Islamism, State Control Over Religion and Social Identity: Turkey and Egypt

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ISLAMISM, STATE CONTROL OVER RELIGION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY:
TURKEY AND EGYPT

by

Alper Y. Dede

A Dissertation
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Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
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Dr. Kevin Corder, Advisor

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking elements of post cold war politics of the Middle East is the resurgence of Islamism and its political manifestations. The multifaceted manifestations of religious politics have sparked a renewed interest in explaining why religious movements have become principal contestants in the politics of the wider Muslim world. Ample cases exist regarding the resurgence of religious politics in the Muslim world.

Especially in the last three decades, the resurgent Islamism\(^1\) has continually and considerably caught the attention of the world by gaining both popular acclaim and notoriety as a powerful alternative voice of opposition against the west and "status-quo" regimes of the Muslim World. Democratization, Islamist political activism and the relationship between Islamists and politics are among the most critical political issues for many Middle Eastern countries as various Islamist movements increasingly challenge governments for greater participation in the political process (Abdo 2000; Esposito 1995, 1998; Esposito and Voll 1996; Fuller 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori 2004; Owen 2000; Wiktorowicz 2004; Wickham 2002).

Muslims everywhere, not just in Muslim majority countries, are increasingly calling for democratization, which is an indication that Muslims can reflect their political views through the existing political systems to pressure governments to reform or to challenge the secular governments for power (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). In the

---

\(^1\) Islamism (or referred to by some as political Islam) and Islamists will be discussed later in detail Chapter 2 and 4 separately for each country.
Muslim world, Islamist groups insistently called for reform as Islam has eclipsed secular ideologies as the primary source of political activism (Wickham, 2002). Islamists believe that the huge problems faced by the contemporary Muslim societies could be resolved through a return to religion. *Al-Islam huwa al-hall* (Islam is the solution) is the slogan of most Islamists in the Muslim world.

The current debates on Islamism, though useful, often revolve around the concepts of security, democracy, or stability. Those debates generally overlook the importance of *process*, and the *mechanisms* and *complexity* of Islamist political struggle. In addition, the current debates often overlook the fact that Islamist groups change over time, and generate dynamic strategies to combat official constraints, and there is more to the relationship between the Islamists and the state than just state repression and Islamist violence. Moreover, those debates often times ignore how Islamists’ concern for preserving social identity against perceived external threats contribute to their politicization. Thus, the major puzzle is about the increasing role of religion in the political movements throughout the Muslim world, and how Islamists resist and/or respond to official constraints as well as perceived external threats to social identity. Moreover, current debates on Islamism do not generally link Islamist political activism to Islamist frames which are vigorously used by Islamists to counter perceived external threats and the state control over religion. A frame is “an interpretive schemata that signifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137).

In relation to those frames and identity oriented political struggle waged by the Islamists, this study conceptualizes the recent growth of Islamism in the Muslim world through a
Gramscian theoretical framework which helps one articulate a theory of social and political revolution through the creation of what he terms “counter-hegemonic bloc”.

The Islamist response to the state control and perceived external threats often takes place through the mobilization of limited resources available to them and through the creation of resonant frames to broaden their base of appeal among various segments of the Muslim society. In regards to understanding the role of religion in Middle Eastern politics, this study shows that it is not religion per se but the institutional, organizational and historical factors in relation to the way politics work that define Islamism’s political appearance. Thus, several questions should be thoroughly answered regarding our major puzzle: how and why do conflictive or cooperative patterns of Islamist’s policies emerge and change in the context of status-quo oriented state authoritarianism? Under such authoritarian settings, what makes people to get involved in Islamist activism given the fact that political activism is highly risky? What aspect(s) of Islamist activism attracts those people? How do the perceived threats to social identity mobilize Islamists for more political action? How do Islamists use resonant frames to broaden their bases of political activism? Within the context of those general questions, my study is going to scrutinize Islamist political activism in relation to state control of religion and the Islamists’ perceived threats to social identity.

Islamists of Egypt and Turkey have been challenging the status-quo oriented regimes through a wide range of activities from political participation to civil society activism and from contentious politics to charity activities especially for the last three decades. This study argues that Islamist involvement in politics strongly correlates with two interrelated factors: first, the state regulation over religion; second, Islamists’ perceived threats to social identity. Through the proliferation of means of communications
and the growing access of the Islamists to the media, for almost three decades Islamists have been increasingly concerned about state control over their political activities and about preservation of their social identity. Political Islam is a multifaceted phenomenon which is produced by a complex set of independent variables. However the aspects of state control over religion and identity have been understudied.

A second puzzle is about some of the theoretical approaches to the emergence of Islamism within the greater framework of the relationship between religion and politics in Muslim countries. Many studies on the role of religion in politics (i) treat secular and religious as binary forces (ii) study religious parties and groups only in relation to secular institutions (iii) focus on macro level trends and the leadership structure of the religious parties and groups, and (iv) regard political religion as some form of deviation from the global imperative of modernity and secularism (Tepe 2002, 28). Fascinatingly, what happens throughout the Muslim world is contrary to Modernization theory which posits that the importance of religion in modern societies and their politics would inevitably decrease in a gradual fashion as societies become industrialized modern societies.²

This study will contribute particularly to our understanding of Islamist political activism and the relationship between the state and Islam in Egypt and Turkey in two interrelated aspects: the causal aspect and the descriptive/conceptual aspect. In regards to the causal aspect, this study relates the government control over religion with politicization

² Weber's conception of religion laid the ground for the binary understanding of religion and traditional society as an alternative to secular and rational society. According to Weber, religious authority, as charismatic authority, forms the foundation of traditional societies. For Weber, traditional societies are unstable in their approach to the transfer of power because charismatic leadership legitimizes itself through beliefs and faith, as opposed to reason. However, Weber's study of Calvinism as "this-worldly" religious doctrine and its instigation of capitalism introduced the idea that religious beliefs have the capacity to transform the social and economic orders, though as an unintended consequence (Weber 1930). Weber also notes that religion and reason have contradictory conceptions of the world, therefore they can not coexist (Weber 1993).
of the Islamists within the context of state-society relations. In regards to the conceptual aspect, this study relates Islamism with social movement literature, frames, and Gramscian struggle of anti-hegemonic war of position.

In regards to the causal aspect, this study will provide better explanatory tools to understand Islamist activism while providing a critique of the dominant conceptual models, i.e., the theories that can be labeled as the conflict and/or crisis theories, which are derived from the Modernization theories and (Neo)Orientalist theories. Such theories generally overlook the importance of process, and the mechanisms and complexity of Islamist political struggle. Many scholars like Dekmejian, Hoffman and Barakat, Wickham and Berman explain the rise of Islamism in terms of crisis theory which is a derivation of Modernization theory. Those approaches interpret the rise of Islamism as a reactionary response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions in Muslim societies (often L. Pye’s five developmental crises are cited by them). The proponents of crisis theories fail to focus upon many crucial aspects related to Islamist activism such as their frame and discourse creation, alliance building, grassroots activities, popular appeal and member recruitment.

In regards to the conceptual aspect, this study analyses Islamism in both countries through a selective reading of the social movement theory because it provides better explanatory tools than those of the Modernization and/or (Neo)Orientalist theories. Social movements are defined by Meyer and Tarrow (1998, 4) as “collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people with common purposes and

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3 Hypotheses are provided under the section titled “Hypotheses and Method.”
4 Gramsci’s conceptualization of state and society, the role of ideology and organic intellectuals as unifiers of belief and action, the role performed by organization, leadership, and each individual member in terms of an organic unity within the revolutionary movement, and the long term strategies of education and preparation (Gramsci 1971), all have their parallels in modern Islamist movements. This study is
Solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities. Social movement organizations (SMOs) diagnose the grievances in a way that resonates with members and potential members, propose a plausible solution that could be accomplished by movement participation, and issue a call to arms that motivates action. A successful SMO must also work hard to maintain the saliency of supportive frames while attacking, debunking, and ridiculing counter frames (McVeigh, Myers and Sikkink 2004). Islamists groups also take part in the creation of meaning through the frames which will be discussed in the course of this study. In regards to the identity politics and social/political activism, this study approaches Islamist activism from a Gramscian perspective through the analysis of frames and social identity. An extensive literature exists on identity politics and political activism in various Western contexts, however such studies are lacking within the context of Middle Eastern societies. Thus, another contribution of this study is approaching Islamist activism from a Gramscian perspective through the analysis of frames and social identity in non-Western and (semi)authoritarian contexts.

In addition to the causal and conceptual contributions, this study fills a significant gap in the existing literature on the Middle East. The existing literature lacks of in depth cross-national and cross-cultural comparisons. Cross-national and cross-cultural studies provide better insight through a comparative perspective which may not always be achieved by individually studying cases. Substantive research on various Islamist movements in separate Arab countries exists; however there is a lack of comprehensive going to relate Islamist activism to Gramscian political theory through Chapters 3 and 5 as a form of war of position and counter-hegemony against the secularist elites in Turkey and Egypt. Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that the study of Islamic activism remained isolated from the research on social movements, and "most publications on Islamic activism are either descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements." The mechanisms of activism are understudied, and scholarship tends to ignore developments in social movement research that can provide theoretical leverage over many issues relevant to Islamic activism (2004, 3).
cross-national and cross-cultural studies on Islamism. In this regard, this study of two culturally and politically different countries of the Middle East will be a significant contribution to the literature on Islamism.

Existing Literature

What is Islamism and How Does Islamism Manifest Itself?

In Kramer’s account, the term Islamism has increasingly been used to denote the political manifestation of the religion of Islam (2003, 2). Often times, the terms political Islam and Islamism are used synonymously (Fuller 2003, xi). However, being Muslim and being Islamist are not synonymous. Ismail argues that contemporary constructions of being Muslim cannot be equated to being Islamist. Thus, the assertion of a Muslim identity does not necessarily represent an endorsement of these movements. In Ismail’s account, Islamist actors can be classified, largely, into militants, conservatives and moderates. Militants originate from lower-middle class backgrounds and they use violence as a means of action. Conservatives and moderates belong to the middle classes with professionals as their main supporters. Conservatives focus on morality issues and seek Islamization of society and state institutions but not a takeover of political power. Moderates attempt to work within the institutional channels of participation. Ismail (2004) counts the Muslim Brotherhood in the category of moderates. Islamism entails a political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government which implements the Shari’a. However, Islamization signifies a drive to Islamize the society which involves a process through which various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions. Islamist politics both diverge

\footnote{Note the parallels between Ismail’s account of Islamists and Husain’s account.}
and converge with the process of Islamization. Thus, Islamists and Muslims who seek Islamization of their societies may not necessarily be the same group of people (2004, 614-631).

The version of Islam proposed by the Islamists in general has many political overtones. For all of the Islamists, Islam is a holistic way of life, not just a religion, which encompasses every aspect of human life (Fuller 2003, xi; Husain 2003). As a result, Islamists plead to redesign the state by implementing the Islamic law (*Shari’a*), despite the fact that various interpretations of the *Shari’a* exist among the Islamists. Islamism in the modern sense basically grew as an aspiration to have a government based on Islam and it manifests itself in three different dispositions: Revolutionary, Traditionalist and Modernist. Although all Islamists (not necessarily all Muslims) would like to have an Islamic state and prefer living under an Islamic state to living under a secular state, they greatly differ in their willingness, determination and methods for achieving that ultimate end. Therefore, Islamists do not constitute a monolith in many aspects. For instance, the Modernist Islamists and the Traditionalist Islamists would be more active regarding Islamization of their societies than politically pursuing programs for the establishment of the *Shari’a*. Other Muslim groups such as sufis (mystics) do not advocate Islamism at all although they would be willing to Islamize their societies. Inside the same society, several types of Islamist movements can often be found, and those separate movements usually hardly cooperate (Husain 2003, 261-285; also see: Hamzawy 2005; Ismail 2000; Akhavi 1992; Bayat 1998; Lapidus 1996; Ismail 2004).

The vast majority of the Islamists are willing to participate in politics and they do not denounce democracy and Western style political institutions. In fact, they draw a lot of parallels between Western style democracy and some classical Islamic concepts such as
social and economic justice, equality, *shura* (consultation), *ijma*’ (consensus of the Muslim community, collective decision-making), and *bey’a* (affirmations of communal loyalty—originally the term denotes the consent provided by the tribal leaders to the first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, which is considered as synonymous with elections by many Islamists)\(^7\) (Fuller 2002, 50-52; Esposito 1995).

Violence and denunciation of politics are the two most important criteria that distinguish the violent and non-violent Islamists. According to the rationale of the violent revolutionary Islamists, all secularist regimes are illegitimate because they represent or are direct products of *jahiliyyah* which is the other extreme of God’s *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty). Accordingly, only Allah rules, humans can have no sovereignty and Islamic revelation takes precedence over the reason-centered view of the world.\(^8\)

**Emergence of Islamism**

The emergence of various forms of Islamism is also a result of domestic factors as well as the international context. Fuller argues that several regimes in the Middle East have decided to play the dangerous game of trying to out-Islam the Islamists becoming more conservative so as to bolster their credentials against Islamist opposition. For example in Egypt, the government controlled Al-Azhar which is a prestigious voice in interpreting Islam, has started to issue more conservative rulings as the regime perceived the emerging Islamists as an increasing threat. Thus, Islam becomes the vehicle of the struggle between the state and its challengers as well as the expression of many different agendas in the

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\(^7\) For a detailed assessment of Islamist concepts on democracy, see Kramer’s article: Kramer, Gudrun (1997) “Islamist Notions of Democracy” In: *Political Islam* Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 71-82

\(^8\) Following the footsteps of Qutb, current violent Revolutionaries consider the struggle to be their ultimate duty against secularist Muslim governments and against those individual Muslims who have fallen into *jahiliyyah*, and only jihad can bring the *nizam Islami* (Islamic order) to the Muslim world. Qutb’s thought will be examined in chapter 4.
Muslim world. Similarly, Islam and Islamist movements provide a key source of identity to peoples focused on strengthening their social cohesion against Western cultural dominance (Fuller 2003, 54-55; Schwedler 2001, 1-17).

Many scholars like Dekmejian, Hoffman, Barakat, and Berman explain the rise of Islamism in terms of the Crisis theory: they interpret the rise of Islamism as a reactionary response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions. Many of those scholars refer to L. Pye’s five developmental crises (*crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and distribution*). According to the Crisis theories, growing disillusionment with secular nationalism and problems of legitimacy in those regimes along with uneven socioeconomic development and political liberalization often instigate social reactions that take religious forms (Esposito and Voll 1996; Toprak 1981; Zubaida 1993; Burgat 1993; Güle 1996). The rapid enforcement of socioeconomic changes produced a group of people who could not cope with the rapid changes. These masses reacted to modernity by asserting tradition. Thus, religion only acts as a tool of opposition for masses against the radical elitist-secularist policies that aim to rebuild a new society. The Crisis models usually start with the discussion of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and their impact on the frustrated masses. Later other factors come into the picture such as the failure of secular regimes, the impact of economic crises on the masses, and the legacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Esposito 1995; Esposito and Voll 1996; Owen 2000; Özbudun 1976; Heper and Landau 1991). However, those explanations usually presented by the proponents of crisis theories are only partial explanations for the emergence of Islamism, because the proponents of the crisis theories argue that driven by the developmental crises, the Islamists seek an outlet through political action.
In her recent article titled “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society” Berman attempts to demonstrate “how the rise of Islamism can be illuminated by findings of the literatures on revolution and civil society, and vice versa.” Berman’s major argument revolves around “the declining efficacy and legitimacy” of the Egyptian state which was for Berman “the necessary precondition for Islamism’s rise” (2003, 12). Those crises create a stalemate where “the existing regime retains political power while ceding substantial control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger [i.e., the Islamists]” Berman also argues that “this stalemate ... is largely a consequence of Islamists’ ability to expand their presence in civil society” (2003, 12). Berman provides Nasser’s mostly failed policies of Pan-Arabism and Arab Socialism, the Six-Day War of 1967, deterioration of Egypt’s economic situation, unemployment, and massive population growth as examples of the crises which eventually led to the emergence of the Islamist movements (2003, 13-14). Thus, Berman concludes that “it was against this background that the contemporary Islamist movement in Egypt emerged” (2003, 14).

Berman also discusses the Egyptian Islamists successes in the Egyptian civil society in length and argues that “the Islamists offered religion as a solution to the crisis” and they gained support and recognition of the masses through their civil society activism by mainly providing “their constituents with a variety of much-needed services” (2003, 15).

Crisis theories might be partially explanatory regarding the emergence of those movements; however, they are not sufficiently explanatory regarding the nature and direction that those movements take in their political environments. Nevertheless, the proponents of crisis theories fail to focus upon many crucial aspects related to the

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9 Further discussion of Berman’s arguments will be provided in Chapter 5.
activities of Islamists such as their grassroots activities, membership profile, frame creation, alliance building, popular appeal, member recruitment and creation of frames.

Two major theories, Modernization theory and Orientalism, deeply influence the way in which most analysts explain Islamist activism and the rise of Islamism. The Modernization theory asserts that due to the process of secularization, the authority of religion in modern societies and its political role would gradually decrease as mechanical solidarity transforms into organic solidarity through a shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies). The causal mechanism of the theory functions from societal secularization to political secularization. Modernization theory claims that the more a society is modernized through industrialization, urbanization, improvement of communications and mass education, the more religion loses its political significance. Through secularization of the society people become less religious; and religion becomes a private and an individual issue, rather than a public and political one.

Contrary to the expectations of Modernization theory and Orientalism, Islamism in the Muslim world has been gradually gaining strength, widening its base of support, increasing its political activities and becoming a significant economic and social force as well. Again, contrary to the expectations of both views (Modernization theory and Orientalism), Islamism in many Muslim countries does not reject modernism by any means; in fact most of those movements are modern in their leadership, methodology and discourse. Regarding the role of religion, the Modernization approach proved to be wrong about the Muslim world. Especially since the 1980s, Islamist activists in Egypt and Turkey have gradually become a major political force.

In parallel accounts, groups such as the Islamists in Egypt and Turkey are regarded as a reaffirmation of traditional religious beliefs and an outlet for the frustrations of anomic social conditions brought by rapid population increase, urbanization and industrialization. Those studies generally focus upon the strains that are created by the tension between modernization, political activism, political institutionalization, and traditional beliefs (Gellner 1985; Huntington 1968; Kepel 1993; Smelser 1963). For those studies, the strains of modernization and Westernization combined with secularization created the prevailing problems of many Muslim societies that could only be solved by turning to Islamic ideals (Esposito 1995; Esposito and Voll 1996; Owen 2000; Poulton 1997; Özbudun 2000; Heper and Evin 1994). However, the Islamist groups in many Muslim societies are modern, not traditional, in their leadership, ideology and organization. It can be said that if the 19th century Islamist-revivalist movements were an attempt to modernize religion, the contemporary movements are just the opposite: they try to Islamize modern structures.

Another approach that distorts our understanding of Islamism is Orientalism. The prospect for democratization in the Middle East has been seen as very low by most Western scholars who advocate an Orientalist view, which can be briefly explained as the employment of Western ethnocentrism towards the analysis of the Middle East. In Gellner’s account, Islam displays unique characteristics as a religion in terms of its immunity to secularization and Islam hinders civil society and secularization as well as democratization. Thus, Gellner assumes that Islam cannot be secularized and Muslim societies cannot converge with Western models (Gellner 1994). Sadowski, in his critical essay on the new Orientalism, argues that the thesis that Middle Eastern societies are resistant to democratization had been the standard tenet of Orientalist thought for decades, and since the 1980s a neo-Orientalist view has emerged. For Sadowski the new generation
of Orientalists inverted some of the old assumptions and used a new vocabulary that allowed them to link their work to a wider international debate about the relationship between civil society and democratization. They sought to prove not only—as Daniel Pipes put it—that "Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the world" but that they always would (quoted in Sadowski 1997, 34).

Islamists, Democracy, Civil Society and the State Control over Religion

A significant issue that is extensively discussed in the literature on Islamism is the relationship between Islamist groups and democracy. Scholars like B. Lewis, G. Kepel, A. Perlmutter, E. Gellner and D. Pipes argue that democracy is incompatible with Islamism and may, in fact, be incompatible also with Islam itself. Hudson argues that the political culture concept, as part of modernization-political development paradigm, was abused and misused to explain Arab politics. Hudson maintains that so many errors were committed such as gross overgeneralization (Patai), crude Orientalism (Pryce-Jones), Eurocentric chauvinism (Kedourie), anthropologic reductionism (Gellner), and media sound-bites like “Shi’a are suicidal, but Sunnis are homicidal” (Hudson 1995, 61). But for some other scholars things are less clear-cut. For instance, scholars like Esposito, Voll, Sadowski, Fuller and Robinson, make a distinction between the legitimate Islamist political groups and extremist ones; and for them the mainstream Islamism in both countries is not violent, extremist, and marginal. Many authors including Norton, Ibrahim, Moussalli, Al-Sayyid, Esposito, Wickham and Robinson believe that the Islamist movements can be a force for democratic expansion in the Middle East. More importantly, those scholars stress the need for democracy, party pluralism, and free elections.

A considerable chunk of the literature on the contemporary Islamist political activism revolves around the concept of civil society. The dominance of both the Egyptian
and Turkish states in the modern era cast doubts about the existence of mature civil society in those countries. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, various voluntary associations existed in the Middle East as far back as the eighth and ninth centuries. Korany (1998), Moussalli (1995) and Ibrahim (1995) argue that those voluntary associations were in the form of mystic orders (sufi tariqa), independent ulema, merchants, guilds, sects, religious foundations (awqaf), and semi-independent self-organizing religious groups (millet). Ibrahim (2002, 31-32) points out that the traditional Middle Eastern societies not only knew the equivalent of civil formations, but also depended on them for survival because social services and economic functions were not expected as immediate obligations of the state and they were mostly left to local communities, religious foundations, and semi-independent religious groups. In the last two centuries, most of those traditional structures either disintegrated or severely transformed through the direct Western penetration of Muslim societies, and through secularizing-nationalizing Westernized states in the region.

Norton argues that the functioning of civil society is one major necessary condition of a democratic regime. Norton defines civil society as “a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen” which is more than a mixture of various groups; it also refers to civility and tolerance for different political views and social attitudes (1995, 7-11). Although civil society is likely to be in opposition to the government, for Norton, the government “must play the essential role of referee, rule-maker and regulator of civil society” (1995, 12). In the Middle East, various associations that form civil society often provide an outlet for the free expression of political ideas. In Egypt, the government clampdown on the politically vibrant professional associations in the late 1980s and the
1990s coincided with a dramatic rise of an assertive Islamist activism through civil society (Esposito 1998, 249-260). Similarly, limited liberalization measures introduced after the end of the 1980 military regime in Turkey opened up the public space for the Islamists. However, as the Islamists gradually gained power, the Turkish military stepped in.

Korany (1998, 60) reports that Islamic associations constituted 34 percent of all Egyptian voluntary associations in 1990. Thanks to the Islamic obligation of zakat (obligatory alms), many of those Islamic associations do not face the chronic problem of financing that risk the existence of other secular private voluntary organizations. The Egyptian government, Korany points out, is increasingly sensitive about the politicization of those associations; in 1988, the Ministry of Social Affairs, which supervises the associations in Egypt, forbade for any voluntary association to go beyond its purely social mission. The governmental tendency to exercise control over voluntary associations is strongest toward those Islamic associations increasingly gaining political capital, like the Muslim Brotherhood (Korany 1998, 61-62).

Political Islam and the State in Egypt

Within a decade after its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood “had built its identity as an internally disciplined, financially resourceful, pro-Palestine anticolonial movement appealing to educated lower-middle- and middle-class effendis” who were alienated by the exclusionary political and economic system of interwar Egypt” (El-Ghobashy 2005, 380; also see Mitchell 1969 and Lia 1998). Mitchell argues that Banna’s first priority was to Islamize the society and applying the Shari‘a through political action. Banna ran and lost in parliamentary elections in 1942 and 1945. The Muslim Brotherhood

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11 In the Ottoman Turkish the word effendi meant “Mr.” or “Sir”. It is a title of respect generally used for educated people and/or government employees in the Middle East.
members actively supported Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser's new regime created in 1952 after the military takeover of the Free Officers had ousted King Farouk of Egypt. However, the organization was dissolved by Nasser in 1954, and its leaders and followers were imprisoned. Later, Sadat's more liberal policies and his easing of tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood for the purpose of balancing out the leftists in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created opportunities for the Muslim Brotherhood to resume political action (Palmer 2007, Lia 1998, Mitchell 1969).

Especially during the 1990s Islamic political and social activism continued to root itself more deeply both in Egypt and Turkey, with growing strength among the middle classes, professionals, students, recently urbanized employees and relatively well-to-do artisans and technicians. The major strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood is a pragmatic accommodation of the existing political system because in terms of politics the group has become totally focused on constitutional channels to institute the changes that they anticipate. Another important aspect of the group is the renunciation of violence as a strategy which is a different approach than that of the radical militant groups. Different from the common misinterpretation of jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood has a more comprehensive interpretation of the concept. They see jihad as a personal and collective struggle to achieve social justice, solidarity and endeavor to build an Islamic state from below (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 65-66). In October 1994, the Brotherhood organized a two-day Conference on Freedoms and Civil Society in Cairo by bringing together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, including government figures, to reach a consensus on basic rights. Also, a delegation from the conference visited the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express support and condemnation of his stabbing by militant Islamists. At the same time, the Brotherhood issued statements
condemning every attack by militant Islamists on government figures and tourists (El-Ghobashy 2005, 383).  

The Egyptian government is anxious about the successes of Islamist social and political organizations whose reputation grew gradually with their successes. The Mubarak government silences the sources of criticism and opposition and maintains tight control over all sorts of elections be they local, national, syndical or within universities (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 36). The Muslim Brothers' successful performance in the associations is due to their "superior organizational and get-out-the-vote skills and transparent management of the syndicates' finances" (El-Ghobashy 2005, 380).  

The year 1992 was a turning point in the government's approach to the Muslim Brothers which shifted from halfhearted toleration to further legal and physical repression. In 1992, the Brotherhood candidates won all of the elections to the medical and bar associations and embarrassed the Egyptian government after the devastating Cairo earthquake in October by efficiently providing relief for the victims. The official response was harsh; shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister issued Military Decree 4/1992 requiring government approval for the collection and distribution of donations. One year later in 1993, the government-controlled assembly passed legislation titled "Law for the Guarantees of Democracy in Professional Associations" that required participation of at least fifty percent of members of professional associations in elections of their leading organs. If they fail to do that, members would be called on to participate in a second election and a quorum of one third of them would be sufficient. If such condition was not met, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs then had the power to appoint an  

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12 Also see the official website of the Muslim Brotherhood in English at http://www.ikhwanweb.com
administrative council, made up of the oldest members of the association and headed by a senior judge (Al-Sayyid 1995, 142-143).

As the Brotherhood members took control of many professional associations, the Egyptian government tightened its grip on the NGOs. According to the HRW (Human Rights Watch) report, Law 84/2002 severely limits the scope of permissible NGO activity in Egypt. For example, Article 11 of Law 84/2002 forbids groups from pursuing the goals of “threatening national unity” or “violating public order or morals”. In practice, Article 11 gave the government officials wide powers to harass activists and dissolve civil society groups. According to the report, the government may use Article 11 as a basis to block an NGO’s registration; to reject particular persons as founders or board candidates; or to dissolve a group and seize its assets. (HRW Report on Egypt 2005, 8-12).

In spite of the restrictions imposed by the ruling NDP, the Muslim Brotherhood members continued to win the syndicate elections. As a response, the government simply closed lawyers’ and engineers’ syndicates in 1995 and 1996. The social support network created by the Brotherhood in the early 1990s in those associations was an enormous draw for these professionals. The Brothers offered full health insurance and other considerable welfare benefits that no other organization could provide. Similarly, the Brothers established virtual hegemony in the student associations in major universities. The Brotherhood used its extensive social resources to support an alienated population (Campagna 1996, 278-304; Esposito 1995, 98-100).

In February 2005, President Mubarak proposed an amendment to article 76 of the constitution that would allow, for the first time, multi-candidate presidential elections. A referendum was held on May 25, 2005, as required by the constitution, and the amendment was approved. However, the terms of the newly adopted amendment make it very difficult
for candidates other than those of Mubarak's NDP to run for the elections. The difficulties include requiring aspiring presidential candidates to first secure the support of 250 elected officials (including 140 local council members, 65 People's Assembly deputies, and 25 members of the Shura Council), and requiring that the parties they represent to have existed for at least five years. The referendum was boycotted by some of Egypt's leading opposition parties, including the Wafd Party ("Politics of Egypt").

The last presidential election in Egypt was held on September 7, 2005. Husni Mubarak won a fifth consecutive six-year term in office, with 88.6% of the votes. Until the presidential elections of 2005, Egyptians have only been able to approve or reject a candidate appointed by the Egyptian Parliament which is dominated by Mubarak's NDP. Ten parties joined the elections, the leading candidates were Husni Mubarak from the ruling National Democratic Party, Nooman Gomaa from the New Wafd Party and Ayman Nour from the Tomorrow Party. Gomaa and Nour received 7.3% and 2.8% of the votes respectively. However, the voter turnout rate in the last elections was around 22%. Under the election law, parties proposed candidates for the election, which were reviewed by the Presidential Election Commission. The Muslim Brotherhood was not permitted to propose a candidate for the election because the organization is banned by the government, which prohibits political parties with a stated religious agenda. The Brotherhood did not endorse any of the other candidates, but strongly encouraged people to go to the polls and vote for anybody but Mubarak. Some of the main legal opposition parties, including the leftist Tagammu Party and the Nasserist Party, boycotted the election having doubts about the fairness of the whole process. ("Egyptian Presidential Election, 2005").

2005 was also the year of parliamentary elections for the People's Assembly (Majlis Al-Sha'ab), the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament. Of the 454 seats, 10 are
appointed by presidential decree and 444 are elected. There are 222 constituencies, with each returning two MPs in two categories: "workers and farmers" (the Constitution says these must account for at least half of deputies), and "professionals". The winner in each category is decided on a first-past-the-post basis. To win outright, a candidate must get over 50% of the vote. Otherwise the top two candidates have to compete in a second round. The Muslim Brotherhood had a list of over 150 independent candidates ("Guide to Egypt's Election" BBC News). The elections took place in three stages. The Muslim Brotherhood won 87 seats in the 454-seat Assembly, almost six times the number it had before. The ruling NDP won 311 seats, significantly less than the 404 seats it gained in 2000, but just nine seats over the crucial two-thirds parliamentary majority required to amend the constitution. For the first time in the last five or even six decades, there is an opposition representation in the Egyptian Parliament around 30 percent. And the strongest bloc within the opposition representation is the Muslim Brotherhood. Most likely this is going to generate pressures on Mubarak and his government to pay more attention to domestic demands, to pay more attention to position platforms, and to the Muslim Brotherhood. (Hamzawy, CNN Interview; "Egyptian Parliamentary election of 2005").

Political Islam and the State in Turkey

In Turkey, the religious party in Turkey was banned many times. However, the Islamist party resurfaced again under different names. Each time when the party was outlawed, the major justification was that the religious party was working to overthrow the government to establish an Islamic state in secret. (Esposito 1995; Howe 2000; Özbudun 2000).

The nature of the secularization process in Turkey paves the way for Islam's continuous politicization (Kadıoğlu 2005). For Kadıoğlu, the strict secularization projects
from above that originate from Kemalist\textsuperscript{13} reforms offended Islamic ways of life in Turkish society. In order to establish a Western-style regime, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk initiated radical changes to separate religion and state such as the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate (Kingdom) and Ottoman Islamic Caliphate in 1924, the abolition of religious schools in 1924, the adoption of the secular civil code from Switzerland in 1926, the change of the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet in 1928, and the declaration of secularism with a constitutional amendment in 1937.\textsuperscript{14} Toprak argues that the Turkish principle of secularism is more related to the French tradition of laicism, or even Jacobin anti-clericalism, than the Anglo-Saxon tradition of separation of church and state (Toprak 1996; Göle 1996). For much of the time since Atatürk founded modern Turkey on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s, Turkey has featured a strong and politically influential central state, and a settled policy of hegemonic, state-enforced secularism. This created a political fault line dividing the secularist political and military elite from pro-Islamic, anti-statist opposition forces. The voters have held unsteady loyalties and parties have consequently had short lifespans, which led to newly forming or shifting political alliances (Tepe 2005, 70).

Turkish secularism under Atatürk and his successors never meant the separation of religion and state (Ayoob 2004, 451-463). The state appoints and pays all the prayer leaders in Turkey’s mosques, which are also subsidized by the treasury. The prayer leaders must be graduates of state-run \textit{Imam-Hatip} (Prayer Leader-Preacher) Schools training religious officials and prayer leaders. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (\textit{Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı}) sends sermons to all mosques to be read during the sermons of Friday.

