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Mapping the Global Landscape in Women's Diasporic Writing

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MAPPING THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE IN WOMEN'S DIASPORIC WRITING

by

Martha Addante

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
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As a contribution to the theory of cognitive mapping, the dissertation examines the ways in which contemporary novels by women writers of diasporic literature offer new conceptual maps of the present global space. This study argues there is a need for alternative mapping strategies that locate the female diasporic subject within the new global political economy. Fredric Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping and Arjun Appadurai’s model of global flows provide a useful framework for mapping global space, yet each must be filtered through a feminist critique and modified by a feminist politics. Ultimately, the dissertation argues for a feminist theory of cognitive mapping that considers women’s multiple experiences of identity and how these experiences define the diasporic subject in relation to the various global flows (of people, capital, technology, information, or ideologies of state).

Surveying three novels written by writers of diasporic literature—Zadie Smith’s *White Teeth*, Jessica Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters*, and Michelle Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven*, the dissertation discusses how these novels function as narratives and provide cognitive maps which help us re-conceptualize social and political structures and women’s places within them. *White Teeth* examines Bengali and Caribbean women’s experience of multiculturalism in London in light of British immigration policy spanning from 1948 to 1981. The novel
maps the disjunctive relationship between global flows that both empower and disempower women. Jessica Hagedorn's *Dogeaters* captures the experiences of women in the Philippines exploited by foreign capital and by their own domestic ruling class and bombarded by American pop culture. Yet, given the disjunctive relationship between the global flows, globalization effectively provides women with new possibilities for resisting ideological and repressive state apparatuses. Still focusing on neo-imperialism, Michelle Cliff's *No Telephone to Heaven* highlights, through the political awakening of its fair-skinned Jamaican protagonist, how global flows work in conjunction to conspire against developing nations, particularly against those within the nation who are most vulnerable. Each of the novels provides a cognitive map of global space highlighting a global system that is ultimately a space of contestation as well as possibilities.
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My interest in women’s diasporic literature has its roots in the immigrant experiences of the women in my family, especially my mother, grandmother, and aunt. It is through their narratives that I first became aware of women’s experiences of migration and their struggles to belong in a new place. Their personal ordeals and triumphs taught me about the link between identity and geography. In these women I saw how it is possible to imagine new social and cultural landscapes as they responded to the challenges of the Canadian immigration experience.

I trace the theoretical inception of this project to the fateful day when I first read Jameson’s essay, “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” I began to think about the ways other women respond to the effects of globalization, and this broadened my understanding of women’s experiences of diaspora. It also made me think about the ways they struggle to make sense of their lives in a global economic, political, and social environment whose dynamics are forever shifting, radically altering women’s lives and their sense of place and purpose.

I would like to thank my committee, beginning with Gwen Raaberg, my director, for her constant guidance and support. In her I found a wonderful mentor. Todd Kuchta provided me with copious feedback. I am sincerely grateful for his painstaking consideration of my work and for sharing my enthusiasm for this project. Allen Webb challenged my understanding, encouraging me to read from different perspectives. Special thanks to Mustafa Mirzeler who graciously joined the committee.
on short notice. In addition to my committee members, I would also like to thank Lorenzo Buj who has been both a friend and mentor to me. Our exchanges over the years have helped me develop many of the ideas that have found their way into this project.

To my friends, words cannot begin to express my sincere gratitude for the emotional support and thoughtfulness you have shown me throughout this process. Anna, Carol, and Phyllis, I am especially thankful to you for helping me to laugh while I wrote these pages and to see the lighter side of life. Phyllis, thank you for believing in me and helping me do the same.

I am most indebted to my family for their encouragement throughout the completion of this dissertation. I am especially grateful to my parents for their support and their patience all these years while I did what I love to do most. And a final thanks to my brother Nick for being the calming voice of reason in my life.

Martha Addante
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INTRODUCTION

As a contribution to the theory of cognitive mapping, this study will examine ways in which contemporary novels by women writers of diasporic literature offer new conceptual maps of the present global space. There is a need for alternative mapping strategies that locate the female diasporic subject within the current global political economy and that contribute to the development of a socio-political theory considering the multiple experiences and locations of women in the age of multinational capitalism. Fredric Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping as well as Arjun Appadurai’s model of global flows are useful to this study, but each can and must be appropriated and modified by a feminist politics. This project will focus on the multiple experiences of identity and how different experiences define the diasporic subject politically, culturally, and socially or in relation to various, shifting global flows, what Appadurai calls “scapes.” In other words, I will focus on the ways that differences in identity conceptually alter the cognitive maps plotted by women in the present era of globalization. The new model will form the foundation of a theory of cognitive mapping applicable to women’s experience of globalization. I will then turn to three novels written by women writers of diasporic literature—Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, Jessica Hagedorn’s Dogeaters, and Michelle Cliff’s No Telephone to Heaven—and discuss how these novels function as narratives and provide cognitive
maps which help us re-conceptualize social and political structures and our place as women within them.¹

In the following pages I will argue that Jameson’s theoretical model of cognitive mapping offers a foundation for a feminist project of mapping global space. As a Marxist theorist Jameson’s primary concern remains the modes of production in his analysis of cultural texts, yet his work also combines aesthetic, philosophical, political, and historical analysis in his reading of art and everyday life (Homer and Kellner xiii). He understands the term modes of production or social totality to include a system of economic as well as cultural, political, and social relationships too. For this reason, his theory of cognitive mapping offers a solid foundation for a

¹ My specific project to examine women’s maps of multinational capitalism in literature has yet to be explored though a number of scholars have examined, critiqued, and sometimes incorporated Jameson’s model of cognitive mapping into their own work. Thomas Rice and Shawn Anthony Miklaucic have both applied Jameson’s model of cognitive mapping in their analysis of the fiction of Umberto Eco and of computer games respectively. Maria Elisa Cevasco has also offered a sample of cognitive mapping in her analysis of the “anti-globalization structure of feeling in Brazil,” an exercise in the search for new ways of living (new forms of practice as well as new social and mental habits) that accompany the alternative modes of production made possible by what she sees as “a modification of capitalism in recent years” (Cevasco 102-3). None, however, have undertaken a feminist reading of cognitive mapping. Kathleen Mary Kirby has included a feminist critique of Jameson’s postmodern subject in her dissertation on postmodern subjectivities and their implications; however, her thesis maps the abstract space of the subject specifically. Michael Rothberg too has critiqued Jameson’s theory, asking “does it matter politically, aesthetically, or experientially….where the subject is situated in relationship to the social totality?” (121). In his analysis of the film lohn-macht-anst, he illustrates how various subject positions offer multiple frameworks and stories, entries and exits that speak to the “discontinuities” within globalization and within our (partial) maps of the globe. Karen Lynnea Piper concludes with a discussion of Jameson’s model in her dissertation on mapping territory in 20th century literature, including, but not confined to, postcolonial literature. As I see it, my own project is situated within the body of literature noted above as it seeks to investigate the implication of female subjectivity in women’s cognitive mapping in postcolonial literature, specifically diasporic literature. A key difference though between my own dissertation and the works by Kirby and Piper, who also considered Jameson’s theory in relation to female subjectivity, is that while I acknowledge the problems inherent in Jameson’s model of cognitive mapping, I ultimately do not reject it as a foundation for my own reading of women’s cognitive mapping. Rothberg too offers a critique of the subject in Jameson’s theory though he still adopts Jameson’s model, but his analysis is confined to film and considers a broader range of subject positions, not just the impact of gender on mapping. My argument is that Jameson’s model can be appropriated by a feminist critique and ultimately recuperated in order to better understand women’s location in the global space of multinational capitalism.
feminist model of cognitive mapping that examines the subjective experience(s) of women as they interact with global flows. For Jameson, it is through art and aesthetic production, particularly narratives, that we order history and map our social totality. The latter project is important in our present period of postmodernism where, according to Jameson, subjects experience disorientation or “disjunction” between the body and its surrounding environment, resulting from the globalization of the economy. It is necessary, however, to expand Jameson’s model and examine the ways women’s narratives re-organize historical events and represent the totality. In doing so, I will adopt Arjun Appadurai’s model of global flows which underscores that the various “landscapes” or flows of people, capital, technology, media images, and national ideologies all position subjects differently depending on their multiple locations in history. In her article “Cartographies of Struggle,” Chandra Mohanty offers an analysis of feminisms in the third world, their diverse histories and struggles, by demonstrating how various structures of power, or “relations of ruling,” such as state rule, economic shifts, and hegemonic discourses intersect and position women differently depending on their historical locations. Such relations of ruling operate by “constructing” and “consolidating” systems of class, race, and gender domination, and they do so differently at particular historical junctures. My project similarly considers the way subjects intersect with various global flows and are shaped by them depending upon their various identities and sympathies. Appadurai’s scapes are “relations of ruling.” I have chosen to adopt his model of global flows,

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2 Mohanty borrows the term from Dorothy Smith.
however, primarily because it captures the constant state of flux characteristic of power structures in the era of multinational capitalism.

Having laid the foundation for a theory of cognitive mapping, this study will also examine ways in which novels from varying global locations map women’s position in relation to the larger system, multinational capitalism. Each of the three novels selected present different possibilities for representation that depend on indeterminate ways heterogeneous and hybrid identities intersect with global flows in various postcolonial spaces, in the West as well as in the former colonies. Zadie Smith’s *White Teeth* maps the multicultural terrain of the former imperial metropolis, London, from the perspective of its former colonial subject now within the nation’s borders. Jessica Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* represents a complex system of global flows and its limitations and possibilities for women depending largely on their locations/positionality in the neo-colonial landscape of the Philippines during Marcos dictatorship. Michelle Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven* depicts global space from the perspective of the Jamaican masses as they collide with overlapping global flows and struggle to throw off the shackles of neo-colonialism in Jamaica. In all three narratives, the global totality mapped differs according to the different locations of the

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3 The novels discussed in this dissertation follow in reverse chronological order, beginning with the most recently published novel to the earliest. I have organized the chapters in this way because it seems to me most fitting to begin my examination of women’s cognitive maps with an analysis of the impact of globalization on the centre of the former British Empire. Globalization has resulted in the reterritorialization of Britain, and it is precisely this process that is captured in *White Teeth*. It is also logical that a discussion of diaspora begins with an examination of current immigration flows. Since the immigration flows run predominantly from the former colonies to Britain, the heart of the empire, I have begun my discussion of global mapping in Britain. The remaining two novels both highlight the workings and effects of other global flows. I have arranged their order again beginning from most recently published to the earliest because while both present very different maps of the global totality, *No Telephone*, discussed in the last chapter, offers a template for democracy and resistance that
mapmakers, consequently offering varying and partial maps of the whole global system.

Within his oeuvre, Jameson delineates his concept of cognitive mapping in some detail, and, given his theory's centrality to my own work, it is necessary to examine the particulars of his theory more closely. In “Cognitive Mapping,” Jameson relates that the term originates with the scholar Darko Suvin’s emphasis on the cognitive function of art and aesthetics primarily in the work of Brecht. For Jameson, “all aesthetic production consists in one way or another in the struggle with and for representation” (348). Aesthetic production is not unlike Althusser’s notion of ideology which bridges the gap between “real” and “imaginary” or “lived” relations. In other words, ideology is an imaginary representation of our relation to our real conditions of existence (Hardt & Weeks 7). Althusser writes, “in ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relation and an ‘imaginary’, ‘lived’ relation” (Althusser, “Marxism” 233). Narratives hold a privileged position in Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping because they are the form through which we order and contextualize random events into coherent and meaningful histories. For Jameson, history is accessible only in narrative or textual form, that is, through prior (re)textualizations (82). For this reason, as Hardt and Weeks suggest, cultural products are of central importance to Jameson’s cultural theory and analysis. Hence, if resonates globally. The struggle of the Jamaican people under Manley as represented in the novel has profound implications for the global community.
we are to develop interpretive frameworks through which to understand women’s place in the global era, we will need to consider contemporary culture, and specifically for the purpose of the dissertation, contemporary novels or narratives by postcolonial women writers.

For Jameson, however, meaningful histories are the histories of class struggle. History is the “single great collective story...sharing a single fundamental theme”—the history of class struggle between dominant and labouring classes (19-20). All cultural artifacts are symbolic acts that must be read, or re-written in the course of interpretation, as ideological conflicts between opposing classes. Yet it is not class alone that defines historical struggles or the subjects of history. As Teresa de Lauretis in “Feminist Studies/Critical Studies” highlights, “consciousness...is never fixed, never attained once and for all, because discursive boundaries change with historical conditions” resulting in “an identity made up of heterogeneous and heteronomous representations of gender, race, and class...across languages and cultures” (8-9). In short, there is no “all purpose...frame of reference” (14)—Marxist, feminist or otherwise—from which to define our multiple histories and the many historical subjects.

Hence, feminists argue that current globalization and the social inequalities it produces cannot be understood without reference to multiple markers of identity, including gender, race, and class. For instance, according to Elisabeth Prugl, home-based workers or contingent workers, the majority of whom are women, are particularly attractive to companies seeking greater flexibility and a way to cut costs.
These companies subcontract labour-intensive production and services to small firms that employ contingent workers for wages that are lower than those paid to full-time factory workers. In the southern hemisphere, due to "structural adjustments" imposed by the IMF, women often work double and triple shifts in factories under deplorable conditions in order to afford such basic necessities as food. Moreover, because of government cutbacks in social spending, women who cannot afford to render welfare services from the market are also responsible for the unpaid labour of caring for elderly, children, and sick family members (199-200). Thus, one cannot read the current historical struggles solely in terms of class. There is no "single great collective story," but rather multiple stories and struggles against gender, race, and class oppression resulting from the globalization of the economy.

Cognitive mapping also develops out of Kevin Lynch's book, *The Image of the City*. Drawing upon Lynch's premise that urban alienation is the result of people's inability to map mentally the city space, Jameson then projects this spatial problem onto larger global spaces or totality. In his essay, "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," Jameson argues that within the new "postmodern hyperspace" dominated by transnational corporations, outsourcing, and the rise of media conglomerates able to exert their power across national borders, postmodern subjects lose the capacity to locate themselves. No longer anchored within stable parameters, subjects experience a new depthlessness or fragmentation. As a result of this

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4 In an attempt to attract foreign capital, governments take measures to cut existing welfare programs, deregulate their economies, and dismantle existing labour protections (200). They also pursue policies to encourage subcontracting contingent workers, the vast majority of whom are women left unprotected by the lack of labour protection laws and welfare programs if and when fired.
decentring of subjects, Jameson develops his aesthetic of cognitive mapping which requires in part "the extrapolation of Lynch's spatial analysis onto the realm of social structure" ("Cognitive" 353). However, yet again Jameson's theory requires us to question how "postmodern hyperspace" will impact women and their attempts to map the new social system crisscrossed by various flows of technology, information, and media images which speed across space impervious to traditional boundaries.

Cognitive mapping, of the sort that Jameson endorses, assumes the bounded subject of the Enlightenment. Such a subject experiences the "crisis" of identity that Jameson identifies as indicative of the postmodern moment and as increasingly exacerbated by forces of globalization. However, for women, especially women of colour, the notion of a splintered identity is in fact necessary for any rudimentary understanding of how subjects interact and are embedded in systems of domination. As Chandra Mohanty declares, "no one 'becomes a woman'...because she is female," but rather "it is the intersections of the various systemic networks of class, race, (hetero)sexuality, and nation, then that position us as 'women'" (12-13). Yet systems of class, race, and gender domination "do not have identical effects on women in third world contexts" (13), or in any global context. Rather, Mohanty argues, any analysis of (third world) feminist struggles must consider the relationship and interaction between "relations of ruling" or institutional practices and the ways in which the latter situate women. I posit that any theory of cognitive mapping must not only consider the ways various levels of the totality or in Arjun Appadurai's terms, global flows, interact and situate women differently, but how they do so largely depending on how
they intersect with various networks of identity. In short, I will argue that a theory of
cognitive mapping must consider the intersection of multiple and fractured identities
with various global flows.

Althusser’s theory of ideology is the third source that informs Jameson’s
concept. The function of cognitive maps is “to enable a situational representation on
the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality
which is the ensemble of society’s structures as a whole” (*Postmodernism* 51). The
unrepresentable totality of which Jameson speaks is the world space of unlimited
capital and the global realities it engenders. Such a totality is not directly accessible to
the individual. It is what Althusser calls an “absent cause”—something known only in
its effects, or in Jameson’s words, “in distorted and symbolic ways” (“Cognitive”
350). Althusser’s concept of the totality is a useful theory for understanding the social
structure. He rejects the Marxist notion of mediation—that the various levels of the
superstructure are identical with each other and ultimately one with or determined by
the infrastructure or the economic base (Dowling 71, 65). Instead he posits that the
social totality is a structure within which distinct and “relatively autonomous”
elements function interdependently. Unlike Marx, who assumes the economic
structure plays a formative or determining role in shaping the totality, Althusser posits
that it exists as one part of the structural whole. For Althusser, the economy plays a
determining role only “in the last instance” that “never comes” (“Contradiction” 113).
Each level of the (super)structure is co-dependent on all the others, and is, as William
Dowling writes, the “condition for the function of every other” (68). Each part or
entity is overdetermined by all other parts of the structural whole and is equally involved in overdetermining every other part of the social formation: it is “determining... and determined by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates; it might be called overdetermined in its principle” (Althusser, “Contradiction”101). Althusser’s concept of overdetermination introduces the concomitant notion of contradiction since every entity in the totality is affected by the “push and pull” of every other part (Resnick & Wolff, Knowledge 24). In short, we can conceive world space of unlimited capital as a totality with multiple semi-autonomous but related systems functioning interdependently as a structural whole.

The above has enormous implications for women’s mapping strategies. If global systems or flows function both in relation to other flows and at odds with them, then consequently they will have varying effects on women across the globe. For example, in Dogeaters, foreign media (mediascapes) clash with national ideology (ideoscapes) to empower some women whereas in No Telephone to Heaven, they collude with other global forces to commodify and appropriate national history in the name of consumerism, downplaying the role of women in the nation’s history. Moreover, Althusser’s concept of overdetermination also implies constant change between the various entities of any social formation. This “ceaseless play of change” (Resnick & Wolff, “Althusser’s Liberation” 63) between global flows alters the social totality (which in turn alters the global flows) so that every representation is only a partial representation of the totality. So while national ideoscapes in the form of British immigration policy regulated the inflow of colonial subjects into Britain (or
ethnoscapes), the former was itself a response to the rise of nationalism in the former colonies and in other parts of the UK, mainly in Scotland and Wales, a response to both domestic and foreign ideoscapes. *White Teeth* captures the ways in which colonial subjects within the British nation in turn alter national self-representation (ideoscapes) and redefine British national identity. Each of the three novels offers only a partial representation of the many manifestations of the ever changing social totality that is globalization. Each offers a point of entry and opportunity to examine a single aspect of the ever changing whole.

Jameson’s view of mediation differs from Althusser’s theory of overdetermination as delineated above. Jameson argues that one cannot “practice mediations” without assuming some prior difference or discuss differences between levels or elements of the superstructure without assuming a prior unity or “background identity.” Jameson resolves the debate between Marx and Althusser by underscoring the dialectical relationship between identity and difference, arguing that these are co-dependent terms. Jameson’s dialectical thinking is problematic though for a number of reasons. As Sean Homer highlights, “dialectical thinking can operate in the opposite direction” too, so that Jameson’s search for totality or similarity may be an attempt to overcome difference and seek coherence where none prior existed (157). Moreover, if Althusser’s concept of overdetermination posits that each entity is necessarily both determining and determined, then a plethora of possible relationships exists between entities or flows, challenging notions of simple contradiction that are oppositional. Each flow or contradiction is “radically heterogeneous,” constituted or
determined by the multiple flows within the totality, each with different origins and conflicting qualities and influences that “push and pull” it in all directions (though there is no reason to assume that some of these directions would not overlap resulting in synchronicity at least temporarily). The differences that constitute each entity or contradiction do not simply “merge” into a “real unity” or “dissipate” as the “pure phenomena” of an essence (Althusser, “Contradiction” 100). Instead each entity displays the complex contradictoriness characteristic of the totality it partially determines. Hence Althusser’s concept of the totality is highly complex, giving way to a pluralistic rather than a traditional dialectic understanding of the workings of social processes and formations. Furthermore, for Jameson, albeit though the same is true for Althusser, the economic level is still the determining variable that shapes the totality: “it is capital itself” that provides “a certain unifying and totalizing force” in the attempt to map the world space of multinational capitalism (“Cognitive” 348). In short, Althusser’s model of the superstructure captures the disjunctiveness and semi-autonomous relationship between systems or elements of the superstructure, allowing for an infinite number of possible relationships between global levels whereas Jameson’s totality underscores the “initial identity” against which difference can be measured, leading to a dialectic understanding of the workings between levels of the social totality. However, there are instances in Jameson’s work when the notion of totality threatens to eliminate difference altogether.

Multinational capitalism is, for Jameson, an example of a total system which at times collapses difference into itself. It is a synchronic structure—one in which
“everything becomes so seamlessly interrelated that we confront...a total system” that neutralizes opposition and reintegrates resistance back into the system, effectively eliminating any real possibility for resistance (Political 28, 91). I will argue instead that multinational capital is better imagined in terms of global flows that address both the disjunctures or contradictions as well as the coherence between elements of global economy. Social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai offers a framework for exploring the relationship between global flows that examines the disjunctures inherent in the superstructure, specifically the chaotic and fractured structure of multinational capitalism. In Modernity at Large, Appadurai offers his theory of global flows or “scapes” which is similar to Althusser’s notion of structural totality. Like Althusser, he underscores the disjuncture between global systems though he does not rule out their possible overlap. He argues that our models need to reflect images of flows, uncertainty, and chaos rather than rely on “older images of order, stability, and systematicness” (47). The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that the flows, and their relations to one another, are “radically context-dependent” (47).

Not only does Appadurai’s theory of global flows reflect the disjuncture and overlap between levels of the global totality, but his theory also conceives of the various flows as systems of power which interact and position subjects differently at different historical junctures. They are not “objectively given relations” (33), but rather “perspectival constructs” nuanced by the historical, linguistic, and political

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5 For instance, in his discussion of mediation in “Globalization and Political Strategy,” Jameson argues that that the economic dimension of globalization often “dissolves” into the rest, “controlling the new technologies, reinforcing geopolitics interests and...finally collapsing the cultural into the economic—and the economic into the cultural” (53).
“situatedness” of the different interpreters—whether nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, villages, neighbourhoods, families, or the individual subject. It is important, moreover, not to think of global flows as networks which position subjects as victims. Rather, as Appadurai notes, his scapes are the foundation for “imagined worlds” as envisioned by subjects with agency. For Appadurai, the imagination is a site of struggle, “a space of contestation” in which subjects are invested with agency (4). It is a “social practice” and form of negotiation between “sites of agency” and numerous “fields of possibilities” (31). As such, his theory has resounding consequences for women attempting to map their relation in the world of multinational capitalism.

A brief definition of Appadurai’s landscapes is necessary to illustrate the features of his model. Appadurai examines the relationships between five global flows or landscapes: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes. Ethnoscapes refer to the movement or flows of people—tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, and guest workers that are constantly in flux because they are connected to other flows, those of capital and technology as well as regulated by state policies on immigration. Technoscapes refer to the flows of technology, both mechanical and informational, that are determined by needs of the market (financescapes), state projects (ideoscapes), and available labour (ethnoscapes) while financescapes refer to the movement of capital across borders “at blinding speed” (33-34). The relationship between ethnoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes are both “disjunctive” and “unpredictable” because each scape is subject to its own limitations
(or contradiction in Althusser’s model) and yet simultaneously functions in relation to the others. Like Althusser’s elements of the superstructure, they are semi-autonomous.

Mediascapes and ideoscapes, unlike the previously discussed scapes, are both related to a “landscape of images.” Mediascapes refer to both the “image-centred, narrative-based strips of reality” (35)—the material which subjects or agents transform into scripts of imagined lives—and the media technology that produces and distributes information (newspapers, television station, film productions studios, and, it is necessary to add, the internet). Ideoscapes are basically series of images that are political and concerned with ideologies of states or counter-ideologies whose aim is to seize state power or a piece of it (36). The latter again highlights the notion of contradiction inherent within all social entities (themselves elements within a larger totality). The official ideologies of state and counter-ideologies are exemplary of the tension that exists within—and not simply between—all social entities, or in this case global flows. Moreover, both official ideologies and counter-ideologies contain their own contradictions in the form of ideological or legislative inconsistencies and inter-party divisions. Appadurai’s model thus provides a broader foundation for a global analysis and theory of cognitive mapping.

Appadurai’s landscapes, like Althusser’s notion of overdetermination, offer a complex disjunctive model of the global totality, but unlike Althusser’s model also allow or account for overlap between various flows. Appadurai’s model moves beyond Marxist concept of mediation where the economic (infra)structure plays the
determining role in shaping the given social formation. It rejects too Althusser’s economic determinism, even if it is “only in the last instance” and “the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes” (Althusser, “Contradiction” 113). Nor does it posit principle and secondary contradictions. Instead the system of global flows is highly relational, marked by the disjuncture as well as the overlap between flows as a result of their “continuously fluid and uncertain interplay” (Appadurai 41). The result is a dynamic model of a global system of interdependent or mutually determining flows that is complex and ceaselessly changing. The above model is again complicated by the fact that each flow contains its own contradictions or tension resulting from its multiple and conflicting aspects, an observation absent in Appadurai’s account of the global totality. For example, Appadurai does not account for the ways multiple media flows work in contradiction to each other.

While the model of global flows advanced in this dissertation rejects the notion of economic determinism and the idea of principle and secondary contradictions, it does acknowledge the need for theoretical entry points. Resnick and Wolff maintain that Marxists acknowledge class as one among many theoretical frameworks from which to understand and change aspects of social life which are clearly overdetermined by economic as well as political and cultural considerations (Knowledge 99). According to Resnick and Wolff, Marx chose class as an entry point because he saw it as a trajectory or process that was insufficiently theorized among

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6 While Althusser does subscribe to economic determinism, he continually stresses the “mutual conditioning” of all the contradictions in the totality. Moreover, he goes so far as to state that while there is always one principal contradiction and other secondary contradictions, they frequently exchange their roles (“Materialistic” 211).
social reformers (99). Keeping in mind that any complete social analysis is impossible, as Resnick and Wolff highlight, I have adopted a feminist approach and understanding precisely because it is a consideration absent from Jameson's theory of cognitive mapping as well as Althusser's notion of totality. Moreover, while rejecting the notion of principle and secondary contradictions, I have also stressed the role of ideoscapes and the ensuing contradictions that arise therein and as a result of their interaction with other flows again precisely because, according to Jameson, the nation ceases to be relevant in the stage of "late capitalism." He writes: in "the moment of the multinational network... in which not merely the older city but even the nation-state itself has ceased to play a central function and formal role in a process that has in a new quantum leap of capital prodigiously expanded beyond them, leaving them behind as ruined and archaic remains of earlier stages in the development of this mode of production" ("Cognitive" 250). Such a proclamation is far from reality. In fact, nation-states and the ideologies of state work both to buffer and accelerate the effects and processes of globalization in both the so-called "third world" and in the West. Economic re-structuring in the former colonies of the Philippines and Jamaica, for example, happens in conjunction with state policies and while the dictates of the market direct the flow of refugees and skilled labourers (from all over the developing world to the West), it also does so in relation to state policies on immigration, as is evident in British immigration policy between 1945-1980, the historical backdrop to Smith's *White Teeth*. As subjects, women both determine and are determined by global flows, especially by ideoscapes, and if any representation of the global reality
and experience is to be useful, it must begin with a discussion of the role of the nation-state in the age of globalization (though of course it need not and should not end there).

Moreover, none of the aforementioned theorists—with the exception perhaps of Appadurai who notes that global flows are “perspectival constructs”—takes into account how different subjects map differently, depending largely on their experiences. A comprehensive model of cognitive mapping must take into consideration multiple subject positions if our maps are to have any relevance in political or social projects and reforms. Althusser offers a theory of subject construction or the ideological interpellation of subjects, yet neither he nor Jameson or Appadurai examine how the experience of gender or the “complex of habits, dispositions, associations and perceptions, which engenders one as a female” (De Lauretis *Alice* 182) shapes one’s map of the global totality. For Althusser, it is the function of ideology to “‘constitute[e]’ concrete individuals as subjects” (*Ideology* 171). It does so by interpellating or “hailing” individuals who “are always-already subjects” (176), already possessing “reflexive self-knowledge” (Lock 84), and recognize themselves as those addressed by the Subject (a “Unique and Absolute Subject”). Subjectivity then is “an effect” (81) of the interpellation process, essentially the subject’s subjection to a Subject. Yet Althusser’s human subject, as De Lauretis says of the structuralist…subject, is “theoretically inscribed—hence solely conceivable—in the terms of a patriarchal symbolic order; and of that subject, women represent the sexual component or counterpart” (*Alice* 161).
A more comprehensive model of cognitive mapping must consider the way women experience and interact with global flows—the specific (global) institutions, discourses, and social practices—that produce the category of woman. The overriding problem with Althusser’s theory of interpellation is that it fails to account for gender difference in subject development. Teresa De Lauretis offers a theory of subjectivity, construed as a process resulting from women’s interactions with the world—from their varying experiences: “subjectivity is an ongoing construction … produced not by external ideas, values, or material causes, but by one’s personal, subjective, engagement in the practices, discourses, and institutions that lend significance (value, meaning, and affect) to the events of the world” (159). For De Lauretis, the “complex of habits” resulting from the women’s ongoing engagement with their social reality (182) is the very definition of experience and the basis for the construction of subjectivity. However, De Lauretis is ever mindful of the fact that since female subjects are “engendered across multiple representations of class, race, language, and social relations,” their experiences as women are marked by difference(s) that “cannot be again collapsed into a fixed identity, a sameness of all women as Woman” (“Feminist” 14,15). Hence, their experiences of globalization will differ. Moreover, precisely because subjectivity is a “continuous” process, habits are subject to modification, resulting in a habit-change and re-articulation of subjectivity. Self-analyzing and consciousness-raising practices produce new social subjects and discourses as women reflect upon and transform themselves and the practices and institutions that engage them.
There are several differences between Althusser’s theory of interpellation and De Lauretis’ theory of subject formation that are pertinent to a theory of cognitive mapping. The first regards the agency of the subject. In Althusser’s model the individual is “always-already [a] subject,” meaning on one hand that he is, even prior to birth, “appointed” as a subject by the family ISA (ideological state apparatus) that prepares for and awaits the “expected” child since its conception (“Ideology” 177), but also for Althusser the individual is always-already a subject who, as Lock highlights, is free and “responsible for its actions,” yet is also subjected and “therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (182).

Althusser concludes that the individual is interpellated as free only so he will freely submit to his subjection to the Subject (182). The reality which is “necessarily ignored” in the subject’s recognition of himself as a subject is “in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of production and of the relations deriving from them” (182-3), namely capitalist relations of exploitation. Self-reflexive knowledge does not exist insofar as the subject “ignores” (or misrecognizes) the real process by which the individual is interpellated as a subject/worker by the various structures of the social totality. Hence, Althusser’s subject is a subject who lacks agency. Individual agency is impossible though demystification is possible through science. To gain scientific knowledge of the mechanism of [ideological] recognition, Althusser writes, “we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology...to be the beginning of a scientific...discourse on ideology” (173). Yet this practice of outlining a scientific
discourse remains removed from concrete, everyday experience of subjects in ideology.

In contrast, De Lauretis outlines a theory of subjectivity in which subjects actively partake in the construction of their subjectivity, but also contribute to the cultural discourses and institutions in which they are located. The subject, for De Lauretis, is in part a subject “subjected to social constraint,” but also a “subject in the active sense of maker as well as user of culture, intent on self-definition and self-determination” (“Feminist” 10). De Lauretis’ subject is an active participant in the construction of her identity rather than the passive recipient of subjectivity. According to De Lauretis, all women engage in practices, “consciousness-raising groups, alternative forms of labor organization, familial or interpersonal relations, and so on,” that produce a habit-change, thereby effecting a change in consciousness (Alice 178). Feminism, unlike Althusser’s science, is “very much a politics of everyday life” (“Feminist” 12).

Moreover, while both Althusser and De Lauretis highlight that subjects are discursively produced, the second key difference between Althusser’s theory of interpellation and De Lauretis’ theory of subjectivity, as already mentioned, is that the starting point for her theory is the feminine subject, constructed as such “by a specific kind of experience” (Alice 161), marked by gender as well as race, class, and ethnicity.\footnote{Althusser’s theory of overdetermination also has immense implications for subject development. If subjectivity is overdetermined, then it is constructed by different forms of consciousness (gender, race, ethnicity, class, and so forth) as well as all the various discourses or levels of the totality, positing a subjectivity that is constantly shifting and never fixed.} Althusser’s model assumes a generic subject (engendered male or
masculine). For De Lauretis a woman’s identity is the product of her own engagement with the discursive contexts available at a historical moment ("Feminist" 8). If “[s]elf and identity...are always grasped and understood within particular discursive configurations,” then identity is forever mutating as “discursive boundaries change with historical conditions” (8). In short, women’s identities are multiple, varying, and heterogeneous representations of gender, race, ethnicity, and class, determined by their relative positions in an ever shifting historical context.

De Lauretis’ theory has several implications for a feminist theory of cognitive mapping. Women’s experience of globalization depends on their race, class, or ethnicity as much as it depends on their gender or sexuality. Yet it is also a subjective, personal, and ongoing process marked by women’s active engagement with various global flows that determine the “horizons of meaning and knowledges available in [a] culture” at a particular historical moment (8). Hence, women’s various forms of consciousness are open to change and development as their discursive contexts change, offering women new “political, theoretical, self-analyzing practices” that lead to habit-changes and ultimately produce “new social subject[s]” (Alice 186). Given the overdetermined and fluid nature of global flows, women constantly occupy different and multiple positions that allow them opportunities for a new understanding of their lives and a fresh take on the world around them, therefore enabling them to negotiate with as well as resist global flows. Women not only actively contribute to the construction of their own identities, but also alter the very context(s) of their development as subjects. As a result of relationship between subjects and their
cultural contexts, women’s maps of the global totality are always provisional and contingent because the positions of the mapmakers alter as discursive cultural boundaries shift.

