Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization

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CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN AN ETHNICALLY HOMOGENEOUS STATE:
THE CASE OF ARMENIAN DEMOCRATIZATION

by

Arus Harutyunyan

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Setting the Stage: What, Why, How?

This study of recent Armenian identity politics raises two intertwined theoretical questions. First, it asks whether there can be contesting national identities in an ethnically homogeneous state. Second, it explores whether identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state affects political trust, perceptions of basic fairness and social justice, and democratic attitudes.

Since this study concerns national identity at the most fundamental level, it builds on the literature of nationalism and identity by analyzing national identity in the ethnically homogeneous state of Armenia. Precisely because of its ethnic homogeneity, the Armenian case allows a direct identity analysis of one ethnic group without isolating a number of confounding variables, a problem analysts of ethnically heterogeneous states must confront. Thus, the Armenian state is an ideal case for empirically testing theoretical expectations pertaining to national identity.

I follow the liberal nationalist literature in emphasizing the political and constructed versus ethno-religious and primordial aspects of national identity. Rather than examining all possible manifestations of national identity, I concentrate on a subset of its politically relevant components: memory, territory, and belonging. The wide scope of these identity categories, however, requires further conceptual refining. First, at the theoretical level, I looked for acceptable cases of national identity with manifest political significance equivalent to memory, territory, and belongingness. Second, at the empirical level, the sub-categories I chose had to be both manifest and acceptable cases of narratives constitutive of an Armenian national self-image. I selected
genocide, war in Mountainous Karabagh, and dual citizenship for members of the diaspora as corresponding sub-categories satisfying both theoretical and empirical qualifiers.

Although the genocide, war, and diaspora citizenship rights satisfied theoretical and empirical requirements of this study, and although these were historically available cases, their analysis would be an endless intellectual enterprise without establishing clear-cut spatial-temporal boundaries. Thus, instead of analyzing national identity sub-categories as perceived by Armenians around the world, the spatial scope of the research was delimited to Armenians residing within the Armenian Republic. This spatial delimitation suggested temporal boundaries as well, since the independence of the second Armenian Republic was declared in 1991. Thus, my research focused on the analysis of national identity sub-categories as perceived by both the Armenian public and political elites residing within Armenia’s political boundaries from independence through 2006. But given that tragic memory, war, and the diaspora’s citizenship rights are historically evolved categories, delimiting research might obscure their historical significance. To compensate for this shortcoming, several sections in Chapters Two through Four have been devoted to an extensive historical analysis of these national identity sub-categories since the late nineteenth century.

This historical analysis not only highlighted the significance of these sub-categories for Armenian identity; it also revealed anomalies in the development of ethno-political thought. Particularly since 1988, a new liberal-nationalist type of Armenian identity emerged as an antithesis to the dominant ethno-nationalist type. These anomalies have remained largely undetected both in the extensive literature on nationalism and in the post-Soviet literature. In the former case, the dominant assumption was that the shared ethno-religious, linguistic, and cultural attributes of a homogeneous community so powerfully shaped its collective identity that no politically significant internal disagreements could arise. In the latter case, derived from the Soviet legacy
hypothesis, Armenia was classified as having a single and institutionalized ethnic type of identity inherited from its Soviet past.

Identity clashes between political elites endorsing contesting liberal-nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of identity intensified following independence and were particularly reflected in fundamental disagreements regarding the genocide, the war in Mountainous Karabagh, and whether members of the diaspora should have full citizenship rights. Disagreements were not about the factuality of these historical events, but rather about contrasting ways of assessing them and adopting state policies on these key identity issues.

Thus, in the case of genocide, disagreements focused on how to remember this national tragedy and, as a consequence, how to structure relations with Turkey. In the case of the war, the disagreements revealed sharply diverging ways of imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state, therefore revealing the extent to which territorial politics nourished the needs of Armenian identity as imagined by liberal and ethno-nationalists. Finally, contesting discourses and actual policies on dual citizenship in Armenia explicitly illustrated problematic relations between belonging to a political community on the one hand and belonging to an ethno-cultural community on the other. In short, historical analysis led to further conceptual delimitation of identity and its categorization into relevant analytical units: liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist identity types.

These analytical units were also informed by quantifiable data, enhancing the exchange between ideas and empirics throughout my research. Employing conventional sociological tools, such as quantitative content analysis of elected party and presidential platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers, extensive qualitative textual analysis of legislative and constitutional provisions and amendments pertaining to the three identity issues, and an original public opinion survey conducted in 2006, I analyzed the public’s and political elites’ perceptions of key issues central to Armenian national identity (i.e., Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in
Mountainous Karabagh, and Possible Solutions and Dual Citizenship for Diaspora). My quantitative analysis confirmed that the identity anomalies I detected in my historical analysis were not a historical accident but were pervasive features encompassing both the public’s and political elites’ identity perceptions throughout the research period.

Finally, I explored whether identity contestation is problematic even in an ethnically homogeneous state. Specifically, I explored whether the absence of a shared national identity could damage political trust, perceptions of basic fairness and social justice, democratic values, and democratic evaluation. My results indicate that the absence of a shared national identity in an ethnically homogeneous state is problematic and that some shared identity types harm rather than advance democracy.

1.2 Why Study National Identity in an Ethnically Homogeneous State?

In this section, I proceed with the defense of my case study. To convey the significance of the Armenian case for the studies of national identity, I provide a brief survey of mainstream theoretical approaches to the concept of nation. This is followed by my working definitions of nation and nationalism. Afterwards, I develop my argument regarding the importance of disentangling and discriminating between the ethno-cultural and political aspects of national identity, particularly in ethnically homogeneous states.

Perhaps one of the most challenging tasks that scholars of nationalism confront is the conceptualization of the nation. The abundance of competing and often overlapping conceptualizations of the nation, as reflected in competing theoretical frameworks of primordialism, perennialism, ethno-symbolism, modernism, constructivism, instrumentalism and neo-statism, makes it impossible to define it in a way that would satisfy all approaches and schools (Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Smith 1998).
In his analysis of various approaches and definitions of the concept of nation, Barrington properly notes that the mainstream nationalism literature has largely failed to distinguish clearly between the analytically different concepts of ethnic group, nation, and the state. Thus, he notes that working definitions for a nation must reflect the following important consideration: "There are two particular things that nations are not . . . states and ethnic groups" (Barrington 2006b, 4). Sharing this point of view, I adhere to David Miller’s definition of the nation, as a politically self-determining community of people in a sovereign land, sharing a range of objective and subjective characteristics (Miller, 1995). Below, I proceed with an explanation of the ways in which this definition demarcates analytical boundaries between the nation, an ethnic group, and the state.

Ethnic groups and nations are different in two respects. But to make this claim more convincing I will highlight a number of similarities shared by ethnic groups and nations, which encompass a host of subjective and objective characteristics.

Scholars from all schools of nationalism have pointed out that nations stand out by virtue of a set of subjective characteristics. Subjective characteristics include but are not limited to a collective memory, common will, and solidarity (Anderson 1991; Renan 1994). Stalin’s definition, which most often has been cited as a classical example of an objective definition of a nation, nevertheless also emphasizes the centrality of subjective elements such as shared psychological make-up (Stalin 1946; Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Others have argued that nations are built around the idea, self-perception and self-definition, feeling and thinking of being unique and belonging to a nation (Kohn 1945; Seton-Watson 1977; Connor 1978; Hobsbawm 1990).

Obviously, scholars disagree on whether these subjective characteristics predate modernity or are modern inventions serving various social, political, economic, and security purposes.

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1 Barrington provides a similar definition of a nation noting that "the belief in territorial self-determination is the key to understanding the difference between nations and other social collectivities." See Lowell W. Barrington, "Nationalism and Independence," in After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Post-Colonial and Post-Communist States, ed. Lowell W. Barrington (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 7.
Scholars also diverge as to whether these are products of elite manipulation, a genuinely mass phenomenon, or a combination of both.

Nevertheless, these cognitive, affective, and psychological characteristics can be found both in ethnic groups and nations. Just like nations, members of ethnic groups share a sense of belongingness. Both groups choose to believe that belonging to a particular group makes them unique and distinct from neighboring groups. Both groups also believe that these subjective lines must be maintained for fulfilling various security concerns. Moreover, subjective characteristics manifest themselves similarly among members of nations and ethnic groups; that is, they get activated under conditions of an imminent threat generating a powerful mobilizing force for defending their own ways of life.

Scholars from all schools of nationalism also agree that in addition to subjective elements, members of a nation must share a number of observable objective characteristics such as language, history, culture, customs or religion, conglomeration of constitutive myths, and central values (Smith 1986). Again, scholarly perspectives of these objective characteristics diverge widely and one can find various weights attributed to each of these characteristics. But the important point I want to make is that these characteristics do not make nations any different from ethnic groups, since both are understood in terms of such objective markers.

One of the objective features that has received a wide acknowledgement among scholars of nationalism is the homeland. Homeland requires a special consideration since this is the first feature that makes nations and ethnic groups different. Ethnic groups may have sacred sites, places of origin, lost historical homelands, or even multiple homelands, as the experiences of diasporas suggest. States with high percent of ethnic homogeneity, such as Japan (98.5%), Bangladesh (98%), Armenia (97.9%), Poland (96.7%), Albania (95%), Greece (93%), and Germany (91.5%), also suggest that ethnic groups may have states of their own.
In fact, historical accidents might result in two separate states being inhabited by the members of the same ethnic group, as was the case in East and West Germanies or in North and South Koreas currently. Yet not all ethnic groups have states of their own. Consider Kurds or Romas, for instance, or thousands of other ethnic groups for that matter, who do not have a state of their own, although some of them might have had a historical homeland in a distant past. Thus, while ethnic groups do not have to control their own land, nations do.

Unlike ethnic groups, nations exercise self-determination in a sovereign piece of land. As reflected in Anderson's famous definition, nations are not only imagined communities, they are also imagined as limited and sovereign communities (Anderson 1991, 7). Therefore, the first difference between ethnic groups and nations is that only nations are self-determining communities in a sovereign territory.

Hence, Miller notes: "We have seen already that nations are groups that act [Nations are communities that do things together, take decision, achieve results]; we see now that the actions they aspire to perform must include that of controlling a chunk of the earth's surface. It is this territorial element that has forged the connection between nations and states" (Miller 1995, 24-25). However, Miller also notes that the state and nation must not be conflated: "Nation must refer to a community of people with an aspiration and present day will to be politically self-determining, and 'state' must refer to a set of political institutions that they aspire to possess for themselves... Let us say, following Weber, that a state is a body that successfully claims a monopoly of legitimate force in a particular territory" (ibid., 19). Here lies the heart of the difference between the nation and the state. In other words, nations and states are different since a nation is a community of politically self-determining people and state is a set of political institutions through which a nation exercises its self-determination.

Note that in his definition of nation, Miller emphasizes that a nation is a community of people. This careful wording requires a special consideration, since therein lies the second differ-
ence between nations and ethnic groups. Most fundamentally, nations are not necessarily eth-
ically homogeneous units. Miller properly notes that overlooking this distinction has been one of
the biggest failures of nationalism studies. For instance, a clearly articulated vision of a nation as
an ethnically homogeneous community has been presented by Gellner, who defined nationalism as:

A theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not
cut across political ones . . . there is a very large number of potential nations on
earth. Our planet also contains room for a certain number of independent and
autonomous political units. . . . If this argument or calculation is correct, not all
nationalisms can be satisfied, at any rate at the same time (Gellner 1983, 1–2).

The confusing premise here, according to Miller, is the assumption that a nation must be
understood as an ethnically homogeneous community (Miller 1995). There are, of course, a
number of cases where an ethnic group may constitute a nation. For instance, Armenia, Japan,
Albania, Poland, or Germany are rare instances of ethnically homogeneous nation-states. This is
because their members share ethno-cultural markers, are politically self-determining in a sover-
eign territory, and have their own state—that is, a set of political institutions through which they
exercise their self-determination. Nevertheless, a brief survey of nations' ethnic compositions
demonstrates that most of the time nations are ethnically heterogeneous units.²

Thus, ethnic groups and nations are different in two respects. First, unlike ethnic groups,
nations are communities of people which exercise self-determination in a sovereign territory.
Second, unlike ethnic groups, nations are not necessarily ethnically homogeneous communities.
In addition, nations and states are different since the state is a set of political institutions through
which a nation exercises its self-determination, and which also claims a monopoly of legitimate
force in a particular territory.

² For an ethnic breakdown of sovereign nations see CIA World Factbook at https://www.cia.gov/library/
Put this way, it becomes clear why national identity is not merely an ethno-cultural phenomenon but primarily a political one. As Barrington notes: “ethnicity does not necessarily determine national identity” (Barrington 2006, 7). Indeed, many scholars note that national identity is not a mere function of pre-existing ethno-cultural attributes (Kymlicka 2002; Beiner 2003; Miller 1995; Mill 1991 [1861]). For instance, reflecting on the foundational characteristics of the ‘sentiment of nationality’ Mill wrote: “But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents: the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past” (Mill 1991 [1861], 308).

Beiner notes that: “implicitly Mill suggests that nationality or national identity is not just a function of pre-existing ethnicity or culture, but is shaped by a history of shared political experiences” (Beiner 2003, 209). Hence, Beiner continues, in a community deeply divided along political concerns, worldviews, and a sense of belonging, democratic citizenship cannot be realized. When this is the case, “it will be hard for them [citizens] to experience their relationships as a community of shared citizenship, and civic agency (the pursuit of shared purposes) will be impaired” (ibid.).

Arguing in the same vein, Kymlicka notes that: “citizens can share a sense of belonging to a particular historical society because they participate in common social and political institutions . . . which operate in this shared language and history; and they see their life choices as bound up with the survival of this society and its institutions into the indefinite future” (Kymlicka 2002, 265). Thus citizens can share national identity, engrained in the state’s ‘basic structure,’ public culture and norms of behavior, the symbolic sphere, national heroes and common histories, without sharing ethno-cultural or religious attributes.³

³ For a detailed account of the ‘basic structure’ famously coined by Rawls as a set of socio-economic and political institutions and the ways these are interrelated with the social cooperation, see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Building on this recent scholarly perspective, my study focuses on the political aspect of national identity in the ethnically homogeneous state of Armenia. I concentrate on a subset of widely accepted classical components of national identity: collective memory, territory, and belongingness. In addition to encompassing both subjective and objective features, these three classical components of national identity also bear a clear political significance for a nation. One of my central contentions is that since national identity is primarily a political phenomenon, ethno-cultural homogeneity alone cannot guarantee a harmonious flow of visions and worldviews in a bounded political community. Undoubtedly, identity contestation is particularly manifest in multiethnic states, where political rivalry capitalizes on the politics of difference along ethnocultural, racial, or religious lines. Nevertheless, precisely because identity is a political phenomenon, political rivalry among co-ethnics over constitutive elements of national identity, such as territory, collective memory, and belongingness, may be manifested as acutely as among rival ethnic groups. Moreover, identity contestation among co-ethnics may take as chronic a form as among diverse ethnic groups, and may be as consequential for developmental and liberal democratic projects in ethnically homogeneous states as it may be in ethnically heterogeneous ones.

Particularly at critical historical junctures, co-ethnics using dominant ethno-cultural identity frames engage in a contestation over the meaning of these constitutive elements. Based on rival visions, worldviews, and agendas for the nation’s future, co-ethnics prescribe contesting approaches and the roles these elements should play in the politics of the state. In this process of identity contestation, political actors, to borrow from Cruz, “engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities” and offer “plausible scenarios of how the world can or cannot be changed and how the future ought to look” (Cruz 2000, 277).

Nations, irrespective of their ethnic composition, engage in a common deliberation on political characteristics of the bounded political community. This collective deliberation, in my strong conviction, also constitutes the core of nationalism. This proposition is consistent with
Barrington's view of nationalism as "the pursuit—through argument or other activity—of a set of rights and privileges for the self-defined members of the nation, including at minimum, territorial autonomy or independence" (Barrington 2006b, 10). Nationalism is a political expression of the nation's aspirations. Nationalism involves a collective deliberation of issues of concern, where all members of a political community are potential contributors. This proposition is also consistent with the view that members of the nation are active agents as citizens of a political community and as bearers of a sovereign power and will (Miller 1995). In this process both the public and elites are important agents in constructing narratives pertaining to national identity issues.

The extent of collective deliberation, nevertheless, will vary widely depending on whether a nation perceives of itself along illiberal or liberal lines. This statement holds true for both ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous states. Unlike in ethnically homogeneous states, in ethnically heterogeneous ones an illiberal form of national self-perception will take a particularly heavy toll on minorities. Nevertheless, ethnically homogeneous states that are exclusively built around ethno-religious properties will also endorse a form of national identity, which is illiberal and exclusionary in content. The extent of collective deliberation will also vary widely depending on regime type. For instance, unlike in consolidated democracies, the content of national identity will be imposed from above in authoritarian regimes. Thus, while the substance of national identity in democracies will be an outcome of a more or less dynamic dialogue, authoritatively imposed national identities to a large extent will be unreflective of genuine popular wishes.

It follows, therefore, that the substance of nationalism, as an expression of the nation's political aspirations, will greatly depend on the nation's self-perception as well as on political conditions under which these national aspirations have been articulated. Consequently, both the content of emerging national narratives and the political regime are important indicators for

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4 Barrington also notes that the concept of nationalism is analytically distinct from patriotism, ethnic politics, and ethnic conflict. See Barrington, “Nationalism and Independence,” 8.
predicting whether nationalism will be manifested in liberal and democratic or xenophobic and expansionist forms.

Finally, the range of collective deliberations will also vary from case to case, largely depending on the salient needs of the nation. However, in addition to objective and subjective characteristics, it will, as Barrington notes, invariably include two basic questions: what is the territory where the sovereign nation exercises its right of self-determination (i.e., the question of political borders) and who are the members of the nation (i.e., the question of citizenship) (Barrington 2006, 11).

Both of these basic questions have been at the heart of Armenian identity politics since independence and were reflected in contesting approaches to war in Karabagh and possible solutions and full citizenship rights for the Armenian diaspora. The third field of rivalry was over collective memory and was reflected in contesting models for remembering the tragic event of Genocide. As I indicated previously, collective memories do not distinguish ethnic groups from nations, since both possess constitutive myths and narratives furnishing their collective memory. Even then, however, we should not assume that the collective remembrance of certain historical events and their interpretation for defining the collectivity’s present and future are unanimously agreed upon. In fact, collective memory can be as much uniting as it is divisive. Much depends upon, as Weiner notes, “who is doing the remembering, what is being remembered, in which context and against what forces” (Weiner 2005, 86–87).

The Armenian case demonstrates that the meaning and content of constitutive narratives are not fixed. Many scholars have pointed out that a substantive reinterpretation of constitutive narratives is a continuous process to accommodate urgent needs of the present (Barth 1969; Nagel 1994; Bhabha 1994; Duara 1996, Cruz 2000). The important point is that the model of remembering that becomes the dominant one is of critical importance, since, as Cruz notes, “how we remember shapes what we can imagine as possible” (Cruz 2000, 311).
To conclude, my analysis of the Armenian politics of identity reveals that contrasting ways of remembering, imagining political boundaries, and defining belongingness to a political community are not the province of ethnically heterogeneous states alone. I illustrate that in contrast to a conventional assumption prevalent in most of the nationalism literature, ethno-cultural homogeneity is not sufficient to engender a conflict-free "deep horizontal comradeship" among members of a political community (Anderson 1991, 7). Precisely because of the Armenian state’s ethnic homogeneity, the Armenian case allows a direct analysis of the national identity politics of one ethnic group, without isolating a number of confounding variables. A case study of the Armenian national identity demonstrates that assuming unproblematic relationships between ethnic homogeneity and national identity obscures the political aspect of national identity as a pervasive feature inherent in all states, irrespective of their ethnic composition.

1.3 Conceptual Framework

This study aligns with the school of liberal nationalism. Since liberal nationalism arose as a response to opposing contentions about identity and choice by liberalism and communitarianism, a brief summary of these schools of thought would be appropriate.

In his seminal essay, Berlin (1969) contends that confinement of an individual’s actions by others is an instance of coercion of individual freedom. "Negative freedom," in this sense, implies non-interference where both other persons and the state do not confine an individual’s actions, "do not block before him every door but one, no matter how noble the prospect upon which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of those who arrange this" (Berlin 1969, 127).

Berlin’s notion of the negative liberty is at the heart of the liberal philosophy. Central to liberal philosophy is the notion of an individual’s self-determination, which implies that a person has to lead a life from inside based on personal values, as opposed to values imposed by a society or a "paternalist" or "perfectionist" state (Dworkin 1989). This in turn implies the notion of state
neutrality, as an indispensable position for enabling people's self-determination in leading their lives from inside in accordance with their values. Dworkin notes that it is conceivable that the non-neutral state could be successful in imposing common activities, which are valuable by themselves. Yet, he also notes that: “There must be some constraints on endorsement; otherwise critical paternalism could always justify itself by adding chemical or electrical brainwashing to its regime” (Dworkin 1989, 486). In addition, the value of those activities will decrease for individuals as a result of conditions under which they have been promoted.

Therefore, an intrinsic value of self-determination is that it implies that men are free agents capable of pursuing a plurality of valuable and very often incommensurable goals, without being “deprived in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal” (Berlin 1969, 171). From this perspective, as Berlin notes, the notion of negative liberty implies an ultimate value for humanity, since instead of assuming that “all values can be graded on one scale” it recognizes that there is a plurality of valuable goals, which are “in perpetual rivalry with one another” (ibid.).

Individuals not only have to be free in leading their lives based on their values, but they also have to be free to question these values through rational deliberation (Dworkin 1983). Similarly, Rawls contends that freedom of choice is critical because it enables an individual to revise and question her beliefs about values through critical reflection (Rawls 1980). An individual, in other words, should be free to choose among goods and judge the value of those goods without an external interference. Hence, Kymlicka notes that there are two preconditions for leading a good life in accordance with our essential interests: “One is that we lead life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life; the other is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information, examples, and arguments our culture can provide” (Kymlicka 2002, 216; 1989, 13).

Freedom of choice does not imply that its central value is the number of choices we can exercise. Also, it does not imply a freedom of activity without a consideration of the value internal to the activity as well as without considering responsibilities for ends of that activity. See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political
By contrast, the concept of "positive liberty" implies self-mastery and drive for perfection. According to Berlin, notions of self-mastery and perfection cannot be condemned as worthless goals. However, what makes them unacceptable is their underlying assumption of the ability to eliminate conflicts and diversity by establishing one common good.

From this perspective, a pursuit of self-mastery and perfection by a larger entity, such as a church, state, or nation implies a subordination of individual preferences to a common good specified by a larger social entity. The notion of positive liberty justifies coercion of "ignorant and corrupt" individuals in the name of a higher common good. According to Berlin, the notion of "positive liberty" is a fundamental aspect of nationalism, which is an "ideologically important and dangerous" primordial force and entails the ideology of "organicism and loyalty to the Volk as the true carrier of the national values, historic roots, and the national will" (Berlin 1980, 341–44).

Much of liberal philosophy in the twentieth century interprets nationalism as a "disease," a "primitive tribal instinct," and as incompatible with liberal values of freedom of choice, self-determination, and rational deliberation. According to this view, if not tamed, there is no force above nationalism that could limit its claims on a society. Under the guise of nationalism, national identity trumps any other identities that a person might have (e.g., gender, class, occupational, regional, religious, etc.).

What is more, according to a conventional interpretation the rise of fascism was the logical extension of nationalism and "nationalism was the logical outcome of identity politics" (Schopflin 2000, 1). Consequently, as Kymlicka notes, "liberal visions of politics do not include any independent principle of community, such as shared nationality, language, identity, culture, 

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religion, history, or way of life” because “recent history had revealed that the ideal of community was too liable to manipulations by fascist, racist, or totalitarian regimes” (Kymlicka 2002, 208).

In response to this neglect of community by liberal thinkers, the school of communitarian thought has emerged since the early 1970s. Positive liberty has an important place in the communitarian thought. Besides, communitarian and nationalist discourses are similar primarily because both see social roles and affiliations as a matter of fate rather than choice (Tamir 1993). Defenders of the communitarian approach criticize liberal theory not because of its egalitarian content but because of its “attempt to derive egalitarian principles through universalism, that is, through reasoning about what is true or right in all times and places” (Friedman 1996, 161). The central claim of the communitarian theory is that self is embedded in existing social practices and individuals’ actions cannot easily be detached from a community to which they belong.

For instance, Sandel criticizes the liberal view of self as being prior to its ends, and argues that rather than choosing their ends individuals learn about them as a result of being embedded in a particular social context (Sandel 1982). Similarly, MacIntyre contends that self-determination is exercised within the limits set by a social background and that rejecting one’s social background implies self-rejection (MacIntyre 1981).

Taylor criticizes the liberal claim that autonomous and rational agents are free in determining their ends without consideration of all the given limits of their social situations and roles. Taylor contends that “complete freedom would be a void in which nothing would be worth doing” (Taylor 1979, 157). Instead, communal values as “authoritative horizons” set worthy projects to be pursued by individuals (ibid.). Moreover, when individuals reject their communal values as “authoritative horizons” and engage in a drive for self-determination then Nietzschean nihilism is inescapable: “One after the other, the authoritative horizons of life, Christian and humanist, are cast off as shackles on the will. Only the will to power remains” (Taylor 1979, 159).
Since the early 1990s, however, liberal nationalism emerged in response to these clashing views of identity, choice, and embeddedness as envisioned by liberal and communitarian schools of thought. At its core, proponents of liberal nationalism argue that personal autonomy and communal belonging are complementary rather than antithetical, suggesting that, as Tamir succinctly puts it, "no individual can be context-free, but that all can be free within a context" (Tamir 1993, 14).

Building on central propositions developed by such classical liberals as J. S. Mill, Green, Hobhouse, and Dewey, liberal nationalism acknowledges the importance of communal ties and cultural membership for individual autonomy and self-determination. For instance, in his classical work on Considerations on Representative Government, J. S. Mill notes that: "Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed" (Mill 1991, [1861], 310). Reflecting on works by classical liberals, Kymlicka notes that "for these liberals, human freedom was tied to the existence and consciousness of a common cultural membership ... membership in a cultural structure enables individual freedom, and enables meaningful choices about how to lead one's life. For Mill as for others, commonality of cultural membership was not in conflict with individual freedom, but rather was its precondition" (Kymlicka 1989, 207–09).

Importantly, liberal nationalists argue that ethnic and national identities can co-exist. For instance, Mill wrote on the importance of free institutions, which are "impossible in a country made up of different nationalities" (Mill 1991, [1861], 310). David Miller (1995) notes that Mill did not mean that free and democratic institutions could flourish only in ethnically homogeneous societies. Rather, Mill thought that "a common sentiment of nationality could co-exist with linguistic and other cultural differences, and indeed used the Swiss and the Belgians as examples to make the point" (Miller 1995, 98).
While acknowledging the centrality of communal membership, liberal nationalism nevertheless rejects the communitarian assumption of "situated identity." According to liberal nationalists, communitarianism's central propositions altogether deny choice to individuals, and therefore set us on a "slippery slope leading to social and cultural determinism" (Tamir 1993, 25). Similarly, they reject modern liberalism's view of national identity as a primordial and uncontrollable force, which cannot be subjected to a critical reflection. Very importantly, liberal nationalism denounces liberalism's contention that national identity overrides many other identities that a person might have. Instead, liberal nationalism contends that national identity co-exists with other identities and, at the same time, it is no less important than other identities.

Liberal nationalism also emphasizes the constructed nature of identity and argues that even the constitutive elements of identity can be subjected to choice and critical reflection by rational agents. At the same time, however, liberal nationalism cautions that rational agents have limits and rejects the instrumentalist assumption that national identities can be chosen freely by rational agents without reference to their social background. Rather than being invented from scratch, national identity involves a considerable amount of continuity and path dependency. Operating within limits set by the social background, rational agents can question even the most constitutive elements and core beliefs of their national identity and reflect on them critically. Thus, national identity can be adapted to current salient problems, changing social realities, and new opportunities; in these ways, national identity is fluid and provisional.

Liberal nationalists also acknowledge that even foundational narratives furnishing national identities are very often artificial inventions serving various political purposes. National histories contain a significant element of myth, where authentic historical events very often have been conveniently lost in the mist of untraceable history. This is not to say that all national histories are falsifications of true historical events. Rather, as Miller notes: "National histories contain elements
of myth in so far as they interpret events in a particular way, and also in so far as they amplify the significance of some events and diminish the significance of others” (Miller 1995, 38).

But as Miller notes, these engineered myths pose the following dilemma: “It appears, therefore, that national identities cannot survive critical reflection. If one applies to them normal canons of rationality, they are revealed to be false. It seems to follow that there can be no justification for giving national loyalties any role in our ethical and political thinking” (Miller 1995, 35). While emphasizing the constructed, provisional, and myth-bound aspects of national identity, liberal nationalists argue that national identity is far from being trivial. Even though national identity is only one source of personal identity, citizens strongly feel the obligations stemming from their national identity and are ready to make sacrifices for their co-citizens and country in a way that they would not for other groups and institutions. Sacrifices should not be understood only in terms of dying defending one’s own country. They also include the agreement to maintain basic principles of social justice.

To grasp the significance of national identity, Miller discusses an abstract state where rights and obligations of citizenship were tied to one another by nothing beyond the practice of citizenship. Here, citizens will still enjoy some package of rights provided by the state and in return they will have an obligation “to uphold the co-operative scheme” (e.g., paying taxes, obeying the law, etc.). However, Miller notes that in this abstract state citizens will pay only for those services from which they stand to benefit. Therefore, political co-operation will be based on the “logic of strict reciprocity,” where each will contribute in proportion to an expected benefit (Miller 1995, 72).

Once “the logic of strict reciprocity” is fused into the scheme of political cooperation, it becomes difficult to justify and explain several aspects of modern democratic politics. The range of difficulties includes (but is not limited to) a provision of opportunities to people with permanent disabilities, contributions for common public goods (where the costs carried by an individual
are higher than returns), voting in state-wide elections (where an individual voter has almost no chance of affecting the final outcome), or complying to military obligations (where benefits of war could not possibly exceed the cost of dying). In other words, in an abstract state with "the logic of strict reciprocity," in general, no one can reasonably complain about the failure of social justice and fairness.

But when the bonds of national identity enter into the scheme of citizenship rights and obligations, political co-operation based on the logic of "strict reciprocity" transforms into one based on the logic of "loose reciprocity." Note that the logic of "loose reciprocity" implies trust rather than calculated immediate exchange. In "ethical communities" an individual or a group can support others' just demand at one point of time, with an expectation of reciprocity at some future moment. Indeed, it is due to prior obligations of national identity that both modern states and citizens agree to redistributive practices and, in general, are capable of solving several collective action problems.

United by their common national identity, citizens of an "ethical community" have a moral foundation for claiming obligations to sacrifices made in the past by one section of community on behalf of the other. Therefore, Miller concludes, there are strong ethical reasons for establishing a common national identity that applies to all the citizens of the bounded political community. This is because "the scheme of co-operation can be based on loose rather than strict reciprocity, meaning that redistributive elements can be built in which go beyond what the rational self-interest of each participant would dictate" (ibid., 73).

Thus, according to liberal nationalist view, nations are "ethical communities"—that is, communities whose citizens have special moral obligations to each other not owed to outsiders. Social justice and democratic citizenship require a bounded political community, whose citizens united by common national identity collectively engage in self-government. National identity is crucial for enhancing the liberal democratic values of active and trustful citizenship. Democracy
is not just a formula for aggregating votes. Besides an actual moment of voting, the process of democratic self-government also involves public deliberation about issues of concern and possible solutions. And for active deliberation, citizens have to trust each other.

Trust enhances the acceptance of the "democratic bargain"—that is, the acceptance of the possibility that conflicting groups could lose in elections, "if they feel that they might win next time, and that others will abide by the results if and when they do win" (Kymlicka 2001, 226). Yet mutual trust is impossible in an unpredictable environment. Therefore, as Tamir notes, the instrumental dimension of national identity is its ability to provide a predictable and transparent environment in which individuals can have mutual trust and make meaningful choices (Tamir 1993).

Liberal nationalists do not imply that we are obligated to trust our fellow citizens and the government blindly just because we happen to share a national identity. To the contrary, they contend that a diversity of pursued goals and disagreements are indispensable in our daily lives. Citizens can agree or disagree, trust or distrust, but still believe that through active participation and citizen deliberation the best solution can be achieved. Moreover, as it has been argued by a great number of scholars, a degree of political distrust is particularly important for a healthy functioning of representative democracies.

Scholars of trust note that distrust is not always the opposite of trust (Barber 1983; Levi 1998). Representative democracies, the argument goes, are paradoxical regimes because they require citizens to trust that their interests will be appropriately represented by elected officials. However, they also require citizens to be critical and scrutinize elected officials and, if necessary, to punish those who do not fulfill expectations of technical competency and fiduciary responsibility. Hence, some degrees of both trust and distrust are necessary in democratic regimes (Hart 1978; Barber 1983; Levi 1998; Hetherington 2005). Nevertheless, an unjustified distrust, which also takes a chronic form, implies alienation and apathy (Hetherington 2005). As Barber notes, "the kind of distrust that is manifested as unwillingness to expect either competent performance
or fiduciary responsibility and that arises out of genuine alienation from democratic norms, from negativism, or from irrationality is clearly dysfunctional for democracy” (Barber 1983, 93).

Thus the values, beliefs, policy issues, and goals that citizens have may vary from person to person. But the multitude of differences will not amount to a social paralysis if citizens share national identity, providing a foundation for co-citizens to believe that they belong to the same moral community. What matters, as scholars of moralistic trust would argue, is a sense of connection with others at a deeper level because “you see them as members of your community whose interests must be taken seriously” (Uslaner 2002, 18). In this sense, schools of moralistic trust and liberal nationalism have much in common since both acknowledge the centrality of moral or “ethical communities” for sustaining trust.

Several scholars, who reject strictly rational accounts of trust, contend that shared norms and values facilitate a trustful environment (Bok 1978; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Inglehart 1997, 1999; Uslaner 2002).⁷ For instance, David Hume writes: “Interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises. . . . Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind” (Warner and Livingston 1994, 38).

Parsons argues that trust is a consequence of commitment, which involves appeals to obligation in terms of basic norms and values (Parsons 1969, 4). Similarly, Fukuyama notes that trust is a result of shared moral values, which create “expectations of regular and honest behavior” (Fukuyama 1995, 153). Fukuyama notes that a “society built entirely out of rational individuals who come together on the basis of a social contract for the sake of the satisfaction of their wants cannot form a society that would be viable over any length of time. . . . More broadly,⁷ Scholars of cognitive and strategic trust argue that trust primarily is a result of personal experiences, cognitive frames, and calculated interests. For examples, see Partha Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity,” in Trust, ed. Gambetta Diego (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 49–72; Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Russell Hardin, “Do We Want to Trust Government?,” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Warren E. Mark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22–41.
if individuals formed communities only on the basis of rational long-term self-interest, there would be little in the way of public spiritedness, self-sacrifice, pride, charity, or any of the other virtues that make communities livable” (ibid., 351).

In other words, if basic premises of norms and values are shared, actors face fewer risks when they seek agreement on collective action problems. The importance of trust and its effect on democracy has been emphasized by several scholars (Putnam, 1993; Inglehart 1999; Uslaner 2002). Nevertheless, with a few exceptions (Rustow 1967), the literature emphasizing the intertwined relations between national identity, trust, and democratization remains rather limited. Liberal nationalists contend that the aspiration to establish democracy must be accompanied by a search for common grounds of agreement, enabling a trustful environment and citizens’ engagement in redistributive and democratic projects. Political institutions and shared political principles of liberal justice, although crucial, are not enough to engender trust and democratic values. Hence, according to liberal nationalism, unlike other available identities and political institutions, national identity has a wider range and operates at a deeper level. It provides co-citizens with a shared sense of belonging to an ethical community solidly based on a long history of shared historical and political experiences, enabling trust and an agreement around democratic causes (Kymlicka 1989, 2002; Tamir 1993; Miller 1995).

One important caveat must be mentioned, however. Scholars of liberal nationalism have provided compelling arguments regarding the centrality of thin national identity for individual self-determination and arriving at meaningful choices, for engendering a transparent and predictable environment conducive for trust, for facilitating collective action and enhancing social justice, and for promoting redistributive projects and democratic values.

Thin national identity is viable in liberal democracies, particularly in pluralistic states where citizens most of the time differ along ethnic, religious, and racial lines. Here, thin national identity, according to liberal nationalism, is essential not for promoting a particular conception of
common good but rather for providing a source of trust and solidarity. As Tamir notes, trust and solidarity in liberal democracies accommodate a myriad of differences in perceived conceptions of the good life and goals (Tamir 1993). In liberal democracies, trust and solidarity increase "the likelihood that citizens will fulfill their obligations of justice," respect democratic values of concessions and tolerance, agree to redistribute resources, and make sacrifices for co-citizens (Kymlicka 2002, 265).

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, most of the time endorses thick national identity that is typically based on common ethnic descent or religious faith and promotes one particular conception of good life. Thick national identity usually is not conducive to individuals' self-determination and restrains personal freedoms and choice. Therefore, before celebrating the ethical significance of a shared national identity, it is important to ask what type of national identity is being endorsed. I do not claim, of course, that liberal nationalism does not acknowledge these fundamental differences between thick and thin versions of identity. To the contrary, on numerous occasions scholars of liberal nationalism have elaborated on these differences and have emphasized that they "discriminate between defensible and indefensible forms of the principle of nationality" (Miller 1995, 40).

Nevertheless, it is not clear how we should assess the instrumental and ethical significance of a shared national identity, which is based on anti-democratic and illiberal values. Numerous studies indicate that political trust and democracy are indeed correlated (Putnam 1993). Yet political trust does not necessarily enhance democracy, especially if it is based on inherently anti-democratic premises, such as trusting a government guided by religious principles or trusting a paternalistic government that provides economic security and peace at the expense of personal freedoms. To have a better grasp of this issue, I distinguish between ethno-nationalist

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It is important to note that illiberal societies do not necessarily promote ethnic national identity. For instance, ex-authoritarian regimes in Latin America did not emphasize ethnic heritage in their definitions of national identity and citizenship. However, it is reasonable to expect that states promoting thick or ethnic type of national identity will be anti-democratic and illiberal.
and liberal-nationalist types of national identity. The novelty of this research is that it emphasizes the importance of national identity types for political trust, democratic attitudes, and basic perceptions of social justice. Put differently, my research contributes to the theory of liberal nationalism by testing its central propositions not only as a function of shared liberal but also of ethnic types of identity.

Thus, I explore whether respondents endorsing liberal and ethnic approaches to key issues central to national identity have different levels of political trust, perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes. I distinguish between democratic values and democratic evaluation where the first one measures respondents' democratic values in general while the latter measures respondents' evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country. The democratic values examined in this study include tolerance of opposing ideologies and agreeing that democratically elected officials have an obligation to be accountable and responsive in general.

While democratic values are important for measuring the overall democratic perceptions of respondents, they are not true indicators of the democratic attitudes in a country. Most people are not willing to say that they cherish illiberal values, such as being intolerant of differences, since this involves a fundamentally negative self-evaluation. Similarly, it is reasonable for people to say that they expect accountability and responsiveness from elected officials in general, since these expectations contain self-interest.

Therefore, I do not necessarily expect that respondents endorsing contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to identity issues will have significantly different democratic values. I believe democratic evaluation is a better indicator of democratic attitudes. Democratic evaluation measures overall satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country.

Using my original survey data, in Chapter Six I offer a separate assessment of whether groups endorsing contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to key identity issues differ in their democratic values and democratic evaluation.
the country. I contend that proponents of true democratic values will be less satisfied with the state of country's democracy and future democratic trajectory compared to those who mask their anti-democratic tendencies. This is a particularly reasonable expectation for a country where democratic scores, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 below, have been trending towards an authoritarian regime.

Figure 1.1

Freedom House Democracy Scores in Armenia\(^\text{10}\)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.1.png}
\caption{Democratic Trajectory in Armenia 1997-2008}
\end{figure}

1997-2003 — Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime (4.4-4.99)
2004-2008 — Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (5.0-5.99)

In sum, I distinguish between liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of national identity. Consistent with liberal nationalism I contend that shared national identity does enhance political trust and has an effect on issues pertaining to social justice. As long as national identity is shared, regardless whether the type of shared identity is liberal or ethnic, political trust will be enhanced.

However, I also argue that not just any shared national identity but the specific type of shared national identity has consequences for democratic attitudes. In other words, even though

\(^{10}\) Democracy scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 the lowest level of democratic score. Democracy score is an average of ratings for Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence, and Corruption. See Freedom House, Nations in Transit at \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17&year=2008} (accessed 10/20/08).
shared national identity enhances political trust, it does not necessarily enhance democracy. To the contrary, I expect that if the type of shared national identity is ethno-nationalist, governments with a democratic deficiency will be criticized less and will receive higher rates of evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy.

1.4 Some Theoretical Considerations on National Identity Typologies: Civic and Ethnic Types versus Liberal Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Types

Because I employ national identity typologies to explain the case of Armenian identity, several things must be mentioned about theoretical debates on identity typologies. Since the mid-twentieth century, scholars have categorized nationalism based on Western-civic and Eastern-ethnic types famously coined by Kohn in 1945. According to this literature, spatio-temporal factors introduce dramatic variations in the ways nationalism is manifested.

Thus, civic national identity, which emerged in the late sixteenth century in Western Europe, is based on ideological concepts of individual liberty and choice. Civic nations, in this view, are devoid of pre-existing cultural norms. Civic nations are composed of rational and self-determining individuals who choose to belong to a political community and exhibit an allegiance to a set of liberal democratic political principles. Conversely, ethnic identity, which emerged later in Central and Eastern Europe towards the end of the eighteenth century, is based on cultural heritage, ethnic descent, and a glorified myth of historical past. Ethnic nations, the argument goes, reject enlightened rationalism and perceive their identity as a matter of fate rather than of individual choice (Kohn 1945; Kedourie 1960; Berlin 1969; Plamenatz 1976; Pfaff, 1993; Ignatieff 1993).

Scholars from various disciplines, including liberal nationalists, have challenged this typology, pointing out the cultural foundation of politics, both in ethnic and civic nationalism. Scholars properly argue that in addition to liberal democratic principles there is always a cultural component to civic nationalism (Nairn 1993; Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Xenos 1996; Yack 1996; Brubaker 1998; Nielsen 1999; Norman 1999; Beiner 1999; Kymlicka 1999, 2002).
Nairn notes the “demonized” understanding of nationalism is a normatively loaded typology essentially telling us that the Western type is original, institutional, liberal, and good while the Eastern type is reactive, envious, ethnic, racist, and generally bad (Nairn 1993). Similarly, Yack notes that contrasting nations in terms of rational attachments to political principles and emotional celebration of inherited culture is unreasonable (Yack 1996). This misinterpretation, according to Yack, created myths of civic and ethnic nationalism, where the former one tells us that our national identity strictly is a result of our choice, while the latter one “suggests that there is no choice at all in the making of our national identities” (ibid., 198). Yack notes that even in Locke’s theory of popular sovereignty the presence of pre-political community with shared culture and history is necessary. Yet the modern liberal interpretation of the popular sovereignty conceals the presence of this community and presents it as a voluntary association of individuals, merely united by their shared commitment to a body of political principles.

Xenos notes that in order to avoid two seemingly antagonistic terms (nationalism and liberalism), proponents of civic nationalism substitute the term nationalism with patriotism. By blurring conceptually different notions, modern liberal ideology can claim that patriotism should be understood as a commitment to liberal democratic institutions rather than to blood or culture. Xenos also notes that realizing the vulnerability of a sheer devotion to political principles of independence and liberalism without an emotional bond, Lincoln created an American myth: “the political religion of the nation” (Xenos 1996, 225–26). According to Lincoln’s myth, American family has a common heritage “united by the blood of those who died for our institutions, just as Christians are united by the blood of Christ” (ibid., 227).

States that are considered classical examples of civic nationalism, such as the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, or Great Britain, have engaged in cultural interpretations of their nationhood and have cultivated encompassing national identities, despite persistent divisions along linguistic, religious, ethnic, regional, and cantonal lines (Miller 1995; Nielsen 1999;
Kymlicka 2002). Distinct national identities have been cultivated through a twin effort of nation-building via “invention” of common national myths and the establishment of democratic political institutions.

Very often nation-building in “civic” states has been accompanied by a destruction of entire ethnic communities, which hardly could be classified as liberal democratic deeds (Connor 1972; Kymlicka 2002). In addition, legal membership in liberal democratic states explicitly implies participation in a common culture, as learning of the “official” language, history, and very often the laws of the host country are established norms of naturalization. Integration of immigrants into a mainstream culture is not necessarily a bad procedure, since it does limit a range of potential disadvantages for new immigrants. Yet, what is important to emphasize is that civic nationalism just like ethnic nationalism, has a strong cultural element.

Scholars also note that being a citizen of a “civic nation” does not imply necessarily sharing political beliefs of the democratic state. This is particularly true of Native Americans whose political beliefs widely differ from the mainstream American political culture. Similarly, political beliefs held by citizens of the United States who are also members of the Ku Klux Klan organization are anything but democratic. Moreover, Nielsen notes that having citizenship defined in civic terms does not necessarily imply commitment to democratic principles.

For instance, ex-authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile defined their citizenship in civic terms (i.e., legal membership without ethnic restrictions) while embracing

11 For instance Kymlicka notes that in the 19th century, the French government banned the use of Breton and Basque languages in schools, press, and their political institutions that aimed to promote minority nationalism. Similarly, in the 19th century the Quebeçois and Aboriginals in Canada and Hispanics in the United States were stripped of their language rights and political institutions. Both governments redraw their political boundaries so that Quebeçois and Mexicans could not form a majority in any province and state. After conquering Mexican territories in 1848, the United States imposed literacy tests to make it difficult for Hispanics to vote and encouraged their massive immigration (Kymlicka 2002, 351). Kymlicka also notes that to establish the dominance of English throughout its territory in the United States, “Historically, decisions about the boundaries of state governments, and the timing of their admission into the federation, were deliberately made to ensure that Anglophones would be a majority within each of the fifty states of the American federation” (Kymlicka, 2002, 346). United States policies against Native Americans stand as another striking example demonstrating the ideological flaws of civic nationalism. See, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
antidemocratic values (Nielsen 1999). Thus, Kymlicka notes: “civic nations can be military
dictatorships as easily as liberal democracies” (Kymlicka 1999, 135). In addition, not all “ethnic”
nationalisms occur outside the West and “civic” nationalism is not the sole domain of the
Western world. In the end, as Brubaker notes, it becomes analytically confusing to point to a
single case of pure civic nationalism when virtually all nationalisms resemble the ethnic or cul­
tural type more closely (Brubaker 1998).

I summarized the civic-ethnic typology and the criticism that followed it, partly because
it provides a telling illustration of the problems associated with typological analysis of national
identity and partly in order to illustrate in more concrete terms my own claims about the identity
typology as I see it in the Armenian case. In the next section, I will demonstrate the ways this
typology’s normatively and analytically flawed central propositions have influenced the post-
Soviet literature analyzing South Caucasus. At this point, I turn to a defense of my own treatment
of ethno-nationalist and liberal-nationalist identity types.

I share many scholars’ criticism of the civic-ethnic typology. Yet, this is not to say that
we should deny the existence of national identities promoting xenophobic attitudes or explicitly
capitalizing on ethnic particularism. In his analysis of identity typology, Beiner notes that civic
nations just like ethnic ones require cultural markers of identity. However, he continues “But the
crucial difference is that according to the civic vision, these markers of identity are relevant for
every member of the civic community, whereas the national vision applies only to members of the
nation. . . . So the difference is not the existence of a politically relevant shared culture, but the
class of citizens among whom this culture is shared” (Beiner 2003, 203). Similarly, Kymlicka

12 Nielsen also contends that national movements that could be categorized as cases of ethnic nationalism
may take the form of liberal nationalism, as are the cases of Quebec, Belgium, Wales, and Scotland. Nielsen
notes that Quebec nationalists are committed to the protection of the civil liberties and allow cultural and
linguistic autonomy for both historical anglophone minorities and Native Americans. For example, the policy
of the Parti Québécois includes the protection of the anglophone minority rights to have an English lan­
guage education, English service in hospitals and governmental agencies, and the usage of both French and
English in the National Assembly. See Kai Nielsen, “Cultural Nationalism: Neither Ethnic nor Civic,” in
notes that some nations might define their culture in ethnic and religious terms and “these variations are crucial to understanding why some nationalism are peaceful, liberal, and democratic, while others are xenophobic, authoritarian, and expansionist” (Kymlicka 1999, 133).

States endorsing ethno-nationalism promote thick national identity that is typically based on common ethnic descent or religious faith. Thick national identities usually promote one particular conception of the good life and are not conducive to individuals’ self-determination, personal freedoms, and choice. In general, states promoting thick national identity discount demands of liberal justice and try to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands.

Although hardly any state promotes a “civic” culture-free national identity, there are still a number of cases that endorse “thin” national identity. While certainly not devoid of cultural norms, distinct histories, myths, and symbols, states with a “thin” national identity, in general, do not promote a particular conception of the common good and most of the time endorse a version of nationalism that is benign and peaceful at its core. Thus, Kymlicka notes:

If states promote such thin identities on the grounds that possessing them will make citizens more likely to fulfill their obligations of justice, then there is no violation of liberal neutrality. The identity the state is promoting is not grounded in a particular conception of the good, and the state is not engaged in ranking the intrinsic merits of different ways of life. The liberal nationalist state remains an anti-perfectionist state, which leaves the evaluation of the merits of competing conceptions of good life to individual choice (and revision) in civil society. . . . The liberal nationalist state simply attempts to develop and sustain the sense that citizens belong together in an ethical community, so that we are more likely to fulfill our obligations of justice to our co-citizens (Kymlicka 2002, 266).

Scholars note that citizens in liberal democracies, particularly in pluralistic states such as the United States, Switzerland, Canada, or Great Britain, which differ along ethnic, religious, and
racial lines, may disagree about conceptions of good life and have different interpretations of their past. However, they still recognize and identify each other as belonging to the same ethical community, "because they share a sense of belonging to an intergenerational society which has some historical reference points, and a common future . . . and this sense of shared belonging underlies their national identity" (Kymlicka 2002, 265).

Liberal nationalists' emphasis on citizens' agreement on some historical reference points deserves special attention. This implies that citizens may have disagreements on other historical events. The crucial difference between states with thick and thin national identities is not the number of historical events on which citizens agree or disagree. Irrespective of the promoted type of identity, states will always be composed of groups with different interpretations of the past. Nor are contrasting interpretations of past events or hopes for the future the sole province of ethnically heterogeneous states.

Consider, for instance, the case of ethnically heterogeneous United States, where memories, perceptions of present, and visions of future by African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans are profoundly different from the mainstream white American. Take ethnically homogeneous Armenia at another extreme, where the memory of Genocide forms a constitutive part of Armenian identity. However, the story does not end there, despite what Armenia's ethno-nationalists as well as most of the literature on Armenian identity might suggest (Panossian 2006; Saideman and Ayres 2008). While sharing tragic memory, ethnic Armenians differ in terms of their judgments regarding the role the Genocide should play in state politics, as well as in their attitudes towards Turkey. I elaborate on this point extensively in the chapters devoted to the analysis of national identity differences as perceived by ethno-nationalists and liberal nationalists. The important point, however, is that diverse interpretations of a single event are not only common both in ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous states, but these are also the most fundamental aspect of the political world.
So the crucial difference between states with thick and thin national identities is not the number of events that citizens agree or disagree upon, but the extent to which identities are negotiated through open processes, and are subjected to critical reflection and collective deliberation. Thus, as Miller writes, the crucial difference is “between national identities that emerge through open process of debate and discussion to which everyone is potentially a contributor, and identities that are authoritatively imposed by repression and indoctrination. . . . No national identity will ever be pristine, but there is still a large difference between those that evolved more or less spontaneously, and those that are mainly the result of political imposition” (Miller 1995, 39–40).

Thus, while civic-ethnic typology is flawed for the reasons presented above, we still should acknowledge these fundamental differences. While all states, irrespective of geographical location and ethnic composition, cultivate a common national identity, it is still to be explained whether and why that identity is manifested in liberal or illiberal forms. Typologies can, indeed, be useful tools for gauging and comparing identity manifestations (Barrington 2006b). Yet, rather than being mere “ideal types,” it is essential to make sure that our categories are empirically informed and can stand scientific testing.

Following liberal nationalism’s central propositions, I analyze the content of the Armenian national identity, gauge the extent to which political elites portray it as a matter of fate or choice, and assess their willingness to negotiate and revise its main properties through critical reflection and rational deliberation. Using political elites’ identity rhetoric, I also gauge public perceptions of Armenian national identity. In other words, I examine identity politics in Armenia, to reveal various styles of “imagining” Armenian national identity (Anderson 1991).

I demonstrate that Armenia’s political arena has been contested by two contrasting visions of Armenian national identity: ethno-nationalist and liberal nationalist. Identity clashes were particularly reflected in fundamental disagreements regarding the genocide, the war in Mountainous Karabagh, and whether members of the diaspora should have full citizenship rights.
Rather than questioning the centrality of these identity issues, disagreements were about strikingly different models of remembering, imagining political boundaries and belongingness to a political community.

1.5 South Caucasus as a Reflection of Primordial Identities and the Soviet Legacy Hypothesis

In this section, I demonstrate the ways the civic-ethnic typology's normatively and analytically flawed central propositions have influenced the post-Soviet literature analyzing the South Caucasus. Indeed, this typology has led to erroneous generalizations about the national identity in the post-Soviet South Caucasus. Explicitly influenced by civic-ethnic typology, many Western scholars and practitioners did not even attempt to conceal their geopolitical biases and categorized the South Caucasian nations as the bearers of genuine primordial identities with primitive tribal instincts. For instance, in a rather ominous language, Kaplan writes: “Civilizations have collided in the Caucasus Mountains since the dawn of the history, and the region’s dozens of ethnic groups have been noted for ‘obstinacy and ferocity’ since ancient times. Stalin was born in these mountains, and it was also here that the Soviet empire began to crumble. The story of the Republic of Georgia illustrates that the people of the Caucasus may prove as incapable of self-rule as they were resistant to rule by outsiders” (Kaplan 2000, 67).

Contemplating the collapse of the Soviet empire and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated: “But the collapse of these modern evils has, in many parts of the post-Communist world, been accompanied by the eruption of medieval struggles over blood and culture” (Talbott cited in Jones 2006, 250). Reflecting on Talbott’s words, Jones notes that: “Such overly historicist interpretations simplify the causes of the post-Soviet crises and reflect a crude primordialist view of nations in the region, a view that nationalism was always present and is now, after a period of repression, back with a vengeance” (Jones 2006, 250).
To demonstrate the extent of irrational celebration of inherited ethnic identities Rieff writes:

Even more to the point, it is not clear that in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, or many of the other post-Soviet states—or in many African countries, for that matter—the conception of the state reaches much beyond ethnic identity. The founders of Israel, with whom present-day Armenian nationalists often compare themselves, did not think that creating a Jewish state was all they had to do. They aspired to create a modern state, a new economics (among the Labor Zionists, a version of socialism), and an idea of democracy as well. They would have scoffed at the notion that the mystical virtues of ethnic solidarity would see them through (Rieff 1997, 131).

Obviously, these examples contain a number of normative, historical, and analytical flaws. But the important point is that the idea of ethnic nationalism with all its inherent vices became a dogmatic feature in one stream of literature studying the South Caucasus.

According to another stream of literature emphasizing the Soviet legacy hypothesis, the general tendency is to cite Southern Caucasian states as having an ethnic type of national identity inherited from the Soviet past (Brubaker 1996). The “primitive tribal instincts” perspective certainly is not the central theme of this literature. For instance, referring to the ancient ethnic hatreds view Snyder writes:

This account was simple, intuitive, and reinforced daily by the justifications offered by perpetrators of ethnic slaughter. For Western politicians looking for an easy excuse to limit their involvement in unseemly struggles, the story of ancient hatreds also had the advantage of portraying these disputes as hopelessly intractable. But even those who retained the vision of spreading liberal democracy to unaccustomed corners of the globe considered age-old ethnic prejudices to be liberalism’s major foe (Snyder 2000, 18).
Nevertheless, the analytical properties of the civic-ethnic typology as a bi-polar depiction of the world composed of nations exhibiting loyalty either to political principles and democratic institutions or to ethno-cultural heritage remain a point of departure for many scholars. Thus, Snyder notes: “Nonetheless, nations can be placed on a continuum between the civic and ethnic ideal types depending on whether loyalty to and inclusion in them is based primarily on institutions or on culture” (ibid., 25).

The problem in this literature is not its attempt to explain different manifestations of nationalism in the post-communist world. I do believe that typologies are important tools for understanding such broad and complicated phenomena as nation, nationalism, and identity. However, the problem is that this literature essentially remains committed to the liberal myth of civic nationalism telling us that civic nations of the Western world are voluntary associations of individuals, merely united by their shared commitment to a body of political principles and institutions. It follows then that any nation that does not submit its loyalty to liberal political principles and institutions must be ethnic.

Thus, Armenia, which did not have established democratic institutions when the Soviet Union collapsed, by default was classified as an ethnic nation. According to this argument in Armenia and South Caucasus, in general: “the interaction of mass nationalism and weak democratic institutions . . . provided a permissive setting for belligerent ethnic nationalism” (Snyder 2000, 226). Ethnic nationalism as a mass phenomenon, embraced by the whole region, became an important argument in a significant portion of the literature on South Caucasus.

For instance, Saideman and Ayres argue that Armenian xenophobic attitudes at a mass level resulted in the most violent irredentism in the post-communist world. Reifying the “sacred cause” argument, advanced by Armenian ethno-nationalists (but rejected by liberal nationalists as I argue throughout my study), these authors conveniently arrive at the same conclusion as scholars of civic-ethnic typology would have regarding the irrationality of ethnic nations. Thus,
they write: “Armenian irredentism was a substantially mass-driven phenomenon, and while the masses might have had an interest in economic integration in abstract, they neither understood nor expressed it” (Saideman and Ayres 2008, 93).

In sum, the civic-ethnic typology, coupled with the Soviet legacy hypothesis, has led to a generalization according to which states in the South Caucasus have an institutionalized ethnic type of national identity inherited from the Soviet past. In Chapter Three of this dissertation I provide a detailed literature review and analysis of Soviet nationality policies and the ways these have influenced territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet era. This study acknowledges the importance of Soviet nationality policies, which contributed to the formation of ethno-territorial nationalisms and institutionalized distinct national identities for the titular republics (Motyl 1992a; Brubaker 1996; Suny and Martin 2001).

In that chapter, I also demonstrate that deliberate Soviet policies of nation-building through institutionalization of territorialized ethno-cultural identities on the one hand and of nation-destroying through demographic manipulations and carving of territorial-administrative units cutting across ethno-cultural lines on the other, exacerbated inter-ethnic complexities in the South Caucasus. Largely as a result of these policies, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were caught in ethno-territorial disputes, and became parties in the so-called “frozen conflicts” of the post-Soviet space. The legacy of Soviet nationality policies, indeed, has become a heavy burden for post-communist republics, which not only had to deal with multidimensional transformations in political, economic, and social spheres, but also with formidable territorial disputes and inter-ethnic problems.

However, generalizations based on a “common Soviet legacy” hypothesis as well on “ancient hatreds” view are misleading in two respects. First, they sacrifice vital differences among the three South Caucasian states. A growing literature properly criticizes these generalizations,
ignoring important differences among the states of Eurasia (Suny 1999; King and Melvin 1999–2000; Bertsch et al. 2000; Agadjanian 2001; Jones 2006).

For instance, Rondeli notes that all three states of the Southern Caucasus could be characterized as “quasi-states with a very fragile statehood,” marked by a lack of democratic traditions and civic elements (Rondeli 2000, 48). These states also face an acute problem of political and ideological integrity and do not possess a clearly defined identity. However, while all three states seek security, their perceptions of threat and security vary. Therefore, Suny notes that “the question of self-understanding, goals, fears and anxieties must be investigated as prerequisites to analyzing security requirements of states” (Suny 1999, 140). While Azerbaijan and Georgia perceive their role in the region more in “geo-economic terms,” Armenia perceives its role more in “geo-political terms” (Rondeli 2000, 48).

Similarly, Jones notes that scholarly focus on a clash of ethnic identities and the Soviet legacy in the South Caucasus is so widely shared that a democratic event such as the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia caught scholars by surprise. But as Jones properly notes, this focus “on national conflict and violence in Caucasia distorts our understanding of Caucasian history and nationalist movements and raises broader questions as to what exactly we mean by terms like *ethnic conflict* and *nationalism*” (Jones 2006, 249).

Second, generalizations based on the “common Soviet legacy” hypothesis also overlooked significant differences existing within these states. This, I believe, is largely a result of an assumption, also prevalent in the nationalism literature, that the establishment of national identities is an event. In other words, once identities, whether “given” or constructed, are consolidated then they become the most pervasive features of nations (Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986).

In this dissertation I attempt to address this second problem of post-Soviet literature and argue that “identity as an event” view cannot capture the dynamic nature of national identity. From this perspective, this study aligns with a branch of nationalism literature, arguing that if
identities are constructed they can be reconstructed as well. Scholars in this tradition point out the fluid nature of identity, contending that a collectively accepted narrative about national identity should be understood not as an event, but as a process (Barth 1969; Nagel 1994; Bhabha 1994; Duara 1996).

For instance, Nagel (1994) argues that the meaning and content of ethnic identities are continuously negotiated and revised. Identity change is a dialectical process, since it is a direct result not only of ethnic groups' choices, but also of external socio-economic and political processes. Similarly, according to Duara (1996), community consists of multiple narratives of descent, which coexist with a politicized and privileged "master narrative." The content of narratives is not fixed and can change as a result of multi-dimensional changes.

Finally, Bhabha (1994) argues that to define a national culture as fixed and universally accepted is to overlook any possibility of new or oppositional social movements. The driving force behind historical changes, according to Bhabha, has always been the "politics of difference," which assigns new meanings to national culture. Hence, one cannot take the process of "totalization of national culture" for granted but instead, one should "understand a nation through its narratives" (ibid., 308). Through narratives, it is possible to reveal that national identities and histories are never fully made because they are always in the process of being made.

My study of the Armenian politics of identity challenges the post-Soviet literature according to which Armenia has a single institutionalized ethnic type of national identity inherited from the Soviet past. Indeed, I argue that because of this "fixed" view of identity, this literature overlooked profound identity cleavages in the Armenian politics. Ironically, while in most of this literature the year of 1988 is marked as the beginning of Armenian "belligerent ethnic nationalism," I demonstrate that since then Armenia’s political arena has been contested by two contrasting visions of Armenian national identity: ethno-nationalist and liberal nationalist.
Moreover, I demonstrate that at the mass level, perceptions of the Armenian identity are far away from what most of the literature has argued so far.

1.6 Organization of Dissertation

The three chapters that follow address the first theoretical question of this study: asking whether there can be contesting national identities in an ethnically homogeneous state. In an attempt to answer this question I employ multiple methodological tools and explore the three key issues central to Armenian national identity: Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship for Diaspora. To convey the significance of these issues for Armenian national identity, Chapters Two through Four contain sections devoted to an extensive historical overview of these identity categories. Relying on a large body of literature dealing with the historiography of these issues, I chronologically unwrap historical events surrounding these issues to demonstrate their evolution since the late nineteenth century.

In addition, to demonstrate the enduring role of these identity issues in modern Armenian politics, Chapters Two through Four also contain sections devoted to intensive qualitative analysis of key texts pertaining to these issues since 1988. In these sections my primary sources have been parties' and presidential electoral platforms, pledges, official statements, interviews and parliamentary debates in print media, selected presidential speeches, state official foreign and domestic policies, legislations, and constitutional provisions.

To illustrate the strikingly different portrayals of these issues by political and intellectual elites since 1988, I extensively cite actual excerpts from the above-mentioned sources. Throughout these three chapters, I argue that Armenia’s political arena has been dominated by two main competing groups: liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.

In all three chapters, I contend that strikingly different discourses and policies on these issues by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists must be understood as profoundly contrasting
portrayals of Armenian national identity. Therefore, ultimately I argue that the object of contestation has been the national identity itself since clashing visions have been about contesting ways of dealing with three classical elements of national identity: collective memory (Genocide), territory (War in Mountainous Karabagh), and belongingness (Citizenship for Diaspora).

Identity clashes between political elites endorsing the contesting liberal-nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of identity intensified following independence in 1991. To estimate the magnitude and significance of these differences, Chapter Five embarks on an analysis of key identity issues as they have been articulated by elected political parties. In addition, presidential statements and pledges were analyzed only if the presidential candidates and the elected president represented a party holding parliamentary seats throughout the research period of this study. Elected political elites’ positions on national identity issues were analyzed via a quantitative content analysis using manifest data from two sources: party and presidential electoral platforms, and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing both official and opposition ideologies. Thus, Chapter Five addresses the first hypothesis and two related sub-hypotheses of this study. It explores elected officials’ policy positions along three key identity issues in the period from 1993 through 2006. Essentially, in this chapter I argue that throughout these thirteen years, elected political elites have endorsed contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of national identities. While the pre-1998 dominant political parties chose a liberal nationalist identity, the post-1998 dominant political parties chose an ethno-nationalist type of national identity.

Chapter Six addresses the second theoretical question of this dissertation by asking whether identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state is a problematic phenomenon. In this chapter, I test the theoretical propositions of liberal nationalism using data drawn from my original survey. Specifically, I measure public attitudes on key issues central to national identity and ultimately estimate the impact of contesting national identities on political trust, perceptions of basic fairness and social justice, and democratic attitudes.
In this chapter, I first provide a detailed explanation of the methodology used to analyze the survey data. Second, using the propositions of liberal nationalism, I provide a detailed rationalization for each relationship I seek to explore between the variables of this study. Third, in a section titled “Survey Data Analysis: Part I,” I test the second hypothesis of this study predicting that public and political elites have different perceptions of key issues central to national identity (genocide, war, dual citizenship).

Fourth, in a section titled “Survey Data Analysis: Part II,” I test the rest of my hypotheses. Specifically, I explore whether respondents with liberal and ethnic approaches to key issues central to national identity (genocide, war, dual citizenship) have different levels of political trust (technical and fiduciary trust), perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes (democratic values and democratic evaluation).

In the last chapter, I recapture the main arguments and findings of this dissertation. I also discuss the theoretical implications of my findings and the ways these findings could be of importance to other studies of national identity. In addition, I elaborate on the ethical significance of national identity. I argue that empirically informed identity categories have a potential for enhancing our conceptualizations of national identity. Empirically informed typological analysis assists the assessment of national identity’s instrumental value and ethical significance for political trust, perceptions of social justice, and democratic attitudes. Finally, in this chapter I acknowledge the limitations of this research and make recommendation for further research that could enhance our understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon of national identity.
CHAPTER 2

ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES CENTRAL TO NATIONAL IDENTITY: GENOCIDE AND RELATIONS WITH TURKEY—THE POLITICS OF REMEMBERING

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the first key issue central to Armenian national identity: Genocide and relations with Turkey. To convey the significance of the Genocide for the Armenian national identity, I provide historical background of events before and after the Genocide and trace the evolving meaning of the Armenian Question since its inception in the late nineteenth century. Next, I demonstrate the enduring role of the Genocide in modern Armenian politics since independence in 1991. Here, I analyze the politics of remembering by two main competing groups, liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists, who offered strikingly diverging models of remembering this national tragedy. Throughout this chapter my central contention is that contesting policy statements must be understood as profoundly different narratives of a collective memory as one of the classical elements of national identity.

The chapter is organized as follows. A brief introduction to the Genocide is followed by an extensive historical background explaining the evolution of the Armenian Question in the period from the nineteenth century through 2006. Particularly, I concentrate on the historical period when the Armenian Question was first raised in Ottoman Turkey followed by the internationalization of the question and the Turkish ultimate response to this issue, by launching Genocide. Next, I proceed with the analysis of the Armenian Question in the post-Genocide era by concentrating on the Soviet Union’s strategies of articulating this issue followed by a section devoted to post-Genocide diaspora’s treatment of the Armenian Question. The next two sections
are devoted to a detailed analysis of the Armenian Question, Genocide recognition, and relations with Turkey as perceived by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists in the post-independence period. Primary sources of analysis include state official policies, parties' and presidential electoral platforms, as well as, pledges, interviews, parliamentary debates and presidential speeches extracted from print media.

The section entitled "Reflections: Politics of Remembering" is devoted to a critical examination of politics of remembering. Here I juxtapose two strikingly different models of remembering offered by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists. I analyze these contrasting politics of remembering by integrating Nietzsche's thoughts on resentment as well as on the uses and disadvantages of remembering. Finally, in the concluding remarks I recapture main points and arguments of this chapter.

2.2 Genocide

On April 24 each year, Armenians around the world commemorate the Armenian Genocide. Since 1965, Armenians of the Republic of Armenia bring flowers to the Genocide memorial. Diaspora Armenians bring flowers to community Genocide memorials, and organize demonstrations and various ceremonies, such as delivering speeches and candle light vigils. April 24 marks the beginning of a planned and systematic extermination of ethnic Armenians. In the period of 1915–17, out of approximately three million Armenians living in Turkey under the rule of Young Turks, some 1.5 million Armenians perished. The first phase of the extermination plan was launched in 1915, when about 1,000 leading clergymen, politicians, and members of intelligentsia were arrested throughout the empire and were beheaded or shot within just a few days. The second phase was the extermination of about 200,000 Armenian draftees in the Turkish army. The final phase was the extermination of women, children, and the elderly throughout the empire (Dadrian 1996, 2004; Libaridian 2004a; Walker 1997). Millions of unprotected civilians
were ordered to be deported within days. Only later they realized that they had joined the death marches to the Syrian desert as their final destination. What followed later has been well documented by survivors, eyewitnesses, politicians, and scholars.¹ Henry Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador at Constantinople from 1913 to 1916, wrote: “[T]he whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared with the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915” (Morgenthau 1918, 322).

Citing Talat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of Interior Affairs and the Secretary-General of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Morgenthau writes: “I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years” (Morgenthau 1918, 342).² Indeed, the 1915 Genocide was the final solution to the Armenian Question which reached international diplomatic circles towards the end of the nineteenth century.


