Community Organization Approaches to the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency

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COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION APPROACHES TO THE PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY*

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines juvenile delinquency prevention programs which implement large-scale intervention and social change strategies. A typology of community organization practice is used to analyze the assumptions, objectives, and methods underlying these approaches. Three models of community organization--locality development, social planning, and social action--are used to evaluate three exemplary delinquency prevention programs: the Chicago Area Project, the 1960's provision of opportunity programs, and the 1960's comprehensive community-based projects such as Mobilization for Youth. The difficulties encountered in implementing these models and programs are identified and assessed. The implications for contemporary crime prevention efforts are also considered.

Juvenile delinquency prevention encompasses a wide range of practices, and there is little consensus on what the term "prevention" means (Wright and Dixon, 1977). In general, three preventative orientations can be identified: primary prevention, secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention attempts to keep delinquent behavior from arising in the first place; it involves strategies directed at the entire community and not just at individuals who are "the casualties seeking treatment" (Klein and Goldston, 1977:vii). Secondary prevention focuses on

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early diagnoses and treatment of vulnerable children, and tertiary prevention aims to avoid recidivist behavior after delinquent acts have already occurred. Some observers argue that it would be preferable to limit the use of the term prevention to primary prevention, while rehabilitation would be a more appropriate label for secondary and tertiary prevention (Klein and Goldston, 1977; Gilbert, 1982).

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine approaches to delinquency prevention that embody the notion of primary prevention. These efforts involve large-scale intervention and social change strategies which attempt to provide opportunities to disadvantaged youth, develop community resources, implement institutional reform, and organize and mobilize target-area residents for collective action [1]. A typology of community organization practice, as developed by Jack Rothman (1979a; Cox et al., 1979), will be used to analyze the assumptions, objectives, and methods underlying programs of this nature. While there is controversy as to whether there exists a coherent body of community organization theory (Schwartz, 1977), there are clearly delineated models of community organization practice. In this paper, three models of community organization—locality development, social planning, and social action—will be used to evaluate three exemplary delinquency prevention programs: the Chicago Area Project, the 1960's provision of opportunity programs, and the 1960's comprehensive community-based projects such as Mobilization for Youth. These programs span a range of local and federal efforts which emphasized alteration or modification of the environmental, community, and institutional conditions which were believed to cause delinquency. By examining the general principles underlying these strategies, our analysis avoids simply re-hashing them as episodes in the development of delinquency theory. Rather, they become significant as attempts to operationalize theory through particular organizational mechanisms.

After outlining the assumptions underlying the three models of community organization practice and evaluating the delinquency prevention programs, we will also consider their implications for contemporary
efforts at crime prevention. In contrast to earlier approaches, these efforts aim to change the behavior of potential victims rather than potential offenders (Lewis and Salem, 1981). However, many of the assumptions underlying victim-oriented crime prevention are rooted in earlier offender-oriented programs. Thus, it is imperative that future prevention efforts of all kinds take into account the advantages and limitations of past practices.

MODELS OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PRACTICE

Community organization is defined as "intervention at the community level oriented towards improving or changing community institutions and solving community problems" (Cox et al., 1979:3). For analytic purposes, Rothman (1979a) delineates three different models of community organization practice: locality development, social planning, and social action [2]. Each of these has its own assumptions, utilities, and limitations. Locality development and social planning more readily lend themselves to a consensus view of society and the maintenance of social stability. Social action is oriented toward a conflict view of society and the promotion of institutional social change. However, these approaches need not be applied in a mutually exclusive manner and can be either mixed or phased in their application to specific community problems.

According to Rothman, the central assumption of locality development is that community change is best brought about by enlisting the broadest range of people at the local level to collectively identify needs, goals, and solutions to problems. The basic themes include "democratic procedures, voluntary cooperation, self-help, development of indigenous leadership, and educational objectives" (Rothman, 1979a:27). Process goals are accorded the highest priority; that is, the primary goal is to establish cooperative working relationships and widespread interest and participation in community affairs. Consensus tactics are used by the community organizer to bring various interest groups, social classes, and ethnic groups together to identify their common concerns. It is assumed that these groups have interests
that are basically reconcilable and amenable to rational problem-solving. However, it is the process of bringing the community together, rather than the accomplishment of particular tasks, that is central to locality development.

