears that those with graduate degrees were more likely not to complete all items of the questionnaire. This suggests that the results will underestimate differences in alienation as a function of education.

The Multiple \( R \) for the relationship between the three predictor variables and the criterion variable is a strong .508. The \( R^2 \) indicates that approximately 26% of the variation in community support is accounted for by introducing the three predictor variables of education, types of setting and job title.

The Eta (correlation) coefficients of the three variables before accounting for any of the others is .40, .42, and .35 respectively. That is, initially each variable demonstrates a moderately strong and relatively equal correlation with community support. The Beta (partial correlation) coefficients, however, demonstrate a very different pattern. Clearly, the most important of the three is type of setting (.32). Education drops to .22 and job title to .11. By examining the analysis of variance, it becomes apparent that while type of setting and education continue to contribute significantly, once job title is controlled it does not significantly contribute to our understanding of this form of societal alienation.

II. Organizational Alienation and Integration Into Social Services

Table 8 gives the results of a second MCA procedure. The \( n \) in this analysis drops even lower than in the previous analysis. Besides the reasons already noted, the reader should be aware that the index on which the criterion variable was based included some twelve items; missing data on any one drops the respondent from inclusion in the scale. Once again, there seems to be a disproportionate drop among those with graduate degrees and there also appears to be a disproportionate drop among those in supervisory...
and administrative positions. Thus, the results should underestimate differences in alienation as a function of education and job title.

The multiple R is a rather strong .592 with the $R^2$ indicating that 35% of the variance in organizational alienation is accounted for by simultaneously examining education, type of setting and job title.

The first order Eta correlations once again suggest that all three are moderately strongly and equally related to organizational alienation. The second order Beta coefficients indicate that each of the three, even after being controlled, equally contributes to our understanding of this form of objective alienation. This is also supported by the analysis of variance which demonstrates that each predictor, even when controlled, continues to be significantly related to the criterion variable.

Because job title in the single order analysis frequently demonstrated a curvilinear function, further examination is instructive. The reader should note that in the adjusted deviations, there is a rather linear function apparent with caseworkers and aides reporting more organizational alienation than social workers who, in turn, report more organizational alienation than therapist/counselors. As before, therapist/counselors are no more likely to report alienation than administrators/supervisors. If one recalls that there is a disproportionate drop in the number of administrative staff who supplied information, it could be contended that with more data an even stronger linear correlation might be found.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The findings lend support for the utility of using a Marxian framework for understanding alienation among social service workers. There is reason to believe, like Thompson (1979), that objective alienation may be measured fruitfully using survey techniques. In this study, three types were operationalized, two that relate to societal alienation and one that relates to organizational alienation. Analysis of responses to items making up these measures demonstrates that social service workers report a good amount of objective alienation. On almost all items, most workers give responses indicating that they must deal with a good amount of alienating work circumstances. The use of such objective measures appears to lead to the kind of prediction Marxian theorists have assumed but which frequently has not been found when more subjective measures have been used (Archibald, 1976).

The real test of theory, however, is its ability to predict. It was predicted that the experience of structural alienation would vary as a function of the way social service workers are integrated around the means of service. While most predictions held, support for some was not found. No support is found for a hypothesis linking the sexual status of workers with the experience of any of the three forms of structural alienation measured.

Perhaps, however, the major contradiction to the Marxian hypothesis is that the integration of social service workers does not appear to be significantly related to alienation deriving from market problems, problems relating to job security. This is a troublesome finding that requires further analysis. Two possible explanations may be advanced. The first suggests that the results are spurious and stem from the historical situation surrounding the mailing of the questionnaire. The survey was distributed immediately after major cutbacks in the public services and it may be that those who survived the cuts were experiencing a sense of security that the worse was over and so underestimated the importance of market problems. Similarly, the survey was mailed immediately following President Reagan's election but before any specific cuts were made. This might have made large sectors of the private, but federally dependent, services more apprehensive than they might otherwise have been. It may be that this combination of under and overestimation might have reduced the differences that might otherwise exist.

A second possible explanation is that the results are not spurious but an artifact of the internalization of market values -672-
among social service workers. As some have noted (Blauner, 1964; Seeman, 1967), workers in the twentieth century have become inured to the market system such that they do not expect job security.

Negative findings aside, strong support for the relationship between integration into services and the other two forms of structural alienation was found. Statistically significant relationships are reported between type of practice, type of setting, educational background, membership in professional associations, ACSW membership, union membership and job title and measures of objective alienation deriving from problems of community support and problems of autonomy and creativity on the job.

The findings on type of practice suggest that there might be significant class differences among social service workers in that private practitioners report significantly less alienation than those working in agencies. The small number of exclusively private practitioners in the sample did not allow for a full analysis of this possibility.

Multivariate analysis indicates that type of setting and educational background contribute in an especially strong way to our understanding of the dynamics of objective alienation. People with graduate degrees are more likely to find the kind of position that insulates them from alienation, thus there is support that professionalization diminishes alienation. The data also indicate that in spite of their dependence on federal funding, private agencies have been able to maintain professional working conditions to a far greater extent than public agencies. A Marxian explanation would stress that their underlying historical purpose, that of offering charity, frees them from the kind of public debate and stigmatization that public agencies must endure.

Job title or rank does not contribute significantly to our understanding of alienation deriving from problems of community support. When education and practice setting are controlled, those in administrative positions are as likely as others to perceive a lack of community support. This makes sense since administrators (although not necessarily supervisors) must deal with the community just as much as line workers, albeit at different levels.

Job title, on the other hand, does contribute significantly to our understanding of organizational alienation. Those in high organizational positions, who administer policy, make decisions and control line staff, and possibly counselor/therapists, who represent autonomous line workers within services, will experience less organizational alienation than lower level line workers.
These results may only be put forth tentatively. The sample is not a random one, although it makes up a large number of workers in a particular metropolitan area, and there are losses in numbers deriving from the delicacy of the subject matter. Nevertheless, if the results hold up to further scrutiny, they help make sense of a number of seemingly diverse phenomena in the social services: increasing concern over burn-out, continuing flight of MSW's from the poor and from the public services, continuing concern for professional status, the struggle for licensing among "clinical" social workers, the resilience of private agencies, and the growth of undergraduate education. Each of these concerns may be interpreted as attempts to call attention to the difficulties being faced on jobs and to escape into positions that give greater promise for community support, autonomy and creativity.

The question is whether the choices made by social service workers or by the associations and unions that represent them are choices which promise an end to alienating work conditions. From a Marxian perspective, many of the choices being made appear of doubtful benefit to the worker, the society and the client being served. They appear to lead to increasing hierarchical relations among social service workers generating conflict and competition which can only lead to a weakening of the profession as a whole and of its moderating influence over the negative aspects of capitalism.
Table 1: Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Practice</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pv't Practice</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Time</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Time</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.84</td>
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<td>Agency Practice</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>81.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.21</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of Setting</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>P'vt Setting</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Setting</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA (Pv't Practice)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Respondent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>63.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>55.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some Grad. Studies</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA, BS, BSW</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No College</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Assn.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACSW</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admin/Supervisor</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapist/Counselor</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseworker</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Member</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2: Societal Alienation Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>% high</th>
<th>Mdn</th>
<th>alienation</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY SUPPORT</td>
<td>community support</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low community status</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>limited resources</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>severe economic problems</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET PROBLEMS</td>
<td>job stability</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stable funding</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. N = 518
b. The designation "high alienation" includes those responses, after recoding to account for direction, of "descriptive" or "very descriptive" of alienating work circumstances.
c. The items appear as they appeared in the questionnaire. The reader should note that in scoring each item, the scores were recoded so that a score of one equalled no alienation while a score of six equalled very high alienation.

Table 3: Organizational Alienation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>% high</th>
<th>Mdn</th>
<th>alienation</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>paper work</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choice of clients/persons</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large work load</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frequent changes</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation in policy</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time enough to work</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flexible procedures</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>routine work</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclear expectations</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to administration</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a rules manual</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comfortable work areas</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. N = 518
b. The designation of "high alienation" includes those responses, after recoding to account for direction, of "descriptive" or "very descriptive" of alienating work circumstances.
c. The items appear as they appeared in the questionnaire. The reader should note that in scoring each item, the scores were recoded so that a score of one equalled no alienation while a score of six equalled very high alienation.
Table 4: Market Problems and Integration Into Social Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE OF INTEGRATION</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>t/Fa</th>
<th>pb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Practice</td>
<td>Private Practice</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-.85</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agency Practice</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Setting</td>
<td>Private Setting</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Setting</td>
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<td>104</td>
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<td>Caseworker</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a. For readers not familiar with "t" or "F," the "t" has been computed on variables of more than two groups.

b. Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or less. None of the test statistics presented reach statistical significance.

c. Where n's do not sum to 518, the difference is accounted for by missing cases.
Table 5: Community Support and Integration Into Social Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE OF INTEGRATION</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>n&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>t/F&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>p&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Agency Practice</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Type of Setting</td>
<td>Private Setting</td>
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<td>9.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Caseworker</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a. The "t" has been computed on variables with only two groups, while "F" has been computed on variables of more than two groups.

b. Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or less.

c. Where n's do not sum to 518, the difference is accounted for by missing cases.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>NATURE OF INTEGRATION</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>t/F</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3.26</td>
<td>10.27</td>
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<td>Public Setting</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a. The "t" has been computed on variables of only two groups while the "F" has been computed on variables of more than two groups.

b. Statistical significance requires a probability of .05 or less.

c. Where n's do not sum to 518 the difference is accounted for by missing cases.
### Table 7: Community Support and Integration Into Social Services (MCA)

#### Analysis of Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variance</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>x²</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>32.48</td>
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#### Multiple Classification Analysis

**Grand Mean** 3.46

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>n</th>
<th>Deviation from Grand Mean</th>
<th>Eta</th>
<th>adjusted deviations</th>
<th>BETA</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>-0.11</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*N = 414*

*R = .508*

*R² = .258*
Table 8: Organizational Alienation and Integration Into Social Services (MCA)

Analysis of Variance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source of Variance</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>x²</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
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<td>0.00</td>
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Multiple Classification Analysis

Grand Mean 3.82

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<th>Eta</th>
<th>adjusted deviations</th>
<th>BETA</th>
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<td>Soc Wkr</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

N = 374

R = .592

R² = .351
FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


1979 Thompson, S. Gotch, "An Investigation of the Proletarianization of Labor Using Survey Data" (Tuskegee Institute, Alabama 36088).


The Social Work Profession and the
Ideology of Professionalization

by

Stanley Wenocur & Michael Reisch
University of Maryland
School of Social Work & Community Planning

The idea of Christian brotherly love... in a society founded on serfdom remains an unrealizable and, in this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive for the conduct of the individual. To live consistently in the light of brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on the same principle is impossible. The individual in his personal conduct is always compelled--in so far as he does not resort to breaking up the existing social structure--to fall short of his own nobler motives.

Karl Mannheim (1936: 195)

Introduction

The phenomenon of professionalization has been an exceptionally powerful force in Western industrialized countries for more than a century. "The professions are as characteristic of the modern world as the crafts were of the ancient," said Stephen R. Graubard in the preface to The Professions in America (1963). Talcott Parsons (1968) declared that "The development and increasing strategic importance of the professions probably constitute the most important change that has occurred in the occupational system of modern countries." Dry statistics alone bear out these views. In the United States "professionals" increased in the population from 859 per 100,000 in 1870 to 3,310 in 1950 (Goode, 1957). In absolute numbers professional and technical workers increased from 350,000 in 1870 to 12.5 million in 1974. In 1900 professional and technical workers represented only 4.3% of the workforce; by 1970 they were 14.4% (Galper, 1975: 56).
Professional and Technical Workers in the United States: 1870-1974 (April)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1974</th>
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<td></td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>1,655,270</td>
<td>3,497,100</td>
<td>4,490,000</td>
<td>11,140,000</td>
<td>12,446,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are indicative of profound changes in our political economy, characterized by some observers in the 1970's as "post-industrial" (Bell, 1973; Heilbroner, 1973; Gartner and Riessman, 1974). Its central feature is that economic growth has shifted from the goods-producing sectors to the information and service-producing sectors. The dramatic growth of social work in the last two decades (recent cut-backs notwithstanding) has been part of this larger shift in the political economy, as the expansion of the welfare state has been a substantial ingredient of service sector expansion.

The figures on the growth of professional and technical workers mask a considerable amount of conflict about professionalization and its implications for social democracy. Professions are an integral part of our system of social stratification. In terms of status and rewards, they lie near the top of the occupational hierarchy, much higher than technical occupations. The citadels of professionalism are carefully protected by ideological, political, and economic barriers. In 1970 some 2,200 occupations required highly skilled workers. In a study decrying this "professionalization of everyone," Wilensky (1964), a sociologist, could only find 18 occupations at best, including social work, that might make a reasonable claim to professional status.

Social workers have coveted professional status. Their desire and the course of their struggle for its realization have been shaped by broader political economic conditions. At the same time social workers as professionals have also struggled to create a more egalitarian and a qualitatively richer society. (Other professionals have also done so.) These conflicting interests have created a unique tension within social work, a kind of marginal consciousness about its position in society. Because of it, social workers occasionally have been able to reflect on their role...
in preserving practices and institutions that perpetuate inequi-
ties. This kind of self-conscious deliberation requires an atten-
tion to political economic analysis. Naturally it has been
strongest during periods of cataclysmic social upheaval, when the
total society has been forced to focus on political economic con-
ditions. But it has also appeared at other times as a kind of
consistent counterpoint to social work's main themes. When it
happens, social workers expand their capacity to shape the charac-
ter of their work.

