Symposium on Community Organization

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INTRODUCTION

One of the few promising developments within social work during the current era of Reaganomics has been the revival of interest in community organizing strategies and methods. During the 1970s, most of the vitality in the community organizing field came from outside social work—from the grassroots community groups Harry Boyte described in THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION, from training schools like the Midwest Academy and the Industrial Areas Foundation, and from social movement organizations among women, minorities, gays, the elderly and the disabled. Now, in response to the pressures of severe resource cutbacks, shifts in national ideology and culture, and a less hospitable environment for the human services, social workers are rediscovering the role of community organization in creating and sustaining support for the programs and values with which social workers have historically been identified.

For many social workers, inside and outside community organization, the concept of empowerment has become the holy grail of the 1980s. Hardly a journal issue passes without some reference to this theme. Consequently, what was a novel idea (or, at least, a novel formulation of an older idea) a few short years ago, has threatened to become a cliche. This would be a serious loss for social work as the ideas behind the concept continue to be worth striving for.

In their essay, "Community Empowerment as a Non-Problem," John Russell-Erlich and Felix Rivera address this problem directly. They suggest that social workers, including community organizers, have done little either to empower the poor or to foster the development of a radical consciousness (i.e. one which does not separate theory and practice and which enables people to understand the sources of their oppression in the political and economic systems.) They see the roots of this problem in the nature of social work as a profession and in the changing focus of schools of social work—particularly the shifting role of community organization in social work curricula and the absence of role models for students on social work faculties.
They propose certain tenets for a "radical community organization practice" and a "meta-practice approach" to community organization. Finally, they suggest some future directions for community organization within such an approach. These include (1) a more systematic evaluation of past and present organizing strategies; (2) the development of support systems for individuals and groups involved in community organizing; (3) the nurturing of politicians within community organizations; (4) the creation of community focused research organizations; (5) the use of sabbaticals to support theory-building in community organization; and (6) a more conscious attempt to develop a futurist perspective within community organization.

The subsequent articles by Ralph Woehle and Stephen Rose explore the implications of their practice experiences in client and community empowerment through community-based programs in a conservative environment for the development of community organization theory. Woehle examines the possibility of client empowerment in rural areas in which policy choices about resource allocation are determined by the interaction of business and governmental elites. While opportunities for influence are limited in such settings, he suggests that by engagement in what he terms "program politics" organizers can affect policy decisions, especially at the associational level. He is skeptical, however, about the likelihood of direct empowerment of clients through such activities, nor does he believe that the creation of new programs or the survival of existing ones are in themselves empowering goals.

Stephen Rose examines similar questions within the context of his experience as Director of a community-based mental health after care program in Suffolk County, New York. Like Russell-Erlich and Rivera, he argues that most social work theory rationalizes the social order and is, therefore, of little utility in the development of a practice model whose goal is to transform that order. Rose's Sayville Project employed, instead, an "advocacy/empowerment" orientation which was derived "from an explanatory paradigm which takes as its central concept the necessity to understand the systemic relationship between a person's context, history and identity." His detailed analysis of the project's history demonstrates effectively that a community organization strategy must include (1) the creation of community-based constituency support; (2) political education; and (3) community education regarding the service approach and problem definition.
Community organization can, in this manner, develop as both "a desired and necessary activity... (which) provides the political base for the organizational survival of an agency more committed to the struggle for social justice than it is to prevailing thought structures and interorganizational networks."

The next "set" of essays analyzes several major issues which confront community organizers in the 1980s. Jacqueline Mondros and Scott Wilson focus on the recurrent problem of membership recruitment and maintenance. Their article reports some preliminary findings based on a subset of their larger sample of 45 organizations. Their conclusions reveal a gap between the recognition by organizations that recruitment and retention of members are crucial for organizational survival and the failure by these same organizations to apply sufficient resources towards these tasks. The study also indicates that grassroots organizations give little thought to the reasons why people become involved in their organizations and stay involved. Different types of organizations base their work on different operative assumptions. Mondros' and Wilson's initial findings suggest, therefore, that an integrated model for recruitment and retention needs to combine "both collective and individual instrumental benefits,....collective and individual expressive benefits, and...the development of organizational attachment through commitment...to the organization and in-group ties."

Next, Carl Tjerandsen analyzes the issues which influence the success or failure of self-help organizations, by evaluating the programs sponsored by the now defunct Emil Schwartzhaupt Foundation. His essay looks at the following elements in the organizing process: (1) who initiates the organizing activity; (2) the degree of compatibility between purpose and practice; (3) the nature of participation in the organizing effort; (4) forms of membership recruitment; (5) the nature of organizational strategies; (6) the role of staff in the organization; (7) the level of organizational resources; (8) the nature of organizational sponsorship; and (9) the role of education and evaluation. Tjerandsen concludes that some elements are more significant than others; but a persistent theme is that social development and individual development must go hand in hand. From a different perspective, therefore, his analysis underscores the conclusions regarding individual/community empowerment at which other authors have arrived.
similar vein, Charles Frost examines the experience of a single, albeit massive, community organization project: the creation of the Basque collectives in Spain over the past 40 years under the direction of Father Jose Maria. Frost points out the features of the Basque efforts that make them the most successful cooperatives in the world: the philosophy of the program; the use of political and community education as integral parts of the program; the emphasis on day-to-day details; and the ongoing integration of philosophy, knowledge and tactics (what other writers have called praxis). Anticipating some skepticism about the applicability of the Basque experience to the United States, Frost points out the similarities between Father Jose Maria's work and that of Jane Addams a century ago. In an era in which complex problems are over-simplified and the mass media have socialized us to look for quick solutions, Frost cautions wisely that the Basque experience also reveals how "the process of change is a long and arduous one." While change is possible, even in circumstances far more oppressive than those in the contemporary United States, it is hard work and not rhetorical fantasies that will produce successful results in community organizing. This is a simple, yet worthwhile reminder for the 1980s.

Just as community organizers can learn a great deal from the experience of other communities abroad, Cheryl Hyde argues that the male-dominated field of community organization in the U.S. can learn a great deal about theory and practice from women activists. Her thesis is that the field of community organization would gain by incorporating a feminist perspective into its work. Not only would this enable organizers to work more successfully on the many "women's issues" which are currently on the policy agenda, it would also produce "a more wholistic approach to organizing which would focus on the...process of organizing instead of the...product."

Based on interviews with women activists, Hyde develops what she terms a "Wholistic Collective Practice Paradigm" that contains four dimensions: strategic, structural, subjective and relational. Within these dimensions, Hyde presents nine themes most of which focus "on the emotional and interpersonal aspects of organizing," which she claims are generally ignored in community organization literature.

While most of the essays in this volume emphasize grassroots organization building, Barry Checkoway reminds us in his article,
Building Citizen Support for Planning at the Community Level," that the changing context has also affected the nature of social planning in significant ways. He argues that the creation of citizen support for the concept and substance of planning at the local level is a strategic approach that is every bit as viable and important for the survival of progressive social welfare programs as is grassroots organizing. Checkoway asserts that planners, therefore, "must go beyond rational models to apply sociopolitical methods to build support for planning at the community level." He sketches out a step-by-step framework through which such actions might occur. While he does not assume that citizen support is the sole answer to the dilemmas confronting human service professionals, he maintains that such an approach might make a difference in today's political environment. The potential benefits exceed the potential risks.

The final two articles by Steve Burghardt and James Craigen take opposite positions on another topic of considerable currency for community organizers and social workers in general: the viability of electoral politics as an arena for community organization. Burghardt asserts that electoralism is a misguided tactic today, particularly electoralism which occurs within the context of the Democratic party. He concedes that electoralism, per se, is a valid tactical approach—provided that those groups involved are connected to strong social movements and independent of prevailing power structures. These conditions, however, do not exist today, in his view. Consequently, Burghardt is quite critical of the activities of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, which he consider counter-productive in today's climate. Instead, he argues, social work strategies should concentrate on five arenas: (1) legislative coalitions to fight for the preservation of social welfare entitlements; (2) anti-gentrification coalitions to enable low-power communities to survive; (3) rank and file trade unions; (4) anti-racist and anti-sexist groups; and (5) anti-intervention, anti-militarism coalitions.

Craigen, who was active in Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign, presents an opposing position. He stresses the positive achievements of the Jackson campaign as illustrations of the potential benefits of electoralism, particularly for racial minorities. The campaign, he argues, "went beyond symbolism to represent a real and emerging power base or critical mass in the United States that has significant implications for community organization theory and
practice." Its achievements include the mobilization of the Black (and other minority) communities, especially those portions of the community which had previously been unmobilized and seemingly un-mobilizable; the instilling of a sense of pride in groups whose self-worth has taken quite a beating in recent years; the training of a new generation of community organizers in low income and minority communities, in both urban and rural areas; and, perhaps of greatest significance, Jackson's candidacy placed "race and things racial back in public view where they belong."

Despite the rich history of community organization within social work, much of the ideas presented in this volume still appear fresh for at least four reasons: (1) the persistent belief of most social workers that individual forms of intervention are the key to enhanced professional status; (2) changes in community organization's terminology; (3) the impact of modern social movements and the development of alternative forms of social service delivery; and (4) dramatic shifts in the U.S. political-economy during the past decade. This special issue—comprised of papers first presented at the 1985 Community Organization/Social Administration Symposium in Washington, D.C.—addresses the last three of these factors. We hope that the essays which follow will stimulate thought, dialogue and action among community organizers and among social workers in general.

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It is not much fun to be a radical any more -- as a student, a teacher or a community activist. Often it seems as if there are too many battles and not enough time to begin to fight them. The privileged position in which many on the left found themselves in years past has given way to the treatment usually accorded persons with serious contagious diseases. Feeling unappreciated, unneeded and unwanted, we have tended to become a bit cranky and hyper-critical. In our frustration, we have fallen prey to an isolation that encourages us to think only of people who see the world exactly as we do as allies.

Certainly coping with the mid-1980s has its difficulties. As Reagonomics continues to solidify its position throughout the country, communities with social, political and economic problems have faded into the background and, ultimately, out of the consciousness of most Americans. The rallying slogans of the 60s and 70s -- "self determination," "community control," and "power to the people," are but faint memories in the minds of many of today's community organizers. Community empowerment has become a non-issue. Yet community problems--housing, health care, employment,
racism and the like—-are worse than ever and the voice of the people has been undermined by years of baseless promises, liberal rhetoric, and services that scratch the surface but fail to touch the causes of oppression. The results are predictable.

It should come as no surprise to anyone that poverty rates are increasing at an alarming rate for those at the bottom of the economic scale while others share at least some benefits of an expanding economy.

Social welfare institutions and social workers have been just as guilty as the planners with their shibboleths—"truly needy," "safety net," and "enterprise zones." The planners in the Reagan administration have at least made a conscious decision as to how they are to treat the poor and disenfranchised. Why the liberal social work establishment is still unsure of its position and strategies is a question that has to be asked. Perhaps it is because we still do not really want to be identified with the truly poor or to jeopardize our positions by insisting that we pay attention to oppressed communities or retain a commitment to fundamental social change.

This paper will look at some of the dilemmas of community organization within a changing practice focus. It will address the issue of why community organization has made an accommodation to the values espoused by the White House. In analysing this question, we suggest the need for a truly radical perspective of empowerment so as to refocus the priorities of organizers. Problems of practice preferences and professionalization will be considered and finally, we introduce some suggestions for a revitalization of community organization and a meta-practice structure within which to nurture a revitalized practice.

**Liberal Or Radical Organizer**

Before discussing some of the problems in community organization and exploring some suggestions for change, it is necessary to give a brief definition of what we mean by radical and liberal. The words have been so abused that confusion is the norm rather than the exception. In this way what we are proposing will be clearer, especially as we develop our position on ideological practice.
Liberals have traditionally held a pluralistic view of society, with homeostasis seen more or less as a given. The government is regarded as being justified in its action ostensibly because it is in the best position to speak for the broadest range of individuals and attempt to advance their interests. Furthermore, liberals believe in the redistribution of income, yet typically they will not confront the fact that government primarily serves the interests of the upper classes. Liberals are willing to support selected government interventions in people's lives. While they harbor a mistrust of the private enterprise system, they do not regard it as fundamentally flawed. They believe in individual equality and social justice and that capitalism, with some adjustments, works.1

In contrast, a radical perspective focuses on the economic system and its modes of production. It argues that small elites control the major means of production and, consequently, the working class by wage-contracts. Similarly, production and distribution are regulated by profits, there existing a constant tension whereby profits inexorably push prices upward as long as enough people are willing to pay the price for the available goods and services. One of the most important ways to increase profits is by keeping wages low. This wage pattern contributes to a pyramidal power structure with workers finding themselves at the lower end totally disenfranchised economically. The dynamics of labor and management has increasingly extended its influence over the workers by guaranteeing a measure of job security at the expense of working conditions and contract benefits. Recently this has occurred under the guise of recession cutbacks and lowered profit margins.

A radical analysis sees government as an operating party to class conflict. Rather than encouraging people to compete with each other, service professionals should contribute to the welfare of fellow workers and clients. Radicals argue that theory and practice cannot be separated. This praxis is what makes for an ideological base that dictates actions in ways that help empower people as both the community organizers and the community increase their level of consciousness about the nature of their oppression and who controls needed economic resources. Thus together practitioners and communities can begin to identify their problems and possible arenas of action so as to change their life situations.
What has mainstream social work and social welfare as a system done to foster a radical perspective? In recent years, nothing. The authors suggest that social work as a profession mitigates against the empowerment of the poor and against the development of a radical consciousness. We offer this not as something new or startling, but rather to emphasize that community organization has, no less than casework, been a part of this control. Some of the sources for this continued trend are: the nature of social work as a profession, the functions of schools of social work and the changing nature of students in graduate schools, and the implications these trends have for curriculum and practice.

Social Work as a Profession

Wilensky and Lebeaux have defined professionalism as a job that is technical by nature, where the worker's knowledge is so specialized that she or he has a monopoly over that field. The knowledge base for the technical expertise comes from a discreet foundation of information with many years of training. The normative value base of the profession dictates behavior that is objective, impartial and has a strong motivation to help people. Does this sound like social work as we now know it? We do not think so.

If we accept the above definition, then it should come as no surprise that social work is in even more trouble than what we have been led to believe. As far back as 1973 Richan and Mendelsohn cried for change in a much-maligned profession. Their position was that social workers were being trained to be the "sanitation department of society." A report for NASW showed that only two percent of MSWs are working in the "field of poverty and its elimination."

The view offered by many outsiders is not less castigating in tone. A well-respected historian sees the social welfare approach as "elitist and manipulative, seeking to maintain existing class arrangements by palliating social problems and coopting social disorder." Not surprisingly, this historian sees community organization as being basically reformist in its approach.

Its liberal objectives, consensus strategies, scanty resources, relative lack of power, and professional orientation...
characteristic of the social welfare approach mitigate against developing democratic grassroots projects that could truly serve the interests and needs of neighborhood residents.\(^6\)

If the profession believes its claim to uniqueness then it should not have to fear its turf being threatened by allied professions. This is not quite the case, however, as social workers see themselves competing with psychologists, psychiatrists, public health workers, public policy types, social planners, political and social scientists, economists and even people from the business sector. Rather than openly competing with these other professionals and letting their values emerge in discussion and debates, social workers have dug a hole for themselves by moving more and more towards specialization. The dramatic move toward psychotherapy with "clean" clients has put increased pressure on community organization. Is social work becoming so secure in its specialization and sub-specialization that it can eschew some of the most important, time honored, practice areas? What happens then to the social, economic and political arenas? Is the profession assuming that some "other guy" is going to do what needs doing in the area of social change: Hardly. The evidence has shown us that entrepreneurship has won out over ideologically-based practice. Practice fashions always follow human service dollars.

**Schools of Social Work**

More and more schools of social work are changing their focus towards working with families and individuals using psychotherapeutic interventions and apolitical diagnostic assessments. A recent research study brings this alarming and oppressive trend home most poignantly. Rubin and Johnson report that past studies by CSWE and NASW have shown a steady rise in psychotherapy interests by entering graduate students around the country.\(^7\) In their study, 68% of students indicated this practice preference. In the schools where the authors teach the numbers are even higher and the proportions still increasing.

In identifying their therapy interests further, the students' inclinations towards working with clean clients was clear. In
order of appeal of client groups, 76.7% wanted to work with "people with marital or family problems," 63.4% chose "clients experiencing a turbulent adolescence," and 54.9% picked "people who are depressed" as their choice. At the opposite end of the appeal continuum, 16.2% identified their desire to work with "the chronically mentally disabled discharged from state hospitals," 19.1% identified "adult criminal offenders," and 17.8% identified "the physically disabled." Of the total of 247 students, 220 of them wanted to go into private practice—an unbelievable 89%. What we are seeing here is, among other things, a movement away from the disenfranchised people of the community. So the profession, instead of trying to live up to its early mandates to serve the poor and oppressed has, at least symbolically, turned its back on them.

What are the implications of these trends for community organization? They do not augur well for us. Indeed, we must share the responsibility for these trends because we have done little to thwart them. The so-called professionalization of students sees increasing numbers heading into the social problems-for-profit market. There they may exert all manner of social control with virtual impunity. What happens to people in need of services who cannot relate to a verbal exchange as a means of being helped, or compete in the fee-for-service market place, (as is the case with so many ethnic minority people of color)? What happens to people who need jobs, decent housing, and medical care; to the elderly and handicapped living on fixed incomes, battered women, single parents and thousands of others in need of crisis intervention? As the buck gets passed along from the most expensive and professionally "sophisticated" services to the already weakened public agencies, who will serve these multi-problem social push-outs?

Community organization curricula in responding to the curricular pressure of psychotherapy has accommodated to the move by curtailing its course offerings. As the professors of direct practice so astutely point out, community organization no longer has the students to teach, therefore, the need for multiple sections of advanced psychodynamics, family therapy and the like is obvious. Is having warm bodies in the classrooms the sine qua non of higher education? Do they dictate curriculum? To a considerable degree the answer is yes. We would like to believe that community organization faculty are ostracized from their colleagues and students because of their radical stance on the issues
and their preference for radical practice—but the reality is another matter. Burnout, the shifting job market and the typical status quo orientation of so many in the field have been responsible for this trend to a point. But we cannot put the blame squarely on shifting student interests. The sad fact is that community organization has not made itself viable to students by carefully defining what community organization is and by demonstrating what jobs exist throughout the entire social welfare system for building an empowerment-oriented and change-oriented practice.

The Invisible Communities

If problems of professional perceptions and curriculum have changed social work education from within, what has happened to social work in the field? What has community organization done to merit the kinds of students entering its graduate programs? Can we safely hypothesize that if community organizers and teachers of community organization were actively involved in current issues areas as grassroots movements, domestic violence program planners, single parent policy analysts and medical needs assessment, the publicity they would receive from these activities would help to attract students to their respective schools. As one of our students recently noted:

I have two problems with your (community organization) program. The first is that you are not beginning to do what you could to support change efforts now going on at the community level (of various women's groups, gays, elderly, people of color -- especially recent arrivals from Southeast Asia and Latin America, etc.). The second is that, with the exception of a very few people in your faculty, you seem to spend very little time working out in the community on the problems that you tell us are in urgent need of our attention. No wonder you complain that so few of us (entering students) seem committed to social change.

We believe that this student's assessment is pretty accurate for a large number of social work schools. It would seem reasonable to assume that if we could put our actions closer to our
rhetoric, our programs would be more attractive to students. It has worked in the past and it will work in the future. Part of the problem has been that of accommodation by the organizers who in their liberal stance seem to be saying "wait until the right moment" to act instead of working to create those moments.

If we as organizers are serious about empowering communities, then we should say it and go out and do it. However, we may no longer believe our own rhetoric. If so, we have a choice -- to shut up (and stop perpetuating a fraud that students and client groups find so nauseating) or to explore the possibility of more radical actions. The current conservatism can be confronted in more fundamental ways. For example, students in one Eastern city took the abortion struggle to the doorstep of the "pro-life" forces (quite literally in a substantial, well-coordinated demonstration) to demand that the leadership disavow the violent attacks on a local abortion clinic. They achieved a small, but important victory (and did it by going on the offensive rather than using typical, defensive liberal tactic of physically "defending" the clinic).

We have seen individual mobility and autonomous participation, fighting and mobilizing participation. The latter would involve the development of group consciousness and true political participation and civil disobedience, even with the threat or the use of major disruptive tactics. One problem has been that for years there has not existed any large-scale, national or regional organization that is oriented to the oppressed poor. The atrophied action systems nation-wide have contributed to plans of accommodation. An excellent example of this kind of accommodation is shown in an article by Austin that is ameliorative in tone with suggestions for dealing with agency cutbacks like "team building," "strategic planning," and using the "administrator as leader." The lack of any ideological stance in his paper is reflective of the amnesia confronting our organizers. He goes further to state that we should "protect the agency's viability by political lobbying and reducing agency costs by increasing fees," (emphasis ours), "emphasis on fee-generated services, changing services to reduce costs," and, "adapting programs to the changing environment."8

The prioritizing of services has been one of the major stumbling blocks in community organization, for, rather than viewing
the community as a broad dialectical and interactive process among
neighborhoods and groups, politics and economics, issues, strategies and tactics, the social welfare pundits have looked upon them as categorized service areas and problems with little or no coordination at the metropolitan, regional or national levels. This fragmentation of organizing and planning efforts has not only permitted a wedge to be driven by the center and right between increasingly splintered groups of radicals, but also the organizers, in all their liberal thinking, seem to have rationalized their ineffectuality by telling us that they are at least introducing reforms at the local level and that this is better than trying to work within a reactionary larger context.

The authors do not believe that perspective makes sense, for the practice gaps even within our own neighborhoods are more than evident. One example here suffices to illustrate our position. The authors have written about the emerging neo-gemeinschaft minority communities with their many problems as a prime area for community organizers to involve themselves. It has been our experience that, although a modicum of direct services have entered these communities (usually by their own racial minority group), there has been little or no serious organizing taking place. The large numbers of refugees, political emigres, migrants and immigrants in these enclaves throughout the United States is staggering. Their numbers alone pose a nascent political force that needs to be tapped.

What we are espousing, however, is not just identifying and working with constituencies around the country. This is but the beginning stages of a significant movement. This movement has to be couched within an ideological perspective or radical community organization practice.

Some of its tenets are:

--- Community organization must work towards the empowerment of people so that they may liberate themselves from their oppression

--- Community organization must have an integrated sense of the history of social problems and how personal concerns develop from a broader historical experience

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-- Community organization should attempt to work with community problems at the primary level of problem severity and magnitude, not the secondary or tertiary levels.

-- Community organizing, in understanding the dynamics of racism, sexism, and classism, needs also to understand the limitations of "a political position" at the expense of losing the community people.

-- Community organization's "political position" should be based on an ideology that is flexible rather than fixed along a political continuum. What is critical here is the praxis that organizers bring into the community and the subsequent development of a shared sense of critical consciousness as it emerges.

-- Community organization needs to be educational by emphasizing social, political, economic and class dynamics.

-- Community organization's results must not only be those that may be discreetly measured, but also what Martin Rein has identified as community sociotherapy as the ways of maintaining them.

-- Community organization must always see its role as a temporary one. As it works towards the empowerment of people, it is also working towards reducing the professional presence in the community by training indigenous leadership from the earliest possible time.

-- And, finally, community organization should be practiced in such a way that organizational power sharing is to be sought above power consolidation, participatory decision-making is to be sought above leaderships between and among organizers and client groups are sought instead of competitive ones.

A Meta-Practice Approach to Community Organization

In identifying the problems of social work and the ineffectual liberal tradition in community organizing, we have also suggested a number of daily operating "rules" for organizers. We will now...
propose an overall framework to help facilitate the implementation of our suggestions. In developing a meta-practice perspective, that is, the practice of community organization practice, we hope that discussions will follow addressing the efficacy of such a formulation. Attachment to favorite strategies by organizers has led to limited knowledge-building in our field. The nature of our activities has too often dictated ad hoc interventions with little time for analysis and reflection on strategies (whether they work or not).

Little can be done to improve community organization by other than incremental means without reformulating the knowledge base, that is, without considering and improving meta-practice. Furthermore, efforts to improve meta-practices are often the best way to introduce more powerful strategies for organizing.

Our reasons for this position are as follows:

- Innovative community organization strategies have little chance of being considered, implemented and revised, unless our field develops new capacities for creativity, implementation and feedback to practitioners around the country. New ways of thinking about interventions and communities (e.g. neo-gemeinschaft communities) are needed, which, in turn, would require changes in how we have traditionally viewed our practice, our "rules of the game" and, in general, a vitally shared ethos of our area of involvement.

- Because of our dependence on a crossdisciplinary approach, the improvement of an area of practice will have limited value unless it is synergetically related to other disciplines, with careful thought being given to common elements of practice. This requires improvements in the information systems of our field, and this can only come about through changes in the way we view our practice (and social change).

- Since community organization is an ongoing activity, it is more important that we focus on the macro concerns of our practice rather than on a specific strategy that may be too case-specific. This approach is more efficient, and, hopefully, will lead to better community organization interventions.
In looking at our knowledge base as being in a state of constant change, we may begin to consider the various components of our practice—the many roles played by us—as defying a specific structure. Thus we may say that community organization meta-practice demonstrates the following:

- Solutions to community problems may be reached in a variety of ways. Different combinations of techniques and tactics may be useful in achieving quality changes in community organization. As we continue to look at case studies, empirical verification will teach us the most effective interventions for a given problem. This method must be open ended with only our imaginations and intelligence limiting what may be perceived as useful. The evidence may show us that techniques that may have been given minimal importance as a strategy or tactic keeps appearing in our catalogue of activities whose outcomes are positive ones. In essence, incremental methods lead to metapractice considerations. This approach is in keeping with how most decisions are made. Although radical change is difficult to orchestrate in the United States, the accumulation of evidence of workable methods can contribute to more fundamental upheavals.

As we develop meta-practice strategies, areas of consideration by community are:

-- A systematic evaluation of strategies employed in the past and their outcomes. How do these strategies reflect the present knowledge base around community power analysis, for example, of citizen participation in neighborhood organizations, or the dynamics of small group behavior?

-- A more critical look at the future. Are we going to be surprised once again by another trend like Reaganomics? We need a careful and thorough identification of the structures and processes that go into making predictions about future issues and problem areas. This may require, for example, watchdog organizations that coordinate their findings around the country. We need organizer "futurists" who can develop a multiplicity of scenarios so that we may put our imaginations and experience to work in learning new ways of solving these future crises.

-- The development of support systems for individuals and organizations involving themselves in creative thinking about
theories and interventions in working with different constituencies.

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The development of politicians. If we are to have nonhostile "ears" in the policy making areas of our government, then we must work towards improving the qualifications of those running for office. One way is to encourage and support the entry of qualified individuals into the political mainstream. The introduction of courses on political behavior in our curriculum, not just for lobbying purposes, but to utilize our own candidates may be important.

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The awarding of paid sabbaticals to student practitioners and professors working in theory-building in community organization by a national coordinating organization. (As funding permits, community activists might be included as well).

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The establishment of a number of research organizations throughout the country to work on central community organization issues. Some of these organizations might well be developed in other countries with coordinated conferences, publications and papers being shared.

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The development of innovative social experimentation designs in order to develop knowledge from unique perspectives. Such areas as critical theory and phenomenology have yet to be applied widely by community organization practitioners, although their relevance for our field is obvious.

Two further questions are in urgent need of attention. The first is, who is going to accompany us on this journey of change? The second is, how are we going to sustain ourselves in the struggles that lie ahead?

What about the liberals, we are often asked, what about them? Well, the truth of the matter is that they are both enemy and ally. When they oppose the forces of meaningful change they must - even if they are our "best friends" - be called what they are -- "enemies." This is not going to make us very popular. We see no way around it. Our analysis must document the part liberals play in undermining, undercutting and smashing important change efforts at the community level. We must not trade our desire for their
support for our own acquiescence in approaches and programs that violate the rights and legitimate needs of oppressed people.

How, finally, do we keep ourselves together for the struggles that lie ahead? We must be mindful of others' needs to balance the demands of security and freedom in ways that are different from our own. Patience and a strong sense of humor should be sustained. The battle against thoughtless adventurism on the one hand, and debilitating frustration and isolation on the other, is ongoing. Find and contribute to a support group for the kind of community organization to which you are committed. A little self-doubt is a good antidote to perfect-appearing single-theory views of social reality and social change.

If you wait for thanks and appreciation, you may be waiting for a very long time. Learn to appreciate small successes, while at the same time always looking to confront issues of importance. The streets of social change in community organization are strewn with burnouts. Do not become a statistic. Know your own limits and back off when necessary. But stick with your commitments. The authors promise exciting times ahead.
Notes and References


6. Ibid.


Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that community work can be understood in relation to the larger structure of society. Community work is seen in terms of observations on cases previously reported. These observations suggest a political model of community work. In that model, goals are short term task goals of program development aimed at social problem or disadvantaged groups. The model assumes conflict among groups which can be dealt with politically. Client systems are different than constituent systems in that model, and clients are weak participants in community work. Non-client voluntary associations can nonetheless influence program decisions. These model elements are explained in terms of pluralism and the dominance of business and big government in American society. Pluralism creates the potential for conflict, thus creating a need for political strategy and tactics in community work. Dominance of business and government in program decisions gives programs and their clients relatively low status. This low status makes empowerment of clients unlikely.

Introduction

During much of my life I have been involved in efforts to change or study public human service programs. In all such efforts, I have been impressed by the importance of government structure for the possibility of change or improvement. Program personnel told me more than once that the possibility of change was controlled by one or more levels of government. During these
efforts, I have read much social science literature. Often, I saw little in what I read that related to the change efforts in which I worked. Nor did I experience the social environment as it was described in the literature.

A few years ago, however, I read Lindblom's Politics and Markets (1977) for the first time. Lindblom describes institutional structures and political processes in polyarchies like the United States. I was impressed by the fit between his analysis and my experience.

One of Lindblom's contentions is that politics is essential for creating change in polyarchies since they are ruled by coalitions between influential groups. For the purposes of this article, the importance of Lindblom's model is that it describes political efforts in the context of societies like the United States.

In a recent paper (Woehle, 1984a), I described three cases of community work observed in small communities. Working with three graduate students, I carefully documented three voluntary groups as they tried to restore or save programs in their communities. This paper will take these results a step further and interpret our observations in terms of the structure of American society.

Definitions

"Community work" is used here to avoid association with particular models of community change. I decided to use a term which does not have the connotations of community organizing, or the non-social work tradition of community development. I hope this new term will call attention to new approaches in community work efforts.

"Program," as used here, refers to the organized delivery of a product, service or money to clients considered to need such benefits. "Partisan analysis" means the calculated description of an issue in terms compatible to certain values or interests. "Pluralism" refers to the division of people into numerous social organizations and/or cultural groups.

Finally, "sociopolitical structure" refers to the society-wide relationship of formal organizations and institutions. The thesis
of this paper is that sociopolitical structure has an important influence on community work particularly in the area of human service provision. Assuming that the cases we observed accurately reflect the nature of community work under similar circumstances, those observations should be understandable in relation to the larger structure of society. Two aspects of the societal content appear to be particularly important: the pluralism of American society, and power and authority as structured in business and government in the United States.

Pluralism is important in two ways. First, it divides society into a variety of groupings which create the potential for conflict among groups. Second, the presence of pluralism and the conflict it may create suggests that those engaged in community work will have to be knowledgeable of the use of conflict and have the ability to resolve it when it appears.

Sociopolitical structure is important for community work because human service programs have low rank in that structure. The low priority of human service programs in the structure is enhanced by the conservative values which support more prestigious parts of the structure. At the same time, limitations on the power of government make influence on human service decisions possible. The freedom of information and assembly provided by the structure allow for real influence on program decisions. Yet, because their programs have low priority, program clients are not seen as valued members of the structure. As a result, client empowerment is unlikely and community work falls to non-client voluntary associations.

Literature Review

To think theoretically, one must think generally. A basic framework is helpful for such thought. The framework used here is based on two themes: the continuum of directiveness to non-directiveness in community work practice (Norris, 1977) and that of conflict to consensus in the community's response to community work (Warren, 1971). Generally, the principles of democracy constrain community work in the United States to be non-directive. The community's response is a more complicated matter, however.
Those who see conflict in the community are inclined to see society as a system of relationships between competing or conflicting individuals and groups. To these analysts, elites consist of competing groups. They see individuals as self-interested, social control as largely unintentional, conflict as functional and change as incremental.

Dahl (1971) sees American political elites as pluralistic. Frohock (1979) summarizes this view stating that, according to pluralists, minorities govern effectively. Issues motivate interest groups which, in turn, compete and bargain for support. The bargained decision becomes policy, while the public at large remains outside of policy making.

In the pluralist model, various kinds of opposing interests serve useful functions (Coser, 1956). On one hand, conflict binds groups together, creating social structure. On the other hand, conflict becomes the basis of change, or the synthesizing process of emerging social structure.

Based on theories like those of Bell (1973), some analysts claim that we are moving from a pluralistic social structure to more intentional social structure, and that these changes are even permeating rural American (Bradshaw & Blakely, 1979). Kleinberg (1979), however, does not believe such basic changes are occurring. Rather, the elitist pluralism emerging as society changes is a continuation of traditional institutions of the type described by Lindblom (1977). The more things change, the more they are the same.

What does elitist pluralism have to do with the small community? First, there is a large social and political system which constrains local decision making. While the larger system may, in fact, be pluralistic (Lindblom, 1977), the small community appears to be under external control. In the 1950's, Vidich and Bensman (1968) saw Springdale politically dominated by state government. Springdale was also increasingly influenced culturally by a more cosmopolitan middle class. By the 1960's, the federal government was more in evidence in Benson, Minnesota, and the middle class was gaining prominence in the transmission of translocal forces (Martindale & Hanson, 1969). By the 1970's, Bradshaw and Blakely (1979) saw an even larger role of state and federal government.
They also saw a presence of a talented group of middle class professionals and technicians. They projected this as a future trend throughout the United States and saw it in a positive light for community development. We have questioned this positive evaluation elsewhere (Woehle et al., 1981).

As a result of external dominance, rural agencies have limited independence (Hobbs, 1980). In fact, some see rural independence as a myth. According to Vidich and Bensman (1968), local laws are constantly adapted to state and national laws. Local governments surrender authority and decision making in order to receive external subsidies. Among the dominating influences are the Department of Agriculture (Martindale & Hanson, 1969), state education agencies (Vidich & Bensman, 1968), and federal Title XX planning requirements for social services (Brandshaw & Blakely, 1979). According to Vidich and Bensman, local government does not take control even where it could, and when it does, decisions are usually unanimous and appear to be dominated by a local elite.

In Minnesota, leaders are over 90% men, including businessmen, public servants and professionals (Sponangle et al., 1982). In Springdale, officials emphasize low taxes locally, delegating the tasks of dealing with outside officials to the professionals able to do so (Vidich & Bensman, 1968). The poor are excluded from the governing structure (Vidich & Bensman, 1968; Bradshaw & Blakely, 1979).

The appearance of a local elite is deceiving, however. The local machine struggles to maintain control in Springdale and politics is a pervasive part of local life (Vidich & Bensman, 1968). Although rural communities emphasize the internal relationships and concerns of the local community (Jacobsen, 1980), Vidich and Bensman see external control and local political conflicts limiting the political control of the local elite.

The attempts by local elites to maintain the appearance of control in rural areas are probably related to values. Larson (1978) has presented overwhelming evidence on the relative conservatism of values in rural America. He shows that community size is consistently associated with values, with rural areas and small communities being the most conservative. Rural and small community people value traditional family structure, religion and local government responsibility more than urban people. In summary,
some writers see pluralism in American life, while others see domination of the small community. I believe both of these views can be accepted as part of Lindblom's (1977) model.

The issues of non-local forces and local control in the small community are important to the degree they describe the context and practice of community work. If the social structure of the community is dominated by a unified elite, and if this unified elite pursues its goals rationally, community work could be in consensus with the community (Warren, 1970). If, on the other hand, elites are pluralistic and community goals are the epi-phenomenal result of the interaction of elites and others, community work is likely to confront a conflicting, often confusing situation. Individuals may not be able to discern what the community needs (Gilbert, 1979) or be sufficiently organized to pursue stated goals.

Rothman (1979) summarized the literature on community work in terms of three major models: locality development, social planning, and social action. Each of these three models can be described in terms of Norris' (1977) and Warren's (1971) concepts. Locality development is non-directive consensus. Planning tends to be directive consensus, but Rothman recognizes that those who describe planning allow for the possibility of conflict. Social action is non-directive conflict.

Rothman did not see the three models as the only ways to practice community work. He made two major qualifying statements on the models. First, he indicated that much social work community work was accomplished in what he called a social reform model. Second, he indicated that the models could be "mixed and phased."

Rothman said that social reform was a mixture of social planning and social action. In social reform, goal categories are of a task nature. Community problems for social reformers include social problems and disadvantages groups. Change strategies involve organizations of concerned citizens. Campaign tactics are used, with information utilized to persuade decision making bodies. Practitioner roles include coalition building, gathering facts and the operation of political techniques. The medium of change is the manipulation of voluntary associations, mass media, and legislative bodies. The power structure is viewed as a gate keeper and can be manipulated through persuasion or pressure. The
client system is defined as a segment of the population at risk. Interests of community subparts may be reconciliable or in conflict. The public interest is realist-individualist. Clients are considered victims, but have the potential of being consumers or recipients.

Although Rothman gave limited attention to the social reform model, it is of great interest here. As Rothman stated, much social work reform has taken place historically within this model. While the community work I will discuss in this document is not basically reformative, the community work we observed is very similar in form to the social reform model as presented by Rothman. Furthermore, this model is compatible with the model of a pluralistic society which nonetheless contains strong dominating influences.

The Setting, Cases Observed and Method of Analysis

The setting for this study is Minnesota or, more precisely, counties and/or portions of counties in northeastern Minnesota. Minnesota has two major types of terrain. To the south and west, open prairie befriends the farmer. To the northeast hills, lake swamps, rocks, and forestation have sometimes favored lumber jacks or miners, and still attract tourists. But such terrain makes farming difficult. Moreover, it is the northeastern part of the state where one can expect the greatest utilization of social services (Woehle, 1984b) or financial assistance (Department of Commerce, 1979).

For a time at least, the relative deprivation of northeastern Minnesota was offset, in part, by the "Minnesota Miracle" (Peek & Wilson, 1983). This miracle had kept state taxes high and the economy strong, assuring Minnesotans of plentiful jobs and a strong social welfare system. Minnesota's liberal populist tradition (Nye, 1959) had provided a series of redistribution formulas to tap a vital statewide economy and bring service resources to disadvantaged areas. As Peek and Wilson indicate, however, state and federal funding availability had downgraded the miracle considerably by the early 1980's. Except in elementary and secondary education, where they expected state increases to offset federal cuts, Peek and Wilson projected at least double-digit proportions would be slashed from state and federal funding for human services.
In this setting, my research assistants and I worked with three groups trying to save programs. We worked with each group through one episode leading to a decision on program provision. One episode was the yearly budgeting process of the Northeast Carlton County United Way. This episode involved the United Way board and subcommittees of the board. Contributors to the United Way and recipients of United Way funds were also important parties in this episode. This episode followed the yearly decision making process through eventual appeals by some funded groups and ended when those appeals were finally decided. This episode was selected to approximate locality development.

A second episode involved the Human Services Advisory Committee of Carlton County. This Committee is a creature of the County Human Services Board, a committee of the whole of the elected County Board, and recommends a human services budget to the Human Services Board. Four task forces serve the Advisory Committee and various service areas and special interest groups are important actors. This Committee had a year's experience when we began our observations and we followed the episode through the formally scheduled process to the approval of the budget by the elected County Board. This episode was selected to approximate social planning.