In *social planning* emphasis is placed on the design and application of controlled rational change by "experts" who possess highly technical skills and specialized knowledge. The emphasis is on task goals, that is, the completion of a specified task related to the solution of a tangible problem. Community members are viewed as customers or beneficiaries of services and are not involved in the planning or delivery process. Social change tends to be gradual, maintenance-oriented, removed from politics, and regulated and controlled by professionals who are not themselves members of the client population. The organizer often acts as a mediator between conflicting interests and attempts to tone down more radical demands.

Finally, in the *social action* approach the community organizer seeks to mobilize the economically and politically disadvantaged members of the community to make effective demands for the redistribution of resources and alteration of institutional policies. This approach may involve both task and process goals. Conflict tactics are frequently engaged in as the organizer aims to build a large constituency capable of obtaining and utilizing power to promote their own interests. Dominant political and economic groups and institutions are often the targets of change and considered to be part of the community's problems. The organizer is a partisan and advocate of the disenfranchised and not a mediator of conflicting community interests.

As ideal types, locality development, social planning, and social action identify the basic assumptions underlying various large-scale delinquency prevention programs. In the following sections we will use these community organization models to evaluate the Chicago Area Project, the programs for the provision of opportunities, and the comprehensive community-based projects. While these prevention programs were not necessarily pure applications of any single model of community organization practice,
each contained different emphases which can be illuminated by applying community organization concepts.

THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT

The Chicago Area Project (CAP), begun in the early 1930's, is considered to be the classic illustration of locality development as applied to delinquency prevention (Mech, 1975). The underlying philosophy was that only through the mobilization and active participation of the entire community was it possible to impact significantly upon the problem of delinquency (Spergel, 1969; Dixon and Wright, 1974). The project was rooted in the work of Clifford Shaw (1942) who examined the ecological distribution of delinquency and found urban slums to be populated by a disproportionate number of delinquent youths. Unlike the anomie-opportunity theory which formed the basis of later programs, Shaw did not consider blocked opportunities or institutional inequality to be the central problem. Rather, he saw the problem as lying in social disorganization and the failure of the adult community to exert informal social controls over its youth.

Self-help and democratic procedures were major themes of the CAP. Project staff workers functioned in an advisory role, but decisions about policies and programs were made by community members, independent of the approval or disapproval of the project staff. The task for community organizers was to convince local residents to assume responsibility for the prevention of delinquency, to help them exercise more influence over their children, and to facilitate cooperation and joint problem-solving among the residents, the churches, the schools, the courts, the police, and other significant community groups. The focus was on building community cohesion and pride, and on developing residents' confidence in their ability to effect change (Empey, 1982; Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).

The CAP engaged people in a variety of activities intended to achieve its goals. The development of recreational facilities and the creation of clubs, hobby groups, and rap groups were central features. The CAP pioneered the use of detached workers to
provide curbstone counseling for juveniles and identify indigenous gang leaders who might be encouraged to adopt the legitimate community's values. Efforts to intercede in matters relating to the schools and juvenile justice system forshadowed more contemporary efforts at child advocacy and diversion. Finally, the project attempted to assist incarcerated juveniles in preparing for return to the community (Empey, 1982; Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).

The CAP applied the model of locality development in a purist fashion and utilized consensus tactics. The accommodative spirit was illustrated by the community's willingness to accept responsibility for the city's delapidated physical appearance and its decision not to indict the city's service departments. On the other hand, the assumption of consensus and cooperative problem-solving which predicated locality development was often lacking. It was difficult to find common ground between local residents and representatives of the business community, schools, churches, and the criminal justice system. For instance, attempts to enlist the help of the business community in expanding the employment opportunities for delinquent youths were not always successful. The project was also criticized for its heavy reliance on the voluntary services of the Polish Catholic Church which was accused of using the recreational programs to proselytize potential converts. Programs in some neighborhoods were criticized for interfering with those sponsored by other groups. Even the professional staff of organizers was sometimes annoyed and upset about its loss of control over the project, suggesting a preference for a social planning approach to community organizing (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).