\textsuperscript{13} Kemalism refers to Atatürkism (M. Kemal Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey).
congregations which is a strict requirement. The Turkish state also has a monopoly over religious education. The Ministry of Education provides religious education through the Islamic vocational schools and strictly oversees the Qur’anic seminaries. Ayoob concludes that the state in Turkey controls religion and there is no separation between the two; some other Middle Eastern states, such as Syria and Egypt, also attempt to exercise such control, but they do so much less effectively.

The first religious party of Turkey was the National Order Party (MNP, *Milli Nizam Partisi*) which was established in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. In 1972, the party changed its name and became the National Salvation Party (MSP, *Milli Selamet Partisi*). All the parties including the Islamist party were closed down in the military intervention of 1980; however the same cadre established the Welfare Party (RP, *Refah Partisi*) in 1982. In 1996, the RP established a coalition government with the center-right True Path Party (DYP, *Doğru Yol Partisi*) and Erbakan became the Prime Minister after the DYP’s female leader, Tansu Çiller. However, the Turkish Military forced the coalition government to resign in April 1997. The RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court of Turkey in January 1998. The same year, the Islamists created the Virtue Party (FP, *Fazilet Partisi*). After the closing down of the FP just like the RP by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, the old guard within the FP established the Prosperity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) in 2001 (Kanra 2005, 526, 527). A younger and more moderate and conservative faction within the old FP, known as *Yenilikçiler* (Reformists) formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) on August 14, 2001. As opposed to the old guard in the FP, the younger generation within the FP who established the AKP was more moderate and

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14 Before 1937, Islam was accepted as the official religion of the new Turkish Republic in the Turkish constitution. This was changed with a constitutional amendment, and the principle of secularism was accepted in 1937.
less aggressive. For instance, the AKP adamantly took the initiative and sped up Turkey’s EU membership negotiations which were absolutely opposed by the old guard in the FP. In his various speeches, Erbakan harshly criticized the EU and often referred to it as “the Christian club”.

Kanra (2005) argues that a break from the rhetoric of the thirty-year-old Islamic politics was crucial for the success of the AKP. The RP and later the FP have earlier developed an increasingly aggressive tone throughout the ascendancy of the party. In his study, Kanra found a strong resentment among the Muslim community of this aggressive style which led to the ban of the party by the Constitutional Court of Turkey. The AKP, led by Erdoğan, followed a different path than those of the RP and later the FP. Unlike the RP, Erdoğan branded the AKP a centrist-conservative party like the European Christian Democrats committed to secular principles. However, the RP had not openly admitted that it had been committed to secular principles. During the election campaign, religious themes, including the headscarf issue, were put in the background in favor of more immediate issues like the economy and the problem of corruption. During the electoral campaign before the November 2002 elections, the AKP continuously reiterated its loyalty to the main principles of the secular system (528-530).

Heper and Toktaş (2003, 173-177) assert that Erdoğan’s conception of a properly functioning democracy is informed by the Islamic term of shura (consultation). He defined democracy as an exchange of ideas and consultation to the widest extent possible. In fact, when he was the major of İstanbul before becoming the prime minister, Erdoğan invited members from the two secularly oriented political parties to take part in the standing municipal committees and he made it his policy to seek expertise over piety, and during his term, Erdoğan’s municipality was quite successful in meeting the myriad needs of İstanbul
like building new dams and improving the water distribution system, decreasing air pollution by forcing industrial plants to follow environmental regulations, creation of new green areas, improving the natural gas and subway infrastructure.

The Struggle over Identity Through Cultural Frames

Another significant issue regarding the struggle between the state and the Islamists is the continuous attempt of both states to establish a systematic control over religion. In Egypt approximately half of the mosques are under the control of the state, whereas in Turkey all of the mosques organized under the Directorate of Religious Affairs are controlled by the state. Initially this was not a response or a reaction to Islamist groups and Islamism because both countries established that tight control over religion as they evolved modern nation-states at the beginning of the twentieth century. Historically in both states the official-orthodox interpretation of Islam dominated and alternative religious interpretations were perceived with suspicion; the reply of the state has usually been repression. Although there are some dissident Islamic scholars in both countries arguing that Al-Azhar and the Directorate of Religious Affairs should not hold a monopoly on religious teachings, both states enjoy an official monopoly on religious affairs. However, these dissidents are not and cannot be vocal enough to challenge the monopoly of the state on religious affairs mainly because of the state dominance and control over religion (Ibrahim 1995, 60-61; Abdo 2000, 43-45).

In addition to the strategic and structural dimensions of mobilization, framing literature within the social movement theory has increasingly addressed how individuals conceptualize themselves as a collectivity, how prospective participants are convinced to participate and the ways in which meaning is produced and disseminated by the group members. Tarrow argues that movement leaders “cannot simply adapt frames from
traditional cultural symbols, ....they orient their movements' frames toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target population's culture and their own values and goals” (1998, 109-110). Snow and his associates call this process “frame alignment” (Snow et al. 1986).

Through the study of framing, we can understand the “interpretive schemata” that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events around the group members. There are basically three types of frames: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational (Snow and Benford 1988, 200-204). Diagnostic frames identify and define a problem or attribute blame or causality (like, Secularist regimes is the source of Muslims’ problems). Prognostic frames go beyond problem specification or blaming, it defines strategies, tactics and targets about ‘what is to be done’ (like, Islam is the solution). Both types of frames use a factual reasoning. Thirdly, motivational frames explain the rationale for action that is strongly normative (like, Working for the establishment of an Islamic state is the duty of every Muslim). Hence, motivational frames add a moralizing dimension to the specification of problems, culprits and strategies, and produces cognitively hot arguments that demand collective action to redress perceived injustices.

Frames are about reflecting upon the process of grievance interpretation. Frames make sense of emotions and direct an agent’s course of action in such a way as to channel that emotion. Thus, emotions are often a crucial source of the energy which fuels movement activism (Tarrow 1998, 112). It is because agents feel injustices and feel that others are wronged, so they are moved to action. Tarrow argues that religion is a recurring source of social movement framing because it is a reliable source of emotion: “Religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be accessed an appropriated by movement leaders”. Klandermans (1997, 44) argues that the transformation of social issues
into social movement frames does not occur automatically: “It is a process in which social actors, media and members of society jointly interpret, define and redefine states of affairs.”

Framing is inherently about interpretation of grievances (Crossley 2002, 135) and in order to mobilize support, movement organizers must link their frames with those of their potential constituents (Snow et al. 1986). This process is known as frame alignment. Through the frame alignment, movement leaders “orient their movements’ frames toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target population’s culture and their own values and goals” (Tarrow 1998, 110). Snow et al. (1986) provide four basic possibilities for frame alignment through which movements formulate their messages in relation to the existing culture. Frame bridging is the "linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem". Through frame bridging, movements link a movement to "unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters" (Snow 1986, 467) of constituents with similar views and grievances without organizational base. Frame amplification is "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (1986, 469). This might involve persuading prospective movement participants that their values require them to support a particular cause or involve an attempt to amplify beliefs about the causes of particular problems and the ways of solving those problems (Crossley 2002, 135). Frame extension is the process of extending the boundaries of the original frame(s) “so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents” (Snow 1986, 472). Frame transformation takes place when the
existing frames "may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames" (Snow 1986, 473).

Framing is about construction of meaning. Through certain grammatical constructs and interpretive lenses, the groups create an intersubjective meaning and facilitate movement goals. The term framing is used to describe this process of constructing meaning. Islamic movements, like other social movements, are involved in the production of meaning through the framing process. Islamic movements, driven by the issues of identity, culture and post-materialism, are in a constant struggle over meaning and values. Control and reconstruction of state institutions may be an effective instrument for creating a society governed by the Shari‘a. However, control and reconstruction of the state are only one of many routes for change. Thus, Islamists believe that the state is a means for the production of meaning, not an end. In fact, most Islamic struggles are waged through society and cultural discourse rather than state institutions or government decision-making bodies. Disagreements and framing contests over meaning increase competitiveness as various groups produce and disseminate different meanings. (Wiktorowicz 2004, 15-19).

Islamists also compete with official frames or official attempts to establish a control over the creation of meaning. Most regimes in the Muslim world utilize Islam as a form of legitimization and a fight continuously takes place over the formal and informal organizations that produce and sustain the symbols and their meaning (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). To maintain their legitimacy, regimes in the Muslim world strategically either create new frames or modify the old ones for their own benefit to maintain their interests and power.
Social Identity and Contentious Politics

Tarrow argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents. Contentious politics happens when changing opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors. Contentious collective action lies at the base of all social movements; however this does not mean that movements do nothing else but contend. The movements build organizations, elaborate ideologies, construct collective identities, and socialize and mobilize their followers (Tarrow 1998, 2-3). For Tarrow, social movements are better defined as “...collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” rather than “as expressions of extremism, violence, and deprivation” (1998, 4). Similarly, Tilly (1982, 26) defines social movements as:

“...as sustained series of interactions between powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support”

Diani (1992, 13) defines social movements as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity.”

According to social movement research on participation patterns, “individuals are drawn into participation...as the result of their embeddedness in associational networks that render them ‘structurally available’ for protest activity” (McAdam 1994, 36-37). Social networks, ease the uncertainty of activism and provide negative peer pressure if one does not participate (McAdam & Paulsen 1993, 644). People tend to associate with people similar to themselves (Klandermans 1992, 88). Social networks tend to be homogeneous and to reproduce themselves. Accordingly, the constituency of social movements, including
their social movement organizations, most often follows specific, horizontal lines of social categorization like race, gender, or class. Klandermans (1988, 175) argues that people tend to validate information by comparing their interpretations of grievances with those of significant others, particularly like-minded individuals. Tilly (1978, 62-63) uses the word *catnet* (a combination of *category* and *network*) to reflect the socially homogeneous nature of social movements by emphasizing the collective identity of those groups. Clark (2004, 946) points out that public information campaigns, rallies, and the like can be successful for gaining new members; however, face-to-face interaction with a trusted individual within the same social network is the most successful way to ensure participation.

Tarrow’s definition of social movements has four empirical properties: collective challenge, common purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction. Tarrow contends that “collective challenges are most often marked by interrupting, obstructing, or rendering uncertain the activities of others”. However, particularly in authoritarian settings, they can also be symbolized by slogans, forms of dress or music, or by renaming familiar objects with new or different symbols (Tarrow 1998, 5). Islamists engage in many similar forms of actions like creating and reinterpreting new concepts and introducing new meanings.\(^{15}\)

The coordination of collective action depends on the trust and cooperation among the participants by shared identities and on the collective action frames that justify and motivate collective action (Tarrow 1998, 21). Through the frames, social movements shape grievances into broader and more resonant claims (Snow and Benford 1998) and stimulate participants (Gamson 1992). Framing also has an identity aspect. Through framing, the group members define the “us” and “them”. By drawing on inherited collective

\(^{15}\) An example of this is going to be presented in Chapter 3 and 5 respectively in regards to reinterpretation of the concept of “*da’wa*” (call to God) by the Islamists in contemporary Egypt and
identities and shaping new ones, groups define their enemies by real or imagined attributes or evils (Hardin 1995). States are also constantly framing issues both to gain support for their policies and to contest the meanings created by the contentious groups. The struggle between states and movements takes place not only about particular issues, but about contests over meaning (Melucci 1996). Social groups require solidarity to act and creating or modifying identities around their claims is one way of doing that. Tarrow argues that building a movement around strong ties of collective identity does much of the work that would be normally done by the organization, but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances and interaction (Tarrow 1998, 119).

Social identity refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities. Social identity represents our understanding of who we and other people are, and therefore, also their understanding of themselves and others (including us). Jenkins differentiates between the collective identity and the individual identities, proposing that the latter emphasizes difference, while the former similarity. (Jenkins 1996). Through the process of inclusion and exclusion, group boundaries are constructed (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995). Jenkins (1996) argues that a consequence of defining the other is the imposition of negative and putative characteristics on a collective other, whose politics, culture and lifestyle must be resisted and repelled.

Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that the formation and maintenance of social identity involves two processes: i) Categorization (i.e., nationality, religious affiliation), which identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and normative

Turkey. Originally the concept only applied to non-Muslims. However, contemporary Islamists
perceptions and actions, and assigns people including self, to the contextually relevant category. ii) Self-enhancement, which guides the social categorization process such that ingroup norms and stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. Accordingly, people have a basic need to see themselves in a relatively positive light in relation to others, and that self enhancement can be achieved through comparing the ingroup positively in relation to relevant outgroups. If comparison with outgroups is unfavorable, then group members experience a negative social identity. Individuals with negative social identity are likely to attempt to their group better, which frequently involves competition with relevant other groups. Thus, the mere act of individuals categorizing themselves as group members was sufficient to lead them to display ingroup favoritism. After being categorized of a group membership, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem by positively differentiating their ingroup from a comparison outgroup on some valued dimension. In this regard, perceived external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of outgroup norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in socioeconomic status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable intergroup comparisons.

Islamism often times challenges repressive regimes and even under repressive regimes as Scott argues subterranean resistance cultures may sometimes emerge though they may not engage in overt protest action, but they generate and produce resistance identities and beliefs (Scott 1990). Scott maintains that within these cultures, gestures and symbols of defiance are woven into the fabric of everyday life. For instance common phrases can achieve a highly charged meaning, and certain style of handshakes can become a popular vernacular of grassroots resistance (Scott 1985). For instance the Islamic

reinterpreted the concept and applied it to Muslims.
concept of *da'wa*\(^{16}\) is one such concept that has a highly charged meaning. Moreover, Islamists often perceive political activism as a form of Gramscian war of position as part of identity politics, and Islamist frames frequently are in a continuous struggle with the official frames created by the secularist elites. Framing is an ongoing process which requires the movement leaders and members to revise and modify frames continuously to find new ways of connecting with potential supporters, and to reach new audiences (Snow and Benford 2000).

**Cases, Hypotheses And Model**

**Most-different-systems Design**

Although Turkey and Egypt represent most different political systems with their different backgrounds in history, language, national identity, and political evolutions, Islamism is a strong social and political force in both countries. Casual observers might associate the emergence of society-centered Islamism in those two countries with Islam. However, this is a tautological assumption. Neither does Islamism emerge in every Muslim society, nor do all Islamist movements share all of the same characteristics. There are two significant aspects that convince one to study Islamism in both countries. *First*, those are the two countries with high levels of state control over religion, and also high levels of Islamist political activism. *Second*, it is theoretically intriguing that in both countries, the emergence of Islamism followed a similar pattern (the pattern will be explained below). *Third*, in both countries Islamism also expresses itself as a response to perceived external threats to social identity.

\(^{16}\) In the third and fifth chapters will examine how the concept of *da'wa* (literally it means call, in the Islamist context, it means call to Allah or dissemination of Islam) achieved a totally new meaning. Originally the concept refers to dissemination of Islam among non-Muslims. However, according to
Hypotheses and Model

This study attempts to explore Islamism through two dimensions. The first dimension is about the relationship between the state, religion and the Islamists examining the relationship between the state control over religion and the emergence of Islamism. The second dimension is identity oriented which mainly examines the development process of the Islamist concern for preserving social identity against perceived external threats. Thus, this study attempts to explore:

1. The correlation, if any, between the increased state control over religion and the revival of Islamist political activism.

2. The correlation, if any, between perceived external threats to social identity and the resurgence of Islamist political activism in regards to advancements in communications and modern media.

Islamism has been part of Turkish politics since the early 1970s. Why has Islamism started to rise since the mid 1980s and has accelerated since the early 1990s, but not before? Similarly, Islamism has been on the rise in Egypt since the early 1990s? In this study, it is hypothesized that Islamism in both countries is on the rise in regards to the blending of two major factors: the increased state control over religion and the Islamists’ perception of external threats to social identity. Through the use of diagnostic frames, the Islamists identify those perceived external threats. Later, through the use of prognostic frames Islamists take a course of action against those threats. Lastly, through the use of motivational frames Islamists motivate and mobilize their supporters for further political action.

contemporary Islamists, the concept often refers to increasing Muslims’ religious understanding and piousness.
A brief look at the political histories of both countries reveals that the emergence of Islamism in both countries follows a similar pattern. The earliest interaction between the Islamists and the regimes is about counterbalancing. Both regimes used the Islamists to counterbalance the leftist political movements through the later years of the Cold War era. Sadat displayed an accommodationist approach towards the Islamists to counterbalance the leftist elements in the ASU (Arab Socialist Union) which was trying to undermine his authority. Similarly, the military government in Turkey used the Islamists to counterbalance the leftists. When the regimes perceived Islamists as threats, they left accommodationist policies and adopted a harsher policy towards the Islamists.

The February 28 (1997) indirect intervention of the Turkish military into the politics and the forcing of the Islamist-Right wing coalition to resign marked the highest point of the regime intervention against the growing Islamist political activism. Similarly, in Egypt, Mubarak left his previous accommodationist approach after the early 1993s and started to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood through a series of tough legislation, crackdowns and limitation of the political activities of the Islamists. However, in both countries, the Islamists managed to survive those harsh conditions and in fact strengthened their positions in politics of their countries. Moreover, both countries also experienced an increasing level of official control over the religion. Both regimes tightened their grips on the religion through establishing more official control over religious institutions through a selective policy of confrontation and/or cooptation.

In the light of the previous discussions, in this study it is hypothesized that:

H1: The rise of Islamist political activism is positively related to the increased state control over religion.
H2: The rise of Islamist political activism is also positively related to perceived external threats to social identity.

There are various reasons of the emergence of the Islamist reaction to the state control over religion. The first one is the state’s perception of control over religion as part of a social engineering project.\(^{17}\) Social engineering refers to the efforts of the government or private groups to influence popular attitudes and social behavior on a mass scale. Various societal groups always perceive those projects with suspicion, disapproval and opposition. Often times, social engineering goes hand in hand with political engineering which is the counterpart of social engineering in the realm of politics. Moreover, in both countries the state control over religion goes hand in hand with the highly paternalistic-patriarchal\(^{18}\) political structure supported by the secular official ideologies. Nasserism and Kemalism tried to marginalize and as well as to control Islamic institutions. However, this did not lead to the disappearance of Islam from the public realm. It rather paved the way to its politicization (Kadioglu 1998; Tamir 2000).

The state elites’ interest in social engineering projects is not primarily confined to a few policy areas; indeed it is a comprehensive social, political and economic project\(^ {19}\). Thus, it is one of the reasons why many secular elites of the newly independent states in the Middle East established socialist or semi-socialist economies where the state controlled

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\(^{17}\) An interesting anecdote about Nevzat Tandogan (1894-1946), the former governor of Ankara may help illustrate the amount of social engineering applied by the state elites in Turkey. When Tandogan met communist university students protesting on the streets he said: “What is going on here? If it is necessary for Communism to come to Turkey, we [the state elites] are going to introduce it to our country, not you!” For a discussion of social engineering in Turkish politics see: “The Struggles of a “Strong” State” Barkey, Henri Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): p. 87-105

\(^{18}\) Although originally the word devlet (state) in Arabic is a feminine word, the widely used concept of devlet baba (father state) is often used in Turkish when people refer to the state which demonstrates the paternalistic-patriarchal character of the state.

\(^{19}\) It is very noteworthy that the Turkish elites adopted elitist Jacobin French laicism (not Anglo-Saxon secularism) as an official ideology at the early stages of the new Turkish republic which was established
the economy. Those new states had little room for private educational institutions, and often times single-parties dominated. The elitists had little trust in the masses. Moreover, the governments either did not allow any free press or when they allowed it, the governments heavily censored the already weak private media. Various societal groups have always perceived those kinds of social engineering projects with suspicion, and Islamists are not an exception to that (Mardin 1991, 1992; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Karaman and Aras 2000; Frey 1965; Özbudun 1996).

The second reason of state control over religion is directly related to political engineering. When it was in its earliest stages, Islamist political activism was perceived as an ideological rival for the official ideology maintained by the secularist state elites of both countries. Thus, Islamism did not completely match with the ideal “game of politics” envisioned by the secularist state elites. Because of this conception of rivalry and mismatch by the state elites, the official response for any form of Islamism was often harsh and oppressive. In fact, any opposition to the state elites and their official ideology was unwelcome. In fact, both regimes have been characterized by bureaucratic centralization, intolerance for political opposition and states’ lack of respect for civil rights and freedoms. For instance, the Turkish constitution forbids creation of political parties based on religion and ethnic identity, which rules out the major enemies of the official ideology (i.e., Political Islam and separatist Kurdish sub-nationalism). The Egyptian constitution makes it illegal to apply for creation of political parties based on religion and class which rules out the Islamists and the Communists (Karaman and Aras 2000; Kadioglu 1998; Göle 1996; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Najjar 2001).

in 1923 after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. This was a deliberate choice as French laicism fits perfectly into the bureaucratically centralized elitist secular outlook.
The third reason for the Islamist reaction about state control over religion is both side’s uncompromising position and lack of consensus between both parties. The struggle between both sides is often perceived as an “either-or” type of situation by the secularist elites and the Islamists. In other words, both sides perceive politics as a zero-sum game in which a Gramscian counter-hegemonic war of position has to be won for final victory. Often times political struggles are waged through politically-emotionally charged symbols what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) call “Muslim politics”. For instance, the banning of headscarves for female students and government employees has become a serious symbolic struggle between the seculars and Islamists in Turkey for the last two decades (Kadioglu 1998; Cizre and Çınar 2003). Moreover, there is also an identity and framing aspect of the whole struggle between the two parties. Due to the increased access to various forms of media, perceived external threats cause a greater concern among the Islamists regarding social identity. Through the diagnostic frames, the Islamists take a protective-defensive stance in matters regarding social identity. This, in turn, urges the Islamists to counterattack those perceived external threats to social identity to preserve it through the use of prognostic frames. As politics is perceived as a Gramscian war of position, the Islamists try to win political battles by recruiting more soldiers for their ranks through the use of motivational frames. As briefly outlined earlier, groups often times tend to react to outgroup norms in a disliking way and are motivated to eliminate them from their ingroup norms. Thus, they aim to preserve group identity and unity, and ultimately self-purity due to self-attachment to the group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). For the Islamists, the outgroup norms can be non-Islamic values and practices, Western power and dominance (i.e., cultural, military), Western culture and symbols, and secularism (Özbudun 1976; Mardin 1973; Narli 1999; Çarkoğlu 2002; Toprak 1981, 1996).
The fourth reason is about the organic nature of Islam besides confirming the identity dimension of Islamist politics. Scholars like Abdo (2000), Ayubi (1991), Clark (1995, 2004), Husain (2003), Smith (1970), and Toprak (1981) explain the Islamist challenge in relation to Islam's being an organic religion. Smith (1970, 249) argues that an organic religion maintains no church hierarchy or priestly class, indeed within an organic religion "sacral law and sacral social structure are of the essence...religion is largely equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations...are secondary."

Theoretical distinctions drawn in Christianity between the realms of God and of the ruler are absent in Islam (Husain, 2003). Toprak (1981) argues that in an organic religion the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, the two systems merge. In Islam, this merger is both prescribed and effected by the Shari'a which has something to say about every aspect of life. It is this organic nature of Islam that makes the Islamists substantially against state regulation of religion. According to the Islamists, political institutions are designed to defend and promote Islam, not the state. The primary loyalty of Muslims is to the ummah (the community of Muslims), rather than the state, and to the Shari'a rather than the ruler. Thus, it is this organic nature of Islam that makes it clash with the government as it tries to control religion from above, and create an Islamist reaction to such measures of the secularist governments. Islamists believe that the state has no right to control religion authoritatively and they use available political venues to struggle with such state attempts as the state heavily intervenes into religion not necessarily

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[20] A saying of Prophet Muhammad explains this further: (from Sahih Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89, Number 258): 'Abdullah narrated: The Prophet said, "A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it. Obeying the ruler is a religious obligation in Islam. A saying of Prophet Muhammad instructs Muslims to obey their ruler (from Sahih Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89, Number 251): Abu Hurairan narrated: Allah's Apostle said, "Whoever obeys me, obeys Allah, and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah, and whoever obeys the ruler I appoint,
for the sake of religion, but for political reasons. Although the secularist states that control religion substantially contradict with their secular nature, intervening into religion has many political benefits (i.e. social engineering); the greatest one of them is eliminating Islamist opposition.

Turkish and Egyptian regimes heavily restrict various forms of political participation through some official barriers as well as controlling religion. Under such circumstances, the Islamists vigorously attempt to use any political venues available to them as a reaction to state control over religion including civil society activism. Thus for the Islamists, political activism through the civil society is not just a political act, but also a type of activism with cultural-symbolic undercurrents with an emphasis on social identity which can be best explained by the Gramscian concepts of counter-hegemonic struggle and war of position, and culture/identity oriented new social movements.

Regulation of religion in both countries has two aspects. The first aspect relates to the official control over official religious hierarchy. The second aspect relates to the struggle between the official and the Islamist frames. In both countries, the governments are highly secularist and they regulate religion in various ways through the official institutions of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, and Al-Azhar in Egypt. Both states promote what many scholars call "Official Islam" actively as opposed to the politically active version of Islam promoted by the Islamists. Controlling religion is not necessarily perceived as a non-secular practice by Egyptian and Turkish authorities although the two regimes are highly secular in nature. The Muslim Brotherhood candidates in Egypt control many major professional associations and existing research documents a serious increase in the number of Islamic civil society organizations in Turkey especially after 1983.
I operationalize the state regulation of religion through the number and extent of parliamentary and governmental acts that regulate religious affairs in both countries, the powers and the extent of the official religious hierarchy through which the state regulates religion, the extent of the government’s reach over various religious institutions (mosques, religious foundations, charity organizations, educational institutions), the number of mosques controlled by the government and the number of religious personnel appointed by the state, and censorings of religious publications and sermons. I operationalize Islamist political activism through the increasing public sentiment for an interest in an Islamic system, resurgent grassroots or populist Islamist movements. Resurgence of Islamism and its political manifestations could be demonstrated by five major indicators. First, the spread of Islam from homes, mosques, and Islamic schools into the mainstream sociocultural, legal, economic, and political spheres of the contemporary Muslim states. Second, Islamism engenders widespread discussion and debate of Islamic issues in the mass media, leading to a proliferation of books and articles on Islamic theology, history, jurisprudence, culture, and civilization. Third, Islam’s emphasis on socioeconomic equality and justice has significant populist appeal at a time of great disparity between the rich and the poor. Fourth, Islamists often reassert the relevance of the Islamic approach to solving contemporary problems while presenting a criticism of both the secularist elites and the materialist values imported from the West or the socialist-communist world. Fifth, Islamist movements have strong anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, and nationalist undercurrents. Thus, the Islamists call for an end to international dependence on Western powers.

As stated earlier, the rise of Islamist political activism is also positively related to perceived external threats to social identity. The formation and maintenance of social just.
identity involves categorization and self-enhancement. Categorization (i.e., nationality, religious affiliation) identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and normative perceptions and actions, and assigns people to the relevant category. Self-enhancement guides the social categorization process such that ingroup norms and stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. Therefore, many people have a basic need to see themselves in a relatively positive light in relation to others, and that self enhancement can be achieved through comparing the ingroup positively in relation to relevant outgroups. If comparison with outgroups is unfavorable, then group members experience a negative social identity. Individuals with negative social identity are likely to attempt to their group better, which frequently involves competition with relevant other groups. Accordingly, perceived external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of outgroup norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in socioeconomic status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable intergroup comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1986).

Yılmaz (2002) argues that the rise of political Islam in Turkey is positively related to perceived external threats to social identity specified as secular and Western cultural influences and unfavorable intergroup comparisons (i.e. perceived weakness in comparison with the West). Perceived external threats to social identity could be categorized under six separate themes; and the three frame types (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) play a significant role in the way that Islamists perceive those external threats to their social identity. The first theme is the perceived immorality or moral erosion. Indeed this is the most frequently repeated theme in the Islamist writings including criticism of non-Islamic lifestyle or actions considered immoral from an Islamic viewpoint. Examples include consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling, prostitution,
pornography, and extramarital sexual intercourse. The theme also includes some crimes such as theft, murder, and drug use (Yılmaz 2002, 76).

The second theme is Western cultural influence which is also expressed as the primary source of perceived moral erosion and corruption of Muslim identity. Moreover, for the Islamists, the secular regime is the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and educational institutions. The second major source of perceived moral erosion for the Islamists is the visual and written media. The corruption of the Muslim identity is considered as another major source of perceived external threats to social identity by the Islamists. Islam, according to the Islamists, is perceived as the main source of social identity and imposition of the strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the Muslim identity. For the Islamists, it is impossible to divide human existence into the individual spiritual or private domain and the public secular domain due to the organic and holistic nature of Islam. For the Islamists, the secularists' attempts to empty Islam of its social and political meaning disturb the Islamists greatly (Yılmaz 2002, 77-78).

The third theme is domestic suppression of Islam. Secular ideologies (i.e. Kemalism and Nasserism) produced a politicization of Islam rather than its secularization. Activities of mosques, Islamic political parties and associations are severely restricted due to harsh secularization measures often imposed undemocratically by the secularist elites (Yılmaz, 2002: 79; Karaman and Aras 2000).

The fourth theme is about economic issues. Islamists argue that the secularist elites are not indeed in favor of economic development of their country with the assumption that as a country becomes wealthier, there will be more pressures for democratization, human rights and rule of law. Thus, according to the Islamist claim, the secular elites keep people
under control by keeping the country at a sustenance level and keeping peoples’ minds occupied with bread and butter issues, not with politics, democracy and human rights. Moreover, according to this understanding, the secularist elites do not want to jeopardize their privileged positions by allowing an economically powerful Islamist class.\footnote{In the Turkish political lexicon, the extent of the economic activities of the businesses owned by the Islamists is labeled as \textit{yesil sermaye} -green capital- (since green is popularly considered as the color of Islam). For a detailed discussion see: Rubin, M (2005) "Green Money, Islamist Politics in Turkey" \textit{Middle East Quarterly}, V.12, I. 1} Majority of the time, those kinds of Islamist assumptions are also linked with Islam’s emphasis on socioeconomic equity and justice (Yılmaz, 2002: 79; Husain 2003; Rubin 2005).

The \textit{fifth} theme is Western imperialism. The arguments view the West as the major imperialist power whose aim is to exploit and control the Muslim world. The vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries, economic dependency on the West, Western cultural influences, and the cooperation of the ruling elites with the West (Yılmaz 2002, 80).

The \textit{last} theme is the Muslim’s lack of self esteem against the West. Islamists frequently claim superiority of Islam as a social, political and economic system against capitalism and communist/socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in origin. Islamists frequently portray capitalism as an excessively materialistic, competitive, exploitative and therefore inherently immoral system. Socialism is viewed as another type of exploitative unjust political system where peoples’ rights are severely limited. Based on such criticisms, Islamism is offered as a genuine alternative which, according to the Islamists, eliminates any form of exploitation. Accordingly, Islam is believed to balance individualism and community life without giving superiority to either (Yılmaz 2002, 81; Husain 2003; Rubin 2003).
There are two aspects of Islamist political mobilization: organizational aspect and ideational aspect. Islamists use various resources available to them to mobilize support for their cause such as informal horizontal relationships among the group members, regular formal and informal meetings of the group members, informal religious learning circles (dars), recruitment through the mosque (masjid), providing cheaper housing for students and recognition through charity activities. Moreover, through a large network of Islamist NGOs, professional and student associations, and unions Islamists actively mobilize individuals. Those are the organizational aspects of Islamist mobilization.

The ideational aspect of Islamist political activism often develops in the form of frames in relation to the perceived external threats to social identity. Islamist mobilization often times goes hand in hand with creation of Islamist frames by those groups. Islamist frames link those perceived threats to political activism through the need for preserving Islamic social identity through a protectionist viewpoint. Moreover, the Islamists often link Islamist identity with political mobilization through an activist conception of da'wa. Frames are also utilized by the Islamists to create Islamist discourses. Thus, Islamist frames and discourses contain high levels of political criticism of secularism and the West so that they are frequently targeted in the official frames by the government elite and the members of the official religious establishment. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the official religious establishment often develops counter frames to combat the Islamist frames.