² The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was a political organization, established by Young Turks in 1906, during the dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire. The CUP came to power between 1908 and 1918. At the end of World War I most of its members were court-martialed and imprisoned. The most prominent figures of the CUP, the “Three Pashas” (Talat Pasha, the Minister of Interior Affairs and the Secretary-General of the CUP; Enver Pasha, the Minister of War; and Djemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy) formed a dictatorial triumvirate of the Ottoman government until the end of WWI in 1918. The Three Pashas were also masterminds of the Armenian Genocide. Talat Pasha was assassinated in Berlin in 1921 by Soghomon Tehlirian, a survivor of the Genocide. Due to Talat’s war crimes, Tehlirian was found innocent by the German court. Djemal Pasha was assassinated in 1922 by an Armenian, Stepan Dzaghigian, and Enver Pasha was killed by a Red Army soldier in central Asia during the Russian Civil War.
2.3 Ottoman Turkey and the Armenian Question

The Ottoman Empire, which conquered much of the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and Greece by the fifteenth century, governed its non-Muslim subjects through the millet (i.e., confessional community) system. The millet system allowed subjects to be grouped by religious confession as opposed to ethnicity. Ethno-religious groups, such as Orthodox Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, and Jews, were allowed to practice their faiths and were granted with self-governing functions limited to internal matters, through the use of groups’ customary laws and courts. However, the millet system was by no means a federation of freely organized self-governing ethno-religious communities with equal rights vis-à-vis the dominant Muslim community. To the contrary, limited freedoms were tolerated only as a condition for loyalty and submission to the Ottoman Empire.3 Moreover, as Suny writes: “Islam did not recognize social or racial inequalities, such as those between rich and poor or black and white, but it did believe in three basic inequalities: master and slave, man and woman, believer and unbeliever. Whereas the slave could not become free except by will of the master, and a woman could not become a man, the unbeliever was able to join the faithful but chose not to take up the true faith” (Suny 1993, 97). Therefore, Armenians who chose not to convert to Islam were treated as infidels and underclass, and for centuries lived in a system “in which their testimony was not accepted in Muslim courts, where they were subject to discriminatory laws (for example, they were forced to wear distinctive clothes to identify themselves), where they were not allowed to bear arms when most Muslims were armed, and where their prosperity and person were subject to the arbitrary and unchecked power of Muslim officials” (ibid.).

Even during the Tanzimat period (1839–78), which led to the creation of an Ottoman Constitution in 1876 and when a number of reforms were implemented with an objective to

3 For analysis of the millet system in the Ottoman Empire see Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, vol. 1, The Central Lands (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).
modernize the Ottoman Empire, the plight of non-Muslims did not improve significantly. The reformist Tanzimat period was reversed once Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1878–1909) suspended the constitution in 1878 (Barsoumian 1997; Davidson 1963).

Yet it was during the Tanzimat era when Western-educated Armenian intellectuals, inspired by the doctrines of Enlightenment, were hoping to improve conditions of Armenians throughout the empire. According to Hovannisian, “it was this dual development, the conscious Armenian demand for individual and collective security of life and property on the one hand and the burgeoning insecurity of both life and property on the other, that gave rise to the Armenian question as part of the larger Eastern question” (Hovannisian 1997, 204). As repeated requests for protection from Kurdish and Circassian tribesmens’ attacks and for fair governance through “direct taxation, civil justice and local representation” were not met, the leaders of Armenian community now sought provisions for self-administration (ibid., 206).

The latter half of the nineteenth century was an era when ideas of equality and nationalism were rapidly spreading throughout Europe. Taken together, these two ideas threatened the legal-customary foundations and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The idea of equality demanded a fundamental restructuring of the millet system by advocating an institutionalization of horizontal power relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim confessional communities. The idea of nationalism demanded the empire give in to rising demands for independence, especially in the Eastern European provinces, known as the “Eastern Question.” Eventually, as a result of Russian military advances in the Balkans and Eastern Turkey (the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78), the Eastern Question was solved (partially) by the San-Stefano peace treaty signed on March 3, 1878. It ended the Ottoman hegemony in the Balkans by granting independence to Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and autonomy to Bulgaria (Hovannisian 1997). Yet, as

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Hovannisian writes, to the major disappointment of Armenians, despite Russian promises of negotiating self-governance in Armenian provinces, there was not even a self-administration provision for Armenians. The only loose reference to the Armenian question was the article 16, according to which Russian troops were to remain in Western Armenian provinces (Eastern Turkey) to enforce the implementation of reforms and improvements for local Armenians, by the Sublime Porte.  

Meanwhile, major European powers, pursuing their own opportunities created by the weakness of the Ottoman state, perceived of the Russian military advances as a direct threat to their strategic interests in the region (Barsoumian 1997; Salt 1993). After all, the Russian troops were stationed in a strategic “overland trade route from Trebizond over Alashkert and Bayazit to Persia and beyond,” particularly hurting Great Britain’s interests (Hovannisian 1997, 209). Therefore, European powers—with an active engagement by Disraeli and Bismarck—arranged the Berlin Congress, in June 1878. As a result, the previous article 16 was replaced by article 61 in the Berlin treaty effectively putting an end to Armenians’ hope for getting protection either from Russia or from Europe. The Berlin Treaty stated that the Russian army had to withdraw from Turkish territories. Facing internal and external pressures and not wanting to further aggravate already hostile relations with European powers, Russia agreed to withdraw from the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, except the province of Kars. In return, article 61 stipulated that the European powers collectively will enforce the implementation of reforms for Armenians by the Sublime Porte. Hovannisian notes: “The conversion of article 16 to 61 was succinctly stated

5 After the fall of the last Armenian dynasty in the eleventh century (Bagratid Armenia 886–1045) and the last Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia in the fourteenth century (1080–1375) Armenia was partitioned for the last time between Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire in 1639. Later, Eastern Armenia, which was controlled by the Tsarist Russia since 1828, has often been viewed as an escape point for Armenians living in Western Armenia, controlled by the Ottoman Turkey. Of course, the treatment of minorities in Christian Russia has been marked by periods of brutality, especially during the rule of Alexander III (1881–94). But unlike Eastern Armenians in Russia, Western Armenians were facing existential issues on a massive scale.

6 For an excellent analysis of the contradictory nature of the British Empire’s attitudes toward Armenians and the Armenian Question in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Joanne Laycock, Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
by the Duke of Argyll: 'What was everybody’s business was nobody’s business’” (ibid., 210).

Three years later, major players Germany, Austro-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia, consumed by their own affairs, withdrew from their collective responsibility stated in the article 61.

Feeling abandoned by European imperialist powers, Armenian political parties, such as Armenakan (established by Ottoman/Western Armenians in 1885, Van), the Social Democrat Hnchakyan Party (SDHP, established by Russian/Eastern Armenians in 1887, Geneva) and the Armenian Revolutionary Party (ARF, established by Russian/Eastern Armenians in 1890, Tbilisi) started adopting socialist doctrines for solving the Armenian question. Party programs varied widely in terms of tactics and goals ranging from peaceful reforms through national emancipation and propaganda, mobilization of Armenians for self-defense and armed resistance against the state terror, revolutionary struggle against oppressive Ottoman regime, the establishment of some form of regional autonomy to a complete liberation, and establishment of a socialist Western Armenia (Suny 1993; Hovanissian 1997; Bournoutian 2002; Libaridian 2004). Meanwhile, fearful of significant territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire and relying on Europe’s reluctant intentions regarding Armenians, Sultan Abdul-Hamid II initiated his own solution to the Armenian question. According to various sources, in the years of 1894–96 about 200,000 Armenians were massacred and about 100,000 others escaped and found a refuge in other countries (Poghosyan 2005; Dadrian 2004; Hovannisian 1997; Lang 1981).

Following Hamidian massacres, Armenian parties (particularly the ARF) sought reforms from within and advocated a loosely defined political and economic freedom in a form of autonomy within the Turkish Empire. Essentially, Armenian parties did not seek full-fledged political independence. Yet the ARF had to scale back its goal of an autonomous Armenia since it

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7 Later, in 1908, the Armenian bourgeoisie established the Democratic Constitutional Party in Egypt. It was created as an opposition party to socialist ARF and SDHP parties, and advocated capitalism as the best ideology for solving both the Empire’s economic decay and Armenians’ socio-economic problems. In 1921 it was reorganized and was renamed as the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party.
was unacceptable to the Young Turks, who were emerging as a successful anti-Hamidian political force. The Young Turks argued that “Armenians needed neither European protectors nor a special status but could prosper, together with all other ethnic and religious elements, in the constitutional Turkey” (Hovannisian 1997, 229).

After the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks established a parliamentary system and guaranteed equality, civil liberties, and parliamentary representation for minorities. Yet an ideological split within the Young Turks between conservatives (i.e., the Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) and moderates (i.e., the Liberal Union) was widening as Turkey was experiencing serious military losses in the Balkans. In addition, the new idea of equality which ended the long-standing legal-customary superiority of Muslims was wearing off across the empire right after the revolution. The 1913 coup by the conservative wing CUP ended the revolutionary ideal of constitutional equality.

Concerned by European powers’ manipulative politics threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity and internal stability, the CUP leadership was determined to establish a strong and secure nation-state. The Turkish nation-state required a new vision and “the idea that the Turks were not just the ruling elite in a declining empire, but had a vast kinship, based on race and the Turkic languages, stretching from the Balkans to Siberia, was attractive, something to revive them after the hangover of democracy” (Walker 1997, 242). Hence, the adoption of a racist Pan-Turanist ideology was perceived by the CUP as one of the effective tools for achieving the objective of a strong and secure state. Walker notes that while theocracy tolerated the existence of ethno-religious communities, albeit with limited rights, the racist ideology did not have room for either ethnic or religious diversity (Walker 1997). National homogenization through Turkification of minorities (very often defined as internal enemies), including non-Turkish Muslims, such as Arabs and Kurds, became the main policy of the CUP elite. Libaridian notes that defining Armenians as enemies was particularly convenient “since Armenians were neither Turks nor Muslims;
and the long history of the Armenian Question as an integral part of the Eastern Question made identification with outside enemies, in this case, France, Great Britain, and Russia, easy.” (Libaridian 2004, 142).

Armenian political parties—the SDHP, the Democratic Constitutional Party, and the ARF—functioned as loyal and legitimate political institutions in Turkey. Particularly the ARF cooperated with the Young Turks’ government and continued hoping that the government would deliver its promised socio-economic and political reforms (i.e., security of life and property, political equality, economic development, abolition of feudal taxes, and land reform) (ibid., 149). Yet, by 1913, they came to a full realization that requests for even moderate reforms were not only being overlooked but were also being perceived as acts of separatism and of treason by the CUP. Meanwhile, Russia’s and Europe’s strategically revived interest in the Armenian question presented yet another historical opportunity for Armenians to solve the issue through a third power. From 1913 to 1914, with an active engagement of the Tsarist Russia, the Franco-Russian-British Entente and the Triple Alliance by Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy drafted a reform plan which promised a regional autonomy in six western Armenian provinces (vilayets): Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbakir, Harput, and Sivas (Hovannisian 1997).

However, with the outbreak of World War I, Turkey joined the Central Powers and effectively terminated Armenian reforms. For the CUP, termination of promised reforms for Armenians at this particular historical juncture was fully justified since they were supported by Turkey’s external enemies, mainly Russia. It was also justified, since the neither Muslim nor ethnically Turkish Armenians were perceived as the state’s internal enemies inhibiting the establishment of a full-fledged Turkish nation-state. Maneuvering in this complex web of international

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diplomacy, World War I, and the formation of the modern Turkish nation-state, the Young Turks’ CUP elite launched its final solution to the Armenian Question. The perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide were determined to eliminate the Armenian Question through a systematic and orderly extermination of Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire.

After 1.5 million deaths, the Armenian Question evolved for Armenians into a substantively and normatively different issue. It now included the recognition of the Genocide by Turkey, restoration of the ancestral homeland, financial reparations, and return of Armenians to their historic homeland. The transformation of the question was already evident during the short period of the first Armenian independent republic (1918–20) in Eastern Armenia.9 Already in 1919, the ARF leaders of the republic were formulating new, albeit very unsuccessful, approaches to the Armenian Question by declaring that the establishment of a unified and independent Armenia was the party’s ultimate political goal (Libaridian 2004a; Hovannisian 1997, 1973). As a result, the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920), initiated by victorious Entente Powers, recognized and approved Armenia’s official claim to Western Armenian territories in Turkey. According to the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey would recognize Armenia as a free and independent state. The signatories agreed to let the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, determine the boundaries of the proposed Armenian state. The proposed state incorporated Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van provinces. The Democratic Republic of Armenia was also prescribed with an outlet to the Black Sea at the port of Trabzon. Finally, according to the treaty Turkey would renounce any claim to the ceded land. The Treaty of Sevres was never implemented, however.10

Instead, in the course of an alliance between Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal and Soviet authorities, the Moscow Treaty (March 16, 1921) and the Treaty of Kars (October 13, 1921) were signed. The Moscow Treaty recognized Armenia's independence and sovereignty, while the Treaty of Kars defined the borders of the newly established Armenian state. However, the Treaty of Kars was annulled when the Turkish government and Entente Powers ratified the superseding Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

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1921) were signed. As a result not only Western Armenian territories but also territories of Kars and Ardahan that were in the Russian Empire since 1878 were returned to the Republic of Turkey (Bournoutian 2002; Hovannisian 1997, 1973).

2.4 The Soviet Union and the Armenian Question

After Armenia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921, the Armenian Question received various treatments depending on the goals pursued by the Soviet Union. Already in 1917, in his essay entitled “On Turkish Armenia,” Stalin wrote: “The Union of National Commissars adopted a special decree on a free self-determination of the ‘Turkish Armenia’” (Stalin 1947, 26). Stalin argued that for several years Armenians were duped by “civilized empires,” which pursued their own interests in the region. As a result of diplomatic maneuvering of the Turkish Armenia, Armenians were massacred and lost their historical lands. Hence, Stalin continued, the true national liberation of oppressed nations and the restoration of Turkish Armenian territories can be achieved only through joining the October revolution (ibid.). Yet, Stalin’s and Lenin’s strategic policy towards the Armenian Question was quickly reversed once the 1921 Moscow Treaty was signed and did not resurface in the Soviet agenda until the end of World War II.

Although displayed as a concern for Armenians’ just cause, the Soviet Union’s renewed interest in the Armenian Question after World War II was an attempt to increase the sphere of its influence in the post-WWII world, particularly in the so-called Northern Tier (i.e., Turkey, Iran, 

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11 The Moscow Treaty superseded all previous Russo-Turkish treaties by declaring them null and void. In addition, the treaty specified that Russia would decline to recognize any international act not ratified by the Turkish government. The treaty also stipulated the autonomous status of Nakhijevan (with large Armenian population) within Azerbaijan. See Richard Hovannisian, “The Republic of Armenia,” in Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, The Armenian People: From Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 303–47. The Treaty of Moscow (1921) in Russian language is available at http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/sab/moskovi.html (accessed 2/4/08). Special relationships between Turkey and the Soviet Union based on mutual interests were further strengthened by the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, signed on December 17, 1925.

12 The ARF leadership of the Armenian Republic was exiled once the Soviets took control of the republic.
and Afghanistan). In 1945, the Soviet Union abrogated the Soviet-Turkish Treaty on Neutrality and Friendship signed in 1925, and informed Turkey about the need for “a revision of the Soviet-Turkish border in the region of Kars and Ardahan and a revision of the Montreux Convention to give ‘real’ guarantees to the USSR, namely bases on Turkish territory and joint control of the straits in time of war” (Suny 1993, 166). Inspired by Stalin’s policy towards Turkey, Catholicos of the Mother See of Echmiadzin in the Soviet Armenia requested Stalin initiate the policy of Armenian repatriation to the motherland, stating: “The Armenian people are firmly convinced that the Great Russian people will aid them in realizing their patriotic and humane aspirations of recovering their national patrimony” (ibid., 167). Similarly, diaspora Armenians and organizations, including the ARF, mobilized their efforts for supporting the Soviet Union’s territorial demands from Turkey.

With the renewed hope of solving the Armenian Question, hostile relationships between the Soviet and diaspora Armenians, as well as among diaspora Armenians, seemed to fade away. Scholars note that for Soviet Armenian authorities, the repatriation policy was a way to address Soviet Armenia’s demographic concerns as a result of colossal human losses in World War II. For diaspora Armenians, the Soviet policy of repatriation was perceived as an opportunity for addressing two major issues dominating the diaspora’s thought: “the problem of the lost homeland and the evident process of de-Armenization of diaspora Armenians” (ibid.). According to Mouradian, in the years of 1945–47 about 90,000–100,000 Armenians, mostly from the Middle Eastern countries, repatriated to Soviet Armenia hopeful of a better life and ultimate resettlement in the lost homeland (Mouradian 1990, 325–26). Yet, their hopes were shattered once they reached the Soviet Armenia. Many of the repatriates suspected of supporting anti-Soviet ideology were sent to prisons in Siberia and Central Asia. In addition, the post-WWII Soviet Armenia was economically devastated and was not prepared to accommodate a large inflow of repatriates. As a result, relations between local and repatriated Armenians grew tense and hostile, with the latter
infamously named aghbarner. Aghbarner means brothers in Western Armenian dialect. However, it is used in a derogatory sense implying Armenians from abroad, that is, not real Armenians. Most importantly, the term signifies the identity cleavage between local and diaspora Armenians, which remains true even today.

Meanwhile, fearful of territorial losses, Turkey put forward all efforts to mobilize Turkish state and society against Stalin’s demands. Taking advantage of cooling relations between the Big Three (i.e., Great Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union), and the West’s growing suspicions about the Soviets’ geopolitical intentions in the Northern Tier and Eastern Europe, Turkey insisted that Turkish territorial integrity not be violated. Stalin’s expansionist policies eventually led to Winston Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946, marking the beginning of the Cold War between the USSR and the West. Stalin’s policies were perceived as a direct threat to Western interests in the Middle East and succumbing to Soviet demands from Turkey meant allowing the creation of a communist satellite (Suny 1993). Citing the U.S. intelligence report, Suny writes: “Strategic and political considerations regarding the Middle and Near East in general weigh infinitely more than championship of Armenian irredentism in the Soviet claim regarding the Armenian (or Georgian) provinces of Turkey. As a by-product, however, the Armenian question is played up both as a good pretext for the Soviet claims and as an effective means of enlisting the sympathy and/or support of Armenians throughout the world” (Suny 1993, 173).

Eventually, the Soviet Union withdrew its demands on Turkey and a new alliance between Great Britain, the United States, and Turkey was formed in 1946. In the following years, with the Cold War in full-fledged ascent, Turkey became a member of NATO and the United States stationed military bases in Turkey. With the Soviets’ failed policies in the Northern Tier and the renewed era of state terror against any nationalist claim, the Armenian Question was dropped from the Soviet agenda for the next twenty years.
After Stalin's death in 1953 and with Khruschev's era of de-Stalinization, the Soviet Union relaxed its policies towards cultural and nationalist claims. Within this environment of limited tolerance of cultural and nationalist aspirations, Armenians saw another opportunity to raise the Armenian Question. Importantly, this renewed interest in the Armenian Question was organized and sanctioned by Soviet authorities. In 1965, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide, Soviet authorities for the first time sanctioned official commemoration of the Genocide. The commemoration ceremony was performed by the Armenian Catholicos Vazgen I at the Spendaryan Opera House in Yerevan. Outside the Opera House, Armenians organized mass demonstrations demanding that Moscow urge Turkey to recognize the Genocide and return historical lands. Moscow, of course, did not comply, but very interestingly despite the disordered nature of demonstrations, it has sanctioned peaceful marches on April 24 ever since (Suny 1993). Moreover, two years later Moscow authorized the construction of the Genocide memorial in the capital city, Yerevan. In addition, Soviet authorities allowed the establishment of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Diaspora Armenians, commonly referred as Spyurk (i.e., diaspora) Committee, with an objective to strengthen homeland-diaspora ties. The real objective, however, was to propagate pro-Soviet ideology among diaspora Armenians, who by then were already split into pro- and anti-Soviet camps. Soviet authorities encouraged Catholicos in Echmiadzin to visit diaspora communities and advocate the political message that the Armenian nation could not have survived without Mother Russia.

13 Very interestingly, on April 24, 1965, Soviet authorities allowed Genocide commemoration even in Moscow, where after the ceremony Armenian students for the first time marched to the Turkish Embassy and demanded to lower its flag. See Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 320, note 1.

14 The Genocide memorial is an impressive architectural construction where the 44 meter stele symbolizes the national rebirth of Armenians and 12 slabs positioned in a circle, represent 12 lost provinces in Turkey. At the center of the circle there is an eternal flame around which Armenians put millions of flowers.

15 The Diaspora Committee was promoting closer ties between Soviet and diaspora Armenians in cultural and education matters. For instance, it provided some diaspora communities with Armenian textbooks, organized educational and artistic exchange programs, and sponsored free education in Soviet Armenian universities for diaspora youth. The Committee was also sanctioned to disseminate Soviet Armenian papers and magazines, such as Voice of the Fatherland and Soviet Armenia among diaspora communities. See Panossian, *The Armenians*, 369–71.
Scholars disagree regarding the Soviet authorities’ reasoning for these generous concessions. However, according to a general consensus, unlike nationalism manifested in Baltic states and Ukraine, Armenian nationalism was by and large not a threat to Soviets’ internal order. After all, for Armenians the main enemy was the Turk, not the Russian. The dominant Armenian perception of a Russian was still one of a “big brother,” who sympathized with Armenians’ existential concerns. Building on these perceptions, the post-Stalin Soviet authorities were not threatened by expressions of a limited Armenian nationalism. In fact, as Suny notes, “Armenian nationalism until 1988 was consistent with the long tradition of Russophilia that marked it in the past. Armenians were still a ‘loyal millet’ within the Soviet Socialist world” (Suny 1993, 186). Soviet authorities did not revisit the Armenian Question ever since, at least not publicly.

2.5 Diaspora and the Armenian Cause

Political parties which traditionally acted on behalf of Armenians and the Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire—the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), Social Democrat Hnchakyan Party (SDHP), and the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADLP)—and very briefly in the Eastern Armenia (i.e., ARF), were searching for new avenues for acting on behalf of post-Genocide Armenian diaspora. While Genocide was the most painful event, from the 1920s through 1965 it was not a political issue for diaspora Armenians. It rather remained largely as a tragic narrative remembered and mourned by succeeding post-Genocide generations. However, starting in the mid-1960s, largely as a reaction to events in Soviet Armenia in 1965, the Genocide was politicized by post-Genocide diaspora political elites. Essentially, political elites transformed the Armenian Question into the Armenian Cause, which encompassed the three R’s: Recognition of the Genocide, Reparation of historic lands in Western Armenia, and Repatriation of Armenians to their historic homeland.
After a violent dispersion from their historic lands survivors of the Genocide (about 400,000) found refuge in Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus as well as in a number of Middle Eastern and European countries. Traumatized and tortured, hungry and sick, Armenians had to cope with new perplexities in unfamiliar environments. Surviving, healing, and integrating into new socio-economic and political settings often proved to be uneasy goals, particularly where these attempts were met by resistance and discrimination by recipient states. Being dispersed across the globe, the post-Genocide diaspora adopted socio-cultural and political peculiarities of their various host states and eventually emerged as a multi-local heterogeneous entity.

Scholars disagree whether the multi-local nature of diaspora, absorbed by peculiarities of their environs, introduced sharp differences in diaspora Armenian identity and therefore influenced the diaspora's perceptions of the Armenian Cause. Diaspora and ethnic identities, just like national identities, are flexible, continuously evolving, and changing. Numerous studies indicate that stateless and multi-local diaspora and ethnic identities are situational, being defined and redefined in response to politics of their host states and homelands. Host governments' political priorities regarding domestic multicultural and foreign policies continuously reshape the extent of these groups' political activity, available resources and mobilization efforts, particularly around the issues that extend beyond the host states' political borders (Shain 1999, 1994; Tololyan 1996).

This, of course, does not imply that diaspora and ethnic identities are passive recipients of host and homeland policies. To the contrary, as Nagel demonstrates, both the agency (i.e., ethnic and diaspora groups) and structure (i.e., the external audience) are in a continuous process of negotiating, revising, and revitalizing the meaning of particular ethnic boundaries (i.e., identities) (Nagel 1994). While diaspora and ethnic groups can choose and highlight certain elements of their identity, they are also limited to socially and politically defined ethnic categories with vary-
ing degrees of stigma or advantage attached to them (ibid.). The case of Armenian diaspora demonstrates that its identity has and is being shaped by both agency and structure. It also demonstrates that although the Genocide was and is a constitutive element of diaspora identity, diaspora elites’ proposed tactics and solutions to this pan-national issue were not always shared by multi-local diaspora members.

A vast literature indicates that identity formation was fraught with difficulties and contradictions very much dependent on political party affiliations (i.e., the ARF, SDHP, ADLP, and the Armenian Progressive League [APL]), political ideology (pro- or anti-Soviet), and ecclesiastic-cum-political alignments and location (Middle East or Western liberal societies). Each of these ingredients very often was instrumental, necessitating identity revisions at various stages. Panossian (2006) contends that by the late 1920s, diaspora elites (i.e., the ARF, SDHP, and ADLP), despite divisions along ideological and political lines and disagreements regarding linguistic, religious, and cultural matters, produced a clearly articulated vision of Armenian identity, which among others included language, history, religion (Apostolic, Catholic or Protestant), commitment to the Armenian Cause (i.e., liberation of lost lands in Turkey), anti-Turkishness, and repatriation to lost lands (Panossian 2006, 300–1). Moreover, elites managed to inculcate this vision across multi-local diaspora transforming it into a “norm or ideal” (ibid.).

For instance, in an article entitled “Our Neutrals,” published in the Armenian Review in 1954, an ARF member stated that “there is really no such thing as a ‘neutral.’ Since Soviet ‘imperialism’ runs contrary to the democratic values espoused by the ‘free countries in which we live,’ a ‘neutral’ stance towards its policies is disastrous for the diaspora because it arouses the suspicion of the host countries and encourages the cultural, political and religious oppression of Armenians in the homeland. Armenians cannot afford to be neutral because the conditions for struggle still exist.” See Armen Gakavian, “Homeland, Diaspora and Nationalism: The Reimagination of American-Armenian Identity Since Gorbachev” (unpublished thesis, 1997), chap. 3, available at http://www.realchange.nareg.com.au/phd.htm (accessed 3/4/08). The article reflects the “situational aspect” of the Armenian diaspora identity, which is limited by structural constraints, such as socio-political culture of the host country. However, it also demonstrates that these limitations at the same time are opportunities for advancing the party’s identity priorities, that is being anti-Soviet Armenia and “struggling” for the Armenian Cause, that is, for freedom, independence, and unification of two parts of Armenia. Very importantly, from 1944 through the early 1950s as well as in the late 1970s, the sequence in ARF’s slogan was changed from “free, independent and united Armenia” to “united and independent Armenia.” Changed priorities primarily signaled the party’s choice of becoming pro-Soviet, further strengthening the argument about the situational nature of stateless ethnic identities. See more below.
Yet, the literature also indicates that this unity was only a transitory stage later to erupt into inter- and intra-communal struggle and violence. For diaspora political parties the most important objective was to assume hegemonic leadership of the Armenian diaspora. Moreover, diaspora parties did not politicize the Genocide, that is, they did not officially demand from Turkey to recognize the Genocide and address the issues of territorial and financial reparations, at least up until the mid-1960s.\(^{17}\) By the early 1930s the diaspora was divided along partisan lines, each delineating its own version of Armenian identity. Very importantly, the three parties were in the process of reformulating the substance of the Armenian Question itself by asking whether the Soviet Armenia is a good worthy of the diaspora’s support or whether it should be rejected as a flawed political-ideological construct, which does not truly represent national ideals and aspirations.

The three parties disagreed on their ideological stance towards the Soviet Armenia (Libaridian 2004a, 1999; Bournoutian 2002; Dekmejian 1997; Suny 1993). Interestingly, however, the ideological divide was quite inconsistent and was in sharp contrast with parties’ foundational tenets. For instance, the traditionally socialist ARF party adopted anti-Soviet and pro-Western stance. Scholars agree that this ideological inconsistency could be explained by historical circumstances and resentment against the Soviet Union. After all, the ARF was the government exiled by the Soviet authorities.\(^{18}\) Traditionally liberal ADLP, formed to represent

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\(^{17}\) One exception to this tendency was in the years of repatriation to Soviet Armenia in 1945–47. Still, the revival of the Armenian Question during this historical period was initiated by Stalin, not by diaspora political parties. Hence the latter acted in response to Soviet political demands from Turkey rather than independently initiating these political claims.

\(^{18}\) It must be noted that the ARF’s anti-Soviet stance since the 1920s as well as from the mid-1950s through 1970s contradicts its pro-Soviet position taken in 1944. Citing the Department of State, Office of Research and Intelligence, “Notes on Armenian National Aspirations and on the Soviet Claims to the Eastern Provinces of Turkey,” March 12, 1946, no. 3523.2, Suny writes: “In the first years of the World War II, there were contacts between German agents and some Tashnag [Dashnak] leaders . . . . Nevertheless, the outright ‘collaboration’ of individual Tashnags and the broadcast appeals of one prominent leader over the Berlin radio for a crusade against the common Bolshevik foe cast the stigma of pro-Nazism on the party as a whole . . . . In July 1944 the Tashnag Party decided to reverse the anti-Soviet policy it had followed since 1920, when the Soviets annexed the Armenian Republic founded by the Tashnags. The change was officially explained as a determination to help the USSR in its efforts to rebuild Armenia; but it does not imply
bourgeois class interests to begin with, took a pro-Soviet stance. The party's odd stance, according to scholars, could be explained by the resentment held against the ARF. According to the party, the ARF not only failed the Armenian Question in the Ottoman Turkey but also lost the first independent Armenian Republic. The ADLP's pro-Soviet stance and recognition of the Soviet Armenia as a homeland could also be explained as a pragmatic response given Soviet Russia's protection of the only existing homeland and absence of the historical homeland. Marxist SDHP and APL displayed consistency between party ideology and their pro-Soviet stance and "defended Soviet Armenia as the practical answer to the Armenian Question, a secure state backed by a powerful Russian ally" (Suny 1993, 222). Like ADLP these parties held resentment against the ARF for its failed policies and aligned themselves with the ADLP in an anti-ARF struggle. In this web of resentments, historical animosities, and ideological inconsistencies, parties fought for maximizing their influence among diaspora communities, assuming the leadership position and ultimately defining the Armenian diaspora's identity. The net result was a compartmentalized, fragmented, and highly politicized diasporic community.

Meanwhile, parties did not cease their attempts to define Armenian identity. For instance, in the early 1930s the ARF adopted the ideology of *tseghagron* (race-based religion) developed by a party member, Garegin Nzhdeh. Nzhdeh was a national hero fighting against the Ottoman Turkey and Turkish expansion in the Eastern Armenia. Also, he was a Prime Minister and Minister of Defense during the short-lived independent Armenian Republic in 1918–20. While in exile, Nzhdeh blamed Armenian misfortunes, primarily the Genocide and Sovietization of Ar-

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Tashnag reconciliation to Soviet overlordship. The Tashnags have not given up their long-range goal of a 'United and Independent Armenia,' but hold that under present conditions, when Soviet might and the Soviet hold on Armenia are unshakable, it would be unpatriotic to block the efforts that are being made for the progress and territorial aggrandizement of Armenia. They believe that their ideal will have to be achieved in two stages: union of Turkish and Russians Armenia now; and independence whenever they can attain it. Although the diehards are unhappy about this compromise, the party as a whole seems determined to contribute its support to the Soviet policy of rebuilding a United Armenia, with the reservation that once the task is accomplished they will turn against the Soviet regime" (Suny 1993, 174–75). In addition, antagonistic parties ARF and SDHP, ADLP and APL collaborated briefly and supported Soviet territorial demands from Turkey and the policy of repatriation in 1945.
menia, on the slavish condition brought by Christianity. Rejecting Christianity as a nihilistic and intrinsically anti-Armenian moral system, Nzhdeh praised the pre-Christian values of power and violence necessary for achieving pan-national goals. However, teachings of tseghagron did not resonate well with Christian Armenians especially in the United States. Tseghagron was a short-lived party ideology but eventually resulted in the creation of the ARF-affiliated movement called the Armenian Youth Federation.¹⁹

It was clear that the surest way of achieving the role of pan-Armenian leadership was through controlling the Apostolic Church, which continued being the highest authority transcending multi-local diaspora communities. Ecclesiastic-cum-political alignments shook diaspora communities for about twenty years, from the early 1930s to the late 1950s, eventually dividing it into antagonistic camps. Scholars agree that one of the most defining moments further fragmenting the Armenian diaspora was the assassination of the newly re-elected Archbishop Tourian in New York in 1933. Archbishop Tourian had a pro-Soviet stance and was supported by the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin in the Soviet Armenia, the ADLP, SDHP, and APL, but was opposed by Dashnaks (i.e., ARF) (Libaridian 2004b; Bournoutian 2002; Dekmejian 1997).²⁰ Libaridian notes: "This is one event, which similar to a few others in Armenian history, suspend the sense of time as well as define collective memory . . . . The assassination of the Archbishop was even labeled a ‘yeghern’ or holocaust by his supporters . . . . The ‘two church’ system that evolved, one ‘Dashnak’ and the other ‘anti-Dashnak,’ combines the worst features of Armenian feudal behavior: political institutions controlling religious ones; and when political power is divided,

¹⁹ During World War II, Nzhdeh fought on the German side against the Soviet Union. In 1944, he was captured by the Soviet soldiers and died in the Soviet prison. Very importantly, the ideology of tseghagron became the guiding ideology of the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). The RPA underwent a number of changes since its creation and increasingly embraced the tseghagron ideology, particularly since 1999. The party, however, has no quarrels with the Church or with the Christian religion. See more below.

²⁰ Despite the ARF’s denial, the party has been largely suspected in the assassination of the Archbishop Tourian. Suny (1993) notes that as a result of these events, American-Armenians “attend rival churches” allied either to the ADLP or the ARF till now. Furthermore, while anti-ARF segment of diaspora accepted the Mother See in Echmiadzin as the only pan-Armenian church, the ARF supporters remain loyal to the Catholicossate of the Great House of Cilicia in Antelias, Lebanon.
The assassination led to an alienation of a sizable diaspora community, particularly of the younger generation, which distanced its ties with the Apostolic Church and the Armenian diaspora.

The ideological rivalry between parties reached its heights in 1952 over the Catholicossate of the Great House of Cilicia in Anthelia, Lebanon. In 1956, the ARF won the battle over the Catholicossate of Cilicia. Churches in the United States, South America, Canada, Lebanon, Cyprus, Iran, Syria, and Greece allied with the ARF and denounced the Mother See of Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia. The net result was the final split of the Armenian Church and with it of the politically active diaspora, one segment supporting the ARF’s visions of the Armenian identity, church, and political principles and the other rejecting it. The ARF camp rejected Soviet Armenia as a true homeland, pledged its allegiance to the Catholicossate of Cilicia, and concentrated its efforts on anti-Soviet activity. The anti-ARF camp decided that Soviet Armenia, for better or worse, was the only existing homeland, pledged its allegiance to Mother See in Etchmiadzin, and concentrated its efforts on pro-Soviet activity. Both sides also established their own cultural, educational, youth, sports, and philanthropic associations, “thus striving to preserve and reproduce in their own host countries ‘Armenian identity’ as seen through the prism of their own ideologies” (Astourian 2005, 82).

With the outbreak of the Cold War, diaspora parties initiated their own war, one side supporting the agenda of the West and the other side supporting the agenda of the Soviet Union. These divisions led to full-fledged intra-communal wars in Iran in 1953 and the Lebanon Crisis in 1958, with pro-Soviet parties “supporting the anti-Shah and anti-Maronite factions, and the Dashnaks (i.e., the ARF) joining the pro-Western coalitions” (Bournoutian 2002, 361).

Scholars agree that the Genocide’s commemoration ceremony in Soviet Armenia in 1965 sanctioned by Soviet authorities was one of the most defining moments triggering the politici-

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zation of the Armenian Cause among diaspora communities. The Genocide had a crucial impact on diaspora’s identity but its narrative was limited to the ethno-religious and cultural domains. However, events in the homeland necessitated reformulation of the Genocide narrative embracing its political aspect. For instance, referring to events in the homeland Suny notes: “A new discourse around the genocide developed, along with ritual observances on April 24, conferences and institutes for study of genocide, and political action to have European and American governments recognize the ‘forgotten Holocaust’” (Suny 1993, 228). Panossian notes that: “Explicitly politicized in the diaspora, and implicitly in Armenia, the Genocide became the core of what it meant to be Armenian in the political domain . . . . In addition to the traditional realm of ‘grandmother stories,’ the Genocide was placed squarely in the realm of collective identity. Private grief was transformed into a key symbol of Armenianess on April 24 1965” (Panossian 2006, 322). Aghanian notes:

The outburst of nationalism in the homeland coincided with a new bolder era of ethnic mobilization throughout the Diaspora . . . . On April 24 1965 services in commemoration of the genocide were conducted throughout the Diaspora in many cases organized by joint committees of the three political parties. Articles and pamphlets were published by various groups within the Diaspora communities coupling the demand for genocide recognition with the demand for the restoration of the Turkish-Armenian lands. Such articles were regularly published from 1965 onwards and in each case strong appeals were made to the governments of the Armenians’ host countries, particularly the United States (Aghanian 2007, 105).

In the 1960s all three diaspora parties included Genocide recognition in their political platforms. Finally in 1975, three diaspora parties, in a rare instance of cooperation, presented a joint memorandum to the United Nations demanding the “return of Turkish-held Armenian territories to their rightful owner-the Armenian people” (Libaridian 2004a, 40-41).
Since the politicization of the Armenian Cause in 1965, diaspora Armenians actively engaged in various activities such as dissemination of Genocide documentation, public demonstrations, erection of memorial monuments, anti-Turkish propaganda, and lobbying in various governmental and international organizations for pressuring Turkey to acknowledge its moral, political, and legal responsibilities. Importantly, diaspora Armenians attempted to achieve historical justice primarily through peaceful means. However, the more forceful the Armenian demand to recognize the Genocide, the more vehement was the Turkish denial of the Genocide.

Scholars note that the frustration growing out of a failure to achieve historical justice was partially responsible for addressing the Genocide issue through violent means. As a result of frustrated expectations coupled with a threat of assimilation and ongoing inter- and intra-communal fights, the Armenian Cause entered its most radical stage. In 1975, practically simultaneously two terrorist organizations, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide-Armenian Revolutionary Army (JCAG-ARA), appeared in the political arena.22 The primary targets of terrorism were Turkish officials in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. In the period of 1975 through 1983, Armenian terrorism claimed lives of 33 Turkish diplomats and 30 civilians; about 200 people were wounded (Panossian 2006).

The diaspora’s duality was reflected even in this terrorist activity. The ASALA party was not affiliated with any of the three diaspora parties and claimed that its political ideology was based on Marxism and the Third World movement. ASALA adopted a pro-Soviet and an anti-Western stance and was allegedly supported by the Soviet KGB. The ASALA was created as a radical reaction to diaspora’s duality, which according to party members was manipulated by imperialistic powers (i.e., the West) and was distracted from the Armenian Cause. The JCAG-

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22 ASALA’s and JCAG’s first communiqués were issued in 1975 on January 20 and October 23, respectively. In 1983 the JCAG was dissolved and was replaced by the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). See Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of their People: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (New York: GP Press, 1986).
ARA, which was reportedly associated with the ARF and was created as an opposition to ASALA, adopted anti-Soviet agenda. Both ASALA and JCAG-ARA claimed the leadership in pursuing the Armenian Cause through revolutionary armed struggle.

In 1981, ASALA published its political program according to which “the main enemy was the Turkish imperialism . . . . Revolutionary violence was said to be the principal means to achieve the liberation of Armenian territories . . . . The final goal was a united Armenia with a democratic, socialist and revolutionary government. The Soviet Union and other socialist government were to be called upon for help and Soviet Armenia itself turned into a base for the long people’s war” (Gunter 1986, 45). In his analysis of numerous documents issued by both JCAG-ARA and the ARF, Gunter concludes that the JCAG-ARA’s political goals have been consistent with the goals pursued by the ARF. Citing JCAG-ARA’s sources, Gunter writes: “We continue to emphasize and focus on the Treaty of Sevres . . . . it is the cornerstone and the most important element for our cause . . . . The exact goals of the Armenian Cause . . . . are the right of Armenians to live in their homeland and the right of self-determination . . . . unless these are communicated to the world, the heroic sacrifices of the Armenian freedom fighters will have been made in vain” (Gunter 1986, 57). The ARA’s political goals were not different from the goals pursued by its predecessor, the JCAG. In 1983, the ARA declared that: “Our target is the Turkish reactionary government through all its official representatives . . . . Our campaign will conclude when, taking note of the legality of the Armenian Cause, the Turkish government begins negotiations with the representatives of the Armenian people” (ibid., 60).

The competition between terrorist groups for hegemonic leadership of the Armenian Cause escalated into inter-group violence and a range of assassinations. Eventually, ASALA was split into radical and moderate wings. By 1984 both ASALA and ARA disappeared from the political arena leaving diaspora politics to traditional by-polar political parties.
Although it is difficult to assess objectively the impact of terrorism on the diaspora, literature indicates that the impact was multidimensional (Aghanian 2007; Dekmejian 1997; Tololyan 1988; Bakalian 1993; Gunter 1986). Some find that it contributed to further fragmentation and alienation of diaspora, particularly in North America where terrorism was found repulsive. Others note that terrorism slowed down the so-called “white genocide,” the assimilation of diaspora youth, which was re-awakened by the attention brought through militant tactics.

Gunter (1986) notes that the real objective of terrorist groups could not have been the realization of three R’s. After all, they should have known that neither the Soviet Union nor Western powers were going to pressure Turkey. Dekmejian (1997) notes that the Turkish denial of the historical injustice, the absence of an Armenian independent state to act on behalf of the nation, the growing realization that the diaspora condition is permanent, and the increasing speed of assimilation contributed to diaspora’s fundamental frustration, cynicism, and externalized aggression. Hence, although terrorism cannot be justified, the outburst of it could be understood as an extreme statement of national rebirth, a radical attempt to revitalize the sense of nationalism and pride in ethnic heritage and identity.23

After almost fifty years of inter- and intra-communal clashes, the diaspora entered a stage of inner peace. Intra-communal peace did not result in unity, however. Maintaining traditional ecclesiastic-cum-political divisions, diaspora elites put forward united efforts towards the solution of the Armenian Cause. By the 1970s, the ARF, which emerged as the dominant diaspora party,

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23 Tololyan contends that the origins of the Armenian terrorism could be found in two interwoven cultural narratives. The two narratives were the 1915 Genocide and the story of Vardan and the martyrs in the second half of the fifth century A.D. One of the most significant battles in Armenian history, the Battle of Avarayr, took place in 451 A.D. when Armenians refusing to convert into Zoroastrianism rebelled against Persians. The Armenian army, led by Vardan Mamikonian, had a numerical disadvantage and was defeated. According to the story, Armenian martyrs fell for defending the Armenian Christianity, the constitutive element of the Armenian identity. Hence, although Vardan and his followers lost the battle they held the moral victory. The event is commemorated by a Saint’s Day in the calendar of the Apostolic Church till now. Both events symbolize moral victory in the face of Armenian calamities. Moral victory in turn justifies martyrdom and death for a cause. See Khachig Tololyan, “Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 217–33.
relaxed its anti-Soviet stance and acknowledged Soviet Armenia as a transitory condition and “a foundation upon which the ‘Free, Independent and United Armenia’ it envisioned should be built” (Astourian 2005, 82). This move facilitated inter-party cooperation focusing on the issue of common concern: the Armenian Cause. In 1984, four resolutions dealing with the Armenian Cause were being discussed by the U.S. Congress. Finally, in 1985 the three parties issued a “Joint Communique” demanding that:

The Turkish Government recognize the Armenian Genocide; return the historic homeland to the Armenian people; make material reparations for their heinous and unspeakable crime to the victims of the Genocide; that all world governments, and especially the Superpowers, officially recognize the Armenian Genocide and Armenian territorial rights and refuse to succumb to all Turkish political pressure; that the U.S. Government free itself from the friendly positions it has adopted towards its unreliable ally, Turkey, and officially recognize the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide as well as be supportive of the pursuit of Armenian territorial demands; and that the Soviet Armenian government use effective means to have the Armenian Case (including the internal territorial demands) recognized by the Soviet Central Government (Aghanian 2007, 105).

The four resolutions were: “House Joint Resolution 247, designating April 24, 1984 as a National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man; House Resolution 171 and Senate Resolution 124 according to which the Armenian genocide was conceived by the Turkish Ottoman Government and implemented from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the extermination of one and a half million Armenian men, women, and children, and that the policy of the United States was to embrace these historical events; and Senate Joint Resolution 87 resolved that April 24, 1984 be designated as a day of remembrance for all victims of genocide especially those of Armenian ancestry.” See Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause, 100-1. Initially, due to interventions of President Reagan and the U.S. State Department, all four resolutions did not pass. Nevertheless, Resolution 247 was passed later by the House and another Resolution 241 “expressing the sense of the Senate that the foreign policy of the United States should take account of the genocide of the Armenian people” was passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (ibid., 101). More recently in October 2007, the U.S. House attempted to pass Resolution 106, recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Despite House Speaker Pelosi’s assurances, the resolution failed to materialize and was heavily criticized by President George Bush, the U.S. State Department, and Turkey. Currently, 40 of the 50 U.S. states recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. In 1987, the European Parliament recognized the Armenian Genocide. In addition, 22 countries officially recognized the Armenian Genocide. For the list of U.S. states and countries that officially recognized the Armenian Genocide, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognition_of_the_Armenian_Genocide#International_organizations (accessed 3/8/2008).

24 The four resolutions were: “House Joint Resolution 247, designating April 24, 1984 as a National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man; House Resolution 171 and Senate Resolution 124 according to which the Armenian genocide was conceived by the Turkish Ottoman Government and implemented from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the extermination of one and a half million Armenian men, women, and children, and that the policy of the United States was to embrace these historical events; and Senate Joint Resolution 87 resolved that April 24, 1984 be designated as a day of remembrance for all victims of genocide especially those of Armenian ancestry.” See Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause, 100-1. Initially, due to interventions of President Reagan and the U.S. State Department, all four resolutions did not pass. Nevertheless, Resolution 247 was passed later by the House and another Resolution 241 “expressing the sense of the Senate that the foreign policy of the United States should take account of the genocide of the Armenian people” was passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (ibid., 101). More recently in October 2007, the U.S. House attempted to pass Resolution 106, recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Despite House Speaker Pelosi’s assurances, the resolution failed to materialize and was heavily criticized by President George Bush, the U.S. State Department, and Turkey. Currently, 40 of the 50 U.S. states recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. In 1987, the European Parliament recognized the Armenian Genocide. In addition, 22 countries officially recognized the Armenian Genocide. For the list of U.S. states and countries that officially recognized the Armenian Genocide, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognition_of_the_Armenian_Genocide#International_organizations (accessed 3/8/2008).
Divided but in peace, diaspora political elites were united by tragic past and a new vision of the Armenian Cause. In this vision, Soviet Armenia was assigned an instrumental role of an intermediary leading to a “true” homeland, Western Armenia. In this context, the existence of Armenia within the Soviet Union was essential since it was the latter that would guarantee both territorial unification of Armenia and the security of unified lands. According to this vision, unification of Armenian territories was substantively and strategically prior to a “forbidden fruit,” the establishment of independent Armenian state (Libaridian 1999).

Yet history took an unpredictable course jeopardizing this new vision of the Armenian Cause. The Soviet Empire was quaking at its core and neither Soviet Armenian authorities nor diaspora political elites were prepared to cope with this monumental political challenge. Three diaspora parties issued a joint communique criticizing mass-demonstrations and other “extreme acts,” endangering “the good standing of our nation in its relations with the higher Soviet bodies” and upsetting the “unity of our people” (Libaridian 1991, 129). Homeland authorities criticized “extremist elements,” reminded Armenians about dangers of pan-Turanism, and preached about the Soviet Union’s historical role in fulfilling national aspirations.

By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet structure started breaking down and in the course of a couple of years the center lost its control over separatist peripheries. On August 23, 1990, Armenia passed its Declaration on Independence. On September 21, 1991, following a national

\[25\text{In 1987 during Gorbachev's era of glasnost and perestroika, the ARF chairman Hrair Marukhian announced: "... today, at great sacrifice, the Armenian people must continue to adhere to the credo that was consecrated by the blood of one and one half million victims and by the lives of all those who died during the liberation struggle, and [see] the credo as the source of renewing energy, an impetus for the continuing struggle... That credo must unite its inherent potential to the gravitational power of the positive achievements of present-day Armenia and must direct toward our small nation the possibilities of Armenia so that the Armenia of today, which is anchor to tomorrow's united and independent Armenia, continues to grow and become a considerable power... this [prioritization] further underlines the fact that the demand for independence is not necessarily the same as opposition to the present reality of Armenia..." See Hrair Marukhian, “We Must Cherish the Vision of a Free, Independent, and United Armenia,” in Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era: Essays, Interviews, and Speeches by the Leaders of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia, ed. Gerard Libaridian (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991), Appendix B-Two, 143-45.}

\[26\text{See “Joint Statement by the Three Armenian Political Parties in the Diaspora,” in Armenia at the Crossroads, ed. Libaridian, Appendix A-One, 127-29.}
referendum on independence, Armenia declared its political independence and in October 1991, Levon Ter-Petrosyan was elected as the first president of the independent Republic of Armenia. On March 2, 1992, Armenia joined the community of sovereign states once the independence of the Republic of Armenia was formally recognized by the United Nations.

2.6 Armenian Question or Question for Armenians? Liberal Nationalist Politics of Remembering

Since 1988, the homeland born-Karabagh Committee, later transformed into Armenian all-National Movement party (ANM), led the Karabagh movement. Initially known as the Karabagh movement, snow-balling events eventually transformed it into an independence movement. Scholars properly note that the independence movement in Armenia, just like in all breakaway Soviet republics, was accompanied by a nationalist rhetoric endorsing a revival of ethnic history, religion, language, and pride for ethnic belongingness. However, there was another development that for different reasons did not receive appropriate attention in the literature. While celebrating ethno-cultural values of the Armenian identity, such as language, religion, folk, and traditions, Armenian intellectual elites were simultaneously questioning core values in Armenian history and political thought. Critically reflecting upon ethno-political aspect of Armenian identity the new intellectual elite argued for a necessity of revising it.

Particularly they were questioning the conventional interpretation of the ethnic history, heroes, and myth, which emphasized and indeed romanticized victimhood vs. scrutinizing failed
strategies leading to bigger calamities, moral victories brought by martyrs vs. lost tangible victories, slavishness and reliance on foreign powers for solving national aspirations vs. self-reliance, and collective fear and hatred against the Turk vs. seeking rational approaches for addressing the national tragedy.

Intellectual elites believed that national identity had to be re-defined in a way that addresses state security and promotes liberal and communal values equally. Essentially, intellectuals were offering a “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity which would sustain the project of liberal democracy and celebrate ethnic heritage without compromising of liberal principles. In several publications, elites made it clear that “thick” ethno-nationalist identity promoting the vision of a victimized nation inhibits liberal political culture, restrains political freedoms, individual choice and endangers state security.

Elites promoting liberal nationalist identity questioned the conventional primordial worldview that the Armenian history was nothing but an endless story of national victimization and eternal struggle against the Turkish enemy. As a result, they denounced the victim identity, which they saw as a double-edged sword threatening the statehood from within and out. On the one hand, the narrative of victim identity augmented primordial fears of further victimization in the absence of a powerful sponsor (i.e., Russia or the West). From this perspective, the idea of independent state could not be justified since ethnic survival and security had to take precedence over it.

On the other hand, new intellectual elites were concerned that the idea of a victimized nation, implicitly nurturing feelings of anxiety, envy, hatred, and frustration for unfulfilled national aspirations, could transform into full-fledged externalized resentment. Indeed, once the idea of independent statehood was realized, the narrative of victim identity evoked the externalization of primordial fears through state sponsored aggression against the eternal enemy, Turkey. From this perspective ideas of liberal democratic statehood, and normalization of relations with
Turkey and Azerbaijan, were not defensible. Victimized-but-resentful identity did not have room for a project of liberal democracy and instead promoted the politics of hatred, ethnic exclusion, and one particular conception of good life: the fulfillment of the Armenian Cause. Here, the existence of independent state was not only justified but was also expected to undertake a paternalistic role and moral responsibility of addressing and restituting all historical injustices, from Genocide recognition to recovering territorial losses and repatriation.

It was within this context that new intellectual elites perceived the victim identity as a double-edged self-destructive ideology, on the one hand resisting the idea of independent state and on the other hand resisting the idea of liberal democratic state.

Diaspora political parties and Armenian communists alike argued that political independence from Russia should be prevented since the threat of pan-Turanism leading to a further victimization of the nation was imminent. In sharp contrast, new elites disapproved the self-definition of victimized people and denounced as irrational the fear and threats of pan-Turanism. Already in 1989, the Karabagh Committee had a clearly articulated stance regarding the threat of Pan-Turanism and made the following statement:

some of our intellectuals are still feverishly preaching the politically bankrupt and dangerous mentality according to which, Armenia, being surrounded by enemy peoples of another religion, can survive only when it is under the protection of a powerful state . . . . The concept of Armenia as an obstruction of Pan-Turanic plans and, therefore, as the political factor serving Russia’s interests, pushes the Armenian question into the complex sphere of international relations, which has always been pregnant with dangerous consequences for our people . . . . The Karabagh Committee . . . has rejected from the start the dangerous mentality of placing our hopes on an external savior and seeing Pan-Turkism as a permanent threat . . . . The Karabagh Committee condemns, in the harshest terms, the
periodic attempt to turn the Armenian question into a cheap card within an international relations game. We are convinced that the only available path to achieve our goals is to guarantee the irreversibility of the democratization of the country.²⁹

Critically reflecting upon failed strategies of solving the Armenian Question throughout history, intellectuals highlighted the dangers of relying on the “third force.” For instance, Ishkhanian notes that the idea “invented” by Armenian historians and political leaders that the Armenian Question cannot be solved without some “third force” (i.e., Russia or West) nurtures slavishness and “debilitates the internal strength of Armenians, turns them into sycophants, kills their spirit of resistance, and destroys their will to survive” (Ishkhanian 1991, 26). Pointing out catastrophic losses from the Genocide to the Moscow and Kars Treaties, Ishkhanian argued that fundamental self-criticism and revision of falsified history is the only path to a true independence: “Our historians, whose main task during the last 70 years has been to cover up, remain silent in the face of this defeat. And it is very harmful not to inform the nation about its own defeat and not to identify the causes of that defeat . . . A nation that does not learn the lessons of its own history has no future” (ibid., 25).

Very importantly, elites emphasized that independence should not be an end in itself but must be achieved in a piecemeal form; beginning from imagining to actually coming an independent and sovereign political community. The process of imagining independence was necessary for a nation that did not have a state and therefore had no independent political thinking for centuries. Ishkhanian argued that: “The law of ruling out the third force requires that at present we imagine ourselves facing those five neighbors alone. Once we start thinking that thought, much will change. We will immediately begin to seek ways of finding resolutions to our conflicts

²⁹ This passage is from Karabagh Committee’s response to Zori Balayan’s speech on Pan-Turanism on the floor of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in 1989. For a complete version of the speech see “Pan-Turanism: A Response from the Karabagh Committee,” in Armenia at the Crossroads, ed. Libaridian, Appendix C-Three, 155–56.
instead of showering [our neighbors] with sterile curses. And we will begin preparing for statehood" (ibid., 27).

The “law of ruling out the third force” was not tantamount to a “retreat to the inner citadel,” to borrow from Berlin, an attempt of “political isolationism where no voices from outside need be listened and no external forces can have effect” (Berlin 1969, 136). To the contrary, intellectuals envisioned an independent state where political and economic isolationism was to be excluded. Integration into international community, regional cooperation (vs. leadership), adoption of international norms of human rights, and regional peace were recurrent themes later to become clearly articulated policy positions reflected in presidential and party platforms and in constitutional provisions. Imagining independence meant imagining taking on responsibilities traditionally relegated to or performed by the “third force.” Instead of relying on others to negotiate Armenians’ national issues, political independence would allow Armenia to enter political dialogue with the international community, independently. And in this process, not only was it important to seek political allies versus “third forces” but it was also essential to imagine a peaceful co-existence with a bordering neighbor Turkey.

Continuing in this vein, Siradeghyan notes that Armenians’ collective fear of further victimization by Turkey must be understood not only as a result of a historical tragedy but also as a result of relentless and successful manipulations of this fear by historians and politicians throughout history. Siradeghyan notes that it is very hard to befriend a neighbor who once attempted to exterminate you. Yet one must not forget that although human history is a history of wars, it also contains pages of a long-standing peace and normal relations (Morikyan 2005, 127–29).

As prospects of achieving political independence were growing, an interesting transformation took place. Parties and organizations (e.g., the ARF, Communist Party, and National Self-Determination) that vehemently opposed the independence movement because of a fear of further victimization and inability to survive without Russia’s protection turned into fearless and
ardent proponents of the Armenian Cause with or without the “third force.” Siradeghyan notes that anti-independence political forces in the diaspora and Armenia were now united by the “renaissance” of anti-Turkishness and anti-any force that would denounce this politics of national unity based on hatred (Morikyan 2005, 61). Hence, the transformation from victimized to resentful identity was on its way. For ethno-nationalists, a state sponsored inculcation of a victim identity would enable moral justification for anti-Turkishness as objectively necessitated self-defense, territorial expansion as a historically just restitution and would justify claiming Armenian uniqueness as the first Christian nation slaughtered by Muslims in the beginning of the twentieth century.30

Before and after independence, liberal nationalists denounced anti-Turkish and expansionist discourse since this could overshadow democratic foundations of the state and threaten both internal and external state security. They argued that hatred-based politics did not permit rational considerations of state security and did not leave any room for building a state based on liberal democratic principles.31 They denounced ethno-nationalists’ belief that a unifying pan-national ideology must emphasize a vision of Armenians as a “special and unique people” with an extraordinary national potential and historical mission.32 Instead, liberal nationalists perceived

30 Scholars analyzing genocide agree that rather than being a merely political issue, genocide primarily is a moral issue, particularly for the victimized side. This, of course, does not mean that the victimized side never attempts to gain leverage by using it either as a bargaining political chip or by establishing a moral monopoly of the concept itself. The policy of “accumulating moral capital” has been exercised by a number of “exclusivist” Jewish scholars and practitioners who have insisted on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as an unparalleled and singular event in the history of humanity. See, for example, Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (New York: Free Press, 1993); Edward Alexander, The Holocaust and the War of Ideas (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994); Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas 1492 to the Present (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997).

31 For instance, Siradeghyan argued that although local and diaspora parties attempted to “unite” people using the politics of hatred and racism (such was the case in Azerbaijan, also) the ANM always denounced it as anti-democratic. See Ayden Morikyan, ed., Vano Siradeghyan: Erkir Tspahanj [Vano Siradeghyan: Land to be called for] (Yerevan: Gasprint, 2005), 128–29.

32 For one example of this view see National Democratic Union’s 1995 parliamentary election platform, “Azgayin Zhoghovrdakan Miutyun” [National Democratic Union], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, June 25, 1995.
Armenians as just one of the many nations existing in the world who deserve a decent life as much as other nations do.\textsuperscript{33}

Liberal nationalists believed that politics of hatred was a logical extension of a victim identity, devoid of objective historical facts and objectively existing political constraints. For instance, referring to ethno-nationalists’ demands to denounce historical treaties, such as the Moscow and Kars Treaties, in the Declaration on Independence, Sardaryan notes that:

These treaties are our history, our biography, which have no yield in today’s political world. It is possible to go a step further and say that including these treaties may complicate our activities in the future. We must adopt documents we have the power and ability to realize. In this respect I believe our Committee must be circumspect, it must not burden itself with wish lists . . . . If we are able to create an independent and strong state, I believe new doors will open for our nation. Should we be unable to achieve this, the rest become mere wishes with which you can do nothing in politics . . . . If we deviate from that goal, if we take uncircumspect steps, inevitably we will have set our neighbors against us, because declaring those treaties null and void will lead us exactly there (Sardaryan 1991, 88–89).

Reflecting on claims of territorial unification through implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, Sardaryan notes that: “in politics nothing is achieved by mere moral arguments . . . . Turkey is a powerful country. Do we want to create a state on the territory we have or do we want to dwell on wishes . . . .? If you put on your shoulders weight heavier than you can carry, you achieve nothing” (ibid., 93).

\textsuperscript{33} Tyden Weekly’s (Czech newspaper) interview with Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Liarzhek Zhoghovrdavarutyunts Menk Derevs Shat Heru enk” [We are Still Far Away from Consolidated Democracy], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 5, 1996.
Similarly reflecting on demands of territorial unification, the Armenian Cause, and objectively existing political constraints, Ishkhanyan (1990) argues that: “The steps of the Armenian people must be proportionate to the degree of our strength.” Arguing in the same vein, Siradeghyan notes that adopting the Armenian Cause as a state official policy is pregnant with dire consequences for Armenian people and the state (Morikyan 2005).

One of the primary accusations against proponents of liberal nationalism was that they emphasized democratic and cosmopolitan values at the expense of the unifying national ideology: the Armenian Cause. Ethno-nationalists perceived the Armenian Cause as a given aspect of Armenian identity, overriding other identities that an individual might have. According to ethno-nationalist view, objectives of the Armenian Cause are not subject to critical reflection and their achievement is the ultimate end, which must be the guiding ideology of an Armenian individual and the state. However, liberal nationalists endorsed principles of the “negative freedom,” and rejected the concept of one-nation one-ideology. Liberal nationalists believed that promoting a particular national ideology was inherently anti-democratic since it eliminates individual choice and self-determination. For instance, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan argued that: “National ideology is a false political category... implying that the whole nation must adopt that particular ideology. In my opinion, nations are forced to be guided by one ideology only in totalitarian systems. ... Democracy cannot survive in a society where a nation is forced to adopt one particular national ideology.” Moreover, the ANM and the president argued that the establishment of a strong democratic state was the highest “cause.” Ter-Petrosyan argued that rather than relying on a “mysterious unifying national ideology” the government must pursue realistic

34 See Rafayel Ishkhanyan, “Mahvan Chanaparhe yev Kyanks Chanaparhec” [The Path of Death and the Path of Life], Haik, January 28, 1990.
35 Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Hajord serundneri gaghaparakhosutyune petq e lini mer petakanutyun amrapndume” [Achieving Strong Statehood must be the Next Generation’s Ideology], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 27, 1997, 5; Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Sahmanadrutyan endunman lavaguin eghanake hanrakven e” [The Best Way of Adopting the Constitution is via the Referendum], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, April 26, 1994.
goals, among which the establishment of a secure and democratic state with a vibrant civic society must take priority. In addition, he argued that national unity must be sought around the public good, as the ultimate goal of all democratic states. Thus, unlike ethno-nationalists, the establishment of a democratic state was the highest “cause” for liberal nationalists.36

The establishment of liberal democracy also required a comprehensive revision of foreign policy. Despite ethno-nationalists’ fierce criticism, proponents of liberal nationalism were determined to normalize relations with Turkey.37 The government of a small Armenian state stretching over 29,800 sq km (11,500 sq mi), landlocked, lacking natural resources, located in a fragile region where geo-political interests clashed throughout history, envisioned a peaceful coexistence with all neighbors, including Turkey and Azerbaijan, as the only defensible policy. The government led by Ter-Petrosyan and the Republic Block, which held a majority of parliamentary seats, continued the policy delineated by new intellectuals and the ANM since 1988.38 Adopting demands of the Armenian Cause—territorial claims and genocide recognition—as a precondition for relations with Turkey was not only a politically immature move ignoring objectively existing political constraints but was also tantamount to provoking another war. Referring to infamous historical examples, such as the failed treaties of San-Stefano and Sevres and disastrous treaties of

36 Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Mer serndi partky Hayots petakanutyun kayatsumm e, bargavachunn u hzoratsumm e” [The Establishment of the Armenian State, its Prosperity and Strengthening is Our Generation’s Obligation], in Apagan Bakhum e Dure [Future Knocks at the Door], ed. A. Azaryan (Yerevan: Pahpanoghakan Shem Matenashar, 2000), 36; Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Sahmanadrutyan endunman lavaguncan ehanake hanarakven e” [The Best Way of Adopting the Constitution is via the Referendum], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, April 26, 1994, and Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Hartsazruits ‘Haik’ Tertin” [Interview with ‘Haik’ Newspaper], in Levon Ter-Petrosyan: Entrant, Eluitner, Hodvatsner, Hartsazruitsner [Levon Ter-Petrosyan: Selected Speeches, Articles, Interviews], ed. Ashot Sargsyan (Yerevan: Archive of the Armenian Republic’s First President, 2006), 75-77.

37 For example see M. Bojolyan, “Hay-Turkakan haraberutyunnere turkakan mamuli tesankyunits” [Armenian-Turkish relations from the perspective of the Turkish press], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, August 21, 1995.

38 Unlike the ARF, after independence the SDHP and ADLP diaspora parties supported the homeland government, established their party headquarters in Armenia, and registered as legally functioning political parties in the Republic of Armenia. During 1995 parliamentary elections, both parties joined the Republic Block, a coalition that won and held 50% of parliamentary seats from 1995 through 1998. Republic Block was composed of the following parties and unions: ANM, Republican Party of Armenia, SDHP, ADLP, Christian Democratic Union of Armenia, and Intellectual Armenia Union.
Berlin, Moscow, and Kars, intellectual and political elites pointed out devastating human losses and substantial territorial losses as a result of reckless territorial claims.

Responding to ethno-nationalists’ accusations of insulting the nation’s most tragic memory (i.e., Genocide) and betraying national aspirations (i.e., recognition, reparations, and repatriation), Ter-Petrosyan argued that the Genocide recognition and reparations of historical lands in Turkey will be included in the foreign policy agenda only when the Armenian state would be capable of discussing these monumental issues with Turkey, independently. They argued that establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey without preconditions was not tantamount to renouncing historical claims and Genocide recognition. Realizing the impact of the Genocide on national identity and psychological obstacles to even imagining normalization of relations with Turkey, liberal nationalists believed that Genocide recognition was necessary for national healing and historical justice. In his discussion of the pre-1998 administration’s treatment of the Genocide issue, Libaridian writes: “The Genocide was a catastrophic event in the history of the Armenian people that had to be documented; its victims remembered in dignity; its lessons drawn for humanity; and its barbarity and inhumanity exposed. The Genocide was not a worldview or a philosophy; it was not a principle, especially one on which Armenia’s foreign policy could be based” (Libaridian 1999, 87). Hence, for liberal nationalists, the Genocide had primarily moral-historical significance as opposed to legal-political.

It must be noted that the pre-1998 administration did not explicitly reject the possibility of addressing the issue from a legal-political perspective. However, as Ter-Petrosyan noted, since the issue was highly sensitive for both Armenia and Turkey, it should be treated with the ultimate circumspection based on political realism (Ter-Petrosyan 2000). Hence, the first step towards resolving the issue had to be normalization of relations with Turkey without political conditions.

39 Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Azgayin ev iratesakan” [National and realistic], in Apagan bakhum e dure [Future Knocks at the door], ed. Azaryan, 5–17; Ter-Petrosyan, “Mer semdi partke Hayots petakanutyun kayatsunn e, bargavachunn u Hzoratsunn e” [The Establishment of the Armenian State, its Prosperity and Strengthening is Our Generation’s Obligation], in ibid., 18–38.
Most importantly, judging from historical events, liberal nationalists believed that reconciliation of Armenian-Turkish relations must be a bilateral effort without involving “third forces” and international pressures on either side.

In sum, liberal nationalists envisioned the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey as an essential step towards building a peaceful coexistence with Turkey and strengthening state security. This vision denied reckless territorial demands as a political precondition, since these would prevent Armenia from obtaining a vitally important economic partner in the region, would deepen mutual misunderstandings and distrust between Armenian and Turkish people, and thwart all possibilities of addressing the issue of Genocide in any form.40

To conclude, from 1988 through the velvet coup in February 1998, political and intellectual elites attempted to revise Armenian national identity. They believed that national identity had to be re-defined in a way that addresses state security and promotes liberal and communal values. Essentially, intellectuals were offering a “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity which would sustain the project of liberal democratic state and celebrate ethnic heritage albeit not at the expense of liberal principles. While celebrating ethno-cultural values, they were simultaneously questioning the ethno-political aspect of the Armenian identity, which nourished political dependency and the self-image of a victimized nation.

Within the context of the state’s internal and external security, new intellectual elites perceived of a victim identity as a double-edged self-destructive ideology—on the one hand resisting the idea of independent state and on the other hand resisting the idea of liberal democratic state. Hence they argued about the necessity of a fundamental revision of the Armenian

40 Although Turkey never ended the road blockade, as a result of Armenian-Turkish efforts it stopped the air blockade in 1995. In 1995 the government organized the first international conference on the Genocide in Armenia. It was attended by a Turkish scholar, Taner Akcam, who labeled 1915 events as Genocide. As a result of both governments’ efforts a Turkish-Armenian Business Council was established in 1995. In the same year a Turkish mayor attended the Genocide memorial in Yerevan. See Gerard J. Libaridian, Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), esp. 277–81; Turkey’s continued road blockade as a precondition for liberating Karabakh and its vehement denial to recognize events as Genocide are important questions that require an in-depth research and fall beyond limits of this study.
identity, which had to start from deconstructing falsified history and imagining the unimaginable: political independence and peaceful co-existence with Turkey.

Foreseeing multidimensional dangers emanating from collectivistic ideologies, the pre-1998 government denounced the Armenian Cause as a unifying national and state ideology. Liberal nationalists refused to assign the state a paternalistic role and moral responsibility of addressing and restituting all historical injustices, from Genocide recognition to recovering territorial losses and repatriation. They believed that politicization of the Armenian Cause not only would perpetuate the narrative of victim identity but also would evoke the externalization of primordial fears through state-sponsored aggression against the eternal enemy, Turkey. In addition to endorsing anti-democratic attitudes and building national unity based on the politics of anti-Turkishness, politicization of the Armenian Cause was also transforming victim identity into a victimized-resentful identity, therefore endangering state security from within and without.

Instead, liberal nationalists envisioned a national identity which celebrated ethnic heritage but rejected ethnic narcissism; encouraged self-reliance but rejected political and economic autarky; mourned the Genocide victims but tamed the ideas of anti-Turkishness and resentment. It embraced the myth of Armenian nation stretching back to immemorial times but at the same time used historical scripts for highlighting self-induced national defeats and disastrous losses. Hence, it evoked self-criticism and rational deliberation over national issues, one of which was the Genocide and relations with Turkey.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a presidential candidate in the 2008 elections, delivered a speech entitled “History, Ideology and Typology” in front of thousands of peacefully demonstrating supporters. The speech contains a critical discussion of Genocide and relations with Turkey that succinctly captures the ways liberal nationalists reflect upon nation's tragic memory and envision Armenian national identity:
I have no doubt that Turkey, sooner or later, will recognize the Genocide. However, it will not happen before reconciliation of the Armenian-Turkish relations but after establishing friendly, cooperative and trustworthy environment between our countries . . . . Many nations and states under various circumstances and for various reasons have encountered national calamities. Armenians and Jews experienced genocides. After devastating defeats Germany and Japan were shattered from foundations. Ottoman Turkey, Great Britain and Russia lost their once powerful empires. Each of them perceives their national tragedy as unique: as Tolstoy famously noted 'happy ones are all alike but every unhappy one is unhappy in its own unique way.' However, most of the nations and states that experienced national tragedies transformed their tragedies into a factor for recovery and empowerment instead of hopelessness and inferior self-esteem. Not only they found strengths to heal their wounds and liberate themselves from historical complexities but they also found ways to revive and enlist the ranks of the world's most vigorous and prosperous states. What does prevent us from following the path of these nations instead of mourning endlessly, complaining about the world and begging justice? We will never become a modern and vigorous nation until we overcome the victim psychology, liberate ourselves from complexities of the past and gaze towards the future . . . . For many nations history is a source of pride but historical burden is an unwanted shackle.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) This is a paraphrase of Lev Tolstoy's famous opening line in *Anna Karenina*: "Vengeance is mine; I will repay. Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."