One of the strongest criticisms was levied by Saul Alinsky, the project's most aggressive detached worker. Although the CAP attempted to increase community empowerment by training indigenous leadership and intervening in institutional affairs, Alinsky argued that it was inadequate to achieve significant economic change. He advocated confrontational tactics indicative of a social action approach to community organizing in order to force more fundamental political and economic concessions from the power structure. Alinsky's frustration undoubtedly derived from
a basic dilemma of locality development strategies—how to sustain community interest following mobilization when process goals are given priority over task goals (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983).

In spite of these problems, Shaw believed that the project was successful in reducing delinquency in the community (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983). Though this reduction was difficult to measure, Kobrin (1959) argues that the case for the CAP ultimately rests on logical and analytic grounds. Shaw was mainly interested in demonstrating the possibility of operationalizing his analysis of social problems through particular organizational mechanisms. He believed that: (1) delinquency was symptomatic of underlying social processes; (2) simply responding on a one-to-one basis with individual youths was ineffective; and (3) the entire community must and could be organized effectively to solve its own problems.

THE 1960'S PROVISION OF OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS

Many observers view the delinquency prevention programs of the 1960's as direct descendants of the CAP (Freeman et al., 1979; Empey, 1982; Ohlin, 1983). However, there are significant differences which can be highlighted by applying Rothman's community organization typology. The various programs associated with the 1960's period and the "War on Poverty" were predicated on the anomie theory of Robert Merton (1938) and its application to delinquency by Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin (1960). Essentially, the theory postulated that delinquent behavior develops because of a discrepancy between the aspirations of disadvantaged youth for culturally approved goals (i.e., success, money, material goods) and their opportunities to achieve these goals through legitimate channels (i.e., education, employment). In general, the prescribed remedy involved significant improvement in the economic and educational opportunities of low-income and minority youth.

The 1960's programs were comprised of two major orientations—the "provision of opportunity" programs and the "comprehensive community-based" projects. The former utilized a social planning model of community organization, while the latter employed a
social action model mixed with locality development and social planning. Because the provision of opportunity programs relied on a single model, we will discuss them first and consider the comprehensive community-based projects in the following section.

The provision of opportunity programs attempted to increase low-income and minority youths' access to socially-approved means of obtaining success. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authorized the Department of Labor to become involved in delinquency prevention through the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Job Corps. The Neighborhood Youth Corps included an in-school program to provide jobs and training on a part-time basis to youths who were enrolled, a summer work program for students who needed summer jobs to remain in school, and an out-of-school program for youths who were both unemployed and unenrolled in school. The Job Corps differed in that it was designed to take low-income urban youths out of their delinquency-prone environment and place them in residential centers for job-training. These residential centers were frequently located in rural areas where residents were taught forest conservation skills (Griffen and Griffen, 1978). This was a serious planning error which obviously ignored the training needs of urban youth who would be returning to the city to search for employment. In addition, both the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps merely offered job training without guaranteeing employment upon completion of training. The validity of preparing youths for jobs which did not exist was another planning error.

During the same decade, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Housing and Urban Development developed a broad range of delinquency prevention programs. For instance, HEW's Upward Bound program was directed towards producing positive changes in motivation and skill to facilitate the educational achievement of disadvantaged youth. Similarly, HUD's Model Cities programs provided youth in deteriorated urban areas with college scholarships, job placements, college prep programs, and health career projects. They also included direct social services such as counseling, drug abuse
treatment, help for unwed mothers, recreation, and teen clubs (Griffen and Griffen, 1978).