Maps are contingent on the particular relationships between identities and the various global flows that intersect in specific historical locations. A theory of cognitive mapping must consider different possibilities for representation that depend largely on the indeterminate ways that heterogeneous identities intersect with a system of complex global flows at particular locations in time and space. Zadie Smith’s *White Teeth* focuses on the trials of various postwar immigrant groups as they negotiate their place in the multicultural community of London. Smith’s novel maps a specific phenomenon of multinational capitalism that has significantly re-shaped the West in recent decades—multiculturalism—specifically multiculturalism in England. Jessica Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* takes place in the Philippines and maps global space in terms of the history of neo-colonialism as it interacts with indigenous kinship politics and both opens up new possibilities for Filipino wo/men, particularly Rio, the protagonist as well as presents new challenges. Finally, Michelle Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven* presents a very different map of global flows as it follows the struggles of Clare Savage, a fair-skinned Jamaican, in concert with the Jamaican masses and in conflict with diverse systems or global flows as they attempt to renegotiate their position(s) within the global network of power. The above provide multiple maps of global capitalism.
The novels I will examine are examples of what Deleuze and Guattari term minor literature. Minor literature is not the literature of "masters" or of "masterpieces," and minor "no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature" (18). According to Deleuze and Guattari, minor literature is defined by three characteristics. The language is marked by "a high coefficiency of deterritorialization" (16), often written by displaced persons. Their alienation is reflected in language and literature. As Kaplan explains, "in one sense it describes the effects of radical distanciation between signifier and signified. Meaning and utterance become estranged...enab[ling] imagination, even as it produces alienation" (358). Deterritorialized language allows the writer to produce highly political works in which individual concerns are always connected to the social milieu. In other words, in such literature the personal is always the political. Yet those "individual concerns" are not at all the singular or idiosyncratic concerns of the writer alone since they express the collective voice(s) and desire(s) of "another possible community and...forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility" (Deleuze & Guattari 17).

The novels discussed in this dissertation are examples of minor literature. While they employ literary strategies of a major language, they often have a minor purpose. They seek to express the ideological and political concerns of their representative communities. Clearly, the novels do not and cannot represent the sensibilities of entire nations since there is no single, homogenous national
community, but they do express the interests of another possible community. The aesthetic forms borrowed from major literature are appropriated to highlight the experiences of those minor subjects within the nation as they interact with their social reality—global flows. It also bears stressing that minor literature does not designate works with a “scarcity of talent,” as Deleuze or Guattari suggest, but in fact often describe works and authors that are canonical. Works of minor literature are often highly popular and widely read. *White Teeth*, Zadie Smith’s first novel, sold over a million copies and had “publishers falling over themselves to get hold of it” (Thomas par. 5) while *Dogeaters* was nominated for the National Book Award (Evangelista). Michelle Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven* has received much attention since its first publication in 1987 as one of three novels written by the critically acclaimed writer. Yet what categorizes all three texts as minor is their focus on the concerns of exiled and displaced persons whose writing voices the experiences and political concerns of dispossessed communities as they interact with their global realities.

The following chapters detail how each of the novels offer cognitive maps of the global totality from various reference points. Chapters one through three will discuss how *White Teeth*, *Dogeaters*, and *No Telephone to Heaven*, respectively function as narratives that offer partial knowledge of the existing global order. Each offers an “imaginary representation” or interpretation, however incomplete, of global space. They do so from various locations, from the former centre of the world to the periphery. I have chosen these novels precisely because each offers a particular

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8 Deleuze and Guattari reference Kafka as well as Joyce and Beckett as examples of artists who write and “live within the genial conditions of minor literature” (19).
“figuration” that attempts to represent the universal or the whole global reality. No version can claim to represent the universal, yet each offers a working map. *White Teeth* captures the contradiction between ethnoscapes and ideoscapes that characterizes the global phenomenon of immigration and resulting experience of multiculturalism from the perspective of minorities at the heart of the former British Empire, England itself. *Dogeaters* and *No Telephone to Heaven* both narrate the history of neo-colonialism in former colonies (the peripheries), the Philippines and Jamaica respectively, yet each depicts a unique history. While both nations share a common history of colonialism and neo-colonialism where foreign ideoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes and even technoscapes often work against the interests of the nations and their people, what they do not share in common is the state’s response to global economic pressures. It is the function and direction of local ideoscapes—perhaps the most highly contingent and contextual element in the global network—that renders the two accounts radically dissimilar.

Chapter one will discuss the ways in which Zadie Smith’s novel, *White Teeth*, attempts to map the English nation whose composition has been radically changed by the influx of recent immigrants (and their English-born children) from the periphery of the former Empire to the centre. The focus of the chapter is Smith’s attempt to record this postwar transformation of the English nation by following its women migrants. My reading of the novel is set in the context of British immigration policy stemming from 1948 with the passing of the British Nationality Act to 1981, the latter policy itself a response to global changes such as the end of the British empire and
rising nationalisms in the British Isles of Scotland and Wales as well as the rise of the European Union. These events prompt the state to define British nationality narrowly at the exclusion of former British colonial subjects. The contradiction within British nationality policy or what Appadurai terms ideoscapes has resounding consequences, one of which is the concomitant reterritorialization of the nation by former British subjects rendered invisible because of their race and gender. *White Teeth* is part of a cultural revolution that captures the tension or contradiction between British ideoscapes in the form of British immigration policy and ethnoscapes, comprised of former colonial subjects and their descendants now residing in England. Yet the cognitive map presented in the novel is “multidimensional” (Rothberg 131). It not only maps the relationship between global flows in our current moment of multinational capitalism, but it also maps across time underscoring the ways histories overlap to complicate our maps of global flows.

The novel also represents the tension between ideoscapes and ethnoscapes as they play out in relation to multiculturalism. Yet the multiculturalism that the novel ultimately endorses is by no means easily achieved. The narrator proclaims that “we have finally slipped into each other’s lives with reasonable comfort,” (271) yet the narrative betrays the difficulties characters like Irie Jones and even Alsana Iqbal encounter as they inevitably shape and are shaped by the nation. Smith pokes fun at the supposed liberal multiculturalists exposing all of the conventional stereotypes and cultural assumptions about minorities. Characters not only define themselves and the nation against the outright racist ideology of the sort inherent in colonial constructions
of Britishness, but also in relation to the liberals and neo-liberal notions of multiculturalism on the left of the political and ideological spectrum. The map that emerges captures the disjuncture and dissonance between two levels or flows—ideoscapes, official state notions of the nation, and ethnoscapes, the multiple flows of immigration that have effectively redefined Britishness, but it also captures the overlap within flows, in this case ideoscapes that cross historical periods.

The novel’s attempt to reinvent new constructions of Britishness by the formerly marginalized, has resulted in the invention of new forms of literary expression. According to Jameson, formal patterns are “symbolic enactment[s] of the social within the formal and aesthetic” (Political 77). Forms of aesthetic expression are ideological in nature; that is, they provide formal “re/solutions” to social contradictions or problems. I will suggest that White Teeth too displays certain literary qualities, formal expressions, primarily humour and the lack of seriousness, that are attempts to come to terms with a deeper social problem—how to represent the formerly excluded and invisible subjects no longer scattered throughout the empire, but within the nation’s borders. Humour undercuts seriousness of official discourse while it also allows for the imagining of new, prior unthinkable definitions of belonging, but it also highlights the contradiction between ideoscapes and ethnoscapes as well as the overlap of ideoscapes across time.

While chapter one offers a partial map of the totality from the former centre of the globe, chapter two moves to the Philippines in an attempt to map global flows from the perspective of women living in the neo-colonial state. The state under
Marcos plays a significant role in shaping the lives of women as well as that of the nation. As I foreground in the beginning of the chapter, Marcos institutionalized patron-client relations or kinship politics for personal gain, yet in endorsing the latter through official and unofficial state ideology, he both complicates the struggles of women as well as offers some a means to combat patriarchal tradition in the Philippines and resist his own regime. Characters in the novel like Daisy Avila are able to manipulate the discourse of kinship politics and stir counter insurgency and resistance to the regime and its policies. Moreover, Marcos' courtship of foreign capital (financescapes) and subsequent introduction of American media (mediascapes) also provide alternative images of womanhood and values such as feminism leading to counter-ideology and the rise of resistance movements (alternative ideoscapes). However, empowerment through the manipulation of kinship politics is not a strategy available to all women. Less affluent women are victims of global flows, kinship politics (domestic ideoscapes), domestic and foreign mediascapes, and exploitive labour practices (domestic financescapes) they are unable to control and work to their advantage. Hence, while Nerissa Balce-Cortes in “Imagining the Neocolony” describes Dogeater’s presentation of the Philippines and Manila particularly as “a garish and occasionally nightmarish theme park created by and for the West” (107), this is only partially accurate.

Indeed, there are a number of ghastly references to American neo-imperialism in the Philippines. The character of Severo Alacran, the Filipino incarnation of American corporate capitalism and owner of Sportex, the department store, renowned
for its exploitive labour practices, the commodification of subaltern bodies like Zenaida and Lolita Luna, and the saturation of Philippine culture by American pop culture are all examples of the negative effects of globalization. Such realities speak to the ways in which various global flows of capital, tourists, and media productions—respectively financescapes, ethnoscapes, and mediascapes—overlap and work interdependently to create a neo-colonial state. Yet Hagedorn also suggests that American pop culture, for example, is a positive and potentially liberating force. So while state endorsed media presents traditional scripts and models of female subjugation, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice, characters like Rio, the protagonist and “director” of Dogeaters, effectively resist such constructions of female subjectivity as a basis for nation building and instead turn to foreign mediascapes in the form of Hollywood films as a counter resistance. In short, Hagedorn not only illustrates the complex interconnectedness of various scapes in the context of a neo-colonial state, the Philippines, but she also illustrates the creative ways third world women intersect with the global system of flows and take advantage of the contradictions within and between flows as well as the ways global flows restrict the possibilities of less fortunate women. In the process, she presents a partial map of global capitalism as it manifests in the Philippines.

Formally, the novel also registers the complexity of neo-colonialism in the Philippines and women’s interaction with the global system. E. San Juan Jr. describes Hagedorn “as a safe female substitute…and an example of Third World postmodernism, [and as such] Hagedorn will no doubt be next season’s ‘pick’ for the
Establishment celebration of its multicultural canon” (455). Yet Dogeaters is not
simply the poster child for third world (women’s) postmodernism. The novel’s use of
postmodern strategies such as pastiche reflects the tensions between and within
various global flows. Tensions between domestic and foreign ideoscapes (kinship
politics and Western ideals of nationalism and feminism respectively) and
mediascapes are reproduced formally in the official and unofficial documents and
stories presented in the novel. In short, postmodern forms of literary expression
within Dogeaters reflect the complex nature of the simultaneously colonizing and
liberating flows of multinational capitalism in the Philippines.

Chapter three continues to focus on maps of the totality from the perspective
of women in the developing world yet the focus shifts to Jamaica where global flows
interact very differently producing different results. The chapter focuses on Michelle
Cliff’s No Telephone to Heaven and that novel’s attempt to expose the machinations
of global forces that conspire to exploit and impoverish Jamaica. The novel is set in
the context of Prime Minister Michael Manley’s attempt to create a social democracy
in Jamaica to combat foreign exploitation and provide social security net for its
citizens. It records the self-discovery of the protagonist, Clare Savage, who eventually
follows in the footsteps of Manley. She is on “a troubled, non-linear path towards
resisting dominant ideology and claiming the community of ‘others’ as her home”
(Schwartz 294). That is, she becomes part of an imagined community that struggles
against foreign domination. Clare’s story is broken and interrupted by characters who
represent the nation’s masses and who seek to politicize their plight and demand
equal recognition as members of a global community. In the unravelling of Clare’s story and those of her fellow citizens, Cliff maps the plight of Jamaica itself in the world economy and reveals the way current ethnocapes, financescapes and mediascapes intersect to rob Jamaicans of their collective memory and to create modern day slums like the Dungle. Cliff maps multinational capitalist space in terms of neo-colonialism; however, in this case, Jamaica does not benefit from conjunction of flows within its borders. The flows work independently yet with similar results—the continued colonization of the nation.

Aesthetically, the novel’s narrative form is also an ideological attempt to express the nation’s quest for equal representation on the global stage despite continued exploitation at the hands of global forces. Multiple plot lines that interrupt Clare’s story illustrate how different subjects interact with various flows and with more or less little success, but also highlight the effort to establish a popular hegemony, as was briefly attempted under Manley’s years in power. The story re-writes this period in Jamaica’s history when the plight of the people came to represent the nation as a whole.

The goal of this dissertation is to examine how the novels, *White Teeth*, *Dogeaters*, and *No Telephone to Heaven* respectively function as narratives and provide cognitive maps of various global contexts which help women re-conceptualize social and political structures and their places within them. Each of the novels represents women interacting with global flows in an attempt to offer a partial map of the totality that is the system of globalization. These flows are mutually
determining and continuously changing. Given the overdetermined nature of the totality, it is necessary to conceive global flows as “perspectival constructs” that change according to the location of female subjects. They are context dependent and open up new possibilities for women even while they close off others. Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping is a useful political strategy; however, it needs to be modified by a feminist politics before it can be applied to women’s situation in the world and illuminate our understanding of their struggles as they move and are shaped by global forces around them.
CHAPTER I: MAPPING THE NATION IN ZADIE SMITH'S *WHITE TEETH*

While Jameson accords narrative a vital role in the interpretation of history, unlike Benedict Anderson, he dismisses the role of literature in imagining the nation—at least in the West. In his most maligned of essays, "Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," Fredric Jameson proposes his "sweeping hypothesis"—that in third world texts "the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society" (86). He goes on to argue that "it is precisely this very different ratio of the political to the personal which makes such texts alien to us...resistant to our conventional western habits of reading" (86-87). However, such texts are not "alien" to the genre or readers of women's literature. Zadie Smith's *White Teeth* offers but one example of a first-world novel in which the personal lives of its female protagonists are—if not national allegories—certainly "political allegories" (Szeman 59). In his defence of Jameson essay, Imre Szeman argues that the term, "political allegory" better describes that situation which Jameson seeks to capture by his term, national allegory—namely, the relationship between the production of narrative and the political (59). Szeman contends that "it is this connection that in the first world has been shattered so completely that third-world texts appear 'alien to us at first approach'" (59). Yet it is precisely the connection between literary production and the political that I seek to explore in Smith *White Teeth.*
John Clement Ball suggests that novels constitute cities as much as planners and builders and politicians do (19). Zadie Smith’s *White Teeth* offers one blueprint of London, and England more generally, from the perspective of former colonial subjects. The novel is both a social practice which contests official concepts of the nation and a work of imagination which re-invents the nation and what it means to be English at a crucial moment in Britain’s history. Momentous changes in post-war Britain such as the loss of its empire and decolonization in Asia and Africa, the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, and its entry into the European community, left an “emotional vacua” in the centre of the British state (Marquand, “Whig Imperialism” 189). This void gave rise to “Tory nationalism” or what Marquand calls “authoritarian individualism,” (189) ushering in a new wave of British immigration policies from 1962 through to 1981. As I will illustrate through a brief history of British immigration policy, colonial subjects provided “the theatre in which modern European [in this case specifically British] identities were shaped and revamped” even though “this shaping of identity was predicated on the invention and exclusion of…colonial subject[s] [and female subjects I would add] as a figure[s] of alterity” (Gikandi 7). *White Teeth* is involved in a process of reterritorialization, representing the British homeland as it is perceived and experienced by women migrants, the “ghostly” others whose presence, according to Jameson, could be felt in the texts of Modernist literature though they remained unnamed until recently. Though Jameson’s evocation of the “invisible” but “essential other component” (“Modernism” 50) remains genderless, it must be noted that the haunting spectres of Modernism were
colonial subject who were rendered invisible because of their gender as well as their race. In short, *White Teeth* is part of the cultural revolution which heralds the “margins coming into representation,” (Hall 34) and those margins are defined both in terms of race and gender.

While authoritarian individualists may seek to resurrect a vision of England that precedes imperial expansion and “whig imperialists” one that coincides with the period of imperial expansion (Marquand, “The Twilight” 216), novels such as *White Teeth* contest both constructions of the nation, choosing instead to re-present the social and political spaces within Britain as navigated by gendered subjects of the former colonies. All three competing visions map the nation in relation to images of past imperial landscapes, but in *White Teeth* the nation becomes reterritorialized by “diverse pasts” and “imperial elsewheres,” (Baucom 212) transformed by multiple migrations. Zadie Smith’s novel, as Ian Baucom says of Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses*, “collaps[es] the multiple landscapes of [Britain’s] past onto the metropolitan expanse of its postimperial present” to create a new British identity (212). The map of the global system that emerges then is highly disjunctive. The various levels of the system (primarily ethnoscapes and domestic ideoscapes) operate in opposition to one another so that official state notions of Britishness collide with the reality that is multi-ethnic Britain. Yet it is precisely as a result of this clash that that new vision of British national identity emerges.

While some theorists readily proclaim the deterritorialization of the nation and claim its insignificance and irrelevance in this age of globalization, such
pronouncements are premature. After all, while capital and technology may flow freely across borders, such is not the case with movements of immigrants still subject to state immigration policies and border security measures. Moreover, its influence is still widely and immediately felt in “everyday contexts” (204) such as social services, labour laws, education, and the environment. Women often experience state legislation in terms of “interference in family and social life” (Smith, “Nations” 27). Such situations reinforce the notion that for women the personal is the political regardless of their location in third or first world nations. The female protagonists in *White Teeth* confront national policies in other ways yet. It is their encounter with, what Anthony Smith terms, “cultural resources” (20) that shape their perception of space and maps of Englishness. Such resources include: myths of origins and ancestry, myths of election, collective attachments to sacred ancestral homelands, myth-memories of golden ages, and ideals of sacrifice and destiny (21). The extent to which they conform or challenge the above nation building processes determines not only their sense of belonging to Britain, but also their maps of contemporary Britain.

The danger inherit in cultural resources is that they often lead to what Jameson terms “reified cultural patterns.” For Jameson, cultural structures and attitudes are “reified cultural patterns” that were once “vital responses to infrastructural realities...as attempts to resolve more fundamental contradictions—attempts which then outlive the situations for which they were devised” only to become part of a new

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9 For example, when health and welfare programs are cut, they often become the unpaid health providers for their families (Tickner 196). The impact on women resulting from cutbacks in social services and healthcare varies according class. Upper and middle class women are able to render services from the market—an option not always available to working class women (Steans 128).
problem ("Third" 94). The nation itself is a "reified cultural pattern". In White Teeth, contemporary Britain presents a new problem. For Jameson, imperialism results in such a situation where lived experience "no longer coincides with the place in which it takes place" rather its logic resides in "India or Jamaica or Hong Kong; it is bound up with the whole colonial system of the British Empire that determines the very quality of the individual's subjective life. Yet those structural coordinates are no longer accessible to immediate lived experience" ("Cognitive" 349). If imperialism caused a fissure between experience of daily life in the metropolis and the economic and social structure that grounds our understanding of that experience, then our present moment of late capitalism brings with it its own contradiction. For post-imperial Britain a new problem emerges (though not the only problem): how to imagine and represent the formerly colonized other within its borders that, according to Jameson, "is its essential other component or opposite" and has until recently remained invisible" ("Modernism" 50). In short, if, as Baucom argues, "in cultivating an empire, England has made itself host to a thousand and one narratives of belonging" (221), then the question remains how will it begin to translate these other narratives into "maps of Englishness"?

For Jameson, imperialism rendered knowledge of the colonial other impossible and understanding of the functioning of the colonial system as a whole inconceivable for British subjects in the metropolis, but the empire also shaped British identity in definite and discernable ways in relation to its neighbouring nations and members of the UK. It forged British identity and consolidated Britain as a
multinational state. The British state came into existence in 1701 with the signing of the Act of Union by English and Scottish ruling elites. Marquand argues that it is this “predatory war-making machine” that defeated France in the eighteenth century race for global expansion (“Whig Imperialism” 185). The two nations, Scotland and England, set aside “old national animosities” to defeat a common foe and pursue a common goal—that of empire (185). Moreover, whether British subjects in the metropolis stressed the homogeneity of British nation (that is, stressed an intrinsically English cultural identity) or celebrated its “deep seated pluralism,” (Miller 162) they nevertheless embraced the imperialist vision of the British state. The operations of empire became synonymous with the British nation and state: “Whig-imperialist Britain was Britain... Shorn of empire, ‘Britain’ had no meaning” (Marquand, “Whig Imperialism” 188). The loss of empire fundamentally undermined British identity. Yet, it was not decolonization alone that eroded British identity, though of course, as Marquand points out, one cannot be an imperialist if one has no empire (188). The end of empire also sparked the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalisms, calling into question the state’s multinational character. Pressures to join the European Union further undermined British identity since expansion of empire had led the British

10 While two nations do not share a common official state church since the church of England is Anglican while that of Scotland is Presbyterian, the two did once again share a common threat—Catholicism of the French state. The British also saw their political institutions as superior to the absolutism that prevailed in France (Miller 158). In short, the British state and identity were consolidated in opposition to French religious and political institutions.

11 The British state is a pluralist state on many levels. Though Scotland joined the Union, it retained control over its legal, educational, and religious systems as well as its local government (McCrone 591). Moreover, English traditions borrowed heavily from older Celtic traditions and notions of Britishness (Langlands 59). For example, the term “British” was adopted from the Welsh Arthurian legend by the Tudor dynasty during the Wars of the Roses as a “bridging and legitimating force” (59).
away from Europe to pursue an “oceanic destiny” (187). It had now to consider membership in a supra-European Union. Faced with tumultuous changes that called for a redefinition of what it meant to be British, the state responded, but it did so by “mak[ing] a mockery of the whig imperialist vision of a world-wide multiple kingship embodying an oceanic and imperial identity” (188).

The state responded with a legislative redefinition of British nationality marked by xenophobia. According to Marquand, the vacuum left by the fall of British empire was replaced by authoritarian individualism. The latter’s vision of the nation is an English vision—not a British one—and it is post-imperial, not imperial (Marquand “The Twilight” 216). As Marquand highlights, the myths, the symbols and the iconography used to evoke the nation were English, forging ties to those generations before imperial expansion (“Whig Imperialism”190). Change, for the authoritarian individualists was “for the worse,” not the better, and though it ensured property rights and individual liberty (as well as social hierarchy), it did so against a perceived immanent threat (“The Twilight” 214). That threat is embodied in the colonial subjects having migrated to England in response to the latter's labour shortages. The colonized other was no longer invisible, but a manifest internal “significant other” against which the nation defined itself (Triandafyllidou 600). It is in relation to immigrant communities from New Commonwealth nations that

The quintessentially English tradition of the monarchy also shares its lineage with Welsh, Scottish as well as Dutch and German-Hanoverian dynasties (60).

According to Triandafyllidou, immigrant communities, who might have previously been “potential significant others” become salient internal significant others during periods of crisis, whether social, political, or economic when national identity is challenged. Britain’s immigrant population became a
authoritarian individualists appealed to some idyllic notion of the pureness of English identity and homogeneity of the nation. It is ironically at the point in British history precisely when the latter is not only a multinational and multi-ethnic state but also contemplating membership in the supra-European Union that Englishness is for the first time narrowly and exclusively defined through immigration policy.

In response to conservative nationalism, novels such as *White Teeth* redefine Englishness from the perspective of the “significant others” who were formerly unrepresented and marginalized and later denied British citizenship. It challenges previous notions of Englishness defined as singular and homogenous, depicting instead a nation marked by multiple routes and migrations rather than ancestral roots or racial purity. The project of re-mapping the British nation accounts for the occluded others, alterity, within its borders. *White Teeth* is engaged precisely in this process. In order to better understand present “fundamental contradiction” that is Britain, it is necessary to briefly summarize the history of immigration in England post World War II and the independence of its former colonies. Such a step is necessary because, as Szeman puts it, “all attempts to resolve the ‘fundamental contradictions’ of the present through cultural production must pass through the concretized history of previous attempts to solve the contradictions of earlier infrastructural realities that have since changed in form and character” (55). *White Teeth* is a response to a contradiction that was itself an attempt to solve an earlier dilemma. Specifically, it is a response to a situation created by British immigration
policy which defined the nation in terms of race yet which was itself an attempt to curb New Commonwealth immigration resulting from earlier British policy of Pax Britannica. The following will briefly summarize two distinct and contradictory chapters in British immigration policy, particularly their application to black Commonwealth women: years between 1948 and 1961, the phase James Hampshire terms, “the period of imperial citizenship” and the nearly two decades from 1962 to 1981, the interval he terms, “the period of exclusion” (18).

Post-war immigration policy reinforced the notion of imperial citizenship. The British Nationality Act of 1948 created an imperial (and multiracial) citizenship and conferred British subject status to all members of the British Empire. As Francesca Klug confirms, “under Britain’s nationality laws there was no legal distinction between people born in the UK and any other part of the Empire” (18). As such, colonial born citizens possessed the right to settle and work in the United Kingdom (Hampshire 19). However, the invention of Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) by the British government in 1948 in no way intended to imply that all British subjects were equal. Rather, like the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, the first of the British nationality Act, it was instated “to put the seal on British domination” (Klug 17). Implicitly, in Britain the construction of the myth of the nation centred on the notion that the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons possessed

13 According to Kathleen Paul in “The Politics of Citizenship in Post-War Britain,” during initial talks regarding the BNA, civil servants assumed that colonials and residents of the UK would be given separate citizenship because a shared citizenship would be “such an artificial entity that it would not be politically practical to propose it” (Foreign Office Memo quoted in Paul 469). However, when the Colonial Office objected that separate citizenship would not be received well by colonial peoples, debate swung in their favour. Moreover, Hampshire argues that though BNA 1948 granted statutory
rights to the homeland and innate superiority over inhabitants of the dominions (16, 18). As a result, tension between the official understanding of British imperial identity (subjecthood) and informal definition of who belonged continued in spite of the BNA of 1948. As Hampshire points out, in reality “the tension between citizenship and belonging continued to shape immigration policy until British citizenship was finally redefined in narrow, post-imperial terms” (16). That is, belonging was actually construed restrictively and, as Kathleen Paul says, rooted in the assumption that “‘real’ British citizens were white,” and were men I would add (462).

Dual notion of citizenship continued to characterize immigration and citizenship discourse throughout the second phase of British immigration policy. The British government enacted a series of immigration laws which restricted the entry of Commonwealth citizens and redefined who belonged in the UK.\(^ 14 \) In fact, as Christian Joppke argues, there were two “key objectives” in the construction of British immigration policy: to restrict the right of entry of coloured citizens of the empire and embrace the descendants of the Old Commonwealth (settlers), who just happened to be white (101-5). Yet to prevent the immigration of black Commonwealth subjects the government enacted discriminatory laws against women—both British-born women wishing to bring in foreign-born husbands and dependents seeking to reunite with Commonwealth husbands settled in Britain. In 1962, the conservative government passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act which,\(^ 14 \) The following is not a summary of all Acts passed restricting entrance of CUKCS into the UK. It is meant to offer a context for which to read the social contradiction mapped by *White Teeth.*
for the first time, restricted the right of entry into Britain of British subjects of the Commonwealth. It was a contentious step viewed by many critics as racist. It imposed immigration control for all British subjects except those born in the UK or Ireland or those who held UK passports issued by the British government (or government representative overseas). For the first time, British subjects holding colonial government issued passports were restricted entry. To enter they now had to secure employment vouchers from the Ministry of Labour. Though citizens of the independent Commonwealth countries were also subject to immigration controls, controls applied to New Commonwealth citizens, blacks and Asians, more than Old Commonwealth subjects. Case in point, it excluded from controls Irish immigrants who in practice were ensured unrestricted entry. While the government did include provisions to regulate Irish immigration, it clearly stated in Parliament that it would not enforce such measures.  

While the Act introduced immigration controls for British subjects of the Commonwealth, it also limited the rights of women in order to further restrict the entry to Britain of black subjects. Commonwealth husbands residing in the UK were granted the right to bring over dependents, wives and children under sixteen years of age. However, women were not granted the right to bring over their husbands. In Instructions to immigrant officers though, Bhabha et al explain, husbands of settled women were allowed to join their wives in the UK “as ‘the normal rule’” (30). They

15 According to Hampshire there were a number of practical reasons for the privilege granted to the Irish: it would be costly and almost impossible to police the Northern Irish border and such a move
were also allowed to seek employment (without employment vouchers). Husbands were rejected admittance if they could not provide for themselves and their families without recourse to social services (30). There were no such requirements for women. Moreover, as dependents of Commonwealth husbands, women whose husbands were exempt from deportation were themselves exempted, but this rule did not apply to husbands of wives settled in the UK. Those with British-born fathers were also exempt, but not with British-born mothers. Such discrepancies are evidence of the sexist and patriarchal nature of immigration policy designed to keep black British subjects from entering Britain.

The 1971 Immigration Act further defined the terms of British citizenship and right of entry into the UK. The Act divided colonials into two groups: partials and non-patrials. In order to be a partial and granted access into Britain one had to be a UK-born CUKC, or resident of the UK for more than 5 years, or have a parent or grandparent born in the UK (the grandparent clause was later dropped but reintroduced in 1973). The latter condition clearly benefited Old Commonwealth citizens, but not New Commonwealth citizens. Hampshire confirms, “the patriality provisions were designed to secure access for Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders while denying it to the New Commonwealth” (41). In short, the Act annulled the old notion of imperial citizenship.

The Immigration Act 1971 also impacted women in several ways. Commonwealth women married to (or widowed or divorced from) partial men were
granted patrial status. Female patrials were for the first time also allowed to confer their immigration rights on their children abroad (Bhabha et al 36). This change, however, still did not benefit black women, most of whom were not patrials. Commonwealth men (non-patrials) no longer held the right to bring over wives and children. In fact, those without UK passports had themselves no right of entry to the UK. Moreover, to further limit the right of entry of black commonwealth subjects to the UK, the government allowed the “illegitimate” children the right to claim patriality through their mothers, but not through their fathers. The latter was not only out of sync with nationality law under which citizenship was traceable only through the male line, but the move was clearly intended to limit the entry of children of women raped or taken as mistresses by British men throughout the Empire (39).

There were far more children born to patrial men than to patrial women throughout the New Commonwealth. Furthermore, the law would still benefit the “legitimate” children born to fathers in the old Commonwealth countries.

While Immigration Act 1971 eliminated rhetoric of imperial citizenship, the British Nationality Act of 1981 devised three new categories of citizenship. Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies was superceded by British citizenship, citizenship of the British dependent territories, and British overseas citizenship. While the first group included citizens of Britain born, naturalised, registered or settled in the UK for more than five years or whose parents or grandparents had been born, adopted, naturalised, or registered as citizens or permanently settled in Britain (former partials), the latter two designation did not
include right of entry. According to Hampshire, the latter designations existed as categories “to mop up various former CUKCs who were without local citizenship in their country of abode but, crucially, they did not carry the right of entry to the United Kingdom” (43). This Act marked a profound change in the concept of citizenship, defining memberships exclusively in terms of the national community (43).

Moreover, for the first time in British history, it replaced the tradition of *jus soli* (citizenship by territory) with *jus sanguinis* (citizenship by descent). This means that currently a child born in Britain is not automatically granted legal citizenship.16 Citizenship is acquired only if one of the child’s parents is a British citizen or settled in Britain (regardless of where the child is born). Such legislation once again ensured easier acquisition of British citizenship for the descendents of Old Commonwealth settlers, most of whom were white, than for those born anywhere else in the Commonwealth.

BNA 1981 continued to discriminate against former subjects of the Empire, but it also continued to discriminate against women in specific ways. It allowed them to pass on citizenship rights to children living abroad. For the first time in British history women were granted equal citizenship rights though women in the Old Commonwealth countries already possessed this right as did women in US, Denmark, and France (Bhabha et al 46). However, the Nationality Act also withdrew the rights of women married to British men to register as British citizens (44). Like men,

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16 As such, it is possible for a baby born in the UK to be stateless. As Bhabha et al point out, half the countries in the world do not allow women to pass on their citizenship to their children born abroad. If a woman from one of those countries is on a work permit in Britain or married to a non-settler and gives birth in Britain, her child will be born stateless (45).
women were no longer to able to claim British nationality upon marriage. While this stipulation guaranteed equality for all spouses married to British citizens, it was a “levelling down for women” (44).\footnote{17}

In addition to the Acts described above, women were also subject to Immigration Rules which regulated the entry and stay of visitors, students, workers and dependents who were not directly accounted for in the Acts themselves (37).\footnote{18} As dependents, women were “largely invisible in the Immigration Rules, and in immigration legislation as a whole; where their existence is recognized, it is almost entirely in relation to men” (38). In fact, they were rendered doubly invisible as both former new Commonwealth subjects and as women. The rights of women, both those living in Britain and wanting to bring over husbands as well as those abroad seeking to join their husbands living in Britain, were restricted in an attempt to keep minority families apart and ensure their population sizes remained small. As a result, they faced a number of hurdles in seeking to reunite with their families. Citizenship, as Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis remind us, is “far from being gender-neutral, it constructs men and women differently” (6). Women are included in state practices, even if involuntarily, as “the biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities” (7). On the basis of this role alone, they were the target of British immigration control.