The final episode was the effort of a citizens group, Aitkin County Citizens Together (ACCT). This group attempted to reverse the decision of the Aitkin School Board to discontinue participation in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP). A handful of citizens calling themselves ACCT, the School Board and School Superintendent, and interested members of the public were the important actors. We followed the episode from the emergence of the issue through the decision of the School Board to hold to its decision. This episode was selected to approximate social action.

In summary, then, we observed three community work efforts. These efforts approximated the major models reviewed by Rothman (1979). The general observations of the observed cases are described below. As indicated elsewhere, (Woehle, 1984a), these observations tended to indicate a uniformly political approach to community work in the small community.
The conservatism of the small community, as well as the fiscal cutbacks described above, provide an excellent setting for studying community work under conservative conditions. All that was needed was a method of analysis. Bulmer (1979) provided one, called retroduction.

This method goes beyond the induction normally used in case studies. Rather than move between fact and generalization as one does in induction, the analyst moves between fact, generalization, and theory to develop concepts. Concepts, therefore, are not the only end, but the development of concepts as an integrated part of theory is accomplished.

According to Bulmer, the process of retroduction has three steps:

1) A surprising phenomenon, P, is observed;

2) P would be explicable if H, a theory, were true;

3) Hence, there is reason to believe that H is true.

In this study, the surprising phenomenon is that community work is political in a way not described by Rothman's (1979) major models. One way to explain the form that community work takes is to describe the structure in which the efforts are developed. As I will attempt to show below, I believe that political community would be explicable if we view the sociopolitical structure as a pluralistic system which generates conflict and as an institutional structure dominated by business and big government.

Summary of the Observed Cases

Through our observations of community work in small communities, a new model of community work emerged. This "program politics" model is similar to Rothman's (1979) social reform model. Yet, there are some differences. Both models are presented in Table 1.
As Table 1 indicated, both social reform and program politics seek to accomplish task goals. Reformers seek to develop new programs for disadvantaged or social problem groups. Program politicians seek to maintain such programs. Both social reformers and program politicians assume social problems and disadvantage in the community.

Social reform strategy consists of attempts to organize a coalition of concerned interests. As we observed them, program politicians do not achieve such organization. Rather, they rely on arguments in favor of existing programs. While these arguments are analytical, they resemble what Lindblom (1980) calls "partisan analysis." Furthermore, they threaten conflict if the programs are cut.

Both reformers and program politicians mount campaigns to support programs. For reformers, this aids the formation of the coalition. For program politicians, the campaign serves two purposes. First, it provides a position that decision making might adapt. Second, it keeps that threat of conflict visible.

The differences in strategy are reflected in the differences in practitioner roles. While both models include fact gathering, the reformer relies on the coalition to motivate decision makers in the legislative bodies. Working with existing programs and making threats they may not want to actualize, program politicians must be willing to negotiate solutions.

Table 1

A Comparison of Rothman's (1979) Social Reform Model and the Program Politics Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Reform</th>
<th>Program Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Goal category of</td>
<td>Social Provision for a disadvantaged or social</td>
<td>Program maintenance or re-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community action</td>
<td>problem group (task goals)</td>
<td>restoration for disadvantaged or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>social problem group (task goals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social problems and disadvantaged populations</th>
<th>Social problems and disadvantaged populations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Assumption concerning community structures and problem conditions</td>
<td>Organization of coalition of concerned interests</td>
<td>Partisan analysis and threat of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Basic change strategy</td>
<td>Campaign: Employment of facts and persuasion</td>
<td>Campaign: Employment of facts and persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Characteristic change tactics and techniques</td>
<td>Coalition builder, fact gatherer, legislative technician</td>
<td>Fact gatherer, advocate, partisan, negotiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Salient practitioner roles</td>
<td>Manipulation of voluntary associations, mass media, legislative bodies</td>
<td>Manipulation of voluntary associations, mass media, legislative bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Medium of change</td>
<td>Neutral: Centers of change that can be influenced through persuasion/pressure</td>
<td>Neutral: Centers of change that can be influenced through persuasion/pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Orientation toward the power structure</td>
<td>Client system is community segment: Disadvantaged population or population at risk</td>
<td>Client system is community segment: Disadvantaged population or population at risk; constituent system consists of any set of groups with related interests and exceeds local geographic boundaries; system is institutionally defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Boundary definition of the community client system or constituency</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Assumption regarding interests of community subparts</td>
<td>Reconciliable or in conflict</td>
<td>Reconciliable or in conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Conception of public interest</td>
<td>Realist-individualist</td>
<td>Realist-individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Conception of client population or constituency</td>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Consumer and recipients and interest groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Conception of the client role</td>
<td>Potential consumers/ recipients</td>
<td>Potential victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social reform and program politics are alike on the medium of change and orientation toward the power structure. Both approaches would manipulate voluntary organizations. Both take a relatively neutral stance toward the power structure. Both approaches assume the power structure can be influenced.

In our observations, the boundary definition of the client or constituency system differs considerably from the social reform model. In that model, Rothman (1979) seems to indicate that clients and constituents are one and the same. Our observations suggest that there are many non-client constituents. Furthermore, both clients and constituents are defined by complex organizational structures. Thus, the client-constituent system may exceed simple geographic definition of the local community. In addition, the differences of clients and constituents are important for the conception of the client-constituent populations and roles.

On the public interest and interests of the community sub-parts, our observations are similar to the elements of the reform model. As described above, interests of the sub-parts are often in conflict but these conflicts are reconciliable. The public interest can be thought of as the political, if non-rational, reconciliation of interests.

Finally, our observations suggest a different conception of clients and constituents than is evidence in Rothman's social reform model. Constituents are different from clients. Constituent
are any group with a relevant interest according to observations. Clients' interests lie primarily in the benefits of the programs. The client role is reversed in the two models. Reformers see victims who might become consumers or recipients. Program politicians see recipients and consumers who might become victims.

Briefly, I have suggested that the community work we observed is similar to Rothman's social reform model, except for some specified differences. I will now turn to the place of such community work in the sociopolitical structure.

The Sociopolitical Structure as Context

It is reasonable to assume that there will be a relationship between social structure and community work. The theoretical literature reviewed above suggests that the degree of consensus, as opposed to conflict, is a structural component of the community important to community work. Bulmer's (1979) retroduction suggests a method for discovering that relationship.

There are, I believe, two major statements about structure in American society which apply here. First, American sociopolitical structure is pluralistic. Second, the major institutions of American society are business and government, in that order. These two major institutions consist of various organizations arranged in status layers of relative influence. Lindblom (1977) has discussed these characteristics in detail. Given the conditions of pluralism and the dominance of business and government, the things we observed in community work are not surprising. In fact, the logic of retroduction and the acceptance of Lindblom's generalizations make our observations quite understandable. Let me discuss these generalizations and their implications for my findings, beginning with pluralism.

Pluralism and Community Work

For the sake of this discussion, pluralism can be divided into two categories. These are sociopolitical pluralism and cultural pluralism. The first refers to the structuring of society into a variety of formal organizations. The second refers to cultural differences which generate differing values.
Sociopolitical pluralism is evidence in the division between the public and private sectors and in the many divisions within these sectors. Significant for this study are the many levels and departments of government, the many business organizations, the presence of a variety of voluntary associations and social and economic status differences.

Cultural differences are most relevant here in terms of value differences. Although this is not a study of value differences, the cases do reveal the importance of certain values associated with small communities. Relative conservativism on social issues and a relative high value on local government often found in small communities, are important here.

Pluralism is important for community work in a number of ways. For the most part, this importance is related to the possibilities for conflict which result among groups with differing values and interests. Pluralism means that community workers will find conflict, not consensus, in the community.

Pluralism suggests that community work will have to assume a realist-individualist view of the public interest. The need for this assumption comes from the divisions in a pluralistic society, as well as the impact of pluralism on knowledge and information. Because society is organized into a variety of structures, the purposes of those structures will vary. As individuals attached to those structures, our interests become associated with their purposes. If we work for or receive benefits from a social service organization, we have interests in that organization. If we are workers, owners or consumers in business structures, we may find the taxes or contributions of those businesses to be contrary to our interests. Since taxes and contributions pay for social services, there may be conflicts between those types of organizations and the individuals who are attached to them. On a value level, we may take a position for or against social services and the resources they require. Under such conditions, the public interest will not be viewed in any singular way.

Pluralism also affects the conception of the public interest by creating a variety of knowledgeable views on an issue. In part, these differing views spring from the fact that people are associated with different organizations. Business people, for example, may try to bring "workfare" or tight management to human services,
while social workers emphasize humanistic practice. Other knowledge differences spring from value differences. One person's view of the recipient as victim has considerably different implications from another's view of the recipient as leech. Although rural communities are generally conservative, our social action case saw people demonstrate both extremes on the value of the recipient. Where culture encourages such differences on values and knowledge, it is unlikely that a general, rational view of the public interest will emerge.

In brief, our society is pluralistic. Pluralism is evident in differing values, which are related to cultural differences. It is also evident in sociopolitical pluralism consisting of multiple organizations. This pluralism divides us into interest groups and gives us differing views of the public interest. Basically, community work will probably have to assume a realist-individualist view of the public interest.

Just a pluralism generated differences which require community work to assume a realist-individualist view of the public interest, it also generates real interest differences. Community work must see these as differences which may or may not be reconciled. So far as the various organizations are concerned, issues of budget may not be reconcilable. Human services compete for resources from a finite pot. As a whole, human services providers would like the pot to grow. Outside the human services, however, individuals and businesses paying taxes and making contributions try to keep the pot small. The conflict may not be budgetary, but that does not necessarily make it reconcilable. In our social action case, the conflict seemed to be a case of the rural value of local control versus the control of the federal and state government. Nonetheless, this conflict was not reconciled. In fact, budgetary conflicts in other cases seemed more reconcilable.

Pluralism, and the conflicts it generates, makes community work a political task. Coalitions are one means of reconciling differences. This is the social reform strategy according to Rothman. Political parties are an example of coalition. Under such arrangements, groups, agree to work together despite differences. Parties and other organizations often organize around values as well as interests. The rhetoric of party positions facilitates
such organization. Similarly, partisam analysis allows legislative bodies to use information to develop policy (Lindblom, 1980). By laying out issues in a way that encourages the opposition to join the cause, the differences of groups can be more easily reconciled.

The threat of conflict is more radical than partisan analysis, but it also derives from pluralism. It is the existence of groups with differing interests and values which make conflict possible. Holding a political coalition together is a major problem for decision makers, particularly elected decision makers. Thus, they see conflict as a threat.

Just as social reform requires a campaign to hold the coalition together, a campaign based on partisan analysis becomes part of the tactic to keep the threat of conflict before the decision maker. The campaign limits the choices of decision makers. Then, decision makers must risk conflict if they make the wrong choice. Without pluralistic points of view and the possibility of dissatisfied interest groups, this tactic could not operate.

Pluralism is also important for the role of the practitioner. For the practitioner, the question is, "What do I do?" Given divided interests, the political use of information and possibility of conflict, the nature of practice becomes clear. Fact gathering and campaigning are required. The facts gathered will be subject to partisan interpretation, so the practitioner becomes partisan. The practitioner advocates for services and points to possible conflict should they be cut. Both the practitioner may not want the conflict to come to fruition. Rather, negotiated compromises may be used to avoid conflict or, perhaps, resolve conflict should it arise. To be available as negotiator, the practitioner may wish to avoid public association with conflicting parties.

In summary, pluralism is important for community work in several ways. It requires the assumption of a realist-individualist view of the public interest. It generates interest and value differences among social groupings. These conflicts necessitate political strategy and tactics to bring groups together. Strategy and tactics include campaigning, partisan analysis, and the threat of conflict. It is the role of the community worker to promote these strategies and tactics.
Sociopolitical Structure

As described by Lindblom (1977), there are two generalizations about American institutional structure which are important for community work. The first is the institutionalized limitations of the power of government. The second is the tendency of some sectors of society nonetheless to have considerably more authority than others. Checks and balances, and relative freedom of information, constitute the former. The dominance of big business and big government constitute the latter.

The limitations on government authority are related to pluralism which was discussed above. Our government institutions, defined by constitutionalism, are pluralistic. We have many levels and branches of government. In a system of checks and balances, no single level or branch is all powerful. (Some levels or branches are more powerful than others, however, a point I will return to below.) In addition to limited authority, no single organization has complete control of information. Thus, it is possible to have more than one view of a problem and no single official view. These characteristics are important for community work because they make it possible to influence an area dominated by government such as human services. Thus, the orientation toward the power structure assumed by social reform and program politics are compatible with our form of government.

The flexibility of government should not be overstated, however. In some respects, pluralism itself slows change. There is no single organization responsible for any problem in the United States. Simply locating a point to influence decisions can be difficult. But, there are more serious problems for community work than pluralism.

In modern American human services, the presence of big government is an important factor. Beginning with the 1930's and culminating in the 1960's, the federal government became a major provider of human service resources (Dunham, 1958; Kravitz & Kolodner, 1969) and social service provision has been largely taken over by government. This creates a relationship between community work and big government whenever community work is aimed at social service provision. While private groups like United Ways are somewhat independent of this relationship, they cannot ignore the ever present public sector. Moreover, they have their
own relationships to major institutions, depend on businesses for help with campaigns, and make grants to national voluntary associations or semi-public programs.

The major institutions of American society are big business and big government, in that order. True, government gives the appearance of being open to the people. But, as Lindblom (1977) has indicated, government is constantly bending over backwards to serve business interests. Politicians know they have little choice in this matter. If politicians fail to aid the economy, voters will lose jobs and throw them out of office. Business has control of jobs and thus has enormous ability to control the electorate. Although business acts like a public body in the control of employment, our popular control of business is remarkably weak.

Politicians know that they do not have to satisfy all of the people all of the time. Any politician's voting constituency is but a minority of public represented. The non-voters are often members of social problem or disadvantaged populations. Thus, politicians can often chose to ignore these segments of the population.

Business is even more likely to ignore these segments of the population. Business is most interested in those portions of the population which produce and consume what business has to offer. Those who lack skills and money are of little value to business. Because business is not subject to much popular control, there is little reason for business to be accountable to broader populations.

Those without skills or money are therefore "disadvantaged" or "social problem" populations. They reside outside the major institutions. Their interests, unaddressed by business, are served mostly by the social welfare problems or government. Less institutionalized than other government functions, their programs are last to be budgeted for, the first to be cut. Such programs are, in a word, residual (Dolgoff & Feldstein, 1984).

Our society has its humane side, of course. Some people see the needs of social problem and disadvantaged groups and work on their behalf. Sometimes, these populations work on their own behalf. Often, the advocates of the disadvantaged or social problem
groups describe them as victims of the major institutions. Although they would like to see them integrated into these institutions, the institutions are less than fully responsive. Programs are the usual response when reformers push for the interests of excluded populations. In good times, programs grow. In hard times, other interests compete against the interests of the clients of programs. In hard times, reformers are reduced to fighting to retain what they had gained in better times.

Reformers have created programs when and where they could. In the early history of social work, programs were created in the private and voluntary sector. While private services remain, the Great Depression opened the public sector for development of social welfare programs. At first, much of this development was at the state and local level. The good times and social crisis of the 1960's smashed most remaining barriers to the development of federal programs. Today, programs are largely public, and associated with all possible levels of government (Kahn, 1979).

Creating or maintaining a program is a limited goal. The major structures of society are not greatly altered by the presence of programs. While the programs provide something for the social problem or disadvantaged groups, it is less than full integration into the social fabric. The role of the program client tends to be that of recipient. Unlike a consumer in the business economy or more institutionalized public services, these roles carry strict rules about eligibility and choice of services.

Cast in the role of recipients, the client is subject to degradation. The values of American society support its major institutions and devalue its residual organizations. To be employed in the major institutional structures is good. To be a recipient of social welfare services is bad. As I indicated in the literature review, small communities are more likely to adhere to such values than large communities.

In the struggle to maintain services in hard times, clients are relatively weak constituents. The superior organization and clout of those in the major institutions tend to prevail. This weakness, combined with the tendency to label clients as bad, makes clients weak contestants in the arena of the strong.
The job of advocating for programs often falls to voluntary associations. Because clients are often too weak to work on their own behalf, this is the work of others who care.

To summarize, I see a social structure which is pluralistic but dominated by business and government. Human service programs of the type studied here are associated with all possible levels of government and the private sector. They have relatively low priority, being residual in nature.

The nature of the community work for service provision is related to the sociopolitical structure of society. Pluralism assures divided interests and makes conflict and campaigns likely. The institutional structure and its residual programs ostracize program clients. Although limited government authority makes community work influence possible, the work of creating or maintaining programs falls to voluntary associations. Clients, weak and dispirited by their place in the large structure, are unlikely to be an active part of the struggle for programs.

Briefly then, the structure of American society is related to community work as we saw it practiced.

Conclusions and Implications

This paper has presented the analysis of the place of community work in the social structure of American society. First, I noted that the community work we observed tends to indicate a community work model similar to Rothman's social reform model. The reform model is a generally political model, a mixture of social planning and social action. I call the community work we observed "program politics." Second, social reform and program politics can be related to the pluralism and sociopolitical structure of polyarchy. Basically, pluralism creates conflict in the community, while the sociopolitical structure assigns residual status to social welfare programs.

The way pluralism and sociopolitical structure affect community work can be understood by referring to Table 1. Five items in that table reflect pluralism. Items 3, 4, and 5 relate to the need to bring pluralistic groups together. Coalition building, campaigning, gathering facts for partisan purposes, advocating and negotiating all result from the presence of groups with varying
interests. Pluralism is also reflected in items 9 and 10. These items are concerned with assumptions about group differences in the community. The remaining items in Table 1 are related to the dominance of business and big government.

Item 2 indicates that social problem and disadvantaged groups are assumed. These groups exist because business and government fail to integrate them into the major institutions. Item 1 emphasizes programs for excluded populations, recognizing the failure to integrate these groups. Items 11 and 12 accentuate this exclusion. Clients may become victims or victims may become clients, depending on the interests of other constituents. Item 8 recognizes the complex nature of client and constituent systems, and the importance of non-client constituents like business. Item 6 likewise recognizes the limitations of clients as constituents, and the importance of voluntary associations which act in their behalf. Finally items 6 and 7 recognize the government has limited power and can be influenced.

In this context, community work tends to be the politics of program provision. In good times, this means reform in the form of new or expanded programs. In bad times, it means fighting for the maintenance of programs.

Like any human endeavor, this paper has its limitations. Thus, there is at least some possibility that my analysis is wrong. Naturally, I believe there is some truth in my analysis.

Being wrong has one set of implications. Being right has another. Basically, being wrong suggests that research is needed. Being right suggests that we should consider program politics as a model for community work. Let me discuss each of these possibilities.

Retroduction may bias my analysis. Retroduction says that the researcher will include theory in the analysis. It does not select theory in the analysis. It does not select theory for the analyst. For every set of observations, there are a number of plausible theoretical explanations. My selection of Lindblom's (1977) model may, therefore, bias my analysis. If I am wrong, the implications for this analysis are obvious: More research is needed.
But, I have qualified my work enough. Let me turn to the possibility that my conclusions are valid. That being the case, it is necessary to think about the implications of my research and theory for community work practice.

The implications for practice are quite straightforward. The community worker should be prepared to adopt political methods for the promotion of social programs. These methods are the methods of social reform in good times and the methods of program politics in hard times.

Because our society is pluralistic, community workers will have to work with differing groups. They may need to build coalitions between groups, conduct partisan analysis, threaten conflict, advocate, and negotiate. Assuming a realist-individualist public interest, they can expect interest in the community to be in conflict. These differences, however, may be reconciliable.

Dominance by business and big government is also important for community work. This is especially true when the goal is program provision. Most important is the implied low status of clients and victims. Excluded from the major institutions, community work clients are not likely to be ready for empowerment in those institutions. As social problem or disadvantaged populations, they do not even get much access to the power structure in programs designed for them. Even if they do, they are but one of several constituencies on program issues. Often, their interests are in the hands of voluntary associations comprised largely of non-client members. Nonetheless, constitutionalism and pluralism in government do allow for some influence by those voluntary associations.

Community workers can expect to work with such voluntary associations. Thus, direct empowerment of clients will be unlikely. Furthermore, establishing or saving programs is not an empowering goal. Clients are not noticeably more powerful than non-client victims. On program issues, however, the power structure is not the enemy. Rather, community workers should think of the power structure as subject to favorable influence.
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Social work as a profession and social workers as individual professionals often labor within the constraints of structural ambiguity. The historical emergence and location of the profession within the structure of a political economy whose normal functioning simultaneously creates the miseries of the profession's clients and the funds to serve them, poses a series of contradictions internal to the field and to most of its practitioners. The central expression of this conflict is hidden or mystified in social work education, thus preserving the legitimacy of the social structure while delegitimizing or invalidating its oppressed populations. This process occurs through the utilization of defect or deficit-based problem definitional paradigms, thus justifying various forms of therapeutic interventions which deny the structural foundations of problems, or depoliticizing problems by absorption into the area of management and technological problem-solving. Transferring political conflict centered on the distribution of power and control over resources to the design and implementation of services derived from a defect model paradigm implementation expresses this latter tendency.

Previous research has documented the extent to which the agencies and organizations typically directed by social workers, or where social workers constitute a considerable part of the professional work force, are tied firmly to dominant thought structures and ideologies (Rose: 1972; Warren, Rose, and Burgunder: 1972).
1974). The prevailing problem definitional paradigms, organized to synthesize defect-based projections of problems with residually styled service programs, also carry with them typical organizational and interorganizational strategies. These latter forms of stabilizing and turf maintaining activities reaffirm, in turn, the legitimacy of the local interorganizational field and its member agencies. As these agencies reflect the distribution of power and wealth through their structural location and ideological patterning, support for them or cooperative participation with them, by definition, contributes to reproduction of the structure and legitimation of the prevailing social order. Following Warren, et al, we are forced to conclude that the political character of most social work theorizing, whether it focuses on defining problems or addressing practice, rationalizes the social order and thus can be seen as a participant in its institutional thought structure, creating "a common frame of reference regarding the nature of social reality, of American society, of social problems, and efforts at social change and human betterment" (Warren, et al: 1974, pg. 19).

The institutional thought structure depicts a broadspread manner of thinking about the problems experienced by people who become the clients of social agencies legitimated to function within the social structuring of human service systems. The ideological convergence of these service delivery systems and their member agencies are both a reflection of their organizational patterns of interaction and the basis for its ongoing reproduction. Service provider systems require ideological convergence to sustain hegemony over competing claims and organizational actors. In The Structure of Urban Reform, Warren, et al empirically detailed the escalating intensity that accompanied the shift from competitive forms of interaction between agencies with a common ideological base to zero-sum conflictual interactions which occur when an agency bearing a structural problem definition with an internally consistent intervention strategy enters a local interorganizational field.

It is in these few instances of confrontation by an alternative construction of social reality (Berger and Luckmann: 1966) that the structural ambiguity experienced by human service system providers expresses itself without equivocation. The agencies enmeshed in the institutionalized, defectpremised thought structure and in the community interorganizational field depart from
their typical stance of isolation, passive cooperation or coordination with others to forge alliances targeted at removal of the "deviant" organization from the local interorganizational network (Warren, et al: 1974).

These summary comments and contextual assumptions are presented as the background for a more focused discussion of community organization as a central survival strategy for community-based organizations or agencies that rely on typical social welfare funding streams, but which also attempt to operationalize a social structural problem definition and practice. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a brief case example of such an agency, an articulation of its organizing strategy for survival, and a concluding set of suggestions.

The Sayville Project

The Sayville Project is a community-based, mental health after-care agency located on the South Shore of Long Island, New York. Its funds come directly from the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) through the OMH Community Support Systems (CSS) program. The Sayville Project has been in existence since 1976, beginning as a social work education program and internship site, but expanding in 1979 to become a "legitimate" service provider when the Office of Mental Health awarded it a contract to deliver case management services to former State Hospital patients dumped into unprepared and under-serviced communities. Now in its fifth year of operation as a CSS program, with a budget four times the size of its original funding, and a "psychosocial club" component to complement its more individualized case management function, the Sayville Project serves as a useful example of the development of organizational interaction and community organization strategies that are internally consistent with the agency's perspective on problem definition and intervention approach.

Funded by the Social Work Education branch of NIMH. Our deep appreciation is extended to Dr. Milton Wittman, former chief of that office; to Dr. Neilson Smith, its present chief; and to Dr. Marta Sotomayor, our former program officer.
The problem definition used by the Sayville Project is identified as an "advocacy/empowerment" orientation to confronting the realities of the ex-patient clients it serves. The concept of an advocacy/empowerment approach derives from an explanatory paradigm which takes as its central concept the necessity to understand the systemic relationship between a person's context, history and identity. In the case of former psychiatric patients deposited in communities as part of the economic policy of deinstitutionalization (Rose: 1979; Scull: 1977), the focus is on the interaction between the person's experience in the total institution of the mental hospital (Goffman: 1961) and the forging of mental patient identity (Rose and Black: 1985); on the harsh objective conditions that contour the reality of life in communities (Hynes: 1977; Comptroller General: 1977); and on the omnipresence of a "maintenance therapy"-psychotropic drug medical regimen as the organizing framework for most forms of after-care services.

Numerous contributions to the literature (Lamb and Goertzel: 1971; Reich and Siegal: 1973; Lander: 1975, among others) attest to the fact that State mental hospitals emptied their beds at a rapid rate between the years 1955-75 (Bassuk and Gerson: 1978) without a concomitant shift in mental health funding from institutional care to community-based care (Rose: 1979). The Report of the Comptroller General of the United States (1977) confirms studies at lower jurisdictional levels regarding the role of the profit sector in exploiting the housing needs of ex-patients; the profits accruing to the pharmaceutical industries (Lerman: 1980); and the benefit to stressed State budgets (Scull: 1977) that derived from the fragmented policies and short-sighted practices that occurred before rising recidivism rates and community outrage combined to force states to prepare some type of mental health after-care service system.

Led by the National Institute of Mental Health (through its Community Support Program), states began to invest money in developing programs designed to sustain ex-patients in community settings. Pivotal to the new services were case management programs dedicated to creating viable service plans where there previously were none, identifying and conducting outreach to clients for referral to community-based agencies, and advocating for clients' needs. As with the transition from state hospitals to
community-based services delivered through the previous NIMH program of Community Mental Health Centers, the change often proved to be far more cosmetic than substantive, more a relocation of medically dominated, defect-based services than an alteration in program paradigms taking into account the structural transition to community living. Co-optation of new programs by local service delivery systems had been empirically demonstrated in earlier social service reform adventures (Rose 1972; Warren et al; 1974). The usurpation of the thrust for change by prevailing structural and ideological interests was predictable, once the funding sources were determined to utilize traditional mental health service providers as a major part of their implementation strategy.

Taking the objective reality of community life to be an oppressive antagonist of ex-patients because of its addiction to profit housing, poverty and medicalized program options, the Sayville Project determined that its primary commitment was toward the transformation of oppressive environments and the conditions which these circumstances imposed upon the already dominated identities of discharged mental patients. The commitment to pose the objective reality into which the mental hospitals had thrust vulnerable people as a problem to be confronted, and to see the people (ex-patients) as an oppressed population rather than as medicalized objects, set the stage for the type of zero-sum conflict described above. This was so not because the Sayville Project emerged as a new organizational actor on the local interorganizational scene, complete with the legitimation incurred by Office of Mental Health funding - that, in itself, was commonplace as new agencies or agencies new to the State hospital/ex-patient system proliferated in response to new dollars. The conflict ridden or intensely turbulent interactional arena emerged because the ideological paradigm of the Sayville Project contradicted that of the entire local mental health structural apparatus and turned its taken-for-granted, defect-based conceptual machinery (Berger and Luckmann: 1966) into part of the problem to be addressed.

Anticipating the attack from the entire local interorganizational network of community agencies engaged in social service and mental health service delivery allowed the Sayville Project to construct its survival strategy and organizing objectives. It was clear from the outset that any organizational strategy dependent upon coordination with the agencies in the local interorganizational field was suicidal - contradictory ideological paradigms
cannot co-exist cooperatively, and with the power and self-declared hegemony in conventional agency operations well within their control, any strategy calling for operative or coordinative interaction promised a certain early demise, whether through cooperation or confrontation. The available possibilities had to be assessed: who could be identified that held existing agency policies and practices in contempt, for whatever reasons?

Evaluating potential coalitions and alliances, as always, produces strange agreements. It is critical to understand the nature of coalitions and their degree of internal consistency for strategic planning. When we began to examine the potential for alliance building within the community where our program was located, we had to assess the political situation within the community. As outsiders, we could not know the various affiliations of different individuals and seemingly non-partisan associations and organizations. Constituency building requires time and outreach effort, activities we had already assumed as prerequisites for any community-based program, and absolute necessities for social programs working with stigmatized client groups. Our community organizing interactions had alerted us to the fact that ex-patients were being viewed as responsible for their own circumstances and held accountable for their structurally imposed oppressed conditions by many community people; that there was an active antagonism towards the State hospitals for discharging people into the community; and that there was no consciousness at all about the converging role of State economic policy, mental health policy related to deinstitutionalization and the profit sector housing arrangements which were used for all ex-patients in the community where we were located.

This political matrix suggested an active campaign to alert community constituencies to the history and outcome of deinstitutionalization, together with a systematic analysis of who the real beneficiaries had been. Community education programs prepared for delivery to church, civic and professional associations were designed to focus on the role of the State in determining mental health policy, on the role of the profit sector in opportunistc expansion of beds to accommodate State hospital discharges, and on the neglect shown toward both ex-patients and communities by the entire mental health/social services systems. Ex-patients were portrayed as the victims of economic policies which also victimized communities in parallel fashion. Both were
out of control of what was happening to them, both were thrust upon one another; and both were maligned by hospital systems and social service departments who were forced into community-based service delivery, a form of service with which they had little to no familiarity and equally little experience and competence. And neither benefitted, although the State budget office, the pharmaceutical industries, the profit sector and the profession of psychiatry did (Rose: 1985).

The central focus of constituency building contains within it the necessity to shift the problem definition from one which sees clients pejoratively into one which contemplates a structural definition of the situation. This was the purpose of the organizing strategy originally developed. It sought to identify community antagonisms, legitimate the emotionality of the peoples' feelings, while redirecting the target of their anger from individual ex-patients toward regressive social policies, medicalized definitions of community-based needs, and exploiting profit-based businesses dominating housing options. Legitimating the anger felt by community people was a new and enlightening experience for most audiences for, in previous contacts with service providers, they were presented with attitudes which did little beyond rationalizing the system's policies and attempting to induce guilt among the people for feeling negatively towards the "frail" and "vulnerable" population. Proposing an ongoing agency-community working committee for mutual problem-solving, further education and mutual investigation of the entire situation met with great success.

The agency-community group, which might include representatives from other service providers serving the same target population in the geographic area, becomes a focus for discussing problems which exist in the community. It can engage in efforts to problem-solve in relation to an individual's problems; it can serve as an information exchange; it can anticipate forthcoming policy issues and obtain material for review from distant bureaucracies which affect agency practice and/or clients' lives (but which generally go unknown by community people); it can direct attention to and invite representatives from other sub-systems which have an impact on client's lives (e.g., SSI or Medicaid) to attend meetings and explain their agency's role; and it can expose community people to the conflict situations which regularly confront advocacy/empowerment oriented agencies.
An agency which creates such a group or association has responsibility for providing leadership to it. Leadership must take several forms, one part of which is simple logistics (for example, making up name, address and telephone lists for everyone, arranging meetings and making sure everyone has transportation). Leadership also expresses itself, especially in early meetings, through issue clarification developed by elaboration, thematization, development of thematic patterns and problematization moving on to action strategies and critical assessment (See Rose and Black: 1985, Chapter III). In the form of education, issues related to the lives of clients are introduced, discussions initiated, and preliminary exploration of feelings and thoughts engendered. For major issues, study committees or sub-groups are formed, led by agency staff members. These issues are investigated further and elaborated. Position papers may also be prepared which can be brought to the larger group for deliberation and action.

Drawing from our own experience, our agency-community group developed a policy paper on After-Care Rights and Responsibilities. This paper began as a discussion at an Agency-Community Association meeting where staff introduced some of the daily life problems and issues* confronted by former patients. The issues were referred to a sub-group headed by agency staff for development and elaboration. Eventually, the subgroup returned to the whole Association with a draft of a position paper for representation, refinement and approval. The discussions provoked by the draft document led to significantly broadened perceptions among community people about such issues as homeowner domination, medication, regulating agencies, etc. Drawing on the work of the sub-group, the entire Association then approved the final position paper, drafts of which were prepared by agency staff as summaries of sub-group discussions. Action strategies were then offered which, in this case, led eventually to a set of legislative hearings and proposed legislation. Community people were able to see political action as a process of critical analysis and were able to understand systemic characteristics which previously were hidden.

*See appendix for a visual presentation of the complexities of daily life for ex-patients.
The reaction of other service providers to Agency-Community Association group position papers further develops the community participants' consciousness of the institutional thought structure and interorganizational context within which services are delivered. This process of expanding awareness of interorganizational structure and ideology is furthered through regularly inviting selected community people as representatives to all inter-agency meetings, with particular emphasis on their attendance when conflict-laden issues are most likely to emerge. It is crucial for community representatives to participate in these meetings because the actual experience of inter-agency confrontation, the opportunity to hear other service providers articulate their positions, and the presence of community people itself all contribute to community constituency building. Briefing of community people before such meetings, while helpful, is not nearly so important as "de-briefing" afterwards. Hearing their accounts afterwards and correcting any distortions is crucial to ensure that community people fully understand the bases for conflict. Over time, through discussions of what took place and why things happened as they did at such meetings, community people can begin to see reality from the perspective of the advocacy/empowerment program.

The process of carefully explaining interorganizational clashes to community participants invited to inter-agency meetings is critical in the early stages of community development. In our case, for example, community people could not understand why the staff of the local mental health clinic felt so antagonistic toward advocacy/empowerment agency staff over the issue of confidentiality. Hospital and clinic staff were continually exchanging information about clients with one another, as well as with adult home owners or SRO management. We absolutely refused to participate in this medium of exchange. The situation became so heated at the local level that we chose to escalate the issue out of the local interorganizational arena to the Regional Office of the State Office of Mental Health. All participating agencies were told to come to a meeting at the Regional Office. We participated, but only on the condition that at least one community representative from our association could attend. The mental health providers took the expected position of expediency, arguing for sharing of client information among mental health professionals. The presumption was that ethical conduct in this situation exists
imply because professionals are involved. We refused to cooperate, to the point of making clear that even unanimous agreement of the whole group would have no bearing on our position. The relative insignificance of mental health policy when compared to constitutional law was made as the basis for our view. When the denial of constitutional protection was connected to the convenience of the very same agency people who placed ex-patients in the profit housing market, community people began to see ex-patients' reality more clearly.

The community representatives, after the meeting, had to be informed of the assumption behind each agency's position, and each agency's role in the conflict had to be elaborated in significant detail for the community people to comprehend the basis of the conflict and its meaning. This type of time-consuming activity is required if knowledge and trust are to be built. Simple, rhetorical repudiation of the other agencies is transparent self-ggrandizement and will produce estrangement among community people just as quickly as other forms of transparent self-righteousness.

Careful cultivation of community support, in the context of a hostile interorganizational environment, also can prove to be effective in advocacy efforts. Joining in preparation of position papers can lead to jointly authoring legislative testimony, contacting local legislative representatives, co-presenting at legislative or administrative hearings, making written comments on state, city or county agency policies, regulations and/or guidelines. Forwarding copies of positions on issues to all locally elected representatives can produce an impact, or have that potential. Efforts to establish contact with local representatives at city, county or State legislative offices are directly connected to community organization and legislative advocacy efforts. When elected officials see position papers and written commentaries from an Association in their district, and they know that the community people serving as members of the organization hold offices in other, larger community groups (e.g., civic or neighborhood associations, church social action committees, etc.), the potential impact can be significant. Locally elected representatives often hold no positive view of mental health system track records, and can often be looked to for consultation on and/or sponsorship of legislation. They also can be seen as potential allies in conflict situations with the State hospitals and/or other service
providers. Keeping these officials updated on local activities of importance retains their interests and sustains their support. It can also present them with useful issues of community importance, that, in turn, can add to their own local support.

Similar contact can be initiated within the vertical funding system or outside the local interorganizational network. People in regional or central office planning positions are often beset by problems in implementation of their programs and by community opposition. When agencies bring community groups and representatives together with regional or central office planners, the latter can see that community organizing strategies can produce positive - or non-hostile - outcomes, a relatively new experience for them. Equally new is the community-legislative relationship in support of ex-patients and programs directed toward their needs as community residents.

Marked progress in community organization is shown by growing consciousness among community people of the difference between the advocacy/empowerment program and other service providers in the definition of clients' needs or problem definitions, in practice principles, in appreciation of community context, and by their increased concern about ex-patients' well-being in the community. Community members can be invited into adult homes or any other residential facility by ex-patients living there. Facilitating such visits promotes an increased capacity among community people to understand former patients' daily life. In crisis situations, when landlords and homeowners deny access to workers, community people who have developed relationships with residents can become involved as active and especially effective participants in the struggle against landlord domination. Maintaining contact with residents in the homes can be a vital source of support both for them and for agency workers. The possibility of community involvement in a struggle, which may later become an issue for legislation, contributes to the further isolation of landlords from sources of community support. It also forces community people to observe the role played by other agencies: which agencies stand firm behind residents' rights, which side with landlords?

Critical appraisal of a process such as this is a step which must be taken and initiated by program leadership. The purpose of recounting the steps in the process is political education: the conditions in the home are reflected upon and connected to the way
the residents are forced to live; income levels are reviewed, and
the amount of SSI dollars going to the landlord are compared to
the spending allowances available to people; the items which each
resident must purchase from the meager leftovers (after rent) are
reviewed; the impact of living this way on self-image and self-
confidence is posed as a question to the people. Through this
process, community people, whose initial political posture is
often one of moral outrage, can be engaged in reflecting on op-
pressive conditions producing advocacy-targeted issues. Through
the process of critical reflection, the significance of community
advocacy activity takes on deeper meaning to those involved. Com-
munity people become better able to see the advocacy/empowerment
agency and its approach to practice more clearly; that is, the
agency's intentions, its approach to problem definition and its
ways of relating to clients. As this process unfolds, the pers-
pective on other agencies in the interorganizational system also
sharpens, thus strengthening the agency-community alliance.

Once a program has reason to believe its principles and prac-
tice orientation are at least partially understood and accepted by
constituencies in its host community, the role of community groups
can be expanded. A positive relationship with a neighborhood or
community civic association, which has the largest and most rep-
resentative membership, can lead to a commitment from the agency
to get association approval prior to any major changes or expan-
sion of program activities. Meeting with some regularity with
association executive board members, or on an as-needed basis,
program directors can provide a continuous funnel of information
to association directors, solicit input from them where appropri-
ate, and maintain continuous communication. Where agency deci-
sions related to funding arise, association members can be in-
formed well in advance about the contract process as well as about
who has the decision-making power. Any problems in funding
requiring a meeting with staff people from a funding source should
include community representatives from the Association as well.
In funding crises, the relationship between agency staff and com-
munity association members, if characterized by honesty and shared
experience, can lead to active community support in the form of
demands for sustained funds, community advocacy for the agency and
political pressure applied to sustain funding. Our program has
enjoyed all of these benefits, because of our commitment to doing
the community organization work in the manner described above.
Our experience has been that, at first, community people rarely want to know the detail necessary to understand the complexity of creating and operating any community-based program, much less a program constructed out of an alternative (advocacy/empowerment) paradigm. However, agency staff who are genuinely open to dialogue, interested in learning community members' thoughts and feelings about issues, and free from typical professional condescension, can open possibilities for a more sustained and developed agency-community relationship. When staff of an advocacy/empowerment based agency reflect on their rather tenuous position within the local interorganizational field and recall that there will be no support forthcoming from that system, transferring energy, resources and commitment to constituency building among organizations, associations and individuals in the host community becomes a preferred activity as well as a necessary strategy for survival.