The provision of opportunity programs were the outcome of a straight-forward social planning approach. Professional planners with specialized skills and knowledge designed a program of controlled rational change to solve the delinquency problem. The planners, working for the government, created programs which were considered to be in the public interest, but the recipients of these services had minimal or no role in the determination of program policy or goals. Community workers tended to operate as agents of the state, helping to regulate the poor and phase out social action oriented projects and confrontational tactics (see Piven and Cloward, 1971).

Rooted in liberal ideology, the social planning approach to providing opportunities sought only to establish conditions of equal opportunity for individuals to compete for society's economic rewards. While these programs did help to secure a fragile black middle class, equality of result has not been achieved for the intransigent underclass which contributes disproportionately to the serious crime and delinquency problem in urban areas (Wilson, 1978). Lacking a concern with community involvement, self-help, and use of indigenous community resources and leadership, the social planning model lent itself to an expensive, bureaucratic welfare apparatus which administered "prevention" to clients but which created as much "opportunity" for social welfare professionals as it did for the target population.

As was the case with the CAP, the provision of opportunity strategies were never subjected to systematic program evaluation to determine their effectiveness on reducing delinquency. Rather than reaching hard-core delinquent or delinquent-prone youth, the programs may have only helped those who were more motivated and upwardly mobile to begin with (Spergel, 1969; Grosser, 1976). Thus, neo-conservative critics (e.g., Wilson, 1975) have pointed to the rise in crime rates which occurred during this period and suggested that the provision of opportunity programs were based on a naive liberal optimism and a blind "throwing money" approach to solving social problems.
We will have more to say about the limitations of these programs after discussing the social action component of the 1960's efforts. It suffices here to say that anomie-opportunity theory in its original form no longer guides delinquency prevention strategies in the United States.

**COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION**

Like the provision of opportunity programs, the 1960's comprehensive community-based prevention (CCBP) projects attempted to prevent delinquency through modification or alteration of social conditions. However, promoters of CCBP attempted to utilize and integrate all three models of community organization: locality development, social planning, and social action.

The CCBP programs began in the early 1960's through the auspices of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and continued under the Office of Economic Opportunity. They were large-scale, multi-dimensional social welfare programs established under federal control, funded with government money, and rooted in the local neighborhood. The projects focused on increasing the ability of communities to develop the requisite services and conditions which would enable youths to participate in and have influence upon community affairs (Grosser, 1976; Freeman et al., 1979).

The comprehensive community-based projects placed a great deal of emphasis on locality development strategies of community organization. As in the CAP, adults and juveniles were involved in autonomous, community-controlled organizations. Adults were included to help reduce community apathy and provide evidence to young people that residents could effectively exercise control over their own affairs. In 1964, a demonstration review panel summed up the basic assumption:

The panel is unanimous in its opinion that major involvement on the part of community residents to improve their own situation is the *sine qua non* of a successful comprehensive program to combat delinquency in disadvantaged and demoralized communities (Grosser, 1976:24).
One year later, Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act translated this recommendation into a mandate for "maximum feasible participation." This mandate generated much controversy and criticism when coupled with the social action components of these projects (Moynihan, 1969).

Mobilization for Youth (MFY) is viewed as the blueprint for comprehensive community-based delinquency prevention programs (Empey, 1982). MFY utilized a combination of the three community organization strategies to achieve a broad range of objectives, including: (1) the improvement of educational opportunities through teacher training, the development of relevant curriculum and teaching methods, increased parent-school contacts, and pre-school programs; (2) the creation of job opportunities through work subsidies, vocational training, and career guidance; (3) the organization of the low-income community through the formation of neighborhood councils and the mobilization of residents for social action; (4) the provision of specialized services to youth through detached gang workers, recreation activities, and rap groups; and (5) the provision of specialized services to families through Neighborhood Service Centers which offered childcare, counseling, and assistance in applying for public social services (Empey, 1982).