\footnote{17} Prior to 1981 foreign husbands of UK women had to reside in Britain for five years before applying for naturalisation while wives were automatically able to register as British citizens (44).
\footnote{18} It is also important to note that Immigration Rules can be altered more easily by a single vote in Parliament than changes in legislation which involve a lengthier process (37). Frequent changes in Rules were therefore relatively quick and easy ways to regulate the entrance of former New Commonwealth subjects.
Controlling the number of women allowed into Britain was only one means of regulating the entry of New Commonwealth subjects. According to provisions of CIA 1962, dependents, the wives and children under the age of 16 of primary immigrants, had a right of entry (Hampshire 29). However, in an attempt to reduce the number of CUKCs in England, dependents, especially women, became increasingly subject to controls. In attempt to control “swamping” of England by New Commonwealth subjects and their families, the British government, beginning in 1965, attempted to prevent women abroad from joining their husbands in the UK. Underlying British immigration legislation was the belief that women should follow their husbands, the heads of the households (Bhabha et al 77). However, at the same time, the British government sought to block women seeking to join their husbands in the UK. The entrance clearance system was one means by which the government reduced the number of wives allowed to enter the UK. In 1965, entry certificates were first introduced, but they were optional. The British government declared they were a way for Commonwealth citizens to find out in advance whether or not they would be allowed into the UK (78). However, by 1969 they became compulsory for dependents seeking to reunite with their families in the UK and were used by the government as a delaying mechanism because “the political benefits of keeping annual immigration figures within a politically acceptable quota far outweighed the disadvantages of keeping black families divided” (79).

Yet the entrance clearance system was not the only tactic used by government to keep black families apart. The marriage of the couple often came under scrutiny.
During interviews with immigration officers applicants were often misled by leading questions designed to discern whether or not the applicants were truthful (84). Moreover, as Bhabha et al argue, behind the questioning lay certain ethnocentric assumptions about family and marriage (85). Asian women, for example, were expected to know their husbands’ daily routines abroad after having lived apart for years (86). Other complications included sparse documentation, the use of nicknames instead of formal names, differences in methods of recording dates and times leading, as Bhabha et al highlight, “the whole exercise of trying to establish the applicant’s ‘truthfulness’ an arrogant and racist imposition of one et of cultural practise on another” (87). The supreme example of faulty assumptions about marriage was the virginity test scandal targeting non-patrial women seeking to reunite with husbands or marry fiancés who were British citizens. Women found to be virgins were assumed to be genuine fiancées. South Asian women were the primary target of this policy since they tended to emigrant for the purpose of marriage. As one would imagine, the tests were very controversial and not approved by Parliament nor were they addressed in any public forum prior to their introduction (92). As a result of public outcry, they were abolished approximately decade after they were introduced.

Once in Britain, women faced continued hardships. They had no independent rights to remain unless their husbands were settled. This forced many women to remain in abusive and violent relationships to avoid deportation. If a husband decided to leave Britain, abandoned his family or violated immigration law and was deported back to his country of origin, his wife was forced to leave with him (even if she had
never before visited his country of origin) (94). Moreover, married women who were British Overseas citizens and who were allowed into Britain under the voucher system, lost their right upon marriage since vouchers were administered to heads of households, unmarried, widowed, or divorced women (93).

Like women seeking to reunite with husbands, women seeking to bring over husbands also had to deal with discriminatory legislation and practices. As of January 1969 women no longer had the right to bring over Commonwealth husbands. Commonwealth husbands or fiancés would be allowed to enter only with an entry certificate, granted by Home Secretary only if it could be proven that wives would suffer hardship living with their husbands outside the UK (50). As Bhabha et al underscore, the only women who met this criteria were white women who would have to live in a country without a substantial European presence in order to be with their husbands (50). Asian women born and raised in Britain or white women joining husbands in another European country were equally pressed to prove the “hardships” they would endure abroad (50). In August 1974, Home Secretary introduced new Rules so that all husbands, regardless of nationality, could join their wives in Britain so long as the latter had settled status (51). This victory was won though only because of public outcry that British born (white) women could not live in their country of origin with foreign husbands (53). However, by 1977, government introduced new Rules to prevent “bogus marriages.” The new Rules were even more restrictive than the previous ones. Husbands or fiancés were now refused entry if immigration officials believed the marriage was one of convenience to gain entry into
the UK. Furthermore, if granted entry, husbands or fiancés were permitted to remain for only twelve months at the end of which their cases would be revisited. If the marriage lasted and officials were satisfied that it was not one of convenience, only then the husband or fiancé would be granted permanent settlement (55). The Rules up until this time discriminated against both white British women as well as black immigrant women, yet much of the public outrage centred on the fact that white British women were penalized in attempts to reduce black male immigration (59). In short, the new Rules of 1980 created a “two-tier citizenship” so that UK women citizens born or with one parent born in Britain could bring over fiancés and husbands born abroad (60). In this way, it was only women of non-British ancestry whose rights were restricted.

In addition to the above, the new Rules of 1980 also targeted arranged marriages. Before husbands or fiancés could live in Britain, the couple had to have met (60). This would make it difficult for Asian families to continue with arranged marriages. The second clause stipulated that husbands or fiancés would not be allowed to enter if the primary motivation for the marriage was to obtain entrance into Britain (61). The British government, intent on reducing black immigration, targeted male immigration on the faulty assumption that men would threaten the labour force. Again, they construed women as dependent on their husbands, the heads of households, for their maintenance. In fact, however, statistics show that between 1963 and 1972, nearly 20% of all Commonwealth workers and nearly 50% of non-Commonwealth workers who entered Britain on employment vouchers or work
permits were women (Anthias 77). By 1981, according to the *Labour Force Survey*, the “economic activity rate” for non-white women in Britain was nearly 50% (Bhabha et al 63). Many women affected by the 1980 new Rules brought their cases before the Commission on Human Rights, enforced by the European Convention on Human Rights, that ensures the protection of civil liberties against violation by the state (65). The Commission ruled that there indeed was a case against the British government, encouraging the latter to draw up the new Rules of 1983 which granted all women with British citizenship, regardless of ancestry, to bring over husbands and fiancés; however, women settled in Britain not naturalized as British were still denied this right (67).

Lastly, the Rules introduced one other change, the “primary purpose” clause. It stipulated that husbands would be allowed in for twelve months only if the “primary purpose” of the marriage was not to enable the husband to immigrate and the couple also had to have met and henceforth commit to living together permanently (67). In short, as Bhabha et al note, the onus was on the couple to prove that their union was legitimate (68). Yet, British men bringing over wives did not face such restrictions and neither did women from other European states who migrated to the UK, bringing along their families (68). The “primary purpose” clause worked to reduce the number of Asian men allowed to join their wives and fiancées in Britain, yet protected the rights of British women to bring over husbands.

If the period of exclusionary citizenship was the response or solution to the concept of imperial citizenship, the former itself over time became a “reified cultural
pattern” to which texts such as *White Teeth* have offered their own critical response. Such texts belong to a new phase in British national policy that Hampshire terms, “the period of renegotiation” (18). The focus since the 1980s has been on the social and cultural impact of immigrant communities on British society. There has been a considerable re-evaluation of the definition of citizenship and notion of Britishness. *White Teeth* is part of the cultural revolution hailed by Hall as “the emergence of new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities…new communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms of cultural representation” (Hall 34). As such, it offers new maps of Englishness, in this era of multinational capital, charted by subjects located on the margins of British society.

The attempt to express this new contradiction, namely the effort to reinvent new constructions of Britishness by the formerly marginalized, has resulted in the invention of new forms of literary expression. According to Jameson, formal patterns are “symbolic enactment[s] of the social within the formal and aesthetic” (*Political 11*). Forms of aesthetic expression are ideological in nature; that is, they provide formal “re/solutions” to social contradictions or problems. Jameson writes: the aesthetic act is itself ideological, and the production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal ‘solutions’ to unresolvable social contradictions” (79). For Jameson, postmodern space with its “suppression of distance,” homogeneity, and fragmentation, is symptomatic of a deeper historical dilemma: “our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities”
(“Cognitive” 351). I will suggest that White Teeth too displays certain literary qualities, formal expressions, which are attempts to come to terms with a deeper social contraction—how to imagine to imagine the British nation from the perspective of the invisible others inside, rather than outside, its immediate state borders.

In White Teeth, the literary forms manifesting as a consequence of the present historical and social dilemma is humour or utter lack or problematizing of all seriousness. Such strategies are common to many postmodern texts; however, in White Teeth they are a way of giving expression to the contradiction arising from British immigration policy as it seeks to define ever more narrowly the parameters of the nation. Humour and the general lack of seriousness become the logical response to an impossible condition: seeking to represent the excluded and invisible—no longer scattered across the Empire—but within the nation’s borders. In fact, humour has long been the conventional response of feminists seeking to highlight the absurdity of a patriarchal/sexist system. According to French feminist, Luce Irigaray, laughter and humour are means of undermining and mocking the seriousness of official discourse (163). In White Teeth humour and the refusal of seriousness result from attempts to expand the notion of what it means to be British from the perspective of those on the margins because of their race and their gender. In so doing, White Teeth undercuts the exclusivity of definitions of citizenship and belonging, producing laughter (or general amusement). In short, formal literary properties of the novel are in fact attempted resolutions to a historical and social dilemma that is the modern British nation.
There are numerous instances of humour (or general lack of seriousness) within the novel, highlighting the social and cultural contradiction that is England. The function of humour in *White Teeth* is to displace notions of national identity rooted in ancestral origins and to make way for an inclusive definition of Britishness by rendering visible former colonial subjects, particularly women. For example, Mr. Hamilton’s homogenized formulation of the nation, where physiological roots are markers of national communities, is debunked by hybrid notions of ethnic and national communities.\(^{19}\) Mr. Hamilton is a character cast in the tradition of the absurd. He is absurd in the double sense Abrams refers to as “grotesquely comic” and “irrational and non-consequential” (1). He is representative of Whig imperialism and the later resurgence of Tory nationalism (or authoritarian individualism), but also an attestation of both the failure of the former to create a truly imperial identity and of the latter to account for the colonial Others within the nation. Instead Mr. Hamilton insists upon shared ancestral roots and physiological attributes as the basis of community. According to him, Congo natives could be identified by the “whiteness of [their] teeth” (144) and “died because of it...see a flash of white and Bang! (144). As Thompson notes, Smith challenges such notions of community by exposing Mr. Hamilton’s own false teeth (125). In a rather “grotesquely comic” moment, Irie, Magid, and Millat, are privy to a “click-clack sound and...Mr. Hamilton’s teeth were

\(^{19}\) Thompson makes a similar argument. She suggests that for Mr. Hamilton white teeth function as a synecdoche for Congo natives who were identified by this one characteristic (125). Yet his belief is challenged by his own false white teeth and by characters like Clara who also wear prosthetics (125). My argument is not only that Cliff discredits essentialist notions of race based on biological or physiological roots, but that she also debunks notions of national community based on a common racial identity implicit in British citizenship legislation.
on his tongue, as if a second mouth had come out of the first...then in a flash they were back in” (Smith 143). By extension, however, she also challenges the concept of citizenship as embodied in the British Nationality Act of 1981 where citizenship is based on ancestry (and a common racial identity) or extended to those born in Britain whose parents are also British citizens or settled in Britain (the concept of citizenship by descent).\textsuperscript{20} If teeth are physiological markers of national communities, then Mr. Hamilton’s lack of teeth challenges his own status as a British subject. In the presence of second generation English children, Mr. Hamilton’s logic and vision of the nation is flawed and contradictory, and by implication, so too is the notion of a racially homogeneous national community as imagined by British citizenship legislation.

Not only does Mr. Hamilton imagine a racially homogenous community of tribesmen, but he re-imagines the racial composition of the British army, remembering it as an exclusively white gentlemen’s club. When “given the opportunity to rewrite history,” he reconstructs a racially segregated British army, deciding “there were certainly no wogs as I remember...the Pakistanis would have been in the Pakistani army” (144).\textsuperscript{21} As in his construction of the community of Congo tribespeople, Mr. Hamilton once again insists on physiological roots as the basis community solidarity. However, his sermon on the third molars, the wisdom teeth, exposes the problem(s) with notion of roots altogether—they are vulnerable to

\textsuperscript{20}The law, as already noted, ensured easier acquisition of British citizenship for descendents of Old Commonwealth settlers, who were white, than for those born anywhere else in the Commonwealth.

\textsuperscript{21}The scene is also ironic because Mr. Hamilton’s own membership in the military (and by extension national) community is tenuous. He is self-professed “old queen” and while, like new Commonwealth subjects, he participated in the military exploits of the Empire, he too would have been considered a secondary citizen. Moreover, in his meditation on the third molars, or “the wisdom teeth passed down
distortion and infection: “they grow crooked or any which way...they stay locked up
there with the bone—an impaction...and terrible, terrible infection” (145). Nor are
they essential to one’s existence since one could easily “have them out early” (145).
As such, Smith discredits Mr. Hamilton’s concept of community based on notions of
common genetic inheritance and as embodied in British citizenship legislation. The
scene again deteriorates into the absurd (into the “grotesquely comic”) as the children,
Magid and Millat, vehemently contest the old man’s version of history, insisting their
Bangladeshi father is indeed a retired, medalled war hero in the British army while the
former continues his senile ramblings, caught in his own (selected) memories of the
nation’s imperial legacy.

Like Mr. Hamilton, Joyce Chalfen, and the entire Chalfen family, also reflect a
narrow concept of Britishness founded on the purity of roots. The opposing concepts
of community as represented through Alsana Iqbal and Joyce Chalfen illustrates
Chandra Mohanty’s argument that gender is a relational term and “to define feminism
purely in gendered terms assumes that our consciousness of being ‘women’ has
nothing to do with race, class, nation, or sexuality” (12). While both women laud

by the father,” Mr. Hamilton reveals that he “wasn’t big enough for mine,” contesting his own
rootedness in the national community (145).

22 Like Mr. Hamilton, Joyce subscribes to characterizations of Englishness regarded by Edmunds and
Turner as “malign” while Alsana subscribes to “benign” concepts of Englishness. Malign Englishness
is closed and insular (supports protective measures to ensure preservation of English culture from
forces of multiculturalism), earnest (views national identity as pure), masculine (endorses violence and
aggression), and reactive (looks to past to defend old values of English supremacy) (94). On the other
hand, benign Englishness is open (tolerant toward minority cultures), cosmopolitan (values
multiculturalism and welcomes cultural diversity), ironic (rejects notions of cultural purity and
acknowledges the contingency of national identity), feminine (opposes violence and warfare for
nationalist purposes though it is not necessarily pacifist if war ensures preservation of universal human
rights), and creative (seeks to rebuild national identity based on values such as openness, liberalism,
and tolerance) (92-4). While Edmunds and Turner characterize “malign” Englishness as “masculine”
and “benign” Englishness as “feminine,” they also acknowledge that the terms “masculine” and
the benefits of hybridity, Joyce Chalfen and family represent a rather exclusive model of Britishness, one which privileges whiteness. The Chalfens are the quintessential liberal middle-class family. They are “more English than English,” (273) but the joke is that they are in fact third generation. They represent those immigrants of “good human stock” who eventually assimilated to the British way of life, but also problematicize any possible formulation of a homogeneous English nation. 23

Hence, while she celebrates diversity in theory, such is not the case in practice. According to Joyce in her bestselling gardening book, “cross-pollination produces more varied offspring, which are better able to cope with a changed environment” (258). Her philosophy applies to both plants and humans. Yet Pirjo Ahokas quips, for Joyce, cross-pollination is “to be restricted to the same species” (122). Joyce treats her wards as if they were sub-human. Her charity and good-will toward the Iqbal and Jones offspring reeks of colonialism’s “civilizing mission” (122). Joyce Chalfen is a parody or caricature of the multicultural liberal. In fact, she proves to be quite the opposite—parochial and small-minded. As Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman highlight, one of the pitfalls of multiculturalism is that it pigeonholes cultures, “putting cultures in little boxes, thereby reifying and fixing them” (529). Moreover, it also differentiates minority cultures from “normative human behaviour” defined by Western hegemonic culture (523). The result is a anthologizing of minority cultures as

23 Immigrants of “good human stock” generally referred to those immigrants of European descent who were recruited to fill the labour shortage in Britain in the immediate post-war years.
is evident upon Joyce’s first meeting Irie and Millat, the two “exotic,” “brown
strangers,” as she refers to them.

It is upon this first encounter Joyce reveals a number of her own cultural
assumptions about minorities. These stereotypes are amusing (and grotesquely
comical) only because they are shockingly inappropriate (coming from a supposed
liberal): Millat’s parents “must have something arranged for him” because “he [is] a
Muslim boy” (266); “Afro-Caribbeans seem to find it hard to establish long-term
relationships” (268); Jamaican parents “just don’t appreciate their children
sufficiently” (270). She makes similar assumptions about Irie and Millat’s home
environments: “...and your headmaster explained to us how your own home
environments aren’t exactly...well...I’m sure you’ll find it easier to work here” (268).
The humour of the scene (and irony) exposes Joyce as a Tory nationalist rather than a
multicultural liberal (despite her philosophy on cross-pollination).

Because Irie and Millat stray from “normative human behaviour,” it becomes
Joyce’s mission then to “civilize” or, in her floral vocabulary, “prune” her young
wards: “Nurture, thought Joyce. Be patient, water regularly, and don’t lose your
temper when pruning” (268). As an upstanding and respected member of the
community (and by extension British nation), Joyce construes the above subjects as
outsiders and deviants in need of an “English education”. She becomes involved in a
project whose aim is to promote “social cohesion,” or assimilation. 24 Not only then

24 Such was the recommendation endorsed by the White Paper “Secure Borders—Safe Havens” in
2002. The White Paper identifies the lack of social cohesion as the main reason for the race riots in the
north of Britain in the summer of 2000 (Yuval-Davis et al 517). It insists on the need for greater social
cohesion and maintains “the view that the progress of groups away from racism and disadvantage lies
are Commonwealth subjects, and women in particular, made invisible in immigration legislation and in the Rules which construes them as dependents, but once granted entry, they (and their children) are then encouraged to assimilate in the name of “social cohesion.”

Despite her own Irish roots, Joyce’s mission to “prune” Irie and Millat links her to the history of British colonialism. She is again the subject of contempt in the following passage reeking of sarcasm:

Joyce was descended from the kind of bloody-minded women who continued through the African swamps even after the bag-carrying natives had dropped their load and turned back, even when the white men were leaning on their guns and shaking their heads. She was cut of the same cloth as the frontier ladies who, armed only with a Bible, a shotgun, and a net curtain, coolly took out the brown men moving forward from the horizon toward the plains. Joyce didn’t know the meaning of backing down. She was going to stand her ground. (290)

Indeed Joyce determinately ploughs on (like her foremothers) in her duty to re-educate Irie and especially Millat.²⁵ Yet, the narrator’s sarcasm highlights that her endeavour, like that of the frontier ladies, is problematic and morally questionable, for the headmaster’s scheme to “bring children of disadvantaged or minority backgrounds into contact with kids who might have something to offer them. And there could be an exchange, vice versa” (256) is as ill-thought and dangerous as previous colonial projects.

²⁵ Here Joyce participates in the reproduction of the nation by part-taking in the ideological reproduction of colonial discourse and by transmitting/imparting British culture to the wayward
In fact, the headmaster’s project, which Joyce so determinedly and dutifully takes on, directly parallels the disastrous colonial project undertaken by the school’s benefactor nearly a century earlier. According to the PTA booklet and all historical accounts, Sir Edmund Flecker Glenard, is a “kindly Victorian benefactor” and “educational philanthropist” who was devoted to “the social improvement of the disadvantaged” (252). The irony is that Glenard was really an opportunist (though a dimwitted one at times) beset by a certain “conundrum”: how to motivate Jamaicans to labour in the fields without taking strike action and without complaining about low wages. Simply put, he wanted to channel their devotion to their God to devotion toward their employer (253). His harebrained solution (comical in its impracticality though not in its results) is to ship his Jamaican workers to a newly built compound in England where they would work alongside the English packaging cigarettes and taking instruction from them in the evenings, and on Sundays, take the English to church and teach them how to worship (254). Unfortunately, the project fails because Glenard loses interest (and his subsidies eventually dry up), for as the narrator gibes, “his mind was a small thing with big holes through which passions regularly seeped out” (254) and the Jamaicans were left to sink or swim in their new homeland. Glenard is remembered for his charity and goodwill, yet he too is a parody of the humanitarian or philanthropist. Through tropes such as parody and irony, Smith exposes the fallacy of such notions as the superiority of British morality and questions their sense of goodwill toward minority subjects of the Empire. Similarly, Irie too is
abandoned by Joyce: "the more progress Irie [makes] — "whether in her studies, her attempts to make polite conversation on her studied imitation into Chalfenism—the less interest Joyce showed in her" (278). By linking current neo-liberal multicultural policy with previous colonial projects, Smith challenges the assumptions about the superiority of the British and the inferiority of minority cultures still inherent in British policy vis à vis colonial subjects, and she firmly roots Joyce and the Chalfens in the long history of British colonialism.

If Joyce fits the definition of Britishness, then Irie Jones is representative of the sort of subjects against which Britishness defines itself. Irie is the daughter of a British father and Jamaican mother. She believes “she was all wrong” and had been dealt “dodgy cards”; that is, she had inherited all the “wrong” physiological characteristics. Indeed she is rather quirky, if not outright funny, in appearance, rendering her rather sympathetic from the start. She inherited: her grandmother’s “substantial Jamaican frame” (221), and along with the “mountainous curves, buckteeth and thick metal retainer, impossible Afro hair, and to top it off mole-ish eyesight that in turn required Coke-bottle spectacles in a light shade of pink” (224). So while her mother tried to convince her she was “fine,” Irie only saw “England, a gigantic mirror, and [herself], without a reflection. A stranger in a strange land” (222).

Though she feels invisible, Irie struggles to belong. This is evident in her re-reading of the Shakespeare’s sonnet 127 where “she had thought she had seen something like a reflection” (227). She identifies with the sonnet claiming, “I just thought...like when he says, here: Then will I swear, beauty herself is black...And the
curly hair thing, black wires—” (227). But the reflection quickly vanishes when her teacher condescendingly rejects her reading and a “reddened” Irie is forced to “give up in the face of giggling” (227). While Irie is enlightened that the subject of Shakespeare’s sonnet is “not black in the modern sense” because “[t]here weren’t any...well, Afro-Carri-bee-yans in England at that time” and besides “it does seem unlikely, unless she was a slave of some kind, and he’s unlikely to have written a series of sonnets to a lord and then a slave” (226-227), Irie’s does not fail in her attempt to find a reflection. In fact, the awkwardness of the moment (and its resulting humour) marks a crucial period in Irie’s development—her attempt to make herself visible in a country that seeks to erase her presence. She begins to re-map British culture and create a space for herself within it. While her roots place her outside the traditional construction of Britishness, she begins to search for a way to re-read cultural texts. Her re-interpretation of the Shakespearean sonnet is significant moreover because it belongs to a body of work that is a quintessential English cultural artefact. It is part of public culture and Irie, as a representative of the cultural minority, performs what Bhabha would term, an act of enunciation, of cultural translation (at the beleaguerment of her clearly unsuspecting teacher).

However, Irie attempts to erase her Jamaican roots altogether before she learns to recognize the multiple routes, her own included, that make up Britain. As a result of her physiological roots being “all wrong,” Irie decides to change her Afro hair, a

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26 Education plays a dual role in this instance. It functions as what Gail Lewis calls “citizenship education” that both “foster[s] the correct habits of mind” necessary for “social cohesion” (Lewis 550) or assimilation, but it also simultaneously marks the limits of the nation, defining members of minority communities as outsiders (546).
genetic marker of her African roots, and “beat each curly hair into submission” (229). The result is quite comical. In her attempt to obtain the “straight straight long black sleek flickable tossable shakable touchable finger-through-able wind-blowable hair. With bangs” (228) that she so desperately desires, Irie’s hair falls out in clumps, the hair follicles burnt down to the roots. The scene evokes what Abrams would call “sympathetic laughter” at Irie’s expense as the reader journeys with Irie, now “[b]lubbing like a baby” (232), through her blunders and painful lesson(s).

Eventually, Irie gets her straight red hair (fake tresses), but she also gets a lecture from Alsana’s lesbian “niece of shame,” Neena, and her girlfriend, Maxine. It isn’t until Maxine tells her, “you had beautiful hair…all curly and wild. It was gorgeous” that Irie for the first time “considered the possibility that she looked…terrific” (236). It is only after this exchange that Irie begins to embrace her appearance and her Jamaican roots rather than seek to assimilate to the cultural norm.

After her hair disaster, Irie begin her journey to discovering and accepting her Jamaican roots. She visits her grandmother, Hortense Bowden, and for Irie, that house is “an adventure” (330). It is there she reads about the “other Jamaicans, fallen short of the attention span of history” and discovers “so this was where she came from” (331). If Irie could not find her reflection in the gigantic mirror that was England, she finds it in the Bowden women. Her grandmother remarks: “‘Bwoy, sometime it like lookin’ in a mirror-glass’… ‘You built like me, big, you know! Hip and tie and rhas, and titties. My mudder was de same way. You even named after my mudder’” (318). However, most importantly Irie uncovers her own family history and learns of her
great-grandmother, Ambrosia and grandfather, Captain Charlie Durham. It is here she learns of the multiple routes that intersected, criss-crossed, and came together to create contemporary Britain. In short, she learns of the contingency of national identity, which enables her to place herself within the history of the nation.

It is the story of Ambrosia and Charlie Durham that ultimately supplant notions of the nation built on the purity of roots or common ancestry. The coming together of these lovers illustrates that Britain, as a result of its past colonial mission, is not founded on a common ancestry that can be traced back to any single source. Rather it has been re-mapped by the migrants that have reterritorialized the nation and redefined the notion of Britishness, no longer based on a common Anglo-Saxon origin and possessing innate superiority and therefore the right to rule over others. In fact, it is precisely the British sense superiority and right to rule that the narrator challenges. The story begins when Captain Durham, stationed in Jamaica, decides Ambrosia, his landlady’s adolescent daughter requires an “English education.” Yet, “[a] little English education can be a dangerous thing,” as the narrator sarcastically retorts (294). The narrator scoffs at the sort of “English education” given native women of the Empire, for while Ambrosia learns “letters, numbers, the Bible, English history, trigonometry…when that was finished, when Ambrosia’s mother was safely out of the house, [she also learns] anatomy, which was a longer lesson, given on top of the student as she lay on he back, giggling” (296). Narrator’s use of sarcasm highlights the duplicity of English notions of benevolence. The romance between Captain Durham and Ambrosia ends rather quickly, but the (other) significance of
their involvement is that it marks a mixing of roots as a result of routes travelled by
the British during colonialism. When Hortense migrates to England with her own
family, she travels a similar route returning to the land of her father, Captain Durham.

Irie learns that she does have a reflection in the gigantic mirror that is England as a
result of the history of colonialism, and the consequences of which continue to shape
the nation in the present.

Irie’s re-education at the hands of Hortense Bowden ultimately enables her to
feel at home in her own skin and in the nation. While she can only dream of the “land
of accidents” in which “birthplaces are accidents, that everything is an accident,”
(335) she is able to envision “a time not far from now, when roots won’t matter
anymore...[and] She looks forward to it” (437). In short, while her roots help Irie find
a reflection and sense of belonging, she also comes to understand that roots are and
have always been mixed as a result of multiple migrations. In short, she is no longer
“[a] stranger in a strange land” (222). For the nation, this means that no unitary
definition of Britain is possible, especially since British imperialism re-mapped not
only the world, but consequently also supplanted homogenous notions of Britishness.

By the end of the novel, we see Irie “seven years hence” with her daughter, whose
paternity is uncertain (given Magid and Millat are twins). Her daughter will “never be
mapped exactly nor spoken of with any certainty” (437) because her roots are too
entangled. And this is the face of the nation with which Smith leaves us.

27 According to Immigration Act 1971, “illegitimate” children could only claim patriality though their
mothers and not through their fathers. While Hortense arrives in Britain prior to the passing of the
legislation, it is such ties to Britain that Immigration Act 1971 sought to sever.
While many of the characters in the novel profess closed and reactive concepts of the national community based on myths of racial or cultural purity, Alsana too, like Irie, challenges those definitions of the nation and envisions a Britain inclusive of minorities like herself. Like Mr. Hamilton, Samad Iqbal also holds fast to infectious notions of roots, this time cultural roots. For Samad, “tradition was culture, and culture led to roots, and these were good, these were untainted principles” (161). Hence, despite having himself been “corrupted” by England, he derides his wife, Alsana for her choice in dress: “Running shoes and a sari?...what is that?...You do not even know what you are, where you come from” (166). Yet through the use of humour, Alsana not only questions Samad’s understanding of what it means to be Bengali, pointing out that Bengalis are in fact descended from Indo-Aryans who migrated to Bengal and mixed in with indigenous groups there, but also challenges myths of Britishness that claim common ancestry extending back to Anglo-Saxons. In her rather sarcastic retort to Samad, Alsana challenges notions of cultural purity, claiming: “Oi, mister! Indo-\textit{Aryans}...it looks like I am Western after all! Maybe I should listen to Tina Turner, wear the itsy-bitsy leather skirts. Pah. It just goes to show...you go back and back and back and it’s still easier to find the correct Hoover bag than to find one pure person, one pure faith, on the globe. Do you think anybody is English? Really English? It’s a fairy tale!” (196). Alsana refuses to be made to feel like a “stranger” in her new adoptive country because she recognizes the contingent nature of national identities and appreciates that the fact that as a result of past
migrations, “roots will always be tangled” (68). Hybridity—not racial or cultural purity—has always been the norm. Her humour underscores this very point.

While on one hand Alsana must combat closed concepts of national identity espoused from members of the conservative right (like her husband), she must also resist cultural assumptions and stereotypes from the so-called leftist camp, from feminists and multiculturalists. At the school council meeting Alsana receives “piteous, saddened smiles...reserved for subjugated Muslim women” from members of the Women’s Action Group who again “put cultures in little boxes” and assume that all Muslim women are oppressed (110). However, Alsana comically defies such assumptions. She is no subjugated Bangladeshi woman, for as Samad forces Alsana to raise her hand in support of his motion “she kicked him in the ankle. He stamped on her toe. She pinched his flank. He bent her little finger and she grudgingly raised her right arm while deftly elbowing him in the crotch with her left” (110). The slap stick routine employs humour to contest (and resists) the neo-liberal tendency to assume/assumption that all Muslim women are oppressed, thereby erasing their individual agency. Alsana refuses to be subsumed under a label and made invisible as a member of a minority.

Similarly, she again refuses to be typecast as the submissive wife by her Westernized niece. When her Niece-of-Shame accuses her of being “the little submissive Indian woman” who is stuck in a relationship where “there’s no communication,” and where Samad always wins and does what he pleases (64), Alsana again refuses to fit the stereotype. However, she goes a step further and
presents an alternative vision of marriage that seems like "skewed logic" to her lesbian niece. Her niece assumes the Western model of romantic love is consistent with a normative model of human behaviour and relationships only to be challenged by Alsana in her comic rebuttal. Alsana ridicules the New Age Western model of romantic love:

The truth is, for a marriage to survive you don't need all this talk, talk, talk; all this 'I am this' and "I am really like this' like in the papers, all this revelation...Eve did not know Adam from Adam...they got on so A-OK...I didn't know him [Samad] from Adam. But I liked him well enough...Now, every time I learn something more about him, I like him less. (65-66)

Alsana's version of "common sense" offers support for arranged marriages at around the time when the British government introduced immigration policies seeking to reduce the practice and thereby reduce the entrance of Black Commonwealth subjects. Her humour challenges what qualifies as "normal" and highlights the validity of non-Western traditions. She refuses assimilation to the Western norm (which would make her invisible).

Not only does Alsana refute neo-liberal orthodoxy, but she stands her ground with Joyce, admonishing the latter for meddling in the affairs of her family. If women participate in the affairs of the nation as both biological reproducers of communities as well as transmitters of cultural values from generation to generation, then Joyce's decision to re-educate Irie and Millat (and then later Magid) not only challenges Alsana's role as a biological mother, but also her role as reproducer of an ethnic and
national culture.28 In the showdown between these two, who seem to Millat like "two big Italian matriarch from opposing clan battl[ing] it out," (Smith 365) Alsana goes on the attack: "There are two rules that everybody knows, from PM to jinrickshawallah. The first is, never let your country become a trading post. Very important... The second is, don't interfere in other people's family business" (364).

While Alsana defends her role as mother to her twins, the humour in the above also highlights the futility of Alsana's attempt to keep Joyce from interfering in her family business. Alsana's ancestors were unable to fend off the British. Similarly, as much as Alsana resents Joyce, descendant of the frontier ladies, she also realizes that the latter is involved in her family's doings (as a result of the attempted assimilation of her children into British society). In short, while she asserts her role and takes her place within the nation as a biological and cultural reproducer (of an ethnic minority), she also acknowledges the nation's attempt to assimilate her offspring as "a consequence of living... of occupation and immigration, of empire and expansion, of living in each other's pockets" (363).29 The latter is one of the difficulties of co-existence in a cosmopolitan society.

28 There are moments when even Alsana fears "dissolution, disappearance." For example, she envisions the day when Millat (genetically BB; where B stands for Bengaliness) marrying someone called Sarah (aa; where a stands for Aryan), resulting in a child called Michael (Ba), who in turn marries somebody called Lucy (aa), leaving Alsana with a legacy of unrecognizable great-grandchildren (Aaaaaaaal)!" (272). Joyce's involvement in her sons' development only exacerbates her fears that her children will assimilate and abandon their heritage even though, for the most part, Alsana is comfortably integrated in British way of life.

29 That is, she accepts Joyce's involvement in the supposed improvement of her sons' welfare, again echoing previous colonial missions, because she is in no position to refute the social or educational system of which Joyce is a part. While the British conquered India as a result of their superior military might, Joyce's superior social privilege leaves the other with limited choices. That is not to say though that Joyce's involvement has not impacted her own family. Clearly that is not the case since her family's involvement with the Iqbal boys has split father and son (Marcus and Joshua). Similarly,
In short, the map of the global system that emerges in highly disjunctive.

Ethnoscapes and domestic ideoscapes clash to produce a new vision of British identity. Humour, or the total lack of seriousness, is the only response to the contradiction that is the British nation. It becomes the aesthetic expression to an ideological problem—how to represent the invisible others and former subjects of the Empire no longer scattered across the globe, but within the nation’s very borders. Humour not only undermines “malign” visions of the nation, but it also renders visible the very subjects excluded by British immigration and nationality law. In the following chapter, we will further examine the role of ideoscapes in the global system and determine to what end they collude against or in favour of women’s lives.