\(^4\) See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, "Patmutyun, gaghparakhosutyun ev tipabanutyun" [History, ideology and typology], 11-2, available at http://www.levonforpresident.com/upload/file/PDFs/08_12_2007_Levon_TP_speech.pdf (accessed 3/1/08). Translation from Armenian is the author's. Early morning, on March 1, 2008, Armenian authorities brutally crushed the sleeping crowd, which was relentlessly but peacefully demonstrating against highly flawed presidential election results. Main contestants were the founding president Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the Prime Minister, Serzh Sarksyan, hand-picked by the outgoing president Kocharyan. Later that day, the army and police fired on unarmed demonstrators. The official number of
2.7 Resenting the Past, Resisting the Future: Ethno-Nationalist Politics of Remembering

For ethno-nationalists, the refusal to adopt the Armenian Cause as a national ideology and as a state official policy was tantamount to a national betrayal and was inherently anti-Armenian. The new vision of Armenian identity proposed by liberal nationalists was so alien that an ARF member wrote: “At this stage [March 1995], it is possible to assert with a clear conscience that the situation would have been preferable [to the presidency of Levon Ter-Petrosian] if Armenia was directly occupied by Turkey . . . .” (Panossian 2006, 386). Eventually, some diaspora (i.e., ARF) and local ethno-nationalist parties (Armenian Communist Party, National Democratic Union, and Union of National Self-Determination) and intellectuals accused the homeland government of leading the nation to a total nihilism, national self-denial, and “spiritual genocide.”

Following the coup in 1998 and the complete restructuring of both the executive and legislative branches, ethno-nationalist politics became the dominant mode of conveying the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey. Particularly in the years of 1998 through 2002, both the new president, Robert Kocharyan (elected in 1998), and parties holding parliamentary seats after the 1999 elections (Unity Block, Armenian Communist Party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Law and Unity, National Democratic Union) took a course of politicizing the Armenian

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killed was more than 8, however the exact number remains unknown. The same day, the government declared the state of emergency for 20 days, accompanied by endless arrests, tortures, and complete media censure. State terror, through massive arrests and hatred campaign, continued after the state of emergency. Levon Ter-Petrosyan remained under unofficial house arrest for more than a month.

Cause and selectively reformulating Armenian-Turkish relations within the framework of Genocide recognition.\textsuperscript{44}

In the period of 2002 through 2006 both the president and elected parties (Republican Party of Armenia, Justice Block, Country of Law, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, National Unity, and United Labor Party) softened their ethno-nationalist discourse on this issue. Nevertheless, while three out of a total of six elected parties opted for a liberal nationalist stance on this issue (i.e., Country of Law 13.71%, National Unity 8.91%, United Labor Party 5.67%), overall the official discourse remained overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist on this issue.\textsuperscript{45}

Political discourse increasingly reinforced the view that Turkey’s denial of the Genocide must be interpreted as a continuation of Pan-Turanik ideology. Therefore, political rhetoric which did not distinguish between the Young Turks’ government and the government existing at the end of the twentieth century evoked primordial fears of Pan-Turanism as an imminent threat hanging over the head of the Armenian nation. For instance, the Armenian Communist party’s electoral platform contained existential rhetoric, stating that “the survival of the Armenian nation” is the most important issue and “must be at the heart of both domestic and foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, since survival was the ultimate national concern, the Communist party advocated integration with

\textsuperscript{44} The only exception was the party Country of Law, which refrained from discussing the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey before and after 1999 parliamentary elections. However, before and after 2003 parliamentary elections, this party opted for a liberal-nationalist approach as reflected in several party statements.

\textsuperscript{45} It is important to note that the Turkish government closed its borders with Armenia since 1993, effectively imposing land blockade, as a political support to Azerbaijani government. Azerbaijan closed its borders with Armenia and imposed economic blockade since 1991. On several occasions Turkey announced that it will not open borders unless Armenian military forces withdraw not only from occupied Azerbaijani territories but also from the Mountainous Karabakh. Hence, Turkey also limits its relations with Armenia based on preconditions. Moreover, Libaridian notes that before 1992, the Turkish government also preconditioned, albeit unsuccessfully, its diplomatic and economic relations “by a promise by Armenia that the Armenian state would not raise the issue of Genocide and Genocide recognition and would take it upon itself to convince the Diaspora to also desist from doing so . . . . The Armenian government made it clear that it was not willing to make such commitments, that it was unreasonable for Turkey to make such demands, and Turkey should emulate Armenia in eliminating preconditions” (Libaridian 2004a, 268).

\textsuperscript{46} Percentages represent parties’ seats elected through a proportional representation. See Chapter 5 for a detailed content analysis of party positions on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey.

\textsuperscript{46} Armenian Communist Party, “Entrakan Tsragir” [Electoral Platform], Mer Khosqe, November 2, 1994, 2.
powerful Russia as the only defensible policy addressing Armenians’ existential concerns. Russia’s protection, in turn, would enable Armenians to pursue and achieve a just solution to the Armenian Cause, from Genocide recognition both by the Turkish government and the international community and unification of historical lands.\(^{47}\)

Narratives of fear and further victimization became intertwined with the narratives of national self-assertion and resentment. Rejecting the notion of “Armenians as just one nation among others,” ethno-nationalists embraced the exclusivist idea of a uniqueness of Armenians and their ability to become “the most organized nation in the region.”\(^{48}\) Hence, they insisted on the urgency of achieving high standards in political, educational, health, and cultural spheres, enabling Armenians to become the leading nation in the South Caucasus. Thus, geographical and historical features as well as nation’s high intellectual potential would help Armenia to become a bridge for dialogue and cooperation between civilizations and hence would facilitate the achievement of the regional leadership role.

The National Democratic Union (NDU) party believed that liberal nationalists’ view of Armenian identity and the “Crusade” against the Armenian Cause was a-national and detrimental to national self-esteem.\(^{49}\) According to Vazgen Manukyan, the leader of the NDU, the vision of


\(^{48}\) The emphasis on Armenia’s regional leadership role has entered the official political discourse since 1998, and has been reflected in numerous articles as well as in a number of party platforms. For examples see Robert Kocharyan, “Hayastane petk e lini taratsashrjani amenakayun, kazemakerpvats ev mtavor bardzr neruzh uneisogh erkire” [Armenia must become the most stable and organized country with the highest intellectual potential in the region], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, February 25, 1998; Kocharyan, “HH Nakhagah Robert Kocharyani eluite Hayastan-Spyurk khorhdrzaghovum” [RA President Robert Kocharyan’s speech at the Armenia-Diaspora Conference], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 23, 1999; RA Presidential Candidate Robert Kocharyan’s Election Program, “Hayastane darnalu e taratsashrjani amenakazmakerpvats petutyune” [Armenia will become the most organized state in the region], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, January 22, 2003; Country of Law, Pre-election Platform Brochure (Yerevan: Tigran Mets, 1999); Nina Iskandaryan and Ruben Meloyan, eds., Parliamentary Elections: Armenia 2003 Election Guide (Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute, 2003), 100–1.

\(^{49}\) Anahit Esayan, “Hayreni Kusakutyunnere Hayots Tseghaspanutyun Masin” [National Parties about the Armenian Genocide], Hayots Ashkharh, April 24, 1999, 3.
Armenians as one of the many nations existing in the world deserving a decent life as much as other nations do was not only devastating but was also a source for "provincial complexities and national misery." Instead, Manukyan's own vision of identity emphasized Armenians as a "world nation," a special and unique people stretching back to times immemorial with an extraordinary national potential and historical mission. As the first Christian nation which was victimized throughout its long history of existence, Armenians not only have developed a unique system of inter-group support and exceptional skills of self-organization and survival but have also rendered an invaluable contribution to the development of world culture and civilization. Therefore, such a nation that also survived an unprecedented Genocide in the history of humanity deserves to be a "world nation."

Manukyan argued that the pre-1998 government's strategic reformulation of the Genocide as a moral and historical issue relegated the question to an intangible historical past where no one could be held responsible. In reality, according to Manukyan, Genocide is a political issue requiring political action. Therefore, while not excluding the possibility of establishing economic relations with Turkey, Manukyan believed that this should not come at the expense of demanding the Turkish government take political responsibility for the Genocide committed in 1915.

Similarly, the Law and Unity party accused liberal nationalists of abandoning national ideology, arguing that this policy led to national humiliation and the loss of self-respect. The

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50 Tigran Avetisyan, "Dashinke Merats e" [The Union is Dead], Hayasytani Hanrapetutyun, September 23, 1997, 3.
52 Vazgen Manukyan was one of the founders and key ideological leaders of the Karabagh Committee and the Armenian National Movement (ANM). He was the Prime Minister of Armenia from 1990 to 1991. From 1992 to 1993, Manukyan was the Minister of Defense. However, because of growing ideological differences and struggles for political power, Manukyan left the ANM. He founded his own party, the NDU, and became one of the ardent opponents of the ANM and Levon Ter-Petrosyan.
party’s own vision articulated national ideology as a necessary precondition for national survival. National ideology had to perform paternalistic functions of maintaining and teaching communal values and norms to members of the collectivity. According to the party, having a guiding national ideology was in the interests of the whole nation whose members will be enabled to live and develop not as individuals but as members of the Armenian nation. Guided by the national ideology, members of the community will collectively engage in maintaining the nation’s characteristics, morality, and high spirit and will achieve pan-national unity. Most importantly, guiding national ideology was particularly necessary for national preservation, as a self-defense mechanism against Pan-Turanism, an ideology which ultimately pursues the goal of exterminating the Armenian nation. Finally, national ideology had to keep the tragic memory of Genocide alive as a necessary condition for collectively achieving just solution of the Armenian Cause.\textsuperscript{54}

The Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which formed an alliance with the People’s Party and formed Unity Block in 1999, announced that the Armenian people were rightful owners of historical lands. Therefore, using Nzhdeh’s ideology of tseghagron (race-based religion), the RPA argued that the state must mobilize all efforts towards the solution of the Armenian Cause, that is, reclaiming and recovering the Armenian State in the Armenian Plateau, the “eternal cradle” and “the god-sent Fatherland of Armenians.”\textsuperscript{55} The party and the Unity Block believed that liberal nationalists’ denial of the Armenian Cause as the national ideology was detrimental to pan-national unity and deviated from Armenians’ supreme objectives.\textsuperscript{56

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\item[\textsuperscript{54}] Law and Unity Electoral Platform, “Azgayin Gaghaparakhosutiune Vorpes Goyatevman u Zargatsman Nakhapayman” [National Ideology as a Precondition for the National Survival and Development], \textit{Iravunk}, April 30–May 6, 1999, 12. Law and Unity held 7.96% of parliamentary seats after the 1999 elections.
\item[\textsuperscript{55}] Anahit Esayan, “Hayreni Kusaktsutyunnere Hayots Tseghaspanutyan Masin” [National Parties about the Armenian Genocide], \textit{Hayots Ashkharh}, April 24, 1999, 3. RPA has created a youth organization, called “Tseghagron,” with an objective to raise the youth’s awareness on such values as “military-patriotic and healthy lifestyle.” Since 2004, the youth organization cooperates with the Armenian Apostolic Church in the “struggle” against religious minorities. See Karin Grigoryan, “Nzhdehyan gaghaparakhosutyune sharunakvum e” [Nzhdeh’s Ideology Continues], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, January 15, 2005.
\item[\textsuperscript{56}] Unity Block did not have any statements regarding the Armenian Cause, the Genocide Recognition, and relations with Turkey in its electoral platform. However, leading party members, particularly of the RPA within the Block made a number of statements emphasizing the need of adopting the Armenian Cause as
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Before and after 2003 parliamentary elections, the RPA insisted that “It is necessary to be realistic and consistent in the issues of the Armenian Cause” and that the state must “present the tragic reality of the Armenian Genocide to the judgment of the international community.” According to Andranik Margaryan, “recovering territorial losses,” and the notion of hay-renatirutyun (i.e., rightful ownership claim of the Fatherland), has to take a central place in the Armenian national ideology. The party believes that the Armenian national ideology has a sacred purpose of preserving the “God-created Armenian Nation, its vital force, creative genius, free will . . . and strengthening the credence of Armenian people in their own power and in the future,” in the Armenian Plateau. According to the party, the Armenian State “is the main and the most effective means for the attainment of Armenian goals,” and may take various regime forms “depending on the efficiency of the program solutions and tasks carried out by the state . . .”

Finally, in its electoral platforms and numerous publications the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) emphasized that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide must be one of the part of the state foreign policy before and after parliamentary elections in 1999. Unity Block held 41.69% of parliamentary seats after the 1999 elections. The Unity Block, which was formed as a result of an alliance between the People’s Party of Armenia and the RAP, was essentially decapitated with the assassination of the prominent leaders of both parties during infamous parliamentary assassinations on October 27, 1999. Anahit Esayan, “Hayreni Kusaktsutyunnere Hayots Tseghaspanutyun Masin” [National Parties about the Armenian Genocide], Hayots Ashkharh, April 24, 1999, 3. Andranik Margaryan assumed the RPA’s leadership following Vazgen Sargsyan’s assassination, on October 27, 1999, during an infamous parliamentary incident. Karen Demirchyan, the leader of the People’s Party of Armenia and the Speaker of the parliament, was another key political figure assassinated that day. Since May 12, 2000, Margaryan also assumed the post of the Prime-Minister, previously held by Aram Sargsyan, brother of deceased Vazgen Sargsyan. Aram Sargsyan was appointed as a Prime-Minister by the president Kocharyan, largely as a political gesture. However, within seven months he was replaced by Andranik Margaryan. Prime-Minister Andranik Margaryan died of allegedly natural causes on March 25, 2007, a few weeks before the 2007 parliamentary elections.

Since 2000, Aram Sargsyan founded Republic oppositional party and became a prominent opposition figure. Aram Sargsyan was one of the political figures supporting Levon Ter-Petrosyan during the 2008 presidential elections. The latter on several occasions pledged to disclose names of the organizers behind the 1999 parliamentary assassinations. Another important opposition figure supporting Ter-Petrosyan was Stepan Demirchian, son of Karen Demirchian, who has resumed the leadership of the People’s Party of Armenia since his father’s assassination.

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major elements of the state foreign policy. The party stated that: “The ARF strives for the solution of the Armenian Cause and formation of the entire motherland with all Armenians.” The party made it abundantly clear that historical justice will be achieved once ethnic Armenians repatriate to united Armenia, which in addition to its existing political boundaries would include Western Armenian territories (in Eastern Turkey), Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhijevan (in Azerbaijan), and the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of the southern Georgia, bordering Armenia.

Harshly criticizing the pre-1998 government for “ignoring the Armenian Cause” and for perceiving of “national ideology as a false category,” the ARF specifically insisted on the necessity of adopting the ideology of *Pahanjater Azg* (i.e., irredentist nation). For instance, Hrant Margaryan argued that: “irredentism is justice and justice is peace . . . . Both the state and the nation must prevent the possibility of new crimes” and the first step must be adopting the Armenian Cause as a state official policy. Levon Mkrtchyan explained “irredentist nation” as follows: “At its core, today’s Armenian Cause is a conglomeration of national goals and aspirations, and irredentism is part of this parcel.” Irredentism, according to Mkrtchyan, is targeted towards the solution of concrete national objectives. It pursues the goal of recovering historical justice and rights, that is, re-claiming historical lands that have been taken away from their rightful owners: Armenians who became victims of the Genocide. The Armenian Cause itself is a new formulation of the Armenian Question, Mkrtchyan continues. The highest objective of the

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61 The closest translation of the term *Pahanjater Azg* is “irredentist nation.” However, if the dictionary definition of the term “irredentist” has a somewhat negative connotation, in the Armenian usage it denotes a sense of demand for justice, a nation that insists on its rights, and therefore has more of a positive connotation. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation held 12.09% and 11.45% of parliamentary seats after the 1999 and 2003 elections, respectively.


Armenian Question is the creation of an independent and strong statehood in the historical land. According to Mkrtchyan, the Armenian Cause has always pursued multidimensional purposes:

Thus the issue [Armenian Cause] became something that not only could be raised before the foreigners but also something that could organize Armenians since those claims [claims of the Armenian Cause] are powerful means for uniting Armenians . . . no matter what their differences and interests are. We have a powerful uniting goal and our claims also serve our goal of preserving the Armenian identity . . . . Now they have acquired a new quality because the independent Armenian state has included the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide in its foreign policy, thus building a durable bridge between the Homeland and the Diaspora. The movement for international recognition of the Armenian Genocide unites the Armenian potential for a great goal. So the issue is larger; it is not only a matter of Armenia’s foreign policy.\(^6^4\)

According to the ARF, unless Turkey takes responsibility for the Genocide committed in 1915, relations between the two countries cannot be reconciled. For instance, Kiro Manoyan stated that: “the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey would pave the way for discussions and eventually negotiations to resolve the outstanding differences between the two peoples, which would naturally include reparations and restitution. By recognizing the Armenian Genocide, Turkey would demonstrate its sincere desire to coexist next to Armenia and the Armenians and not on their account. Thus, this would be the first step for normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations.”\(^6^5\)

Finally, the ARF members argued that the idea of a “United Armenia” must be kept alive and nurtured “in our national memory” as one way of “forcing Turkey to resume its responsibility

\(^6^4\) Ibid.
towards the Armenian nation.” They contended that: “the restoration of our rights is the only way to guarantee our national security” but to do so, it is essential that “the whole nation acquires a perpetual sense of rightful ownership . . . . If today’s Eastern Turkey is just a territory for Turkey, the same territory is our homeland . . . . The issue of Genocide is part of our national liberation struggle . . . . It keeps the international community informed about the violated rights of our nation, prepares our nation for an organized struggle, and is a means for pressuring our enemy.”

One of the puzzling aspects of ethno-nationalists’ discourse on the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey was that this discourse was never transformed into a clearly articulated policy. Genocide recognition was not presented by the state as a precondition for establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey. Ethno-nationalists harshly condemned liberal nationalists’ policy of refusing to adopt the Armenian Cause as a state official policy and Genocide recognition as a precondition for relations with Turkey. Their election platforms, public statements, and speeches intended primarily for domestic consumption invariably contained vociferous rhetoric regarding the Armenian Cause. They enthusiastically supported the presidency of Kocharyan, who pledged to achieve pan-national unity by radically shifting previous administration’s policies on Genocide and relations with Turkey, Mountainous Karabagh, and dual citizenship for diaspora.

Right after the elections in 1998, Kocharyan announced that the issue of the Genocide recognition must be part of Armenia’s foreign policy agenda. During

his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 1998, the president raised the question of Genocide recognition. His speech received the full commendation of ethno-nationalists, who contended that for the first time since independence Armenian government “explicitly and boldly delineated main directions and interests of the Armenian foreign policy.”

Nevertheless, despite ethno-nationalists’ forceful rhetoric, Genocide recognition was not presented as a precondition for establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey. To the contrary, the post-1998 official policy on this issue was marked by continuity and was very often indistinguishable from the one pursued in the pre-1998 period. In fact, contrary to their own rhetoric, post-1998 political elites in numerous speeches and publications clearly stated that Armenia was ready to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey without preconditions. Moreover, on numerous occasions high-ranking Armenian officials criticized the Turkish government for keeping the Armenian-Turkish border closed as a precondition for Armenia withdrawing its military forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories (i.e., Mountainous Karabagh and surrounding areas). According to Armenian officials, preconditions imposed by Turkey not only hampered the process of reconciliation but also raised broader questions regarding...

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68 See Robert Kocharyan, “HH Nakhagah Robert Kocharyani eluite MAK-i Gikhavor Asambleayi 53-rd nstashrjanum” [RA President Robert Kocharyan’s Speech at the UN General Assembly’s 53rd Session], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 26, 1998; Karmen Davtyan, “Bavakanin hstak ev hamardzak artahaytetsin Hayastani motetsunnere” [Armenia’s approaches were expressed quite explicitly and boldly], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 29, 1998.
70 For example see RA President’s Press Office, “Voroshichetntesakan shahern en: Nakhagah Robert Kocharyani hartsazruite turkakan ‘Millet oratertin’ [The determinant is economic interests: Robert Kocharyan’s interview with the Turkish daily “Millet”], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, May 26, 1999; Gayane Gasparyan, “Hamazhoghove drakan kazdi tseghaspanutyun chanachman gortsentatsi vra” [The conference will positively influence the process of genocide recognition], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, April 22, 2005; Vaghinak Terteryan, “Vardan Oskanyan: Tseghaspanutyun chanachume chi karogh khochendotel hayturkakan haraberutyunnerin” [Vardan Oskanyan: Genocide recognition cannot hamper Armenian-Turkish relations], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, October 5, 2005.
ing Turkey’s true intentions towards the Armenian state.\textsuperscript{71} In sum, in sharp contrast to an abundant official rhetoric to predicate Armenian-Turkish relations on the Genocide recognition, the official foreign policy towards Turkey never took that direction.\textsuperscript{72}

However, in principle, there were three major differences between the pre-and post-1998 foreign policies. First, ethno-nationalists cautiously and selectively used some elements of the Armenian Cause as a state strategy, such as achieving pan-national unification by granting dual citizenship to diaspora Armenians. Ethno-nationalists believed that dual citizenship would have multidimensional effects, from economic growth to repatriation and a collective pursuit of historical justice. Very importantly, in addition to traditional elements of the Armenian Cause (i.e., Genocide recognition, reparations, and repatriation), since independence the issue of Mountainous Karabagh became an integral and indispensable part of the Armenian Cause. For ethno-nationalists the issue of Mountainous Karabagh was an ultimate turning point, shifting the nation’s historical trajectory from endless humiliation, sufferings, and victimization to a restitution of justice, national liberation, and self-assertion.

A detailed analysis of the issue of Mountainous Karabagh will be provided in the next chapter. However, at this point it is sufficient to mention that for many, including Robert Kocharyan (who is originally from Karabagh), this issue had a paramount significance. Some ethno-nationalists were convinced that if pressured enough to recognize the Genocide, Turkey


\textsuperscript{72} Another interesting contradiction in official rhetoric and action was Kocharyan’s announcement that Armenia does not have territorial claims from Turkey. The statement was made after a vehement Turkish reaction following Kocharyan’s speech at the UN in 1998.
would eventually soften its position on the Mountainous Karabagh. In other words, the politics of pushing the agenda of Genocide recognition but collecting benefits for the Karabagh agenda was fully justified for many ethno-nationalists.

Second, while ethno-nationalists continued the policy of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation without preconditions, they officially included the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the foreign policy agenda. For instance, Libaridian notes: “While continuing the policy of seeking a normalization of relations with Turkey without preconditions, President Kocharyan—for reasons not fully articulated—decided to bring the question of the recognition of the Genocide to the table of negotiations with Turkey and make it part of Armenia’s foreign policy discourse, though not a precondition to diplomatic relations” (Libaridian 2004a, 195–96).

Third, as several sources indicate, the post-1998 administration took a double-edged approach to the issue of Genocide. For instance, according to Armen Rustamyan’s explanation, the NA Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Armenian-Turkish relations could have three possible directions: “one direction is establishing relations without any preconditions (a direction that was chosen by the previous administration), the second direction is establishing relations based on preconditions, and the third direction, which has been adopted by the current government, is establishing relations while keeping national interests in the foreign policy agenda.”

This approach was designed for selective application for domestic and foreign consumption and was applied on an ad hoc basis. The decision to establish relations without preconditions was not a result of ethno-nationalists’ true intentions and goodwill. It was a semantic reformulation of the ethno-nationalist discourse intended for foreign consumption and largely was


a result of a lack of political and economic power in the international community to push the explicitly ethno-nationalist agenda of solving this issue. Besides, the official discourse intended for domestic consumption remained firmly and explicitly ethno-nationalist.

In the end the “third approach” to the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey (i.e., establishing relations while keeping national interests in the foreign policy agenda) proved to have the same effects as the second approach would have had (i.e., establishing relations based on preconditions). Diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey were not established and prospects of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation were as unrealistic as ever. This approach was also quite consequential for Armenia’s economic prospects. Intentionally or not, half-hearted attempts toward Armenian-Turkish reconciliation encouraged economic autarky. Using bloated economic growth indicators and the influx of remittances, political elites argued that closed borders did not impact Armenia’s economy.\(^75\) For instance, in 2003 during his speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Kocharyan announced that in Armenia: “Annual GDP

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\(^75\) Regarding Armenia’s economy see especially Gerard Libaridian, “Economic Reform and War: Interview with Hrant Bagratyan,” *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 14, no. 2 (2006): 184–93. During his presentation delivered at Columbia University in 2006, former prime-minister of Armenia Hrant Bagratyan highlighted particularly three major problems in the post-1998 Armenian economy. The first problem according to Bagratyan was in the imports sector: “Particularly worrisome is the situation of imports: in spite of formal freedoms, there are strict state controls over the importers of goods. Upon the demand of the state the customs service uses the practice of price control toward ‘non reliable’ importers. This is followed by usual practice of bankruptcy. Hence, all rights to imports are assigned to more ‘reliable’ hands in a short period of time.” The second problem is in the banking system: “Policy since then [post-1998] is geared toward the consolidation of banks, ignoring the rules of secrecy of bank deposits, amalgamation of banks with formed oligarchic capital, etc. This has decreased the attractiveness of Armenian banks for investors.” Finally the third major problem identified by Bagratyan is in the stock exchange: “in 2000, by adopting of the law ‘About Securities’ the government took the path of excessive state control over the securities market. The rule of self-regulation of the exchanges has been ignored; securities dealership is currently not only controlled, but also mediated by the state. The result was a full disappearance of the market of corporate capital. At present, it is equal to null in Armenia. Based on this characteristic, Armenia is in the last place among CIS countries, when the initial program of reforms was intended to make the country a regional financial center.” Hrant Bagratyan, “Adaptation to New Economic Values: Armenia in Transition,” speech delivered at the Armenian Studies Conference, Columbia University, New York, March 11–14, 2006.
growth has averaged at 12 percent for the last three consecutive years, regardless of the blockade implemented by two fellow-members [Turkey and Azerbaijan] of this very organization.\footnote{Ambassador Omer Ersun, former Karabakh negotiator for Turkey, commenting on this and other contradictory official messages, noted that if economy indeed was doing so great in Armenia, then why should Turkey be concerned with the issue of opening borders: “Well, there is nothing to worry about then and no need to rush,” Ambassador Omer Ersun, “Why we failed to devise a conclusive peace plan for the NK conflict: A candid, personal account/1992–1995.” Speech delivered at the International Conference: Armenia/ The South Caucasus and Foreign Policy Challenges, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, October 21–23, 2004.} The net effect of the “third approach” coupled with the unresolved conflict in Karabakh was a steady transformation of Armenia into an economically isolated zone with decreased economic power and political significance. Major economic projects and initiations in the region (e.g., Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, TRACECA and South Caucasus pipelines) bypassed Armenia and virtually created a complete economic dependency on Russia.\footnote{Russian companies took full control of Armenia’s energy industry. In 2002, within the framework of Armenia’s assets-for-debt program with Moscow, the Hrazdan thermal power plant—the largest such plant in Armenia—was transferred to Russia for $31 million. The Russian energy giant Unified Energy Systems (UES) also was named “financial manager” of the Armenian nuclear power plant Metsamor. To pay for the delivery of nuclear fuel to Metsamor, the Sevan-Hrazdan hydroelectric power station Cascade was transferred to Russia in 2003. The same year, GazProm, the Russian energy conglomerate, became the chief supplier of natural gas to Armenia. In 2006, the Russian energy giant UES announced that Iterenergo, an offshore subsidiary of UES, had purchased for $73 million 100% of the shares of Armenian Electricity Network (AEN), previously owned by the British-registered firm Midland Resources Holding, Ltd. In 2004, AEN ranked as Armenia’s fourth-largest corporate taxpayer, according to the Armenian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center, and earned revenues of some 70.67 million drams (about $106.6 million). In 2006, GazProm also increased its holds from 45% to 58% of shares of Armenian “ArmRusGasProm,” which holds a monopoly on distribution of natural gas in Armenia. Another 10% of “ArmRusGasProm” is controlled by the private Russian energy firm ITERA, leaving the Armenian government’s share at just 32%. In 2006, Armenian authorities agreed to hand over more energy assets to GazProm, such as the incomplete fifth unit of Armenia’s largest thermal power plant located in the central town of Hrazdan. According to official explanation it was part of a complex April 2006 agreement that allowed Armenia to avoid a doubling of the price of Russian gas to $110 million until January 2009. See particularly, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav01706.shtml; http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav101706.shtml; and http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav111606.shtml. Finally, Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, a project initiated to reduce Armenia’s energy dependence on Russia, also failed to deliver its initial promises. In 2006 Armenia agreed to hand over the new Iran-Armenia gas pipeline’s section on Armenian territory to GazProm via the ArmRosGaz company, in which GazProm and its offshoot ITERA hold a combined 68% of shares. Moreover, GazProm took major precautionary measures against an expansion of Iran’s role and indeed against any independent Iranian gas-export policy in Armenia or beyond. According to Vladimir Socor: “it imposed from the outset on Yerevan—against Tehran’s will—to reduce the Iran-Armenia pipeline’s diameter from the originally designed 1,420 millimeters (the size of major gas export pipelines) to 700 millimeters.” According to Socor: “this measure controls the pipeline and distribution network within Armenia and any transit of Iranian gas to third countries through this pipeline, confining Iran to the Armenian market.” See http://www.jamestown.org/edn/article.php?article_id=2372025 (accessed 5/10/08). For a detailed analysis of economic projects in Armenia and Armenia’s regional role and significance see Libaridian, Modern Armenia, esp. Chapter 13.}
Genocide contributed to the "re-nationalization" of the foreign policy and constrained the formulation of the state's strategic interests within the framework of past grievances. Essentially, it made the thorny issue of Genocide recognition a precondition of the nation's progress, redirected the politics of remembering towards politicization of victim identity, and fixed the current national self-image in the wrongs of the past.

2.8 Reflections: Politics of Remembering

In his essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," Nietzsche contends that given that history is an inescapable feature of human existence and that the present is unavoidably informed by our past, remembering and forgetting must be performed in such a way as to address urgent interests of the present and secure hopeful future, in short to engender life. Nietzsche writes: "We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it, even though he may look nobly down on our rough and charmless needs and requirements . . . . We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves life: for it is possible to value the study of history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate—a phenomenon we are now forced to acknowledge, painful though this may be, in the face of certain striking symptoms of our age" (Nietzsche 1997, 59).

Excessive preservation and veneration of the past (i.e., of "antiquarian history"), whether heroic or tragic, exhausts energies necessary for pursuing projects of the present and transforms individuals and nations alike into self-centered organisms incapable of seeing things in a wider perspective, "of drawing a horizon" between past and present: "Cheerfulness, the good conscience, the joyful deed, confidence in the future—all of them depend, in the case of the individual as of a nation, on the existence of a line dividing the bright and discernible from the unilluminable and dark; on one's being just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time; on the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary to feel
historically and when unhistorically...the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal
measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture” (ibid., 63).

I have attempted to illustrate that liberal nationalists evoked self-criticism and rational
deliberation over national history and identity issues, one of which was the Genocide and rela-
tions with Turkey. They re-evaluated national history, emphasized the central role of the human
agency in forging history and demonstrated what Nietzsche called the “the plastic power of man,
a people, a culture” that is “the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform
and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been
lost, to recreate broken moulds” (Nietzsche 1997, 62).

Notwithstanding critics’ arguments, liberal nationalists relied on and have drawn lessons from history, but did so in a cautious manner so the past does not return “as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment...does not become the
gravedigger of the present” (ibid., 61–62). This selective approach to history was driven by vital
socio-political and economic interests and needs serving the present and future of the state and
nation.

Vital interests required revising victim identity, alleviating anti-Turkishness, and denying
the politics of resentment. Capitalizing on the victimized aspect of Armenian identity was per-
ceived by liberal nationalists as dangerous in two respects. On the one hand, the narrative of
victim identity evoked primordial fears of further victimization in the absence of a powerful
protector (i.e., Russia or the West). From this perspective, the idea of an independent state could
not be justified since ethnic survival and security had to take precedence over it. This policy
strikingly parallels Wendy Brown’s analysis of “wounded,” victimized identity, which reproaches
the idea of attaining a sovereign power for itself and reinstates “generalized political paralysis”
(Brown 1995, 62).

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78 See Frederich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely Mediations,
79 See Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood.
On the other hand, the concern was that the idea of victimized nation, implicitly nurturing feelings of anxiety, envy, hatred, and frustration for unfulfilled national aspirations, could transform these feelings into a full-fledged externalized resentment. From this perspective ideas of liberal democratic statehood, and normalization of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, were not defensible. Realizing the dangers of the victim identity and its potential to transform into self-destructive victimized-but-resentful identity, liberal nationalists insisted on the necessity of redefining identity, which had to start from imagining and practicing fearless and peaceful coexistence with the one who caused the crystallization of victim identity.

For liberal nationalists the question was never about forgetting the past, erasing the memory and becoming a-historical, in a sense that Jefferson or Hobbes advocated, for the sake of liberated new beginning of a political community. Notwithstanding accusations, liberal nationalists were not advocates of "amnesiac identity." They consistently emphasized the centrality of history, particularly historical events before and after the Genocide, for stimulating critical reflections about nation’s past, current realities and possible ways of imagining nation’s future.

Besides, asking—let alone forcing—a nation to forget a tragedy of this magnitude is both unethical and unrealistic. Nietzsche himself did not believe that complete forgetting is either possible or reasonable: "For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to free oneself from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in them" (Nietzsche 1997, 76). Similarly, in his engaging discussion of the politics of apologies, Wiener properly notes that: “Denying past’s presence cannot will it away” (Weiner 2005, 111). Finally, Brown notes: “Yet erased histories

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and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated selves” that insisting on forgetting the past is both unethical and cruel (Brown 1995, 74).

Despite critics’ accusations of forgiving heinous crime and adopting pro-Turkish policies the question also was not about forgiving.81 Notwithstanding all liberating properties of forgiving it does not make sense to forgive if the wrongdoer is not aware of what he/she is being forgiven for. As Wiener properly notes there must be some initial consensus between the two parties that wrong has been inflicted and needs to be addressed in order for the act of forgiving to have a significant meaning for both parties. A one-sided act of forgiving does not benefit either the wronged or the wrongdoer, such as renewing relationship “without the wrong at its center” (Weiner 2005, 150).82 Liberal nationalists were not advocates of purposeless forgiveness and on numerous occasions announced that establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey without preconditions was not tantamount to forgiving national tragedy and renouncing historical claims.

Given the objectively existing limitations, the present Turkish denial and inability or perhaps unwillingness to recognize past events as Genocide, neither forgetting nor forgiving would be satisfactory or reasonable responses. The ultimate question was how to remember a tragedy of this magnitude without becoming a prisoner of past wrongs in a way that inhibits the ability to “draw horizons” between unjust sufferings of the past and the urgent needs of an evolving present and future. The ultimate question was how to remember the fear and pain of the ancestor without re-experiencing it. Re-experiencing pain and fear would repress the desire to fully appreciate present achievements, such as freedoms brought by sovereignty and liberal democracy, for as Nietzsche sarcastically notes: “It is a disgrace to be fortunate! There is too

81 See Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood.
82 Weiner notes that even though forgiving does not erase either the wrong or all its effect, it is rare and “possibly the most liberating of potential responses to a wrong; it aims to liberate both parties from the effects of the wrongful deed and reestablish a relationship freed from them” (Weiner, Sins of the Parents, 150).
Finally and perhaps most importantly, liberal nationalists’ politics of remembering avoided self-destructive resentment, since it encouraged remembering national tragedy but at the same time attempted to recover relationships and fearless coexistence with the one who brought this tragedy.

In this process of remembering, liberal nationalists also were considering the sensitivity of the issue for the Turkish side as well as complexities brought by challenging questions that had to be confronted by both parties. That is, in this process of remembering the wrongdoer was not de-humanized. To the contrary, both the wronged and wrongdoer were viewed as sharing human nature, with all its flaws and weaknesses. They offered an understanding of history, which stressed interconnectedness versus an isolated history of two peoples and framed tragedy in a political language that could potentially reopen a desire for futurity, a desire for coexistence liberated from past “unwanted shackles” fearlessly “gazing towards the future” (Ter-Petrosyan, 2007). Doing so was not a-historical or a-national, let alone nihilistic, notwithstanding critics’ argumentations. To the contrary, it was transformative and liberating for national identity releasing it from its surreal fixity in the past. It was psychologically therapeutic and was a politically emancipatory response without violating boundaries of humanistic concerns for ethics and justice and without imposing “amnesiac identity” by erasing the memory of the Genocide. Finally, it was an honest encounter with and a realistic response to limitations of a politicized victim identity and its claims for recognition.

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85 One of the most illustrative examples used by liberal nationalists was that in 1918 during famine in the first republic of Armenia and as a result of negotiations between Armenian and Turkish politicians, Turkey provided Armenia with 20,000 pounds of wheat. It is noteworthy that the aid was provided by Halil Pasha, who personally participated in massacres of Armenians. See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Mer serndi parti Hayots petakanutyun kayatsumn e, bargavachumn u hzoratsumn e” [The Establishment of the Armenian State, its Prosperity and Strengthening is Our Generation’s Obligation], in *Apagan Bakhum e Dure*, ed. Azaryan, 34.
However, the pre-1998 politics of remembering was vehemently rejected by ethno-nationalists. Liberal nationalists' attempts to revise the Armenian identity as primarily fixed in the wrongs of the past were branded as attempts of self-denial and nihilism. Given the deteriorating political and economic outcomes as a result of post-1998 approach to the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey, it is indeed puzzling that the ethno-nationalist mode continued dominating the politics of remembering. Moreover, given limitations of the Armenian geography, economic power, and political significance, these outcomes could have been predicted. In other words, ethno-nationalists should have been able to realize the limits of politicized victim identity and its claims for recognition.

Although it is difficult to decipher the exact logic behind ethno-nationalist politics of remembering, one should not interpret this as a "natural" consequence of national identity's overriding nature. Ethno-nationalists surely put forward a considerable effort to frame the issue from a primordial perspective and used a political language to harness an exclusively essentialist interpretation of the Armenian tragedy. Ethno-nationalists willingly embraced the communitarian assumption of "situated identity," according to which self is embedded in existing social practices and individuals' actions cannot be detached from a community to which one belongs (Tamir 1993, 25). The language of social and cultural determinism and the idea of identity as "situated," "embedded," or "given" conveniently stripped individuals of a freedom to search for alternative modes of remembering tragic events. After all, ethno-nationalists' central criticism of liberal nationalists was their belief that agents can reflect critically on constitutive elements of identity (in this particular case the victimized nature of Armenian identity), revise and adapt it to current salient problems.

Still, why adhere to an ethno-nationalist politics of remembering, which not only created the structural foundations for Armenia's isolation from regional economic initiatives, but also, and perhaps most importantly, did not deliver its promised outcomes; the longed-for Genocide
recognition by Turkey and the establishment of Turkish-Armenian diplomatic relations. To explore this interesting phenomenon, an attempt will be made to illustrate that ethno-nationalist politics of remembering fulfilled intertwined two-dimensional functions complementing ethno-nationalists' intentions.

The first explanation, and perhaps the most common one for electoral politics, lies within power politics, that is, a desire to achieve and maintain political power by means of being different from political competitors. Chapter 6 of this dissertation, devoted to the analyses of Armenian party politics, illustrates that parties attempted to attain political power by offering substantively different and contesting policies on all three issues, including the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey. Content analysis of party pledges and statements revealed that during pre- and post-election periods elected political parties used political rhetoric to highlight their differences in relation to each other and that the trajectory of interparty differences corresponded to contesting rhetoric used by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.

Figure 2.1 demonstrates percentages of party statements endorsing contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist policy positions across three intervals. In the first interval a majority of statements at 54% had a liberal-nationalist content, which disappeared in the second one and reappeared in the third interval at 22%. Thus, overall the official discourse, at 75%, remained overwhelmingly, ethno-nationalist on this issue.
Offering substantively different policy positions on the same issue for the sake of attaining and maintaining political power is a common feature of electoral politics; the Armenian case is not unique in that sense. What is interesting, however, was that since the ethno-nationalist mode of remembering, including the “third approach,” did not deliver its promised results, political elites could have altered their position on this issue. Also, considering the highly complicated nature of the issue, political elites could diminish its saliency and omit discussion of the issue in their electoral platforms and speeches. Yet instead, post-1998 political elites continued emphasizing the saliency of the Genocide issue and its recognition by Turkey. Hence, power politics, that is, a desire to achieve and maintain political power by means of being different from political competitors, provides only a partial explanation to the logic behind ethno-nationalist politics of remembering.

The second explanation lies within identity politics, that is, identity being put in the service of pursuing particular political projects. Various types of identity and their subsequent claims for recognition, usually accompanied by a politicization of identity, first of all require an in-depth understanding of what has produced it. Within the Armenian context, scholars have already noted that narratives of extinction, existentialism and survival of the first Christian nation
“between and within rival imperialisms” have for long dominated the writings of cultural and political entrepreneurs. These narratives encouraged an “essentialist” understanding of Armenian identity and a depiction of a self-image as “chosen and unique” ethno-religious group who has been victimized throughout the history of its long existence. In addition, the most traumatic experience of Genocide has been instrumental in consolidating and crystallizing the victimized aspect of Armenian identity.

In her analysis of identity politics, entitled “Wounded Attachments,” Wendy Brown raises a critical question: “Given what produced it [identity], given what shapes and suffuses it, what does politicized identity want?” (Brown 1995, 62). If transplanted into the Armenian context, the question would be the following: knowing that Genocide crystallized the victimized aspect of Armenian identity, what is the ultimate goal behind the politicization of victim identity? What can explain ethno-nationalists’ policy of Genocide recognition?—a policy which, in reality, is self-defeating and pushes its final resolution—that is, Genocide recognition by Turkey—beyond the possibility of being resolved. After all, if Turkey’s recognition of the Genocide and a consequent issuance of apology is the ultimate goal, exhibiting polemic rhetoric and resentment by Armenian politicians will not accomplish it. It requires a delicate and a tactful approach based on the understanding that accepting political responsibility and apologizing for ethnic extermination is an incredibly traumatic experience for the Turkish nation requiring a fundamental re-evaluation of Turkish historiography, national myth, and foundations of the modern Turkish republic.86

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86 It could be argued that Turkey’s vehement denial of the Genocide coupled with the land blockade since 1993 raises serious suspicions regarding its genuine intentions towards the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process. One could even say, as several Armenian politicians did, that Turkey’s aggressive stance towards Armenia confirms Armenians’ existential concerns. But instead of entrap my discussion in a vicious cycle of justifications in regards to which side should initiate reconciliation process and why, and instead of reifying rhetoric crafted by political elites in both countries, I simply concentrate on strikingly different responses to the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey offered by ethno-nationalists and liberal nationalists in Armenia. Also, and very importantly, one should not overlook the importance of Turkish assistance, particularly in the early 1990s. During this period Turkey transferred 52,000 tons of wheat donated by the European Union (EU). The EU donated 100,000 tons of wheat that was intended to
Is it possible that ethno-nationalists resist the Genocide recognition? This potentially explosive question does not have an exhaustive answer. But this should not prevent us from posing it, especially when there are indications pointing towards an affirmative end of the posed question. For it is possible to propose that so much has been invested in the long history of Armenian "victim" identity that any revisionist attempt would be tantamount to self-annihilation and a denial of a true tortured self. It is not accidental that when criticizing liberal nationalists' attempts to re-direct the obsessive focus on the victim identity and to re-imagine a common space for Armenian-Turkish cooperative coexistence, ethno-nationalists employed an existential rhetoric.

But an exclusive concentration on non-revisable properties of victimized identity provokes a thought that sometimes as Weiner acutely notes: "The wronged party may wed themselves both to the wrong and to the identity of victim" (Weiner 2005, 168). Saturated by a national history of suffering, humiliation, and historical injustice, "wounded" identity, as Brown notes, becomes invested in its own subjection, "in its own history of suffering" (Brown 1995, 55). And as the Armenian case indicates, when "wounded attachments" grow strong, attempts of re-directing attention from past wounds to present needs are met with a vehement resistance not because interests cannot be re-directed but because the wounded party believes that they should not be.

I have attempted to illustrate that ethno-nationalists' narratives of fear and further victimization became intertwined with narratives of national self-assertion and resentment. Ethno-nationalists explicitly attempted to transform victim identity into victimized-but-resented identity, thus justifying liberal nationalists' primary concerns regarding the victim identity. These attempts

be transported through Turkey. However, following the Armenian occupation of Kelbajar the wheat delivery was interrupted by Turkey. As a result, the total that was transferred to Armenia was 52,000 tons. It is true that following the escalation of war in Karabagh, Turkey sided with the Azerbaijani cause by imposing a land and air blockade in 1993. However, Turkey also lifted its air blockade in 1995. Referring to harsh conditions in Armenia, Libaridian notes that: "Life would have been seriously disrupted had Turkey not allowed that gradual transfer, sometimes even advancing wheat from its own storages." See Libaridian, *Modern Armenia*, esp. 269–70.
have almost always been justified by ethno-nationalists as a necessary response to pan-Turanik
expansionist projects, as a self-defense strategy, as an affirmation of the righteousness of Ar-
menian claims and as preparing the nation for collectively achieving just solution of the
Armenian Cause.

To obtain a better understanding of ethno-nationalists’ politics of remembering, it is in-
structive and appropriate to seek a counsel from Nietzsche’s thoughts on ressentiment. In On the
Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Nietzsche noted that usually ressentiment erroneously is in-
terpreted as a “defensive counter-strike, a merely protective measure, a ‘reflex movement’ in the
case of any kind of sudden injury and danger” (Nietzsche 1996, 105–6). Instead in Nietzsche’s
account, the primary “physiological” cause of resentment is suffering:

For every suffering man instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more
precisely, a doer, more definitely, a guilty doer, someone capable of suffering-in
short, something living on which he can upon any pretext discharge his feelings
either in fact or in effigie: for the discharge of feelings represents the greatest
attempt on the part of the suffering man to find relief, anaesthetic, his invol-
untary desired narcotic against pain of any sort . . . it is here alone, in a desire to
anaesthetize pain through feeling, that the real physiological cause of ressent-
iment, of revenge, and related matters to be found . . . to anaesthetize by means of
any more intense emotion a secret pain and torment which is becoming unbear-
able, and so to exclude it from consciousness for a moment at least. And for this
purpose, a feeling is required, the most intensive feeling possible, and, in order to
stimulate it, the first pretext which happens along (ibid.).

Importantly, Nietzsche distinguished self-defense from ressentiment, noting that unlike self-
defense, which is employed to prevent further injury, ressentiment requires a continuous supply
of a “more intense emotion a secret pain and torment,” which upon becoming unbearable is
anesthetized but then again is suffused by a further supply of this “secret pain” (ibid.). In other words, if the cause of resentment is suffering, then it needs an uninterrupted supply of pain and suffering in order to sustain itself: “He [the ascetic priest] brings salves and balsam, there is no doubt; but he needs to wound before he can cure; then, in relieving the pain he has inflicted, he poisons the wound—for this is his particular area of expertise” (ibid., 105).

Given that Genocide—suffering on a grand scale—crystallized the victimized aspect of Armenian identity and later provoked resentment over past injuries, politicized victim identity sustains itself by searching a “guilty doer” or a site to discharge the suffering and by continuously evoking images of unredeemable wrongs. But as Brown notes by seeking a site to discharge sufferings, politicized identity:

installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundations of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity. In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past—a past of injury—and locating a “reason” for the “unendurable pain” of social powerlessness in the present, it converts its reasoning into an ethicizing politics, a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future—for itself or others—that triumphs over that pain (Brown 1995, 74).

Political claims of identity entrenched in victimhood and suffering and re-structured in resentment are self-defeating. As Brown notes: “Thus politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a ‘hostile external world’” (Brown 1995, 70). Hence ethno-nationalists promoting the image of victimized-but-resented identity engage in a reiterative process, which while seeking healing reinstates suffering. To sustain the legitimacy of victim identity restructured in resentment and to
sustain the rejection of its political claims by a ‘hostile external world,’” they envision past injuries as unredeemable and inscribe an everlasting collective guilt to the wrongdoer, the genocidal nation Turkey.

Ethno-nationalists’ policies of adopting the Genocide recognition as a state official foreign policy but not as a precondition for establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey, the “third approach” (i.e., establishing relations while keeping national interests in the foreign policy agenda) and anti-Turkish political rhetoric were not merely contradictory and confusing. These policies pushed their “longed-for” objective, Genocide recognition by Turkey, beyond the possibility of being achievable and damaged prospects for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. These policies sustained victim identity and rejection of its political claims by a “hostile world,” therefore justifying the non-revisable nature of Armenian victimhood and “locating” a renewed reason for further resentment.

Finally, for ethno-nationalists, the preservation of victimized identity and the economy of resentment is a way to legitimize their own vocational existence and their claims of political power since the “ascetic priest poisons the wound” not because he has no other choice, but because “this is his particular area of expertise” (Nietzsche 1996, 105). And for that reason ethno-nationalists will continue investing in the history of suffering, in victim identity crystallized by the Genocide. That is, they will continue politicizing victim identity and framing its claims for recognition in a political language that sustains rejection of these claims.

These are only tentative and by no means exhaustive conclusions in an attempt to analyze the ethno-nationalist politics of remembering. Yet what is definitive is that so far ethno-nationalists’ political discourse capitalized solely on the victimized-cum-resented aspects of Armenian national identity and persistently suppressed revisionist attempts, casting them as attempts of self-denial. There is no question that the tragedy of Genocide constitutes the most traumatic memory shared by all Armenians and dismissing psychological effects of the Genocide will not make
them disappear. Nevertheless, the model of remembering offered by ethno-nationalists merely exacerbates these effects, raising serious questions regarding their willingness to imagine the Armenian identity as liberated from past wrongs. This politics of remembering has not offered a possibility that wrongs can have a temporal nature; instead it fixes identity in injuries and sufferings of never-ending past.

2.9 Conclusions

This chapter was devoted to the analysis of the first key issue central to Armenian national identity: Genocide and relations with Turkey. To fully convey the significance of the Genocide in modern Armenian politics, I provided extended historical sections devoted to the genesis of the issue. Within this context, I particularly concentrated on the evolution of the Armenian Question, which underwent a series of redefinitions and transformations since its inception in the late nineteenth century.

Initially, the Armenian Question embodied requests of fair governance for Christian Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Turkey, who lived in a highly discriminatory millet system. By the end of the nineteenth century, these reformist attempts came to be known as the Armenian Question. As repeated requests for just treatment of Armenians were not met, the leaders of Armenian community now sought support from outside powers hoping to secure provisions for self-administration.

Yet, neither the Russo-Turkish San-Stefano peace treaty, signed in 1878, nor the Berlin treaty, initiated by European powers in 1878, delivered the longed-for solution to the Armenian Question. Meanwhile, fearful of significant territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire and relying on Europe's reluctant intentions regarding Armenians, Sultan Abdul-Hamid II initiated his own solution to the Armenian Question, by launching widespread massacres of Armenians in the years of 1894–96.
As a result of Russia's and Europe's strategically revived interest in the Armenian Question, from 1913–14, the Franco-Russo-British Entente and the Triple Alliance drafted a reform plan which promised a regional autonomy in six western Armenian provinces. However, with the outbreak of World War I, Turkey joined the Central Powers and effectively terminated Armenian reforms. Eventually in 1915, the Young Turks’ CUP elite launched its final solution to the Armenian Question through a systematic and orderly extermination of Armenians throughout the Ottoman Empire.

After 1.5 million deaths, the Armenian Question for Armenians evolved into a substantively and normatively different issue. Already in 1919, the ARF leaders of the short-lived independent Armenian republic (1918–20) were formulating new, albeit very unsuccessful, approaches to the Armenian Question by declaring that the establishment of a unified and independent Armenia was the party’s ultimate political goal. As a result, the Treaty of Sevres initiated by victorious Entente Powers in 1920 recognized and approved Armenia’s official claim to Western Armenian territories in Turkey. The Treaty of Sevres was never implemented, however. Instead, in the course of an alliance between Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal and Soviet authorities, the Moscow Treaty (March 16, 1921) and the Treaty of Kars (October 13, 1921) were signed. As a result not only Western Armenian territories but also Eastern Armenian territories (i.e., Kars and Ardahan) that were in the Russian Empire since 1878 were returned to the Republic of Turkey.

After Armenia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921, the Armenian Question received various treatments depending on the goals pursued by the Soviet Union. Stalin’s and Lenin’s initial enthusiasm for Armenians’ plight was quickly reversed once the 1921 Moscow Treaty was signed and did not resurface in the Soviet agenda until the end of World War II. Although displayed as a concern for Armenians’ just cause, the Soviet Union’s renewed interest
in the Armenian Question after World War II was an attempt to increase the sphere of its influence in the so-called Northern Tier (i.e., Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan).

In the years 1945–47, thousands of Armenians, mostly from the Middle Eastern countries, repatriated to Soviet Armenia hopeful of a better life and ultimate resettlement in the lost homeland. Yet, many of the repatriates suspected of supporting anti-Soviet ideology were sent to Siberian and Central Asian prisons. In addition, economically devastated post-WWII Soviet Armenia was not prepared to accommodate a large inflow of repatriates. Eventually, relations between local and repatriated Armenians grew tense resulting in significant identity cleavages. With the Soviets’ failed policies in the Northern Tier and the renewed era of state terror against any nationalist claim, the Armenian Question was dropped from the Soviet agenda for the next twenty years.

In 1965, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide, Soviet authorities for the first time sanctioned official commemoration of the Genocide. Ever since Moscow not only sanctioned peaceful marches on April 24 but also authorized the construction of the Genocide memorial in Yerevan. These were followed by the establishment of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Diaspora Armenians, with an objective to propagate pro-Soviet ideology in diaspora communities, which by then were already split into pro- and anti-Soviet camps.

After a violent dispersion from their historic lands, survivors of the Genocide formed the core of the modern Armenian diaspora. The Genocide’s commemoration ceremony in Soviet Armenia in 1965 became one of the most defining moments triggering the politicization of the Armenian Question among diaspora communities. Essentially, diaspora political elites transformed the Armenian Question into the Armenian Cause, which now encompassed the three R’s: Recognition of the Genocide, Reparation of historic lands in Western Armenia, and Repatriation of Armenians to their historic homeland. Since the politicization of the Armenian Cause, diaspora Armenians attempted to achieve historical justice primarily through peaceful means.
However, as a result of frustrated expectations coupled with a threat of assimilation and ongoing inter- and intra-communal fights, the Armenian Cause entered its most radical stage. In 1975, two terrorist groups, the ASALA and JCAG-ARA, pledged to pursue the Armenian Cause through militant tactics and violence. By 1984, following inter-group violence and a range of assassinations, both groups disappeared from the political arena, leaving diaspora politics to traditional by-polar political parties.

While maintaining traditional ecclesiastic-cum-political divisions, diaspora political elites were now united by tragic past and a new vision of the Armenian Cause. In this vision, Soviet Armenia was assigned an instrumental role of an intermediary leading to a "true" homeland, Western Armenia. In this context, the existence of Armenia within the Soviet Union was essential since it was the latter that would guarantee both territorial unification of Armenia and the security of unified lands. Yet collapse of the Soviet Union jeopardized this new vision of the Armenian Cause. Both diaspora parties and the homeland soviet authorities criticized the Armenian independence movement, reminding Armenians about dangers of pan-Turanism and about the Soviet Union's historical role in fulfilling national aspirations. On September 21, 1991 Armenia nevertheless declared its political independence.

Since independence the Armenian Question entered a new phase. For the second time in the twentieth century Armenians as a nation with a sovereign state had to confront the question of Genocide and relations with its neighbor Turkey, independently. But that was exactly the problem, as fundamental disagreements regarding the ways of dealing with the Armenian Question, and therefore with Genocide and relations with Turkey, quickly led to a consolidation of two distinct ideological groups: liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists. Acknowledging the centrality of collective memory, both camps offered their distinct interpretations of the nation's past and visions for the collective future. Strikingly different models of remembering the national tragedy were essentially contrasting attempts of reconstructing modern Armenian national identity.
Armenian National Movement party (ANM), which led the movements of Karabagh and independence and which established itself as the dominant political power from 1991 through 1998, opted for a liberal nationalist approach to the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey. On numerous occasions, new intellectual elites made it clear that “thick” ethno-nationalist identity promoting the vision of a victimized nation inhibits liberal political culture and endangers state security from within and without. Essentially, new elites were offering “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity which would sustain the project of liberal democracy and celebrate ethnic heritage without compromising of liberal principles. Drawing on lessons from history and realizing the dangers of the victim identity, liberal nationalists insisted on the necessity of redefining it, which had to start from imagining and practicing fearless and peaceful co-existence with the one who caused the crystallization of victim identity.

Liberal nationalists believed that liberal democracy required normalization of relations with Turkey without preconditions. Given the objectively existing limitations, such as pressing economic needs, and political realities, such as Turkish denial to recognize past events as Genocide, for liberal nationalists the ultimate question was how to remember a tragedy of this magnitude. Rather than forgetting or forgiving the question was how to remember the national tragedy without losing the ability of distinguishing between unjust sufferings of the past and the urgent needs of an evolving present and future.

Reflecting on liberal nationalists’ politics of remembering, I argued that it offered an understanding of history, which stressed interconnectedness versus an isolated history of two peoples and framed tragedy in a political language that could potentially reopen a desire for futurity and fearless coexistence. Doing so was not a-historical or a-national, let alone nihilistic, notwithstanding critics’ argumentations. To the contrary, it was transformative and liberating for national identity releasing it from its surreal fixity in the past. It was also psychologically therapeutic and was a politically emancipatory response without violating boundaries of humanistic
concerns for ethics and justice and without imposing "amnesiac identity" by erasing the memory of the Genocide. Finally, it was an honest encounter with and a realistic response to limitations of a politicized victim identity and its claims for recognition.

Following the coup in 1998 and the complete restructuring of both the executive and legislative branches, ethno-nationalist politics became the dominant mode of conveying the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey. The pre-1998 politics of remembering was vehemently rejected by ethno-nationalists as being inherently anti-Armenian. Instead, the model of remembering offered by ethno-nationalists capitalized on narratives of past injuries intertwined with the narratives of national self-assertion and resentment.

Particularly in the years of 1998 through 2003, both the new president, Robert Kocharyan, and parties holding parliamentary seats after the 1999 elections took a course of selectively reformulating Armenian-Turkish relations within the framework of Genocide recognition. In the period of 2003 through 2006 ethno-nationalist discourse on this issue, especially the one intended for foreign consumption, was softened. Nevertheless, the official discourse intended for domestic consumption invariably contained vociferous rhetoric regarding the Armenian Cause and remained overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist on this issue.

One of the puzzling aspects of ethno-nationalists' politics was that in sharp contrast to an abundant discourse to predicate Armenian-Turkish relations on the Genocide recognition, the official foreign policy towards Turkey never took that direction. Contrary to their own rhetoric intended for domestic consumption, elites stated their readiness to start the process of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation without preconditions. Moreover, they criticized the Turkish government for keeping Armenian-Turkish border closed as a precondition for Armenian military forces' withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territories (i.e., Mountainous Karabagh and surrounding areas).

There were, however, three major differences between the pre- and post-1998 foreign policies. First, ethno-nationalists cautiously and selectively used some elements of the Armenian
Cause as a state strategy. For instance, the extension of dual citizenship to diaspora Armenians was justified on the grounds of achieving pan-national unification and a collective pursuit of historical justice, namely Genocide recognition and reclaiming of historical Armenian lands in Turkey. Also, very importantly, since independence the issue of Mountainous Karabagh became an integral part of the Armenian Cause. Thus, some ethno-nationalists were convinced that if pressured enough to recognize the Genocide, Turkey would eventually soften its position on the Mountainous Karabagh.

Second, ethno-nationalists officially included the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the foreign policy agenda. Third, the post-1998 administration took a “third approach” to the issue of Genocide and relations with Turkey. According to this approach, Armenia could establish diplomatic relations with Turkey while keeping national interests in the foreign policy agenda. Hence, the “third approach” was merely a semantic reformulation of the ethno-nationalist official discourse intended largely for foreign consumption.

Reflecting on ethno-nationalists’ politics of remembering I argued that it led to Armenia’s economic isolation, virtually a complete economic dependency on Russia and its decreased political significance. I also argued that the model of remembering offered by ethno-nationalists, capitalized on the victimized-cum-resented aspects of Armenian national identity and persistently suppressed revisionist attempts, casting them as attempts of self-denial. This model of remembering merely exacerbated effects of past wrongs and fixed identity in injuries of never-ending past, therefore raising serious questions regarding ethno-nationalists’ willingness to imagine the Armenian identity as liberated from past wrongs.

Ethno-nationalists’ policies on the issue of Genocide were not merely contradictory and confusing. These policies conveniently pushed their “longed-for” objective, Genocide recognition by Turkey, beyond the possibility of being achievable and damaged prospects for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Essentially, ethno-nationalists continued investing in the history of suffer-
ing. They politicized victim identity and framed its claims for recognition in a political language that sustained rejection of these claims. By doing so they secured the sustenance of victim identity, therefore justifying the non-revisable nature of Armenian victimhood and locating a renewed reason for further resentment.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES CENTRAL TO NATIONAL
IDENTITY: WAR IN MOUNTAINOUS KARABAGH AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS—THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY

3.1 Introduction

Separated by only 3.726 miles from the south-eastern border of Armenia, the enclave of
Mountainous Karabagh (commonly referred to as Nagorno-Karabagh) is located in western Azer­
baijan. Currently, Nagorno-Karabagh is a self-proclaimed sovereign Republic of Mountainous
Karabagh (independence was proclaimed on December 10, 1991) with a reestablished land link
with Armenia (the strategic Lachin strip conquered in May 1992). As are all territorial conflicts,
the Karabagh problem has historical roots and at least two different interpretations of the
conflict. Even the name of the land, Nagorno-Karabagh, is reflective of various empires that had
conquered it at one time or another. It literally means mountainous black garden, where nagorny

1Acknowledging the existence of Azerbaijani perception of the Karabagh conflict, I primarily concentrate
on the Armenian perspective. For a comprehensive analysis of Azerbaijan's history, politics, and identity
see Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); The Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on
the Region of Mountainous Karabagh 1918–1988, ed. Gerard J. Libaridian (Cambridge: The Zoryan Insti­
tute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation, 1988); Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani
Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992); Shireen T.
States, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 225–60; Shireen
for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), esp. 58–97; Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan:
A Borderland in Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Tadeusz Swietochowski,
“National Consciousness and Political Orientations in Azerbaijan, 1905–1920,” in Transcaucasia, Nation­
alism and Social Change, ed. Ronald G. Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan University, 1996), 211–
41; Peter B. Golden, “The Turkic Peoples and Caucasus,” in Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change,
Quest for Identity: A Short History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations
and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (Surrey, England: Curzon, 2001);
Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York and London:
is a Russian word for mountainous, *kara* is a Turkish word for black, and *bagh* is a Persian word for garden. The historical Armenian name of the land was Artsakh, which in addition to Mountainous Karabagh also included greater Karabagh, the territories of the surrounding lowlands.

Throughout history the conflict of Mountainous Karabagh brought in new parties whose decisions complicated geo-political complexities of the regions. Intentionally or not, diversification of involved parties, and therefore of interests, led to conflicting policy arrangements by Armenians and Azerbaijanis; bigger regional players, such as Russia, Turkey, or Iran; and extra-regional players, such as European powers, or the United States. Maintaining neutrality or siding with any of the involved parties does not change the fact that the conflict of Mountainous Karabagh primarily is a problem for the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples.

Since the eruption of the conflict, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis shared the full package of human tragedy that comes with wars. In addition, over a million refugees from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabagh fundamentally restructured Transcaucasia’s demographic distribution, adding another wrinkle of violence to the story of Karabagh. Meanwhile, Karabagh Armenians still refuse Azerbaijan’s authority over the region. Yet, Azerbaijanis still refuse to acknowledge this claim of self-determination, relying on the principle of territorial integrity. Both Armenians and Azeris lay claims on this land as a focal historical site intrinsic to the formation of ethno-religious and cultural identity, while all sufferings seem only to solidify these claims.

The nature of the conflict, encompassing its demographic, ethno-cultural, historical, legal, socio-economic, and political dimensions, has received an impressive coverage. With much depth and extent, scholars and practitioners alike have made sincere attempts to understand, explain, and provide possible policy solutions to an ongoing territorial dispute. However, an

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important caveat must be highlighted. Much of the western literature analyzing this challenging problem highlights the “sudden” aspect of the conflict. For many, the conflict was unexpected and puzzling with regards to “why” did it start. Yet, there was nothing sudden about this conflict, particularly for Karabagh Armenians. The existing tensions between Karabagh Armenians and Azeris since the early twentieth century were perpetuated by the Soviet system and simply leaked during Gorbachev’s era of reforms.

To convey the significance of Karabagh in the Armenian history, politics, and identity, the first four sections of this chapter (“From Ancient Times to Persian and Tsarist Russian Empires”; “World War I, British Empire and Bolshevik Revolution”; “Soviet Era: Carving NKAO”; and “The Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy”) are devoted to an overview of historical events pertaining to Karabagh and the genesis of the conflict. I provide an extensive overview of the relevant literature, analyzing genesis of the conflict before and after the sovietization of the region. Here, I also demonstrate the Armenian perspective regarding the Karabagh’s role in the formation of Armenian ethno-religious identity.

If anything was sudden or unexpected it was the truly historical proportions of the movement for Karabagh that erupted in the Armenian SSR in February 1988. Even leaders of the movement concluded that: “The issue of Mountainous Karabagh’s unification was a pretext for expressing the discontent which has been accumulating over decades in the face of social injustice, corrupt leaders, the degradation of the environment, [and] the decline of cultural and moral values.”

Thus, in a section entitled “From Karabagh Movement and Karabagh Committee

3 Posing the “why” question, perhaps unintentionally, but certainly bears an imprint of Western bias to brand self-determination aspirations as acts of irrational ethno-nationalism. Still for others, geo-political interests trump claims for national self-determination disturbing regional stability. Nevertheless, it must be noted that there is a significant controversy regarding how did the conflict start in 1987. Thus, unlike the “why” question, the question of “how” did it start is indeed puzzling and so far any explanatory attempts have been branded as conspiracy theories.

4 Karabagh Committee member, Hambartsum Galstyan as cited in Mark Malkasian, Gha-ra-bagh!: The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996), 44.
to Armenian National Movement and Independence,” I summarize historical events explaining the transformation of the Karabagh movement into the movement for independence.

In the next three sections (“War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions: Package versus Step-by-Step Deals”; “Liberal Nationalist Politics of Territory”; and “Ethno-Nationalist Politics of Territory”), I compare and analyze two diverging interpretations of war in Karabagh. Based on an extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis of state policies, presidential and party platforms, official statements and interviews, I demonstrate that since 1988 Armenian political thought has been marked by two contradictory depictions of the Karabagh issue.

My main contention is that the crisis created around Karabagh revealed contesting ways of imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state. Therefore, the Karabagh crisis revealed fundamental national identity cleavages existing among Armenian political elites and the extent to which territorial politics nourished the needs of the Armenian identity as imagined by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists. Finally, in the concluding remarks I recapture the main points and arguments of this chapter.

3.2 From Ancient Times to Persian and Tsarist Russian Empires

Since at least the first century B.C., the region immediately north-east to Armenia, known as Caucasian Albania (not related to Albanians in Balkans) encompassed the historic Artsakh and most of eastern Transcaucasia (i.e., territories of the modern Azerbaijan). Burney and Lang note that Caucasian Albanians originally were worshipers of the sun and the moon. They came under the influence of Zoroastrian religion during the Parthian and Sassanian periods and eventually under Armenia’s influence embraced Christianity, early in the fourth century (Burney and Lang 1972, 222–23).5

5 Azerbaijani historians claim that Caucasian Albanians are authentic ancestors of modern Azeris and that all of the Caucasian Albania is the precursor of modern Azerbaijan. This view enables historically justified territorial claim over Mountainous Karabagh. Also, according to the Azerbaijani view, the Armenian majority
Artsakh became an Armenian principality since about the fifth century A.D. In the seventh century Artsakh was conquered by Arabs, followed by an invasion of Seljuk Turks in the eleventh century. Seljuk Turks initiated the process of Islamization of Artsakh, particularly in the eastern Transcaucasian lowlands. Inhabitants of plains who converted into the Shi'i brand of Islam and spoke a Turkic language became direct ancestors of Azerbaijanis. However, the western Albanian regions, including what later became Mountainous Karabagh, were largely absorbed by Armenians (Chorbajian 1994). From the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, Artsakh was overtaken by Genghiz Khan but the Mongols’ rule was terminated after the Ottoman Turkey’s conquest of the region in the sixteenth century. In 1639 the Armenian Plateau was partitioned between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, where the former took control of the major, Western part and the latter took control of the Eastern part of the Armenian Plateau, including Artsakh.

Despite centuries of Muslim rule Mountainous Karabagh stands out by its remarkable Christian cultural heritage, dating back as far as the fourth century A.D. Throughout the land Armenians erected churches, fortresses, monasteries, and khachkars (i.e., cross-stones). The first Christian monastery, Amaras, was established in Martuni (i.e., region in the Mountainous Karabagh) in the fourth century by Gregory the Illuminator, the first Catholicos of Armenia. According to legend, the Armenian monk Mesrop Mashtots, the creator of the Armenian alphabet in 405 A.D, founded the first Armenian school at the monastery Amaras. The Gandzasar Monastery, built in the thirteenth century, was the spiritual center of Khachen, the largest and most powerful principality in Artsakh. It was also the home to the Catholicosate of Aghvank, also known as the Holy See of Gandzasar, as one of the territorial subdivisions of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Panossian notes that according to the myth the alphabet was revealed to Mashtots in a divine vision. “This made the actual script the product of Godly intervention and therefore more acceptable to the newly converted Christians.” The celebration of the alphabet and the literary work is sanctioned by the Armenian church as an official holyday called holyday called Holy Translators. See Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 44–46 and notes 25, 26.
Also, in 1827 cultural elites set up Armenian press in Shushi, the capital of Mountainous Karabagh (Oshagan 1997).