The ideology surrounding professions has obscured social
work's past and present relationships to political economic
events. Both the schools and the professional associations whose
purpose is to advance professionalization usually fail to examine
social work critically from this perspective. One consequence is
that social workers always seem to be contending with a series of
recurrent professional issues—whether schools should train
generic or specialist practitioners; whether caseworkers should be
involved in social reform and reformers in casework; whether or
not private practice is a "sell-out", etc.—whose relevance and
implications cannot be thoroughly assessed because their political
economic character is washed out. Another consequence is that the
options that social workers might have for working towards social
construction are not fully explored.

Sociological Perspectives on Professionalization

Because "an industrializing society is a professionalizing
society" (Goode, 1960), prevailing ideas about professions and the
quest for professionalization have more than academic significance
for an aspiring occupation. They serve as an ideological screen
through which other societal events are sifted out, either to be
acted on or neglected. To comprehend the effects on social work
of its struggle for professional status, we need to make explicit
the screens through which professionalization has customarily been
viewed, as well as our own position.

The ideology of professions appears in two important forms.
The first, which will not be our focus here, concerns the degree
to which the scientific-technical knowledge base within a particu-
lar profession—the sine qua non for claimants to the title—is
riddled with ideology, and the circumstances wherein this
ideological content is most likely to arise. Scientific princi-
ples informing practice are seldom complete enough to enable prac-
titioners to explain, control, or predict all the practice situa-
tions they encounter. In order for professions to maintain an
aura of competence, consensually validated ideologies—beliefs,
normative principles, expectations, and "practice wisdom"—fill the gaps, also leaving room for competing ideological belief systems to arise. These ideological elements are especially likely to surface (1) when a professional field experiences social pressures to produce "professional" behavior, (2) where the application of theory to practice requires or allows for a high degree of subjectivity, intuition, or particularistic values, and (3) where the content and behavior of professional practice involves many moral and ethical considerations (Holzner and Marx, 1979: 258,6).

The second form of professional ideology deals with the bits and pieces of ideology surrounding professionalization. These are the empirically unproven assumptions, values, and theories attached to the idea of professions and taken as "truths" that offer an interpretation of their relationship to man, nature, and society in its parts and as a dynamic whole. Aspiring occupational groups have fallen back on such ideological material to pursue their claims to professional status; established professions use it to maintain their privileged position.

The Structural-Functional and Processual Perspectives

The structural-functional perspective has probably been the most powerful lens through which professions have been studied. It is rife with ideology. In this view, professions are part of the natural elaboration of an organic social structure accompanying modernization. The social and technological changes set off by the industrial revolution created specialized needs that could no longer be met by traditional institutions like family businesses and small communities. In the economic sphere, new occupations arose in response to these needs. As they developed a distinctive and "responsible" expertise based on scientific-technical knowledge and an ethical code, they gained community sanction and progressed up the occupational ladder to professional rank. Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958: 286-7) offer a clear illustration of this perspective in their explanation for why "demand" for a profession of social work arose.

Specialization itself, a prerequisite for professionalism, is the result of the underlying industrialization process. Rising productivity and income not only permit but force the eventual withdrawal of population from farming and manufacturing. These people are channeled into the tertiary service "industries"—service professions and occupations of all kinds, from physicians and social workers to beauticians and television repair service men...
The growth in scale and complexity of social organizations—business corporations, labor unions, professional groups, social agencies, units of government—is likewise a factor, because it creates a demand for liaison and contact men of all kinds. We need guides, so to speak, through a new kind of civilized jungle. Social work is an example par excellence of the liaison function...

Also involved in the shift towards professionalization is the prestige of science... The empirical, critical, rational spirit of science has found its way into nearly every type of activity in America. And it has become particularly important to social work because the neighboring, established professions, especially medicine, to which social work looks for its model of professionalism, stresses scientific knowledge as the basis for professional practice.

The functional importance and positive contribution of professions to the larger society is a central assumption of the structural/functional perspective. Professions are seen as rational, "stabilizing elements in society." "They engender modes of life, habits of thought, and standards of judgement which render them centers of resistance to crude forces which threaten steady and peaceful evolution"... They function "to bring knowledge to the service of power" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 497, 499). They "dominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of authoritarianism and capitalistic exploitation" (Parsons, 1968: 546). On an international level, professions even help to maintain world order through the communication among intellectual leaders of different countries (Lynn, 1965: xiii).

In the sociology of professions, structural-functionalists have devoted a good deal of energy to investigating the attributes that distinguish professions from other occupations. A core list of attributes culled from this work would be as follows (Holzner and Marx, 1979; Ritzer, 1972: 1) an abstract, theoretical knowledge base; 2) an esoteric, specialized, technical skill; 3) a long period of training and socialization; 4) strong professional subculture and ideology; 5) lifelong commitment to a structured career; 6) autonomy of action; 7) a formal occupational association; 8) control over training and legal licensing; 9) a code of ethics and/or a client-centered orientation—the service ideal.
With the exceptions of the archetypes of law and medicine, however, sociologists disagree as to which occupations actually meet the criteria. The solution to this troublesome problem has been to place occupations on a continuum of professionalization with the ideal-types of law and medicine demarcating the outer professional pole and other unskilled occupations, such as janitoring, the opposite non-professional pole. Then the more of the "differentia specifica" (Barber, 1965) held by an occupational group, usually with heavier weighting for scientific knowledge combined with a formalized service ideal, the higher the rating on the scale of professionalization (Greenwood, 1957). This approach has lent support to labeling some occupations as "emergent," or "marginal" (Wilensky, 1964), or "semi-professional" (Etzioni, 1969), based on possession of these attributes in only moderate degree.

The structural-functional perspective, as the name implies, derives from that particular theoretical perspective in sociology. The processual approach has focused mainly on the question of how occupations actually achieve the status of professions. This emphasis, more than a particular sociological perspective, is what distinguishes it from the structural-functional. Authors who have studied the process of professionalization draw on functionalism as well as social exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, and conflict theory.

Though not incompatible with functional assumptions about the role of professions in society, in general, examinations of the process of professionalization have revealed that the elaboration of social structure is not an inherently orderly process and that occupational groupings play an active part in engineering their changes in status. The view is a politically pluralistic, dynamic one wherein occupational prestige, treated as a scarce resource, becomes the object of competing interests within a single occupational sphere or in the larger division of labor, or both. Social changes create conditions necessitating specialization, professionalization, and bureaucratization, but these necessary conditions are not sufficient in and of themselves to account for the differential rise of occupations in the status hierarchy. If the conditions are right (a situation to be viewed dynamically rather than statically), an occupational grouping or sub-segment, much like a social movement, can organize itself and act strategically to improve its occupational ranking (Bucher and Strauss, 1961).

Several authors have outlined the steps or stages over time of the professionalization process (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933; Caplow, 1954; Hughes, 1958; Wilensky, 1964). They generally agree on the substance of the steps, if not on the particular sequence.
For our purposes, Wilensky's summary is illustrative (1964: 145-46).

In sum, there is a typical process by which the established professions have arrived: men begin doing the work full time and stake out a jurisdiction; the early masters of technique or adherents of the movement become concerned about standards of training and practice and set up a training school, which if not lodged in universities at the outset makes academic connection within two or three decades; the teachers and activists then achieve success in promoting more effective organization, first local, then national--through either the transformation of an existing occupational association or the creation of a new one. Toward the end, legal protection of the monopoly of skill appears; at the end, a formal code of ethics is adopted.

"Many occupations engage in heroic struggles for professional identification; few make the grade" (Wilensky, 1964). Therefore, for the processualists, attributes that the structural-functionalists consider as static distinguishing characteristics, particularly scientific-technical knowledge and professional norms, may be used strategically by an occupational group or subsegment to advance their status goals and to debase the competing claims of other groups. In simplified outline, the knowledge-skill base links the concept of profession in the public mind to the prestige and positive ideology of science and higher learning; the service ideal separates professionalized occupations from commercial enterprises. Other traits are derivative of these. To gain sophisticated technical skill and scientific knowledge, a lengthy training period is required in a university, which at the same time provides a thorough socialization-into-the-profession experience. University sanction also furnishes a valuable stamp of legitimation to the aspiring group which enables them to claim the privileges from society of autonomy of action, control over its training, authority over its clientele in functionally specific areas, and eventually the legal right to title and domain through licensing and/or other benefits. The claims of an occupation to these various privileges are further bolstered by promotion of a professional code of ethics and service ideal, which also serves to reassure the public that the interests of the client and the community will take precedence over the desire for commercial profit.

In some instances, the processual line of inquiry has challenged functional assumptions about the homogeneity among members of a profession. Rather than studying individual professions as
communities of shared values, identification, roles, and interests and then identifying the mechanisms that help to create this cohesiveness, such as socialization and selectivity processes (Goode, 1957), Bucher and Strauss (1962: 326) argued that professions are "loose amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in different manners and more or less held together under a common name at a particular period in history." Within organized medicine, the prototypical profession, one can find great divergences, for example, according to specializations (radiology vs. pathology vs. family medicine); sense of mission to support special expertise (within surgery, the struggles between proctology and urology for separate identities); work activities (the public health physician vs. the anesthesiologist); methodology and techniques (within psychology the physiologists vs. the therapist); client relationships (the pathologists with little patient contact vs. clinicians). Given these differences, professional associations become "battlegrounds as different emerging segments compete for control" of the organization and its resources for influencing the general membership, societal elites, and the public at large.

In sum, the processual perspective takes a developmental view of professionalization, which ranges, depending upon the author, from a naturally unfolding, evolutionary process to a highly politicized, conflictual one resembling a social movement. In this process, the attributes that separate professions from other occupations may be used instrumentally to advance a group's interests. Steps in the professionalization process can be identified, the details of which, in a broader context of modernization, help to explain the differential status of occupations in the division of labor.

A Critique

Both the structural-functional and the processual perspectives accept and build on the values and remnants of an older aristocracy as these were carried forward under a new set of conditions—the industrial revolution. The structural approach is essentially a-historical (Ritzer, 1975); so really is the processual, despite the ostensible historicity of developmental stages. Ideologically, both still take established professions, the so-called "learned professions," as a point of departure, a standard against which the characteristics and developmental patterns of newer claimants are measured and found wanting. Furthermore, the standard may be applied unevenly, as when Wilensky (1964) assumed that only the established professions had followed a "natural history of professionalism," while new and emerging professions were "opportunistic."
From a strictly methodological viewpoint, the use of "established" professions as the basis for formulating criteria to distinguish professions and their developmental patterns from non-professions has serious scientific consequences. Assuming the existence of commonalities among the established professions, the approach set off a search for them, while sliding over their differences. At the same time it also tended to limit the investigation of similarities between the established professions and other occupations in favor of a search for differences. The outcome has been a state of conceptual/definitional confusion requiring a series of ad hoc justifications for the differential attributes that have been identified. Since many phenomena have been excluded, the resulting "theory of professions" has violated the rule of parsimony in theory construction.

A bit of ideology that has stubbornly clung to the professional concept has been its ethical purity. The view that professions are beneficial for society flows from this a priori definitional relationship between professions and the service ideal as a distinguishing attribute. In the functionalist approach, it is not that professionals have typically altruistic motivations as compared to the alleged "egoism" of businessmen. Rather, the service ideal, which broadly includes such professional norms as dispassionate objectivity, is carried out in professional role behavior because it is useful for providing more efficient service. Professional roles, in turn, are supported by an institutional context of "science and liberal learning" which is radically different from the institutional context of commerce (Parsons, 1938: 46-8). This image justifies the proposition that professionals represent an intellectual status group or class which can guide the public interest because they somehow operate beyond the bounds of bourgeois imperatives.

A substantial amount of empirical data suggest that professionals have not quite transcended the pushes and pulls of capitalistic competition. The alternative proposition that professional organizations and professional morality serve to increase the economic gains of professional practitioners and the status of their vocations is more defensible. In an early comparative study of professions, Friedman and Kuznets (1945: 391) found that "professional workers constitute a 'non-competing' group" in the marketplace, whose average earnings in comparable communities were from 85% to 180% higher than those of non-professional workers. Furthermore, they found that medical societies in the United States contributed to the comparatively higher salaries of physicians over dentists by their greater monopolistic control of entry into the profession. The monopolistic practices of the American Medical Association (AMA) have been analyzed by
Garceau (1941), Hyde and Wolff (1953-54), Kessel (1958, 1970), and Rayback (1967) among others. Kessel (1958, 1970) showed how the power of the AMA has supported profit-maximizing behavior by physicians as well as the ways in which its activities have circumscribed the choice of contractual arrangements between patients and physicians and reduced innovation in medical education. Arnould (1972) found that the legal profession also engaged in monopolistic practices through the widespread use of fee schedules akin to price-fixing, thereby raising the price structure of legal services. This practice was struck down by the Supreme Court in the 1970's.

Many authors have considered the detrimental effects for the public of the licensing of occupations, a primary concern of professional associations, and justified as a means of protecting the public. Pfeffer (1974a) found that governmental regulation and occupational licensing have operated to restrict entry, increase price, and protect and economically enhance an industry or occupation. In another study, Pfeffer (1974b) also showed that the more professionalized the occupation, the more independent its income was from local economic conditions. Fech's (1974) review of the literature on the licensing of health occupations and professions presents additional support for the allegation that licensure has not protected the public interest on balance. Benham and Benham (1975) found similar practices and effects on prices and services in the optometry profession. Recent studies of the optometric profession have also dispelled the functionalist notion that greater technological sophistication has so improved the quality of services that it offsets such dysfunctional consequences as higher prices (Begun, 1979). Finally, in a slightly different vein, Walsh and Elling (1968) found that among the public health professionals in their study--nurses, sanitarians, and physicians--the greater the striving for professional status of the occupational group, the more negative their orientations to lower class clients. These findings led Walsh and Elling to speculate (1968:27) that:

...the class structure maintains itself in significant part through the efforts of work groups as a whole to establish themselves. In this process, the differential distribution of rewards affected by the class structure operates not only through the money market and its salaries and incomes, but through orientations and behaviors of members of work groups which aid them in avoiding identification and involvement with detracting or devalued elements of society. The depth of this human tragedy is suggested by the fact that
those most in need of service are least likely to receive it.