British involvement in India had consequences for those back at home. There is a difference though. Alsana is (partly) correct in reflecting that one does not choose to be involved nor does one enjoy it (363), for clearly this applies to her situation. The difference is that Joyce did choose to get involved when she opened her home to the Iqbal boys as part of the headmaster’s program, as the British chose to get involved in the affairs of a foreign state. In essence what Alsana resigns to is the resulting tension produced from the attempted re-inscription of unequal relations between immigrant and host society (mirroring that of colonizer and colonized) in a new context, the post-imperial or neo-imperial nation, and the immigrant’s resistance to assimilation (her own included).
For Jameson, the nation is both a “reified cultural pattern” that was once a “vital response to infrastructural realities” (“Third” 94), only to become itself part of a new problem, as well as the last remaining site for political struggle and stronghold against US global interests (“Globalization” 65). In his writings on globalization, Jameson argues that the fundamental inequality between the United States and all other nations has led to “an attempt to universalize a particularity” and to confuse US interests for universal ones (66, 51). Hence, according to Jameson, American mass culture, one of the US’s major exports, threatens to destroy other forms of domestic cultural production. The global triumph of American culture, notably in the form Hollywood films, is devastating to national cultures and economies, but it is also politically troubling for Jameson because it spells “the death of the political, and an allegory of the end of the possibility of imagining radically different social alternatives to this one we now live under” (“Notes” 62). Jameson laments the loss of alternative forms of film production which suggest new ways of living “everyday life”:

political film in the ’60s and ’70s still affirmed that possibility...by affirming that the discovery or invention of a radically new form was at one with the discovery or invention of radically new social relations and ways of living in the world. It is those possibilities—filmic, formal, political, and social—that have disappeared as some more definitive hegemony of the United States has seemed to emerge. (62)
For Jameson, as Imre Szeman notes, the nation, or more specifically national culture, designates a “utopic space” (207) which offers a means of resisting US globalization (206). Such is the case in the Philippines, the setting of Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters*, and the focus of this chapter. Despite multiple occupations of the Philippines by the Spanish and then the Americans, indigenous culture in the Philippines continually reasserts its presence alongside foreign influences. It is indigenous culture that offers resistance to American and foreign interests. Hence, while the novel presents yet another map of the global totality in which foreign financescapes and mediascapes intersect with domestic ideoscapes to create a neo-colonial or dependent state, elements of indigenous culture continually reassert themselves, preventing the complete annihilation of Filipino culture.

However, it is questionable whether indigenous culture is always necessarily beneficial to the nation and its people, particularly to its women. While the nation may offer resistance to global interests, it is not necessarily a “utopic space” for all the nation’s citizens. The chapter will examine one aspect of indigenous culture, kinship politics, as manifested during the Marcos regime when it developed as potential strategy for women’s advancement in Filipino society. Yet Marcos not only expanded and institutionalized patron-client relations, but simultaneously opened up the nation to foreign investment and the global market. Hagedorn’s novel suggests that both foreign imports, such as American mass culture, and kinship politics, as it evolved in Filipino culture, are potentially liberating for women. It is often neither one nor the other, but a combination of both that leads to a politics of liberation for women in the
Philippines, especially for women during the Marcos dictatorship as they struggled against state sanctioned representations of female subjectivity.

While kinship politics or patron-client relations formed the basis of the Filipino political economy prior to the assent of Ferdinand Marcos, the latter exploited the system for personal gain. As Emmanuel de Dios argues, “it is evident the crony phenomenon was no more than a logical extension and culmination of the premarital law process of using access to the political machinery to accumulate wealth” (114). During the premarital law years (1946-1972), Philippine politics was dominated primarily by the landed elite, a minority of the population that held much wealth and economic power. They were prosperous patrons with strong ties to dependent clients. In addition to the power exerted by landowners through their control of vast holdings of land, they cultivated ties of personal obligation on the part of their tenants that could be exchanged for votes upon the institutionalization of democratic forms of government (Hawes 147). Personal loyalty, at the heart of pre-colonial and colonial political systems, continued as a founding principle of the Philippine political system after the establishment of a democratic state. Once in power, patrons used the political system to accumulate further wealth. The Filipino constitution of 1935 laid the framework for functioning of government modelled after the American political system. By 1946, the onset of independence, the Philippines emerged as an independent and democratic state. Yet as A.E. Lapitan suggests, its political and institutional infrastructure and distribution of wealth and political power

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30 Employers and professionals in positions where they could grant favours to ordinary citizens (voters) were also part of the Filipino elite (Lande qtd in de Dios 111).
remained as they were in the 1800's (236). With the introduction of democratic institutions, the landed elite came to dominate the legislature and evolved into a national oligarchy (Hutchcroft 421).

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, “Filipino First” policies, again founded on favouritism, further entrenched patron-client relations within the Philippine political economy. Following World War II and as a result of shortages in foreign currency and continuing balance-of-payment deficits, the government eventually instituted policies in support of import substituting industries. Rapid rise in foreign investment, primarily from the US who held “parity rights,” further aided in the development of domestic industry. Multinational corporations (MNCs) provided the technology, managerial expertise, and capital for the development of import-substituting industries while local entrepreneurs oversaw the arrangements of licenses, labour, and maintenance of local plant facilities. As a result of profits from import-substituting, many of the landed elite diversified and entered the import-substituting industries (Carroll qtd in de Dios 117). Hawes suggests too though that manufacturing also drew “those from humbler origins” (149). In any case, import-substituting manufacturing further entrenched a system of patronage between politicians and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs sought government favours in the form of “licensing of new import-substitution ventures, granting of import permits, the right to exchange peso for the dollar needed to import, and the amount of hard currency exporters would get after turning in their export receipts to the Central Bank” (Hawes 150).
While “Filipino First” policies did intend to curb foreign control of the national economy, the lobbyists and beneficiaries of such policies were not necessarily nationalists. American “parity rights,” MNC control of capital intensive enterprises, and IMF interference in economic policy all contributed to the rise of Filipino nationalism (151). Hawes highlights, “nationalism became the battle cry of both local industrialist and the masses seeking structural change” (151). However, as both de Dios and Hutchcroft argue, it would be wrong to assume that the manufacturing class (many of whom belong to the landed elite) were nationalists. After all, the landed and manufacturing elites both continued to resist any real effort for agrarian reform and structural changes of the political economy. They supported national control of the economy and import-substitution because the latter offered opportunity for profit. Nationalization of the economy was not nationalist at all, but driven by the dynamics of kinship politics—by both clients seeking profits and patrons seeking political support to further consolidate their wealth.

While government policies did give rise to a new generation of entrepreneurs, diminishing foreign control, by the late 1960s, they also led to additional problems. These included the overdependence on import-substituting industries because of the lack of industrial growth, and the rise in the balance-of-payment deficit because import-substituting industries remained import-dependent and because Marcos increased borrowing (and spending) to fund his 1969 presidential campaign (151). The latter resulted in an increase in inflation and a devaluation of real incomes, leading to worker-student unrest (de Dios 112). Moreover, there was also uncertainty
about American investments in the Philippines, given the upcoming 1974 termination of parity rights granted to all US citizens (112).

Such was the state of the Philippines when Marcos decreed martial law in 1972, winning political and financial hegemony over his rivals, the established political families in the Philippines. Upon his declaration of martial law, Marcos received widespread support from various international agencies. The IMF, the World Bank, the commercial banks and donor governments all supported Marcos’ authoritarian rule (Hawes 152). They believed, erroneously, that Marcos intended to pursue economic restructuring in favour of a strategy of export oriented industrialization. Yet Marcos was not moving the Philippines towards greater participation in a global economy nor was he interested in the further nationalization of the economy. Instead he was attempting to prolong his rule and funnel as much foreign capital as possible into the Philippines. Kinship politics was the means he used to accomplish both. It remained the hidden force behind the “restructuring” of the Philippine economy under Marcos. While governments and policies alter in the Philippines, kinship politics remains as the only constant and real agent determining the economy. Marcos appointed Filipino technocrats, “persons appointed to high government positions on the basis of their academic or professional credentials” who represented the views of international lending institutions (114-5). However, because they had no domestic constituency, they were ultimately indebted to Marcos, their patron, for their positions and therefore held very little clout. They were employed
simply to ensure a steady inflow of foreign capital to the Philippines. Similarly, while Marcos dismantled democratic institutions, suspending the constitution and Congress and banning political parties, there was little international protest because as Abueva notes, “the Congress was a multifaceted symbol of an elite representative system...of horse trading and patronage, privilege and corruption, outside the executive branch” (57). Given Marcos’ assurances that martial law was temporary, only a transitory phase to parliamentary democracy, there was little resistance to his declaration of martial law. In fact, his plans to dismantle the old oligarchy were welcome. In the end, Marcos simply replaced the old elite with his own loyal followers, otherwise known as his “cronies.”

The new oligarchy was composed of friends and relatives of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Some were economic and political newcomers, while others were part of the old oligarchy. In either case, they owed their prominence and consequently their loyalty to Marcos. Hence, Imelda and Ferdinand Marcos continued to promote kinship politics of the nationalist period. Moreover, as Hawes explains, his followers were expected to cultivate and control their own followings, creating a hierarchical system based on personal patronage rather than common political or economic ideals (156). The cronies infiltrated every sector of the economy, especially the lucrative import-substitution sector. While Marcos ensured foreign investors and bankers that he

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31 While technocrats were supposedly responsible for managing the economic program, their policies were continuously undermined by presidential exemptions. Raul Fabella elucidates, “Technocrats were given the prerogative to formulate and rhetorize the public agenda in the form of economic and development plans which formed the basis for foreign loans. The political leadership then allowed the unconstrained introduction of exceptions that made complete mockery of the spirit and the letter of the plans” (qtd in Hutchcroft 434).
sought to implement their policies and open the Philippine economy to foreign
competition, thereby securing the free flow of foreign capital into the Philippines, he
continued to protect the import substitution sector of the economy controlled by his
cronies. He did not, in short, give foreign investors full control of the economy.
Kinship politics remained the mechanism fueling economic change.

It would be incorrect therefore to conclude that foreign interests in the
Philippine, American or otherwise, destroyed the national economy and national
culture. Marcos effectively employed kinship politics as a buttress against foreign
control of the Philippine economy. While he did so not out of commitment to
nationalist ideals nor out of any sense of responsibility for the welfare of the Filipino
people, he did illustrate how indigenous culture offers effective resistance to global
economic interests. He was a shrewd politician, skilled at manipulating foreign
interests and swindling investors out of large sums of money. As Hutchcroft asserts,
the "long history of American manipulation of Philippine affairs not withstanding,
Marcos knew that neo-colonial manipulation can be a two-way street" (429). Hence,
while he engaged in negotiations with the IMF and other international lending
agencies to secure loans and personal profit, many critics remain skeptical regarding
the extent to which Marcos implemented any of the recommendations and plans of his
own technocrats or foreign investors and loaning agencies. For example, Hawes
argues that had Marcos actually wanted to transform the Philippines into a base for

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32 For example, as Belinda Aquino describes, Herminio Disini, a Marcos crony by way of marriage to a
cousin of Imelda Marcos but also one of the president's golfing partner, profited from a 1975 decree
that imposed a one hundred percent tax on tobacco filters for all companies except Disini's Philippine
low-wage manufactured exports, he would had invested money in export processing
zones and in improving infrastructure, communication linkages, housing, and he
would have moved to deregulate the economy (154). However, as Hawes explains, by
the end of Marcos’ reign, the Bataan zone, the nation’s first export processing zone,
suffered from the same complaints as it had when Marcos first took office and only
marginally contributed to employment and export earnings (154). In reality, Marcos
had no intention of opening the economy to foreign interests and undermining his
own political and economic base (155). However inadvertently, it is clear that kinship
politics offers resistance to American and foreign domination of the Philippine
economy, yet it also has resounding, if mixed, consequences for the women of the
Philippines.

Kinship politics for women employ a different set of standards than those
applied to men, making it a contentious means of engendering power for women,
especially at the national level. According to Mina Roces, women in kinship politics
exercise unofficial power through their kinship ties to powerful men. Philippine
notions of power (malakas) regard power as communal—held by the kinship group—to
the benefit of fe/male kin alike. For Roces, this dynamic ensures that women at
least have access to “real power” (Women 2). While women often lack official power,
those who excel at kinship politics “behind the scenes” may wield considerable
power. Imelda Marcos is the prime example of a woman with unparalleled malakas

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Tobacco Filters Corporation, which was required to pay only a ten percent import tax. The measure
effectively eliminated all competition, including those owned by foreign competitors (45).
resulting from her alliance with husband President Ferdinand. She is also an example of a woman who wielded power nationally (and internationally).

Women's power, however, derives not only from their kinship associations, but also from correlation between beauty and power in the Philippine discourse on gender and power. While men's power is linked to machismo, female images of power are associated with beauty and religiosity—woman as beauty queen and moral guardian (Roces, *Women* 3). According to Roces, beauty (maganda) in the Philippine cultural and linguistic contexts denotes physical beauty, but also “socially pleasing” demeanour. Hence, women are expected to conform to beauty etiquette as defined by the beauty contest—sporting the latest fashionable dress and high heels complete with makeup, and manicured nails as well as acting as moral guardian (168). Hence, the wives of politicians, many of them former beauty queens, are often involved in charity and community work. Imelda Marcos initiated numerous beautification projects, cleaning and building parks, and expanded operations to provide employment projects for women (47). It is this conflation of beauty with goodness and virtue that is central to Filipino articulations of female power.

Contemporary images of women endorsed by Marcos and upheld by the system of kinship politics hark back to the period of Spanish colonization and Catholicism which exported, among other things, male-dominated Judeo-Christian culture. Spanish culture underscored the purity and chastity of women while it encouraged the keeping of mistresses (queridas) for men (Eviota 58). With the institutionalization of private property, the concept of women as sexual property for
the purpose of producing heirs emerged. According to Eviota, regulation of female sexuality by male authority in the family became the norm, especially among the upper *principalia* and *ilustrados* class. Within the marriage contract, men attained the products of women’s labour and right to women’s sexuality. In return, women were compensated for their domestic labour with a share in men’s wages, but they did not receive sexual exclusivity from men. This double standard reflects the Filipino credence that women’s value lays in their chastity. Other social restrictions and “feminine virtues” were soon imposed on women’s social conduct such as modesty, timidity, and passivity.

The above ideas of Filipino womanhood became enshrined in Jose Rizal’s conception (or parody according to some critics) of Maria Clara. According to one critic, “[n]o other character in Philippine literature has had a more pervasive influence on the thought-life of the Filipino people than this famous heroine of Rizal” (Lopez 81). Maria Clara was “loyal to the point of selflessness, modest to the point of weakness” (82). Many Filipinas attempted to emulate the tragic heroine, “becom[ing] martyrs to duty and familial love” (Guerrero-Nakpil 85). While contemporary representations of women have changed as a result of increased education and women’s emigration to the cities and entrance into wage labour, the double standard continues to plague Filipino culture. Moreover, increased sexual openness and slackening of sexual mores have not necessarily led to women’s sexual liberation or empowerment but rather to the commodification of their sexuality evident in the
increased practice of prostitution, mail-order brides, domestic violence, and rape (Eviota 63).

The Marcos regime adopted kinship politics and endorsed images and roles of women formulated by the dynamics of kinship politics, yet the regime also gave rise to another embodiment of female power: the activist/militant. While refusing the label “feminist,” the first feminist organization, MAKIBAKA (Free Movement of New Women), formed during student activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Women gathered to protest social injustices, the Vietnam War, US imperialism, oil prices and inflation, the Marcos government’s fascist proclivities and the economic gap between rich and poor (Roces, “Negotiating” 120). Martial law forced it underground, but by 1983 with the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., women’s organization mushroomed to protest graft and corruption in the Marcos government. Like MAKIBAKA, these groups did not focus on feminist issues, but organized with the intent of overthrowing the Marcos regime.  

33 This is partly because feminist groups emerged in the midst of national struggles, and as Roces suggests, the tension between feminism and nationalism resolved in favour of nationalism, preventing the development of any sophisticated theorizing of feminism and its application in a distinctly Filipino cultural context (120). Moreover, given the surge of nationalist sentiments in the Philippines at this time, it is very likely that the association of

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33 A number of women also joined the Communist Party. Many were journalists or writers who focused on propaganda or consigned to healthcare and education. However, like much of Filipino culture, in practice, the Communist Party was male-dominated. Women experienced difficulty acquiring leadership roles or positions as theoreticians; instead they often served as support staff, as cooks, housekeepers, and babysitters (Roces, Women 137). Roces highlights: “women guerillas, or amasonas,
feminism with Western culture (and foreign interests) would make the explicit espousing of feminist concerns unpopular. Feminism would also call for a restructuring of social relations unlikely to be favourable to the majority. In 1984, women’s organizations united under GABRIELA (General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action). After the collapse of the Marcos regime, GABRIELA developed an openly feminist orientation, critiquing Philippine society from a gendered perspective. It tackled issues such as mail-order brides, prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, rape, and domestic violence (Women 152). Given the dynamics of kinship politics, a woman may wield power for the benefit of her kinship group; however, she will do so at the expense of the nation. As Roces notes, “[t]o be a ‘good’ mother, a woman has to help her kinship group, but that very action negates any chance she might have of being the mother of the country who protects the nation’s interests from the abuses of kinship politics” (18). Kinship politics, whether exercised by wo/men, sets up an antagonism between traditional ties to one’s clan or devotion to democratic principles such as nationalism (or feminism).

While kinship politics is a fundamental feature of Philippine national culture, it is not the only defining dynamic. In contrast to the system of kinship politics, pop

had become martyred, and scores more imprisoned and tortured...yet they had been marginalized from the top leadership positions (137).

34 Such structural changes have continuously been avoided in Philippines. Land reform calling for major redistribution of property (and therefore capital) failed in the face of strong opposition from the elite classes. The 1986 revolution which overthrew the Marcos dictatorship also failed to restructure the socio-economic order, once again merely substituting Marcos’ “new oligarchy” with the “old oligarchy.”

35 With the re-institution of democratic processes and safeguards women are freer now than before to seek official power. In fact, they may even be encouraged to do so by spouses seeking to retain political privilege yet limited by the number of terms in office as stipulated by the 1986 Constitution (Roces,
culture has and continues to penetrate Philippines, offering alternative images of womanhood and a means of resisting traditional feminine ideals. As Jameson highlights, the various, “distinct” levels of globalization are interconnected and work in tandem to secure US global interests. Hence, the economic dissolves into the technological, the political, the social, and “with postmodernity, finally collaps[es] the cultural into the economic—and the economic into the cultural” (“Globalization” 53). Economic treaties such as GATT and NAFTA include cultural clauses so that American film and television industries are both economic and cultural exports. As Jameson notes, for American lobbyists, the purpose of GATT negotiations and agreements is to open foreign markets (to American interests) by getting rid of national subsidies. While nations continue to implement protectionist measures to ensure the survival of national cultural production, the global monopoly of the US entertainment industry is undeniable.

American control of the film industry predates the second world war. According to Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, even prior to the second world war, eight companies controlled patents on film and sound, distribution channels, theatres, and radio stations, and they were all linked to major financial groups. For example, Paramount was connected with the Morgan group and Warner Brothers was associated with the Rockfellers (31). Pineda-Ofreneo also underscores the global dominance of other forms of American mass media by the early 1980s. For instance, the U.S. earned just under half (49%) of the world market in advertising. Moreover,

\textit{Women} 14). Again, it is not democracy alone, but also the nature of kinship politics itself which opens up new opportunities for women.
thirteen of the top fifteen world advertising agencies were American (32). In the case of print media, “90 percent of the material published in the press and broadcast over radio in Asia (excluding Japan and China) as well as in Africa and Latin America, came from New York and Paris” (36). For Pineda-Ofreneo, such statistics are evidence of the “communication imperialism” that has both economic and political implications, shaping consumer tastes and ensuring local demand for foreign goods as well as subjecting locals to American values and way of life.

In the Philippines, the development of a new communications network is an example of “communication imperialism,” but it is also an example of the mutual manipulation between colonizers and colonized. As Gerald Sussman argues, Marcos “learned how to create a nationwide communication network to satisfy the World Bank, the IMF, foreign investors, and U.S. defence interests, as well as his own lifelong ambitions for great wealth and grand power” (95). At the bidding of the Pentagon’s Defence Communication Agency in its attempt to improve U.S. military’s communication and intelligence system, Marcos agreed to install communication satellites in the Philippines aware that his cooperation would ensure continued grants and loans from the U.S. 36 He also took the opportunity to create the state-run, but privately funded Philcomsat. The U.S. military remained its primary user. Marcos’s business partners (cronies) developed their own satellite system, DOMSAT, set up by NASA in 1976. DOMSAT was used commercially, broadcasting transnational TV

36 Hutchcroft again highlights the symbiotic relationship between Washington and the Marcos regime. He writes: “at a time when the military bases were offering such important support to U.S. forces in Vietnam, Marcos could approach Washington aid givers from a position of strengthen...the U.S. rewarded martial law with large increases in grants and loans (Wurfel 191)” (429).
programs and advertisements, and carried by KBS television network owned by the Marcos family (Sussman 98). The satellite system also carried presidential palace broadcasts. Due to lack of finance, DOMSAT was forced to shut down in 1980. There were, however, other telecommunication investments of note made by international telecommunications carriers such as AT&T and ITT, invested in by one of the country’s wealthiest families; RCS, invested in by Marcos’s defence minister; and a joint British Cable & Wire venture nominally run by Marcos crony, Roberto Benedicto (98). Even equipment suppliers were controlled by Marcos’s associates and TNC joint venture partners. 37 The domestic satellite system contributed to the national debt, and while it was intended for educational and health programs, it was never developed for those purposes. Instead, as Sussman highlights, it extended the reach of western consumer culture by transmitting Miss America pageants, heavyweight boxing matches, and similar vernacular “spectacles” to Filipino audiences (99). In short, while the elaborate communications network set up in the Philippines by Marcos and his cronies did further American global domination, it also illustrates that neo-colonialism is “a two way street.”

As a result of Marcos’ concessions, American culture in the Philippines is certainly pervasive and penetrating though, it is not necessarily devastating to national culture. Doreen G. Fernandez insists, though Westernization through the export of popular culture is global, in the Philippines it is deep-seated and lasting because of the nation’s colonial or neo-colonial legacy (“Mass” 491). For Fernandez, when the

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37 Needless to say, telecommunication services were offered on an “ability to pay” basis, benefiting TNCs and the US military while most Filipinos were disconnected from information and
recipient culture is colonial or neo-colonial, certain “factors of receptivity” are in play. One such factor is the “colonial mentality,” which encourages Filipinos to consider the colonizer’s culture superior to their own (492). Such an outcome is inevitable after nearly forty years of colonization and Filipino exposure to American culture and values through the education system, the English language used in education and government, and the American mass media (491). Because of the continued onslaught of American pop culture, Filipino cultural production mimics American forms. This is evident in Philippine films, TV programs, music, and popular literature. For example, there are Filipino Westerns and Pinoy rock, the latter mixing Filipino lyrics with Western rock rhythms (492). The Filipino penchant for foreign imports (at the expense of those locally produced) also explains the success of foreign canned shows (90 percent of them American) (Ofreneo 37). While it is cheaper to import a series than to produce a single local episode, it is also safer to invest in a foreign series than a new untested Filipino program (37). Similarly, the preference for foreign films, predominantly from the US, is damaging to the local film industry. Because of foreign competition, “70 percent of Filipino films failed…in 1980” (39).

However, the triumph of American pop culture in the Philippines results in the creation of a hybrid culture that in fact, contrary to Fernandez’ argument and communication lines.

38 Senator Avila in *Dog eaters* similarly comments: “We Pinoys suffer from a cultural inferiority complex. We are doomed by our need for assimilation into the West and our own curious fatalism…a complex nation of cynics, descendents of warring tribes which were baptized and colonized to death by Spaniards and Americans, as a nation betrayed and then united only by our hunger for glamour and our Hollywood dreams” (Hagedorn 110).
Jameson’s prediction, generates new aesthetic forms, suggesting alternative social relations. Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* presents a highly diverse nation that incorporates American pop culture even as it seeks to resist American neo-colonialism and a corrupt state apparatus supported by Western powers, primarily the U.S. Ethnic, folk, and popular cultures all contribute to the national culture—though “not in homogeneous blending, or even in harmony” (Fernandez, “Mass” 490). Values transmitted through a heterogeneous mix of cultural forms present in Filipino cultural production are no longer foreign imports, but integral components of Filipino national culture. While Jameson is justifiably skeptical about the universality of American values, such human rights, feminist, and parliamentary democracy, in the Philippines, such American cultural characteristics are, however precarious at times, fundamental national values as well. Hence, while the “benefits of the market [may not] be extended so far as to make this way of life [American consumerism] available for everyone on the globe” (Jameson, “Notes” 64), they have not completely “destroyed...cultures without offering any alternatives” (65). Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* is, like much of Filipino cultural production, a cultural by-product of consecutive colonizations that attempts to make sense of Philippine history as well as posit an alternative reality in which female subjects claim agency and new possibilities.

American pop culture offers alternative representations of women and presents new possibilities otherwise unimaginable in the repressive state that was the

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39 Folk culture includes variety of native cultures prior to Western contact, cultural influences inherited from Chinese, Arab, and Indian traders as well as aspects absorbed through 375 years of Spanish occupation and 48 years of American domination and continuing neocolonialism (489).
Philippines under Marcos. Upon his declaration of martial law, Marcos seized control of the media, establishing censorship guidelines and banning “subversive publications.” Marcos set up “media-regulating agencies” (Fernandez, “Philippine” 334) to enforce government decrees. For example, the Mass Media Council (MMC) was founded in 1972 to license media operations. No broadcast or print media operated without an MMC certificate of authority (334). The MMC was eventually replaced by the Media Advisory Council (MAC) in 1973. It supervised privately-owned media while its counterpart, the Bureau of Standards for Mass Media, supervised government-owned media. These too were eventually replaced by other watch-dog agencies. The media agencies allowed to (re)open after martial law belonged to Marcos’s friends and relatives, creating a “crony press.” 41 Dogeaters captures state images of women as authorized by a repressive regime and endorsed by kinship dynamics and contrasts them with those offered by American pop culture. The state endorsed images of women proliferate traditional of representations women as subservient, obedient, and self-sacrificing while American pop culture offers alternative, Western ideals that, though empowering, must be adapted to the Filipino situation.

This constant tension between popular culture and its ideological content (advancing democracy and feminism) and the enduring Filipino practice of kinship

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40 The Philippine Bill of Rights and Constitution, as already noted, are modelled after their American counterpart though both were suspended during the Marcos dictatorship.
politics (promoting allegiance to one’s clan) is captured in *Dogeaters*. Such tension came to a climax during the 1986 Revolution when Filipinos overthrew the Marcos regime which institutionalized kinship politics in favour of democratic ideals. Like early reformist women’s organizations, Hagedorn condemns the abuses of the Marcos government; however, if radical women political activists shunned the term “feminist,” Hagedorn’s novel represents a new brand of activism, one that critiques the Marcos regime and Philippine culture from a gendered perspective. Hagedorn’s strategy for women’s empowerment combines the Filipino women’s practice of unofficial power behind the scenes with Western ideas of women’s empowerment through increased official power. In so doing, she unifies feminist and nationalist commitments. She imagines a way for women to exercise power at the national level, in part by appropriating kinship politics to serve national ends.

Yet Hagedorn’s novel also illustrates how global flows both intersect and collide simultaneously creating third-world conditions while also offering developing nations (and their citizens) ways to resist oppressive regimes supported by Western nations. In *Dogeaters*, foreign ideoscapes (economic policy dictated by lending agencies and donor governments) and mediascapes (American pop culture) work interdependently and at odds with domestic ideoscapes (Marcos government), both supporting a corrupt regime and offering the nation (primarily its women) a way to resist the state apparatus. At the same time, it is precisely domestic ideology (kinship politics instituted by Marcos) inscribed both culturally and by the state that prevents

controlled three television channels. The Lopez-owned ABS-CBN was taken over, and one channel became GTV-4, the official government station” (“Philippine Press” 336).
the total devastation of national cultures by foreign interests. Hagedorn then suggests that it is precisely the tension between scapes that provide subjects—women—with agency and possibility.

Hagedorn’s novel not only presents new social relations and ways of living everyday life in the Philippines, but the novel itself is an example of what Jameson describes as a radically new form of aesthetic production. Her stylistic use of postmodern strategies such as pastiche, “a montage of heterogeneous materials that syncopate linear plot with a polyphony of voices, tones, and rhythms” (San Juan 14), reflect the tension between global scapes—financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes and the possibilities that arise as a result. Form, in Hagedorn’s postmodern novel, reflects the disparate history of the nation—of its multiple colonizations, dictatorship and corruption, military violence, and rising nationalism. Tension between kinship politics and Western ideals (nationalism and feminism) is reproduced formally in the medley of official articles—historical documents, newspaper clippings, books—and unofficial stories—the personal narratives, gossip, soap opera clips—all present throughout the novel. It is in the relationship and tension between and within official and unofficial histories that we, as readers, observe the resilience of the nation’s women as they navigate the political landscape, exploiting the incongruence between foreign and domestic cultures.

Through the depiction of Zenaida, Lolita Luna, and Trinidad Gamboa, Hagedorn illustrates the potential dangers for women resulting from the relationship between of foreign financescapes and mediascapes and domestic ideoscapes. All three
characters in some way fail to take advantage of any opportunities afforded by the system of kinship politics or by the inflow of foreign capital to the Philippines. All three migrate to Manila from surrounding towns and villages in a last attempt to make something of their lives. They represent the nation’s non-elite classes and their very real struggles, challenging Madame’s claims that “[t]here are no real issues. Issues are conflicts made up by the opposition to further tear my country apart” (Hagedorn 221). Very little is known about Zenaida. She has no known kin except her young son, Joey, and finds herself outside the kinship system and vulnerable to exploitation. It is quite likely that, like women before her, she came to the city from the poverty stricken countryside in search of opportunities and found work in the sex service industry that sprouted near US military bases. Like women before her, she becomes “a legendary whore...Disgraced and abandoned, just like in the movies. Driven to take her own life” (42). Her fate is cliché. She forms a connection, a makeshift kinship tie to Uncle, a street hustler, and likely her pimp, but the relationship is clearly an exploitative one with few benefits for women like Zenaida. In short, Zenaida represents the difficulties and dangers for women who are unable to exploit the kinship politics and are set adrift to navigate economic terrain determined by foreign capital.

Yet the novel suggests perhaps an alternative story for Zenaida as well, one not as sad or tragic as people remember. Her son is skeptical of people’s account of Zenaida’s life and death: “They say she was still young and still beautiful, they shake their heads solemnly at the terrible waste. I’m not sure they’re telling the whole truth” (42). In an inserted excerpt from The Metro Manila Daily immediately following
Joey’s recollections of his mother (in the chapter entitled “His Mother, the Whore”) we learn of another young woman in the insurgent “troubled area” of the Makupit region who similarly met with a watery death: “[o]nly last month the body of a woman was found washed up on the banks of the…river. The woman has been beheaded, and her hands and feet were also missing. She has never been identified” (36). Hence, Zenaida’s fate contrasts but also links her to the official history of an insurgent class, highlighting and contesting the corruption of the Marcos regime and the abuses of the military, and revealing a subaltern insurgent class unwilling to passively endure its own exploitation. While the news article officially records nationalist uprisings, Zenaida’s story offers a firsthand account of women’s plight caught between the workings of ideoscapes and financescapes. Hagedorn captures the suffering of subaltern women under dictatorship, but also imagines them actively participating in their own emancipation. Whether such movements were feminist in their orientation may be questionable, but they were certainly nationalist, opposing the functioning of a global system that exploits the most vulnerable in Philippine society, including its women.

Movie starlet Lolita Luna’s circumstances parallel Zenaida’s despite their dissimilar economic conditions. She is, as Balce-Cortes observes, “‘another tragic whore’ figure” (107). Like Zenaida, she relocates to the city in hopes of achieving stardom and succeeds. Lolita Luna is a celebrity modelled after Hollywood stars. She is featured in gossip columns of tabloids like Celebrity Pinoy. However, the tabloid story, in both form and content, directly contrasts with Lolita’s personal story because
despite her celebrity status, her beauty, her wealth, and her popularity, she is a “kept woman” (Hagedorn 96). Unlike her Hollywood counterparts, she is trapped by the very kinship ties that sustain her wealth. It is the General who continually supplies her with drug money and rent money and supports her son in exchange for sex. While Lolita does have kin living in nearby Zambales, they have disowned her. Her relationships to powerful men like the General place her within the kinship system, yet leave her vulnerable to the whims of her benefactors. The latter is willing to buy her expensive gifts, yet he is unwilling to part with her, refusing to arrange for her visa to leave Manila permanently.

Unlike Zenaida, there is no suggestion that Lolita may redeem herself. She is self-defeating and “agrees with those who attribute her success to her flagrant sexuality and magnificent body” (171). She resigns herself to limited choices: “she will rot in Manila for the rest of her life, or else he will have her killed; it is that simple” (176). Alternatively, she will feature in an upcoming porn production dubbed as an “experimental art film” (177). She has only to name her price. While Western feminist notions like women’s sexual freedom may contribute to her success (and exploitation), they do not free her from ingrained cultural codes. While beauty connotes virtue, according to Filipino cultural codes, female sexuality implies the opposite. Hence, Lolita’s sexuality becomes a source of her fame and fortune but also of her exploitation. Moreover, as a product of her Filipino culture and as a woman, she is raised to endure abuse and victimization. She is, despite her sex symbol status, modelled after Maria Clara, and painstakingly endures her own subjugation. Lolita
believes her only avenue to freedom is through the commodification of her sexuality. Despite her wealth, she is unable to free herself from ingrained notions of female sexuality that permeate Philippine culture. Lolita remains trapped by the system of kinship politics and traditional cultural codes (domestic ideoscapes), unable to capitalize on Western notions of femininity (foreign ideoscapes) that contributed to her fame.