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22 *Da'wa* literally means call, call to God and dissemination of religion. For more information on how the original concept of da'wa which was mainly towards non-Muslims was transformed into a more activist version which is more towards Muslims, see Chapters 3 and 5.
Cases and Focus of Study

Before the 1980s Islamists in both countries had been politically active, however the number and scope of Islamist political activism has been gradually increasing in the last three decades. After the 1980s Islamism has exponentially grown in both countries in regards to a parallel advancement in the media and communications. The model in this study is longitudinal and cross-national. The scope of this study for Turkey is the period since the establishment of the Islamist Party of Turkey (National Order Party) -1970- to present. The focus is on the periods starting with the end of the military rule (1980-1983) and the AKP's rise to power (2002). For Egypt, the scope of this study is the period between Sadat's liberalization policies (infitah) -1974- to present. However, the main focus is on the Mubarak period (1981- ). Those periods are chosen deliberately since both countries heavily experienced Islamist political activism during those years.

The focus of this study is on the Islamists who are politically active through Islamist professional associations, student unions, human rights groups, and charitable organizations in the civil society. Through snowball sampling, in Egypt I have interviewed Islamists who were members of the Medical Association, Cairo and Ain Shams University Student Union, and several other Islamist charity organizations. Those associations are controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and they are highly politically active. I have also interviewed small businessmen and government employees. In Turkey, I interviewed members of the MÜSİAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) and the MAZLUMDER23 (The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed

23 MÜSİAD is a business association established by the Islamists imitating secular TÜSİAD (Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen). MAZLUMDER is the Islamist version of secular İHD (Association of Human Rights).
People) as well as the AKP representatives. I have also interviewed Islamist businessmen and regular citizens who described themselves as Islamists.

There are many reasons why I chose those organizations in both countries. First, those organizations are highly involved in politics and they constantly criticize the human rights violations by the state and non-democratic official practices. Those groups are also vocal on many political issues that do not necessarily fall into their area of operation. Second, these organizations present a wide array of organizations operating on different areas. Third, the normative component of those organizations and their Islamist discourses closely relate to contentious politics and social-political activism. In addition to the study those groups, this study also examines how the Islamists frame various issues and how those frames are related to Islamist political activism. To do this, I identified different types of Islamist frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) in the Islamist literature and through my interviews I linked how those frames were related to Islamist political activism.

Methods and Plan of Study

A variety of methods were used to test the main hypotheses stated earlier. Those methods are: face-to-face interviews with members of Islamist civil society associations, members of official religious establishment and other relevant human subjects whose views would be significant to the research, content analysis of various documents (like religious newspapers, books, sermons, press releases, websites, and related printed material by Islamist groups), discourse analysis of newspapers, journals, speeches and sermons, and archival work. In the case of abundant material, simple random sampling was used. Where there were difficulties in obtaining the total number of sources, convenience sampling was preferred.
Methods

Face-to-face Interviews

Face-to-face interviews included (reachable) members of the religious establishment (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı-Directorate of Religious Affairs- in Turkey, and Al-Azhar in Egypt), significant figures of Islamist civil society associations that are stated earlier, as well as other relevant human subjects whose views would be significant to the research such as ex and present members of parliament, academics, newspaper editors, political activists and so on. Besides scheduled face-to-face interviews through my personal contacts, snowball sampling was used. For each country, approximately 50 people were interviewed separately. The interviews lasted 45-60 minutes most of the time. Such sample composition produced a balanced and broader view of the Islamist movements and of the official religious establishment. The interviews also included several respondents from the bureaucratic ranks of the official religious establishment as well as clerics and prayer leaders who provide religious instruction or lead the congregational prayers in the neighborhoods of cities.

In my interviews with the Islamists, I had a variety of participants with different levels of activism, age, socioeconomic background, and gender. One of the limitations of this study was about the gender of the respondents. Since traditional Middle Eastern societies are not fully appreciative of male-female communication (because of the traditions and religion), female respondents felt shy about responding to questions, and some prospective female interviewees refused to be part of this study. I interviewed a total of twelve female interviewees (nine female interviewees in Turkey, and three in Egypt; please see the interviews’ profiles for chapters 3 and 5 for details). In fact, I intended to
have interviews with more females, however that was not possible. If I were a female analyst, it would be possible to have more interviews with female respondents.

The interviewing process was semi-structured; the interviewees received both unstructured and structured questions. The open-ended questions targeted respondents' subjective views regarding state control of religion, perceived external threats and reasons for Islamist political activism (see attached interview questions). The responses were noted, and any references (words, phrases, sentences...) regarding state control of religion, perceived external threats and Islamist political activism were highlighted. Later, after completing the interviews, the relative weight of such responses were counted as well as comparing them to other reasons attributed to the hypotheses in the study. Participants were also given the opportunity to express their ideas freely about the relationship between state and religion and about the West in general. The purpose of such design was to check whether interviewees by themselves saw those factors as a significant independent variable in explaining the growing popularity of political Islam without any intervention during the interviews.

Following those general questions, the respondents received more specific and more structured questions about their perception of state control of religion and external threats. First, the interviewees were asked whether they believe state control over religion existed, and if it did, whether such control was legitimate in their perception. They were also asked to provide examples of such control through the open ended questions. Additionally the interviewees were asked about their beliefs about the possible causes of such control. They were also asked whether such control makes them engaged in increased political activity in any way. Second, the interviewees received more specific questions about their perception of Western values, threats on cultural and religious values, traditions
and religion. They were also requested to answer specific questions about their perception regarding whether those threats were related to politicization and increase of their political activities in any way.

Respondents’ answers were noted on separate sheets with no identifying information on them to ensure confidentiality. The responses then were categorized into themes (similar to the six separate themes stated earlier). Those themes later helped me to map out Islamist frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational). In short, interviewees’ responses about causes of state control over religion and external threats were associated with diagnostic frames; their responses about what should be done to deal with those problems were associated with prognostic frames; and their responses about their rationale for political activism were associated with motivational frames. The interviewees were free to refuse to be interviewed at any time.

**Content and Discourse Analyses**

In the content analysis, themes (similar to the six themes stated earlier) were utilized by creating theme categories. The theme categories were mutually exclusive to ensure that the data was analyzed only in one category. Data analysis was based on counting frequencies of the themes as well as relating those frequencies with Islamist frames and discourses. Where there was no direct access to materials, secondary sources were utilized. Through the content analysis, I sought to identify how Islamists diagnosed the state control over religion and the perceived threats to their social identity (similar to the six separate themes stated earlier) through Islamist literature like books, journals, and pamphlets. Additionally, the content analysis revealed how various grievances are framed and how prognostic and motivational frames are used by Islamists to urge the members for political action. The content analysis included various prominent Islamist newspapers and
journals like *Milli Gazete* (The National Gazette), *Altunoluk* (Golden duct), *Sizinti* (Spring), and *Vakit* (Time), *Yeni Şafak* (New Dawn) as well as books and pamphlets written by prominent Islamists like Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.

This study also linked Islamist discourse(s) to Islamist frames. Through the discourse analysis I sought to reveal how the prognostic and motivational frames stated through the Islamist discourse affect the recruitment and mobilization of the members of those groups through the use of Islamist frames. In this regard, it is crucial to understand how Islamist rhetoric and a religious worldview (*weltanschauung*) are used to attract people, create an appeal, and recruit new members to broaden the base of support for the Islamist groups. Discourse is not just a simple collection of words, but “sets of rules that ... enable practices and are reproduced and/or transformed by them... Discourses manifest themselves in both linguistic and non-linguistic practices.” They are also productive in the sense that they produce truth and are inherently political because “they are about the production and distribution of power” (Laffey and Weldes 2004, 28). In short, discourse analysis aims to “uncover the way that reality is produced” Moreover, “discourse analysis involves the systematic study of texts to find evidence of their meaning and how this meaning translates into a social reality.” One of the major differences between discourse analysis and content analysis is that discourse analysis is *constructionist*, because it assumes that reality is socially constructed; whereas content analysis is *realist* since it assumes that an independent reality exists (Hardy et al 2004, 19-21; Crawford 2004, 23). Although many studies independently use discourse and content analyses, few studies have combined both. Hardy et al. (2004, 19-20) and Neuendorf (2004, 34) argue that there can actually be a mixture of the two methods.
Through the frame analysis I sought to gain insight into “the ideological dynamics of structuring opposition, mobilizing actors, and sustaining cohesion necessary for successful collective action”. Besides focusing on the strategic aspects of framing (how social movement activists/entrepreneurs construct messages of injustice and grievances), this study also focused on the underlying concepts of culture and ideology through the thorough analysis of the “discursive foundations” (Steinberg 1998, 846) of the framing processes. Steinberg argues that a careful analysis of discourse(s) provide useful for some unresolved problems of frame analysis regarding the conceptualization of ideology, identifying the manifestation of the frame, the distinctions between discourse and material resources, the micro-macro linkages in the framing process, and the difficulties of maintaining frame fidelity and alignment (1998, 847). Discourse is the social production of meaning that is essentially dialectic and dynamic. The Bakhtinian discourse theory argues that discourse is dialogic that involves an “interactive process of meaning production” within social interaction. A constant struggle between actors takes place “to invest discourse with their preferred meanings”. Thus, production of meaning through discourses is both “intralinguistic and highly contested” and from the Bakhtinian perspective, ideological meaning and consciousness are “not within us, but between us” (1998, 852).

Discourse does not neutrally convey meanings. Rather, discourse is “a process of joint ideological labor, one that is often fraught with underlying ambiguities and contradictions that can become manifest in public contention”. As Bakhtinians emphasized, Steinberg maintains, discourse becomes “an explicit battleground for ideological wars of position that are dynamic products of dialogic interactions” (Steinberg 1998, 853). Purvis and Hunt argue that the framing process takes place through the discursive fields. Through the genres that exist within those fields, collective actors can draw upon to construct
discursively diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation (Purvis and Hunt, 1993). Steinberg’s
discursive approach depicts framing as an inherently collective process, and “tilting the
frame with a discursive turn” enables us to recognize the role of ideology in social
movement mobilization and action (1998, 862). In short, analyzing frames from a
discursive perspective opens more opportunities for researchers to fully uncover the
relationship between the creation of ideas/ideologies, discourses, (collective) identities,
frames and social movement mobilization.

Analyzing Islamist frames and discourses revealed how Islamists produce truth and
meaning, and later disseminate it through their religio-political discourse. More
specifically, the analysis of Islamist frames and their relation to Islamist discourses also
helped me clarify how the diagnostic frames were used to identify the perceived threats to
social identity by the Islamists. Similar to the method used in interviews and content
analysis, theme categories were created out of the most frequently repeated themes. Later,
those theme categories were linked to creation of frames and discourses.24

Archival Work

Besides face-to-face interviews and content analysis, this study also embarked
upon archival work primarily to help understand the nature and level of state control over

24 For instance: poverty is one of the themes used in Islamist frames. The problem of poverty is
expressed by the Islamists through phrases like: “Islam does not want poverty”. Later, the prognostic
frames are created as a remedy for poverty like: “Through the institution of mandatory alms (zakat) Islam
tries to eliminate poverty”. Afterwards, motivational frames like “every Muslim has to pay his/her zakat
to eliminate poverty in Muslim countries” are added to the diagnostic and prognostic frames. Similarly,
one powerful Islamist theme is Islamists’ anti-secularism. Anti-secularism is expressed through
diagnostic frames like: “Secularism is one of the main sources of Muslims’ problems”. Later prognostic
frames are employed by the Islamists defining strategies and tactics about what is to be done, like: “Islam
is the solution” or “Replacing the secularist regimes with Islamic regimes will solve the problems of
Muslims”. Consequently motivational frames complete the whole picture by providing explanation for the
rationale for action. Diagnostic and prognostic frames generally use factual reasoning; however
motivational frames are strongly normative. Thus, motivational frames add a moralizing dimension to the
specification of problems, strategies, and they demand collective action. An example of such a
religion in both countries. The work primarily consisted of the study of official regulations designing the operations religious affairs in both countries, and the powers and the extent of the official religious hierarchy through which the state regulates religion. Through the archival work, I sought to reveal the extent of the government's reach over various religious institutions (mosques, religious foundations, charity organizations educational institutions) controlled by the government. I also sought to reveal how the government organizes the affairs of religious personnel appointed by the state. I was also in constant contact with three professors who study the Middle East and discussed various issues extensively about my subject as I wrote. I greatly appreciate their help and comments.

Chapters and Organization

This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is the introductory chapter. The second and third chapters are similar in many ways. The second chapter is about the development of Islamism in Turkey. I briefly introduced major selected historical events as they relate to the Islamists and formation of Islamist activism. The chapter makes a brief introduction to Islam, and demonstrates the historical roots of the relationship between Islam and politics. The demise of the Ottomans, colonialism and the emergence of Turkish nationalist-secularist movements is examined as they relate to the formation of current Islamist movements. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new secular Turkish republic by M. K. Ataturk were analyzed with a priority given to the role of state-religion and state-society relations. The primary emphasis in the second chapter is on how Islamism developed in relation to state control over religion and how Islamists perceive external threats to their social identity. The fourth chapter is similar to the second

Motivational frame of the Islamists about their anti-secularism would be: "Struggling/striving for the establishment of an Islamic state is an Islamic obligation (fardh) on every Muslim".
chapter except, it's focus is Egypt. Starting from the era of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, the fourth chapter discusses the role of religion in Egyptian politics. Ali’s authoritarian way of dominating the *ulema* (religious class) and his rapid program of modernization and Westernization are discussed as they relate to formation of Islamism in Egypt. The colonization period, the Urabi Revolt and the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood are discussed. Additionally, a brief account of the historical evolution of Islamist political movements is provided for the period after the military coup of Free Officers of Egypt as those were the precursors of contemporary Islamist political movements. Also, a discussion of Sadat’s accommodationist policies towards the Islamists after Nasser’s dominance is provided.

The third and fifth chapters focus on Turkey and Egypt respectively by utilizing the social movement and Gramscian theories. In those two chapters, I examined the political activities of Islamists by testing my hypotheses. In those two chapters, a detailed analysis of state control over religion, the perceived threats on social identity, and politicization of each movement is provided in the light of my interviews and context analysis. Additionally, I discussed the Islamists’ ideology (politics as *jihad*), rhetoric and way of mobilizing the movement participants. Moreover, frames (official vs. Islamist) and the battle waged over frames by the two governments and the Islamists were also discussed in length.

The sixth chapter is a comparison and contrast of the Islamists in the two countries. Similarities and differences were laid out between the two. The last chapter provides a brief account of the possible direction that the Islamists of both countries might take in the future. Moreover, in this chapter I provided my insight on the possibilities for the Islamists in two countries to challenge the status quo. What would happen if Islamists change the
status quo in their countries? In such a case, what kind of path(s) are those Islamists going to follow? The seventh chapter also ties up all of the chapters and provides the conclusion.
CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF ISLAM, TURKEY AND TURKISH SECULARIZATION

Islam

In the period from Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 to the transfer of locus of power from Damascus to Baghdad in the midst of the 8th century, the Islamic ummah (the universal Islamic community) developed from an Arab origin to a universal empire through the Arab conquest. The Arab conquests transformed tribal-nomadic people into the ruling elite of an imperial structure. Arabic replaced other languages like Greek, Persian and Aramaic as the language of literature, administration and science. Claiming to be the continuation of the Abrahamic monotheistic religions, Islam replaced Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and paganism in the Middle East. While replacing those religions, Islam actually did not eliminate them. In an interaction with the existing literary, religious and administrative traditions of Byzantium and Iran, Islam created a civilization centered around the revelations contained in the Qur'an.25

Emergence and Rise of Islam

Before the rise of Islam, the two major powers in the Middle East were two competing imperial states: Byzantine Empire in the west and Sassanid Empire of Iran in the east. In the early 7th century, the Byzantine Empire stretched from the Italian peninsula

across southern Europe to the capital city of Constantinople including the Middle Eastern provinces of Egypt, Palestine, Syria and parts of Iraq and Anatolia. The strong Byzantium was weakened by the rivalry of the Sassanids with continuous warfare from 540 to 629. The Sassanid Empire of Iran contested Byzantium for control of the territories between Iraq and Egypt. In 602, right before the rise of Islam, Sassanid ruler Khusraw attacked the Byzantium and captured Jerusalem and Egypt. But in 622 the Byzantine emperor Heraclius defeated the Sassanid forces and recaptured the lands. As the two major empires of the Middle East were waging wars between themselves, a movement was emerging in the sparsely inhabited lands of the Arabian Peninsula (Lapidus 2002, 3-8).

The Arabian Peninsula, with the exception of Yemen and a few oasis settlements, is a vast desert. In comparison to the Byzantium and Sassanids, the Arabian peninsula of the early 7th century did not have any central authority. Tribes were the largest units of political and social structure. In fact, the majority of the inhabitants were nomads raising camels, goats or sheep. During the two centuries before Islam, Arabia became increasingly important as a commercial transit route between the two big empires of the Middle East and Yemen which received commercial goods through the Indian Ocean. The camel caravans carried those goods to Gaza, Damascus and cities of Iraq passing through Hijaz region. By the early 7th century, Meccan merchants became rich, organized their own caravans and managed to secure their caravans by paying different tribes for protection. In addition to being a commercial center, Mecca was also a religious center with the Ka 'ba (the most sacred Islamic shrine, located in the city of Mecca) previously built by Prophet Abraham and his son Prophet Ishmael. Paganism was a long standing traditional religion of the Arabs in Mecca who converted Ka 'ba into a shrine which attracted pilgrims all
throughout the Arabian Peninsula annually. Part of the city's wealth and influence came from the pilgrims (Cleveland 1994, 6-7).

The leading clans of Mecca were all members of the Quraysh tribe that established the city, dominated most of its religious, commercial and political role. Muhammad ibn Abdullah was born in Mecca in 570 coming from the clan of Hashim which belongs to the tribe of Quraysh. Muhammad's father, Abdullah, died just before his birth and he became an orphan at the age of six. Abu Talib, Muhammad's uncle, raised and protected him. As a young man, Muhammad engaged in the caravan trade and by the age of 25 he married Khadijah who was a wealthy widow. Khadijah is an honored woman for the Muslims because she was the first convert to Islam when Muhammad became a prophet and she protected Muhammad during the very difficult years of his prophethood when he was scorned and rejected by the Meccans (Lapidus 2002, 18-22).

Muhammad was respected as a trustworthy and decent person and lived as an ordinary life as a merchant and a family man until the age of forty. As he got closer to forty he often left Mecca to meditate in a cave in the Mt. Hira near Mecca. Besides meditation, Muhammad was also concerned about the problems of pagan Arab society and seeking ways to resolve them. In the month of Ramadan, during the Laylat al Qadr (the Night of Power) the holiest month of Muslims, Muhammad was approached by angel Gabriel and started his prophetic mission. That night marked the beginning of a huge movement that would transform the Arab society and later the others and lead to the emergence of a monotheistic religion. During the remaining twenty two years of his life, Muhammad continued to receive revelations which are recorded, memorized and later collected into a single book by his companions because Muhammad was illiterate. Muhammad's prophethood can be divided in two phases, the period at Mecca (610-622) and the period
in Medina (622-632). The Meccan verses lay out the theological foundations of the religion, the verses of Medina outline the basis of an Islamic society.

During his Meccan years Muhammad's preaching attracted very few people and produced considerable opposition because Muhammad's message was a direct challenge against the social, economic and religious structure of the city. Not only did Muhammad criticize the attitudes of the wealthy Quraysh merchants, Muhammad condemned the religious practices of the pagan Arabs including those that made Mecca a wealthy pilgrimage center. After some years the opposition turned to persecution and when an invitation came from the city of Yathrib (later Medina, located at 200 miles north of Mecca), the small band of Muslims migrated from Mecca to Medina. Medina was a fertile oasis with mostly farmers suffered from an old blood feud among the several tribes in the city. Muhammad became a mediator between those tribes and received protection for himself and his believers. The event known as the *hijrah* (emigration) which took place in the year of 622 marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar and also was a turning point in the history of Islam (Cleveland 1994, 5-9).

Muhammad became the head of a small state during his ten years of prophethood in Medina, and prepared to capture his native city. During these ten years Meccans launched two campaigns against the Muslims in Medina but each time the outnumbered Muslims managed to defeat the Meccan forces. In 630, Muhammad managed to besiege Mecca with ten thousand men and the city fell with no fight. When Muhammad captured his native city, he forgave his enemies and secured their properties. The first thing that Muhammad did when he entered the city was to destroy the idols in Ka’ba. From the conquest of Mecca in 630 to the death of Muhammad in 632 most of the tribes in Arabia accepted Islam and submitted to the authority of Mecca. Muhammad managed to create a unified state out of
constantly fighting little tribes and completed Islam as a social, economic and a religious system. After Muhammad’s death, Abu Bakr who was one of the first converts to Islam and was Muhammad’s father in law became the successor (caliph). Abu Bakr (632-634) and his three successors, ‘Umar (634-644), ‘Uthman (644-656) and ‘Ali (656-661) are known as the Rashidun (the rightly guided) caliphs because of their adherence to Islamic principles. During the time of the Rashidun, Islam expanded tremendously. Muslims defeated Sassanids and Byzantium, captured most parts of Iran, Damascus, Jerusalem and all North Africa. Within hundred years of Muhammad’s death Muslim forces reached the Indian subcontinent in the east and occupied Spain and crossed the Pyrenees in the west. The Sassanid Empire was completely destroyed and Byzantium lost its lands in North Africa and in the Middle East. Besides the amazing speed and extent of the conquests, the durability of those conquests was also stunning. Except for Spain, the areas occupied during the first century of expansion remained Muslim to the present day (Cleveland 1994, 10-14).

The Umayyad and Abbasid Empires

The question of succession to the caliphate became an issue when ‘Uthman was murdered by rebellious Arab tribesman in 656. When ‘Ali was elected as a caliph, he was contested by Mu’awiyah, the powerful governor of Syria. The forces of two contestants clashed in Siffin in 657 but the result of the battle was inconclusive. This was also the beginning of the Sunni-Shiite split in Islam’s history. When ‘Ali was murdered in 661, Mu’awiyah became the caliph and the founder of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750). Although Mu’awiyah’s successors continued to expand the Islamic Empire, they were troubled by internal dissention partially caused by the policy of Arab exclusivism adopted by the Umayyad ruling elite by discriminating against the continually growing non-Arab
converts to Islam. The discontent grew into a revolution that destroyed the Umayyad dynasty in 750 and brought to power the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258). The first one and a half centuries of the Abbasid Empire was a period of relative political stability, economic prosperity and increasing universalism all throughout the Islamic Empire. These conditions attracted many other nations into Islam and created a rich and diverse civilization. When the Abbasids were at the peak of their power other regional Islamic dynasties and cultures were being formed too. Each of those dynasties formed their particular synthesis of local and Islamic practices. So, there was no single Islamic polity or culture that was tied to the Abbasids in Baghdad. It is true that the fall of the Abbasid dynasty in 1258 created political fragmentation, it did not lead to a dark age of Islamic culture and did not cause a power vacuum. Because Islam was universal, a period of stagnation in one segment of the Islamic ummah could be reversed by an infusion of intellectual, economic or military energy from another. Among the others, Turks are one example of that phenomenon. During the eleventh century the military power and ruling authority passed from Arabs to Turks in the central Islamic lands (Lapidus 2002, 45-56)

The Turks

Before converting to Islam, Turkish pastoral nomads from central Asia were in contact with Islam for some time. After converting to Islam, Turks served as professional soldiers in the armies of various Abbasid caliphs. By the middle of eleventh century Seljuk Turks established domination over Iran and in 1055 the Abbasid caliph invited Seljuk leader to assume military and administrative authority in Baghdad. The Turkish Seljuks became the lieutenants of the caliph. After the Seljuk defeat of the Byzantine army in Manzikert in 1071, the migrating Turkish tribes moved into Anatolia and gradually transformed the land into a Turkish-Muslim state of their own (Cleveland 1994, 36-38).
By 1157 fragmentation took place in form of various Seljuk princedoms as the Seljuks could not maintain their authority over the vast Islamic empire. The Seljuk period had lasting importance in the history of Islam and Turks. First, it demonstrated the universal character of Islam as Turks quickly converted to Islam. Second, nomadic Turks quickly adapted to urban life and embraced the high culture of Islam like excelling in arts, architecture and respecting the Shari'a and the ulema. Third, Seljuk Turks rejuvenated the Sunni Islam by establishing and sponsoring the madrasah system which is a state sponsored education for the ulema. Fourth, the Seljuks prepared the groundwork for the emergence of the Ottoman Empire in the Anatolian lands. It was during this politically fragmented era of the Islamic Empire when the Crusaders first appeared in the Middle East and established four Latin kingdoms. A serious threat came later on from the east during the thirteenth century. The Mongols first led by Genghis Khan and then his son Hulagu destroyed everything in their path to Baghdad including the city itself in 1258. Hulagu aimed to conquer Egypt; however, a new dynasty in Cairo, the Mamluks, defeated the Mongols and established its control over Egypt and Syria in 1260 until they were taken over by the Ottomans in 1517 (Cleveland 1994, 39).

The Rise and Expansion of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman state emerged out of a dozen small Anatolian principalities created after the destruction of the Seljuk Empire. These Turkish principalities were Islamic warrior states inspired by the tradition of ghaza (warfare against non-Muslims to extend Islam), and the ghazi spirit played an important role shaping the Ottoman Empire. One of the principalities led by Osman achieved significant victories against the Byzantine forces during the early 1300s. Victories of Osman attracted other chieftains and tribesmen to his side and Osman’s son Orhan captured the city of Bursa from the Byzantines in 1326.
Orhan’s principality made the successful transition from a frontier principality to a state and his subjects started to be known by his family name, *Osmanlı* (Ottomans). The Ottoman expansion of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was like the Arab conquests seven hundred years earlier. Ottomans added new European territories into their states while extending their rule to the Arab lands where Islam had originated (İnalçık 2001, 5-9).

When Ottomans conquered Egypt and most of the Arab lands in 1517, they were recognized as the protectors of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina; moreover Sultan Selim who conquered those lands received the title of caliph and enhanced the Islamic standing of the Ottoman rulers. In fact, sultans did not use their title until the nineteenth century to obtain Muslim support to drive out European imperialists. The Ottomans reached their peak under the rule of Sultan Süleyman and at his death in 1566, stretched his empire from the Danube to Yemen, from Albania to the Crimean shores of the Black Sea, and from Algeria to Baghdad (İnalçık 2001).

Ottomans are known for their strong and well established bureaucracy. Along with the bureaucratic and military elite, the ulema was the third pillar of the Ottoman ruling class. With the Ottomans, the ulema had a hierarchical class structure including the *qadis* (judges) appointed by the government for various administrative subdivisions of the government. As the empire expanded, the chief religious dignitary of the empire, the *Sheikh al Islam*, oversaw the appointment of *qadis* and the *madrasah* teachers in addition to providing legal opinion for the sultans. The income of the ulema class was independent of the government, it was provided by the religious endowments (the *waqf*), however their appointments were not. Also, in addition to providing slave soldiers for the Janissaries, the
devşirme system provided the top ranking military and civilian administrators with the exception of the religious establishment composed of entirely free Muslims. The talented children were taken from their parents and were assigned to special royal schools within the palace and they went through a hard training period. They studied Persian, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish and also learned arts like calligraphy and painting as well as military strategy. The term slave here may be misleading, in theory they were slaves of the Sultan, but they accumulated vast wealth and had immense power and had slaves of their own. The success of the devşirme was determined by their talents, not by their families. With the devşirme system the Ottoman elite was constantly renewed and because it was forbidden to enslave a freeborn Muslim, their sons excluded from holding positions. Therefore the system did not allow for hereditary positions (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 36-39).

Another characteristic of the Ottoman social and political system is the millet system where the sultans organized their non-Muslim subjects into religious communities called millets, and granted them a considerable amount of autonomy. Each of the three major non-Muslim religions (Greek Orthodox, Judaism and Armenian Christianity) was granted millet status and was placed under the direct authority of the leading church patriarch. The two patriarchs and the grand rabbi were selected with the approval of the sultan and resided in Istanbul. The millet officials were granted both civil and religious responsibilities such as tax collection, education, justice and religious affairs within their religious communities. In this system, an individual's identity was determined by religious affiliation, not by nationality or by location. These minorities were tolerated but they were

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devşirme It was the system of collection of young boys from conquered Christian lands by the Ottoman Empire to build a loyal slave army and class of administrators: the Janissaries, or other administrative servants. The word devşirme means "picking up" in Ottoman Turkish. Boys delivered to Ottomans in this way were called acemi oğlanlar (novice boys). The devşirme was similar to a system used by earlier Islamic dynasties, such as the Abbasids who used slaves to build armies -especially guard troops- intended to be
barred from service in the armed forces or from being a member of the Ottoman ruling elite. All these practices originate from the practices of Prophet Muhammad during his life in Medina where Muslims, Christians and Jews signed a treaty (known as the constitution of Medina) to coexist. The Qur'an refers to Christians and Jews as the people of the books and in the Shari'a those minorities have a special status (*Djimmi*-protected community or minority) (İnalçık 2001, 66-74).

The Ottomans lost their dominance especially after the seventeenth century mainly because of the external factors. The European merchant capital penetrated the empire and Ottomans started to sell raw materials to European producers and bought manufactured goods from them. Ottomans had an economy mainly based on agriculture. This benefited Ottoman merchants at the beginning, but in the long run there was a huge shortage of raw materials for domestic consumption. The prices rose and there was huge inflation. The state did not have enough resources to meet its expenses and increased military expeditions drained the economy. Ottomans signed a series of commercial treaties known as the Capitulations including extensive privileges for European merchants. Along with their economic effect on the empire, those treaties had long-term political implications. In the military realm, after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 signed with Austria, the Ottomans were on the defensive. For the Ottomans, the eighteenth century was a period of political and economic disintegration as Ottomans lost their ability of control their territories. The decline of central authority also enabled the local leaders to gain regional power. Although some sultans like Selim III had huge efforts to reform the Ottoman system, the forces of the status-quo usually succeeded (Shaw and Shaw 1976; İnalcık 2001).
As Ottomans lost their ability to control their territories gradually, by the late eighteenth century Egypt became a _de facto_ independent state under a revived Mamluk order. In fact, Ottomans destroyed the Mamluk state in Egypt in 1517, but the local Mamluk rulers remained powerful through the years and as the Ottomans started to lose their control in the region, the Mamluk rulers emerged as regional powers. After the French revolution of 1789, Britain and France were in conflict which extended to dominating overseas markets and strategic outposts. Egypt was the subject of that rivalry and Napoleon invaded the country in 1798 by defeating the Mamluk forces. The same year British forces defeated the French forces; however the French military remained in Egypt three more years until a British-Ottoman allied force drove the French out (Vatikiotis 1991; Lewis 2002).

Muhammad Ali of Egypt was an ethnic Albanian born and raised in the Greek city of Kavalla. He arrived in Egypt as part of the British-Ottoman allied force as second in command of an Albanian contingent. Several people competed to fill the power vacuum left by the French and Muhammad Ali was the successful one. In 1805 Ali was recognized as the governor of Egypt by Istanbul. Through forty years, Ali achieved an amazing internal development and imperial expansion for Egypt. Ali retransformed the army and reorganized the administrative structure, increased agricultural production and introduced heavy industry. Ali wanted to be independent of the Ottoman Empire and establish a hereditary dynasty for his family. To increase his power Ali destroyed most of the local Mamluk rulers and strengthened the armed forces.27 Ali sent several educational missions

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27 Additionally, both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Egypt of M. Ali the centralizing governments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries sought to break the hold of the ulema over _waqfs_ and to gain control of the revenues because the _waqfs_ were outside of the states' control. M. Ali granted huge amounts of land to certain government officials and to his relatives who were supposed to cultivate the land for some tax exemptions. M. Ali also experimented with new crops; the most important of them was the long staple cotton which became Egypt's cash crop quickly. To irrigate more land, M. Ali also introduced forced peasant labor to build irrigation canals. A program of industrialization was initiated with an emphasis on war related materials and textiles (Lewis 2002, 183-184; Vatikiotis 1991).
to Europe, established educational institutions to produce civilian and military personnel and a translation office and government press to prepare Arabic textbooks for students (Cleveland 1994, 63-73).

On several occasions, Muhammad Ali helped the Ottoman Sultan through several military campaigns as the Ottoman Sultan requested help from Muhammad Ali. Ali’s first overseas military campaign was against the puritanical Wahhabi movement in Arabia who had captured the two holy cities. The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) ordered Muhammad Ali to put down the revolt. Ali’s son Ibrahim led the Egyptian forces and captured the two holy cities in 1811. Ali also aimed at Sudan and by 1820 captured all of it. Ali’s forces also helped the Ottomans to subdue the Greek nationalists who revolted against the Ottomans. To obtain raw materials and a large market for Egypt’s new industrial output, Ali turned against the Sultan and invaded Syria in 1832. Ali’s son Ibrahim led the Egyptian forces and defeated the Ottoman army. After a treaty Muhammad Ali’s son Ibrahim became the governor of Syria in 1833. In 1841 the European powers imposed a settlement on the Ottoman-Egyptian conflict known as the Treaty of London. Muhammad Ali was forced to withdraw from all territories he occupied except Sudan. Although Ali lost a lot of the land he had occupied, he achieved a major objective. The treaty stated that the governorship of Egypt was to be a hereditary office held by his family. In fact, Ali’s descendants ruled Egypt until 1952 (Cleveland 1994, 73-76).