Communities are the settings or environments where people participate in daily life. Integration of the ex-patients into their social environments as people or citizens, rather than as aberrations, deviants or medicalized objects depends upon an agency being able to develop a context where the existing community anger, stereotypes, and distances can be confronted. Equally important in recognizing the social reality of deinstitutionalization and the provision of services to stigmatized populations is the awareness of what it means to be in a "host" community, and what community peoples' feelings are about the issues related to an agency, its clients, or its imagery. The larger context for conceptualizing these matters is the shrinking role both individuals and localities have in making critical decisions that affect daily life. In addition, community people have to deal with the fears engendered by the "mentally ill," fears derived from the use of institutionalization as a treatment of first resort for the many years preceding deinstitutionalization.

Conclusion

We have attempted to demonstrate that a community organization strategy must provide a base for developing a constituency of support within the community if a community-based, alternative paradigm program is to survive. It must develop an approach to political education which will support taking issues into advocacy
renas for legal, political or legislative action. It must struggle to cultivate an understanding among involved community people of the practice approaches and problem definitions held by the agency. This latter dimension is produced as part of an ongoing effort to help community people break down the barriers between them and the ex-patients residing in their community. This struggle, in turn, emerges as community people are able to transform stereotypes and widely-held medicalized perceptions into concrete understandings of ex-patients as socially human, subjugated and powerless. Thus, the community organization approach advocated here is one which does not simply see community people or organizations as useful objects to be manipulated for agency objectives, but rather sees direct corollaries between the community and the ex-patients. Both are dominated by external forces, often not directly known (e.g. Why does inflation rise faster than income? How does X community benefit from defense spending?); both have decreased power to determine what happens in their immediate environments (e.g. the use of eminent domain to locate a community residence for developmentally disabled adults around the corner, despite the unanimous opposition of neighbors); and both are subject to manipulation by government and media.

Seeing parallels at a thematic level between community members and ex-patients allows for the creation of an organizing strategy which is devoid of objectification and contempt, which encourages community people to express their feelings and doubts, which mandates agency leadership in the representation and connection of this antagonism to the larger social reality. Such a strategy totally contradicts community members' past experiences with State mental health authorities, service providers and entrepreneurial landlords by encouraging community input into issues relevant to their concerns; by attempting to figure out quick responses to problems experienced by community residents relating to the ex-patient population; by bringing people together in an organization to learn about information and policies generally kept hidden from them; by requiring community involvement in interagency settings where previously negotiated arrangements were worked out and mystified by professionals; and by asking community members to know something about the reality experienced by the ex-patients living in their community so that together they can act to change this reality. The community organizing strategy also parallels an advocacy/empowerment direct service strategy in its reformulation of problems, identification of potential action
strategies, and critical assessments of actions undertaken. As community people experience the principles involved in a practice where they, too, are the participants, their capacity to comprehend and consciously support the program's work with ex-patients is enhanced.

Community organization thus develops as both a desired and necessary activity. It exists as a form of practice which analyzes the needs of a given target population for a decent, socially alive life and struggles to produce the contextual and relational climate in which clients can feel and see themselves as active participants in their communities. It also provides the political base for the organizational survival of an agency more committed to the struggle for social justice than it is to prevailing thought structures and interorganizational networks. This commitment requires a corollary commitment to the social development of clients, to community development in the context where clients live, and to a conflict-based orientation to the interorganizational field and its surrounding ideological environment. Coupling community organizing, constituency-developing strategies to an empirically validated need for a conflict orientation to service system interaction allows innovative, structurally orient-ed agencies the possibilities of survival and the probability of practicing without the additional burdens created by structural ambiguity.

Bibliography


Recruitment And Retention Of Organizational Participants: What's Happening Out There Now?

by

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study on some initial research relating literature to actual practice in social action organizations. Our concern is to learn what are social action organizations of the 1980s doing to recruit and maintain their membership and how this relates to the literature on recruitment and retention. We will review the literature, describe the methodology and report the findings, and then attempt to connect the findings and the literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature is replete with lengthy discussions of what motivates voluntary participation. There has also been a great deal written on whether or not poor people join organizations, under what conditions they join, and the forms their participation takes. The discussions are particularly relevant to community organizers in social action organizations. These are voluntary organizations which seek to recruit and maintain large memberships as an alternative power base in order to win resources and change existing structural power relations. By definition, recruitment and retention of organizational participants becomes an important
Focus, an essential means to an end. For these organizations, why people join and remain involved, and what are the most effective means of involvement pose serious and often troublesome questions. The literature suggests some interesting and possibly useful answers.

Olson and O'Brien discuss motivation for voluntary participation on the basis of incentive theory. O'Brien argues that while disadvantaged people have interests in common, they are also self-interested individuals. The "benefits" of voluntary organizations (i.e. instrumental goals attained) accrue not only to participants but to others as well. In order to recruit and retain people, the organization must offer selective individual benefits in addition to collective rewards. O'Brien suggests strategies to deal with the dilemma: offer collective benefits with individual "by-products," use a federated structure which builds on primary organizations which do offer individual benefits, and provide social incentives, viewed as less stable and not competitive with other rewards.

In O'Brien's thinking, the inability to offer individual instrumental rewards will always create a certain deficit in a voluntary organization's ability to recruit and retain membership. Without rewards the organization will always be transitory. Piven and Cloward accept a transitory organizing model asserting that large numbers of people can be mobilized only in the context of a larger socio-political-economic environment and then only for spontaneous action rather than in an ongoing organization. On the other hand, Brager and Specht and Wellstone all underscore the importance of expressive rewards, particularly personal recognition.

Gerlach and Hine in their study of the Pentecostal and Black Power movements, suggest four major factors, perhaps best categorized as relating personal needs to organizational structure. First, they identify fluidity of organizational structure as being functional for promoting growth, preventing suppression, and enabling personal and programmatic change. Second, they identify face-to-face recruitment by committed members along lines of pre-existing, significant social relationships as promoting growth. Third, a process of commitment to both ideology and in-group ties is seen as essential. Finally, the existence and vehemence of an
opposition to the movement intensifies rather than weakens participants' involvement.

Knoke and Wood\(^7\) offer a systems understanding of involvement and retention of organizational participants, conceiving of it as a transaction between internal organizational dynamics and external environmental forces. In their study of "social influence associations" they found that internal organizational characteristics—purposive incentives, legitimate leadership and, most importantly, involvement in decision making—correlated highly with organizational commitment. The reputation for influence was based more on the organization's ability to amass financial resources and generate high levels of membership commitment than goal attainment in the external environment, a finding which clearly contradicts an emphasis on instrumental rewards.

In developing these theories none of the authors make distinctions among social action organizations; in general they are discussed as a single cohort.\(^8\) Based on discussions with organizers and our own experience this apparent assumption may be erroneous. Certain prototypes do seem to exist, and the testing of existence of these prototypes became part of our study.

Given the literature, we were left with several questions related to current organizing efforts. First, do social action organizations still see recruitment and retention of an active and large membership as a pre-requisite for effective organizing and action? If so, what procedures, rewards, and structures do these organizations use to induce and maintain participation? Second, is membership involvement a focus from which issues and strategies are generated or do the tactical demands of a given campaign necessitate membership recruitment?

Third, is organizational attachment valued and how is it generated? Fourth, are there differences in recruitment and retention between different types of social action organizations? And, finally, in today's social action organizations how much attention is paid to the advice of the literature related to incentives, both expressive and instrumental? In summary, what are the social action organizations of the 1980s doing to recruit and maintain memberships?
METHOD

These questions were addressed as part of a larger study of approaches to social action organizing. Through reputational means the authors identified established organizations in two East Coast cities which had been in operation for two or more years and employed at least one full-time organizer. These staff were then asked to identify their approach to organizing by selecting from case vignettes reflecting grass-roots, mobilizing, and lobbying approaches to organizing. A total of forty-five organizations—fifteen in each approach—will be involved in the larger study. For the current effort, four grassroots and three mobilizing organizations are analyzed. There are two respondents for each organization: the "lead" organizer and a non-salaried participant, knowledgeable and representative of the organization who is nominated by the organizer.

Two research instruments were used: a structured questionnaire focusing on organizational attribute variables and semi-structured interviews with each respondent focusing on the organizing work itself. Because of the small number of respondents, only very basic descriptive statistics have been used. Qualitative content was analyzed for themes and associations among variables mentioned by respondents.

The organizations included in the current effort have been in existence for between ten and twelve years. The "lead" organizers had all been on staff for at least three years. The organizations represented both interest groups and geographic constituencies.

FINDINGS

Recruitment and Retention of Participants

A subset of questions focused on how and why participants are initially recruited, subsequently engaged, leadership is fostered, and involvement sustained.

All the organizations believed that recruitment of participants was extremely important for the reasons one would expect. They believed in the need to replace community leaders who would be lost to the organization through natural attrition and valued the potential for bringing in "new blood" with new ideas.
Further, the organizers saw recruitment of new participants as a way for the organizations to keep a pulse on the new and current issues of their constituencies. Methods of recruitment varied, but grassroots organizations tended to use federated structures to bring in new people.

The organizations differed in terms of the kinds of people they wanted to recruit. Grassroots groups tended to focus on people who had extensive social networks in combination with other personal qualities. Mobilizing organizations tended to look for "committed individuals" who would remain in the organization on a long-term basis and whose motives were more altruistic than self-interested. The majority of participants were those directly affected by the organizations' issues; such people tended to make up the total membership of grassroots organizations. All the organizations had ways of including "supporters" or "experts" in their organizational structures by forming advisory boards, administrative committees, or using formal or informal expert "consultants" on primarily administrative matters.

Most of the organizations made a distinction between levels of participation. They tended to accept the notion that people self-define the degree to which they will participate and simply work with them at that level. Only one organizer said that it was her job, by definition, to increase the individual level of participation or to challenge new people to join the inner circle of more established leaders. The mobilizing organizations tended to be more fatalistic about increasing participation. In one organization there was an inverse relationship: the more active an individual became, the less attention the organizer gave that person.

The organizations differed in their response to why people got involved with them. Most of the grassroots groups said that self-interest was a major factor, along with personal growth, excitement, and a composite of personal reasons. For two of the mobilizing groups, involvement was seen as connected to the organizations' track record for success. One organization merged a religious philosophy with concerns about the neighborhood, and felt that participants' understanding of Christian scripture was a major motivating force.
While all the organizations had ideas about involvement, no group had actually assessed why their membership had become active. In spite of this, the organizations used a variety of methods and messages to recruit people ranging from offering services, espousing the morality of a cause or the importance of a current issue, reinforcing organizational purposes, or alluding to the collective gains of their constituents.

The organizations once again differed in their initial steps to involve new recruits. The grassroots organizations had more organizational structures with decision-making power to absorb new recruits immediately. Boards, steering committees, action committees, and issue committees were used as a way both to engage new people with organizational roles and decisions and with more experienced and established leaders. Mobilizing groups tended to engage new recruits with small, task-oriented responsibilities such as doing research, operating the copying machine, and answering phones.

At an abstract level, the organizations espoused the belief that indigenous people could do all the work of the organization. This belief was limited by a practical concern with volunteer time and capabilities relative to the organizational staff. But even this limited belief was clearly not operational. The grassroots groups generally operated on the principle that staff carries out day-to-day operations while lay leadership makes policy decision with staff "coaching." In mobilizing groups, the roles are often blurred; staff often made profound organizational decisions. For example, when a mobilizing organizer was asked about who in the organization selected issues, he responded, "Issues would get picked by staff who present them, who have a major input. I have a lot of input.... They (members) want to do something, they're not sure what, and they're open to ways to go." The visibility of staff is defended in various ways; issues move too fast to develop appropriate lay leadership; or the organizer sees herself as a member of the constituency and, therefore, given decision making powers rightfully. The fact that the organizer has the option to choose to be a member of the constituency is not mentioned as a concern about staff-member roles.

All the organizations interviewed had at least one or two lay leaders, if only for the reason that they were then able to say
they represented their particular constituency. The criteria for leadership differed by the type of organization. Grassroots organizations tended to look for people with a mixture of personal and organizational qualities; people with a natural social network or base in a community institution such as a church were valued. The grassroots organizations also had more structured ways of developing leadership. By offering formal training and informal preparatory and reflection sessions, they had ideas and ways to develop a member into a credible leader. Mobilizing groups tended to look for people who came into the organization with some sort of credibility, perhaps a reputation for activism, and offered them support around their existing strengths. In fact, leadership legitimacy was less significant to the mobilizing groups than was the saliency of an issue. One organizer said, "We'll move on an issue even if we don't have a credible leader. The issues are more important than the development of a leader."

Similarly, the notion of an optimum number of leaders differed by approach. Mobilizing groups tended to want a small number of lay leaders and staff sometimes performed leadership tasks. Recruiting in these organizations was more for background roles than real decision-making leadership positions. Grassroots groups said clearly that the organization could never have too many leaders. As one organizer put it bluntly, "By having fewer leaders we are cutting off exactly what we are trying to do."

The organizations once again differed on ideas of sustaining participation. Mobilizing organizations tended to believe that people stay involved because of their history with the organization in times of struggle; they admit that they have greater difficulty keeping people involved who have not shared that struggle. The dilemma for these organizations is that while they recruit members on the basis of organizational track record, the communication of organizational history is apparently not a strong sustaining force. The grassroots organizations, on the other hand, stress current and constant successes and how that makes organizational participants feel, as well as close personal relationships formed both among members and with the organizer. As one organizer said,

"You should get to know some of the people so you can ask about their kids, their dog. And no matter how you felt before, you have to go..."
in there acting with conviction, that there's something right about being there, about what you are doing, not only for yourself, but for everybody who's there. So they say, 'If this guy's so sure about it, there's got to be something there.'

All the organizations emphasized the importance of organizational victories, both major end-results and small victories during the organizing process. There was a strong recognition of the need for success on concrete issues as a way of instrumentally rewarding people for participation. Grassroots organizers tended to see victories as an inducement more for people to join the organization while mobilizing organizers saw them primarily as a way of sustaining people already engaged. Grassroots groups, then, saw the emergence of new issues as a way of bringing in new people; in mobilizing groups the notion of new issues was seen as unimportant except when an issue was solved or hopelessly lost.

None of the organizations had given much thought to expressive rewards for participants. They had tried to build in collective expressive rewards like parties and celebrations and some individual rewards (public and media exposure in grassroots organizations and testimonials and plaques in mobilizing groups.) One organization had an innovative idea about offering a "benefit package" of discount services from locksmiths, lawyers, and others. The organization decided, however, not to implement that incentive. Essentially, all the groups concentrated on offering instrumental collective rewards through organizational victories and small collective and individual expressive rewards. Individual instrumental rewards were glaringly absent.

Generation of Organizational Work

A subset of questions was framed around whether membership generated organizational work (i.e. selection of issues, strategies and tactics, and the implementation of action) or whether organizational work generated the need for recruitment.

All the organizations expressed the idea that issues should come from their own constituencies but they differed to the degree to which the belief was realized. Mostly, issues were selected out of constituent perceived needs and environmental conditions.
For instance, the Reagan assault on social security benefits was accepted as an issue by a senior citizen organization, even though it had not been yet raised by membership. It was generally conceded that it was more difficult for an organization to proceed on any issue when it had not been raised by constituents.

All the grassroots organizations said that they involved members in selecting issues and had highly structured ways of doing so (e.g. action or issue committees, boards, surveys.) The mobilizing groups tended to be much more informal about involving participants in selecting issues. As one organizer put it, "The staff bounces an idea off the members, and they're pretty open."

The types of issues preferred also differed by organizational approach. Mobilizing groups had more diverse reasons for selecting issues. Issues of interest to constituents, issues which would produce a large number of people, and issues which reflected the larger socio-political-economic climate were all acceptable. Grassroots groups tended to use the classic Alinsky definition of "good issues:" they had to come directly from constituents, have the potential to increase organizational power, and be concrete and winnable.

In the area of target selection, grassroots organizations once again used committee structures to foster participation; members would be offered alternative targets garnered from staff research. The tendency for mobilizing groups was a larger staff role during target selection. For example, a mobilizing organizer said, "I'm pretty good at selecting targets. I have a tendency to help out there. I can see things, I can see how it looks in the Daily News and how TV is playing it, and that's a lot of my role."

In all the organizations, staff performed a larger role in the selection of strategies and tactics in contrast to issue selection. Clearly here there was a shift of staff control, the rationale being that staff was more expert in the area. In only one organization did members have control over strategy and tactic selection, and this was for pragmatic reasons. "If leaders don't buy the strategy, it isn't do-able," one organizer said. Implementation of strategy, however, meant re-involvement of membership. In grassroots organizations, either lay leaders had the visible roles in action, or it was done mutually by salaried staff and leaders. In mobilizing groups, staff would often have visible
roles, after consultation with lay leadership. Membership involvement was different at different stages and, then, by organizational approach. As Figure 1 indicates, grassroots groups tended to engage members extensively around issue selection, engage leadership only in the selection of strategies and tactics, and broaden out participation once again during the action phase. Mobilizing groups tended not to involve the extensive membership either around issue or strategy selection, broadening out participation only in the action stage. One might hypothesize about the difficulty in involving members that late in the process.

**FIGURE 1: LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT OF VOLUNTARY LEADERS AND MEMBERS BY PHASES AND ORGANIZING APPROACH**

In sum, all organizations expressed the belief that membership should generate the work the organization pursues; membership should select issues, targets, and strategies and tactics. The selection of strategies and tactics involved the least amount of member participation for all the groups. Grassroots organizations, however, tended to have many decision-making organizational structures (e.g. boards, steering committees, and action committees) which operationalized that belief. These organizations tended to involve membership intensively and extensively around the selection of issues, involve a fewer number (mostly identified
leaders) around the selection of strategies and tactics, and then look for extensive involvement again when implementing the strategy. The mobilizing organizations tended to have less involvement around both issue and strategy and tactic selection, broadening out participation only when it came to implementing a strategy.

Organizational Attachment

A subset of questions was framed around issues of organizational attachment, defined as attachment to the organization's causes, to other members, and to the organization itself. The idea of a world view, an over-arching sense of principles, was rejected by all the organizations, although individual value statements were evident. Even these were expressed with some ambivalence by the organizers. For grassroots organizations, values were likely to be expressed as an adherence to a shift in power relations from the "haves" and powerbrokers to the people. For mobilizing groups the values were most often in relation to a concrete issue, e.g. "decent housing" or the "right to a job." One group had attempted to marry Christian beliefs to organizing principles and was using the combination in practice. For instance, they were planning a Palm Sunday Stations of the Cross march through the South Bronx, stopping at fifteen neighborhood sore spots signifying the current reality of scripture. One stop, for example, was to be a neighborhood brothel symbolizing Jesus' concern for the abuse of women and the rebirth of Mary Magdalene.

The organizations generally had an equally weak sense of opposition; opponents existed but were not clearly defined or especially vehement. Mobilizing organizations tended to generalize opponents (e.g. landlords or employers,) while opponents shifted in grassroots groups according to the issues. Despite the shift of opponents, grassroots groups tended to believe that directing the anger of the membership at a target was important. A dilemma could be noted here as anger can often only be developed when conflict operates continuously and over a long period, an impossibility if targets shift with every new issue.

All the organizations expressed the opinion that members feeling a "we-ness" was important, but not much was actually done by any organization to foster in-group cohesion. Mobilizing groups tended to stress "allegiance to the cause" to bind members together, while grassroots groups tended to structure in-group
ties by using committees which would foster a sense of working and socializing together.

Interestingly, consensus on organizational decisions was not seen as very important. As long as internal conflict was contained, organizations could still be functional. The grassroots groups tended to believe that consensus was most important in the area of strategy and tactics. If there wasn't agreement, it was believed, it was unlikely that the strategy could be carried out. These groups tended to define issues so that they would not have the potential of dividing people. They looked for "common denominators" in issues and helped people barter issues of individual self-interest. "If we work on this issue first, we can work on that issue later," was a common approach. Mobilizing organizers, on the other hand, tried to override internal divisions by convincing people of the rightness of a particular issue, what some called the "hard sell" approach.

The grassroots organizations felt that at least the core group of lay leaders had to be committed to the organization over and above any set of issues currently undertaken. Members were seen as expressing their commitment by increasing contact with the organization and taking on more responsibility (e.g. chairing committees, speaking in public, recruiting others.) In mobilizing organizations, commitment to issues took prominence over commitment to the organization. People were seen as expressing it in smaller task-oriented ways such as wearing tee shirts with the organizational logo, running the copying machine or baking cakes for a fundraising event. In grassroots organizations, then, increased commitment means increased responsibility, while in mobilizing organizations involvement does not necessarily result in organizational responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, social action organizations view recruitment and retention of organizational participants as important. Yet, despite that belief, not a great deal of attention is paid to the care and grooming of the membership. It seems that while the value of membership is operant, there is little assessment of the reasons why members become and stay involved. Mobilizing groups tend to rationalize non-involvement by either assuming the primacy of the issue over leadership development or that staff can assume
lay leadership positions and so membership is secondary. Grassroots groups, on the other hand, heavily utilize the tried and true (but certainly not the only effective) means of structuring participation by the use of decision-making committees.

The literature we reviewed suggested several ideas about involvement. Our initial findings suggest that social action organizations do give some limited attention to the various types of inducements for participation. O'Brien placed emphasis on individual and collective rewards. The organizations studied largely operate by offering collective instrumental benefits through organizational victories. Yet, only one organization had discussed (and ultimately decided against) the implementation of an individual instrumental reward in the form of a members-only "benefit" packages. Knoke and Wood and Brager and Specht all stress the importance of expressive rewards. Small collective expressive benefits were noted in most of the organizations through parties and victory celebrations. Attempts at relatively minor individual expressive benefits also existed; grassroots organizations gave individuals media exposure and mobilizing groups rewarded members with plaques or testimonials. Gerlach and Hine's notion of organizational attachment was less evident. The grassroots organizations make attempts at attachment through the use of federated systems and structures which foster organizational and in-group affiliation. But a sense of world view was expressed with ambivalence, and opposition was seldom seen as continuous and vehement. One group tried to engender organizational attachment by merging Christian scripture with organization principles.

In sum, our research found some evidence of all the theories, although not a great deal of practical attention to any strategy for involvement other than offering collective instrumental rewards through organizational victories. Social action organizations are badly in need of a reformulation of what constitutes the most effective means of recruitment and retention of participants. Essential questions revolve around organizational ownership, i.e., who owns the organization and what are the various and most effective ways of initiating participant ownership?

The literature and our initial findings suggest, therefore, an integrative model for recruitment and retention. Figure 2 represents this complexity by integrating the idea of offering both collective and individual instrumental benefits, the notion of
offering both collective and individual expressive benefits, and, finally, the development of organizational attachment through commitment of individuals both to the organization and in-group ties. It is suggested that organizers develop mechanisms to involve and sustain members in each of these areas. Especially needed are ideas which offer individual instrumental benefits and foster organizational attachment. Membership benefit packages, the articulation of a world view as it arises from an organization's efforts, and a clearer identification and relationship with ongoing and vehement opposition ripe areas for development and thus greater involvement. Our model demands testing, of course. Still to be studied are the model's effectiveness in practice and the relative strength of each component part in recruiting and retaining organizational participants.

FIGURE 2: INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF REASONS FOR PARTICIPANT INVOLVEMENT

The argument that "the times" simply do not lend themselves to grassroots participation is obviated by the apparent successful social action organizing efforts on the right wing end of the political spectrum. If progressive social action organizations
are to be equally as successful in garnering the masses of support necessary for social change, questions of recruitment and retention of participants must be addressed.

Bibliography


9. We have categorized three approaches to organizing: 1) a grassroots or populist approach, best expressed in the work of Saul Alinsky; 2) a mobilizing approach, best articulated by Piven and Cloward; and 3) a lobbying approach, as explained by James Q. Wilson, Edward Banfield and practiced by Ralph Nader.
When the preparation of a final report of the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation was first envisaged, it was assumed that it would deal primarily with education for citizenship and, hence, would be primarily of interest to civic educators. However, because so much of its grant program involved efforts to form community organizations or to use other kinds of groups (e.g. 4-H club groups or boys clubs) as vehicles within which certain behaviors might be changed, it became evident that other kinds of professionals such as social workers or community health educators might find the experiences of its grantees to be useful.

A review of materials dealing with these stories suggests that successes or failures were affected by choices made with respect to certain elements of the organizing effort such as whether to

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1The Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation began its work upon the death of its founder in 1950. Its goal was "to promote...the upbuilding and betterment of American citizenship...." Because this charge was so broad, the Trustees decided to narrow its focus to the encouragement of participation of citizens in efforts to deal with problems of common public concern, especially but not exclusively, in a community context. During a period of about twenty-five years, a total of something under four million dollars was expended. The work of its grantees is reported in its final report entitled "Education for Citizenship: A Foundation's Experience." Inquiries concerning the report may be addressed to the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation, 425 Miramar Drive, Santa Cruz, CA 95060.
recruit individuals or organizations or whether conciliation or confrontation should be the preferred tactic.

Those projects deemed successful are those in which there was evidence of the achievement of goals and objectives; where the organization had an impact; and where participants changed so as to become more effective as citizens or as problem solvers. Another criterion was whether or not activities initiated in one place had sufficient vitality to be replicated elsewhere.

This paper examines some of the factors which affected grantee results -- with one further caveat. The elements are discussed separately but several may have been involved in a given success or a failure.

1. Initiating activity: Who decides?

The question is sometimes raised concerning the right of outsiders to come into a community proposing to change it.

Alinsky maintained that the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) did not try to organize a community except by invitation. With respect to those grant projects for which the IAF was responsible, invitations were forthcoming. In the Community Service Organization (CSO) program, the starting point was the house meeting, convened at the request of the staff person. In the Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in Chicago, staff met with organizations to explain and request support. While all elements in these communities did not join in the invitation, a group representative of a legitimate "cluster of interests" was involved. The time spent articulating problems and goals and how an organization might help certainly contributed to the success of the IAF projects.

Although the Highlander grant had perhaps the greatest impact of any the foundation supported, not all of its activity was successful. To test a concept Miles Horton, the Director, did not believe in, he sent a small staff, without any preliminary contact, into two communities to start a "community leadership training program." The effort failed miserably.

Having decided, however, to emphasize community leadership, Horton was alert in residential workshops offered at Highlander
for expressions of interest he might follow up. For example, when Septima Clark asked how 68 children on Johns Island could have died of diphtheria and nothing was done and when Esau Jenkins asked if Highlander could help him to get his neighbors on the Island registered to vote, Horton said he would go to the Island to explore what could be done. It took perhaps a year of talking but the effort produced the Citizenship School which was replicated and had an enormous impact across the South. The basis for cooperation was sound.

On the other hand, a grant to the National Conference of Catholic Charities was made for an organizing project in St. Louis which, because of local difficulties, was suddenly shifted to Lackawanna, New York. An organizer was sent in before the local sponsor could even begin to understand what was happening. Given the lack of preparation, together with the conflicting interests and the cynical political climate, failure was inevitable.

2. Compatibility of purpose and practice

The projects sponsored by the Industrial Areas Foundation were among the most successful that the Foundation supported. Community Service Organization chapters were formed in 35 communities or counties in California. Because of the interest in voter registration, citizenship classes were a major program. In each local chapter, a Citizenship Committee organized the classes, recruited teachers, arranged for materials, and provided a committee member to serve as an aide for each class. At the peak, 108 classes were meeting, averaging about 25 students in each. This was only one of several major on-going programs over the length and breadth of Central and Southern California. Yet this activity was supported by only two staff persons -- Fred Ross and Cesar Chavez. The work was being done by the members. The purpose of helping people learn to help themselves was consistent with the methods employed. People learned to do things by doing them, with the guidance of staff who understood their role to be that of teacher and not merely that of provider of services.

Other grantees failed because staff did not involve people in the right way. For example, on the Pine Ridge reservation, AFSC staff sent to do community organization work appointed Indians to
a committee to advise the staff instead of the other way around. In Boston, neighborhood house staff expressed regret that it was necessary to use lay persons to help form block organizations because staff could not do it all. In Chicago, a project was sponsored by the Welfare Council to provide staff to strengthen citizen organizations. The staff criticized one group for choosing as its goal the improvement of physical facilities rather than the expansion of welfare services. The staff was trying to impose its priorities on the community group. The project failed and unexpended funds were returned.

Several factors may have been involved in the failure of these projects, but certainly the failure to place responsibility on the people who were supposed to be the focus of the enterprise was a principal one.

3. **Who should be included in the organizing effort?**

Many would say that not to invite everyone to join an organization being formed would be wrong, even immoral. This is sometimes referred to as the "whole community" approach. Others would try to limit membership to those who share a "cluster of compatible interests" which are seen to be consistent with program goals.

The United Community Fund Project in San Francisco became an extreme version of the former. The stated purpose in the application was to help citizens learn to solve problems. The staff person hired, however, imposed his own goal, which was to develop a "sense of community." At an early meeting, he congratulated those present for being there as individuals and not as representatives of "interests." The organization for him was anyone who came.

When the organization's housing committee in Haight-Ashbury (encouraged by the young editor of a neighborhood newspaper) announced after several weeks study that it would recommend at the next meeting that the city designate the area for urban renewal, that meeting was packed by landlord interests who feared higher taxes. Given the lack of any membership structure, nothing could be done by the committee to impose any control of the process. The group died in a sea of acrimony.
By contrast, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, a membership organization in Chicago, set as its goal, establishing "an inter-racial community of high standards." It concluded that this goal could be served only if it sought to enlist those who would support it. Therefore, membership among realtor groups was not encouraged. In its most active period, it was highly successful. It then had over 2500 dues-paying members, but as many as 7,000 volunteers were working at one time or another on one or more aspects of its program. It succeeded, in part, because its membership reflected a cluster of compatible interests.

The Community Dynamics Program at Earlham College espoused a "whole community" approach, partly on moral grounds. Its project in a Kentucky mountain community worked there because there were problems on which the community could readily unite, including flood control, cooperation in repairing their churches, and working for more equitable allocation of road funds. But, in Indianapolis, racial tension prevented cooperation except at a very nominal level. It was possible to do a survey but not form a block club. "Success" was possible only by drastically limiting goals.

The CSO movement represented a different version of the principle. The initial cluster-of-compatible-interests was built on the concerns of less-advantaged Mexican-Americans, such as discrimination with respect to naturalization, police protection, employment, voter registration, and social welfare. With this program, CSO's enrolled thousands of members. Their political power grew and middle class-oriented Mexican-Americans began to join.

Being more articulate, they tended to win election to office in the CSO. But if a social worker, lawyer, or teacher became president, pressure would no longer be applied, for example, to gain a hearing for a member having difficulty with a governmental agency. In one San Joaquin community, a proposal to create an industrial area through urban renewal would have wiped out much of the barrio. The CSO chairman, who was a school teacher, said the CSO must remain neutral and stated at the city council hearing that the CSO took no position on the proposal. But the people of the barrio made so persuasive a statement that the proposal was defeated. The credibility of the CSO having been destroyed,
however, by the pusillanimous behavior of the chairman, the membership fell away, leaving only the chairman and a few of his friends. A field trip to a dozen CSO's showed those headed by professionals or semi-professionals were dead; those headed by artisans or farm workers were alive.

The middle-class members were not only ashamed of the disadvantaged members, they opposed raising dues to provide staff to help them with the services they needed, for example, with naturalization procedures. Unable to maintain a compatible "cluster of interests," the CSO's withered and Cesar Chavez resigned to form the United Farm Workers Union. As he said, the "success of CSO tends to destroy it."

4. What should be the basis of membership?

The question of the basis of membership was usually seen as a choice between individual or group membership. In most cases, the choice appeared to reflect local circumstance rather than principle.

However, to Alinsky, who referred to his work as mass organization, it was a matter of principle. For him, the purpose of organization was to gain power for the members. And this was most quickly done by recruiting existing organizations which would have more ready channels into the community as well as more financial power. One possible weakness, of course, might be that organization members would include too many individuals opposed to the overall goals.

Among the Foundation's grantees, the organization basis worked especially effectively in the Woodlawn Organization. To illustrate, an individual requesting help (e.g., with a problem in an apartment building), might be asked, as a condition of receiving help, to organize the building residents into a group which would then become an organization member of TWO. Program and organization developed reciprocally.

It is ironic, therefore, that the CSO's should have been organized on the basis of individual memberships. But in the barrios of the 1950s and 1960s in California, there were virtually no significant Mexican-American organizations to be organized. Although individual membership was the only practicable alternative,
the weakness was that the structure lacked the strength to support a staff (although in retrospect Fred Ross thought this difficulty could have been surmounted).

Organizing by groups did not ensure success, however. In Butte, Montana and in Chelsea in New York City, large associations were formed on the basis of organization members. But, in each case, the interests and goals of these organizations were so divergent that both projects failed. The "cluster of interests" could not hold.

In sum, the membership basis chosen made a significant difference in given situations.

5. Reaching those to be helped.

Not all grantees were sufficiently successful in involving on a timely basis the people with whom they were ostensibly to work. The Migrant Ministry requested a grant to try to form organizations among migrant workers in Texas, Illinois, and Michigan, recognizing that its traditional approach of providing services through local committees of clergy, church members, social workers, and growers was not adequate. The Migrant Ministry said it hoped to use IAF methods to bring migrants to a level where they could hold their own with the Establishment.

A survey in a fruit-growing area in Michigan showed that about a thousand black workers came each season but that about a hundred black migrant families had settled on a more or less permanent basis.

After much time spent on the survey and discussions with local agency personnel, the local Council and project staff, as the first organizing step, appointed several black "leaders." When nothing further happened, they discovered that these "leaders" had a following consisting of a small group of descendants of Civil War-era blacks plus gardeners, household help, etc., who feared contact with migrants would be too controversial. No recent migrants had been included.

The staff finally found a person among the recent migrants who saw that people who had similar problems should work together. In
a three-week period, 22 house meetings were held. Finally, there was progress, but by then, the project funds were virtually gone.

The point is that several months had gone by in making a survey and researching services before any serious effort was made to reach the migrants for whom the project was set up in the first place.

6. Cooperation versus Confrontation

Perhaps the liveliest issue on the list is whether conflict or cooperation will characterize the relationship of the organization and its milieu. For one group, the answer involves goodwill and rational discussion to resolve differences. Others are convinced such a course will often be ineffectual, especially if there are differences in status among the interests involved.

Alinsky, for example, did not believe that those who enjoy privileges or discriminate against others would change their practices unless pressure was brought to bear. The organization's goal, then, must be to gain sufficient strength to enable it to negotiate effectively.

Instances of discrimination were easy to find. For example, in California, naturalization examiners refused, contrary to law, to give examinations in Spanish or asked much more difficult questions of Mexican-Americans than were asked of Anglos. Black schools in Woodlawn were grossly overcrowded while classrooms in white schools stood empty.

Appeal to moral principle was necessary but not sufficient as was the appeal to statute or regulation. In the end, it was the boycott against certain Woodlawn merchants that cured the cheating problem. It was the sight of 45 busloads of Woodlawn residents arriving at City Hall to register that helped to get Mayor Daley's support on the redevelopment issue. It was the Citizenship Schools on Johns Island that produced enough black voter registration to swing the election to one of the white candidates for the position of judge, who was then willing to be fair. The highly successful English and citizenship classes and voter registration drives in Mexican-American communities began to turn their situation around.
But confrontation was not the only acceptable approach. The Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference worked adjacent to the University of Chicago. The leadership of the Conference believed that there was a sufficient constituency supportive of cooperation and negotiation, of seeking facts and marshalling sound arguments, and of taking steps to promote an interracial community of high standards, that success was possible. The Conference did not limit itself to dialogue, however. It worked out effective arrangements for ensuring code compliance by combining the efforts of its volunteers working with the staff of the building department. It worked hard to inform its constituency with respect to its goals and evidence of progress. But it was not hesitant about pressing the city government to enforce the laws. In Hyde Park-Kenwood, cooperation as a tactic had significant impact.

It should be noted that although Woodlawn and Hyde Park were adjacent, they were quite different. The residents of Woodlawn were largely black, poorer and less well-educated (hence, of lower status) than the residents of Hyde Park. For Woodlawn, confrontation was more acceptable, especially as it was directed largely against outsiders. The interests needing to be influenced in Hyde Park were largely resident there and, in any case, found cooperation more commensurate with their educational level and lifestyle.

In connection with the confrontation-cooperation issue, the project conducted by the South East Chicago Center (SECC) and its director, Everett S. Cope, is also germane. The SECC was located by the great South Works of U.S. Steel in South Deering. Residents were mostly Yugoslavs or Italians. Several years before the project began, public housing, called Trumbull Park Homes, was built. Instead of preference for local residents, people from elsewhere in Chicago, including welfare clients, mostly single parents, were moved in. South Deering felt betrayed. About the time the project began, it became known that blacks were also to move in. The community exploded, literally and figuratively, as cherry bomb detonations became a nightly occurrence. At one, 300 police were detailed to Trumbull Park Homes each 24 hours, the largest police detail in the history of the city to the time.

Cope's rationale emphasized several points: 1) Proper conduct by tenants would earn respect in the surrounding community; 2) Concrete activities would help bind hostility and develop a sense
of belongingness; 3) The program would have to be based on actions; not talk about it. Merely to talk about how to work together interracially would leave the focus on differences; 4) The agency had to be clear and firm about its policies; board of staff must be integrated; 5) The Center must serve all, including offenders; 6) The attention of the community must focus from the first on a common need reflecting a warm, human impulse (in this case, pre-school children); 7) Something constructive must be done at once; 8) There must be continuous citizen participation in planning, conducting and supporting the program; and 9) The work should begin with basic existing groups without trying to force integration.

He proposed to begin with a half-day nursery school program emphasizing the participation, training, and counselling of parents, to be followed by a club program for small, natural groups of school children and teenagers. At the same time, work would begin with adult clubs, looking forward to the development of relationships on a community organization level.

After five years, there were 50 nursery schoolers with half from outside the project. There were 20 clubs for children with 200 members of which 25 were from South Deering and 35 were black. Teenagers had become assistant leaders. There were 350 adults in the club program of whom 15 percent were from outside. Trumbull Center had achieved its own independent, interracial board. The South Deering Improvement Association, a center of opposition to the SECC, asked cooperation in promoting a senior citizens program through the Center, to include project residents. Given the nature and virulence of attitudes prevailing in South Deering at the time, these achievements were remarkable.

Was this project an example of confrontation or cooperation? Perhaps neither. Cope would not cooperate by giving in to South Deering. On the other hand, he did not throw down the gauntlet of battle. He finessed the opposition by choosing ground the latter could not readily violate. He compelled the enemy, in time, to cooperate instead.

7. Role of Staff
A review of our projects shows that project staff help was usually considered essential, especially where situations were complex and/or conflict was involved.

The primary staff role in successful projects was that of educator so that members could learn to do for themselves. A needed staff contribution was to keep alert to opportunities to combine solving a problem and building the organization.

In general, those projects seemed to flourish (in the absence of other strong negative elements) in which staff did not see themselves as doing things for people but stressed the importance of the people taking responsibility for their own problems, who used on-going activities as opportunities for leader training, who were alert to questions to tactics and strategy and who could advise organization leaders of opportunities as well as dangers. Devolving responsibility on members as much as possible was not how project staff functioned in Pine Ridge, the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago, or Upper Roxbury in Boston. These projects failed.