Trinidad Gamboa is yet another subaltern subject exploited by domestic ideoscapes and financescapes. Like Zenaida and Lolita Luna, she waits for her lover to save her from her fate, in this case, spinsterhood. While Trini does have kinship ties to family in Cebu, she flees to Manila in a last ditch attempt to “make something of her uneventful life” by enrolling at the university in Manila or to “quickly find a husband” (52). Though her father provides her with a stipend, Trini does seek independence from her kinship alliance by moving away to Manila and working at Sportex Department Store. But her bid for independence is limited since she would only exchange one kinship alliance for another: her ultimate goal is to find a husband rather than enrol at the university in Manila. The latter alternative would have gained her a measure of independence from kinship politics and introduced her to core Western values, but ultimately she finds such a prospect—spinsterhood—dreadful. Hence, when she meets Romeo Rosales, she sweeps him off his feet. However, while Trini is clearly the pursuer in their relationship, she does not challenge courtship practices established by patriarchal society or appropriate the man’s position of power within the relationship, as argued by Maria Teresa de Manuel (25). For all her role
reversals, Trinidad emulates traditional, stereotypical notions of femininity. She is unable to imagine a role for herself outside that of wife, eats "demurely, picking at her food and professing a lack of appetite" despite being "quite hungry" (51). But, most significantly, she patiently awaits the day Romeo Rosales would "beg her forgiveness and thank her for all she had done for him...praise her selflessness and ask her to marry him. Just as Nestor Noralez finally asked the saintly and equally generous Barbara Villanueva, in the memorable...musical Serenade" (54). In short, she conforms to traditional notions of femininity and roles for women as stipulated by the system of kinship politics.

It is more than her sense of self-sacrifice that contributes to Trini's exploitation at Sportex Department Store, owned and operated by wealthy capitalist tycoon Severo Alacran. Alacran adopts American corporate methods to run his business. According to Doreen Fernandez, Filipino business enterprises were initially American owned and "[t]heir methods, and their bags of goodies were copied and assimilated by Filipinos wanting to be 'modern,' 'with it,' and updated ("Mass" 492). Alacran is a capitalist entrepreneur in the import substitution industry and Trini is a devoted consumer who "dream[s] of the day she could use a salesgirl's twenty-percent discount" (53). She is the ideal employee willing to endure long work hours without any breaks and without overtime pay, forego benefits or medical insurance, and "gratefully accept" a "meagre" salary solely for her twenty percent discount: "For her, the discount is valuable and the job is fulfilling, keeping her in constant touch with the amazing lives of the rich and their wives" (160). She is complicit in her own
exploitation. However, it is worth stressing again that her job provides her with the financial independence she would otherwise not have enjoyed and she also takes great pleasure in her work. She is neither a savvy consumer nor a feminist, but she is financially independent. Unfortunately, as a member of the masses she is also still vulnerable to government corruption and abuse. As a result of her new kinship ties to Romeo Rosales, she is accused of acting as the latter’s “unwitting accomplice” in the assassination of Senator Avila. In short, Trini represents the nation’s women and, like many Filipinos during Marcos’ dictatorship, becomes a victim of kinship ties and the inflow of foreign capital which shapes the nation.

Leonor Ledesma, Isabel Alacran, and Imelda Marcos represent another cross-section of Philippine society—the elite. Unlike Zenaida, Lolita Luna, and Trinidad Gamboa, they are better able to maneuver within the system kinship politics and ultimately acquire power, yet their power and success reinstates the power structure already existing in the Philippines. These women are compliant, representing exemplary citizens. While Roces argues that the practice of kinship politics is indigenous to Philippine culture, Hagedorn seems to suggest that, as a feminist practice, the power it accords women is limited, serving only the men in their kinship groups. While one is tempted to feel some sympathy for Leonor Ledesma, having been “forced to marry Nicasio Ledesma by her elderly parents” and then persuaded by the parish priest, Leonor Ledesma is an example of a woman who practices kinship politics to the benefit of no one but her husband, as similarly noted by Rachel Lee. The General’s masochistic, self-negating wife is admittedly “not expected to
accompany the General to the social functions he attends” (68), or actively campaign on her husband’s behalf; however, her physical deprivations and austere spirituality serve as atonement or reparations for the General’s crimes.

Despite her spiritual righteousness, Leonor closes a blind eye to her husband’s violent exploits. 42 She is content enough to escape every few months to a Carmelite nunnery in Baguio for “rigorous meditation and prayer in an atmosphere heavy with imposed silence” (68). During martial law the militant nun symbolized the “ideal activist” (Roces, “Negotiating” 122), yet Leonor refuses such responsibility, choosing instead to remain cloistered in her coffin-like bedroom. Militant nuns held moral power and authority and were “the most vocal of women activists” after Marcos’ seizure of power in 1972, actively partaking in illegal labour strikes, risking their lives to fight for the rights of workers, writing newsletters reporting on current events and rallying against prostitution on American bases (121). The personal narrative of Leonor Ledesma stands in direct tension to the news report of the activist nuns whose work is officially documented in a clipping from The Metro Manila Daily which reads: Senator Avila and Sister Immaculada Panganiban from the Sisters of Mercy Order were the alleged primary organizers of a “mock trial” held by human rights activists calling themselves ‘the court of the common people’” (Hagedorn 98). Hence, the militant nun in the news is a symbol of political activism, yet Leonor, despite her charity work for the Sisters of Mercy Orphanage, is complicit in her husband’s crimes.

42 Her “days are spent collecting and sorting old clothes, toys, medicine, and canned good for the Sisters of Mercy Orphanage... [or] locked in her narrow room, fasting on water and praying prostate on the cold cement floor” (68), yet so long as no demands are made upon her, she is willingly ignores state endorsed violence and corruption perpetuated by her husband.
and those of the regime he supports, for rather than lending her "spiritual authority" to protest injustice, she buries herself within the General's fortress.

Isabel Alacran also practices kinship politics though she is more conscious of her role in sustaining her husband's image. She conforms to the standard of beauty expected of the wife of a powerful businessman in the Philippines under the Marcos dictatorship.\footnote{While Severo Alacran may be representative of one of Marcos' crony capitalists—he owns TruCola Soft Drinks, a Coca-Cola spin-off, Sportex Department Store as well as a number of media holdings—\textit{The Metro Manila Daily}, \textit{Celebrity Pinoy Weekly}, and Radiomanila—his relationship with the President differs than that of the crony capitalists under Ferdinand Marcos. One major difference is "he tells the President what to do" (18).} In fact, her husband marries her precisely because she is beautiful, and in the Philippines, beauty and power are symbiotic. In her youth, she wins beauty contests, \textit{Miss Postwar Manila} and \textit{Miss Congeniality} and "because of her exceptional beauty, she is given small parts" in films (20). Despite the fact that she and her husband "are both in love with other people," they marry because "he is compelled by her beauty" and [s]he...knows exactly who he is” (20). Their union is mutually beneficial. She stops making films and "concentrates on being thin, sophisticated, icy" and becomes "an asset to her husband at any social function" (20). For this reason, regardless of their "mutual contempt...they would never consider leaving each other" (21). In short, she conforms to traditional roles and expectations required of women, especially those of her class.\footnote{Maria Teresa de Manuel concludes that Isabel Alacran is, as a result of "social conditioning," "a feminist's nightmare" (15). On the contrary, however, Isabel Alacran, in traditional Filipino fashion, participates in the system of kinship politics, and in exchange for her services in}
helping to maintain her husband’s image and status, she shares in the rewards—wealth, power, and prestige. While kinship politics fails to challenge gender relations and in fact entrenches traditional notions of femininity and masculinity (and is rather unpalatable for Western feminists), it not only works to the advantage of elite Filipino women like Isabel Alacran, but it makes her representative of the Filipino elite who supported the regime and who also served as the symbolic embodiments of the nation.

Imelda Marcos, otherwise referred to as Madame in the novel, also participates in kinship politics and benefits from the system as no other woman in Philippine history. In the process, she also lends credibility to her husband’s regime. As Roces highlights, “Imelda Marcos wielded so much unofficial power that the martial law period was sometimes referred to as the ‘conjugal dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos’” (“Negotiating” 115). She became known as “Marcos’s Secret Weapon in Diplomacy” (116) and, though not an official diplomat, met with three US Presidents—Nixon, Carter, and Reagan—on official diplomatic missions, negotiated with Libya’s President Ghaddafí in regards to his support of the southern Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, and met with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Imelda Marcos was also well-known for her beautification projects and became infamous for her “edifice complex” because of her obsession with erecting structures of colossal magnitude (116). At her urging, the Construction and Development Corporations of the Philippines built the longest bridge in the Philippines, the San Juanico Bridge, connecting the undeveloped islands of Leyte and

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44It is worthy to note that Isabel Alacran conforms to her role as wife of Severo Alacran in class specific ways. For example, as the wife of a Spanish mestizo, “she develops a Spanish accent, and
Samar. She built the Folk Arts Theatre, tourist hotels, the Manila Film Centre, the Coconut Palace, and the Palace in the Sky. She also built hospitals and her own University of Life (116). In short, as first lady, Imelda Marcos “marked the zenith of women’s unofficial power” (115). She later came to hold official power as the Governor of Metro-Manila and Minister for Human Settlements (1975). In 1995 she also won election as a congresswoman.

Imelda Marcos’ effective use unofficial power lay in her ability to manipulate the power-beauty dialectic within her public identity. Imelda Marcos conformed to the role of politician’s wife, adhering to standards of beauty expected of a woman in her position. Yet, though able to appropriate kinship politics for personal gain, she supports a system that is inherently exploitive of women. Nor does she appropriate the system to alter gender relations in Philippines. Her ultimate goal is personal power at the expense of the nation’s subaltern others. As previously noted, images of female power in Philippine culture stress beauty and religiosity. Hence, in her role as politician’s wife, Imelda, former winner of two beauty queen pageants, donned the outward apparels of beauty and entertained crowds, singing and dancing and hoping to win their votes. This conflation of beauty and virtue is marked in Madame’s interview with the American journalist in Dogeaters. Madame confronts the journalist: “People talk about corruption...We are a corrupt regime—a dictatorship...I wouldn’t look like this if I were corrupt, would I? Some ugliness would settle down on my system...If I were corrupt, I would look like that other

learns to roll her r’s” (20).
movie, *Dorian Gray. Di ba,* he got uglier and uglier because of all the ugliness in his life?” (220). The Tagalog concept of beauty, in short, is twofold, involving beauty and virtue, and Madame exploits such subtleties to her advantage and on behalf of her kinship group. As such, she defends her husband’s regime and represents the nation under his rule as virtuous.

However, Hagedorn does expose Madame’s “convoluted thinking” (Hagedorn 220) as a cover for a corrupt regime. Madame accuses the opposition of being truly “ugly”—that is, pangit or indulging in socially unacceptable behaviour. According to Madame, the opposition creates conflict to “further tear my country apart,” (221) but Hagedorn exposes her duplicity and “[h]er face...[as] a cordial mask” (219). During “Manila’s Worst Disaster,” the collapse of one of the structures of the new cultural centre built especially to house foreign films during The Manila International Film Festival, Madame “blows her nose” and weeps along with the weeping and wailing masses yet she then orders the survivors to continue building and “more cement is poured over dead bodies” (130). The weeping First Lady channels the nation’s grief, but her remorse is hardly genuine. Moreover, her beautification project to rejuvenate the city and slums similarly “all looks fake” (130). Even her attempts to portray Romeo Rosales as “a brilliant, sophisticated young man...a genuine ‘intelektwal’” (219), fail since the reader is privy to Romeo’s story and will conclude with the American journalist that “[t]he chubby-faced waiter Orlando Rosales with his pathetic Elvis pompadour—[was]out-of-sync and dated, but certainly innocent” (222). In short, Madame adheres to the system of kinship politics not only to further her own
ambitions but also to invent an image of a poor but “emerging and prosperous” nation under the just leadership of her husband and his regime.

Although *Dogeaters* critiques the system of kinship politics as practiced by the national elite of the Philippines, it also offers an alternative. Hagedorn seems to suggest Western values and way of life challenge traditionalism and the practice of defining the nation through female subjects. Yet she is also careful to illustrate the limitations of adopting a specifically American perspective. Rio, the protagonist and “director” of *Dogeaters*, effectively appropriates foreign mediascapes in an attempt to imagine an independent Philippines. This newly “imagined community” is represented through the lives and bodies of women who are themselves hybrids, having adopted Western ideas and ways of life in a distinctly Filipino context. Hence, we have characters like Daisy Avila who combine feminist and national values to protest and work towards the overthrow of the Marcos regime. In her representation of Philippine women, Rio directly challenges state sanctioned portrayals of women offered by local media. After watching *All That Heaven Allows* in “Manila’s ‘Foremost! First-Run! English, Movies Only!’ theatre[,]” (3) she admires Jane Wyman’s independence:

> The cashmere scarf is gracefully draped around Jane Wyman’s head to keep her warm. In her full-length, mahogany sable coat, she drives her dependable dark green Buick, the colour of old money. It is how I remember the movie: a determined woman alone in the winter, driving a big green car on a desolate country road, on the way to see her young lover... A woman like Jane Wyman baffles Pucha. Why does she choose to drive her own car, when she can obliviously afford a chauffeur?” (6)
Like Wyman who defies social convention by running off to meet her younger lover, Rio too will defy expectations and leave Manila for New York to become (eventually) a movie director. She will break free from her kinship responsibilities and refuse to be a spectacle for the benefit of the men in her life. She assumes a position of authority and power in the novel as she rewrites the stories of the women around her, employing Western feminist scripts that defy Filipino convention and the system of kinship politics that supports them. In short, American pop culture in the form of Hollywood films (foreign mediascapes) offer women like Rio a means to critique and escape traditional and state endorsed gender conventions (ideoscapes).

The American films are also positioned in stark contrast to the Philippine soap opera series, *Love Letters*, “the most popular...series in Manila” (11) and a remnant of Judeo-Christian culture. The top movie stars in Manila, Nestor Noralez and Barbara Villanueva, turn up as guests on the show, but the scripts are traditional, endorsing models of female subjugation, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice as prescribed by the discourse of kinship politics: “Nestor and Barbara are engaged to marry in real life but keep postponing the wedding. Nestor sadly admits...‘Lady Success comes first.’ Barbara is just as understanding and loyal to Nestor as the characters she portrays” (11). A sample of *Love Letters*, episode #99, is inserted into the text of *Dogeaters* only to reveal “a spectacle of female suffering.” Yet such portrayals of female suffering and submissiveness are state approved, for “even the President boasts of being an avid fan” (11). Madam, the first lady, also presents herself as a martyr and a victim endorsing the view of women as submissive and suffering. She
claims in her interview with the American journalist: “My beauty has been used against me... I’ve been made to suffer... I am cursed by my own beauty” (218). She endures her “curse” just as the protagonist of Love Letters is “meekly resigned” to her fate. She again plays the role of the humble and selfless martyr when she swears to the American journalist that “we sacrificed everything” (224) to serve the people.

While Rio, along with the rest of the nation, watches the series with relish, she also re-imagines and re-writes the personal scripts, histories, and events of Filipino women, providing them with agency and independence and thereby offering alternative conceptions of the nation. For example, Rio imagines her “Rita Hayworth mother” who is in actuality “a beautiful woman who works hard at it” (82) in an alternative light. In Rio’s version of events her mother begins painting “with furious energy” (244) after her fiftieth birthday. She paints her “bleeding bouquets” and eventually decides to take her daughter and re-locate in America, never to return to Manila or to her husband. She dreams her mother has rejected the traditional feminine script and the system of kinship politics that maintains it. However, Rio’s alternative script also illustrates the limitations of Western feminist values in a Filipino context. They are incongruous with Filipino values. Hence, Dolores Gonzaga’s new found independence removes her from the Philippines entirely. While she may be at home in America, her feminism has no place in the Philippines. It is this non-nationalist brand of Western feminism that Rio will adopt and revise for women in the Philippines.

Similarly, in her rewriting of Lola Narcisa’s life, Rio not only empowers her Filipino grandmother, but also highlights the absurdity of adopting solely foreign
values. Once again Rio manipulates American and Filipino mediascapes, but this time to give voice to her Filipino grandmother. While Lola devotedly tunes in to watch her nightly soap opera, the image of womanhood presented is not what Rio imagines for Lola or for women in general. Instead, Rio merges a supposed memory of the death of her grandfather, who is in fact alive, with the movie *A Place in the Sun*. She casts her grandmother, who is in reality dead, in the role of Jane Wyman and her grandfather in the role of Rock Hudson: “I try to imagine Lola Narcisa bending over my grandfather’s bed like Jane, an angel of mercy whispering so softly in her ear that none of us can make out what she is saying” (16). Rio re-writes her grandmother as the “angel” who will save her husband, but in fact the scene is absurd because her grandfather “barks like a dog, grunts and sputters like an old car. My grandmother wipes the drool from the corners of his mouth” (16). Moreover, the image of Lola as Jane is farcical too because Lola is a shrivelled, old, brown-skinned, grey eyed woman and not the young, independent, American woman who saves her lover. Lola cannot cure her husband. In a crucial moment, Rio empowers her grandmother, granting her a voice: “‘Don’t touch him!’ my Lola Narcisa screams in English at Doctor Leary” (16-17), for her request is that he dies in his sleep. However, the absurdity of the scene also suggests the incompatibility of Western feminist scripts and values with traditional Filipino ways of life. On the one hand, the scene, as Rio narrates it, challenges constructions of the nation as consisting of “unspoiled children” and imagines even its oldest and most traditional-bound citizens as capable of becoming critical subjects who contest authority. On the other hand, the absurdity
of the imagined moment suggests that Rio, the mastermind behind the scene, is
effectively using unofficial power to re-write personal and women's history in the
Philippines and doing so also through her critical re-appropriation of pop culture. It is
the influence of foreign/American media and traditional kinships politics—or more
specifically, women's effective exploitation of unofficial power—that creates hybrid
characters, the nation's own savvy consumers such as Rio Gonzaga, who challenge
the state and the status quo.

Like Rio, Daisy Avila contests and defies the traditional role of the Filipina to
selflessly serve her country. At first, it appears that Daisy, like Dolores Gonzaga, will
conform to traditional Filipina models of femininity. She enters the national pageant
and is "crowned the most beautiful woman in the Philippines" (100). Yet shortly after
she falls into a deep depression "whimpering softly" and spending "most of her
waking hours...crying, or trying in vain to stop" (105). She comes into feminist and
then national awareness. In this way she differs from both her father, Senator Avila
and the First Lady. While the Senator takes every opportunity to critique the regime's
policies, he does not challenge state endorsed representations of the nation through
women's bodies. As the narrator highlights, it is "a supreme irony then, when such an
otherwise wise man as the Senator allows his gullible daughter to participate in a
government-endorsed beauty contest run by the first lady" (101). Yet the Senator is
not "gullible," and, despite the colonial origins of the ceremony, he silently condones
Daisy's participation in the national pageant to reap the rewards of his kinship ties
with the most beautiful woman in the Philippines, his daughter. The beauty pageant
was introduced in the Philippines during the American colonial period when women (one American and one Filipina) were first bestowed with titles such as “the most prestigious title of Carnival Queen (of the Manila Carnival)” (Roces “Gendering” 304). After Philippine Independence, the Carnival Queen pageant became “Miss Philippines.” Hence, from the onset of Philippine Independence the beauty pageant has been an opportunity to foster national unity. Women’s issues are central to those of the nascent nation. Feminism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive political movements. Kinship politics is so ingrained in Philippine national politics that even the Senator, and opposition leader, will allow his daughter to participate in the beauty contest (run by his opponents) to profit from her malakas. Hagedorn then not only critiques the regime’s exploitation of women, but also rebukes the opposition’s failure to expose the gendered ideology at the heart of the regime’s nationalist discourse. It is Daisy herself who offers a critique of regime’s gendered national politics.

Daisy’s feminist awakening leads her to questions the First Lady’s notion of women’s patriotic duty. Upon Daisy’s descent into seclusion, the First Lady appears on national television to declare “‘Daisy Avila has shamed me personally and insulted our beloved country’” (Hagedorn 107). Daisy refuses the role of woman as national spectacle. Moreover, she refuses the tradition of kinship politics which involves women adhering to traditional roles of femininity—conforming to beauty standards and submissively performing their duties to kinship group, or in this case, to the state. Yet because she is considered beautiful, she is also virtuous according to Philippine cultural and linguistic codes. Daisy therefore becomes a potential threat to the state by
refusing to conform to state endorsed representations of womanhood. That threat is finally fully realized when she becomes a revolutionary. However, because of her “stubbornness,” “a scheduled whirlwind tour of the provinces is indefinitely postponed, and Daisy’s cameo role in the upcoming Tito Alvarez-Lolita Luna disco-dance drama *Loverboy* is cancelled by Mubuhay Studios” (106). If Daisy refuses to pose for the cameras, the first lady serves in her place in an interview that unites the nation in a patriotic moment as it tunes in to watch “the First Lady’s eyes...fill with tears. She stifles a sob and pulls out a handkerchief, which she dabs carefully at the corners of her eyes” (107). Daisy’s response is to re-appropriate the power-beauty dialectic and recuperate her role as national spectacle, appearing before cameras to “publicly denounce the beauty pageant as a farce, a giant step backward for all women...[s]he accuses the First Lady of furthering the cause of female delusions in the Philippines” (109). Hence, Daisy manipulates cultural codes endorsed by the tradition of kinship politics to refute state endorsed roles and images of women.

As a former beauty queen and the daughter of the assassinated Senator Avila, Daisy becomes a real threat once she joins the guerrilla resistance movement. She uses the influence and power accorded her by both her kinship relation to her father, an opposition leader and national hero, and that rendered her through her own status as a former beauty queen to win the hearts and minds of the people. Yet Daisy also resorts to official power to overthrow the regime. Reviewing the history of women’s power in the Philippines from the 1970s onwards, Roces argues that women who shunned unofficial power and their roles in the kinship politics of their group held
little power within the organizations they joined; however, Hagedorn suggests an alternative means of feminist resistance that combines official and unofficial uses of power. While Roces argues that feminists too often subscribe to Western feminist paradigms resulting in their marginalization from official power by male leadership within resistance movements, Hagedorn seems to suggest that women’s groups must use all the tools at their disposal and, like organizations such as GABRIELA, keep women’s issues at the forefront of nationalist concerns.

Indeed Daisy does precisely this. She and Joey bond as they cry and reminisce about Zenaida: “[s]he cries while Joey describes his mother, what he remembers of her” (233). At the heart of this resistance movement are the “defiled, belittled, and diminished” (250) that comprise the nation and are evoked in the love aria Kundiman in the final chapter. The raison d’etre of the resistance movement is to prevent the further suffering and destruction of the nation by the regime and its neo-colonial policies. Daisy and the guerrillas must put an end to the “[s]pilled blood of innocents, dead by the bullet, the dagger, the arrow; dead by the slingshot of polished stones, dead by grenades, hunger and thirst; dead by profound longing and profound despair” (251). Hence, Hagedorn both presents Dogeaters as a national allegory and negotiates strategies whereby women exercise both official and unofficial forms of power as they re-imagine the Philippines from their often marginalized positions within the nation.

In short, Hagedorn maps the nation through her female protagonists, framing her allegory between multiple discourses—traditional kinship politics and Western
values of nationalism and feminism. She exposes the ways in which domestic
ideoscapes, supported by foreign financescapes serve to entrench exploitive policies
and the ways in which foreign mediascapes, film media and the “world of images”
created by that the media, both offer a means of resisting and furthering the process of
globalization. The women in the novel represent various walks of life illustrating the
exploitation of a subaltern class and the complicity of the elite with the Marcos
regime. While Hagedorn clearly lauds the benefits of adopting Western feminist
values, she also exposes the limitation of implementing feminist strategies in the
Philippines. The novel suggests instead that within a nation as diverse as the
Philippines, true independence will require multiple pronged approach, appropriating
both foreign values and traditional models that officially and unofficially empower
women and create new social relations and ways of living.
CHAPTER III: MULTICULTURALISM AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN MICHELLE CLIFF’S *NO TELEPHONE TO HEAVEN*

If *Dogeaters* suggests that dominant values of American pop culture can be appropriated and potentially liberating for women struggling against the dictates of an oppressive regime, such as that of the Philippines under Marcos, *No Telephone to Heaven* highlights the danger of American global hegemony to a developing nation such as Jamaica. Cliff’s novel condemns the “fundamental dissymmetry” that exists between the West with the rest of the world. As Jameson argues in “Globalization and Political Strategy,” American interests and values too often become international and universal ones, and this is similarly the case in *No Telephone to Heaven*. The attempt by American mass culture to universalize its particular American culture and way of life is problematic, Cliff suggests, since it threatens to destroy traditional cultures and national economies. Yet resistance is possible, and Cliff seems to endorse such political agendas as those proposed by Michael Manley, who introduced measures that would make Jamaica self-reliant and free from the shackles of the IMF and other foreign economic powers. The protagonist of her story, Clare Savage, is not unlike Manley. She too longs for an independent Jamaica where the poor and underprivileged share equally with the privileged classes the resources of the nation.

In fact, Clare’s struggle and development mirrors that of the Jamaican people so that a number of critics including Fiona Barnes argue that *No Telephone to Heaven* is a hybrid form of a bildungsroman (29). For Barnes *No Telephone to Heaven* adapts and builds upon the Western genre, incorporating the postcolonial motif of the “been
to narrative” and altering its individualistic focus to a collective one, thereby “politicizing” the form (29). Moreover, Barnes notes, the postcolonial variety of the bildungsroman often includes the mirroring of the protagonist struggle and development with the political awakenings of the nation, or, as in No Telephone to Heaven, with growing third world resistance to Western oppression (29). For this reason, and precisely because Clare’s “individual destiny is...an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society” (Jameson, “Third-world” 86), I will argue the novel is also a national allegory. It narrates the trials of the nation from the perspective of the underprivileged, or what Slavoj Zizek terms “the point of inherent exception/exclusion,” as it attempts to achieve economic and cultural independence during the Manley (and early Seaga) years.  

Zizek’s idea of politicization proper is particularly useful in examining a novel like No Telephone to Heaven that narrates Jamaica’s attempt to initiate social revolution on both a national and global level. It calls for a complete restructuring of the social structure. Jameson does indicate the importance of mapping the totality for the purpose of social change, arguing that “if society has no form—how can architects

45 Claire’s awakening to national consciousness also conforms to the stages of development of the colonized intellectual as described by Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth. According to Fanon, the colonized intellectual undergoes three stages of development: assimilation, followed by a period of questioning, and then revolt or “combat” (159). In the first stage, the colonized intellectual immerses himself in European or metropolitan culture. Clare, for instance, studies Renaissance art. In the second stage the colonized intellectual returns to his people, but as an outsider. Old memories resurface, yet are still interpreted according to a “borrowed aesthetics” (159). Clare similarly holds fast to memories of her mother, and even returns to “explore” her mother’s land, but it is some time before she re-educates herself and moves into the third stage of development, revolt. Claire becomes a “galvanizer of the people” (159), a teacher teaching children the lost history of Jamaica, the history of resistance. Like Fanon’s colonized intellectual, Claire is also part of Jamaica’s privileged class. Her fair complexion affords her many advantages, including “blending into the majority with ease” (Cliff 152). Yet she chooses to partake in the struggle for politics proper. Her allegiance to the nation and its people
build its counterform?” (Frampton quoted in Jameson “Cognitive” 356). In other words, social change or revolution is possible only once we can identify and represent the complex system that constructs our reality. Appadurai goes one step further to introduce the idea of fluid, disjunctive, global landscapes that position subjects differently. Global flows allow for a number of possibilities. Such a system, however, does not necessarily ensure that constantly changing flows alter wo/men’s lives for the better. Moreover, as Zizek argues, it is also “easy” to show “the subdivision of the people” who occupy a location; however, it is more productive politically to alter the social structure altogether by identifying the whole of society with the point of exclusion (“Multiculturalism” 50). Zizek’s model begins by acknowledging marginal subject positions and the importance of a system in which excluded groups become representative of universal values. For this reason, his theory offers insight to the social changes that occurred in Jamaica under Manley, changes that Cliff attempts to re-capture in *No Telephone*. Clare, and the characters in the novel whose stories interrupt her own, represents the nation’s masses as they attempt to realize “politics proper” or democracy as Zizek defines the latter. That is, they seek the politicization of their plight and demand for equal recognition and representation as members of the national and international community.

In short, *No Telephone to Heaven* attempts to make sense of the dynamics that draw the national into the global economy and keep it dependent on foreign powers. Like *Dogeaters*, global flows in *No Telephone to Heaven* work interdependently and transcends simplistic notions of national unity based on identity politics, but stems from her sense of political justice or what Zizek calls “universal Truth.”
in contradiction to one another, but in this case they lead to the deterioration of the nation. The novel attempts to trace or outline the relationship between national ideoscapes (both official and unofficial state policies) as they contradict each other but also interact with foreign ethnoscapes, financescapes and mediascapes. Moreover, it also examines the relationship between Jamaican ethnoscapes as Jamaican immigrants collide with foreign ideoscapes abroad. In the latter case, the novel highlights the racism immigrants experience in the West, and sometimes in the form of multiculturalism, but also the difficulties in attempting to unify struggles of the underprivileged globally (that is, build coalitions).

While Jameson critiques the proliferation of American economic interests and cultural values as universal in their aspirations, Slavoj Zizek critiques benevolent liberal policies of multiculturalism for a similar reason—because they leave untouched the global economic system of late capitalism. According to Zizek, “everybody silently accepts that capitalism is here to stay—critical energy has found a substitute outlet in fighting for cultural differences which leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world system intact” (“Multiculturalism” 46). For Zizek, postmodern politics in fact facilitates the uninhibited development of global capitalism by diverting attention from the analysis of capital to the plurality of struggles. According to Zizek, “class and commodity structure of capitalism...is the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion” (“Class Struggle” 96). Hence, the travesty of today’s postmodern politics is that it retreats from class analysis, choosing instead to focus on multiple struggles (96). Postmodern
politics with its focus on the multiplicity of identities and abandonment of class analysis is no longer a threat to capitalism. In fact, cultural difference is assimilated and marketed as any other commodity. The result is the depoliticization of the economy and with it the preclusion of politics proper. Moreover, Zizek argues that capitalism easily accommodates difference and plurality of identities and ways of life.\(^4^6\) In fact, it absorbs and commodifies cultural difference, “always ready to satisfy the specific demand of each group and subgroup (gay tourism, Hispanic music...)” (Ticklish 210).\(^4^7\) For Zizek, there remain two other fundamental problems with multiculturalism and today’s postmodern politics. Not only does it breed racism, but it prevents the realization of “a proper political act.” In regards to the first objection, Zizek argues that multiculturalism and its tolerance of difference is another form of racism: “treat[ing] each local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people—as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied and ‘respected’” (“Multiculturalism” 44). Multiculturalism is a form of Orientalism. The multiculturalist maintains a distance made possible from his/her “privileged universal position” from which one is able to appraise, “to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures—the multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority” (44). Secondly, Zizek contends that multiculturalism’s embrace of difference or “unity in difference” “leaves open, as the

\(^4^6\) Zizek highlights that even Zen Buddhists adapt their teachings to fit the needs of the economy, advertising how the achievement of inner peace enables one to function more efficiently in the marketplace (Zizek, “Holding” 328 endnote 8).

\(^4^7\) His argument here is not unlike Aijaz Ahmad’s critique of theories of hybridity. According to Ahmad, the notion that one is continuously able to refashion oneself is an illusion created by surplus capital (Ahmed 291).
only way to mark the Difference...the gesture of elevating a contingent Other (of race, sex, religion...) into the ‘absolute Otherness’...the ultimate threat to our identity...which must be annihilated if we are to survive” (Ticklish 202). It is a case of what Freud would term “narcissism of small difference”—that is, of magnifying inherently negligible differences that would otherwise remain inconsequential.

Ironically then, as Zizek notes, “the ‘mature’ universe of the negotiated coexistence of different groups” also leads to outbursts of violence (202).

Such outbursts of violence are inevitable in the depoliticized climate of postmodernism. Zizek argues that violence is in fact the product of liberal multicultural tolerance and its politics of negotiation because it forecloses political struggle. For Zizek, the ultimate act of politicization takes place when a “particular demand...starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global restructuring of the entire social space” (208). In other words, politicization proper occurs when the excluded group with no place in the social structure demands recognition as an equal member of the whole community, and moreover, their particular demands come to represent the realization of the broader goals and aspirations of the masses (“Leftist” 989). In other words, it occurs when a particularity becomes the stand in for the universal (989). For Zizek, this is the definition of democracy. For this reason, the proliferation of American culture, for example, is problematic—precisely because it is the proliferation of goals and aspirations of the dominant group, threatening to obliterate all other cultures and ways of life and effectively putting an end to the possibility of democracy as Zizek defines it.
“metaphoric universalization of particular demands” and fails to address the underlying social antagonism (Ticklish 204). Moreover, identity politics also requires “an intricate police apparatus (for identifying the group in question, for punishing offenders against its rights...for providing the preferential treatment which should compensate for the wrong this group has suffered)” (209). In short, it diffuses the political struggle for change. The failure to address the real demand for social equality leads to violence as the only means left to express the fundamental social antagonism at the heart of the political struggle.