Armenian *meliks* (i.e., princes), particularly in the regions of Mountainous Karabagh and Zangezur, managed to maintain a semi-autonomous status and preserve the Armenian ethno-cultural and religious identity. Bournoutian notes that because of Armenians’ economic power in Iran, shahs of Safavid Persia very often extended equal and even greater privileges to *meliks* than to Muslims. In exchange for the patronage, *meliks* were expected to cooperate with Persian rulers. Nevertheless, according to Bournoutian: “Their [melik’s] autonomy and occasional defiance, however, attracted some popular support and together with some Armenian merchants and clerics, initiated the Armenian emancipation movement” (Bournoutian 2002, 211).

From the seventeenth through eighteenth centuries Armenians made a couple of unsuccessful attempts to liberate from alien rule. Israel Ori, from an aristocratic family, entered Armenian history as an advocate of Armenia’s liberation (Panossian 2006; Bournoutian 1997; Oshagan 1997; Walker 1980). Although his mission failed, the legacy of his ideas inspired the plight of future generations. Shortly after Ori’s death, Armenian general David Bek emerged as a prominent historical figure. After the Ottoman invasion of Safavid Persia, Armenians (led by David Bek) allied with the Iranian forces and maintained a fierce resistance to the Ottoman Turks in 1722. Although Armenians were not able to prevent the Ottoman invasion of Eastern Armenia, *meliks* (led by David Bek and his associates, such as Mkhitar Sparapet) defended Karabagh for

7 Armenia and Azerbaijan historically had three disputed regions: Zangezur, Nakhijevan, and Mountainous Karabagh. While Zangezur and Nakhijevan had mixed populations, Mountainous Karabagh’s population was overwhelmingly Armenian. As a result of the Treaty of Kars in 1921 and the Soviet-Turkish Treaty in 1921, Nakhijevan was granted the status of an Autonomous Soviet Republic within Azerbaijan in 1924. Nakhijevan is an exclave bordered by Armenia, Iran, and a 6.21-mile frontier with Turkey. Mountainous Karabagh was made an Autonomous Oblast (region) of Azerbaijan on July 1923. Zangezur, which separates mainland Azerbaijan from Nakhijevan, was returned to the Armenian SSR.

nearly a decade. After Persia’s restoration of rule in 1735, Ottoman Turkey was pushed back to the boundaries of 1639. Nader Shah rewarded meliks for fighting against the Ottoman Turks and exempted them from tribute. More importantly, he “rewarded them by recognizing Karabagh and Zangezur as semiautonomous enclaves” (Bournoutian 1997, 89; 2002).

Historical battles against Ottoman Turkey and the defense of Karabagh became central themes in the popular folk, literature, art, and music, signifying the enduring Armenian spirit and heroism. Panossian notes that: “some contemporary historians argue that his [David Bek’s] war was much more than a self-defensive struggle, but a fine example of national liberation” (Panossian 2006, 114). Thus, the story of David Bek emerged as one of the foundational narratives furnishing Armenian self-image and collective memory.

In sum, equipped with a distinct vernacular, script, Christian religion, and myths, semiautonomous lands of Mountainous Karabagh came to symbolize the “last bastions” of the Armenian statehood and a significant hub contributing to the formation of the Armenian ethno-religious and cultural identity.

With Russia’s annexation of the region in 1805, meliks of Karabagh lost their political significance and autonomy (Bournoutian, 2002). In 1813, Persia and Russia signed the Treaty of Gulistan, as a result of which Artsakh and most of the territories of current Azerbaijan (i.e., khanates of Ganja, Baku, Sheki, Kuba, and Shirvan) were ceded to Tsarist Russia (Bournoutian 1997, 103). Since then administratively and economically Artsakh and Muslim provinces of

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9 It inspired the historical novels The Five Melikdoms and David Bek by Raffi (1882), the opera “David Bek” by Armen Tigranyan (1950), and the novel Mkhitar Sparapet by Sero Khanzadyan (1961). To mobilize Soviet nationalities in a war against Nazi Germany, Stalin eased his tough grip on nationalism. Within parameters conforming to main tenets of the Soviet ideology, Stalin allowed a limited expression of patriotism. As a result, in 1944 a movie David Bek was filmed by a prominent Armenian cinematographer, Hamo Beknazaryan. After WWII, Stalin resumed his reign of terror and condemned the Armenian cultural elite for “idealizing the historical past of Armenia . . . ignoring the class struggle . . . and being too attracted by the reactionary culture of the bourgeois West.” As a result, any expression of nationalism, except the one praising the greatness of Russian people, was banned across the Soviet Union until Stalin’s death (Ronald G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993], 160). In 1978, Armenfilm in association with Mosfilm produced another movie about the efforts of David Bek and Mkhitar Sparapet called The Star of Hope.
Transcaucasia were incorporated into Elizavetpol province, later to be named Azerbaijan. The rest of Eastern Armenia, including Nakhijevan, was ceded to Tsarist Russia only in 1828. Libaridian notes that because of different times Artsakh, Azerbaijani territories, and the rest of Eastern Armenia were ceded to Tsarist Russia. "Administratively, then, Karabagh could not be joined in 1813 to the as-yet-un-annexed Armenian territories of which its history and population made it a natural part . . . Here, as in other empires, decisions made by colonial administrators laid the foundations for future difficulties" (Libaridian 1988, 4).

3.3 World War I, British Empire, and Bolshevik Revolution

The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the collapse of the Russian Empire created a political vacuum in the South Caucasus. Pressured by the colossal losses of WWI, Lenin and Trotsky were forced to sign the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Central Powers, Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, on March 3, 1918. The Brest-Litovsk peace agreement, designed to end Russia's participation in WWI, came with exceptionally costly terms attached to it. In exchange for peace Russia surrendered Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Kurland, Livonia, and Bessarabia to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany demanded Russia to recognize the independence of Georgia, Ukraine, and Finland. At the insistence of the Ottoman Turkey, all lands Russia had captured from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), specifically Ardahan and Kars in the Armenian province, and Batumi in the Georgian province, were returned to the Turkish government.

In the midst of revolutionary political upheavals in Russia and Central Powers' territorial expansions, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia formed Transcaucasian Federative Republic, on April 22, 1918. However, conflicting interests in the region proved a common Transcaucasian

state to be an illusory short-lived political arrangement. To protect its territorial integrity from Turkish expansion and to save Batumi, a crucial commercial center with a large oil port on the Black Sea and the last stop of the Baku-Tiflis-Batumi Transcaucasian railroad, Georgia signed a treaty with Germany. Germany agreed to protect Georgia’s territorial integrity and in exchange Georgia agreed to economic concessions and declared independence on May 26, 1918. Azerbaijan sympathized with Ottoman Turkey’s Pan-Turanian policy and was eager to destroy the Baku Soviet and make Baku the capital of the new republic. Therefore, Azerbaijan allied with the Ottoman Turkey and announced independence on May 27, 1918. Faced with the Ottoman Turkey’s eastward expansion and having no powerful allies Armenia reluctantly declared its independence on May 28, 1918. Thus, compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan, which received some security guarantees because of their alliances with Germany and Turkey respectively, Armenia’s state security was the most vulnerable.

Meanwhile the Ottoman Turkish army penetrated the South Caucasus and invaded most of the Eastern Armenian territories, reaching the last remaining Armenian city Yerevan. The crisis was solved with a signing of Turko-Armenian Treaty of Batum on June 4, 1918. As a result the Armenian Republic was cut down to a tiny enclave around the cities of Yerevan and Echmiadzin, limiting the Armenian territory to just 4,500 square miles (Hovannisian 1967, 1997).11 Backed by the Turkish support, the new Azerbaijani republic proclaimed Mountainous Karabagh as its territory while the Turkish troops in Baku launched a massacre of Armenian population in September 1918.12 Initially refusing Turko-Azeri demands to accept Azerbaijan’s authority, Karabagh Armenians eventually had to surrender in October 1918.

12 At least 20,000 Armenians were killed in Baku massacres: Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 261.
Following the surrender of Central Powers, the British Empire emerged as the dominant player in the region. When Turkish forces were ordered to leave the region in November 1918, Armenian guerilla fighters marched towards Mountainous Karabagh. However, the British ordered to terminate Armenian advances and wait for results of the Paris Peace Conference. Despite British assurances, the final decision was to leave Karabagh and Zangezur within Azerbaijani jurisdiction as autonomous regions. Moreover, the British appointed Khosrov Bek-Sultanov as a provisional governor-general of Zangezur and Karabagh. Bek-Sultanov had personally participated in Baku massacres of 1918 and was an ardent pan-Turkist, having close ties with Young Turks (Walker 1980, 270; Payaslian 2007).

In response to British policies, Armenia declared Zangezur and Karabagh as inseparable parts of Armenia in January 1919. The next month Pan-Karabagh Assembly declared its decision of unification with Armenia. However, unlike Armenians in Zangezur, Karabagh Armenians could not defy British arrangements. Following a number of desperate struggles they were forced to accept Azerbaijani authority over the region in August 1919. After British forces were pulled out from the Transcaucasus in 1919, Bek-Sultanov demanded a complete incorporation of Karabagh into Azerbaijan. Armenians rebelled in March 1920 but in retribution Azerbaijani forces burned Sushi, the capital of Mountainous Karabagh, and massacred most of its Armenian population (Hovannisian 1997, 318).\(^\text{13}\)

Historians argue that British motivations for such a consequential policy could have been determined by various factors. According to Arslanian: “British postwar intervention in Transcaucasia was not undertaken for the purpose of redeeming British pledges to Armenian . . . . Britain obtained control of the region in order to force the evacuation of the Turks, defend India

\(^{13}\) The numbers of Armenians who perished during the destruction of Shushi in 1920 vary widely. However, the Armenian population of the city, which comprised majority before pogroms, was almost extinct. Since then Azeri population comprised an overwhelming majority of Shushi. According to the Azeri claim, Shushi has been the cradle of Azeri cultural life since ancient times. Currently, the city of Shushi is controlled by the unrecognized Republic of Mountainous Karabagh.
from a future German or Turkish threat, and assist the anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia” (Arslanian 1978, 524). However, the British did not have enough military forces in Transcaucasia to achieve these objectives. Therefore, Arslanian argues: “expediency played a very important role in the shaping of policy towards Karabagh, for nothing could have proved more ruinous to British efforts to keep Azerbaijan quiet than a decision in favor of Armenia” (Arslanian 1980, 92). Similarly, Croissant argues that it was believed that pro-British Azerbaijan would be “a valuable barrier against pan-Islamic-and later, Soviet encroachment upon the approaches to India and the newly acquired British mandates in the Middle East” (Croissant 1998, 15). Hence, the British “set out to provide Azerbaijan with an important carrot: The attachment of Nagorno-Karabagh to the Republic of Azerbaijan” (ibid.).

Sources also indicate that British policies were driven by their interest in oil supplies via the Baku-Batum pipeline. To secure an unhindered access to Baku’s oil, British policy aimed to establish pro-British and anti-Bolshevik Azerbaijan (Walker 1980; Croissant 1998; Krikorian 2001; Payaslian 2007).

Finally, many scholars also believe that British policy towards Karabagh was driven by their long-standing pro-Turkish attitudes (Arslanian 1978, 1980, 1996; Walker 1980; Hovannisian 1997; Cornell 1999; Payaslian 2007). As Arslanian quotes General George Milne, responsible for British military operations in South Caucasus: “They [the local nationalities] are certainly not worth the life of one British soldier. The Georgians are merely disguised Bolsheviks . . . . The Armenians are what the Armenians have always been, a despicable race. The best are the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, though they are in reality uncivilized” (Arslanian 1996, 303). Also, due to a long history of the Ottoman Empire, the British exerted a degree of respect towards Turks and “considered the Muslim leadership with Turkish support far more reliable as a political and military force in the region” (Payaslian 2007, 155). Motivations notwithstanding, scholars agree
that British policy on the status of Mountainous Karabagh furthered inter-ethnic animosities and geopolitical complexities of the region.

British departure from the Transcaucasus was followed by Bolshevik's advances in the region. As a result Armenia was compelled to accept a "temporary" Bolshevik occupation of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan on August 10, 1920. This was also the day when victorious Entente Powers and the Armenian delegation signed the Treaty of Sevres. The treaty would provide the longed solution to the "Armenian Question." According to the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey would recognize Armenia as a free and independent state. The signatories agreed to let the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, determine the boundaries of the proposed Armenian state. The proposed Armenian state's boundaries delineated by Wilson would incorporate Western Armenian provinces: Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van. The Democratic Republic of Armenia was also prescribed with an outlet to the Black Sea at the port of Trabzon. Finally, according to the treaty Turkey would renounce any claim to the ceded land (Hovannisian 1967; 1997; Walker 1980).

However, logistically "Wilsonian Armenia" could not be realized without a considerable military enforcement. Armenia was trenched in multiple problems created by post-Genocide refugees, internal combating between pro-and-anti Bolshevik forces, and regional wars. Thus, they were incapable of implementing terms of the treaty fulfilling the longed dream of united Armenia. And since neither European powers nor the United States had enough political will to commit to this task, "Wilsonian Armenia" was never implemented.

14 In a dramatic comparison Herzig notes that the Armenian Republic in the years 1918–20 was comparable to a contemporary Ethiopia or Sudan. See Edmund Herzig, "Armenia and the Armenians," in The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith (New York: Longman Group Ltd., 1996), 248–68.

15 Hovannisian writes that because the United States had not actually declared war on the Ottoman Empire, the U.S. Department of State notified the Allied Powers about its decision not to participate in the Turkish peace settlement. For further details see Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Walker, Armenia. The Treaty of Sevres was annulled when the Turkish government and Entente Powers ratified the superseding Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Sevres, which was intended to partition the Ottoman Empire, encouraged a powerful wave of Turkish nationalism led by Mustafa Kemal (i.e., Ataturk). To prevent disastrous territorial losses, Turkish nationalists aligned with Bolsheviks. According to Hovannisian, “Soviet leaders, in their turn, recognized the potential role that Turkish influence could play in stirring the Muslim colonial world against the Western powers and thereby saving the Bolshevik revolution and Soviet state” (Hovannisian 1997, 333).

As a result of this mutually beneficial political partnership, a draft Soviet-Turkish Nationalist accord was initiated in Moscow on August 24, 1920. The draft was a precursor to Moscow Treaty signed by the parties on March 16, 1921. According to the terms of the draft and the treaty, previous Russo-Turkish treaties were announced null and void and Russia would decline to recognize any international act not ratified by the Turkish government. Eastern Armenian territories of Kars and Ardahan that were in the Russian Empire since 1878 were returned to the Republic of Turkey (Bournoutian 2002; Hovannisian 1997, 1973). The Sumarlu district of Yerevan, encompassing Mount Ararat, was transferred to Turkey and Nakhijevan was granted an autonomous status within newly sovietized Azerbaijani republic (Hovannisian 1997, 345).

Immediately following the draft initiative, Kemal authorized a new Turkish offensive against Armenia. By November 1920, Armenian military forces surrendered and were forced to sign another disastrous peace treaty. Under the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol, signed on December 3, 1920, Armenia renounced the Treaty of Sevres, all claims to Western Armenian territories, the province of Kars in Eastern Armenia, and accepted temporary Turkish jurisdiction over Nakhijevan (Hovannisian 1967, 1997; Walker 1980). Ironically just a day before the Treaty of Alexandropol was ratified, the Armenian government also signed a treaty with Bolsheviks and

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16 See Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road. Special relationships between Turkey and the Soviet Union based on mutual interests were further strengthened by the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, signed on December 17, 1925.

17 Azerbaijan was the first Transcaucasian republic to be sovietized in April 1920, followed by Armenia in December 1920 and Georgia in March 1921.
became a Soviet Socialist Republic on December 2, 1920. For the next seventy years, Soviet Russia was the highest authority administering ethno-territorial, socio-economic and political issues of the South Caucasus.  

3.4 Soviet Era: Carving NKAO

Intense disputes over Mountainous Karabagh continued after the sovietization of the region. On July 3, 1921, at the Kavbiuro (the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party) meeting attended by Stalin as the chairman of the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs, a decision was made to assign Karabagh to Soviet Armenia. The decision was reversed two days later, however, and this time Karabagh was assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan. Soviet authorities justified this decision with reference to economic dependency of Karabagh on the surrounding Azerbaijani territory and the necessity to create a harmony between Muslims and Armenians for the “soviet construction” (Altstadt 1992, 117; Suny 1993). Although facts remain unknown to this date, many scholars suggest that the Soviet-Turkish strategic alliance influenced the decision favoring Azerbaijani rather than Armenian claims over Mountainous Karabagh (Herzig 1999; Cornell 1999).

A decree from Baku on July 7, 1923 established the status of Mountainous Karabagh as an Autonomous Oblast (i.e., region) of Nagorny-Karabagh (NKAO) within Azerbaijani SSR. The Russian term Nagorny (i.e., mountainous) was affixed to Karabagh and Stepanakert was declared

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18 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia signed a treaty forming the Federative Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSSRZ) on March 12, 1922. The FSSSRZ was dissolved and instead a more centralized unit was created where the federation of republics was changed into a single federated republic. The Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (ZSFSR) was created on December 30, 1922. The final stage of political centralization took place in 1924, when the ZSFSR (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), Belorussia, Ukraine, Russia and five present-day Muslim republics in Central Asia, entered a new political federation—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Thus, Suny writes, the Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were members of the ZSFSR, which in turn was part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

as the new capital of NKAO, thus replacing the historical capital Shushi.\textsuperscript{20} In November 1924, NKAO was officially proclaimed as a constituent part of the Azerbaijani SSR.\textsuperscript{21} Soviet authorities granted NKAO with cultural autonomy and Azerbaijan was instructed that “all business, legislation and instruction in schools . . . will be conducted in the native [Armenian] language” (Altstadt 1992, 126). However, Azerbaijan’s 1937 constitution proclaimed its superseding rights over NKAO’s local organs and judiciary and Article 47 secured the right of Azerbaijan to nullify decisions by NKAO’s Soviet of Deputies (Altstadt 1992, 129).

The creation of NKAO was accompanied by a number of strategic border manipulations. Mutafian quoting the decree on the formation of NKAO writes: “To create an autonomous region in the Armenian portion of Mountainous Karabagh” (Mutafian 1994, 138). Thus, wherever possible, regions in the proper Mountainous Karabagh inhabited by Armenians were largely depopulated effectively excluding these regions from the NKAO borders. For instance, as a result of demographic manipulations predominantly Armenian districts of Shahumyan, Shamkhor, Khanlar, and Dashkesan located in the northern areas of Mountainous Karabagh were excluded from NKAO (Mutafian 1994).

One of the most consequential border changes was the elimination of the Lachin strip. Historically some 3.726 miles long, the Lachin corridor has been the only strip linking Mountainous Karabagh and the south-eastern border of Armenia. Altstadt notes that NKAO initially touched the Armenian border at one point: “as shown in the first volume of the \textit{Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia} published in 1926. By the time the volume on Nagorno-Karabagh was published in the early 1930s, the borders had been changed and no part of the ‘oblast’ touched

\textsuperscript{20} NKAO’s new capital Khankendi was renamed Stepanakert, after Stepan Shahumyan, an Armenian Bolshevik of the Baku commune.
\textsuperscript{21} The same year in March, Nakhijevan was officially recognized as an Autonomous Republic within the Azerbaijani SSR. Nakhijevan formed an exclave bordering southwestern Armenia, Northern Iran, having 6.21 miles frontier with Eastern Turkey and without a land connection with mainland Azerbaijan. This arrangement was a result of the Moscow Treaty, which not only stipulated the autonomous status of the region within Azerbaijan but also that the region’s status could not be altered without Turkey’s approval.
Armenia” (Altstadt 1992, 127). For strategic reasons the Lachin corridor was emptied of its Armenian population and dissolved into territories of the lower Karabagh, a sovereign Azerbaijani territory. This way, the territorial linkage with Armenia was abolished and NKAO became an enclave in Azerbaijan—a geographic positioning that disfavored Armenians’ claim over the region hereinafter.\(^{22}\)

Since the creation of NKAO, Armenians consistently raised the issue of Karabagh, requesting its reunification with Armenia.\(^{23}\) Especially after Stalin’s death followed by Krushchev’s “destalinization” era, a number of requests in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1977 were sent to Moscow to reassess the status of Mountainous Karabagh. The 1970 census was particularly disheartening for Armenians, which recorded 80.5% Armenians in Karabagh whereas in 1939 they had comprised 91% of the population and 94% in 1921. In 1989 the Armenian population of the region was further reduced to 77% (Chaliand 1994, xi; Anderson and Silver 1996, 503).\(^{24}\)

Fearing the repeat of demographic manipulations in Nakhijevan, which was depopulated of its Armenian inhabitants, Armenians blamed Karabagh’s demographic changes on the Azerbaijani government. Indeed, despite guarantees for cultural autonomy, Armenians in Karabagh were subjected to a systematic cultural oppression and economic discrimination all of which encour-

\(^{22}\) After emptying the Lachin strip of its Armenian population, it was settled by Kurds. In 1923 Lachin became an Autonomous District of Kurdistan. It was abolished in 1929 followed by mass deportation of Kurds to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In general, Kurds received a better treatment and had more cultural rights in the Armenian SSR than in the Azerbaijani SSR and supported Karabagh’s unification with Armenia.

\(^{23}\) In 1936 Aghasi Khanjian, Secretary of Communist Party of Armenia, was assassinated after requesting Stalin to return Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhijevan to Armenia.

\(^{24}\) Based on Soviet census numbers, Anderson and Silver report the following population figures in NKAO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Years</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Azerbaijanis</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Armenians</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Russians</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aged migration. Moreover, the 1981 new constitution of Karabagh stripped local authorities from decision-making powers in any sphere except the power to ratify and execute decisions made by the government of Azerbaijani SSR (Libaridian 1988). Notwithstanding bitter concerns and argumentations, Soviet authorities branded them as nationalist-bourgeois propaganda disturbing the harmonious coexistence of Soviet people.

NKAO was an anomalous arrangement within the Soviet ethno-territorial politics. It was the only case in the USSR where a national group (i.e., Armenian ethnic group) was endowed with both a republic (i.e., Armenian SSR) and an autonomous region (i.e., NKAO) in another republic (i.e., Azerbaijani SSR). As a general rule commonly practiced in Soviet ethno-territorial federalism, only minority groups without a titular republic were given autonomous status either in a form of republic, region (oblast), or area (okrug). Thus, Suny writes, it was “the only autonomous national region with a majority that was of the same ethnicity as a neighboring Soviet republic [Armenia] yet was not permitted to join that republic” (Suny 1993a, 194).

At this juncture, it must be noted that the discussion of the Karabagh problem in the Soviet era is incomplete without placing it within a broader framework of Soviet nationality policies. Soviet nationality policies, of course, were not the sole cause of this dispute. As I attempted to illustrate, the problem goes farther back, pre-dating the sovietization of the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, unique ethno-territorial arrangements in many ways outlined a tra-

25 Armenian schools were poorly funded since they were dependent on Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Education. The history of Armenian people was not taught and books from Armenia were not allowed to be used in the Armenian schools. To get a decent education, Armenians had to migrate either to Armenia or Russia. Preservation of Armenian cultural sites was deliberately ignored and they were erased from the republic’s books and travel guides. In general, the socio-economic infrastructure of NKAO was underfinanced and underdeveloped.

26 Another anomaly, albeit of a different type, is the Ossetian case. Ossetians were not granted with a titular republic, but were divided into two political units between two different titular republics: an Autonomous Republic in Russia and an Autonomous Region in Georgia. Finally, another odd arrangement was the creation of Nakhijevan’s Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijani SSR. As a result, Armenia is positioned in the middle of the mainland and the Nakhijevan exclave since 1924.

27 This is not to say that Karabagh is an “ancient problem” as ethno-nationalists both in Armenia and Azerbaijan have argued. However, the inter-ethnic conflict over the territory goes back to at least 1905, when violence broke out between Azeris and Armenians in Karabagh’s capital of Shushi.
jectory of inter-ethnic relations not only in the South Caucasus but also across the Soviet space. From this perspective, Karabagh is only one example among many where deliberate territorial allocations cut through ethnic lines, thus creating zones of vulnerability for both majority and minority ethnic groups.

3.5 Legacy of Soviet Nationality Policies

Soviet nationality policies stood out by three distinct trends: (1) nation-building through institutionalization of territorialized ethno-cultural identity, (2) homogenization through Russification, and (3) nation-destroying through demographic manipulations and carving of territorial-administrative units cutting across ethno-cultural lines. Each of these three trends had its own logic, was applied in a highly selective manner, and was designed with an ultimate objective of preserving the multi-ethnic Soviet empire. Taken together these three trends produced complex outcomes, including the ones that in the long-run worked against the preservation of the empire. They also fundamentally defined inter-ethnic relations not only in the Soviet empire but also in the post-Soviet space. The legacy of Soviet nationality policies, albeit with some variations, continues informing political decisions and influencing ethno-territorial tensions in post-Soviet republics.

Overall the USSR was inhabited by more than 100 ethnic groups. It was composed of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), including the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).28 SSRs were named after majority ethnic groups, thus forming titular republics. Titular republics were granted with nominally equal basic rights, were declared as sovereign states, and had the right to secede from the Union. However, this was a mere formality and in practice they were stripped of independent decision-making powers in economic, political, cultural, and legal matters.

28 Soviet Socialist Republics in the South Caucasus were: Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; in the Pre-Baltic region: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; and on the Western flank, Belorussia, Moldavia, and Ukraine.
Since its inception in the early 1920s the USSR was a highly centralized state with a constitution that concentrated most of the power in the hands of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Foreign policy, defense, foreign trade, communications, and most domestic socio-economic and political policies became the sole domain of the USSR’s central organs, such as CPSU and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Politburo). Already in the early 1920s republics’ decision-making powers were strictly regulated to conform to interests of the RSFSR, which was a strategic choice to bring peripheries closer to the imperial center (Suny 1993b).

Although in the USSR constitution SSRs formed a federation, Soviet federalism, as Pipes notes, “did not involve a distribution of power between the center and the province; only a corresponding decentralization of the Communist Party would have made the establishment of genuine federal relations possible. If, in 1917, Lenin had accepted state federalism so readily, it was because he knew that the existence of a unified, centralized Communist Party with authority over political institutions throughout the Soviet territories made possible the retention of unalloyed centralized political power” (Pipes 1997, 246). Institutionalized imperial relations between the center and peripheries remained the defining aspect of the Soviet Union until its demise.

Besides, the creation of territorial federalism was a formality triggered by considerations of foreign policy. For instance, Pipes notes that especially in borderland areas, such as Georgia and Armenia, which had independent states and diplomatic representations abroad, “it was necessary to create the impression that the subjugated lands retained their independence even after Soviet conquest” (Pipes 1997, 250). Therefore, non-Russian areas located on the fringes of the Empire were made into Union Republics. In contrast, the non-Russian inland areas without contact with foreign powers were made into autonomous regions, republics, and areas.
Thus, in addition to 15 Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR was composed of 20 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and 8 Autonomous Regions (*Oblast* or *Krai*).\(^{29}\) Finally there were 10 Autonomous Areas (*Okrugs*) within the RSFSR territories. Jurisdictionally, Autonomous *Okrugs* were subordinated to Autonomous *Oblasts* or *Krais* within RSFSR's territories, which, in their turn, were subordinated to the RSFSR.\(^{30}\) Similarly, Autonomous Republics and *Oblast* were jurisdictionally subordinated to SSRs within which they were located. Constitutionally, as Pipes notes, the principal difference between Soviet Republics and Autonomous Republics, *Oblast* and *Okrugs*, was that unlike the latter ones Soviet Socialist Republics were recognized as sovereign and independent states with a right to secede from the USSR. Although these formal entitlements had certain “psychological” affects for constituent republics, in practice the exercise of these rights was not tolerated by Moscow officials (Pipes 1997, 250).

\(^{29}\) Within the RSFSR the 16 *Autonomous Republics* were: Bashkir ASSR (now Republic of Bashkortostan), Buryat ASSR (now Buryat Republic), Chechen-Ingush ASSR (now Chechen Republic and Republic of Ingushetia), Chuvash ASSR (now Chuvash Republic), Dagestan ASSR (now Republic of Dagestan), Kabardino-Balkar ASSR (now Kabardino-Balkar Republic), Kalmyk ASSR (now Republic of Kalmykia), Karelian ASSR (now Republic of Karelia), Komi ASSR (now Komi Republic), Mari ASSR (now Mari El Republic), Mordovian ASSR (now Republic of Mordovia), Northern Ossetian ASSR (now Republic of North Ossetia-Alania), Tatar ASSR (now Republic of Tatarstan), Tuva ASSR (now Tuva Republic), Udmurt ASSR (now Udmurt Republic), and Yakut ASSR (now Sakha [Yakutia] Republic). The current status of Autonomous Republics that underwent administrative changes as of December 2007 within the Russian Federation is given in parentheses. The remaining 4 ASSRs were: The Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistani SSR, Nakhijevan ASSR within Azerbaijani SSR, Abkhazia ASSR, and Adjar ASSR within the Georgian SSR. In 1921 Soviet authorities established a separate Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, it was joined with Georgia in a confederative Union Treaty later that same year. In 1931, Abkhazia was incorporated formally into the Georgian SSR as an Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.

Within the RSFSR the 6 *Autonomous Oblasts* were: Adyghe AO (now Republic of Adygea); Gorno-Altai AO (now Altai Republic), Jewish AO, Karachay-Cherkess AO (now Karachay-Cherkess Republic), Khakas AO (now Republic of Khakassia), and Gorno-Altai AO (now Altai Republic). The remaining two *Oblasts* were NKAO in Azerbaijani SSR (Azerbaijan abolished the autonomous status of the region since the Soviet disintegration), and South Ossetian AO in Georgian SSR (Georgia abolished the autonomous status of the region since the Soviet disintegration).

\(^{30}\) Ten autonomous *okrugs* within the RSFSR were: Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug (now Agin-Buryat Okrug within Zabaykalsky Krai); Chukotka Autonomous Okrug within Magadan Oblast (no longer subordinated to Magadan Oblast); Evenk Autonomous Okrug within Krasnoyarsk Krai (now merged into Krasnoyarsk Krai); Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug within Tyumen Oblast; Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (now Komi-Permyak Okrug within Perm Krai); Koryak Autonomous Okrug within Kamchatka Krai (now Koryak Okrug within Kamchatka Krai); Lenets Autonomous Okrug within Arkhangelsk Krai (now merged into Arkhangelsk Krai); Taiginsk Autonomous Okrug within Krasnoyarsk Krai (now merged into Krasnoyarsk Krai); Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug within Irkutsk Oblast (now merged into Irkutsk Oblast) and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug within Tyumen Oblast. The current status of Okrugs that underwent administrative changes as of December 2007 within the Russian Federation is given in parentheses.
When the basic pseudo-federal and pseudo-autonomous structure of the USSR was being outlined, another principal question that occupied Lenin and Stalin was concerning the ways in which the Soviet empire should govern its multiethnic society. By 1923, namely at the 12th Party Congress in April 1923 and at a special Central Committee Conference on Nationalities Policy in June 1923, a resolution was adopted according to which: “the Soviet state would maximally support those ‘forms’ of nationhood that did not conflict with a unitary central state” (Martin 2001, 73). Consistent with Marxism it was made clear that these forms of nationhood should not contradict the creation of a united international socialist society led by vanguard proletariat. Already in 1913, in his much quoted essay *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin argued that social democracy will not support all manifestations of national customs, institutions, and

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31 Similar to the tradition of German Romanticism, Marx and Engels treated nations as communities of language and natural sympathies. From this perspective nations were objectively existing natural phenomena. For instance, Engels writes: “No one will assert that the map of Europe is definitely settled. All changes however, if they are to be lasting, must be of such a nature as to bring the great and vital European nations ever closer to their true natural borders as determined by speech and sympathies; while at the same time the ruins of peoples... which are still to be found here and there, and are no longer capable of leading a national existence, must be incorporated into the larger nations, and either dissolve in them or else remain as ethnographic monuments of no political significance” (Engels, quoted in Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997], 21). According to Marx and Engels, nation-state and nationalism were peculiar and transient historical categories belonging to a particular epoch of rising industrial capitalism. Reactionary nationalism was an ideology of bourgeoisie. By disseminating nationalist sentiments and nationalizing the proletariat, bourgeoisie used nationalism as a weapon for distracting proletariat from its real class interests and for preventing international unity of revolutionary movement. See Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nation and Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). Marx also believed that: “National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto” (Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker [New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1978], 488). Therefore, according to Marx, highly developed nations were particularly prone to social revolutions led by the proletariat, a universal class which was also a true embodiment of genuine nations and national cultures (Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*). Importantly, Marx did not envisage the withering away of nations along with the state, although he talked about the withering away of national differences and antagonism: “National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing... In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end” (Marx, *Manifesto*, ed. Tucker, 489). Smith notes that although both Marx and Engels assumed that there would be a “global cultural convergence, national forms and cultures would persist, albeit with a socialist content” (Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 47). Thus, they believed that international socialism led by an emancipated proletariat is the only foundation, which eradicates national antagonism, guarantees nations a right of equality, and reduces political national differences to irrelevancy.
demands but only those that promote interests of the proletariat. Eventually, the slogan "National in form, socialist in content" famously coined by Stalin became the true embodiment of Soviet nationalities policy delineated in 1923.

Connor notes that although Lenin encouraged pluralism he also made it clear that "pluralism had no intrinsic value beyond serving as a transitional step leading to a higher stage at which national differences would have withered away" (Connor 1992, 32). Citing Lenin, Connor writes: "The proletariat supports everything which contributes to the elimination of national differences [and it] welcomes any and every assimilation of nationalities—with the exception of those carried out by force or on the basis of privilege" (ibid.). Consistent with Marx and Engels, Soviet leaders believed that nationalities with their diverse national attributes and consciousness belonged to a transient but an unavoidable historic phase. National stage, in its turn, was believed to be inevitably followed by socialist internationalism. For instance, Martin notes that according to Lenin:

[32] It is noteworthy that for Stalin, nation does not have to be composed of ethnically homogeneous population. He makes this point abundantly clear and indeed uses French, Italian, British, and German nations to demonstrate his point. For instance, he mentions that modern Italian nation is composed of Romans, Germans, Greeks, and Arabs. Similarly, he points out the French nation as being composed of Gauls, Romans, Britons, and Germans. Common language is a critical component of the nation for Stalin. But at the same time, he notes that mere linguistic commonality is insufficient for constituting a nation and uses examples of Britain and the United States sharing the same language. Thus, he makes it clear that nation must possess a territory. Yet, a population occupying a territory and sharing a language does not constitute a nation unless it is governed by a common economic system. According to Stalin, Georgia has emerged as a nation only at the second half of the 19th century, marked by the fall of serfdom, growth of economic life, development of communication, and the rise of capitalism. Capitalism introduced division of labor between various districts of Georgia, completely shattered the economic isolation of the principalities, and bound them together into a single whole. Finally, psychological make-up is responsible for a common culture, national identity, mentality, and physiognomy of a nation. Stalin, however, acknowledges that a common psychological make-up of a nation is not fixed and can change in time. Yet, the very existence of a psychological make-up is so strong that it necessarily manifests itself in all spheres of life. For English translation see Joseph Stalin, "The Nation," in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18–21; for Russian text see I. V. Stalin, “Marksizm i Natsional’nyi Vopros” [Marxism and the National Question], in Sochineniia: 1907–1913 [Essays: 1907–1913], Tom 2, ed. Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin (Moscow: State Publisher of Political Literature, 1946), 290–367.

[33] Connor notes that Stalin's expression "National in form, socialist in content" was inspired by the Manifesto of the Communist Party, which states that: "Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie" (Marx, Manifesto, ed. Tucker, 482); Walker Connor, "Soviet Politics Toward the Non-Russian Peoples in Theoretic and Historic Perspective: What Gorbachev Inherited," in The Post-Soviet nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, ed. Alexander Motyl (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 47.
“Mankind can proceed towards the inevitable fusion (sliianie) of nations only through a transitional period of the complete freedom of all oppressed nations” (Martin 2001, 70). Thus, Soviet leaders believed that the phase of national assertiveness had to be encouraged on a massive scale in order to accelerate the inevitable transition to socialist internationalism with voluntarily merged nationalities.

The extent of Soviet authorities’ devotion to the “positive affirmative action” leading to internationalism has been well documented by scholars. For instance, Martin (citing Stalin) writes: “We are undertaking the maximum development of national culture, so that it will exhaust itself completely and thereby create the base for the organization of international socialist culture . . . . It would be an error if anyone thought that in relation to the development of the national cultures of the backward nationalities, central workers should maintain a policy of neutrality . . . . I emphasize this so that [it will] be understood that we are not indifferent, but actively protecting the development of national cultures” (Martin 2001, 70, 77). Thus, Soviet nationalities policy envisaged three interrelated stages leading to a “voluntary” assimilation into a single Soviet culture: (1) flourishing of nationalities (also known as “indigenization” [korenizatsiia], encouraged by Lenin and supported by Stalin until the early 1930s), followed by (2) national rapprochement (sblizhenie) and (3) an eventual merger of nations (sliianie) (Suny 1993b).

As an extensive literature suggests, among those three stages the only successful one was the stage of indigenization. For Soviet leaders the policy of indigenization was not only a state sponsored accelerator towards international socialism; it also facilitated the implementation of massive economic projects, such as New Economic Policy (i.e., a mixed state and market economic system in 1921–28), and “Great Transformation” (i.e., a policy of rapid industrialization initiated by Stalin from 1928–32).

Both Lenin and Stalin were aware of anti-Russian sentiments across the empire and argued that Tsarist Russia’s oppressive policies towards subject minorities were responsible for
generating distrust towards “Great Russians.” Based on existing anti-Russian moods, and in line with Marx, they distinguished between oppressor-nations’ offensive nationalism (i.e., Great Russian chauvinism), and oppressed-nations’ defensive nationalism (i.e., subject minority groups). Using this distinction the “Greater Danger Principle” was developed according to which the Great Russian chauvinism was a greater danger than local nationalism (Martin 2001, 71).

Slezkine notes that if Russian chauvinism had to be eliminated through proletariat victory and harsh measures, local nationalism had to be eliminated through sensitivity and tact. Soviet leaders believed that if granted with increased national rights minority groups would recover their trust “in the proletarians of the former oppressor nation. Genuine equality of ‘form’ would reveal the historically contingent nature of nationalism and the underlying unity of class content” (Slezkine 1994, 419).

Besides, realizing the powerful mobilizing force of nationalism Soviet leaders believed that by sanctioning the flourishing of national forms, minority groups would perceive the Soviet power as “native,” fulfilling their own national needs. For instance, Martin (citing Stalin) writes: “the [non-Russian] masses would see that Soviet power and her organs are the affair of their own efforts, the embodiment of their desires” (Martin 2001, 74). Native elites, in turn, using their native languages would facilitate the dissemination of Bolshevik ideas and economic policies without perceiving them as Russian impositions. In sum, it was believed that by granting national forms, negative manifestations of nationalism would be depoliticized making a room for political content of socialism.

The scale and effects of the policy of indigenization were so monumental that they earned the USSR a title of the first “affirmative action empire” in modern history. Central organs of the USSR, as directed by postulates of Soviet nationalities policy, were in charge of supporting and if necessary inventing basic forms of nationhood, namely national territories, languages, identities, elites, and cultures. By the early 1930s most of Soviet nationalities have been reinforced, in-
vented, and institutionalized. In each national territory the language of the titular nationality was established as the official language. And minorities within titular republics, such as Karabagh Armenians in Azerbaijan or Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia, were sanctioned to flourish their respective languages, cultures, and traditions. Alphabets were invented for those national groups that did not have one (e.g., Central Asian republics).

Each territorial unit acquired its national flag and emblem. National elites were instructed to develop and invent ethno-symbolic attributes (such as histories, myths, and folklore), and to establish cultural and artistic centers, national academia, museums, and educational and scientific institutions. Finally, ethnicity was institutionalized as a fundamental social category, where individuals' ethnic identity was formally acknowledged in their passports (Brubaker 1996). Importantly, ethnic identification did not depend on the birth place or residency but on descent. Thus, minority groups in titular republics, such as Karabagh Armenians in Azerbaijan or Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, were registered and categorized based on their ethnic descent.34

Since the early 1930s Soviet nationality policies underwent a radical shift. During the years of Stalin’s “Revolution from Above” and “Great Terror” since the early 1930s the official Soviet policy took an aggressive road of homogenization of the Soviet space through Russification. The Russian ethnicity “was raised to the rank of ‘first among equals’ in the Soviet family of nations” and the Russian language became an obligatory lingua franca across the Soviet space (Martin 2001, 81). The Greater Danger Principle was abandoned and the “Friendship of Peoples” principle was introduced. According to the Greater Danger Principle everything Russian had to

34 Soviet Union’s passports contained the record of an individual’s last name, first name, patronymic, date and place of birth, nationality (natsional'nost’ meaning ethnicity, such as Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Estonian, Jew, Armenian etc.), family status, the record of military service, and the record of place of residence. Recording place of residence was similar to the Tsarist internal passport system, which was established as a means of controlling population movements in the Russian Empire. Under the Soviet rule, in addition to population control, this system was used as a condition for employment, marriage, medical treatment, and in many other situations. An individual’s ethnicity was determined by his/her parents’ ethnic descent and was fixed for life. If parents had differed ethnicity then at age 16, the applicant had to choose between the two ethnicities. The institutionalization of ethnicity eventually resulted in wide-spread discriminatory practices by titular nationalities against minority groups. It also emerged as one of the powerful forces contributing to the break-up of the USSR.
stay invisible for eradicating anti-Russian sentiments and distrust of "oppressed nations," and for accelerating socialist internationalism. Conversely, according to the "Friendship of Peoples" principle, "great Russians" were in charge of guiding ethnically diverse Soviet empire towards rapprochement and an eventual merger of nationalities.

Thus, with the Russians' dramatically increased political power, Soviet interests were identified with the Russian interests. The most important posts in the USSR, such as in the CPSU, the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, were almost exclusively controlled by Russians. In addition, Russians were assigned to positions of second secretaries in titular republics. Although members of titular nationalities were allotted the post of the first secretary in their republics, second secretary's position controlled by Russians was less-visible yet politically far more important. As Suny notes "native cadres" may have governed in titular republics “but policies were largely determined in Moscow, and local interests were subordinated to all-Union goals” (Suny 1993b, 112). Thus, since the early 1930s, in their drive for economic growth and the fulfillment of Soviet doctrines of sblizhenie and sliianie, Soviet leaders from Stalin to Chernenko, with some variations, actively promoted systematic Russification of the Soviet space.

However, despite the policy of active Russification, banning of religious institutions, and the suppression of nationalistic expressions in culture and politics (such as NKAO’s aspirations to join the Armenian SSR), titular nationalities were still allowed to retain their territories and cultivate attributes of their ethno-cultural identity. As Slezkine notes: “The continued existence of nationally defined communities and the legitimacy of their claims to particular cultural, territorial, economic and political identities was never in doubt” (Slezkine 1994, 441).

Moreover, if titular ethnicities were allowed to celebrate attributes of their ethno-cultural identity, ethnic minorities had fewer opportunities to engage in similar activities. In fact, as Saroyan notes, ethnic consolidation and hegemony in titular republics resulted in “compart-
mentalization of other ethnic groups in everything from the writing of history to the preservation of historical and cultural monuments. The Azerbaijanis in Armenia remain to this day a people without history. Similarly in Azerbaijan, the legacy of Baku's flourishing Armenian cultural past is not a topic for local research agendas . . . and Baku's numerous monuments of Armenian architecture are literally written out of the city's history. Overwhelmingly Armenian-populated district of Havlabar in Tbilisi does not have a single store with Armenian markers or store-front sings” (Saroyan 1997, 407–08).

With increased levels of education and urbanization, political and cultural elites within titular republics increasingly grew aware of the inequitable power distribution in the USSR vis-à-vis Russians. This duality in Soviet nationalities policy—that is, official endorsement of national identities within brackets specified by the center on the one hand, but official promotion of active Russification on the other—in the long term produced profound tensions between the center and peripheries eventually contributing to the breakdown of the Soviet Union (Suny 1993b; Motyl 1992a; Martin 2001).

Another growing concern across the empire was the status of minorities, the so-called non-indigenous ethnic groups within titular republics. Just like non-Russian titular minorities were concerned with the policy of Russification so were ethnic minorities within titular republics concerned with discriminatory or assimilatory policies imposed by titular nationalities. Ironically these concerns echoed Stalin's argument (one of his basic disagreements with Lenin) that local nationalism, such as the Georgian nationalism against South Ossetians and Abkhazians, represented another danger to socialist internationalism (Martin 2001).

35 The term non-indigenous widely used in titular republics is illustrative of biases against these ethnic minorities since in reality, many of these ethnic groups are indigenous to these lands.

36 Ironically, despite his own argument about dangers of local nationalism, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Adzharia, remained within administrative jurisdiction of the Georgian SSR. Moreover, Abkhazia, which was created as a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921, was stripped of this status later in the same year by being joined with Georgia in a confederative Union Treaty. Eventually it was incorporated into the Georgian SSR as an Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in 1931.
In the process of territorialized nation-building, ethnic minorities were subject to a systematic discrimination by titular nationalities. Very often these discriminatory practices were driven not so much by inter-ethnic historic animosities as by a sheer competition for economic resources among union republics. Erickson notes that massive economic projects—such as water projects in Nurek and Aral areas and industrial projects in Karaganda and Tyumen areas—undertaken by central organs “without local consultation or consent, resulted in the uprooting of native groups and ways of life” (Ericson 1992, 255). Similarly, as long as economic interests of the center were fulfilled, political elites in titular republics were sanctioned to carry out economic projects without consent of ethnic minority groups. Thus, economic resources were tapped into projects addressing needs of titular nationalities and to the detriment of ethnic minorities’ interests.

Policies of discriminatory financial spending and underinvestment in the economic and social infrastructure of autonomous republics, regions, and areas had multidimensional results. For instance, in a search for better employment opportunities many Karabagh Armenians migrated to either the Armenian SSR or the RSFSR. But Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, who did not have titular republics, had to either migrate to the RSFSR or assimilate. Also, in both cases minorities very often preferred Russification to the assimilation into either the Georgian or Azerbaijani culture. Therefore, they developed closer ties with Russians, were well versed in Russian language (often better than in their native languages because of titular political elites’ discriminatory spending and underinvestment in minorities’ educational systems), and perceived of Russians as their protectors.

The third significant trend in Soviet nationality policies has received various names, such as “divide and rule,” “combine and rule,” the standardization of Tsarist Russia’s provincial system (guberniia), implanting “apples of discord,” population control, or demographic manipulation. All of these terms accurately capture a colonial strategy of ruling over subjects. Policies of forced deportations, demographic manipulations, and carving of territorial-administrative units
cutting across existing ethno-cultural lines were not only fundamentally nation-destroying. They were also designed to prevent secessionist attempts and increase dependency on the Russian center.

For instance, this policy, which was applied in the Central Asian region to create five republics in the early 1920s, sowed tensions among the Central Asian ethnic groups. The final partition of Fergana Valley among the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik SSRs in 1928, blocked the valley’s natural outlet and the routes to Samarkand and Bukhara. During the Soviet period the whole region was part of a single economy geared to cotton production on a massive scale and the over-arching Soviet political structures curbed problems associated with crossing borders.

Nevertheless, the deliberate application of ethnic politics caused animosities and territorial claims among Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz through much of the Soviet era. Conflicts grew especially sharp after the collapse of central Soviet rule. In 1990, shortly before the end of Soviet power in Central Asia, furious ethnic clashes broke out between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in Fergana Valley, Osh, and its environs.

The imperial practice of mass deportations was applied to regions that were considered to be populated by “unreliable and harmful elements.” Deportations were accompanied by a simultaneous injection of “reliable elements,” that is, Russians, into the emptied lands (Holquist 2001, 125).

Thus, in 1920, Soviet authorities initiated a “de-Cossackization” of the Northern

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37 In particular, the territory of Uzbekistan was drawn to include the two main Tajik cultural centers, Bukhoro and Samarqand, as well as parts of the Fergana Valley to which other ethnic groups had claims.

38 The Valley is now divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan it is part of Soghd province, with the capital at Khodjend. In Uzbekistan it is divided between the Namangan, Andijan, and Fergana provinces, while in Kyrgyzstan it contains parts of Batken, Jalalabad, and Osh regions, with Osh being the main town for the southern part of the country. Since 1991 Uzbekistan regularly closes its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, causing immense difficulties for trade. Uzbekistan’s final border closer with Kyrgyzstan in 2003 devastated the local economy by preventing the importation of cheap Chinese consumer goods. Scholars of Central Asia have argued that rapidly deteriorating economy, as a result of border sealing, largely contributed to the eruption of the Andijan tragedy in Uzbekistan in May 2005, where at least several hundred people were massacred by the Uzbek army.

39 Holquist notes that massive population exchanges through violent deportations were neither Bolshevik nor Russian inventions. These practices were widely practiced by European powers since the mid-19th century with the rise of the population politics and military statistics and with the advent of relevant technologies. All European major powers were engaged in extensive military statistical studies for their own colonies: the English in India and Central Asia, the French in North Africa and Indochina, and the United
Caucasus, including Chechnya, who came to be viewed as “counterrevolutionaries.” In 1921, Cossacks on the Don territory were brutally exterminated and survivors were sent to Siberian labor camps. In 1925 Soviet forces entirely depopulated Chechnya from the “bandit element” and repopulated the area by the “Russian element” (Holquist 2001, 133). Similarly, Azerbaijani Kurds in the thousands were deported to Central Asian lands as unwanted elements in the republic.

The extermination of “anti-Soviet elements” reached unprecedented levels during Stalin’s years of Great Terror since 1936. In 1944, about 120,000 Meskhetian Turks, Muslim inhabitants of Georgia, were forcibly deported to Central Asia, mostly to Fergana Valley. As a result of economic shortages and growing ethnic tensions in 1989, Meskhetian Turks of Fergana Valley were subjected to violent attacks by Uzbeks. Chechens were harshly punished by Stalin for allegedly assisting Nazi troops. In a course of a couple of days, hundreds of thousands were deported to Central Asian and Siberian prison camps. Similarly, Volga Germans and the Ingush and Balkars in the Caucasus were deported en masse to Central Asian and Siberian “special settlement camps.”

In 1944, almost an entire Crimean Tatar population of the Crimean ASSR en masse, in a form of collective punishment, was shipped off to Siberian and Central Asian camps. These policies have been described as Russia’s final annexation of Crimea through violent ethnic cleansing and resettlements of these lands by Russians. Soviet authorities engineered two artificial famines (1921–22 and 1932–33) in Ukraine, as a result of which eight million people died.


For a detailed account of Stalin’s policies towards Caucasian minorities, see Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978). In the post-Stalin era Soviet efforts were minimal for restoring losses and redressing unspeakable injustices towards these minorities. Nevertheless, in 1957 the Crimean Tatars were officially released from the “Special Settlement Camps” during Khrushchev’s destalinization era and in 1967 an official decree exonerated the Crimean Tatars from any wrong doing during World War II.
Russian Jews were branded as “rootless cosmopolitans” and Stalin’s anti-Semitism culminated in the “Doctors’ Plot” of the early 1950s.\footnote{Hundreds of Jews were charged with a conspiracy against high-ranking Soviet officials. Many, including prominent Soviet doctors, were executed. At the Communist Party’s Twentieth Congress, Nikita Khrushchev asserted that Stalin intended to use the doctors’ trial to launch a massive party purge.}

Although the nation-destroying policy through demographic manipulations was scaled back after Stalin’s death, the policy itself was not abandoned by Soviet leaders. For instance, in Kazakhstan industrial and agricultural developments, particularly Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands program in the 1950s, resulted in a large-scale settlement of Russians in the republic (Suny 1992). Continuous Russian resettlements were promoted, particularly in Baltic States since their incorporation into the USSR. Eventually, Kazakhstan experienced a sharp demographic shift emerging as a republic with an indigenous population outnumbered by Russian settlers. Similarly, Estonia, and south-eastern regions of Ukraine, including Crimea, became heavily populated by Russians. In all three republics, demographic concerns influenced relations with Russia and defined citizenship and diaspora policies in the post-Soviet era.

The creation of autonomous units, whether Republics, Oblasts, or Okrugs, was based on several considerations, ranging from foreign policy and economy to demographic manipulation and control. With reference to foreign policy, Connor notes that the creation of these territorial-administrative units had “an enormous propaganda value,” and was appealing to national minorities elsewhere who perceived the USSR “as a cluster of ethnically delineated, autonomous or sovereign units” (Connor 1992, 34). However, the message for autonomous units was different from the one intended for foreign consumption. With reference to autonomies within the RSFSR Stalin announced that “Autonomy means not separation but a union of the self-ruling mountain people with the people of Russia” (Pipes 1997, 248). Thus, Pipes writes, autonomy for Soviet leaders was an “instrument of consolidation not decentralization” (ibid.). And the principle of
autonomy as a consolidating tool was unequivocally applicable to all autonomous units both within and beyond the proper Russia, including NKAO.

The formation of political units—such as NKAO in 1923, Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia in 1922 and Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia in 1931 and Adjara in 1921 within the Georgian SSR, and the Moldavian Autonomous Republic in 1924 within the Ukrainian SSR—were particularly illustrative examples of Soviet colonial cartography. The latter’s status was upgraded to Moldavian SSR in 1940, after Soviet forces re-conquered Bessarabia from Romania (German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in 1939). This status elevation was accompanied by strategic ethno-territorial patches. As a result, the far northern Moldavian ASSR and southern Bessarabia (bordering the Black Sea) were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, leaving the Moldavian SSR landlocked.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, part of the Moldavian ASSR, which was incorporated into the Moldovan SSR (roughly equivalent to present-day Transnistria), became a separate Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. Thus, largely as a result of a legacy of Soviet nationality policies, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova were caught in ethno-territorial disputes, and became parties in the so-called “frozen conflicts” of the post-Soviet space. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as an important (if not the central) mediator negotiating the settlement of “frozen conflicts” in Mountainous Karabagh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Pridnestrovie.

To conclude, there was no Soviet republic, region, or area that was not affected by Soviet nationality policies of nation-building, Russification, and nation-destroying. Lenin and Stalin believed that socialist internationalism had to be achieved in three stages: (1) indigenization (korenizatsiia), (2) followed by a national rapprochement (sblizhenie) and (3) an eventual merger of nations (sliianie). It was believed that by granting national forms negative manifestations of nationalism would be depoliticized, thus making room for political content of socialism.
The policy of nation-building through indigenization and institutionalization of nationhood was necessary for spreading revolutionary ideas across the multi-ethnic empire, for recovering “oppressed” minorities’ trust towards “Great Russians,” and for initiating massive economic projects. But as Davis succinctly notes, despite the slogans: “the interests of the Soviet Union were never sacrificed on the altar of internationalism” (Davis 1978, 89). Even before and during the early stages of indigenization, nation-building for some ethnic groups was accompanied by violent nation-destruction for others. Entire ethnic groups were uprooted and destroyed and the emptied lands were resettled mostly by Russians.

Wherever possible the Soviet empire resorted to colonial style of territorial adjustments cutting through ethnic lines thus creating zones of vulnerability for both titular and minority ethnic groups. In addition, the policy of indigenization was quickly followed by aggressive policy of homogenization through Russification.

Privileges for ethnic groups increased and decreased vis-à-vis their location and very much depended on territorial-administrative status of the land where they resided. Russians standing at the top of ethnic hierarchy and located at the center of the Soviet empire were followed by non-Russian titular minorities located on the fringes of the Soviet empire. Non-Russian and non-titular ethnic minorities within the RSFSR and in titular republics were positioned at the bottom of ethnic hierarchy and at best were granted with autonomous republics, regions, or areas. Thus, the multi-ethnic Soviet Union resembled a conglomeration of “mini empires” ruled by titular nationalities, within the larger Soviet empire ruled by the Russians.

The duality of Soviet nationalities policy, that is, official endorsement of national identities on the one hand but official promotion of Russification on the other, produced profound tensions between the center and peripheries. This duality was extended all the way down the ladder of ethnic hierarchy, where nation-building for titular republics was accompanied by a destruction of ethnic minorities’ ethno-cultural identities and socio-economic opportunities. Just
like non-Russian titular minorities were concerned with the policy of Russification, so were ethnic minorities within titular republics concerned with discriminatory or assimilatory policies imposed by titular nationalities. As a result, as Suny notes, “the USSR had become a ‘prison house of nations’—indeed, of nations that had grown up within the Soviet Union. The inherently inequitable political relations between the center and the republics (and within republics, between the capital and the autonomies) became increasingly intolerable as nationalists became capable of self-development” (Suny 1993b, 113).

The policy of institutionalization of nationhood in titular republics coupled with imperialistic policies of demographic manipulation and carving of territorial-administrative units cutting across ethno-cultural lines produced conflicting expectations and profound cleavages between titular and non-titular ethnic groups. While titular nationalities were allowed to cultivate attributes of ethno-cultural identity, revise centuries of ethnic history, and extend historical claims over lands inhabited by “non-indigenous” ethnic elements, the same ethnic “elements” not only became increasingly vulnerable but turned their gaze towards the Russian center for protection. Thus, policies of population intermingling with diverse ethnic backgrounds and territorial allocations were not simply driven by the Soviet empire’s economic considerations, as many scholars tend to argue, for instance in the case of NKAO. These policies increased dependency on the Russian center, for pacifying inter-ethnic tensions in republics, which were engineered by the center to begin with. From South Caucasus to Central Asia, the Western flank to the Baltic states, titular republics were injected with a dose of ethnic vulnerability as an antidote to nationalism, but most essentially, to secessionism. The fear of secessionism, as the worst nightmare of all empires, ultimately determined the true content of Soviet nationalities policy.

Initially, Soviet settlement of Karabagh might have favored Azerbaijan’s interests. Yet, in reality, as Altstadt notes: “Neither republic could feel safe from border adjustments or interference in its internal affairs . . . . Tension was perpetuated; ‘apples of discord’ remained”
Soviet nationality policies contributed to the institutionalization of ethnic identities both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both republics also developed a strong sense of territorial ownership and entitlements over Mountainous Karabagh. While Armenians in Armenia and Karabagh never settled for Soviet colonial cartography, a couple of generations in Azerbaijan were brought up with a strongly held belief that Mountainous Karabagh was an integral part of Azerbaijan since immemorial times. At the same time, Karabagh Armenians’ ethno-cultural identity grew more vulnerable and socio-economic opportunities became more confined as Azerbaijani territorialized ethno-cultural identity grew stronger.

In the end, NKAO was an explosive implanted in the middle of Azerbaijani SSR waiting for a trigger. Interestingly, the trigger turned out to be Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (i.e., restructuring) and glasnost (i.e., openness). To the dismay of Soviet authorities, the explosion and its sweeping waves across the Soviet space were so powerful that even great Soviet Russia was buried under the rubble. And, as Slezkine notes, when the collapse was over “the tenants of various rooms barricaded their doors and started using the windows, while the befuddled residents [Russians] of the enormous hall and kitchen stood in the center scratching the backs of their heads. Should they try to recover their belongings? Should they knock down the walls? Should they cut off the gas? Should they convert their ‘living area’ into a proper apartment?” (Slezkine 1994, 452).

3.6 From Karabagh Movement and Karabagh Committee to Armenian National Movement and Independence

In January 1988, NKAO Armenians sent a petition with 100,000 signatures requesting Moscow to sanction a referendum on the status of the region. The following month on the 20th, NKAO authorities requested the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to transfer NKAO from the
Azerbaijani SSR to Armenian SSR. In support of Karabagh Armenians, close to a million demonstrators filled the Theater Square and surrounding vicinities in Yerevan, capital of Armenia. In a course of successive mass demonstrations in February 1988, holding Gorbachev’s portraits and banners proclaiming “Karabagh is a test of perestroika,” demonstrators were demanding unification of NKAO with the Armenian SSR.

Practically simultaneously the Armenian diaspora organized a chain of mass demonstrations across the world requesting Soviet authorities to redress the historical injustice. A 1,694-square-mile territory with ethnic Armenians comprising 77% of the population came to embody a unique historical sight for redressing wrongs of the past encompassing physical extermination, lost homelands, and social injustices. Thus, the movement for Mountainous Karabagh emerged as the single most important political issue for Armenians around the world.

In Karabagh, the movement was led by a group called Krunk (i.e., crane) with Robert Kocharyan (president Ter-Petrosyan’s successor following the coup in 1998) as its leader. Krunk, its offspring organization Miatsum (i.e., Unification), and Karabagh leaders in general pursued a single political agenda: Karabagh’s unification with Armenia. In Armenia, the movement was led by a group called Karabagh Committee. Initially, Karabagh Committee, just like its counterparts in Karabagh, was a single issue organization. Original committee members were solely interested in Karabagh’s unification with the Armenian SSR and were ready to employ any means towards that end. For instance, Igor Muradian was discredited for his attempts to provoke inter-

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43 Other Krunk members were Arkady Manucharov, Henrik Poghosian, and Armenianorii Balayan. Krunk was banned on March 23, 1988 and eventually a group Miatsum (i.e., Unification) was formed led by Robert Kocharyan, Henrik Poghosian, M. Petrosyan, Levon Melik-Shahnazarian, Henrikh Grigoryan, and Serz Sargsyan (current Armenian president, a protégé of Kocharyan). Unlike Karabagh Committee, members of Krunk and Miatsum were Communist Party members, government officials, and factory managers who had little interest in reforming the Soviet system and did not have an interest in overthrowing the Communist rule. Thus, as Malkhasian notes, if unification with Armenia was the only issue for Karabagh Armenians, “democratization was the touchstone for activists in Armenia.” See Malkhasian, *Gha-ra-bagh!*, 4. These differences produced profound ideological cleavages between the two movements and greatly complicated the solution of the Karabagh issue.
ethnic violence following Armenians’ massacres in Sumgait, in February 1988. Another leading member Zori Balayan, who had extreme nationalistic views, ironically advocated leaving Karabagh and Armenia for that matter within USSR’s protectorate as the only force against the alleged imminent threat of pan-Turanism.

Since May 1988, because of sharp ideological disagreements the committee underwent fundamental structural and ideological revisions. Some of the leading committee members were sidestepped by reformed Karabagh Committee members who were determined to seek comprehensive democratic reforms through legal means.\(^{44}\) De Waal, citing Ter-Petrosyan, writes: “The first Karabagh Committee—Igor Muradian, Zori Balayan, Silva Kaputikian, and others—thought only about Karabakh. For them, issues like democracy or the independence simply did not exist. And this was the ground where the split occurred . . . . They thought that the Karabakh question had to be solved, by using the Soviet system. And we understood that this system would never solve the Karabakh issue and that the reverse was true: you had to change the system to resolve this problem” (de Waal 2003, 57).

The reformed committee was composed of eleven intellectuals from Armenia, including seven academics, with no single leader.\(^{45}\) The Karabagh Committee adopted a broader spectrum

\(^{44}\) Original leading members that left Karabagh Committee included Zori Balayan (a journalist from Karabagh), Igor Muradian (an economist born in Baku), Silva Kaputikyan (a famous poetess from Armenia), Manvel Sargsyan, and Gagik Safaryan. On May 19, 1988, Igor Muraidian openly called masses to “arm themselves with iron rods (the most widely used weapons during the Sumgait massacre) and Molotov cocktail to defend Armenian interests, and suggested that atrocities against Armenians in Shushi be countered with eye-for-an-eye revenge.” See Malkasian, *Gha-ra-bagh!*, 72.

\(^{45}\) Reformed Karabagh Committee members were: Levon Ter-Petrosyan (a philologist and historian, Ter-Petrosyan was the speaker of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet in 1990 and Armenia’s president from 1991–98); Vazgen Manukyan (a professor of mathematics at the Yerevan State University, Manukyan was the Prime Minister of Armenia from 1990 to 1991 and Minister of Defense from 1992 to 1993; however, because of growing ideological differences and struggles for political power, Manukyan left the ANM, founded his own party, the National Democratic Union [NDU], and became one of the ardent opponents of Ter-Petrosyan); David Vardanyan (a biologist, Vardanyan was the head of the Supreme Soviet’s Permanent Committee on Foreign Relations; he left ANM and joined Manukyan’s NDU party); Ashot Manucharyan (a teacher and vice-principal of a high-school as well as a Communist Party Youth activist, Manucharyan was a senior national security advisor to Ter-Petrosyan until 1993; ideological cleavages resulted in Manucharyan’s departure from the ANM; afterwards he established the Civic Union of Scientists and Industrialists [CUSCI]); Raphael Ghazaryan (a physicist, Ghazaryan was a chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Permanent Committee
of action, ranging from Karabagh’s unification with the Armenian SSR to ecological improvements, democratic reforms, and an eventual independence.\textsuperscript{46}

The movement for Mountainous Karabagh also snowballed into a chain of the largest unauthorized mass demonstrations ever held in Soviet history.\textsuperscript{47} Demonstrations both in Armenia and Karabagh were accompanied by strikes as a political weapon to call the center’s attention to Armenians’ cause.\textsuperscript{48} Initially, the nature of demonstrations was not anti-Soviet. Armenians’ anticipation to achieve unification grew in parallel with the advent of Gorbachev’s policies of \textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost}. Also, Gorbachev’s renewed attention to Soviet nationality policies sparked a hope that Soviet authorities were finally willing to reassess Stalin’s political cartography.

\begin{itemize}
\item on Education and Science; he left the ANM and together with Manucharyan established the CUSCI; Hambartsum Galstyan (an ethnologist, who before his assassination in 1994 was the Mayor of Yerevan); Babken Araktsyan (a professor of mathematics, Araktsyan was the Speaker of the Armenian Assembly till 1998); Vano Siradeghyan (a writer, Siradeghyan became the chairman of the ANM in 1998, and held two important positions before 1998: Minister of Internal Affairs and the Mayor of Yerevan); Samvel Gevorgyan (a journalist, Gevorgyan later became the Head of TV State Committee); Alexan Hakobian (a historian, Hakobian was the head of Lachin’s regional administration until 2004); and Samson Ghazaryan (a history teacher, Ghazaryan joined the opposition party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, but later returned to the ANM).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Democratic structure of the Karabagh Committee, where ideas not only were a result of common deliberation but also required an approval of all members, was extended all the way down to the method of conducting public demonstrations. In many ways, peaceful multi-thousand demonstrations held at the Theater Square from 1988 through 1990 reminded a breathtaking series of tutorials in direct democracy. Leaders and people were in a continuous exchange of ideas and public deliberation was an essential component for resolving issues of the day. One of the illustrative examples was the decision to open a “table of suggestions” where people could submit their ideas for future actions. Following Gorbachev’s decision on July 18, 1988, the Committee was reevaluating its tactics and relied on popular opinions and suggestions in the process. Several observers, from Baltic States as well as Russian democrats, admired the non-violent, constitutional, and democratic nature of these demonstrations and were hoping that this method of social movement would set a precedent in other Soviet republics. For anthropological perspective and analysis of these demonstrations see Levon Abrahamian, \textit{Armenian Identity in a Changing World} (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2006, esp. 217–64).
\item \textsuperscript{47} One of the first demonstrations that erupted in the USSR during the Gorbachev era was in 1986 in Kazakhstan. Here Kazakh students protested against Moscow’s decision to replace Kunayev, Kazakhstan’s first secretary, by an ethnic Russian. Also, in the summer of 1987, Baltic republics commemorated the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 1939 and Crimean Tatars rallied in Moscow.\textsuperscript{48}
\item \textsuperscript{48} It was believed that because of an interconnected economic system of the USSR, a strike in one republic could have an economic impact in other republics, thus providing Armenians with a political leverage. For example, strikes in Yerevan affected factories in Belorussia. Strike as a political tool was largely abandoned after Gorbachev’s decision on July 18, 1988 to leave Karabagh within Azerbaijan. The Soviets’ decision to reject NKAO’s transfer, despite economic losses, was indicative of the ineffectiveness of strikes as a political tool for altering the Soviet cartography. But most importantly, it illustrated that administrative-territorial allocations in the USSR were not simply driven by the logic of economy, but mostly by considerations for “consolidating” the Soviet empire’s hold over the republics, preventing secessionism.
\end{itemize}
However, the initial enthusiasm started wearing off when Soviet authorities did not prevent Azeris' atrocities against Armenians in Sumgait in February 1988. The tragic events of Sumgait instantaneously evoked existential concerns and fears among many Armenians who drew parallels between Sumgait and the 1915 Genocide. Sumgait became one of the most defining moments of the Karabagh story, in many ways setting a course towards escalation of inter-ethnic animosities in both republics. Anti-Soviet mood in Armenia grew even stronger following Gorbachev's decision (July 18, 1988) to leave Karabagh within the Azerbaijani SSR. The final assault came in January 1990, when a radical wing of the Azerbaijani Popular Front waged another slaughter of Armenians, this time in Baku. Like in Sumgait, Soviet Interior Ministry troops did not intervene to avert the bloodshed in Baku, despite several Azerbaijanis' requests to help defenseless Armenians.

Events in Sumgait and Baku coupled with Gorbachev's decision caused a fatal stroke to Armenians' "traditional loyalty" to the Soviet regime and irreparably damaged Armenians' trust towards the system. The nature of demonstrations became increasingly anti-Soviet as the movement for Karabagh gradually transformed into a movement for independence. This transformation, however, was accomplished within USSR's constitutional parameters, deliberately avoiding radical changes that could easily provoke Moscow's harsh response.

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49 Assaults on Armenian population were widespread in other areas of Azerbaijan, such as in Kirovabad and Nakhije.
50 Eventually, albeit with a deliberate and fatal delay, Soviet troops entered Baku. However, the real objective was not to stop, let alone prevent, despicable barbarities against Armenians, although it was used as a pretext. Soviet authorities sanctioned Baku's military takeover to punish Azeris' anti-Soviet movement, who already in 1989 (September 25) passed a law on sovereignty. Soviets' harsh punishment of Azeri crowds entered the Azerbaijan's history as the "Black January" and in the long run resulted in a complete destruction of the Azeri public's trust towards the Soviet regime. See De Waal, *Black Garden*. Similarly, Soviet troops brutally crashed protesting crowds in Tbilisi, Georgia, 1990. Both in Azerbaijan and Georgia, hundreds of people were killed. Soviet authorities had identical plans in Armenia since February 1988. For instance, in March 1988, under the guise of creating order and stability in Armenia, Soviet troops took control of the republic for a month. However, due to wise leadership fatal clashes were avoided. Another military deployment took place in July (days before Gorbachev's infamous decision on July 18, 1988) and November. On July 5, 1988, as a result of provocations a fight broke out in Yerevan's airport resulting in one fatality.
51 Special Soviet forces were deployed to Armenia since March 1988 and the state of emergency was pretty much a continuous condition throughout that year. Immediately following a devastating earthquake in
The establishment of the Armenian National Movement (ANM) in 1989 marked the beginning of this transformation. Led by Karabagh Committee members, the ANM emerged as the largest social movement in Armenia. Although the substitution of the Karabagh movement’s name by the ANM did signal leaders’ priorities, it did not imply the abandonment of the Karabagh issue. Rather, the Karabagh issue became one of the important objectives of the movement in parallel with others, such as comprehensive democratic and environmental reforms. By summer of 1990, leaders of the ANM became the first non-Communist representatives elected to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia. In May 1990 elections ANM members won a plurality of the seats in Armenia’s Supreme Soviet and Levon Ter-Petrosyan became its elected speaker on August 4. On August 23, the Supreme Soviet passed the Armenian Declaration on Independence signaling Armenia’s pro-sovereign position.