8. Financing the Organization

Alinsky argued that a community organization should become self-supporting in three years. The number of organizations reaching this goal was very small. Community Service Organizations were not successful in this regard. But this was so, in part, because when more members from the middle class joined, they voted against dues to finance the services needed by the poor members. Fred Ross believes, however, that the financial problem might have been solved, had a reasonable dues structure been adopted early enough and been combined with a Service Center Program.

TWO did achieve an adequate financial base through organization member dues and earnings from a community newspaper. As for neighborhood house grantees, raising funds from members did not seem to concern them. They expected gifts and grants to produce what was needed. Dues and fees were set only to the extent needed to impose some feeling of responsibility on the part of users of services.

One fund-raising technique which led to controversy might be mentioned. A popular device among a few grantees was the raffle.
Catholic members usually saw little objection; Protestant members were opposed, seeing it as merely a redistribution of resources through gambling. In some cases, this became a sharp issue.

In general, self-financing was a difficult problem, usually not productive enough to support necessary staff.

9. Sponsorship

The kinds of sponsorship fell into several categories. The most significant consisted of free-standing organizations, each being an extension more or less of one individual's world-view. This group included Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, Horton's Highlander Folk School, and McNickle's American Indian Development. A second group consisted of national organizations which included a community focus as only one element in a total range of programs. Examples are the American Friends Service Committee, the Migrant Ministry, and the National Conference of Catholic Charities. A third group included metropolitan groups such as the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. A fourth category included neighborhood houses. Colleges were included in a fifth category. And a sixth category consisted of a single grantee -- the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference which was a neighborhood organization made up of individual dues-paying members and block clubs.

Reviewing grantee results overall, it is clear that the most successful group was the first. The IAF, Highlander, and American Indian Development shared the following characteristics. Each had a founder with a mission to help deprived persons learn to help themselves. Each found like-minded people to share the task. Each was realistic about what needed to be done and had the courage to persevere. Concentration of effort and understanding of what needed to be done went hand in hand.

Briefly stated, it seems clear that unless grantees understood what needed to be done, had a realistic view of community dynamics, were committed to helping people learn to help themselves, and had the courage to persevere, success was unlikely, regardless of the kind of sponsorship.

10. Education and Evaluation
For Horton, the educational focus must be central. His starting point was a residential workshop in which 25 or so participants were encouraged to discuss the problems of their home communities, each contributing something to the understanding of each other's problems. Beyond this, Horton sought to help each person gain a deeper understanding of his or her potential, to become able to think of oneself not just as one was, but as one might become, not only of the situation as it is but as it ought to be.

The key to the success of the American Indian Center in Chicago lay in its emphasis on the members taking responsibility for what went on in the Center, the Center which provided the framework within which new, more constructive roles could be tried out. This was a central educational value. The more knowledgeable and successful members provided leadership for the less fortunate. As each took more responsibility, he gained identity.

The CSO program also had an educational focus. Fred Ross spent countless hours with chairmen of committees and with officers helping them to think through a task or problem. His technique was to ask questions. What will you do if too many things are suggested to be done? (Set priorities.) How will you get the people of the neighborhood to pitch in to help get sidewalks? (You don't send around a petition. You hold house meetings. That gets you more members, too.) After a meeting, Ross would go over the discussion, helping the leaders to understand what had happened and how they might do better next time. In this framework, the emphasis was directly focused on training leadership for the purpose of making the organization more effective, to increase its power.

For Horton, the emphasis was on broadening and deepening understanding on the part of the individual. It was his or her growth that was primary. The value to the organization would follow.

Alinsky added an overtly educational program to the CSO organizing effort in which officers, committeemen, and members would meet perhaps once a month to discuss some topic of concern to the membership. In several CSOs, these had a major impact. In these
sessions, it became clear to the participants what the basic issues really were. As one CSO leader put it: "Your organization is your gun and you learn in the educational program where to aim it and when to shoot. Another thing you learn which you never thought about is what the shooting is all about."

In general, the strongest programs were those which recognized that action and learning must go together.

Summary

This paper has attempted to identify in the experiences of Schwarzhaupt Foundation grantees elements which, if invoked or ignored, would be likely to lead toward success or toward failure. These elements involve questions of: initiating activity in the community; compatibility of purpose and practice; inclusion or exclusion of community interests; the preferred basis of membership; reaching, in fact, those to be helped; cooperation or confrontation as tactics; role of staff; method of financing; sponsorship; and the role of education and evaluation. Some elements seem to be more decisive in their impact than others, but, in general, the choices made by grantees of these elements did make a difference. An important theme which pervaded each of these projects was that social development and individual development must go hand in hand.

The Foundation's goal was not to promote community organization for its own sake. Rather, it was to promote the "upbuilding and betterment of American citizenship." As it turned out, encouraging people to learn how to help themselves and each other, proved to be a powerful experience for developing the ways of thinking, feeling, and acting which are essential elements of effective citizenship. As just one example, I think of the old field worker in Stockton whom I asked what the CSO had meant to him. He said, "Senor, we have learned not to be afraid." Courage is not the least of the civic virtues nor of the virtues of the organizer.
Examination Of The Basque Collectives: Lessons From One Of The World's Most Successful Community Organization Efforts

by

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INTRODUCTION

The system of Basque collectives is recognized as the world's most effective worker owned system (Henk & Logan, 1982). It is a direct result of the community organization effort of Father Jose Maria Arizmendiarrreta, who created an extremely progressive agenda under Spain's repressive Franco regime. Father Jose Maria's work will be explored in this paper and principles extracted that are important lessons for community organization teachers and practitioners.

The potential values of worker ownership have long been recognized; the ability of community organizers, however, to realize this potential has generally fallen far short. The worker owned enterprises in the Basque Provinces of Spain stand out as an exception to this dismal rule. Father Jose Maria was the Basque priest and community organizer whose stimulus gave this model of organization the philosophy necessary to ensure its success.

HISTORY

During the Spanish Civil War (1935-39), most Basques fought for the Republicans against Franco and thus ended on the losing side. Father Jose Maria fought in the war for three years, was captured and sentenced to death by firing squad. When the Fascists learned he was a Jesuit priest, his sentence was commuted. In 1941, after the Civil War's conclusion, Father Jose Maria, 26
years old, was assigned to the parish at Mondragon. For the next 35 years, he served this parish until his death in 1976.

When he arrived in Mondragon, the Basque economy was in tatters due to the war. Unemployment and poverty were widespread resulting primarily, in his view, from a lack of jobs and a lack of skills among the adult population. He began his organizing effort, therefore, by gaining the support of local business interests and, by 1943, he had a technical school operating.

From the outset, however, Father Jose Maria recognized that the needs of his people went beyond mere technical skills. His school taught philosophy as well, a philosophy of participation and involvement. As a result, when some of his students became engineers and went to work for a local factory, they urged management to increase the level of participation of workers in decision making. In Franco's Spain, such ideas fell on deaf ears and management refused to comply with this request.

Instead, under Father Jose Maria's guidance, the first Basque worker-owned cooperative, ULGOR, was created in 1956 with 23 workers. Today, 18,199 workers in 132 enterprises located throughout the Basque Provinces have evolved from this initial effort. All 132 enterprises are inter-linked and include a banking system, a research and development unit, a technical school, a business school, and a health and welfare system.

"Discovered" in the mid-1960s, it was not until the 1980s that serious empirical study of the Basque system began. Recent economic analysis indicates that this worker owned effort is 30% more productive than comparable enterprises and has a very high level of worker morale and low absenteeism. (Bradley & Gelb, 1981 & 1982; Campbell, 1979; Goyder, 1979; Gutierrez-Johnson & Whyte, 1977; Henk and Logan, 1981; Ornelas, 1980 & 1981; Schwartz, 1984)

This model also effectively combats elitism, sexism, and unemployment and does this in both an expanding and a contracting economy.

**WHAT MADE IT WORK?**

Why was Father Jose Maria so successful? Often, it is believed that the success of leaders is due to their charismatic personality. They are dynamic speakers and can rally support for
what they believe is the answer to some social problem. Physically, Father Jose Maria was not a striking person. Also, he was never an eloquent speaker and often had a hard time finding the right words to express his ideas. Frequently people had trouble understanding what he was getting at.

Ruling out charisma, another plausible explanation for the success of this social action effort is that the times were right and that Father Jose Maria's ideas met with a receptive audience. Yet, one of the founders of ULGOR commented, Father Jose Maria's ideas seemed absurd at first. He was told, "yesterday we were craftsmen, foremen, and engineers. Today we are trying to learn how to be managers and executives. Tomorrow you want us to become bankers. That is impossible." (Gutierrez - Johnson and Whyte, p. 18) The impossible, however, became the Caja Laboral Popular, a banking system that was founded in 1958 which now has 400,000 depositors and has never had a loan default.

If the answer for the success of the Basque cooperatives does not lie with his personal charisma or the receptivity of the environment, why was Father Jose Maria so successful?

1) Philosophy

The primary driving force that underlies the success of the Basque collectives is the belief in the dignity of man. Father Jose Maria taught a non-elitist philosophy in which all people were valued. This philosophy guided all of his community organizational efforts. A basic tenet of the philosophy is that it is equally important to have a job and make that job one which is supportive of personal dignity. As Father Jose Maria said: "For me the problem is not illiteracy. It is making the educated people conscientious." His task was always one of raising the level of awareness of how society exploits individuals and tends to degrade their dignity.

2) Knowledge

The second element in the success picture was Father Jose Maria's knowledge of the history of other cooperative systems. For example, he had studied the cooperative movement of Great Britain where consumer cooperatives had developed successfully. He was aware that when the leaders of the consumer cooperatives
made the logical step toward developing production cooperatives, they failed. At first, the production cooperatives had been successful, but then they borrowed capital in order to stabilize their effort and to finance growth. Over time, the shares in the production cooperatives no longer resided with the workers and the enterprises evolved into "normal" capitalist enterprises. The Webbs wrote of this alteration and contended that efforts to develop production cooperatives faded from the British cooperative scene leaving only the consumer cooperatives to carry on.

Father Jose Maria felt that the Webbs had made a significant error in their analysis and he taught that, for the production cooperative to remain healthy over time, the workers would have to maintain financial control of their enterprises. From this knowledge base, he patiently argued that the cooperatives could not develop to their full potential without capital and that credit from private banks would have unacceptable strings attached. The second lesson is thus an old lesson. He knew what he was talking about, he had knowledge and understanding of how to proceed. He did not try and reinvent the wheel; however, at the same time he correctly saw that past wheels were out of balance and pointed the way toward developing a balanced system.

3) Details

Meis van der Rohe's dictum, "God is in the details" is a basic ingredient in all community organization efforts that succeed over the long haul. Father Jose Maria believed in the need for detail work. It was one thing to advocate change, to sketch a grand design of worker ownership where solidarity would replace elitism, and where all participants would be valued for both their abilities and their humanity; and quite another thing to realize that grand design. As Goethe said: "Theory is grey, my friend, but green is the tree of life." Father Jose Maria knew that: "There are always two levels to learning. You must start with the theory, then put the theory into action." And, as you implement change you constantly monitor it, examine what theories really work and what is causing problems. You attend to the details and take nothing for granted. This is not an easy dictum to follow. As Father Jose Maria said: "After the war, people were destitute. I thought it was my duty to improve their lives." This feeling, this recognition of urgency, often causes community organizers to
lose sight of the detail work that is crucial for success. Without the attention to details, half-completed projects deteriorate, undermining the opportunity for someone else to move ahead with a similar plan of action. As John Wesley said: "I have no time to be in a hurry." Father Jose Maria spent the time, devoted the energy, attended to the details that made it work right, and when it did not work right the first time out, he then examined what went wrong, examined the details of failure, and corrected the mistake. Which leads to the fourth principle of his success.

4) Cyclical Process

Change is a cyclical process, it is a growth and change cycle. You tackle a part of a part of a part of an interrelated part of the whole. One never tries to correct all the world's ills at once because there is neither the knowledge nor the time to attend to all the details of such a massive effort. Instead, you learn about a small piece of the pie - recognizing how it is related to the whole - and then go about changing that item. With the knowledge gained from that success, you move on to the next element. Father Jose Maria started with a school, teaching both technical skills and a philosophy of how the world should be run. His students, when they were ready, moved on with him to the next level of change and the first cooperative was founded. However, the cooperative only clarified the next problem area, the problem of finances, and started the next cycle of change, the creation of a banking system.

Although I have been examining the principles that guided Father Jose Maria's community organization effort separately, it is important to keep in mind that the principles are fused. Together, through their interaction, the principles come alive. Let us look at the creation of the bank as an example of this fusion.

Father Jose Maria's KNOWLEDGE of the need for a sound source of capital for the cooperatives led him to the idea of creating a bank. The easiest and least risky course of action would seem to be to create a bank along the lines of existing banks - to use an existing model and replicate it. Yet, his PHILOSOPHY, combined with that knowledge, told him that banks tended to degrade their customers, that the cooperatives needed a banking system that was consistent with the desire to create systems that would encourage
the dignity of man. How to accomplish this required an intense attention to DETAILS. When the CYCLE OF CHANGE presented the opportunity to start the community organizational effort that would create a bank, Father Jose Maria built a bank so unique that it is really inaccurate to call it a bank. But no other word exists that captures with any greater precision what the Caja Laboral Popular is and does. It is a bank, a credit union, a repository of both money and administrative talent. It is a guiding force for the collectives at the same time that it is an equal member of the collective system.

For example, if a group of people want to start a cooperative, the Caja works with ALL of them toward that goal. The Caja will help them develop the managerial expertise, help them with product selection and marketing plans, loan them the needed capital, reduce the interest rate on the loan if they have difficulty making payments during their start-up phase, and make them a full-partner with the already established cooperatives so that all of the cooperatives help each other succeed. In essence, the Caja will serve you, help you, relate to you, and not just use you. The Caja cares about you because Father Jose Maria cared about you and created a bank that has a higher mission than profits. Mind you, all of this is done with a meticulous and pragmatic attention to details so that the bank is profitable at the same time that it is a caring institution.

CONCLUSION

When you realize that community organization requires an in-depth knowledge of the problem, an excruciatingly precise attention to details, and a willingness to follow the cycle of change, tackling one problem and then another as you learn from the first, you also come to an important mega-principle. To be an effective community organizer you must be willing to devote yourself to the process over the long haul. Father Jose Maria was successful because he spent 35 years patiently working away at the details, following the cycle of change year in and year out. It is the same mega-principle that we glean from Jane Addams' Twenty Years at Hull-House and her following book The Second Twenty Years at Hull-House. Although it is an old lesson, it is a frequently ignored lesson. Community organizers often think that they can rush in, get the job "done," and move on to another community, another job. What they frequently fail to see is how the quick "success"
often deteriorates over time due to the failure of someone being committed to a continuing attention to details.

The process of change is a long and arduous one. Father Jose Maria exhibited a patience and dedication that is rare. The lessons he taught, however, are consistent with the lessons of all significant community organization efforts. Therefore, the Basque collective organizational effort teaches yet two more lessons. First, the basic rules of the game do not change. If you teach a student why Jane Addams was successful, you also are teaching why Father Jose Maria was successful. Second, if you pay attention to the basics of community organization you can accomplish the "impossible" and do so without being confrontive, antagonistic, belligerent, or revolutionary. You can evolutionarily change the system in a manner that does not take forever and a day. The Basque collectives were created in a relatively short period of time considering how significantly they have affected the lives of thousands of people - people who were once desperate and destitute and who now live comfortable and secure existences in control of their work environment.

In an area when people fantasize that more-of-the-same-old-tired-policies will solve everything and vote accordingly, many change agents have become disillusioned. Perhaps that is the greatest lesson Father Jose Maria taught. Under Franco he did not lose hope. Instead, he planned and worked and built and succeeded. Despite the darkness of those early days, he always kept an eye toward the light at the end of the long tunnel through which change agents must march, bringing with them, slowly but surely, the more hesitant souls. In his later life, Father Jose Maria laughed ironically over the honors that Franco's government bestowed on him - earlier they had sentenced him to die.

As a founding member of the first Basque cooperative commented: Father Jose Maria's "...thinking was twenty years ahead of his time...At first people didn't understand what he meant but gradually they began to comprehend his ideas. We owe (him) everything." (Bradley and Gelb, p. 212).
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Experiences Of Women Activists: 
Implications For Community 
Organizing Theory And Practice

by

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I long to hear that you have declared an independancy - and by the way in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors...If particular care and attention is not paid to the Ladies we are determined to foment a Rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.
- Abigail Adams to John Adams
March 31, 1776

The field of community organizing would be wise to heed the words of Abigail Adams to her revolutionary husband, John. Contributions of women activists have been virtually ignored by the field of social work. Consequently, social work has a diminished knowledge base and has alienated large numbers of talented women. Ironically, both the past and the future of community organizing are tied intimately with the action of women. Foremothers include Jane Addams, Dorothea Dix and Lillian Wald. Current trends suggest that "women's issues," such as poverty, the family and reproductive rights, will be on national, state and local agendas for years to come. In order to prepare for the future, we need to understand the talents of the past and present.

This paper explores the experiences of women activists, primarily in the labor, peace and feminist movements. A number of salient themes, generated in interviews with and presentations by women activists, are identified. Suggestions are made as to how
and why these themes should be integrated into community organizing practice. Given that a personal research goal of the author is to generate a community organizing theory based on the experiences of women, the discussion of themes is preceded by a newly developed analytical framework for collective practice. This project also represents a preliminary attempt to weave qualitative research methods, feminist thought and women's experiences into an understandable and meaningful whole.

Such an approach is a departure from traditional community organizing theory and practice for a number of reasons. First, critical attention is paid to the impact of gender. Second, women's experiences are considered legitimate and credible, an important factor given that the needs, thoughts and actions of women organizers are rarely addressed in the literature and in training. Third, the benefits of cross-fertilization are illustrated, since none of the women interviewed considered themselves "community organizers," yet their actions are quite applicable to the field. Finally, the analysis is from neither a community organizing model perspective (Rothman, 1979) nor a "how-to" approach (Alinsky, 1969, 1972; Kahn, 1982; Speeter, 1978; Staples, 1984). Rather a wholistic approach is presented that focuses on the "how" or process of organizing instead of the "what" or product of organizing. Important work along this line has been done by Brandwein (1981), Burghardt (1982), Freire (1974), Galper (1980), and Galper and Mondros (1980).

Background and Context

This project reflects much of the author's thoughts and experiences as a feminist activist. This experience includes legal advocacy for women, labor education and, currently, consciousness-raising workshops on unlearning or confronting the "isms" - racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ageism and handicapism. Much feminist analysis has been brought to bear on this project. A complete discussion on feminist scholarship, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the women's movement is a rich, yet uncultivated area for community organizing. The reference section of this paper includes a number of sources that ought to be incorporated into community organizing curricula. For the purposes of this paper, many basic tenets of feminist thought are seen in the identification of salient themes.
A non-positivist, qualitative research approach was selected because this methodology seemed best suited for women to define their reality, rather than it being imposed upon them. The analysis is based primarily on interviews with and presentations by women activists (listed at the end of the paper). The interviews were open-ended, and much of the richness in the material results from "chasing tangents." Five issues, however, were raised in all of the interviews: 1) Reasons for becoming an activist; 2) How organizing is accomplished; 3) Structure of the organization; 4) Gender dynamics within the organization; and 5) Type of training. Additional interviews and relevant material published in a variety of social change oriented journals supplement the analysis.

Although this paper focuses on the experiences of women activists, its application should not be limited to a female audience. The purpose of this project is defeated if the results are not considered in an integrative fashion. For a variety of reasons, including sex role stereotyping and "either-or" analytical frameworks, there exists the temptation to dichotomize the findings. By way of a warning, two dichotomies should be mentioned: male versus female styles, and process versus product orientations. Each shall be considered briefly.

There is a growing body of literature, particularly in the area of group development, on male and female styles of leadership, power and authority. Within this literature there is general agreement that masculine and feminine styles do exist. Furthermore, masculine styles are typified by aggressive, task-focused, and competitive traits and feminine styles are typified by passive, interpersonal-focused, and cooperative traits (Bokemeier & Tate, 1980; Brandwein, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Hyde, 1983; Johnson, 1976; Reed, 1981; Van Wagner & Swanson, 1979). The community organizing field needs to be attentive to these different styles, for in varying degrees they have implications for the recruitment and training of both practitioners and constituents. Reed (1981) suggests three areas in which gender differences influence the training of group leaders: assumptions about gender-related behaviors, gender composition of groups, and a group's reaction to female leaders. It is her contention, shared by others, that these issues surrounding gender need to be brought to the forefront of a training experience. Failure to acknowledge or plan for them could undermine the overall goal of the group.
The existence of masculine and feminine styles, however, does not mean that they are intrinsic traits (Brandwein, 1981: 189). Many feminine traits, however, do emerge in the themes presented below. Therefore, they receive what may appear to be a lop-sided emphasis, especially given that the community organizing field is seen as having a masculine orientation. This study does not conclude, however, that women are the only people capable of nurturance, emotions and other feminine actions, nor that their behavior is limited to these traits. Such conclusions limit both women and men. As one woman involved in the peace movement states:

The notion that women are more nurturing and, therefore, should participate to save the earth is usually sexist. That's our sex role stereotype. The fact is that everyone has the capacity to nurture. That women have been socialized to do so is a reality, and it's an asset we have going for us. But at the same time we recognize it as a strength, we must deplore it as a mandate. If that's done, then I think we're talking feminism. (Popkin & Delgado, 1982:40)

Community organizing would be enhanced if a greater integration of masculine and feminine characteristics occurred. For this to happen, organizers need to be aware of these different traits, to stop dismissing feminine traits as weak and ineffective, and to encourage both men and women to acquire a more integrative style in their organizing.

A second dichotomy, often viewed as a component of the male-female split, is between process and task (or process and product). Crow (1978) and Riddle (1978) provide thoughtful discussions on the damaging impact that this dichotomization has on organizing and social change efforts. A process orientation focuses on how things are accomplished and attention is paid to the development of trust, sensitivity, empathy and support among group members. A product orientation focuses on what things get accomplished and attention is paid to the efficiency, action, rational
order and task completion. There are strengths and weaknesses in both approaches and a savvy organizer needs to determine a balance. There is a distinct bias, however, in this paper towards a process orientation. This is partly due to the emphasis placed on process by the women activists. It is also a reaction to the lopsided product/task orientation found within community organizing. Here again, the ideal would be an integration of process and product.

**Emerging Paradigm**

As stated above, one goal of this project was to develop a paradigm that would prove useful for future analysis. This paradigm would emerge from and reflect the experiences of women activists, suggest a wholistic approach to community organizing, and relate all components to one another rather than force a linear or causal ordering. The result is referred to as a Wholistic Collective Practice Paradigm, illustrated in Figure 1.

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**Figure 1: WHOLISTIC COLLECTIVE PRACTICE PARADIGM**

**STRATEGIC**

**STRUCTURAL**

**SUBJECTIVE**

**RELATIONAL**

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The four dimensions, subjective, relational, strategic and structural, represent different concerns or levels within collective practice. Briefly, definitions for these dimensions are:
Structural: Focuses on the organization, its purpose, development, apparatus and positions. Also focuses on connections between organizations.

Strategic: Action aspects of practice, with emphasis placed on the strategy as a process. Tactical steps are considered a subunit of this dimension.

Relational: Focuses on the relationships between people—people and people—organization. Stresses the collectivity, its origin, maintenance and growth. Also focuses on the process of others engaging in strategies.

Subjective: Introspective or reflexive statements by the individual (such as the organizer). Captures the assessments, interpretations and opinions of the individual. This transcends all dimensions.

Collective practice, such as mobilizing or organizing, is the process of connection these four dimensions toward the goal of some form of intervention or social change. All of these dimensions are connected to or interdependent on one another. No dimension is more important to the process than another, although at a given point in time one may have greater emphasis placed upon it. This paradigm can be envisioned as a mobile trying to balance its parts.

Within each of these dimensions are themes that specifically relate to the experiences of women organizers. There is considerable overlap, in that a theme is not constrained to one dimension. In fact, the power of this paradigm is that it forces us to consider that an act has implications on a variety of levels. For example, when an organizer considers a fundraising effort, she/he needs to consider the organizational structure, pre and post effort, the steps involved, the opinions, desires, and skills of the collective and individual concerns. While the development of this paradigm is in its preliminary stage, it may provide a new frame of reference or a way of thinking about or analyzing community organizing efforts. It conveys the importance of considering a variety of dimensions simultaneously (a difficult notion to grasp, see Boulet, 1981). Furthermore, it suggests that the practitioner needs to allow the group to define its own reality, rather than imposing a predetermined, ordered plan upon it.
A number of themes appear consistently and without prompting in the descriptions of the experiences of the women interviewed. At the very least, these themes should be seriously considered in relation to current community organizing practice. A process by which these themes can be integrated into practice is important. Hopefully, these themes, and the dimensions, will serve as a foundation for the generation of a new community organizing theory.

Themes

1) The Wholistic Organizer - Many of the women activists stated that to be an organizer meant to involve oneself fully. One woman stated it quite eloquently: "What is my view of social change? It is a wholistic approach. It involves all, the spiritual, actions and intellect. It is engagement" (KL). This notion of total engagement or investment was echoed by others. Considerable attention was paid to personal investment and to the alienation felt when emotions were denied. Thus, an organizing effort should not focus solely on what is being done. It also needs to incorporate the intellectual and emotional needs of individuals and the collective.

The wholistic organizer should not be equated with the organizer who does everything. Alinsky believed that an organizer needs to be adept at all phases, yet this creates a power dynamic between organizer and group that many of the women felt unnecessary and detrimental. First, it places too much emphasis on the organizer as expert, a pressure that often leads to burnout and disinvestment. It also suggests that the group becomes too dependent on the organizer's expertise and will be unable to function once the organizers leaves the setting. Second, it closes a door for the organizer in terms of her or his own learning. There was overwhelming sentiment that while an organizer can offer something to the organizing effort, the effort serves as an educational experience for the organizer.

When one woman said, "...overall, the whole thing has been very enlightening" (TN), she was referring to the skills and insights she gained while being the facilitator to a selfhelp group. She, and others, also acknowledged that they do not know everything. Rather than limiting the group's development, this can free up the group to explore the skills and strengths of others.
Thus, delegation, support, interdependence and the acknowledgement that everyone can contribute something, become focal points for the organizing process.

2) Fulfillment through Organizing - Closely tied to the wholistic organizer is the notion that organizing, aside from reaching a goal, can be a fulfilling process in and of itself. The learning and support gained while organizing became as meaningful as achieving the product. One woman described organizing as a "natural high" (KG), despite the struggles and setbacks. In fact, one way of overcoming disappointments was with support for others. The encouragement of bonding and the development of support networks were considered of primary importance by the women.

3) Personal as Political: The Indigenous Organizer - A common image of a community organizer is the person who goes into the community, helps people organize around an issue, and then leaves. There is little sense as to the actual investment of the organizer into the issue. This image did not apply to these women activists. Their reasons for becoming activists varied, but the common theme was that they became involved because the problem or issue was personally experienced. Reasons include:

"It started with my own health. I was misdiagnosed"(TN)

"I think I initially became involved because of self-interest. The neighborhood was going down and nobody was doing anything about it"(Hayes, p. 24).

"Whatever it (project) is, it will have a lot of personal investment. Like Braun Court, this is important. It's our home (scheduled for rezoning). I am guided by personal issues, I need that kind of investment to organize"(FS).

"Listening to the (women's) music is like being on dope without drugs. I had a lot of friends who were musicians and we would get together. It filled a
need, it was something very personal. And, I can't sing or anything, but I know how to organize and thought, why not organize an event that would feature women performers" (KG).

"I feel strongly that what I'm doing is for them (her children)"(TL).

These personal reasons for being an activist stem from two main sources. One is the need to gain knowledge. Perhaps the best or, at least, most recognized example of this is the book Our Bodies, Ourselves. This book began with a group of women who gathered to discuss their health needs and how they were not being met by the current medical establishment. The outcome was the Boston Women's Health Collective and the publication of one of the most influential books regarding health care and self-help. Often, the need to obtain knowledge is accompanied by the need to disseminate any information so that it could help others. The women believed it was important that others have access to information and to demystify previously denied information so that it could be understood and used.

Another reason stems from a reaction to unmet needs and hostility found within male-dominated organizations. Both Freeman and Evans (1980) argue that early participants in the women's movement had endured degrading and humiliating treatment within the leftist and student movements of the 1960's. These women obtained important skills while working in the movements, yet were not given credit for their contributions and were not treated seriously. Demands for equality were scoffed at and ignored. Women caucuses began to be formed and experiences were shared, thus creating an environment that provided a springboard for the feminist movement. This analysis suggests, again, the importance of personal fulfillment and investment.

4) Use of Emotions - In many of the organizing efforts, emotions provided the cornerstone. The Women's Pentagon Action (Linton & Whitham, 1982; Popkin & Delgado, 1982) was mobilized around mourning, rage, empowerment and defiance. Every activity was tied into expressing these emotions (In my own work, I use an equation
Awareness=Pain=Healing=Growth, as a way of emotionally contextualizing an anti-racism (or other ism) workshop. Exercises help participants pass through these stages.

Women stressed the importance of bonding, of people getting to know each other so that they could work together in a way that was mutually fulfilling and rewarding. Attention to emotional or personal needs improves the overall organizing effort: "I learned that if a person feels important, they will help and get involved" (EK). Not only does the acknowledgement of emotions and bonding help people become invested, it also serves as a source of reserve energy in the face of opposition. Knowing that others care often comforts an individual when confronted with derogatory comments, hecklers, etc. Fears and concerns can be addressed within a supportive environment. This sounds obvious, yet it is often overlooked because accomplishing the task has assumed a disproportionate emphasis, to the detriment of the group. Rather than denying emotions, emotions should be used as a way of building personal ties and as a context for mobilizing. When emotions are used as a focus of organizing or as a source of strength, attention must be paid to the building of support networks (they won't happen spontaneously) and to the allowance of time so that people can sufficiently express their feelings.

5) Attention to the Environment - The themes identified thus far have stressed the importance of support, emotional bonding and personal investment. Women stressed that a "safe" environment was essential to developing these interpersonal sides of organizing. A safe environment is one in which trust, respect, equality and validation of an individual's experiences takes place. It was viewed as a high priority among most of the women: "I want a good, open working environment, where people are safe. A safe environment is definitely one of my interests and needs. It's a place where people trust one another" (FS). Most of the women said that a safe environment was all-female, although all-female environments are not necessarily safe. One woman suggested: "That with all women staffs you have differences in power and control. You don't have the male/female battles. It is a support and sanctuary that you can invest in" (QZ).

A safe environment, however, is not an environment that is conflict free. The creation of a safe environment allows for the airing of problems, for the exchange of diverse ideas in a direct
manner. In building a safe environment, attention is paid to the creation of a process through which information, grievances, and thoughts can be heard. For one woman, consensus decisionmaking was the key. Her experience of being an organizer/participant in a local women’s peace camp proved rewarding, in part because the planning group had taken considerable time in determining a consensus style that was accessible and available to all participants: "...(P)ositive stuff were tive stuff were that a lot of feelings got heard and a lot of subtle adjustments were made in the actual plan, that, because people were heard, ideas came forward and...it was very rich, very diverse...and that doesn't happen when you have an uncomfortable environment, when it's not a safe environment to talk"(MB). Taking the time to address the environment can pay off in the long run with increased commitment, greater group ownership for the project and organization, and different, creative ideas.

6) Gender dynamics - In connection with discussion on a safe environment were comments regarding gender dynamics. Most of the women saw clear differences between male and female styles of organizing that were in line with the stereotypes outlined above. These differences were particularly apparent in comments on power/control and communication:

Regarding Affinity Groups for a peace action and the lack of recognition given to a facilitator: "so they don't acknowledge what a facilitator is and it's the men that don't, I'm sure it is, that disrupt it because they don't have a sense of what collective work is and they're not trained...but they're not comfortable with having somebody who is the person, who is trying to help every one manage their feelings and their conflict"(MB).

"Men and women are different as organizers. One of my major complaints is with men. Organizationally, they are always dealing with power issues. Women are more trusting, more sensitive, able to communicate and relate to others. ...Women intuitively use group process and interpersonal skills. Where men are rational and intellectual. ...very un-intimate, real "heady." Can't listen to others."(FS)

"What I have noticed is that where men are involved, they end up being power hungry. Not cooperative."(TN)
"I was taught the Alinsky model. Charging white knight saving the day. I knew that I couldn't do that." (TL)

In order to break down the walls that exist between men and women, it is important that women's experiences and concerns are respected and treated seriously. It is also important that men become trained in other methods of decision making, leadership and control, given the opinions against hierarchical, male-dominated, aggressive, individualistic settings.

7) Bridging Differences - A common concern among these women was closing gaps that exist along racial, sexual preference, class, age and handicap lines. Consequently, confronting one's own biases, rather than ignoring them, was seen as central to individual and group development. Before, or in conjunction with an organizing effort, internal group prejudices are addressed. Rather than hide these problems so that an illusion of solidarity is created, these women stress the importance of raising these issues directly as a way of furthering growth and opportunities. Failure to do so will lead to divisiveness, anger, frustration and, ultimately, disintegration.

8) Women's Culture and History - Virtually every woman had a female role model who served as a source of inspiration and courage. These were not necessarily famous women, but they were women who helped make a struggle understandable and workable through their actions. Some of these role models were known personally as they were bosses, friends, or other activists. Others served a symbolic purpose, such as in the Women's Pentagon Action in which women who died from the violent acts of men were remembered in ceremonies. Still others represent feminist culture (music and arts) and are viewed as a source of sustenance and connection: "I turn on Sweet Honey in the Rock and understand Bernice Reagan's meanings of social actions, consciousness raising. Need this global meaning. You need emotional support" (KL).

Community organizing needs to rediscover the female organizers of its past. It should also consider the life histories of women in a variety of movements for they will suggest a different way of mobilizing.

9) Training - There was no consistent view of the best training. Many of these women received their training through
experience and not through any formal educational process. Some took advantage of available training opportunities presented by organizations, such as Settlement Houses, the Midwest Academy and labor schools. Of concern to the field of community organizing should be the resentment felt towards the increased professionalization of the field. One woman, when asked why she went back to school, said: "It's time for the credentials"(KG); another said: "All I'm getting is a piece of paper that says I'm qualified"(FS). These women have demonstrated that grassroots experience, particularly if one is open to learning from others, is a valuable means of gaining an education of organizing. Community organizing needs to determine ways of tapping this knowledge and creating learning situations that are meaningful to women.

Conclusion

This paper has explored some common threads among women activists with the hope that these findings can be incorporated into community organizing practice. It presented an analytical paradigm that stresses a wholistic approach to collective practice. The paradigm's four dimensions - subjective, relational, strategic, and structural - comprise an integrated, interdependent whole; much like a balanced mobile. Within these dimensions are themes, nine of which were presented. Most of these themes focused on the emotional and interpersonal aspects of organizing, a view often overlooked or ignored in current community organizing theory and practice. I hope that serious consideration of these themes occurs and that community organizing, from training through the execution of efforts, changes in ways that accepts and integrates the experiences of women activists. In the words of Abigail Adams - "Remember the Ladies," and the future will be stronger and more vital.

REFERENCES

PRIMARY SOURCES:

Some identifying factors have been eliminated and the initials recoded in order to insure confidentiality.

EK. Interview, May 1984. Involvement in labor education, minority women.
FS. Interview, October 1984. Involvement in tenant rights, housing reform, youth issues, economic/poverty issues.

KG. Interview, June 1984. Involvement in consumer services, the arts, feminist networking.

KL. Presentation, October 1984. Involvement in peace work, civil rights, labor education.

LD. Presentation, October 1984. Involvement in labor organizing.

MB. Interview, May 1984. Involvement in peace work, environmental issues.

QZ. Interview, October 1984. Involvement in reproductive rights, labor organizing, neighborhood organizing.

SA. Presentation, October 1984. Involvement in desegregation, student rights, peace work.

TL. Presentation, October 1984. Involvement in women's economic rights, peace work.

TN. Interview, October 1984. Involvement in health issues.

SECONDARY SOURCES: INTERVIEWS/DIARIES


SECONDARY SOURCES: REFERENCES


Planning practice is changing. Previous years of economic growth contributed to an increase in federal, state, and local planning agencies, in addition to regional and special purpose bodies with territorial or functional responsibilities. In times of growth, planning was viewed by many as a type of urban engineering and applied social science characterized by objective fact-finding and the so-called rational model. Leading texts emphasized technical research methods and 'hard data' analysis, while government guidelines described scientific application of facts (Krueckeberg and Silvers, 1974; Spiegel and Hyman, 1978). Planners were akin to technical experts who analyzed data for other people who then considered alternatives and made decisions. Implementation was largely a matter of choice among technical alternatives. The plan, as a statement of reasoned deliberation and general public interest, was considered capable of generating support throughout the community. If some planners criticized contradictions between the rational model and actual practice, or used planning as a vehicle for power redistribution and social change, they were by no means typical in the field (Beyle and Lathrop, 1970; Burchell and Sernlieb, 1978; Boyer, 1983; Davidoff, 1965).

Today, planning operates in a changing context. Economic recession has replaced growth and reduced development. This has exacerbated conditions in central cities and metropolitan areas,
some of which are slowing, even declining in population, employment, and other measures of urban activity. Private groups blame government for economic problems and planning agencies for a range of ills. They mobilize substantial resources, mount campaigns to shape public attitudes, and elect representatives who reduce the size of government and agencies. Planners no longer expect to generate widespread support, but instead may struggle for survival in the face of power (Checkoway, 1983; Clavel, et al., 1980; For- ester, 1982).

It is, therefore, no surprise that planning agencies may not, in fact, implement their plans. Analysts have documented the shortcomings of implementation in diverse arenas for years (Alterman, 1983; Bardach, 1977; Lynn, 1980; Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1979; Thompson, 1981). The surprise for many planners is that the problem is not implementation alone but also their very future in the community. Austerity policies and adversarial power challenge planners to recognize sociopolitical change and develop the capacity to deal with the years ahead.

This paper analyzes methods of building citizen support for planning at the community level. It draws on research and practice in several fields and includes cases of planners and agencies that apply innovative or exemplary methods. It does not suggest that suggest that these planners are typical in the field, or that these methods alone are sufficient to alter the context of practice. It does suggest that planning operates in a changing context, and that planners who want to influence implementation -- and, perhaps, agency survival -- must go beyond rational models to build support for planning at the community level.

Methods of Building Citizen Support

Building citizen support involves methods to plan programs, services, and resources with influence and implementation in mind. It assumes that planning operates in a context of politics, that planning decisions are usually in the hands of other people, and that planners wishing to influence decisions must apply methods appropriate to this context. Practitioners apply methods in public or private settings; at national, state, and local levels; and in housing, health, human services and other fields. There is no single notion that characterizes all forms of practice.
There is nothing new about agency attempts to build support, but previous efforts often contradicted stated aims or produced uneven results. For example, agencies for years have composed governing bodies, boards and committees to provide representation, involve citizen interests, and build support for plans, but these bodies have not always broadly represented the area population or involved individuals accountable to diverse constituencies in the community (Checkoway, 1981; Mannor and Morone, 1980).

Other agencies have adopted subarea planning aimed to decentralize decisions and programs to territorial subunits and local participants, but subarea planning has often served administrative ends and deconcentrated functions within real decentralization to local residents (Checkoway, 1984; Kasperon and Brietbait, 1974). Other agencies have employed programs and methods to improve communications, involve individuals, and activate participation in planning, but most agencies have not adopted singular driving objectives for participation. They have instead favored safe methods like public hearings that satisfy minimal federal requirements and provide public relations without transferring power to or increasing the support of citizens (Arnstein, 1969; Checkoway, 1982). Exceptional agencies have represented interests and activated citizens with fervor, but most have not mobilized forces or built significant support (Checkoway, 1981).