Much of the ideology surrounding professions is grounded in historical misunderstanding. It is a misinterpretation of history to equate today's concept of profession with the idea of the "learned professions" of pre-industrial times. In pre-industrial England (the most relevant source for the United States), the specialized functions now performed by established professions in a given field were carried out by a variety of occupational groupings, whose members were both university educated or organized into guilds with an apprenticeship system of training outside the university. No profession could claim a unified occupational domain over which it reigned supreme. As Freidson (1970: 5-6) pointed out with regard to medicine:

Its position is not a long established one; in fact, it is less than a hundred years old. If medicine was a 'profession' in the past, it was a profession of quite different characteristics than today's. During most of recorded time there was not a single occupation identifiable as 'medicine' for there were many kinds of healers. After the rise of the university in Europe, medicine became primarily a 'learned profession'. Only recently has it become a truly consulting profession, and only recently has it attained the strength and stability which now characterizes its preeminence.

Around the year 1200, universities grew up out of the guilds of learning organized by teachers and students and soon came under domination of the Church. For many years the ecclesiastics performed many of the specialized functions we attribute to professions, but by the 15th century, perhaps earlier, secular associations, such as the Inns of Court, and secular guilds provided the aegis for carrying them out. "Thus the earliest forms of organization among surgeons, apothecaries, and notaries, and in a certain sense also among common lawyers, took the shape of training guilds. These professions, therefore, unlike physicians, civil servants, and teachers, did not emerge out of the clerical order" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 291). Nor did they require university-based education--as did physicians and civil servants--to carry out their medical and legal functions.

In pre-modern Europe the social stratification system was quite rigid, so that vocational groups, "learned" and "unlearned," came from different segments of society and often served different social strata (Larson, 1977: 3). In this stratified social system the university diploma was not sufficient to assure its learned
control over an area of technical expertise. The learned professions did not have a monopoly of practice in the broader community.

On technical grounds the learned professions would have had a hard time asserting their rights to exclusive occupational control. The scientific/technical knowledge obtainable in the university was not necessarily more effective than the expertise gained from practice. Nor was it practically oriented. In 17th and 18th century Europe and the United States, university education largely sought to educate gentlemen through a classical, liberal arts orientation. It was more a mark of differential social status than it was scientific or utilitarian (Larson, 1977). In Europe, scientific education did not penetrate medical education until well into the industrial period, mid-19th century, and in the United States, not until the late 19th century.

Despite differences in the social, political, and physical features between the United States and Europe, the course of the learned professions in America was strongly influenced by developments in Great Britain and Europe generally, so that the above points still apply. For example, medical functions were performed by diverse vocational groups—surgeons/barbers, physicians, apothecaries, patent-medicine men, midwives—outside the control of university based vocations or any other monopolistic healing group up to the 19th century. And the results of the medical care of the "non-educated" practitioners were often no worse than those of the "learned professionals" of the day (Freidson, 1970: 20). In 1775, some 3,500 practitioners, who were not graduates of any medical school, gave most of the medical care in the country. Accounts of the profession in the 18th century, which usually describe it in terms of the activities of some 50, European-trained men who played a prominent part in institutional medicine or public life, distort the picture (Bell, 1970).

In short, the conception of profession as we understand it is really a modern invention. Its pre-industrial heritage was quite mixed—common and elite, "learned" and "unlearned." Modern professions, as a sociological phenomenon, actually emerged together within a relatively short, two-generational span of time, roughly 1825-1880 (Larson, 1977). The historical circumstances that imprinted the first stage of professionalization for our present professions were similar for all of them, namely the political, economic, technological and ideological conditions of 'the great transformation' from a pre-capitalist socio-economic system to industrial capitalism.
Within this context, the "opportunistic" struggles of the established professions for their exalted position would tell us more about how and why some occupations succeeded than any static, a priori versions of their creation. Empirical data on the economics of professionalization support this logic. As Carr-Saunders and Wilson realized in their pioneering study of professions with respect to law and medicine (1933: 304):

The evolution of the legal and medical professions was anything but smooth; and something more than has yet been said is required to account for so tangled a history. On reflection it appears that what happened in both cases was the early segregation of practitioners, advocates, and physicians, whose function at a later date was realized to be specialist. But the associations of these specialists, having attained great power and prestige, attempted to inhibit the development of general practitioners of law and medicine of whose services the public had need. When they could not prevent their appearance, they tried to keep them subservient, and the history of both professions is largely concerned with the problems so brought about.

These considerations taken together point to the need for an alternative perspective on professions. The structural-functional perspective and much of the thinking in the processual approach begin with an a priori set of assumptions about the basis of the occupational division of labor. Professions are implicitly or explicitly the yardstick for assigning rank in the occupational hierarchy; their characteristics are assumed to be beneficial to a defineable public interest without regard to differential social group interests, and functionally required for the development of modern society. Some writers have assigned professionals a unique status and role in society (Parsons, 1968: 536), "neither 'capitalists' nor 'workers', nor typically government administrators or 'bureaucrats' ... independent peasant proprietors or members of the small urban proprietary groups." Like Mannheim's intellectuals (1936: 155-64), who are largely unattached to any social class and able to transcend their relations to the system of social stratification because of their diverse origins and academy training, professionals represent a new form of moral and intellectual leadership for the society, based on the cultural criteria of legitimacy rather than criteria of political power or economic success" (Parsons, 1968: 545).

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The central issue in a "theory of professions" is to account for the variance in the occupational hierarchy. Why is it that some occupations have been able to achieve and maintain a special status that has come to be identified as professional? Professions as we know them arose in the division of labor during the industrial era. In advanced industrial societies this division of labor has become complex and specialized. We do not assume at the same time that the professional phenomenon is the crowning achievement of the industrial revolution, or a requirement of industrialization, found in the same form across all industrial societies, and/or certain to continue with little change into the future. To do so is to accept a restrictive ideology propounded by professionals themselves that ignores contradictory data so as to preserve a particular social order. In theory development, variables must be able to vary, and the concept of profession cannot be both the independent and the dependent variable.

Status is a human artifact. As Bottomore has written (1966: 10):

...a system of rank does not form part of some natural and invariable order of things, but is a human contrivance or product, and is subject to historical changes. More particularly, natural or biological inequalities, on one side, and distinctions of social rank on the other, belong to two distinct orders of fact. The differences were pointed out very clearly by Rousseau in a well-known passage: 'I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul; and another, which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and it is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges, which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful, or even in a position to exact obedience.'

To understand the development and maintenance of occupational inequality, we must, then, come face to face with issues of power and the distribution of resources, within an occupational sphere and at the societal level, and in such a way as to attend to
shifting historical conditions with the passage of time. This endeavor requires a re-conceptualization of the notion of profession.

A traditional definition of a profession is (Cogan, 1953: 49), "a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding...applied to the practical affairs of men." The definition does not accommodate either all of the occupations usually considered as professions, such as law which is not based upon a scientific body of knowledge, or exclude other occupations not usually considered to be professions, such as computer programming. Status variations in the occupational hierarchy are not adequately explained by this form of definition or its underlying conceptualization.

The political-economic approach takes a different tack. In this view the concept of profession is separated from the concept of occupation. Johnson (1972: 45) succinctly clarifies this point when he states that "a profession is not an occupation, but a means of controlling an occupation. Likewise, professionalism is a historically specific process which some occupations have undergone at a particular time, rather than a process which certain occupations may always be expected to undergo because of their essential qualities." The professional phenomenon, then, may be viewed as an "institutionalized order of control" over a set of marketplace activities, which could be arranged in a typology of institutionalized orders of control, such as collegial control (professions) or patronage (Johnson, 1972).

More formally, we suggest that a profession is a quasi-corporate entity or enterprise whose members have obtained a substantial degree of control over the production, distribution, and consumption of a needed commodity. This definition is consistent with Freidson's analysis of the medical profession in the United States (1970:171) that "the most strategic distinction lies in legitimate, organized autonomy--that a profession is distinct from other occupations in that it has been given the right to control its own work." The degree of control is never complete; its nature and extent vary over time with socio-political, economic, ideological, and technological developments within the enterprise and the society. Similarly, the differential status of occupations in a given time period also varies as a function of the degree and form of control which an enterprise can exercise. The control exercised by the professional enterprise involves to a greater or lesser extent:

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1) the definition of the commodity which its specialized practitioners produce and distribute;

2) explanations of the relationship of the production and distribution of this commodity to the broader needs of the total political economy;

3) delineation of the organizational parameters in and through which this commodity will be produced and distributed, including some ability to define the nature of the workplace with respect to its relation to the commodity producers, the commodity users, and the concept of commodity itself;

4) definition of what constitutes efficient and effective production and distribution of commodities (i.e. how its production and distribution is to be evaluated);

5) control over resources required to produce and distribute the commodity;

6) control over demand (i.e. consumer need) for the commodity, and over the number (supply) of specialized practitioners who are sanctioned to meet it—that is, a quasi-monopoly over production and distribution involving control over education, training, licensing (legal sanctions), and cultural sanctions (values, beliefs, customs, etc.).

Structurally, the professional enterprise can be considered to be a loosely ordered interorganizational system of occupational control, consisting of: a) individuals who perform roughly similar specialized functions, primarily as a means of earning a livelihood; b) associations to advance the interests of these specialized practitioners and promote occupational cohesion through political, social, and ideological activities; c) educational and training institutions to produce, reproduce, and legitimate the practitioners and their knowledge and skill; and d) cultural and legal devices to protect the established domain of occupational specialization.

The formation of successful professional enterprises and their continued hegemony over an occupational domain is not a haphazard occurrence. New enterprises are formed purposively by innovative entrepreneurs who have sufficient incentives, access to the necessary resources, and organizing talent. More specifically, people
will be motivated to found new enterprises when (Stinchcombe, 1965: 146,7):

(a) they find or learn about alternative better ways of doing things that are not easily done within existing social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future will be such that the organization will continue to be effective enough to pay for the trouble of building it and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social group with which they are strongly identified will receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources of wealth, power, and legitimacy needed to build the organization; and (e) they can defeat, or at least avoid being defeated by, their opponents, especially those whose interests are vested in the old regime.

These characteristics of individual motivation are affected by social structural conditions in a complicated kind of interaction which accounts for both the rise of various classes of organization in historically specific time periods, such as guilds during medieval times, and their particular modifications and variations based on prior organizational history and social technologies available at the time (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich, 1979). In accounting for the appearance of a population of organizational systems, ecology has greater explanatory power than psychology. Thus, to complete Stinchcombe's thought (emphasis added),

Better ways are communicated socially; the future is partially guaranteed by social arrangements and disrupted by social convulsions; the pattern of identification of individuals with groups which will benefit, and the legal protection of the appropriated benefits, are social phenomena; the patterns of trust and of mobility of resources which can determine whether resources can be moved to innovators are socially patterned; and the distribution of power in society is an aspect of social structure.

The general rise of professions as a form of occupational control in 19th century industrializing societies corresponds to the rise of other related forms of social organization aimed at regulating production-distribution-consumption activities, most notably business and governmental corporations and trade unions. The transformation of feudal society to industrial capitalism over several centuries provided the social structural conditions necessary for the rise of these organizational forms. To summarize these conditions briefly, they include:
(1) ECONOMICALLY - the development of a market (or money) economy as a dominant cultural force apart from the religious, political, and social fabric of life into which it was indistinguishably interwoven in an earlier era; the rise of "free laborers", capitalists, and landlords selling their services on the market for land, labor, and capital; and the corresponding growth of a middle class of consumers of commodities with the appearance eventually of the phenomenon of consumer "demand" (Heilbroner, 1970: 64);

(2) IDEOLOGICALLY - the principle of economic liberalism aimed at establishing and perpetuating a self-regulating market through laissez-faire and free trade policies (Polyani, 1957: 132); the doctrine of individualism that justifies laissez-faire, that "the good of all will be served if each individual pursues his self-interest with minimal interference" (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965: 34); rationality as applied to the discovery and application of knowledge and its manifestations in social organizations and the allocation of scarce values;

(3) POLITICALLY - the evolution of citizenship as an (initially restricted) institution protected by civic, political, and social rights, especially: (civic) individual freedom and freedom of thought, religion, and the right to own property, to contract, and to justice or due process; (political) the right to participate in the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of its members; and (social) the right to a measure of economic welfare and security according to standards prevailing in the society, social services, and education (Marshall, 1964: 71-2);

(4) SOCIALLY - a vast increase in urbanization, and in specialization in the division of labor involving a decline in unskilled occupations and a growth of semi-skilled, technical, and managerial work (Heilbroner, 1970: 102); and the creation of new classes that eventually displaced the old;

(5) TECHNOLOGICALLY - the growth of science and a myriad of technological inventions and their rapid diffusion throughout society; and a concomitant social reconstruction of the meaning of time, family, and work.
It has been argued that the conditions outlined above can be found to a greater or lesser degree in all industrializing societies, capitalist or socialist. As Wilensky and Lebeaux have stated (1965: 44-5),

Much of what is called 'capitalism' turns out to be features of economic organization common to all highly industrialized countries, whatever their culture; (2) the uniqueness of capitalism is often a matter of degree--for something resembling the doctrines of economic individualism if not the free market is found in noncapitalistic societies as well...

...Capital, mechanization, a monetary system of exchange, double-entry bookkeeping, the conversion of property rights into monetary terms, stable nation-states, the emergence of a working class--these are universal features of highly developed economies. They are all present in the more recent development of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, countries which could hardly be lumped together as capitalist.