Meanwhile (on January 15, 1990), Moscow declared a direct military rule in Karabagh. From April through July 1991, Azerbaijani security forces and Soviet troops were dispatched to Karabagh to implement a military assault called Operation Ring. The ultimate goal of the assault was to punish pro-independence movement in Armenia and suppress Karabagh’s secessionist attempts by means of wholesale cleansing of Armenian villages in Karabagh. Operation Ring with its brutal measures against civilians had a counterproductive effect, however, as almost an entire male population of Karabagh and several from Armenia mobilized to participate in the partisan war. The disintegration of the Soviet Union between August and December 1991, and a consequent dissolution of the Soviet army, ended the Ring Operation.

Armenia and Azerbaijan announced their independence on September 21 and August 30, respectively. On September 2, 1991, Karabagh announced its secession from Azerbaijan and in

Armenia on December 7, 1988, Karabagh Committee members were jailed for six months in an infamous Butyrka prison in Russia. Prominent Russian democratic leaders such as Andrei Sakharov and Galina Starovoitova played an indispensable role in negotiating committee members’ release from the prison on May 31, 1989. Leaders of Krmk in Karabagh were detained for a year. See Malkasian, Gha-ra-bagh! Karabagh Committee started seriously considering Armenia’s independence particularly following Russian miners’ strikes in the summer of 1989. See De Waal, Black Garden, 72.
response the new Azeri parliament abolished the autonomous status of Karabagh in November 1991. On December 10, 1991, following a referendum, Karabagh proclaimed its independence. Thus, with the political vacuum in the South Caucasus created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Karabagh conflict escalated into a full-fledged international war. By 1994, local Karabaghi forces with the support of the Armenian army established full control of the de facto independent Republic of Mountainous Karabagh and surrounding seven districts in Azerbaijan proper (i.e., Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Zangelan, Jebrail, Fizuli, and Agdam). As far as official Azerbaijan was concerned, Armenia occupied 20% of its territory and Karabagh’s de facto independence was illegitimate contradicting the principle of territorial integrity.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and internationalization of the conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan were admitted to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Since then the CSCE, later renamed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), led by the so-called Minsk Group, (co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States since 1997) assumed responsibility as a mediator for the conflict. On May 12, 1994, through Russia’s active mediation, a temporary cease-fire agreement was signed by military leaders of Armenia, Karabagh, and Azerbaijan. Although, in general, parties remained committed to the cease-fire, mediating efforts did not result in a comprehensive peace settlement. A number of solutions proposed by mediators were rejected either by Karabagh and Armenia or by Azerbaijan eventually turning Karabagh into a “frozen” conflict.

52 Till present, Karabagh’s independence remains unrecognized by the international community, including Armenia.
3.7 War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions: Package versus Step-by-Step Deals

Since the cease-fire in 1994, involved parties and mediators were actively discussing two possible approaches to resolve this dire conflict: package and step-by-step formulas. Although there have been other proposals (e.g., Common State and Land Swap, also known as Goble plan), Armenia’s political arena has been particularly affected by a fierce contestation around package and step-by-step deals.

Package solution essentially was a comprehensive formula envisaging a simultaneous solution of security and political issues. It required a withdrawal of Karabagh forces from six occupied Azerbaijani territories, excluding Lachin district. Freed territories were to be permanently demilitarized and international peacekeeping forces were to be deployed along Karabagh-Azerbaijan borders. It also delineated the creation of buffer and separation zones extending along the 1988 borders of the former NKAO, as well as the northern and southern borders of the Lachin district, elimination of blockades, and return of refugees.

The package deal also sought to solve the final legal-political status of Karabagh without specifying what is going to be the final status of the land. Rather it left the status determination to be approved by parties to the conflict. In other words, security issues had to be resolved simultaneously with the political ones, where the legal-political status of the land had to be clarified and agreed upon by parties to the conflict.

In May and July 1997, parties discussed two new proposals based on the package formula. Both proposals became to be known as “de jure part of Azerbaijan de facto independent” formula, although it would be better to characterize the status offered in these proposals as the highest level of autonomy. They essentially sought to maintain Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,

however, at the same time granted Karabagh with extraordinary privileges enabling a virtual sovereignty over its domestic affairs.\footnote{According to the July 1997 proposal, Karabagh was granted with the following rights: to form its own executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, constitution and laws with superseding powers over Azerbaijani ones on its territory, flag, coat of arms, anthem, official language, national guard, police force, and direct relations with the international community. In addition, Azerbaijani army, security forces and police could not enter Karabagh’s territory without the latter’s authorization. See Zourabian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Revisited” and the Comprehensive agreement on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts18.php. This proposal (i.e., de jure part of Azerbaijan but de facto independent) was only one possibility based on the package formula. There have been other proposals envisaging alternative solutions to the status based on the package approach. Of course, involved parties had their own and very often conflicting understandings of how the status problem should be solved, ranging from cultural autonomy and confederation to full independence. In the pages that follow, I particularly concentrate on ethno-nationalists’ solution of the status problem, who insisted on the “land for status” solution based on the package formula.}

The package solution was accepted by the Armenian side but with serious reservations. However, it was rejected both by Azerbaijan and Karabagh, as parties could not agree on the final legal-political status of Karabagh because of mutually exclusive conceptions of territorial integrity and self-determination. Arkady Ghukasyan, Karabagh’s Foreign Minister, referring to the package solution, announced that “any status for Nagorny-Karabakh within Azerbaijan is impossible and pledged to expand the Karabakh military and broaden economic integration with Armenia” (Croissant 1998, 121).

Irreconcilable disagreement regarding the final legal-political status of the land necessitated a discussion for the step-by-step approach in September 1997. Essentially, step-by-step approach sought to address three issues, consequences of the conflict, security and political issues, in two separate phases. Thus, security issues outlined in the package approach (i.e., the withdrawal of Karabagh military forces from six districts of Azerbaijan, excluding Lachin district, permanent demilitarization of freed territories, deployment of international peacekeeping forces along Karabagh-Azerbaijan borders, the creation of a buffer and separation zones) had to be addressed in the first stage. Also in the first stage, the proposal sought to address consequences of the conflict, such as the return of occupied lands and re-settlement of refugees, removing of blockades and restoration of the communication infrastructure.
These were to be followed by addressing political issues in the second stage. Thus, resolution of the most contentious issues, such as Karabagh’s final legal-political status, the issue of the Lachin land corridor, and the return of refugees to Shushi and Shahumyan, “would have been left for future negotiations in the Minsk Conference, or just postponed for an indefinite period until confidence building would enable the possibility of reaching further agreement” (Zourabian 2006, 259).

Given Karabagh’s and Azerbaijan’s uncompromising positions on the legal-political status of the land, the step-by-step approach provided an optimal peace settlement. It was an optimal peace settlement formula because it envisaged a potential for creating a balance between two fundamentally contradicting principles of the international law: self-determination and territorial integrity. It left the extremely contentious issues to future negotiations, meanwhile securing peace prospects of the land and enabling Karabagh to address a number of security and humanitarian issues, without losing the Lachin’s land corridor with Armenia, without an unconditional return of Karabagh’s historical capital city of Shushi, and without losing its de facto independent status (Libaridian 1999).

Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in principle agreed to accept this approach as a basis for negotiations towards peace settlement. However, Karabagh and Armenian high ranking officials rejected it based on Karabagh’s unconditional right of self-determination. Among the most ardent opponents of step-by-step approach were Robert Kocharyan (Prime Minister of Armenia and the former President of Karabagh prior to his appointment in Armenia), Serzh Sargsyan (Minister of Internal Affairs and Security of Armenia and the former Defense Minister of Karabagh), Vazgen Sargsyan (Defense Minister of Armenia), and Arkady Ghukasian (the newly elected president of Karabagh). Karabagh’s president Ghukasian announced that “however badly the people live, there are holy things, there are positions that they will never surrender under any circumstances” (De Waal 2003, 260). In addition to high-ranking officials in Armenia
and Karabagh, Armenia’s opposition parties accused the president of betraying national ideals and posing a danger to national security.

Thus according to opponents of the step-by-step approach, or as it was referred to “land for peace” formula, that is, return of occupied Azerbaijani lands in exchange for peace in Karabagh, was simply unacceptable. Instead, it was argued that only “land for status” formula could satisfactorily resolve the Karabagh issue. In other words, based on the package approach, opponents envisaged a comprehensive solution that would guarantee Karabagh’s de jure independence or unification with Armenia first, followed by a return of some of the occupied Azerbaijani lands.

Irreconcilable disagreements escalated into Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation on February 3, 1998. This was accompanied by the Republic Bloc’s disintegration in the parliament and the loss of ANM’s political power. In the following sections, I illustrate that within Armenian politics disagreements around package and step-by-step approaches were not simply about methodological details for achieving peace settlement in Karabagh. Disagreement also revealed contesting ways of imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state. Therefore, they revealed fundamental identity cleavages existing among Armenian political elites and the extent to which territorial politics nourished the needs of the Armenian identity as imagined by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.

3.8 Liberal Nationalist Politics of Territory

In many ways, the Karabagh movement, the Armenian national movement, and the war in Karabagh were misunderstood in Western academic circles. According to conventional wisdom, the movement and the consequent war were manifestations of an excessive devotion to communitarianism and an irrational celebration of ethno-cultural value structure. Consistent with basic properties of ethnic type of identity, the argument was that nationalists in Armenia, and
South Caucasus in general, were incapable of reflecting critically on constitutive elements of identity, and therefore embraced the “situated” aspect of identity embedded in existing social and communal practices.

Thus, the war in Karabagh was interpreted as a logical and even as a natural consequence of ethnic identity inherited from the Soviet past (Rieff 1997; Snyder 1999; Kaplan 2000). But as Jones properly notes, a scholarly focus “on national conflict and violence in Caucasia distorts our understanding of Caucasian history and nationalist movements and raises broader questions as to what exactly we mean by terms like *ethnic conflict* and *nationalism*” (Jones 2006, 249). Generalizations based on a “common Soviet legacy” hypothesis not only sacrificed vital differences among the three Caucasian states but they also overshadowed significant differences existing among political elites within these states.

One of the important facts lost in the Western interpretation of the Karabagh war was that Azerbaijan started it. Despite ANM’s attempts to initiate negotiations for resolving the conflict, Azerbaijan opted for military assaults, mass deportations, and ethnic cleansing of Karabagh Armenians. Armenia did not stay unresponsive to events in Karabagh and was compelled to meet the challenge of the war as a defensive measure to protect its ethnic kin in Karabagh. Thus, as Libaridian notes, “the war in Karabagh was a defensive war, and not a war of expansion. Armenia did not seek territorial aggrandizement in general” (Libaridian 1999, 72).

Turbulent events were also misunderstood in some circles within Armenian diaspora and proper Armenia, who paradoxically criticized the ANM for its excessive devotion to liberalism-cosmopolitanism, at the expense of ethno-cultural value structure. Many did not catch up with the democratic current of the Armenian national movement, did not fully appreciate the direction of

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the movement leading to independence, and the ways this was bound to limit claims on Karabagh. Like their counterparts in Karabagh, for this group of political leaders, hereinafter referred to as ethno-nationalists, the single purpose of the movement remained the unification of Karabagh with the Armenian SSR. Following independence, ethno-nationalists’ ultimate purpose was either Karabagh’s unification with Armenia or achieving Karabagh’s unconditional *de jure* independence. From this perspective, ethno-nationalists, particularly after 1998, partially justified West’s interpretation of war in Karabagh as a direct result of ethnic identity.

This was in sharp contrast to ANM leaders, hereinafter referred to as liberal nationalists, whose rhetoric on Karabagh became more cautious as prospects for independence were increasing. After all, if before independence the Karabagh dispute was an internal Soviet matter, the Armenian leadership had to consider limits of territorial claims by the Armenian state following the independence (Libaridian 1999; 2004a). Armenian state as an international legal entity had to abide by accepted norms of international community and deal with Karabagh war as a direct matter of foreign policy, not as a matter of symbolic ethno-nationalism or ethno-territorial irredentism. This was one of the important reasons behind ANM’s decision not to recognize Karabagh’s independence or declare Karabagh’s unification with Armenia; a decision that instantaneously was branded as a national betrayal by ethno-nationalists. This was also one of the important reasons for accepting a proposal that envisaged concessions albeit without sacrificing vital interests of Karabagh—a decision that eventually resulted in the president’s resignation, the ANM’s loss of parliamentary power, and the disintegration of the Republic Bloc.

Yet, the ANM leaders’ strategic decision prevented the international community’s inevitable condemnation of Armenia in territorial expansionism—a condemnation that truly contradicted the ANM’s foundational tenets. Armenia’s recognition of Karabagh’s independence would be considered as a territorial claim by Armenia vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. Therefore, it would make Armenia a direct party to the Karabagh conflict, as opposed to a dispute between Karabagh and
Azerbaijan. As Croissant explains: “By renouncing their [Armenians’] claims to the region while refusing to recognize its [Karabagh’s] independence, Armenian officials sought to deny Baku its strongest argument for justifying suppression of Karabagh’s separatism, that Armenia was trying to annex Azerbaijani land, while at the same time gaining a powerful argument of their own, that Azerbaijan was forcibly denying the right of self-determination to its own constituents” (Croissant 1998, 70).

In reality, core beliefs of the ANM movement before and after independence were neither ethno-nationalist nor cosmopolitan but liberal nationalist. The ANM was liberal because it embraced core liberal democratic values and rejected ethno-nationalism, but it was also national because it built on existing national content and rejected cosmopolitanism. For instance, Ter-Petrosyan argued that the ANM could be best described as national in content and democratic in form. According to Ter-Petrosyan the concepts of national and democratic did not presuppose hierarchical relations but rather that they were in a state of philosophical interconnectedness, each possessing its own value but still complementing each other. Thus, he argued, without democracy the national transforms into extreme nationalism and without national democracy transforms into cosmopolitanism. According to Ter-Petrosyan, since both extreme nationalism and cosmopolitanism were not conducive to the establishment of democratic state and society they did not fulfill vital needs of the Armenian nation, and hence had to be rejected.  

57 Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Mer serndi partke Hayots petakanutyun kayatsunn e, bargavachumm u Hzoratsunn e” [The Establishment of the Armenian State, its Prosperity and Strengthening is Our Generation’s Obligation], in Apagan bakhum e dure [Future Knocks at the door], ed. A. Azaryan, 18–38; Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Handipum Lragroghneri Het” [Meeting with Journalists], in Levon Ter-Petrosyan: Entrani, Eluitner, Hovadatsner, Hartsazruitsner [Levon Ter-Petrosyan: Selected Speeches, Articles, Interviews], ed. Ashot Sargsyan (Yerevan: Archive of the Armenian Republic’s First President, 2006), 305–28.

Democracy became the cornerstone for achieving national aspirations. In 1989, the ANM adopted a “Declaration on Fundamental Democratic Reforms in Armenia,” which clearly drew parallels between democratic values and Karabagh’s right for self-determination. It was argued that only by embracing democracy would it be possible to contain Moscow’s harsh suppression of the Karabagh movement, establish alliances with democratic powers in other Soviet republics, and seek the international community’s favorable opinion. The declaration stated that only by adhering to democratic norms, such as fundamental principles of human rights, social justice, and the right of national self-determination, would it be possible to secure safety of Armenians in Karabagh and Armenia. In this case, attempts to suppress the movement for Karabagh’s self-determination would be condemned as violations of democratic values by Soviet democratic forces and the international community.\(^59\)

One of the foundational principles of the committee was the interpretation of the Karabagh issue as a political question. Karabagh Committee condemned Soviet authorities’ the and media’s deliberate emphasis on ethnic animosities to avoid the core political aspect of the Karabagh issue. Instead it sought to provide a political solution to the Karabagh problem—that is, revising USSR’s territorial-administrative structure based on the Soviet constitution and international law of national self-determination.

Arguing in the same vein, committee members denied Soviet authorities’ accusations that the movement’s objective was to perpetuate both anti-Azeri and anti-Russian sentiments in the republic.\(^60\) To the contrary, on several occasions committee members relentlessly denounced


attempts that could provoke animosities on ethno-religious grounds. For instance, following Sumgait events, committee member Ashot Manucharyan insisted on distinguishing between the government and Azerbaijani people, arguing that “coexistence [between Armenians and Azerbaijani] is possible” (Malkasian 1996, 58). Manucharyan also harshly criticized Igor Muradian’s speech on May 19 as provoking inter-ethnic hatred and asked people to condemn such attempts.

On August 19, 1988, the ANM issued its manifesto outlining foundational tenets of the movement. The document was a crystallized articulation of the ANM’s deeply held convictions, which remain intact till present. With reference to ANM’s manifesto Malkasian notes: “Most revealing was the exposition of the movement’s distinct worldview. In sharp break with the mainstream of Armenian political thought since the late 1800s, the platform asserted that Armenia must not rely on other states for protection. Instead, the ANM envisioned an Armenia capable of living in peace and harmony with its neighbors. In line with that view, the document maintained that ideologies based on religion and race (i.e., pan-Turkism) played a declining role in international relations” (Malkasian 1996, 128).

The ultimate significance of the ANM was that it became the first political organization constructively questioning core values in national history and political thought. The ANM condemned centuries-long reliance on foreign powers (i.e., Russia or Europe), for addressing national aspirations instead of self-reliance. It rejected notions of eternal enemies (i.e., Turks) and friends (i.e., Russians), central to Armenian political thinking (Libaridian 1991, 1999). Elites promoting liberal nationalist identity questioned the conventional primordial worldview that the Armenian history was nothing but an endless story of national victimization and eternal struggle against the Turkish enemy. They also questioned the political significance of Pan-Turanism at the end of the twentieth century and denounced collective fear and hatred against the Turk. Therefore, they argued for the inevitability and necessity of establishing friendly relations with all neighboring states, including Turkey and Azerbaijan.
In several publications, the ANM announced that Azerbaijan is Armenia’s “most natural ally,” a position that was also reflected in Ter-Petrosyan’s presidential electoral platforms as well as in electoral platforms of the ANM and the Republic Bloc. For instance, referring to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations Hambartsum Galstyan noted that:

In substance, the ANM’s position is a corollary to the incontestable truth that the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians have to live with each other in the region. And in accordance with this truth [...] escalation of tensions between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Karabagh should not be viewed as a unique event in history of civilization [...] There have been moments in history when tensions between neighborly peoples have reached and surpassed the level of war. Invariably, meetings and negotiations have followed these wars [...] If, through such meetings as in Riga, we can save even one life without compromising our just cause, then it is immoral not to do so (Galstyan 1991, 48).

Similarly, Ter-Petrosyan argued that throughout history Armenians and Azeris have been “the most natural allies.” Ten years of tensions between Armenians and Azeris because of the Karabagh issue should not overshadow three hundred years of cooperation between the two people.

Thus, despite military confrontation with Azerbaijan and to the dismay of ethno-nationalists, the ANM remained committed to the objective of re-establishing relations with Azerbaijan. And for that purpose, it was necessary to achieve regional peace through negotiations and concessions. Peace settlement was essential for a number of other reasons, such as preventing

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more human losses and heavy economic losses because of Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s blockades. Armenia also did not possess natural resources attractive enough to generate investments in its highly risky environment because of the unsettled peace. In addition, diaspora investments remained insufficient ($10 million annually) to compensate for economic losses, let alone to boost up Armenia’s economic infrastructure.⁶⁴

This was in sharp contrast to Azerbaijan, which even though it shared the burden of war and its consequences, attracted large scale investments, because of its oil resources. Already in 1994, Azerbaijan attracted more than $35 billion in investments by international oil companies (Croissant 1998). The so-called “Contract of the Century,” signed by the Azerbaijani president Heidar Aliev in 1994, included oil companies from the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. The contract initiated an “exploitation of the giant offshore Guneshli, Azeri, and Chirag fields on the Caspian shelf near Baku” and over a thirty-year period promised to accrue “$100 billion or more at current prices—80 percent of which will go to the Azerbaijani treasury” (ibid., 115–16).

Azerbaijan also had the advantage of insisting on its territorial integrity to defend its position on Karabagh’s status, as this formula for settling territorial disputes was preferred by the international community. With 16.3% of its territory being controlled by the “hostile forces,” Azerbaijan was able to get the international community’s favorable opinion by portraying itself as a victim of Armenian aggression. And as Croissant points out: “This claim has found a receptive audience among Western mediators unwilling to alter inter-state borders for fear of opening a Pandora’s Box of territorial irredentism in the post-Cold War world” (Croissant 1998, 133). The

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⁶⁴ Ter-Petrosyan as cited in De Waal, Black Garden, 259. Ethno-nationalists argued that diaspora’s investments remained low because of the president’s policy of denying dual citizenship for co-ethnics abroad. For a detailed analysis of homeland-diaspora relations since independence see Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
claim for territorial integrity also played well with Russia, which as Ter-Petrosyan succinctly noted, had twenty Karabaghs within its boundaries.\textsuperscript{65}

Thus, in 1997 and compared to Armenia, Azerbaijan held an almost absolute advantage over economic prospects (which eventually led to an increased military budget) and the international community's disposition favoring the principle of territorial integrity. Armenia, on the other hand, with no powerful and reliable allies and without attractive economic infrastructure for foreign investments, was slowly but steadily turning into an economically isolated zone, with decreased economic power and political significance. Major economic projects and initiations in the region (e.g., Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and TRACECA) bypassed Armenia and eventually created a complete economic dependency on Russia.

Azerbaijan's advantage was not absolute, however, because at that time Armenia and Karabagh still maintained bargaining powers and were in a position to negotiate Karabagh's interests. In 1997, there was a balance between Azeri and Armenian armies and military supplies, providing a strategic opportunity to negotiate as equal partners. Yet, in the event of the non-resolution of the conflict, within a year or two the balance would be lost as both Armenia and Karabagh would be substantially weakened compared to Azerbaijan (Ter-Petrosyan 1997a). As Ter-Petrosyan famously noted in his much quoted article entitled "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness": "Besides the essence of the compromise, its timing is also important" (Ter-Petrosyan 1997b).

During his press-conference on September 26, 1997, Ter-Petrosyan provided a detailed analysis explaining the essence of Karabagh's problem and the existing five options for resolving

\textsuperscript{65} See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, "Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Lrjanalu Pahe" [War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 2, 1997. In July 2008 Russia signed an agreement with Azerbaijan, recognizing the latter's territorial integrity.
the conflict. The first three options, ardently defended by ethno-nationalists, were the following:

permanently maintaining the status quo of Karabagh (i.e., de facto independence of Karabagh without peace settlement); Armenia’s and Karabagh’s final resolution demanding the recognition of Karabagh’s independence by Azerbaijan and the international community or declaring Karabagh’s unification with Armenia; and achieving Karabagh’s de jure independent status by resorting to war.

Regarding the first option of status quo, Ter-Petrosyan argued that this option was doomed to fail, for two reasons. First, according to Ter-Petrosyan, the Armenian state would not be able to survive more economic pressures of double blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. The second reason was that because of its oil interests the international community will not tolerate this option indefinitely. It eventually would push for a peace settlement in the region, albeit with much harsher conditions for Armenia and Karabagh than it did in 1997. The second option was rejected as a fiasco dead-end leading to an international community’s harsh sanctions in an expedited version. The third option again was denounced as non-realistic, since in order to achieve Karabagh’s de jure independence by means of war, it first required a complete defeat and capitulation of Azerbaijan.

The fourth and fifth options for resolving the Karabagh conflict, package and step-by-step approaches proposed by the OSCE, were described by the president as the only two “realistic approaches.” He outlined basic points of both proposals but also pointed out that since Azerbaijan and Karabagh had irreconcilable disagreements regarding the latter’s final legal-political status, the only realistic approach that was left was the step-by-step approach.

The press conference raised instantaneous speculations by the opposition and in response Ter-Petrosyan published his seminal article “War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness.” A couple

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66 Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Hajord serunnteri gaghaparakhosatyune petq e lini mer petakanutyun amrapndume” [Achieving Strong Statehood must be the Next Generation’s Ideology], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 27, 1997.
of months later he delivered another speech at a meeting of Armenia’s Security Council on January 7–8, 1998. Both in his article and the speech, the president responded to his critics’ comments point by point, critically reflected on alternative solutions to the Karabagh conflict as proposed by his opponents, provided with economic realities and predictions, explained political details of the conflict, and critically analyzed the international community’s position on this issue. He highlighted the urgency of concession stating that:

To solve the question of Karabagh we have only one option, a compromise solution, which does not mean that one side is the victor and the other the loser; it does mean finding an agreement based on what is possible when the conflict has reached maturity . . . . The opposition should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an alternative to the compromise: the alternative to compromise is war. The rejection of compromise and maximalism (the drive to obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the final destruction of Karabagh and the worsening of the situation in Armenia . . . . That which we are rejecting today, we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history. We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not for long tolerate the situation created around Nagorno Karabagh because that is threatening regional cooperation and security as well as the West’s oil interests . . . . Compromise is not a choice between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise is just a means to avoid the worst, from which parties benefit when they have become conscious of the worst and are able to display the necessary political will and courage . . . . Let us not be preoccupied with self-deception and let us not cherish

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hollow illusions. On the issue of Karabagh’s independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve it to the extent that our capabilities allow us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism.68

In sum, all things considered, the costs of the war were prohibitively high necessitating peace settlement through mutual concessions. But this was exactly the problem. Given that gloomy economic realities, predictions, and the international community’s general disposition favoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity were objective factors, then how can one explain a profound split among Armenian political leaders on the issue of permanent peace settlement through mutual concessions. For liberal nationalists the war in Karabagh, including the occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts surrounding Karabagh (some also border Armenia), was a protective measure defending the ethnic kins’ physical security. Once the security was guaranteed the problem had to be resolved through mutual territorial concessions without sacrificing Karabagh’s vital interests. However, as I argue in the following section, in addition to the protection of the ethnic kin, for ethno-nationalists it was also a matter of territorial expansion.

3.9 Ethno-Nationalist Politics of Territory

In the second chapter, I demonstrated that one of the fundamental differences between proponents of liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalist identity was their treatment of the Armenian Cause. Ethno-nationalists perceived the Armenian Cause as a given aspect of Armenian identity and, indeed, harshly criticized liberal nationalists for emphasizing democratic values at the expense of the Armenian Cause. According to ethno-nationalist view, objectives of the Armenian Cause could not be subjected to critical reflection and their achievement was the ultimate end, which had to be the guiding ideology of the Armenian nation and the state.

68 See Levon Ter-Petrossyan, “Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Lrjanalu Pahe” [War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 2, 1997.
I also illustrated that since its inception at the end of the nineteenth century, the content of the Armenian Cause, initially known as the Armenian Question, underwent substantive changes particularly following the Genocide. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the Armenian Cause came to embrace not only the three R’s (i.e., Recognition of the Genocide, Reparation of historic lands in Western Armenia, and Repatriation of Armenians to their historic homeland) but also Karabagh’s unification with Armenia.69

Thus, as far as some ethno-nationalists were concerned, Karabagh was a constitutive part of the Armenian Cause, and therefore represented Armenians’ just territorial claim from Azerbaijan. In the summer of 1988, when the Karabagh Committee decisively placed the solution of the Karabagh issue within the context of democratization and international law of self-determination, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation issued a communiqué defining Armenian interests within the context of the Armenian Cause and the dangers of Pan-Turkism. Similarly local intellectuals, such as Zori Balayan, announced that: “Karabagh is not just a geographic spot on the map. Karabagh is a provocation, an obstacle to the Pan-Turkic goal of reaching Turan, or Russia’s ‘underbelly’.”70

In sharp contrast to ethno-nationalists, whose perceptions of the issue were framed through the prism of the Armenian Cause, liberal nationalists were very careful in drawing a line between the Armenian Cause and the Karabagh issue. In response to Balayan’s speech on Pan-Turanism, the Committee made the following statement:

The raising of the issues of Pan-Turkism at this moment has only one purpose: to represent Armenians as revanchists, to discredit the just cause of Artsakh, and to deny Armenians the support of its allies . . . . The Karabagh Committee con-

69 Another important addition to the Armenian Cause since independence was the extension of citizenship rights to post-Genocide diaspora Armenians as a restitution for sufferings caused by historical injustices. 70 For the ARF’s communiqué and Balayan’s speech see “Pan-Turkism and the Armenian Question: Twenty-Fourth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune,” in Armenia at the Crossroads, ed. Libaridian, Appendix C-One, 149–50, and Zori Balayan, “The Threat of Pan-Turanism,” in ibid., Appendix C-Two, 150–54.
demns, in the harshest terms, the periodic attempt to turn the Armenian question into a cheap card within an international relations game. We are convinced that the only available path to achieve our goals is to guarantee the irreversibility of the democratization of the country.\footnote{This passage is from Karabagh Committee’s response to Zori Balayan’s speech on Pan-Turanism on the floor of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in 1989. For a complete version of the speech see “Pan-Turanism: A Response from the Karabagh Committee,” in Armenia at the Crossroads, ed. Libaridian, Appendix C-Three, 155–56.}

Since foundational tenets of the Armenian Cause were perpetuating irrational fears of pan-Turanic projects, and therefore anti-Turkish and anti-Azeri attitudes, framing the Karabagh issue within the context of the Armenian Cause was comparable to turning the political issue of national self-determination into ethno-territorial vengeance. Proponents of the liberal nationalist identity, such as Ktrich Sardaryan, argued that military victories brought only temporary peace in Karabagh, and it was time to permanently denounce the argument that military victories in the field should be maintained at all costs. According to Sardaryan, it was imperative to enforce a permanent peace at the diplomatic level based on mutual concessions, instead of pursuing the politics of maximalism and territorial claims.

In a different article Sardaryan argued that the notions of martyrdom and an unlimited national spirit to resist pressures and deprivations have been the cornerstone of Armenian political thinking. History, Sardaryan continued, has shown that political thinking based on a sheer nationalism has brought national calamities since it is devoid of rational considerations for state security.\footnote{Ktrich Sardaryan, “Inchpes Ogtvel Ais Zinakan Hajoghutyunits” [How to Gain From This Military Success], Haik, January 30, 1998, and Armenpress, “HH Nakhagahi Khorhrdakan Ktrich Sardaryani Hartrasruts Armenspressi Het” [RA Presidential Consultant Ktrich Sardaryan’s Interview with Armenpress], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, September 20, 1998.}

Similarly, referring to ethno-nationalists’ uncompromising position on the issue of Karabagh, Vano Siradeghyan argued that the opposition in modern Armenian politics has taken a dangerous route of irredentism by presenting ethno-territorial claims to most of Armenia’s
neighbors. Siradeghyan noted that instead of defending Karabagh’s physical security and supporting Karabagh’s claim for self-determination, Karabagh has become a territorial claim based on ethno-national aspirations.73

This was also the critical juncture where narratives of victim identity and their denial clashed. In the second chapter, I argued that liberal nationalists were concerned that the idea of a victimized nation—implicitly nurturing feelings of envy, hatred, and frustration for unfulfilled national aspirations—could transform into full-fledged externalized resentment. In many ways Karabagh became the site for this resentment, a symbol of revenge for all historical injustices, from the Genocide to lost homelands.

It is not accidental that step-by-step approach—or, as it was referred to, “land for peace” formula, that is, return of occupied Azerbaijani lands in exchange for peace in Karabagh—was considered by ethno-nationalists as defeatist, betraying Armenians’ historical rights and their just cause. Instead, it was argued that the only acceptable solution for the Armenian nation would be “land for status” formula, that is, return of some of occupied lands in exchange for Karabagh’s de jure independence. Thus, according to ethno-nationalist view, only the package approach could satisfactorily resolve the Karabagh issue, albeit the one that guarantees Karabagh’s de jure independence or unification with Armenia first, followed by a return of some of the occupied Azerbaijani lands.

The denouncement of the step-by-step solution was accompanied by the rhetoric of national self-affirmation and resentment. Karabagh, as it was argued on numerous occasions, was the first step towards the establishment of the “United Armenia” and towards the restitution of historical injustices. Central to this rhetoric was the equation of military successes to the winning of the war, an assumption, albeit the wrong one, which justified ethno-nationalists’ denial of

73 See Karmen Davtyan, “Hartsazruits Vano Siradeghyani Het” [Interview with Vano Siradeghyan], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, October 1, 1998.
territorial concessions. Thematic interplays between military victories in Karabagh and winning the war, restitution of historical injustices, and national self-affirmation were not just narratives but articulated policy positions reflected in electoral platforms, official statements, and policies.

For instance, in its 1995, 1998, and 1999 parliamentary and presidential electoral platforms, the Communist Party stated that the heroic national-liberating struggle for Karabagh, as an integral part of the Armenian Cause, required an unconditional recognition of its de jure independent status not only by the Armenian state but also by the international community.\(^\text{75}\)

The Union of National Self-determination declared that an immediate annulment of the 1921 Russian-Turkish agreement would automatically restore Karabagh’s legal-political independent status. The party argued that: “adopting the motto ‘the salvation of the Armenian nation is its unity’ and being committed to a comprehensive solution of the Armenian Cause, the party fights for the de facto unification of Armenia’s two parts.”\(^\text{76}\)

In its 1999 electoral platform, the Law and Unity Party stated that: “It must be acknowledged that with the establishment of the Republic of Mountainous Karabagh, our generation has made a step forward towards the historical Armenian Cause.” It also insisted on an immediate

\(^{74}\) Ter-Petrosyan extensively referred to this erroneous assumption, arguing that winning the battle should not be equated to winning the war, therefore making the need to accept concessions irrelevant. He noted that: “Unfortunately, Karabagh has won the battle, not the war. A war is considered won only when the foe has been forced into capitulation. The confusion between battle and war has brought misfortune to many.” See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Larjanalu Pahe” [War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 2, 1997.


declaration of Karabagh’s reunion with Armenia and on the international community’s recognition of this declaration.\footnote{77}{Law and Unity Electoral Platform, “Azgayin Gaghaparakhosutiune Vorpes Goyatevman u Zargatsman Nakhapayman” [National Ideology as a Precondition for the National Survival and Development], Travunk, April 30–May 6, 1999, 12.}

In numerous official statements, interviews, and in electoral platforms, the ARF insisted on Karabagh’s unification with Armenia and emphasized that as a victorious example of national-liberating struggle, Karabagh symbolizes the first step towards the solution of the Armenian Cause. The party made it abundantly clear that historical justice will be achieved once ethnic Armenians repatriate to united Armenia, which in addition to its existing political boundaries would include Western Armenian territories (in Eastern Turkey), Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhijevan (in Azerbaijan), and the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of southern Georgia, bordering Armenia.\footnote{78}{See Mkhitaryan et al., “Political Parties,” 57; Iskandaryan and Meloyan, eds., “Parliamentary Elections,” 71–73; and Armenian Revolutionary Federation, “HY Dashnaksutyan Nakhentrakan Tsragire” [ARF’s pre-electoral platform] (Yerevan: Tigran Mets Press, 2003). In 2005, the ARF member and the deputy speaker of the parliament, Vahan Hovannisyan, expressed his agreement with the ARF founder Christopher Mikaelyan’s words. Mikaelyan, referring to Karabagh’s incorporation into Azerbaijani SSR in 1923 followed by strategic border manipulations since the creation of the NKAO, stated that maps with unjust borders carved by Soviet leaders must be torn and geographic inks delineating these borders must be erased. See Vahan Hovhannisyan, “Armenia in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” Erkir, March 28–April 4, 2005. Available at http://www.yerkir.am/arm/index.php?sub=interview&id=24 (accessed 9/12/08).}

Consistent with the language of non-concessions, the Unity Bloc, an alliance between the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) and the People’s Party in 1999 elections, argued that it was of ultimate importance to “maintain current achievements in Karabagh and mobilize all Armenian forces for supporting Karabagh’s right for self-determination.” It also insisted that “pan-national defense of this right [self-determination] must be an imperative necessity.”\footnote{79}{See Unity Bloc, “Unity Bloc: Basic Principles of the Electoral Platform,” Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, May 28, 1999, 4; and Unity Bloc, Miasnutyun Dashinki Nakhentrakan Tsragri Himnadrutnere [Unity Bloc’s Principles of the Pre-Electoral Platform] (Yerevan: Gunavor Tpagrutyun Press, 1999).} The RPA wing of the Unity Bloc believed that liberal nationalists’ denial of the Armenian Cause as state ideology was detrimental to pan-national unity and deviated from Armenians’ supreme objectives, including the proper defense of Karabagh’s vital interests.
On numerous occasions, the former leader of the RPA, Vazgen Sargsyan, denounced the step-by-step approach as defeatist arguing that: “certain people should not be allowed to resolve the Karabakh problem on behalf of the whole Armenian nation . . . . Armenia and the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ should be prepared for a protracted conflict not only by rejecting concessions to Baku, but also by annexing Shusha and Lachin in the interests of Karabakh’s security” (as cited in Croissant 1998, 122).

In several publications before and after the 2003 parliamentary elections, the RPA stated that the Armenian people were rightful owners of historical lands, including Karabagh. Therefore, using Nzhdeh’s ideology of “tseghagron” (race-based religion), the RPA argued that the state must mobilize all efforts towards the solution of the Armenian Cause, that is, reclaiming and recovering the Armenian State in the Armenian Plateau, the “eternal cradle” and “the god-sent Fatherland of Armenians.” According to the RPA, “recovering territorial losses,” and the notion of “hayrenatirutyun” (i.e., rightful ownership claim of the Fatherland), has to take a central place in the Armenian national and state ideology.

Party members argued that since Karabagh de facto belongs to Armenia, and in reality “forms one of the Armenian regions,” a parliamentary ratification of this fact was necessary to legalize the merger of historical Armenia’s two parts. Andranik Margaryan also argued that the most important victory in Karabagh war was a moral-psychological one. As a result of military

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80 See also Gegham Baghdasaryan, “Vazgen Sargsyan: Menk Piti Ashkharhin Tsuits Tanq, vor Mi Bruntsenk” [Vazgen Sargsyan: We Must Show the World that We are One Fist], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, June 11, 1998; and Gayane Karapetyan, “Vazgen Sargsyan” [Vazgen Sargsyan], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, March 11, 1999.


victories in Karabagh, Armenians overcame complexities associated with the victim identity. Armenians, according to Margaryan, were convinced that they were not just a “slaughtered nation with lost homeland but were also capable of re-conquering their fatherland.”

Some parties that chose to reduce the saliency of the Armenian Cause in their electoral platforms and official statements, or opted to skip the issue altogether, still used a mixture of existential-cum-resentful language to denounce territorial concessions. For instance, the party Country of Law, which omitted a clause on the Armenian Cause in its 1999 and 2003 electoral platforms, stated that: “As a major national issue the party underlines the package resolution of the Karabagh problem” and insisted on “an approach coming from the national interests to the Artsakh issue, a united starting-point in realization of the aged goals and objectives.” The party’s program also highlighted that the Armenian nation’s history of several centuries, as well as Karabagh’s heroic defense, proved that defeatist psychology must be rejected as detrimental to Armenian national ideology, unity, and its mighty spirit.

Similarly the National Democratic Union, which explicitly rejected the notion that Karabagh is an integral part of the Armenian Cause, argued that the defeatist policy of the pre-1998 administration was a recipe for national calamities. According to party leader Manukyan, since Karabagh is Armenia’s continuation and since the health of both parts are inextricably interdependent, Karabagh can only heal via Armenia’s lifeline. Therefore, Manukyan argued, pressures for concessions must be resisted at all costs as they would not only result in a loss of pan-national dignity but would also lead to a mass exodus of Armenians from their homeland. Finally,

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83 Anahit Esayan, “Hayreni Kusaktsutynner Hayots Tseghaspanutyun Masin” [National Parties about the Armenian Genocide], Hayots Ashkharh, April 24, 1999, 3. Andranik Margaryan assumed the RPA’s leadership following Vazgen Sargsyan’s assassination, on October 27, 1999, during an infamous parliamentary incident. Andranik Margaryan, who was also Armenia’s Prime Minister, died of allegedly natural causes on March 25, 2007, a few weeks before the 2007 parliamentary elections.

84 See Country of Law, Pre-election Platform Brochure (Yerevan: Tigran Mets, 1999); Irina Ghulyan, “Npatake Nuinn e, Dran Hasnelu Ughinere Voch Ainkan” [Objective is the Same but Ways of Reaching It are Not], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, May 23, 2003; and Samvel Mkhitaryan et al., Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia: Directory (Yerevan: Gasprint, 2005), 122.

according to Manukyan, the nation’s future would perish with the loss of Karabagh, since it is not merely a land issue but symbolizes the whole Armenian national psychology.\footnote{Karen Garagashyan, “Vazgen Manukyan ev Gharabaghi Hartse” [Vazgen Manukyan and the Question of Karabagh], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, April 10, 1997; Tigran Aveisy-an, “Dashinke Merats e Isk Andamnere Voch” [The Union is Dead but Members are Not], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, September 23, 1997; Edmon Zargaryan, “Inchu miaynak nnats AZhM-n?” [Why was NDU Left Alone?], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, April 24, 1999, 3; Vahan Vardanyan, “Azatakanutyun chi nshanakum talan” [Freedom Does not Mean Looting], \textit{Haykakan Ashkharh}, April 24, 1999, 4; Margarit Esayan, “Vazgen Manukyani Hetevits Gnalu Karik Cheghav” [There was No Need to Follow Vazgen Manukyan], \textit{Aravot}, April 24, 1999; and Tsovinar Nazaryan, “Vazgen Manukyan: Gharabaghe Hayastani Sharunakutyunn e” [Vazgen Manukyan: Karabagh is Armenia’s Continuation], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, July 25, 2002, 1-2.}

Finally, there were others who used the Armenian Cause as a bargaining chip to secure independent status of Karabagh. According to this group of ethno-nationalists, Turkey and Azerbaijan would make more concessions on the question of Karabagh, should Armenia confront Turkey with the Genocide recognition. Particularly, the second president Robert Kocharyan, a native of Karabagh himself, was an ardent proponent of this approach. As Libaridian explains:

He [Kocharyan] thought that by raising the question, a thorny one for Turkey, he would counter Turkey’s insistence on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict before normalization proceeds. The corollary was that for Armenia not to raise the Genocide question, Turkey would withdraw its own precondition [the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories and Karabagh], which in turn, would weaken the Azerbaijani negotiating position and strengthen Armenia’s economy and standing (Libaridian 2004a, 275; 1999).

Reflecting on this view, Ter-Petrosyan argued that: “It should be obvious to the naked eye that, quite to the contrary, such a position would provide additional bases for Azerbaijan and Turkey to charge that Armenia is an expansionist state and to set against Armenia an already unfavorable international public opinion.”\footnote{See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, “Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Larjanalu Pahe” [War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness], \textit{Hayastani Hanrapetutyun}, November 2, 1997.}

Kocharyan’s bargaining politics did not reach its longed-for objective. To the contrary, as predicted by proponents of liberal nationalist identity, it eventually turned the Karabagh issue into
one of territorial expansionism. As a native of Karabagh, Kocharyan’s uncompromising position on the package deal eventually led to international community’s and “negotiators’ perception of Kocharyan as representing both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh” and an eventual “replacement of the negotiations’ trilateral format [between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabagh] by bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani talks. In addition, this allowed for the interpretation of the conflict as a territorial dispute between the two countries” (Zourabian 2006, 254).

Eventually, as a consequence of ethno-nationalist position on the issue of Karabagh, Azerbaijan successfully advanced its strongest argument for justifying suppression of Karabagh’s separatism: that Armenia was trying to annex Azerbaijani land. International community’s perceptions were particularly reflected in the United Nations General Assembly’s passage of a resolution on March 14, 2008 recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and calling on Armenia to withdraw its troops from occupied Azerbaijani territories.88

To conclude, according to a general tendency, particularly following the coup in 1998 as a result of a crisis created around the Karabagh issue, elected political parties as well as the second president Kocharyan, endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this issue.89

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88 The measure was supported by 39 UN members. However, seven countries, including the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs the United States, France, and Russia, overseeing the Karabagh peace process, opposed the measure. See Haroutiun Khachatryan, “Armenia: Yerevan Rolls Out its Rhetorical Guns, as Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process Stumbles” (April 4, 2008), at Eurasia Insight http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav040408a.shtml (accessed 4/4/08).

89 Ethno-nationalists’ territorial politics has been also reflected in Armenia’s new cartography. It is not unusual to find maps in Armenia where borders between Armenia and Karabagh, as well as between Karabagh and the surrounding seven occupied lands in proper Azerbaijan, have been deleted. For one example, see Collage Ltd., Map: Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh (Yerevan, Armenia: Collage Press, 2005). Politics of territorial expansionism has also been reflected in the amended constitution of 2005, article 81, point 2. In the 1995 Constitution it is stated: “Upon the recommendation of the President of the Republic, the National Assembly: 2) shall ratify or revoke the international treaties signed by the Republic of Armenia. The range of international agreements which are subject to ratification by the National Assembly shall be prescribed by law.” Compare this to 2005 amended Constitution stating: “Upon the recommendation of the President of Republic the National Assembly shall: 2) ratify, suspend or denounce the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia. The National Assembly shall ratify those international treaties: a) which are of political or military nature or stipulate changes of the state borders.” See amended Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, available at http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=alpha&lang=eng#3.
Ethno-nationalists envisioned a solution which would redeem all historical injustices, in many ways justifying liberal nationalists’ concerns regarding the victim identity. Victories in Karabagh and in seven surrounding districts were interpreted as a restitution for historical injustices and any attempt of territorial concessions was tantamount to betraying pan-national ideals and invalidating the long history of Armenians’ sufferings. This is why gloomy economic realities, predictions, and the international community’s disposition favoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity were not strong enough factors to overshadow the idea that Karabagh’s victories should be cherished at all costs. And from that perspective, ethno-nationalists’ territorial politics favored expansionism and nourished a vision of ethno-nationalist identity capitalizing on victimized-but-represented elements of the Armenian self-image.

3.10 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter was devoted to the analysis of the second key issue central to Armenian national identity: War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions. Despite centuries of Muslim rule and socio-political upheavals at various historical junctures, Karabagh Armenians managed to preserve their ethno-cultural and religious identity. Equipped with a distinct vernacular, script, Christian religion, and myths, semiautonomous lands of Mountainous Karabagh came to symbolize the “last bastions” of the Armenian statehood and a significant hub contributing to the formation of the Armenian ethno-religious and cultural identity. To convey the significance of Karabagh in the Armenian history and politics, the first four sections were devoted to an overview of historical events pertaining to Karabagh and the genesis of the conflict.

Since February 1988, following Gorbachev’s liberalizations policies, in a chain of uninterrupted peaceful demonstrations Armenians supported Karabagh Armenians’ petition to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to transfer NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to Armenian SSR. While initially demonstrations were not anti-Soviet, anti-Armenian atrocities in Sumgait and
Baku coupled with Gorbachev's decision (July 18, 1988) to leave Karabagh within the Azerbaijani SSR, caused a fatal stroke to Armenians' "traditional loyalty" to the Soviet regime.

With the political vacuum in the South Caucasus created by the fall of the Soviet Union, the Karabagh conflict escalated into a full-fledged international war. By 1994, local Karabaghi forces with the support of the Armenian army established full control of the de facto independent Republic of Mountainous Karabagh and seven surrounding districts in the proper Azerbaijan. On May 12, 1994, through Russia's active mediation a temporary cease-fire agreement was signed. Mediating efforts, however, did not result in a comprehensive peace settlement, effectively turning Karabagh into a "frozen" conflict.

In the last five sections, I analyzed political elites' depiction of this issue from the beginning of Karabagh movement in 1988. Since the cease-fire, involved parties and mediators were discussing two possible approaches to resolve the Karabagh issue: package and step-by-step solutions. I argued that disagreements around package and step-by-step approaches were not simply about methodological details for achieving peace settlement in Karabagh. Disagreement also revealed contesting ways of imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state. Extensive qualitative and quantitative analyses of presidential and party platforms, interviews, official statements, and policies revealed that since 1988 the Armenian political thought was marked by two contradictory depictions of the Karabagh issue. Since then, a new liberal-nationalist interpretation of Karabagh emerged as an antithesis to the dominant ethno-nationalist one.

Figure 3.1 below pictorially summarizes elected parties' and presidential positions on the issue of war in Karabagh and possible solutions throughout the time-period from 1993 through 2006.**

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90 Elite attitudes (both official and opposition) on national identity were analyzed through quantitative content analysis. Manifest data from two sources was analyzed: party platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing both official and opposition ideologies. Both party platform and newspaper analyses covered the time period from 1993 through 2006. In both platforms and newspapers, I looked for pledges, statements, interviews, or announcements regarding the three key issues central to national
As depicted in Figure 3.1, while in the first interval 57% of official statements had liberal nationalist content, they disappeared in the second one but appeared again in the third one at 3%. Instead, compared to the first interval there was a 92% increase of ethno-nationalist content in the second interval and 90% in the third one. Thus, in the third interval, elected political parties, overwhelmingly at 81% endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to the issue of War in Karabagh and Possible Solutions. Substantively, results suggest that political elites in the post-1998 era rejected a peace settlement through step-by-step approach and denounced territorial concessions without first securing either Karabagh’s *de jure* independence or its unification with Armenia.

Results of the quantitative content analysis are also consistent with the findings of qualitative textual analysis going back to the beginning of the movement for Karabagh in 1988. Both
analyses revealed that since this historical date, the Armenian political thought was marked by two contradictory depictions of the Karabagh issue.

These anomalies have remained largely undetected both in the extensive literature on nationalism and in the post-Soviet literature. In the latter case, derived from the Soviet legacy hypothesis, Armenia was classified as having a single and institutionalized ethnic type of identity inherited from its Soviet past. According to the West’s conventional interpretation the Armenian national movement (ANM) and the consequent war were manifestations of an irrational celebration of ethno-cultural value structure. Consistent with basic properties of ethnic type of identity, the argument was that nationalists in Armenia were incapable of reflecting critically on constitutive elements of identity. Thus, war in Karabagh was interpreted as a logical and even as a natural consequence of ethnic type of identity inherited from the Soviet past.

But as I illustrated, the core beliefs of the ANM movement before and after independence were neither ethno-nationalist nor cosmopolitan but liberal nationalist. The ANM was liberal because it embraced core liberal democratic values and rejected ethno-nationalism, but it was also national because it built on existing national content and rejected cosmopolitanism. Democratic ideas became the cornerstone for achieving national aspirations. They were reflected in ANM’s manifesto of 1988, in the “Declaration on Fundamental Democratic Reforms in Armenia” adopted in 1989, as well as in numerous publications, which clearly drew parallels between democratic values and Karabagh’s right for self-determination.

The ultimate significance of the ANM, as the leading advocate of liberal nationalist identity, was that it became the first political organization constructively questioning core values in ethno-political history and thought. In sharp contrast to mainstream Armenian political thought, liberal nationalists questioned the conventional primordial interpretation of the Armenian history, rejected core values of martyrdom and condemned traditional Armenian political thinking as being devoid of rational considerations for state security. They also questioned the political sig-
nificance of Pan-Turanism at the end of the twentieth century and denounced collective fear and hatred against the Turk. Finally, they criticized the politics of “maximalism” and territorial claims, instead arguing for the inevitability and necessity of establishing friendly relations with all neighboring states, including Turkey and “the most natural ally” Azerbaijan.

Thus, despite military confrontation with Azerbaijan and to the dismay of ethno-nationalists, liberal nationalists remained committed to the objective of re-establishing relations with Azerbaijan. And for that reason, coupled with considerations for preventing more human losses, gloomy economic realities, predictions, and the international community’s disposition favoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it was necessary to achieve regional peace through negotiations and mutual territorial concessions. Hence, even though seven districts in proper Azerbaijan were occupied during liberal nationalists’ political leadership, for them the war in Karabagh did not pursue the politics of territorial expansionism. It was a defensive war to protect Karabagh Armenians from mass deportations and ethnic cleansing. However, once the security was guaranteed the problem had to be resolved through mutual territorial concessions without sacrificing Karabagh’s vital interests.

While, in the summer of 1988 Karabagh Committee decisively placed the solution of the Karabagh issue within the context of democratization and international law of self-determination, ethno-nationalists placed it within the context of the Armenian Cause. In many ways Karabagh for ethno-nationalists became the site for a resentment, a symbol of revenge for all historical injustices, from the Genocide to lost homelands. For ethno-nationalists victories in Karabagh and in seven surrounding districts symbolized an ultimate turning point, shifting the nation’s historical trajectory from endless humiliation and victimization to a restitution of justice, national liberation, and self-assertion. This is why any attempt of territorial concessions was tantamount to betraying pan-national ideals and invalidating the long history of Armenians’ sufferings.
The case of Karabagh challenges a large body of nationalism studies, where according to the dominant assumption the shared ethno-religious, linguistic and cultural attributes of a homogeneous community so powerfully unite its members that no politically significant internal disagreements could arise. For this body of literature, irreconcilable differences among Armenian political leaders on the Karabagh issue are quite puzzling, given that Armenians in Armenia, Karabagh, and diaspora share ethno-religious markers of identity. These fundamental disagreements are also puzzling given that historically semiautonomous lands of Mountainous Karabagh symbolized the “last bastions” of the Armenian statehood serving as a significant hub contributing to the formation of the Armenian ethno-religious and cultural identity.

Yet the crisis created around Karabagh is an excellent case study which demonstrates that assuming unproblematic relationships between ethnic homogeneity and national identity obscures political aspect of the national identity as a pervasive feature inherent in all states, irrespective of their ethnic composition. The Karabagh crisis revealed contesting ways of imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state by the members of the same ethnic group. Therefore, it revealed existing fundamental national identity cleavages among Armenians and the extent to which territorial politics nourished the needs of the Armenian national identity as imagined by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES CENTRAL TO NATIONAL IDENTITY: DUAL CITIZENSHIP—THE POLITICS OF BELONGINGNESS

4.1. Introduction

Chapter 4 is devoted to the third key issue central to Armenian national identity: Dual Citizenship. Like Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter pursues two interrelated objectives. First, I provide historical background of the issue. Second, I demonstrate the significance of dual citizenship debates in modern Armenian politics and the ways these debates have influenced the conception of modern Armenian national identity.

Scholars analyzing intertwined relations between citizenship and national identity agree that belonging or a sense of belongingness to either political or ethno-cultural community is a constitutive element of national identity. Contesting articulations and actual policies on dual citizenship in Armenia are explicit illustrations of problematic relations between belongingness to political community on the one hand and belongingness to ethno-cultural community, on the other. Hence, my central contention is that since independence, dual citizenship debates in Armenia by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists must be understood as profoundly different portrayals of national identity.

The chapter is organized as follows. Initially, I provide a historical overview of Armenian migration waves as well as an overview of the most significant factors causing migration waves from the early twentieth through early twenty-first centuries. In this chapter I also convey the notion that rather than being a mere chronological classification of the Armenian migration waves, the old-new diaspora typology customarily used in the Republic of Armenia also reflects
the underlying political biases directly affecting expatriate policies, especially the thorny issue of
dual citizenship.

Next, I proceed with the analysis of contesting policies on the issue of dual citizenship as
proposed by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists. Here, I provide a comprehensive dis­
cussion and analysis of party platforms and pledges, official policies, legislations, and consti­
tutional provisions pertaining to dual citizenship. Essentially, my analysis suggests that liberal
nationalists envisioned politics of belongingness that promoted fundamental principles of demo­
cratic citizenship and civic inclusion. The politics of belongingness envisioned by ethno-nation­
alists, however, reversed the institute of democratic citizenship and promoted principles of ethnic
exclusion.

In the section entitled “Discriminating from Within: Old Diaspora versus New Diaspora
and Armenian Citizens,” I analyze an unexplored layer of homeland-diaspora relations by relying
on 2007 legislative amendments. Analysis suggests that the most striking aspect of ethno-nation­
alist policies is that they encourage discrimination from within, where old diaspora has more
rights and less obligations and new diaspora and local citizens have reduced rights but more obli­
gations. Essentially, I contend that ethno-nationalists created institutional niches for justifying
political membership based on discriminatory practices and political inequality of citizenship
rights and obligations. Finally, in concluding notes I provide a summary of findings regarding the
politics of belongingness as envisioned by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.

4.2 Historical Overview of Migration Waves

According to the 2001 census, the official population in Armenia is 3,020,768.1 The
approximate number of Armenians living worldwide currently is about 10 million, with the

1 2007 population estimates indicate a lower number, standing at 2,971,650. See CIA World Factbook at
largest concentrations in Russia (2,250,000) and the United States (1,400,000). This disproportional ratio of ethnic Armenians and Armenian citizens residing within the state territory is a result of several waves of mass migrations, particularly in the twentieth century. The landmark cause of the Armenian large-scale migration was the Armenian Genocide. In the period of 1915-17, some 1.5 million Armenians perished in the Ottoman Turkey. About 400,000 others escaped to Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus as well as to a number of Middle Eastern and European countries (Libaridian 2004a, 140). By the 1970s, about 250,000 Armenians lived in Europe, 450,000 in North America, about 100,000 in South America and the Far East, and about 600,000 in the countries of the Middle East (ibid., 36).

As a result of Soviet authorities' policy of repatriation, between 1946 and 1947 about 90,000 to 100,000 Armenians, mostly from the Middle East, returned to Soviet Armenia (Mouradian 1990, 325-26). Most of the returnees were survivors of the Genocide. Despite the promise of a better life in the homeland, repatriated Armenians were stripped of their belongings, were forced to live in harsh conditions, and many were exiled to Siberian and Central Asian prisons. After Stalin's death and by the early 1970s, thousands of repatriates left Soviet Armenia. In Armenia this group of expatriates is customarily referred to as old diaspora.

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4 In Armenia, the diaspora group that left the homeland right before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union is customarily referred to as a new diaspora. The diaspora group that left the homeland either voluntarily or through coercion as a result of the Genocide and during the Soviet period is referred to as an old diaspora. Since I analyze identity issues as perceived by citizens of the Republic of Armenia, I follow chronological classification of migration waves as it is perceived in the Republic of Armenia. I also acknowledge that this chronological classification of migration waves differs from the one existing in diaspora itself. Here the post-Genocide diaspora group is referred to as new diaspora while the pre-Genocide diaspora is referred to as old diaspora. The phenomenon of Armenian migration or diasporization existed before the twentieth century. For instance, scholars note that Armenian diasporic communities were formed.
After the Genocide, the second largest mass migration took place right before and after the years of independence. Since 1988 between 900,000 and 1 million Armenians left the country. Survey research has shown that there have been five significant causes of migration from Armenia at the end of the twentieth century (Poghosyan 2005). Economy is one of the most significant causal variables. As a result of the Soviet economic system collapse, privatization, and roads and communication blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey since 1991, Armenia experienced significant economic deterioration, a paralyzing energy crisis, and mass unemployment that led to an extensive exodus of the local population. Another important cause of mass migration has been war and conflicts. Surveys reveal that many young males eligible for the draft left the country to avoid obligatory military service, because of the war in Mountainous Karabagh.

Other three important causes of migration include historical-political (i.e., the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of borders), cultural-historical (i.e., the Armenians’ long-
in Crimea and Northern Europe after the fall of the last Armenian Bagratis kingdom in the eleventh century. A significant migration wave took place also in the fourteenth century after the fall of the Cilician Kingdom. As a result, diasporic communities were formed throughout Eastern Europe, the Russian Empire, and the Far East. Finally, a significant population exodus occurred in 1894–96 during massacres of Armenians by Abdul Hamid II in the Ottoman Turkey. About 200,000 Armenians were killed and about 100,000 Armenians found a refuge in other countries. In 1895–99 about 78,980 Armenians emigrated to the United States.


Socio-demographic characteristics of emigrants encompass various social strata of the Armenian population. Most emigrants are between 18–55 years old with dominating male population (65%). Most of the time emigrants’ level of education varies between high school diploma and bachelor's degree, although 30–35% of them also have a master’s degree or higher. See Poghosyan, Sovremennoye Armyanskoye Obshestvo, esp. 203–04.

Since the beginning of the conflict in Mountainous Karabagh in 1988, 78,000 refugees migrated to Armenia from Karabagh only. Currently, about or less than 250,000 refugees reside in Armenia. See Poghosyan, Sovremennoye Armyanskoye Obshestvo, 201–08.
standing experience of living in foreign environments), and psychological factors (i.e., feeling of unhappiness, apathy and sense of insecurity) (ibid., 206–08). Armenia also experienced a large inflow of refugees because of wars and conflicts in Azerbaijan, Mountainous Karabagh, and Northern Caucasus. A total of about 360,000 refugees migrated to Armenia. Later, several thousand refugees left Armenia not only because of economic reasons but also as a result of uneasy relations between refugees and the recipient communities in Armenia. This group of expatriates is customarily referred to as a new diaspora.

In addition to being a mere chronological classification of the Armenian migration waves, the old-new diaspora typology also reflects diaspora political elites’ attempts to claim moral primacy of the old diaspora over the new one. Since the new diaspora was largely formed as a result of economic factors and often involved the element of choice, it did not constitute the “true” diaspora. However, the post-Genocide old diaspora constituted what Cohen famously called a “victim diaspora” as a social formation through traumatic destruction and coerced departure of an entire population from the homeland (Cohen 1997). Political biases underpinning the old-new dichotomy were particularly reflected in constitutional and legislative amendments since 2005. As a result of a national referendum held in 2005, the amended constitution allows dual citizenship, which was banned in the previous (1995) constitution. In addition, in February 2007 the parliament passed a number of legislative amendments (i.e., on citizenship, military service, and the electoral code), specifying rights and obligations of dual citizens.

These amendments were indicative of profound differences between pre- and post-1998 governments’ policies on dual citizenship and homeland-diaspora relations, both of which emerged as uneasy aspects of modern Armenian politics. As the National Assembly’s (NA) Vice-President Ara Sahakyan announced in 1994, disagreements around dual citizenship and citizens’ rights and

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obligations divided the NA into two extreme poles. Disagreements were between proponents of liberal nationalism (the pre-1998 government) and ethno-nationalism (the post-1998 government). While proponents of liberal nationalism defined citizenship in civic terms and denied dual citizenship, the post-1998 official policies by ethno-nationalists endorsed dual citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* (i.e., right of blood) as a way to unify and repatriate ethnic Armenians.

### 4.3 The Politics of Civic Inclusion

Once independence is achieved, one of the first potentially explosive issues that states have to address is defining the rules of membership. No sovereign state can get by without answering the eternal question whether the citizens of the state are *demos* or *ethnos*. Linz and Stepan note that the saliency of the question is somewhat reduced in non-democracies since “everyone is normally excluded” from exercising their basic citizenship rights (Linz and Stepan 1996, 28). Therefore, the choice between *ethnos* or *demos* is less problematic, since both are stripped from their political rights. However, the choice of membership rules becomes crucial when states aspire for establishing democratic systems. Armenian leadership opted for defining membership rules through the *demos* principle. Since independence, proponents of the liberal nationalism insisted that ethno-national ideology was a dangerous category for state security. Instead, the pre-1998 political elite argued that national ideology must evolve around development of a democratic state.\(^9\) Liberal nationalists perceived of a state as a political community with bounded citizenship, where nationality (but not ethnicity) and citizenship are tied to territorial boundaries of the state. Article 14 of the 1995 constitution banning dual citizenship reflected this strategy.


They continued to argue in this vein, contending that granting dual citizenship based solely on *jus sanguinis* will lead to ethnic selection and violate the principle of democratic equality.\(^{11}\) The primary goal of the state was the creation of a civic community in which rules and norms of the political culture apply to all members of the political community equally. Article 15 of the 1995 constitution reflected this strategy, which guaranteed the legal equality of citizenship rights and obligations and prevented citizenship acquisition based on discriminatory practices.\(^{12}\)

Citizens, regardless of national origin, race, sex, language, creed, political or other persuasion, social origin, wealth or other status, are entitled to all the rights and freedoms, and subject to the duties determined by the Constitution and the laws.

This article contained two crucial declarations essential for liberal democracies. First, that citizenship acquisition cannot be denied based on discriminatory practices. Second, it emphasizes that the legal equality of citizenship rights and obligations is constitutionally guaranteed. Scholars note that there is a strong association between the idea of citizenship and the idea of political equality. If balance is distorted then the creation of first- and second-class citizens with different set of rights and obligations is inevitable.

Regarding military service, political elites argued that if dual citizenship is adopted then citizens likely would not choose to serve in the Armenian army. Citizens’ choice of military service location, of course, would not be an acute problem in a state free of concerns about wars. However, given the threat of war in Mountainous Karabagh, the pre-1998 elites believed that


local citizens would be likely to seek dual citizenship to avoid service in the Armenian army. For instance, President Ter-Petrosyan (1997) argued that compulsory military service is not one of particularly pleasant activities for citizens in any state, but it is a constitutional duty that must be fulfilled. If dual citizenship were allowed, Armenia would not have a strong national army capable of supporting Karabagh's struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{13}

This tendency not only would result in the weakening of the national army but also would accelerate emigration, thus contributing to the already existing problem of large-scale migration. Hence, proponents of liberal-nationalism believed that dual citizenship poses a threat to state security, because it will result in the weakening of the national army and accelerate emigration.

Considering that the number of ethnic Armenians abroad largely exceeded the number of Armenian citizens, demographic concern was another significant argument for rejecting dual citizenship. Both political elites and constitutional experts believed that the constitution had to reflect the reality of unbalanced population distribution. For instance, Vladimir Nazaryan, one of the founders of the Armenian constitution, argued that the possibilities of political influence from abroad and of a radical distortion of a constitutionally guaranteed equality of citizens are of a magnitude that simply could not be neglected in constitutional provisions for citizenship.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, it was argued that the constitutional ban on dual citizenship was a reflection of and a pragmatic response to the reality of unbalanced population distribution.

While accepting that Armenia is the homeland of all Armenians, liberal nationalists insisted that: "Viewing Armenia and Diaspora as historically formed two complete identities of

\textsuperscript{13} Ter-Petrosyan, “Hajord serundneri gaghaparakhosutyune,” 3; and Ter-Petrosyan, “Mer serndi partke Hayots petakanutyun kayacume, bargavachunn u hzoracumn e” [The establishment of the Armenian state, its prosperity and strengthening is our generation’s obligation], in Apagan Bakhum e Dure [Future Knocks at the Door], ed. A. Azaryan (Yerevan: Pahpanoghakan Shem Matenashar, 2000), 18–38.

\textsuperscript{14} See Nazaryan, “‘Mard’ ev ‘Kaghakatsi’.”
one nation, their relations must be kept away from political contradictions, based on mutual respect and the principle of non-interference into each other’s domestic affairs.”

Despite arguments that diaspora was completely alienated before 1998, the Armenian state put a considerable effort to involve diaspora in various developmental and socio-economic projects. Sure, Article 11 of the 1995 constitution reflected uneasy relations between diaspora political rights and domestic security concerns by defining the character of homeland-diaspora relations as primarily limited to the cultural sphere. In addition, presidential official statements and electoral platforms of the Republic Block, with majority parliamentary seats (50%) and Shamiram party (20%), mostly highlighted the importance of cultural relations with diaspora. For instance, the Republic Block stated the importance of intensifying homeland-diaspora relations in matters of national culture, sport and education, such as expanding exchange programs for students and teachers. However, it also emphasized the importance of diaspora mobilization around goals pursued by the Armenian state. Thus, since 1991 the government encouraged diaspora’s socio-economic activity in the homeland by reducing personal income taxes, profit taxes, and payroll taxes.

It is important to acknowledge that several diaspora organizations and individuals have been consistently supporting various cultural, economic and developmental projects in Armenia, without expectations of political rights. For instance, in 1992, based on donations from Armenians all over the world, including Armenian citizens, the All-Armenian Fund was established. During the first five years of its activity, $53 million was spent on various projects for a sustainable development in Armenia and especially in Karabakh. Among other activities the Fund developed Armenia’s physical infrastructure, such as roads and major highways between Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh (i.e., Goris-Stepanakert highway). Since 1991, the Armenian

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General Benevolent Union established the American University of Armenia, children centers, medical establishments, schools, and soup kitchens. Catholic and Protestant Churches and Fund for Armenian Relief built and maintained orphanages and delivered a variety of humanitarian aid in Armenia. The Armenian Medical Association and the Armenian Lawyers Association were established in the early 1990s. In 1993, Armenian Assembly of America (ASA) initiated a number of projects in Armenia and Mountainous Karabagh, such as the Armenian Tree Project, promoting environmental recovery. In 1992, Land and Culture Organization initiated a project promoting restoration of Armenian churches and construction of refugee homes. In 1992, because of economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan, Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and ASA campaigned against the aid to the Azerbaijani government. As a result, the U.S. Congress adopted Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning direct aid to the Azerbaijani government. Finally, a number of prominent businessmen and artists, such as Kirk

ASA is not affiliated with political parties and in general supports the homeland since independence. However, ANCA is affiliated with the ARF, which has a long history of opposition and hostility towards the founding president Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the ANM. For instance, when Armenia was chalking because of economic crises and war, ANCA was lobbying against the U.S. aid to Armenia. Following the ARF's ban in Armenia, ANCA continued lobbying actively against the homeland government. Therefore, ANCA's lobbying effort for Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, and support of the homeland government before 1998, was a singular event. ANCA's partisanship is evident till present. Early morning, on March 1, 2008, Armenian authorities brutally crushed the sleeping crowd, which was relentlessly but peacefully demonstrating against highly flawed presidential elections results. Main contestants were the founding president Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the Prime Minister, Serzh Sarksyan, hand-picked by the outgoing president Kocharyan. Later that day, the army fired on unarmed demonstrators. The official number of killed was more than 8; however, the exact number remains unknown. The same day, the government declared the state of emergency for 20 days, accompanied by endless arrests, tortures, and complete media censure. ARF accepted Sarkisyan's victory and joined the anti-opposition hate campaign. While ANCA continued Genocide related updates in its website, there was not a report about tragic events in the homeland, except just a few representing the distorted "official" view. This was in sharp contrast to the ASA's website, which harshly criticized authorities' brutality and state of emergency.

Restriction on Assistance to Azerbaijan (Title 9: Section 907)

(A) RESTRICTIONS - “United States assistance under this or any other Act . . . may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.”

(B) WAIVER - The restriction on assistance in subsection (a) shall not apply if the President determines, and so certifies to Congress, that the application of the restriction would not be in the national interests of the United States. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section 907 (accessed 1/10/08). Later the Clinton administration, which did not approve of sanctions, lifted them gradually. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, Section 907 was waived by the Bush administration in 2002. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020130-6.html (accessed 1/10/08).
Kerkorian, Hrair Hovnanian, and Charles Aznavour initiated a number of philanthropic activities since independence.