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

For the Ottoman Empire the nineteenth century was the era of nationalist independence movements within the empire, starting with its European subjects and continuing with its Muslim subjects. Those nationalist independence movements were often manipulated by the great European powers for their own ends. Serbs were the first to
revolt and Greeks followed the Serbs against the Ottomans. Being unable to end the rebellion, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II invited Muhammad Ali's forces to Greece. The Ottomans managed to end the revolt; however the European powers asserted their interests and changed the outcome of events. In 1827, without a declaration of war, the Great Power alliance fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in Navarino Bay in Greece. When Mahmud II still refused to concede the loss of the region, the Russians attacked the Ottomans a year later and crossed the Danube River and captured Adrianople. However, hostilities were avoided when Russia and Britain decided that the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire was not in their best interest and the existence of a weak buffer Ottoman state between their competing ambitions was preferable to waging a war for dividing the Ottoman territories. With the Convention of 1832 Greece became independent (Quataert 2005, 81-82).

The first half of the nineteenth century was the period of reform for the Ottomans. Mahmud II eliminated the Janissary and established a new army along European lines trained by European advisers. Mahmud II also established the educational infrastructure for the new military. Renovating the tax farming system, reorganization of the bureaucracy, introduction of the Official Gazette, and opening of a translation office were major reforms of Mahmud II. One major issue remaining was how to limit the authority of the leading ulama because the entire religious establishment was mostly independent of the central state and had a considerable amount of control over the revenues of the waqf. Mahmud II aimed to limit the authority of the sheikh al Islam, the chief religious dignitary of the empire, by making his office part of the state bureaucracy. Also like Muhammad Ali, Mahmud II tried to control the waqf revenues and created the Ministry of Religious Endowments (1826) to administer waqf income and transfer any surplus to the state.
treasury. Although this measure of centralization did not completely work at Mahmud II’s time, it was the beginning of state intervention in the affairs of religious establishment and it weakened the position of the ulema (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 280-286).

The Tanzimat Era

The reform attempts of Mahmud II and emulation of European methods of administration and education brought a continuing expansion of the role of the state. The graduates of new state-sponsored schools increasingly moved into the top ranks of state hierarchy. The Islamic foundations of the society were not openly criticized by those new generation of Western style educated officials; however their policies gradually reduced the significance of the religious establishment. The Tanzimat period (1839-1876) of the Ottomans was the most intense period of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms. The royal decree of Gülhane (Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu) in 1839 made all subjects of the Sultan equal. Regardless of their religion all Ottoman subjects had equal opportunities and obligations. By that decree, the Sultan tried to secure the loyalty of the Christian and Jewish subjects while nationalism was a growing idea among the minorities of the empire. Instead of the millet system, the reformers tried to create an Ottoman citizenship (Quataert 2002, 66). Two other remarkable changes took place in the areas of education and legislation. The central authority created many secondary schools throughout the empire and placed them under the control of the Ministry of Education. This was another step toward limiting the control of the religious establishment and the ulema because historically education used to be under the administration and supervision of the ulema. A new legal code was compiled based on the Shari’a, but a lot of penal and commercial codes were introduced following the French civil code as a model (Cleveland 1994, 79-82).
One of the results of increased interaction between the Ottomans and Europe was the creation of a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats known as the Young Ottomans (Genç Osmanlilar). They were not a coherent group; however their main concern was to reconcile the new institutions of the Tanzimat and the traditional Ottoman and Islamic institutions. One of their main successes was to elaborate the notion of Ottoman patriotism. Another success was the creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1876. However the constitutional monarchy did not live long, after two years Sultan Abdülhamid II dissolved the assembly and suspended the constitution (Quataert 2002, 65-67).

The Tanzimat reforms did not come cheap. To cover the budget deficits, the reformers started to get loans from Europe starting in 1854 during the Crimean War. After twenty years, about sixty percent of the state’s total expenditure was allocated for paying those debts. In 1881 the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established to reserve certain state revenues to pay the debt. The Ottomans lost their financial independence. The reforms in the Ottoman Empire created an institutional dualism. With the exception of destruction of Janissaries, most traditional institutions remained. Although there were new courts and some changes to the legal code were made, they did not eliminate the Shari'a courts and the new elite educated in European-style institutions coexisted with the graduates of religious schools or with the ulema. There was also a large gap between the educated officials and the population. The nineteenth century reforms of the Ottomans and of Egypt brought certain advantages; however, they also brought economic instability, social disruption and alienation, and political crises (Shaw and Shaw 1976; İnalçık and Quataert 1997).
The Response of Islamic Society and the Ulema to the Tanzimat Reforms

By the end of the nineteenth century most of the Muslim lands were under some form of European control. Those who escaped direct occupation had severely limited sovereignty and did not have economic independence. Muslim intellectuals and activists argued that widespread degeneration of the Muslim societies and deviation from the true religion were the main causes of such defeats. That kind of a self criticism and a reaction against the adoption of European ways led to an assertion of Islamic values.

Abdülmecid II (1876-1909) was the last Ottoman sultan who exercised unrestrained royal authority. In 1878 he suspended the constitution and abolished the parliament. His period is characterized by cautious reform, conservatism and a reaction against European institutions and ideas. To maintain the integrity of the empire, Abdülmecid II stressed the Islamic heritage of the empire and instead of the idea of Ottomanism he adhered to Pan-Islamism. Adherence to Pan-Islamism and benefiting from his title as the caliph of the Islamic ummah were useful diplomacy tools. From a domestic perspective, Abdülmecid’s policies were intended to secure the loyalty of Arab subjects of the empire. In fact, during his era, many Arab notables enjoyed increasing prestige. Abdülmecid’s era also marked the increasing German influence in form of army reorganization and of investment capital in the empire (Cleveland 1994, 113-118).

Muslim intellectuals were increasingly concerned about the survival of the Islamic ummah in the Ottoman Empire increasingly dominated and penetrated by European powers. Although some members of the ulema recommended the rejection of all Western innovations, some new thinkers like Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) recognized the importance of accommodating European achievements in science and technology within the framework of
Islam. Afghani's call for direct action in the name of Islamic solidarity appealed to many people. For Afghani Islam did not contradict with the spirit of science and technology, however Muslims had become ignorant of true Islam. To rediscover the true Islam, strengthening the unity of the *ummah* was necessary. Afghani was a believer in Pan-Islamism and he was especially critical of Muslim rulers who allowed European armies to invade Muslim territories and permitted European capital to control their economies. Thus, collective solidarity combined with action was necessary to resist exploitation and to bring the Islamic revival (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).

The Young Turk Revolt of 1908 and the Collapse of the Ottomans

The movement of Young Turks was a combination of three separate dissident groups; first was an Ottoman exile community in Paris and Geneva existing from the time of the Young Ottomans, second was a group of discontented civil servants and students, the third was a coalition of dissident army officers. In 1889 students in the military medical academy found a secret protest society known as the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihad ve Terakki* [*Cemiyeti*]). In 1896 Abdülhamid's spies uncovered the organization and arrested and exiled its members. In 1908 a group of officers from the Third Army in Salonika (Selanik) revolted and demanded that Abdülhamid restore the constitution. The Sultan accepted the demand from Salonika, the constitution was restored and elections were held in the same year. One year later a counterrevolution broke out against the new government by some soldiers and theological students in Istanbul who were resented by the influence of the Europeanized army officers. The Third Army acted fast and put down the disturbances and Abdülhamid was accused of cooperating with the counterrevolutionaries. Abdülhamid was deposed and sent to exile to Salonika by the Third Army. The *Ittihad ve
Terakki gradually gained the full control of the parliament. Much like the Young Ottomans forty years earlier, the Young Turks were Ottomanists. 28

In the wake of Arab and Balkan nationalism, the emergence of Turkish nationalism was natural. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire lost eighty percent of its lands in Europe. Two trends emerged simultaneously. The first is Pan-Turkism, the other is Turkism. For Pan-Turkists the Ottoman Turks were just one branch of several Turkish speaking peoples who live in a vast territory from the Balkans to China. Turkism was more appealing to the Turks of the empire which focused on the Ottoman situation. Turkism stressed the crucial Turkish contribution to the success of the Ottoman Empire and argued that there was a special pre-Islamic and pre-Ottoman cultural heritage that distinguished the Turks from other subjects of the empire. It was a departure from Ottomanism; however many elements of nationalism, Islamism and modernism were combined among the adherents of the movement. Z. Gökalp was the most prominent of them whose following statement summarizes the situation: “we belong to the Turkish nation, the Muslim community and the European civilization”. During the turbulent years of the empire Turkism did not fully develop as a coherent ideology, however after the establishment of the new Turkish Republic by M. Kemal it emerged as a developed ideology. The İttihat ve Terakki was also successful in silencing Arabism before the First World War by co-opting leading Arab dissidents by appointing them to some administrative posts (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 284-292).

28 Ottomanism is a concept developed during the First Constitutional Era (1876-1878). Ottomanism was highly effected by thinkers as Montesquieu and Rousseau and the French Revolution. It was promoting the equality among the various ethnic and religious groups within the empire. The idea originated among the Young Ottomans. Ottomanism regarded all Ottoman subjects equal before the law. The Millet system was not dismantled but secular organizations and policies were applied. Primary education, conscription, head tax and military service were applied to non-Muslim groups. For more details see: Shaw and Shaw (1976).
On October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War after it allied itself with the Germans and the Ottoman fleet bombarded several Russian ports on the Black Sea. The Capitulations were denounced and protectionist tariffs were introduced to break the economic dependence of the empire on foreigners. The war divided the empire and its Arab provinces were occupied by Britain, France and Italy. Following the peace settlement and the establishment of the mandates a new regional state system came into existence in the Middle East. The interwar era in the Middle East witnessed an Anglo-French dominance. In the same period most of the Arab political activity was primarily devoted to achieving independence from foreign control. The war years did not produce upheaval and the same elite that had power and prestige before 1914 continued to maintain their privileges during the 1920s and 1930s in the Arab world. In fact local political leaders were dependent for their positions on the discretion of the occupying power. Therefore even as the Arab political leaders demanded independence, they tried not to upset European authorities too much. The Second World War accelerated the end of Anglo-French dominance in the Middle East and led to the emergence of independent Arab states in the region (Cleveland 1994, 140).

The New Turkish Republic

The Emergence of Modern Turkey from the Ruins of the Ottoman Empire

By the end of 1918 Istanbul, the Ottoman capital was controlled by the British. The İttihad ve Terakki leaders fled the country and the Sultan under the guns of the British had to sign the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 dividing the remaining Ottoman lands between the British, French, Italians and Greek. However in the heartland of Anatolia local Turkish resistance groups were determined to resist occupation and division of their country.
Several experienced Ottoman commanders organized and led those local forces. Mustafa Kemal was one of them and gradually became the leader of the emerging national independence movement. Kemal first defeated the Greek forces that captured the city of Izmir, its hinterland and the city of Bursa. Kemal attempted to broaden the base of resistance and find a means to replace the Istanbul government which was under British control by convening the representatives in Ankara chosen by local resistance groups in April 1920. The representatives agreed to form a government on April 23, 1920 with Mustafa Kemal as the president. In January 1921 the Assembly adopted a constitution with the principle of popular sovereignty. The local resistance movements also turned into a regular national army (Lewis 1968).

Kemal’s forces managed to capture Izmir after defeating the Greeks and then headed for Istanbul which was under the control of the Allied forces. The British invited both Ankara and Istanbul to send representatives to the upcoming negotiations. Kemal argued that the government in Ankara is the true representative of the Turkish nation and introduced legislation that would abolish the sultanate and turn the caliphate into a religious office without a political authority. In November 1922 the assembly passed a resolution that separated the caliphate from the sultanate (kingdom), and eliminated the sultanate, which ended the Ottoman era. The last Ottoman Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdeddin left Istanbul under British protection; the Assembly designated his cousin Abdülmecid as caliph. With the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey was recognized as a sovereign state (Cleveland 1994, 166-169).
Authoritarian Reform in Turkey

After establishing the governmental mechanisms of the new republic, M. Kemal (Atatürk) initiated an intensive reform (inkılıp) period to eradicate the Ottoman past and replace it with a Western orientation in all realms of life. Kemal’s reforms can be understood through the six principles that he assigned as the foundations of the doctrine known by his name, Kemalism: reformism, republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism and etatism. Reformism permeated the whole Atatürk era. Republicanism was a part of the constitution and marked a significant difference from the Ottoman era with the emphasis on the principle of popular sovereignty. Secularism was the central element of Atatürk’s reforms. Atatürk initiated secularism first by deposing Caliph Abdülmecid and abolishing the caliphate and banishing all members of the Ottoman royal family from Turkey. The office of Sheikh Al-Islam was abolished and the religious schools were closed, and the Ministry of Religious Endowments was eliminated. In 1926 the Assembly voted to abolish the Mejelle (the codified Shari’a laws of the Ottoman Empire). Swiss civil code, Italian penal code and German commercial code were adopted as the law. The new laws introduced during the Young Turk and Tanzimat eras were based on the Shari’a; but the changes of 1926 were a complete break with the past. The sufî (mystics) orders were banned. Atatürk also abandoned the fez and made it criminal to wear it. Hats became a symbol of the Westernization. The lunar calendar was replaced by the Gregorian calendar and Sunday became the holiday instead of Friday, and the Ottoman alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet. One of the controversial acts of reform was making it obligatory to issue the ezan (originally adhan in Arabic, call to prayer) in Turkish instead

29 His surname, meaning the father of the Turks, was bestowed to him by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1935.
of Arabic. It was clear that the ulema class had no place in this picture (Yılmaz 2002; Lewis 1968).

The other two overlapping principles of Kemalism were nationalism and populism, which had similar objectives. Nationalism was about creating a sense of being a nation and a national identity. For that purpose Atatürk initiated a language reform by replacing the alphabet in 1928. At some point some extreme theories were also used such as the sun language theory claiming that Turkish was the first spoken language on earth. Atatürk also established People’s Houses (Halkevleri) all over the country which were a combination of adult education centers, sports clubs and political indoctrination units. The government had to take the revolution to the masses. As well as recreational purposes, the main focus was on promoting solidarity and mobilizing the masses. Those houses were run by Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and were used to generate support for the party and the reforms. Also a massive program of educational expansion took place especially focusing on the rural areas with no schools (Lewis 1968).

Atatürk and his economic planners concluded that the new republic had to be less dependent on imports and that the basic industries had to be developed. Private capital was insufficient for that purpose, therefore the government decided to intervene directly and to divert state money for major industrial projects. As a result, etatism (state capitalism) was a necessity for the new republic to industrialize. The focus was on the textile, steel, paper, glass, cement and sugar industries. Etatism was not a complete success; inefficiency, poor productivity and the neglect of the rural areas were major problems associated with the etatist projects (Lewis 1968).

Atatürk died in 1938 at the age of fifty seven. The Turkish people deeply mourned his death. He was a charismatic and an inspirational leader. He started his career as an
Ottoman military officer and proved himself in the battles of the First World War and the war of independence. Atatürk’s talent in creating a nation state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was remarkable. However, for some people his secular reforms were too abrupt. Some of the secular measures alienated some segments of the population, and cut the Turks off from their Islamic past. In spite of the authoritarian measures of his rule, the democratic institutions established at the beginning of the new republic have remained. The transition of power to his successor and close friend, İsmet İnönü, was smooth. İnönü became the president after Atatürk’s death on November 10, 1938, and advanced Atatürk’s reforms in the upcoming years. During the Second World War, İnönü’s Turkey remained neutral until almost the end of the war. Three months before the end of the war, Turkey declared war on Germany and qualified for charter membership in the UN (Zürcher 1998, 184-196).

Secularist-Atatürkist Ideology and Government Control over Religion

Ever since the beginnings of modernization of the Ottoman institutions through the 18th century, the primary goal of the modernizers had been the preservation of the state. For instance, the Tanzimat reforms (1839) launched in the late Ottoman period were geared towards preserving the existing order. However, the Ottoman statesmen’s encounters with the West during and after the reforms have fundamentally changed the major premises of the old Ottoman order. The traditional millet system based on religious stratification of the Muslims and non-Muslims began to be dismantled in the course of the Tanzimat reforms. Later, the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire was introduced in the Reform Edict of 1856 (İslahat Fermanı) which promised full equality to the non-Muslims. The Edict included equality in liability for military service as well as for entry to governmental positions and schools (Kadioğlu 1998, 3).
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish Republic, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, adopted a process of secularization which was more akin to the French secularist model (*laicism*) than the Anglo-Saxon model which involves the separation of state and religion. In French laicism, which Atatürk emulated, religion is perceived as an entirely private matter and churches are voluntary associations. The French secularism is based on positivist Comtean ideals. A. Comte believed that history progressed from theological, to metaphysical, and then to positive modes of thought and related types of social organization. Thus, Comte envisioned a view of progress by turning away from theology towards the scientific study of nature and society. He foresaw the development of societies through utilizing the scientific methods of empirical observation which would pave the way to a social evolution under the supervision of specialists or social engineers (Kadroğlu 1998, 5).

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the new Turkish Republic was established by M. Kemal Atatürk and his close associates who altogether led the independence war against the British, Greek and French. In addition to separating Islam from politics and completely secularizing the new republic, Atatürk also wanted to subordinate Islam to the new republic through measures like confiscating the properties of the religious endowments (*vakif*), banning religious education, prohibiting the use of religious symbols in public and subordinating the clergy (*ulema*) by prohibiting private religious organizations. For instance, in 1924, the Caliphate was abolished and the *Shari'a* was replaced by the Swiss code in 1926. The next year, the religious orders (*tarikat*) were banned and Western forms of hats, clothing and calendar were introduced. Earlier, the 1924 Constitution envisioned Islam as the official religion of the new republic. However, after a constitutional amendment in 1928 Islam was no longer the religion of the
republic. In 1937, the Turkish state officially became a laic (secular) state with another constitutional amendment. According to Berkes (1964, 461-479) Kemalist secularism sought to rationalize Islam, and aimed to take religion under the control of popular sovereignty, rather than abolishing it. In Toprak’s (1995, 90) words, Atatürk’s secular measures “were basically designed to establish state control over religion rather than to separate the two spheres.” The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, DiB) was created 1924 under the Ministry of Interior Affairs (İç İşleri Bakanlığı) to maintain the secular nature of the state. Karakaş (2007, 10) points out that Atatürk established the institution with the “goal of de politicizing...Islam through a state takeover of certain religious functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building project.” Thus, through a secularist interpretation of religion, the DiB was given the responsibility “to prevent non-state and anti-Kemalist circles from using religion for political mobilization against the state.” The secularists referred all matters that were connected to religion to the DiB (the role of the DiB will be discussed extensively in the next chapter). The governments of the multi-party era remained faithful to the secularist principles set forth by Kemal Atatürk.

The Multiparty Era

İnönü followed Atatürk’s line of reforms regarding economic and social development embodied in the principle of etatism which suggests a major role for the government in sponsoring industrial development. Because of domestic and international pressures, İnönü allowed greater freedoms for the expression of political dissent. In 1946, four members of the CHP left the party and established a new party, the Democratic Party.

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30 Berkes highlights the combination of the Durkheimean and Republican tones in M. Kemal Atatürk’s conception of religion. For details, see Berkes (1964).
Bayar was elected as the president after İnönü and Menderes became the Prime Minister. Bayar was a banker with a long record of government service and Menderes had a law degree coming from a wealthy family. Neither of them had any military background as opposed to Atatürk or İnönü. During the Democrats’ decade in power, the national assembly included many professionals and businessmen instead of government officials and military officers turned politicians. This was a radical break from the Ottoman and early Republican tradition where a career in the military or the bureaucracy served as a path to political power. One of the first actions that the Democrats did was to legalize the *adhan* (the call to prayer) in Arabic. From 1932 to 1950 the government forbade to call the *adhan* in Arabic; the Turkish translation of the call was heard from the minarets for 28 years.

Religious education was offered to all Muslim students through the Imam-Hatip schools (Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools) in the educational system and the number
of schools for training Muslim prayer leaders was increased. The government also devoted considerable amount of money for repairing existing mosques and building new ones throughout the country. In this new more favorable political climate, more religious books were published and public observance of Islamic rituals intensified, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca. People were free to practice Islam which contributed to the popularity of the government. Menderes was not in favor of overturning the secularist principles although his government's respect for religion contributed to the popular support for the DP (Zürcher 1998, 220-231).

The Democrats also diverged from the Republicans on the economy. Menderes was for liberalization, allowing more private enterprise and reducing the role of the state in economy. The Republicans, on the other hand, were against liberalization of the economy and they favored the continuation of etatist principles that had been first established by Atatürk. Menderes government also undertook agricultural reforms and sought to improve the living standards of the peasants in rural areas. The Democratic government imported large quantities of agricultural machinery, built dams and irrigation canals and constructed a national network of highways which improved communication and opened remote regions of the country to commercial agriculture. However the initial sudden growth of the economy slowed down as by the mid-1950s, a series of droughts devastated the rural areas, and the Democrat's high level of government spending created large annual budget deficits which then created a large national debt (Cleveland 1994, 263).

After the mid-1950s, the Democratic government introduced a series of repressive measures that allowed the government to censor the press, imprison the journalists, and shut down oppositional newspapers. Violent protests began to happen in cities during the
spring of 1960. Menderes used the army to maintain law and order. A few weeks after the Kayseri incident, the military intervened on May 27, 1960 under the command of Gen. Cemal Güresel. The army seized the major cities and arrested leading government officials including President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes. The Turkish military announced that it was not intending to stay in power for a long time, in fact in October 1961, the military returned their barracks and peacefully transferred power to the civilian authorities. The purpose of the military was not to establish a long term military rule in the country, but the intervention was done with the belief that Menderes government had strayed away from the principles of Kemalism (Atatürkism). A National Unity Council of thirty-eight officers led the country during the military rule. Chairman of the council, Gen. Güresel, became president and prime minister. The first act of the Council was to draft a new constitution prepared by a group of law professors from Istanbul University. The new Turkish constitution was approved in July 1961 which replaced the unicameral legislature with a bicameral one consisting of a senate and an assembly (Cleveland 1994, 264). Before elections were held, nearly 600 members of the former overthrown government were charged with offenses involving political and financial corruption and subversion of the constitution. Most of the charges were fabricated. The trials lasted almost a year and 450 individuals received different prison terms. Menderes and two of his cabinet members were sentenced to death and were hanged in September 1961. The controversial execution of Menderes and two ministers was seen by the followers of the DP as a political act, not as an act of justice (Ahmad 1993, 123-132).

Menderes also used the army to disrupt Republican Party campaign meetings. In April 1960, troops blocked the Republican leader İnönü’s train before it entered the city of Kayseri where he was scheduled to make a campaign speech. When former war hero and close friend of Atatürk got off the train to see what was happening, the troops parted before him, İnönü boarded the train and the train entered the city without any incident.
Two parties were established following the legacy of the Democrat Party: the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP). In the parliamentary elections of 1961 these parties received 35 and 14 percent of the votes respectively compared to the 38 percent won by the CHP. President Gürsel asked İnönü to form the government, and İnönü established a coalition government with the AP which lasted only six months. The CHP had two more unsuccessful coalitions. The fourth coalition government was created by an independent senator, S. H. Ürgüplü, who was elected on the AP list. The voters were tired of weak and inefficient coalition governments, and in the 1965 general election they voted for the populist AP which was led by Süleyman Demirel (1924-). Demirel was able to rise to the top because the top layer of the DP leadership had been eliminated from politics by the military (Ahmad 1993, 137).

Rapid Urbanization and Politicization of Turkey in the 1960s

In the 1960s, Turkey was experiencing a complex process of social economic and demographic changes. The population nearly doubled in twenty-five years from 21 million in 1950 to about 40 million in 1975. After the end of the Second World War, Turkey experienced rapid urbanization. In 1950 8.4 percent of the population lived in the cities of 100,000 and over; in 1975 the figure was 23 percent. In search of better economic opportunities, Turkish peasants moved to larger cities; they did not always find better jobs, and shantytowns inhabited by poor migrants became a prominent feature of large cities in Turkey (Cleveland 1994, 265).

Ahmad argues that politics of the 1960s contrasted sharply from those of the previous decade in Turkey. Turkey had been thoroughly politicized after 1960 and the new freedoms provided by the constitution permitted ideological politics for the first time. There was a strong left-wing presence in the country, especially in the universities. These
political trends coincided with Turkey's disillusionment with the U.S. Menderes had remained loyal to Washington and supported U.S. policy unquestioningly. After seizing power, the junta immediately reaffirmed Turkey's commitments to the Western allies (Ahmad 1993, 136-138). For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Prime Minister İnönü stood by Washington even if it could bring nuclear annihilation to Turkey. However, during the same crisis, Turkey learned that it was little more than a bargaining counter in the negotiations between the superpowers in the peak years of the Cold War and that its interests were not taken into account by the U.S. during the negotiations. Public opinion became convinced that Turkey's interests were negotiable, and during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-4, Washington's siding with Athens inflamed public opinion against the U.S. (Ahmad 1993, 139). There was overwhelming popular support for Turkish military intervention to the island and İnönü government was considering to proceed. However, President Johnson's letter of 5 June (1964) to İnönü prevented the possible military intervention by warning him that weapons provided by Washington could not be used without U.S. consent and the NATO alliance would not come to Turkey's aid against the Soviets if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention. The contents of the letter which contributed to anti-Americanism were leaked to the press (Ahmad, 139-141).

The anti-American camp included neo-Kemalist nationalists of all political orientations as well as leftists who often overlapped. For those people, Turkey's predicament was about its dependence on the capitalist West whose leader was the U.S. They reinterpreted Turkey's war of liberation as a struggle against imperialism for the purpose of establishing an independent, non-aligned state. They also criticized the rulers of post-war Turkey for lacking the determination to preserve the true independence of the
country. For them both the CHP and the DP were guilty; the CHP for accepting the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and the DP for leading Turkey into NATO and the Baghdad Pact. The right was alarmed by the appeal of this new radical nationalism of the left which it denounced as communist. Ahmad argues that since the neo-Kemalists were successful in making nationalism one of the fundamentals of their ideology, the right, which hitherto had monopolized nationalism, was forced to use Islam as a counter-force. For instance, the new right-wing organizations such as the Association to Combat Communism were found as early as 1962 and presented Islam as the antidote to communism (Ahmad 1993, 142).

Demirel, whose Justice Party won the 1965 election, had spent a year in America as an Eisenhower Fellow and was employed by a US multinational corporation operating in Turkey. Demirel was attacked from all sides; the left denounced him as a capitalist, the right denounced him as a Freemason. During the late 1960s, Turkey's workers became more militant in their struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. The employers resisted and numerous strikes and lock-outs followed each other. Politicized by the events of the 1960s and by the propaganda of the Worker's Party, in 1967 a group of unions broke away from the pro-government confederation (TÜRK-İŞ) and formed the radical confederation DISK (Devrimci Işçilari Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-The Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions). The traditional lower-middle class in the AP began to criticize Demirel, adopted an Islamist rhetoric and started to organize politically. The AP won the parliamentary elections in October 1969, but its share of the vote was reduced by 6.4 percent. In January 1970, Necmettin Erbakan formed his own party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which was the first Islamist party of Turkey. Later in December another faction broke away from the AP and formed the
new Democratic Party. Meanwhile Col. Türkeş, who was among the officers who carried out the 1960 coup, renamed the Republican Peoples Nation Party the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) in February 1969. Türkeş’s purpose was to attract the same lower middle class vote by creating a militant, ultra-nationalist party claiming to be equally opposed to capitalism and communism (Ahmad 1993, 143-144).

Societal changes, rising political tensions, rapid urbanization and industrialization, high inflation rate, high unemployment rates, militant labor movements, inadequate educational system resulted in a state of chaos in Turkey. By January 1971, the universities ceased to function; radical left-wing students robbed banks and kidnapped US servicemen, and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike, and the Islamist movement became more aggressive and openly rejected Atatürk’s principles and Kemalism. On 12 March, 1971 the generals (the Chief of General Staff and the commanders of the army, navy, and air forces) presented a memorandum to Pres. Sunay and the chairmen of the two chambers demanding the formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing reforms. They threatened to assume power if the Demirel government refused to resign, Demirel resigned. This military intervention is known as the coup by memorandum because unlike the 1960 coup, the armed forces did not seize power (Ahmad 1993, 144-147).

Islam and Politics: The Conceptual Framework

It is often suggested that contemporary Islamist movements are seeking to establish an Islamic state that had existed at some point in the history of Muslims exemplified by the Islamic state first established by Islam’s prophet Muhammad (570-632) in the city of
Medina after Muslims emigrated there in 622. Implicit in this suggestion is the argument that Islam has a particular political theory. Although it is still debated whether such a theory exists, the contemporary Islamists continually refer to the religious texts and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad as well as certain precedents set by earlier Islamic governments in history (Ayubi 1993). The earlier sections of this chapter will briefly introduce some of those references employed by the contemporary Islamists.

Contemporary Islamist movements are inspired by the vision of a prophetic community. They attempt to return to the principles of Islamic morality and to a renewal of personal commitment to the foundations of Islam. Moreover, the Islamists commonly aim to control the state and to use the power of the state to enforce Islam. To them, the state is simply the force that requires the citizens to adhere to Shari'a. Islamists often argue that the ideal Islamic state has no institutional form, and it is embodied in the leadership of individuals who are dedicated to Islamic principles. Thus, Lapidus argues, contemporary Islamist movements have ambiguous political implications; while some believe that the control of the state is essential to the success of an Islamic social and moral program, some others look upon states as inherently corrupt and incapable of realizing Islamic values because they do not see the state as a realm of moral fulfillment (Lapidus 2002, 25, 26).

Before Islam, the city of Medina was known as Yathrib by the people of the Arabian Peninsula. After Muslims migrated there in 622, Muslims changed the name of the city to Al-Medina Al-Munawwarah, the enlightened city (or the city of Prophet Muhammad). This event, known as Al-Hijrah (emigration), marked the beginning of the Muslim lunar calendar. Muslims who were less than a total of 70 people had to emigrate to Medina due to heavy persecution by the powerful idolatrous Meccan tribes following an invitation by the two most powerful tribes of the city (Al-Aws and Al-Khazraj—predominantly non-Muslim at that time). Those tribes invited Prophet Muhammad as a mediator to mediate conflicts and long-lasting blood feuds between them. In an incredibly short amount of time Prophet Muhammad was able to resolve conflicts between them; and pronounced the two tribes as brothers. Gradually, Islam's message was able to convert the majority of the inhabitants of Medina and surrounding Arab tribes into Islam. Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic city-state based on the Medina Charter, signed between Muslims, Jews, and the idolatrous dwellers of the city creating a city identity for all. The charter which is considered the first Islamic constitution enabled the early Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of Medina to coexist peacefully and defend their city against the Meccan tribes and their allies.
Islam as a Historical and Organic Religion

Before Prophet Muhammad’s emergence, Arabia was a politically fragmented region, largely pastoral, primarily idolatrous in religion, and without either an organized state or a region-wide church. Muhammad organized a Muslim community in Medina to fulfill God’s command in a variety of matters such as faith, ethical conduct, family, commerce, law, war, diplomacy and politics. In the early days of Islam, religious identity did not supersede clan and tribal identity, but was rather superimposed on them. Also, there was no differentiation between Prophet Muhammad’s religious role as the prophet of Islam in spiritual and moral matters, and his role as a tribal mediator and arbitrator in resolving conflicts. Thus, no distinction was made between the realm of religion and that of the state (Lapidus 2002, 9). The original Islamic sources (the Qur’an and the Hadith texts) do not have much on matters of government and politics. Immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community faced with the problem of government; and the first disagreements that took place and eventually led to the division of Muslims into Sunnis, Kharijites and Shi’a were predominantly about politics, not theology. The Qur’an did not stipulate a specific form for the state or the government, nor did Prophet Muhammad appoint a successor for himself. Ayubi (1993) argues that given the limited nature of political stipulations in the Qur’an and Hadith, Muslims have had to borrow and improvise to develop their political systems, inspired by the Shari’a, by Arabian tribal traditions, and by the political heritage of the lands they conquered, especially Persian and Byzantine traditions. The influence of the first source was more noticeable during the era of the first four rightly guided caliphs (Al-Khulafa’ Al-Rashidun, namely Abu Bakr, ‘Umar,

37 Prophet Muhammad just requested his close friend and one of the early Muslims Abu Bakr to lead the congregational prayers when he became very sick before his death. After his death, Muslims perceived
‘Uthman, and ‘Ali), the second during the Umayyad dynasty, and the third during the Abbasid, Seljuki and Ottoman dynasties (Ayubi 1993, 7).