While Wilensky and Lebeaux's observations of the objective features of economic development may be true, the "matter of degree" is not a matter to be passed over lightly, if we hope to understand the more particular forms of social organization within different advanced industrial societies. Despite occupational specialization and differentiation, the medical profession in Great Britain obviously has much less control over the production-distribution-consumption functions of health care than its entrepreneurial counterpart in the United States. Nor does the social work enterprise look quite the same in these countries (Parry, Rustin, and Satyamurti, 1979). Despite the leavening qualities of industrialization, the shape of the professional phenomenon in the USSR is also a unique product of the country's political economy (Haug, 1975).

Stated differently, then, the relationship of the division of labor to the hierarchical distribution of resources is a function, not of industrialization, but of the political, economic, and social structures through which industrialization occurred in a given society, and the ideology that interpreted and thereby helped fashion the industrialization process. For the United States, the culture of capitalism cannot be separated from industrialization; it has been its major defining force. The study of the professionalization of an area of specialized work, therefore, requires an analysis of a complex set of relationships
between and among occupational groups and segments therein, powerful elites, and consumers interacting in an encompassing, highly competitive market economy. The central concern in that investigation is to find out how, within that dynamic political economy, some particular occupational segment succeeded in establishing control (as a profession) over its sphere of occupational specialization.

A Political Economic Model of Professionalization

The achievement of professional status by an occupational group is a complex process. Minimally, for each separate profession it involved a group of organizers who wanted a professional enterprise and were able to garner the resources to construct it. Since professionalization is a population phenomenon—a species of organization (identified here as the professional enterprise) emerged during a specific historical time period—it also involved a nurturant environment, an environment with sufficient resources and information, of a particular kind, distributed in some usable fashion, that could be tapped by occupational entrepreneurs. A political economic model fits this version of professional development and should help clarify its dynamics.

Political economy, defined descriptively, is "the interrelation between a political system (a structure of rule) and an economy (a system for producing and exchanging goods and services)" (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17). Political economic analysis entails the study of both systems and their interrelationships along the following lines (Wamsley and Zald, 1973: 17):

...In general, analysis of political systems has two major components: (1) ethos or values, and (2) power system. That is, 'political' encompasses both power and the values (ends) which power is used to achieve.

...An economy is a system for producing goods and services. A description of an economy consists of two parts: (1) a statement of the goods and services produced, their quantities, and through which organizational forms they were produced; and (2) a definition of the mechanisms, rules, and institutions that shape exchange of goods and services.

Since political power is often used to control the distribution of resources, and the accumulation of resources is an important source of political power, political economic phenomena are not
easily separable into their respective categories. The utility of the model, however, lies in this interaction.

The outlines of a political economic model for the development of the professional enterprise can be constructed around three sets of relationships and their interaction, --the relationship of the developing enterprise to: (1) the economic system; (2) societal elites and the class structure; and (3) competitive occupational segments within its specialized domain and the overall occupational hierarchy. We should like to begin our model construction at an abstract level with a brief overview of power relations in a dynamic environment. We shall then sketch in more detail some of the concrete tasks and variables that affected the professional project in the United States during the growth of industrial capitalism.

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND EXCHANGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL PROJECT

Occupational groups with professional aspirations needed an environment with the right kind and amount of resources to construct a professional enterprise and the capacity to take advantage of the available opportunities. Stated differently, the environment positively selects out those organizational forms that fit with or match its complex of opportunities and constraints (Aldrich, 1979). Variations among and within occupational groups in a given environment also affect selection, helping to explain the success and failure of professional endeavors, hence the stratification of occupations. The strategic role of environmental variables places boundaries on the activities of the founders and sustainers of any organizational endeavor. It is axiomatic that, from their standpoint, the greater their ability to control relevant environmental variables, the greater their chance for success.

For any new or continuing organizational endeavor, the elements of the environment that must be available and/or subject to control in some favorable mix consist of (1) customers (both distributors and users); (2) suppliers of materials, labor, capital, equipment, and work space; (3) competitors for both markets and resources; and (4) regulatory groups, including governmental agencies, unions, and interfirm associations. Dill (1958) conceptualized this set as a task environment, because these are the salient environmental elements that an organization must concern itself with in order to carry out its mission or achieve its ends. We would add to this list (5) symbolic information, organized in the form of political ideologies. Political ideologies are socially constructed beliefs and ideas which explain and justify the claims...
that groups make for their resource requirements and allocations (Silver, 1980), as for example, the sanctity of science and technology. They become an important resource themselves for the creation and exercise of power.

The task environment can be conceived of as a political economy or an exchange field within which aspiring occupational groups operate. The characteristics of the environment or field define the parameters of constraint and opportunity for such groups, as well as their contingencies, that is, the degree to which task environment elements may be subject to control or predictable. Control is never complete; it varies with the composition, structure, and dynamics of the field. For example, financial support in the hands of a benefactor is relatively clear as to its potential size and the conditions under which it might become available. Financial support based upon consumer demand is a much less determinate resource. Thus, the nature of the task environment elements—such as the substance, relative scarcity, distribution, accessibility, exchangeability, and stability—all contributed to the rise of professions and the relative success of individual occupational efforts.7

Applying some of these ideas to the rise of professions, it might be argued that the pre-industrial occupational environment was essentially resource-poor, placid or static, and dispersed. Occupational groups operated within local consumer markets, separated from one another by the rigid boundaries of the social stratification system. The rules for production-consumption-distribution were well established by social class, and supported by legal regulations and tradition. Technology was undeveloped and its rate of development was slow. Information among the different actors in the exchange field travelled slowly; actual and potential linkage among these actors, that is, the state of interconnectedness, was low. The prevailing sense of time and distance affected both the individual and the collective sense of social change.

By contrast, during the period of industrial capitalism, when professionalization was taking place in the United States, roughly 1850-1930, the environment was much more complex, competitive, dynamic, and resource-rich. A labor market and a consumer market for professional services were being created and expanded through the growth of a "free middle class," unfettered by social class privilege and tradition. Coalitions of occupational groups were forming. Capital was being organized in new ways and new corporate forms were emerging. Regulations and norms governing economic exchanges were open to strategic manipulation. New technology was being rapidly created and diffused alongside the spread...705-
The concept of task environment is useful for understanding the interplay of power and exchange during the process of professionalization. In order to professionalize, an aspiring occupation group needs to control the resources in its task environment, and it interacts with others to obtain them. To the degree that their exchange partners in the task environment (individuals, groups, organizations) control the needed resources, the occupational group lacks the power to accomplish its ends. Thus, in an exchange relationship, power is a function of control over strategic resources, or independence. The greater the control, the greater the independence, hence power; the less the control, the lower the power, and the greater the dependency on whomever does control a strategic resource (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962).

So, for example, the need of an aspiring occupation for money to staff a professional association may or may not be problematic. It may lead to dependency on a private foundation which then gives the foundation a corresponding degree of power to define the professional project; it may obtain these funds from its own members, retaining more membership power to define the professional project; it may fail to locate resources altogether and either find a viable substitute, or go without. If the strategic resource is critical, the occupational group's efforts may fail.

In sum, in a complex and dynamic exchange field, or political economy, transactions go on simultaneously among many interrelated actors. The composition, structure, and dynamics of the field mediate these transactions. Power is a function of strategic resource control or the ability to manage environmental contingencies. The result of this continuous interplay is a highly politicized climate with both fixed and shifting power arrangements among the actors. Power shifts among different factions in the professional enterprise and/or its task environment as conditions change and competing elements are able to mobilize to take advantage of them. In a context of resource scarcity, "cooperation, competition, and conflict (are) transitory elements in a process to accumulate resources and achieve autonomy" (Silver, 1980: 23). Autonomy, of course, is the goal of an aspiring occupation. In market terms, when an aspiring occupation gains enough power in its task environment to regulate the production-consumption-distribution processes of its specialized commodity, largely by
itself, its drive for professional status will have been accomplished.

**Tasks and Strategic Variables**

During the last half of the 19th century in the United States, the growth of industrial capitalism opened potential new markets for specialized occupations and the possibility for gaining access to the older segregated markets of the traditional "professions." These opportunities stimulated various occupational groups to embark on the construction and expansion of professional enterprises for their economic self-interest. In some instances, these efforts were mutually supportive; in others they competed for resources and turf. Collectively, however, they shared the same ideological terrain, founded on the enduring tenets of U.S. political economic ideology: the sanctity of private property, the philosophy of economic individualism, the value of opportunity (Hofstadter, 1960: viii). They also faced similar problems negotiating a course through the still nascent market economy.

In order for the professionalizing sectors of a growing "middle class" to organize and control these competitive markets, they had to accomplish several tasks. Ideologically, they had to construct a "monopoly of credibility" with the public to secure a clientele, and they had to conquer "official privilege" so as to obtain "a set of legally enforced monopolies of practice." The precondition for successful management of these external ideological tasks was an internal task, "the unification of the corresponding areas of the social division of labor under the direction of a leading group of professional reformers." The heart of the unification project was the creation of a system of training which would centralize and standardize the production of the professional commodity, namely, the professionals themselves, who gained the specialized expertise (Larson, 1977: 16-17).

To fully explicate the political economic model, these tasks can be refined into a more specific set of economic, political, and ideological tasks which the founding members of any professionalizing occupation need to carry out to successfully build an enterprise.
ECONOMIC TASKS

(1) create a marketable (needed) commodity;

(2) ensure sufficient production of the commodity by:
   a) securing and training a production force,
   b) securing production sites,
   c) instituting centralized systems of product control to maintain a commodity of standardized quality;

(3) acquire control of outlets for distribution and sales;

(4) establish and negotiate an acceptable rate of return for investors;

(5) create a consumer market of clientele for its commodities.

POLITICAL TASKS

(1) induce individuals and groups of potential providers and other resource holders or managers to invest labor and capital in developing and producing the commodity, providing work space, distribution outlets, etc.

(2) define the boundaries of the new enterprise so as to include and exclude desirable and undesirable members;

(3) establish the domain of the enterprise by overcoming competitors for resources and markets;

(4) negotiate favorable agreements with regulatory bodies to protect investments in the enterprise (preferably a monopoly).
IDEOLOGICAL TASKS

(1) convince the potential members of the enterprise that they share a joint mission;

(2) convince legitimating bodies that the enterprise is worth sanctioning, --including relevant segments of the ruling class;

(3) convince the public of the superior quality of and necessity for its commodities.

Though similar to other industrial ventures, some aspects of this organizing effort are (and were) unique because of the unusual type of commodity to be marketed. Variations in the commodity and in other, less singular but still strategic resources and their management, account for the differential success of particular professionalizing occupations in the past. They also continue to affect the professional phenomenon in the present. We shall list three variables and briefly discuss them here in order to complete a political-economic model. Divided into three groups, they are:

ECONOMIC VARIABLES

(1) the intangible quality of the commodity;

(2) patterns of consumer demand, consumption, and distribution;

(3) the ability to attract producers to join the enterprise.

POLITICAL VARIABLES

(1) the social status of the founders and other members of the enterprise and the strength of their ties to members of the ruling class;

IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES

(1) ideological justification and the capacity to communicate it.
These variables are not independent of one another. For example, the social status of the founders affects the ability to attract selectively other producers as well as the political ideology of the enterprise. However, they may vary independently of one another. In addition, the political process in an exchange field is a function of multiple opportunities, contingencies, and ideological constructions, and the skills which actors bring to the interplay. The analysis of individual professionalizing efforts ultimately involves sorting out these variations and determining the effects of combinations of multiple interactions on the outcomes.

The Intangible Quality of the Commodity

Professionalizing occupations had, and continue to have, a unique set of production and distribution problems that derive from the nature of the commodity they seek to exchange in the marketplace. For most professions the commodity is an abstract, intangible service of uncertain worth--"an intellectual technique"--rather than a tangible good with ultimate utility (use value) which is immediately visible or apparent to a potential consumer or investor. In Larson's words (1977:4),

...professional work, like any other form of labor, is only a fictitious commodity; it 'cannot be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized', and it is not produced for sale. Unlike craft or industrial labor...most professions produce intangible goods; their product, in other words, is only formally alienable and is inextricably bound to the person and the personality of the producer.

This intangible quality creates several difficulties pursuant to establishing a degree of market security sufficient to offset high "investment and production" costs. Mainly they can be considered under the headings of visibility and cognitive superiority.

For a commodity to be marketable, it must have sufficient visibility for potential consumers and investors to identify it as something they value. This visibility, in turn, depends upon both perceived utility and standardization, or how well the commodity can be identified in the public's mind with the solution of a problem, meeting of a need, or resolution of an uncertainty felt as real and significant. "Professional" commodities vary in their potential to demonstrate visible benefit. Some are inherently more "useful" because they can be defined by the producers in terms of individual, clearly articulated needs for a large group of potential consumers, such as legal services to obtain a
favorable contract or judgement regarding disputed life, limb, property; or medical care to treat common afflictions or specific maladies. The benefits of other types of "professional" commodities may not be as readily apparent because they are bound up with conflictual societal values and/or more ambiguous individual needs, such as psychiatric treatment or social work services.

In the interplay between meeting needs and shaping needs, the desire of producers to establish the immediate utility of their commodities may also affect the way they define them for the public. An example is the representation of health care as the treatment of illnesses or individual "curing" rather than "prevention." Furthermore, the utility of some commodities may be easier to demonstrate because the relationship between the applied technology and a beneficial outcome may be dramatic and direct rather than indirect, close in time sequence rather than protracted, or empirically more capable of support, hence less subject to debate about beneficial effects. Medicine has had many of these advantages in its professionalization efforts. When a commodity controlled by a professionalizing occupation is also, in fact, demonstrably superior to its competitors, e.g. sulfa drugs by physicians, the construction of a professional enterprise may be greatly advanced.