Inspired by MFY, the President's Committee sponsored additional legislation and invited other communities to submit proposals and demonstrate how they would set up a comprehensive, large-scale program aimed at achieving institutional and social change. The federal government offered funding and assistance in planning, but the communities had to utilize their own resources and involve residents of the target area in the planning and implementation (Empey, 1982). Some of the better known of these demonstration projects included: Houston Action for Youth, Harlem Youth Unlimited-Associated Community Teams, and the United Planning Organization in Washington, D.C. The central features shared by these diverse projects were: (1) the development and promotion of community involvement and self-help capabilities; (2) the organization of formal structures for indigenous leadership and decision-making, such as neighbor-
hood councils, policy boards, and committees; (3) the maintenance of local autonomy; (4) the increased responsiveness of social institutions to the needs of the target population; and (5) the involvement of both youths and adults in social action activities designed to redress specific grievances in the areas of housing, health care, and discrimination in employment (Mech, 1975; Grosser, 1976).

The social action component of these projects generated a great deal of criticism, debate, and withdrawal of support. In MFY, for instance, the residents were encouraged to participate in strikes, protests, and confrontations with public institutions. The intended goal was to make political leaders aware that the community was an organized interest group to which they must respond. Frequently, the community's grievances concerned the same institutions (e.g., schools, welfare, juvenile justice system) that the prevention program attempted to bring together in a cooperative alliance. The consequence was that local, federal, and private sponsors became the targets of social action strategies (Grosser, 1976). It was a classic case of "biting the hand that feeds you," a dilemma created by attempting to mix the consensus tactics of locality development with the confrontational tactics of social action. This built-in contradiction pitted the goals of political leaders and funding agencies against community organizers and local residents. Whereas the politicians and funding agencies desired to achieve community stability by getting youths involved in legitimate activities, the community attempted to challenge the power structure and change the political process which distributed inequitable institutional opportunities in the first place. By the mid 1960's, MFY was overrun by accusations of communist sympathies and misuse of government funds, and organizers who favored social action were eventually purged (Krisberg, 1975).

Other CCBP projects experienced similar difficulties. Local interest groups and institutions such as landlords, police, school officials, and the news media, mounted counter-offensive propaganda which encouraged curtailment of funds. The escalating Vietnam military budget also reduced funds, and
remaining program resources had to be devoted to organizational survival rather than the original social change objectives. Confrontational tactics and innovative programs were toned down or altered to conform to a social planning model of social service delivery that was more attractive to funding sponsors. Many were transformed into predominately counseling and treatment programs (Burkhardt, 1973).

Some observers question whether there was ever full political support for the radical changes implied by opportunity theory and CCBP (Marris and Rein, 1973). Many community agencies did not believe that such large-scale changes could be justified merely to prevent delinquency (Ohlin, 1983). Bureaucratic funding policies, administrative demands, and a preoccupation with accountability, efficiency, and cost-benefit analysis took precedence over innovation and experimentation. Many projects were only granted short-term funding with no commitment for continued, long-term support. Evaluation efforts to assess the impact of programs were unimpressive (Grosser, 1976; Braithwaite, 1979). It was difficult to demonstrate that the interventions of a specific program with particular methods brought about specific changes in individuals. It was not possible to designate control and experimental groups since services were not selectively provided. And the explicit focus on delinquency tended to get lost in the escalation of the larger "War on Poverty."

The various approaches which were implemented in the 1960's appear to have failed to bring about the anticipated social changes and reductions in delinquency. Ohlin (1983) argues that programs proliferated too rapidly and exceeded the talent and knowledge available to achieve tangible results. Wilson (1975) believes that "It was the failure to appreciate the importance of community and gravity of the threats to it that lead to some mistaken views during the 1960's of the true nature of the 'urban crisis'" (1975:24). While Ohlin's observations are correct, Wilson's criticisms ignore the explicit focus on community which was at the root of CCBP. In contrast, a more reasonable critique of the programs' apparent failure would emphasize: (1) the lack of full political support and counter-offensive efforts waged by vested
interest groups; (2) bureaucratic funding policies, administrative concerns, and competition for scarce resources; (3) the provisions for job training without a concomitant effort to increase the supply of available jobs; and (4) the contradictions inherent in attempts to mix the social action and locality development models of community organization. Publicly funded projects which organize people for social action can expect to have great difficulties in establishing and perpetuating their autonomy and original objectives. Priority will inevitably be given to reformers working for change through a social planning model rather than those who organize people to pressure for change from the outside.

IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTIM PREVENTION

A recent shift in prevention strategies has been toward community crime prevention for victims [3]. Like earlier offender-oriented prevention programs, these efforts aim to increase the capacity of the community to respond collectively to social problems (Lewis and Salem, 1981). Boostrom and Henderson (1983) classify these victim-oriented approaches as: (1) mobilization of the community to increase the effectiveness of individual security; and (2) crime prevention through environmental design. The individual security strategy includes technological improvements (e.g., locks, alarms), property-marking, neighborhood watch, block clubs, citizen patrols, whistlestop programs, self-defense training, and use of citizen-band radios. Environmental design involves urban planning and architectural modifications to create a "defensible space" where like-minded residents share a common territory, public areas are highly visible, paths of movement are clearly delineated, and particular areas are designated for legitimate users and activities and delegitimated for others (Newman, 1972). Both the individual security and environmental design models are clearly based on one or more of the methods of community organization discussed in this paper.

The individual security strategy is indicative of a locality development approach to community organization insofar as it attempts to mobilize residents to take responsibility for crime control in
their neighborhood. However, political officials and law enforcement agencies have preferred a social planning emphasis. Though citizen involvement has been favored as a way to reduce reliance on expensive, bureaucratic methods of crime control, police desire to maintain their role as experts who possess the skills and knowledge necessary to "define the nature of the problem, gather the information necessary to implement the...preventative measures, and also oversee, supervise, and regulate" the community's activities (Boostrom and Henderson, 1983:26). The conflict between the locality development and social planning components of community crime prevention is illustrated by police opposition to autonomous, citizen-initiated attempts such as the Guardian Angels (Michalowski, 1983). Thus, the police are likely to support only those prevention programs which allow them to direct citizens' activities. This social planning orientation becomes especially problematic when police-directed victim prevention strategies are biased in favor of the middle class communities and consequently reinforce existing neighborhood patterns of victimization (Batten, 1984).

Boostrom and Henderson see environmental design as more capable of maintaining a commitment to the citizen autonomy characteristic of locality development. This strategy requires the skills of urban planners and architects, not police officers. It, therefore, contains no inherent mandate for expanded police resources or control. The themes of self-help and self-reliance are stressed over the surrender of "responsibilities to any formal authority" (Newman, 1972:14). Residents are encouraged to "reinforce their norms of behavior, develop a stake in protecting their spaces (and) dictate what is going to be allowed as legitimate activity within these spaces" (Boostrom and Henderson, 1983:27).

The locality development emphasis in victim-oriented crime prevention, as in offender-oriented delinquency prevention, is not without its inherent contradictions and dilemmas. On the one hand, locality development is predicated on a consensus approach to solving problems whereby different interest groups come together to identify common concerns and objectives. On the other hand, community crime prevention
may become a means by which middle class residents attempt to defend the purity of their neighborhoods and prevent "undesirables" and "outsiders" from using their streets. Surveys indicate that residents are as much concerned about various "incivilities" (e.g., teenagers hanging around, illegal drug use) as they are about more serious violent crimes and thefts (Lewis and Maxfield, 1980). While wealthy communities can afford private security patrols, middle class residents have been forced to rely on public police to keep their streets clean. It is possible that middle class neighborhoods are beginning to adopt strategies of self-policing similar to vigilante peer groups and delinquent gangs which have long "defended" lower class communities (see Suttles, 1972). Thus, community crime prevention has the potential to create territorial conflicts between diverse classes and races which are attempting to establish the boundaries of their neighborhoods in urban areas (Boostrom and Henderson, 1983).