In Islam, the realm of Caesar and the realm of God are mutually inclusive, and Islam makes no distinction between religious and political aspects of human life. In this regard, Islam provides models for both individual and political action (Husain 38-43).

Islam is a historical religion. Unlike ahistorical religions (like Hinduism and Buddhism), Islam perceives history as divinely ordained. Muslims see the hand of God purposefully guiding history. Religion explains the beginning, and the end of human history and the direction it must take. For Islam, particular events in history are crucial acts of revelation (Smith 1970, 248-249). For example victory in battle is considered as a sign of God’s gift; likewise defeat in battle was God’s warning and test. The following verses (8:7-9) are about the victory of Muhammad in the Battle of Badr (624):

(7) Behold! Allah promised you one of the two (enemy) parties, that it should be yours: Ye wished that the one unarmed should be yours, but Allah willed to justify the Truth according to His words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers;— (8) That He might justify Truth and prove Falsehood false, distasteful though it be to those in guilt. (9) Remember ye implored the assistance of your Lord, and He answered you: "I will assist you with a thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks."

The following verses (3:139-142) are about the defeat of Muslims in the Battle of Uhud (625), after an initial success the Muslims were driven back and the Prophet was also wounded:

(139) So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith. (140) If a wound hath touched you, be sure a similar wound hath touched the others. Such days (of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns: that Allah may know those that believe, and that He may take to Himself from your ranks Martyr-witnesses (to Truth). And Allah loveth not those that do wrong. (141) Allah’s object also is to purge those that are true in Faith and to deprive of blessing Those that resist Faith. (124) Did ye think that ye would enter Heaven without Allah testing those of you who fought hard (In His Cause) and remained steadfast?

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this as a sign where according to the understanding of the early Muslims, the Prophet Muhammad pointed out to Abu Bakr to be the khalifah (caliph) of Muslims after his death.
Thus, in history such particular events that are considered as acts of revelation set specific precedents for establishing a social, economic and political order that conforms to a divine design. Hence, to devout Muslims, what Muhammad did is as important as what Muhammad said and to the devout believers Muhammad is the most significant role model. For Muslims, he was a charismatic religious leader, a successful statesman, a just judge, a competent administrator, a courageous military leader, a loving husband and father and a trustworthy friend (Husain 2003, 39-40).

Besides being a historical religion Islam is an organic religion as well. Islam as a religion encompasses every social aspect of human beings. Smith (1970, 249) maintains that an organic religion has no church hierarchy or priestly class; indeed within an organic religion “sacral law and sacral social structure are of the essence...religion is largely equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations...are secondary.” In this regard, theoretical distinctions drawn in Christianity between the realms of God and of the ruler are absent in Islam (Husain, 2003). While some religions emphasize the role of a well established and well structured clerical organization that has a separate identity from both government and society, Islam as an organic religion maintains no such church hierarchy or priestly class. In an organic religion, religion is largely equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations are secondary. In organic religions the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, in fact the two systems merge. Toprak (1981, 23) argues that in an organic religion the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, the two systems merge. In Islam, this merger is both prescribed and effected by the Shari’ah which has something to say about every aspect of human life like marriage, divorce, hygiene, manners, crime, punishment, economics, politics, war and so forth. The society is the ummah (the brotherhood/community of the believers) and the
ummah is a religious community and a political society. Thus in Islam political institutions are designed to defend and promote Islam, not the state. Those institutions are supposed to establish and uphold an Islamic system based on the Shari'a. Thus, the primary loyalty of Muslims is to the ummah, not to the state, and to the Shari'a, not to the ruler (Toprak 22, 23; Husain 38-43).

The Interplay Between Modernization, Secularization and Islamism

Many modern Middle Eastern states are organized around secular identities and development goals defined in either capitalist or socialist terms. In those states, Islam no longer legitimates the state and no longer defines its moral or social vision. All of these states have secular educational and legal systems. However, secular states give special consideration to Islamic symbols and practices (Lapidus 2002, 26).

The modernization theory assumed that complex economic structure and political development proceed in tandem. Economic specialization leads to political institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional (usually landed) elites by urban middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic and educational structures. According to this formulation of modernization theory, religion gradually recedes from the public life. Consequently, the religious establishment is seen as resistant to change. As the civic order becomes secularized, rational conduct becomes the norm and this leads to greater political participation and political stability. Eickelman and Piscatori argue that the fundamental difficulty with the modernization theory lay in the sharp contrast between two artificial constructs: modernity and tradition, and the consequent misunderstanding of the entrenched social functions of tradition (2004, 22-23).

Filali-Ansary (1996, 76-80) argues that Muslim societies did not experience secularization as an internal or autonomous move; external influences either started the
process or disrupted it. However, secularization is a current reality in the Muslim world; no Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law; and religious traditions are no longer predominant in the Muslim world. Thus, secularization in the Muslim world happened before religious reformation which is a complete reversal of the European experience in which secularization was more or less an outcome of such reformation. Husain (2003) argues that the failure of the secularists in the post colonial Muslim states is one of the major factors that fuel Islamism today. During the colonial rule, the Europeans not only exploited their colonies, but used them as export markets for their surplus capital and consumer goods. Moreover, Europeans introduced modernization and Western secular education. The indigenous elite initially both emulated and cooperated with the European powers, they embraced westernization and secularization. However, it was the same indigenous elite that became the leaders of independence movements in those countries with the decline of colonial rule after the First World War (Husain 2003, 131-134). The Europeans never granted independence to their colonies in the Muslim world in exchange for their cooperation against the Axis nations in general, and the Ottoman Turks in particular. Nationalism also became a potent force among the Muslims through the end of European colonial rule replacing the loyalty of the Muslim people to the Islamic ummah.

The Muslim secularist elites quickly filled the political void left by the departing colonial administrations. The Secularists worked to transform the predominantly rural and traditional Muslim world into modern urban nation states by pursuing programs of modernization, westernization and secularization. Despite the Muslim secularists’ early popular support, within a few decades their credibility and legitimacy eroded. The rapid economic growth achieved in some Muslim countries did not significantly benefit the impoverished majority. Instead, the economic gains were enjoyed mostly by the wealthy
elite. Secularists’ modernization project unfortunately did not bring substantial development and wealth to the people. Muslim secularists used the Western idea of nationalism to integrate and unify their fragmented societies, and to consolidate their political power. Muslim secularists also used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism in domestic and foreign policy to achieve greater popular support. However, instead of appeasing the Islamists, the Muslim secularists’ political use of Islam legitimized Islamism and undermined secularization process in those countries. (Husain 2003, 133-139).

Emergence of Islamism as a Political Movement

Politicians who governed Turkey from 1971 to 1973 ruled the country under instructions from the military. The military believed that they could rid the country of its class divisions, its economic disparities, and its ideological disagreements by imprisoning discontented political activists. Under the martial law, the government imprisoned many political activists, mainly of the left. Political violence temporarily diminished, however the real underlying social, political and economic reasons behind political violence did not end. In the 1973 elections the CHP came to power again under its new leader, Bülent Ecevit after İnönü. Since the CHP did not have enough majority in the parliament, it had to create a coalition government with the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP).

The MSP is the continuation of the MNP which had been established in 1970 and then dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1971 for violating the articles of the constitution regarding secularism. The short term of stability did not last long. The same kind of political violence resurfaced after 1975. Many coalition governments fell, and minority parties exercised an influence which exceeded their real political power. The CHP and the AP granted excessive favors to the minority parties to attract them as coalition
partners. The small parties were given many cabinet positions for their support in the coalition governments. Those ministers filled the public bureaucracy and the law enforcement agencies with their supporters. Professional civil servants and police were heavily politicized by the elements of the extreme right and left. The polarization of those agencies reduced the ability of the government to deal with the growing violence in the country (Ahmad 1993, 159-180, Cleveland 1994, 267).

The collapse of civil order in the country was accompanied by two worrying developments. The first one was the increased activities of Kurdish separatists. The second was the rise of uncompromising Islamist activism led by the MSP. In September 1980, the party organized a massive national rally where the crowds demanded the establishment of the Shari'a and refused to sing the Turkish national anthem in their gatherings. These developments threatened the secular and nationalist Kemalist principles which were highly regarded by the Turkish military. Six days after the MSP incident, on September 12, 1980 the High Command of the Turkish military carried out a well planned coup which was the third military intervention since 1960 (Ahmad 1993, 181; Cleveland 1994, 268). In his statement broadcasted over radio and television, the leader of the coup, Gen. Kenan Evren, held the parties and the politicians responsible for the social divisions, the economic breakdown, and the anarchy and violence. The leading civilian politicians were placed under house arrest, and a five member National Security Council led by Evren took charge of the administrative and legislative responsibilities of government. The Council ruled Turkey until the parliamentary elections of November 1983.38

38 Martial law was proclaimed, the constitution was suspended, the parliament was dissolved, and the parties were closed down and virtually all of the professional associations and trade unions were dissolved and thousands of suspected terrorists and political agitators were arrested and later tried by the military government. Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, was charged with violating the secular principles of the constitution and received a four-year imprisonment. In October 1981, the Council appointed a
The referendum of 7 November 1982 made Gen. Evren the president of Turkey and the new constitution was popularly approved in the absence of any real criticism under the military government because the NSC banned all criticism of the constitution and Gen. Evren. Ahmad (1993, 187) argues that the voters were sure that if they had rejected the constitution, the military rule would have been prolonged because the yes vote in the referendum for Gen. Evren as the new president was combined with the yes vote for the constitution itself. All members of the 1980 parliament were disqualified from political activity for five years, and all the party leaders were disqualified for ten years by the military government. The new electoral law introduced a ten percent national threshold to reduce the influence of the smaller parties in the parliament.

Conclusion

The legal, political and military reforms in the late Ottoman period did not become very successful and the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War. The İttihat ve Terakki's lack of vision should also be counted as a reason for the collapse as they believed that through authoritarian measures, they could perhaps prevent the collapse. However, the collapse was pretty quick as the İttihat ve Terakki elites sided with the Germans during the war. After the collapse, a new Turkish republic was born out of the ruins of the Ottomans under the leadership of M. Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk and his close associates followed a highly secularist and nationalist agenda to transform what was left...
out of the Ottoman Empire on the Anatolian peninsula into a developed independent nation. In addition to secularism and nationalism, bureaucratic elitism and etatism (state custodianship of the economy) constitute the major pillars of Kemalism (Atatürkism).

In the new Turkish Republic, the military, being a highly secularist institution, did not remain apolitical, and intervened into politics three times (1960, 1971, 1980). Two new constitutions were written after 1924 (1961 and 1982 Constitutions) under military regimes. Those constitutions clearly reflect the protectionist view of the secularist establishment in regards to preserving the privileges and authority of the bureaucratic elite, as well as the secular principles. State was thought to be superior to citizens; basic responsibilities of the citizens usually come before their basic rights and freedoms.

Islamism in Turkey evolved through several stages since the establishment of the MNP by N. Erbakan in 1970. The following chapter will discuss the emergence of Islamism in Turkey as a well established political movement by focusing on the period after the 1980 military coup as well as the social, economic, and political conditions that paved the way for its emergence.
CHAPTER III

ISLAMIST POLITICS IN TURKEY

This chapter examines contemporary Turkish Islamism in the light of interview data and content analysis with an emphasis on the activism aspect of contentious Islamist movements in the larger context of social movement theories. In doing this, government's control over religion and the Islamists' perception of external threats will be used as independent variables.

There are several recent works that examine Turkish Islamism from a social movement perspective by authors such as Yavuz (2003) and White (2002). However, these two authors appear to analyze Islamism from what I call an identity/opportunity (Yavuz) perspective, and social network (White) perspective. Although both authors study Islamist activism from a social movement perspective and use the methods employed by the social movement theorists, Yavuz and White seem to overemphasize the impact of identity, opportunity structures, and horizontal networks on the emergence of Islamism respectively.

For example, Yavuz emphasizes the conservative identity created around the gecekondu (slums around big cities) through the kinship relations and rural neighborhood ties of the inhabitants. Also, Yavuz emphasizes the role of the (neo)liberal openings on the emergence of Islamist identity and Islamist groups that took place during the Özal period in Turkey after the military coup of 1980. With those liberal openings, for Yavuz, Islamists were able to mobilize the available resources and benefit from the opportunities that emerged as a result of those liberal policies. White has a different approach in explaining Islamist activism. For White, Islamist political activism is prompted through the collaborative work
and horizontal networks through lower and lower-middle class neighborhoods of large cities. Both authors seem to credit the emergence of Islamism in Turkey to demographic shifts that take place in lower and lower-middle class neighborhoods around larger cities of Turkey. My approach throughout this study recognizes the impact of those social networks and the identity aspect of Turkish Islamism; however by themselves, I believe the horizontal networks and emerging opportunity structures are not enough in explaining the emergence of Islamism in Turkey. I believe both Yavuz and White seem to underestimate the role of state control over religion in Turkey and the Islamists' concerns over preservation of their Islamic social identity (Muslimness) on their increased level of politicization in the last three decades. The following sections will analyze emergence of Islamism in Turkey and introduce the interview data.

Emergence of Islamism in Modern Turkey

Islamist pioneers emerged during the late Ottoman period and their influence on the early Turkish Republican Islamists continued in the decades following the establishment of the Turkish republic. Islamists of that time displayed mixed reactions to the new secularist regime. While Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-1936), the poet of the Turkish national anthem, chose hijra (emigration) to Egypt, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960) dropped any distinctly political action in favor of going grassroots to revive the essentials of Islamic belief among the people without making any direct references to politics. Similarly, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959) started an apolitical grassroots movement to preserve the popular knowledge about the rituals of Islam. Some of the early Turkish Islamists were co-opted by the regime, such as Şemsettin Günaltay (1883-1961), who later served as prime minister for a brief period (1949-1950), right before the multiparty era in Turkey. Others were either imprisoned or executed (like Nursi and İskilipli Atif
During the early period of the Turkish Republic until the multiparty era, Islamism as a political discourse was delegitimized and eliminated from the public discourses in any form or capacity.

After Atatürk's death in 1938, variants of Islamism gradually appeared in public life. Islamist intellectuals like Eşref Edip (1882-1971), S. Nursi, Necip Fazıl Kıskırek (1905-1983), and Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975) established their own tradition. This generation of Islamists represented neither the ulama nor the official religious establishment, and made significant contributions to Islamism (Çetinsaya 1999, 367).

Among the Islamists of the multiparty era, the most outspoken voices against the secularist regime were N. Fazıl Kıskırek, and Osman Yüksel Serdergeçti (1917-1983) with their Büyükdoğu (the Great Orient) and Serdergeçti magazines, respectively. 

There was also an increasing demand for Islamic books. A wave of translations into Turkish from the Islamist thinkers of the Muslim world (most prominently, the books of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi) took place after the introduction of multiparty era in Turkey. For instance, Sezai Karakoç (1933- ) with his Diriliş (Revival) was among the pioneers of this trend. The masses who consumed those Islamist publications were predominantly of rural backgrounds, and they were the first educated generation of their families. In addition,

39 İskilipi Atif Hoca (1875-1926) was executed by Atatürk's İstiklal Mahmeleri (Courts of Independence) on February 4, 1926 because he was critical of Atatürk's new dress code. He authored Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka (Imitation of the West and the Hat) in 1924 before Atatürk's "Hat Law" (11.25.1925) which required all Turkish citizens to wear Western style hats.

40 Their Islamist criticism of the secularist regime had heavy nationalist undercurrents. Among other magazines with Islamist content, Sebiliireşad, as the magazine of Islamist pioneers that was closed by the one-party regime but started its publication towards the end of it, Büyük Chat (Greater Jihad), Hür Adam (Free Man), and Selamet (Salvation) stood out. Apart from the conservative-nationalist magazines, a new generation of young Islamists started to get organized in several national student organizations that were led by Islamist intellectuals of their time. The most prominent of those organizations were Milli Mücadele Birliği (The National Struggle Union), Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği (Association for Struggle against Communism), and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Union of Turkish Students, MTIB). Among them, the MTIB was the most popular Islamist student organization.
they were mainly, but not always, *Imam-Hatip* ⁴¹ high school graduates and they began to read translations of Islamist thinkers together in book circles. Later, through the late 1970s, one of the most prominent Turkish Islamists Ali Bulaç successfully synthesized Qutb and Mawdudi's conceptions and applied them into the Turkish context through his exemplary works titled *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler* (Modern Concepts and Regimes) (1979) and *İslam'ın Anlaşılması Üzerine* (On Understanding Islam) (1980).

By removing Islam from the public domain, the Kemalist revolutionaries were able to secularize urban areas; however this policy failed to transform the majority of the people in rural areas of Turkey. With the exclusion of religion from politics, politics became a matter of nation-building and was largely confined to a small authoritarian circle in Ankara (Yavuz 2003, 57). Erdoğan (1999, 382) argues that Turkey's secularist policies had two basic characteristics: "... a strict separation of religion and politics, and an understanding of secularism as a social project". ⁴² The strict separation model suggested that religion and politics are clearly distinct areas of human endeavor that should be kept as separate as possible from each other. Moreover, religion is seen as a personal, private matter, best left to the realm of personal choice and action. Secularism was also perceived as a social model through which, the secularists believed, the Turkish society could be

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⁴¹ Prayer Leader-Preacher schools were established and run by the Ministry of Education to educate the imams (prayer leaders) and vaizs (preachers) for the mosques. After graduation the imams and vaizs become government employees working in government controlled çamîs (mosques; indeed, all mosques are controlled by the government in Turkey through the Directorate of Religious Affairs Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, DİB, under the Ministry of Interior). More information will be provided about Imam-Hatip schools in the following sections.

⁴² The modernizing and secularizing reforms of Atatürk harshly repressed Islam not only as a religion but also as a culture. These harsh measures treated Islam as merely a religion, thus Kemalist ideology, which was the official ideology of the new Turkish republic, ignored Islam as a way of life. This neglect directly reflected in the social science studies in Turkey, where most of the studies take Islam either as pure religion or politics. Islam as cultural ways of life and identities has been widely discarded from the spectrum of Turkish social science (Turam 2001, 94).
elevated to the level of modern/contemporary Western civilizations (*muasir medeniyetler seviyesi*).

During the single-party era in Turkey (1923-1950) two forms of Islamist oppositional movements emerged in response to the cultural revolution imposed by the statist-bureaucratic Turkish elites who were also the elites of the Republican People’s Party (CHP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). These movements were led by two separate religious groups in Turkey: *Nakşibendis* and *Nurcu*. The Nurcu led a spiritual inward-oriented Islamic movement whose goals were piety, self-purification and self-consciousness. The Nurcu sought ways of freeing themselves from state control since they were perceived by the state as illegitimate. Unlike the Nurcu movement, the Nakşibendi orders pursued a more revolutionary and confrontational strategy by leading several conspicuous antisecular disturbances (Yavuz 2003, 56).

The state’s repressive strategy toward Islam was relaxed significantly with the introduction of multiparty politics. Turkish peasantry and small townspeople vastly voted for the new center-right Democrat Party government (DP, *Demokrat Parti*, 1946-1960) in the first multiparty elections of 1950. The DP was secular in orientation, however in a purely pragmatic way, it was sensitive and responsive to the demands of the population including those of the pious. One of the first things that the DP did after winning the parliamentary election was to change the call to Muslim prayer (*ezan*) in its original form. The decade from the first successful multiparty experiment to the first military coup of 1960 experienced a relaxation of relations between the state and the religious community; there was a growth in manifestations of popular religious sentiments evidenced

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43 Religious orders (*tarikats*) were banned through the Kemalist (Atatiirkist) reforms.
44 During Atatürk’s reforms, the call to prayer was translated from Arabic to Turkish and the Turkish version was recited from the minarets of the mosques all over Turkey. This angered the pious Muslims.
in the building of newer mosques, establishment of additional Imam-Hatip schools and religious seminaries, and diminishing suppression of the activities of religious orders (tarikat) (Yılmaz 2002, 19). During its rule, the DP carefully co-opted certain Islamic groups like Nureus and Nakşibendis into the electoral system to expand its electoral base.

The military coup of 1960 put an end to the convergence of the Islamists and the DP by temporarily banning all political parties and political activities in Turkey (Ahmad 1991). This was the first military intervention in the history of the Turkish republic which was mainly due to the military's reaction to the DP's reversal of the secularist policies and dismantling of the state centric economy with liberal economic programs which diminished the state bureaucracy's power and prestige significantly. A new constitution was written after the coup of 1960, and the 57th Article of the 1960 Constitution stated that the political program of the political parties must be in line with the secular republic, or otherwise would be outlawed (Tepe 2002, 99).

The Gramscian Struggle: Politics as Jihad

In this study, the Gramscian theory will be used in combination with the social movement theory. Employing the two theories will make it easier to explain Islamist political activism in Turkey at two separate levels: the macro-level and the micro-level. At the macro-level, the Gramscian theory will enable this research to explain how the Turkish Islamists perceive themselves as a collectivity, and how they relate with the general political system on the whole. And at the micro-level, the social movement theory

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will help this research explain why the Turkish Islamists do what they do, how they interact with their members, mobilize resources, benefit from opportunity structures. When necessary, a cross-level discussion will be provided when different forms of political activism overlap or intersect. Indeed both Gramscian and social movement theories will be employed in this study in a complementary manner, not in a mutually exclusive way.

Although the Gramscian perspective is pretty useful in analyzing the way that the Turkish Islamists perceive their struggle vis-à-vis the secular establishment, it does not provide useful tools to explain the Islamist political activism at the grassroots and neighborhood level. Complementing the Gramscian theory, in the following sections of this study, the social movement approach will be employed in explaining the Islamist outreach, how Islamists benefit from opportunities and opportunity structures, and how several constraints influence Islamists' political activism at the grassroots level. The Gramscian approach is advantageous regarding how the secularist establishment and the Islamists perceive and approach politics; however, the Gramscian approach cannot adequately help to investigate Islamist outreach, opportunities and constraints.

My reason for choosing the Gramscian approach is twofold. First, Gramscian theory is functional in explaining how the Turkish Islamists perceive their struggle in regards to the government control over religion. As stated earlier, since both sides perceive politics as a zero-sum game where one’s gain is another’s loss, political activism becomes a tool of hegemonic struggle which can be best explained in Gramscian terms. When both sides perceive politics as a zero-sum game, any game strategy that they employ would be about gaining strategic posts (or strongholds) to conduct the “war of position.” In a sense, the Turkish secularist bureaucratic elite and Islamists are alike in regards to their

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46 This point was discussed in chapter one earlier.
perception of politics, which can be summarized as "politics is war." Indeed, this is a highly contentious just like other contentious political struggles waged over identity, religion, and culture. Second, the Gramscian approach will be informative in the analysis of competing frames of the secularist elites and the Islamists as it elaborately examines the relationship between hegemony, counter-hegemony, and war of position waged within the political and ideological realm through the creation of frames. Thus, the Gramscian approach provides the researcher with the conceptual/theoretical tools to examine the struggle between the secularist establishment and the Islamists by laying out the intricate interplay between hegemony/counter-hegemony, ideology, war of position, organic intellectuals, and frames. Overall, the Turkish Islamists’ perception of politics as jihad through a Gramscian perspective will permeate the following sections.

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47 Perceiving politics as such is similar to Machiavellian realism. The text above shows how Machiavelli perceives politics. There has been similar cases of pure realism in perceiving politics. One such approach belongs to Mao Zedong (1893-1976), the chairman of Chinese Communist Party, who stated "Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed." Such approaches to politics are still popular, for instance Neo-Conservative activist David Horowitz stated: "Politics is war conducted by other means..." During the 2000 presidential and congressional elections, every Republican member of the U.S. Congress received a free pamphlet, compliments of Congressman Tom DeLay, the party's majority whip. Written by conservative activist David Horowitz, the pamphlet was called The Art of Political War: How Republicans Can Fight to Win. It came with an endorsement on the cover by Karl Rove, the senior advisor to then-candidate George W. Bush. According to Rove, The Art of Political War was "a perfect pocket guide to winning on the political battlefield from an experienced warrior." In addition to DeLay's gift to members of Congress, the Heritage Foundation, one of the leading conservative think tanks in Washington, found Horowitz's advice so impressive that it sent another 2,300 copies to conservative activists around the country. The information above about Horowitz is cited from: John Stauber and Sheldon Hampton, "The War at Home" Published on Monday, May 17, 2004 by CommonDreams.org at: http://soocs.commondreams.org/views04/0517-08.htm

48 This type of conception of politics has parallels with Clausewitz's statements about war which he described as "politics with bloodshed" as well as with the Machiavellian thought. Machiavelli argues that politics is a type of war. "Thus, you must know that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second." (Machiavelli, 69).

49 The Arabic word of jihad literally means struggle which comes from the verb jahadah (JHD), to struggle; and contrary to popular misperception, it does not mean holy war. Accordingly, a person’s struggle with his/her carnal desires is also a type of jihad (struggle) for Muslims. Fighting in the battlefield is just one type of jihad.
Politics as Jihad: The MNP

The closure of the DP by the military regime did not prevent various religious groups from getting involved into the political game. After 1960, the Nurcu and Nakşibendi communities actively kept supporting the Justice Party (AP, Adalet Partisi) of Süleyman Demirel in the 1960s until the establishment of the first Islamist party of Turkey: The National Order Party (MNP, Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970-1972) of Necmettin Erbakan in 1970. The MNP was established by Erbakan and leading Nakşibendis with the advice of M. Zahit Kotku50 (1897-1980), a prominent Nakşibendi sheikh,51 and the party was the predecessor of the National Salvation Party (MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972-1980), the Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi, 1983-1998), the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi, 1997-2001), the Felicity Party (SP, Saadet Partisi, 2001-present) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 2001-present). Lütfi Doğan's52 statements about M. Zahit Kotku and his role in the establishment of the MNP are quite interesting:

Mehmed Zahit Kotku was the brainchild of the party [the MNP]. He wanted to have a party where Muslims could feel at home. We were, in fact, tired of being used by other center-right parties. I became involved in this part because of Zahit Efendi [Master Zahit]. I remember that evening when Zahit Efendi invited five people and told us that "you are all men dedicated to the cause of protecting and advancing this nation. The core identity (kimlik) and character (kişilik) of this wounded nation is Islam. Your main heritage is Islam and as Muslims you can heal this wound by listening to what our Turkish Muslim people want. What they want is an Islamic sense of justice and the restoration of their Ottoman-Islamic identity."(quoted in Yavuz 2003, 207)

Erbakan and his close associates named their new movement the National Outlook Movement (Millî Görüş Hareketi, MGH) before they had established the MNP. The

50 M. Zahit Kotku (1897-1980) was the leader of İskenderpaşa Cemaati (Cemaat: Community) which is a prominent branch of the Nakşibendi order. The Nakşibendi order is one of the oldest Islamic orders, it was established by Muhammed Bahaeddin Nakşibend (1318-1389). For Kotku's life visit: http://www.iskenderpasa.com/MZK/hayati.asp For the İskenderpaşa Cemaati: http://www.iskenderpasa.com/Default.asp
51 The spiritual leader of a religious order (şeyh in Turkish).
followers of Zahit Kotku first mobilized a group of community leaders and merchants to get Necmettin Erbakan to the Grant National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM) from Konya (a conservative city in central Turkey) in 1969. Kotku and his followers set the organizational model and necessary networks for the formation and evolution of MGH into MSP (Yavuz 2003, 207-208). Before analyzing Islamism in Turkey, a brief overview of the Gramscian concepts will be provided below as they relate to Islamism in Turkey as a social movement.

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was a leading Italian Marxist, a journalist, and a major theorist who spent his last years in Mussolini’s prisons in Italy. In Prison Notebooks Gramsci developed a new Marxist theory applicable to the conditions of advanced capitalism. Gramsci did not depart from the classical Marxian analysis of capitalism, and like Marx, Gramsci recognized that the struggle between the ruling class and the working class was the driving force that moved society forward. However, Gramsci departed from the traditional Marxist view of how the ruling class ruled. It was here that Gramsci made a major contribution to modern thought in his concept of the role played by ideology. (Burke 2005).

With the rise of fascism and the failure of the Western European organized labor movements, Gramsci contemplated on the questions of why the working class was not necessarily revolutionary, and why it could be defeated by fascism (Gitlin 1994, 516). According to Gramsci, the term ideology is often seen as referring simply to a system of ideas and beliefs. However, it is closely tied to the concept of power. The traditional Marxist theory of power was one-sided in its analysis of the role of force and coercion as the basis of ruling class domination. For Gramsci, what was missing in Marx’s theory of

52 Lütfi Doğan, former head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DiB, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) from
power was an understanding of the “subtle but pervasive forms of ideological control and manipulation that served to perpetuate all repressive structures” (Boggs, 38). Thus, Gramsci identified two distinct forms of political control: domination, and hegemony. Domination referred to direct physical coercion by the government, and hegemony referred to both ideological control through the control of culture and more crucially, consent. Gramsci assumed that no regime, regardless of how repressive it might be, could maintain its authority mainly through coercion. In the long run, as Gramsci theorized, it had to have popular support and legitimacy in order to maintain stability (Simms 2002, 564; Burke 2005).

For Gramsci hegemony is the permeation of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality throughout society and it has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. In Gramsci’s understanding, hegemony becomes an “organizing principle” that is diffused by the process of socialization into every aspect of human life. Depending upon the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the population, it becomes part of what is generally called “common sense” so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things (Boggs 1976, 39, quoted in Burke 2005). Gramsci believes that there exist two processes of attaining hegemony: eliminating or subordinating opposing forces, and winning active or passive consent of subaltern allies (Gramsci 53). Later Gramsci discusses the interdependence of force and consent; he maintains that:

The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the

1968 to 1971.
winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well (57-8).

Gramsci maintains that domination without intellectual and moral leadership is not hegemony. Where Gramsci discusses the Piedmont situation, in which social groups emerged that wanted to dominate, but not to lead; he says that this situation does not constitute hegemony. He says: “It is one of the cases in which these groups have the function of ‘domination’ without that of ‘leadership’: dictatorship without hegemony” (Gramsci, 106). According to Gramsci, the crisis of hegemony happens when the ruling class loses the consent of the masses, or when there is a mobilization of large subordinate classes (peasantry or intellectual petit bourgeoisie) against the ruling class. Gramsci argues that in such crisis situations anything can happen, and the ruling class usually attempts to reassert its control by using violent solutions to quell the opposition (Gramsci, 210-211). To Gramsci, cultural institutions like the state, school, and church persuade the subordinated class to conform and consent to the political status-quo and therefore to their own domination. Gramsci also develops the idea of counter-hegemony as an oppositional force through which revolutionaries subvert the ruling class ideology and substitute democratic socialism for capitalism. To accomplish this, the subordinated classes must develop counter-hegemonic institutions and ideologies of their own in order to carry out a universal coup through cultural subversion rather than violence. Gramsci’s conception of intellectuals is broad. Teachers, politicians and theologians create and perpetuate cultural values thus producing both hegemony and counter-hegemony. Traditional intellectuals originate and espouse dominant ideology, whereas organic intellectuals create counter-hegemonic ideals and “establish anti-ruling class institutions and platforms of expression
that challenge the right-to-rule of the dominant group.” These revolutionary minded ideologues must gradually build a “liberatory ideology” that will eventually become universal by replacing the ideology of the dominant classes (Simms, 565).

Gramsci believes that the way of challenging the dominant hegemony is through political activity. However, Gramsci proposed a distinction between two different kinds of political strategies to for the revolutionaries to reach their goals: i) war of manoeuvre, and ii) war of position. The war of manoeuvre is a frontal attack; and the main goal is a quick victory. It is recommended for societies with a centralized and dominant state power that have failed in developing a strong hegemony within the civil society (like the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917). However, the war of position is a long struggle primarily through the civil society. Besides taking control of the civil society, for Gramsci, the revolutionary forces should also struggle to gain control through culture and ideology. Gramsci suggests this type of struggle (war of position) for the liberal-democratic societies of Western capitalism with relatively weaker states but stronger hegemonies (i.e., Italy) because Gramsci believes that these countries have more extensive and intricate civil societies that deserve a longer and more complex strategy (Stillo 1999).