Standardization of an intangible commodity, as with the more tangible goods, enhances its visibility for several reasons. It allows the commodity to be recognizable to a wide public; it facilitates claims to a definable professional domain; it makes commodity production possible in dispersed locations but identifiable with the same occupational group; it facilitates production of sufficient quantities to meet market needs. In a situation where new professional markets had to be developed altogether during the industrial revolution, standardization was a major requirement.

But standardization also poses some unique problems. Since the "professional" commodity is not separable from the producers, the ability to produce it in sufficient quantity and quality, uniformly, requires that "the producers themselves be reproduced. In other words, the professionals must be adequately trained and socialized so as to provide recognizable distinct services for exchange on the professional market" (Larson, 1977:14). In industrial terms, in effect, the situation requires quality control over the mass production of human beings who will attain mastery over "an intellectual technique" which can be marketed as distinct and recognizable services. This degree of control necessitates highly selective screening of applicants and rigorous education and socialization in a standardized setting where the producers
can closely supervise and regulate the training process. Institutions of higher education, programmatically controlled by producers, lend themselves to these needs better than apprenticeship arrangements in diverse settings. During the generational period of the professional project, the development of compulsory education, the growing prominence of science, and the growth of the modern university all complemented the requirements of the professional market. In the new industrial democracy, higher education became the convenient arbiter of merit—achieved status over ascribed status—through the use of purportedly universalistic criteria for recruitment and performance evaluation. In the process it abetted and legitimated professional monopoly by these same criteria in the occupational sphere and the ever more subtle perpetuation of social stratification (Larson, 1977).

The difficulties of securing a professional market are compounded by the intangible quality of the "professional" commodity in still another way that also supports the thrust towards monopoly. Ultimately, the intangible quality is a function of the more abstract "theoretical" principles of the cognitive base that underpins the specialized technology. Internally, while battles over cognitive superiority may be quite intense (Turner and Hodges, 1970: 26), colleagues can still make a reasoned, even scientific, assessment. Externally, since the layman does not ordinarily share the specialist's universe of discourse, evaluation is more difficult. The professional has difficulty establishing the authority which will make a client seek out professional advice and follow it. Therefore, cognitive superiority must be partially established through ideological means. Some commodities have greater potential for ideological exploitation than others, and some occupations by their nature can make better use of institutionalized ideological supports to advance their claims for functional authority. The trappings of educational credentials, expensive office furnishings, prestigious associations, social status, and legal regulation often substitute as supportive data for any public evaluation of cognitive superiority (Freidson, 1970). When a legally protected monopoly of practice can be established, the professional enterprise gains official sanction for its expertise which now does not have to be continuously proven.

Patterns of Consumer Demand, Consumption, and Distribution

A profession is a form of collegiate control by a group of practitioners over a set of production-consumption-distribution activities of a specialized occupation. Other forms of control are also possible, namely patronage and state mediation. With
patronage, subdivided into oligarchic and corporate types, consumer control over occupational services becomes institutionalized. "Patronage arises where the dominant effective demand for occupational services comes from a small, powerful, unitary clientele" (Johnson, 1972:65), either an aristocratic elite or a small number of large-scale corporations who may become major consumers of the 'expert' services. With mediative control by the state, "the state intervenes in the relationship between practitioner and client in order to define needs and/or the manner in which such needs are catered for" (p. 77). State mediation can be distinguished from corporate patronage by public agencies in that "the state attempts to remove from the producer or consumer the authority to determine the content and subjects of practice" (p. 77). In all of these forms of occupational control, patterns of consumer demand and consumption represent the major sources of environmental uncertainty affecting the form of institutional control which develops.

Occupational control in the form of professions appeared in the latter part of the 19th century with the emergence of an urban bourgeoisie who provided consumers for specialized services and the recruits for the body of aspiring practitioners. Successful professionalization could not occur without "an effective demand for occupational skills from a large and relatively heterogeneous consumer group" (p. 51). In an environment with only a small number of powerful clients, a professionalizing occupation would lack the broad base of support necessary to secure a sizeable market investment and/or it would be highly dependent upon meeting the needs defined by the group paying for its services.

Professionalization efforts benefit as well from an unorganized consumer population because organization can be an effective means to balance power dependency by consumers through collective control over the demand for services. In this respect, the recent development of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) and third party payment systems in the United States have led to some shifts in the control of professional medical services, though not yet to a national health service. Services provided to consumers on a one-to-one, fee-for-service basis through solo or group partnership arrangements also strengthen professional control, despite the contention of classical liberal economists that this arrangement maximizes consumer choice. Consumer power is decreased, rather than maximized, when the consumer population is large and heterogeneous, and the provider group is carefully restricted, and when large inequalities exist in the ability to pay for services. Furthermore, the individual approach reduces the consumers' ability to collectively define problems, needs, and
roles, and thereby potentially to alter the demand for certain kinds of benefits or services.

The professionalizing efforts of both law and medicine benefitted from the type of consumer population which was available in the mid-19th century and their pattern of demand. Both professionalizing occupations provided services for an expanding, urban, middle class market, which sought and paid for them on an individualized basis, whether privately or entrepreneurially. "Needs which had been restricted to the upper stratum of society filtered down and outwards so that medicine, law, and architecture, for example, were no longer small, socially prescribed cliques, but large associations servicing competing status groups of near equals" (p. 52). Engineering, on the other hand, provided technical and economic consultation that could be better assessed by its consumers, and, more to the point, engineers were generally salaried employees of large-scale economic enterprises rather than independent consultants or entrepreneurs (Larson, 1977: 27). In still a different pattern, social work services in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were neither sought out nor paid for by the direct users of the services, the urban poor. The real clientele of social workers were the philanthropists, and eventually the state, who actually paid for the services and thereby restricted the collegiate control that social workers could establish in their sphere of occupational expertise.

As is evident from the above, other consumption patterns also affect the ability to professionalize. While consumer utilization of specialized services is usually a voluntary matter, the need for particular services is affected by socio-cultural patterns and is distributed differentially according to socio-economic status. Need itself is, therefore, elastic—subject to custom, economic capacity, and ideological manipulation. The struggles to build a profession and a corresponding professional market have involved, not only the identification of need, but also its creation. With the pre-eminence of the professional phenomenon in 20th century industrial capitalism, the role of powerful professions in creating need has come under scrutiny and sharp criticism. The tenor, if not the substance, of this critique is captured in the trenchant writing of Ivan Illich (1977: 27).

The disabling of the citizen through professional dominance is completed through the power of illusion. Religion finally becomes displaced, not by the state or by the waning of faith, but by professional establishments and client confidence. The professions appropriate the special knowledge to define public issues in terms of problems. The acceptance of this claim
legitimates the docile recognition of imputed lacks on the part of the layman; his world turns into a chamber of needs. This dominance is reflected in the skyline of the city. Professional buildings look down on the crowds that shuttle between them in a continual pilgrimage to the new cathedrals of insurance, health, education, and welfare. Homes are transformed into hygienic apartments where one cannot be born, cannot be sick and cannot die decently...

Consumption patterns and demands also may affect the ability to control the distribution of a specialized commodity. In patronage and state mediative arrangements, where definition and demand for a commodity are much less strictly regulated by the producers or the marketplace, as for example with public school education, the distribution of services is also much less subject to producer control. This lack of autonomy may contribute to crises of legitimacy for a professionalizing group (Baum, 1978).

Additionally, the nature of the specialized commodity or service itself affects the ability of producers to control its distribution. For example, routine medical examinations can be performed in a private office, but non-routine medical care often requires other facilities, e.g. the hospital or nursing home, and/or other specializations. Though education can be provided on an individual tutorial basis, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and sometimes pedagogy as well, educational services do not lend themselves well to such individualistic arrangements. Thus the distribution requirements of specialized commodities vary as to: size and complexity of physical facilities, machine implements and hard technologies (computers, x-rays, etc.), ancillary labor, interdependencies with other specialized groups (heteronomy), legal sanctions, and legitimacy. All of these distribution requirements represent sources of dependency in its "task environment" that a professionalizing occupation must deal with successfully to gain collegiate control. These dependencies may also change for many reasons, as for example, newly organized demands by consumers for more control over the commodity, or the need for new and sophisticated technologies controlled by other specialized groups, or competitive professionalizing occupations. The relationships between production and distribution, as well as production and consumption, then, may become major sources of tension for an aspiring occupation or an existing profession.
Ability to Attract Producers

The construction and continuation of a professional enterprise requires a steady stream of recruits able and willing to pay for the protracted education (and overhead set-up costs in some cases) to become its specialized experts. Since investment costs in time and money are high, potential recruits have to be convinced that their endeavors will be worth it socially and financially. Once a professionalizing group has established its monopoly of practice, the attraction of producers is simplified. In the absence of such a monopoly or prior to its attainment recruits must be attracted on other grounds. Usually these have involved the promise of individual payoffs in the form of social status, high income, secure career, autonomy over the conditions and content of one's work, social class socialization to the value of intellectual of "gentle" vocations, and/or a persuasive mission or ideology.

In general, the ferment of industrial capitalism provided a rich soil for recruitment. The expanded middle classes formed a labor pool; individualism as a pervasive value orientation stressed individual status and financial remuneration as worthy cultural objectives; the university became the arbiter of merit, the accepted agency of individual social mobility and legitimator of social status; the growth of large public and private corporations offered new opportunity markets for occupational specialization; and science and research applied to all manner of human endeavor were optimistically advanced as the avenue to alleviate social stress. Even so, professionalizing occupations varied in their ability to attract producers.

Professionalizing occupations with a core of elite producers trained in already prestigious universities—the older "learned" professions of medicine and law—had the advantage of prior social standing and accepted mission to lend to their attractiveness. Taking medicine as an example, while battles for control among sub-groups raged during the last half of the 19th century, and medical societies actually lost their licensing powers for a time before the Civil War, the field continued to attract large numbers of prospects. Despite, or perhaps because of the title "doctor," at the turn of the century, the United States had one of the highest doctor-to-patient ratios in the world (Larson, 1977). But if the average yearly income of most doctors was low, in the laissez-faire market system of medical practice, so were the costs of becoming one. When the American Medical Association eventually succeeded in gaining control of the medical schools in the early decades of the 20th century, and forged the educational reforms that enabled professionalization (in our terms), the desired effects of market monopoly were set in motion. The number of medical schools
and the supply of physicians decreased, the length of education
and training was extended, and access to the profession was great-
ly restricted, particularly for women, blacks, and working class
persons. At the same time, the status and income of the average
physician was considerably improved (Larson, 1977: 164).

New aspiring professions or those whose status, financial
promise, and autonomy were less certain because of the clientele
they served or the organizational context of their work, relied
more on ideological persuasion to attract recruits. These occupa-
tions benefitted from the ideology already attached to the profes-
sional concept in general, such as an association with "science"
and education, as well as the substantive ideological potential of
the particular aspiring vocations, such as the nobility of public
service moral reform, or social justice. These professionalizing
occupations, such as nursing, social work, teaching, already in a
disadvantageous position in the occupational hierarchy, remained
much more open to women, minority group members, and working class
persons who were excluded from the older "professions" by the os-
tensibly neutral meritocratic criteria that masked sexual, racial,
ethnic, and social class discrimination.

**Founder Status and Ties to Power Structure**

Occupational groups whose members are connected to societal
elites have a competitive advantage in the political and ideologi-
cal struggle to establish a monopoly of practice. Wealthy elites
command the resources to define and legitimate knowledge, values,
priorities, social problems and needs and different ways of meet-
ing them. They can sanction a professional enterprise, invest
resources in its development and upkeep, and help it to fashion
and control its consumer market.

Members of the "learned" professions of law, medicine, and
theology brought a pre-industrial inheritance of wealth, aris-
tocratic traditions and ties, political title, and university
education (with little technical expertise) with them into the
competitive 19th century period of professional expansion and
development. In medicine, to use an example from the archetypical
profession, this inheritance gave physicians in the United States
a competitive edge over other healing occupations to establish
themselves as the controlling segment (Freidson, 1970a, Larson,
1979).

The nineteenth century United States was a society with a spa-
cious frontier and an egalitarian ethic. As one form of healer on
the scene, physicians did not have a demonstrably superior technology, nor could they regulate producer or consumer markets. For the elite of physicians, connected to the most prestigious medical schools, urban hospitals, and public offices, this situation was temporarily worsened by the reform of higher education in the 1860's which brought technological and professional training and scientific research into the universities and set off an era of tremendous expansion (Ben-David, 1964; Bledstein, 1976). The new middle classes now had access to credentials and legitimacy for a broad range of healing practices.

As medical specialties developed within the physician group and outside it, e.g. nurses, midwives, chiropractors, homeopathic doctors, surgeons, the medical field also became confused and over-crowded. To oversimplify a complex history for the sake of a point, ultimately, through its connections to the corporate and university power structure, the elite specialists from the most reputable Eastern medical schools prevailed over the medical domain. An enforcement of licensing became more feasible through an expanding network of county medical societies, the Flexner Report of 1910, also promoted by the AMA and funded by the Carnegie Foundation, spurred the reform of medical education and the consolidation of the medical field under the "scientific doctors." Flexner's recommendation, essentially for "fewer and better doctors" was not the most significant aspect of this history; high level commissions commonly make recommendations that are never followed. Rather, it was that the recommendations were sanctioned and implemented through resources controlled by societal elites. According to Larson (1977: 164),

Much more than official sanction and punitive measures, foundation money brought about the implementation of Flexner's recommendations. The leading foundations clearly favored the Northeastern medical establishment: between 1911 and 1936, The Johns Hopkins Medical School got about $10 million of Rockefeller money and $2 from the Carnegie Corporation. Between 1910 and 1938, the nine leading foundations gave more than $154 million to medical schools, most of it going to the best private schools. The Rockefeller General Education Board gave slightly under $66 million to only nine schools.