What methods could help build citizen support for planning at the community level? The following are not the only methods, but are among the most important.

Formulate Strategy

Strategy is the science and art of mobilizing resources toward goals. It includes steps to set goals and priorities, identify issues and constituencies, develop structure and organization, take actions and evaluate results. It involves choice and sequence, staging and timing, and several styles and roles. Strategy shows a commitment to think ahead, anticipate alternatives, and achieve results (Booth, 1977; Bryson and Delbecq, 1979; Steiner, 1979).

Corporate leaders formulate strategy to help assure success, but planning officials tend not to think or act strategically...
(Baum, 1983; Peters and Waterman, 1982). However, Bleiker (1978) instructs planners how to design programs and apply techniques that develop support for plans that are controversial, unpopular, and difficult to implement. Staples (1984) describes strategic analysis to help build winning organizations. Bryson, Freeman, and Roering (1984) describe cases of strategic planning in public agencies, including a health service which identifies issues, analyzes alternatives, identifies internal and external environmental factors, forms task forces around issues and selects alternatives for implementation. These cases are exceptional but provide lessons nonetheless.

**Identify Issues**

Issues express specific social concerns and affect people in deeply felt ways. They appeal to particular constituencies with concrete proposals, provide tactical handles and multiple phases, and help build support for organizations. Which is the most salient issue? Who are the constituencies? What tactics and actions will work? Where will it lead? Booth (1977) instructs planners to "cut" issues in ways which relate to constituencies, although many planners produce comprehensive plans with vague goals for some general public. Such plans may serve functions but diffuse constituencies and exacerbate implementation. Such goals may be good but too vague to stir imaginations and more constituents to action.

How can planners cut issues which build citizen support? Lano-court (1979) challenges planners to consider salience and self interest in identifying issues for implementation. She assumes that people will act in the name of public responsibility and civic duty when it is in their self interest to do so. Roche (1981) describes planners who took goals from agency plans, listed groups with identifiable stakes and political strength, defined issues in terms of target groups, and used media to make issues come alive to these groups. For example, they built support to labor leaders by seeking their input and demonstrating how proposed plans would maintain wages and fringes and minimize disruption to employees. They did not justify esoteric formulas or sell rationality, but appealed to self interest and, as a result, leaders voted overwhelmingly to support the plan.
This does not suggest that issues alone will generate support. On the contrary, Krumholz (1975, 1982) describes planners who framed comprehensive plans in terms of specific issues and constituencies, but had uneven results because they lacked resources to activate participation or overcome opposition in the community. Issues are important but insufficient to build support without other methods.

**Develop Constituencies**

Building an organization involves caring about those who are affected. Whose issue is it? What do they see as their stake? Are they organizable? Constituencies are those who are affected by issues and may show support. Planners who represent some diffuse public interest rather than target supportive constituencies may do so at risk to themselves.

Constituencies are not random relationships but result from efforts to identify and develop them (Barkdoll, 1983; Beneviste, 1977; Lipschultz, 1960; Staples, 1984). In one innovative agency, for example, planners identify major constituency groups, invite them to select representatives to the governing body, and assist representatives in building support in the community. In another, they create an independent organization with business, labor, professional, civic and consumer group members who build support beyond the governing body (Checkoway, 1981). In yet another, they analyze agency goals in terms of individual and group opposition, and then develop relationships and provide services to selected ones in expectation of loyalty and support in return (Roche, 1981).

**Educate the Public**

Citizens cannot be expected to support planning without understanding their problems and stake in the process and agency addressing them. The challenge is not public relations but popular education and community development. It is an older conception of planning in which planners help people to learn about themselves and their communities as well as to understand the problems they face, and facilitate a process to involve people in the decisions which affect their lives (Freire, 1968; Goulet, 1971).
Planners recognize the importance of public education, but tend to emphasize public information programs including "safe" methods like annual reports, newsletters, and public hearings to inform the general public rather than target specific constituencies (Checkoway, 1981, 1982; Texas Municipal League, 1975; Winholz, 1968). Others lack educational objectives or rely upon obscure media like legal notices in newspapers, although studies show that these are among the least effective ways to communicate with the public (Rosener, 1975; Sinclair, 1977). Yet others use technical language which exacerbates difficulty in understanding and gives the impression that only professionals can present an adequate response (Friedman, 1973). No wonder some people may lack awareness or understanding of planning agencies, ignore calls for participation, or withdraw their support (Checkoway, 1979).

Several practitioners provide suggestions regarding strategy and skills of popular education (Joslyn-Scherer, 1980; Gordon, 1978). Who are the people to be reached? What issues will educate and develop constituencies? What media are appropriate and what language will communicate? There is a history of popular education in earlier agencies -- including exhibits and displays in department stores and shopping centers, and popularizations of technical documents for mass distribution (Glenn, et al., 1947; Scott, 1969). One innovative agency provides extensive public notices of hearings, public service announcements, radio and television appearances, direct mailings, leaflet distribution, public presentations, and personal outreach by staff and board members, in addition to publishing a monthly multicultural, multilingual newspaper targeted to specific constituencies. The newspaper has become the leading vehicle for planning information in the area. Another agency sponsors a speakers' bureau that facilitates board and staff member presentations to local groups, helps agency representatives exchange ideas and receive feedback, and facilitates board member education and leadership training. Another agency conducts training programs, publishes educational guides to develop leaders and activate citizens, and reaches the public through weekly columns in newspapers, public service announcements, and regular appearances on television and radio (Checkoway, 1981). These agencies view education as central to their mission, to involve individuals and groups, and bring planning closer to the community.
Find and Make Leaders

Citizen leaders show commitment to goals, develop a following, and stand up for planning in the community. They also attend board meetings and chair committees, but these are vehicles for leadership rather than leadership itself. Many planners retreat from the process by which leaders are selected or developed. Instead, they consider leadership in the narrow context of meetings, or believe that some given process satisfactorily produces leaders to represent the population and account to constituencies, or creates "appropriate" leadership by promoting people who hold positions in established institutions. However, leadership appropriation also may promote people who are unrepresentative, unaccountable, or uncommitted to plans, or who simply lack time to act like leaders.

There is no a priori justification for overrepresentation of business and other private interests in planning agencies. Their traditional overrepresentation is purely political and difficult to defend by leadership or implementation criteria. It would be ironic if agencies appropriated leaders with relatively little commitment to planning, although this happens in some communities.

How can planners find and make leaders? Bradley (1981) describes an innovative agency that seeks to identify potential leaders, recognize their talent, and develop their skills. He assumes that any citizen can function well when given proper support, that planners have responsibility to foster development, and that if citizens are not acting like leaders, planners may not be doing their job properly. Kimmey (1981) describes centers authorized to assist and consult with participants through orientation, reference, and other programs. These include training to overcome disparities in knowledge, present technical information and participation techniques, and develop leadership capacity and political skills. Others provide curricula to teach board members about the political economy of planning ideologies of the principal actors, distribution of benefits and problems of special clients and subpopulation groups, alternative delivery systems and elements of planned social change. Lessons focus on skills with citizens and enlist their participation, set goals and formulate strategies, develop self confidence and think independently (Checkoway, 1981; Strauss, et al., 1976). There is no science of
leadership development in planning, but if planners themselves do not take this responsibility, then who will?

Establish Relations with Influentials

These key actors are able to exercise power and influence decisions that affect the agency. They are not random relationships but result from a plan for establishing or maintaining them. Who are the influentials? What are their political resources? What is their place in various institutions? What are the possible paths of influence?

How can planners identify, maintain and develop relations with influentials? Tait, Bokemeir and Bohlen (n.d.) describe positional, reputational, decision making and other methods to identify those who may gain from agency activity and marshall their support. They also identify possible opponents, analyze their interests, and anticipate ways to channel their involvement constructively. Roche (1981) analyzes ways to cultivate relationships through issue-based appeals to self-interests, or special efforts to involve influentials in decisions, or priority responses to requests for information and assistance in return for support. He describes planners who discuss issues with influentials to explain their stake, respond quickly to requests from public officials, labor unions, chambers of commerce, media, and community groups with large constituencies, and participate in political elections for officials who return favors by defending planning. There is no lack of published advice on personal or political approaches to win friends and influence others (Carnegie, 1936; Riordan, 1963; Twain, n.d.).

Build Coalitions

Coalitions are working relationships to collaborate together and influence outcomes. They serve to mobilize individuals or groups around a common program and generate power to fulfill the program which is developed. They also help individuals share resources, help one another, and build mutual support. They may be short-term, shifting, or relatively permanent. Some are little more than occasional meetings, while others operate with staff of their own. They are important for individuals seeks to build support beyond the reach of what each could accomplish alone (Dluhy, 1981; Pearce, 1983; Kahn, 1980; Schakowsky, n.d.).
Coalition-building methods vary from one case to another. For example, an agency covering a large rural area applies "coalitional planning" to build support among community leaders and public officials who can affect planning. Agency staff analyze power structures to identify influentials and then include them on the governing board, subarea councils, and committees. Another agency creates subarea councils with committees, subcommittees, and task forces to develop plans, review projects, and advocate change at the local level. Each council has staff who coordinate relations with constituent organizations. Another agency assists and funds groups forming community councils within subareas. These councils help identify local problems, lobby legislators, and support implementation (Checkoway, 1981; Roche, 1981). A third agency targeted under-served groups and traditional non-participants, conducted community outreach and medial campaigns, held training sessions on problems and prospects, and formed a coalition which continues to have an impact on the agency and community today (Glenn, Lipschultz, and Sherry, 1981).

Activate People in Planning

The benefits of citizen participation in planning are well known. For agencies, participation can fulfill legislative mandates, improve communications, provide information, and build support. It also can open up the political process, involve low-income and minority citizens, and develop community organizations. For citizens, participation can offer opportunities to gain representation, exercise legal and political rights, and influence policy decisions. Done with knowledge and skill, participation can enhance participatory democracy, improve planning, and build support on which to ground change.

Recent years have witnessed an increase in citizen participation programs and methods employed by agencies, although the overall record has been uneven. Many agencies have expanded the scope of participation, and exceptional ones have sought participation with fervor. But few agencies have adopted singular, driving objectives for participation, favored methods that transfer power to citizens, or used participation to mobilize constituency support. Most planners view themselves as committed to participation, but work in the face of obstacles and problems of practice that remain.
Knowledge of participation practice also has increased over time. Agency catalogues count more than forty current or emergent methods, analyze selected methods according to function, and rationalize the design, implementation, and evaluation of practice (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1979; Community Services Administration, 1978; U.S. Department of Transportation, 1976). Analysts have studied participation objectives and methods in use, identified major participants and obstacles, and evaluated impacts and factors influencing the field (Burke, 1979; Gil and Lucchesi, 1979; Glass, 1979; Rosenbaum, 1983; Rosener, 1979).

Practitioners have provided perspectives and lessons from practical experience. For example, Creighton (1981) describes steps from empirically based practice to identify participation objectives and publics, formulate alternatives, assess internal and external resources, and match methods to purpose at each stage of planning. This is not to suggest that methods alone can activate citizens and build support. On the contrary, studies suggest that formal methods show little or no association with the quality or impact of participation, while other factors -- including board and staff commitment and leadership -- do correlate with quality participation (Checkoway and O'Rourke, 1983). But they provide lessons for practice nonetheless.

What are the Obstacles?

There are serious obstacles to building support for planning at the community level and there has been extensive writing on this subject. It is important, however, to recognize obstacles while also embracing the desirability and possibility of change.

It is difficult to build support for planning when agencies lack legitimacy in the community. Private economic interests often act like they should control local planning decisions and resist efforts to get them to share their power with others. Citizens may accept the notion of private control over planning systems and show little support for public intervention. Only a fraction of the general public perceives planning as an activity in which they could participate or knows of the existence or functions of planning agencies (Foley, 1955; Lipsky and Lounds, 1976; Riska and Taylor, 1978). Citizens often receive information
through networks dominated by private interests and hesitate to "intrude" in areas involving private power. The lack of public knowledge and support tends to lower the expectations for planning and reduce the incentives for public initiatives. This is not to suggest that public attitudes toward planning agencies necessarily arise from some independent group consciousness or are to be taken for granted. On the contrary, it would be as mistaken to take public attitudes as given as it would be to ignore organized private efforts to shape public attitudes or to reject the possibility that new initiatives could respond and alter the situation. Intervention could make a difference, as private interests have shown for years.

It is also difficult to build support when planners lack knowledge, skills, or attitudes conducive to practice. Studies find only a minority of planners who regard their work as properly or inevitably political, a majority of straightforward technicians who believe they are or should be concerned with objective fact-finding and rational analysis of information, and a substantial group who are ambivalent about acting political and who tend to emphasize technical skills as a result of this ambivalence (Baum, 1983). Other studies find planners who stress values of efficiency, economy, and control which often are the antithesis of citizen participation (Aleshire, 1972; Friedman, 1973). They perceive ordinary citizens as lacking knowledge and professional expertise; expect their participation to cause delays in action, expand the number of conflicts, and increase the costs of operations; and regard their inquiries as a waste of time and distraction from "work" (U.S. House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, 1978). There are exceptional planners who activate citizens and build support with fervor, but they do not appear typical.

This image has implications for planning research and education. First, most planners do not perceive themselves as political, a situation which could be defined as a problem for research and education to address. Second, a minority of planners are political and their work could provide lessons for others. Third, a substantial group of planners are ambivalent and possible constituents or allies for changing practice. There is no a priori reason why planners could not develop the capacity and skills to build support for their work in the community. Research and education could find excellent opportunities here.
Some analysts argue that research and education do not prepare people for effective practice. Hemmens, Bergman, and Moroney (1978) survey planning graduates who report that their jobs require analytic, communication, and process skills different from the training received in the schools. Schon, Cremer, Osterman, and Perry (1976) survey other planning graduates who report that key skills in writing, negotiating, influencing, and consulting with clients were not usually available in planning curricula. De Neufville (1983) contends that planning schools agree on no common literature, raise questions which have no answers or produce stale debate, and provide poor instruction to make planning work. She argues that planning theory is inconsistent with experience, irrelevant to application, and frustrates scholars and practitioners.

But it would be as mistaken to blame scholars and educators for not bridging the gap between knowledge and action as it would be to excuse practitioners from their responsibility to apply knowledge that is already available. The issue is not the continuing need to improve knowledge and education, but whether practitioners are willing or able to apply what is already available. Some planners have sought to build support, and implement plans in the face of power, but others, perhaps most, have opted to sit tight and wait for earlier times to return rather than to play a more active role. Dyckman (1983) argues that although planners once may have been concerned with broad social policy, political action, and community leadership, they subsequently became entrenched in government bureaucracies applying instrumental rationality and mechanical skills to projects shaped by authoritarian regimes and powerful private interests. Marcuse (1983) decries the retreat of some planners from progressive ideals to instrumental or technocratic practice, from long range planning to short range expediency, from the broader public to narrow private interests, and from ordinary citizens to established powerholders. Schon (1983) observes that despite technical innovations in planning -- most planners have not adopted behavior conducive to agency survival.

In the final analysis, planning agencies face the power of private economic interests, which mobilize resources and ongoing organizations, mount campaigns to shape public attitudes, and work to influence, control, or defeat planning. For example, Pines (1982) describes heads of companies developing media campaigns and
advertising drives against government agency initiatives; conducting economic education and antiregulatory programs in the workplace and classroom; formulating strategy and building coalitions to pack public hearings with witnesses, write speeches for allies, lobby legislators and administrators, and influence decisions. Citizen participation has increased in scope and quality around planning, but private economic interests are often the most active, organized, and influential participants. They challenge planners to respond and alter the situation, but even exceptional efforts still would operate in an imbalanced political arena.

Conclusion

Planning operates in a changing context in which austerity policies and adversarial power challenge them to recognize sociopolitical change and develop capacity for the years ahead. Planners who want to influence implementation -- and perhaps agency survival -- must go beyond rational models to apply sociopolitical methods to build support for planning at the community level. These include methods to formulate strategy, identify issues, develop constituencies, educate the public, and activate citizens in planning. There are obstacles to practice, but exceptional agencies show possibilities and provide lessons for others.

Building citizen support can help influence implementation at the community level. This does not suggest that the answer to implementation is in these methods alone, for planning operates in an arena which requires more powerful methods than those described here. Nor does it deny that this approach might engender controversy and arouse reaction by groups that may emerge more powerful than before. Nor does it neglect that planning agencies offer only one vehicle to activate citizens and create needed change in the community. There are other means, one or a combination of which may be better ways to bring needed change. In the final analysis, building citizen support for planning at the community level might not make much difference. But then again it might.

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Electoralism, Mobilization and Strategies for the 80s:
An Assessment of Organizing Trends in the Mid-Decade

by

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Community organizers in the United States have two tasks today: a short-term defensive one of holding back the rightward assault against both the social welfare state and the working class in general; and a long-term, mobilizing task of building a constituency strong enough to transform the welfare state itself. We cannot lose sight of this latter goal, for the method and objectives we set for ourselves in the short-run will greatly determine the feasibility of our long-term goals.

This is no small matter, for the assault on the welfare state is as fundamental to the restructuring of class and social relations today as the New Deal was in helping to stabilize and expand social wages for working people in the 1930s. Today, economists as varied as Silk, Gordon, Bluestone and Thurow see our society moving toward a highly stratified, two-tiered class system of very well-off professional workers and managers and a huge layer of far poorer, underskilled workers kept passive by their fears of joining the so-called underclass.1 Homelessness and gentrification; the birth of yuppies and the emergence of the underclass; the rise of privatization and the decline of entitlements are all part of this new stratification. In this context, the roles of social workers, with the exception of those entering private practice, can only become increasingly marginal, less skilled, and less autonomous if this crisis is not altered politically.2

This daunting economic and social reality must inform any strategy for social change that we attempt. We, therefore, must,
confront the issues of power -- power now being utilized to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands of people through deindustrialization, gentrification, Social Darwinism -- if we are to re-emerge with our own power to combat the right. If we use the wrong tactics and create false illusions that eventually undermine long-term effectiveness, we can never attain those long-term goals.

This is why today's emphasis on electoralism, especially Democratic Party electoralism, is such a misguided tactic. A brief look at history shows no example of movement activity increasing its strength once it entered the Democratic Party. Let me cite two examples: the major gains of the welfare state and the labor movement occurred before labor's and left's entry into FDR's 1936 coalition; indeed, the movement quickly suffered defeats culminating in the debacle of Little Steel in 1937. Likewise, the major growth of civil rights organizations occurred before their entanglements with Democratic Party electoralism after 1964.

The dissipation of movement activity occurred when the movements themselves were quite powerful. Such power gave a spurious but understandable rationale to entry into the Democratic Party. Today, no such movements exist. Thus, the possibility of resisting such cooptive tactics is even less likely. The Rainbow Coalition learned this when the Black Caucus' designate for Vice-Chair was for the first time ever denied selection. Since then, Kennedy and other progressives have admittedly moved to the right. So much for the possibilities of "internal reform."

Electoralism itself, given strong movement support and independence, is viable. But the ideas expressed in campaigns must be sufficiently visible, even in nascent form, to connect political, economic, and social issues in some meaningful way. That simply does not exist today.

Indeed, this is true even for the Rainbow Coalition. The Rainbow Coalition, while having the outlines of the social composition we all wish, has shown itself to have limited staying power since the election. (As the Black Caucus incident above suggests.) The one exception is Chicago, where the virulent, entrenched racism of the white community has kept alive a defensive unity within the Black Community.
The Rainbow Coalition has had little staying power because its leadership has no interest in maintaining a highly mobilized, increasingly skilled and active constituency in their own trade unions, civil rights organizations, and professional groups. To do that would be to join short-term objectives with the long-term ideas and consciousness that train people in their own self-determination. Such a phrase is no longer heard in organizing circles -- self-determination would contest for power within our own organization before it threatened the right. Instead, today's emphasis is on what is popularly called 'empowerment' but what, in fact, is nationalist pluralism.

Nationalist pluralism is a two-headed phenomenon -- nationalist, in the progressive, populist sense of fighting for a particular people's civil rights, anti-police brutality, pro-affirmative action, for example. It is highly conservative, however, in the pluralist sense of "empowering" only a particular stratum of its population to maintain the status quo, ignoring the changing economic relationships developing beneath them. Pluralism is concerned only with political elites and consciously ignores the disparity in economic arrangements within groupings. This is why it is possible for there to be a ten-fold increase in Black and Hispanic officials and a five-fold increase in female lawmakers since 1970 concurrent to the emergence of the so-called underclass and the "feminization of poverty."

Thus, even the Rainbow Coalition ignored the ways to join economic and political issues by working in their own organizations to change them. Many rallies would be held with thousands of people, but they were there only to listen; there were massive campaigns, but no mass participation. (For example, Jackson staffers took over every local headquarters and arbitrarily vetoed any fund-raiser that could not bring in $3,000.) The remaining engagement of more and more people in economic and political issues that affect their lives daily just has not happened.

For this engagement must be more than simple "participation" at scattered events. It needs to involve a process that educates and socializes people to feel more confident about themselves and their ability to act on their world. Organizing is designed to carry out this process, even when movements are weak. Electoralism, especially when there are few developed community and mass-based organizations influencing it, runs counter to that
development process. Even local campaigns emphasize a narrow range of techniques: high status, given to officials and established leaders, especially those running for office; highly specific issues confined to dominant perceptions of problems that reinforce mainstream, status quo changes; and a task-oriented, "there's no time for talk!" method of functioning that limits political education and training immensely. Only the glow -- and I admit it is real at first -- of fighting on the side of progressivism against the forces of reaction creates anything sustaining for the membership. But that glow cannot and does not last, even with local-level victories, if the material conditions affecting daily life are not altered and if the likelihood of long-term social justice is not improved upon. More often than not, when those conditions do not change, that glow of idealism is replaced by the greyer passivity of fatalism.

It is the lack of connection between our short-term struggles and our long-term goals that contributes so much to our weakness at mobilization. Reagan, on the other hand, has no such problem at present. He calls for a "new, vigorous free enterprise," and concrete images of Silicon Valley and rich yuppies come into view that give hope, however illusory, to the right wing rhetoric. Likewise, his attacks against a bloated welfare state bureaucracy have equally clear, dismal images of indifferent employment counselors and hostile welfare workers which, however misunderstood, legitimate his claim for further cuts. Conservative electoralism and mobilization of the right move in easy symmetry, feeding off each other's strengths to continue economic restratification, militarism, and racist and sexist Social Darwinism.

We have no such symmetry. We need to defend entitlements, but there can be no illusions about how they are dispensed: the welfare state has too much bloated bureaucracy. Trade unionism, historically and symbolically a representation of working class independence and strength, needs to be maintained, but anyone who has worked in trade union activity knows they bear little resemblance to democratic, internally heterogeneous organizations. They need to be redemocratized and restructured if they are to be able again to fight for better working conditions and improving standards of living. All of this is true to civil rights organizations as well.
In short, the crisis of progressive politics today, be it European social democracy, Third World socialism or United States liberalism, has developed in large part because of the discrepancy between our ideas and the concrete models we have used to represent those ideas. In great measure, we have nothing to excite people to build towards a better world. While defensive mobilizations, especially against racism and sexism, are possible, such fights historically have little staying power if they are not connected to concrete formations like the CIO in the 1930s or SNCC in the early 1960s. This is why, despite the efforts of thousands of people in 1984, the power of the right is greater than ever today.

As painful as it is to face, two-party electoralism in this historical period must be viewed as counter-productive. It diverts people from the rebuilding and redemocratizing of our organizations that can then begin exciting others to consider widespread, lasting mobilization. Only such movement activity has the staying power, ideas and creativity to threaten the new powerful right wing.

In the mid-1980s, therefore, our social welfare strategies, while in the short-run defensive in character, need to concentrate in five arenas:

(a) legislative coalitions fighting for entitlements

(b) anti-gentrification coalitions (i.e., homelessness, tenants' rights, etc.)

(c) rank and file trade unionism

(d) anti-racist and anti-sexist groups

(e) anti-intervention, anti-militarism coalitions

The first type of coalition fights for maintenance of the social wage. It does not demand sectarian perfection; such coalitions will include politicians and others not interested in long-term, wide-scale reform but who are short-term allies who can be pushed to fight for social welfare. The next two arenas will be more grassroots-based and, thus, capable of widespread internal education and activity. For example, anti-gentrification efforts often bring professionals and community people together where
there are possibilities of breaking down status illusions regarding leadership and types of expertise. Rank and file trade unionism, while fighting for specific needs of union members, also carries the possibility of reforming unions in the process by emphasizing greater democratic traditions. Anti-sexist and anti-racist groups (such as pro-abortion groups and anti-police brutality coalitions) defend people under attack from the Social Darwinism of right-to-lifers, anti-humanists, the Klan, etc. The final, anti-intervention coalition, while not specific to social welfare, serves the important educational purpose of fighting ideas that spread militarism and economic investment in the war machine. Such ideas need to be countered if investment in social needs is ever to increase again.

Such coalitions are not that different from much work now being suggested by others. But they must also join these struggles with the long-term goals discussed at the start of this paper still in mind. That means:

(a) Political objectives must have short-term and long-term goals beneath them so political education moving in the direction of self-determination is possible. If large numbers of new people are not developed with both self-confidence and political awareness there is little likelihood for sustained progressive activity.

(b) Coalition work, the training of activists, etc., must, therefore, always attempt to include clients, students, the unemployed, etc. whenever possible to break down elitism in our own ranks.

(c) Feminist process must be used as much as possible so that we all relearn new ways to behave while working together.

Through this process new, more collective and supportive forms of leadership can be developed. In this way the vision of a better world and the way we shall try to work in that world take on concrete form in the present.

This work will be small-scale now: in rank and file caucuses; as parts of coalitions, often in minority positions; in work that has neither immediate victories nor illusions. It will
seem paltry, a "joke" compared to the power of the right. But let's not forget that in 1964 the right wing was seen as a joke. Yet they did the same kind of small-scale work, building to a point where twenty years later we are no longer laughing.

NOTES


4. Marvin Sussman, noted cultural historian and writer on social movements, expresses an equally dim view on the likelihood of "change from within" the Democratic Party, basing his analysis on previous attempts at internal reform. See a review of his books and comments in The Village Voice, March 31, 1985. For those who hold out that the dynamics between mobilization and electoralism are more complicated than I suggest -- and I grant they are complicated -- I ask but one question: Can anyone point to an example somewhere in the 20th Century where social movement involvement within The Democratic Party increased, directly or indirectly, movement activity? For a stimulating analysis of movement activity and electoralism, see Eric Chester, Labor and the Ballot Box, New York: Praeger, 1985.
The Influence Of Rev. Jesse Jackson's Candidacy For President On Pluralistic Politics: Implications For Community Action

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INTRODUCTION

This essay addresses the significant changes in power relationships brought about by the candidacy of the Reverend Jesse Louis Jackson for President of the United States. Specifically, it will attempt to focus on themes or issues reflecting the impact of his entry into the contest for the Democratic nomination as a viable Black candidate in November 1983, and the consequent re-definition of power relationships which occurred not only within the Democratic Party, but between Blacks and Whites, Blacks and Jews, Black elected and appointed officials, and his effort on relative deprivation among the people in the Rainbow coalition that he represented. Therefore, issues of racism, coalition building, networking (specifically, within the Black church), leverage, pluralistic politics, and the role of the media in image-making and image-breaking will be touched upon.

Jesse Jackson is a unique catalyst for change, alternately viewed as "the Savior" by some and by others as "the Devil." He is viewed with both admiration and fear. Nevertheless, as a political figure he could not and cannot be ignored. During the 1984 campaign, Jackson was considered "the embodiment of Black pride, an incandescent force glowing beside dull white politicians, demanding respect and "our fair share." He was the power broker who was ignored or patronized at great risk" (Thomas, 1985: 30).
His transition from an outsider seeking to influence policy and politics through advocacy and other normative reeducative approaches, to an "insider" seeking to utilize power-coercive strategies to influence policy and politics through the political electoral process is a major developmental step. The differences between these strategies represents a significant break through in community organization and mobilization, which could modify not only the character of power forces operating for change, but the empowerment of the Black and other exploited communities. The resultant pride, involvement and investment of a broad range of constituencies has demonstrated what can be done, and what must be done, what additionally must be taught and incorporated into community organization courses and self-determination activities.

Jackson's candidacy thus went beyond symbolism to represent a real and emerging power base or critical mass in the United States that has significant implications for community organization theory and practice. At a conference on "Black and Presidential Politics," held at Howard University, November 17, 1983, Smith and McCormick presented a paper entitled, "The Challenge of a Black Presidential Candidacy." They analyzed Jackson's bid for the Democratic nomination from a systemic perspective which defined success,

not on the number of delegates obtained nor on whether Mondale, Glenn, (Hart), or Reagan are helped or hurt but instead on the nature of his definition of the black predicament and the consequent ideology and policies he argues are necessary to address that predicament. And on the extent to which he is willing to challenge the Democratic party in order to build on independent base of Black power in the party.
system (Smith and McCormich, 1983: p. 3).

Jackson's Platform

Jackson announced his candidacy in Washington, D.C. on November 4, 1983, a year before the Presidential election, three months before the first primary, and in most instances, a year or more after six other candidates (with the exception of McGovern) had announced their candidacies. Through his campaign, he sought to create a norm that would

overcome the historic and current flaws in our democracy... put a floor under the neediest and most vulnerable ... and remove the artificial ceilings imposed... initiate the quest for a more just society and peaceful world, ... make the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act a national issue, ... to inspire hope in our young people and let them know that America can offer them more than unemployment, dope, jail, and the military ..., to change the present course of our nation, ... to help build a rainbow coalition of the rejection, ... to offer our nation a new leadership option, ... and to reach out and serve the people of this country and the world in a more humane and just manner (Jackson, 1983: 30).

He viewed his candidacy as "the opportunity to ... allow America and the world to see us at our best." His platform spelled out a Black agenda that would provide for an institutional policy conception (main-line functions) of social welfare needs rather than the prevailing residual model of meeting social welfare needs (safety net function) (Gilbert/Specht, 1974: 8). Emphasis was on social values of equality of results, not just
equality of opportunity; equity or our fair share; adequacy of programs rather than incremental changes.

William Raspberry, columnist with the Washington Post, viewed Jackson's entry into the primaries as a major challenge to the Democratic Party as well as to the media. He predicted that the media would launch a political and personal attack on Jackson as his candidacy became more serious. Raspberry labeled this approach "media opportunism" (Raspberry, 1983).

Strategic Conception of the Campaign

Goldenberg (1978: 24) describes four approaches to change and dimensions of social intervention: social technician, traditional social reformer, social interventionist, and social revolutionary. Jackson's campaign operated from a social interventionist model. He opposed existing elitist values, such as the sanctity of the profit motive, class differences and the unequal allocation of opportunity, goods, and power, and the consequences of those values on the lives most directly and adversely affected by the social practices which emanate from such values (Goldenberg, 1978: 24).

Within this model of change, conflict is viewed as inevitable. In fact, Jackson has never sought to avoid basic conflicts whether within the Civil Rights movement, with politicians, such as former Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, or the Black politicians who are more closely linked to the Democratic Party. The acceptance of conflict implies that those who possess power and have benefitted most from the exploitation of others, should not be expected to begin to share that power willingly or easily.

Jackson's campaign forced these issues out onto the open. He developed what some people called a "crusade" instead of a political organization. Yet, it was an organization that sought change for those that had been systematically denied access to goods, services and power. Towards this end, Jackson's campaign tried to promote collective community action through the synthesis of Black clergy, middle class Blacks (some with prior political experience), academics, and other interest groups under the umbrella called the Rainbow Coalition. Like most social interventionists, Jackson believed in the potential of the existing political system and hoped that in response to the appropriate
strategy the elite would surrender some of its power in order for
the system to survive. Elements of the advocate role and the or-
ganizer roles are evident in this model of change (Spergel, 1969).
The objective of the Jackson campaign was, therefore, power, in
order to control or influence, directly or indirectly, the condi-
tions under which his constituents lived (Goldberg, 1978: 59).

Jackson had been previously involved in the use of non-violent
strategies based on the examples of Mohandas Gandhi and Jackson's
mentor, Dr. Martin Luther King. While these strategies were also
power-coercive, they used civil disobedience to demonstrate the
injustice, unfairness, or cruelty of institutional racism. The
intent was to arouse the guilt of the oppressor in order to gain
sufficient leverage to force them to act more humanely. In the
South, this strategy was effective in getting state and local laws
changed to conform with the U.S. Constitution. This strategy,
however, had little impact in the North where de facto discrimi-
nation was the rule.

Direct intervention in the political system and the explicit
use of political power were, therefore, new tactics designed to
influence the means by which societal resources are allocated.
This tactic is based on the assumption that while elites dominate
the political process, there is still the potential for low power
groups to exploit existing socioeconomic cleavages (Dye, 1981:
365) and compel elites to engage in the process of negotiation
(Schatzki, 1981: 27).

Jackson's purpose was to gain sufficient leverage through the
mobilization of Blacks, poor whites, Hispanics, women and other
oppressed groups to vote in sufficient numbers in the primaries
and caucuses to demonstrate their latent political power as a
coalition. He hoped this demonstration would force elites to the
negotiating table where compromises could be worked out and a com-
mitment could be made by all parties.

Jackson was able to demonstrate his ability to get out Black
votes and to create enthusiasm within the Black community. People
ran for office, people registered to vote, the status quo was
challenged, and he became a credible candidate. The original
group of eight candidates became a group of three, significantly
increasing Jackson's leverage in the campaign.
Jackson's Accomplishments

Above all, Jackson was able to mobilize the Black community. All generations responded -- from the oldest to the youngest. Jackson appealed to all segments of the Black electorate, winning roughly 70-80% of the Black vote outside of the South, and up to 90% of the Black vote in the South. This had both a positive and negative effect because it raised Black hopes, while it simultaneously aroused white fears. Many Black mayors, such as Coleman Young, Andrew Young and Wilson Goode, viewed Jackson as a threat to their power bases. The mayor of Chicago, Harold Washington, took a neutral stand on his candidacy. Jackson's off the record remarks spurred Jews to attack him as "anti-Semitic," and his protege, Muslim Minister, Louis Farrakhan, became a "lightning rod" of controversy that began to erode his credibility and limit his ability to attract significant numbers of white voters. In fact, Jackson obtained only 10% of white votes during the primaries.

The controversy surrounding Jackson's campaign significantly benefitted political conservatives. Senator Jesse Helms sent out mailings to white voters in North Carolina and across the nation asking for their financial support to help to defeat his opponent, James Hunt, who, it was alleged, supported Jackson's "radical" positions. Helms raised millions of dollars and ultimately defeated his opponent. The Moral Majority mounted voter registration drives to register the "silent white majority" to defeat Jackson and the policies he pursued. These tactics demonstrated the latent racism which was endemic in the campaign once Jackson became the first serious Black candidate for President.

While Raspberry accurately predicted the media would engage in character assassination once Jackson began to deliver votes, free hostages, visit foreign countries, outshine his opponents during political debates, develop grassroots political organizations, win the D.C. and Virginia Primaries, and win the vote in numerous major cities across the country, it became necessary for the Democratic Party to cut him in or cut him out. Jackson had thus demonstrated the ability to mobilize one segment of the Democrats natural constituency -- poor and working class people.

The party needed to keep this group's allegiance to win the general election but sought to do so without unduly rewarding Jackson. The strategy which emerged was to give Jackson prime
time at the Convention, while denying him and his supporters leverage on major platform issues. In other words, the Democrats gave Jackson a symbolic victory but not the substantive change he demanded. The results are well-known: Jackson's plank on Civil Rights was "watered down" and passed at the convention, Black delegates failed to form a united front on the first ballot, and Mondale forces dominated the Convention.

During the remaining weeks of the campaign, Jackson let his constituents know he was not satisfied with the deal. Although he did not leave the Democratic Party, his support for the Mondale-Ferraro ticket was less than enthusiastic. This schism became more evident as Mondale played down the issues that Jackson had raised and appeared to ignore Black voters on the premise that they had no one else to vote for.

The major electoral result was that the number of Blacks who supported the Democratic ticket did not increase significantly. 90% of Black voters voted for Mondale, 9% for Reagan; Jackson supporters voted for Mondale 93% of the time, while 6% of those who voted for Jackson in the primaries voted for Reagan.

Conclusion

Despite this unhappy denouement, Jackson's campaign gained far more than it lost. He was able to create a sense of worth and pride all across the nation, particularly within the Black community. Old and young, poor, working poor, and middle class took pride in participating at many levels, often for the first time, and in helping Jackson to develop credibility as a national Black political leader.

Hodding Carter gave him credit for another achievement. He said that "his candidacy has helped to put race and things racial back in public view where they belong" (Thomas, 1985: 31). The differences and similarities between Blacks and Jews were also put back on the table for future negotiations.

A cadre of community organizers was trained during this campaign and learned how to raise community consciousness, get out the vote, and articulate the needs of the unrepresented constituencies. The Black underclass (Glasgow) is no longer invisible. The Rainbow Coalition has become a new interest group
with Jackson as its convenor and leader. He has outgrown his role in PUSH and is likely to remain on permanent sabbatical. He will join the pluralistic elements seeking to wield power and influence in the halls and smoke filled rooms of America. He has made the transition from the politics of guilt to the politics of power.

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PEER REINFORCEMENT FOR SOCIAL WORK TRAINING: AN EVALUATION

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ABSTRACT

Techniques for peer reinforcement of social work training programs appear to be a promising complement to educational supervision. The authors conducted a quasi-experimental evaluation of its effectiveness for reinforcing learning of interviewing skills. Subjects were income maintenance workers in a large state public welfare agency. Findings indicated that peer reinforcement may have resulted in knowledge retention and use of skills which were superior overall to those demonstrated among trainees denied access to peer reinforcement techniques. Interpretation of findings and productive areas for future research are suggested.

Even the best of continuing education is only as good as the vehicles available for implementation of learning and for reinforcement of skills acquired. When employees leave the classroom and return to the work environment, what can be done to assist them to retain and apply learning? Supervisors have commonly been viewed as a source of reinforcement. Kadushin (1976:130) has noted that "as a result of educational supervision the worker.... learns the difference between good and poor practice and has some criteria by which he can be self-critical." Other writers have similarly stressed the responsibility of the social work supervisor for the ongoing professional growth of the worker (Munson, 1983; Middleman and Rhodes, 1984).

The research was funded through a grant from the South Carolina Department of Social Services.
The fact that supervisors may lack total familiarity with content and methods used in continuing education programs attended by their workers often makes reinforcement activities difficult. In addition, theories of adult learning seem to suggest that peers, based upon their equal status and comparable work experiences, may be potentially as good as or even a better choice for the provision of learning reinforcement than the supervisor. Webster (1971) observed that:

Adult education is more like marriage than child rearing. Despite the parental inclination of teachers, continuing education is even more a mutual education process than is childhood education. Adults learn together and grow older together.

The need for ongoing evaluation that may exceed the time capacity of the supervisee often is stressed. In the process of offering constructive criticism for growth, the supervisor is expected to be involved in the time consuming activities of "offering an explanation in support of the criticism, making the criticism specific, offering clear alternatives that the supervisee might consider and making concrete recommendations for changes" (Kadushin 1976: 176). These activities fall within the scope of follow-up and reinforcement required for adult learning designed to "prevent erosion of the learning experience through the passage of time" (Ingalls 1973: 105). They might also be performed by a peer.

Given the constraints of the supervisory role, those persons most likely to reinforce (or to extinguish) learning are those who have regular formal and informal contact with the employee, her/his peers. The concept of systematic and planned reinforcement for learning by peers is an extremely logical and promising complement to supervisory reinforcement. But can it be demonstrated that peer reinforcement can help a worker to apply learning?