The ideology of the MGH revolves around doing service to religion and enabling the political representation of the religion. Yıldız (2003, 189-190) argues that the MGH is a particular synthesis of religious and non-religious themes reconciling traditional Islam, modernism and politics. However, the MGH’s modernism was limited to scientific and technological progress and de finitely did not include cultural and religious transformations of the Turkish society. Indeed, the intellectual sources of Erbakan and the MGH is an “amalgam of traditional Sunni-based Islamic culture and Sufi [mystic] worldview

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53 Gramsci’s conception of traditional and organic intellectuals are going to be discussed in the following
embedded within a developmentalist discourse (Yıldız 2003, 189). In the MGH’s political discourse, the backwardness and subordination of the Muslim world (including Turkey) were associated with the domination of global Western imperialism. Erbakan and his associates argued that promoting a strong Islamic consciousness/piety and heavy industrialization would be the key solutions to end Western exploitation and domination of the Muslim world.

Yıldız further argues that the MGH intended to promote an Islamic message in the guise of nationalistic expression. While doing that, the movement elites took the advantage of double connotations of the word millet in Turkish: national and religious (referring to the Ottoman millet system). Yıldız further argues that the ideological core of the MGH is a combination of traditionalist discourse and a modern but defensive conception of so-called Western science and technology which are readily welcomed through establishing references to the Islamic roots of science and technology. Another central issue of the MGH’s discourse is the emulation of the Western way of life by the Turks. According to the MGH’s narratives, the Turkish nation has undergone a fundamental moral degeneration due to blindly emulating the Western way of life. The MGH’s followers also hold this emulation responsible for the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. By going back to the origins of Islam and by applying the underlying Islamic ethics, the MGH discourse urges the Turks to undergo a spiritual renewal (Yıldız 2003, 189-190).

The MGH’s perception of the Atatürkist ideology is similar to Gramscian notion of hegemonic ideology in several ways. First of all, for the MGH followers, ideology is

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sections.

54 This two-sided understanding of development (both spiritual and material) is expressed in Turkish Islamists' literature as zulcenaheyn (two-winged).
closely tied to the concept of power. In other words, the MGH’s perception of its political struggle vis-à-vis Kemalism is pretty similar to what Gramsci thinks of the ideology of dominant classes in capitalist societies: “subtle but pervasive forms of ideological control and manipulation that served to perpetuate all repressive structures” (Boggs, 38). Many of the interviewees who were from the MGH movement shared the same perspective towards ideology (i.e., hegemonic). They tended to understand Kemalist ideology in terms of “ideological control and manipulation” exerted by the secularist elites of Turkey.

The Interviewees’ Profile

Many of my respondents were outspoken about the secularist regime and the secular principles stated in the Turkish constitution as part of the Kemalist ideology. Indeed, many have spoken more openly as they had already been informed by me earlier that their names would not be disclosed. Although some of my interviewees did not want me to conceal their names, I had to opt for anonymity to not to get them involved in any legal persecution because of their critical statements.

I conducted a total of forty-nine interviews in three cities (Ankara, İstanbul and Samsun). I stayed in Istanbul briefly, thus the bulk of my interviews took place in Ankara and Samsun. Seven of the forty-nine interviewees described themselves as non-Islamists. Three of the forty-nine voted for the MHP, the nationalist party; and the other four voted for the secularists CHP. I had two unfinished interviews, so they were not included into this study. One of those two felt uncomfortable and did not want to talk, and the other had an

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55 This can be clearly seen in the writings of Islamist political writers like Abdurrahman Dilipak, Ahmet Taşgetiren, Hekimoğlu Ismail, Ali Bulan (his earlier writings), Mustafa Karahasanoğlu and others.

56 This point will be discussed in detail under section F: Islamists Push Forward in the War of Position and the subsequent subsections.
important phone call just after our conversation started and had to leave; and later I did not have a chance to meet that individual again. The interviews took place during the period after the third week of July until the end of August. After finishing my interviews in Turkey, from August 2007 until late April 2008, I conducted additional eight phone interviews with people whom I got in touch through my contacts in Turkey. I purposefully had eight more phone interviews after having forty-two face to face interviews with the Islamist interviewees just to complete the total number of my Islamist respondents to fifty.

Eleven of the fifty interviewees were graduates of the Imam-Hatip schools; three of the eleven were working as prayer leaders in Ankara (2) and Samsun (1). Seventeen of the fifty were of rural origins (recently moved to the city for finding a new job or for pursuing his/her education); two of the seventeen were still living in rural areas. Nine of the fifty were female interviewees; seven of the nine female interviewees described themselves as Islamists, the remaining two did not. Twenty-eight interviewees had four-year college or two-year vocational school degrees; sixteen had high school degrees, and the remaining five had either the basic elementary or secondary school education or were high school dropouts. One of my interviewees was illiterate.

Age of the interviewees was unevenly distributed across different age categories. The following age categories are arbitrarily created. Since snowball sampling was used, age was not used as a determinant of who would become an interviewee. Eleven interviewees were between the ages of 18-24; fourteen were between 25-34; twelve were between 35-44; nine were between 45-54; and the remaining nine were above the age of 55.

A small part of the interviewees were individuals whom I knew personally, however, the majority of the interviewees were people whom I met through my
connections. Mainly, the snowball sampling was used; and often times to gain the trust of interviewees, I had to declare that I was a close friend of person x whom the interviewee knew personally. To a certain degree, this had to be done because it facilitated some form of trust between me and my interviewees. This enabled me to gain the trust of the interviewees and my interviewees were more open in their statements and they were more willing to talk. In fact, the period during which my interviews took place was a politically vibrant period just after the July parliamentarian elections when the AKP increased its votes to 47%. Thus, people were willing to talk about politics, and the debates over the relationship between Islam and politics in Turkey were being done in full swing.

One finding of my interviews was that Turkish Islamists were highly against Kemalist secularism. 84% of the interviewees believed that as it was applied in Turkey, secularism was not the same as secularism as applied in advanced democratic Western countries. 92% of the interviewees believed that secularism in Turkey was used as a "tool to oppress religion." And finally, 82% of the interviewees believed that the government in Turkey was trying to control religion through various means. For instance 62% of the interviewees mentioned governmental control and restrictions over religious education as a means to control religion. 68% believed that imposing the headscarf ban was a means for control over religion. Muharrem was one of those interviewees who were highly critical of secularism. He worked for the municipal government of Ankara in a junior administrative position. After finishing the Imam Hatip57 High School in Kayseri (a conservative city in central Turkey) in the late 1980s, he came to Ankara where his older brother lived to pursue his college degree in public relations. During his high school years in Kayseri, as a

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57 Imam Hatip schools are established and run by the Turkish government for the purpose of educating prayer leaders and preachers for the official religious establishment in Turkey-Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı.
teenager, Muharrem frequently attended conferences and panel discussions organized by
the MGH bringing prominent Islamist writers and the (current and/or prospective) MGH
followers together. After finishing college in Ankara, primarily through his older brother’s
canons with the MGH, Muharrem found a job in the municipal government of Ankara.
Melih Gökçek, an Islamist from the RP, took over the mayorship of Ankara from the
secularist CHP in 1994 municipal elections. In our conversation, Muharrem argued that
Atatürk and his followers were extremely elitist and established and official ideology for
the purpose of manipulating the masses. He remarked: “sovereignty never truly belonged to
people in Turkey... the secularists say that sovereignty belongs to people, but they have
never respected the masses... Kemalists have never been sincere.”

The Road to the Coup of 1980

Through the 1970s, unstable coalition governments of Turkey were unable to
solve the country’s economic and social problems and failed to reach a consensus as

(The Directorate of Religious Affairs) which controls all of the mosques throughout the country (Imam: Prayer leader, Hatip: Preacher).

M. Gökçek is still the mayor of Ankara which is the capital of Turkey.

Earlier in our conversation Muharrem was referring to one of Atatürk’s most well known sayings about sovereignty. In several of his sayings, M. Kemal Atatürk’s assigned sovereignty directly to the Turkish people. The most well known is: “Hakimiyet kaysiz sarsız milletindir (Without any reservations, sovereignty belongs to the nation)” which is written on the wall of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Previously, the MNP was shut down by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, primarily due to the pressure from the Turkish military, on May 20, 1971 shortly after the establishment of the party, on the
grounds that it violated the secularist principles of the Turkish Constitution. Thus, the MSP was
established in October 1972 to succeed the MNP. In the 1973 general elections, the MSP got 11.8
percent of the total votes and later became a coalition partner in successive governments. To the surprise of many, the MSP became a coalition partner with the secularist CHP, which at that time was led by
Bülent Ecevit. However, Ecevit’s coalition government did not last long after Turkey’s costly military
operation in Cyprus in the summer of 1974. The MSP later became a coalition partner in a new “National Front Government” on March 31, 1975 formed under the leadership of the center-right AP led by
Süleyman Demirel. A third coalition partner of the National Front was the nationalist MHP led by
Alpaslan Türkeş. After the June 1977 general elections, the MSP was also included in the second National Front Government formed by Demirel. Demirel resigned in July 1977, however he returned to power in
August as the head of an almost identical coalition government including the MSP, MHP, and AP.
However he was forced to resign again due to defections from his own party in December. Later, Ecevit
formed a coalition government in January 1978 with a promise to deal with the economic problems and
political violence that was increasing as a result of the clashes between the extreme left and right groups.
antagonism between the radical left and radical right escalated into violent clashes on the streets. On September 12, 1980 the Turkish military led by the Chief of Staff Gen. Kenan Evren seized power in a bloodless coup and restructured the country with a newly drafted constitution in 1982 written under the military rule which lasted until 1983. After the coup d’etat of 1980, the military government in Turkey, which ruled the country for three years until the parliamentary elections of 1983, banned all political activities in Turkey, closed down all political parties, and imprisoned the leaders of political parties.

Civil Society and the Islamist Politics in the Aftermath of the Military Rule

Cohen and Arato differentiate political society, civil society and economic society from each other. In their formulation, political society includes political parties, political institutions and legislative organs of the governments while economic society includes businesses, manufacturers, industries, service sectors, distributors, and firms. On the other hand, civil society is a buffer between the political society, the economic society and the ordinary citizens. Civil society organizations act like an intermediary between the state and citizens by continuously creating new identities and demanding more democracy and rights. Civil society groups struggle for making the institutions of political society more receptive to the newly emerging identities and demands, and they can become a major driving force behind democratization and accountability of political leaders (Cohen and Arato 1997). In other words, “...the mediating role of political society between civil society and the state (political society sets up receptors for the influence of civil society) is indispensable, but so is the rootedness of political society in civil society” (Cohen, 38).

Thus, the relationship of Islamist movements with civil society and democracy in Turkey is
largely determined by the nature of relationship between the political society and the state in Turkey since among other things, one of the major purposes of the Islamist civil society groups is to carry the underrepresented and muted Islamist voices and views into the public realm (Kadioglu 2005, 27-28).

After the 1980 coup, during the military rule, the Turkish military "imposed a new constitution that restricted the activities of labor unions and voluntary associations and abolished the autonomous status of the university and state-run television and radio." However, ironically, the junta depended on Islamic institutions and symbols for legitimization because the junta was seeking to discredit the leftist and rightist ideologies. The military regime was hoping to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic community by fusing Islamic ideas with national goals under the supervision of the state. Before the coup, Turkish society was greatly divided by ideological polarization between the extreme left and the right; "Islam, in this radical departure from the military's past practices, offered a way to reduce or even eliminate the cultural differences that led to the polarization of Turkish society." Interestingly, the leadership of the coup "considered Islam a pacifying and submissive ideology preferable to the threat of communism" (Yavuz 1997, 67). To realize their goals, the generals of the military regime actively used an organization named *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Association of Intellectuals' Hearth) which contributed to the creation of an ideology known as *Türk-Islam Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis).  

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[61] For detailed accounts of the period, see Ahmad (1993) and Zürcher (1998).

[62] The military leaders have associated themselves with the ideology. With their support, a group of conservative scholars created consent for the consolidation of state power who organized themselves into the *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Association of Intellectuals' Hearth) (Çetinsaya 1999, 373-376; Kaplan 2002, 114). The members of the association were cultural nationalists. For them, religion was indispensable and Islam was the essence of the national culture. They believed that "Turkishness and Islam cannot be split from each other; cannot be thought separately; and cannot be listed in order of priority." They reinterpreted the nation and state as a family and as a community, and selectively used Ottoman-Islamic ideas to make the past relevant to the present. By drawing attention to the danger of ideological fragmentation to the family, nation, and state, they attempted to reunify the Turkish citizens after a decade of terror and anarchy.
Newer Qur’anic seminaries were opened during the military rule, religious classes in elementary, middle and high schools became compulsory, and additional imams (prayer leaders) were employed by the government (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 148-149; Kaplan, 2002; Göle, 1996).

Political Engineering, Government Led Depoliticization, and Political Alienation of the Masses after the Coup

After a decade of terror in the 1970s, the coup leaders sought to depoliticize Turkey through social engineering with the help of The Intellectual’s Hearth and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The communitarian nature of the Turkish state after the military coup of 1980 become evident (Yavuz 1997, 68). Another aspect of the period after the coup was promoting Atatürk by the military as a national symbol to unite the nation. 63 The 1981 “Atatürk is Hundred Years Old Campaign” was celebrated extensively throughout the schools, the military, and the public bureaucracy by the orders of the military regime (Özyürek 2006, 101-102). Additionally, all elementary school kids (1st-8th grades) start their day in schools by reciting the National Pledge 64 (Milli And) which reads:

I am a Turk, I am trustworthy, I am hardworking. My first principle is to protect my minors and to respect my elders, and to love my motherland and my nation more than myself. My goal is to rise and to progress. O Atatürk the great! I swear that I will continuously walk through the path you opened and towards the target you pointed. May I be sacrificed for the Turkish nation. How happy is the one who says: “I am a Turk.”

inflicted by the extreme rightists and leftists. They were, however, against radical religious movements. They argued that Turkish people would remain respectful towards religion; however Turkey would never be a theocracy (Çetinsaya, 374; Yavuz 1997, 68). The association “put forth a moral and philosophical rationale for the [Turkish-Islamic] Synthesis... to legitimize the hegemony of the new ruling elite” (Yavuz 1997, 68). In addition to the heavy use of Islamic symbols and culture, the organization was strictly antisocialist which overlapped with the antisocialist stance of the generals. In return, this favored the religious right to a great extent after the military coup of 1980.

63 All governmental offices and classrooms must have a portrait of Atatürk, the Turkish National Anthem (Milli Marşı), and Atatürk’s Address to the Turkish Youth (Atatürk’ün Gençliğe Hitabesi), framed and hanged high on a visible wall, and elementary school kids have to memorize the National Anthem and Atatürk’s Address and recite them on Monday mornings and Friday afternoons before Atatürk’s bust on a pedestal found in the yard of every school (public or private) in Turkey.

64 All translations from Turkish have been made by me unless stated otherwise.
The junta established a civilian cabinet “to carry on the day-to-day administration of the country” (Hale 1994, 247) and ruled Turkey with non-political technocrats who were mainly older bureaucrats, university professors, and retired high rank officers. Before the end of the military rule, the generals created a new constitution in 1982 that guaranteed the dominance of the army in Turkish politics through the newly created National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), and scheduled parliamentarian elections for November 1983. In the new constitution, the president was given extraordinary powers; the leader of the junta, Gen. Evren automatically became the new president of the country, and all members of the pre-coup parliament were disqualified from political activity for five years and all party leaders for ten. The MGK was given extraordinary powers (Zürcher 1998; Ahmad 1993).

With such extraordinary powers, the junta leaders were determined to depoliticize the people through “crushing every manifestation of dissent from the left, including revolutionaries, social democrats, trade unionists, and even members of the nuclear disarmament movement.” By January of 1981 there were about 30,000 people in detention.

65 The most significant appointments were those of Turgut Özal who became deputy prime minister with responsibility for the economy, and Kaya Erdem, a close associate of Özal’s and a former official of the Turkish Central Bank who was appointed finance minister (Ahmad 1993, 183).

66 The 1982 Constitution which was written during the military rule (1980-1983) established a strengthened presidency in the parliamentarian system of Turkey. Thus, many appointments for key bureaucratic positions like the director of state radio and television (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu, TRT), the director of the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu, YÖK), governors of provinces (valis) and subprovinces (kaymakams), and ambassadors have to be approved by the president. The president does not have the authority to initiate legislation, however the president is to enact laws passed by the TGNAs within 15 days. With the exception of budgetary laws, the president may return a law to the TGNAs for reconsideration. If the TGNAs reenacts the law, it is binding. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority for approval. They also may be submitted to popular referendum. The president can also refer legislation to the Constitutional Court.

67 Additionally, the existing Martial Law Act was amended which gave the army more powers. The generals could now carry out crude censorship, ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend newspapers and other publications, and dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed “undesirable without right of appeal.” The extent of depoliticization also reached the universities. The Board of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu, YÖK) was established to oversee
Ahmad reflects the harsh conditions created by the martial law authorities after the military coup (1993, 185):

The use of torture, never uncommon, now became widespread and systematic, with a number of suspects and prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances. The regime never denied the existence of torture; it merely claimed that it was the work of rogue policemen and not policy, and that all charges were investigated and the guilty punished.

The new law on parties went into effect on 24 April 1983 and the following day, the MGK lifted the ban on politics. The new law required that parties be founded by at least 30 citizens (excluding the previously disqualified 723 ex-politicians) and gave the MGK the power to veto any founding members without providing any explanation. Within a matter of weeks 17 parties were established, however only two of them had any substance. The junta allowed only three parties to compete in the November 1983 elections: The Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP) led by retired Gen. Sunalp, Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), and Necdet Calp’s Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP). When the polls indicated that Özal was ahead of Sunalp and Calp, the generals of the junta decided that President Evren and Prime Minister Ulusoy should support Sunalp openly and attack Özal. Both men expressed their open support for Sunalp and attacked Özal in a panel discussion broadcasted live on November 4, just two days before the elections. This event changed Turkish politics after the junta because the voters became even more hostile towards the “state party” and

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68 One was the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokratik Parti, SODEP) established by Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü who was a close associate of Atatürk, former president (2nd), and former prime minister. The other was the Great Turkey Party (Büyük Türkiye Partisi, BTP) which was Demirel’s AP in a disguise. Generals of the MGK closed down the BTP. Though, SODEP was not banned, the MGK vetoed its founders and prevented it from contesting in the election.

69 It is still a matter of debate why the junta did not ban Özal’s ANAP. Indeed, the junta never expected ANAP to win because the junta was openly supporting Sunalp’s MDP and the generals were expecting it to win the parliamentary elections of November 1983. People associated Sunalp and Calp with the bureaucratic, repressive state, and it was only Özal who projected the liberal, anti-statist, and anti-bureaucratic image and the promise of a quick return to civilian rule.
Turkish citizens predominantly voted for ANAP. The MDP achieved only 23.3 %, the HP got 30.5 %, and Özal’s ANAP got 45.2 % of the votes (Ahmad 1993, 188-190).

**Controlled Liberalization And The Reemergence Of Political Islamism**

Zürcher (1998) points out that Özal’s ANAP was a strange coalition of various ideological currents and interest groups, who had joined it partly because they had nowhere else to go under the military’s restrictive policies. The party attracted the support of the old center-right AP, the MSP and the MHP. Özal’s personality was crucial to the party; in fact, Özal was related with both camps: he had previously worked both for the private sector and the State Planning Organization\(^{70}\) (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilati*), and he had connections with the *Nakşibendi* order through his elder brother Korkut Özal who had been a leading member of the MSP since its establishment. Moreover, Özal was down to earth and was from a modest background; he was coming from a middle class family from Malatya, a city in eastern Turkey. Like Demirel, Özal was the kind of politician with whom the average Turk could identify. In fact, Özal’s election slogans often referred to strengthening the *ortadirek* (middle class), which literally meant the center pole of a tent (Zürcher 1998, 297).

Due to Özal’s neoliberal economic policies coupled with an export oriented approach, small and medium scale manufacturing industries rapidly grew as the government policy has encouraged their growth by taking an active role in the construction of organized industrial districts for small and medium-size enterprises.\(^{71}\) Gölalp (2001, 435-436) points out that political Islam found a particularly fertile ground in the rise of

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\(^{70}\) The State Planning Organization (SPO) is an official agency working under the Prime Ministry assisting the Cabinet to formulate and implement developmental goals. The SPO was established in 1960.

\(^{71}\) Gölalp (2001) notes that by 1997, there were 36 such districts, housing several thousand establishments. Of these 36 districts, only 6 were built during the twenty-five years between 1962 and
petty entrepreneurship especially in the provinces of central Turkey. Students of Turkish politics recognize this newly emerging class of Islamist entrepreneurs as “Anatolian Tigers”\(^{72}\) (*Anadolu Kapılanlar*), and the financial resources that they controlled as “Green Capital”\(^{73}\) (*Yeşil Sermaye*). Not all of these petty entrepreneurs were necessarily Islamists; however the Islamist segment of the business class comes primarily from among this sector.\(^{74}\)

Later in 1990, those entrepreneurs would join forces and establish MÜSİAD\(^{75}\) (Gülalp 2001, 437-438). This “green” or “Islamic” capital was invested in different sectors. The religious orders and brotherhoods (*tari̇kat*) received new freedoms under Özal’s period of controlled liberalization. Indeed, Özal was not an Islamist, however he was a member of the Nakşibendis; and his older brother Korkut Özal was one of the founders of the MSP. During Özal’s prime ministry and presidency these new groups were “allowed to officially finance the construction of private schools and universities, and they established social services for the feeding of the poor and handed out scholarships to students in schools and universities.” Currently, there are an estimated 130 separate religious orders in Turkey with a total of approximately 10 million members (Karakaş 2007, 20).

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\(^{72}\) Analogous to “Asian Tigers”.

\(^{73}\) Green, by many, is considered as the color of Islam, yet this has no religious basis.

\(^{74}\) Özal’s Neoliberal policies provided new opportunity spaces for the Islamist entrepreneurs. Indeed, the post-1980 period has seen the rise of new companies whose establishment depended on the limited savings of many partners and/or shareholders. YILMÂŞ and KOMBASSAN are two such companies. They have both become successful businesses in a short time frame. Moreover, the “Anatolian tigers” have not limited their activities to Turkey. They are also trying to expand their businesses into Europe, America, and Asia. There is no doubt that these associations and businesses are contributing to the Turkey’s economic development (ÇaHa 2001, 43).

\(^{75}\) MÜSİAD, (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen-Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği), its philosophy and activities will be discussed in detail through the end of this chapter.
The Just Order (Adil Düzen)

On July 19, 1983, after the junta leaders decided to allow elections, Ali Türkmen and his thirty friends\(^76\) established the RP. Türkmen was a proxy for Erbakan who was imprisoned and banned from politics during the military regime. After political restrictions for ex-politicians were lifted with a national referendum on September 6, 1987, Erbakan became the new leader of the party.\(^77\) The most appealing program that the RP presented was the Just Order platform\(^78\) (Adil Düzen), and most RP supporters identified social equity as the main objective of the Just Order.\(^79\) The Just Order was first introduced in 1985 into the RP’s party program and it is based on a theoretical charter that introduced by two Islamist university professors (Süleyman Karagülle and Süleyman Akdemir) who founded Turkey’s first Muslim commune, the Akevler Kooperatif in İzmir.

Right before the 1991 parliamentary elections Erbakan presented the Just Order to the Turkish audience with a booklet, *Just Economic Order*, under his name (Yavuz 2003, 221). Many RP supporters associate the Just Order with concepts like justice, stability, and ending bribery, nepotism and corruption, respect for basic rights and freedoms, and an end to undue Western influence over Turkey. Erbakan’s youth associations under the MGH utilized the structural opportunity of the İmam-Hatip schools and appealed to the alienated

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\(^{76}\) At least thirty founders were required to establish a political party according to the Law on Parties.

\(^{77}\) Indeed, almost all of the ex-politicians returned to politics. Demirel became the leader of the True Path Party, Ecevit the Democratic Left Party, and Alpaslan Türkeş the Nationalist Labor Party which later changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party.

\(^{78}\) More information on the Just Order can be found on the FP’s website at: http://www.saadet.org.tr/ The FP also has a website in English at http://www.saadet.org.tr/english.asp which is not as comprehensive as its website in Turkish. Or, see Milli Öğzüm Dergisi (Journal of National Solution) at http://www.millozu.com

\(^{79}\) At the Third General Convention of the RP in October 7, 1990 Erbakan voiced the Just Order and since then it has been used as the fundamental slogan of the party. The Just Order is more than a radical criticism of Capitalism. Issues like social solidarity, prevention of waste, progressive taxation, equal governmental services for everyone, equal income distribution, and abolition of interest are the main pillars of the Just Order (Yıldız 2003, 192; Karagülle 2007). Yavuz argues that the Just Order “marked one of the first times a group of Muslim professionals used Islamic precepts to justify notions usually
conservative masses of the gecekondu (shantytowns) through framing strategies that framed Islam either through a promise for social justice (Adil Düzen, Just Order) or a pledge for Shari'a rule through electoral politics for more politicized religious masses. Just like its Islamist counterparts in the other Muslim countries, the powerful message of “Islam is the solution” (Çözüm İslamda!) was delivered to the alienated poor dwellers of gecekondu by providing social services through Islamist social/charity organizations.

Kamil, one of my interviewees, shared Muharrem’s views on the Just Order. Kamil is a retired civil servant who worked for the Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs (Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Müdürlüğü) under the Ministry of Interior in a small town in central Turkey. He pointed out that he was coming from a very conservative family and learned how to pray when he was in the elementary school and started to go to the neighborhood mosque with his father. Since his early adulthood, Kamil supported the MGH, attended many conferences organized by the movement, read its literature, and voted for the MSP since its establishment. Kamil believed that Turkish people either partially understood or did not get the concept of the Just Order. He remarked by shaking his head from right to left in a sad tone: “opponents of the RP often slandered and ridiculed the Just Order and Erbakan, and the majority of the Turkish people believed those false accusations and ridicule by the secularist media.” Kamil also strongly believed that the media in Turkey was controlled by anti-Islamic secularist writers and producers who often enjoy slandering and ridiculing Muslims and Islam. In our interview, he remarked: “Thank God! (Elhamdülillah!) Muslims are newly gaining strength in the media, but this is not still enough to break the secularists’ monopoly in the media.”

associated with liberal ideologies, namely pluralism, democracy, the free market, and individual responsibility”

As opposed to many Arab Muslims,
The RP’s Electoral Record

The RP’s electoral record shows a sudden gradual increase over the years. Before Erbakan, under Ahmet Tekdal’s leadership the RP participated in local elections and won mayoral seats in two eastern cities (Van and Urfa) by receiving 4.4% of the total votes. After Erbakan’s takeover of the party leadership, in the parliamentary election of 1987 the RP increased its share of votes to 7.2%. However, the party was short of the ten percent threshold\(^81\) required to gain a seat in the Turkish parliament. After winning 9.8% of the votes in 1989 local elections, the RP elites formed a purely pragmatic alliance with the MHP and Reformist Democratic Party (İslahçı Demokrasi Partisi, IDP) on September 23, 1991. After the Alliance won 16.9% of the votes in the 1991 general elections, and gained sixty-two seats in parliament; within a month twenty-two deputies from the MHP and IDP resigned from the RP returned to their parties.

The major turning point for the RP in Turkish politics was the RP’s victory in the local elections of 1994. On March 27, 1994, the RP won 19.7% of the national vote. Pro-Islamist majors took control of twenty-nine larger cities including İstanbul and Ankara which made the RP a significant force in Turkish politics (Yavuz 1997, 71-72). The Islamist mayors of Ankara and İstanbul were able to solve the chronic problems of citizens with responsible fiscal management and a wide range of services affordable for everyone.\(^82\) One chronic problem of Ankara used to be the traffic jams. Göçek, in several

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\(^81\) The 550-member TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Turkish Grand National Assembly) carries out legislative functions. Election is by proportional representation. To get seats, a party must obtain at least 10% of the votes cast at the national level. This threshold mechanism is intended to reduce the likelihood of coalition governments by reducing the number of smaller parties in parliament.

\(^82\) Since the local elections of March 1994, RP mayors have worked hard and offered better services to the citizens by improving public services and solving many of the chronic problems of the larger cities in their control. One such service was the Halk Ekmek Projesi (Bread for Citizens Project). Both İstanbul and Ankara municipalities established and started to run large automated bakery complexes in the outskirts of İstanbul and Ankara, and started to sell the standard 400 grams bread (approximately 14 ounces) for a cheaper price to people at several locations through the kiosks owned and operated by the
years, was able to solve the problem by building several additional bridges and tunnels at
the busiest intersections and by streamlining the city's traffic in a more efficient way.

Rasim, one of my interviewees, is a shuttle bus driver for a private transportation company
that has contracts with several public institutions in Ankara. He enthusiastically said:

Before Gökçek, there used to be heavy congestion at the intersections, so I could only
work for one institution. Now, I am working for two, because I do not waste time in city
traffic. By God, (Vallah!) I am an Alevi; and I used to vote for the CHP. My whole
family still votes for the CHP, but after what Gökçek had done, I am now voting for him.

It was right after the RP's victory in the 1994 local elections when the RP scored
its second victory in the December 1995 parliamentary elections. The RP received 21.4%
of the votes, became the leading party in the parliament. However, the number of the RP
seats was not enough to create a majority government; thus, in the summer of 1996, Erbakan
established a coalition government with Tansu Çiller's center-right True Path Party (Doğru
Yol Partisi, DYP) which received 19.2% percent of the votes and became the third. Many
ordinary Turkish citizens associated the RP with positive attributes like honesty, justice
and equality. At the ideational level, the RP deputies and mayors successfully framed the
means of solving the Turkish people's problems with Islamic notions of honesty, justice,
socio-economic equality, observing others’ rights (*kul hakka*, i.e., refraining from violating others’ rights). 87

**Structural Strains: The Secular Backlash and the February 28 Period**

The RP-DYP coalition lasted only about a year. The Turkish military took the accession of the RP into government as confirmation of its belief that *irtica* (Islamist reactionism) had become a substantial threat to the secular nature of the Turkish republic. On February 28, 1997, less than a year after the establishment of the RP-DYP coalition government, through the MGK the military issued a list of demands and measures designed to reinstate the secular nature of the government and reverse the supposed Islamization of Turkey. 88

The architects behind the February 28 process were the Turkish military, former President Süleyman Demirel (1993-2000), the DSP, and the CHP, the members of the judiciary, TÜSİAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), the civil societal network of the secular establishment, and the secular media. Article 35 and 85 of the Internal Service Regulation of the Turkish Armed Forces state that the “Turkish military shall defend the country against internal as well as external threats, if necessary by force.”

Thus, the military justified its intervention on February 28, 1997 through forcing the coalition government to meet the demands of the military at the monthly MGK meeting as

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87 Thus, people who voted for the RP deputies and mayors did so both through *prospective* and *retrospective* judgment. That is, first people voted based on the promises made by the Islamist candidates supported with strong Islamic concepts mentioned above (*prospective judgment*). Second, people voted based on the record of public services that had been provided for them until the elections by the Islamist deputies and mayors during their tenure (*retrospective judgment*).

88 The MGK, consisting of President Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Erbakan, three other ministers from Erbakan’s cabinet, and six generals convened for their regular monthly meeting. Different than the previous meetings, this particular one resulted in a “soft” *coup d’état* against the government of Islamist Erbakan. The generals had already changed the security doctrine of the military by defining *irtica* as the
defending the country against their biggest perceived (internal) threat: Islamism. The coalition government under the premiership of Erbakan did not last longer, and Erbakan resigned on June 17, 1997 just four months after the declaration of the MGK decisions on February 28.

The process, which is also called as a *post-modern coup d’état* by many Turkish commentators, was an attempt to reconstruct politics in Turkey by ensuring “the continuity of the basic assumptions of the Kemalist model” (Cizre and Çınar 2003, 310). Immediately after the implementation of the generals’ demands, approximately 900 military officers and several civil bureaucrats were expelled from their posts due to their alleged Islamic ways of life (ASDER 2004; Arslan 2005, 45-47). Businesses affiliated with the Islamists were labeled “green capital” and discriminated against in governmental contracts. The headscarf ban strictly remained in place in all educational institutions, and hundreds of Qur’an courses and all of the secondary (middle) schools (6th-8th grades) of the *Imam-Hatips* were closed. Mosque construction was restricted, and all mosques were placed under state control.

During the February 28 process the Constitutional Court of Turkey (the highest court in the country) closed down the RP, and Erbakan was banned from politics for 10 years and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was abruptly sentenced to 10 months imprisonment for reciting Gökalp’s following verses: “Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets,

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89 According to the MGK declaration on March 31, 2001, the number of the Qur’an courses closed by the state reached to 370 and the personnel of religious institutions indicted by the state was 12,071. “Kriz Aşılacak,” *Milliyet*, March 31, 2001.