Recently, in "The De-professionalization of Everyone?", Haug (1975: 211) advanced the perceptive proposition that "societal trends, both technological and ideological, are rendering the concept of profession obsolete," so that the future may bring, not the end of expertise, but de-professionalization in the sense of a status-equalizing process. The forces challenging and eroding the
Historic importance of status for professionalization include: the rise in the general educational level of the public, attacks on credentialism without the requisite experiential component, trends towards patient and consumer education in specialized fields, the availability of technological information stored in computers and readily retrievable, mistrust of the service ethic as evidence in malpractice suits, and the stiffer monitoring of the rights of human subjects in experiments, --in short, a general weakening of professional autonomy and authority. "The de-professionalization of everyone would usher in an age of the client as consumer, a consumer who is expected to question, compare and treat all advice with a skeptical ear," and "the moral and evaluative overtones of the professional model" would decline (Haug, 1975: 212).

Haug's observations can be accepted without reaching the same conclusions. There is no evidence that the capitalistic vision of economic man has been seriously weakened in U.S. culture. We assume that in a competitive capitalistic society prestige will continue to be associated with occupation and income. Therefore, occupational groups will continue to compete for status, creating and re-creating an occupational hierarchy. Since expertise alone is not the basis of occupational prestige, even if expert knowledge becomes widespread and the consumer more assertive, occupations that already have attained the status of "profession" and the monopoly that goes with it, and other aspiring occupations, will still value and protect the rubric of "professionalism." This assumption in no way implies professions forever. It does suggest, though, that our current economic, political, and social institutions would need to be modified. When production and allocation decisions are not so strongly governed by the political economy of the marketplace, differential status could eventually be based on criteria other than occupation and income. In this new context, professions may then lose their social class trappings to disappear entirely or be replaced by a new occupational hierarchy based upon characteristics consistent with the new social order.

I ideological justification and communication capacity

As part of their political struggles for monopolistic privileges, professionalizing occupations must engage in several ideological tasks. These involve convincing relevant segments of the ruling class and the public of the merits of their demands for autonomy, and that privileges, once granted, will not be abused, but on the contrary, will benefit society. Successful exercise of these ideological tasks in the main requires two kinds of
ideological resources: (1) the construction of a persuasive rationale or justification; and (2) an effective capacity to communicate proof of the occupation's merit.

The justification for monopolistic advantage that aspiring occupations developed in the 19th and 20th centuries fit with the tenets and values of industrial capitalism; it also helped to shape its development. Eventually, this justification became an ideology of professionalism still used by aspiring occupations today. As discussed in earlier sections, the content of this professional ideology centered around the cognitive superiority of specialized knowledge/technology based on science as a method, and the norms of impartiality, objectivity, and non-commercial advantage embodied in a service ideal. This ideology was responsive to and promoted at the same time such dominant values as individualism, free competition, the application of science (as a method and a world view) and technology to human endeavors and social progress, and the rationalization of the economy and community life to secure a stable environment for business and industry (Kolko, 1963; Wiebe, 1967). It supported and received support, in turn, from such major developments as the reform of the university to be more compatible with the industrial world and its rise as a status-transforming and status-conferring institution, and the growth of large-scale bureaucracies in the public and private sectors of the political economy. In the eyes of at least one observer, this professional ideology would have to be placed as the centerpiece of an entire culture of professionalism that permeated middle class life in the United States between 1840 and 1915 (Bledstein, 1976).

Ambitious individuals in America were instrumental in structuring society according to a distinct vision—the vertical one of career. The most emphatically middle-class man was the professional, improving his worldly lot as he offered his services to society, expressing his expanding expectations at ascending stages of an occupation. Professionalism emerged as more than an institutional event in American life, more than an outward process by which Americans made life more rational. It was a culture—a set of learned values and habitual responses—by which middle-class individuals shaped their emotional needs and measured their powers of intelligence...

Professionalizing occupations vary in their capacity to use the ideology of professionalism strategically, either because they cannot convey an image sufficiently consistent with the ideology or because their capacity to communicate the proof of their claims...
is in some way deficient. Ideological resources to communicate justification include: symbolic resources—the status of the aspirants as a symbol itself, and the special language and dramaturgy of their practice; and formal and informal vehicles of communication—journals, textbooks, conferences, conventions, occupational associations, and the mass media. The symbols associated with an occupation can convey or reinforce persuasively a belief in the highly unique knowledge and skills of its practitioners. "The more abstract and ambiguous the language, the more superhuman the practitioners and their challenges are portrayed, the more exclusively the occupational dramaturgy is enacted with clients (who must assume the good faith of the practitioners) rather than customers, the more convincing these symbols are..." (Nilson and Edelman, 1976: 24). A familiar illustration of the power of symbols to justify occupational prestige has been the successful, long-running, and stereotypic TV portrayal of the ethical sensitivity, drama, and skill of physicians and lawyers at work. Similar efforts to portray social workers and nurses have been unsuccessful.

Conclusion

Each of the perspectives we have presented above regards the professional phenomenon differently, and as such takes a different stance towards professional ideology. The ideology of professionalism has become an accepted part of the dominant ideology of United States society. "Put forward by established authorities, the dominant ideology praises traditional arrangements, denies the existence of conflicts of interest between authorities and subordinates, and opposes political change...Its major significance lies in its influence over how alternatives are defined" (Karzenelson and Kesselman, 1975: 356,7). In capitalist society, "ideology conceals the existence of class and the basic structure of exploitation" and "emphasizes individualism and individual solutions" (Larson, 1977: 156).

The structural-functional perspective of professions accepts and supports the dominant ideology. Professions are viewed as liberating for society, an integrative force that brings the wisdom of science to the service of the public interest. Social class is not an issue. The processual perspective questions prevailing arrangements in the division of labor, viewing these as the outcome of a pluralistic political process in which occupational groups must engage. It does not question the competition over status and rewards nor the basic structure of inequality itself. The ideology of professionalism is supported by accepting
and using its tenets as the measure and means of achieving professional status. The general assumption is still that professions are beneficial for all groups, and social class is, therefore, not a concern, except as it may become an issue in individual service delivery.

The political-economic perspective ties professions squarely to social class. Professions are an integral part of the social stratification system in United States society. As Western societies were transformed by the industrial revolution, professions arose like other corporate ventures to take advantage of newly forming economic markets. In a competitive and rapidly expanding capitalist economy, workers who had information and services to sell—an intellectual technique—needed to find a means of protecting their labor. Those workers who could garner resources by virtue of individual talent and the advantages of institutional ties to the structure of power—through family, education, and social class positions—were able to consolidate occupational functions in a given sphere and control them by building a professional enterprise. Professions tie workers into an existing power structure and serve it through their expertise in order to advance their own class interests and status aspirations. With the dominant ideology thus exposed to criticism, professions can be examined as potentially detrimental or obstructive to the objective interests of other groups. The structure of inequality is laid bare as a fundamental issue.

The issue is not merely academic. The willingness of social work professionals to examine structural inequality and their part in preserving it can be a beginning step in the re-definition of capitalistic institutions to more socialistic patterns. The prerequisite of that re-definition, however, is the development of class consciousness. Here professional ideology is notably obstructive.

Among the many changes in post-modern society, the most heralded have been the unprecedented growth in the numbers of professionals, managers, and white-collar workers, and the centrality of theoretical knowledge for development, planning and policy analysis (Bell, 1973). The questions are whether this potentially powerful aggregation constitutes a new social class, who belongs to it, and whether it can become conscious of its objective interests and united around the reduction of structural inequality (Wenocur, 1975). Professionals clearly belong to a middle or upper-middle economic stratum in the society, but to know that is to know very little. "There are many intermediate strata, conveniently referred to as the 'middle class,' the boundaries of
which are difficult to state exactly, and membership in which cannot be determined in any simple fashion" (Bottomore, 1966: 12). Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977) among others have argued that a coherent professional--managerial class is emerging, whose members share an overrizing common "culture" or lifestyle, despite some internal antagonisms. Perhaps. But the ideology of professionalism within this class is divisive; it inhibits the development of a progressive, shared political consciousness.

The issue of structural inequality is especially pressing for social workers in post-modern society. For not only does social work have a unique historical tradition rooted in social reform, but its mission brings social workers into daily contact with poor and working class people who suffer most from inequality. Social workers (not alone among professionals) are caught between their class interests as aspiring professionals and their democratic and humanitarian ideals. If they hope to act on their ideals as they come to terms with the multitude of issues facing the profession in post-modern society, they need to explore and understand the historical development of social work from a political economic perspective. We believe this will enhance the capacity of social workers to find socially progressive alternatives, and in concert with other progressive groups, eventually to create a different social reality.
NOTES

1. The figures in this table were compiled from two sources: 1) The Statistical Abstract of the U.S.; 1975 U.S. Factbook, Table No. 568, "Employed Persons by Major Group and Sex: 1950-1974", p. 350, U.S. Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce, October 1974; and 2) a summary of three tables presented by Lewis Corey in "The Middle Class", contained in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) Class, Status, and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953, pp. 371-380. The three tables which were summed were Tables Nos. 3, 4, and 6, Independent Professionals, Technicians, and Salaried Professionals: 1870-1940. The original source for these tables was the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

2. Wilensky has used the dual attributes of technical/scientific knowledge and the service ideal to challenge the contention that the occupational structure as a whole is becoming more professionalized (Foote, 1953). This is a particularly convenient bit of ideology because it contains a number of unproven assumptions about the virtues of professions and does not seem measureable in any reliable fashion. According to Wilensky (1964: 148) neither specialized technique nor theory is sufficient for the professionalization of labor. There is an optimal base for professional practice 'neither too vague nor too precise, too broad nor too narrow.'

If the technical base of an occupation consists of a vocabulary that sounds familiar to everyone (social science and the arts of administration) or if the base is scientific but so narrow that it can be learned as a set of rules by most people, then the occupation will have difficulty claiming a monopoly of skill or even a roughly exclusive jurisdiction.

By the same token, rules which govern working conditions and production standards may help assure "technically competent, high quality work," but do not ensure that a service ideal will be followed. Nor can union rules, which are designed to protect employees more than the public, be equated with the "moral norms" of established professions. An example of the former would be seniority rules; an example of the latter would be the routine referrals made by professionals to their colleagues, even if a fee is lost, when the client's needs fall outside one's own domain of specialized competence. Nor are either of these attributes alone sufficient for an occupation to claim professional recognition. Both must be present.
3. Professional movements differ from social movements in many ways. The analogy holds best in terms of the presence of shared ideology, interest group association, and the passions engendered in the struggle for professionalization. The analogy breaks down in the consideration that the ideology is not a counter-ideology to an established institutional order, but rather a struggle by groups with resources for a still greater share and more powerful position in the existing institutional structure.

4. "In the fifteenth century the Inns of Court were active educational institutions. They were, in effect, the residential colleges of a (purely legal) university, filling the gap left by the exclusion of the common law from any place among the studies pursued in the recognized seats of learning" (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 37).

5. Civil servants were university-trained clerks who studied civil law to pursue careers in the civil service. With the recession of church influence, both civil lawyers and canon lawyers declined before the 16th century. Common lawyers, not requiring training in the university, became prevalent and were involved in a wide range of legal and semi-legal activities (as they are today), such as politics and various administrative/managerial positions (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933: 2943).

6. U.S. institutions were influenced by this transformation in many ways, though a feudal system never existed in the United States. This historical difference partially accounts for the differences in the structure of U.S. professions compared to those in Europe.

7. A number of organizational theorists have described the composition and structure of organizational environments. Some of these include: Levine and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Aiken and Hage, 1968; Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968.

8. This section is based upon the work of Terence Johnson, Professions and Power, 1972, and unless otherwise indicated all quotations are from this source.

9. The Professional-Managerial Class consists of "salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1977: 45).
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Recognizing social problems is only the beginning. Harder is identifying the public policies which will provide a real solution. Hardest of all is finding the social power to make the changes.

For a significant number of intellectuals, the experiences of the late 60's and early 70's led to revolutionary conclusions that the "irrationalities" of society were actually rationally rooted in the social structure of capitalism.

One radical current rediscovered in Marxism the latent power of the industrial working class. The pressing question: How to get this sleeping giant to use its power? The first steps seemed obvious. The walls which protected the intellectual community also isolated it from the working class and had to be broken down. One way was for the socialist intellectuals to become part of working class life to learn from it and be a part of organizing the class struggle.

It happened in every developed capitalist country in the world. Robert Linhart's story is the French version. Following the 1968 uprising in France, Linhart left his life as an academic economist and hired on as an unskilled laborer in a Citroen plant. But what he describes could almost as well be the experience of the radical who ends up working the assembly line of a Detroit Chrysler plant.
From the inside, factory life has little romance. Linhart describes it well. Workers are individuals and there are as many stories as there are workers. There are heroes and cowards and traitors. There are small group dynamics as well as divisions along race, cultural, sexual, age, craft, and job lines. Yet penetrating through all of this is the experience of class relations.

As a description of this industrial working class experience the book is at its best. The central daily objective is nothing more glamorous than basic survival. But the strategies for survival widely differ. Some workers play beat the machine. Some get pleasure out of beating the system. Some live for putting one over on the foreman and some live for getting the foreman's approval. Some find ways to informally change the situation and cooperate among themselves. Some survive by trying to make their work interesting. But others cope by trying to reduce their job to a completely thoughtless rhythm so that the mind is free to wander elsewhere. "The mechanism of habit brings back a small amount of liberty: I look around... I escape in my imagination." (So management tinkering with the work process or paternalistic "job enrichment" programs can actually threaten daily survival.)