At the same time, recent evaluations of victim prevention programs indicate that residents continue to view social service and neighborhood improvements as effective crime prevention strategies. People are more likely to get involved in crime prevention when it is connected to broader community goals and pre-existing voluntary community organizations (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1980; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982). These findings suggest that the public would be receptive to strategies which integrate offender-oriented and victim-oriented approaches to prevention. This integration becomes even more important given that victim prevention efforts alone have not been particularly successful at reducing crime (Murray, 1983). In fact, these programs have tended to emphasize the reduction of fear of crime rather than crime itself (Murray, 1983). Thus, the current trend in victim prevention, as indicated by recent projects funded by the National Institute of Justice, appears to be toward fear reduction rather than a return to offender-oriented primary prevention strategies (e.g., Lavrakas, 1984). Such an approach has obvious limitations for those residents who live in neighborhoods where the fear of crime is a realistic assessment of reality.
Large-scale approaches to the prevention of juvenile delinquency began with the 1930's Chicago Area Project and emerged full bloom in the 1960's provision of opportunity programs and comprehensive community-based projects. All of these strategies shared a view of delinquency as symptomatic of underlying social conditions which could not be prevented or remedied by responding to individuals on a one-to-one basis. However, the programs applied the models of community organization practice in different ways. The CAP pioneered the use of locality development in delinquency prevention, along with specific innovations such as recreation, detached workers, child advocacy, school liaisons, and diversion. The social planning model employed in the provision of opportunity programs has left its legacy on current efforts at economic and job assistance, equal opportunity programs, and affirmative action. And the social action emphasis of CCBP projects has now been transmuted in the form of increased citizen involvement in grass-roots, neighborhood organizations (Rothman, 1979b).

Future efforts to implement primary delinquency prevention strategies must avoid replicating the problems encountered in earlier programs and avoid "merely trying to win back liberal ground lost to neoconservative policy makers" (Michalowski, 1983:13). However, in a period of high unemployment, slow economic growth, and declining state resources, it is not clear whether the constraints placed on community organization strategies can be overcome. The often praised emphasis on process goals in locality development has serious pitfalls. Expectations may be raised without providing concrete gains. This may lead to increased anger, frustration, apathy, and sense of relative deprivation. Local organizing efforts are ineffectual if they are not linked to legislation and policy at higher governmental levels. However, the experience of the Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps demonstrates that social planning to equip youths with job skills is futile if the economy has no room for them. Similarly, social action and confrontation with public institutions to demand
better services are useless if legislators are endorsing massive cut-backs. Thus, any strategy which ignores the need for economic policies leading to full employment and income redistribution can expect to fail [4]. Jobs will need to be attractive enough to provide viable alternatives to crime and motivate individuals to undertake adequate training. These policies would undoubtedly require community organization for social action to create pressure for change, but these actions in themselves could lead to short-term reductions in delinquency, as the experience of communities in protest have shown [5].

While governmental policies aimed at economic reconstruction are needed, the principle of local control that was the central feature of the comprehensive community-based projects should be maintained. Residents need to be involved in the planning and implementation process. This would minimize the sense of alienation which people often experience when services are "dispensed" to them by social welfare professionals. People must have a sense that the program "belongs" to them and that they are capable of succeeding on their own given a fair chance (Walker, 1984).

An additional way to promote both community involvement and prevention goals would be to create community-controlled neighborhood mediation committees. Under the guidance of neighborhood panels, residents could be encouraged to publicly express and resolve their conflicts with one another before these conflicts become crimes. In order to further greater self-reliance on the part of the community members, these efforts at conflict resolution should remain independent of formal ties to the criminal justice system (Shonholtz, 1984).

Offender-oriented strategies would also be more effective if they contained a victim-oriented component. Community mobilization for victim prevention would reduce the need for an expensive, bureaucratic law enforcement apparatus and make funds available for neighborhood improvements and social services. Youth's involvement in practices such as protective community patrols might help reduce their alienation and divert their interest from destructive community behaviors (Michalowski, 1983), especially if they
were also recipients of services provided to them. Programs to assist juvenile victims of crimes would also reinforce conventional standards of behavior (Alcabes and Jones, 1980).