90 The Turkish military was adamant about the February 28 project, and the generals appeared very confident in the success of their policies. In 1999, when the Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, was asked about the prospects for the continuation of the process, he remarked: “If necessary, February 28 process will last a thousand years” (“İlk Kez Konuştu,” *Sabah*, 9.4.1999).
mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers" (Kocacitoğlu, 448-450).

The consequence of this sentence would mean a life-long ban from politics for Erdoğan because the Turkish Law on Parties stated that if someone had been convicted for "political" reasons, he/she would be banned from politics for life. For the purpose of overseeing the implementation of those measures, the MGK established a special unit composed of the military personnel called Bağımsız Çalışma Grubu (The Western Study Group) that directly reports to the MGK working within the Headquarters of the General Staff in downtown Ankara (Kuru 2006, 183-184). The goal of the group was to collect information about the political orientations of civil society groups, mayors, governors, government employees, political party cadres, and media personalities.

The generals did not have a difficult time in imposing this new doctrine upon the civilian members of the council and had it approved as the official national security doctrine immediately (Kuru 2006, 182). The generals forced the civilian members to sign a program to fight irtica, which included drastic secular measures. The demands of the generals from the government included: closing the Islamist party (the RP) and banning its leaders from politics, expanding teaching on Atatürkism to cover almost all courses, scrapping the secondary school system for the İmam Hatip schools, introducing strict age limitations for the Qur'anic seminaries (religious seminaries to teach the Qur'an), appointing staunch Kemalists as university presidents, cleansing the public bureaucracy by firing suspected Islamists, continuing the strict enforcement of the ban on headscarves for females, and other similar discriminatory measures against the suspected Islamists (Cizre and Çınar 2003, 310-312).

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91 The poem was written by the founder of Turkish nationalism Ziya Gökalp and published in a book recommended by the Ministry of Education. See: Heper, M. and Ş. Toktaş (2003). 'Islam, Modernity, and...
The MGK’s press declaration explains the rationale of the meeting by emphasizing that “secularism in Turkey is not only the assurance of political regime, but also...a way of life.” In the following months, subsequent pressure from the military through the MGK and the civilian component of the secular establishment (the bureaucracy, judiciary, and secular media) led to the collapse of the coalition government in June 1997 (Cizre and Çinar 2003, 309). After the collapse of the coalition, a new coalition government was formed with M. Yılmaz’s ANAP and B. Ecevit’s DSP to implement the directives of the military. Yılmaz became the prime minister and Ecevit was the deputy prime minister. In November 1998, after a vote of no confidence from the Turkish parliament the Yılmaz government ended due to corruption charges because of Yılmaz’s close ties to some “underworld-linked businessmen bidding for state contracts” (Yavuz 2003, 250). President Demirel nominated Ecevit to be prime minister who created a minority government until the parliamentary elections of April 1999.

The February 28 process came as a shock to the Islamists who in general concluded that the military’s intervention into politics was a top-down effort of the secularist establishment to protect the secularist nature of the regime. Indeed, there was a consensus among the Islamist and secular commentators on the media about the process. The common belief was that it was a “secular reflex” to protect the secular nature of the Turkish regime in the face of the rising Islamist politics. During the process, Islamist

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Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan." *Muslim World.* Vol. 93, pp. 157-185. Erdoğan spent four months in prison.
93 The name for the new coalition was ANA-SOL (ANA from the ANAP, SOL from the DSP, Demokratik Sol Parti)
94 For example, see Ali Bayramoglu’s (a secular columnist) comments on the February 28 process in his article “Laik tutumdan Kızıl Elmacılığa” Yeni Şafak, December 21, 2005 at: http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/aralık/21/abayramoglu.html
newspapers like Milli Gazete, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, and Vakit criticized the authoritarian top-down policies of the MGK.

The remarks of Hasan, one of the AKP officials in a suburb of Ankara, summarize what many Islamist, including the old school Islamists of the SP, think about the February 28 process: “The military and the secularists did not want Islam and us Muslims to succeed politically in this country. Our strengthening simply scared them; ... they have exploited Atatürk and his ideas to struggle with us.” Hasan also commented that there was a law for protecting Atatürk which could only happen in repressive countries. He found this ridiculous because he thought that such laws belonged to backward countries that impose a particular official ideology on their citizens.

My interviews revealed that Islamists in general believed that the way that the principle of secularism had been applied in Turkey was contrary to the spirit of secularism itself. Islamists claim that the secularist establishment in Turkey does not equally distance itself from all religions since, as they claim, by top-down authoritarian policies, the secularist establishment has been trying to eliminate Islamism from the political realm.

95 Actually he was referring to the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk (Atatürk Hakkinda İlsenilen Suçlara Dair Kanun) which is still in effect in Turkey. It is the Law number 5816 of the Turkish penal code. It is also popularly known as the Law of Protecting Atatürk (Atatürk'u Koruma Kanunu). People who openly criticize Atatürk could be imprisoned between 1-3 years upon conviction. If criticism is committed through the media, the punishment is increased by fifty percent. Atilla Yayla, a respected professor of Political Science and the president of Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu (Liberal Thought Association) was recently sentenced to 15 months in prison for allegedly insulting the memory of Atatürk. Later the court converted Yayla's sentence to a fine. The basis for his sentence was that a court in İzmir ruled that Yayla had violated the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatürk when he made the following statement in a conference: "In the future we will be asked the question 'Why are this man's [Atatürk's] statues and photographs all over the place?' You cannot bury this issue. This will certainly be debated." Yayla's defense lawyers appealed the sentence. For details, visit Sahin Alpay's article at Today's Zaman at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetav.do?haberno=133692 “Atatürk and the ‘Atatürkist system of thought’” Today's Zaman, 2.11.2008 accessed on 2.13.2008.

96 Almost unanimously Islamists openly and harshly criticized the February 28 process. Among my interviewees, Cezmi commented in a similar vein by referring to the military and the secularists: "Their intentions are clear... They can not openly fight against Islam in a country with a Muslim majority. So, they use secularism as a pretext to punish us just for being Muslims, and just for coming up with a demand to have a say in the politics of our country."
Feyzullah is an Islamist lawyer whom I interviewed in Ankara. He is also an active member of the MÜSİAD. He comes from a middle class family from eastern Turkey. I met Feyzullah in one of my visits to the headquarters of MÜSİAD; later we arranged an interview in his office in Şişhие which is in walking distance from Kızılay (downtown Ankara). Feyzullah stated that Turkish regime had never had an equal distance between itself and Islam. He also added that if the Turkish regime had had that equal distance, the Turkish Islamists would not have dealt with what he called antidemocratic oppressive practices (antidemokratik baskı uygulamaları). Like many of my other interviewees, Feyzullah did not perceive secularism as being fundamentally at odds with Islam since he repeatedly stated that if the secularist establishment had been neutral about Islam in Turkey, Muslims would have actually benefitted from that situation, Feyzullah stated that “the secularist establishment in Turkey had two major goals: maintaining their power (iktidarını devam ettirmek) and prevent Islamic movements (İslami hareketleri engellemek) whether they be political, social, economic or even purely religious in nature.” Feyzullah also maintained that if true secularism had been applied in Turkey, it would not have been antidemocratic and hostile to political expression of Islam.97

Government Control over Religious Education

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the 1924 Law of Unification of Education (1924 Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) sought to create a new citizen committed to Kemalist ideology by promoting secular-nationalistic ideas through the secularist education to attain “contemporary Western civilization” (Göle 1996, 22). One

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97 In a similar vein, Hayreddin Karaman (“Hukuk Yargıçı Bağlamaz mı?” Yeni Şafak 3.20.2008), a prominent Islamic scholar and a columnist of Islamist Yeni Şafak, argues that the secularist establishment is willing to punish Islamists in Turkey by portraying Islamists’ democratic demands as antisecular actions violating the secularist nature of the Turkish Constitution.
year after the proclamation of the republic, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, DİB) was founded in 1924. Karakaş (2007, 10) argues that Atatürk established the DİB with the “goal of depoliticizing...Islam through a state takeover of certain religious functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building project.” Karakaş (2007, 11) maintains that through the secularist interpretation of religion the DİB was supposed to “prevent non-state and anti-Kemalist circles from using religion for political mobilization against the state.” The Kemalists referred all matters that were connected to religion to the DİB and later placed the DİB under the Ministry of Interior Affairs (İç İşleri Bakanlığı). Thus, “all questions of theology, faith, and religious ritual were to be decided upon by the DİB” which was to be “solely responsible for overseeing the mosques, for the organization of worship, and for the discussion of religious affairs that exclusively involved matters of faith.” The Islamic scholars of theology and law (ulama) and the clergy were made subordinate to the DİB.

Since the closure of the medreses in 1924, private religious education of Islam has been prohibited in Turkey. This ban is not just about Islamic schools; other religions have also been targeted by the secularist regime. The only non-Muslim theological school of the Greek Orthodox Church remained open until 1972; and since that time, although the Church’s has made numerous attempts to reopen the school, those efforts have been futile. Kuru (2006, 188) argues that the ban on private Islamic education and intense popular demand pushed the state to pursue two policies: i) over the years, the state has provided obligatory religious education in public schools, and ii) opened Qur’anic seminaries, Imam-Hatip schools, and faculties of theology. Through these policies, the Turkish state does not aim to support Islam; instead, it has two broader aims: i) regulating and overseeing religious institutions and religious education by hiring the Islamic clergy and
scholars at several levels as government employees, thus creating a religious bureaucracy and making them subservient, accountable and responsible to the state, and ii) creating an “Official Islam” as opposed to “political Islam” by defining the Orthodox version of religion sanctioned by the state.

Another major goal behind such policies was to unify the new nation through the uniform state-sponsored education. The Law brought all educational institutions under the control of the Ministry of Education, closed down all medreses (traditional theological seminaries established during the Ottoman Empire). The Faculty of Divinity was opened in 1924 in Ankara. The same year, the Ministry of Education opened 29 four-year vocational Imam-Hatip schools in several cities. In 1930, the Ministry closed down all of them. In 1948, due to intense popular demand, the CHP’s single-party regime in Turkey established ten-month religious seminaries to educate prayer leaders and preachers as people started complain about the lack of prayer leaders and preachers in their neighborhoods. The Faculty of Divinity under Ankara University was reopened in 1949. Within eight years after the DP’s coming into power in 1950, the number of those schools were increased to 26.98 Before the military coup of 1980, their number reached 379. By 1995, right before the February 28 process, their number reached a maximum of 395; and the generals, after the February 28 process, forced the government to close down the first four years of the schools-secondary schools- which drastically cut down the number of students enrolled in those schools (“İmam Hatiplerin Tarihi” 2004; “İHL’lerin 77 Yıllı” 2000).

98 The DP also opened up Imam-Hatip high schools as the earlier versions of those schools were limited to only secondary school kids. Additionally in 1959, the Institute of Higher Islamic Studies (Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü) was opened at Istanbul University; a similar institute was opened in Konya in 1962. By 1970, the total number of Imam-Hatip schools reached up to 72. However, until 1977, the graduates of those schools were not accepted in any university other than the Faculties of Divinity (İlahiyat Fakülteleri).
The process of opening up newer Imam-Hatip schools has been a highly politicized event. Islamist parties and associations carried out a sustained campaign between 1973 and 1997 to build new Imam-Hatip schools by collecting donations from individuals and businesses. Through societal activism, new associations mushroomed to build and maintain the schools under the name of Imam-Hatip Associations (İmam-Hatip Dernekleri). The earliest of those associations was İlim Yayıma Cemiyeti (The Association of Disseminating Sciences) established in 1951 (İmam Hatiplerin Serencam, 2006). The growing civil society in Turkey in the late 1970s and 1980s empowered Islamic groups to act on and build upon their resources and have access to other people. Many ordinary Turkish citizens contributed to the movement financially and by volunteering (like fundraising), because they wanted their children to have a more conservative education with an Islamic code of ethics and values. However, even though those schools were run by the Ministry of Education many secularist Turks and the military perceived the growing movement as a threat to the secularist pillars of the Turkish Republic (Yavuz 2003, 126).

Many conservative families wanted their children to enroll into the Imam-Hatip schools. Kamil enrolled two of his three children in the late 1980s into the Imam-Hatip (one of them went to a technical school) when those schools were mushrooming all over Turkey. He believed that in addition to regular high school curriculum, his children would learn Arabic and several religious classes (like Theology, Exegesis, Creed, Methods of Jurisprudence, Life of Prophet Muhammed and Ethics, Muhammed’s Tradition and Methodology, and Preaching) there. Indeed, Kamil’s children later did not choose to be prayer leaders or preachers, and after high school they chose management and accounting related majors in college. The secularist media in Turkey has been critical regarding the number of the Imam-Hatip schools by contending that Turkey did not need that many
religious schools; and the government did not need that many preachers or prayer leaders to be employed under the DİB. People who are İmam-Hatip graduates believe that the secularist establishment perceived them as “enemies of the state.” 99 One common argument often brought up by those people was that the İmam-Hatip schools were run by the Ministry of Education and their curriculum was strictly controlled by the Ministry. There was nothing in their curriculum that would make them “turn against the Turkish state.” Thus, they repeatedly argued, the secularist establishment was against the İmam-Hatip schools because they were against Islam, and they expressed their enmity against Islam by attacking the schools. Eleven of my interviewees were graduates of İmam Hatip schools 100 and many brought up similar arguments, which appear to be the common sentiment of the graduates of those schools, in line with the arguments of the subscribers of the İmam-Hatip forums.

Emin was one of the graduates of İmam-Hatip schools. After graduation, in the early 1990s he served as the prayer leader (imam) in a small subprovince of Ankara since then. I met Emin through one of his relatives. Emin shared the sentiments of İmam-Hatip graduates reflected on the online forums. He believed that being a prayer leader was not easy; they were working longer hours (prayer times change according to the seasons), and they were being paid less than other governmental employees. Emin also argued that the secularists’ criticisms of the İmam-Hatip schools and their graduates as reflected in the secularist media were unjustifiable. He stated: “love of country is under nobody’s monopoly... we [İmam-Hatip graduates] love this country as much as the secularists, may be even more... in their criticisms they [secularists] are doing a great injustice.” He, like

99 I subscribed to several online İmam-Hatip forums (like İmam Hatip Forum at www.imamhatipforum.net, and İHL Forum at www.ihlforum.net) and read some debates under different forum topics revealing their views regarding how the secularists have been perceiving the schools.
most other graduates, believed that the secularists were indeed enemies of Islam; however in a country with Muslim majority it would not be easy for anyone to openly express their enmity towards the religion. Thus, he believed that the secularists’ attacks on the schools were a sign of their enmity towards Islam. He stated “... because they cannot directly attack Islam, they attack sincere Muslims and the schools.”

Imam-Hatip schools were not the only type of religious schools challenging the transformative function of Turkey’s secular-Kemalist education. Imam-Hatip schools are part of the public school system in Turkey. Newly emerging private Islamic schools also had a similar challenge. In Turkish society, “major change took place in the 1980s and 1990s when high rates of literacy and mass printing converged with the emergence of a middle-class” (Yavuz 2003, 122). A new reading public with Islamic sentiments formed. This new reading middle-class also demanded their children to pursue education in an Islamic environment. Thus, “with the opening of private, religiously oriented high schools, the state lost control over the production of a state-centric secular identity.” Especially in the Özal era, a rapid expansion of Islamic groups in the educational sphere took place. By the 1996-1997 academic year, a total of 120 out of 376 private high schools (about 32 percent of all private high schools) belonged to Islamic foundations with approximately three hundred thousand students enrolled in them (Yavuz 2003, 122-123). Students of those schools usually come from conservative middle-class Sunni families. Kuru (2006, 189-190) reports that in 2003, the Erdoğan government initiated a project to finance all private

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100 Among my 11 interviewees who were Imam-Hatip graduates, only 3 chose to work as prayer leaders after graduation. From the remaining 8, 5 pursued their college education in various fields, 3 found jobs after graduation.

101 Since private Islamic education is under the monopoly of the state, Islamist movements have opened private secular schools, which have used the same curricula of secular public schools. These schools are still a matter of criticism by the secularists since they are run by Islamist movements and more importantly those schools inculcate students religiously through extra-curricular activities. No state funding exists for these schools.
In my interviews, I did not directly interview the interviewees whether they were involved with the private schools established by the Islamists. However, in the course of my interviews, a few interviewees mentioned their involvement with those private schools. One of my interviewees, Kerim, mentioned the fact that he sent his older son to one such private school in Ankara (Private Samanyolu High School) in the late 1990s. Kerim was a relatively well-to-do businessman in the food wholesale business, a partner of a food wholesales company operating at GI MAT, a site for food wholesalers in Yenimahalle, Ankara. Samanyolu High School is run by a company (Başkent Eğitim, Yayın ve Ticaret Limitet Şirketi) established by people who are closely associated by Fethullah Gülen. Kerim told me that he knew some businessmen, mainly in the food wholesales business, donating money for the Gülen community on a regular basis; and through his personal and business relations with those businessmen, he got to know the Gülen movement. Indeed, Kerim also stated that he had started donating money for the Gülen community which was before he enrolled his son into Samanyolu.

Kerim elaborated the details of how he got to know the Gülen group during our conversation. He stated: "...one day, one of my close friends asked me if I was available tomorrow night. I said why you are asking. He said we would go and visit "a good place." I did not understand anything..." Indeed, Kerim’s friend invited him to a ders, a religious lecture, at the residence of an individual who would later become one of their common friends. Kerim’s friend, on the way to the ders, explained him that they were going to a ders. Kerim knew what a ders was, however he had never attended one earlier in his life. Kerim and his friend were greeted by the owner of the residence (not by his wife); and
were invited to the living room where there were some 4-5 other men sitting on the two large couches next to each other in a larger living room. One of the men was sitting on an armchair; and in front of the man on the armchair, there was a small coffee table on which there was an open book. The host seated Kerim and his friend, and because no more place was available on the couches, he sat on another armchair. The man on the armchair smiled at Kerim and his friend and greeted them: “Esselamu Aleykülm102 You are welcome oh my brothers…” The man introduced himself as Ahmed Hoca;\textsuperscript{103} and said: “because we have two new guests this week, I think it will be a good idea for us to meet.” Everyone introduced themselves; and as Kerim reported, many people in the room including the host were either small businessmen or tradesmen. After the introductions, Ahmed Hoca said: “tonight God willing (\textit{in\textasciitilde allah}) we are going to read a lesson about our Prophet’s miracles from the \textit{Mektubat}.”\textsuperscript{104} Kerim told \textit{me} that Ahmed Hoca had started to read a chapter from a book which had appeared to be an old book on Islamic creed including a lesson on Prophet Muhammed’s miracles. Kerim thought so because the language of the book sounded old, and Ahmed Hoca, as he read from the book, was explaining the topic and from time to time providing the meanings of the old Ottoman words in contemporary Turkish. Indeed, the book, which was read by Ahmed Hoca, was written by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi; and Kerim would learn this later at the end of the \textit{ders}. Kerim, indeed, became part of an Islamist “reading circle” and as he reported during our interview, since then Kerim continued to attend the weekly circles (\textit{ders}).

\footnote{Esselamu Aleykülm is the universal Muslim greeting, which is in Arabic. It means “Peace be upon you”\footnote{Hoca is not a name, it is a title. Depending upon the situation, it can either mean teacher or preacher. So, Ahmed Hoca means, Ahmed the Teacher, or Ahmed the Preacher.\footnote{\textit{Mektubat} (The Letters) is one of the books of Bediüzzaman’s Treatises of Light Collection (\textit{Risale-i Nur Külliyati}).}
In our interview, we also talked about Kerim’s perception of the Samanyolu High School where he enrolled his son in the late 1990s, which as Kerim told, happened after he met the Gülen movement. Kerim sent his son there for two reasons. *First*, it was a very good school and the quality of education was quite high. *Second*, it was run by religious people, so Kerim wanted his son to be educated by religious teachers and get Islamic values and morals not through the curriculum, but through the actions and attitudes of teachers around him. In Turkey, private schools are not allowed to have religious curriculum since the religious education is under the monopoly of the government. However, in many of the private schools run by religious groups like the Samanyolu High School, students are encouraged by the teachers and administration to participate into extracurricular activities directed by the teachers. Kerim reported that after taking part in some of the clubs, his son’s attitudes changes in a positive way. In Kerim’s words his son became: “well-behaved, respectful and polite (*edepli, saygılı ve efendi*).” Kerim also reported that many parents were concerning about negative peer pressure on their children, but he never had that kind of concern.

Islamists in Turkey seem to understand the significance of education. My interviewees, like Kamil, Muzaffer, Kerim and Gülsen commented on the significance of education.105 Kamil, for instance believed that “for years in Turkey, the secularist mentality...”

105 Islamists whom I interviewed were highly critical and emotional about the issue. For instance, Muzaffer stated: “without changing the mentality of the secularists, we can not solve the headscarf issue in Turkey... unfortunately they are not willing to change their minds, for them Muslims are dangerous and should be stopped at any cost” Muzaffer also thought that in the past the secularists were criticizing Muslims for not caring about education of females; however now it was the Muslims who were willing to send their daughters to schools to have their education, but the secularists became upset about it. He believed that the secularists were not sincere in their efforts to educate the Turkish people. For Muzaffer, the secularists “wanted it [to educate people in] their way.” He maintained: “…If a Muslim woman is a custodian or a waitress at a school and wears the headscarf it is not a problem for the secularists, but if a female student or teacher wears it, it makes the secularists mad... They always blamed Muslims for being ignorant and uneducated. But when we wanted to get more educated, and be ourselves at the same time,
dominated everything....they were the educated ones...” Kamil also argued that people with religious sensitivities did nothing to encourage their children to have education beyond high school. For him, since sincere Muslims did not care about education over the years, they did not have a say in the government. On the other hand, he also believed that things are currently different. He stated:

“...now it is the sincere believers who try to educate their kids, however the secularists are not happy about it...Look, now they [the secularists] do everything to prevent Muslims from educating their kids...Don’t you know the injustices done to the Imam-Hatip graduates?106... Don’t you see how they have been trying to prevent our girls to have education because they wear the headscarves?”

Gülşen, who had to give up her headscarf to pursue her education in a nursing school, was also highly critical about the headscarf ban. She argued that the headscarf issue in Turkey had become a symbolic issue. She stated: “the secularists made it a matter of pride (olayı gurur meselesi yaptılar)... the rise of Islam in Turkey made them [the secularists] upset... they panicked and chose us [the females with headscarves] as targets...” Islamists whom I interviewed did not approve the headscarf ban and believed that it was completely anti-democratic. They appeared to recognize the importance of education both at the individual and at the movement level because they believed that education meant power.

Islamists believe that such anti-democratic measures are direct outcomes of the secularist state’s deliberate attempts to control religion. According to the Islamists, the

106Kamil was referring to the complex formula used to calculate the points of students taking the nationwide university entrance exam in Turkey (Universite Sinavi Katsayısı). The formula discriminates against the graduates of the Imam-Hatip Schools as well as the graduates of the Vocational High Schools. Imam-Hatips are considered Vocational High Schools by the government because their students learn a skill. When graduates of vocational schools chose a college in the same category as their high schools, they do not lose points. However, if they want to pick a different category, they are punished by the formula. For instance, when a graduate of the İmam-Hatip Schools choses The Faculty of Theology he/she would not be punished. However, if the same student picks any other degree, they are punished by the
state's control over religion is not limited to restricting people's liberties; indeed, they believe that through official channels, the secularist Turkish state tries to control religion by controlling religious education and mosques. The following section will discuss the government's control over mosques.

**Government Control over Mosques**

In Turkey, besides religious education, the *camīs* (mosques) are under the complete control of the government. The *imams* of mosques are hired by the government, and all of them are civil servants of the state's DiB\(^\text{107}\) (Kara 2003; Canatan 1997; Karakaş 2007). Erdoğan succinctly points out the intentions of the designers of the 1982 Constitution written during the military rule in reaffirming the state's control over religion through the DiB (1999, 380):

"...Article 136 of the [1982] Constitution, which provides for the creation of the Department of Religious Affairs, considers religion subject to the parameters of "secularism" as a means of national integrity. Therefore, any other conception or practice of religion is excluded from constitutional protection".

Karakaş (2007, 11) reports that today the DiB is one of the largest public institutions in Turkey. The institution oversees the almost 78,000 state mosques and 5,000 state Qur'anic seminaries (2006: 157,000 students) (See the table in the Appendix). The DiB has other responsibilities including the preparation and distribution of the Friday sermons centrally from Ankara to all mosques in the country; the design and the content of broadcasts about Islam and of Qur'an recitations in the state media (on TRT channels, usually one-hour programs once a week); the translation of religious texts; the writing of *fatvas* (a religious edict or a ruling on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar) on a

\(^{107}\)The 89th article of the Law of Political Parties (no. 2820) forbids a political party to propose the abolishment of the DiB.
variety of different questions submitted by ordinary citizens regarding religious issues; the organization of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca; and providing religious services for Turkish Muslims abroad (the DİB is also active in Europe, where it is known under the acronym DİTİB, Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği-[The Directorate of] Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union). The DİB currently employs approximately 80,000 personnel; many of them are prayer leaders, preachers, and Islamic jurisprudents who are all public employees (Karakaş 2007, 11).

The agency's resources of approx. 1.3 billion YTL (about 1.06 billion US dollars) in 2006 represented the fourth-largest item in the state's budget (See the table in the Appendix). The money is split between paying the salaries of the personnel, maintenance of the mosques and construction of new ones, and the bureaucratic expenses and publications. The DİB is always headed by a theology professor who is appointed by the Prime Minister. The percentage of the budget allocated for the expenses of the DİB could be perceived not so high by some observers. However, in many large cities or towns in Turkey, through the neighborhood mosque associations (cami dernekleri) and the continuous donations (bağış) of the congregation, the needs of the mosques are locally met; thus, the share of the budget that directly goes to the DİB is spent mainly for the salaries of the DİB personnel, and for bureaucratic expenses and publications. Moreover, many items are subsidized for the mosques by the central government or the local governments. For instance, the water and electricity services are subsidized by the local governments for

108 These theologians are educated by the public universities (Faculties of Theology or Higher Islamic Institutes), thus private groups can not establish and run those schools. Currently, Prof. Ali Bardakoğlu is the head of the DİB. See Table 3.4 in the Appendix.
mosques, and in many neighborhoods various charity organizations undertake various costs associated with operating and maintaining the mosques.  

All *vaazes* (lectures delivered by imams before the congregational Friday prayer) and *hutbes* (sermons during the Friday prayers) are under the control of the DIB. The sermons are important for observant Muslims because they are weekly lessons for Muslims encompassing a wide range of issues from creed to morals, and from anecdotes of Prophet Muhammed’s and his companions’ lives to some issues pertaining the daily worships of Muslims. Sermons have an educational function; and the congregation has to listen to the Friday sermon since listening to the sermon is part of the weekly Friday prayer. The sermon is followed by a short prayer led by the prayer leader. There are also some optional prayers performed individually by the Muslims after the Friday prayer. Sermons usually last fifteen to twenty minutes and they are very formal.

In many mosques, there are also the *ders* (religious lectures on a variety of different topics). Although they are not part of the requirements of the congregational Friday prayer, many pious Muslims go to the mosques early (about 40-45 minutes before the obligatory sermon starts) for the purpose of listening to the lectures. Compared to the sermons, the lectures are less formal. In the past before the centrally distributed sermon system, individual prayer leaders used to prepare their own lectures and used to lecture the congregation on a variety of different issues. The issues included a wide range of topics which could be about creed, theology, stories and tradition of early Muslims including Prophet Muhammed, morals, Islamic education, and questions about obligatory worships. Additionally, the prayer leaders used to answer written questions submitted by the

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109 All sorts of mosque renovations are often undertaken by charity organizations and private foundations. In small towns or villages, people in the neighborhoods often volunteer if a new mosque is being built or a renovation is being made.
congregation a week ago. With the introduction of central sermons, this type of lecturing system was also abolished. Instead of prayer leaders individually lecturing before the sermons, the new system introduced a centrally broadcasted lectures prepared and delivered by a scholar of the DiB in that province or subprovince. Usually the lecture delivered in the largest mosque of a city or town is broadcasted to all other mosques in that area. The only minor exception would be the limited number of travelling preachers of the DiB who occasionally preach in different locations of the same province. With the new system, all sermons are directly delivered to the prayer leaders of every neighborhood mosque; and throughout the county the lectures before the sermons are broadcasted via a central broadcasting system. The sermons are mailed to prayer leaders prior to the congregational Friday prayers, and the prayer leaders have to recite those nationally standard sermons that are written by the DiB scholars.

During my interviews, the interviewees are asked some open ended questions and the issue of central sermons came under discussion in regards to the broader topic of state control over religion. More than half of the interviewees argued that the sermons in Turkey avoided meddling with politically sensitive issues and were highly "sanitized." Five of the interviewees claimed that it would be "foolish to expect any political content in sermons prepared by scholars of the DiB who are government employees." Seven of the interviewees argued that some of the sermons recited by the prayer leaders had nothing to do with religion, since they were about topics like the Republic Day or abstaining from using foreign currencies. Three of my interviewees were highly critical of the sermons; they believed that through the sermons the government was trying to de politicize and politically pacify Muslims. One of those interviewees, Tekin, a young university student in
Ankara, believed that the secularist elites had never liked Muslims to get involved into politics, and they had done everything to prevent Muslims to get politically active. Tekin believed that the secularists could not even tolerate the smallest religious demands coming from the Muslims. Forty-three (86%) respondents believed that the secularist government was using legal means to prevent the Islamists from coming to power. Indeed, the Islamists repetitively offered reform proposals to make the DIB an autonomous institution funded by private Islamic foundations rather than the state. Thirty-two respondents (64%) stated that Muslims had the ability to govern their own religious affairs without any governmental intervention.

Perception of External Threats

Another cause of the Islamists' politicization is their perception of the external threats to their Islamic social identity (Muslimness). Social identity refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities. Social identity represents our understanding of who we and other people are, and therefore, also their understanding of themselves and others (including us). This collective understanding is closely related to group boundaries that are created through the process of inclusion and exclusion (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995).

Jenkins (1996) maintains that one of the results of defining the other is the imposition of negative and putative characteristics on a collective other, whose politics, culture and lifestyle must be resisted and repelled. In a similar fashion Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that the formation and maintenance of social identity involves the processes of categorization and self-enhancement. Categorization (like national identity, religious

\[110\] Indeed, many interviewees used the Turkish idiom “suya sabuna dokunmamak” which can be translated as “avoiding meddling with controversial issues”.
affiliation) identifies intergroup boundaries by producing group stereotypical and normative perceptions and actions, and assigns people including self, to the contextually relevant category. Self-enhancement guides the social categorization process such that ingroup norms and stereotypes are largely ingroup-favoring. In this regard, perceived external threats to social identity can be specified as unwanted influences of outgroup norms, perception of foreign threats, and perception of relative weakness in socioeconomic status in comparison with relevant outgroups resulting from unfavorable intergroup comparisons.

**How does the Islamists’ Perception of External Threats Relate to Political Activism**

Perception of external threats is not absolute, they can change based on the way that the movement leaders frame issues and shape the movement’s collective identity. A good example would be the AKP’s stance on the EU. The AKP adamantly took the initiative and sped up Turkey’s EU membership negotiations which were absolutely opposed by the old guard in the VP. Indeed, Erbakan, the leader of the RP often criticized the EU by referring to it as the “Christian club.” However, unlike the RP, Erdoğan branded the AKP a centrist-conservative party like the European Christian Democrats committed to secular principles.

Seventeen of my interviewees were of rural backgrounds. I did not visit rural areas to conduct my interviews, and only two of my interviews were actually of rural origins and they were living in rural areas. I had the chance to interview them because they were visiting their friends and family in the city during the summer. Other fifteen interviewees were born in rural areas, still had relatives and parents in rural areas, and they had moved to the city for pursuing their education and job training, or to work. Among my interviewees, the ones from rural backgrounds (seventeen people) and the ones with lower education (sixteen of my interviewees were high school graduates, six either had
elementary or secondary school education or were high school dropouts) were more skeptical about Turkey's prospective EU membership than the more educated upper-middle class interviewees (twenty-eight of my interviewees had college or two-year occupational school degrees after high school).

One of the ways that the Islamists frame external threats is their linking of secularism with a secularist/elitist project of *social engineering*.\(^{111}\) Social engineering refers to the efforts of the government or private groups to influence popular attitudes and social behavior on a mass scale. Various societal groups always perceive those projects with suspicion, disapproval and opposition including the Islamists. Often times, social engineering goes hand in hand with political engineering which is the counterpart of social engineering in the realm of politics. Moreover, in both countries the state control over religion goes hand in hand with the highly *paternalistic-patriarchal*\(^{112}\) political structure supported by the secular official ideologies. Nasserism and Kemalism tried to marginalize and as well as to control Islamic institutions. However, this did not lead to the disappearance of Islam from the public realm. Such attempts rather paved the way to its politicization (Kadroğlu 1998; Tamir 2000). Islamists reject Jacobinism, and social engineering, and often perceive the two as antidemocratic and authoritarian.