A few jobs in auto plants do not require the same kind of daily survival strategies because they involve a high degree of skill and creativity. Linhart tells a story of a metal finisher whose skills and experience have won him considerable respect. "Even the foreman and the section manager modify their usual tones of voice when they speak to him. Almost courtesy." But skill means discretion and a measure of power on the shop floor and therefore a thorn in the side of a system of hierarchical authority. The skilled metal finisher in this case had created his own workbench with special features that enabled him to do a quality job efficiently. But in the name of rationalization and standardization and authority, someone upstairs decides to replace the workbench. The skilled craftsman who took great pride in the quality of his work is suddenly confronted with the task of trying to do his job with a misdesigned workbench. He is surrounded by various levels of management who cover themselves by blaming him. His old workbench and his dignity have been dumped on the junk pile.

Long term survival strategies are also varied. Some workers may believe for 20 years that they are only working "temporarily" in the plant until they can get the money to do something else (return to the home country, open a small business). Others hope to escape by climbing into management.

And still others hope to improve their conditions through the unions and politics. Here Linhart's book is weaker because it covers only a year's events. While qualitative jumps do take place in the class struggle, the long term experience is also a summation of many small victories, defeats, and nonevents. Linhart views the brief period with the impatience that is typical for most of the radical intellectuals who went into the factories.

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In Linhart's case it is self conscious. After four months: "I didn't join Citroen to make cars but 'to organize the working class'. A contribution to the resistance, to the struggles, to the revolution... And now, here, it's this very political effectiveness itself which escapes me. Where can I start?" And therefore his story is also about the radical intellectuals in the factory.

Linhart stuck it out until he was fired ("dismissed"). For a year it was a personal challenge just to stay at the job. The difficulties of basic survival, the frustrations with all of the obstacles to action, and the impatience with the pace of events as well as management (and in some cases union) harassment, combined with the attractions of returning to intellectual lifestyles, drove most of the radical intellectuals like Linhart out of industry. But some successfully found ways to survive and are a part of the collective working class history, experience, and future.

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This provocative and pathbreaking book is a major contribution to the political analysis of the American social security system and of the welfare state more generally. Employing an analytical framework derived from the theory of collective choice, Carolyn Weaver poses a number of intriguing and important questions about the founding and growth of the nation's public retirement system. Like Martha Derthick (Policymaking for Social Security, Brookings, 1979), the author locates the engine of social security expansion in governmental actors, especially bureaucrats and key congressional figures, rather than in public opinion, interest groups, or the political parties. In at least two respects, however, Weaver moves beyond Derthick. On the one hand, her book is more self-consciously theoretical and thus develops an argument that aspires to applicability beyond a single government program. In this way Weaver generates numerous hypotheses that may be tested in other contexts and avoids the impression which Derthick leaves that social security
is an anomaly in American politics. On the other hand, she produces a bold and original interpretation of the circumstances of the introduction of the program, a period Derthick mostly ignores. It is with this part of Weaver's book, where her contribution is potentially most significant but also most vulnerable to criticism, that I will deal.

Weaver begins by laying out two competing models of the political process drawn from the public choice literature. Demand-side interpretations argue that "political outcomes reflect the demands of citizen-voters as transmitted and aggregated by the political process...The demands...generally result from the inefficiencies and inequities created by market failures" (p. 5). Weaver deduces from this perspective two explanations for the emergence of a compulsory federal old-age insurance program in 1935. One is that socio-economic transformation increased poverty among the elderly and "generated demands for an institutional means of enforcing upon the individual the obligation to ensure against the financial hazards of old age" (p. 6). The other interpretation suggests that the Great Depression, by undermining public faith in the market and the viability of private savings and insurance institutions, demonstrated the necessity of non-market provision of old-age income security. Supply-side interpretations, on the other hand, focus on the role of bureaucrats as actors who seek to preserve and enhance their organizations. The key environmental characteristic of a public bureau as opposed to a private firm is that it has a type of monopoly power because it is "generally immunized from the efficiency generating forces of the competitive market process" (p. 7). The hypothesis that this model suggests is that the monopolistic and compulsory character of the 1935 program were the means by which program advocates sought to insulate themselves from competition and evaluation.

Weaver, to her credit, argues that demand and supply-side frameworks need to be integrated and she develops a complex process-model of the evolution of public programs. However, her primary purpose is to discredit the demand-side explanation of the introduction and expansion of social security. Toward this end she tries to demonstrate that in the pre-Depression era, there was no broad-based popular support for a program like social security, that the emergence of a notion of the "elderly" as a distinct class of citizens with peculiar needs was an artificial and false rhetorical symbol, that the vast majority of elderly were either self-supporting or cared for by family or friends and not dependent on private charity or almshouses, that though poverty among the aged was real it was not clearly linked to age and would be likely to decline with further industrialization, that aggregate savings rates remained steady up to the Depression, and that there was rapid growth and innovation in private life insurance and pensions in the period. Weaver concludes that the market failure hypotheses of the demand-side model cannot be sustained. She goes on to assert that "in all probability the basis for compulsory insurance, as envisioned by early advocates, would have been weakened over time had it not been for the Great Depression and Franklin Roosevelt" (p. 56). But the Depression created only a generalized demand for
some kind of action; bureaucrats and "reformer-zealots" gave the program its particular character, as she argues in a detailed legislative history of the Social Security Act.

The forcefulness and clarity with which Weaver argues her case lend it a not fully justified air of conclusiveness. She persuasively shows that the social insurance movement had not yielded success on the eve of the Depression, but she is much less convincing when she tries to argue that there was no objective evidence of market failure before 1929. The data she cites are too skimpy to answer the specific questions about living standards of the aged that she asks. Moreover, some of her interpretations of existing evidence are suspect. That the "vast majority" of elderly were not public or private wards tells us little about the economic strains they imposed on their "families and friends." Nor can one accept the author's rosy descriptions of private insurance and pensions as a viable road to income security, especially when she herself notes that aged poverty was primarily the result of "low income" during working lives, making adequate provision beyond the means of the majority. Weaver treats the Depression and the political transformation it generated as an historical accident that unfortunately led us to adopt a non-market, redistributive policy from which we have not yet deviated. The Depression might better be seen as part of the normal cyclical behavior (in extreme form to be sure) of the unregulated market. Finally, her attempts to show that life insurance companies and industrial pensions were able to weather the economic crisis miss the point: The Depression shattered the faith of Americans in the market. Whether this was completely justified by the facts, and whether it was good or bad, are separate issues.

While Weaver's emphasis on bureaucratic supply represents a distinct improvement over highly simplistic demand-side models, it is appropriate to consider the utility of the public choice approach more generally. I believe the tendency to dissolve the government and bureaucrats into nothing more than rational self-interested actors and to treat the public and private sectors as conceptually and empirically opposed rather than systematically and symbiotically linked are serious deficiencies. Nevertheless, Weaver's impressive study should stimulate lively and fruitful polemic and research.
The general theme of this text on aging policies and programs is the vulnerability of particular population groups in a capitalistic society. Of most concern are persons who work for low wages, are irregularly employed, or who receive no wage compensation for labor (homemakers). The point is made that economic insecurity during the working years is carried over into old age.

The source of inadequate income levels for many older persons, according to the author, stems from inherent inequities characteristic of a capitalistic economic system. Business manipulation of labor and technological displacement along with sex, race, and age discrimination combine to restrict employment opportunities and earning capacities. As a result many people face old age with few assets and very limited pension rights.

It is argued that current income maintenance programs tend to increase the inequalities between capitalists and workers, older and younger generations, and among the elderly. Benefit increases in old age pensions, for example, disproportionately raise the income levels of workers who earned good wages during their careers. Those who had low wages or who were unable to work, on the other hand, are subjected to poverty in old age. Their poverty is, in fact, exacerbated as employment possibilities diminish with advancing age and as increased living costs are incurred by gaps in health care and housing policies.

This informative and well-written book clearly presents the most important present and potential issues facing the elderly. The provisions of current public and private income maintenance programs, housing policies, and human services legislation are more than adequately covered. Moreover, the reader's understanding of the forces behind the development of programs for the elderly is enhanced by a thorough historical view.

This book is set apart from other descriptive texts by the thematic forces on the root causes of economic and social insecurity in old age. The author argues that structural contradictions in our advanced capitalistic society not only contribute to inequities but impede any realistic hope for
improvement through normal change processes. Particular criticism is aimed at the false hopes of either free-market mechanisms or liberal reforms.

While many legitimate concerns are raised about the limits of income redistribution in a capitalistic economy, some questionable conclusions are drawn relative to program policies and capitalistic manipulation. The Social Security earnings test, for example, is cited as a tool of capitalists to create a part-time pool of labor. In fact, however, earnings tests are used even more extensively in socialist economies as a mechanism to open up job opportunities for younger workers. Similarly, such arguments that capitalism is the primary cause of the absence of physicians in rural areas are quite spurious, as comparable problems prevail in socialist economies.

The real strength of the book is more in the clarity and thoroughness of the issues than in the persuasiveness of the critical assessment of capitalism. Perhaps an even more important contribution is the discussion and debate that its arguments should generate. It is highly recommended as a policy course text or as a resource book on programs for the aged.


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Steve Burghardt's The Other Side of Organizing is a groundbreaking effort to redefine the nature of community-based practice in the face of the rightward drift of U.S. social policies and the social work profession over the past decade. Rather than asking whether community organization will be "fact or fiction" in the 1980s, Burghardt explores the more trenchant question of how community organizers can make their work both more effective and more rewarding in an increasingly conservative context. Burghardt's answer is the major focus of his book: that effective practice requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction between the personal and social/political aspects of work and the development of skills which translate this ongoing reflection into action. In Burghardt's view, a successful community organizer must synthesize the analyses of such diverse theorists as Karl Marx and Carl Rogers Sigmund Freud and Paulo Freire. The Other Side of Organizing is an attempt to formulate the framework for that synthesis. Its purpose and vision are to be
applauded; its accomplishments, while less grand, certainly merit commendation and, above all, serious analysis.

Burghardt's thesis rests on two interlocking assumptions: (1) that the context of practice reflects the tension between the forces of stability and the forces of change in any given era and (2) that social work methods tend to reproduce either "dominate-subordinate" or "self-determining" social relationships. That is, social work serves either to reinforce or to replace prevailing ideologies and the structural arrangements from which they derive.

His first assumption--with its implication that community organizers must view the larger context of their practice as dynamic--is a necessary precondition for practice in all social work methods. In fact, Burghardt recognizes this throughout his book, particularly in chapters 2 and 8, in which he attempts to develop a dialectical framework for practice that cuts across traditional methodological divisions. The problem lies in how to translate this awareness into action. Burghardt struggles throughout the book to formulate this framework and is only partially successful. Three factors limit the attainment of what Burghardt identifies as his primary goal.

One factor is a consequence of Burghardt's second underlying assumption. Despite his efforts to integrate the "personal" and the "social," to find common ground between caseworkers and community organizers, Burghardt's formulation of social work cannot fully escape the dichotomization of practice that has plagued the profession since the 1960s. A dialectical conception of practice (and of the "collective practice" of the social work profession) must recognize that the work of individuals and of the profession as a whole often simultaneously reinforces and challenges existing values and institutions. The contradictions of society, which Burghardt admirably describes in several chapters, are reproduced within the work of individuals, the organizations in which they practice and, all too frequently, in every step of the helping process. Burghardt emphasizes the need for organizers to examine their work through a multi-dimensional lens and to engage in an ongoing process of overcoming their personal weaknesses and the external forces of resistance. He slips into oversimplification at times, however, such as the subsection of chapter 3 which charts "organizing situations and their dominant personality demands." Further work needs to be done to expand upon these categories and "instructions".

A second obstacle is the book's utilization of theory. Burghardt begins by citing Corrigan and Leonard who advise social workers to look outside as well as within their practice for the theoretical insights that will produce practice breakthroughs. Burghardt heeds their advice by attempting to incorporate within community organization theory material from casework literature, Freudian and Rogerian psychology, Marxist political-economy and the pedagogical theories of Paulo Freire. At times, the effort works well and produces important insights. The chapter on leadership development, which applies Freire, is particularly valuable. Chapters on "The Changing Context of Practice in the
"The Class Character of Social Work in the 1980s" and "The Class Character of Social Work in the 1980s" use a Marxist analysis to explicate the relationship between national and international economic developments to local crises and even the daily dilemmas of practice. This material should be required reading for all students of social work (and their professors) to broaden existing perspectives on the environmental context of practice and the relationships between policy and practice.

Burghardt is less successful in his attempt to synthesize "personal/psychological" and "social/political" perspectives. Although his critique of existing practice theory is instructive, his alternative framework is incomplete for several reasons: (1) Burghardt strives to create "critical reflection" by linking intellectual/rational with intuitive/emotional (and unconscious) abilities. Yet he fails to identify what constitutes practice "intuition" and, especially, how one can cultivate it and incorporate it into practice. Many of the practice illustrations used throughout the book which purport to prove certain generalizations derived from theory are, in fact, subjective interpretations of the personal experiences of Burghardt or his colleagues. The attempt to demonstrate the application of "tactical self-awareness" to the situations presented often suffers from the self-consciousness of hindsight. There is not convincing evidence that the workers in the case studies consciously applied the techniques Burghardt presents.

(2) Burghardt relies heavily in his development of a dialectical framework (chapters 2-4) on his understanding and appreciation of certain concepts from Freud, Rogers, and Helen Harris Perlman. Inasmuch as the assumptions and universal applicability of their theories have been effectively challenged by others, the attempt at integration of these ideas into a model of radical community organization rests on shaky foundations. As helpful as the insights derived from Freudian therapy may have been for Burghardt (as he acknowledges they were), there is no evidence that Freud's view of the unconscious has the subversive quality that Burghardt attributes to it.