Zizek’s criticisms of multicultural postmodern politics highlight some of the shortcomings of current attempts to address global issues concerning women’s diaspora experience and the plight of third world nations in the era of global capitalism. However, Zizek’s criticisms require closer attention and commentary. Clearly no critique of global capitalism is effective without the politicization of the economy and an analysis of class and capital in the global economy. Yet the predominance of class as a category of analysis in Zizek’s critical assessment of postmodern politics is problematic. For Zizek, like Jameson, class struggle is not one of many political struggles, but it is the “structuring principle” that overdetermines the social totality (“Class Struggle” 96). He writes: “I do not accept that all elements which enter into hegemonic struggle are in principle equal: in the series of struggles (economic, political, feminist, ecological, ethnic, etc.) there is always one which, while it is part of the chain, secretly overdetermines its very horizon” (320).
While class may very well be the overlooked category in the series race, class, gender, and, I will argue in this chapter, a necessary category for analysis, it can not be said to dominate the series. For Zizek, class antagonism plays a pivotal role in defining the totality or “the empty place of universality” (320). As Jodi Dean highlights, Zizek accepts Ernesto Laclau’s formulation that society or the social field is constituted by some “original trauma” (Dean 56). For both Laclau and Zizek, the Real is that “original trauma” or the “kernel which resists social integration” (Zizek, “Holding” 323). In short, “the Social itself is constituted by the exclusion of some traumatic Real” (311). Society then is constituted by its failure to achieve fullness (Laclau, “Identity” 68) and by “antagonism/negativity” (100). The fundamental antagonism for Zizek is that of class struggle, which “is ultimately the struggle for the meaning of society… the struggle for which of the two classes will impose itself as the stand-in for society… thereby degrading its other into the stand-in for the non-Social (the destruction of, the threat to, society)” (“Lenin’s Choice” 210). In other words, it is class struggle that Zizek privileges as the as the particular element that overdetermines the whole social field. It is this particular struggle that “contaminates” the universal and “structures in advance the very terrain on which the multitude of particular contents fight for hegemony” (“Holding” 320). Moreover, for Zizek it is class struggle which modifies and cuts across other particular struggles. He writes: “class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonism, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others” (320).
While class impacts and shapes other struggles, it is also affected by the
struggles in the series race, class, gender. In her reading of Zizek, Jodi Dean
concludes, “Zizek’s point that class struggle is not reducible to identity politics draws
our attention to the way class...impacts particular and identity-based struggles,
constituting a kind of extra barrier to their success. Feminists have witnessed
[how]...opportunities for some women have not meant opportunities for all but have
reinforced already existing inequalities” (59). Yet the experience of class struggle is
no less shaped by race or gender difference. For example, in Jamaica in 1960
(contemporaneous with the onset of Cliff’s novel) class divisions are marked by racial
boundaries. Evelyne H. Stephens and John Stephens write: “The relationship is clear,
with the lower classes being predominantly black and whites being almost absent in
these groups [while]...the capitalist class is predominantly white with some Chinese
and brown presence” (36). While Stephens and Stephens note that blacks are
represented in the upper middle-class, in the professional and supervisory strata (at
43%), their representation in manual and services double at 83% (37). Moreover,
class as a category of social difference is also marked by gender inequality. This is
evident in the “gender segmentation” (Brah 246) of the global economy. For example,
export manufacturers in developing countries prefer to hire women workers because
they are cost efficient: they are cheaper and less likely to unionize, and they are more
willing to endure the tedium of the work (Young and Miranne 186). Thus, class is no
less divided and modified by race and gender than the latter are by the category of
class. Moreover, in many cases it becomes impossible to separate issues of class from those of gender and race.

I will argue instead that it is more productive to adopt an intersectional approach that considers the “multidimensionality” of women’s experience (Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing” 139). Such an approach takes into account the multiple and “interconnecting divisions” within and between categories of identity (Yuval-Davis et al. 530). According to such logic, class struggle alone cannot solve economic exploitation. As Brah argues, one needs to “go beyond claims which assert the ‘primacy of’ this or that axis of differentiation over all others” (Brah 246). A particular struggle or category of analysis may be the focus of interest or examination, as Brah notes; however, none can be said to work alone without reference to other struggles (246). To focus solely on the struggles of one group risks meeting the needs of the most privileged while marginalizing those who are multiply-burdened (Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing” 140). Moreover, it leaves established hierarchy or political structure unchanged (145). For Crenshaw, the intersectional approach is a “bottom-up” strategy that allows for a “collective challenging of the hierarchy” rather than each particular group striving to maintain its privilege within the established order (145).

Brah adopts the intersectional approach to her understanding of diaspora space that includes the concepts of diaspora, borders, and multi-axial locationality.49

49Diaspora designates the network of economic, political, and cultural inter-relationships that constitute the commonalities between various components of a dispersed group (196). It is a “heterogeneous category” divided by class, gender and so forth, and it defies any sense of “originary absolutes” or “stable,” “pre-given,” fixed identities (196). Borders refer to the social, cultural, and psychic
Diaspora space is the result of multinational capitalism whose flows brings various groups of people together in diaspora spaces across the global. Hence, it designates a space that is universal. It is also a “space of intersectionality,” marked by “axes of differentiation” such as race, class, gender, and sexuality (209). Nor is it a space occupied by migrants alone, but includes those traditionally defined as “indigenous” (209). Given the close proximity of multiple, co-existing groups, diapora spaces are marked by cultural “border crossings” that occur “within cultural formations of subordinated groups” and are not “always mediated through dominant culture” (209).

In fact, the new cultural formations often challenge and decentre the dominant ones (210). Brah’s diaspora space then becomes a contested site of political struggle. It is “the point at which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness, of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ are contested” (208-209). In other words, diaspora space becomes the site of political contestation in the attempt to determine who will come to represent the Universal (here defined as diaspora space). For Zizek, the intersectional approach as well as Brah’s diaspora space would be examples of the postmodern abandonment of class as the fundamental category of analysis, which results in a case of “ideological displacement” where “the horrors of sexism, racism, and so on...have to bear the surplus-investment from class struggle whose extent is not acknowledged” (“Class Struggle” 97). Yet, as Brah suggests, it is as a result of the

boundaries that divide people and constitute them as “insiders” and outsiders” (198). Multi-axial locationality refers to the multiple subject positions one comes to assume, or the “simultaneous situatedness within gendered spaces of class, racism, ethnicity, sexuality, age; of movement across shifting cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries; of journeys across geographical and psychic borders” (204).
globalization of the economy that one can no longer address class inequality without reference to other struggles (246). Given the “feminization” of labour and the continued exploitation of third world nation-states by the West, it becomes difficult to separate class issues from the discussion of gender and race. Instead it is more useful to conceive of social differences as operating as a system of “intersecting oppression” or a “matrix of domination” (Collins 228).

In short, I propose that we are not dealing with the suspension of class as a category of analysis, but incorporating it within discussions of other differences such as gender and race. The intersectional approach thus allows us to consider the ways that multiple struggles or categories of identity shape women’s experiences and define society at large. For Brah, it is the multiple “axes of differentiation” rather than class alone that function as the fundamental antagonism[s]s that define the Social and women’s experiences. Her notion of diaspora space is like Zizek’s Universal. For Zizek, the Universal is an empty signifier hegemonized by some particular content (Ticklish 176). The struggle to represent or “stand-in for” the Universal is the political struggle (176). Brah seems to propose something similar, but suggests new, hybrid cultural formations or collectives become representative of diaspora space.

Thus, I will argue that the two position delineated above (Brah’s diaspora space versus Zizek’s notion of the Universal) are not necessarily contradictory. It is possible to take the intersectional approach that acknowledges the multiplicity of identities (resulting, for example, from the “border crossings” between subordinated groups) as the starting point for politics proper. That is, another strategy might be to
seek unity among the variety of particular groups involved in multiple struggles (such as a coalition) by emphasizing shared goals, experiences, and hopes. The construction of a common “chain of equivalence” could lead to “a relative universalization of values,” functioning as the foundation for a popular hegemony (Torfing 186). In this case, a coalition rather than any particular group becomes hegemonic and occupies “the empty place of universality.” Competition between various representatives (struggles) would then ensure the continuation of democracy, for as Laclau underlines, “a democratic society is not one in which the “best” content dominates unchallenged but rather one in which nothing is definitely acquired and there is always the possibility of challenge” (“Power” 292). Clare Savage’s story is exemplary of such a scenario. Her struggle against global forces is one with multiple struggles all sharing in their common marginalization and exclusion from Jamaican society and collectively attempting to represent the empty signifier of the Universal, the Jamaican nation.

If we assume Zizek’s definition of politics proper—the identification of the universal with the point of inherent exception or exclusion (Ticklish 224)—then, Clare is involved in the political struggle to represent Jamaica. She does so in conflict with global forces seeking to commodify the nation for Western consumption. Her struggle is representative of Jamaica as a whole precisely because it is not based in identity politics or essentialist categories defined by any set of characteristics. Clare’s genealogy is mixed; she is “a light-skinned woman, daughter of landowners, native-born, slaves, émigrés, Carib, Ashanti, English” who “has taken her place…alongside
people who easily could have hated her” (Cliff 5) because, unlike them, she is not “the point of inherent exclusion.” On the contrary, she could have easily aligned herself with the dominant social class in Jamaica or with global interests. Yet she adopts the position of a “true universalist” defined by Zizek as “not those who preach global tolerance of difference and all-encompassing unity but those who engage in a passionate fight for the assertion of the truth that engages them” (“Leftist” 1002). As Zizek highlights in terms of a Marxist perspective, there may be a link between the working class as a social group and the proletariat as “the position of militant fighting for universal Truth,” yet this connection is not “a determining casual connection,” and the two levels are “to be strictly distinguished” (1003). In other words, one need not be part of the working class as a social group to take up the proletariat stance. Similarly, Clare is not and needs not be part of the marginalized classes of Jamaican society to engage in the political fight or politics proper on their behalf. Yet her commitment to Jamaica is what Zizek calls “radically subjective” and derives, as she reveals, from “my own needs” (Cliff 192). It is also a struggle that is divisive, “introducing a radical split,” or a “fissure” (Zizek, “Leftist” 1002) between established order in Jamaica (dominant social class and global interests) and the Jamaican people. Hence, I will argue, she follows in the footsteps of Michael Manley, who attempted to create an imagined community founded on democratic socialism. Moreover, she also follows in the footsteps of the Jamaican women and feminists who supported Manley and worked to improve conditions for the underprivileged in Jamaica.
I propose that Manley’s political program is an attempt to realize politics proper where the marginalized come to represent of the nation itself. While Zizek’s critique of multiculturalism and its preclusion of politics proper describes primarily a Western political context, it can be co-opted to aptly highlight the Jamaican’s people’s struggles against oppression. This is because his model is about political conflict between parts of the social body and the challenge(s) of democracy in a hierarchically structured society: “in a hierarchically structured society, the measure of its true universality resides in the way its parts relate to those ‘at the bottom’, excluded by and from all others” (“Multiculturalism” 51). For Zizek, the identification of the “nonpart” with the universal is “discernable in all great democratic events” (“Leftist” 989), of which the Jamaican people’s struggle for social democracy—that is, their struggle to represent the nation—is one. Moreover, while Cliff’s novel is set during Manley’s first period in office between 1972-1980, his broader political agenda speaks to contemporary generations witnessing the destabilizing and dehabilitating effects of globalization. The novel does not perfectly “represent” the historical developments of the period. Such a task may not be possible, but neither is it necessary since the point rather is that it reconstructs and re-inscribes the political philosophy or ethos of the period for future communities across the globe and not necessarily confined to Jamaica. In this way, it too seeks to universalize particular interests, the Jamaican people’s struggle against global domination, and create a popular hegemony across the globe.
To provide a brief history of Manley's democratic socialist programme and the policies implemented to improve the lives of Jamaicans as well as Jamaica's standing in the global economic and political hierarchy, it is helpful to examine the "Principles and Objectives" accepted by the People's National Party (PNP) at their 38th Annual Conference in 1978 defining the term (and the programme) for the Jamaican people. A key feature of the document is its economic philosophy. While it rejects capitalism as a system of exploitation, it does not reject private business. Instead it advocates the development of a mixed economy in which the state will take a leading role, but "in which there is a clear and honourable role for the responsible private business working in partnership with the public sector of the economy" (qtd in Kaufman 78). Neither does PO discourage foreign investors from investing in Jamaica, providing that "their presence 'is consistent with national purposes'" (qtd in Kaufman 79). In short, economically, democratic socialism sought to create an economy independent of foreign control, ensuring that "the means of production, distribution and exchange are owned and/or controlled by the people" (qtd in Kaufman 78). Private business was welcome, but it was "expected to work within the bounds of National interest and the right of the people" (qtd in Kaufman 80).

According to Kaufman, the PNP sought to realize democratic socialism through a four step strategy: a class alliance of all workers, though the term "workers" is flexible enough to include domestic helpers and cane cutters as well as accountants and entrepreneurs; education of the population on democratic socialist values via

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50 Democratic socialism was first declared to Parliament and to the public at a mass rally in 1974 in Kingston, Jamaica, but it was not defined until 1978.
education and mass media; the development of a cadre organization constituted of party members to ensure change according to socialist democratic principles; and the development of community councils and other such grass roots organization to work alongside government, helping to make decisions that will affect the entire nation (80-81). Hence, Manley's programme sought to involve the masses in the political process as well as create a partnership with the business sector that would allow for the people to negotiate the terms of their integration into the global economy. His program is an attempt to realize politics proper, where the needs of masses determine the nation's economic policy. Whether or not he succeeds is debatable.

Though Manley's program did bring about changes, its ultimate success is questionable. The term democratic socialism is "rich in ambiguity" (81), as Kaufman notes, though this in itself was not necessarily a problem. Its flexibility as a term allowed the PNP to shape its content according to the political event and audience (81). Stephens and Stephens note that democratic socialist ideology was previously introduced in Manley's 1973 *The Politics of Change*, where he espouses the virtue of a mixed economy, stressing however that control and ownership of the economy belong to the people (105). Stephens and Stephens contend though that the book too is plagued by ambiguity, since it fails to offer a class analysis or stipulate which class should receive priority in the struggle for scarce resources (105). Anthony Payne suggests that the party's declaration of its commitment to democratic socialism in 1974 did not alter the government's policy (68). The PNP's public popularity fell between 1972 and 1974 as a result of increases in both inflation and unemployment.
Hence, an immediate repercussion of the 1974 declaration was mass mobilization of public support. However, the party’s public declaration in support of social democracy did have a number of drawbacks as well. Local capitalists became uneasy about the direction of government policies. According to Payne, until this point they had supported Manley despite his rhetoric, believing that “his type of politics was necessary to maintain social order in Jamaica” (69). Not only did this class cease to invest in Jamaica, they migrated in large numbers to North America, taking their much needed capital with them. Those who stayed still managed to smuggle money out of the country (leading to the problem of capital flight). Foreign investors also refused to invest in Jamaica while foreign agency and “imperialist forces” imposed a “credit squeeze” (69). Manley’s counter-attack on imperialist forces won him the next election in 1976, but as Payne notes, it cost him the support of the capitalist and middle-classes. Payne concludes that Manley’s support for social democracy “polarize[d] class voting patterns and rob[bed] Manley of his chance of leading a genuinely populist movement of reform” (70). Manley’s loss of capitalist and middle-class support is the consequence of his attempt to realize politics proper—universalize the particular aims of the underclasses (the working class, the unemployed, and the women of Jamaica).

Yet the real and unfortunate consequence of his programme of change, especially his foreign economic policy, is that it disadvantaged the very classes he sought to represent. Manley’s overall agenda was to make Jamaica self-reliant. Hence, he set out to reduce Jamaica’s dependency on Western powers. As Kaufman
highlights, until the election of 1972 and the victory of Manley’s PNP party, Jamaica was a nation dependent and shaped by its relationship to North American and Great Britain. After 1972, Manley introduced a new foreign policy, itself influenced by the development of a number of domestic factors such as the rise of black power and anti-colonialist sympathies in Jamaica, the increasing resentment among intellectuals and activists with foreign economic domination, and the growing nationalism among some of the capitalist class (86-7). A number of international changes also inspired Manley to change the direction of Jamaica’s foreign policy. The rise of OPEC as a Third World bargaining unit, Third World membership to the UN, an international recession, the impending United States defeat in Vietnam, and the US’s temporary disinclination to get involved in Caribbean affairs, were all factors that gave Jamaica “new-found confidence within the international arena” (87). Given the dependency of the Jamaican economy on foreign investments and development, it made sense for Manley to want to integrate foreign policy with domestic changes to the economic and social sectors. However, in the end, his radical foreign policy severely crippled the economy and made the party’s social objectives impossible. As Kaufman notes, Manley’s shift “cut into the political and economic interests of foreign capital, foreign states, and, in some cases, the real or perceived interests of Jamaican capitalists and parts of the middle class” (87). Unfortunately, his change of course spelled disaster for the Jamaican economy and much of the population.

The PNP began plotting a new direction by reaching out to Cuba and subsequently courting the great displeasure of the US. The US had sought to isolate
the communist state while Manley incited the independent Commonwealth of Caribbean countries to declare full diplomatic recognition of Cuba. Moreover, in September 1973 he flew to the Non-Aligned summit meeting in Algiers aboard Castro’s private plane (Payne 69). Despite Kissinger’s disapproval, Manley also publicly supported Cuba’s decision to send forces to back the Marxist regime in Angola. Part of Manley’s programme of change was to take up the cause of developing nations with similar standings in the global economic hierarchy. In a 1973 speech Manley states, “it is our purpose to make common cause with all developing nations of the world who share our fate” (Manley quoted in Kaufman 87). While Manley did not seek out Cuba as a trading partner, he did see the island state as a potential alternative source of technical, scientific, and managerial support in areas such as agriculture, security, and international trade (Kaufman 88). In his foreign policy, Manley again attempted to create a coalition to realize politics proper and unite nations that similarly share a common plight in their struggle against foreign control. In this way, a coalition of developing nations would demand inclusion in any decision making process as a principal member of the global economic community.

Manley’s attempt to bring about a “New International Economic Order” further led him down a path antithetical to foreign interests, particularly American interests. In 1974 he attempted to renegotiate the bauxite levy with aluminum companies. Jamaica depended on revenue from the bauxite alumina industries to expand government service (82). Hence, Manley became instrumental in establishing the IBA, International Bauxite Association, including all the major bauxite producers
with the exceptions of Brazil and the US and modeled after OPEC. IBA countries produced 85% of the capitalist world’s bauxite (Kaufman 82). While companies agreed to an increase in the levy, the two parties could not agree to the amount of the increase. In May 1974, the government imposed its own terms. Although Jamaica was an important source of bauxite, it was not the only source, and as Kaufman notes, “the industry’s future did not lie in Jamaica” (84). Australia and Brazil both rivaled Jamaica in bauxite production. In subsequent years, the demand for Jamaican bauxite decreased substantially. While recession in the industry, labour disputes, and an unexplained explosion at an Alcoa plant were partly responsible for the drop in production, many critics agree that alumina producing companies purposefully set out to punish the Manley government for the levy. 51 By 1977, the crisis in Jamaica was over and bauxite production was up again by 11.5% (109). A year later government renegotiated the levy with alumina companies, the latter having achieved their goal to reduce the levy.

During this same period Jamaica suffered from a number of internal problems as well. Its most immediate troubles sprang from its balance of payments crisis, which itself was a result partly of a decrease in tourism and bauxite production. Many hotels faced bankruptcy and the government interceded to acquire them. The decline in tourism (due to a decline in US visitors) was a result of bad press in the US regarding

51 The latter claim is supported by various statistics. For example, the drop in world bauxite production in 1975 (the year after the tax was instated) and 1976 (the year of an election in Jamaica) was slight compared to the decrease in production in Jamaica: global production of bauxite fell by 7.6 in 1975 but grew by 5.3 in 1976 for a total drop of 2.7% in total for the two year period while Jamaica’s production dropped by 26% in 1975 and another 9.6% in 1976 for a total of 33.1% over the two year period.
the so-called "Cuban influence in Jamaica" (Stephens & Stephens 128) as well as growing violence. Moreover, there was a mass exodus of the capitalist class, and those who stayed, according to Stephens & Stephens, halted production and employment to embarrass the government and influence the outcome of the 1976 election (131). The middle class and business class were both by 1976 disenchanted with the Manley government. While people's living conditions, at least until this time, were generally not greatly and "negatively affected," eight percent of the population, those in the top income bracket, felt a squeeze (129). They were inconvenienced by import restrictions, higher taxes, and limitations on foreign exchange available for travel (129). According to Kaufman, the middle-class and capitalist class both wanted a "reform-minded government" (121), but they got a leftist leaning government pursuing relations with Cuba and spouting anti-imperialists rhetoric, thereby scaring away tourists and wrecking havoc on the economy. To top it all, Manley gave a fervent anti-imperialist speech at a PNP conference in the fall of 1976, declaring "We are not for sale!" (signaling the party's rejection of an IMF economic bailout) and confirming his socialist agenda for the nation. Yet his continued anti-imperialist rhetoric only antagonized the upper echelons of Jamaican society, who deserted the PNP in the '76 elections. In short, Manley's politicization of the economy and of the unequal relations between developing nations like Jamaica and the international

(Kaufman 106). Moreover, statistics show that Canadian companies, for example, imported alumina at a higher cost from the US rather than bought from Jamaica.

52 It would seem that both the alumina companies and the business class in Jamaica attempted to oust the Manley government. Moreover, it was not only the business class and their money that fled, but many professionals and skilled labourers migrated abroad to North America as well.
economic community backlashes on a global and a national level. The goals and aspirations of the masses fail to achieve universal resonance.

Despite the PNP’s seeming disinclination to turn to the IMF, it is exactly what they did in 1977. As of late 1976 the balance of payment crisis peaked and Jamaica entered into secret negotiations with the IMF, yet given that the IMF austerity measures would hit hardest the working class, the unemployed, and the poor, Manley’s government sought an alternative course of action. In January 1977, he reiterated his “we are not for sale” message over radio wires: “This government, on behalf of our people, will not accept anybody anywhere in the world telling us what to do in our country. We are the masters in our house and in our house there shall be no other masters but ourselves. Above all, we are not for sale” (quoted in Girvan, Bernal, and Hughes 122). Accepting the IMF’s terms would freeze the increase in real wages, cut funding for social services, raise the costs of needed imports, and decrease the standard of living for the majority of Jamaicans and for these reasons Manley’s government came up with an alternative plan—the Emergency Production Plan or the People’s Production Plan (so dubbed for the grass roots way the government was able to appeal to the people directly to offer suggestions, ideas, and support for an alternative economic plan). The final plan advocated self-reliance, egalitarian production relations while increasing levels of production, and use of existing resources with minimal reliance on the state budget and the foreign exchange budget (Stephens & Stephens 164). Agriculture, for example, would play a key role, making use of idle land and providing 37 000 jobs and costing the government 42 M but
needing no foreign exchange (164). Construction likewise would be expanded, creating 7500 jobs, but manufacturing would suffer a loss because it was so heavily dependent on imported raw materials (164). Manufacturing of small goods and crafts which used local raw materials could be expanded also to create 500 new jobs (Stephens & Stephens 165). While the plan was ultimately rejected by the Manley government, it is yet another example of Manley's efforts to realize Zizek's idea of politics proper. It sought to make Jamaica independent of foreign control and therefore able to negotiate with global organizations as an equal partner, at the very least. Yet as Kaufman sums up "the problems Jamaica faced were immediate" (137). The economy was deteriorating and according to Stephens & Stephens the main weakness of the People's Plan was the shortage of foreign exchange. Jamaica was in no position to secure the capital it would have needed to implement the plan. In short, by April 1977 Jamaica announced negotiations with the IMF, marking its assimilation by global financescapes.

As expected, IMF demands devastated the very class Manley sought to protect. While the terms of the first agreement were generally considered lenient (partly in thanks to newly elected Carter), once Jamaica failed its first performance test, the IMF required Jamaica to devalue its currency and agree to future devaluations. By May 1978, the two parties reached another agreement, the Extended Fund Facility. Under the second program there were further devaluations of the Jamaican currency, new taxes on consumer goods, reductions in government spending and increases in charges for government services, incentives to the private sector, and
a cap on wage increases (Kaufman 147). The measures hit hardest the working class (especially women) and the peasantry who saw a decrease in their real wages while they faced increases in taxes and charges for government services. By 1979, mass protests ensued in response to increase in gas prices, violence erupted, and by December, Jamaica failed yet another performance test. Negotiations for a third deal ended in deadlock. The IMF strategy in Jamaica failed mainly because it depended on foreign loans that never materialized. The reason for the latter was political. Foreign banks were generally scared away by the PNP’s leftist politics and particularly their anti-imperialist rhetoric. Moreover, as Stephens & Stephens highlight, Manley’s 1979 speech at the Conference of the Non-Aligned in Havana only made matters worse. He not only praised Cuba and Castro, and Lenin’s contributions to history, but he also condemned US presence at Guantanamo Bay and its trade embargo against Cuba (205). In retaliation the US banks refused to re-finance Jamaica’s $450 M debt and grant a request for an additional $200M in loans (205). The break with the IMF finally came in 1980.\footnote{The sticking point was the IMF’s demand for 150M in budget cutbacks while the government agreed to only 100M, refusing to terminate 10 000 to 11000 jobs in the public sector (Kaufman 184).} The same year, despite his wrangles with the IMF, Manley lost the election. Seaga’s JLP reinstated the old model of dependent capitalism, though with little more success and at a great cost to the working class and the poor. In short, Manley’s efforts to challenge Western economic powers fail along with his attempt to realize politics proper on behalf of the Jamaican people.

Many of the PNP’s policies throughout Manley’s eight years in office greatly affected women. In fact, between the years 1972 and 1980, Manley enacted many
policies to help eliminate gender inequality in Jamaica. Women were an example what Zizek would called “the point of inherent exclusion,” often marginalized on account of their gender, race, and class. It is the intersection of gender struggles with race and class struggles that often marginalized women and made them the point of inherent exclusion so that their plight became representative of the nation’s plight. Manley was aware of the inequality women faced in Jamaica as is evident in his writing from his 1975 *The Politics of Change*: “The disabilities from which they [women] suffer in adult life are the products of systematic discriminations reflecting deep-seated prejudices in the society...It is an intolerable invasion of the principle of equality (214). As Bolles highlights, Manley was also both aware of women’s outpouring of support for the PNP in the 1972 elections and undoubtedly also aware that women remained an untapped source of power and ability (166-167). Hence, in 1973 Jamaica established a Woman’s Bureau, based out of the Prime Minster’s Office, at the insistence of the party feminists, Lucille Mathurin-Mair and Mavis Gilmour (Reddock 60). It was one of the first countries to do so. Though mainly defined as a women’s auxiliary of the PNP, the PNP Women’s Movement (PNPWM) agitated for many reforms throughout the 1970s. Its then president, Beverly Manley, says of the PNPWM, “It never occurred to us at the time that we could become an independent group within the PNP” (Manley quoted in Kaufman 174). In 1977, however, it became an independent party group consisting of thousands of working class women—higglers, domestics labourers, and wage workers—led by the Prime Minister’s wife.
The PNPWM became an influential force on the party’s left, agitating for more progressive legislation changes affecting women and their households. Together with the Committee of Women for Progress (CWP), linked through its leadership to the Workers Party of Jamaica, the PNPWM successfully advocated for maternity law. The two groups forming the Women’s Movement of Jamaica along with the National Union of Democratic Teachers (NUDT) formed the Joint Committee for Women’s Rights and spent the next two years campaigning for a universal maternity leave law. In 1979, the government enacted a maternity law that ensured all working women over 18 eight weeks of paid maternity leave and another fourteen weeks without pay (Kaufman 175). Women’s groups also lobbied and inspired the Manley government to pass legislation and set up social programmes benefiting women or improving their quality of life by providing legislative or material assistance to their children (Henry quoted in Reddock 66). Such programs included legislation on equal pay, minimum wage, and the Status of Children Act to remove the principle of illegitimacy (Reddock 66). The implementation of the above legislative policies not only affected the lives of women, but also those of their children and families that depend on them. By improving the living and working conditions of women, women’s organizations and the Manley government attempted to improve the living conditions of families, communities, and the nation. For this reason too women were (and continue to be) the point of inherent exclusion. Unfortunately though, not all legislation was beneficial to women. For example, while the minimum law affected many women in Jamaica,
many employers simply switched to a part-time week to avoid having to pay minimum wage (Kaufman 174).

Women’s groups also advocated for laws and programs that not only benefited them directly, but helped improve the standards of living, or in some cases simply increased survival, for many Jamaicans. In this way too their plight became the people’s plight. By the late 1970s, the food shortage became a crisis. The problem was the balance of payment crisis which restricted funds available for imports. This led to hoarding, illegal pricing, and the ‘marrying’ of goods—hard to get items sold only with the purchase of other items at inflated prices (Kaufman 176). The PNPWM and the CWP advocated for a better government prices policy. PNPWM Prime Minister Beverly Manley demanded improvement to the existing “feeble law” (Kaufman 176). The Vice President of the PNPWM unveiled a ten point programme to improve the food shortage. She called for such measures as government and shopkeepers’ cooperatives in food distribution, tougher laws against hoarding and marrying, more power to the price inspector, prevention of wholesalers from operating retail outlets, government purchases of non-perishable and salted meats, setting up a Food Monitoring Council to oversee the arrival and distribution of food (Kaufman 177). With pressure from the women’s movement the government recruited Voluntary Price Inspectors. The inspectors would visit supermarkets, show their VPI identification, and request to inspect the stockroom, repeatedly finding stockpiles of essential goods and supplies. When managers refused to distribute the goods, the VPIs did so themselves (Kaufman 177-8). According to Kaufman, while
the program was effective, there were too few VPIs to police the distribution of goods and their powers were limited. However, it was at the instigation of women’s groups that the government implemented the above program aimed at relieving the food shortage for all. In short, women’s struggles become the representative of the nation’s aspirations as a whole.

This is only one example of the role the women played in rallying the Manley government to action. They were also critically involved in the People’s Plan. By late 1977 after the first IMR agreement resulting in shortages, lay-offs and cut-backs to social services, the PNPWM and the CWP joined to form the Joint Committee for Women’s Rights (JCWR) and began to campaign for an alternative to the IMF. The IMF agreement hit women particularly hard. This was because five percent of the total employed female labour force was concentrated in working class jobs in the manufacturing sector (Bolles, “Kitchens”145). Manufacturing suffered under the IMF agreement because it depended on availability of foreign exchange at every level of production. Moreover, the devaluation of currency made the import of parts costly. This led to slowdowns and lay-offs. Hence, as Bolles highlights, capitalist development in Jamaica led to an increase in women’s employment in the manufacturing sector of the economy, “which became the largest employer of working women in productive areas of heavy capitalist investment” (146). However, IMF policies also forced them to engage in economic activities in addition to wage-labour in order to make ends meet. Women formed “domestic networks of exchange” through which they exchanged goods, services, and cash as available (150). By the
end of the 1970s these women became critical of the Manley government and its “mismanagement” of the economy (155). Perhaps working women’s sentiments were best expressed by the following statement by one woman who had recently separated from her partner because he had been unemployed for two years: “Mi hava man—Michael; him a burden enuf fe we” (quoted in Bolles 155).

Clare in *No Telephone to Heaven* follows in the footsteps of fellow Jamaican women who involved themselves in the politics of the nation in hope of ameliorating not only their own lives, but those of the fellow citizens who struggled daily simply to survive. She also follows in the footsteps of Michael Manley who attempted to implement politics proper so that the marginalized and excluded would come to represent the nation as a whole. Neither Clare nor Manley themselves represent “the part of no part,” but they both assume “radically subjective” positions and take up the political struggle for and on behalf of the Jamaican people. As such, they function as catalysts that allow for the voices of the marginalized to be heard and become the voice of the nation. Clare embodies the ethos of democracy, for she comes to represent what Zizek calls the “the part-of-no part,” those who fall by the wayside of society. Her journey, and the novel itself, maps the trials of Jamaicans during the 1970s and its period of economic crisis resulting from IMF attempts to integrate Jamaica into the global economy. Clare’s story is the story of Jamaica under the

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54 In *Piecing the Tapestry of Memory and History*, Agosto similarly argues that Clare embraces multiple identities excluded by the dominant system (103). Her subject position undergoes an evolution whereby she comes to encompass multiple subject positions that allow for the possibility of resistance to the dominant ideology (104). My argument in this chapter goes a step further. My point is that Clare along with those excluded from society or the nation by their marginality in fact seek to stand in for the
Manley government. It is the people’s plight that she defends against global forces that steadily deteriorate their already impoverished existence. The novel’s map[ping] of this period in Jamaica’s history is reflected in the structure of the novel, which has attracted commentary from many critics. Meryl Schwartz notes that Clare’s psychological fragmentation is mirrored in the structure of the novel while Fiona Barnes highlights the importance of the multiple plot-lines in broadening the novel’s political perspectives. The fragmentation of Clare’s subjectivity and the multiple plot-lines allow the struggle of other Jamaicans to emerge and unite in a “chain of equivalence” that attempts to establish a popular hegemony or to occupy what Zizek calls the contested space of the Universal. In this way, the story re-writes (and universalizes) the period of social democracy in Jamaican when the plight of the working class and unemployed, and especially women, came to represent the whole of the nation.