This was not a one-way street, however. Considering the importance of homeland-diaspora relations, the law on the “Status of Foreign Citizens in the Republic of Armenia” was enacted in 1994. It allowed members of the diaspora (and other distinguished individuals rendering significant services to the Armenian nation) to receive Armenian passports with “Special Residency Status” for a ten-year term with a possibility of extension. Survivors of the Genocide were granted this status through a facilitated procedure. Bearers of this passport were released from visa requirements and were entitled to basic civil rights for legal protection and complete property rights, including land ownership. They were also entitled to social rights for employment, health care, and education. However, they were denied political rights of electing, being elected, and joining political organizations, which were reserved for Armenian citizens. Finally, they were exempt from compulsory military service.\(^1\)

In addition, the 1995 constitution and Article 13 of the law “On the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia” established a simplified procedure for members of the diaspora to acquire Armenian citizenship, stipulating that a three-year residency requirement for the Armenian citizenship acquisition did not apply to diaspora members who establish residency in Armenia.\(^2\)

Liberal nationalists’ denial of the diaspora’s citizenship rights was not accepted well by diaspora political elites, particularly the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF).\(^3\) Homeland’s

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\(^3\) ARF is one of the oldest Armenian political parties, founded in 1890 in Tbilisi, Georgia. ARF was a key player in establishing the first independent Republic of Armenia in 1918–20. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Armenia the party moved its headquarters to Lebanon, where it continued its political activity. ARF was banned by the presidential order in December, 1994 because it violated the Armenian law on parties, Article 5.3, according to which political parties could not be controlled from abroad. Also, according to the Law on Parties, Articles 1 through 5 particularly, only citizens were entitled with the rights to join, establish, reorganize, or liquidate parties. ARF’s role was central in removing the first administration led by
citizenship policies were interpreted as a denial of ethnic Armenians' intrinsic rights. A diaspora scholar writes: "The government decided to deny its citizens the right to be simultaneously a citizen of another country. For many diaspora Armenians who thought naively that their Armenian ethnicity entitled them to Armenian citizenship, this was a major disappointment. It meant that there was no such a thing as a one and indivisible Armenian nation." \(^{22}\) The denial of full citizenship rights was interpreted as an unjust partition of one historical nation into citizens and outsiders. A member of the ARF's ruling council announced that "imposing distinctions between native Armenians and Diaspora when it comes to involvement in Armenia's politics is insulting." \(^{23}\)

### 4.4 The Politics of Ethnic Inclusion

Civic approach to the issue of dual citizenship virtually disappeared after the resignation of the first president Ter-Petrosyan and a consequent disintegration of the majority Republic (Hanrapetutyun) Block, in February 1998.\(^{24}\)

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23 Apo Boghigian, as cited in Razmik Panossian, "Between Ambivalence and Intrusion: Politics and Identity in Armenia-Diaspora Relations," *Diaspora* 7, no. 2 (1998):171. Also, in a number of newspaper articles diaspora members argued that they had been granted with nothing more than just an "empty citizenship." The concept usually is applied to a group of people who while residing in the country are being denied citizenship rights. This concept, however, distorts the Armenian citizenship acquisition procedures and in general is not applicable to the Armenian case because residents could apply for citizenship through *jus soli* principle. Finally, several diaspora and local scholars and politicians argued that economic contribution should entitle diaspora with a full package of dual citizenship rights. For instance Poghosyan writes: "diaspora Armenians have the 'right' to worry, to take care of Armenia... and to render financial assistance to the population of Armenia, but they do not have the right to become Armenian citizens." See Gevorg Poghosyan, "Citizenship Regimes in the South Caucasus," 24, available at http://www.cimera.org/files/reports/rr1/chapter4.pdf (accessed 1/13/06).

24 For instance, compare 40% of civic statements in the period of 1993-99 to 97% of ethnic statements in the period of 1998-2003 and 95% of ethnic statements in the period of 2002-06. See Chapter 5 for a content analysis of elected parties' statements on the issue of dual citizenship.
During his presidential electoral campaign in 1997, Vazgen Manukyan, the leader of the NDU, made a statement that both captures and summarizes the political trajectory since 1998: “Azerbaijan has oil, Georgia has sea, Armenia has Diaspora.” Ethno-nationalists perceive of a diaspora as an asset capable of solving both economic and pan-national issues of concern. According to ethno-nationalist view the Armenian state is the homeland of all the Armenians spread all over the world and there should be no legal distinction between Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians. Indeed, since 1998, ethno-nationalist propaganda of pan-national unification and ethnic mobilization has become a recurring theme in presidential speeches, intellectual, and religious discourse.

Already in the 1995 parliamentary elections the ethno-nationalist approach to dual citizenship was reflected in several party platforms. For instance, National Democratic Union stated that it was necessary to adopt dual citizenship because: “Armenia is a pan-national spiritual-cultural center, which must undertake the responsibilities of preserving the nation, defending the nation’s genetic repository and guaranteeing the common development of the nation.” The Communist Party of Armenia defended dual citizenship arguing that “Our party has consistently fought and fights for the Armenian Cause . . . . The survival of the Armenian nation is the most ultimately important issue and must be at the heart of both domestic and foreign policy.” Similarly, the Union of National Self-Determination (UNSD) argued that just solution of the Armenian Cause must be achieved through the unification of Armenians around the world. Dual citizenship is necessary since “the salvation of the Armenian nation is its unity.”

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26 Election Platform, National Democratic Union, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, June 25, 1995, 7. The NDU won 7.5% and 5.17% of seats in 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, respectively.
27 Armenian Communist Party’s Electoral Platform, “Mer Khosqe” [Our Word] (the official newspaper of the party), November 2, 1994, 2. The ACP won 15.00% and 12.09% of seats in 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, respectively.
28 Union of National Self-Determination, Election Platform, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, June 22, 1995, 7. The UNSD won 7.5% of seats in 1995 parliamentary elections and was never re-elected since then.
As a result of an alliance between the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) and People’s Party, the Unity Block was formed during the 1999 parliamentary elections. The Unity Block argued that “diaspora had a special place in the Armenian state’s foreign policy and must be treated as an extension of the Armenian state and national ideology.” In several publications, and consistent with modern tenets of the Armenian Cause, the Unity Block believed that diaspora’s citizenship rights are essential for uniting Armenians throughout the world and for achieving national goals. The party Law and Unity stated that: “Disapora has a special place in the development of the national ideology . . . . Diaspora’s national survival cannot be achieved without the homeland and the homeland cannot achieve rapid and productive construction of the Armenian state without the diaspora’s political, moral, cultural and financial support...the dialogue on pan-national issues of concern must be implemented through recognizing the diaspora as Armenian citizens.” Finally, during both 1999 and 2003 elections, party Country of Law (CL) stated that: “Ethnic Armenians must be granted special residency status in Armenia . . . through a legislation on Dual Citizenship.”

Since independence, the ARF made numerous statements regarding diaspora citizenship rights as an inalienable ingredient of the Armenian Cause insisting that: “one of the goals of the party is the reunion of diaspora Armenians in their historical motherland.” The party

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30 Ibid., and “Finally There was a Talk on Revising the Regulation on Deputy’s Immunity,” Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, April 29, 1999, 2. The Unity Block won a majority 41.69% of seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections.
vehemently opposed citizenship policies of the pre-1998 administration stating that a treacherous and anti-national policy of the first administration put artificial divisions between citizens and diaspora.\(^{34}\)

In 2006 the party published a draft-proposal "The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Granting Dual Citizenship Status of the Republic of Armenia to Armenians of Abroad," which perhaps is the best illustration of the ARF’s position on this issue:

The necessity of dual citizenship for the Armenian people has emerged by our national historical conditions, because we represent a people, who because of the Genocide committed on the territory of its motherland, in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century has been forced to disperse across the globe. The Armenian Diaspora is a unique phenomenon in world history . . . Each Armenian with national dignity wishes that Armenia becomes the motherland for all Armenians, that the whole collective potential of our people concentrates in the Republic of Armenia and be utilized for the achievement of national and state priority goals. Today less than 1/3 of Armenians live in their Motherland. This situation requires efforts towards establishment of a united system of national identity, which . . . will form a collective responsibility towards the Motherland and the future of the Armenian nation based on national and historical memories . . . Granting dual citizenship to Armenians living abroad will . . . unite all Armenians around the world for the creation of a single and united motherland.\(^{35}\)


Essentially, the party has always been clear that historical justice will be achieved when ethnic Armenians repatriate to united Armenia, which in addition to existing political boundaries would include Western Armenian territories (in Eastern Turkey), Mountainous Karabagh and Nakhijevan (in Azerbaijan), and Samtskhe-Javakheti region of the southern Georgia, bordering Armenia.\textsuperscript{36}

Similarly, the RPA insisted numerous times that the unification of Armenians around the world is part of the Armenian Cause and that dual citizenship’s “ultimate goal is the repatriation of the Diaspora Armenians to the Motherland.”\textsuperscript{37} RPA endorses the ideology of \textit{tseghagron} (race-based religion) and believes that: “By God’s will, we were created Armenians and therefore the eternal contact between God and the Armenian nation is ensured by the perpetuation of the Armenian type.”\textsuperscript{38} RPA also stated that: “The Armenian Plateau, which is the eternal fatherland of Armenians, is the cradle of Armenians. The continuation of existence in the fatherland and the consolidation of its vital energy, creative genius and free will is the supreme goal of the Armenian Nation.”\textsuperscript{39}

To conclude, at least at the ideological and constitutional levels, ethno-nationalists’ politics of dual citizenship is a mirror image of the civic citizenship politics conducted by liberal nationalists.

\textsuperscript{36} According to the 2002 census ethnic Armenians comprise the majority in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, making up about 54% of the population. Ethnic Armenians feel discriminated and alienated by Georgian officials, because of under-representation of Armenian’s concerns particularly regarding cultural matters. The United Javakhk Democratic Alliance is a civic organization composed of ethnic Armenians, which calls for local autonomy for Javakheti comparable with the one promised to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara.

\textsuperscript{37} Iskandaryan and Meloyan, \textit{Parliamentary Elections}, 112; and Anahit Esayan, “Hayreni Kusatsutyunne Hayots Tseghaspanutyun Masin” [National Parties about the Armenian Genocide], \textit{Hayots Ashkharh}, April 24, 1999, 3. RPA won 23.66% and 33.91% of seats in 2003 and 2007 parliamentary elections, respectively.


The context and practice of citizenship has steadily changed since World War II. Universal declaration of human rights, EU citizenship policies, transnational communities, globalization, and technological innovations constantly exert a considerable amount of pressure on governments' definitions of citizenship and immigration laws. Scholars agree that "as the globalization process produces multiples diasporas," modes of relations between homeland and host-societies become increasingly complicated. Meanwhile, the traditional idea of national citizenship (i.e., bounded to a political community) becomes increasingly problematic because states are no longer the only source and appeal of authority in defining citizenship. Hence, domestic debates over who constitutes a citizen must accommodate and adjust to a wide array of external pressures.

A steady trend of "internationalization" of dual citizenship practice is undeniable. Dual or multiple citizenship is practiced by previous empires, such as France, Great Britain, Spain, Turkey, and Russia, traditional immigrant countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, and important labor sending countries such as Mexico and Dominican Republic. The number of countries aspiring to join this trend is yet to grow. Nevertheless, and very importantly, while adhering to international norms and standards, states simultaneously pursue local issues of concern. Spiro properly notes that while one cannot ignore the impact of EU citizenship policies on member states, it is still only a regional enterprise. While the UN Human Rights Convention is binding for all member states, the locus of immigration and citizenship laws and their implementation is still located within nation-states. Despite an almost universal adoption of international norms reflected in lengthy listing of human rights in constitutions and laws, the same norms are revised and redefined for solving a variety of domestic issues.

42 Regarding this point see Suzanne Shanahan, "Scripted Debates: Twentieth-Century Immigration and Citizenship Policy in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States," in Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring
The Armenian case illustrates that dual citizenship debates are simultaneously debates about nationhood. "They are debates about what it means, and ought to mean, to be a member of a nation-state in today's increasingly international world." Since 1998, arguments by political elites have been marked by parallels drawn between human rights and the rights based on ethnicity. Discourses on dual citizenship and ethno-national definition of citizenship are blended with international norms of human rights, thus blurring the boundaries between human rights and rights based on ethnic criteria.

The language of international norms can be accommodated to ethno-nationalistic objectives pursued by political elites. For instance, a curious blurring of international norms with state objectives is reflected in Article 30 of the amended constitution, which allows non-citizens for suffrage in elections of local self-governing bodies. This article hardly is designed to protect the interests of migrant workers, since Armenia itself is a labor sending country. The provision cannot be for thousands of refugees from Azerbaijan, Karabakh, and Northern Caucasus (total 360,000), since the law "On Amendments into RoA Electoral Code" (enacted April 21, 2000) entitles refugees with the right to participate in the elections of the local self-governmental bodies.

In numerous articles, under the guise of European norms, political elites have argued about non-citizens' human rights to participate in local elections. A similar provision can be found only in the European Union citizenship norms—specifically in the Treaty on the European Union, known as the Maastricht Treaty, adopted in 1993. Articles 8 through 8e of the treaty specify migrant workers' political rights of electing and being elected at municipal elections. Yet, these rights are applicable to citizen-workers of the European Union's Member States only.

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Hence, a citizen of a country which is not a member state (such as Armenia) in the Union is not entitled to these political rights. In sum, international standards do not entitle non-citizens with political right and do not require states to adopt similar laws. Therefore, Article 30 must be understood as another step towards ethnic politics, that is, diaspora’s integration into local politics.

While pursuing ethno-nationalistic objectives, constitutional distortions can be justified based on international norms of human rights. For instance, the amended constitution does not provide for the fundamental political equality of citizens vital for liberal democracies. Article 15 has been deleted and instead has been replaced by a provision consistent with the language of human rights. Article 14.1 of the amended constitution states:

People, regardless of race, sex, language . . . are legally equal, have all the rights, freedoms and obligations defined by the Constitution and law and shall be given equal protection of the law without discrimination.

The above article is designed to protect human rights in general, which of course must be welcomed. Yet, in essence it does not add to the protection of human rights, which were already protected by the 1995 constitution in articles 4 and in articles 16 through 43. What is new, however, is that the amended article and constitution in general say nothing about the political equality of citizens. Two most essential criteria for liberal democracies—citizenship acquisition without discriminatory practices and the legal equality of citizenship rights and obligations—are not protected at the constitutional level. The fact that constitutionally defined political equality has been neglected raises fundamentally serious questions about the very nature of democratic statehood.

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Scholars note that there is a strong association between the idea of citizenship and the idea of political equality. If balance is distorted then the creation of first- and second-class citizens with different sets of rights and obligations is inevitable. Indeed, the amended constitution and consequent 2007 legislative amendments provide an institutional framework for the creation of first- and second-class citizens with different sets of rights and obligations.

The objective of ethno-nationalists has been to establish an institute of citizenship, which in practice will be available only to ethnic Armenians. Arguments for dual citizenship evolve only around ethnic criteria, and ethno-religious minorities, who have been citizens since independence, are left out from this discourse. Current policies designed by Armenian political elites bear striking similarities with Hans Kohn’s classical observation that nationalists do not aim to transform the state into a people’s state but try to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands (Kohn 1945). Questions such as what defines Armenianness and what are the constitutive elements of the Armenian ethnicity have been at the forefront of political discussions.47

4.5 Discriminating From Within: Old Diaspora Versus New Diaspora and Armenian Citizens

The most interesting aspect of the Armenian dual citizenship is that even though it will mainly be available to ethnic Armenians, the 2007 legislative amendments (i.e., the laws on the Citizenship, Military Service, and Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia) primarily promote the old diaspora’s interests. Both the ARF proposal discussed above and amended laws have

47 For instance, the NA Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee argued that those who marry foreigners should not be eligible for Armenian citizenship. Also, because dual citizenship will intensify ethnic Armenians’ outflow, the Chairman argued that restrictions on emigration must be implemented. A member of the “Armenian Cause” committee insisted that dual citizenship has to be available only to able-bodied ethnic Armenian males who serve in the national army. The NA Chairmen of State and Legal Affairs argued that it must be granted based on ethno-religious criteria since equal access to dual citizenship without discriminatory criteria will endanger the state security. See Gayane Gasparyan, “Erkkaghakatsiutyun: Iravunqneri u partakanutunneri sahmanagispetk e hstaketsvi” [Dual Citizenship: The boundary between rights and obligations must be specified], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, June 7, 2005.
discriminatory membership criteria and distinguish between native Armenian citizens and old diaspora by favoring the latter. Indeed, the proposal puts native Armenian citizens into the same category with foreign citizens stating: “Armenian citizens, as well as foreign citizens, may also obtain dual citizenship status, with some specific features which would be subject to legislative regulation by the laws of the Republic of Armenia On Citizenship and On the Legal Status of Foreigners.”

The amended law on citizenship states that ethnic Armenians (i.e., who have Armenian ancestors, that is through the *jus sanguinis* rule) are eligible for Armenian citizenship without residency requirements. However, Armenian citizens who emigrated and obtained second citizenship without renouncing their Armenian citizenship after January 1, 1995 will be allowed to restore their citizenship rights and become eligible for dual citizenship only if they report their whereabouts to the appropriate Armenian authorities. Moreover, while having dual citizenship, these individuals will be considered as subjects of the Armenian Republic only, therefore will be subject to the Armenian law primarily. The amended law is silent about thousands of expatriates who left the country before January 1, 1995. It appears that while in theory new diaspora (rather part of the new diaspora) is not denied dual citizenship rights, in practice the acquisition of the status will be a logistical nightmare for this group of expatriates.

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48 Most of the 2007 legislative amendments reflect objectives specified in the ARF proposal on dual citizenship. The proposal and subsequent legislative amendments is an excellent example illustrating the ways old diaspora’s special interests have been promoted in the parliament. See ARF’s concept paper “On the Law of the Republic of Armenia on ‘Granting dual citizenship status of the Republic of Armenia to Armenians of Abroad’,” 2, at http://www.aiprg.net/UserFiles/File/dc_papers/ARF_DC-Concept-eng.pdf (accessed 1/14/08).


While political rights granted to non-citizens at the local level are quite generous even compared to international practice, these rights are substantially curtailed for elections at the national level. The question of dual citizens’ voting rights has been the most contested issue.\textsuperscript{51}

Before 2007, Armenian citizens temporarily residing abroad had the political right of absentee voting at the Armenian Embassies and Consulates worldwide. Yet, the 2007 amendments to the \textit{Election Code} require that elections must be held only on the territory of Armenia, effectively banning absentee voting. Thus, although a substantial number of registered voters live abroad, as of 2007 only those with resources to travel to their homeland will be able to enjoy their political rights in practice.\textsuperscript{52} While both resident citizens and diaspora dual citizens have to vote in Armenia only, old diaspora dual citizens do not have to fulfill any residency requirements to enjoy their voting rights.\textsuperscript{53}

Considering the objectives pursued by ethno-nationalists, that is, repatriation and the establishment of a common national identity, political rights of dual citizens are quite restricted. Amended political rights are also discriminative in nature, therefore inhibiting the project of establishing a common national identity. That political rights have been designed with special caution is not surprising, however, precisely because they directly affect the selection of political elites. Electoral calculation is a particularly sensitive dimension of political rights in Armenia, where as more than three times as many Armenians live abroad as within the country’s borders.

\textsuperscript{51} Voting is not mandatory in Armenia.
\textsuperscript{52} The change was already in effect for May 2007 parliamentary elections causing a great deal of criticism. According to several sources vote fraud took place by using the names of Armenian citizens who live abroad temporarily to fill voting cards.
\textsuperscript{53} This was another concern discussed not only by opposition parties but also by a key pro-government Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which demanded some residency requirements in exchange for diaspora’s political rights. For instance, the speaker of the Parliament and a member of the RPA argued: “The right to vote is also an opportunity to define own destiny and own way, this is the greatest right and in this aspect, I think, there should be a difference—those people should develop Armenia, whose life and destiny directly depend on the Republic of Armenia.” See http://www.parliament.am/news.php?do=view&ID=2226&cat_id=2&day=22&month=02&year=2007&lang=eng (accessed 2/23/2007). Also, see Margarit Esayan, “Government Against the Republican Party,” \textit{Aravot}, February 22, 2007, at http://www.aravot.am/2007/aravot_rus/February/22/aravot_news.htm (accessed 2/23/2007), and Associated Press, “RPA has Serious Objections,” \textit{Aravot}, February 20, 2007, at http://www.aravot.am/2007/aravot_arm/February/20/aravot_news.htm (accessed 2/23/2007).
The most salient issue within social obligations is military service, which is compulsory in Armenia. Therefore, political elites had to deal with this issue with a special caution. The 2007 amended law “On Military Service” specifically states that local Armenian citizens who adopt citizenship of the second country are not released from the military service, even if they have served in the military forces of the second country. The new diaspora, which in theory is not denied dual citizenship, in practice will not be released from the military service in Armenia also, because many of them still maintain Armenian citizenship. It is likely that the new diaspora will give up its right to dual citizenship simply because the costs are much higher than expected benefits of dual citizenship.

This requirement imposed on local citizens and new diaspora is quite different from the one imposed on the old diaspora. The amended law specifically states that citizens of other countries (i.e., ethnic Armenians who never held Armenian citizenship) who also adopt Armenian citizenship are released from the Armenian military service if they have served either in military forces or fulfilled alternative service in their respective countries of citizenship. This regulation does not apply to countries where military service is not compulsory, in which case this group of old diaspora dual citizens is not required to serve in the Armenian army either (e.g., the United States).54

Amendments in legislation on military service reflect concerns emphasized by liberal nationalists that given the threat of war in Mountainous Karabagh, the number of current citizens seeking dual citizenship will increase. In this case, the state security will probably be threatened because of the weakened national army and accelerated emigration. Yet while before the duty of military service was applied to all citizens equally, the principle of equality was violated with the adoption of dual citizenship.

In sum, as a result of 2007 legislative amendments, political equality of citizenship rights and obligations has been challenged, where old diaspora has more rights and less obligations and new diaspora and local citizens have reduced rights but more obligations.

First, while the old diaspora is granted the status of dual citizenship based on *jus sanguinis*, it appears that local citizens and new diaspora holding Armenian citizenship will be eligible for this status through a special procedure. Second, the old diaspora was granted a full package of political rights both at the local and national levels without any residency requirements. Yet, by banning absentee voting rights citizens temporarily residing abroad effectively ended up with reduced political rights. Finally, within social obligations, unlike the old diaspora, the new diaspora and local citizens will not be released from the obligatory military service even if they have served in the country of their second residence.

Thus, rather than being a mere chronological classification of the Armenian migration waves, the old-new diaspora typology reflects the underlying political biases directly affecting expatriate policies. Claims of the old “victim diaspora’s” moral primacy as a direct outcome of genocide resulted in policies confining political choices of both new diaspora and local citizens.

4.6 Conclusions: The Politics of Belongingness

Membership criteria, that is, policies instituting rules of belongingness in the political community and the package of rights and responsibilities, are the two most essential elements of citizenship. These two fundamental elements are also applicable to dual citizenship policies. Whether membership rules should be applied without discriminatory criteria and whether the set of rights and obligations should be extended equally to all members has been the subject of theoretical debates since ancient Greece. Throughout history, criteria for extending membership and rights have been continuously changing, ranging from property to literacy, ethnicity to race, gender to sexual orientation, migration patterns and demographic issues. Since independence,
Armenia's policies for extending membership and citizenship rights and obligations to its co-ethnics abroad have been affected by contesting visions of national identity by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists.

The pre-1998 administration attempted to challenge the “fear of victimization,” move beyond the existential concerns to state security concerns, and redefine the national identity emphasizing its civic end. Liberal nationalists believed that national identity is not just a function of pre-existing ethnicity, culture, or religion. It is primarily a political phenomenon and requires shared political experiences within bounded political community. They believed that in Armenia, where historical grievances such as genocide and territorial disputes are unresolved and where demography is an overwhelmingly significant concern, distributing citizenship rights to ethnic Armenians around the world with different political experiences and worldviews could be detrimental to state security.

Liberal nationalists extended full civil and social rights to co-ethnics abroad. However, they believed that ethnicity is unacceptable for granting political rights to non-residents. Thus, they were willing to grant a complete package of citizenship rights to ethnic Armenians through facilitated procedures only if they established permanent residency. From this perspective, liberal nationalists' civic policies echoed Robert Dahl's observation that "laws cannot rightfully be imposed on other persons who are not themselves obliged to obey those laws because this would violate the self-determination of all those subject to the laws." Indeed, this was also a concern expressed by 51% of the surveyed population in 2006, who feared that their political choices would be confined during national elections since about two-thirds of ethnic Armenians live abroad. Moreover, liberal nationalists argued that granting dual citizenship based solely on *jus sanguinis*

will lead to ethnic selection and violate the principle of democratic equality, creating a society with first- and second-class citizens with different sets of rights and obligations.

Instead, liberal nationalists contended that the primary goal of the state was the creation of a civic community in which rules and norms of the political culture must apply to all members of the political community equally. By promoting principles of democratic citizenship and by denying full membership to co-ethnics abroad, liberal nationalists essentially separated the institute of citizenship from ethnicity.

For ethno-nationalists, the policy of distinguishing between Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians was inherently anti-Armenian. For the old diaspora it was a violation of their moral entitlements as victims of the Genocide. Instead, ethno-nationalists opted to emphasize ethno-national security concerns and the ethnic end of the national identity. They have endorsed the "essentialist" understanding of the nation and advocated the image of a "chosen people" who survived despite historical and political upheavals.56

Dual citizenship based on ethnic criteria was perceived as a way to unify and repatriate ethnic Armenians. Ironically, ethno-nationalists’ goal of diaspora repatriation, as part of the Armenian Cause, was and is an empty ideal. A growing number of empirical studies suggest that the "symbolic" nature of diaspora Armenians’ identity does not have room for repatriation. Repatriation to liberated historical lands in Western Armenia was the ultimate ideal cherished by the first post-Genocide generation. However, generational changes among diaspora population introduced important shifts in perceptions of the Armenian Cause, particularly regarding its aspect of repatriation. For instance, in her analysis of Armenian-Americans’ identity, Bakalian finds that “there is a straight-line generational decline in involvement in Armenian issues and interests”

Bakalian finds that overall 50% of respondents regarded the Soviet Armenia as their "spiritual homeland," and that political party affiliation was a factor influencing perceptions of a 'true' homeland" (Bakalian 1993, 163–65). However, Bakalian notes that the idea of repatriation to either Western or Eastern Armenia was alien for the second and third generations of Armenian-Americans. Thus, Bakalian concludes: “Now, the political parties and other traditional institutions can officially relinquish the dream of repatriation. Instead...they need to account for the fact that overwhelming majority are here to stay and their Armenianess is voluntary, symbolic” (ibid., 163).

Similarly, Gakavian (1997), in his study of Armenian-Americans, finds that while only a very small number of Armenian-Americans repatriated to Armenia since independence, more people are nostalgic and pay short “pilgrimage” visits as well as visit Armenia for humanitarian purposes (ibid.). Importantly, Gakavian notes that most diasporans do not perceive of Eastern Armenia as their true homeland since their ancestors originate from the Western Armenia. Therefore, the idea of repatriation to Eastern Armenia is alien to them. Finally, in her study of Manchester Armenians in Great Britain, Aghanian finds that the reason diaspora Armenians relate to Eastern Armenia is because “it is the construct of double imagination as the Armenia imagined by most of them is the Armenia of their Western Armenian ancestors and nothing like the Eastern Armenia homeland” (Aghanian 2007, 166). Unless “the homeland was to achieve greater economic and political stability or extends its boundaries to include the historic Armenian territories in Turkey” Anglo-Armenians will not repatriate to Armenia (ibid., 180).

Using the double-edged rhetoric of human rights and rights based on ethnic criteria, ethno-nationalists challenged the very nature of democratic statehood by neglecting political

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57 It must be noted that Bakalian conducted her survey before Armenia declared its independence. Hence, her finding that "there is a straight-line generational decline in involvement in Armenian issues and interests" among diaspora respondents could have changed in the post-independence era.
equality of citizenship. Consequently, they created institutional niches for justifying political membership based on discriminatory practices and political inequality of citizenship rights.

Despite the rhetoric of establishing common national identity and uniting all ethnic Armenians with an ultimate goal of repatriation, political elites were constrained by electoral calculations, external threats, and historical pressures. Because of demographic challenges, political elites had to consider their electoral chances and therefore were reluctant to extend voting rights without considerable restrictions for dual citizens (i.e., banning absentee voting). In case of military service, the elites’ decisions have been affected by concerns of war in Karabagh and national security. Finally, historical pressures were reflected in elite’s perceptions of new and old diaspora and their citizenship entitlements. The net effect of 2007 legislative amendments was an institutionalization of political inequality, protecting rights of the old diaspora but enforcing obligations of the new diaspora and native Armenian citizens. By redefining rules of belongingness to political community ethno-nationalists reunited citizenship and ethnicity and reversed the institute of democratic citizenship.

Another important factor that could have influenced authorities’ decision to ban absentee voting was the sheer cost associated with absentee voting. Studies suggest that the high costs of absentee voting can exceed expected returns, particularly considering the possibility of a low turnout. See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and The Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico, Voting from Abroad: International IDEA Handbook (2007), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/voting_from_abroad/index.cfm (accessed 1/10/08).
CHAPTER 5

QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ELITES
POLICY POSITIONS: USING INTERPARTY POLICY DISTANCES
AS ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

5.1 Introduction

One of the primary objectives of this study is to identify worldviews of the political elite regarding Armenian national identity from 1993 through 2006. During the field research extensive data was collected to address this objective.¹

The research question of this chapter explores the nature of national identity in the ethnically homogeneous post-Soviet country of Armenia by asking whether there can be contesting national identities within an ethnically homogeneous state. Specifically, this chapter explores three key issues central to Armenian national identity and the ways political elites have positioned themselves along these issues throughout the period of thirteen years. Three key issues central to national identity analyzed in this study are:

1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey,

2. War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions,² and

3. Dual Citizenship.

Political elites' positions on national identity were analyzed via content analysis using party and presidential electoral platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing

¹ The primary research site in Armenia was the National Library of Armenia.
² In scholarly literature the disputed region of Mountainous Karabakh usually is known as Nagorny-Karabakh. The word Nagorny is a Russian translation of Mountainous. Throughout the text I will refer to the region as Mountainous Karabagh. For a detailed historical and qualitative analysis of this issue see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
both official and opposition ideologies. Both platforms and newspapers analyses covered the time period from 1993 through 2006.

Results of the content analysis reveal that pre- and post-1998 visions of national identity as articulated by political elites have been marked by significant contestation. While the pre-1998 official discourse on national identity was leaning towards a liberal nationalist type the post-1998 official discourse has been marked by a tendency towards an ethno-nationalist type of national identity.

5.2 Defining Concepts and Statement of Hypotheses

I borrow ideological trends identified by Libaridian (1999) and treat them as contesting national identity categories (i.e., liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists). Liberal and ethnic categories of national identity are shaped by “cognitive models” of political actors, capturing accurately the contestation over the content of key issues central to national identity. Cognitive models refer to “the worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests,” which affect political action, conceptions of legitimacy and policy choices (Abdelal et al., 2006, 696). Cognitive models involve certain “ways of reasoning,” therefore lending justification to different interpretations of the past, present and future of a collective existence (ibid., 699).

In this study, I measure the content of three key issues central to Armenian national identity. Once the content is measured, it is possible to assess the degree of contestation over the content of key issues central to national identity as proposed by the proponents of liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to national identity issues. Table 5.1 below illustrates the ways liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of national identity are shaped by political actors’ contesting worldviews across three key issues central to national identity.
To structure the content analysis, I developed a coding scheme for analyzing party and presidential platforms and key issues central to national identity based on a pre-specified vocabulary for policy positions from Libarian’s definitions of pragmatists and nationalists. Later, I recorded and refined all the possible policy positions around three key issues central to national identity (see Appendix A, “Coding: Key Issues Central to National Identity”).

I aim to test the following major hypothesis:

\[ H1. \text{From 1993 through 2006 there have been contesting national identities in Armenia.} \]

Related to this, I also hypothesize that:

\[ H1.1 \text{ Pre- and post-1998 political parties have offered different policy positions around the key issues central to national identity.} \]

\[ H1.2 \text{ Pre-1998 dominant political parties chose a liberal nationalist and post-1998 dominant political parties chose an ethno-nationalist types of national identity.} \]
5.3 Statement of Research Methodology

5.3.1 Content Analysis Procedure and Data Sources

Elite attitudes (both official and opposition) on national identity were analyzed through content analysis. Manifest data from two sources was analyzed: party and presidential platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing both official and opposition ideologies. Both platforms and newspapers analyses covered the time-period from 1993 through 2006. In both platforms and newspapers, I looked for pledges, statements, interviews, or announcements regarding the three key issues central to national identity. A total of 348 relevant observations were analyzed.

5.3.2 Party Platforms and Positional Method Tradition

The Manifesto Research Group (MRG) contends that party platforms are excellent data sources because they “cover a wide range of political positions and themes and, therefore, can be seen as a ‘set of key central statements of party positions’; they are representative statements for the whole party, not just statements of one faction or group within the party or of individual party members; and they are published before every election. Thus, changes of policy positions of parties over time can be studied” (Budge et al. 2001, 215–16).

I aim to reveal interparty differences based on policy choices regarding each specific issue. I intend to identify whether parties have policies around each key identity issue which are in agreement, disagreement, or unique in relation to each other. Therefore, I adopted the methodology used by the Positional Method tradition, which estimates interparty policy distances from platforms under the assumption that “parties compete by offering different policies to the voters on the same issue” (Petry and Landry 2001, 133). The Positional Method operationalizes party distances “in terms of the substantive positions that political parties take on issues,” and hence enables assessing the extent to which parties agree or disagree on the issues at each election.
The unit of analysis in the Positional Method is a specific pledge made in a party platform. This method is useful for this study, because it allows me to obtain a substantive understanding of whether party policy choices around three key identity issues and ultimately identity choices are in agreement, disagreement, or unique in relation to each other. The Positional Method essentially allows me to (1) identify party positions on the key issues central to national identity; (2) estimate interparty policy distances based on party positions on the key issues central to national identity; and (3) categorize each party according to the typology of national identity.

The working definition of a party used in this study is an elected party only. That is, only those parties (total 13) that have won seats in the Armenian National Assembly since 1995 were analyzed (see Table 5.2 below). In addition, I analyzed presidential candidates’ electoral platforms if the presidential candidate represented a party holding parliamentary seats at the time of presidential elections.

The research period was divided into three intervals (1993–1999, 1998–2003, and 2002–2006), determined by parliamentary and presidential election years. All three intervals overlap because usually elected Armenian parties started campaigning at least a year prior to elections. I had to build my intervals in a way that allowed me to capture party statements not only during the period when they were already elected (i.e., immediately after elections throughout the next election year) but also during the period when parties were campaigning for the next parliamentary elections (i.e., a year before upcoming elections throughout the next election year). Hence, even though intervals overlap, the data analyzed within overlapping years is not redundant.

Also, while each interval contains parties that have won elections twice in a row, most of the parties/blocs that have campaigned and won elections were different. For instance, Armenian Communist Party and National Democratic Union won in 1995 and 1999 elections. Similarly, Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Country of Law won in the 1999 and 2003 elections. Yet
the remaining parties (a total of 9) analyzed in this study were different. Therefore, most of the
time these intervals contain different groups of parties, and all of the time these intervals contain
different data.

Table 5.2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Elected Parties</th>
<th>Party Code</th>
<th>Party List Vote: Percentage Seats PR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1. Republic Bloc</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Shamiram</td>
<td>SH</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Armenian Communist Party</td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. National Democratic Union</td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Union of National Self-Determination</td>
<td>UNSD</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1. Unity Bloc</td>
<td>UB</td>
<td>41.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Armenian Communist Party</td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Law and Unity</td>
<td>LU</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Country of Law</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>5.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. National Democratic Union</td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1. Republican Party of Armenia</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>23.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Justice Bloc</td>
<td>JB</td>
<td>13.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Country of Law</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>11.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. National Unity</td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. United Labor Party</td>
<td>ULP</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>13 (repeated parties are discounted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.3 Newspapers

Scholars of both the MRG and Positional Method research traditions note that newer
democracies have significantly shorter party platforms when compared to older democracies. This
observation appropriately captures the structure of Armenian parties' platforms. To compensate
for this potential limitation, a set of newspapers was analyzed to obtain more information about
parties' policy positions. Hence, the second source for content analysis was eight Armenian news-

3 Percentages represent parties' seats elected through a proportional representation. Party List Vote Source:
history&lang=eng (accessed 8/29/06).
papers representing both official and opposition ideologies. The newspaper analysis covered the time-period of 1993 through 2006. As in the party platforms analysis, I employed the Positional Method with the objective of identifying party policy positions, estimating interparty policy distances based on parties' positions around key national identity issues, and categorizing each party according to the categories of national identity.

The newspaper population was intentionally selected in a way to represent diverse ideological orientations. This decision was driven mainly by a concern for a representative data collection. For instance, I did not expect a comprehensive coverage of party policies in a newspaper which is not affiliated with that party's general ideological orientation. In the course of an extensive newspaper analysis, my expectation that during important political events newspapers most of the time prefer interviewing those party members who are affiliated with the newspaper's general ideological orientation or political views, was confirmed.

5.3.4 Sampling of Newspapers and Units of Analysis

To reduce the population of newspapers to a manageable and representative size, a non-random sample selection procedure (NRSSP) was employed. The NRSSP is built around events, such as parliamentary and presidential elections. Also, the NRSSP is built around events which are important for identity issues and have a high potential for generating reactions from various parties (e.g., adoption or amendments of the constitution, annual commemorations of the Genocide, etc.). In other words, I sample under the assumption that relevant data is distributed non-randomly and is clustered around specific events.

4 The following eight newspapers were analyzed: (1) Haik (official before 1998; not published after 1998, resumed publication in 2006); (2) Aravot (official before 1998, opposition thereafter); (3) Azg (semi-independent, represents the Armenian Democratic Liberal party's views); (4) Haykakan Zhamanak (opposition since 1998, published since 1997); (5) Haykakan Ashkhar (official since 1998); (6) Iravunk (Constitutional Right party's official paper, opposition before 1998); (7) Erkir (opposition before 1998, semi-official with an independent agenda after 1998, represents Armenian Revolutionary Federation's views); (8) Hayastani Hanrapetutyun (my base newspaper, always represents official view).
The reliability of the assumption that the data is distributed non-randomly was tested through an intensive analysis of one specific newspaper's daily issues covering all years from 1993 through 2006. The Newspaper *Hayastani Hanrapetutyun* (Republic of Armenia) has been selected because this is the only newspaper which always represents an official view and its publication has never been interrupted since independence. The NRSSP method confirmed that data was distributed non-randomly. I sampled the remaining seven newspapers around the data dates identified through the selected newspaper analysis. Hence, the reliability of the NRSSP was significantly enhanced. It enabled generalizations across the remaining seven newspapers. Repeated confirmation of data dates in the remaining seven newspapers increased the validity of the NRSSP. It indicated that important data dates identified initially in the selected newspaper were accurate.

Each article was treated as a relevant unit of analysis only if it met three conditions: (1) the article is an interview or a statement by a party member; (2) the article contains a reference to at least one of the key national identity issues; and (3) the article contains at least one policy position regarding the key issue central to national identity.

5.3.5 Coding Criteria (Platforms and Newspapers) and Extracting Contesting National Identity Categories From the Text

Essentially, I am coding for the substantive policy position of parties. Each policy position in the data set was recorded in terms of three attributes: (1) the object of the proposed action (e.g., Diaspora); (2) action (e.g., adopting dual citizenship); and (3) a connecting verb that gives the direction of the proposed action (e.g., support, do not support). When necessary, I recorded positive or negative adjectives, if a pledge or an article contained a statement such as, “adopting dual citizenship (action) for Diaspora (object) is undesirable or desirable (adjective).”

Out of a large universe of examined sources, 21 party platforms and 187 newspaper articles were identified as relevant sources (total 208). These sources generated total 348 relevant
observations and were subsequently analyzed. Table 5.3 below illustrates the percentage of observations devoted to each of the three issues central to national identity.

Table 5.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>% &amp; N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey</td>
<td>34% (119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions</td>
<td>41% (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>25% (87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (348)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Sample error ± 0.05 (5%).

5.3.6 Reliability

Kaplan and Goldsen contend that "reliable data by definition, are data that remain constant throughout variations in the measuring process" (Kaplan and Goldsen 1965, 83–84, as cited in Krippendorff 1980, 129). Ultimately, the goal is to establish that the research data can be used to reach valid inferences. To ensure the reliability of the data, an intercoder reliability test was conducted. A reliability test was designed to check the reproducibility of the data, which is "the degree to which a process can be recreated under varying circumstance, at different locations, using different coders" (Krippendorff 1980, 131).

Two coders were trained to analyze independently randomly selected relevant sources. The intercoder reliability test was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, coders were asked to check ten sources only for training purposes. The training stage was useful for resolving any problems and misunderstandings regarding the coding procedure. During the second stage, coders were ready to work independently and coded a different set of ten sources. A total of 10 (5% of 208, 1 platform and 9 newspaper articles) sources containing 36 observations (10% of 348) were analyzed. Intercoder reliability produced 92% of agreement between my coding and coding by the two coders (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coder 1</th>
<th>Coder 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGREE</td>
<td>92% (33)</td>
<td>92% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAGREE</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (36)</td>
<td>100% (36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The entries in parentheses are numbers of cases of agreement and disagreement. Total $N=348$. Sample $N=36$ observations (10%).

5.4 Data Analysis

5.4.1 Identifying Party Policy Positions

Initially, the simple frequency of party policy positions was recorded based on a total number of statements devoted to each particular issue (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 illustrates a summary of findings based on a simple frequency, where in the interval years 1993–1999, two parties, RB and SH, had a civic position on all national identity issues and parties ACP and UNSD chose ethnic positions on national identity issues. Party NDU did not have a position on Issue 1, Genocide and Relations with Turkey, because it stated two mutually exclusive positions: three 1.a (Liberal Nationalist) and three 1.b (Ethno-Nationalist) positions.


In interval 2002–2006, parties RPA and ARF chose ethnic positions on all national identity issues. JB did not have a dominant position on Issue 1, Genocide and Relations with Turkey, because it stated two mutually exclusive positions: one 1.a (Liberal) and one 1.b (Ethnic) positions. Similarly, it did not have a dominant position on Issue 2, War in MK and Possible Solutions and chose five 2.a. (Liberal) and five 2.b (Ethnic) positions.
Table 5.5

Estimating Simple Frequency of Party Policy Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR CODE</th>
<th>PARTY CODE</th>
<th>1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey</th>
<th>2. War in MK and Possible Solutions</th>
<th>3. Dual Citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>1.a(13) LN</td>
<td>2.a (14) LN; 2. c (2) U</td>
<td>3.a(7) LN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SH</td>
<td>1.a(2) LN</td>
<td>D/M</td>
<td>D/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>1.b(3) EN</td>
<td>2.b(3) EN; 2. c(1) U</td>
<td>3.b(2) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>1.b(3) EN 1.a(3) LN=N/P</td>
<td>2.b (4) EN; 2. c(2) U</td>
<td>3.b(7) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSD</td>
<td>1.b(4) EN</td>
<td>2.b(2) EN</td>
<td>3.b(2) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>UB</td>
<td>1.b(3) EN</td>
<td>2.b(8) EN</td>
<td>3.b(9) EN; 3.c (1) U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>1.b(2) EN</td>
<td>2.b(2) EN</td>
<td>3.b(1) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>1.b(5) EN</td>
<td>2.b(9) EN</td>
<td>3.b(9) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LU</td>
<td>1.b(2) EN</td>
<td>2.b(3) EN</td>
<td>3.b(2) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>D/M</td>
<td>2.b(1) EN</td>
<td>3.b(1) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>1.b(6)EN; 1.a(5) LN</td>
<td>2.b(3) EN ; 2. c(2)U</td>
<td>3.b(6) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>1.b (7)EN; 1.a(2) LN</td>
<td>2.b (16) EN; 2.a(2)LN</td>
<td>3.b(4) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JB</td>
<td>1.a (1) LN; 1.b (1) LN=N/P</td>
<td>2.a (5) LN; 2.b (5) EN=</td>
<td>3.b(3) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>1.a(6) LN</td>
<td>2.b(8) EN; 2.a (2) LN;</td>
<td>3.b(3) EN; 3.c(2)U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>1.b(41) EN; 1.a (1) LN</td>
<td>2.b(41) EN</td>
<td>3.b(20) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NU</td>
<td>1.a(3) LN</td>
<td>2.a(3) LN</td>
<td>3.b(4) EN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ULP</td>
<td>1.a(6) LN</td>
<td>2.c(3) U</td>
<td>3.b(4) EN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party CL chose a liberal position on Issue 1, Genocide and Relations with Turkey, but had predominantly ethnic positions on Issue 2, War in MK and Possible Solutions, and Issue 3, Diaspora Rights.

NU party opted for liberal positions on two issues: Issue 1, Genocide and Relations with Turkey and Issue 2, War in MK and Possible Solutions. Yet it chose an ethnic position on the

---

5 The entries in each cell are coded policy positions. Frequency of party statements on a particular issue position is in parentheses.

Key Issues Central to National Identity are coded the following way: Issue 1 = Genocide and Relations with Turkey; Issue 2 = War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions; Issue 3 = Dual Citizenship. For the coding of key issues central to national identity see Appendix A.

Abbreviations LN, EN, and U stand for Liberal Nationalist, Ethno-Nationalist, and Unique national identity categories, respectively.

D/M denotes that party does not mention the issue.

N/P denotes that party does not have a dominant position on an issue.
issue of Dual Citizenship. Finally, ULP was recorded as having mixed positions and chose liberal position for the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey, unique position for the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions and ethnic position for the issue of Dual Citizenship. Overall, the simple frequency test indicates that throughout the research period, political parties chose different policy positions regarding the three key issues central to national identity.

To estimate the percentage of party policy positions devoted to each issue, an index of relative percentage of party policy positions (Relative % PPP) was developed using the following formula:

\[
\text{Index} = \left( \frac{n}{N} \right) \times 100
\]

The objective of the Relative % PPP index is to identify the percentage of party policy positions devoted to each issue and group them under each national identity category (see Appendix B presenting a relative percentage summary of party positions on each issue).

Based on the Relative % PPP index, Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 below illustrate each party’s policy positions on each issue central to national identity.

In the first interval 1993–1999, party policy positions are sharply divided where parties RB and SH had liberal positions on all three issues and parties ACP and UNSD had mostly ethnic positions on all three issues.

Interestingly, party NDU had mixed liberal and ethnic positions on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey but ethnic positions on the two remaining issues of War and Dual Citizenship. While only two parties were recorded as having overall liberal position, it is important to note that during this interval, these parties held majority seats in the parliament (70% combined). RU held 50% and SH held 20% of parliamentary seats.
Policy position divisions among parties were significantly lessened in interval 1998–2003, where the dominant position across all issues was clearly ethnic (see Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below).

On average, only 3% of policy positions had a liberal content, while 94% were ethnic and 3% were recorded as unique. The predominantly ethnic approach to national identity issues is not surprising, however. In interval 1993–1999, majority parties and the president (who was also the
former leader of the Armenian National Movement) were criticized for their liberal stance on these three national identity issues. The 1998 February coup, followed by a resignation of the first president and a consequent dissolution of the Republic Bloc, took place because of contesting perceptions and approaches to the issues analyzed in this study. Therefore, it is not surprising that party policy positions on three issues central to the Armenian national identity in the second interval 1998–2003 were in direct disagreement with the previous dominant party policy positions.

Figure 5.4


Figure 5.5


Figure 5.6

Finally, in the third interval 2002–2006, the relative percentage index recorded a more mixed representation of party policy positions. On average, 31% of policy positions had liberal content, 61% ethnic, and 9% of policy positions were recorded as unique.

One of the important findings for this interval is that in addition to liberal and ethnic types there was also a mixed approach (i.e., equally liberal and ethnic) to two issues central to national identity. Figure 5.7 illustrates that elected parties chose contesting positions by adopting ethnic, liberal, and mixed approaches to this issue. Two parties, Republican Party of Armenia and Armenian Revolutionary Federation, took an ethnic position. Three parties, Country of Law, National Unity, and United Labor Party, took liberal positions and one party, Justice Bloc, adopted mixed position on this issue.

Figure 5.7


![](image)

Similarly, for the issue of War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions (Figure 5.8), elected parties chose contesting approaches. Republican Party of Armenia, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and Country of Law took predominantly ethnic positions, Justice Bloc chose a mixed position, National Unity took a liberal position, and United Labor Party opted for a unique position (neither liberal nor ethnic or mixed). For the third issue, Dual Citizenship (Figure 5.9), all parties overwhelmingly adopted ethnic policy positions.
Despite the more mixed representation of policy positions in the third interval, the ethnic position was represented more than twice as much as the liberal position and was endorsed by parties holding majority seats in the parliament.

Based on the Relative % of PPP results, the overall relative percentage of party national identity was estimated for the entire research period. Results are reported in Table 5.6 and Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12, below.

Throughout the research period only the parties Republic Bloc, Shamiram, and National Unity were recorded as having liberal nationalist identity.

Previously the United Labor Party was recorded as having mixed positions on key issues central to national identity. The Relative % of PPP results confirmed that overall this party chose policy positions that were equally liberal, ethnic, and unique in substance. Therefore, the party was recorded as having mixed national identity on average. Party CL was recorded as having a predominantly ethnic position on all three issues. Consistent with the previous findings, all the remaining parties were recorded as having ethnic national identity. No party was recorded as having unique national identity.
Table 5.6
National Identity Average of All the Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>ETHNIC</th>
<th>UNIQUE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>Republic Bloc (RB)</td>
<td>95.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamiram (SH)</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Communist Party (ACP)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democratic Union (NDU)</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union of National Self-determination (UNSD)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>Unity Bloc (UB)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Communist Party (ACP)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law and Unity (LU)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country of Law (CL)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democratic Union (NDU)</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>Republican Party of Armenia (RPA)</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice Bloc (JB)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country of Law (CL)</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Unity (NU)</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Labor Party (ULP)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>MIXED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.10

Figure 5.11
5.5 Estimating Interparty Distances

5.5.1 Estimating Interparty Distances Based on Each Policy Position

The previous two tests established that throughout the research period political parties chose different policy positions regarding the three key issues central to national identity. Based on policy position differences, parties were classified according to the following categories of national identity: Liberal, Ethnic, and Unique. The second objective of this study is to estimate interparty policy distances based on party positions on key issues central to national identity.

To measure interparty policy distances, Interparty Policy Differential Index was employed using the following formula:

\[ \text{Index} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{|a_i - b_i|}{2} \]

For any policy/issue position i, ai is defined as the relative percentage of statements devoted to policy/issue position i, by party a, and bi as the relative percentage of statements devoted to policy/issue position i, by party b. The index was applied to each pair of parties analyzed in

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*Source: Petry and Landry 2001.*
this study. The index is designed to capture the magnitude of differences in the policy positions emphasized by parties and estimate percentages of interparty differences for each policy position. The index varies between 0% (no differential) and 100% (maximum possible differential) (see Appendix C, Differential Issue Saliency Index).

For the interval 1993–1999, the Interparty Policy Differential Index recorded no difference (0%) between RB and SH. But a maximum possible difference (100%) was recorded between parties RB and SH and parties ACP and UNSD. Substantively, this means that RB and SH are in a direct agreement regarding their positions on each issue/policy position (SH does not have statements on issues 2 and 3). Similarly, ACP and UNSD are in a direct agreement regarding their positions on each policy/issue (0%). NDU was recorded having 50% difference with parties RB and SH (liberal positions) and parties ACP and UNSD (ethnic positions) on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey. For this issue NDU took mixed positions (three liberal and three ethnic) and therefore was recorded as having 50% difference magnitude with parties holding two extreme positions.

On all other issues, the NDU took an ethnic position and the difference magnitude was reversed in relation to the above parties. Consequently, most of the issue/policy positions by parties RB and SH are in direct disagreement with issue/policy positions by parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD. The magnitude of interparty differences ranged between 88% and 100%, indicating a very high degree of interparty policy differences.

Previous tests (Simple Frequency and Relative % of PPP) established that parties RB and SH had a liberal position overall on national identity issues, while the remaining three parties were recorded as having an overall ethnic stance on national identity issues. The Differential Index therefore confirmed previous findings that in the first interval 1993–1999 there were sharp inter-party differences by revealing the high magnitude of these differences.
For the second interval, 1998–2003, the index recorded a very low magnitude of inter-party differences on almost all the issues. The magnitude of differences ranged between 0% and 40%, indicating a very low degree of interparty policy distances for each issue.

The highest difference magnitude in this year interval was recorded at 40% for party NDU in relation to the rest of the parties on issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions. This is because unlike the rest of the parties which took 100% ethnic approach to this issue, NDU made policy statements that were 60% ethnic and 40% unique in substance (see Appendix B). The index reflected these details and confirmed that in the second interval all parties took predominantly ethnic positions on key issues central to national identity.

For the third interval, 2002–2006, the index recorded a relatively more mixed magnitude of differences for each issue.

For Issue 1, Genocide and Relations with Turkey, the index recorded no policy position difference (0%) for parties CL, NU, and ULP. All three parties adopted a liberal stance on this issue and argued that relations with Turkey must not be based on the precondition of recognition of the Genocide.

RPA and ARF took an ethnic stance on this issue, and therefore were recorded as having a very low magnitude of difference, 20%. Consequently, a high magnitude of difference (ranging from 78% to 98%) was recorded between parties CL, NU, and ULP and parties RPA and ARF, indicating that these parties’ positions on this particular issue were in disagreement.

JB did not have a dominant stance on this issue since it took two mutually exclusive positions. As the Relative % of PPP index revealed, 50% of policy statements were ethnic and 50% were liberal in substance. This explains the 50% difference magnitude between JB and parties CL, NU, and ULP, all of which had 100% liberal stance on this issue. JB was recorded as having relatively low magnitude of difference with parties RPA and ARF, ranging from 28% to 48%.
The latter parties took 78% and 98% ethnic positions, respectively, on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey, therefore shrinking the policy distance among these parties.

For issue 2, War in MK and Possible Solutions, party ULP were recorded as having the highest magnitude of difference with the remaining five parties (ranging from 91% to 100%). The main reason for this high disagreement is because of UL’s unique position on the issue of war in Karabagh (i.e., neither phased nor package solution to the problem), stating that one of the objectives of the party is to “choose national priority issues, among them legal and fair options of solving the Karabagh issue.”

JB did not have a dominant stance on this issue since it took two mutually exclusive positions. As the Relative % of PPP index revealed, 50% of policy statements were ethnic and 50% were liberal in substance. This explains the 50% difference magnitude between JB and NU which took a 100% liberal stance on this issue. This also explains the 50% difference magnitude between JB and the ARF, which took a 100% ethnic stance on the issue of war in MK. The difference magnitude between JB and ULP was recorded as 100% because, as explained before, the ULP party took a 100% unique stance on this issue.

RPA was recorded as having very low magnitude of difference with ARF and CL (ranging from 11% to 16%), because of a shared ethnic approach to this issue.

Finally, for issue 3, Dual Citizenship, all the parties took an ethnic position and endorsed dual citizenship based on an ethnic criterion, that is, only for ethnic Armenians. The difference magnitude was very low ranging between 0% and 40%, indicating that the parties’ positions are in agreement regarding this particular identity issue.

---

5.5.2 Estimating Interparty Distances Across All Three National Identity Issues

The Interparty Policy Differential Index was designed to capture the magnitude of differences in each policy position emphasized by parties and estimate percentages of interparty differences for each policy position. In this section, I compare interparty distances across all three issues, where I estimate the mean value of the Differential Indexes for the three issues.

To measure interparty policy distances across all three issues, an Overall Interparty Policy Differential Index was developed using the following formula:

\[
\text{Index} = \sum \left( \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{|a_i - b_i|}{3} \right)
\]

The Overall Interparty Policy Differential Index was applied to each interval and to each pair of parties analyzed in this study. The index is designed to capture the overall magnitude of differences in the policy positions emphasized by parties and estimate percentages of interparty differences across all three key issues central to national identity. The index varies between 0% (no differential) and 100% (maximum possible differential).

As Table 5.7 illustrates, RB and SH were recorded as having no differences across all three issue positions (0%). These results indicate that parties RB and SH are in direct agreement regarding all three issue/policy positions. However, the same parties' overall issue/policy positions were recorded as having high magnitude of difference (ranging between 50% and 100%) with overall issue positions by parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD. Also, parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD were recorded as having very low difference magnitude with respect to each other (ranging between 8% and 19%). As was expected, the Overall Index confirmed that in interval 1993–1999, RB and SH, which chose liberal positions on all three issues, were in disagreement with parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD, which took ethnic positions on all three issues.
Table 5.7
(Parliamentary Election Year 1995, Presidential Election Years 1996 and 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1993-1999</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>RB</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>NDU</th>
<th>UNSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>95.83%</td>
<td>79.17%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SH</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>19.45%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNSD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5.8 illustrates, the overall interparty distances on national identity issues were very low in the second interval. The difference magnitude ranges between 0% and 20%, indicating that in this period parties were in an agreement regarding their overall issue positions. From previous tests, we know that all the parties in this period chose ethnic positions on all of the issues (except CL, which did not have a statement on Genocide and Relations with Turkey); therefore, results reported in Table 5.8 were expected.

Table 5.8
(Parliamentary Election Year 1999, Presidential Election Year 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1998-2003</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>UB</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>LU</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>NDU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UB</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, as illustrated in Table 5.9, the overall index recorded relatively more mixed magnitude of interparty distances across all three issues central to national identity, for interval years 2002–2006.

Table 5.9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 2002-2006</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>RPA</th>
<th>JB</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>ULP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>22.30%</td>
<td>44.68%</td>
<td>10.37%</td>
<td>55.63%</td>
<td>59.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JB</td>
<td>40.62%</td>
<td>32.67%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>43.62%</td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>55.05%</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.62%</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.62%</td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consistent with previous findings, parties RPA and ARF (ethnic positions on each issue/policy) had only 10% overall interparty difference magnitude. NU (liberal) and ULP (mixed) were recorded as having relatively low difference magnitude (33%). As expected these parties had high difference magnitudes with parties RPA and ARF ranging from 56% to 66%.

Disagreements on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey explain relatively high difference magnitudes between CL and ARF (55%), since CL had 100% liberal stance while ARF had 98% ethnic stance on this issue. The remaining 45% agreement between these parties is explained by these parties’ shared ethnic approaches to the issues of War in MK and Possible Solutions and Dual Citizenship.

Contesting approaches to the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey explain 45% of difference magnitude between CL and RPA. Unlike CL, which took a 100% liberal stance, RPA took a 78% ethnic stance on the same issue. Yet, shared ethnic approaches to the issues of
War in MK and Possible Solutions and Dual Citizenship explain moderately high agreement (55%) between CL and RPA.

Finally, since JB did not have a dominant position on two issues (Genocide and Relations with Turkey and War in MK and Possible Solutions) the highest difference magnitude at 50% was recorded with ULP. This is explained by the latter's overall mixed position on national identity issues.

On the whole, for the third interval, the Overall Interparty Policy Differential Index confirmed that the magnitude of disagreements is relatively high. The highest difference magnitude was 66.00%, indicating more distance than proximity.

5.6 Estimating Interparty National Identity Distances

In the previous section, I estimated interparty policy distances first based on each issue individually and later across all three issues. In this section I estimate overall interparty distances with respect to national identity.

Previously (Table 5.6), I estimated national identity averages of all parties based on the relative percentages of party policy positions and classified parties according to each category of national identity: Liberal, Ethnic, and Unique. Results reported in Table 5.6 indicated that in interval 1993–1999, out of a total of five parties, two parties (Republic Bloc and Shamiram) had a liberal nationalist type of national identity and three parties (Armenian Communist Party, National Democratic Union, and Union of National Self-determination) had an ethno-nationalist type of national identity. In interval 1998–2003, all six parties (Unity Bloc, Armenian Communist Party, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Law and Unity, Country of Law, and National Democratic Union) had an ethno-nationalist type of national identity. Finally, in interval 2002–2006 out of a total of six parties, Republican Party of Armenia, Justice Bloc, and Armenian Revolutionary Federation had an ethno-nationalist type of national identity, National Unity had a liberal
nationalist type of national identity, and Country of Law and United Labor Party had mixed type of national identity. No party was recorded as having a unique national identity.

To estimate overall interparty national identity distances, an Overall National Identity Differential Index was employed using the following formula:

$$\text{Index} = \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{|a_i - b_i|}{2}$$

For any national identity category i, ai is defined as the relative percentage of policy positions devoted to any i-th by party a, and bi is defined as the relative percentage of party policy positions devoted to any i-th by party b.

The Overall National Identity Differential Index was applied to each pair of parties analyzed in this study. The index is designed to capture the magnitude of interparty differences across national identity categories: Liberal, Ethnic, and Unique. The index varies between 0% (no differential) and 100% (maximum possible differential).

According to results reported in Table 5.10, parties RB and SH had very low magnitude of overall interparty differences across national identity categories (4%). Results also indicate a very low magnitude of overall interparty differences across national identity categories among parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD. The difference magnitude ranges between 8% and 28%. Finally, the magnitude of overall interparty differences across national identity categories between parties RB and SH and ACP, NDU, and UNSD is very high, ranging between 79% and 100%.

Table 5.10

Overall National Identity Differential Index, First Interval 1993–1999
(Parliamentary Election Year 1995, Presidential Election Years 1996 and 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1993–1999</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>RB</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>NDU</th>
<th>UNSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>96.00%</td>
<td>79.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>83.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Substantively, results indicate that parties RB and SH are in an agreement regarding their overall liberal national identity. Similarly, parties ACP, NDU, and UNSD are in an agreement regarding their overall ethnic national identity. Consequently, the Overall National Identity Index confirmed that in interval 1993–1999, elected parties endorsed contesting national identities(3,6),(995,989). Moreover, while out of a total of five parties, only two parties endorsed liberal national identity, the predominant national identity type was liberal because it was endorsed by the parties holding majority seats in the parliament (70% combined). Taking into account the percentage of parliamentary seats held by these two parties, I conclude that the dominant approach to national identity issues in interval 1993–1999 was liberal nationalist.

Results reported in Table 5.11 indicate that in the second interval 1998–2003 interparty differences on national identity were very low. The magnitude of differences ranged between 3% and 28%. The index confirmed that in interval 1998–2003, elected parties agreed on their approaches to national identity issues and overall endorsed an ethno-nationalist type of national identity.

Table 5.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 1998–2003</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>UB</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>LU</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>NDU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UB</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, results reported in Table 5.12 indicate that in the third interval 2002–2006, as could be expected, the index recorded a more mixed magnitude of interparty differences on national identity.
Table 5.12

(Parliamentary Election Year 2003, Presidential Election Year 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR 2002-2006</th>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>RPA</th>
<th>JB</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>ULP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>44.50%</td>
<td>10.30%</td>
<td>55.70%</td>
<td>55.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JB</td>
<td>49.67%</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>49.83%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CL</td>
<td>55.00%</td>
<td>27.20%</td>
<td>16.85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ULP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lowest magnitude of interparty difference was recorded between parties RPA and ARF. These findings were expected since both parties were consistently recorded as taking ethnic positions on all national identity issues and were categorized as having an ethnic type of national identity. Not surprisingly, both ethnic parties had the highest magnitude of interparty differences with NU and ULP (ranging from 56% to 66%), since NU was categorized as having liberal and ULP as having mixed types of national identity.

Very interestingly, 33% difference was recorded for NU and ULP. This is a slightly higher magnitude than could be expected because both parties endorsed a liberal approach to the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey and an ethnic approach to the issue of Dual Citizenship. However, previous tests revealed that while these parties took similar policy positions on these issues they had mutually exclusive positions on the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions. Unlike NU, which endorsed liberal approach, ULP chose a unique approach to this issue. The Overall National Identity Index captured these details and increased the interparty distance. Nevertheless, the difference magnitude of 33% is still relatively low, indicating an overall agreement on their policy choices even though these parties endorsed different types of national identity category.
Since JB did not have a dominant position on two issues (Genocide and Relations with Turkey and War in MK and Possible Solutions) it was recorded as having roughly the same difference magnitude (50%) with the remaining five parties.

Finally, CL was recorded as having low difference magnitudes with NU and ULP (27% and 17%, respectively). This is because of a shared liberal stance on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey and an ethnic stance on the issue of Dual Citizenship. The remaining differences among these parties are explained by contesting approaches to the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions where CL took an ethnic approach while NU and ULP opted for liberal and unique approaches, respectively.

To conclude, the Overall Index confirmed that in interval 2002–2006, elected parties most of the time disagreed on their national identity choices. Out of a total six parties overall, four parties (RPA, JB, CL and ARF) endorsed an ethno-nationalist type of national identity, one party (ULP) endorsed mixed type of national identity, and one party (NU) endorsed liberal nationalist type of national identity.

Again, this distribution of national identity is in sharp contrast with the previous, 1998–2003 interval, where all parties chose an ethno-nationalist type of national identity.

However, despite relatively high degree of overall interparty differences across national identity categories, the ethno-nationalist type was still the dominant identity and was endorsed by parties holding majority seats in the parliament. On average, 31% of national identity type was liberal, 61% was ethnic, and 8% was unique. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the third interval the national identity was predominantly ethno-nationalist.
5.7 Estimating the Significance of Interparty Distances for Policy Positions and National Identity

While the differential index is designed to capture the magnitude of interparty differences of policy positions on key issues central to national identity and overall national identity categories, it does not capture the statistical significance of these differences. Therefore, a Chi Square ($\chi^2$) test was employed, in order to detect the statistical significance of interparty national identity differences based on each policy position. A $\chi^2$ test was applied to each of the three intervals.

Table 5.13 indicates that in interval 1993–1999, interparty differences produced statistically significant results for each national identity issue analyzed in this study. Substantively, $\chi^2$ confirmed that in interval years 1993–1999, elected parties chose contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

Table 5.13


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>PARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIQUE</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 2. War in MK and Possible Solutions</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>PARTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIQUE</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frequencies reported in Table 5.13 confirmed that RB and SH chose liberal positions on all issues and endorsed a liberal nationalist type of national identity. Similarly, ACP, NDU, and UNSD chose ethnic positions on all issues (except NDU on Issue 1) and endorsed an ethno-nationalist type of national identity. While out of a total of five parties, only two parties endorsed a liberal national identity, the predominant national identity type was liberal nationalist. In addition, liberal nationalist identity was endorsed by parties holding majority seats in the parliament (70% combined).

Figures 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15, below are based on statements devoted to each national identity issue by all elected parties in the first interval. Figures confirm that in the first interval the dominant approach to national identity issues was predominantly liberal nationalist. Only in case of Dual Citizenship majority of statements had ethno-nationalist content.
Results reported in Table 5.14 indicate that in interval 1998–2003, the variable party did not produce variations in policy position choices. Interparty differences did not produce statistically significant results for any issue analyzed in this study. Substantively, $\chi^2$ confirmed that in interval years 1998–2003, elected parties were in agreement regarding their approaches to key issues central to national identity.
Table 5.14


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\chi^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>LU</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
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<td>LU</td>
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</tr>
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<td>CL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 2. War in MK and Possible Solutions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\chi^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ARF</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 3. Dual Citizenship</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>(\chi^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
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<tr>
<td>LU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC Frequency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIQUE Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UB</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
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<td>LU</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0

**N** = 80

***p < 0.01

Frequencies reported in Table 5.14 and Figures 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 below confirmed that parties predominantly opted for ethnic positions on all three national identity issues. Based on these results, I conclude that the dominant approach to national identity issues in the second interval was ethnic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Ethno-Nationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>22% (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>78% (18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic = 22% (5)
Ethnic = 78% (18)
Total = 100% (23)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethno-Nationalist</th>
<th>Unique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>93% (26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic = 93% (26)
Unique = 7% (2)
Total = 100% (28)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethno-Nationalist</th>
<th>Unique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>97% (28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic = 97% (28)
Unique = 3% (1)
Total = 100% (29)

Results reported in Table 5.15 indicate in interval 2002–2006, party variable produced variations in policy position for issue 1 (Genocide and Relations with Turkey) and issue 2 (War in MK and Possible Solutions). For the last issue, Dual Citizenship, the test did not produce statistically significant results.
Table 5.15


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 1. Genocide and Relations with Turkey</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td>PARTICY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>JB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC Frequency</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIQUE Frequency</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 2. War in MK and Possible Solutions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td>PARTICY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>JB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNIC Frequency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIQUE Frequency</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE 3. Dual Citizenship</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NI Frequency</td>
<td>PARTICY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL Frequency</td>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>JB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETHNIC Frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIQUE Frequency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0

\( N = 194 \)

*** \( p < 0.01 \)

Substantively, \( \chi^2 \) confirmed that in the third interval 2002–2006, elected parties chose contesting approaches on issues 1 and 2 but were in agreement regarding their approaches to issue 3. These results were expected and confirmed findings from previous tests that CL, NU, and ULP chose a liberal approach to issue 1. Similarly, the test confirmed that NU chose a liberal position on issue 2, while ULP chose a unique position on the same issue. These differences contributed to an overall variation producing statistically significant results for issues Genocide and Relations with Turkey and War in MK and Possible Solutions.
Nevertheless, frequencies reported in Table 5.15 as well as Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 below confirmed that the predominant policy position for all issues central to national identity, including issues 1 and 2, was ethnic.

**Figure 5.19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue 1: Genocide 2002-2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethno-Nationalist</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal = 27.94% (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic = 72.06% (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = 100% (68)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue 2: War 2002-2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethno-Nationalist</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unique</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal = 13.95% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic = 81.39% (70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique = 4.65% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = 100% (86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue 3: Dual Citizenship 2002-2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethno-Nationalist</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unique</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic = 95% (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique = 5% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total = 100% (40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consequently, I conclude that although in the third interval elected parties took contesting positions on two national identity issues, the predominant position was still ethnic. Moreover, in this interval, parties holding majority seats in the parliament clearly endorsed an ethnic approach to national identity issues and an ethno-nationalist type of national identity.

Finally, $\chi^2$ test was employed to detect overall national identity differences throughout the entire research period.

Results reported in Table 5.16 confirmed that in interval 1993–1998 elected parties had contesting national identities, and that the dominant identity type was liberal nationalist. The $\chi^2$ test also confirmed that in interval 1998–2003, elected parties were in agreement regarding their national identity choice, which was clearly ethno-nationalist. Finally, $\chi^2$ confirmed that in interval 2002–2006, elected parties chose contesting national identities but the predominant type of national identity was ethno-nationalist.