(3) Burghardt calls for a reevaluation of how one experientially combines theory and practice. Yet, much of his framework for practice rests on a narrow, highly personal empirical base. There is too much reliance on personal incidents and "informal surveys" to "prove" key points of analysis. More work needs to be done not only to spell out in greater detail the practice principles which Burghardt outlines but also to validate their effectiveness in a broader range of practice situations. Although the book has value as a personal statement on community organizing, it will have far greater value when that statement reflects a broader range of experiences.

A final problem stems from Burghardt's implicit definition of community organization, which, despite his critique of existing practice theory, does not reflect the full reality of community organization practice. Burghardt's experience, his illustrations and, by implication, his model largely focus on community organization within a "grassroots" level organization. Many social workers who consider themselves organizers and even activists work within existing social service agencies, governmental or quasi-governmental...
bodies, industry and labor unions. Further work needs to be done to assess how (and when) the practice principles Burghardt constructs can be applied to these diverse practice settings.

None of the above criticisms detracts from the importance of Burghardt's book. Rather, they reveal how new and how significant is the territory he is attempting to chart. The measure of the success of a work like The Other Side of Organizing is not only its immediate utility but also the extent to which it stimulates new lines of inquiry and analysis. Burghardt raises far more questions than he answers. That, in itself, is the mark of an important and worthwhile book.
Zillah Eisenstein, a feminist and political scientist, has written a very important book for the future of the women's movement in the 1980s. This book is important for those of us teaching women's studies, social and political movements, and social policy and for those of us who, in the sense of praxis, wish to combine our feminist knowledge with action in the women's movement.

Her book is divided into two parts. The first considers the origins of liberal (mainstream) feminist thought in the works of early political philosophers such as Locke and Rousseau and early feminist writings of Wollstonecraft, Taylor, Mill, and Stanton. The second half reviews the ideas and actions of reformist feminists through the writings of Friedan and the early statements of the National Organization for Women (NOW). Finally, Eisenstein examines the increasingly prominent contradictions among the social relations of patriarchy (male dominance), liberal or democratic ideology, and liberal feminism. These contradictions become more apparent with the entry of women in the paid labor force and the efforts of the state to defuse the subversive and potentially radical nature of the women's movement through limited and symbolic legal reforms.

The first part of the book is primarily of historical interest. It traces the 17th and 18th century use of liberal ideas to break away from the patriarchal ideology of divine right and feudal authority toward the liberal notions of individualism, freedom, and autonomy for men under capitalism. Early feminist writers, however, argued simply that similar liberal rights and ideas should be extended to women. They stopped short of seeing that the patriarchal underpinnings and the redefinitions of patriarchy under capitalism merely benefited men. Only after the second wave of the women's movement were some feminists able to see that underlying contradictions existed between patriarchal mechanisms of control of men over women and the full extension of liberal citizenship rights to women.

This earlier analysis is useful when Eisenstein sets her sights on these contradictions in Friedan's work and the pursuant politics of liberal or reformist feminism. In other words, she argues that liberal feminism must come to grips with the problem of bringing about change within liberal states that seek to uphold patriarchy and capitalism. For example, the liberal state allegedly provides equality of opportunity, even though, as a consequence of patriarchal relations, women and men start from different, unequal places in society. As Eisenstein notes, "The problem is that the liberal state can
grant equality of opportunity to women in the legal sense without creating the equality of conditions for them to participate" (p. 162).

Hence, efforts that focus on incorporating women into political and state activities or the extension of equal rights for women will not address the underlying inequality and conflict between women and men generated by patriarchal relations. For example, no law mandates that women must go out and work in the paid labor force and then return to work a second, unpaid shift at home. Yet, legal equality only addresses this first form of inequality. This situation provides the major contradiction between women's lives and the liberal ideology: women are supposedly granted equality of opportunity in the labor force, but at the same time, they confront patriarchal relationships and inequality within the home and have no support of law to overcome such inequalities. At the same time, if single female parents fail to meet certain 'social norms' for raising their children, then the law can and does intervene in the home.

Thus, under this system, the effects of reform, especially legal reforms to enhance the position of women, are limited when the state grants minimal reforms that defuse the revolutionary implications of feminist activities and condones conservative efforts to restrict women's rights. For example, under the onslaught of the right wing in the 1980s, with its emphasis on controlling women's reproduction through legislation and constitutional amendments, Eisenstein notes, "...the struggle to control women's reproductive activities and the limiting of her choices related to the institution of motherhood, reflects the centrality of patriarchy to Western society" (p. 224). As a consequence, under so-called liberal governments, women's right to control over their bodies is severely threatened, while a Supreme Court decision barely protects our 'right to privacy'.

Thus, the major point of Eisenstein's analysis is that although feminist activities directed toward legal and symbolic reforms such as the ERA are essential to improve the status of women, feminists should not direct all of their activities solely toward political reforms and integration within liberal states. Instead, feminists should incorporate within their analyses and political activities the contradictions inherent in capitalism between women's work in the labor force and in the home and between women and men. This prescription is particularly timely, given the recent setback for the ERA and the determination of the National Organization for Women to engage in intensive political activity oriented toward increasing the number of politicians who are sensitive to feminist issues. Her analysis also raises the question about the possible outcome of the recent campaign for the ERA, if feminists had chosen to organize around the issues and realities of women's work in capitalist patriarchal society. Finally, such analysis raises questions about the ability of a movement guided by Friedan's liberal yet delimited ideology as outlined in her recent book, The Second Stage, to bring about widespread and needed change in the relationships between women and men without resolving the inherent conflicts noted above.
At the same time, several important themes of the new research on capitalist patriarchy are missing from Eisenstein's analysis. For example, Heidi Hartmann's (1976) pioneering research on the relations among capitalism, patriarchy, and job segregation is notably missing in Eisenstein's discussion of the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy as a mechanism of social control over women in the home and in the market place. Likewise, Natalie Sokoloff's (1980) research on the dialectics of home and market work is not cited (although this could be due to the close proximity of publication). As a consequence, Eisenstein's book draws upon only a limited amount of theory and data on the economic relationships governing the position of women under capitalism and patriarchy. Although it is important to consider the ideological dimensions of liberal ideology and their relationship with feminism, explicit consideration of the economic relationships such as those noted by Hartmann and others is also necessary. For example, if we are to use Eisenstein's work to organize women working in the labor force, analyses such as Hartmann's on men's direct control over women's access to and position within the labor force and men's indirect control over women through male dominated unions and occupational segregation should be essential components of the new feminist analyses of the 1980s. As so many of us finally discovered in the 1960s and 1970s, we can change ideology or sex role attitudes only minimally without large scale changes in the economic organization of capitalist society that is based on the continued patriarchal and racist exploitation of women and persons of color.

Despite these omissions, Eisenstein's book contains the blueprint and the analyses for a feminist movement in the 1980s that can provide a powerful counter-offensive to the pressures of the right wing while potentially bringing about more revolutionary change for women and men. As such, this book should be required reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses on women, policy analysis, and so forth; radical and socialist feminists will find their previous analyses confirmed. Finally, I can only hope that the membership and the new leadership of the National Organization for Women and other major reformist feminist groups read this book.

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Sokoloff, Natalie

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Public policy analysis, especially when it concerns fiscal budgetary matters, has long fallen into two camps: the large, university-and institutionally-based Micro and Macro Fiscal School of Facts, Figures, and Behaviors; and the small, radical, and marginally-based Marxist School of History, Contradiction, and Struggle. The two books discussed here are fine representatives of each faction, solid enough in their distinctive ways to keep the other side from falling asleep often--no mean accomplishment in the land of fiduciary dialectics.

Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget, edited by Joseph Pechman of the liberal Brookings think tank, is an exemplar of school number one. For the reader wishing to understand both the short-term objectives and budgetary options before the president and the marginal liberal alternatives to Reagan's supply side ax, the work fully analyzes defense, nondefense (how's that for a new name for social welfare?), and the New Federalism proposals in great detail. Some of this is good enough to interest anyone: for example, Henry Aaron on "Nondefense Programs" and Edward Gramlich and Deborah Laren on "The New Federalism" analyze the various forms of block and categorical grants, tracing their history, the role they have played between the federal and state systems, and why Reagan's proposals, given the particular economic strength of certain states, will have such a diverse--and socially negative--impact on so many states with once relatively large social welfare programs. Similar discussions on the largesse in defense expenditures, the draconian cuts and their implications for education, health, and income maintenance, all give the work some short-term, descriptive value.

But, gee, what about things like, um, race? Or sex? Or class? Are there any clear social implications behind any of the proposals, that is, do the cuts fall disproportionately on one social grouping or another? Why? You won't learn anything about these issues here--after all, they're not in the budget.

Likewise, what about the liberal alternatives? Here is where the reader keeps falling asleep. Charles Schultz, ex-President Carter's fiscal wizard (and no mean budget slasher himself) begins by agreeing with the need for real increases in defense, real decreases in social spending, and the need to end deficits through the closing of some loopholes and a lot of regressive consumer taxes. The language is sweeter, but the pill will still be bitter to
most people. His main reform interest—in the midst of international economic crisis, 10% unemployment (at least double for Blacks and Hispanics) and heightened suffering for millions of Americans—is reform of the budgetary process itself! He wants better, more streamlined relations in Congress and the Executive. To read all this is to understand why liberalism is dead.

For those wanting to grapple with genuine alternatives and who also wish to deepen their understanding of the history of the economic and fiscal crises, URPE's (Union for Radical Political Economics) Crisis in the Public Sector is much better, livelier reading. Instead of just facts and figures, the reader seeks to place the fiscal crisis in a larger national and international perspective, analyzing not only the crisis of capital but presenting a broader analysis of the state, its institutions, and their role in capitalist development. The tax revolt—just assumed by Brookings—is looked at for its social and political meanings, and various organizing case histories are presented which detail the longer term behavior of politicians, business leaders, public sector unions, and rank and file and community groups. Instead of emphasizing budgetary figures, its emphasis is on the political and economic actors and what their history of activity means for the future. Above all, the roles of the public sector unions and workers are analyzed, in part because they are viewed as important elements in future strategies of social welfare reform, in part because they have received little attention in the past.

The work isn't perfect. Some of the articles will be perceived as too parochial and localist to have value on a national scale, and there isn't much attempt to draw out national and class-wide implications of various strategies; macro fiscal types' eyelids will droop here. But no one can leave the work less informed about the seriousness of what is clearly an unresolved political and economic crisis, nor fail to recognize the key role certain actors must play if progressive alternatives are to take place. One may not agree with all the prescriptions here (personally, I did), but there is far more vitality and hope in URPE's pages than in Brookings's.


PATRICIA MORGAN
University of California, Berkeley

Alcohol and the Family is everything a good anthology should be. It offers the reader articles which not only represent the contours of the field, but articles which also introduce the varied conceptual and theoretical facets of the problem. The key to the richness of this book also lies in the editors' ability to weave in both the more traditional methodologies, with historical
and cultural analyses of alcohol's place in the family. Starting with a chapter on the historical perspective, the book then follows with one chapter on alcohol and the family in literature, runs through discussions of social influences, sex roles, organization, legal aspects, children, systems, services, prevention, and treatment, and closes with an overview chapter by Harwin and Orford.

The value of Norman Longmate's opening chapter on "Alcohol and the Family in History" lies in the breadth of his presentation. Alcohol's historical relationship to the family is historically situated within the culture as well. Thus, we not only learn about the threat gin posed to the family in 18th century England, but how it entered the culture, the legal ramifications, and the effects on different social classes. In the same manner we learn how the concern over drinking in the family in the Victorian era was an integral part of Victorian culture itself.

Ghinger and Grant's interpretive essay on "Alcohol and the Family in Literature" analyzes through novels and plays, not only the effects of popular perception of alcohol in literature, but its significance. Shaw takes a different tack in the next chapter to ask what are the social, cultural, historical, and economic influences on the role of alcohol within the family. The strength here is that Shaw defines "social influences" broadly enough so that the reader is able to integrate information from the first two chapters.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8 all discuss various aspects of the problem as it exists in contemporary society. Davies talks about the transmission of the problem (here defined mostly as "alcoholism"), weighing genetic, social, environmental, and contextual factors. Sex roles and family organization are discussed next by Leland in a concise and comprehensive review of the issues in this literature. Jacob and Seilhamer, in Chapter 6, take a look at how spouses cope, locating the literature nicely in an historical context, for both male and female spouses. In Chapter 8, Wilson discusses the various theories on the impact of the problem on children.

Chapter 7 takes the problem into the family systems perspective with Steinglass attempting to focus attention on to the organizational structure of the family rather than the individual as the actual site of the problem. John's analysis of family law and alcohol in Chapter 9 provides a major contribution to the book. She shows how the law looks at alcohol problems in the family in several oblique ways: domestic violence, divorce, and custody and welfare maintenance.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 deal with services, treatment and prevention respectively. Ritson, in Chapter 10, asks why the family is rarely involved in services involving alcohol and family problems. He then analyzes various barriers to family oriented services, from help seeking and recognition to the structural. In Chapter 11, Harwin analyzes treatment approaches in terms of the excessive drinker and the family, locating the various alternatives. Orford presents a comprehensive overview of prevention issues in Chapter 12.
arguing that the barriers to prevention lie in an amalgamation of factors related to the traditional narrow focus of the problem and problem intervention.

The book closes with an overview chapter by Harwin and Orford, who attempt to integrate the various chapter presentations into a comprehensive discussion of the problems in establishing a family perspective. It is this attempt at synthesis, at drawing out the relevant questions and problems, that mark the unique contribution of this book.
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