Like Manley, who aspired to unite developing nations sharing a common cause, Cliff too examines the commonalities between black women’s experiences globally even while she maintains the contingency of racial determinations, illustrating the ways race intersects with differences in class, gender, and sexual identity, separating wo/men despite their similarities. While race becomes a “fundamental antagonism” that defines the struggle for meaning in a global setting, it is not the only antagonism. Black women’s experiences vary depending on class and sexual identifications and allow for unity among those who suffer for a common

nation itself. I am not so much interested in Clare’s multiple subject positions as realized through other characters in the novel, but in the way she and those excluded together come to represent all of society.
cause, but also for radical split among women. The guerrilla movement Clare joins is part of a larger international network of resistance consisting of parties who share a common cause. Clare Savage’s experiences of racism in America and then Britain eventually persuade her to join the movement, and make her receptive to the sort of vision and message of social democracy (more equitable distribution of goods and services) as espoused by Manley. While in Jamaica her fair complexion is a marker of her privileged social and class position, in America, Clare is “white chocolate” in a nation that does not tolerate “in-betweenes.” In fact, in America even unfamiliar accents sound “strange” and “unsettling” (74). In short, Clare’s experience is another instance of the “narcissism of small difference,” the magnification of inconsequential differences, where race (even the slightest variation in skin tone or accent) become the ultimate marker of difference. Her experience recalls Zizek’s argument that multiculturalism’s “unity in difference” leads to the elevation of a “contingent Other” into an “absolute Other” (Ticklish 202). However, this is not quite the case since Claire’s experience takes place in America in 1960 at the height of tense racial relations and civil unrest. It is therefore precisely the lack of “unity in difference” that produces the racism Clare experiences, not multiculturalism. Yet in both cases, racial or ethnic difference remains the fundamental social antagonism that overdetermines the social field and “contaminates” the universal. The struggle for racial and ethnic equality becomes the struggle for the meaning of society. It is this struggle that shapes Clare’s political sensibilities and makes her sympathetic to the personal and political struggles of others.
The experience of multicultural tolerance Clare encounters as an adult in England is another form of racism. It is a tolerance, according to Zizek, for an Other who is not “the real Other” (219). Rather it is an “experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (the idealized Other who dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while practices like wife beating remain out of sight...)” (Welcome 11). In short, multicultural tolerance, for Zizek, is not tolerance at all. It is for similar reason Clare rebukes a fellow graduate student who “barrel[s] on about an uncle in Uganda who had sewn a man’s lip back on, bitten off in a …drunken fight, by the man’s own wife” and who continued to work in Uganda as a doctor and missionary until his expulsion by Idi Amin, “the ‘great ape’” (Cliff 138). After Clare’s rebuke, all the fellow student can muster is “You can’t be defending the policies of Amin” (138). The exchange illustrates Zizek’s point that multicultural tolerance is tolerance for those who share the same fundamental principles and politics, but that turns to “a destructive hatred of all (‘fundamentalist’) Others who do not fit into our idea of tolerance—in short, against all actual Others” (“Lenin’s Choice” 225). While there is a marked difference between the postcolonial moment described above and the multicultural present that Zizek critiques, there is also an underlying commonality that makes Zizek’s criticism applicable to Cliff’s novel. In both cases there is a lack of a grand unifying gesture or binding “secondary identification” (“Multiculturalism” 42). Instead we see an increase in “primordial identification[s],” or “smaller (ethnic, religious) forms of identification” (“Multiculturalism” 42). The two moments parallel what Zizek describes as “a reverse
process to that of the early modern constitution of a Nation” (42). Zizek argues that in postmodern societies we see an “ethnicization of the nation” or a “renewed” affirmation of ethnic roots as opposed to the modern gesture toward the “nationalization of the ethnic” (42). In the novel, and in the postmodern societies that Zizek discusses, there is a movement toward “[de]nationalization of the ethnic.”

After the National Front march, Clare aligns herself with the excluded fundamentalists. She ceases to be consoled by the fact that “you’re hardly the sort they were ranting on about” (139). In fact, she seeks to identify with her ancestors, the actual Others who were Caribs or cannibals (139) as well as, like Manley, with peoples and nations similarly defeated by Western policies, whether political or economic. Her actions, like Manley, are an expression of the attempt to re-nationalize the ethnic or the shift toward politics proper where the excluded become the stand-in for the Universal. These are choices she will affirm again later in her life. Clare’s experiences abroad are indicative of the tension between foreign ethnoscapes and national ideoscapes. This clash between immigrants and foreigners and political ideologies (as supported by national institutions, such as education system and political parties) is one that involves Clare throughout her life.

Clare’s own perspective and experiences in diaspora space are fractured by that of her mother, who lacks the privileged marker of fair skin and highlights the difficulty of global unity among disadvantaged black women. Kitty is yet another example of a “contingent Other” turned into an “absolute Other.” Both her “golden skin” and “musical voice” (78) limit her to “office girl” at a Brooklyn cleaner. After
repeated job rejections and her constant longing for home, she begins her spell of “automatic writing” and dispensing “helpful hints” (72), under the guise of Mrs. White, to laundry customers. The idea, originally that of Mr. B, depicts “an American image” (74) of “an older woman with gentle gray curls, pink skin...a smile...reassuring, never mocking or making fun,” making it her duty to ensure “her husband’s shirts, their crispness and their stiffness, [was] a matter of her primary concern” (73). The irony of course is that Mrs. White in no way reflects the “dark spiky hair...common to all the older women in the neighborhood, who...were not Americans and who had nothing in common with this image” (74). Nor does the image bear any resemblance to the women packers, Kitty, and the two middle-aged Black women, Georgia and Virginia. In protest, Kitty turns Mrs. White into a “furious Aunt Jemima” (83), condemning racism in America. It is her struggle that prompts Clare to “someday help your people” (103) and become one with their cause against exploitation.

Despite her experiences of racism though, Kitty is unable to bond with other Black women with similar experiences. To Kitty’s frustration and distress, she cannot befriend her co-workers. While they “chat softly” and “laugh” with one another and call each other “girl” (77), they immediately “fall silent” in her presence. The gulf between them stems from differences in both their class and skin tones and consequently from the fact that their experience of racism and oppression has been greater than hers: “She wanted to tell the women what had prevailed, who she really was, but she could not...afraid of what they might think of her, knowing their own
travels through the city would make her seem only like a cry-cry baby. A house-slave inconvenienced by massa whim, while dem work the cane” (77). This difference in the women’s experience of oppression is reinforced by the fact that it is they who pay for Kitty’s rebellion. Her “golden skin” absolves her from punishment while Mr. B fires the Black women, thinking it was they who committed the capital offence, for “that kind is just no good” (83). He refuses to believe their denials because he could never imagine that “a nice girl” like Kitty could do such a thing (84). Hence, though Cliff posits race as a determining element in the social field, she also illustrates the ways differences in identity cut across Black women’s experience of oppression, fracturing any sense of unity or common cause and leading to the failure of democracy. Kitty’s experiences in America (diaspora space) highlight the difficulties of coalition building (especially globally and between multiple ethnoscapes), but also highlight its necessity in the popular bid for hegemony.

While Kitty does commit an act of sabotage in protest of the racism she experiences in America, it does not make her an actual Other. Her actions are comprehensible and her character sympathetic. Christopher, yet another character who fractures Clare’s story, is the novel’s actual Other. He is the fundamentalist, the terrorist whose experiences and actions are radically and incomprehensibly intolerable to Western sensibilities. For Zizek, violence is the result of a failure of politicization proper. It is the response to postmodern tolerance that prevents the “possibility of the metaphoric elevation of [the] specific wrong into the stand-in for the universal wrong. The only way openly to articulate this universality...consists then in its apparent
opposite, in the thoroughly irrational excessive outbursts of violence” (“Leftist” 1002). In *No Telephone to Heaven*, it is not tolerance that leads to Christopher’s violent act (murder), but “the return of the repressed” and the reassertion of his specific injustice (albeit in an irrational and excessive outburst) in an attempt to render it visible and elevate it to the level of the universal. Indeed he achieves justice not by murder, but through Clare who becomes what Zizek terms a “true universalist” because she takes up Christopher’s struggle and the struggle of all those deprived of representation in the national community as a result of the West’s attempt to integrate Jamaica into the global economy.

Christopher’s violence is the result years of poverty and loneliness. It is the struggle of the poor and destitute, the forgotten like Christopher, that the novel documents as well. His violence is the result of colonization, followed by neo-colonialism. It is not the result of multicultural tolerance, yet there is at least one similarity between the two types of violence—both are the consequence of the failure of society to realize “true universality.” He and those like him are the forgotten: “If he had thought about it, he would realize that there was not one single smaddy in the world who cared if he lived or died. His death would cause inconvenience to no one—unless him dead on dem property” (44). His childhood home, the Dungle, is bordered off, “perimetered by a seven-foot-high fence of uneven and rusty zinc wall, one entry and one exit (32). Christopher grows up like other children of the Dungle, sick with ringworms or else TB, and all of them hungry. As an adult he enlists his services as gardenboy to Mas’ Charles and his family until one day he slays the
nation's "leading family." While violence has a long history in Jamaica, as Kaufman notes, and ultimately stems from supreme "human degradation," such as slavery (112), Christopher's actions are the result of poverty, destitution stemming from Jamaica's economic dependency on foreign capital; however, as the embodiment of the Ogun, the Yoruba warrior god of iron and "the vengeance of the forge," Christopher also seeks to bring about class warfare and overturn master/servant relations (Cliff 177). His violence is what Fanon would term the violence of decolonization, yet it is not directed at the former colonists, but at members of the national bourgeoisie who have taken the place of the colonists. While his violence is an act of "madness" (34), decolonization, writes Fanon, "is always a violent event" (1). Yet, it is one that ushers in "a new humanity" where "[t]he last shall be first" (2). Hence, Fanon's "new humanity," like Zizek's idea of politics proper is the identification and acceptance of the excluded group as the stand in for society. Decolonization is no less than the identification of the nonpart with the whole of the nation (Zizek, "Leftist" 989). Christopher seeks to realize politics proper or a new world order, Fanon's "new humanity." In short, Mas' Charles and his family are representative of the Jamaican middle-class that eventually lost faith in Manley and aligned themselves with the interests of foreign capital while Christopher is representative of the poor whose lives Manley sought to ameliorate.\footnote{This class later supported JLP led by Edward Seaga who came to power in the 1980 election while Manley's PNP were generally favoured among the working class and the poor.} Cliff reconstructs the internal division within the nation and the tension within ideoscapes.
(national ideologies) represented by these two camps—that is, she narrates the tension between two parties each seeking to represent the nation.

Yet even prior to his acts of violence or “madness, Christopher attempts to resolve the tension between classes (and national ideologies represented by these two camps) by politicizing his struggle or claiming equality as a member of the national community. Hence, his efforts to realize a new world order are, like Zizek’s concept of politics proper, twofold. He begins by demanding equality with the ruling class. In his conviction that the master “owes” him for his years of faithful service, he seeks a favour from Mas’ Charles as an equal. Given his poverty and loneliness, his desire to locate and properly bury his grandmother is understandable, despite its futility. Given that his “people...wo’k fe dem long time,” his conviction that “Dem...owe we sinting,” is not unreasonable either (Cliff 48). Yet given class structure in Jamaica and its roots in slavery (and moreover the difficulty of his request), Mas’ Charles' reaction is also predictable. Christopher’s violence is an act of desperation and frustration at his miserable life, but it is also an attempt to seek justice and to politicize master/servant relations, thereby ushering in a “new humanity.” For this reason, and not only, as Agosto argues, because he was a child of the slums, does Cliff have him die with the guerillas (100). He not only represents the underprivileged for whom they die, but he is also, like them, a guerilla fighter seeking the politicization of his plight. His actions make him part of a larger coalition whose members share similar values, though their struggles are distinct, and together present themselves as the multifarious
voice of the people and the stand in for the whole nation. His struggle, as a member of Jamaica’s poor, coincides with their fight for a new humanity and politics proper.\(^\text{56}\)

The problem also, ironically, is not only the master’s refusal to comply, but the “faithful servant’s” internalization of the dynamics of master/servant relations. This is evident in Christopher’s exchange with the servant, Mavis. She rebukes him upon his suggesting that the master “owes” him: “Wunna talk ‘bout owe, bwai? Whatsoever wunna have, wunna owe do dem. Dem nuh rescue wunna?” (48). Despite the misery of his lot, he ought to be grateful for his subsistent employment. She continues to remain loyal to the family until death: “Lord Jesus, they were dead and she was still taking care of them. In death, as in life, their faithful servant” (48). For this reason, his murder of Mavis was the most violent of all: “He cut her like an animal, torturing her body in a way he had not tortured theirs” (48), for she refuses to see the justice in his demand and in his actions.

Early on in his life, there is one attempt to draw awareness to his plight and raise it to the “stand-in for the universal wrong,” but it fails (Zizek, “Leftist” 1002). While attending mass with his grandmother, Christopher hears the sermon of Brother Josephus whose Lickle Jesus is as “Black as his mother was Black” (36). The “small dark man” who Brother Josephus calls Jesus also bore “a hump between his shoulder blades” like Christopher no less (36). For Brother Josephus, Christopher, as well as the Dungle’s inhabitants, “is true bredda of Lickle Jesus. Him have Christ in him heart. Him is Christlike. Christ like him” while “de ones who mixed, de ones who talk

\(^{56}\) Moreover, like the resistance fighters, he is betrayed by state military defending foreign capital and interests. He is “set up” by the American filmmaker and the rebels are ambushed by their own
'my white grandmother' or 'my English father'—des ones carry Satan in dem blood. Jus' so...jus' like dem would carry typhoid...cancer...for it eat at dem. Dem cyaan help demselves, but dem tainted" (39, 38). For Brother Josephus, the colonizer (and his descendants who follow in his footsteps) is the devil while the oppressed of the earth, like Christopher, are the brothers of Christ. In short, Christopher and the Dungle inhabitants are "the part-of no-part" that stands in for and defines the whole of Christianity, as embodied in the life and message of its central figure, as well as the nation, as represented through its oppressed.

While the members of the congregation reject their identification with Jesus, considering it plain "heresy," Clare will come to accept Jamaica's poor as the representation of Jamaica as a whole. These are her mother's people for whom she returns and for whom she gives her life to help. Years later when she comes upon orphaned children from "some of our finest families in Jamaica" (120) and fair like herself, she remembers other children, like Christopher, who, when her father could not avoid them, "swarmed around the car, beating the hood" (120). While her father evades such places as Trench Town, Denhem Town, and the Dungle, Clare, like her mother, "Cyaan live on this island and not understand how it work, how the world work. Cyaan pass the Dungle, cyan smell the Dungle, and not know this island is the real world...in the worst way" (123). Clare, like her mother, cannot ignore the people's suffering. Like Kitty who stopped in Trench Town to give money to a government. They are all "tricked" and manipulated to safeguard foreign interests. It is important to clarify here that for Brother Josephus it is not all fair skinned Jamaicans that "carry Satan in their blood," but only those who continue to glory and profit by their privileged identification with the white colonizer.
pregnant woman squatting in the gutter, Clare donates farmland to feed neighbouring locals. The land also helps raise money for the guns and ammunition she and her group will need to free their people from “contamination from the outside” (195) that creates the Dungles of this world. In short, Christopher’s struggle is one of many in Jamaica politicized through Clare’s resistance to the global forces that rule Jamaica. Like Christopher, she longs for “new humanity” in which “the last shall be first.” For Clare, Jamaica’s poor represent the nation, and as such, her goal is to feed the people, but also to challenge the power interests of local and global flows that rule the nation. She becomes part of a political agenda (historically led by Manley) that seeks to combat global capitalism (particularly financescapes and mediascapes). While Clare and Christopher never meet, and while their experiences have shaped them differently, they share a singular purpose and drive for politics proper. That is the thread that unites them.

The novel also maps the struggle of the Jamaican people through the character of Harry/Harriet, whose own story also interrupts Clare’s narrative. Harry/Harriet’s personal struggle is one in a “chain of equivalence” that becomes part of the struggle of the Jamaican people. She not only works towards healing the poor and raising their standard of living, but she also seeks to heal them spiritually and broaden their narrow perspectives. She has elevated her own wrong into the stand-in for the “universal.” His rape as a boy by a British officer is, for Harry/Harriet, “no more, no less” than what his mother, a maid, suffered at the hands of his father, her employer. While he rejects the “symbol,” it is also, both literally and metaphorically speaking, “no more,
no less” than what “they did to all of us, always bearing in mind that some of us... also do it to each other” (129). Hence, his own personal experience is the starting point for his political awareness of relations of power. When Clare asks how it is that he knew “to question, to know to question, so early,” he responds “Don’t forget, mi mumma was a maid, and my father, her employer. And dem keep me and let she go. Is how you think she come to bear me?” (124). The personal, for Harry/Harriet, becomes the political and his struggle resonates on a national level, becoming one with the struggle of the people against their domination by foreign powers.

Given the conditions of his conception and his early childhood trauma, Harry/Harriet becomes a political activist. As an adult, s/he continues to live on the margins of society, for s/he was “strange, since childhood, they say, but everyone tolerates him, as if measuring their normalness against his strangeness” (21). While s/he is aware of people’s perceptions of him/herself and even plays upon their ignorance because “our people kind of narrow, poor souls” (127), his identity position is a dangerous one to occupy. He can play upon people’s narrowness, and he can nurse their ills, but even if those whom he helps “had known about Harriet, they would have indulged in elaborate name-calling, possibly stoning, in the end harrying her to the harbor—perhaps” (171). Still, she throws in her lot with theirs and works toward healing the nation and politicizing Jamaica’s demand for global independence. She gains knowledge about the nation’s history, her own history, for some of her own ancestors were slaves, and shares it with Clare, informing her of the slave hospital built for their ancestors because “‘Tek a lot of smaddy fe grow cane, missis. Cyaan
have smaddy dying off—not when dem cost so” (132). With this knowledge, Harry/Harriet decides upon her vocation as a nurse, learning the healing practices of the old women, “women who knew the properties of roots and leaves and how to apply spells effectively...to temper dengue fever, to slow TB, to stop gangrene” (171). It is with this knowledge of obeah, handed down for generations since the days of Nanny, that Harry/Harriet heals “all manner of illness and wound, turning from none...touching here and there” (171).

That she becomes one with “some of her people” (188) and their plight is suggested in her sharing of their meal. Having nothing else to eat and becoming desperate, her people break into the local zoo and steal an iguana for food. While their ancestors too ate lizards, rats, and mongoose, because “despair too close sometime,” for Harriet this episode clearly demonstrates that “better never come...We locked in time...Everyt’ing mus’ change,” and it prompts Harry/Harriet to take Clare and join the resistance movement (188). S/he becomes part of the national ideoscapes that oppose global capitalism and its effects on nation’s most vulnerable citizens. In short, Harry/Harriet’s story not only interrupts Clare’s plot, but also merges with it as she teaches the latter about “loving your own kind,” the Jamaican people. Harry/Harriet is “the point of inherent exception/exclusion” (Zizek, Ticklish 224). Yet the injustices she endures help her come into national consciousness and understand her suffering within the larger context of the nation’s suffering. The people’s lot becomes her lot, and that is why she joins the resistance movement, a coalition consisting of people...
with their own different struggles and who choose to come together to fight for politics proper on behalf of Jamaica’s underprivileged classes.

Upon meeting Harry/Harriet, Clare also begins to understand her own plight as paralleling that of her people. She finally acknowledges “I’m not outside this history,” the history of the nation (194). Hence, her story maps Jamaican history at a particular point in time; she comes to political awareness of the plight of her people during Manley’s two terms in office and follows in the footsteps of other feminists (and Manley supporters) of the period. Not only does Clare experience first hand the racism that oppresses her own people, but she suffers the consequences of other imperial missions as well. Her relationship with Bobby leaves her sterile from the effects of agent orange. However, as Agosto highlights, her sterility prevents her from becoming a biological mother yet it transforms her into a political revolutionary and mother to the nation (90). In this way, she takes up the work and legacy of Jamaica’s national hero, Nanny. Upon her return to Jamaica, Clare begins to “educate” herself: she’s “spoken with the old people...leafed through the archives downtown...spent time at the university library...studied the conch knife excavated at the Arawak site...the shards of hand-thrown pots...the petroglyphs hidden in the bush...listened to the stories about Nanny and taken them to heart” (Cliff 193).

Yet it is not only history that she learns, but also the current history of Jamaica’s “contamination from the outside” (195). She learns of the increased violence in the streets and the polluted water from the waste of the bauxite mines and the aluminum refineries (195). Bauxite alumina industries provide an important
source of revenue, but they also contaminate the water supply from which the children drink, the women wash, the men fish, brew coffee, clean tripe (195). She learns of the “severe” shortages since the election of the new government: “Petrol at ten dollars a gallon—like salt, on the rise. And the dollar falling fast...No sugar—much of the time. Little rice. No Flour. People could buy necessities only by marrying goods, purchasing flour—were there flour—along with a luxury, a jar of chutney, a box of Cheer. No vaccine. But plenty-plenty polio” (187). In short, Clare’s story merges with that of the people. She learns about the nation’s economic problems and seeks to change Jamaica’s state of dependency on global capitalism (financescapes).

Having immersed herself in Jamaica’s history and contemporary politics, Clare chooses to carry on in the tradition of Jamaica’s national hero, Nanny. If, as Agosto suggests, Nanny “epitomizes the continuity of female resistance, and obeah is the source of her power against the forces of slavery” (77), then the burning of 167 old women in an almshouse fire motivated by political violence is indicative of the deterioration of Jamaican society and its continued defeat by imperial forces. The fire is typical of the escalating violence in Jamaica throughout Manley’s term, especially as economic conditions deteriorated. It is also a specific form of political violence, gang violence. In Jamaica, urban ghettos were divided into territories where the two parties, PNP and the JLP, established bases, protected by gangs whose members functioned as guards and errand runners, and which did not change even with a

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58 The reference here is likely to the 1980 election of the JLP led by Edward Seaga although shortages were a particular problem during Manley’s years in power. The balance of payments crisis, particularly during the late 1970s, restricted funds available for imports leading to hoarding, illegal pricing, and the
change in government (Kaufman 114). Raids on the territory of the opposing party were common and symptomatic of the internal divisions within national ideoscapes. The two parties represent two completely different economic agendas for Jamaica—continued economic dependency or support for global capitalism as endorsed by the JLP or the rejection of global capitalism in favour of (democratic) socialism as endorsed by Manley. The struggle between these two opposing alternatives led to street violence and often left hundreds dead and injured (114). Hence, the Gleaner report that the burning of the old women “has something to do with politics” is referencing the destruction and devastation of this form of political violence. Yet the loss of these women is Jamaica’s loss because they keep the memory and spirit of Nanny alive, and, as the narrator in the following chapter, “Magnanimous Warrior!” bewails, “we need her more than ever” (164). The neglect of and disrespect for the old women is also the death of the nation. It is Clare Savage who will “remember how to love her” (164).

Like Nanny, Clare participates in armed battle against enemy forces, this time imperial forces which seek to turn the homeland into a stage set (121). Perhaps the greatest affront to Nanny’s memory is the Western film crew’s project to adapt Nanny’s story for a Western audience. Such attempts according to Fiona Barnes, amount to what Michel Foucault terms the “fake archeology of history” that “provides a glamorized and comfortable version of the past that is commodified into a fashion fad for mass culture” (24). Such projects (a form of mediascapes) not only distort the

“marrying” of goods as already noted. Though crisis continued through the Seaga years, the latter allowed for import liberalization to appease the middle-class (Kaufman 255).
memory of Nanny, but erase Jamaica’s history of resistance to colonial oppression, leaving it bereft of a legacy of struggle and robbing it of a reference point for modern day struggles. According to Jamaican folklore (popular national ideoscapes), Nanny was the leader of the Windward Maroons, the Maroon community that fled to the hills upon the exodus of the Spaniards and the conquest of Jamaica by the British (Gottlieb 3). It was this Spanish Maroon community that resisted the British for eighty-five years from their arrival in 1655 to the signing of the last treaty in 1740 (17). Their leader Nanny was the primary strategist for all the Windward Maroon battles against the British though she herself never participated (24). While Jamaican oral history and folklore record many of Nanny’s heroic feats, none are as popular as those recorded by Cliff. Nanny, it is said, could catch bullets, originally probably with her hands though some version of the story claim she caught them with her buttocks. Nanny’s pot “into whose cauldron the Red Coats vanished” is yet another popular tale (Cliff 164). Nanny’s pot, it is said, boiled with no fire beneath it and hypnotized the British soldiers as they plunged to their death (Gottlieb 74). Perhaps most important of Nanny’s accomplishment is the “Land Patent to Nanny, 1740” which granted land rights to Nanny and her people (Gottlieb 28).

Despite her heroic feats as the leader of the Windward Maroons, the revised version of Nanny’s story bears little resemblance to the historical Nanny as recorded

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59 It must be noted that Nanny was not only the military strategist and political leader, but also the spiritual leader of her people.
60 Most likely the pot was naturally formed by two rivers and the turbulence at their convergence gave the illusion of boiling water (Gottlieb 74).
by storytellers and by Jamaican folklore.\textsuperscript{61} Cliff highlights the way foreign mediascapes and financescapes come into conflict with national ideoscapes.\textsuperscript{62} The film production of Nanny not only spins its own exotic version to appeal to the Western audiences and their penchant for romance, but also de-politicizes the legacy of the Jamaican hero and Jamaican history itself. Nanny is no longer “an old woman naked except for a necklace made from the teeth of whitemen...Wild Nanny, sporting furies through the Blue Mountains. Old. Dark. Small...such detail was out of the question, given these people even knew the truth” (Cliff 206). Instead the actress portraying Nanny, the one “called in when ever someone was needed to play a Black heroine” wore a “designer’s notion of the clothes that Nanny wore” (206). Nor is this Nanny as accomplished as the Jamaican national hero. While Nanny caught bullets and boiled British soldiers, this one needs her lover, Cudjoe (the leader of the later ex-slave community, the Leeward Maroons) to rescue her from attack by a fantastical monster (207). Hence, it is the re-writing and appropriation of Jamaican history that Clare and her group resist. They seek instead to control representations of the nation, and posit Jamaica’s excluded groups as the stand in for the nation as a whole. It is the

\begin{itemize}
\item The revised version of Nanny’s story, like Fanon says of colonialism, makes every “effort to demean history.” It too “turns its attention to the past of the colonized people and distorts it, disfigures it, and destroys it” (149). In the process it deprives the nation of its national history and culture, leaving the people without a point of reference for modern day struggles against globalization. In contrast, Jamaican folklore and stories of Nanny form part of an oral tradition and national culture that encourages the people to fight for a “new humanity.” While Fanon generally rejects recursions to the past to find examples of anti-colonial struggle, stories of Nanny live on in the present in people’s collective memory. For this reason they continue to be an example of “combat literature” (173). For Fanon, combat literature is intrinsically tied to the people’s struggle, though not for liberation in this case, but for politics proper (168).
\item It is worth stressing Jameson’s argument that in the entertainment industry economic and cultural processes often overlap with one another (or even, for Jameson, “dissolve” into one another). Hence, the film production of Nanny is both an example of foreign mediascapes and financescapes respectively.
\end{itemize}
latter that the film disavows. It will not acknowledge the way past and present abject populations come to stand for the universal. The novel maps the way foreign interests in the form of mediascapes conflict with popular national history or ideoscapes, robbing national communities of their past and commodifying their history for mass markets.

While Cliff maps the tension between various global flows, she also highlights the complexity and ambiguity within each flow. In 1980, Edward Seaga was elected Prime Minister of Jamaica and restored Jamaica to its previous economic dependency upon foreign powers. As the excerpt from the New York Times article “U.S. Film Makers Lured by Jamaican Incentives” by Treaster makes clear, Jamaica is an island paradise with many Spanish and British colonial buildings dating back to the 1500s as well as an assortment of communities—“concrete and glass cities, elegant suburban homes, ramshackle slums and villages with thatched huts,” making it an ideal filming location (200). It is also home to a population “of many hues and ethnic distinctions,” many of whom are willing to serve as movie extras (200). Moreover, unlike many tropical paradises, “you can drink the water” (200). In short, Seaga turns Jamaica into a filmmaker’s ideal filming destination and a getaway paradise for tourists in general. Indeed this is also what the “two whitemen,” the filmmakers, in the rumshop discover. As one assures the other: “We have an island. Landscape. Extras up the ass. Weather. And a fucking army complete with helicopters—” (203). Seaga’s economic policies overlap with foreign mediascapes and financescapes, but they stand in direct
contrast to previous state policies implemented by the Manley administration, highlighting the complexity and tension within domestic ideoscapes.

Foreign financesscapes in the novel also work in conjunction with a number of other flows to ensure Jamaica’s dependency on global economy. Jamaica, for instance, does not have much of a choice but to provide accommodations to foreign filmmakers since “they’re trapped. All tied up by the IMF. All thanks to Manley and his bleeding heart” (201). As the filmmaker highlights, international lending organizations like the IMF are just one example of financesscapes that keep Jamaica dependent on global capitalism. Yet Jamaica is not only an ideal setting for movie producers, but it is also a hotspot for Western vacationers bringing in foreign capital for similar reasons: “Jamaicans will do anything for a buck...Look around you...the hotels...the private resorts where you have to get an invite...the reggae festivals for white kids...The cancer spas for rich people...These people are used to selling themselves...That brief shit with Manley was the exception” (202). The tourism industry is vital to the Jamaican economy. In short, financesscapes work with foreign mediascapes as well as ethnoscapes to create national economy dependent on foreign interests.

Cliff is skeptical of the possibility of altogether eliminating foreign interests from Jamaica. While it would be impossible, as Barnes notes, to altogether eliminate neo-economic and cultural forces in Jamaica (26), given the nature of global flows, it may also not be in Jamaica’s best interest to do so. In this way, Cliff differs somewhat from Zizek whose notion of politics proper realizes the impossible/real demand of
"abstract" universality or the recognition of the point of exception as the true universality as opposed to the "false' concrete" universality that legitimizes the existing division of the Whole into parts ("Multiculturalism" 50). While the rebels do represent the point of exclusion, they do not overturn the existing totality of multinational capitalism nor is there any real sense that such a task would even be possible. Instead they seek reform with the existing system. That is, while they are unable to resist Jamaica's integration within the world economy, they seek to set the terms of their immersion by attempting to manipulate global flows. This is evident in their ambivalence toward tourism. Tourism is "the lifeblood of the Jamaican economic system," and, as many Jamaicans regard it, "a necessary evil" (Taylor 187, 169). On the one hand, the rebels clearly resent foreign invasion by "white kids high on dope" (6). The young Americans are "nuisances" tolerated only for their "Papa's credit cards" and "American Express traveler's checks" (6). Yet while they are "deeply hated" (6), they are also needed. They are a source of foreign investment in the nation and provide a market for the group's ganja crop in exchange for guns and ammunition. In short, the tourists (ethnoscapes) and the foreign capital they invest in the nation (financescapes) also work with (or in the interests of) the counter-ideologies of state (ideoscapes) represented by the resistance fighters (as well as with official policies instituted by the state led by the JLP), underscoring the complexity of flows that simultaneously exploit subjects while offering them a means to counteract their exploitation.
Moreover, the tourists also significantly provide the rebels with a sense of identity. It is, after all, the tourists’ clothing, the old army clothes, that make these resistance fighters feel like “real freedomfighters, like their comrades in the ANC” (7). Not only do the rebel fighters trade with tourists, making the former complicit with the same Western imperialist economies they resist, but they also appropriate the identities of American soldiers fighting another imperial war against a nation not unlike Jamaica. The jackets, cultural emblems “to do with another country” (6) also have a lot to do with Jamaica and with these rebels who seek to align themselves with an international movement to defeat Western imperial powers. Yet it is not even with the real American soldiers that the rebels identify, but with some B-picture’s version of American soldiers “like the ones they used to see in triple features at the open-air Rialto before it was torn down. GIs fortified with Camels talking about baseball while stalking the silent, treacherous Jap (7). The jackets may offer them an identity, but it is one borrowed from the very cultural and economic power they seek to defeat. Ironically, the resistance fighters who represent a counter ideology, counter to the new ideology of state under Seaga, subscribe to images produced by the very mediascapes they combat, mediascapes supported by the new administration. It shapes their very notion of identity and resistance. However unwillingly, they are complicit in a global system supported by the new Seaga administration and its opposing political camp.  

Hence, what they really seek is some sort of compromise and voice in the future of their nation.

63 Similarly, when Manly was re-elected to office in 1989, he no longer resisted dealing with the IMF and embraced neo-liberal economic orthodoxies. Having come to the realization that there was no
While it becomes impossible for the guerilla fighters to extricate themselves from total dependency upon foreign imperial cultures and economies, they make an attempt to resist the ways in which they are integrated into the world economy and in the process come to represent the very nation itself. In a nation like Jamaica, already divided by class, race, gender, sexuality, and politics, the jackets become an emblem of their unity of purpose: “This alikeness was something that they needed, which could be important, even vital, to them, for the shades of their skin, places traveled to and from, events experienced, things understood...ones they loved, living family, varied widely, came between them” (4). The jackets become a symbol of the nation unified, at least as it had been under Manley, where the whole, the universal, becomes one with the point of inherent exclusion. Clare’s very presence among the group, whose members have been less privileged than she, is indicative of Zizek’s notion of democracy. She identifies with their cause, a cause that becomes her own, despite her privileged skin, class, and education. Even Christopher’s plight becomes her plight as his story of exclusion parallels her own story and coming to national consciousness. Christopher is the ultimate outcast, the actual Other, disregarded by society as he wanders the streets and is left to die along with the rebels as the rest take shelter against the rain of bullets, yet it is significant that he is, in death, united with Clare.