Table 5.16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>60.747***</td>
<td>17.939</td>
<td>88.826***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(df = 8)</td>
<td>(df = 10)</td>
<td>(df = 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0
Degrees of freedom in parentheses
$N = 348$
***$p < 0.01$

Figure 5.22, below, illustrates national identity distribution based on policy position frequencies in the first interval. It confirms that in the first interval there were contesting national identities but the dominant national identity choice was liberal nationalist. Figure 5.23, below,
depicts national identity distribution based on policy position frequencies in the second interval
and confirms that in the second interval national identity choice was clearly ethno-nationalist.
Finally, Figure 5.24 summarizes national identity distribution in the third interval. In the third
interval, there was a slight increase of policy position frequencies endorsing the liberal type.
Nevertheless, the predominant national identity choice was ethno-nationalist.

![Figure 5.22](image)
Liberal = 53% (39)
Ethnic = 41% (30)
Unique = 7% (5)
Total = 100% (74)

![Figure 5.23](image)
Liberal = 6% (5)
Ethnic = 90% (72)
Unique = 4% (3)
Total = 100% (80)

![Figure 5.24](image)
Liberal = 15.97% (31)
Ethnic = 80.92% (157)
Unique = 3.09% (6)
Total = 100% (194)
Finally, to have a more detailed understanding of parties’ overall policy positions in three intervals I discounted unique positions and estimated the party means for liberal and ethnic policy positions on each of these issues. Figures 5.25 through 5.27 below depict the distribution of mean party positions for the issues of Genocide, War and Dual Citizenship throughout the three intervals. Figure 5.28 depicts the overall national identity choice, based on mean party positions across all three issues throughout three intervals.

Figure 5.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal Nat</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Ethno-Nat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>53.57%</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>47.83%</td>
<td>52.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>22.06%</td>
<td>2.94%</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 119$

Figure 5.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal Nat</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Ethno-Nat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>82.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>3.49%</td>
<td>11.63%</td>
<td>81.39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 134$

Percentages of parties’ mean positions demonstrate that throughout the research period, parties endorsed contesting liberal and ethnic as well as mixed approaches to identity issue of Genocide. In the second interval, nevertheless, parties endorsed only mixed and ethnic approaches to this issue (Figure 5.25). Means of party positions for the issue of War revealed that in the first interval the contestation was between liberal and ethnic approaches. In the second interval, there was no contestation as parties endorsed an ethnic approach to this issue. Finally, in the third interval parties’ mean positions revealed liberal, mixed and ethnic approaches to this issue (Figure 5.26). The only case where means of party positions did not reveal a mixed approach
throughout the entire research period was the issue of Dual Citizenship. While in the first interval there was a contestation between liberal and ethnic approaches, in the second and third intervals parties endorsed only an ethno-nationalist approach to this issue (Figure 5.27).

Results depicted in Figure 5.28 confirm that in the first and third intervals elected political elites endorsed contesting liberal and ethnic as well as mixed approaches to all three identity issues, and therefore endorsed contesting national identities. As expected, in the first interval the predominant identity choice at 51% was liberal nationalist and in the third interval a predominant identity choice at 80% was ethno-nationalist. Means of party positions also demonstrate that in the second interval parties endorsed only mixed and ethno-nationalist types of national identity. As expected, in the second interval the predominant identity choice was ethno-nationalist at 80%.

5.8 Results Summary and Conclusions

This chapter explored political elite’s worldviews of Armenian national identity from 1993 through 2006. It explored three key issues central to Armenian national identity: (1) Genocide and
Relations with Turkey, (2) War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and (3) Dual Citizenship, and the ways elected political parties (total 13) have positioned themselves along these issues throughout the period of thirteen years. Positions of political elites on national identity were analyzed using the Positional Method and via content analysis of party and presidential platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing both official and opposition ideologies. Both platforms and newspaper analyses covered the time-period from 1993 through 2006.

Based on my analysis I was able to confirm the following major hypothesis:

**H1. From 1993 through 2006 there have been contesting national identities in Armenia.**

Related to this, I also confirmed the following two hypotheses:

**H1.1 Pre- and post-1998 political parties have offered different policy positions around the key issues central to national identity.**

**H1.2 Pre-1998 dominant political parties chose a liberal nationalist and post-1998 dominant political parties chose an ethno-nationalist types of national identity.**

**5.8.1 First Interval: 1993–1999**

In the first interval, years 1993–1999, out of a total of five parties, two parties holding majority seats in the parliament (Republic Bloc and Shamiram) adopted liberal positions on all three issues. One of the important findings of this chapter has been that in addition to liberal, ethnic, and unique (i.e., neither liberal nor ethnic) policy positions, there was also a mixed type of policy position endorsed by political elites. Based on the index of Relative Percentage of Party Policy Positions I found that in the first interval National Democratic Union chose a mixed (i.e., equally liberal and ethnic) position on the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey (see Figure 5.1). Nevertheless, it adopted ethnic positions on the remaining two issues. Finally, Armenian Communist Party and Union of National Self-Determination adopted ethnic positions on all three issues (see Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3).
Based on Relative % of Party Policy Positions the overall relative percentage of party national identity was estimated for the first interval. Two parties (Republic Bloc and Shamiram) were recorded as having a liberal nationalist identity while the remaining three parties (National Democratic Union, Armenian Communist Party, and Union of National Self-Determination) were recorded as having an ethnic national identity (see Figure 5.10).

A $\chi^2$ test confirmed that in the first interval contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity were significantly different (see Table 5.13). In addition, based on frequencies of party statements devoted to each national identity issue, I determined that the dominant approach to national identity issues was liberal nationalist. Only in the case of Dual Citizenship did a majority of statements have ethno-nationalist content (see Figures 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15). Finally, even though only two parties held liberal policy positions on all issues and overall endorsed liberal nationalist identity, frequencies of party statements devoted to each national identity issue revealed that the predominant national identity type in the first interval was liberal nationalist (see Figure 5.22).

To have a more detailed understanding of parties' overall policy positions in the first interval, I discounted the unique approach and estimated the party means for liberal and ethnic policy positions on each of these issues. Percentages of parties' mean positions (Figures 5.25 through 5.27) revealed that in the first interval, parties endorsed liberal, ethnic and mixed approaches to the issue of Genocide. Means of party positions for the issues of War and Dual Citizenship revealed that the contestation was between liberal and ethnic approaches. Finally, based on parties' mean positions across all three issues I determined that the overall national identity choice in the first interval was predominantly liberal nationalist at 51%, followed by ethno-nationalist type at 41% and mixed type at 8% (see Figure 5.28).

The index of Relative % of Party Policy Positions, Interparty Policy Differential Index, and $\chi^2$ test revealed that the only interval during which all parties agreed on policy positions and national identity choice was the second interval, in the years 1998–2003. While there were some interparty differences they did not produce statistically significant results for any issue analyzed in this study (see Table 5.14). Within this interval all elected parties (a total of six parties) adopted predominantly ethnic policy positions on all three issues and overall endorsed ethno-nationalist type of national identity (see Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.11, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, and 5.23).

Percentages of parties’ mean positions (Figures 5.25 through 5.27) confirmed that in the second interval, parties endorsed predominantly ethno-nationalist approaches to all three identity issues. Based on parties’ mean positions across all three issues I determined that the overall national identity choice in the second interval was predominantly ethno-nationalist at 80%, followed by a mixed type at 14% (see Figure 5.28). As expected, means of party positions did not reveal a liberal nationalist type of identity in the second interval.

5.8.3 Third Interval: 2002–2006

Unlike the second interval, in the third interval the distribution of policy positions and national identity was not heavily skewed towards the ethnic type.

For the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey, two parties (Republican Party of Armenia and Armenian Revolutionary Federation) took ethnic positions. Three parties (Country of Law, National Unity, and United Labor Party) took liberal positions and one party (Justice Bloc) adopted a mixed position on this issue (see Figure 5.7).

Similarly, for the issue of War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, elected parties chose contesting approaches. Republican Party of Armenia, Armenian Revolutionary Fed-
eration, and Country of Law took ethnic positions, Justice Bloc chose a mixed position, National Unity took a liberal position, and United Labor party opted for a unique position (neither liberal nor ethnic or mixed) (see Figure 5.8). All parties adopted predominantly ethnic policy positions on the third issue of Dual Citizenship (see Figure 5.9).

Based on Relative % of Party Policy Positions, the overall relative percentage of party national identity was estimated for the third interval. Out of a total of six parties, four parties (Republican Party of Armenia, Justice Bloc, Country of Law, and Armenian Revolutionary Federation) chose a predominantly ethnic type of national identity. One party (United Labor Party) overall endorsed equally liberal, ethnic, and unique policy positions on all three issues. Therefore, on average this party was recorded as having a mixed type of national identity. Finally, one party, National Unity, chose a predominantly liberal nationalist type of national identity (see Figure 5.12).

A $\chi^2$ test confirmed that in the third interval, elected parties adopted contesting policy positions on issues of genocide and war but were in agreement regarding their approaches to the issue of dual citizenship (see Table 5.15). In addition, based on frequencies of party statements devoted to each national identity issue, I revealed that the predominant approach to national identity issues was ethnic (see Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21). In general, the third interval had the most diverse representation of policy positions and national identity choices. However, despite all differences the predominant national identity type in the third interval was ethno-nationalist (see Figure 5.24).

Percentages of parties' mean positions (Figures 5.25 through 5.27) revealed that in the third interval, parties endorsed liberal, ethnic and mixed approaches to the issues of Genocide and War. Consistent with previous findings, there was no contestation in case of Dual Citizenship, as parties were in an agreement regarding their ethno-nationalist approach to this issue. Finally, based on mean party positions across all three issues I determined that the overall national
identity choice in the third interval was predominantly ethno-nationalist at 80%, followed by liberal nationalist type at 9% and mixed type at 6% (see Figure 5.28).

To conclude, this chapter explored three key issues central to Armenian national identity and the ways political elites have positioned themselves along these issues throughout the period of thirteen years. Results of the content analysis revealed that pre- and post-1998 official and opposition perceptions of national identity have been marked by significant contestation. While the pre-1998 official discourse on national identity was leaning towards a liberal-nationalist type the post-1998 official discourse was marked by a tendency towards an ethno-nationalist type of national identity. Results also revealed that political elites endorsed contesting liberal nationalist, ethno-nationalist and mixed types of national identities not only across all three intervals but also within the first and third intervals. Therefore, I was able to confirm hypotheses of this chapter.

These interesting findings underpin theoretical expectations that national identity is fluid and is subject to critical reflection. Moreover, these findings also indicate that even ethnically homogeneous countries are not secure from identity contestation.
CHAPTER 6

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON KEY ISSUES CENTRAL TO NATIONAL IDENTITY, POLITICAL TRUST, ETHICAL ISSUES AND DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I established that throughout the period from 1993-2006, elected political parties' (total of 13 elected parties) worldviews of Armenian national identity have been marked by significant contestation. Results of the content analyses confirmed that from 1993 through 2006, elected political elites endorsed contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist, as well as mixed national, identities. Findings confirmed that while pre-1998 dominant parties opted for a liberal nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity, Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship, post-1998 dominant political parties chose predominantly ethno-nationalist approaches to the same issues.

In this chapter, I intend to identify public attitudes on key issues central to national identity and ultimately estimate the impact of contesting national identities on political trust, a number of ethical issues and democratic attitudes. Specifically, I aim to test the following hypotheses:

H2. There are discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, and Dual Citizenship).

H3. Discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) depress levels of political trust. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

H4. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect basic perceptions of fairness and justice in a society. Perceptions of ethical issues
alter under conditions when the public and political elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

H5. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) do not affect respondents' democratic values. The public's democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

H6. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect respondents' democratic evaluation. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide an explanation of the methodology used to analyze the survey data. Second, I provide a detailed rationalization for each relationship I seek to explore between variables of this study. Third, in a section titled “Survey Data Analysis: Part I,” I test the second hypothesis of this study predicting that public and political elites have different perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship). Analyses reveal that the public's and political elites' perceptions of key issues central to national identity are marked by sharp discrepancies lending support to the second hypothesis of this study.

Fourth, in a section titled “Survey Data Analysis: Part II,” I test the rest of my hypotheses (H3, H4, H5, and H6). Specifically, I explore whether respondents endorsing liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) have different levels of political trust (technical and fiduciary trust), perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes (democratic values and democratic evaluation). Most of the time, theoretical expectations regarding political trust, democratic values, and democratic evaluation as a result of contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to identity issues were met. The only case where results were reversed was the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey.
6.2 Public Opinion Survey

In the summer of 2006 with the support of the Armenian Sociological Association (ASA) I conducted a nation-wide public opinion survey of 1,000 respondents. The questionnaire addressed questions on key identity issues, political trust, democratic attitudes, and the public’s perceptions of a number of ethical issues (see Appendix D, Questionnaire, and Appendix E, ASA Proposal and Methodology Explanation). The questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at Western Michigan University (see Appendices F and G). Survey data allowed me to test the proposed hypotheses and make rough generalizations regarding the third interval of this study (2002–2006).

6.2.1 Explaining Indexes

National Identity

To measure public opinion on key identity issues analyzed in this study, three separate indexes were constructed: GENOCIDE (Genocide and Relations with Turkey), WAR (War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions), and DUAL CITIZENSHIP (Dual Citizenship for Diaspora). Each question was coded in terms of liberal and ethnic approaches where 0.0 always stands for Liberal and 1.0 always stands for Ethnic approaches to national identity issues (see Appendix H for a detailed explanation of constructing indexes).

Political Trust

For the variable Political Trust two separate indexes were constructed, one measuring technical competency and another measuring the fiduciary responsibility aspects of the political trust. In all indexes, 0.0 always stands for a weak political trust and 1.0 always stands for strong political trust.
Ethical Issues

In the ethical issues index 0.0 stands always stands for endorsing high ethical standards and 1.0 stands for the absence of ethical standards.

Democratic Attitudes

To measure democratic attitudes, two separate indexes were constructed. The democratic values index measures respondents’ democratic attitudes in general, where 1.0 always stands for strong democratic values and 0.0 always stands for an absence of democratic values. The democratic evaluation index measures respondents’ evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country, where 1.0 always stands for high evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy and 0.0 always stands for low evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy.

6.2.2 Explaining Multiple Imputation Technique for Handling Missing Data

The problem of missing response data is ubiquitous in the social sciences. King et al. (2001) note that, on average, about half the respondents to surveys do not answer one or more questions. The issue becomes even more problematic once several questions are combined for constructing indexes because indexes will contain a multitude of empty cells affecting final results. In this case, attempts to test relationships between variables become impossible because of incomplete data. My own survey also encountered the problem of incomplete responses because of which one third of my survey data could have been lost.

Statisticians and political scientists have developed a number of techniques, involving various degrees of complexity for handling missing data.1 One of the most commonly used

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1 For a brief overview of a number of missing data handling techniques see The University of Texas at Austin website at http://www.utexas.edu/its/rc/answers/general/gen25.html (accessed 4/10/2007).
approaches is a listwise or case deletion which deletes all the respondents who did not answer all the questions. In other words, if a record has missing data for any one variable, a researcher omits that entire record from the analysis. Yet in the case of responses that are missing at random (MAR), analyses focused only on the complete data have adverse consequences ranging from a loss of a great amount of valuable data to a selection bias (King et al. 2001). For instance, the listwise deletion procedure “may bias the results if the subjects who provide complete data are unrepresentative of the entire sample” (Schafer and Olsen 1998, 546).

Another widely used method for dealing with the missing data is substituting likely values for missing data. Schafer and Olsen note that regardless of value substitution procedures, “imputed values are only estimates of the unknown true values. Any analysis that ignores the uncertainty of missing-data prediction will lead to standard errors that are too small, p-values that are artificially low, and rates of Type I error that are higher than nominal levels” (ibid.). Similarly, King notes that even if these imputed values are right on average, “the procedure overestimates the certainty with which we know those answers. Consequently, standard errors will be too small” (King et al. 2001).

Following recommendations by King et al. (2001), I adopted the multiple imputation technique for handling the missing data in my survey, using Amelia II software. The multiple imputation technique involves imputing values for each missing item and creating some number of completed data sets (usually 5 outputs). “Across these completed data sets, values are the same but the imputed values are different “to reflect uncertainty levels” (ibid., 53). While the technique’s prediction power for missing values is high, imputed values may vary either a lot or not significantly “to reflect whatever knowledge and level of certainty is available about the missing information” (ibid.). Three main goals of multiple imputation are: “To reflect the uncertainty of

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the imputations properly (fundamental and estimation uncertainty); preserve important aspects of
the distribution of the data; and preserve important relationships between variables in the data”
(King et al. 1999).³

Once multiple imputations were completed, data sets with imputed values were analyzed
applying conventional statistical methods. Each data set was analyzed separately as if it were
fully observed. Afterwards, results were combined using recommendations mentioned in the article
by King et al. (2001).⁴

6.3 Why and How Liberal-Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Types Affect Political
Trust, Ethical Issues, Democratic Values and Democratic Evaluation

I provide below a detailed rationalization for each relationship I seek to explore between
my variables.

6.3.1 National Identity and Political Trust

Liberal nationalism argues that national identity and trust are correlated. That is, shared
national identity helps to establish trust in an otherwise unpredictable environment. For active
deliberation on issues of common concern, citizens have to trust each other. Yet mutual trust is
impossible in an unpredictable environment. Therefore, the instrumental dimension of national
identity is its ability to provide a predictable and transparent environment in which individuals
can have mutual trust and make meaningful choices (Tamir 1993). National identity, in other

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³ See Gary King et al. (1999), “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm
for Multiple Imputation,” esp. 17, available at http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/methods_videos/handouts/
⁴ See Gary King et al., “Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multi-
ple Imputation,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 49–69. See also Michael Tomz et al.
(2003), “CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results” (version 2.1), Stanford
University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University, available at http://gking.harvard.edu/ (ac-
cessed 5/24/2007).
words, is a glue uniting citizens pursuing a myriad of incompatible ends. Hence, the immediate ethical significance of the national identity is that it enhances trust.

While liberal nationalism does not consider national identity typologies, I add liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist typology to its general theoretical formulations and test Political Trust as a function of liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist types of national identity.

I distinguish between the technical competency and fiduciary responsibility dimensions of political trust and have separate indexes for each. The typology was framed by Easton (1965) who distinguished between specific and diffuse support. Specific support refers to satisfaction with government outputs and the performances of political authorities, while diffuse support refers to the public’s attitude towards regime-level objects regardless of their performance (Hetherington 2005, 15). Building on this typology, Bernard Barber (1983) defines political trust as having two dimensions:

1. Trust as the expectation of technically competent role performance. Barber notes that, in modern societies, marked by accumulation of knowledge and technical expertise, expectations of trust in this sense are very common. Also, in modern societies the technical aspect of trust is subject to scrutiny and criticism in modern democracies; therefore, distrust is implied in the democratic process.

2. The second dimension of trust is expectations of fiduciary obligation and responsibility, that is, “the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their own” (ibid., 15). According to Barber, fiduciary obligation goes beyond technically competent performance to the moral dimension of interaction and is essential for the relatively orderly functioning of society.

This study does not attempt to explain the consequences of frustrated technical and fiduciary trust on democracy, although these are clearly important. Rather, it explores whether contesting national identities depress levels of both technical and fiduciary political trust. My
My second major hypothesis predicts that public and political elites have different perceptions about key issues central to national identity. If my survey data demonstrates that indeed this is the case, I expect lower levels of political trust. Conversely, if these perceptions coincide then I expect to detect higher levels of political trust. Essentially, consistent with the theory of liberal nationalism, I argue that shared national identity enhances political trust, while its absence impedes it. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H3. Discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) depress levels of political trust. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

6.3.2 National Identity and Ethical Issues

Theorists of liberal nationalism argue that national identity is central not only for enhancing trust but also for a range of ethical issues. Ethical issues tested in this study are: provision of opportunities to people with permanent disabilities; cheating on taxes; accepting a bribe in the course of fulfilling duties; paying fare in public transportation; and a condemnation of suicide. Using my index of ethical issues I test theoretical predictions that there are relationships between national identity types and ethical issues. I am interested in exploring whether groups endorsing contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity have different perceptions about basic fairness and justice in a society. Hence, I hypothesize that:

H4. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect basic perceptions of fairness and justice in a society. Perceptions of ethical issues alter under conditions when the public and political elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.
6.3.3 National Identity and Democratic Attitudes

Liberal nationalism has been successful in its contentions regarding the centrality of national identity for people's freedoms, respect for democratic values, and for enhancing social justice and redistributive projects. While this is true for liberal democracies with thin national identity, it is not clear whether democratic attitudes increase in illiberal societies with thick national identity. Thin national identity is viable in liberal democracies, particularly in pluralistic states where citizens most of the time differ along ethnic, religious, and racial lines. Here, thin national identity, according to liberal nationalism, is essential not for promoting a particular conception of common good but rather for providing a source of trust and solidarity and for enhancing the likelihood that citizens will fulfill their obligations of social justice and democratic citizenship. As Tamir (1993) notes, trust and social unity in liberal democracies accommodate a myriad of differences in perceived conceptions of the good life and goals. In liberal democracies with shared 'thin' national identity, trust and social unity increase "the likelihood that citizens will fulfill their obligations of justice," will agree on redistributive projects, and make sacrifices for co-citizens (Kymlicka 2002, 265). In liberal societies with shared 'thin' national identity, citizens will also exhibit higher levels of respect for democratic values of concessions and tolerance.

Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, most of the time promotes a thick national identity that is typically based on common ethnic descent or religious faith and promotes one particular conception of good life. Thick national identity typically is not conducive to individuals' self-determination and therefore restrains personal freedoms and choice. Therefore, before celebrating the ethical significance of a shared national identity, I think it is important to ask what type of national identity is being endorsed. This is the main reason that I distinguish between liberal nationalist

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5 It is important to note that illiberal societies do not necessarily promote ethnic national identity. For instance, ex-authoritarian regimes in Latin America did not emphasize ethnic heritage in their definitions of national identity and citizenship. However, it is reasonable to expect that states promoting thick or ethnic type of national identity will be anti-democratic and illiberal.
and ethno-nationalist identity types and argue that the type of identity is essential for understanding not only the trajectory of political trust but also the trajectory of democratic attitudes.

Numerous studies indicate that political trust and democracy are indeed correlated (Putnam 1993). Yet political trust does not necessarily enhance democracy, especially if it is based on inherently anti-democratic premises, such as trusting a government guided by religious principles or trusting a paternalistic government that provides economic security and peace at the expense of personal freedoms. The novelty of my research is that it emphasizes the centrality of national identity types not only for political trust but also for democratic attitudes.

Hence, another important relationship that I am interested in testing is between national identity types and democratic attitudes. I distinguish between democratic values and democratic evaluation, where the first one measures respondents' democratic values in general while the latter measures respondents' evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country. I offer a separate assessment of whether respondents endorsing contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity differ in their democratic values and democratic evaluation.

The democratic values examined in this study include tolerance of opposing ideologies and agreeing that democratically elected officials have an obligation to be accountable and responsive in general. While democratic values are important for measuring the overall democratic perceptions of respondents, they are not true indicators of the democratic attitudes in a country. Most people are not willing to say that they cherish authoritarian values, such as being intolerant of differences, since this involves a fundamentally negative self-evaluation. Similarly, it is reasonable for people to say that they expect accountability and responsiveness from elected officials in general, since these expectations contain self-interest. Therefore, I do not necessarily expect that groups endorsing contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity will have significantly different democratic values and hypothesize that:
H5. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) do not affect respondents' democratic values. The public's democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

Democratic evaluation, on the other hand, measures overall satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country. I contend that proponents of true democratic values will be less satisfied with the state of their country's democracy and future democratic trajectory compared to those who mask their anti-democratic tendencies. This is a particularly reasonable expectation for a country which is marked by anti-democratic tendencies and where political elites endorse an ethno-nationalist type of national identity and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity. I expect that respondents endorsing ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issues will be more satisfied with the state of democracy than respondents endorsing liberal nationalist approaches. Hence, I hypothesize that:

H6. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect respondents' democratic evaluation. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

Note that this expectation is similar to a previous proposition (H3), predicting that since political elites endorse ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issues, respondents endorsing ethno-nationalist approaches will have higher levels of political trust compared to respondents endorsing liberal nationalist approaches. Essentially, I argue that proponents of liberal nationalist approaches not only will have lower levels of political trust but also will have lower evaluations and levels of satisfaction with the state of democracy.

To conclude, consistent with liberal nationalists I contend that shared national identity does enhance political trust. Unlike theorists of liberal nationalism, I distinguish between ethno-nationalist and liberal nationalist types of national identity. Using this identity typology, I contend
that as long as national identity is shared, regardless whether the type of shared identity is liberal or ethnic, political trust will be enhanced.

However, I also argue that not just any shared national identity but the specific type of shared national identity has consequences for democratic attitudes. In other words, even though shared national identity enhances political trust, it does not necessarily enhance democracy. To the contrary, I expect that if the type of shared national identity is ethno-nationalist, governments with a democratic deficiency will be criticized less and citizens will report being more satisfied with the state of democracy. In other words, even though political elites enjoy the public’s trust and receive higher rates of satisfaction with democracy because of a shared ethnic approach to identity issues, this is a trust and approval for a government which is marked by anti-democratic tendencies.

6.4 Survey Data Analysis: Part I – Comparing Public and Official Perceptions

One of the primary objectives of this chapter is to explore whether the public and political elites had similar or different perceptions about key issues central to national identity in the year of 2006. Therefore, my second major hypothesis states that:

H2. There are discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship).

Survey design allowed participants to choose liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity. I explored the type(s) of national identity based on participants’ responses to survey questions that deal with key issues central to national identity: Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship.

In the following section, I proceed with reporting results for each identity issue as perceived by respondents and descriptively compare them with official positions on these identity issues.
6.4.1 Results Report on Issue 1: Genocide and Relations With Turkey

To identify public perceptions of this issue, respondents were asked two questions (see Appendix D for questions). The first question asked whether respondents consider the issue of improving Armenian-Turkish relations and opening borders as being urgent or not. Table 6.1 below depicts respondents’ choices pertaining to the first question.

Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N \text{ (Liberal Nationalist)} = 621 \]
\[ N \text{ (Ethno-Nationalist)} = 379 \]
\[ N \text{ (Total)} = 1,000 \]

As depicted in Table 6.1, 62.1% of respondents endorsed liberal nationalist approach to this question and believed that the issue of improving Armenian-Turkish relations and opening borders was urgent. Conversely, 37.9% of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question did not perceive of this issue as being urgent. It must be noted that response options to this question correspond to policy positions at the official level. For instance, official statements that were liberal nationalist in substance extensively capitalized on the importance of improving Armenian-Turkish relations and underscored the urgency of opening Armenian-Turkish border as it seriously hampered Armenia’s economy.

The second question asked whether respondents think of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation as a possibility and addressed nine conditions under which they perceive of reconciliation as being possible. These nine conditions also correspond to liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric at the official level.
Table 6.2 below demonstrates the public’s attitudes regarding specific nine conditions under which they perceive of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation as being possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Nationalist %</td>
<td>Ethno-Nationalist %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Without preconditions</td>
<td>13.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey</td>
<td>50.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Only if Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. First step must be the establishment of diplomatic relations. After that Armenian government can insist on the Genocide recognition</td>
<td>16.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Through the establishment of economic relations with Turkey</td>
<td>30.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If Turkey compensates the heirs of the victims of the Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. If Turkey returns lands of historical Armenia</td>
<td>17.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Armenia’s strategic interests require an establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey, even if this means that the question of Genocide could be left to be solved in future</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. In no case</td>
<td>12.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N (Liberal Nationalist) = 303; N (Ethno-Nationalist) = 695; N (Total) = 1,000 \]

As depicted in Table 6.2, 13% of respondents who endorsed liberal nationalist approach to this question believed that reconciliation is possible without preconditions. It is very important to emphasize that the statement “without preconditions” does not imply abandoning the tragic memory of Genocide. Rather, it implies that the recognition of the Genocide should not be a precondition for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Fifty one percent believed that reconciliation is possible through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey and 30% through the establishment of economic relations with Turkey. Finally 6% believed that since Armenia’s strategic interests require Armenian-Turkish reconciliation the question of Genocide recognition could be left to be solved in future.

Out of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question, 48% believed that reconciliation is possible only if Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide. One of
the arguments advocated by ethno-nationalists at the official level was that establishing diplo-
matic relations with Turkey, immediately followed by official pressure on Turkey to recognize
Genocide, are not antithetical. Therefore, according to one of the official ethno-nationalist argu-
ments the first step must be the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, immediately fol-
lowing that the Armenian government could insist on the Genocide recognition. Thus, 16% of
respondents exhibited consistencies with this rhetoric at the official level. Seven percent of re-
pondents believed that reconciliation is possible after Turkey offers financial reparations to the
heirs of the Genocide victims and 17% perceived of reconciliation as being possible if Turkey
returns lands of historical Armenia. Finally, 12% of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist
approach to this question believed that reconciliation is not possible under any conditions.

Figure 6.1 below illustrates respondents' overall attitudes regarding the issue of Genocide
and Relations with Turkey. As depicted in Figure 6.1, 24% and 31% of respondents opted for
liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches, respectively. The plurality of respondents at
45% chose neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to the issue of Genocide. Sub-
stantively, this means that the largest portion of population had mixed feelings about this issue,
and overall would prefer an approach that would incorporate elements from both the liberal and
ethnic approaches.

Figure 6.1 also depicts that the public's and elected political elites' positions on the issue
of Genocide and Relations with Turkey are marked by discrepancies. In sharp contrast to the
public's predominant mixed approach at 45%, political elites opted for this approach only at 3%.
Unlike the public who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this issue at 31%, policy positions

\[6\] Many elected officials argued that the state must adopt the ideology of the Armenian Cause, where both
the genocide recognition and territorial reparations are its constitutive parts. Survey questions indirectly,
without using the wording Armenian Cause/Question, address this issue. Extensive analysis of elected officials'
platforms and official statements indicates that the concept of Armenian Cause is in many ways intertwined
with all three identity issues analyzed in this study. For instance, for the issue of Genocide respondents
could choose several elements, such as unconditional Genocide recognition, territorial or financial repara-
tions, all of which are consistent with the main points highlighted by political elites as integral parts of the
Armenian Cause. Therefore, albeit using different wording, responses at the public level and official state-
ments are comparable. See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the Armenian Cause.
of elected political elites emphasized the same approach at 75%. Nevertheless, and very importantly, the public’s and elites’ endorsement of liberal nationalist approach to this issue is roughly equal, standing at 24% and 22%, respectively.

Figure 6.1
Descriptive Comparison of Party Policy Positions and Public Attitudes on the Issue of Genocide and Relations With Turkey

Note: Party percentages are based on means of policy positions on this issue in the third interval of 2002–2006.
N (Public) = 1,000; N (Party) = 68

6.4.2 Results Report on Issue 2: War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions

To identify public perceptions on the issue of War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions, I analyzed two questions. The first question asked whether respondents agree or disagree with a statement that there is no need for negotiations with Azerbaijan at all because Armenians won the war in Karabagh (see Table 6.3 below). This question is based on a widely used rhetoric by ethno-nationalists. Central to this rhetoric was the equation of military successes to the winning of the war, an assumption that ultimately justified ethno-nationalists’ denial of territorial concessions. Conversely, liberal nationalists emphasized the centrality of negotiations.
They extensively referred to ethno-nationalists’ assumption arguing that temporary military successes should not be equated to winning the war and insisted on the need for territorial concessions.\(^7\)

### Table 6.3

**War and Possible Solutions: There is No Need for Negotiations at All Because We Won the War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N\) (Liberal Nationalist) = 563  
\(N\) (Ethno-Nationalist) = 437  
\(N\) (Total) = 1,000

As depicted in Table 6.3, 56% of respondents who endorsed liberal nationalist approach to the first question disagreed with a statement that there is no need for negotiations with Azerbaijan at all because Armenians won the war in Karabagh. Conversely, 44% of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question agreed that there is no need for negotiations.

The second question was drawn from the step-by-step solution to war in Karabagh. Essentially, the step-by-step approach sought to address three issues—consequences of the conflict, security, and political issues—in two separate phases. Security issues (i.e., security guarantees for Karabagh Armenians; withdrawal of Karabagh military forces from six districts of Azerbaijan, excluding Lachin district; permanent demilitarization of freed territories; and deployment of international peacekeeping forces along Karabagh-Azerbaijan borders) had to be addressed in the first stage. Similarly, removing consequences of the conflict (i.e., return of occupied lands, re-settlement of refugees, removing of blockades and restoration of the communication infrastructure) had to be addressed in the first stage.

These were to be followed by addressing political issues in the second stage. Thus, resolution of the most contentious issues, such as Karabagh’s final legal-political status, the issue of

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\(^7\) For a detailed analysis of step-by-step and package solutions, as well of contesting views regarding the issue of war at the official level, see Chapter 3.
the Lachin land corridor, and the return of refugees to Shushi, would have been left for future negotiations for reaching an agreement between parties to the conflict.

Thus, the second question asked whether respondents agree or disagree with the following statement: Mountainous Karabagh remains *de facto* self-proclaimed independent republic, some of the occupied territories (excluding Lachin corridor and Shushi) are returned to Azerbaijan, security of Armenians is guaranteed, but the final legal-political status of Mountainous Karabagh must be resolved through negotiations. Table 6.4 below depicts respondents’ choices on both questions.

Table 6.4
War and Possible Solutions: Step-by-Step Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 illustrates that while 43% of respondents who endorsed liberal nationalist approach to the second question, essentially agreed that step-by-step deal is an acceptable solution, 57% who endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to this question, disagreed with the step-by-step solution to the war in Karabagh.

Figure 6.2 below illustrates respondents’ overall attitudes regarding the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions. As depicted in Figure 6.2, the public’s support for both liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches is roughly the same at 26%. The plurality of respondents at 49% chose neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to this issue. Substantively, this means that the largest portion of population had mixed feelings about this issue, and overall would prefer an approach that would incorporate elements from both the liberal and ethnic approaches.
Figure 6.2
Descriptive Comparison of Party Policy Positions and Public Attitudes on the Issue of War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions

![Graph showing comparison between public and party positions on war and possible solutions.]

*Note:* Party percentages are based on means of party positions on this issue in the third interval of 2002–2006.

\[ N \text{ (Public)} = 1,000; \quad N \text{ (Party)} = 83 \]

Figure 6.2 also depicts that the public’s perceptions and elected political elites’ positions on the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions are marked by sharp discrepancies. While the plurality of the public at 49% endorsed a mixed approach to this issue, political elites endorsed the same approach at 12%. Unlike the public who endorsed liberal nationalist approach to this issue at 26%, policy positions of elected political elites emphasized the same approach at only 3%. Similarly, unlike the public who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this issue at 26%, policy positions of elected political elites emphasized the same approach at 81%.

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8 Another difference that is not depicted in Figure 6.2 is 3% of official statements that were unique in content. According to operational definition a unique statement is the one that is neither liberal nor ethnic in substance. A unique statement is different from a mixed statement, where the latter one is defined as a mixture of statements with liberal and ethnic content. For instance, the United Labor Party chose a unique position on the issue of war, stating that one of the objectives of the party is to “choose national priority issues, among them legal and fair options of solving the Karabakh issue.” See Nina Iskandaryan and Ruben Meloyan, eds., *Parliamentary Elections: Armenia 2003 Election Guide* (Yerevan: Caucasus Media Institute, 2003), 97. Note that this is neither step-by-step nor package solution to the problem. This is also neither liberal nationalist nor ethno-nationalist approach to this issue. Since survey questions did not contain options with unique approaches (i.e., neither liberal nationalist nor ethno-nationalist), the unique approach at the official level is not relevant to my analysis in this chapter.
Public attitudes on this issue are quite relevant to an ongoing ethno-nationalist official rhetoric, insisting that victories in Karabagh must be maintained at all costs. Ethno-nationalists harshly criticized the pre-1998 administration’s readiness for negotiations and territorial concessions. In 1998, clashing worldviews at the official level around step-by-step and package solutions of the Karabagh problem triggered a palace coup. The political crises eventually resulted in the president’s resignation, the ANM’s loss of parliamentary power, and the disintegration of the Republic Bloc.

Since then, political elites not only have advocated an ethno-nationalist approach (the so-called “land for status” formula of the package deal) but also insisted that liberal nationalist solution of the issue (the so-called “land for peace” formula of the step-by-step deal) would be a betrayal of national dreams. Results of the public survey challenge this view and indicate that both liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches are equally supported by the public. Moreover, results indicate that the plurality of respondents at 49% had mixed feelings about this issue, and overall would prefer an approach that contains elements of both liberal and ethnic approaches.

6.4.3 Results Report on Issue 3: Dual Citizenship

The third issue central to Armenian national identity analyzed in this study is dual citizenship. To identify public perceptions on this issue I analyzed two questions. The first question asked whether respondents support dual citizenship in Armenia and listed five conditions under which they would support it. These five conditions for supporting dual citizenship also correspond to liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric at the official level. Table 6.5 below demonstrates the public’s attitudes regarding five specific conditions under which they support dual citizenship in Armenia.
Dual Citizenship: Conditions for Supporting Dual Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Liberal Nationalist %</th>
<th>Ethno-Nationalist %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I support it without any restrictions</td>
<td>50.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I am against dual citizenship in Armenia</td>
<td>31.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I support dual citizenship irrespective of dual citizens’ ethnicity and religious beliefs, but on conditions that dual citizens must perform military or alternative service, pay taxes and be permanent residents in order to have the rights of electing and being elected.</td>
<td>18.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dual citizenship has to be only for ethnic Armenians without any restrictions</td>
<td>31.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Only ethnic Armenians should have the right for dual citizenship but only if they perform military or alternative service, pay taxes and be permanent residents in order to have the rights of electing and being elected</td>
<td>68.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As depicted in Table 6.5, 50% of respondents who overall endorsed liberal nationalist approach to this question supported dual citizenship without any restrictions. It is important to note that although this specific statement did not figure as a central argument by liberal nationalists at the official level, the question nevertheless provides a substantive understanding on xenophobic attitudes. Respondents’ unconditional support of dual citizenship in general is indicative of their liberal attitudes towards foreigners. Thirty-one percent of respondents were against dual citizenship and 18% supported it irrespective of dual citizens’ ethnicity and religious beliefs. However, and consistent with liberal nationalist rhetoric at the official level, these respondents also believed that dual citizens, irrespective of ethnicity and creed, must perform military or alternative service, pay taxes, and must establish permanent residency in order to have political rights of electing and being elected.

Out of respondents who overall endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question, 32% supported dual citizenship only for ethnic Armenians living all over the world and believed that dual citizenship for ethnic Armenians should not contain any restrictions. These attitudes are
consistent with ethno-nationalist rhetoric at the official level. Central to this rhetoric has been a contention that dual citizenship based on ethnic criterion should be perceived as a way to "unify" Armenians scattered around the world. According to ethno-nationalists, dual citizenship based on *jus sanguinis* is a constitutive part of the Armenian Cause, since it encourages the establishment of "unified" national identity. Therefore, ethno-nationalists harshly criticized liberal nationalists' dual citizenship policies and argued that diaspora Armenians, particularly post-Genocide victim diaspora, should be entitled to the same citizenship rights as resident Armenians. However, they also argued that unlike resident Armenians the former ones should be entitled to this status without any restrictions.  

Finally, 68% of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question supported dual citizenship through *jus sanguinis*, however with a condition that ethnic Armenian dual citizens perform military or alternative service, pay taxes, and be permanent residents in order to have political rights of electing and being elected. This attitude reflects some ethno-nationalists' attitudes at the official level. For instance, the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), which held a majority of parliamentary seats in 2006, has been an ardent proponent of ethno-nationalist approaches to all three national identity issues analyzed in this study. While the party unequivocally advocated dual citizenship through *jus sanguinis* rule, some high ranking members nevertheless demanded residency requirements in exchange for diaspora's political rights.

The second question was designed to measure respondents' perceptions regarding the consequences of dual citizenship. Thus, it asked whether respondents agree or disagree that one

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9 For a detailed analysis of dual citizenship as a constitutive national identity issue, as well as for recent legislative amendments pertaining to this issue, see Chapter 4.

of the consequences of dual citizenship for diaspora Armenians would be that results of Armenian Presidential and Parliamentary elections will be determined abroad because twice as many Armenians live abroad than in Armenia. Table 6.6 below demonstrates the public's attitudes regarding this question.

Table 6.6
Dual Citizenship: A Possible Consequence of Dual Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (Liberal Nationalist) = 694
N (Ethno-Nationalist) = 306
N (Total) = 1,000

As depicted in Table 6.6, 69% of respondents who endorsed liberal nationalist approach to this question agreed with this statement, and 31% of respondents who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this question disagreed. This question particularly reflects a concern regarding the democratic deficit, in a sense that residents' votes would be outweighed by votes of twice as many Armenian dual citizens' residing abroad.

Since the early 1990s liberal nationalists extensively referred to this concern. One of the significant arguments by liberal nationalists for rejecting dual citizenship was a consideration of demographic aspect and its consequences. Both political elites and constitutional experts believed that the constitution had to reflect the reality of unbalanced population distribution. For instance, Vladimir Nazaryan, one of the founders of the Armenian constitution, argued that the possibilities of political influence from abroad and of a radical distortion of a constitutionally guaranteed equality of citizens are of a magnitude that simply could not be neglected in constitutional provisions for
citizenship. Thus, liberal nationalists argued that the constitutional ban on dual citizenship was a reflection of and a pragmatic response to the reality of unbalanced population distribution.

Figure 6.3 below illustrates respondents’ overall attitudes regarding the issue of Dual Citizenship.

Figure 6.3
Descriptive Comparison of Party Policy Positions and Public Attitudes on the Issue of Dual Citizenship

As depicted in Figure 6.3, the public’s overall support for liberal nationalist approach to this issue is 39% and for ethno-nationalist approach is 17%. The plurality of respondents at 44% endorsed neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to this issue. As in cases of Genocide and War, these results indicate that the largest portion of the population had mixed feelings about this issue, and overall would prefer an approach that would incorporate elements from both the liberal and ethnic approaches.

Figure 6.3 also depicts that the public's perceptions and elected political elites' positions on the issue of Dual Citizenship are marked by sharp discrepancies. In sharp contrast to the public, political elites did not endorse either mixed or liberal approaches to this issue. Finally, unlike the public who endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this issue at 17%, policy positions of elected political elites emphasized the same approach at 88%.\textsuperscript{12}

6.4.4 Conclusions: Part I

One of the primary objectives of this chapter was to explore whether the public and political elites had similar or different perceptions about key issues central to national identity in the year of 2006. Therefore, my second major hypothesis stated that:

\textit{H2. There are discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship).}

Using data from the original public opinion survey, I first reported public attitudes regarding key issues central to Armenian national identity; Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship. Based on participants' responses to survey questions I explored the type(s) of national identity endorsed by the public. Next, using results of my survey and content analysis of official positions on these identity issues, I descriptively compared the public's and political elites' perceptions of key issues central to national identity.

Descriptive comparisons revealed sharp discrepancies between the public's and political elites' perceptions of key issues central to national identity. The highest proximity between the public and political elites appeared to be on liberal nationalist approach to the issue of Genocide.

\textsuperscript{12} Like in case of the issue of war, 5% of official statements were unique in content. For instance, while the party Country of Law overwhelmingly endorsed ethno-nationalist approach to this issue, it also made statements that were unique in substance. The party stated that it is important to create a working mechanism for Armenia-Diaspora-Karabagh cooperation. This statement is unique since its content is neither liberal nationalist nor ethno-nationalist. See Iskandaryan and Meloyan, \textit{Parliamentary Elections}, 101. Since survey questions did not contain options with unique approaches (i.e., neither liberal nationalist nor ethno-nationalist), the unique approach at the official level is not relevant to my analysis in this chapter.
and Relations with Turkey. Here, respondents and political elites endorsed liberal nationalist approach at 24% and 22%, respectively (see Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, the public's and political elites' perceptions diverged on ethno-nationalist and mixed approaches to this issue. Similarly, for the remaining two issues of War and Dual Citizenship the public's and elites' perceptions were marked by sharp discrepancies. One of the important findings of this study is that a plurality of respondents endorsed neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to all three identity issues and preferred an approach that would incorporate elements of both approaches. These findings lend support to the second hypothesis of this study predicting that there are discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship).

6.5 Survey Data Analysis: Part II

6.5.1 Assessing the Effect of Contesting Approaches to Key Issues Central to National Identity and Overall National Identity on Political Trust, Ethical Issues and Democratic Attitudes

The second major goal of this chapter is to test whether respondents with contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity have different levels of political trust (technical and fiduciary trust), perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes (democratic values and democratic evaluation).

In the previous section, I demonstrated that a plurality of respondents endorsed neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to all three identity issues and preferred an approach that would incorporate elements of both approaches. This, indeed, is one of the important findings of this study. Initially, one of my major objectives was to demonstrate that despite the conventional tenet, ethnically homogeneous states are not secure from identity contestation.
Building on an extensive literature on nationalism and the theory of liberal nationalism, I have structured my research questions to tackle this important issue.

Since the 1940s, when Hans Kohn famously coined the civic-ethnic typology, the literature on nationalism has revolved around this typology. Other scholars rejecting the built-in assumptions of civic-ethnic typology proposed other types, such as liberal nationalist identity. Nevertheless, the mixed type of national identity has never been discussed and explained by theories of nationalism. Either widely accepted or harshly criticized, the civic-ethnic dichotomy or its refined equivalents remain the dominant types informing analysis of nationalism and its manifestations. Given the absence of theoretical knowledge about the mixed type, proposed expectations in my own study are limited to merely liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist identity types.

Specifically, in this section I will test the following hypotheses:

H3. Discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) depress levels of political trust. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

H4. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect basic perceptions of fairness and justice in a society. Perceptions of ethical issues alter under conditions when the public and political elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

H5. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) do not affect respondents' democratic values. The public's democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity.

H6. Contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship) affect respondents' democratic evaluation. Respondents endorsing an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity will have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country than respondents endorsing a liberal nationalist approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to key issues central to national identity.

To test these hypotheses I conducted t-tests. First, I present a set of figures (Figures 6.4 through 6.8) illustrating respondents' political trust, perceptions of moral issues, and democratic
attitudes. Next, I present results reports explaining each dependant variable as a function of endorsed approaches to each national identity issue.

Figures 6.4 and 6.5 depict respondents' levels of political trust where 0.0 stands for no trust and 1.0 stands for a strong trust. Figure 6.4 illustrates that 33% of respondents are con-
centrated in the middle, 44% are in the left, and 23% are in the right ends of the continuum, indicating lower levels for technical trust. Figure 6.5 depicts that a plurality of respondents at 32% are concentrated in the immediate left-to-middle end of the continuum. Overall, 47% of respondents are in the left-to-middle end of the continuum, 27% are in the middle, and 25% are at the right end of the continuum, indicating low levels of fiduciary trust.

Figure 6.6 depicts respondents' perceptions of ethical issues where 0.0 stands for endorsing high ethical standards and 1.0 stands for extremely low ethical standards. Results reveal that the predominant majority at 65% exhibit very high ethical standards. Overall 98% of respondents are concentrated in the middle-to-left end of the continuum and only 2% are in the middle of the continuum. Interestingly, there are no observations in the middle-to-right end of the continuum for ethical issues.

Figure 6.7 illustrates respondents' democratic values where 0.0 stands for an absence of democratic values and 1.0 stands for strong democratic values. Thirty-two percent of respondents are in the middle of the continuum with 16% at the left and 52% at the right ends of the continuum for Democratic Values. Results indicate that respondents have higher democratic values.

Figure 6.8 depicts respondents' evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy where 0.0 stands for extremely low evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy and 1.0 stands for high evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy. Results indicate that 34% of respondents are in the middle of the continuum, 31% are in the left, and 35% are in the right ends of the continuum for democratic evaluation.
6.6 Results Report: Explaining Differences as a Result of Liberal Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Approaches to Key Issues Central to National Identity

6.6.1 Issue 1: Genocide, Political Trust, Ethical Issues and Democratic Attitudes

In this section, I report findings for respondents' levels of political trust, perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes as a function of liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey (see Table 6.7 below).

Table 6.7

Differences Between Respondents With Liberal Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Approaches to the Issue of Genocide and Relations With Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TECHNICAL TRUST</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0.50567</td>
<td>0.09755</td>
<td>0.18659</td>
<td>5.706*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.40811</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIDUCIARY TRUST</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0.48012</td>
<td>0.13824</td>
<td>0.16401</td>
<td>9.365*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.34188</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHICAL ISSUES</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0.09607</td>
<td>-0.00894</td>
<td>0.11277</td>
<td>-0.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.10501</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.10232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC VALUES</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0.59847</td>
<td>-0.01032</td>
<td>0.16579</td>
<td>-0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.60878</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20536</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0.59511</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22342</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>0.46161</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  |     |         |            |           |          |
|                  |     |         |            |           | 0.13350  | 9.306*   |

Note: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0
N = 549
*p< 0.05

As depicted in Table 6.7, test results reveal that indeed respondents with contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to the issue of Genocide have significantly different
levels of technical and fiduciary trust. However, results for political trust are in sharp contrast to my theoretical expectations. It appears that compared to respondents endorsing a liberal approach to the issue of Genocide, respondents endorsing an ethnic approach to the same issue have lower levels of both technical and fiduciary trust. Based on these results, I reject the third hypothesis (pertaining to genocide and political trust) predicting that because in 2006 political elites endorsed ethnic approach to this issue, respondents sharing ethno-nationalist approach will have significantly higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing liberal nationalist approach.

Similarly, results for ethical issues produced an unexpected outcome. In contrast to the fourth hypothesis (pertaining to genocide and ethical issues), results indicate that contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to identity issue of genocide do not affect basic perceptions of fairness and justice in a society. Perceptions of ethical issues do not alter under conditions when public and political elites endorse contesting approaches to key issue of genocide.

Consistent with the fifth hypothesis of this study, results for democratic values indicate that contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to key issue of genocide do not affect respondents' democratic values. The public's democratic values do not alter significantly if the public and elite endorse contesting approaches to key issue of genocide.

Finally, liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of genocide produced significantly different levels of democratic evaluation. However, in sharp contrast to theoretical expectations (pertaining to genocide and democratic evaluation), results suggest that respondents supporting a liberal approach to the issue of genocide have significantly higher levels of democratic evaluation than respondents endorsing an ethnic approach. Based on these test results, I reject the sixth hypothesis, predicting that respondents endorsing ethnic approach to key issue of genocide will have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country than respondents endorsing liberal approach.
Overall, results for liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey were entirely unanticipated. With the exception of the fifth hypothesis about democratic values, results indicate reversed relationships for political trust and democratic evaluation as a function of contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to the issue of genocide. My initial expectations that respondents supporting ethnic approach would have higher levels of political trust and democratic evaluation were not met but appeared to be true for respondents endorsing liberal approach to the issue of genocide. These results, of course, ask for an explanation. I attempt to provide one in my concluding remarks to this chapter once I explain results for the remaining issues of War and Dual Citizenship.

Results also indicate that perceptions of ethical issues do not alter under conditions when the public and political elites endorse contesting approaches to the identity issue of genocide. To conclude, I reject my hypotheses regarding political trust, ethical issues, and democratic evaluation as a function of contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to the issue of genocide.

6.6.2 Issue 2: War, Political Trust, Ethical Issues and Democratic Attitudes

In this section, I report findings for respondents' levels of political trust, perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes as a function of liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions (see Table 6.8, below).

Test results depicted in Table 6.8 indicate that levels of both technical and fiduciary trust vary significantly as a result of respondents' contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of war. Means also suggest that respondents endorsing a liberal approach have lower levels of technical and fiduciary trust compared to respondents endorsing an ethnic approach to the issue of war. Test results lend support to the third hypothesis (pertaining to war and political trust) predicting that discrepancies between official and public perceptions on the identity issue of war
Depress levels of political trust. Consistent with theoretical expectations, respondents endorsing an ethnic approach to this issue have higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing liberal approach, because in 2006 political elites endorsed ethnic approach to the issue of war.

Table 6.8
Differences Between Respondents With Liberal Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Approaches to the Issue of War and Possible Solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TECHNICAL TRUST</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>t-Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.36837</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.46332</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDUCIARY TRUST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.09495</td>
<td>-5.183*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.37814</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.16441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.43447</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18762</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHICAL ISSUES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.05633</td>
<td>-3.625*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.12113</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.08310</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.08424</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC VALUES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.230*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.60171</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.18627</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.60178</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.19890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00006</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.46688</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.52120</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.25426</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0
N = 515
*p < 0.05

Predictions pertaining to war and ethical issues were not met. Instead, the test produced reversed results. In contrast to theoretical expectations, results suggest that respondents endorsing liberal approach exhibit higher ethical standards compared to respondents endorsing ethnic approach. Thus, in contrast to the fourth hypothesis (pertaining to war and ethical issues), test results indicate that contesting approaches to identity issue of war do not affect basic perceptions.
of fairness and justice in a society. These results, however, must be stated with a caution. As depicted in Figure 6.7, no one scored higher than 0.57 on the index for ethical issues, indicating that overall respondents exhibited quite high ethical standards. Nevertheless, based on test results, I reject the fourth hypothesis pertaining to war and ethical issues.

Test results for democratic values indicate that democratic values do not vary significantly. These results are expected and are consistent with the fifth hypothesis predicting that the public’s democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to the key issue of war.

Finally, liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of war produced significantly different levels of democratic evaluation. Consistent with the sixth hypothesis (pertaining to war and democratic evaluation), respondents endorsing an ethnic approach to the issue of war have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country than respondents endorsing liberal approach.

Overall, with an exception of ethical issues, all theoretical expectations regarding political trust, democratic values, and democratic evaluation as a result of contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of War in MK and Possible Solutions have been met.

6.6.3 Issue 3: Dual Citizenship, Political Trust, Ethical Issues, and Democratic Attitudes

In this section, I report findings for respondents’ levels of political trust, perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes as a function of liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issue of Dual Citizenship (see Table 6.9).

Consistent with the third hypothesis, results depicted in Table 6.9 indicate that levels of both technical and fiduciary trust vary significantly as a result of respondents’ contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of dual citizenship. Means for both aspects of trust suggest that supporters of the liberal approach to the issue of Dual Citizenship trust political elites signif-
icantly less compared to supporters of the ethnic approach. Test results lend support to the third hypothesis, predicting that because in 2006 political elites endorsed ethnic approach to the issue of Dual Citizenship, respondents sharing this approach will have significantly higher levels of political trust than respondents endorsing liberal approach.

Table 6.9
Differences Between Respondents With Liberal Nationalist and Ethno-Nationalist Approaches to the Issue of Dual Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>t-Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL TRUST</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.40590</td>
<td>0.20629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47330</td>
<td>0.21307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDUCIARY TRUST</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.37114</td>
<td>0.17852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.46943</td>
<td>0.18063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHICAL ISSUES</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.09629</td>
<td>0.10147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06999</td>
<td>0.08637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC VALUES</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.59856</td>
<td>0.19455</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.60828</td>
<td>0.22001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC EVALUATION</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.47508</td>
<td>0.22390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56307</td>
<td>0.24884</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All estimates obtained from STATA 7.0
N = 560
*p < 0.05

Predictions pertaining to Dual Citizenship and ethical issues were not met. Like in case of war, the test produced reversed results. In contrast to theoretical expectations, results suggest that respondents endorsing liberal approach exhibit higher ethical standards compared to respondents endorsing ethnic approach. Thus, in contrast to the fourth hypothesis (pertaining to Dual Citizenship and ethical issues), test results indicate that contesting approaches to identity issue of Dual
Citizenship do not affect basic perceptions of fairness and justice in a society. Based on test results, I reject the fourth hypothesis. Substantively, results indicate that perceptions of ethical issues do not alter under conditions when the public and political elites endorse contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of Dual Citizenship.

Test results for democratic values indicate that democratic values do not vary because of contesting approaches to the issue of war. These results are expected and are consistent with the fifth hypothesis predicting that public's democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to identity issue of Dual Citizenship.

Finally, consistent with the sixth hypothesis (pertaining to Dual Citizenship and democratic evaluation), test results indicate that contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of Dual Citizenship affect respondents' democratic evaluation. Means suggest that respondents endorsing an ethnic approach to the issue of Dual Citizenship have higher levels of evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy in the country than respondents endorsing a liberal approach. These results are expected and lend support to the sixth hypothesis of this study.

Overall, with an exception of ethical issues, all theoretical expectations regarding political trust, democratic values, and democratic evaluation as a result of contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to the issue of Dual Citizenship have been met.

6.7 Conclusions

This chapter pursued two interrelated objectives. My first objective was to explore whether the public and political elites had similar or different perceptions about key issues central to national identity in the year of 2006. Using data from my original public opinion survey, I first reported public attitudes regarding key issues central to Armenian national identity: Genocide and Relations with Turkey, War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship (see Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6). Based on participants' responses to survey
questions I explored national identity types endorsed by the public. Next, using results of my survey and content analysis of official positions on these identity issues, I descriptively compared the public’s and political elites’ perceptions of key issues central to national identity (see Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3).

Descriptive comparisons revealed sharp discrepancies between the public’s and political elites’ perceptions of key issues central to national identity. The highest proximity between the public and political elites appeared to be on liberal nationalist approach to the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey. Here, respondents and political elites endorsed liberal nationalist approach at 24% and 22%, respectively (see Figure 6.1). Nevertheless, the public’s and political elites’ perceptions diverged on ethno-nationalist and mixed approaches to this issue. Similarly, for the remaining two issues of War and Dual Citizenship the public’s and elites’ perceptions were marked by sharp discrepancies.

One of the important findings of this study was that a plurality of respondents endorsed neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches to all three identity issues and preferred an approach that would incorporate elements of both approaches. These findings lend support to the second hypothesis of this study, predicting that there are discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity (Genocide, War, Dual Citizenship). These findings challenge the extensive literature on nationalism by demonstrating that despite the conventional expectation, ethnically homogeneous states are not secure from national identity contestation. Findings also challenge the post-Soviet literature, where Armenia remains classified as having a single and institutionalized ethnic type of identity inherited from its Soviet past.

Building on central propositions of liberal nationalism, the second major goal of this chapter was to test whether respondents endorsing contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to key issues central to national identity have different levels of political trust (technical and fiduciary trust), perceptions of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes (democratic
values and democratic evaluation). Most of the time, theoretical expectations regarding political trust, democratic values, and democratic evaluation as a result of contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to key identity issues were met.

Nevertheless, the only case where results were completely reversed was the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey. Results for liberal and ethnic approaches to this issue were entirely unanticipated. With an exception of the fifth hypothesis about democratic values, I had to reject all hypotheses regarding political trust, ethical issues, and democratic evaluation. As mentioned previously, entirely reversed results for the issue of Genocide require an explanation. Initial expectations that respondents supporting an ethnic approach to the issue of Genocide will have higher levels of political trust and democratic evaluation were not met but appeared to be true for respondents endorsing a liberal approach to the issue of Genocide. Although any explanation will mostly be of a speculative nature, it is still essential to reflect on these inconsistencies relying both on the available survey data and historical background.

Genocide is the most tragic memory in contemporary Armenian history. It fundamentally defined Armenian self-image and became a constitutive element of the Armenian identity. The traumatic memory encompasses generations and does not seem to fade away almost a century after these horrendous events. It has also been one of the most emotionally charged issues in modern Armenian politics. Right after the independence in 1991 the issue of Genocide polarized Armenia’s political arena where liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists offered two strikingly different models of remembering.\(^\text{13}\)

In a way, since genocide is such a complicated and primarily moral issue, it is not surprising that conventional political analyses are not sufficient to explain these intriguing results. The puzzle is that in addition to having higher levels of satisfaction with democratic progress, supporters of the liberal approach also trusted a government, which predominantly endorsed an ethnic

\(^{13}\) For contrasting politics of remembering as offered by liberal nationalists and ethno-nationalists, see Chapter 2.
approach to this issue. The puzzle is even more intriguing since compared to supporters of a liberal approach, supporters of an ethnic approach exhibited lower levels of satisfaction with democratic progress and had less trust in a government that shared their ethnic approach to this issue.

Although elected political parties predominantly supported an ethnic approach to the issue of Genocide at 75%, it is noteworthy that this is the only issue that had the largest percentage of statements by political elites that were liberal nationalist in content (see Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). Compare 22% of liberal statements on the issue of Genocide to 3% on the issue of War and 0% on the issue of Dual Citizenship. It is also very interesting to note that Genocide was the only issue where percentages of official statements and respondents supporting liberal approach were very close, 22% vs. 24%, respectively. Since genocide is such a sensitive issue, it is conceivable that supporters of a liberal approach had higher levels of political trust and democratic evaluation because their interests were at least represented in the parliament. Supporters of an ethnic approach, on the other hand, were frustrated with the fact that the liberal approach was represented in the parliament at all. In other words, they would have preferred to have a parliament that would have adopted an entirely ethnic policy on this issue. This, of course, is the simplest explanation; but given the dearth of better explanations, it is a plausible one.

Theoretical expectations regarding political trust, democratic values, and democratic evaluation as a result of contesting liberal and ethnic approaches to key identity issues of War and Dual Citizenship were met. Consistent with expectations of liberal nationalism, compared to supporters of the liberal approach, supporters of an ethnic approach to both issues had more trust in elected political elites' technically competency. Also, in both cases, supporters of an ethnic approach reported higher levels of trust that political elites fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities (H3). Thus, consistent with liberal nationalists I conclude that shared national identity does enhance political trust while its absence impedes it. Moreover, data indicates that as long as national
identity is shared, regardless whether the type of shared identity is liberal or ethnic, political trust will be enhanced.

One of the novelties of my research is that it emphasizes the centrality of national identity types for both political trust and democratic attitudes. I contended that not just any shared national identity but the specific type of shared national identity has consequences for democratic attitudes. In other words, even though shared national identity enhances political trust, it does not necessarily enhance democracy.

To have a better grasp of democratic attitudes, I distinguished between democratic values and democratic evaluations, where the first measures respondents' democratic values in general (H5) while the latter one measures respondents' evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country (H6).

I argued that the public's democratic values will not alter significantly if the public and elites endorse contesting approaches to key issues central to national identity (H5). In general, I did not expect respondents to admit that they cherish authoritarian values, since this involves a fundamentally negative self-evaluation. Similarly, I argued that it is reasonable to expect democratic accountability and responsiveness from elected officials in general, since these expectations involve self-interest. Indeed, my expectation regarding democratic values was met across all three identity issues. These important findings offer a cautious observation suggesting that even if respondents exhibit higher democratic values, we should not take it at face value.

My index of democratic evaluations, on the other hand, measured overall satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country. I contended that proponents of true democratic values will be less satisfied with the state of country's democracy and future democratic trajectory compared to those who mask their anti-democratic tendencies (H6). Indeed, my expectation was met in both cases of War and Dual Citizenship.
Findings essentially confirmed my expectation that even though in 2006 Armenian political elites enjoyed the public's trust and received higher rates of satisfaction with democracy because of a shared predominantly ethno-nationalist identity type, this was trust and approval for a government which was marked by anti-democratic tendencies. Therefore, my findings suggest that if the type of shared national identity is ethno-nationalist, governments with a democratic deficiency will be criticized less and citizens will report being more satisfied with the state of democracy.

Finally, it is interesting to note that theoretical expectations of liberal nationalism regarding ethical issues were not met (H4). Consistent with liberal nationalism, I argued that shared national identity increases the likelihood that citizens will fulfill their obligations of social justice and maintain the framework of redistributive projects. Test results produced reversed relationships between shared national identity and ethical standards across two identity issues of War and Dual Citizenship. Although, overall respondents exhibited quite high ethical standards nevertheless, in both cases, results suggest that respondents endorsing a liberal approach exhibit higher ethical standards compared to respondents endorsing an ethnic approach. These interesting results suggest that supporters of liberal nationalist type of identity are more prone to fulfill their obligations of social justice and maintain the framework of redistributive projects.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Discussion of Findings, Limitations, and Suggestions for Further Research

My intention in this dissertation has been to demonstrate that ethnically homogeneous states are not secure from identity contestation. I also proposed that identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state can be a problematic phenomenon, affecting political trust, perceptions of social justice, and democratic attitudes. Results of my research supported both of my expectations.

To verify my claims about national identity, I delimited my research to the ethnically homogeneous post-Soviet state of Armenia. Following the liberal nationalist literature, I emphasized the political and constructed versus ethno-religious and primordial aspects of national identity. I contended that because of its ethnic homogeneity, the Armenian case allows a direct identity analysis of one ethnic group without the need for isolating a number of confounding variables, a problem analysts of ethnically heterogeneous states must confront. In other words, I argued that the Armenian state is an ideal case for empirically testing theoretical expectations pertaining to national identity.

At the theoretical level, I selected a politically relevant subset of classical elements of national identity: memory, territory, and belongingness. At the empirical level, I chose the equivalents of these identity elements: genocide and relations with Turkey, war in Mountainous Karabagh and possible solutions, and dual citizenship for members of the diaspora, which were also manifest issues constitutive of an Armenian national identity.
I contended that since national identity is primarily a political phenomenon, ethno-cultural homogeneity alone cannot guarantee a harmonious flow of worldviews pertaining to national identity in a bounded political community. Because identity is a political phenomenon, political rivalry among co-ethnics over constitutive elements of national identity, such as territory, collective memory and belongingness, may be manifested as acutely as among rival ethnic groups. Moreover, I demonstrated that identity contestation among co-ethnics may take as chronic a form as among diverse ethnic groups, and may be as consequential for developmental and liberal democratic projects in ethnically homogeneous states as it may be in ethnically heterogeneous ones.

Thus, I analyzed the content of Armenian national identity and determined whether and why it is manifested in liberal and illiberal forms. Following liberal nationalism’s central propositions, I gauged the extent to which political elites portray national identity as a matter of fate or choice and assessed their willingness to negotiate and revise its main properties through critical reflection and rational deliberation. I demonstrated that Armenia’s political arena has been contested by ethno-nationalist and liberal nationalist visions of Armenian national identity. Identity clashes were particularly reflected in strikingly contrasting models of remembering the national tragedy, territorial aspirations, and belongingness to a political community.

To estimate the magnitude and significance of identity contestation at the official level, I employed a quantitative content analysis of elected political elites’ positions on national identity issues from 1993 through 2006, using elected party and presidential platforms and eight leading Armenian newspapers representing both official and opposition ideologies. I also conducted a qualitative analysis of key texts pertaining to three identity issues, since the beginning of the independence movement in 1988. In addition, I analyzed official foreign and domestic policies, legislative and constitutional provisions and amendments, and presidential speeches pertaining to these three identity issues. My analysis confirmed that since independence, elected political elites have endorsed contesting liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist approaches to three identity issues.
Analysis also confirmed that while the pre-1998 dominant political parties chose a liberal nationalist identity, the post-1998 dominant political parties overwhelmingly chose an ethno-nationalist type of national identity. In addition, mean party positions revealed that while in the first interval of this study (1993–99) the dominant identity choice at 51% was liberal nationalist, this type was extinct in the second interval (1998–2003) but reappeared at 9% in the third interval (2002–06). Finally, results also revealed that, in addition to these contesting identity types, political elites also endorsed a middle ground position, and chose elements from both liberal and ethno-nationalist types, not only across but also within all three intervals.

Substantively, my analysis revealed that proponents of liberal nationalist identity challenged the view of Armenian national identity as a matter of fate. Liberal nationalist identity, envisioned by the pre-1998 political leadership, embraced the myth of the Armenian nation stretching back to time immemorial but at the same time used historical scripts for highlighting self-induced defeats and disastrous losses. Liberal nationalists believed that agents can reflect critically on constitutive elements of identity, and revise and adapt it to current salient problems. Hence, they evoked critical reflection and rational deliberation over constitutive elements of national identity, three of which were Genocide and relations with Turkey, War in Karabagh and Possible Solutions, and Dual Citizenship.

While celebrating ethno-cultural values of the Armenian identity, such as language, religion, and traditions, liberal nationalists simultaneously questioned core values in Armenian history and political thought. Particularly, they questioned ethno-political thought, which emphasized and indeed romanticized victimhood. Thus, liberal nationalists questioned the conventional primordial worldview, according to which Armenian history was nothing but an endless story of national victimization and eternal struggle against the Turkish enemy.

Liberal nationalists believed that national identity had to be redefined in a way that addresses state security and promotes liberal and communal values. Essentially, they were offering
a “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity which would sustain the project of liberal democracy and celebrate ethnic heritage without compromising liberal principles. They argued that “thick” ethno-nationalist identity promoting the vision of a victimized nation and the essentialist understanding of national identity inhibits liberal political culture, restrains political freedoms and individual choice, and endangers state security.

Foreseeing multidimensional dangers emanating from collectivistic ideologies, proponents of liberal nationalist identity denounced the Armenian Cause as a unifying national and state ideology. Liberal nationalists refused to assign the state a paternalistic role and moral responsibility for addressing and restituting for all historical injustices, from Genocide recognition to recovering territorial losses and repatriation. They believed that politicization of the Armenian Cause not only would perpetuate the narrative of victim identity but also would evoke the externalization of primordial fears against the eternal enemy, Turkey. In addition to endorsing antidemocratic attitudes and building national unity based on the politics of anti-Turkishness, politicization of the Armenian Cause was also transforming victim identity into a victimized-resentful identity. Thus realizing the dangers of victim identity, liberal nationalists insisted on the necessity of redefining it, which had to start from imagining and practicing fearless and peaceful coexistence with the one who caused the crystallization of victim identity.

Liberal nationalists believed that given the objectively existing limitations of the Armenian state, and the present Turkish refusal to recognize past events as Genocide, neither forgetting nor forgiving would be satisfactory or reasonable responses. The ultimate question for them was how to remember a tragedy of this magnitude without losing the ability of distinguishing between unjust sufferings of the past and the urgent needs of an evolving present and future. Thus, they offered an understanding of history which stressed interconnectedness versus an isolated history of two peoples, and framed tragedy in a political language that could potentially reopen a desire for a fearless coexistence.
In sharp contrast to ethno-nationalists, whose perceptions of the Karabagh issue were framed through the prism of the Armenian Cause, liberal nationalists were very careful in drawing a line between the Armenian Cause and the Karabagh issue. Since the foundational tenets of the Armenian Cause were perpetuating irrational fears of pan-Turanic projects, and therefore also fostering anti-Turkish and anti-Azeri attitudes, framing the Karabagh issue within the context of the Armenian Cause was comparable to turning the political issue of national self-determination into ethno-territorial vengeance.

Even though seven districts in Azerbaijan proper were occupied during liberal nationalists' political leadership, for them the war in Karabagh did not mean pursuing the politics of territorial expansionism. It was a defensive war to protect Karabagh Armenians from mass deportations and ethnic cleansing. However, once the physical security of Karabagh Armenians was guaranteed, the problem had to be resolved through mutual territorial concessions without sacrificing Karabagh’s vital interests.