During 1984, the authors designed and implemented a program of peer reinforcement and conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its effectiveness. The results of the research provided
a qualified endorsement of the concept and suggest certain areas where it may be especially beneficial.

Background of the Research

Peer Reinforcement for Continuing Education (PRCE) has been employed at the state Department of Social Services on an informal basis for several years. Social workers have been encouraged to rely on their peers for reinforcement of learning, a phenomenon that has arisen out of both choice and necessity in many social service agencies in recent years as personnel and funding cuts have been absorbed. However, until 1984, no systematic efforts to promote peer learning were implemented.

PRCE was operationally defined as "a system of regular written and verbal critiques of some easily measurable aspect of a worker's performance conducted reciprocally by two peers who had simultaneously undergone the same course of continuing education."

It was decided that existing training in the use of interviewing skills would lend itself to application of a PRCE program. It was concluded that at least a quarter week period of PRCE should be used in order to have reasonable expectations that positive effects could be demonstrated. A clearly identified training component, emphasizing seven discrete interviewing skills was already a part of the "Integrated Casework Skills" training of all new workers. A quasi-experimental research design was employed. It sought answers to three research questions:

1. Do persons who are involved in PRCE activities subsequent to classroom training reflect a different level of retention of classroom knowledge of interviewing from those who are not involved in PRCE?
2. Do persons who are involved in PRCE activities reflect a different level of interviewing skill?
3. Does a comparison of PRCE participants with persons not involved in PRCE provide justification for the regular use of the approach for learning reinforcement among income maintenance workers?
The researchers hypothesized that workers who participate in the PRCE approach would have expanded learning opportunities. They would, therefore, be found to possess greater retention of classroom knowledge and more effective and more appropriate use of interviewing skills than those who did not use the PRCE. In short, they would be more competent workers following participation in the PRCE approach than their non-participating classmates. The hypothesis was based in part on the contention of Bishop (1976: 15) that:

for competency to exist, there must be not only the opportunity to observe, to practice, to experiment, to prepare, to transact, and to evaluate, but also a situation to receive prompt feedback and reinforcement regarding style and effectiveness followed by the opportunity to try again.

Summary of the Methodology

Forty-three new financial assistance workers were scheduled for a six day course of "Integrated Casework Skills" training during the February, 1984 cycle. The new workers had been recently employed in 23 county offices scattered throughout the state. Within the potential subject pool, eight pairs of workers (i.e., 16 persons, each of whom attended training with a peer from their own office) were identified. They constituted the experimental group. Sixteen others were selected at random from among those who did not have a peer from their office attending training with them and, therefore, were denied the planned, structured PRCE experience. They comprised the control group for the research.

Members of both groups completed all phases of training along with other trainees who were not selected for either group. As part of their general orientation, all trainees were told that research of an undisclosed nature was being conducted, and that they might be asked to participate in follow-up evaluation subsequent to training completion.

Following the last training component (a post-test of knowledge designed to measure learning
acquired during training) all but the sixteen members of the experimental group were dismissed. Experimental group members were then given an additional 45 minute orientation session during which they were informed that they were selected for use of the PRCE technique, and that certain activities would be required of them on a weekly basis over the next few months. All were given the opportunity to decline participation, but none elected the opportunity.

The broad concept of the PRCE was explained to group members. They were told that, with previously obtained supervisory concurrence and support, they would be observing one certification or recertification interview of their peer partner per week for ten weeks. They were to evaluate each interview using a Likert-type scale that had been developed. The evaluation instrument addressed both the appropriateness and the skill with which the various interviewing techniques had been employed. The workers were to discuss their evaluation with their partner immediately subsequent to the interview, recommending ways in which her/his interviewing skills might have been improved. Accumulated evaluations were to be mailed to the researchers after five weeks and after the tenth week using stamped, self-addressed envelopes that were provided. Workers were assured that evaluations would not be made available to supervisors, and could in no way constitute a part of performance evaluations.

The PRCE approach was begun the week following training. After five weeks of participation, all 80 evaluation forms were returned; 80 more were mailed back to the researchers after the tenth week.

At the completion of the ten week period, additional evaluation components were implemented with the assistance of both experimental and control group case supervisors. Members of both groups were asked to complete a written examination consisting of the interviewing content items drawn from the training post-test. The examination was administered by their respective supervisors and returned to the researchers. In addition, all 32 participants (experimental and control) were requested to select an initial certification or recertification inter-
view at random, to audio-tape it, and to mail the tape directly to the researchers.

Scoring of written examinations was completed by the researchers. The tapes were independently evaluated by three judges using a slightly modified version of the Likert-type scale that had been employed by the experimental group members. The judges were (1) a trainer who had helped teach the interviewing skills component of the training, (2) a second year social work graduate student not employed by the agency who had reviewed videotape and written lesson materials from the training and (3) one of the researchers, a social work professor, who had also reviewed the training materials. Interviews were case numbered by the other researcher; none of the judges knew to which group a worker had been assigned. After all interviews were evaluated, respondents were identified as having been in either the experimental or control group. Comparative data analysis was performed.

All sixteen experimental group members conducted all peer evaluation critiques over the initial ten week period, but three of the sixteen refused to complete the final evaluation phase consisting of the written examination and submission of the audio-taped interview. Review of the peer evaluations of these three subjects submitted after the fifth and tenth weeks revealed that all three had fallen within the middle range of their group; i.e., they had been neither among the best or the worst as judged by their peers.

Fourteen of the original sixteen control group members (those not undergoing weekly PRCE) completed the final evaluation phase. Data analysis compared the indicators of interviewing knowledge and skill of these fourteen control group subjects with those of the thirteen experimental group members who provided completed data.

With a relatively small number of subjects within the two groups and the logistical impossibility of using total randomization in assignment to the groups (the experimental group members were chosen because of the availability of a peer undergoing the same training), the question of beginning comparability needed to be addressed. Specifically,
How comparable were the members of the two groups in regard to knowledge of interviewing skills immediately following training? Analysis of the interviewing subscale of the training post-test revealed that the experimental group had a median score of 21 of a possible 24 correct answers (87.5%) while the median score for the control group was also 21. The two groups were, therefore regarded as comparable in their knowledge of interviewing skills at the time of the completion of the training. Unfortunately, no indicator of competence in use of interviewing skills was available to ascertain comparability in this important area.

Changes in the Experimental Group

If improvement in use of interviewing skills (or, at least retention of skills) occurs as a result of the PRCE approach, this desirable phenomenon should be demonstrable by longitudinal analysis as well as by analysis of outcome data. Peer evaluations of interviews conducted during the five weeks immediately after training (February and March) were compared with later evaluations of those conducted during the subsequent five weeks (April and early May) for each worker in the experimental group.

Group median scores were computed for each skill and comparative analysis was performed. (T₁ with T₂) Because of the presumed lack of precision of the newly-developed data collection instrument, the data were treated as ordinal level and only the direction of change (rather than the amount of change) was used for analysis. Among the 18 skill categories, seven reflected an improvement in skills and eight were unchanged, while three reflected a decline.
Changes in Interviewing Skill Among Experimental Group Members: $T_1$ and $T_2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Direction</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Appropriateness</td>
<td></td>
<td>(median)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Nonverbal attending</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Open/closed questions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Reflection</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Information sharing</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Encouragement</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Directions</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Self-disclosure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Immediacy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>(median)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nonverbal attending</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Open/closed questions</td>
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<td>3. Reflection</td>
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<td>6. Directions</td>
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<td>7. Self-disclosure</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Immediacy</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Handling of special problems</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Integration of skills</td>
<td>N/C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$p = .046$ (direction predicted)

The conventional .05 level of significance had been preselected for use. Analysis revealed that the overall improvement was statistically significant (sign test) when the frequency of the desired "improvement" or "no change" was compared with the undesirable "decline" in use of skills. Workers in the experimental group were apparently using interviewing skills as well or, usually, better during the latter five week period than during the five week period just subsequent to training. (When the data are broken down and the appropriateness and effectiveness subscales are examined separately, however, the improvement reflected in either subscale is not statistically significant: ($p =$ .06)
It is probably safe to conclude that, as a group, at least little decline in skills occurred among the experimental group, and indications of a tendency toward overall retention and improvement can be documented. Many questions, necessarily, remained. Did the desired result occur because of factors such as improvement in self confidence, increased on-the-job experience or good line supervision? Or, was the PRCE the explanation? Did workers not exposed to PRCE experience a similar overall retention or growth in use of skills?

**Principal Findings**

Comparative outcome data from the experimental and control groups provides a more conclusive answer to the research question. Knowledge of interviewing skills may best be reflected in results of the written test consisting of the same interviewing items that had earlier been used to access the comparability of the two groups. Application of knowledge, use of the skills themselves, is probably better reflected in the judges' evaluations of the taped interviews that had been conducted by the workers.

The results of the written examination for the 27 subjects (13 experimental and 14 control) who completed it ranged from a high of 23 correct to a low of 12 (24 multiple choice items). Test scores were rank ordered, and the Mann-Whitney "U" test was employed to compare the rankings of the experimental group members with those of the control group.

A readily noticeable number of the lower scores were achieved by members of the control group. Five of the six lowest scores (including the two lowest) and eight of the eleven lowest scores were achieved by workers who did not participate in PRCE. Statistical analysis revealed that, as a group, the experimental group reflected a statistically significant higher performance on the test \((p<.05, \text{corrected for ties, direction predicted})\) than did members of the control group.

Evaluations of audio tapes were employed in order to determine whether those workers who parti-
icipated in PRCE (experimental group) might reflect more appropriate and more effective use of interviewing skills than did workers in the control group. After consideration of several ways in which to address the problem of a single very high or very low score if scores were simply averaged, it was decided to score each interview by: (1) using the two judges' scores that reflected the best agreement, discarding the most deviant score (2) taking the average of the two remaining scores. This process resulted in an almost identical number of scores being discarded for each of the three judges (i.e., scores of no one judge were consistently rejected). Worker evaluation scores thus achieved were compiled and analyzed separately for each of the two evaluation subscales (appropriateness and effectiveness). For both subscales, all 27 scores were rank ordered and analyzed using the Mann-Whitney "U".

In the area of appropriateness of use of interviewing skills, those subjects in the experimental group who had undergone PRCE were rated higher as a group than those who were in the control group. They had an average score of 2.88 on a four point scale versus an average of 2.57 for the control group. They had seven of the top ten scores and only three of the bottom nine. Yet statistical significance was not achieved using the Mann-Whitney "U" (p=<.10, corrected for ties, direction predicted). There was judged to be insufficient proof that the members of the experimental group used interviewing skills more appropriately than did members of the control group.

In the area of effectiveness of use of interviewing skills, a similar but statistically significant pattern was observed. The experimental group achieved an average score of 2.85 versus 2.35 for the control group. Seven of the top ten scores were achieved by the experimental group members; seven of the ten lowest scores came from members of the control group. The difference was statistically significant (p=＜.05, corrected for ties, direction predicted).
Conclusions and Recommendations

The results of the research provided what might best be described as a qualified endorsement of PRCE as a method of support to reinforce worker training in the use of interviewing skills. The analysis of data revealed that workers who participated in PRCE:

1. showed a pattern of improvement or at least lack of decline in both appropriate and effective use of skills following training.
2. scored significantly higher than the control group on the written test of interviewing skills administered approximately four months post training.
3. scored significantly higher in effective use of skills as judged by outside reviewers.
4. scored somewhat higher overall in appropriate use of skills, but the difference did not achieve statistical significance as judged by outside reviewers.

Why did the experimental group members perform better on the written test and on the effectiveness subscale, but the difference between their performance and those of control group members on the appropriateness subscale was not statistically significant? Several explanations for this inconsistency can be proposed:

1. The peer training method may be more effective for knowledge retention and growth than for broad-based application of the knowledge.
2. A single, taped new eligibility determination or recertification interview may not provide adequate opportunity for appropriate use of interviewing skills, i.e., experimental group members might have demonstrated more appropriate use of
the skills if the opportunities had presented themselves.

3. The nature of the requirements of the income maintenance worker's job may be such that appropriate use of the interviewing skills may not always be a requirement. It may be unrealistic to expect a significant difference in the two groups to emerge because the skills may be only occasionally needed by any worker to conduct the interview.

The impression of the researchers is that some combination of the second and third explanations may provide the best interpretation of the findings. All reviewers of the tapes noted that there were a relatively large number of instances where there was no opportunity to appropriately use a given skill. Appropriate chances to employ, e.g., self disclosure or immediacy, or to handle a special problem were in evidence in only a small percentage of interviews. In addition, many workers in both of the groups tended to follow the form to be completed quite rigidly, reading many of the questions to be asked. They got the job done, did nothing especially poorly, but also tended not to risk using some of the more creative and, perhaps, unnecessary (for the given case) skills that they had been taught. This practice may have tended to minimize skill and knowledge differences.

There was sufficient evidence to indicate that the PRCE approach may have good potential; it should certainly not be dismissed prematurely as ineffective. But, how might future research better determine if it truly accomplishes its objectives? A desirable follow up study would be one that might employ essentially the same design and instrument, but would also employ randomization or planned group assignment to insure interviewing skill comparability of the two groups prior to introduction of the PRCE method. In addition, the research would either:

1. replicate the research using human service workers or workers in another
more treatment oriented agency where traditional social work interviewing skills are required more frequently for job performance or,

2. replicate the research with a similar cohort of workers, but use at least three taped interviews to be evaluated by the reviewers. In the course of the additional interviews, there would be increased opportunity for both experimental and control group members to use desired interviewing skills.

It might also be productive to continue to follow the experimental group subjects of the current research or to conduct longer range research on the PRCE approach to see if informal reinforcement continues after there are no longer any formal requirements for its use. Does a productive peer relationship, once established, continue to serve to stimulate professional growth?

The PRCE approach appears to have promise. It is conceptually sound and, in one short-term evaluation, has been given a tentative endorsement by empirical research. It may be a valuable response to the problem of a lack of skill retention and application following the completion of training and other forms of continuing education.

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REVIVAL OF WELFARE REFORM*

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ABSTRACT

It is a well known fact that poverty is prevalent among single mothers and children. Currently, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program fails to provide for all children and single mothers in need of public assistance. Previous attempts to "reform" the welfare system have been unsuccessful. However, in the time when the poor's right for social welfare is increasingly threatened, ideas for welfare reform need to be revived. The author advocates for a three-dimensional agenda for welfare reform: universal assistance to families with children, reinforced support for children with absent parents, and targeted employment programs for single mothers.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 85th Annual Conference of the Missouri Association for Social Welfare, Columbia, Missouri, October 23-25, 1985.

+ The author is a Ph. D. candidate at the Washington University in St. Louis.
Recent statistics show that a significant proportion of children live with one parent only. According to the March 1984 Current Population Survey, 26 percent of all families with children under 18 were maintained by one parent (U.S. Department of Commerce (a), 1985:1). In 1984, the proportion of children living with one parent was more than 50 percent for blacks and nearly 20 percent for whites. In the same year, about 90 percent of all children in one-parent families lived with their mothers only (U.S. Department of Commerce (b), 1985:18).

One of the most compelling social welfare issues in recent years is the high incidence of poverty among women and children, which is epitomized by families headed by single mothers. In 1984, families maintained by women with no husband had a median income of approximately $13,000 whereas the median income of married-couple families was approximately $30,000. Consequently, in 1984, 34.5 percent of female-headed families lived in poverty, while about 7 percent of married-couple families fell below the poverty level (U.S. Department of Commerce (c), 1985:2-3). Since a considerable proportion of children live with mothers only, children are more likely than any other age group to be living in poverty. For example, in 1983, nearly one out of four preschool children lived in poverty (Moynihan, 1985:10). Moreover, it is projected that more than 60 percent of preschool children in female-headed families will be living in poverty in 1990 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1984:7).

Considering the high incidence of poverty among female-headed families, it is not surprising that the welfare receipt rate among them is also high. In 1978, about 60
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, the problems with the current Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program are scrutinized. Second, the past approaches toward welfare reform are briefly reviewed. Third, a three-dimensional approach toward welfare reform is discussed.

In suggesting alternative income maintenance policies for children and single-parent families this paper intends to provide rationales for bringing about such policy changes. However, to delineate program costs for establishing a new welfare system goes beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, issues such as tax reform are not discussed. The goal of this paper is simply to facilitate further discussion by renewing life in progressive welfare reform issues.

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE AFDC PROGRAM

Among publicly funded welfare programs, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program has played a crucial role in providing for mainly low income single mothers and their children. Currently, as one of the largest income-tested welfare programs in the United States, the total AFDC payment amounts to approximately $14.4 billion per year, providing for about 3.7 million families (Ross, 1985:9). Since the inception of the AFDC program in 1935, many incremental changes have been made in the program. Looking back on its 50 year history, however, it is now time to make a fundamental advance beyond the limitation in the current AFDC program to fully achieve its
ultimate goal of strengthening family life. There are many problems with the current AFDC program:

- Poor families with unemployed fathers are not eligible for AFDC benefits in 25 states. Due to the inequity of the AFDC program, two-parent families with no other income do not have access to AFDC benefits, even if they are in poverty as a result of unstable employment.

- The disparity of the AFDC program is found in the payment levels which vary by states. In the absence of a nationally uniform benefit level, as of 1982, the amount of the average AFDC monthly payment provided by the most generous state was more than six times the amount paid by the least generous state (U.S. House of Representatives, 1983:52).

- AFDC benefits are less than adequate in meeting the need of AFDC recipient families. The federal government does not require that states pay the full amount of the minimum living expense as designated by each state. As a result, the median maximum AFDC benefit among states is about half the poverty standard. The value of AFDC benefits even when it is combined with food stamps remains below the poverty level in all states except Alaska (The Center for the Study of Social Policy, 1984:15).

- Income-tested welfare programs such as AFDC have produced an intrinsic dilemma by creating work disincentive effects. The dilemma is that welfare recipients' work incentives are influenced by implicit tax rates levied on their earnings, that is benefit reduction rates. Often, welfare recipients' earnings create a "notch" problem -- earnings reach a point at which the eligibility for welfare is terminated and welfare benefits fall by more than the amount...
of the additional earnings. With high implicit tax rates which may go over 100 percent, when the loss of in-kind benefits is considered, "the current system of income transfers penalizes the poor for working" (Smeeding and Garfinkel, 1980:43).

. The current welfare system fails to provide for the working poor. In 1980, about one-half of all poor family heads worked but were in poverty due to low earnings (Levitan and Johnson, 1982:53). The economic "hardship" of the working poor is likely to be faced most frequently by women, minorities, and other low income workers (Taggart, 1982:264). Thus, an income transfer program such as AFDC which ignores the need of the working poor cannot be an efficient program for solving the problem of poverty, particularly among female-headed families.

. AFDC recipients are not free from the stigma of receiving public assistance. The existence of the stigma of welfare recipiency is confirmed by stereotyping of welfare recipients as well as by case studies, survey data, and other resources (Allen, 1982:48; Garfinkel, 1982:496-497; Moffitt, 1983:1030-34). According to a survey study, the degree of stigma attached to General Relief and AFDC programs is the greatest, when compared with other income maintenance programs (as quoted in Pettigrew, 1980:223).

. The AFDC program is inefficiently administered due to its complex procedure of income-testing. In particular, it should be noted that an inefficient duplication of income-testing often takes place in processing separate applications for AFDC benefits and Food Stamps, while 80 percent of AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps (General Accounting Office, 1984:v).
These problems in the AFDC program are traced to the structure of the American welfare system. In 1981, about 45 percent of federal expenditures was used for the income transfer system in the United States. About $300 billion were used for over 40 separate income maintenance programs, amounting to about 10 percent of the GNP in 1981. However, most of the expenditures for income maintenance were used for social insurance programs, leaving about $76 billion for welfare programs (Garfinkel and Haveman, 1983:479-481). Unlike in most industrialized countries, the United States lacks an equality-enhancing welfare system which provides minimum guarantees such as family allowances or national health services.

Due to the structure of her welfare system, the United States is not considered to be a welfare state, nor a social security state, but a "positive state" aiming "primarily at insuring economic stability and thus the self-interest of existing property holders" (as quoted in Mishra, 1984:156). The social security state is defined to be the one aiming at a guaranteed national minimum income like Britain, and the social welfare state the one furthering greater social and economic equality like Sweden. The United States is, at best, a reluctant welfare state, because it does not follow the "principles" of the welfare state: guaranteed basic economic security, distributive justice and equality, and most of all, social solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1982:36). In the absence of nationally guaranteed programs, the American welfare programs have lacked systematic planning, resulting in a series of piece-meal measures. Categorical welfare programs have been incremented in response to economic distress and social crisis (Piven and Cloward, 1971: Hareven, 1974:69-70). In
short, the AFDC program is a typical example of categorical welfare programs with problems of inequity, disparity, inadequacy, work disincentive effects, inefficiency, stigma effects, and complexity.

BILATERAL APPROACHES TOWARD WELFARE REFORM

Policy proposals aiming to correct problems of welfare programs are broadly categorized into two groups: an overhaul of the welfare system and an incremental improvement of existing programs. In the past, neither approach toward welfare reform has been successful. For example, the Family Allowances Act proposed in 1967 aimed at an overhaul of the welfare system by taking an universalistic approach toward welfare reform. The proposal intended to cover all children under 18 in all families, regardless of family income levels or the family structure. It was to be administered by the federal government and financed from general tax revenues (Vadakin, 1968:184-189).

The failure of the proposed Family Allowances Act led to a compromised welfare reform proposal which abandoned the coverage of all children. The Family Assistance Plan (FAP) proposed in 1969 by President Nixon was to provide nationally financed income support to all low income families with children. The goals of the FAP were 1) to alleviate poverty among all poor families with children, 2) to reduce work disincentive effects of income-tested programs, and 3) to encourage family stability by providing for all poor families. However, it was foreseen that work disincentive effects could not be reduced because the FAP relied on income-testing to limit the eligibility to poor families. Thus, the fear of work
disincentive effects defeated the FAP (Lynn, 1977:106-109; Ozawa, 1982:100-103).

In order to produce a politically workable welfare reform proposal, the Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) proposed in 1977 by President Carter combined the provision of income assistance with work requirements. The major features of the PBJI were 1) to create public service jobs, 2) consolidate AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamp programs to provide single cash payments, and 3) to supplement low earnings (Betson, et al., 1980:166). However, despite its emphasis on the work requirement, the PBJI was not enacted due to congressional concern with the budgetary costs.

Although unsuccessful, the above welfare reform proposals were based on the belief that the federal government's intervention should be expanded to deal with social problems. Contrary to the past administrations, the Reagan administration introduced the "New Federalism" in order to minimize the federal government's involvement in social policy. In Glazer's words, "the originality of the administration lay in its conviction that the way to wealth and national income growth, and out of poverty for the poor, could not be designed by government, or implemented by programs keyed to specific problems" (Glazer, 1984:97).

With this conviction, the administration's plans for cutting federal budgets targeted mainly entitlement programs. By definition, the entitlement programs are supposed to be "uncontrollable" because everyone who is eligible for an entitlement program has a "legally enforceable right to the benefits" (Congressional Quarterly Inc.(a), 1982:193). Nevertheless, the Reagan administration managed to control the entitlement programs by changing the laws
through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA). The federal government's ax for cutting the budgets for social programs fell most heavily on the entitlement programs designed for the poor who are politically the least powerful.

The goals of the OBRA were to have more AFDC recipient mothers work, promoting their self-sufficiency and thereby serving the truly needy only. However, from the beginning, the OBRA's goal of promoting self-sufficiency was hampered by its failure to provide work incentives. It was apparent that the ultimate goal of the OBRA was to save AFDC costs by limiting the eligibility and by reducing AFDC benefit levels. A visible outcome of the OBRA changes was the savings in AFDC costs, which were achieved at the expense of AFDC recipient families that lost eligibility or some benefits. The worsened hardship of affected families was reflected in the fact that they had to borrow money or get food from charity organizations frequently (Social Legislation Information Service, 1984:130-131). Ironically, the families affected by the OBRA changes became economically worse-off as they increased work efforts.

In summary, the past administrations' attempts for welfare reform -- either progressive or regressive -- have not resulted in structural changes in the welfare system, nor provided work incentives for welfare recipients. To make things worse, under the Reagan administration, the direction for the advance of the welfare system has been completely reversed. Through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the most recent changes made to the AFDC programs intended to alleviate work disincentive effects of the OBRA. However, the current
AFDC program remains essentially the same in terms of its structural problems.

REVIVAL OF PROGRESSIVE WELFARE REFORM NEEDED

At the beginning of the Reagan administration, Albrecht solemnly declared that demands for (progressive) welfare reform are futile because "welfare reform is dead politically" (Albrecht, 1982:15). On the contrary, despite the conservative tilt of the country, Turem advocated for welfare reform proposals out of his conviction that "the time has come for a discussion of program alternatives apart from ideology and budget" (Turem, 1982:29). More recently, however, regressive perspectives on welfare reform became conspicuous as a result of Charles Murray's (1984) well-publicized book, "Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980". Despite its methodological and interpretational flaws, his book produced bitterly regressive policy implications: retrenchment or elimination of major welfare programs. In attacking the ineffectiveness of the current American welfare system in a politically appealing manner, Charles Murray has argued that the poor became worse-off as a result of pro-poor programs. Although he has made a flawed underestimation of the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs, he effectively described the difficulties in curing poverty under the current welfare system.

On the other hand, given the weaknesses and the problems in the current welfare system, a progressive formula for curing poverty can be prescribed: advance and/or expansion of the welfare system. For example, the U.S. Catholic bishops call for national economic planning for improving distributional justice, income security, and
employment opportunities for women and minority. They claim that a substantial reduction in poverty and inequality requires fundamental changes in social and economic structures. The bishops' specific recommendations include "reforms in the tax system" to reduce the burden on the poor as well as "a thorough reform of the nation's welfare and income-support programs" to protect children and families (Ad Hoc Committee in Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 1985:11).

With the viewpoint that fundamental not incremental changes are essential, a three-dimensional agenda for welfare reform and its rationales are discussed in this paper. The author's advocacy for a reinforced investment in the welfare system is based on the fact that past anti-poverty programs have worked, but not sufficiently nor perfectly. The following policy proposals are based on three principles: 1) all children have the inborn right to be protected against material deprivation, 2) all parents should meet their parental responsibility to provide for their dependent children, and 3) socioeconomic disadvantages faced by single mothers striving for economic independence need to be reduced through targeted employment programs.

Dimension 1: Universal Assistance to Families with Children

An overhaul of the income maintenance system involves the incorporation of universalism into the welfare system. The principle of universalism is to provide non-income-tested uniform benefits to certain categories of persons identified only by demographic characteristics like age. Universal payments to custodial parents aim to cover all children under a certain age, as
shown in the proposal of 1967 Family Allowances Act. There are many rationales for advocating the provision of children's allowances:

. It should be noted that, in 1981, only about 11 percent of all children received some AFDC benefits, while about 20 percent of all children lived in poverty (U.S. House of Representatives, 1983:17-18). The current AFDC program fails to save children from poverty not only because of the program's limited coverage, but also because of its inadequate benefit levels.

. The current labor market structure fails to compensate according to family income needs, because wages are not based on the family size, but on productivity. As primary victims of this labor market structure, children in large families often face the great risk of living in poverty. Thus, children's allowances need to be provided as a way of supplementing the insufficient wages of parents.

. Children's allowances will redistribute income from childless families to families with children and from better-off to poorer families. In fact, the current income maintenance system has benefited the aged more than young children. The aged who constitute about 20 percent of all households receive over 50 percent of the total income transferred through the income maintenance system. On the other hand, the households with children constituting about 40 percent of all households receive only about 23 percent of all transferred incomes. Indeed, the income maintenance system reflects the "pro-aged tilt" (Danziger, 1981:4). The fact that children are distinctly worse off than adults can no longer be ignored.

. It is believed that to invest for securing productive future generation through
children's allowances is in society's self-interest (Segalman and Basu, 1981:202; Watts, et al., 1982:407). Because the opportunities for children of low income families to fully develop potential abilities are limited by the socioeconomic status of their parents, it is necessary to provide socially-affordable children's allowances to promote equal opportunities for children.

. It should not be overlooked that the AFDC program has the divisiveness of income-testing. To raise children under a stigmatizing income support program is viewed to be harmful to society's solidarity (Titmuss, 1971:238; Rotherham, 1981:360; Garfinkel, 1978:187-188).

. Under a universal provision of children's allowances, the working poor will not be penalized by implicit tax rates which are much higher than explicit tax rates levied on the non-poor.

. Children's allowances are advantageous in maintaining a neutrality of public policy, minimizing governmental influences or control over individual family life by paying uniform benefits.

Despite these various advantages, welfare reform proposals based on universalism have often been criticized under the assumption that social welfare budgets are fixed. Usually, the opposition to universalistic approaches toward welfare reform falls on the financial burden of providing for all, including the non-poor. It is criticized that advocating for a guaranteed income has "an almost wistful, childlike appeal -- the desire to be free from the constraints of reality ..." (Anderson, 1978:75). However, it should be noted that, despite the growing federal deficit, defense spending swelled from $136 billion in 1980 to $230 billion in 1984
(American Public Welfare Association, 1985:8). Thus, continued efforts should be made to challenge the assumption of a fixed budget available for social welfare programs. To increase funds to meet the needs of children and families should have a higher priority in the decision-making process of allocating federal budgets.

**Dimension 2: Reinforced Support for Children with Absent Parents**

The goal of the Child Support Enforcement Program initially enacted in 1975 is to collect child support payments from absent parents in order to compensate for AFDC costs. However, the child support program has been ineffective to protect children with absent parents in many aspects. First, only about 60 percent of single mothers whose children have an absent father have legal child support agreements (Sorensen and MacDonald, 1982:59). Also, less than a half of all children awarded child support receive the full amount due, and about 30 percent receive no payment at all (Garfinkel and Uhr, 1984:114-115). Second, the amount of collected child support is not adequate to save all children with absent parents from poverty. For instance, in 1978, 14 percent of families that received the full amount of court-ordered child support still lived in poverty (Sorensen and MacDonald, 1982:65). In addition, there exists inequity in the current system because the amounts of child support awarded vary according to the attitudes of the professionals involved in the court decision (Garfinkel and Uhr, 1984:115).

Recent policy proposals for correcting these problems center around a social child support system which resembles the Swedish
Social child support system providing for children with absent parents (Oellerich and Garfinkel, 1983; Danziger et al., 1979; Smeeding and Garfinkel, 1980; Garfinkel and Uhr, 1984; Garfinkel, 1982; Garfinkel and Sorensen, 1982). The contents of the social child support system as elucidated by its advocates are as follows:

. It assures that all absent parents pay child support taxes to share income with their children. All absent parents should pay an equitable proportion of income varying only by the number of children to be supported. In this way, the parents' responsibility for supporting their children will be sustained no matter how the family structure changes.

. An adequate amount of child support should be guaranteed in order to protect all children with absent parents. If absent parents fail to pay, at least, the minimally guaranteed amount of child support, the government should supplement inadequate child support from the general revenues. Thus, the basic income need of all children will be met even if their absent parents earn a low income, are unemployed, or are sick.

. The AFDC program will be eliminated, thus saving its costs. Since the social child support system will not involve income-testing, it will be administered more efficiently than the AFDC program, reducing stigma effects on the beneficiaries.

. Collecting child support from absent fathers should be carried out effectively through an income withholding system. Employers should be required to withhold a portion of the income of employees liable for child support taxes.

. Most of all, since the amount of child support is not based on the income of custodial parents, work disincentive effects
will not be created by the child support system. The custodial parents will not be subject to higher tax rates in relation to the receipt of social child support, as AFDC recipient parents have been.

Overall, the social child support system is believed to be an efficient policy instrument for reducing the income inequality between female-headed families and two-parent families. Also, the idea of the social child support system appears to be particularly promising in terms of its political feasibility and effectiveness.  

Dimension 3: Targeted Employment Programs for Single Mothers

It has often been maintained that welfare problems must be solved in the context of the labor market problems because poverty and welfare dependence are largely the results of the inadequate structure of the labor market (Gordon, 1972:7; Glazer, 1975; Saks, 1975:103; Galper, 1975:29). The labor market-focused approach for welfare reform relates to both micro and macro economic policies. Microeconomic policies to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor attempt to raise the earnings of the poor by intervening in both the supply side and the demand side of the labor market through training, public employment, and wage subsidy programs. Macroeconomic policies toward full employment are also helpful in reducing the income gap (Cain, 1984:30-31).

From the viewpoint that the intervention in the labor market should be an important agenda for welfare reform, many consider targeted employment programs to be particularly advantageous for welfare recipients to increase incomes by combining earnings and welfare benefits (Danziger and
The primary rationale for providing employment programs specifically designed for single mothers lies in the fact that single mothers are the most disadvantaged workers. Single mothers generally earn low wages compared with male/father providers, in large part, due to sex discrimination and/or occupational segregation in the labor market (Watts, et al., 1982:407-408).

Because the employability of mothers with children is associated with diverse factors such as work experience, educational background, job skills, demand for labor, child care task, and so on, employment programs for single mothers should provide multi-faceted services. In the past, comprehensive employment programs such as the Work Incentive (WIN) program aimed to improve the employability of welfare recipient mothers by providing training, child care, and other services. However, the Reagan administration has shifted from the work incentive approach to the mandatory work requirement approach out of "ideological and fiscal concerns" (Kuttner and Freeman, 1982:18). Since mandatory workfare programs such as Community Work Experience programs cannot lead the participants to better jobs, the current policy should be replaced with a more progressive employment policy aimed at leading low income women to better jobs by improving job skills.

In addition to training/education services, it is particularly important to provide employer subsidies for single mothers. For example, the current Targeted Jobs Credit Program should be made more effective in terms of encouraging employers to hire low income mothers. At the same time, the child care constraint cannot be
ignored in helping mothers transfer from welfare to stable employment.

To summarize, to reduce the earning gap between female heads and male heads is the ultimate goal of targeted employment programs for single mothers. Targeted employment programs for single mothers should deal with both the supply side and the demand side through training/education and employment subsidies. In particular, child care constraints need to be removed through direct child care subsidies. The danger of providing insufficiently-funded employment programs, as has been the case under the Reagan administration, leads single mothers, at best, to dead-end jobs, confining them in prolonged poverty and dependence on public assistance. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that future employment-oriented programs should be sufficiently funded to provide quality services.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, three policy goals have been advocated: basic guaranteed income for all children, reinforcement of child support for children with absent parents, and improvement of employment opportunities for disadvantaged women. It should be noted that both children's allowances and minimum guarantees for children with absent parents resolve the problem of work disincentive effects on custodial parents. At the same time, when children have access to a universal grant as a right and absent fathers meet their parental duties, single mothers with young children will be less frequently forced to sacrifice child care duties for economic reasons. Mothers should be allowed to make the optimal choice between home and work so that their children's need for
maternal care will not be neglected. For this purpose, the above three-dimensional policy proposal needs to be implemented concurrently to make a substantial improvement in both the material and non-material well-being of children and their families.

While the provision of employment-oriented programs for disadvantaged individuals has been diminishingly funded in the past, the proposals for providing a guaranteed income for children have hardly been implemented mainly due to budgetary concerns. Although financial constraints are not likely to be easily overcome in the near future, it cannot be overemphasized that future approaches toward welfare reform should be integrated with the long-term movement toward the welfare state. In the absence of a tradition of social solidarity, advance toward the welfare state is likely to be a painfully slow process. Nevertheless, it is time to resurrect the ideas for progressive welfare reform.

Notes

1. For example, in 1983, about 46 percent of female-headed families with children in school received school lunch benefits (U.S. Department of Commerce (d), 1985:2).

2. The sheer complexity of the current welfare system was effectively documented by Tom Joe and Lorna Potter who examined income-testing procedures for a typical AFDC working mother for a 4-year period. Describing administrative complexity, the authors evaluated that the 1981 policy changes further complicated an already complex welfare system (Joe and Potter, 1985:12).
3. According to a 1983 Brookings study, the reductions achieved by the OBRA, imposed on the budget of 1982, was $27.1 billion, while Ellwood reported an estimated cut of $35.2 billion in outlays (as quoted in Glazer, 1984:79). The budget reductions were made disproportionately in income maintenance programs, with heavier cuts in public assistance. According to an estimate of outlays savings in 1984 arising from the 1981 OBRA, almost 60 percent of reductions occurred in pro-poor programs, while these account for only 18 percent of income maintenance outlays. The expected savings as a percentage of baseline amount for each program is 1.6 percent for OASDI, 16.3 percent for AFDC, 18.6 percent for Food Stamps, and 34.5 percent for low income energy assistance (as quoted in Glazer, 1984:96).

4. Initial studies of the effects of the 1981 policy changes failed to provide empirical evidence that the OBRA changes caused a reduction in the labor supply of working AFDC recipients (Moffitt, 1984:29; Smolensky, 1985:10). However, an updated study showed that a significant decrease in work efforts was found among AFDC recipients when the unemployment rate was taken into account (as reported in "Focus" by Institute for Research on Poverty, Fall/Winter 1985:22).

5. The major changes in the AFDC program brought by the OBRA included: 1) establishing a cap on eligibility at 150 percent of the state need standard; 2) new assets eligibility limit; 3) elimination of $30-and-one-third deductions after four months; 4) reduction in the amount of the
§30-and-one-third deductions during the first four months; 5) standardizing work-related expenses at $75 per month and capping child care expenses at $160 per child; 6) deeming step-parent income available to the children; and 7) automatically counting in advance the Earned Income Tax Credit (Moffitt, 1984:3; The Center for the Study of Social Policy, 1984:19-20).

6. The savings in AFDC costs achieved in the year following the OBRA enactment amounted to $93 million per month (Institute for Research on Poverty, 1985:4). The fiscal 1983 budget proposal also estimated that a combined total savings in AFDC costs would amount to $5.9 billion by fiscal 1987 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. (b), 1982:240-241). The number of AFDC recipient families that were affected by the OBRA changes were 710,000; about 408,000 families lost eligibility and 299,000 lost some benefits nationwide. The average monthly income of families who lost AFDC benefits due to the OBRA changes was lower than the 1983 poverty level for between 28 to 86 percent of the families, depending on the areas of residence (Institute for Research on Poverty, 1985:2-7).

7. The changes to the AFDC program brought by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 include: 1) raising the AFDC gross-income limit from 150 percent of a state's need standard to 185 percent of a state's need standard; 2) extending the disregard of the first $30 of an AFDC recipients' earnings from the first 4 months to the first 12 months on a job. The disregard of a third of the remaining earnings is still limited to 4 months; and 3) raising the AFDC work-expense deduction for part-time workers to the $75
level for full-time workers, and so on (General Accounting Office, 1985:13-14).


9. The family size is closely associated with the poverty rate. For example, in 1978, nearly 40 percent of families with 5 or more children were poor, while less than 5 percent of families with no children lived in poverty (Levitan, 1980:10).

10. It is expected that a social child support demonstration project which is under way in Wisconsin will provide sound evidence that the new system indeed reduces both poverty and public dependence among female-headed families. Several counties are currently using wage withholding for financing child support. According to current plans, as of January 1986, a minimum benefit will also be provided in several counties (Garfinkel and Uhr, 1984:122).

11. Under the current Targeted Jobs Credit program, employers hiring economically disadvantaged, handicapped or welfare recipient persons can receive a credit of 50 percent of the first $6,000 of wages only in the first year of employment. However, the credit reduces to 25 percent in the second year, curtailing its effectiveness (Social Legislation Information Service, 1984).
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THE SOCIOLOGY OF ALCOHOLISM COUNSELING:  
A SOCIAL WORKER'S PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

An occupation - alcoholism counseling - strives to gain professional status. Still a field largely dominated by counselors who derive their status more from personal attributes - the fact of being recovering alcoholics - rather than from achievement of impersonally applied standards, chemical dependency counseling is in a state of flux. This sociological analysis examines recent developments in the field. Special emphasis is on roles for social workers.