In short, *No Telephone to Heaven* attempts to understand the workings of the global economy as it impinges on Jamaica, especially during Manley’s period in office while the latter is under intense global pressure to restructure the economy, escaping global capitalism, he followed path laid out by previous JLP government under Seaga.
resulting in severe shortages and decreases in the standard of living. Yet it does so from “the point of inherent exclusion.” That is, it maps the trials of the nation against imperial forces (in the form of foreign ethnoscapes, finanescapes, and mediascapes) from the perspective of Jamaica’s underprivileged. Hence, it captures the process of politicization proper where the demands of the “actual others,” like Christopher, fracture dominant discourse and come to represent the nation as a whole. The novel, in conclusion, maps the clash but also the co-operation between various flows, specifically between national ideoscapes themselves and other global flows such as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and finanescapes that often work against developing nations like Jamaica, keeping them economically dependent on foreign economic powers. Yet, like Nanny and the Maroons who came to embody the nation and its rebellion against slavery and British imperialism, Clare and Jamaica’s others who fracture her story come to represent the nation and its struggle against global capitalism.
CONCLUSION

Within this work I have sought to contribute to the theory and practice of cognitive mapping by expanding the parameters of Jameson’s concept to discuss the ways narratives by women writers locate female subjects within the new space of multinational capitalism. Such a project must consider how the constantly shifting positionalities of subjects alter the cognitive maps of a social totality that is itself overdetermined and therefore indeterminate. In other words, precisely because of the constantly changing interplay between global flows, there is what Laclau describes as “a necessary undecidability inscribed within … [the] structure” (“Power” 282). The result is a global totality that is “radically context-dependent” as is evident in the partial maps offered by each of the novels. Hence, while the interplay between ideoscapes and ethnoscapes defines the British nation, the disjuncture between domestic ideoscapes and foreign financescapes and mediascapes collectively shapes lives of women in the Philippines, sometimes limiting their possibilities and sometimes offering them new opportunities, though always depending largely on their own positions within the nation. Yet given the highly unstable relations between flows, the opposite is true in Jamaica where foreign financescapes, mediascapes, and ethnoscapes sometimes overlap and sometimes clash with domestic ideoscapes, but in either case work largely against the majority of the population. It becomes clear then that the cognitive maps of multinational capitalism are always necessarily incomplete, given the contingent nature of global flows and the varying subject positions of the social agents that are the mapmakers.
While Jameson's theory has offered the foundation for a feminist project of cognitive mapping of global space, my project has attempted to expand on his model in a number of ways. In Jameson's theory as well as in my own model, narratives feature prominently because history comes to us in narrative form. There is an "active relationship" between literary or aesthetic production and the Real. For Jameson, every aesthetic act "draw[s] the Real into its own texture" (*Political* 81), including religious mythologies, cultural artifacts, and interpretative frameworks such as Marxism and psychoanalysis. History or the Real is written into the very fabric or form of aesthetic productions as their "subtext" (81). Yet "symbolic acts" do not merely or passively reflect reality; they reconstruct it, generating and (re)producing their own contexts. They rewrite and rework historical and ideological subtexts that are not immediately present or accessible, but always reconstructed after the fact (81).

It is then in light of such "projects of transformation" (81) that history becomes an "absent cause" (55, 82). That is, to quote Jameson, "it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and...our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization" (35). Such artistic reproductions of the Real preclude any attempt to reach some ultimate notion of truth, historical or otherwise (55).

Because aesthetic or literary texts reconstruct reality, they are ideological works. Symbolic acts are ideological insofar as they imagine our lived relationship to the Real. However, they also include social structures like the state (38). Jameson's argument then, as Dowling underscores, is that social structures too are unintelligible except in narrative form as part of a larger story (97). The "'text' of the state" (Jameson, *Political* 38) must be read in the context of its
larger social structures (30). For this reason, Jameson concludes that literature is political: "there is nothing that is not social and historical—indeed...everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political" (20). The function of aesthetic production is therefore to reorganize and reconstitute reality, but in such a way as to provide formal "solutions" to political and social contradictions (79). These contradictions are "irresolvable logical bind[s]" that are symbolically addressed by the text, but ultimately only resolved through revolution (Dowling 126). It is in this way that representation is always an act of interpretation.

In reading literary works as symbolic acts that seek to rewrite reality, Jameson devises a system of interpretation, consisting of three interpretative horizons, by which to grasp the social and political implications of literary and cultural texts. His model in The Political Unconscious is an early formulation of his theory of cognitive mapping, though he does not term it as such. Nonetheless an examination of his interpretative horizons will allow us to review his theory, its limitations, and ways to expand it for a feminist project of cognitive mapping. The first horizon of textual meaning is "the historical context of the novel" (128), as discussed above. The aim in this stage of interpretation is to isolate the aesthetic contradiction that conceals or functions as the "imaginary resolution" to the underlying social contradiction (Jameson, Political 77). The second horizon is that of the social where the text is "rewritten" in terms of class struggle and antagonistic discourses (though within the relations to other levels of the totality. It is the history of the totality (of multinational capitalism) that functions as the "subtext" of the state and each of the levels.
unity of a shared master code). Finally, in the third horizon works are read historically in terms of their structurally co-existing modes of production.

It is the above interpretative framework, a form of mediation that examines the relationship between literary text and history, that lies at the centre of any project of cognitive mapping. Each of the novels examined in this dissertation, White Teeth, Dogeaters, and No Telephone to Heaven, is read in terms of its own contradiction, yet each is a representation of an “absent cause” that is multinational capitalism as it manifests in various context-specific locations. In this way too the relationship between literary production and social structures can be said to share a similar identity even while they are semi-autonomous levels of a larger social structure.

The relationship between literary form and social reality is central to understanding all three novels as maps of multinational capitalism. In White Teeth humour is the formal or aesthetic resolution to a social contradiction with roots stemming back to the period of British imperialism. If the policy of Pax Britannica created an imperial and multiracial citizenship that conferred British subjecthood to all members of the Empire, immigration policy between 1962 and 1981 sought to redefine citizenship narrowly (in terms of race) and to exclude the formerly colonized subjects now within Britain’s borders. White Teeth then is the aesthetic resolution to a newly created problem: how to imagine and represent the former colonial subjects, defined both in terms of race and gender, that constitute the nation.65

65 While the novels do function as national allegories to some extent, I am not suggesting that they offer definitive representations of their respective nations. Rather, I am suggesting that the novels selected represent possible communities and historical accounts of the nation. They engage with their immediate historical contexts, reconstructing history after the fact. Yet the historical subtext of any
humour and general lack of seriousness is an attempt to broaden notions of British identity by undercutting exclusive definitions of the nation, especially those still rooted in imperial constructions of the nation premised on the superiority of the descendents of the Anglo-Saxons and their absolute rights to the homeland.

Contradiction in *Dogeaters* is also indicative of the antagonisms within the nation, the Philippines, but this time it marks the tension between domestic kinship politics and imported foreign media, sometimes offering the nation's subjects, particularly its women, opportunities and alternative ways to define themselves and their futures. The latter is not always the case though since women's possibilities and opportunities in the Philippines (as elsewhere) are also determined by class factors. The novel becomes an aesthetic resolution to the contradiction between traditional kinship politics that endorse traditional views of women as beautiful, religious, and chaste and Western values like feminism. The postmodern technique of pastiche is the formal resolution that seeks to bring together disparate and heterogeneous materials (as in a montage), and in doing so offers formal unity in a nation and to national culture divided by the tensions resulting from multiple colonizations, neocolonialism, dictatorship, and the indigenous system of kinship politics.

Cliff's *No Telephone to Heaven*, like Hagedorn's *Dogeaters*, reconstructs the tension between domestic policies and foreign influences. In *No Telephone*, foreign capital, media, and tourism overlap, creating economic crisis and robbing the nation of its collective history. The contradiction in the novel results from the central novel is merely one attempt at reconstruction among many possible reproductions. To claim that any one novel captures the definitive history of the nation is of course reductive.
antagonism between the nation seeking self determination and independence and foreign powers attempting to integrate Jamaica into the global economy and recreating neo-colonial conditions. The novel’s multiple plot lines, following the stories of various Jamaicans through hardship, offers an aesthetic resolution to the nation’s struggle against exploitation. The various plotlines fragment the story of the protagonist, a young, fair Jamaican woman, allowing for the narration of the less privileged in the national community. The novel’s multiple stories of the Jamaican people unite and create a “chain of equivalence” so that no one story of struggle can be said to represent Jamaica as a whole. Instead together they establish a popular hegemony that fills the empty space of the Universal, in this case the nation, but also sets up a template for a more equal distribution of power on a global level. The multiple plots are an aesthetic resolution to the lack of “politics proper” on a national and on an international scale.

Having identified the central contradiction of a literary text and its aesthetic resolution in the first horizon of interpretation, Jameson moves into his second horizon. It bears remembering that for Jameson all meaningful histories are the histories of class struggle between a dominant and a labouring class. It is in relation then to this history that, for Jameson, we must read and interpret symbolic works in this second horizon. He therefore conceives this second horizon as a dialogue (borrowing from Bakhtin) between the ruling class that seeks to legitimize its position and an oppositional class that defines itself in contrast to the dominant value system set up by the former. It is necessarily an antagonistic relationship. In light of the
dialogic nature of class discourse, Jameson concludes that both parties "fight it out within the general unity of a shared code" (84). Evoking Saussure, Jameson likens the individual text to the parole in relation to the langue of a larger class discourse, one that is again dialectical but also antagonistic in nature (85). The individual texts then must be read in terms of the antagonistic dialogue of class discourse.

Yet no text can take its place in the dialogical system without the recuperation of the voices it once opposed and silenced. For example, "masterworks" that communicate the single voice of hegemonic discourse always necessarily imply and require the "artificial reconstruction" of the marginalized voice if they are to reconstruct the class dialogue to which both belong (85). Moreover, any body of texts or utterances must be read in light of a class discourse that is an "absent cause," never "wholly visible" or "fully present" in any one of its individual utterances (87). To complete Jameson's conception of the class horizon it is necessary to include the final element in Jameson's discussion, that of the "ideologemes." Class discourse is organized around "minimal 'units'" or ideologemes (87). They exist in two forms as conceptual systems manifesting as a pseudoidea (belief, opinion, or prejudice) and as narrative manifesting as a protonarrative (class fantasy or tale about opposing classes posing as characters) (87). The latter of the two possible manifestations of ideologemes—narrative—concerns us here.

The problem with Jameson's second horizon becomes immediately clear when attempting to apply it to an analysis of the three novels. It is precisely at the level of social order or class analysis that Jameson's theory proves limiting for a feminist
project of cognitive mapping. The novels *White Teeth, Dogeaters,* and *No Telephone to Heaven* are not strictly speaking class allegories, but they do highlight a shared underlying antagonism between dominant former imperial or neo-imperial “classes” and subordinate colonial “classes” under the unity of a shared ideologeme, neo-imperialism, resulting from a newly hegemonic multinational capitalism.  

However, Jameson’s second horizon does not speak to the complexities of social or political opposition evident in the novels and resulting from subject identities that are defined by their “constantly changing positionalities” (Laclau, “Ideology” 26). While the British state (imperialists turned Tory nationalists) can be said to function as the hegemonic class redefining nationality and citizenship discourse narrowly to exclude the marginalized class of former colonial subjects, such a dialogic model does not address the complexities in novels such a *Dogeaters* and *No Telephone to Heaven* where there are multiple antagonisms and no clear cut dominant and oppositional classes. In other words, Jameson’s horizon fails to account for constantly shifting identities of women that complicate his dialectical model.

While *Dogeaters* focuses on the plight of women, it presents them as a heterogeneous group positioned differently depending on their relation to other multiple and intersecting networks of identity. Hence, domination does not have the same impact on all women. This means that though foreign values like feminism

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66 Perhaps the term neo-imperialism does not precisely fit a novel such as *White Teeth* which is more accurately described as post-imperial; however, the historical situation reconstituted by the novel is a result of former British imperial policies. Rather than re-colonize foreign land, Tory nationalists re-conquer the homeland recently “swamped” by former colonial subjects in a reverse migration pattern.
embodied in imported American cultural forms such foreign films may threaten traditional kinship values, they offer some women new opportunities for self-definition, depending on their class position. Upper and middle class mestizas like Rio and Daisy are able to appropriate feminist values, yet such is not the case for women like Zenaida or Lolita who migrate to the city from rural countryside. While domestic ideoscapes may clash with foreign values embodied in (American) mediascapes, their effects on women vary. As Appadurai’s theory of global flows suggests, the relationship between flows is often disjunctive; however, a women’s project of cognitive mapping must also keep in mind the ways flows interact and position women differently depending on their subject positions. Nor are traditional models of femininity imposed by the state problematic for all women in the novel. Some are able to manipulate kinship politics and advance in society (like Imelda Marcos). As the character of Madame in the novel clearly illustrates, members of the oppressed group can be co-opted to further the agenda, the values, and the legitimization of power of the dominant ruling class. Others manipulate kinship discourse, and, like Daisy, attempt to advance a radical political agenda to overthrow the Marcos regime. In a novel like Dogeaters, there are multiple dominant groups (state, foreign interests) and multiple oppositional groups of women who are not marginalized in the same way or by the same group. Global flows, as Appadurai suggests, have the potential to help women imagine new worlds for themselves. Jameson’s model does not take into consideration women’s constantly shifting

67 While immigration polices excludes wo/men differently, it nonetheless sets up an opposition between those who belong, a dominant Anglo-Saxon class, and those who do not belong, former colonial
identities and the ways women interact differently with social and political structures or global flows.

A similar argument can be made in relation to No Telephone to Heaven. While there is a clear oppositional class in the novel, it is a collective composed of heterogeneous subjects, marginalized because of their race, class, and sexuality. Each is positioned differently in relation to the dominant class and its values so that while they collectively form a coalition, an oppositional class, it is not monolithic or univocal. Their “fight” with the dominant class is not strictly speaking dialogic since their struggles and concerns are multiple. To problematize matters further, one of their members is a fair skinned Jamaican woman who, aside from her political sympathies, shares little in common with fellow activists who, aside from a common foe, share little in common with each other. Clare is not “marginalized” or “silenced” in the same way as her fellow activists. She skews the dialectical relationship between dominant and oppositional classes since she belongs to the former, but sympathizes with the latter. Moreover, the dominant ruling class in Jamaica is also complicated by the ever shifting positionalities of its members. Foreign interests along with the middle classes together form a hegemonic class, but such a class does not necessarily always succeed in the legitimization of its own power position. Hence, under Manley’s term in office, alluded to throughout the novel, the state and its resources not only sought to implement democratic socialism, but in the process also won the subjects of both genders.
support of the middle classes (at least initially). Hence, for a time, the state itself became a tool of the opposition though it remained marginalized on the global stage.

In short, what Jameson fails to account for are the infinite ways identities and political positioning upset a dialogical relationship between opposing camps. Nor does he account for ways in which the “marginalized” exclude and “silence” each other. Subjectivity is critical to any theory of cognitive mapping. While Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping does assume a subject, given the postmodern hyperspace in which the subject exists, it is a decentred subject. Yet the breakdown of the subject need not lead to the negation or erasure of the subject altogether. Nor is the anti-humanism of Marxist theory as embodied in Althusser’s maximum that history is a process without a subject necessarily problematic for a feminist project. Althusser argues “men...are necessarily subjects...in history, because they act in history as subjects...[but] ‘men’ are not ‘the subjects’ of history” (“Remark” 94). For Althusser, subjects live in ideology where they are “formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence” (“Marxism” 235). They function as agents of the mode of production in their various pre-assigned roles, assigned by the mechanisms (the Unique and Absolute Subject) in the reproduction of the relations of production. Yet, Althusser’s argument is problematic for a feminist project insofar as it too does not account for the multiple ways women are interpellated by ideology. While it is possible “to act on ideology and transform

68 It is worth mentioning too that Manley, like Clare in the novel, was also a member of the dominant class and ruling class in Jamaica (his father was founder of the PNP and former PM Norman Manley), yet his political sympathies won him the support of the people. He too does not strictly fit into the dialogic structure between dominant and oppositional classes described by Jameson.
ideology” to affect “deliberate action on history” (“Marxism” 232), class struggle remains the “motor” that drives historical change (“Remark” 99).

A feminist project of cognitive mapping must acknowledge that while practices, discourses, and institutions shape subjects, they do not shape them in the same way. It must account for the ways global flows situate women differently, but do so depending largely on their subject positions. De Lauretis offers a workable model of feminine subjectivity that may be appropriated for a feminist theory of cognitive mapping. For De Lauretis, political practices like self-reflective practices “intervene upon...codes of perception as well as ideological codes” (Alice 178). Subjects then are not simply acted upon by mechanisms in the reproduction of the relations of production, but actively participate in their construction or interpellation as subjects and as women. They are engendered as women within their very engagement with their conditions of existence yet their identities are not marked by their gender alone, but “made up of heterogeneous and heteronomous representations of gender, race, and class, and often...across languages and cultures” (“Feminist” 9). Hence, their experience as subjects or their subject positions are multiple and often contradictory. Moreover, consciousness of self, whether class consciousness, race consciousness, or gender consciousness is “produced at the intersection of meaning with experience” (8), De Lauretis writes, but their sense of what it means to be marked as women (of a particular class, culture, or race) also changes as discursive cultural contexts change with historical conditions. Subjectivity is overdetermined by multiple representations of identity as well as by historical contexts and conditions of existence. Subjects, like
global flows, are semi-autonomous entities often made up of contradictory experiences. The category woman is a relational term or “radically context-dependent.” While women’s “positional perspective” may not alter the relationships between levels of the global totality that is multinational capitalism, it does alter the ways women map that totality.

To conclude the review of Jameson’s interpretative model and its implication for a feminist project of cognitive mapping, it is necessary to examine his third horizon of history conceived as a sequence of modes of production and social formations from the beginning to the end of human history. For Jameson, literary works in this horizon become cultural texts that convey “the dynamics of sign systems of several modes of production” and their antagonistic relations to one another (98). Jameson rejects the Marxist notion of successive modes of production partly because it results in the unproductive classificatory process where an “empirical ‘fact’” is subsumed under a “corresponding ‘abstraction’” when actually “no historical society has ever ‘embodied’ a mode of production in any pure state” (95, 94). Instead Jameson, borrowing the concept of “social formation” from Nicos Poulantzas, posits “nonsynchronous development” or the co-existence of multiple modes of production within any given society. It is precisely this dynamic that, for Jameson, leads to cultural revolution.69 The latter is the result of co-existing modes of production that are inevitably or become contradictory or antagonistic and lead to “great

69 Althusser makes a similar observation in “Contradiction and Overdetermination” arguing that it was precisely contradictions between modes of production that in part led to the Russian Revolution. For example, he cites the contradiction between capitalist methods of production and “the medieval state of the countryside” as having a hand in cultural revolution (96).
transformations” (95, 96). Jameson’s third interpretative horizon allows for a reading of society that is both synchronic and diachronic in that it conceives society as a totality consisting of various synchronic systems and as history, the history of cultural revolution, “systemic transformation” (97).

Jameson’s third horizon also has significant implications for a theory of cognitive mapping, specifically in our conceiving of globalization as a totality. His reading of society as a social formation allows for an understanding of antagonism or tension between various modes of production, the latter defined as an economic system or relationships, but also as cultural, political, anthropological relationships as well (Hardt and Weeks 11). Jameson argues that such tensions exist between various modes of production and are key in the transformation and evolution of society. Jameson’s notion of overlapping modes of production, that is, his understanding of society as a social formation—as the nonsynchronous development of social systems—is the result of what Althusser refers to as overdetermination of the entities or flows that make up any totality. As Resnick and Wolff highlight, relationships in society constituted by global flows change as flows shift, and since flows change differently, social relationships develop unevenly over time; again, the uneven development of social relationships occurs because each flow constituting a relationship changes in its own particular way and at its own particular rate (Knowledge 24). The notion of uneven or nonsynchronous development leading to the co-existence of multiple modes of production is a phenomenon that is common to all
societies whether located in the West or in the former colonial territories, as is evident in the novels.

Yet it is not simply the uneven development of social relationships constituted by global flows that leads to revolution. No structural or systematic account of revolution satisfactorily considers the role of subjects or social agents in sparking cultural revolution. Again, it is precisely the ways in which historical protagonists interact with various levels or flows of the larger global totality or any mode of production that has revolutionary implications, leading to larger systematic transformations. While co-existing modes of production might offer the fodder for change, only the heterogeneously positioned subjects and agents of any given society can realize the potential for transformation. Whether or not they are in position to take advantage of the discrepancies or gathering momentum of global flows is a significant variable in any (hi)story of revolution, as the novels illustrate.

In Smith's *White Teeth*, the female protagonists interact with the multiple modes of production, colonialism and multiculturalism (colonialism linked to a capitalist mode of production and multiculturalism tied to multinational capitalism) leading to the transformation of British society. The notion of British superiority evident in the concept of imperial citizenship continues to influence later immigration policy and to permeate the attitudes of British subjects in their interaction with former colonial subjects (women residing in Britain) even after the fall of the British Empire. It is within the realm of official state policy on immigration and citizenship that remnants of the older imperial system continue to shape notions of belonging in a new
multicultural context. Hence, even though Tory nationalists officially eliminated the policy of imperial citizenship, it retained the ethos of exclusion behind the earlier British Nationality Acts. It is within this context that the female protagonists (ethnoscapes) in *White Teeth* seek to contest official concepts of belonging as embodied in state policy and national attitudes and re-imagine the nation in their own image. Such a project is in fact part of a cultural revolution that, as Stewart Hall famously declared, heralds the “margins coming into representation.” But again, such a revolution is not simply the result of structural tension between modes of production. It is the outcome of protagonists or social agents—former colonial subjects defined in terms of their gender as well as their race—interacting with and contesting state policies (ideoscapes) that bear traces of former ideologies of state belonging to an older imperial mode of production.

The situation is even more complex in Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* where there are a number of modes of production co-existing within the nation. Kinship politics is a remnant of a pre-colonial political system where personal loyalty is reserved for one’s kinship group, family and friends. This system continued in the Philippines and was adopted by Marcos during his dictatorship. Yet kinship politics for women hold a separate set of standards that endorse beauty and religiosity. Such a view of femininity is not pre-colonial, but influenced by Spanish culture, primarily Catholicism, during the period of Spanish colonization. The traditional kinship system as delineated above is challenged by a third political system, multinational capitalism, a form of neo-colonialism many would argue, that results in the
distribution and dissemination of foreign consumer goods and values, one of which is Western feminism as embodied in American films and media. The novel registers all three diverging modes of production that co-exist in the Philippines with varying consequences for the nation’s women. While the clash of systems or flows do not lead to outright cultural revolution, it does have potentially revolutionary implications for those women who are able to manipulate the multiple discourses and imagine alternative futures for themselves. However, while elements of various modes of production co-exist, they do not spell immediate change for all women. Those who are able to take advantages of the discourse of kinship politics (ideoscapes of an older mode of production than multinational capitalism) or that of Western liberalism embodied in foreign media (mediascapes), mainly upper class mestizas, benefit from the potential for transformation opened up by the disjuncture in these two global flows.

Cliff’s *No Telephone to Heaven* is perhaps the only one of the three novels where the tension produced by co-existing modes of production leads to cultural revolution for the masses. Within the novel multinational capitalism in the form of tourists investing in the nation (ethnoscapes), foreign film production companies re-appropriating Jamaican history (mediascapes), and financial lending agencies seeking to re-structure the Jamaican economy (financescapes) all collide with a local resistance movement that embodies the ethos of Michael Manley’s program of social
democracy. The rebel group fight to regain control of Jamaican economy and defeat the imperial powers that attempt to monopolize the country’s resources and commodify its national history. Both national movements attempt to realize an independent Jamaica free from foreign domination. However, the novel also references vestiges of other modes of production, namely British colonialism and colonization of the island which instituted slavery and the corresponding anti-slavery movement and rebellion led by Nanny and her tribespeople. The memory of Nanny fighting the British parallels the tension between multinational capitalism and democratic socialism and functions as a template for revolution. Ultimately, revolution fails though day breaks again, signalling hope and possibility for transformative change in the future; however, the significance of the attack on the film crew and production is that it unites subjects positioned very differently in relation to global flows that overlap to impoverish the nation. That is, it unites the marginalized of all walks of life, but also those too who, like Clare, are not marginalized but who share a political commitment to the ideals of justice and equality for all Jamaicans. The novel makes it impossible for us to forget the multiple subject positions that constitute the movement for social democracy (of sorts) and their uneven relations to global flows even while it highlights the revolutionary potential of national unity.

Jameson’s third horizon also has formal implications for a theory of cognitive mapping. According to Jameson, the text or cultural artifact in this horizon must also

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70 The relationship between the two co-existing modes of production in No Telephone is unlike those in the preceding novels since social democracy co-exists with multinational capitalism because the former
be understood in terms of what he calls the ideology of form or “the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production” (Political 76). Aesthetic forms are signals carrying ideological messages quite separate from the apparent content of the works (99). For example, Hagedorn’s incorporation of pastiche in Dogeaters and Cliff’s appropriation of the bildungsroman form in No Telephone to Heaven are examples of sign systems that transmit ideological content of older modes of production though they have been transformed and integrated into new cultural forms. In Dogeaters, pastiche transmits ideological content from the postmodern society with which it is associated, namely the lack of personal style resulting from the fragmentation of the subject (16), yet its appropriation by Hagedorn transforms it into a form marking the overabundance of personal style and the existence of multiple possibilities for female subject development in the Philippines, resulting from the existence of multiple modes of production. In No Telephone to Heaven, the bildungsroman form, a genre that traces its origins to the German Enlightenment, continues to signal values of development, growth, and maturation yet when transformed into a Caribbean form, it signals the development and growth of a collective or a national community rather than the “coming of age” of an individual.

According to Jameson, the notion of multiple or overlapping modes of production does not, however, signal the importance or predominance of one

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71 While Smith’s novel can be read in terms of its multiple modes of production, it does not readily lend itself to a reading of what Jameson calls the ideology of form.
particular mode over another. He writes, for example, that the “priority of the economic over the sexual, or of the sexual oppression over that of social class” is a “false problem” (99). Patriarchy co-exists with other modes of production in the era of multinational capitalism as the oldest mode of production in human history rooted in the division of labour between men and women (99-100). Hence, radical feminism is “the most radical political act” consistent with Marxism since the restructuring and transformation of capitalism must be accompanied by the transformation of co-existing older modes of production (100).  

While Jameson rejects any attempt to prioritize modes of production, his notion of overlapping modes of production fails to highlight that modes of production are overdetermined, changing over time so that current forms of sexism and patriarchy do not function in the same way presently as they did historically. This is significant because as forms of patriarchy interact with other modes of production, they produce varying outcomes for women—not all bad and in need of change and not all compatible with a Marxist politics. Global flows are, as Appadurai notes, “perspectival constructs” that alter as historical conditions alter. For example, in Dogeaters the patriarchy and sexism inherent in kinship politics overlap with patriarchal ideology inherent in Spanish culture, primarily Catholicism, to limit the potential and options of many, though not necessarily all, women in the Philippines. Patriarchy is common to two distinct modes of production—tribal culture and

72 While Jameson may endorse radical feminism as “the most radical political act,” Marxism remains the “master narrative” in his work while other critical philosophies, feminism included, are “second-degree” theoretical systems (Dowling 13).
medieval, feudal one. Forms of patriarchy inherent in each system overlap; however, such is not the case, with the introduction of Western commodity culture to the Philippines as a result of globalization. Western culture brings with it its own form of patriarchy and sexism as well as capitalist commodity culture, yet its strand of feminism offers some women in the Philippines new possibilities for subject development and new opportunities for survival, largely depending on their own relative subject positions. In short, Jameson fails to account for the ways various modes of production overlap and contradict each other in an "unstable interplay" (Appadurai 41), resulting in unforeseeable and unpredictable outcomes for women that may or may not be compatible with a Marxist framework. Feminist politics or any political project must be attentive to the ways systems interact to varying degrees with both positive and negative consequences for women, but they must also be attentive to the ways interaction between modes of production or global flows both encourage alliances with other political interest groups, but also make those alliances tenuous.

While Jameson’s third horizon allows for a “multidimensional” understanding of the system of global flows across time, no discussion of the totality would be complete without a review of his writing on mediation, the relationship between levels of a total system. For Jameson, the latter Marxist concept is vital in understanding the relationship between art and social structures, but also in

73 According to Elizabeth Eviota, in pre-hispanic Philippines women experienced “relative freedom and autonomy” (57). The sexual division of labour was “not sharply drawn” and women’s pre-marital sexuality was not strictly regulated. However, it would be hasty to suggest that women experienced
understanding the relationship between other global flows that constitute the totality. I have argued that multinational capitalism is best imagined in terms of Appadurai’s model of global flows that capture the “fluid, irregular shapes” of the global landscape. Appadurai’s theory offers a framework for understanding and examining the complex, disjunctive and overlapping relationships between flows as well as the chaotic and fluid nature of multinational capitalism. Jameson, building on Althusser’s views on mediation, argues that latter’s notion of the totality “insists on the interrelatedness of all elements or flows...only it relates them by way of their structural difference and distance from one another, rather than by their ultimate identity” (41). The semi-autonomous nature of any given structure necessarily implies, Jameson insists, that difference must be read against an “initial identity” (42). However, I have suggested that Althusser’s notion of overdetermination offers an alternative to Jameson’s dialectic reading of Althusser’s model.

If the overdetermination of global flows implies that flows are necessarily both determining and determined, then a number of possible relationships exist between flows, challenging Jameson’s dialectic reading of the semi-autonomous nature of structures. Each flow is “radically heterogeneous,” constituted or determined by the multiple flows within the totality, each with different origins and conflicting qualities and influences that “push and pull” it in all directions. Since flows are “context specific,” depending on location, some flows will overlap while others will work in contradiction. Althusser’s model is further complicated by the fact that each

sexual equality with men since the sexual subjugation of women was common in certain communities and “appears to have accompanied an emergent hierarchy of economic and social power” (57).
flow contains its own contradictory elements (arising from a flow's varying origins in space or time). Hence, Althusser's theory of the totality is pluralistic rather than dualistic. Such a model is in fact quite compatible with a feminist politics that eschews binary oppositions and dichotomous hierarchy in favour of multiplicity. The "ceaseless play of change" (Resnick & Wolff, "Althusser’s Liberation" 63) ensures, at least in theory, that the economic base (financescapes) and superstructure (roughly the remaining scapes) are mutually conditioning and actively constituting each other. Neither can be said to have a determining role. It is possible then to envision the system of global flows as "space[s]of contestation" as well as "negotiation" where subjects are social agents that interact with the system to varying degrees and with varying outcomes. Flows allow for new possibilities as much as they limit women's potential.

The novels make evident the variety of ways in which women, depending on their subject positions, interact with global flows. Global flows both offer new possibilities for women and hinder their progress depending on women's locations. In White Teeth, national ideoscapes collide with ethnoscapes in the form of former colonial subjects, resulting in a broadening of the notion of British identity. National ideoscapes in the form of immigration policy positions subjects differently, however, according to their gender and race. Immigration policy sought to keep out all former New Commonwealth subjects from entering Britain (though not necessarily European or Old Commonwealth subjects), but it excluded men and women differently. The novel maps the ways women in particular respond to this exclusion even once they
find themselves residing within Britain’s borders. It is also necessary to stress, however, that the novel registers and engages with ideoscapes that belong properly to another mode of production, as already mentioned in this chapter. Hence, flows not only determine one another, but are determined by internal inconsistencies and difference.74

*Dogeaters* offers another partial map of the global totality, but again it shifts the focus away from the West to the Philippines. Ideoscapes similarly play a larger role in shaping women’s lives, primarily in their function of endorsing kinship politics through official and unofficial state policies. However, ideoscapes in the Philippines are similarly invested with a political system that belongs to another mode of production and that clashes with government policies that court foreign capital (financescapes) and media (mediascapes). Hence, ideoscapes in the Philippines are similarly split and “pushed and pulled” in various directions. It is precisely foreign media that offers some women in the novel opportunity to challenge traditional models of femininity embodied in kinship politics and in state supported televising (domestic mediascapes), leading to unofficial counter-ideologies and the rise of women’s movements and other resistance movements (yet another contradiction in domestic ideoscapes). However, again, women’s ability to manipulate either the discourse of foreign Western values embodied in media or the notions of femininity

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74 While there is clearly a consistency or overlap between imperial definition of citizenship and later notions of belonging as constituted by immigration policy between the years 1948 to 1981, state policies on citizenship and nationality were not the same. At least on the surface, the former sought to create a united imperial subjecthood despite the implicit belief of the inherit superiority of the Anglo-Saxons while later immigration policy explicitly excluded colonial subjects.
embodied in traditional kinship politics depends on their own location within society, primarily on their class status.

Although still focusing on the developing world, Cliff's *No Telephone* offers yet another partial map of the totality. The novel exposes the workings of a global system whose flows seem to conspire against the nation and its people. It captures the ways in which foreign financescapes, mediascapes, and ethnoscapes all seek to exploit the nation and stifle its most vulnerable. Foreign financescapes in the form of lending agencies and nations attempt to restructure the Jamaican economy and usher it into a global economic system that will continue to exploit the nation for its resources. Mediascapes also attempt a restructuring of sorts, but in this instance a film production company seeks to rewrite and commodify the nation’s history for global consumption. Ethnoscapes too, in the form of tourists, come to the island seeking a cheap vacation destination. In short, global flows overlap to exploit the nation. Yet in *No Telephone*, unlike in the previous novels, government policies (ideoscapes) in the form of Manley's social democratic program inspire the masses to unite and rise up against foreign domination (neo-colonialism though more properly termed multinational capitalism). Ideoscapes too in this novel are split by internal contradictions so that while one government’s policies inspire revolution, the other’s hinder the people’s plight. Hence, ideoscapes are shaped by internal tensions that have varying affects on the population. The “people” or masses of Jamaica are no less

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75 There are as well foreign organizations such as the ANC that also offer the Jamaican people support in their rise against oppression. The latter is an example of a foreign ideoscapes (counter-ideological movement in its nation of origin) that overlaps with Jamaican people's movement in the novel.
divided by their location in Jamaican society as are the subjects of the previous two novels; however, for a time many are able to unite for a common political goal: to fight for and to improve Jamaica’s standing in the world economy as well as the living standards of its people. It is the only novel where the nation joins together for a common cause in the spirit of democracy.

In conclusion, I have sought to contribute to a theory of cognitive mapping by expanding the parameters of Jameson’s theory to consider the ways multiple subjects alter the cognitive maps of multinational capitalism. Jameson’s theory of the cognitive function of art highlights how symbolic acts such as literary work are political and ideological. In their aesthetic function they not only capture a piece of the real, but they rework our reality and offer solutions to the contradictions that abound in all social formations. Jameson’s theory of class conflict, however, like his theorizing of the subject is problematic because it fails to acknowledge the multiplicity of subject positions that define wo/men. I have tried to illustrate that any feminist project of cognitive mapping must account for the ways heterogeneous subjects interact with a chaotic and indeterminate system of flows. Such a system is overlaid by multiple modes of production resulting in a totality that is multidimensional as well as overdetermined by its multiple levels that are also overdetermined by each other. It is in relation to such a system that women must cognitively map their reality. Literary works help us with such a project. Even while only a partial map of the totality may be possible at one time, it is vital for women to
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