A major caveat of such a comprehensive approach to delinquency prevention is the difficulty of designing a method of quantitative program evaluation. Klein and Goldston (1977) argue that primary prevention strategies should not be expected "to prove that an individual who did not become the victim of a condition would without question have incurred the condition except for the preventive intervention" (1977:vii). Spergel (1969), on the other hand, believes that primary prevention programs can be evaluated through the designation of experimental and control groups. However, such a design would offset the premise of a comprehensive community-based project—that the entire community be involved and that the provisions of the program be multi-faceted. Moreover, the goal of a primary prevention program should be the improvement of the quality of life in the community in general and not merely the reduction of delinquency. Bureaucratic funding policies which require short-term demonstrations of delinquency reduction need to be re-evaluated if primary prevention is to receive continued, long-term support. Primary prevention strategies cannot be expected to produce instantaneous results because the social, economic, and political patterns which underlie the delinquency problem are deeply ingrained.

We suspect that our society does not have a genuine commitment to the widespread social changes required for an effective primary prevention approach to delinquency. Preference will inevitably be given to secondary and tertiary prevention strategies that are more limited in scope and more accurately characterized as rehabilitative, rather than preventative, in nature (Klein and Goldston, 1977; Gilbert, 1982). Although the "diversion" movement of the 1970's brought promise of increased emphasis on such practices as advocacy, service brokerage, resource development, and agency coordination, professionals working within community-based agencies such as Youth Service Bureaus tend to prefer a counseling and treatment approach to the delinquency problem (Selke, 1982).
Similarly, applications of deterrence theory which attempt to "scare" juveniles into conformity are also not preventative in that these interventions occur after the problem has already arisen (Finckenauer, 1982) [6].

In spite of the difficulties which confront primary delinquency prevention strategies, our evaluation of past practices indicates that it is possible to design and implement a program and mobilize the entire community to address the delinquency problem. Typically, however, assessments of previous successes and failures are made in terms of the "scientific adequacy" of the particular theory which formed the basis of the program (see Empoy, 1982), rather than the organizational mechanisms through which these theories were implemented. But while the popularity of various theories may change [7], the organizational principles underlying their application to large-scale prevention will continue to be predicated on the community organization models we have discussed in this paper. The current debate over the future direction of delinquency prevention should not be limited to considerations of theoretical adequacy. Greater attention should also be given to the potentialities and limitations inherent in utilizing the locality development, social planning, and social action models of community organization.

NOTES

1. This paper will not address other forms of delinquency prevention (e.g., recreation, detached workers, community-based treatment), except as they relate to or are included within large-scale programs.
2. Spergel (1969) approaches community organization practice with a similar typology. He identifies four community organization strategies: development, maintenance, contest, and conflict. Essentially, development is the same as Rothman's locality development, maintenance is similar to social planning, and contest and conflict are aspects of social action. Spergel also identifies four corresponding practitioner roles: developer, enabler, advocate, and organizer.
3. It is interesting that the entire meaning of "opportunity" theory has now been transformed from a concern with the offender (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) to a concern with the victim or crime target (Cohen et al., 1981). Rather than attempting to provide opportunities for youths, these strategies are oriented toward reducing opportunities to successfully carry out criminal acts.

4. More will be required than simply a "War on Poverty." Conyers (1979) argues that criminologists have ignored economic problems and that a policy of full employment should be central to any crime prevention agenda. Chester (1977) recommends progressive taxation aimed at income redistribution to reduce the gap between rich and poor. Michalowski (1983) suggests that publicly run nonprofit corporations could be established, along with increased taxation on corporate profits and restrictions on plant closures.

5. In a study of a Chicano community during the late 1960's and early 1970's, community members reported that gang activity subsided when the community was mobilized in protest activities (Erlanger, 1979).

6. Like the large-scale prevention programs, neither the treatment nor deterrence approaches have had much success in demonstrating reductions in delinquency (Dixon and Wright, 1974; Mech, 1975; Finckenauer, 1982).

7. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention currently favors control theory (see Hirschi, 1969) as the most promising theoretical approach to delinquency (Federal Register, 1980).

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