The National Directory of Drug Abuse and Alcoholism Treatment and Prevention Programs is a compilation of 10,700 federal, state, local and privately funded agencies offering alcoholism or drug abuse services in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Human Health Services, 1985). The growth of the alcoholism counseling enterprise has been truly phenomenal (see articles in Changing Times, 1984; Forbes Magazine, 1982; The New York Times, 1985). Unparalleled opportunities exist for social workers in the administration and providing of alcoholism counseling services. New legal and health policies in chemical dependency treatment, in combination with an increasing readiness by mental health workers to do therapy with alcoholics, are responsible for constructive changes within alcoholism treatment in recent years.

The purpose of the present paper is to provide a sociological analysis of the alcoholism counseling field, a field in search of a professional identity. What is the essence of the work that is alcoholism counseling? Is alcoholism counseling a profession? What is the reality for professionally trained social workers within the alcoholism field; what are the role strains and in what ways can these be alleviated? These are among the major issues
to be addressed in this article. The idea for this article was shaped by my personal experience as a social worker in an outpatient alcoholism counseling center in Longview, Washington.

The organizational framework for this paper is the sociological approach to an occupation in development. Alcohol counseling as a burgeoning and unusual field of specialization is a ripe area for sociological investigation. The sociological approach to an occupational group looks at the individual workers as members of particular peer groups from which they draw their identity and belief systems. Attention is paid to these belief systems, to the roles that are played, and to inter-group conflict.

THE SHAPE OF THE ALCOHOLISM COUNSELING FIELD

In the past, most alcoholism counselors have been male; they have also been recovering (the work recovering rather than recovered is the preferred usage in recognition of alcoholism as an ongoing disease) alcoholics with a strong AA or Alcoholics Anonymous identification. Just as more women are represented in AA membership, more women are now counselors and administrators in alcoholism treatment centers. Highly trained professionals, who may or may not be recovering alcoholics, have entered the field in increasing numbers as opportunities have arisen especially in inpatient and industrial settings where pay scales are commensurate with qualifications. Community mental health centers prefer to hire persons with professional degrees. Regardless of the degrees, however, the work of alcoholism counseling is basically the same - work the details of which will be described later in the paper.

The National Drug and Alcoholism Treatment Utilization Study (1980) showed that of full-time employees in the field of alcoholism and drug abuse, 3.2% were master's level psychologists and 5.2% were social workers. Other treatment providers were nurses and those with general degrees. Most counselors in the field - 81% - were recovering from some form of chemical dependency.

OCCUPATIONAL BELIEF SYSTEMS

Each occupation has its own belief system, jargon and folkways. The occupation can be conceptualized as an in-group, membership in which provides a system of
desirable rewards and benefits. For protection of group members, barriers are set up in the form of formal membership requirements (degrees, certification, AA affiliation) and informal on-the-job training. The purpose of such barriers is to protect the occupational group from encroachment by other occupations. In alcoholism counseling the barrier has not been educational attainment but rather the possession of a rare, personal attribute - a history of alcohol abuse and subsequent recovery. However, insurance providers, the health care industry, the business community: these all stress the importance of the standard academic degree.

As an occupation, for purposes of enhancing economic benefits and social status, begins to professionalize, the stress will be increasingly on universally recognized standards of achievement. A past history of drunkenness or drug abuse, while useful in treatment, does little to meet nationally acceptable professional standards of accomplishment. As educational standards inevitably are raised, occupational belief systems will alter accordingly. Perhaps one day, through professionalization, a unified paradigm for viewing alcoholism and treatment will prevail. In the meantime, there is much dissension and fragmentation.

Today, in alcoholism counseling there is the dominant, pervasive belief system of the recovering personnel, and there are other orientations of more professionally trained workers. Most alcoholism counselors, themselves active members of AA and of other self help groups, have brought with them several fairly strong philosophical beliefs and biases (Bissell, 1982: 810). Among these beliefs are the following: (1) alcoholism is a physical disease and a permanent condition, (2) total abstinence from alcohol, not controlled drinking, is the goal of treatment, (3) personal identity of the self as alcoholic is essential in recovery, (4) for strength in maintaining sobriety, reliance is on a Higher Power and the AA meeting, not on self control, (5) only a recovering alcoholic can truly understand and treat the condition, and (6) the taking of prescribed mood-altering or anti-psychotic medication is actively discouraged. According to Bissell (1982:812), the traditional alcoholism counselor knows the disease alcoholism but little about other illnesses. Suspicion of mental health professionals results.
Social workers bring to alcoholism counseling a special perspective all their own. Regarding the disease alcoholism two types of bias are apparent, even in social workers who choose an addictions specialty. Biases are in terms of either (1) locating the cause for alcoholism in intrapersonal characteristics or (2) placing the stress exclusively on extraneous or situational factors. Workers who subscribe to the former psychodynamic orientation are inclined to blame the alcoholism on the individual himself/herself and to point toward the lack of "willpower" or good moral character. Such an attributional error is a part of the classic tendency in social work to attribute another person's actions solely to innate personality characteristics rather than to a combination of factors (Bell, 1979).

A second attributional error in alcoholism assessment occurs when social workers focus predominantly on situational factors: You drink because you are depressed; you drink because you suffered a grievous loss. Such approaches play into the alcoholic's defense and denial systems and provide a dangerous reinforcement for the drinking response. In fact, the alcoholic drinks because of addiction to alcohol in combination with but not because of severe stress. The relationship between stress and drinking is that each is cause and effect of the other.

The primary treatment task of the alcoholism counselor is to cut through the alcoholic's strong denial, rationalization and minimization system at the same time building trust between therapist and client. Techniques can be learned from recovering alcoholism counselors with a great deal of experience in this area.

Social workers have played and continue to play a significant, productive role in the development of ideas in alcoholism treatment. The introduction of the systems framework has been a major contribution in broadening the perspective on direct treatment. The focus on the person-in-the-environment and on the nature of the interaction between the two is especially relevant to alcoholism counseling practice. Family systems work has become integrated into many alcoholism treatment programs with some specialization in adult-children-of-alcoholics work. The professionally trained
social worker's grasp of the ecological approach gives him/her a major advantage over the more modestly trained counselor from the AA school.

ALCOHOLISM COUNSELOR ROLE REQUIREMENTS

The everyday role requirements of the alcoholism counselor are as demanding and varied as the demands on the generalized mental health clinician. Major specific tasks for the alcoholism counselor are diagnostician, teacher, broker, advocate, individual and family therapist, group leader. As diagnostician, the counselor administers a series of written and oral tests to determine where the client is on the continuum of problem drinking-to-late stage alcoholic. The purpose of such testing is often for psychological reasons, to impress the client with the need for change, and to report to court or other referral agencies whether or not an illness exists. The tendency is for recovering alcoholism counselors to overdiagnose and for mental health clinicians to underdiagnose the existence of alcoholism (Lawson et al., 1982:1035).

In the role of teacher, the alcoholism counselor teaches the disease concept of alcoholism, the physiological process of alcohol dependence as well as the physiological process of recovery. A mastery of the disease concept of alcoholism reduces guilt feelings in the alcoholic and provides a new and meaningful identity that entails a sober and clean lifestyle.

As broker, the counselor is a go-between.Contacts on behalf of the client with lawyers, probation officers, mental health workers, and employers are common. Often the client will stay in treatment because of coercion from one of the above sources. A related but more positive role is that of advocate; the counselor speaks on behalf of the client (e.g., in child custody cases to help reunite the family). A great deal of paperwork is involved in both of these functions.

As individual and family therapist, the alcoholism counselor draws up a treatment plan and utilizes modalities accordingly. The ecological perspective can give to alcoholism therapy tools to launch a multi-effort attack on both the intrapsychic and interpersonal components of the alcoholism syndrome (Dulfano, 1982).

Finally, in the role of group leader is at once one of the most challenging and rewarding of the counselor's
activities. Work in the alcoholism field centers around the provision of support for the alcoholic in his/her sobriety in addition to feeling work to help the alcoholic label and handle his/her underlying feelings.

Having described the general working milieu for the alcoholism counselor, this paper will examine the professionalization movement.

IS ALCOHOLISM COUNSELING A PROFESSION?

The term, profession, may be used loosely or it may be used in a strict scientific and often elitist sense. In the present context, ideal typical criteria for profession will be listed and the occupation known as alcoholism counseling or otherwise as substance abuse or addictions counseling will be considered against the backdrop of the criteria listed.

Flexner (1915) set forth six standards for distinguishing professionals from other kinds of workers. His criteria have been the standard and still are used to this day. According to Flexner, professional activity was (1) basically intellectual, carrying with it a certain prestige, (2) it was learned and based on scientific knowledge; (3) it was practical rather than academic; (4) its technique could be taught in a higher education program; (5) it was autonomous as an occupational group; and (6) it was motivated by altruism as opposed to making money.

Alcoholism counseling today possesses some of these ideal attributes but not others. Regarding the first two earmarks of a profession that relate to prestige and reliance on scientific knowledge, I believe alcoholism counseling fails to meet these requirements. Through no fault of workers in the field, provision of any services to alcoholics is lowly regarded, highly stigmatized work (Googins, 1984; Rosenberg, 1982). Additionally, much of the knowledge, the taken-for-granted assumptions of the field represent rule-of-thumb belief systems that have not been tested empirically (e.g., "female alcoholics are harder to treat than males" "inpatient treatment is more effective in breaking denial").

On the positive side, there is a wealth of emerging knowledge of an almost esoteric nature that could form the backbone for a new profession. I am referring to the disease concept, originally a folk-based belief, now supported by intricate biochemical research into constitutional reactions to ingestion of alcohol. Individual reactions are
found to differ markedly. Results of recent research concerning the exact neuro-psychological effects of alcohol continue to be reported in the academic and professional literature (see for instance regular reports in Alcohol: Health and Research World published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). Neurotransmitters, acetaldehyde, THIQ: these are among the technical terms that help set this occupation apart from other helping professions. From the standpoint of professional development, use of such terminology functions to define the boundaries of a new occupational group.

Alcoholism counseling is practical rather than academic; its techniques can be taught in college (although they usually are not); the field is relatively autonomous, especially in private agencies; and the motivation of altruism is the overriding one. Yet, in spite of meeting these criteria for a profession, the low prestige of the field and the strikingly low educational requirements for entry level jobs prevent alcoholism counseling from obtaining true professional status. The lack of a unified paradigm for approaching the alcoholic in treatment is a further disqualification for professionalism.

This occupation, nevertheless is making strides in the direction of professional growth. The stepping up of educational requirements in conjunction with certification efforts at the state and national levels are significant recent developments. These trends are part and parcel of the external validation stage of the professionalization process (Roman and Trice, 1974).

Alcoholism counseling is seeking to establish an elaborate system of professional development involving the institutionalization of certification requirements for individual counselors and of accreditation for the agencies involved (Royce, 1981; Valle, 1979). The importance of such external control to alcoholism counseling is in regard to protection not only to the client and worker but also, states Royce (1981) to the profession itself.

On the national level, the search for a unifying set of accreditation standards is well underway. National standards are essential, according to a recent Hazelden newsletter. Such standards protect "the consumer from improper care, protect the credibility of treatment providers, and are important to insurance companies and other reimbursers, who look for standards as a sign of quality care. ...But to date we have not found a
One obvious way of promoting professionalization is to encourage an influx of already professionally trained practitioners from the helping professions. Saxe et al. (1985:497) perceive the present reimbursement system as favoring trained (MSW social workers, psychologists) over general counselors. As professionally trained and more highly paid personnel enter the system, the status of the field should increase proportionately.

A promising development in addictions treatment is the recruitment of those Bissell calls "bridge people"—individuals who are both recovering alcoholics and trained professionals, regardless of the order in which these experiences occurred (Bissell, 1982). My prediction is that the future of this occupation will be in the hands of the "bridge people" because they combine in one person the best of two worlds.

ROLE STRAINS FOR THE SOCIAL WORKER AS ALCOHOLISM COUNSELOR

Many social workers, like other mental health professionals, enter the alcoholism counseling field more because of job opportunities than because of any special training or interest in alcoholism (Bissell, 1982: 815). Others come to specialize in alcoholism, often at reduced salaries, because of a recent personal experience with alcoholism in their lives. In either situation, expectations may exceed the realities. Working in alcoholism circles may be fraught with personal stresses and difficulties.

Sociologists utilize the concept, role strain, to denote a situation in which the behaviors associated with a position must be reconciled with the daily constraints and realities. Role strain is defined in a basic sociology textbook as "a feeling of conflict or stress caused by inconsistent demands of a single role" (Popenoe, 1971:51).

I have talked informally to numerous social workers in this field. Their satisfaction or dissatisfaction varied with the circumstances at their individual agency (i.e., client motivation, treatment facility philosophy.) One social worker who had "burned out" told me:

Care Unit was more interested in money than in people. Work was too hectic, and family members were ignored.
client motivation. Previously I worked with involuntary clients in an outpatient center; that was very difficult because we had to answer to the court and police the clients.

Role strain for the social worker in the alcoholism field consists of a discrepancy between the ideal of what social workers should be — "helping people to help themselves" — and sources of role strain inherent in the nature of the work. I will focus on three sources of strain: role inconsistency, training incongruity, and interprofessional status tensions. The format for this discussion is loosely borrowed from Needleman (1983).

**Role inconsistency**

Contradictory role requirements are a common occurrence in chemical dependency treatment. As a social worker, the counselor is supposed to be an advocate for the client, to protect the client's personal interests. Yet information given by the client to the social worker, for example, information concerning a recent relapse, may be used by the agency as a reason to terminate the client for non-compliance.

Another typical situation in alcoholism treatment concerns the referral by the agency of the client to the physician for Antabuse (disulfiram) treatment. Antabuse is a substance the ingestion of which makes the drinking of alcohol virtually impossible. The taking of Antabuse, as a temporary measure, can be extremely effective. In some cases, however, due to client resistance, use of Antabuse may be non-therapeutic. Court or agency requirements mandating Antabuse (or urinalysis) monitoring are clearly an intrusion on the client's and social worker's right to self-determination.

Conflicts between treatment and control roles are characteristic of the entire addictions field. Client attitudes reflect the coercive nature of court-mandated therapy; client resistance is common.

**Training incongruities**

Social workers are trained in treatment intervention designed for the client seeking help with a personal problem or with lack of coping skills. To the extent that alcoholic clients seek help at all it is often to "learn
how to do controlled drinking." This task is not usually either possible or appropriate to the treatment setting. The client has one agenda, the social worker as alcoholism counselor, another. Some sort of confrontation is called for, a confrontation for which the typical social worker is poorly prepared.

Another training problem that plagues social workers is lack of preparation for the adversarial role for the involuntary commitment of chronic alcoholics. The purpose of the courtroom hearing is to send the alcoholic against his/her will to an inpatient treatment center for treatment of an urgent and life-threatening problem. Instead of conflict resolution and negotiation, the process is one with a history that derives from trial by ordeal and trial by combat.

Above all, social workers lack education in alcoholism and drug abuse; they lack understanding of the physical and psychological processes of addiction and are easily bewildered by some of the ramifications.

Interprofessional status tensions
Social workers are a minority in alcoholism treatment. They arrive without certification, often under the authority of one with limited college education. In my experience, some alcoholism treatment centers are characterized by split loyalties and ideological differences while, at other agencies, a high degree of interdisciplinary harmony exists. Depending on the administrative direction provided, social workers are variously ignored or valued, underpaid or well paid. The fact that there is no specific designation for the social worker in addiction treatment and that the social workers are called by the generic term, counselors, diminishes the professional identity of the social worker at the alcoholism center.

In the alcoholism field, in short, social workers are working on the non-professional counselor's turf, with the highest credibility going to the recovering alcoholic counselor. Friction may develop between treatment personnel with social work training and those without it, as occupational and philosophical loyalties come into play.

SUGGESTIONS TO ALLEVIATE STRAIN

What can be done to make the alcoholism counseling field more appealing and accessible to the individual social worker? Following the social worker's entry into the
field what can be done to enhance his/her full participation in alcoholism counseling? One approach would be through policy, for example, in the certification process, to provide greater recognition for the MSW credential than currently exists. At present, certified counselors with modest education have ascendancy over uncertified MSW counselors. A great deal of dissatisfaction among the social workers results.

The following measures can be undertaken to improve the extent and quality of practice by social workers in the alcoholism field. First, for appropriate training:

1. Development in all social workers a firm knowledge base in physiology and psychology of chemical dependency; students of social work should be taught the disease concept of addiction and its application.
2. Provision of the opportunity to develop skills in alcoholism counseling through workshops and interagency visitations.
3. Development of familiarity with self help groups and their basic principles for recovery; visits to local AA and Al-Anon meetings should be arranged.
4. The learning of rapidly growing career opportunities at treatment and administrative levels of alcoholism work.
5. The successful incorporation of facts on alcoholism into the mainstream of social work education at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

Other measures that can be taken by area are as follows:

Community outreach
At the policy level, the university can function to represent the interests of social work in the alcoholism field. State legislatures at the present time are setting requirements for accreditation of alcoholism counselors. Lobbying is required to obtain recognition of social work credits toward certification.

In the field of chemical dependency itself, the university can provide considerable leadership by preparing graduates for entry into alcoholism treatment who, in turn, will offer to the field new ways of conceptualizing the disease alcoholism and its treatment. A strong plus is the introduction to the field of ecological concepts.

Alcoholism counseling education
As the field of alcoholism counseling professionalizes, the counselors are going to college and entering programs at all degree levels. Their choice of a major is usually in the department which house the alcoholism counseling program. Were social work to offer a relevant course curriculum including field placement in alcoholism.
the gain would be twofold—first to the social work field in the growth of job opportunities and second, to alcoholism counseling in broadening its conceptual base and the range of intervention skills.

Recruitment of more social workers

Despite the drawbacks associated with a newly spawned and rapidly growing field, work in an addictions specialty can be tremendously gratifying for social workers. Specific advantages to social workers who choose this field are the following:

1. Unequaled prospects for upward mobility due to new funding sources for treatment coupled with growing awareness of the treatability of alcoholism.
2. Provision of excellent opportunities for practicing a wide range of social work skills due to the disruption in all life functions that is chemical dependency.
3. Availability of work with couples, families, and groups.
4. Enjoyment of high success rate with clients for whom alcoholism is the primary diagnosis; treatment goals are tangible and achievable.
5. Sharing in the excitement of working in a new and growing field.

CONCLUSION

Knowing or unknowingly, social workers have been working with alcoholics for years. What is new, in the eighties, is the unparalleled opportunity for social workers to specialize in one or more of the addictions areas. As funding is cut from traditionally social worker-dominated fields, social work will be inclined to look elsewhere for employment of its people.

Meanwhile, alcoholism counseling as a field is seeing rapid change. In the past, treatment of alcoholism tended to be viewed unidimensionally; there was little recognition of the fact that no one model for treatment (such as the narrow AA 12-step approach) will be equally relevant for all the clients. The self help approach has been augmented through the introduction to addictions work of family systems theory, crisis intervention and stress management work.

As a sociologist, I perceive a situation in which two formerly opposing categories of personnel, divided by virtue of occupational and personal background are coming together in pursuit of a common ground. The predictable process of professionalization, discussed in
the body of this paper, is consistent with the deliberate re-
cruitment of professionally trained personnel and of the ult-
imate promotion to management positions of those same person-
nel. But this is the wave of the future; in the meantime there
is factionalism and fragmentation in some quarters.

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The author utilizes recent sociological approaches to professionalism in order to develop a dynamic conceptual model of the history of Social Work. Professionalization is understood as a social movement or "collective mobility project" of the lower middle class which has been the dominant force in Social Work for a century. This social movement seeks control and expansion of professional markets for services and recognition and sanction from elites. In each period of
history, however, Social Work professionalizers have had to struggle against popular unrest and elite criticism aimed at the field. Challenges to Social Work professionalizers and their basic paradigms emerge historically in different counter-segments within the profession which threaten the dominant segment (e.g., the Settlement House Movement, the Rank and File Movement in Social Work in the 1930's and the Community Organization/Advocacy segment in the 1960's).

Analyzing the Progressive Period, the Depression years, and the 1960s-1970s, the author shows how in each period the casework professionalizers were challenged by counter-segments in the profession which reflected both client unrest and elite criticism. In each period, the profession moved to absorb the critiques and, on the surface, to embrace them. In turn, reformers themselves have generally abandoned their attacks on the profession and have become absorbed in the collective mobility project. However, the unity achieved is a "spurious" one. First because in each period professionalized casework actually triumphed over Reform segments, rather than merged with. Second, each period of history creates new fragmentations in the field in terms of employment, methodology, ideology, manner of organization and social class and status positions for its members. While the structural and ideological splits within the field are frequently bemoaned by many professional leaders, the author suggests fragmentation may not only be inevitable, but may be functional for the profession as a whole.

Two debates have dominated virtually all literature on the history of the Social Work profession: whether the approach was from within the Social Work field, within the Sociology of the Professions literature or from Social Welfare historians. On the one hand, at least since Abraham Flexner's famous speech to the National Conference on Charities and Corrections in 1915 denying that Social Work was a full profession, a debate has raged on how to characterize Social Work. Was it a full profession,
a "semi-profession," an "emerging" profession or simply consumed with an ideology of professionalism? Secondly, historians and intellectuals within the field have long debated the troublesome dichotomies within the Social Work profession, sometimes referred to as the "Cause" versus "Function" debate, sometimes as a debate between "retail" and "wholesale" methods of practice, and sometimes as a question of "reform" versus "technique." As the field has split along lines of methodology, fields of practice, knowledge bases, and social class and status lines, almost all observers have viewed these splits as dysfunctional. Professional leaders and sociologists have viewed fragmentation as retarding true professionalism in Social Work, as a basic consensus is assumed to be a criteria for successful professionalization. Even those who opposed professionalization ideologically have asserted the field required a consensus, albeit a very different one.

The following article attempts to develop a conceptual model of Social Work professionalization from a historical sociological approach. Professionalization will be understood, as described by Magali Larson, as a social movement or as a "collective mobility project" by lower echelons of the middle class. This project is an organizing strategy aimed at achieving upward social and economic mobility and an expansion of a market for professional services. From this perspective, Social Work professionalization will be viewed as a successful strategy throughout the century. Rather than viewing competing segments within the field as problematic, the author suggests that conflicts within the field actually advance the professional project (sometimes very much in spite of the intent of reformers and radicals.) The author drawing on sociological and labor market segmentation theory, suggests that fragmentation is a natural state of the professions. Further, fragmentation serves a key role in the struggle to expand the market for services and to retain the legitimacy of a profession both with clients and with elites which must support a profession. It is suggested that Social Work has advanced as a profession through resolution of a number of crises in which of official unity of the profession.
increased along with broad, absorptive paradigmatic statements, while at the same time social structural fragmentation and ideological disunity among the ranks of Social Work increased at the same time.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AS A COLLECTIVE MOBILITY PROJECT

For many decades, sociological theory on the professions described a profession as an "ideal type" of occupation which met a series of attributes usually based on the profession of medicine; this approach, labelled the "sociologists' decoy" by one critic, led to and continually reinforced Social Work's comparison to the so-called "true professions" to attempt to measure how far Social Work had come in meeting the standards of professionalization. In recent years the meaning of professionalization has been greatly re-defined. Not only has it been accepted that degrees of professionalization exist along a continuum but the discussion of professionalization has begun to emphasize social and political power as a variable in achieving the structural positions of authority and as a variable in the organizing of occupations in such a manner as to assert collective power.

Magali Larson's book, The Rise of Professionalism, has synthesized a new historical sociological approach which views professionalization as a strategy. Larson locates the origin of this strategy in the lower status and class ranks of the emerging professions in the 19th century. Thwarted by the dominance of entrenched corporate privileges of elite professionals who controlled their fields because of the patronage of wealthy clients, a professional strategy was embraced by self-conscious vanguards of lower echelon members of the medical and legal occupations. Professionalization developed in the 19th century as a reform movement; it challenged a wealthy elite who held a stranglehold on positions of power based, not on skill or training, but on their class and status positions.
For Larson, professional movements are "collectivities" of people who organize around certain core paradigms and who drive to control markets in order to assert their collective status. Self-conscious professional leadership must present a solid unified front, not only for public relations purposes, but to wrest from the State the monopoly power it seeks. In reality, professions are hardly homogenous, but are highly stratified along a variety of lines. Yet all factions and levels of the professional groups come to realize that successful organizational efforts, resulting in monopoly and increased markets, benefits all practitioners. While on the one hand, unity is a "fiction" in the sense of any common method or ideology or even status position in society, professionals do share in the "collective credit" from the gains made by the profession as a whole.

Using Larson's analysis, the author will trace historically the origins of Social Work professionalism to a leadership dominated by lower middle class organizers who had to fight a battle against elite domination of the Charity Organizations and other early philanthropic organizations. The struggle to assert the need for trained professional staff entailed securing a core of unified practitioners (a vanguard group) united around a core paradigm (social casework) to challenge the elite conception of voluntary "friendly visiting" by the rich. As they organized, the professionalizers had to convince elites that the expertise of professional social work was necessary. While battling with elites, however, professionalizers also had to gain legitimacy among potential client groups which, as we shall see, were often hostile to organized Social Work. It is suggested that in order to gain such legitimacy, the profession during periods of social unrest, had to absorb ideas of social reform and social action. The need for legitimacy led to major paradigmatic changes in Social Work on an official level, but the more radical germs of theory and Social Work practice were quickly discarded once the period of unrest is over in order to preserve elite recognition of the profession and retain its expanded market.
Early work by sociologists of the professions asserted that professions, in contrast to non-professional occupations, constituted homogeneous sub-cultures organized around consistent socialization to values, common symbols and language, and strong respect for the boundaries and social control set by professional standards. In a 1961 article, Rue Bucher and Anselm Strauss became the first of many critics to revise this view. In examining the most prestigious professions, such as medicine, Bucher and Strauss denied any evidence that professions could be considered as unified communities. Rather they asserted that professionals in every field perform tremendously variant tasks, in very different work settings, with marked different strategies of organization, and without any agreement on a dominant paradigm or "core" professional activity.

Bucher and Strauss conceptualized a profession as a group of "segments" organized around specialities which often conflict with one another in their sense of mission, work activities, methods and techniques, types of clientele, colleague relationships, interests and associations, and in their forms of unity and public relations. Professions are loose amalgamations of segments pursuing objectives in different manners and more or less held together under a common name in a particular period of history" note Bucher and Strauss. While professions present a "spurious unity" to the public through vehicles such as Codes of Ethics, licensing requirements and professional associations, these forms obscure the fact that there are different antagonistic segments in opposition at all times within a profession.

There has been at least one study of Social Work which concluded that no coherent professional community existed, and one attempt to directly use Bucher and Strauss model in relation to Social Work. However, there have been no attempts to tie the segments of
Social Work to the historical development of the field. Moreover, there have been few attempts to look at the structural fragmentation within the field of Social Work as also evolving historically through segment struggles. It is suggested that Social Work must be viewed not only as ideologically split (clinical casework versus ecosystems approaches, casework versus groups versus community organization versus social administration versus social policy, field of practice conflicts,) but as existing in a segmented labor market. Social Work is split between public and private sector employment; between private practice and agency work; between unionized fragments and non-unionized ones; between administration, supervisory, and "line" positions, to name but a few cleavage lines.

It will be argued that the very success of the professional mobility project, particularly in gaining new markets, creates new structural positions and ideological segments which therefore fragment the profession.

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SOCIAL WORK HISTORY

Rather than fully chronicle the century old history of Social Work, the author will analyze and interpret key developments in Social Work which occurred at crisis points in American history. The two charts below identify (1) the vanguard groups leading Social Work's collective mobility project (2) the barriers or obstacles to success which emanate from elite and popular (client) sources (3) the synthesis in each period which officially absorbs opposition and asserts a generic professional paradigm and (4) the results of the crises which paradoxically fragment the profession at the very times in which key intellectuals and professional leaders are asserting unity.
CHART 1

A General Model of Professionalization

Emergence of Vanguard Group from lower echelon ranks (e.g., charity clerks in Social Work) → Organizational Structure (e.g., schools, associations, beginning conceptualization of a core paradigm) → Elite Barriers (The State, Corporate Elite) → Popular Barriers (Client Legitimacy) for services → Conditions for Success

1. Broad Absorptive Paradigms
2. Large, but Fragmented Markets
## Chart II

Model as Applied to the History of Social Work

### Period I (1890-1930s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vanguard Group</th>
<th>Elite Barriers</th>
<th>Popular Barriers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Charity Clerks</td>
<td>Work with the poor as &quot;noblesse oblige&quot; opposition to paid labor by wealthy</td>
<td>Widespread opposition among poor to &quot;charity snoopers&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paradigmatic Absorption**
- Settlement Movement and Academic reformers as bridge to new paradigm: Mary Richmond's "Social Diagnosis" broad "mel of 'retail' and 'wholesale' work with clients

**Structural/Ideological Fragmentation**
- Splits develop between fields of practice: splits by level of organization, professionalization: stratification by income/status develops; splits between psychiatric, reform, custodial and other roles

### Period II (1930s-1950s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vanguard Group(s)</th>
<th>Elite Barriers</th>
<th>Popular Barriers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionalized Casework Leaders v. Public Welfare Workers</td>
<td>New Deal psychiatrists response to social unrest; recognition of need for state intervention subordinate to psychiatric treatment</td>
<td>Mass unrest of the 1930s: mass strikes; unionization, battles for public aid, old age pensions, etc.; revolt against voluntarism and charity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paradigmatic Absorption**
- Social Work accepts public role and adopts liberal programs; social reform and action re-integrated; "parson-in-situation" metaphor as absorptive paradigm

**Structural/Ideological Fragmentation**
- Major splits between public and private sector employees; deepening stratification by bureaucratic levels with growth of administrative supervisory apparatus; growing splits by specialties: split between unionized & non-unionized sectors

### Period III (1950s-1970s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vanguard Group(s)</th>
<th>Elite Barriers</th>
<th>Popular Barriers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionalized Casework Leaders v. Community Organization Groups</td>
<td>LBJ's War on Poverty; elite pressure on Social Work to 'cool unrest'; role of foundations and liberal elite in opposing psychiatric casework</td>
<td>Mass unrest of clients (civil rights, ghetto riots, consumer movements); movements among students and young professionals v. dominance of psychiatric casework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Paradigmatic Absorption**
- Community Organizing Group: work leaders as bridge to new advocacy paradigm: client advocacy over agency is adopted; development of generic curricula and ecosystems models

**Structural/Ideological Fragmentation**
- Creation of Human Service Fields; BSW recognition further fragments field; dramatic increase in employment stratification; widenning splits between agency practice and new clinical roles including private practice
Among the points to be examined further in this historical treatment are:

(1) Like other professions, Social Work professionalization emerged as collective mobility project of a lower echelongo group within a broad field (in this case, primarily in charity work). A group of self-conscious leaders sought organizational unity and has waged a successful, if torturous, struggle to assert its status in gaining legitimacy from the State and from elites. (2) While there have been many historical changes, the casework leaders have remained a dominant vanguard throughout Social Work history. But the casework vanguard received numerous challenges. The most significant segment battles occurred in the Progressive Era when emerging professionalizers were challenged by the Settlement House/Reform Movement; in the 1930's when professionalizers were challenged by both the radical Rank and File Movement and by elites which were linked to public welfare programs; and in the 1960's and early 1970's when Community Organization activists were linked to both elite and popular attacks on Social Work professionalism. (3) In each instance above, the counter-segments raised challenges to the professionalizers which could not be ignored. The challenges both reflected the protests at a popular level (working people, labor unions, poor people, minorities) which could potentially de-legitimate Social Work, and the needs of elites who were more concerned with social reform than professionalization because of the primacy of maintaining order. (4) Because of the power of these counter-segments, in each period, ideological and structural changes were made by professional leaders to absorb criticism and contain protest. Thus, the profession, at an official level, altered its dominant paradigms as a result of these challenges. The dissidents then greatly abandoned their attacks on professionalism and were often themselves absorbed in the professional project. (5) Each period developed a "spurious unity" in which the field could speak of space for a variety of methods and a "generic" practice base. In actuality, each period created new fragmentation along lines of employment, methodologies, ideologies, manner of organization, and
social stratification within the profession. Each period ultimately ended in an uneasy disunity in which professionalized casework was dominant. However, all segments made gains in status and authority by association.

ORIGINS OF CASEWORK AND PROFESSIONALIZATION

The origins of American Social Work were primarily in the Charity Organization Societies which mushroomed in the 1880's and 1890's. The COS's as well as other philanthropic enterprises of this period were based in native born Protestant upper class circles. As has been well chronicled, "Scientific Charity" originally favored the repression of pauperism by the regulation of charity by scientific principles as well as the socialization of the vast numbers of poor and immigrants who were crowding the urban areas. The ideology of "Scientific Charity" reflected the harshness of Social Darwinism and the Poor Law tradition as well as the benevolence of Christian revival and the noblesse oblige of service which had a long tradition. The early charity movement developed the "friendly visitor," a volunteer drawn from the ranks of "solid society" to visit the poor. The visitor was to serve as a role model for the poor against vice, intemperance and pauperism, and engage in a kind of relationship therapy. While initially the COS's adopted the slogan, "Not Alms, But a Friend" in their campaign against relief, quickly all charitable effort led to the dispensation of large amounts of relief. By the 1880's, the COS's were hiring paid agents whose purpose were to administer budgets, record case histories, dispense funds, and supervise volunteers. Staff were considered ancilliary, however, to the real goal of visiting the poor, and were hired to conduct work considered repugnant to the rich visitors. The paid agents who were to be the originators of Social Work were clerks in the service of the elite philanthropic societies.

Most historians treat the "role reversal" that occurred between staff and volunteer in the early 20th Century as a historical inevitability.
the ideology of science and the Progressive Period's "search for order" had its impact, these views minimize two elements of the collective mobility project of professionalization: (1) the class conflict between the professionalizers and the more elite reformers and philanthropists and (2) the very hostile environment which existed for professional Social Work in which to assert its collective status, develop markets for services and develop a core paradigm.

Most texts in Social Work combine the historic roles of leading patrician social reformers such as Josephine Shaw Lowell, Robert Treat Paine, Louisa Lee Schuyler, Jane Addams, Julia Lathrop, and Edith and Grace Abbott with the professional contributions of early social workers such as Mary Richmond, Zilpha Smith, and others. The elite reformers were generally uninterested, if not hostile, to professionalism. As early as the 1890's, Robert Treat Paine and Edward Devine were attacking the idea of a paid agent taking over casework; they objected even more vehemently to social reform being professionalized. Reform and individual aid to the poor were charitable acts; neither payment, religious sectarianism nor political partisanship had a role to play. Josephine Shaw Lowell conceptualized friendly visitors as those who would act in the "noble tradition" of the Dodge and Roosevelt family. Jane Addams not only attacked charity as "obnoxious", but attacked the "negative pseudo-scientific spirit" of its practice, a direct attack on emerging professionalizers such as Mary Richmond.

In contrast to the biographies of the patrician segment of the professionalizers were of working class or lower middle class origins. Mary Richmond was the daughter of a blacksmith who worked her way through high school and was employed as a department store clerk. She was hired by Baltimore COS in 1889 as assistant treasurer, a job akin to a modern administrative assistant. Zilpha Smith, who played a prominent role in the emergence of early training schools and in organizing the first groups of social workers (the "Monday Club" formed in 1888), worked as a telegraph operator and then as a government clerk.
before being hired by COS in Boston to supervise clerical staff. The key leaders in the development of hospital social work, Ida Cannon, and in psychiatric social work, Mary Jarrett, were middle class in origin and connected with rising professionalizers in contrast with the pastrician backgrounds of the Lowells, Abbotts, etc.

Conflict between the elite philanthropists' image of Social Work and reality of the nascent profession was evident early on. While the Charity leaders wanted solid citizens, they were unable to recruit them. Early paid social workers formed groups called the "Hungry Club" and the "S.O.S. Club." Salary figures cited in texts show early social workers trailed many other women's occupations. 18 Further, social service organizations were usually bodies which combined volunteers and elite leaders with paid staff, preventing the self-organization of paid staff. Submerged in forums such as the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, employees were an afterthought. It was not until the 1910-1920 period that a major conflict would surface between segments as to who was a "social worker." One part of the field, its developing leadership, sought a clear separation of paid workers; Zilpha Smith urged in 1911 that clubs should be formed in each city with more than a dozen social workers who were paid employees to discuss professional issues and improvement of working conditions. 19 But a continued effort was made to center the profession around the elite Eastern women's schools which would merge paid and voluntary labor. This was the approach of the Intercollegiate Bureau (founded 1911), and its successor, the National Social Work Exchange (1917). Early efforts to form a professional association floundered on this problem. It was not merely a definitional problem, but one of social class. To the dismay of those who sought to continue the link between social service and noblesse oblige, it was found that "too frequently it appeared applicants resembled the women who wanted a position in social work after a public employment agency had dismissed her as unqualified for clerical work". 20 Another elite reformer, Joseph Lee, decried by the 1920's that "Social Work (was passing) from those who
had the vision to create and the persistence to continue it, into other hands."

Although major economic and political events were critical in dictating the emergence of a paid staff, the transition can also be viewed as a successful social movement led by young women leaders. As opposed to strikes and banners of the labor movement, the early professionals rallied for training schools, organized clubs and associations, and pressured volunteers out of daily work. Only in passing do most histories note how resistant philanthropic boards were to payment, and once paying, to their continual equation of women's work with voluntary labor worth only meager sums. Resistance of hospitals to social workers and educational institutions to social work training is also noted only briefly.

It was the development of an absorptive paradigm—social casework, particularly as codified by Mary Richmond (and eventually published as Social Diagnosis in 1917) — along with calls for training and associations which were critical to the success of the professional project. The paradigm of social casework developed in such a manner as to accentuate the scientific expertise of the emerging professionalizers, using metaphors of diagnosis from medicine and social evidence from law. In order to assert a status claim and stake out professional markets, casework as a technique had to exclude (1) the possibility of voluntarism inherent in the relationship model of "friendly visiting" (2) the association with mere recording or budgeting which would have left social workers as clerks and (3) the possibility that social work could be defined as work that committed non-experts could perform as a part of a social movement.

Strategic victories such as the development of educational training schools and the critical link with the Russell Sage Foundation were among the early harbingers of professionalizers overcoming the elite volunteers who were now characterized as mere sentimentalists. Similarly, Mary Richmond's early rejection of trade unionists as volunteer visitors illustrates as well the hostility professionalizers
would have toward those with low class status, but motivated only by cause rather than sufficient training.

SEGMENT BATTLES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF FRAGMENTED PROFESSION

The Settlement House movement, together with other reformers, such as early faculty members in the emerging field of Sociology, presented professionalizers with a challenge which reflected both elite qualms about Social Work and potential client opposition of Social Work. While the social class status of the Settlement Movement as well as some ideological components of its mission was similar to the Charity Movement, the paradigms of settlement work contrasted sharply with both conservative philanthropic elites and with the professional project.