Liberal nationalists denounced traditional Armenian political thinking based on a romantic nationalism as being devoid of rational considerations for state and national security. Therefore, they criticized the politics of “maximalism” and territorial claims, arguing instead for the inevitability and necessity of establishing friendly relations with all neighboring states, including Turkey and “the most natural ally,” Azerbaijan.

Thus, despite military confrontation with Azerbaijan and to the dismay of ethno-nationalists, liberal nationalists remained committed to the objective of re-establishing relations with Azerbaijan. And for that reason, coupled with considerations of preventing more human losses, gloomy economic realities, and the international community’s disposition favoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it was necessary to achieve regional peace through negotiations and mutual territorial concessions.
Liberal nationalists believed that in Armenia, where historical grievances such as genocide and territorial disputes remain unresolved and where demography is an overwhelmingly significant concern, distributing citizenship rights to ethnic Armenians around the world with different political experiences and worldviews could be detrimental to state security. They believed that national identity is primarily a political phenomenon and requires shared political experiences within bounded political community. While they extended full civil and social rights to co-ethnics abroad, they believed that ethnicity was unacceptable for granting political rights to non-residents. From this perspective, liberal nationalists’ policies reflected the liberal doctrine of popular sovereignty according to which in order to sustain the self-determination of all those subject to the laws, only the governed ought to choose their government (Mill 1991 [1861]; Dahl 1989).

Besides, liberal nationalists argued that granting dual citizenship based solely on *jus sanguinis* would lead to ethnic selection and violate the principle of democratic equality, creating a society with first- and second-class citizens with different sets of rights and obligations. Instead, liberal nationalists contended that the primary goal of the state was the creation of a civic community in which rules and norms of the political culture must apply to all members of the political community equally. By promoting principles of democratic citizenship and by denying full membership to co-ethnics abroad, liberal nationalists essentially separated the institution of citizenship from ethnicity.

In sharp contrast, ethno-nationalists portrayed national identity as a matter of fate. Ethno-nationalists put forward considerable effort to frame all three identity issues from a primordial perspective and used a political language to promote an exclusively essentialist interpretation of the Armenian identity. They capitalized on the victimized aspect of the Armenian identity and advocated the image of a chosen people who survived despite historical and political upheavals. In addition, ethno-nationalists embraced the collectivistic national ideology of the Armenian Cause. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the Armenian Cause came to embrace not only
the three R’s—recognition of the Genocide, reparation of historic lands in Western Armenia, and
repatriation of Armenians to their historic homeland—but also Karabagh’s unification with Ar­
menia and the extension of citizenship rights to post-Genocide diaspora Armenians as a restitu­
tion for sufferings caused by historical injustices.

According to the ethno-nationalist view, achievement of the objectives of the Armenian
Cause must be the ultimate end and must be the guiding national ideology of the Armenian state.
In this view, the objectives of the Armenian Cause should not be subjected to critical reflection
and revisions. Ethno-nationalists willingly embraced the communitarian assumption of “situated
identity,” according to which the self is embedded in existing social practices and individuals’
actions cannot be detached from the community to which one belongs. Ethno-nationalists’ per­
sistent discourse framed within the framework of social and cultural determinism and their view
of identity as “situated,” “embedded,” or “given” were not attempts of merely describing the
Armenian identity. These attempts were clearly of prescriptive nature, imposing a view of what the
Armenian identity ought to be. As with all collectivistic ideals, the prescribed overarching national
identity would strip individuals of their freedom to search for alternative modes of remembering
the Genocide, imagining political boundaries of the Armenian state, and defining legal member­
ship in a political community based on ethnic criteria.

In their policies on the issue of Genocide, ethno-nationalists constrained the formulation
of the state’s strategic interests within the framework of past grievances. Essentially, ethno­
nationalists continued investing in the history of suffering, politicized victim identity, and framed
claims for recognition in a political language that sustained Turkey’s rejection of these claims. By
doing so, they secured the sustenance of victim identity, therefore justifying the non-revisable
nature of Armenian victimhood and “locating” a renewed reason for further resentment. In the
end, the ethno-nationalist politics of remembering does not allow the possibility that wrongs can
be temporally finite; instead, it fixes identity in injuries and sufferings of a never-ending past.
For ethno-nationalists, victories in Karabagh and in the surrounding seven Azerbaijani districts symbolized an ultimate turning point, shifting the nation's historical trajectory from endless humiliation and victimization to a restitution of justice, national liberation, and self-assertion. This is why any attempt at territorial concessions was seen as tantamount to betraying pan-national ideals and invalidating the long history of Armenians' sufferings. This is also why gloomy economic realities, predictions, and the international community's disposition towards favoring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity were not strong enough factors to overshadow the idea that victories in Karabagh should be cherished at all costs. And from that perspective, ethno-nationalists' territorial politics favored expansionism and nourished a vision of ethno-nationalist identity capitalizing on the victimized-but-resented elements of the Armenian self-image.

For ethno-nationalists, the policy of distinguishing between Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians was inherently anti-Armenian and was a violation of the old diaspora's moral entitlements to full citizenship rights as victims of the Genocide. Dual citizenship based on ethnic criteria was justified on the grounds of establishing a common national identity, which would facilitate the achievement of pan-national unification and a collective pursuit of historical justice, namely Genocide recognition and reclaiming of historical Armenian lands in Turkey. Therefore, ethno-nationalists established an institution of dual citizenship, which in practice will be available only to ethnic Armenians. This way they made citizenship rules dependent on a membership in an ethno-cultural community.

Moreover, even though dual citizenship will mainly be available to ethnic Armenians, the 2007 legislative amendments—such as the laws on the Citizenship, Military Service, and Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia—primarily promote the post-Genocide old diaspora's interests. The net effect of 2007 legislative amendments was an institutionalization of political inequality, protecting rights of the old "victim" diaspora but enforcing obligations on the new "labor" diaspora and local Armenian citizens. Consequently, ethno-nationalists redefined the rules of be-
longingness to a political community, established an institutional framework for the creation of first- and second-class citizens with different sets of rights and obligations, and reversed the institution of democratic citizenship.

In sum, through an extensive historical overview, and qualitative and quantitative analysis pertaining to three identity issues, my analysis revealed that Armenia’s political arena has been a site of contest between two contrasting visions of Armenian national identity: ethno-nationalist and liberal nationalist. Consistent with liberal nationalism, these findings demonstrate that operating within limits set by the social background, rational agents can question even the most constitutive elements and core beliefs of their national identity and reflect on them critically. Thus, national identity can be adapted to current salient problems, changing social realities and new opportunities; in these ways, national identity is fluid and provisional. It is important to emphasize that both camps were aware of the fluid nature of national identity. Ethno-nationalists, just like liberal nationalists, were not passive recipients of historical legacies. The ideas that furnish national identity, regardless of their content, as Miller notes: “are conscious creations of bodies of people, who have elaborated and revised them in order to make sense of their social and political surrounding . . .” (Miller 1995, 6). Hence, ethno-nationalists, just like liberal nationalists, were active participants in interpreting, revising, and offering a distinct view of Armenian national identity.

The important difference however, was that proponents of liberal nationalist identity challenged the view of Armenian national identity as a matter of fate. They encouraged critical reflection and rational deliberation over constitutive elements of national identity and argued that agents can revise and adapt them to current salient problems. Therefore, they rejected both the ideas of state-perfectionism and that the state should promote a particular conception of good, such as the fulfillment of the Armenian Cause. Liberal nationalists also rejected an essentialist under-
standing of Armenian identity and, instead, offered a “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity, which would celebrate ethnic heritage without compromising liberal principles.

In sharp contrast, proponents of ethno-nationalist identity capitalized on a view of identity as a matter of fate and, therefore, argued that Armenian identity cannot be subject to critical reflection. The identity that ethno-nationalists promoted was grounded in a particular conception of the good, that is, the adoption the Armenian Cause as the guiding state and national ideology, and the preservation of the Armenian ethno-religious identity in its “pristine form.” Therefore, it required a perfectionist state, which rather than acknowledging that there is a plurality of valuable goals, which are “in perpetual rivalry with one another,” would specify and impose the common good on individuals residing within its political borders (Berlin 1969, 171; Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1989; Kymlicka 2002). Hence, ethno-nationalists promoted “thick” national identity exclusively based on a primordial understanding of Armenianness, redraw political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic claims, and largely discounted demands of liberal democratic justice.

Finally, another important difference is that while distinct national identities advocated by both camps undoubtedly contain elements of invention and myth, nevertheless, the extent of historical revisionism will vary greatly. Liberal nationalist type, which is a result of critical reflection and open deliberation, will not be based on a blatantly falsified interpretation of historical events and will be more receptive of new ideas that challenge the conventional interpretation of national identity. In addition, liberal nationalist identity will certainly be more dynamic since it will be a result of a more or less open dialogue between state and society regarding national issues of concern. Consequently, liberal nationalist type of national identity to a large extent will be reflective of citizens’ aspirations since it will be an outcome of common deliberations, where both the public and elites are important agents in constructing narratives pertaining to national identity issues.
In contrast, proponents of ethno-nationalist type of identity, who as a norm serve a narrower range of interests, often will engage in a blatant falsification of the historical record (Miller 1995). Proponents of ethno-nationalist identity, who support the idea of state perfectionism and, therefore, the idea of an authoritative imposition of a particular conception of good (i.e., the primacy of the Armenian Cause and the preservation of the Armenian ethno-religious identity in its “pristine form”), will block any new ideas that challenge the collectivistic sense of identity. Consequently, the ethno-nationalist type of identity will to a large extent be inflexible and unreflective of citizenry choices, and will certainly be resistant, if not intolerant, to alternative explanations and new ideas pertaining to national issues of concern.

Using political elites’ identity rhetoric, I also gauged public perceptions of key issues central to Armenian national identity. Analysis of my survey data revealed similar tendencies at the public level. Like political elites in the third interval, the public endorsed contesting liberal and ethnic as well as mixed approaches to the three identity issues in 2006. Nevertheless, descriptive comparisons revealed that the public’s and political elites’ endorsements of these approaches were marked by sharp discrepancies. The closest proximity between the public and political elites appeared to be on the liberal nationalist approach to the issue of Genocide and Relations with Turkey (see Figure 6.1). Still, the public’s and political elites’ perceptions diverged on ethno-nationalist and mixed approaches to this issue. Similarly, for the remaining two issues of war and dual citizenship, the public’s and elites’ perceptions were marked by sharp discrepancies. Moreover, survey data revealed that, unlike political elites, who chose overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist approaches to all three issues, a plurality of respondents endorsed neither majority liberal nor majority ethnic approaches and preferred an approach that would incorporate elements of both approaches to all three identity issues.

One of the important findings of this study was the detection of the mixed type both at the public and official levels. Although the public and the elites supported mixed identity type at
widely different rates, the presence of the middle ground is an illustrative example demonstrating that identity categories identified in my research are not fixed or exhaustive. The presence of the middle ground reinforces a common consensus that typologies should be treated as proximities, which help us to file certain attributes together and make sense of broad general tendencies. Specifically, in the case of my research the detection of the mixed type is also indicative of a plausible possibility that Armenian liberal and ethno-nationalist identity types do overlap to some degree, even though they are marked by sharp differences and incompatibilities.

I noted that given the dearth of theoretical expectations regarding the mixed type of national identity, the analysis of this study was limited to liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist identity types. I acknowledge that this is one of the limitations of my study and that this important finding needs further fine-grained analysis. For instance, the question of whether the mixed type should be treated as a separate type of national identity or not merits further exploration. Similarly, it is important to discern if the mixed type is at odds or compatible with liberal nationalist and ethno-nationalist types. Also, it would be important to explain the ways the public's identity choices in general, and the choice of the mixed type in particular, interact with the public's socio-economic conditions.

Finally, it would be critical to understand whether more active political representation of the mixed type could introduce variations in levels of political trust, democratic attitudes, and ethical standards for the supporters of the mixed identity. Since the mixed approach to key identity issues received the least support from political elites, it would be reasonable to expect that supporters of the mixed approach would have the lowest levels of trust, ethical standards, and democratic attitudes, compared to supporters of liberal and ethno-nationalist approaches. On the other hand, one could also expect relatively higher levels for these variables since supporters of mixed identity endorsed equally liberal and ethnic approaches to identity issues. In sum, since it
is of great theoretical importance to understand implications of an identity that is mixed in substance, I intend to explore it in my future research.

Another central question deserving further exploration is whether political elites are capable of liberally swaying public perceptions of identity issues. The fact that endorsements of identity types by the public and the elites have been marked by sharp discrepancies suggests that the public's identity perceptions might not be as easily manipulated as it has been argued in the literature, emphasizing the "elite manipulation" view. According to this view, masses are at the receiving end of identity cues engineered by "ideologues." Nevertheless, the fact that both the public and the elites opted for contesting liberal and ethnic as well as mixed approaches to the three identity issues, albeit endorsing them at widely different rates, suggests that a view of national identity as a "mass driven phenomenon" cannot be entirely supported either.

It appears, therefore, that both the public and elites are important agents in constructing narratives pertaining to national identity issues. This proposition is consistent with the view that members of the nation—that is, citizens of a political community as bearers of sovereign power and will—collectively deliberate on constitutive elements of their national identity. Yet as mentioned before, the collective deliberation aspect will vary widely depending on regime type. For instance, unlike in consolidated democracies, the content of national identity will be imposed from above in authoritarian regimes. This is also a critical juncture where the regime type becomes crucial for predicting whether identity will be manifested in liberal or illiberal forms. This is not to imply that regime type will invariably determine the type of national identity. As I mentioned previously, while authoritarian regimes in Latin America embraced anti-democratic principles, they nevertheless defined their citizenship rules in ways consistent with civic standards.

However, the regime type will be crucial for the extent to which the public's identity narratives will be suppressed or form an important part in national identity constructs. From this perspective, the Armenian case provides a telling illustration of the problems associated with the
regime and the identity type. In Armenia, where the current political regime is marked by anti-
democratic tendencies and where the endorsed type of national identity by political elites cur-
rently in power is predominantly ethno-nationalist, it is not unreasonable to expect a suppression
of the public’s identity preferences.

And indeed, my results point towards this direction. One of the striking paradoxes I
detected in my study was that in the third interval, from 2002 through 2006, elected public of-
ficials did not adopt more popular policy positions. To the contrary, their policies on these three
identity issues remained overwhelmingly ethno-nationalist, therefore persistently ignoring the
public’s visions of national identity. This finding is paradoxical in a sense that according to the
logic of electoral politics in liberal democracies, Armenian politicians should have been inter-
ested in expanding their electoral base by offering an acceptable array of identity choices to their
respective electorates. Yet this logic is applicable in liberal democracies where ordinary citizens
exert relatively high degree of control over elected officials.

In countries like Armenia where fraudulent and rigged elections are a norm rather than an
exception, elected officials are not obligated either by their promise or action to deliver or
represent popular wishes. In fact, Armenia’s electoral politics fits uneasily even into minimalist
procedural definitions of democracy, where selecting leaders competitively is a minimum require-
ment for democracy and where the legitimacy of public decisions and decision-makers is guar-
anteed as a result of their competitive electoral victory (Schumpeter 1942; Sartori 1987). In Armenia,
where electoral victory largely is not dependent on effective functioning of institutional-pro-
cedural mechanisms, politicians neither can reasonably be held responsive and accountable for
their decisions nor will they have electoral incentives to confine their decisions to reflect wishes
of the electorate. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the wide gap between citizenry and official
national identity choices in Armenia is indicative of the current political regime’s persistent anti-
democratic tendencies.
In addition, as emphasized previously, proponents of ethno-nationalist identity also support the idea of state perfectionism and, therefore, the centrality of positive liberty. Ethno-nationalists in general do not oppose the idea of an authoritative imposition of a particular conception of good, such as the primacy of the Armenian Cause and the preservation of the Armenian ethnorenigious identity in its "pristine form." Consequently, policy decisions made by officials endorsing ethno-nationalist type of identity will to a large extent be unreflective of citizenry choices. Ethno-nationalist type of identity as a norm is resistant to, if not intolerant of, alternative explanations and new ideas pertaining to national self-definition. It follows, therefore, that officials endorsing ethno-nationalist type of identity will block any new ideas that challenge the collectivistic sense and the conventional interpretation of national identity.

It appears, therefore, that the suppression of the public's national identity preferences could be explained as a consequence of Armenia's anti-democratic political regime on the one hand, and of the endorsement of ethno-nationalist type of identity by anti-democratic political elites on the other.

7.2 Theoretical Implication of the Study

I argued that because of its ethnic homogeneity, Armenia is an ideal case for empirically testing theoretical expectations pertaining to national identity. Indeed, the case study of identity politics in ethnically homogeneous Armenia offers a number of valuable insights with broader theoretical implications.

First, findings of this study challenge the extensive literature on nationalism. My quantitative analysis both at the official and public levels confirmed that the identity anomalies I detected in my qualitative analysis since 1988 were not a historical accident but rather were pervasive features encompassing both the public's and political elites' identity perceptions throughout the research period. Yet, these anomalies remain largely undetected in the extensive literature on
nationalism. Here, the conventional assumption is that the shared ethno-religious, linguistic, and cultural attributes of a homogeneous community so powerfully shape its collective identity that no politically significant internal disagreements could arise in an ethnically homogeneous state. Employing different methodological techniques, my results persistently challenged this assumption both at the elite and public levels.

Contrary to a prevalent assumption in the literature of nationalism, findings of this study illustrate that since national identity is primarily a political phenomenon, ethno-cultural homogeneity alone cannot guarantee a harmonious flow of worldviews pertaining to national identity in a bounded political community. Findings reveal that contrasting ways of remembering, imagining political boundaries, and defining belongingness to a political community are not the province of ethnically heterogeneous states alone.

Findings also illustrate that national identity is fluid and provisional even in ethnically homogeneous states, where ethno-religious attributes of citizenry remain constant. Findings clearly indicate that operating within limits set by the social background, rational agents even in ethnically homogeneous states can question constitutive elements and core beliefs of their national identity and reflect on them critically. Essentially, my results demonstrate that assuming unproblematic relationships between ethnic homogeneity and national identity obscures the political aspect of national identity as a pervasive feature inherent in all states, irrespective of their ethnic composition.

Second, persistent identity contestation in ethnically homogeneous Armenia also challenges the post-Soviet literature. In this literature, Armenia remains classified as having a single and institutionalized ethnic type of identity inherited from its Soviet past. Scholars have long established that as a result of Soviet nationality policies, ethnicity was institutionalized as a fundamental social category across Soviet space. In Armenia, just like in all other titular republics, Soviet policies of nation-building resulted in an institutionalization of territorialized ethno-cultural identities. Based on this, scholars developed a Soviet legacy hypothesis, according to which
titular republics, particularly the ones in the South Caucasus, inherited a single and institutionalized ethnic type of identity from their Soviet past.

However, my findings demonstrate that generalizations based on a "common Soviet legacy" hypothesis are misleading since they overlook significant differences existing within post-Soviet states. For instance, while in most of this literature the year of 1988 is marked as the beginning of Armenian "belligerent ethnic nationalism," I demonstrated that since then a new liberal-nationalist type of Armenian identity emerged as an antithesis to the dominant ethno-nationalist type.

My findings particularly at the public level cast doubt on the assumption according to which Armenian ethnic nationalism is a mass phenomenon driven by irrational co-ethnics. Neither the majority nor a plurality of respondents endorsed an ethno-nationalist approach to any of the identity issues analyzed in this study. Across all three identity issues, a plurality of respondents opted for a mixed approach that would incorporate elements from both liberal and ethnic ends. Moreover, in addition to the mixed approach, respondents also endorsed equally ethnic and liberal approaches to the issue of war and possible solutions. Finally, in the case of dual citizenship the second largest group was the one endorsing liberal nationalist approach. Hence, a mere presence of diverse approaches to constitutive elements of Armenian national identity refutes the assumption of an internal homogeneity of interests among co-ethnics on the one hand, and the argument about irrationality of masses on the other.

Results at both the elite and public levels offer a new perspective on understanding post-Soviet identities. Essentially, they suggest that even though ethno-cultural aspects of national identity remain persistent features, political aspects of Armenian national identity have not been as deeply institutionalized along ethnic lines as it has been argued so far. To the contrary, the political boundaries of Armenian national identity remain porous. They are neither clearly specified nor commonly shared, particularly at the public level, and have a potential to change in
reaction to socio-economic, political, and external pressures. Therefore, rather than being “fixed,” political boundaries of national identity are dialectical constructs and unfinished narratives based on rival visions, worldviews, and agendas about the nation’s collective future. It follows therefore, that “identity as an event” view, prevalent in post-Soviet studies, must be rejected, since this view cannot capture the dynamic nature of national identity.

Hence, results of this study illustrate that Armenian national identity—considered by many as uncontested because of a shared language, religion, history, myths, and the Soviet legacy—contains contesting criteria for assessing its constitutive and primarily political elements. These findings reinforce my argument that ethno-cultural and political aspects of national identity must be disentangled for analytical purposes. They indicate that a failure to do so may lead to overlooking fundamental differences existing among members of a single ethnic group and the ways they are willing to remember their tragic past, imagine political boundaries of the state and define the rules of belongingness to a political community. In sum, the equation of ethno-cultural and political aspects of national identity has been an elementary error both of the Soviet legacy hypothesis as well as of the mainstream nationalism literature, leading to a failure to detect differences of identity politics among co-ethnics and contrasting styles of “imagining” Armenian national identity.

The findings of this study also demonstrated that identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state can be a problematic phenomenon. As mentioned previously, this study builds on central propositions by scholars of liberal nationalism who primarily engage in theorizing the centrality of common national identity in liberal societies. Here, thin national identity is essential not for promoting a particular conception of the common good but rather for providing a source of trust, increasing the likelihood of citizens fulfilling their obligation of justice and enhancing democratic values. I argued that while scholars in this tradition have provided compelling arguments regarding the instrumental and ethical significance of shared national identity in liberal
societies, it is not clear how we should assess the instrumental and ethical significance of a shared national identity, which is based on anti-democratic visions and illiberal values. To have a better grasp of this issue, I tested theoretical propositions of liberal nationalism pertaining to political trust, ethical issues, and democratic attitudes as a function of my empirically informed identity categories of liberal and ethno-nationalists. Within this context, the central issue that I sought to explain was whether identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state can be a problematic phenomenon, affecting political trust, perceptions of social justice, and democratic attitudes.

At the most fundamental level, my findings suggest that national identity does matter for explaining political trust, democratic attitudes and ethical issues. A second implication of my findings is that identity contestation produces variations in political trust, democratic attitudes, and ethical issues. Essentially, results suggest that studies explaining these variables should consider not only national identity but also whether that identity is shared by the members of a political community. Third, results suggest that the type of shared identity is of great importance. Whether the type of the shared national identity is based on liberal or illiberal content, will assist in assessing not only its instrumental value but also its ethical significance for the explained variables.

**7.2.1 National Identity and Political Trust**

Consistent with liberal nationalism, my findings suggested that the absence of a shared national identity depresses levels of political trust. To put it differently, political trust will be enhanced under conditions when national identity is shared among members of a political community, both at the public and elite levels. Shared national identity, indeed, bears an instrumental value, as it provides citizens with a predictable environment facilitating trust. Under these conditions, citizens will exhibit higher levels of confidence in politicians' technical competency.
Citizens will also believe that political elites’ policy choices have been determined by considerations that go beyond self-interest. In other words, citizens will have higher levels of confidence that elected political elites demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their own and therefore fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. From this perspective, shared national identity also has an ethical significance. It provides co-citizens with a shared sense of connection with each other at a deeper level, where members believe that their interests do matter and have been taken seriously. In sum, the multitude of incompatible ends pursued by citizens will not amount to a social paralysis if citizens share national identity, providing a foundation for co-citizens to believe that they belong to the same moral community.

What is more, my findings suggest that shared national identity’s instrumental value and ethical significance for political trust hold true irrespective of the type of shared national identity. They indicate that respondents who shared the government’s predominantly ethno-nationalist approaches to identity issues had higher levels of both technical and fiduciary trust compared to respondents endorsing liberal nationalist views. Thus, as long as national identity is shared, regardless whether the type of shared identity is liberal or ethnic, political trust will be enhanced. This finding by itself adds a new perspective for explaining political trust.

First, it demonstrates that political trust is likely to be enhanced if both the public and political elites hold a common vision pertaining to the constitutive elements of national identity. Second, it demonstrates that for enhanced political trust, the shared national identity does not need to be liberal in content. Third, it offers a cautious observation pertaining to the ethical significance of shared ethno-nationalist type of identity for political trust. Although a shared ethno-nationalist type of identity provides a foundation for co-citizens to believe that they belong to the same moral community, the community here is perceived in a strictly communitarian sense. As I spelled out in the first chapter, the communitarian assumption of a just political community is the one where members share a conception of a particular common good determined by communal
values. What is more, here communal values determine individuals' social situations and roles. Communal values as "authoritative horizons" set worthy projects to be pursued by individuals, consequently limiting the ability of individuals to revise their ends. Therefore, the ethical significance for political trust that is triggered by ethno-nationalist visions of national identity and its constitutive elements has a limited scope and is incompatible with liberal principles of choice, self-determination and rational deliberation.

7.2.2 National Identity and Democratic Attitudes

My findings also suggest that compared to supporters of liberal nationalist visions on identity issues, supporters of ethno-nationalist visions were more satisfied with the state of democracy and were more optimistic about democratic progress in future. In other words, it appears that if the type of shared national identity is ethno-nationalist, governments with a democratic deficiency will be criticized less and will receive higher rates of evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy. This is a very important finding since it demonstrates that even though in 2006 Armenian political elites enjoyed the public's trust and received higher rates of satisfaction with democracy because of a shared predominantly ethno-nationalist identity type, this was trust and approval for a government which was nevertheless marked by anti-democratic tendencies.

This finding contributes to an ongoing scholarly debate regarding relationships between trust and democracy by emphasizing the centrality of national identity types not only for political trust but also for democratic attitudes. It demonstrates that political trust does not necessarily enhance democracy, particularly if it is based on inherently anti-democratic premises, such as trusting a paternalistic government that endorses "thick" ethno-nationalist conceptions of a political community. It appears, therefore, that if political trust originates from a shared national identity which is illiberal in its content, the likelihood of enhanced democratic attitudes will be impaired. Thus, even though a shared ethno-nationalist type of identity bears an instrumental
value for its supporters to justify an anti-democratic political regime, its ethical significance is compromised. In sum, for shared national identity to have a beneficial effect on democratic attitudes, it has to be based on values that promote “thin” liberal nationalist conceptions of national self-image without compromising of liberal principles.

7.2.3 National Identity and Ethical Issues

My findings regarding perceptions of social justice and fairness also point to the centrality of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal forms of national identity and offer a new perspective for understanding relationships between national identity and ethical issues. Interestingly, results suggest that enhanced perceptions of ethical issues do not require a shared vision pertaining to constitutive elements of national identity What mattered, however, was the type of national identity by itself, regardless whether that type was shared by the public and political elites. Although respondents exhibited quite high ethical standards overall, these intriguing results deserve a special, albeit a cautious consideration regarding identity typologies and perceptions of fairness and justice in a society.

It appears that supporters of a liberal nationalist approach are more prone to fulfill their obligations of social justice and maintain the framework of redistributive projects. They are more willing to participate in projects that provide opportunities to people with permanent disabilities and are less likely to avoid paying a fare on public transportation. They are more likely to condemn such social malaise as corruption and are less likely to cheat on taxes.

From this perspective national identity, indeed, bears an ethical significance as has been powerfully argued by scholars of liberal nationalism. Yet, again, it is important to discriminate between types of national identity. It appears that unlike supporters of ethno-nationalism, supporters of liberal nationalism are more likely to fulfill obligations of liberal democratic citizen-
ship. Moreover, they are more likely to exhibit higher ethical standards, regardless whether their endorsed type of identity is shared or not at the official level.

In sum, following central propositions of liberal nationalism, I nevertheless contended that it is not clear how we should assess the instrumental and ethical significance of a shared national identity which is based on anti-democratic visions and illiberal values. Therefore, I tested theoretical propositions of liberal nationalism pertaining to trust, ethical issues, and democratic attitudes, as a function of my empirically informed identity categories of liberal and ethno-nationalists. Overall, the findings of this study reinforce my argument that empirically informed identity categories can be useful tools for gauging whether identity is manifested in liberal or illiberal forms. Further, findings suggest that empirically informed identity categories have a potential for enhancing our conceptualizations of various identity manifestations and assist in assessing their instrumental and ethical implications for political trust, democratic attitudes, and perceptions of social justice and fairness. Thus, this study also contributes to typological analysis of the national identity.

Essentially, my results suggest that studies explaining political trust, democratic attitudes and ethical issues not only should consider national identity but also need to determine whether that identity is shared by the members of a political community. They also indicate that the type of shared identity is central for assessing its instrumental and ethical implications for the explained variables. Findings suggest that even though shared ethno-nationalist vision of national identity fulfills some instrumental functions for its supporters, its ethical significance for political trust and democratic attitudes is limited in its scope and is incompatible with liberal principles of self-determination, choice, and rational deliberation. Furthermore, in case of ethical issues ethno-nationalist type of identity does not bear any ethical significance.

From a strictly instrumentalist point of view, supporters of liberal nationalist type of identity are more likely to fulfill obligations of liberal democratic citizenship, and therefore are
more likely to contribute to effective functioning of liberal democracy. Very importantly, supporters of this identity type are more likely to condemn anti-democratic tendencies and critically evaluate the democratic progress in the country. What is more, when it comes to social justice, liberal nationalist type of identity has a built-in universalistic scope. Supporters of this identity type are more prone to fulfill their obligations of social justice and maintain the framework of redistributive projects regardless whether their endorsed liberal nationalist identity type is shared or not at the official level. Thus, the ethical significance of liberal nationalist type of identity is indisputable since it serves a wider range of interests in case of political trust and democratic attitudes and has a built-in universalistic scope in case of ethical issues.

It must be emphasized that even though my data reveal relationships between analyzed variables, these relationships are not causal. In other words, I do not claim that variations in political trust, democratic attitudes, and ethical issues are necessarily caused by a contestation of identity. Rather my intention has been to demonstrate that levels of these variables appear to vary depending on whether national identity is shared or contested. Political trust, for instance, depends on a number of factors, from a personal dislike of a particular official to socio-economic characteristics of a respondent. I am proposing that shared national identity or its contestation could be one of these factors.

One of the questions that still needs to be addressed is regarding my claim that the national identity contestation in an ethnically homogeneous state is problematic. Thus, a legitimate question that this study could raise would be the following: If we care about effective functioning of liberal democracy then we should not condemn identity contestation as a problematic phenomenon. To the contrary, we should celebrate diverse identity formulations, and therefore treat identity contestation as a sign of a healthy and open political environment rather than as a political problem. It appears, therefore, that the absence rather than the presence of contestation is the real problem since the absence of contestation also implies an absence of a vibrant society...
with an unobstructed flow of ideas, choices, and preferences about constitutive elements of national identity.

Surely, contestation in general is a sign of a healthy competition. Moreover, I do believe that the absence of identity contestation either at the public level or at the official level is neither realistic nor desirable. Complete unanimity on national identity implies a suppression of diversity and a dangerous artificiality, which can be achieved only through heavy social engineering. Indeed, one of the concerning signs detected in this study was a tendency of an almost unanimous agreement on ethno-nationalist approaches to all three national identity issues in the second and third election intervals, at the official level. In this case, the problem is the near absence of identity contestation and the fact that ethno-nationalist identity has been so strongly supported at the elite level.

However, identity contestation becomes problematic when it comes down to state society relations. Identity contestation is problematic under conditions of such a wide gap between official and public perceptions of national identity. The detection of identity contestation at such high rates is indicative of institutional and socio-political deficiencies and raises a number of concerns. The first concern that I already discussed is regarding the suppression of citizenry identity preferences.

In Armenia, where electoral victory largely is not dependent on effective functioning of institutional-procedural mechanisms, politicians neither can be held responsive and accountable for their decisions nor will they have electoral incentives to confine their decisions to reflect wishes of the electorate. In addition, as explained before, policy decisions by officials endorsing ethno-nationalist type of identity will to a large extent be unreflective of citizenry choices. Thus, the contestation between citizens' and elites' national identity visions is problematic since it is indicative of the current political regime’s persistent anti-democratic tendencies. Moreover, under conditions when the public’s identity preferences are not channeled through institutional
mechanism, high rates of identity contestation can lead to alternative means of expressions, including social unrests and violence.

Further, when contestation at high rates is about national self-definition, then the presence of contestation is more indicative of social polarization rather than of a lively debate. A great number of scholars have explored socio-political problems caused by social polarization. For instance, Knack and Keefer (1997) argued that individuals and groups in polarized societies have greater incentives to renounce policy agreements. Uslaner (2002) found that in polarized societies both individuals and political parties “are increasingly likely to deny that their political opponents are part of our moral community” (Uslaner 2002, 215). In sum, according to a general consensus in polarized societies it is more difficult for opponents to sustain liberal democratic virtues of tolerance and fair compromises.

What is more, when co-nationals, irrespective of their ethno-cultural differences, have deep disagreements about the meaning of membership and belonging to a political community, then these disagreements could be an indication of a crisis of common national identity. In fact, several minority separatist movements or inter-communal hatreds and violence have been caused by deep disagreements on basic features of common national identity in ethnically heterogeneous states. And there is no good reason to assume that ethnically homogeneous states are immune from intolerance of alternative ideas, intra-communal clashes and violence under conditions of social polarization and identity crisis.

Another way of answering this question is to revisit the old question of social unity. How should modern societies maintain social unity given what Rawls has called the fact of pluralism: “How is social unity to be understood, given that there can be no public agreement on the one rational good, and a plurality of opposing and incommensurable conceptions must be taken as given?” (Rawls 1998, 70; 1971). Rawls’s own solution to maintaining social unity was based on citizens’ public acceptance of the principles of justice. In other words, Rawls argued that when
members of a society share the same principles of justice, which are also intuitively fair, then the
dilemma of social unity would be solved, since citizens would believe that they belong together in
a single moral community.

Communitarians in contrast argued that communal values were the only solid foundation
enabling the shared sense of belongingness and social unity. However, liberal nationalists argued
that imposition of communal values on a society would deprive individuals from their freedom of
choice and reflection on constitutive elements of national identity. In such societies, in other
words, social unity would be an outcome of social engineering rather than of a voluntary citizenry
agreement. Liberal nationalists also challenged Rawls’s formula of social unity. For instance,
reflecting on Rawls’s argument about social unity as an outcome of shared principles of justice
Tamir noted: “But this agreement is too thin, and is insufficient to ensure the continued existence
of a closed community in which members care for each other’s welfare, as well as for the well-
being of future generation” (Tamir 1993, 118).

Therefore, liberal nationalists argued that social unity requires that citizens share a sense
of community that goes deeper than the sharing of political principles. As Kymlicka notes:
“Social unity in short, requires that citizens identify with each other, and view their fellow
citizens as one of ‘us.’ This sense of shared belonging and shared identity helps sustain the relation­
ship of trust and solidarity needed for citizens to accept the results of democratic decisions
and the obligations of liberal justice” (Kymlicka 2002, 257).

Although I am in an agreement with liberal nationalists’ view of common national iden­
tity as being essential for sustaining social unity, critics might still argue that any assumption con­
cerning the primacy of national identity is “empirically questionable” (Charney 2003, 296). At
this juncture it would be appropriate to revisit my results for the political trust variable. I dis­
tinguished between the technical competency and fiduciary responsibility dimensions of political
trust, where the former deals with satisfaction with outputs and the performances of political
authorities, while the latter deals with the public’s attitude towards regime-level objects regardless of their performance (Hetherington 2005). As Barber notes, fiduciary trust refers to “the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for others’ interests above their own” (Barber 1983, 15).

Scholars have noted that distrust is not always the opposite of trust, particularly considering the paradoxical nature of representative democracies. For instance, on the one hand representative democracies require citizens to trust that their interests will be appropriately represented by elected officials. On the other hand, they also require citizens to be critical and scrutinize elected officials and, if necessary, to punish those who do not fulfill expectations of technical competency. Hence, both trust and distrust are implied in and even necessary for healthy democratic process. However, since fiduciary trust measures the public’s general satisfaction with the system, failed expectations of fiduciary obligations are not as easily reparable. For instance, Barber notes that fiduciary obligation goes beyond technically competent performance to the moral dimension of interaction and is essential for the relatively orderly functioning of society.

Data results of my own study suggest that levels of both technical and fiduciary aspects of trust vary as a result of identity contestation. Consistent with the scholarly consensus, I believe that lower levels in technical trust could be interpreted as a sign of democratic process. However, the problem is that supporters of liberal nationalist type of identity not only have lower levels of technical but also of fiduciary trust. These results are particularly important considering that lower levels of both types of trust are correlated with discrepancies between official and public perceptions about key issues central to national identity. In other words, even though we could treat the absence of the technical trust as a normal outcome of the democratic process, failed expectations of fiduciary responsibility reflects systemic problems in Armenia’s democracy. It implies alienation and apathy, both of which are clearly dysfunctional for democracy.

---

1 This must be stated cautiously nevertheless, since as I demonstrated electoral politics of Armenian democracy does not fit well even into minimalist definitions of democracy.
Consequently, findings of this study indicate that arguments by scholars of liberal nationalism regarding the primacy of national identity particularly for sustaining social unity are not “empirically questionable.” To the contrary, not just national identity, but whether it is shared or contested has important implications for healthy functioning of democracies. It provides co-citizens with a shared sense of connection with each other at a deeper level, where members believe that their interests do matter and have been taken seriously. In sum, values, issues, and goals that citizens have may vary from person to person. But the multitude of incompatible ends pursued by citizens will not amount to a social paralysis if citizens share national identity, providing a foundation for co-citizens to believe that they belong to the same moral community, and therefore a foundation for social unity.

Therefore, this study contributes to the theory of liberal nationalist in two respects. First, while scholars of liberal nationalism acknowledge the fundamental differences between thick and thin versions of identity their discussions are limited to “thin” liberal nationalist type of national identity. Consequently, liberal nationalists’ compelling arguments are limited to the ethical and instrumental significance of only “thin” type of national identity. The novelty of this research is that it tested liberal nationalism’s central propositions not only as a function of shared liberal nationalist but also of ethno-nationalist types of identity. Put differently, it assessed the instrumental and ethical significance of shared national identity types for political trust, democratic attitudes, and perceptions of social justice.

Second, this study offers a cautious observation regarding the critical importance of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal forms of national identity. As such, it addresses one of the central, yet misleading criticisms of liberal nationalism, according to which “if common national identity intended as a normative ideal, the theory lends itself to a prioritizing of identities that are profoundly illiberal” (Charney 2003, 296). As mentioned previously scholars of liberal nationalism do acknowledge this critical difference. Therefore, consistent with liberal nationalism, the
study concludes that before celebrating the instrumental value and the ethical significance of a common national identity for political trust, democratic attitudes, and social justice, we ought to make sure that it is based on values that promote "thin" liberal nationalist conceptions of national self-image, without compromising liberal principles.
Appendix A

Coding: A Sample of Political Elites Positions on Key Issues
Central to National Identity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDENTITY ISSUES</th>
<th>POSITIONS</th>
<th>CODING</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Genocide and Relations</td>
<td>Relations must not be based on a precondition of recognizing the Genocide</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Turkey</td>
<td>Solution of the Armenian Cause must be dictated by both national and state realistic interests</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Cause must not be part of the state foreign policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations must be based on a precondition of recognizing the Genocide</td>
<td>Ethno-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Genocide (both recognition and territorial reparations) is part of the Armenian Cause</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Cause must be part of the state foreign policy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party/presidential candidate does not mention the issue at all</td>
<td>D/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions</td>
<td>Phased solution. Territorial concessions are possible</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MK is not part of the Armenian Cause</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Package solution. Territorial concessions are not possible</td>
<td>Ethno-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Genocide (both recognition and territorial reparations) and MK is part of the Armenian Cause</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party/presidential candidate does not mention the issue at all</td>
<td>D/M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>Legal distinction between Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians.</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>No legal distinction between Armenian citizens and ethnic Armenians</td>
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<td>Unification of all Armenians is part of the Armenian Cause</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Unification of all Armenians and Genocide (both recognition and territorial reparations) is part of the Armenian Cause</td>
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Appendix B

Relative Percentage of Party Policy Positions (Relative % PPP)
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<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>2. War in MK and Possible Solutions</th>
<th>3. Dual Citizenship</th>
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Appendix C

Differential Issue Saliency Index

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### YEAR ISSUE 1 Genocide and Relations with Turkey

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### YEAR ISSUE 2 War in Mountainous Karabagh (MK) and Possible Solutions

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### YEAR ISSUE 3 Dual Citizenship

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</tbody>
</table>
QUESTIONNAIRE

Technical Trust

7. Do you believe that political parties in the National Assembly are competent and have enough knowledge to represent peoples' interests.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know

9. How satisfied are you with the way politicians handling the country’s affairs now?

1. Very satisfied
2. Fairly satisfied
3. Fairly dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
5. Don’t know

15. People have different views about current national leadership. Where on this scale would you put the leadership by Robert Kocharyan. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going now. (1 means very good and 10 means very bad.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The questionnaire lists only those questions that have been analyzed for this study.
10. Do you agree that on the whole, Armenian elections reflect the wishes of most citizens.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know

11. Do you agree with an opinion that voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in the country.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know

12. Do you agree with the following sentence “I would like to be more active in the politics if political leaders paid more attention to my concerns.”

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know

20. Do you think that politicians in Armenia demonstrate a special concern for people’s interests like you above their own interests.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know
Democratic Values

8. Do you think that citizens have to hold democratically elected deputies responsible for their bad political choices.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree
5. Don’t know

13. People have different views about Soviet Union. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was during communist times. Here is a scale for rating how well things were going during Soviet Union. (1 means very good and 10 means very bad.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Good</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

18. In politics different political parties often hold different views. Which do you think is better:

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<tr>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Parties should be prepared to cooperate with each other, even if it means that parties need to make concessions and give up some of their important ideological beliefs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parties should stand firm for their ideological beliefs, even if it prevents possibilities of cooperation with other parties.</td>
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19. Do you think that democratically elected politicians in general have a moral obligation and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for citizens’ interests above their own.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
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</table>
Democratic Evaluation

16. Overall how do you feel about the process of democracy in Armenia. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going now. (1 means very good and 10 means very bad.)

| Very Good | | | | | | | | | | | Very Bad |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1         | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

17. Where on this scale would you put democracy as you expect it will be in 10 years from now. Here is a scale for rating your expectations. (1 means very good and 10 means very bad.)

| Very Good | | | | | | | | | | | Very Bad |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1         | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Ethical Issues

21. Using this scale please tell us whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between.

**Ignoring needs of people with disabilities**

| Never Justifiable | | | | | | | | | | | Always Justifiable |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1                 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
22. Using this scale please tell us whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between.

**Avoiding the fare on public transportation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never Justifiable</th>
<th>Always Justifiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Using this scale please tell us whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between.

**Cheating on taxes if you have a chance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never Justifiable</th>
<th>Always Justifiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Using this scale please tell us whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between.

**Accepting a bribe in the course of duties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never Justifiable</th>
<th>Always Justifiable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Using this scale please tell us whether you think it can always be justified, never justified, or something in between.
Committing suicide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dual Citizenship

27. Do you support dual citizenship in Armenia and under what conditions?

<p>| | | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I support it without any restrictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I am against dual citizenship in Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I support dual citizenship irrespective of dual citizens’ ethnicity and religious beliefs, but on conditions that dual citizens must perform military or alternative service, pay taxes and be permanent residents in order to have the rights of electing and being elected.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dual citizenship has to be only for ethnic Armenians without any restrictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Only ethnic Armenians should have the right for dual citizenship but only if they perform military or alternative service, pay taxes and be permanent residents in order to have the rights of electing and being elected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Different people have different opinions about dual citizenship consequences in Armenia. Please tell us if you agree with the following argument:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Results of Armenian Presidential and Parliamentary elections will be determined abroad because twice as many Armenians live abroad than in Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
War in Mountainous Karabagh and Possible Solutions

34. Here are some possible approaches to solve the issue of Mountainous Karabagh. Please tell us if you agree, disagree or don’t know.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There is no need for negotiations at all because we won the war.</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mountainous Karabagh remains de facto self-proclaimed independent republic, some of the occupied territories (excluding Lachin corridor and Shushi) are returned to Azerbaijan, security of Armenians is guaranteed but the final legal-political status of Mountainous Karabagh must be resolved through negotiations</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Genocide and Relations with Turkey

41. Do you consider the issue of improving Armenian-Turkish relations and opening borders as urgent today?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know

42. Do you think Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is possible... (Only one answer!).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Without preconditions</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Only if Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. First step must be the establishment of diplomatic relations. After that Armenian government can insist on the Genocide recognition</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Through the establishment of economic relations with Turkey</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If Turkey compensates the heirs of the victims of the Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. If Turkey returns lands of historical Armenia</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Armenia’s strategic interests require an establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey, even if this means that the question of Genocide could be left to be solved in future.

Demography

44. Age

1. 18-29
2. 30-44
3. 45-59
4. 60 and higher

45. Gender

1. Male
2. Female

46. Education

1. Primary (4 years)
2. Incomplete secondary (8 years)
3. Secondary (10 years)
4. Secondary special (professional-technical college)
5. Incomplete higher
6. Higher

47. Occupation

1. Worker
2. Intellectual (specialist)
2.1 Media
2.2 Health Care
2.3 Judicial System
2.4 Science
2.5 Teaching and Education
3. Student
4. Housekeeper
5. Pensioner
6. Businessmen
7. Agricultural worker
8. Military
9. Unemployed

48. Status of the workplace

1. Public sector
2. Private sector
3. Non-governmental
4. Neither
5. Refuse to answer

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

Time interview end: _____ hours _____ min
Date: _____ month _______ day

Number of Interviewer _____

Special notes of Interviewer_
Appendix E

ASA Proposal and Methodology Explanation
PROPOSAL
For conducting a nationwide sociological survey in Armenia

President Dr. Gevorg Poghosyan
44 Aram Str., Yerevan
Tel/Fax: (374 10) 53 10 96
Tel: (374 10) 53 05 71
Tel: (374 91) 40 33 09 mobile
E-mail: gevork@sci.am
www.asa.am

YEREVAN - 2006
Armenian Sociological Association (ASA) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization. ASA has a big experience in the following spheres:

- Conducting sociological researches, public opinion poll, focus group discussions, expert surveys, in-dept interviews;
- Market research, hall-test surveys, media surveys, diary panel for TV ratings;
- Publications and conferences in Armenia and in South Caucasus.

ASA is a national member of International Sociological Association (ISA), Eurasian Marketing and Research Association (EMRA).

ASA is an NGO, registered in the Ministry of Justice of RA in 1992 (registration number is 39/26).

### Research Experience

ASA has the great experience in Armenia on preparing and conducting sociological researches and public opinion poll, the majority of results of which were published both in Armenia and abroad.

ASA has the most number of publications in Armenia. These are as a rule not only serious scientific articles and monographs, but also newspaper articles, results of public opinion poll, Radio and TV programs.

ASA is the greatest authority in Armenia on conducting quantitative nationwide surveys, starting from 1992.

Among the Clients of ASA were: Government of the RA, political parties and different international organization: World Bank, UNDP, UNISEF, UNHCR, IOM, USAID, IREX, TACIS, INTERMEDIA (USA), Aguirre International (USA), DRC (Denmark), MASMI, EMRA, ROMIR Monitoring, CESSI (Russia), International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), GTZ (Germany), AEPLAC and many others.

ASA has a big number of partners from abroad among reputable universities of USA, Germany, Finland, Russia, South Korea, and Poland.

ASA participates in numerous international sociological projects, takes part in numerous international conferences and world congresses.

ASA has participated in numerous international projects, including TACIS and COPERNICUS, World Value Survey and also (single from the Caucasus) in the international longitude Project "Democracy and the Local Governance", which included 22 Central and East European countries and also Japan, USA and South Korea. ASA are figured in many international reference books of sociological organizations all over the world.
Today ASA has no equal in Armenia on:

1. the quantitative nationwide surveys and scale of conducted researches;
2. the media surveys;
3. the market researches;
4. the number of focus-group discussions and capacity for conducting FGDs;
5. the quantity of publications in different languages;
6. the quantity of participation in international projects, conferences and congresses;
7. the quantity and geography of reputable partner organizations;
8. the realization of regional programs (Georgia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus);
9. availability of technical basis and program equipment (two-stored office, local network of 11 modern PC, 2 copy-machines, scanner, Internet, mini phone station, two cars, the last version of SPSS software, TV- and video equipment, etc);
10. availability of net of 70 trained interviewers all over the country.

Annually ASA is conducting about 25-30 surveys. Among the permanent staff there are doctor of sociology and 4 candidates of science, 9 postgraduate students and competitors, fluent in foreign languages. Many of staff members received individual grants from IREX, Fulbright Fellowship Foundation, Open Society Institute (USA), CEU (Budapest).

Field Survey Methodology and Regional Strategy

National sample for Armenia includes all 10 marzes (districts) plus Yerevan-marz, according to the administrative-territorial division.

The Republic has 914 localities: 48 urban and 867 country settlements. According to the State Statistic Department of the RA on 01.01.05, all population is 3,02 mln., from which 67% is urban population and 33%- country one. The survey will be conducted via a multi-stage random probability sample of the adult population which is 2 432 968 residents.

Armenia will be stratified by region (marz) and urban/rural residence. There will be eleven Primary Sampling Units (PSU), distributing the 1 000 interviews proportional to the distribution of the population in every marz. Interviews will be conducted at a total of 125 sampling points.
In every marz sampling points will be selected randomly, with probability proportional to the size of individual marz. Each selected sampling point may include different types of settlements, both large and medium in size, including urban and rural settlements.

Following is the regional stratification of National Sampling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARZES (DISTRICTS)</th>
<th>GENERAL POPULATION (15+)</th>
<th>SAMPLE SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>RURAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. YEREVAN</td>
<td>870 502</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SHIRAK</td>
<td>130 981</td>
<td>76 845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LORI</td>
<td>132 302</td>
<td>85 537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TAVUSH</td>
<td>39 278</td>
<td>62 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ARAGATSOTN</td>
<td>25 137</td>
<td>74 596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. KOTAIK</td>
<td>119 284</td>
<td>86 682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. GEGHARKUNIK</td>
<td>59 440</td>
<td>111 351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ARMAVIR</td>
<td>75 046</td>
<td>128 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ARARAT</td>
<td>59 350</td>
<td>140 532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. VAJOTS DZOR</td>
<td>14 858</td>
<td>26 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SUNIK</td>
<td>79 197</td>
<td>35 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 605 375</td>
<td>827 593</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 125 selected points of sample

**Sampling Design and Respondent’s Selection**

Interviewing will be face-to-face in the respondent’s home. Only one member of any one household will be interviewed, employing a “Kish grid” or similar device (next birthday, alphabet code, etc.,) which ensures equal probability of selection for all adults in a household.

In every locality, selected in sample, interviewers work with route selection method according to agreed started points: in 1-2 points in villages and in 3-35 points in cities (dependent on the size of city). Started points in villages are village council buildings, schools, ambulance or bus stops. In cities the started points are squares, buildings of regional administrations, cinemas, monuments.

From started point the interviewer makes his way to nearest street (or according to the “star principle” from started point-square).

The selection of observing units makes in a following way: moving the street, interviewer selects houses in turn from right and then left street sides, changing the floors in the building. Households will be selected via random route technique. This approach eliminated interviewer bias in the selection of households. Intervals within cities and
villages will be different. In cities intervals will differ depending on whether interviewing takes place in multi-family dwellings or single-family homes.

Within each household only one adult respondent (18 years of age or older) will be selected at random. All adult members of the household will be listed according to their birth dates and the person with the next birthday (in the future and not in the past) becomes the designated respondent. Interviewers will be instructed to make two callbacks (at different times of day and different days of week) in order to complete the interview with the designated respondent. If, after selection of the respondent, it turns out that the respondent is not at home, the interviewer will make up to two callbacks in order to find the respondent at home.

If the respondent is not home on the interviewer’s third visit (second callback), the interviewer will receive appropriate instructions from the field supervisor. These instructions will not be given until the callback procedures have been exhausted. Under no circumstances may the interviewer substitute another member of the respondent's household for the respondent. If the designated respondent refuses to give an interview, then the interviewer proceeds to the next household on the route. A substituted respondent is not taken from the original household.

The interviewer’s work control makes randomly from the number of conducted interview in respondents’ addresses and phones (if they are) (which interviewer writes down after completing an interview).

The whole number of interviewers involved in this survey will be 40.

The maximal number of interview per day is 5 for each interviewer.

The whole sample design, control and correction are made on the basis of the general data in sex, region, age, and education of the adult population (urban and rural) of Armenia.

### Sampling Methodology

In interpreting survey results, it should be kept in mind that all sample surveys are subject to sampling error, that is, the extent to which the results may differ from what would be obtained if the entire Armenian population had been interviewed. The size of such sample errors depends largely on the number of interviews.

The following table may be used in estimating the sample error of any percentage in this survey. The computed allowances have taken into account the effect of the sample design upon sampling error. They may be interpreted as indicating the range (plus or minus) within which the results of repeated sampling in the same time period could be expected to vary, 95 percent of the time, assuming the same sampling procedure, the same interviewers, and the same questionnaire.

The 95% confidence level means that, for example, if the sample size for a given question is approximately 1000, and the given percentage is near 50 percent, then there is 95% chance that the percentage given is correct within + or - 3%.
Training of Interviewers

The training of interviewers will include the following:

- detailed explanation of the objectives of the survey
- sampling design, method of selecting households in the PSUs and respondents within households
- call back procedures (up to 3 attempts when the respondent is most likely to be in)
- response rate records, non-response records and reasons, substitution of households after 3 unsuccessful call-backs
- quality control by interviewers’ supervisors and the project management team, including use of the interviewer’s field log
- detailed explanation of the questionnaire, question by question, including routing and filtering, and a comprehensive discussion of directive and non-directive probing.
- detailed explanation of radio wavebands and frequencies, and how to locate them on respondent’s radio set. For this purpose, the interviewers will practice checking a number of different receivers.
- the use of other survey materials (Interviewer’s Manual, Show Cards)
- practice interview, delivered between the trainer and a supervisor, in front of the interviewers under training
- discussion of any problems or respondent queries that may arise
- practice interviews, each interviewer with other interviewers, each interviewer role-playing as both interviewer and respondent
- one outside interview by each interviewer to check understanding of household and respondent selection as well as questionnaire administration

In the training session, particular attention will be devoted to an explanation of directive and non-directive probing, and to developing interviewers' sensitivity to the former as an unacceptable practice.

During several days before starting the field study selection and training of interviewers is conducted. Experienced instructors in the presence of project coordinator and DS representative (due to his desire) conduct training in the ASA office. After detailed instruction, interviewers conduct experimental interviews between each other. Then a chance passer-by is invited and a demonstration interview is conducted with him in ASA office in the presence of all interviewers. The ASA will schedule as many sessions as required to thoroughly train interviewers in administering the questionnaire.

Interviewers’ training will be conducted centrally by small groups (10 people) for participating in training are invited also interviewers from regions of the republic. Every interviewer will receive training from the project coordinator and assigned supervisors. Prior to the pre-test of the questionnaire in the field, interviewers will receive three to four hour training session. The first half of this session will cover general interviewer techniques. Project coordinator will discuss the following aspects of research: explain the aim of the study and the role of the interviewer in this research, discuss how to contact
respondents, the call back strategy, and the use of the contact sheet, will go over the entire content of the questionnaire and cover how answers should be recorded. Second half of this session will be dedicated to practice interviews in order to gain a better understanding of the questionnaire and discuss potential questions, difficulties in routing that may arise. Every interviewer will conduct three trial interviews in the field. During these tests, supervisors will control the quality of interviewers’ work. Results and experiences will be discussed at the second two-hour training session, where problems, which were encountered during the pretest, will be addressed. Then interviewers conduct independently several piloting interviews for working off methods of respondents’ selection and questionnaire testing.

The "respondent" in the trial interview should answer in such a way as to maximize the number of questions he answers. For example, when answering the questions of the "radio table", the "respondent" should answer positively to all questions concerning foreign radio listening so that the interview gains experience in filling out the entire table. The trial interview should also assume that the respondent uses the Internet so that the interviewer gets experience with the Internet block of questions.

During the fieldwork the interviewer should contact the supervisor and discuss with him/her any discrepancies or problems which occur/could occur during the fieldwork. All of the questionnaires must be checked during the same day in which they are handed to the supervisor. Following this check, the supervisor, in order to verify this process, should sign each questionnaire. This approach is one of the field control techniques, which will be used.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pre-test and Pilot Study</th>
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</table>

The survey questionnaire will be piloted before fieldwork begins. The number of the pilot interviews will be 20 and they will be distributed in Yerevan and in one remote village. The pilot interviews will be carried out by experienced interviewers. Test-research is conducted in order to reveal how adequate is working the questionnaire during the survey, whether all questions are enough well understandable and in the same way are comprehended by respondents or not; what kind of difficulties have the interviewers, who will conduct the interview with different categories of people. Results of the test-research together with the interviewer’s comments are taken into consideration for elaboration of the questionnaire and improvement of the questions. Researchers analyze results of piloting survey, and on this base making corrections in the final version of the questionnaire and other field materials (booklets, coding lists, contact cards, etc.).

After piloting has been completed, a debriefing session will be held, in which any difficulties the interviewers had with the operation or interpretation of the questionnaire will be discussed. Fieldwork will only start once the DS has approved the edited questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality control</th>
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</table>

An additional and crucial quality control measure will be field control by supervisors at the time of interviews and post-factum. The team of independent Controllers
will check 15 percent of interviews face to face and via phone. ASA will implement quality control measures to ensure a high level of interviewer performance. ASA shall ensure that every respondent can be matched to a questionnaire and an interviewer. A full description of these measures and the results of the quality control will be included in the final technical report.

At least 15% of the total number of interviews will be verified. Quality control will be spread throughout Armenia and the distribution of controls will be proportional to the sample distribution in terms of region of residence and urban/rural residence. In regions where telephone penetration is suitably high, telephone verification is acceptable under the condition that the respondent's telephone number is given voluntarily by the respondent at the completion of the interview, and that the reason for requesting it is fully explained to the respondent.

At a minimum, quality control measures will include verification of the:

- fact that the interview took place;
- proper application of the sampling plan in selecting the respondent;
- the approximate duration of the interview;
- the proper administration of the various sections of the questionnaire;
- interviewer's general adherence to professional standards.

Interviewers will at all times carry a route list (field log) in which they record relevant information on what happens in the field, such as contact and call-back details. The interviewer logs will supply enough information for an independent observer to locate the selected household and to identify the respondent interviewed.

Coding, Data Processing and Deliverables

Data entering is implemented directly after the preliminary elaboration of questionnaires and the procedure “closing” open-ended questions. Several operators simultaneously conduct data entering with 5-6 computers. The data will be keyed twice and data compared to reduce the risk of keying error. Data entry will be performed in SPSS Data Entry Builder, which guards against errors in data-entry and coding. Performed data will be presented as frequencies, percentages and cross tabulation of two, three and more dimensions of variables.

Coding, data entry and cleaning, and materials to be provided to the DS will be handled entirely by the ASA. ASA will provide data either as a completely labeled (both variables and values labeled in English) SPSS.sav file and ASCII.

A codebook, in English, clearly and accurately specifying variable labels and response codes for each question, with card (if applicable) and column locations for all variables will be provided if DS prefer the data submitted in ASCII format. The codebook will also contain variable definitions and codes for any computed variables, and it will identify the data-entry system (software) used to construct the survey database.

To assist DS in its own data processing, the ASA will send a complete SPSS data set (and ASCII data set with codebook) to the DS as soon as the final data structure has been set.
Appendix F

Approval From the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board
Date: April 14, 2006

To: Sybil Rhodes, Principal Investigator
    Arus Harutyunyan, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Mary Lagerwey, Ph.D., Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number: 06-04-07

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization" has been approved under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: April 14, 2007
In compliance with Western Michigan University’s policy that “the HSIRB's review of research will be conducted at appropriate intervals but not less than once per year,” the HSIRB requests the following information:

I. PROJECT INFORMATION

PROJECT TITLE: Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization

HSIRB Project Number: 06-04-07

Previous level of review: ☑ Full Board Review ☑ Expedited Review ☑ Administrative (Exempt) Review

Date of Review Request: 03/15/07 Date of Last Approval: 04/14/06

II. INVESTIGATOR INFORMATION

Have all Investigators completed human subjects protections training at www.citiprogram.org?

☑ Yes ☐ No (Training must be completed before protocol can be renewed)

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR OR ADVISOR

Name: Sybil Rhodes
Department: PSCI Mail Stop: 3308 Friedmann Hall, Kalamazoo, MI 49008
Address: sybil.rhodes@wmich.edu

CO-PRINCIPAL OR STUDENT INVESTIGATOR

Name: Arus Harutyunyan
Department: PSCI Mail Stop:
Address: arus.harutyunyan@wmich.edu

III. CURRENT STATUS OF RESEARCH PROJECT

Please answer questions 1-4 to determine if this project requires continuing review by the HSIRB.

1. The project is closed to recruitment of new subjects.

☑ Yes (Date of last enrollment: 06/06) ☐ No (Project must be reviewed for renewal.)

2. All subjects have completed research related interventions.

☑ Yes ☐ Not Applicable ☐ No (Project must be reviewed for renewal.)

3. Long-term follow-up of subjects has been completed.

☑ Yes ☐ Not Applicable ☐ No (Project must be reviewed for renewal.)

4. Analysis of data is complete.

☑ Yes ☐ No (Project must be reviewed for renewal.)

• If you have answered “No” to ANY of the questions above, you must apply for Continuing Review. Please complete numbers 5-12 on page 2. If you need to make changes in your protocol, please submit a separate memo detailing the changes that you are requesting.

• If you have answered “Yes” or “Not Applicable” to ALL of the above questions, please check the Final Report box below and complete questions 5-10 on page 2.

• If your protocol has been open for three years and you still want to collect or analyze data, you must close this protocol by filing a final report using this form and apply for approval of a new protocol using an Application for Initial Review. Please make a Final Report on your project by completing numbers 5-10 on page 2.
IV.  □ Application for Continuing Review

V.  □ Final Report

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5. Have there been changes in Principal or Co-Principal Investigators? □Yes □No
   (If yes, provide details on an "Additional Investigators" form (available at the HSIRB web site, http://www.wmich.edu/research/compliance/hsirb/hsirb_2.html).)

6. Has the approved protocol been modified or added to with respect to:
   (If yes to any item below, provide the details on an attached sheet.)
   a. Procedures □Yes □No
   b. Subjects □Yes □No
   c. Design □Yes □No
   d. Data collection □Yes □No

7. Has any instrumentation been modified or added to the protocol? □Yes □No
   (If yes, attach new instrumentation or indicate the modifications made.)

8. Have there been any adverse events that need to be reported to the HSIRB? □Yes □No
   (If yes, provide details on an attached sheet.)

9. Total number of subjects approved in original protocol: 01000

10. Total number of subjects enrolled so far: 01000
    if applicable: Number of subjects in experimental group: N/A Number in control group: N/A
    • If this is a FINAL REPORT you may stop here and return the form electronically.
    • If this is an APPLICATION FOR CONTINUING REVIEW continue with numbers 11-13 below.

11. Estimated number of subjects yet to be enrolled: 00000

12. Verification of Consent Procedure: Provide copies of the consent documents signed by the last two subjects enrolled in the project. Cover the signature in such a way that the name is not clear but there is evidence of signature. If subjects are not required to sign the consent document, provide a copy of the most current consent document being used.

13. If you are continuing to recruit subjects for this project, please remember to include a clean original of the consent documents to receive a renewed approval stamp.

   [Signatures and dates]

   Principal Investigator/Faculty Advisor Signature Date

   Co-Principal or Student Investigator Signature Date

Approved by the HSIRB:

   [Signature and date]

HSIRB Chair Signature Date

Western Michigan University
Human Subject Institutional Review Board – Mail Stop 5456
(269) 387-8293 research-compliance@wmich.edu

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Appendix G

Approved Consent Form (English and Armenian)
Consent Form

You are invited to participate in a nationwide research project entitled "Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization." The study intends to identify popular attitudes regarding national identity and democratization in Armenia. The study is designed by Arus Harutyunyan, a Ph.D. candidate from Western Michigan University, Department of Political Science. This survey is a part of the dissertation requirement for Arus Harutyunyan. The survey is being conducted by the Armenian Sociological Association.

Please read this form before answering the questions. The consent form is an important technique ensuring that your participation is fully voluntary. By stipulating terms and conditions of the survey, prior to your participation, the consent form also protects your privacy. It prevents an invasion of your privacy by ensuring that all the data based on your responses have been collected with your knowledge and consent.

You do not have to sign and return this form. This way we can guarantee the confidentiality of your responses. Your decision to participate in this survey, after you read this form, will indicate your oral consent.

Your responses will be completely confidential. We ask you not to identify your names. You may choose not to answer any question and simply leave it blank. If you choose to discontinue your participation you may do so at any time during this survey.

The survey is comprised of 47 questions. For an enhanced survey quality, please be attentive to instructions provided by interviewers.

One of the costs of this research is your time. To answer all the survey questions, you will have to allocate on average 30 minutes of your time.
One way in which you may benefit from this survey participation is having the chance to express your political concerns. Very importantly your participation contributes to a general public in the Republic of Armenia who may share similar political concerns. Others who have similar political concerns may benefit from the knowledge that is gained from this research.

Your responses will be coded and assigned appropriate labels. To protect the security of your responses the collected data will be kept in a locked file for at least 3 years in Sybil Rhodes office, at the Western Michigan University. To protect the confidentiality of your responses only aggregate data will be published and available to general public.

If you have any questions, you may contact Arus Harutyunyan at (+1 269 388 5883, or e-mail arus.harutyunyan@wmich.edu), Sybil Rhodes (+1 269 387 5700, or e-mail sybil.rhodes@wmich.edu) the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (+1 269 387 8293) or the vice president for research (+1 269 387 8298).

This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board chair in the upper right corner. You should not participate in this project if the stamped date is more than one year old.
Appendix H

Explanation of Indexes
Explanation of Indexes

To measure national identity, political trust, perception of ethical issues, and democratic attitudes, I combined relevant survey questions regarding each variable and constructed separate indexes. I borrowed the National Election Studies’ (NES) technique for constructing indexes.\(^1\) The indexes vary between 0 and 1. “Don’t know” responses were analyzed using multiple imputation technique.

**National Identity**

To measure public opinion on key identity issues analyzed in this study three separate indexes were constructed: GENOCIDE (Genocide and Relations with Turkey), WAR (War in Mountainous Karabagh and possible solutions) and DUAL CITIZENSHIP (Dual Citizenship for Diaspora). Each question was coded in terms of liberal and ethnic approaches where 0.0 always stands for Liberal and 1.0 always stands for Ethnic approaches to national identity issues.

*The Genocide* index was constructed by combining questions 41 and 42. Question 41 was recoded: Yes=0.0, No=1.0. Question 42 was recoded: Response 1=0.0, Response 2=0.0, Response 3=1.0, Response 4=1.0, Response 5=0.0, Response 6=1.0, Response 7=1.0, Response 8=0.0, Response 9=1.0.

The *War* index was constructed by using 2 parts of the question 34. Question 34 part 2 was recoded: Yes=1.0, No=0.0. Question 34 part 6 was recoded: Yes=0.0, No=1.0.

The *Dual Citizenship* index was constructed by combining questions 27 and 28 part 4. Question 27 was recoded: Response 1= 0.0, Response 2=0.0, Response 3= 0.0, Response 4= 1.0, Response 5=1.0. Question 28 part 4 was recoded: Yes=0.0, No=1.0.

Political Trust

For the variable Political Trust two separate indexes were constructed, one measuring Technical Competency and another measuring the Fiduciary Responsibility aspects of the Political Trust.

The Technical Competency index was constructed by combining questions 7, 9 and 15 employing the following coding technique: Question 7 was recoded: Strongly agree=1.0, Somewhat agree =0.67, Somewhat disagree=0.37, Strongly disagree=0.0. Question 9 was recoded: Very satisfied=1.0, Fairly satisfied=0.67, Fairly dissatisfied=0.37, Very dissatisfied=0.0. Question 15, with a rating scale from 1 (very good) to 10 (very bad) was recoded: 1=1.0, 2=0.88, 3=0.77, 4=0.66, 5=0.55, 6=0.44, 7=0.33, 8=0.22, 9=0.11, 10=0.0.

The Fiduciary Responsibility index was constructed by combining questions 10, 11, 12 and 20. Questions 10, 11 and 20 were recoded: Strongly agree=1.0, Somewhat agree =0.67, Somewhat disagree=0.37, Strongly disagree=0.0. Question 12 was recoded: Strongly agree=0.0, Somewhat agree =0.37, Somewhat disagree=0.67, Strongly disagree=1.0.

Ethical Issues

The Ethical Issues index was constructed by combining questions 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, where 0.0 stands for endorsing high ethical standards and 1.0 stands for the absence of ethical standards. All questions had a rating scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable) and were recoded as follows: 1=0.0, =0.11, 3=0.22, 4=0.33, 5=0.44, 6=0.55, 7=0.66, 8=0.77, 9=0.88, 10=1.0.
Democratic Attitudes

To measure democratic attitudes, two separate indexes were constructed. The Democratic Values index measures respondents' democratic attitudes in general. The Democratic Evaluation index measures respondents' evaluation and satisfaction with the current state of democracy and future democratic expectations in the country.

The Democratic Values index was constructed by combining questions 8, 13, 18 and 19, where 1.0 always stands for strong democratic values and 0.0 always stands for an absence of democratic values. Questions 8 and 19 were recoded: Strongly agree = 1.0, Somewhat agree = 0.67, Somewhat disagree = 0.37, Strongly disagree = 0.0. Question 13 with a rating scale from 1 (very good) to 10 (very bad) was recoded: 1 = 0.0, 2 = 0.11, 3 = 0.22, 4 = 0.33, 5 = 0.44, 6 = 0.55, 7 = 0.66, 8 = 0.77, 9 = 0.88, 10 = 1.0. Question 18 was recoded: Parties should be prepared to cooperate with each other, even if it means that parties need to make concessions and give up some of their important ideological beliefs = 1.0, Parties should stand firm for their ideological beliefs, even if it prevents possibilities of cooperation with other parties = 0.0.

The Democratic Evaluation index was constructed by combining questions 16 and 17, where 1.0 always stands for high evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy and 0.0 always stands for low evaluation and satisfaction with the state of democracy. Questions 16 and 17 were recoded: 1 = 1.0, 2 = 0.88, 3 = 0.77, 4 = 0.66, 5 = 0.55, 6 = 0.44, 7 = 0.33, 8 = 0.22, 9 = 0.11, 10 = 0.0.
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