Settlement work was developed in England by Christian Socialists who sought to bring the social classes together by democratic relationships established through community living and participation in the natural activities of the neighborhood. In the settlement activities, the "obnoxiousness and intrusiveness" of means-testing and charity were discarded for encouragement of the "common human fellowship of men." Self-determination, respect for cultural differences and an accent on the rhythm of daily life contrasted with the medical model of the professionalizers and the social control model of the conservative elite. Further the settlements did not promote professionalism in employment since often its residents received only room and board; as altruists and reformers there was little division of labor in activities. The American settlement residents were involved in sanitation, public health, labor affairs, and many worked in professions other than social work. The settlements were the Peace Corps or Vista of a generation of young people (primarily women) in the 1890-1914 period who sought to escape home and join a vibrant, altruistic movement which also linked economic, political, social and philosophical concerns.
As is well known, the Settlements and the most prominent leaders such as Addams, Lillian Wald, Florence Kelley, Julia Lathrop, the Abbotts, and Mary McDowell became extensively involved in reform movements. The reform leaders developed links with science and education which were quite different than early charity workers. Addams, Kelley, and Lathrop pioneered the social survey at Hull House and University of Chicago Settlement House. Both were interested in documenting the problems of the poor, the needs of working people, and statistics on health and safety. This led them into close relationships with Sociology; and to a lesser degree, with Economics and Philosophy. In the late 19th century, the settlements and allied reformers attacked the Charity movement. The NCCC proceedings include lively battles between the two movements. Mary Richmond at this point opposed most reforms, such as the minimum wage law and the 8 hour day law, and found a focus on reform irrelevant. She urged early social workers to not permit themselves to be swept away by enthusiastic advocates of social reform. 27 Richmond argued that the settlements were sentimental, unscientific, and relied on pure pragmatism since they lacked a theory. Moreover, Richmond and her followers opposed strong academic links, preferring vocationally oriented training rather than affiliation with universities. Early professionalizers were oriented towards agencies, not the academy; they wanted training for practical tasks of interviewing not the economics, political science and sociology courses demanded by the reformers.

It is frequently stated that the two movements came together. As early as 1897, Jane Addams suggested that there was room for both approaches in Social Welfare. Most of the leaders of COS, including Mary Richmond herself (after assuming the command of the Philadelphia COS) came to accept reform activity. In 1905, the journals of the NY COS, Charities, and the voice of the settlements, Commons, merged to form Survey. Some authors cite this as the final consolidation of the two movements, while others cite the election of Addams as president of the NCCC in 1909 as the symbolic unity. Certainly by the 1910's, Mary
Richmond's conception of social casework was not only providing for environmental study and "action on the environment" but stated that there was a need for both "wholesale" and "retail" approaches to social problems (reform and one-to-one treatment).

The "convergence" of the two movements can be explained by the need of the emerging professionalizers to absorb the reform critiques. The reform segment held power to retard professional status. First, the reform leaders had elite origins, connection with political leaders, and a great deal of prestige; they had to be listened to. Second, the Reform segment spoke for many potential social work clients who opposed charity work. While the settlements and reformers were themselves not immune from stiff criticism, there is no doubt that their critique of 'snooping,' 'investigating,' and 'penny-pinching' charity workers was shared by millions of workers and poor families. The settlements and some reformers also had organic links to trade unions, immigrant groups, and other social forces from which early social work professionalizers were isolated. Then the Reform segment spoke at NCCC or at other other forums, they spoke, whether commissioned to or not, for potential client groups. Thirdly, as is true with most reform groups, the Settlement Movement, while not interested in Social Work professionalism per se, were in a position to create additional professional markets for services by their demands on the State for Social Welfare programs. This was precisely the interest of the professionalizers. The settlement houses pioneered school social work (the visiting teacher movement in 1906-08) whose positions female teachers flocked to hoping for upward mobility. The pressure mounted by Addams, Lathrop, Kelley, and others which led to the famous 1909 White House Conference on Children ultimately expanded Social Work's professionalization. The agitation of reformers led to professional roles in foster care and adoption, in residential treatment for children, in the mother's pension movement, etc. The development of federal programs such as the Children's Bureau and the Sheppard-Towner Act on infant mortality secured state backing for professional services and new expert roles in the child welfare and health fields.
But the Reform segment was absorbed and not merged; it was subordinated in the spurious unity. While officially there was a new absorptive paradigm of Social Diagnosis with room for all tenets, in fact, the distinctive nature of settlement work, of the reform movements themselves, and the broad academic base for social welfare were to be defeated, and buried within a fragmented profession.

The Settlement movement declined in influence by World War I and was not to be central to Social Work either in employment or as a center of professionalization. The distinctive techniques pioneered at the settlements, groupwork and the social survey, were cast to the fringes of the nascent field or allowed to be absorbed by other emerging professions. A second indication of the subordination of this segment was its educational defeat. The reform segment succeeded in putting its principles of broad sociological, economic, and political training into practice only at the Chicago School of Social Service. Elsewhere, the professionalizers fought for limited training focused not on broad academic disciplines, but on the practical skills of interviewing and social diagnosis, and learning through field work at social agencies. The defeat of the academic/reform segment at the New York School of Philanthropy occurred in 1912 with the resignation of Samuel Lindsay, its president, under the pressure of NY COS to orient around a field work curriculum rather than a broad social science curriculum. At Smith's newly founded school, an early attempt to have study in social legislation was defeated. The Russell Sage Foundation withdrew a grant to the Chicago School when they formally affiliated with the University of Chicago. By the postwar period, Edith Abbott, a key representative of the Reform segment, was denouncing Social Work education as narrow and restrictive.

Further as employment in social agencies came to dominate Social Work, as well as the development of a myriad of professional associations, reform was also cast to the margins of the profession. The newly formed American Association of Social Workers was fearful of "being seen as sentimentalists, now
reformers, now philanthropists, radicals or what not."
Rather than reformist, many social workers opposed reform, particularly public benefits which would erode their professional role by making benefits a right rather than requiring assessments by skilled professionals.

Fragmentation in the nascent field was both ideological and structural. The key needs of the professional project, to persuade elites of their skills and to expand professional markets, led to a public 'core skill' of psychiatric casework, although numerically these Social Workers continued to be a small percentage of the field. The very success of the early professionalizers created a multitude of different settings which hired social workers. Each setting had its own forms of organization, its own culture, and, in some cases, its own training schools. As the field of Charity and Family Services, Settlements, Child Welfare, School Social Work, Hospital Social Work, and Psychiatric Social Work diverged, each developed their own associations. But additionally within each sub-field as well as across the field, structural divisions caused dramatic differences in response to professionalization. In many areas of practice workers were apathetic; they would not join professional associations of any kind, would not read newly formed journals and certainly could never afford to go to Social Work school. The most professionalized settings, such as hospital and school social work, had the initial advantage of recruiting among professionally aspiring women (nurses, teachers) in settings dominated and conceived around professional ideology. In each historical period there is a tendency to ascribe ideological and structural unity to the profession; so historians focus, for instance, on the "psychiatric deluge" of the 1920's for instance. Yet this focus ascribes too much unity to the field. Some psychiatric and family service agencies became consumed with a medical model of treatment; and these workers and others in complex urban agencies dominated by high income professionals (e.g. physicians) were able to extract higher pay and social status. But large numbers of social workers were non-graduates working in foster care, in settlements, in charity work with
little or no identification with professionalism. Community chest administrators viewed themselves as fundraisers; settlement house and boys club workers as group leaders; and child welfare workers as custodians.

While fragmentation and disunity is regretted by leadership, since professional leadership always seeks expansion, there are positive functions of fragmentation for the professional project. Each field of practice and methodology expanded a market for social services. While structural positions develop for reformers on faculties, in agency administration or in policy groups, the very fragmentation of these segments allowed the casework paradigm to become more psychiatric and specialized in other settings. The most professionalized segments of the field (family service, psychiatric, hospital) were freed from duties considered "unprofessional" and enabled to raise their status with elites, while Social Action was restricted to other areas of employment and the caretaker/custodial role was restricted to still other areas of employment. Fragmentation serves to (1) delegate "inferior" roles to certain lower status professionals and to non-professionals, while developing a public model of high status and skill claims (e.g. psychiatric casework) and (2) to incorporate divergent segments and paradigms into the field to insure broad markets for services and to co-opt potentially dissident groups into marginal areas of the broad profession.

**ABSORPTION AND FRAGMENTION IN THE 1930's CRISIS**

The Depression period provided a second challenge to the professional project. The basic engine of change was economic disaster and massive unrest. In addition to mass strikes and demonstrations, much popular unrest involved the social services directly: unemployed councils sitting in and demanding aid; marches on relief offices; direct action against evictions; the movement for old age pensions, etc. Social workers themselves were hard hit by layoffs and wage cuts as private agencies cut back staff. One response to this crisis was the rise of an elite social welfare segment
which actually was the historic remnant of the Progressive Period. A cadre of social welfare administrators, policy makers, and labor relations intellectuals still existed in 1920's who favored social insurance and government regulation of the economy particularly, the "New York crowd" who later served FDR. Some have argued that the existence of this group proves Social Work was still dedicated to reform in 1920's. Rather, as Walter Trattner has suggested, it proves only that a small number of thinkers kept alive reform ideas. The New Deal Welfare State called back to arms the old reform contingent as well as new leaders such as Reginald Tugwell, Eveline Burns, and Frances Perkins who were associated with the administration of new social programs.

At the same time, social workers hard hit by the Depression, and new recruits to the field had begun to organize trade unions, participate in demonstrations, and in radical political movements. A segment organized around these emerging Social Work unions and the journal Social Work Today (founded 1934) came to be known as the Rank and File Movement (RPM). This movement included prominent social workers such as Bertha Reynolds, Mary Von Kleeck, Grace Coyle, Harry Lurie, and Jacob Fisher. The Rank and File movement was to view Social Work as a newly proletarianized profession which should abandon its professional pretensions, organize in unions, and ally with other workers to fight for revolutionary change. During its early years (1931-36), the RPM attacked professionalism as an "atrophied manifestation of what once was proper belief in the value of objective scientific approach." While the early thrust of this movement, closely linked to the Communist Party, was on economic and broad social issues rather than on practice, the RPM did attack the condescension of charity workers toward the mass of workers applying for relief and the irrelevance of psychiatric paradigms to the current situation. The RPM was initially attacked by the professionalizing segment of the field. The AASW charged that RPM members "over-identified with clients" and saw them as revolutionaries who were intent on causing trouble for ulterior purposes.
The Social Work profession, on an official level, moved quickly to respond to the need for public social services. Public services were the key demands of both the elite social policy segment and popular unrest among clients and social workers. As early as 1932-33, the AASW adopted as its own program such planks as a massive public works program, social insurance, fair labor standards, adequate federal relief, as well as a few planks that the New Deal would never see passed such as health insurance and taxation on "unearned income" rather than on worker's paychecks. It was the first time the profession's leadership would endorse such a program of government intervention. It is argued that in addition to the shock of massive economic failure (in its own ranks as well as within society) the possibility of increased professional markets was causal and made this dramatic reversal consistent with professionalization strategies.

By the mid-thirties, the professional leadership and the Rank and File movement had seemingly converged in goals. Influenced by the 'left turn' in the Roosevelt Administration in 1935 and the declaration of the worldwide Popular Front strategy of the Communist Party, the RFM began stressing cooperation with the professional associations whenever possible. Indeed this happened frequently in the late 1930's in areas such as opposition to WPA cuts, in organization of support for the Loyalists in Spain, and in the development of both anti-fascist, and, alternatively, peace programs. On various issues, the RFM and Social Work Today garnered the support of major professional figures such as Gordon Hamilton, a professor at New York School of Social Work who was to become the leading casework theorist, and Paul Kellogg, editor of the Survey, the field's leading journal, as well as numerous deans, professors, administrators, and other professional leaders.

Of equal importance, the radical segment began to tone down its own criticism of professionalism and to develop its own approach to social casework. Best conceptualized by Bertha Reynolds, Rank and File social casework stressed client self-determination, equality of client and worker, self-help by organizations of
clients (unions, tenant and community groups,) and the precedence of assistance to poor and working people above those less in need. While some of these ideas were innovative and couched in radical rhetoric, the radical segment moved very close to prevailing thinking in social casework, particularly as it was evolving theoretically from the Functional School through the person-in-situation paradigm of Hamilton. Contrary to the early skepticism about the paradigms of Social Work, Reynolds and others came to see social service work as a positive goal in itself. She and others helped move younger rank and file social workers from a boring-from-within perspective, to the viewpoint that good casework was good politics.

As in the earlier period, Social Work advanced by adopting an absorptive paradigm to incorporate new areas of service. Like the Settlement movement, the RFM, despite its radicalism and its initial attacks on professional leaders, held important strengths for the professional project. As the earlier reformers had reflected potential client hostility to Social Work, the RFM, bridged the opposition of client groups (relief recipients, tenant and union groups) with rank and file social workers who had, as yet, little or no identification with the profession. Had the demands for public social services, for the acceptance of Social Action and Social Reform as legitimate methods within Social Work, and the demands for acceptance of social service unionism alongside of professional associations not been met, Social Work as a profession may well have lost its legitimacy with both client groups and with the many new entrants into the field itself. By officially absorbing some of the demands of these groups, Social Work gained legitimacy among working class and poor clients.

Secondly, as with the Settlement House movement, the RFM and the liberal reformers of the New Deal became involved in the collective mobility project of Social Work and in expanding the market for services. Because of the role of both segments in leading the struggle for public services, many figures in the RFM as well as the reformers came to hold administrative positions in the new public welfare bureaucracies. More than simply co-opt the radicals, the mass
development of new centers of power provided opportunities for all segments in the profession to co-exist. Quarrels now would center on educational programs and whether recruits should be trained for public welfare or for Masters level casework. These debates were more safely confined within the Social Work bureaucratic structure. In addition to public welfare, the RFM pioneered work with trade unions and community groups which provided apparent new markets for services. The link of Grace Coyle and others with the development of Groupwork (which first received recognition in 1936 as a co-equal method of social work practice) also indicates how reform segments provide a link with new professional markets for services, and new roles for radicals and reformers.

The challenge of the 1930's forced the profession to officially develop an absorptive program to incorporate (1) Public Welfare as a legitimate field of practice (although it would numerically dwarf the other fields of practice, it would lack a base for a successful status claim) (2) the development of a Public Administration elite as a permanent feature of Social Work leadership, often uneasily co-existing with clinically minded professional leadership, and frequently at odds with it (3) the acceptance of Groupwork and Community Organization as equal methods (4) the assumption of greater social and economic causation in Social Casework theory which throughout the 1940's would express itself in the "person-in-situation" approach of Gordon Hamilton and the "problem-solving" approach of Helen Harris Perlman (5) acceptance of Social Work unionism existing alongside of professional associations (6) the development of political activism as separate and distinct from on-the-job militancy or professional dissidence came to be accepted in the field, as Social Work had a permanent role in Public Welfare, as radical segments were absorbed, and as a tradition of political commentary on certain national events came to be accepted by the profession.

Just as a "spurious unity" had been achieved earlier, the illusion of unity in the 1940's and 1950's obscured structural fragmentations in the profession. The development of public services allowed private
agency based professionals to abandon concerns with financial eligibility only to increase their concern with the therapeutic. The revolution in social services created a greatly non-professionalized, Bachelors degree educated, industrialized, and greatly unionized segment in Public Welfare. These workers and their advocates in the educational institutions and agencies of Social Work, increasingly were at loggerheads with the localized, individualized system of private agency based therapeutic services led by professional leaders who were wedded to Masters programs in Social Work. The vast increase in personnel (Social Work doubled in the 1930's) created fragmentation between the cadres of 'non-professionals' and those with Masters degrees; between those wedded to a professional strategy and those to industrial strategies; and between those in major urban areas and those in rural and non-Eastern areas where there were few social work schools. Meanwhile the huge growth of both public and private bureaucracies led to increased stratification; levels of supervisory and administrative personnel increased dramatically. With increased scrutiny on the job came, paradoxically, the tendency of high level officials to speak for the field. Yet the interests of different levels of social work personnel diverged dramatically.

Though Groupwork and Community Organization were officially recognized as methods, they lacked major markets for professional mobility and hence were marginal to the professional project. Reform, which had also been declared in a field of practice in the 1930's, was embraced only as a ritualistic function: speeches were delivered as were occasional position papers, but Social Action was not to be part of daily Social Work practice.

As has been argued, the casework professionalizers triumphed because of their ability to garner new markets, and, at the same time, maintain the symbols of professionalism. So while large numbers of recruits were added to public welfare in the 1930's through the 1950's, casework in private agencies, in contrast to public services, appeared to have an even stronger base for professional public relations. Schools were
reluctant to train for public services, and higher status entrants to the field avoided it as well. While the high administrative posts within public services met the professional mobility project, the line positions did not. In fact, to the professional leaders, the further recognition of the State of the Social Work profession as a sanctioned part of Mental Hygiene (notably achieved by such gains as the screening of Selective Service recruits by social workers, among others, for service in World War II; and the passage of the National Mental Health Act after the war with concomitant growth of the VA services and NIMH) was far more significant than the development of state welfare services.

Despite the organizational mergers of the 1950s (as the National Association of Social Work formed in 1955 and the Council on Social Work Education in 1952, both from numerous predecessor groups), Social Work left the second period of reform more fragmented by employment, methodology, ideology, auspice, and speciality than it had entered the 1930s with.

THE 1960's - 1970's CRISIS AND NEW FRAGMENTATIONS

Events of the 1960's would challenge almost all aspects of Social Work: the casework method, the need for professional credentials, and the dominance of professional over client would all be questioned. Like previous crises in Social Work history, the challenge to Social Work was a combination of social unrest at society's base and elite pressure which reflected itself in different segments within the profession.

The civil rights movement and urban riots created the impetus for social change and professional challenge; but while black unrest created the War on Poverty and other new social programs, unrest did not cease, but spawned a radicalization in the Black community and, in elements of the white community, notably in the advent of the anti-war movement and the New Left. Pressed by social unrest, the government itself acted as an elite pressure on Social Work, illustrated by Sargent Shriver's 1964 speech on the War on Poverty in which he attacked social casework and
The insertion of "maximum feasible participation" language into the OEO legislation, while its intent was politically aimed at circumventing Southern racists and Northern political machines, had the effect of by-passing the established professional leadership of Social Work. Whatever its intent, the phrase provided an official legitimacy to client demands for power, rather than subordination to professionals. It became critical as a linkage to slogans of "community control," "power to the people," and "participatory democracy" which served in general way to link the Black movement, the New Left, certain government officials, and Community Organizing segments in Social Work.

Within Social Work, a segment of Community Organization faculty, policy makers, and administrators had been in the forefront of criticizing Social Work's "disengagement from the poor." Casework was subjected to numerous studies and critiques, questioning its effectiveness, accessibility, and relevance to the poor. This segment came to view community organizing as the primary means of assisting people overcome poverty and dependency, not one-to-one intervention. Beginning with the experience of the Mobilization for Youth Project in NYC, continuing through the War on Poverty, and into the National Welfare Rights Organization, a self-conscious vanguard again emerged to re-legitimate Social Work. This segment, including Richard Cloward, Frances Fox Piven, George Brager, Charles Grosser, and many others urged challenges to the welfare system, to the educational and health care system, and to the local political machines. The growing New Left supported this segment and came to view psychiatric interventions as an instrument of social control and domination. While not a unanimous view, there was widespread support for the view that caseworkers and most of professional Social Work had as their sole mission "cooling out" the ghettos, rebellious youths, and other social deviants.

Between 1965 and 1975, students and young professionals in many fields were challenging the very need for educational credentials, for professionals'
special mystique and special social power. These elitist traits were contrasted with the new ideas of self-help and social movements' providing their own services. The radicals-in-the-professions movement served as a bridge between demands of Blacks and poor people for community control and citizen participation and the changing paradigms in the professions that dealt with human services. 50

Social Work was marked by disorientation and shock in these years; virtually every professional journal reflected the ferment in paradigms and ideologies. Scott Briar wrote about "The Current Crisis in Social Casework" and "The Casework Predicament." 51 Harry Specht learned the "The De-Professionalization of Social Work." 52 The NASW Committee on Advocacy stated the field's faith in its own essential viability is being severely tested" while two social work educators began their 1973 book by noting that "Social Work is a profession in desperate trouble." 53

The reform segment in Social Work, oriented around Community Organization, Social Action, and Advocacy, crossed elite and popular interests, much as the Settlement/Reform movement of the Progressive Period. Many leading planners and faculty members had served on governmental committees, particularly under J.F.K., and many had strong ties with major foundations. At the same time, they took the side of the poor, minorities, and students in asserting the need for client control in social agencies, schools, and hospitals. While it is possible that many of the Community Organization radicals were engaged only in "community sociotherapy," a new rhetoric of reform that would only integrate the poor further into the political system, as many radicals charged by the late 1960's. 54 Other leaders, such as Cloward and Piven, clearly sought to bring down welfare and other systems, not merely sociotherapy. Others, such as Frank Reissman and Allen Gartner, focused on particular reforms such as the "New Careers" program which served as a mobility project for thousands of poor ghetto residents to move into the social services. Unlike other periods, there was no systematic and consistent identification with one party (such as the hegemonic role of the Communist Party in the 1930's among radicals) nor even with one program.

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(as was the case for many years among Progressive reformers). Therefore, there was considerable change within a short time in this period; some leaders became radicalized by the Vietnam War and campus protests, while others became alienated by these developments and dropped out of reform movements.

While there has been little research, there is evidence that the majority of practitioners, and, possibly even students and faculty in Social Work, were not particularly drawn to radical critiques. Many social agencies and clinical practitioners shuddered from these series of attacks on their skills and motivation. In some cases, there was a backlash on the part of agencies towards developments in schools of Social Work where casework appeared to be at a low ebb of popularity. Nevertheless, like the Progressive period and the 1930's, there were important reasons for Social Work to adopt significant changes in these years.

First, client unrest was directly apparent at welfare centers, in schools, hospitals, and on the streets. When the Community Organization faculty or New Left students or Black social workers spoke about client rights, advocacy for the poor, opening up the barriers of the profession to new recruits or reducing credentials, they were voicing the power of social work clients to delegitimate professional practice. Second, much of the reform segment had key ties with elites who were anxious for reform and, disinterested, if not hostile, to professionalism. These elites included governmental leaders, large foundation leaders, and political party activists. Just as the professional mobility project was squeezed between prestigious reformers and working class pressure in the Progressive Period and the 1930's, Social Work leaders were faced with opposition from both fronts in the 1960's - 1970's. Thirdly, like the Settlement movement and the RFM, much of the reform segment also held the potential for increased market control for Social Work. The 1960's, like the 1930's, saw social services expand dramatically in response to unrest and elite pressure. The Community Organization segment had direct ties with OEO, the Job Corps, Headstart, and dozens of other
programs which meant that its critique of casework was paralleled by its creation of new professional opportunities. Movements such as Community Mental Health, Health Planning and Mental Retardation reform were led by reform segments. All these efforts led to additional jobs for social workers and additional prestige for the profession. New fields of practice opened up as well as more jobs. Finally the very prosperity of the 1960's created room for the demands of minorities and poor people for professional entrance. Neither the profession as a whole nor radical segments in Social Work appeared to fear a loss in Social Work employment due to embracing controversial strategies or unorthodox rhetoric.

The absorption of unrest on an official level in Social Work took the following forms: (1) The professional association, NASW, agreed to allow Bachelors of Social Work (BSW's) into its ranks while CSWE began affording recognition to these programs. These actions reversed many years of opposition to lowering credential barriers to the profession, and essentially was a capitulation to reform demands of many groups (2) The New Careers Movement, after spawning thousands of paraprofessional positions, led to the development of the Human Service professions with their own curricula, schools, and work roles. This change came in spite of the organized Social Work profession, but a direct result of the segment battles (3) "Social Advocacy" was officially adopted as a professional paradigm, greatly accommodating demands to provide a new sanctioned role for social workers as clients' defenders against oppressive environmental systems (4) NASW, contrary to earlier policies, also vowed to protect professional advocates; and the profession's Code of Ethics was changed to reflect worker loyalty to the client above the agency when they conflict (5) Social Work education changed dramatically; first because both Community Organization and Groupwork gained new inclusion in curricula; then by the 1970's a generic curriculum began to replace the old divisions by method in many schools of Social Work (6) Casework practice, at least in some schools, went through dramatic changes. This was reflected in new systems, ecological and behavioral approaches which
replaced the medical model as a core paradigm. Many of the theorists were self-conscious about the influence of unrest on the need to change the theoretical base of social work practice.

Yet again, official changes that appeared great, only obscured new structural and ideological fragmentation. With all the zeal toward Community Organization, Advocacy, Social Action, and other roles, these methods were thrown to the borders of the field. The combination of the end of social unrest, government cutbacks, and a new renaissance of clinical casework had greatly cast aside the new paradigms. Many of the segment members entered faculties, administration; some even went into private practice. As the official paradigms became absorptive, in practice clinical casework emerged triumphant in a more professional, psychiatric garb. Private practice in Social Work has grown dramatically since the early 1970's, as has attendance in clinical institutes and other programs specifically geared toward clinical social work. Only a few years after the attack on professionalism in Social Work, the dominant segments have placed their primary emphasis on the passage of licensing and social work vendorship bills in order to insure reimbursement from insurance companies for casework services provided by private practitioners and agency based clinicians.

Structurally, the greatest changes in the 1960's - 1970's fragmented the entire social service field. With the rise of the Human Service programs throughout the nation and the recognition and growing use by agencies of both non-professionals and BSW's, several fields of Social Work now exist with markedly different interests. While Human Service and BSW workers will seek increasing professionalization, including dissociation from lower status work and increased association with MSW workers, the MSW's will seek increasing work differentiation in which non-MSW's perform most direct practice, while MSW's can become supervisors, consultants, and administrators. Along with the historic splits between public and private sectors, between fields of practice, between methodologies, between administrators and line workers, fragmentation became even more dramatic as private
practice and agency social work split, and Masters level and BSW and Human Service Social Work split.

Once again though, fragmentation, while confusing to the public many be a condition for professional gain. On the one hand, BSW and Human Service programs serve a collective mobility function for working class recruits. On the other hand, for the MSW sector, the development of lower level staff again allows for an increase in clinical concentration and a shedding of the very roles so focused on in the 1960's: social advocacy and direct concrete services to clients. Just as the creation of LPNs and aides increased the ability of RNs to bargain by allowing them to differentiate their skill claims, so MSW's are able to bargain with employers for salaries and job descriptions, which suitably distinguish them from lesser trained workers. As long as the psychotherapy market grows, a large entrepreunerial segment will grow in Social Work, a somewhat new phenomenon. The dream of independent practice with all its attendant autonomy will appeal to many, and this segment of the field will have less need for a fictional unity in Social Work than other segments. This segment will orient natually to developments in psychiatry and psychology as well as Social Work. As many students seek the MSW credential to do therapy and identify themselves as psychotherapists, not social workers, the profession's fragmentation may develop even further.

SUMMARY

The preceeding article attempted to develop a conceptual model of Social Work history based on the viewing of professionalization as a collective mobility project and professions as themselves being composed of divergent segments, divided structurally and ideologically. It is suggested that throughout its century old history, the profession has had a significant impact on raising entrants social class positions. The field has done so, as with other professions, by strategies of expanding professional markets and by successful persuasasion tactics to ensure
its status claims with both elites and popular forces. In many ways the gains made through professionalization are comparable to the gains made historically through trade unionism. Further, much as different theorists have noted the structural limitations of trade unionism, professional organizations (whether associations, educational institutions or social agencies) must incorporate new workers and client groups, but in such a way that it discards the most radical ideologies and safely confines the new groups and ideas within a bureaucratic structure. From this vantage point, professionalization is neither opposed to reform or radicalism nor its vanguard. The vested interest of a profession such as Social Work, whose legitimacy is so tied to support from working and lower class groups, is allied with reform in periods of social unrest. However, to the extent professionalization absorbs dissident segments and provides for mobility for poor people, it mitigates against continued protests and provides structural positions which discourage radicalism and reform in periods of quiesence.

The review of the crisis points in Social Work history—the Progressive Period, the 1930's and the 1960's-1970's—would appear to indicate the key role of client legitimacy at times of social unrest. This unrest filters itself into professional practice and official professional policy through dissident segments within the profession. However, the key need for elite sanction becomes predominant quite quickly, and the dissident segments are incorporated at the margins of the profession. Official absorptive paradigms and policies are declared even as psychiatric casework emerges as dominant after each crisis and other areas of practice and segments within the field are lodged in different structural positions.

As has been well documented, the link of casework with the parallel project of medical/psychological professionalization, perhaps, best explains its historic dominance. Social Work, even if perceived by the public as subordinate to other professions, has gained status by association. As a personal service society has increasingly commercialized and socialized
the function of family and neighborhood, the one-to-one helping model whether called casework, counseling or psychotherapy, has been the most expansive market related to "social services". Despite this historic trend, there is no conclusion intended that this trend will continue indefinitely. Psychotherapy and counseling markets are hardly unbounded, and will be subject to new periods of challenge and social unrest which would severely tax its methodology and even its legitimacy. Major economic or political upheavals could also have a crippling effect on ability of patients/clients to pay or on the very preoccupation with personal change which the recent decades have so promoted. For the moment, there is no question that while Social Work represents many segments and claims many traditions, the dominant unity in the fragmented profession remains very much individual casework and psychotherapeutic treatment.

NOTES

1. The evaluation of Social Work's professional status has produced volumes of literature. The most notable from the traditional "attribute" school of sociological functionalism is Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession "Social Work 2 (July 1957), pp. 45-55. The "semi-profession" analysis was popularized by Amitai Etzioni, see Etzioni (ed.), The Semi-Professions and Their Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1969); also Nina Toren, Social Work: The Case of a Semi-Profession (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971). The concept of "emerging professions" is associated with sociologist William Goode (see "Encroachment, Charlatanism and Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology and Medicine," American Sociological Review 25 (December 1960, pp. 902-14). Radicals have frequently argued that professionalism was an ideology that obscured conditions in Social Work and other fields which only served to mystify the actual working class status of the occupants. This was the position of the journal Social Work Today in its early years. For amore recent formulation see, David Wagner and

2. Classically Social Welfare historians and Social Work theorists have contrasted periods of social reform such as the Progressive Era with periods of psychiatric obsession such as the 1920's. Porter Lee's speech at the 1929 Milford Conference contrasted the "cause" of social reform, which is necessary to develop social services with "function," which comes to replace the zeal of reform once services are in place. The presentation of this dichotomy and the 'heroic' periods of reform and periods of technique appear in histories such as Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: the Emergence of Social Work as a Career (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Kathleen Woodroofe, From Charity to Social Work (London: Routledge, 1968); and Walter Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State (New York: Free Press, 1974). A particularly dynamic treatment of the cause / function dialectic is found inarel Germain and Alex Gitterman, The Life Model of Social Work Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) pp. 343-368.

Almost every historic or analytic article in Social Work has considered fragmentation in the field dysfunctional. Unless the field gained a consensus around its core technical skill or around one set of values or purposes, the field was doomed to low prestige in the minds of the public, and concomitantly low income and status in employment. To cite only some relatively recent examples, see Harriett Bartlett, The Common Base of Social Work Practice (New York: NASW, 1970) who views fragmentation as retarding professionalization in Social Work; Carol Meyer argues that a professional 'consensus' is necessary in order for Social Work to survive as a profession in "Social Work Purpose: Status by Choice or Coercion?" Social Work (Jan. 1981), pp. 69-75. Radicals have also argued that the field was fragmented and therefore needed a radical consensus for activism to overcome its thwarted semi-professionalism; see, for example, Colin Pritchard and Richard Taylor, Social Work: Reform or Revolution? (London: Routledge, 1978).

4. This is illustrated by the approach of Greenwood, op.cit. See David Austin's account of how Social Work's obsession with the sociological attributes of professionalism has been misguided in "The Flexner Myth and the History of Social Work" Social Service Review 57 (Sept. 1983) pp. 357-77.

5. Everett Hughes was the pioneer sociologist in turning from the question of "attributes" to viewing professionalization as a process, and the professional status as a continuum consisting of occupations with greater and lesser degrees of professionalization. An important volume viewing professionalization in this manner is Howard Vollmer and Donald Mills, (ed.), Professionalization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

6. Many recent sociologists have contributed to the development of a more dynamic view of power and struggle in the development of professional status. In addition to Larson (below), an important contribution is made by Terence Johnson, The Professions and Power (London: Macmillan Press, 1972) and by Dale Johnson, (ed.), Class and Social Development (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982).


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


14. The major field of labor market segmentation literature has not yet been applied to professional work in detail. The division between the secondary labor market, the primary subordinate, and primary independent market as described by Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain, (New York: Basic, 1979) can certainly be applied to social agencies to distinguish small sectarian, rural, non-bureaucratic agencies (secondary) from highly bureaucratized ones (primary-subordinate) and highly complex, highly paid, and professionally affiliated settings such as urban hospital social work depts. and psychiatric clinics (primary-independent). The recent work by David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) in which they tie segmentation into the major historical periods of capitalism could also be applied to social work professionals. Since these applications would be enough for another volume, I have made reference to the concept of labor market segmentation/fragmentation as a social structural phenomenon which must be addressed along with the ideological segments of Bucher & Strauss. Because I have treated the ideological together with the structural, I have used the term "fragmentation" as a more general term throughout rather than segmentation.

15. The term "role reversal" is used both in Trattner, op. cit., p. 93 and in Dorothy Becker, "Exit Lady Bountiful: The Volunteer and the Professional Social
Becker is virtually alone among historians in describing the conflict between visitors and agents as "class conflict."

16. Only Becker, "Social Welfare Leaders as Spokesmen for the Poor" Social Casework 49 (Feb. 1968), pp. 82-89, carefully studied the biographies of leaders in Social Work to separate the two factions. While not all of the social reformers were from upper class backgrounds, they were all tied to politically elite families.

17. Ibid.


 pg. 64 cite the Depression of 1893 as a significant landmark in the failure of the friendly visitors to cope with massive poverty with voluntarism. Becker notes also that the COS's were beginning to criticize visitors for "often being absent from the City on Social obligations" at times when they were most needed. As Lubove (p.163) notes the missionary zeal of the upper class reformers had also faded as relief work became subordinated to business obligations and the wealthy elites eventually established a comfortable role on the Boards to Trustees of agencies.


Charity movement and Settlement movement had similarities.

25. This analogy is drawn from NASW, op.cit., p. 1176; see also J.P. Rousmaniere, "Cultural Hybrid in the Slums: The College Woman and the Settlement House, American Quarterly 22 (1970), pp. 45-66 for a social analysis of the composition of Settlement residents.


28. On the consolidation of journals, see Trattner, op.cit., p. 150; on the election of Addams, see Becker, "Exit..", p.67.

29. Lubove, op.cit. p.147.


32. Ibid.,p.128.


34. The phrase was coined by and is a chapter title in Woodroffe, op.cit., but has been used subsequently to refer to the 1920s, if not to the entire period from 1918 on.

35. Social Work's role in the 1920s as an agent for progressive change and repository of reform is best found in Clarke Chambers, Seedtime for Reform and Social Action 1918-1933 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1963).


38. Ibid, p.83.


40. Bruno, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-47 for the full program.

41. Spano, *op. cit.*, see particularly p. 168 on the peace program of the RFM. 42. Summarized in Ibid, p. 188; see also Bertha Reynolds, *An Unchartered Journey* (New York: Citadel, 1963)

43. A debate has frequently occurred on the Left as to the purposes of social service work. In the early and mid 1930s when the RFM began, the focus of organizers was on radical programs and unionization, and practice was only vaguely considered. Similarly in the 1960s at the height of activism, Social Work was an arena like many others to fight the War, racism, etc. As radicalism dies down it tends to center more on professionalism and good service provision is viewed as central. The importance historically of radicals delivering social services is stressed in Ann Withorn "Surviving as a Radical Service Worker: Lessons from the History of Movement Provided Services" Radical America 12 (July/August 1978), pp. 9-23. This article would view the development of radicals-in-traditional-services as part of the professionalization project and the absorption of radicals within that middle class project.

44. For a good history of how the educational dispute played itself out in this period, see, Leslie Leighninger, "Graduate and Undergraduate Social Work Education: Roots of Conflict," *Journal of Education for Social Work*, 20:3, Fall 1984, pp. 66-76.

45. The links of Hamilton and Perlman, the former's "person-in-situation" model and the latter's "problem-solving approach" with recent generic practice models is pointed out in Germain and Gitterman,
op. cit. p. 352 (for Hamilton); Bartlett, op. cit. on both figures; and see R. Ramsey, "Snapshots of Practice in the 20th Century", Social Worker 52 (Spring 1984), pp. 11-16 which in a short review describes the work of Hamilton and Perlman and the dialectic between the medical model and the more social approaches.


47. Ibid, p. 319.


50. The best sources on the radicals-in-the-professions movement are Joel Gerstl and Glenn Jacobs, Professions for the People: The Politics of Skill (New York:Schenkman, 1976) and Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," in Pat Walker (ed.) Between Labor and Capital (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979). Interestingly, the idea that professionals would form a vanguard and lead the social services to the Left was also believed (though disapproved of) by Daniel Moynihan, see Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: Free Press, 1970).


54. By the late 1960s, once the New Left, anti-war movement, and Black Power movements were at their zeniths, it was clear that simply being for community organization or being a "professional change agent" hardly made one a radical. A major debate developed not only in Social Work, but in related professions, between those who regarded professional advocacy and leadership as a positive force and those who saw it as merely "therapy" or domination and cooptation of the poor by professionals. The debate between Frances Fox Piven and Summer Rosen in issue 1 of *Social Policy* reflects this as Piven argued advocacy was at best a diversion for the poor, while Rosen argued expertise was needed by poor people and other social movements which only professionals could provide. See "Whom does the Advocate Planner Serve?" *Social Policy* 1 (1970), pp. 32-37; Martin Rein in "Social Work in Search of a Radical Profession," *Social Work* 15 (April 1970), pp. 13-28 classified "community sociotherapy" along with traditional casework as theories accepting social conditions. He noted it was the purpose a method-casework or organization—was put to, not the method itself, that entailed radicalism.

55. Rein, *Ibid*, p. 25, argues "it is not surprising that the more radical doctrines have failed to win wide support and hence remain at the margins of the profession." Richan and Mendelsohn, op. cit., not only aver that the profession as a whole was not embracing radicalism, but contrast the rather civil conduct of social work students in the 1960s with protests of students from other academic disciplines.

56. In 1972, for example, the Family Service Association of America, in a statement on education, criticized the prepartion and political commitments of
some of the students graduating from Social Work schools, quoted in Gilbert and Specht, op. cit. p. 323.

57. Ad Hoc Committee, op. cit.

58. Richan and Mendelsohn, op. cit., Chapters 6 and 7 give considerable description of the changes in NASW in the late 1960's and the different manner in which worker-agency conflicts were handled between 1959 and 1969, see particularly pp. 153-55.

59. Many of the new theoretical approaches were indeed more self-reflective about the need for integration of the field and a move away from both fragmentation and the medical model. Germain and Gitterman. op.cit., p. 343, place their "life model" approach in the historical context of Social Work's dialectical strains and the crisis of the 1960s, Bartlett, op.cit. also sought to resolve many of the historic dilemmas and splits in the Social Work field.

However, while in theory and within the academy this task is well achieved, the theories break down in the employment market and political-social environment. The integrative theories have failed to dominate practice or policies in the field.

60. If upward social and economic mobility and reduction of social inequality are broadly goals of unions, they certainly are also reflected within the professional mobility project. A study reported in NASW, op.cit. indicates that one-half of the NASW membership (which includes only the most self-conscious professionalized members of the field, since most social workers are not members) had fathers who were in blue-collar or low level white collar occupations. The study concluded that Social Work presented a strong upward mobility direction for its recruits, particularly for men and minorities.

61. There is a large literature on the problematic nature of trade unionism as a structure for political or social radicalism. The view of Marx and Engels and Lenin was that trade unionism would breed purely
economistic views unless there was conscious intervention by revolutionaries into the unions. Recent left-wing views have focused also on the structural limitations of trade unionism, and the tendency of unions to absorb radicals, rather than vice versa. See, for example, Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973). The traditional labor relations literature has long argued that unions represent workers' interest in job control, while political and social concerns are solely an importation of intellectuals into the trade unions, see Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: Macmillan, 1928).
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