Islamists argue that the state elites' interest in social engineering projects is not primarily confined to a few policy areas; indeed it is a comprehensive social, political and economic project as they perceive Islamism as a rival (or the main rival) ideology. In the Islamist literature, the Turkish republican elites' adoption of *Jacobin French laicism*(not

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Anglo-Saxon secularism) as an official ideology is often cited and critically elaborated upon. Islamists often times argue that this was not a coincidental choice but a deliberate one as French laicism fit perfectly into the bureaucratically centralized elitism of the secularists (Mardin 1991, 1992; Yavuz 2000, 2003; Karaman and Aras 2000; Frey 1965; Özbudun 1996).

Islamists have always perceived those kinds of social engineering projects with suspicion. As stated earlier, 84% of the interviewees believed that secularism as applied in Turkey was not the same as democratic Western secularism. 92% of the interviewees believed that since its inception secularism in Turkey had been used as a “tool to oppress religion” and 82% of the interviewees argued that governmental control over religion existed in Turkey. For instance 62% of the interviewees mentioned governmental control and restrictions over religious education (governmental limitations on the İmam-Hatip schools and their graduates, and on the Qur’anic seminaries\textsuperscript{113}) as a means to control religion, and 68% of the interviewees believed that imposing the headscarf ban was one of the most leading means for the governmental control over religion.

A second aspect of external threats for the Islamists is the extent of state control over religion. Islamists maintain that the secularist elites of Turkey have always perceived Islamist activism as an ideological rival against the official Kemalist ideology maintained by the secularist elites. This is about both side’s uncompromising position and lack of consensus between the secularist elites and Islamist movements since both sides often perceive politics as a zero-sum game. This game entails the waging of a Gramscian

\textsuperscript{112} Although originally the word devlet (state) in Arabic is a feminine word, the widely used concept of devlet baba (father state) is often used in Turkish when people refer to the state which demonstrates the paternalistic-patriarchal character of the state.

\textsuperscript{113} More discussion of the government control over the Qur’anic Seminaries will be provided in a separate section.
counter-hegemonic war of position which has to be won for final victory. For instance, the recently resurfaced headscarf debate has become a seriously charged and symbolic struggle between the two sides.

The interviewees responses provided in this section can be related to the organic nature of Islam (please refer to the earlier discussion of Islam as an organic religion on page 7). In an organic religion “...religion is largely equated with society” (Toprak 1981, 23). Husain (2003) points out that in an organic religion the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, indeed the two realms actually merge. In Islam, this merger is both prescribed by the Shari’a. In this regard, anything that would threaten the Muslim way of life or Muslims’ daily practices or religious or social obligations is perceived as a direct threat against Muslim identity, including the state’s attempts to control religion. This “perception of threat” then urges Muslims to protect their Muslimness, or their Muslim identity.

The Content Analysis

Discussion of the frames represented in the Islamist press or the literature will be evaluated via content analysis. The content analysis includes counting the frequencies of the themes taken from Yılmaz (2002) in the Islamist monthly Sızınti 114 (Disclosures), one of the oldest Islamist monthlies, which started to get published in February 1979. Currently, Sızınti is the most widely read Islamist monthly. 115 In many ways, Sızınti is the ideal choice for the content analysis. First, as stated earlier, it is the most widely read Islamist monthly. Second, it heavily emphasizes issues like Muslim identity (Müslüman kimliği) or Muslimness (Müslümanlık), Islamic consciousness (İslami düşünce), and Islamic

114 The monthly can be accessed at http://www.sizinti.com.tr/ (in Turkish)
zeal/passion\textsuperscript{116} (\textit{İslami gayret}). Third, it has a wide range of reader base. The monthly has various sections that address issues like science and religion, society, literature, medicine, education, history, and technology. Needless to say, all of the articles are written from an Islamic perspective. The editorial piece (\textit{başyazı}) and the section called “The Emerald Heights of the Heart” (\textit{Kalbin Zümürüt Tepeleri}) are written with a very heavy and symbolic language. The editorial piece usually addresses a wide range of issues focusing on Muslimness, Islamic passion and Islamic consciousness. The Emerald Heights section discusses Sufism and mystical aspects of Islam. The other sections focus on a quite varied range of issues as indicated above.

\textit{Sızmit} is published by the most prominent Nurcu\textsuperscript{117} group in Turkey known as the Fethullah Gülen movement.\textsuperscript{118} To promote their views, Gülen's followers have set up a wide range of organizations and published several journals including \textit{Sızmit}, \textit{Yeni Ümit}\textsuperscript{119} (New Hope) and the \textit{Fountain}\textsuperscript{120} (in English). Gülen's followers also have been organizing national and international symposiums, panel discussions, and conferences. A

\textsuperscript{115} The circulation numbers for the monthly are not disclosed by the publishers; however the numbers are estimated between 600 thousand to 1 million.

\textsuperscript{116} The Gülen and his followers summarize the concept of Islamic zeal or passion under the umbrella term of “hizmet” which literally means service (serving Islam).

\textsuperscript{117} Nurcus have been discussed under sections B and C earlier.

\textsuperscript{118} Muhammet Fethullah Gülen (1938– ) is a Turkish Islamic scholar and writer who is the leader of the most prominent Nurcu group in Turkey. The movement is also known as \textit{Fethullahcılardar} (followers of Fethullah). In addition to the journals listed in the main text, the Gülen movement also has a daily, \textit{Zaman}, in addition to several television stations like the STV (Samanyolu Televizyonu), Mehtap TV, Ebru TV, and Cihan News Agency. The movement also has several radio stations in major cities of Turkey. The Gülen community owns and runs about 100 schools in Turkey. The schools are funded by the Gülen community Gülen also encouraged his followers to establish schools in the Turkish-speaking Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, where his movement recently has gained many loyal followers after the collapse of the Soviets in 1991. In 1996, Gülen's followers financed a non-interest bearing bank, Asya Finans, backed by 16 partners and $125 million in capital. Gülen also encouraged Turkish businessmen to establish businesses in the newly established Central Asian countries. Followers of Gülen have also founded more than 200 schools around the world from Tanzania to China, but mostly in the Turkic republics of Central Asia. For more information about Gülen’s life and movement, see: Aras and Çaha (2000) “Fethullah Gülen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement” \textit{MERIA}, Vol.4, 1.4, pp. 30–42, also visit Gülen's website (in English) at: \texttt{http://www.fegulen.org/}.

\textsuperscript{119} The journal can be accessed at \texttt{http://www.yeniumit.com.tr/}

\textsuperscript{120} The journal can be accessed at \texttt{http://www.fountainmagazine.com/}

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foundation established by Gülen’s followers, the Journalists’ and Writers’ Foundation, brings secularist and Islamist intellectuals together in what are called Abant Meetings. The foundation has organized conferences and has invited prominent intellectuals to talk on various issues such as democracy, the Kurdish problem, and dialogue among civilizations (Aras and Çaha 2000). Gülen’s followers opened several hundreds of schools predominantly in former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Balkans, Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

While counting the frequencies of theme categories as elaborated by Yılmaz (2002), this study included the journal articles on every January issue of Sızmiti from 1979 to 2008.121 In a total of 28 issues from 1979 to 2008 (see footnote 89 for exceptions), there were a total of 373 articles. Among those 373 articles, 158 of them included the discussion of the theme categories; thus they constituted the total sample population of this study since the remaining articles were about particular issues like biology, literature, history, and arts. Within those 158 articles, some heavily elaborated identity issues while others made indirect references to the Muslim identity.

One particular challenge about reading the Sızmiti articles was the language of the articles. The general tone of the journal tended towards using a heavy symbolic language through making indirect references to various Islamic issues including the Muslim identity. Besides the heavy symbolic language that has parallels with the symbolic language of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi’s Treatises of Light (Risale-i Nur), the Sızmiti authors often used

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121 Several exceptions have been made since there were short periods of discontinuity in the publication of the journal. For instance, one exception was made for the year 1979 since the journal started to get published in February of that year, thus the February issue is included into the sample population for 1979. The journal was not published in 1987 and 1988, thus no issues were used for those two years. Later it started to be published in August of 1989, thus for 1989 the August issue is used. For 1990, the January issue exists. Later in October of 1991 the journal started to be published again. Thus for 1991 the October issue is used. Since then, there is no discontinuity in the publication of the journal. Except the cases indicated above, for all other years the January issues are included into the sample population).
older words from the Ottoman period which sometimes made it harder to comprehend the articles. Additionally, in some articles Muslim identity and Turkish identity are used equivocally (and often interchangeably). In such cases, a discretionary choice was made based on the topics discussed in the course of the articles. By borrowing Yıldız’s (2002, 76) six-fold categorization, the frequency of theme categories are recorded upon reading each article from the sample population. Later those frequencies are calculated by using a simple ratio (i.e., the total number of the occurrences of one particular theme category’s frequency divided by total number of all theme categories’ frequencies). The percentages are rounded to integer numbers.

The first theme category is the perceived immorality (ahlalsizlık) or moral erosion (ahlaki bozulma). Perceived immorality is the most frequently repeated theme in the Islamist writings including criticism of non-Islamic lifestyle or actions considered immoral from an Islamic viewpoint. Examples include consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling, prostitution, pornography, and extramarital sexual intercourse. The theme also includes some crimes such as theft, murder, and drug use (Yıldız 2002, 76-77). In the content analysis, immorality/moral erosion122 was found to be the most frequently repeated theme in a total of 158 articles in Sızmı by constituting 26 percent of the total theme occurrences. The authors often linked moral erosion to religious laxity (gevşeklik, rehavet) and weakness of faith (iman zayıflığı, imanda zaaft). The most frequently suggested solutions by the authors against moral erosion were learning about Islam and prophet Muhammed’s life, practicing the religion (dinin yaşanması) and associating with death (rabita-i mevt).

122 Words with similar meanings in Turkish such are counted. For instance the words ifsat, çürümе, çökünüň, bozgün, yozlaşma, dejenerasyon... all refer to social corruption and moral erosion. Also, an article often included several related topics, the frequency of multiple themes are separately recorded.
and thinking about the hereafter (ahiret) (i.e., the rewards and punishments for people who do good deeds and bad deeds respectively).

The second theme category is Western cultural influences and perceived cultural degeneration due to Muslims' imitation of Western culture and values. According to the Islamists, Islam (being an organic religion) is a complete way of life, thus Muslims do not need to imitate the Western culture and values. Imitation of the West is also expressed as the primary source of perceived moral erosion and corruption of Muslim identity. Islamists maintain that the secular regime and intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and educational institutions. For the Islamists, another source of perceived moral erosion is the secularist media (Yılmaz 2002, 77-78). Islam, according to the Islamists, is perceived as the main source of social identity, values and norms, and imposition of the strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the Muslim identity. In Sizwut, Western cultural influences were found to be the second most frequently repeated theme by constituting the 21 percent of all theme occurrences in the sample population. The Sizwut authors often linked Western cultural influences and cultural degeneration of Muslims to blindly imitating the West (taklit or bati mukallitligi/hayranligi) due to Muslim's lack of religious knowledge and purpose (gaye/amaç), and Muslims' ignorance (cehalet). Another reason for Western cultural influences is the inability of Muslims to build a strong sense of Muslimness (Müslümanlık) and Muslim pride and consciousness (suur/bilinç) to resist against the Western cultural influences. Raising Muslims' consciousness through religious-historical learning, social control among Muslims (sosyal kontrol), and setting appropriate Islamic role models and targets for Muslims are considered among the remedies for the Western cultural influences.
The third theme category is domestic suppression of Islam. Islamists argue that secularists use the Kemalist ideology to secularize Muslims further. Therefore they believe that activities of mosques, Islamic political parties and Islamic civil society associations are severely restricted due to harsh secularization measures often imposed undemocratically by the secularist elites (Karaman and Aras 2000; Yılmaz 2002, 79; Kadioğlu 1998). In Sızunts, the theme category of domestic suppression of Islam constituted 12 percent of the total number of theme occurrences. Finding out references for the domestic suppression of Islam was trickier since the Sızunts authors often refrained from making direct references to the theme in their articles. Words like pressure (bası), obstruction (engellemey/mani alma), and prohibition (yasak) were used to refer to suppression of Islam by the secularist regime and elites. However, due to the reconciliatory approach of the Gülen movement, almost no hostile remarks were used about the government authorities, and almost no direct references were made alleging an official conspiracy against the Muslims with the intention of suppressing Muslims and Islam in Turkey.

The fourth theme category is the economic challenges. Islamists argue that the secularist elites ignored the economic development of their country with the assumption that as a country becomes wealthier; there will be more pressures for democratization, human rights and the rule of law. Thus, according to the Islamist claim, the secular elites intended to keep people under control by keeping the country at a sustenance level, thus keeping peoples’ minds continuously occupied with bread and butter issues; not necessarily with politics, democracy and human rights. Moreover, according to this understanding, the secularist elites do not want to jeopardize their privileged positions by
allowing an economically powerful Islamist class. Majority of the time, those kinds of Islamist assumptions are also linked with Islam’s emphasis on socioeconomic equity and justice (Yilmaz, 2002: 79; Husain 2003; Rubin 2005). In Sizinti, the theme of economic challenges scored the lowest percentage by constituting just 7 percent of all theme occurrences. Muslims’ ignorance (cahillik), lack of direction and method (yol/yöntemi), and misunderstanding/misinterpreting the principles (sinnetullah) that God had set for achieving success (i.e., the one who works harder will be richer) on this earth are listed as the reasons of the economic challenges that Muslims face. The remedy, for the Sizinti authors, would be correctly reading God’s principles for achieving success, and working harder under a plan and program through social solidarity of Muslims.

The fifth theme category is Western imperialism. The Islamist arguments view the West as the major imperialist power whose aim is to exploit and control the Muslim world. The vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries, economic dependency on the West, and the cooperation of the ruling elites with the West (Yilmaz 2002, 80). In Sizinti, the frequency of the Western imperialism theme was 15 percent. Often, the authors linked Muslim countries’ backwardness (in collective terms, not necessarily in individual terms) to Western imperialism (military and economic) and to corrupt secularist leaders who only think about their self interests. The authors generally assume that Muslim countries are systematically kept backward and weak so that the Western powers could exploit the resources of Muslim countries. However, in their discussion of Western imperialism, the Sizinti writers often times refrained from making direct references to particular Western countries by name,

123 In the Turkish political lexicon, the extent of the economic activities of the businesses owned by the Islamists is labeled as yesil sermaye -green capital- (since green is popularly considered as the color of
although several references were made to the major colonial Western powers by name like the British, and the French. Interestingly, no direct references were made by the authors about the US regarding Western imperialism in the Muslim world. One remedy of Western imperialism was bringing Muslim leaders who truly absorbed Islamic values to power so that they could implement Islamic solutions to break the dominance of the Western powers throughout Muslim countries. Other remedies were ending selfishness (bencillik) among Muslims, promoting benevolence (yardmseverlik/hayirseverlik) to strengthen Muslim societies, and inculcating Muslims to create a collective Muslim consciousness (suur).

The last theme category is the Muslim’s lack of self esteem. Islamists frequently claim superiority of Islam as a social, political and economic system against Capitalism and Communist/Socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in origin. Islamists frequently portray capitalism as an excessively materialistic, competitive, exploitative and therefore inherently immoral system. Socialism is viewed as another type of exploitative unjust political system where peoples’ rights are severely limited. Based on such criticisms, Islamism is offered as a genuine alternative which, according to the Islamists, eliminates any form of exploitation. Accordingly, Islam is believed to balance individualism and community life without giving superiority to either (Yilmaz 2002, 81; Husain 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori 2002; Rubin 2003). In Siznli, the theme category of Muslims’ lack of self esteem constituted 19 percent of all theme occurrences. The authors argued that since Muslims do not read the Islamic history properly and adequately, and do not learn from their mistakes, they often lack self esteem (özagüven). Many Siznli authors argued that the Islamic history (besides the Ottoman-Turkish history) was full of cases that should inspire today’s Muslims. For the authors, the sense of pessimism

(karamsarlık/yegis) and helplessness (fâresizlik) also lead to lack of self esteem. To eliminate such feelings, the authors argued, Muslims should help each other (yardımlaşma, teavün), and act under solidarity (dayanışma/tesanüd) which are often recommended by the religion. The following section is going to discuss the frequency of the theme categories and compare the content analysis with the interviews.

The Content Analysis and the Interview Data

The first theme (immorality and moral corruption) was the most frequently repeated theme in the Islamist monthly Sızıntı (26%). The interview data also support this finding. Among the interviewees, 62% believed that non-Islamic publications or media are the cause of immorality in Turkey. 82% believed that families were not providing enough moral education in Islamic terms for their children, and they perceived this as a major cause of immorality. Respondents made comments/criticisms about the secular media by arguing that their publications/broadcasting encouraged masses to do immoral acts like drinking, gambling, or having pre-marital sex. Zekiye, a female interviewee stated: “one never sees the secular media encouraging what is morally good... characters in movies abundantly drink alcohol and extra-marital affairs are perceived normal...”

The second most frequently repeated theme was the Western influences and the resulting cultural degeneration (21%). 60% of my interviewees believed that blindly imitating the Western style of life was the cause of immorality in Turkey. The interviewees were highly critical of the foreign movies as well as domestic movies imitating the foreign ones. Young respondents who had access to the internet complained about pornography and “indecent content” (muzr or edepsiz yayınlar) over the internet. As stated above in the section above, the respondents mostly agreed that Muslims should be aware of their
Muslimness, stop blindly imitating the West, and promote their own values in regards to the corrupting influence of the Western culture and media.

The third most frequently repeated theme was Western imperialism in Stzinti (15%). This is different from the Western cultural influences and the Muslims’ imitation of the West. In Stzinti, the vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries, Muslims’ economic dependency on the West, and the secularist Muslim elites’ cooperation with the West. My interviewees were differentiating between the cultural aspect and the military/economic aspects of Western imperialism. What I understood from their statements was that they perceived Western cultural influences and moral erosion from an identity-culture perspective. However, the interviewees linked the word imperialism with concepts like colonialism, foreign rule, military intervention and economic dependency. Of all of my interviewees, 72% of them believed that the Western countries had been imperialist and had had an agenda to dominate Turkey (and other Muslim countries).

The fourth most frequently repeated theme was domestic suppression of Islam (12%). About this theme, my content analysis of Stzinti and my interview data do not match. Before doing the content analysis I was expecting to see a higher frequency rate for this particular theme in Stzinti since at higher percentages, my interviewees strongly argued that domestic suppression of Islam in Turkey was actually happening. However, my expectation did not turn out to be that way. This perhaps could be explained by the Gülen group’s conciliatory approach when compared to other Islamist groups. Indeed, 84% of the interviewees believed that secularism as applied in Turkey was not the same as secularism as applied in advanced democratic Western countries, and 92% of them argued that secularism in Turkey was used as a “tool to oppress religion” and finally, 82% believed
that there was governmental control over religion in Turkey (For more discussion of this topic and for some interviewee narratives refer to earlier section: *Politics as Jihad: Highly Against Kemalism and Secularism*).

The last two themes were economic challenges (7 %) and Muslim's lack of self esteem (19 %) in the content analysis. My interview questions did not directly handle those topics. However, in some of my interviewees' responses to the open ended questions, those issues were addressed by them. The following paragraphs of this section will relate the themes with an activist and protectionist conception of *da'wa* (*hizmet*, call to God).

The ideational aspect of Islamist political activism often develops in the form of frames in relation to the perceived external threats to social identity. Islamist mobilization often times goes hand in hand with creation of Islamist frames by those groups. Islamist frames link those perceived threats to political activism through the need for preserving Islamic social identity through a protectionist viewpoint. Moreover, the Islamists often link Islamist identity with political mobilization through an activist conception of *da'wa*. In the context of *Sizmîn*, the Islamic concept of *da'wa* (*dava* in Turkish) is used interchangeably with the concept of *hizmet* (literally *hizmet* means service, serving Islam). Man of service, for the authors of *Sizmîn*, meant someone struggling for the cause of God to disseminate religion (*Hizmet adamı/Dava adamı*). Indeed, the Islamic conception of *hizmet* is offered as a panacea for the ills of Muslim societies. In the conception of *Sizmîn* authors through dissemination of God's message (*dava/hizmet*), those societal ills would eventually disappear. This way of conceptualization can be linked to Islam's organic and holistic nature discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and the earlier sections of this chapter.

Additionally, various types of frames are also utilized by the Islamists to create Islamist

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124 *Da'wa* literally means call, call to God and dissemination of religion.
discourses. Thus, Islamist frames and discourses contain high levels of explicit and implicit political criticism of secularism and the West. Mainly because of such criticisms the Islamist frames are often targeted by the secular-official frames of the government elites. In addition, the members of the official religious establishment target Islamist frames through the official Islamic frames created by the DİB and by the official Islamic scholars who work under the institution (Dursun, 2001). (The last part of the following section contains a brief analysis of official frames voiced through the sermons, please refer to the discussion there).

The Closing Down of the Islamist Party

Besides official control over religion, the secularist establishment in Turkey actively used legal means to contain Islamism. Examples of such legal means include (but not limited to) banning headscarves, imprisoning suspected Islamists, closing down religious parties, confiscating the assets of religious organizations and the like. On June 28, 1996, for the first time in its history, Turkey had a prime minister whose political philosophy was based on Islam. However, the February 28 process abruptly forced the DYP-RP coalition to resign. In January 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court, under Chief Justice A. Necdet Sezer, closed down the RP and banned Erbakan from politics for five years on the alleged activities of the RP to undermine the secularist regime in Turkey and to establish Shari’a. In the defense of the RP, Ismail Alptekin (Erbakan’s lawyer), and

125 See Appendix III for F. Gülen’s conception of “man of service” and “people of service.”
126 Refer to the earlier discussion in Chapter 1’s sub-section A.B-Content and Discourse Analysis for the relationship between frames and discourses.
127 A. N. Sezer later became president of Turkey in 2000. Presidents are elected by the TBMM, the parliament, (TGNA, Turkish Grand National Assembly) and serve for seven years. The 1982 Constitution gives the president extended powers. See footnote number 25.
128 The charges (Kocacığl 2004, 448-452) for the closing down of the RP were several: Article 68 of the Constitution states that “no party could be established against the secularist principles of the Republic”. In addition, Article 69 requires those parties that use “religious symbols, emotions, and
his associates argued that there were no clear statements prohibiting headscarves in statutes that regulated the dress codes in state institutions, religious education was a necessity, and practicing religion was protected under the Constitution and it is an integral part of universal human rights and freedoms. Regarding the speeches of Erbakan and party officials, the defense lawyers argued that those speeches enjoyed a principled parliamentary immunity and they should be understood in context, not as particular statements of religious fundamentalism. Additionally, the defense lawyers reframed secularism and argued that secularism does not (and should not) mean hostility toward any religion including Islam. The defense also argued that the indictment was based on flimsy evidence such as newspaper articles from secularist columnists (Kocacioglu 2004, 450).

The Constitutional Court of Turkey adopted the principle of secularism as described in the preamble of the 1982 Constitution in its decision to dissolve the party in January 1998 and ban Erbakan and some other party officials from politics for five years. The Court defined secularism as "a way of life that has destroyed the medieval scholastic dogmatism and has become the basis of the vision of democracy that develops with the enlightenment of science, nation, independence, national sovereignty, and the ideal of arguments" to be banned. In his case against the RP, the Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş alleged that the RP supported the struggle of female students and civil servants to wear the headscarf, and this was against the decisions of the MGK and conflicted with both the Constitution and the Law of Unity of Education. Second, V. Savaş accused Erbakan, RP's leader and the former prime minister, of hosting a dinner party for some tarikat (religious order) leaders sympathetic to the government at the official residence of the prime minister. By the prosecution, this was found to be against the strict separation between the religion and the state. Third, RP was accused because of its position regarding the Imam-Hatip schools. Prior to the case against RP and Erbakan, these state-run schools were deemed a breeding ground for Islamists by the secularist circles that were committed to close down those schools. Finally, earlier public speeches of Erbakan and the RP officials were used as evidence against them with the allegations that the party was committed to bring Shari'a to Turkey. Additionally, the prosecution assumed that RP was the representative of a bigger monolithic Islamist threat at the political scene. Interestingly, "part of the evidence against RP was based on a compilation of newspaper articles in which Islam in general and Refah [RP] in particular were described as working against women's rights and against progress and development." Another part of the indictment prepared by Chief Public Prosecutor Savaş included statements to the effect that Islam is not compatible with democracy; Atatürk was
humanity” (Case No: 1997/1 Political Party Dissolution, Official Gazette, p.255). This definition of secularism appears to be different than the notion of secularism applied in democratic states. Moreover this definition also seems to include an underlying implication that religiously oriented political movements could not be democratic because the Court described secularism as “the basis of the vision of democracy…” By describing secularism as “a way of life” and by implicitly associating Islam with “medieval scholastic dogmatism,” the Court seems to legitimize an antidemocratic practices aiming to shape the society from top down while disregarding democratic principles. This definition also strictly denies any democratic demands of religious expression in the public sphere because the Court perpetually argued that religion could only be tolerated in the private conscience of an individual, and any reflection of religiosity in the public realm was defined as an act against the secular principles of Kemalism.

Erbakan was expecting the closing down of the WP, thus Erbakan had his lawyer, Ismail Alptekin, found a new party, the Virtue Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi) on December 17, 1997 about a month before the announcement of the Constitutional Court’s decision. After the closure, 144 RP deputies in the parliament switched to the FP. At the first convention of the party on 14 May 1998, Ismail Alptekin, the caretaker of the party, resigned from his post and was replaced by Recai Kutan, a veteran and close associate of Erbakan in the party. The young reformist wing of the party became increasingly upset since Erbakan did not allow any one of the young members of the party to serve in the executive committee of the new FP. Under Abdullah Gül’s leadership, the young reformist generation

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extensively cited relying on his speeches where he perceived Islamic identity as a threat to Turkish national/nationalist identity (Kocacıoğlu 2004, 449).

129 Indeed, Erbakan was controlling the affairs of the FP behind the curtain through R. Kutan and Oğuzhan Asıltürk. Kutan was recognized as a non-charismatic but moderate person who was able to get along well
of the FP challenged Kutan in the party convention on May 14, 2000. Abdullah Gül lost the leadership to Kutan with a narrow margin; however this clearly demonstrated the power of the reformist wing in the party.

In the parliamentary elections of 18 April 1999, the DSP got 22.2% of the votes, the MHP got 17.9%, the newly established Islamist FP got 15.4%, the ANAP got 13.2% and the DYP got 12%. The electoral results were clearly related to the institutionalization of the politics of fear. The military, with the help of secularist media, successfully used scare tactics and this fear resulted in "the erosion of two major center-right parties [the DYP and ANAP], the weakening of the Islamist FP, and the increased support for the two nationalist parties [the MHP and DSP]" (Yavuz 2003, 251). The FP lost votes because of its tension with the military and people retrospectively associated the FP with its precursor (RP) and with its closing down by the Constitutional Court. Thus, many people regarded the FP as a party of risk and refrained from voting for it. The conciliatory tone of the FP and the transformation of the FP's ideas about Turkey's membership to the European Union did not prevent a secularist Kemalist attack on its policies or members. After the closure of the FP, the Islamist movement in Turkey divided into two parties. The

with the party cadres, Kutan also adopted a conciliatory tone toward the military that previously ousted the RP from the government (Güllalp 1999, 41; Narli 1999, 43).

130 The MHP and DSP are both nationalist parties at the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum in Turkey. The MHP is on the right; the DSP is on the left.

131 The older generation in the RP and FP often denounced the EU by claiming that the EU is a "Christian club" that essentially has hostile objectives regarding Turkey that would clash with the national interests of Turkey.

132 For instance, when Merve Kavakçı, who was elected to parliament as an FP deputy of Istanbul, attempted to participate in the swearing-in ceremony wearing her headscarf, she was not allowed to do it. Hundreds of secularist deputies demanded her to leave the oath ceremony immediately. The Chief Public Prosecutor opened a similar case against the FP at the Constitutional Court on May 7, 1999, and accused the FP of becoming an extension of the previously banned RP, as well as blaming Kavakçı for committing a provocative criminal act against secularism (Shively 2005, 49-52). The Constitutional Court opened another closure case with the same charges against the newly established FP right after the April 1999 parliamentary elections. The fate of the FP was similar to that of the RP. The FP was closed down by the Court on June 22, 2001 by arguing that the FP was merely the continuation of the RP under a new
traditionalist wing established the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) on July 20, 2001. The young reformist wing established the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP\(^{133}\)) on August 14, 2001. In the elections of November 3, 2002, the FP was marginalized with 2.5 percent of the national votes while the AK Party became the leading party with 34.3 percent of the votes.\(^{134}\)

Types and Strategies of Islamist Political Activism

Islamists in Turkey have been quite resourceful in employing various types of political activism. One significant aspect of their activism is political activism through what Clark (1995; 2004) calls “horizontal ties”. Clark argues that Islamism is not a movement of the disenfranchised poor, but of the marginalized, educated middle class. Through “horizontal networks that connect largely homogenous circles of friends together” separate, independently run Islamic banks, schools, neighborhood associations, charities, study circles, daycare clinics, hospitals, and other organizations are linked to one another; and “within this network of institutions, Islamic PVOs, or Islamic social institutions ... have been particularly successful, providing services to thousands of people each year” (Clark 2004, 942).

White (2002) uses the term “vernacular politics” to describe the type of Islamist political activism carried out through the horizontal ties that Clark mentioned. Vernacular

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\(^{133}\) Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi is also known as AK Parti. *ak* means white in Turkish.

\(^{134}\) Before the AKP’s rise to power in November 2002 parliamentarian elections, Ecevit’s administration, whose left-of-center DSP had been heading a three-party coalition government with the nationalist MHP and the centrist ANAP, was unable to solve the economic problems of Turkey. The economic prospects were bleak: economic growth plummeted by 15 % points compared to the previous year and was at -7.5 % in 2001; the Turkish Lira lost 113 % of its value against the U.S. Dollar; real income for employees fell by 20 %; about 50,000 retail and small businesses had to file for bankruptcy; unemployment rose by 1.5 million people. Between 2000 and 2002 the unemployment rate rose by 4 % points to 10.3 %. (Karakaş 2007, 29-30).
politics or politics through horizontal ties is more than political parties attempting to reach out to the citizens through their representatives in the form of traditional electoral campaigning, meeting, rallies and advertising. For White, vernacular politics is "a value-centered political process rooted in local culture, interpersonal relations, and community networks, yet connected through civic organizations to national party politics" (2002, 27). Her study is based on research in middle-class suburbs of Istanbul and Ankara. White defines the basis of vernacular politics in Turkey as "local networks of people united within a complex set of norms of mutual obligation. These widely shared norms require people to assist one another in open-ended relations of reciprocity, without calculating immediate return" (2002, 20). Political activism takes place through the cells (hücre), upon which the Islamist network is based upon. White argues that cells are based on preexisting networks. "Linked to one another, clusters of cells easily constitute a mass movement" (2002, 21). According to White, one interesting aspect of this type of mobilization is that "people involved in local network politics perceive themselves as practicing community, not just doing politics."

The new generation of Islamist politicians using the vernacular political forms manage to establish a more populist and egalitarian type of relationship between the party and constituency. For White, it is only the Islamists who communicate and personalize their messages in the local idiom of the residents. In contrast, secularists, despite being local to the community, display a cultural elitism that often does not accept a close engagement with the local values (2002, 76). Thus, the success of the Islamist mobilization lies in vernacular politics, which involves recognition of the local cultural norms in political
mobilization. As she insightfully points out, the secularist activists' rejection of local
cultural practices means that such vernacular politics is out of their reach.

Islamists were also successful in garnering support from female voters. Karakaş
(2007, 24) points out that women were mobilized through the RP’s and AKP’s women’s
commissions organized at the provincial levels. Islamist women often gather at “tea
afternoons” on topics such as “the dissolution of the traditional family structure” and “drug
abuse”, and the women’s commissions offered informal cooking and sewing classes open
exclusively to women (with or without headscarf). Unlike other secularist parties, the RP’s
and AKP’s women’s commissions (many of whom were volunteers) were speaking the
language of the masses. Many middle-class traditional female voters often found women’s
commissions of secularist parties as cold and aloof from themselves. Indeed, Karakaş
maintains, the Islamist RP, of all parties, was the very first to discover the sociopolitical
importance of women in electoral politics in a patriarchal society, and in doing so it had
raised the self-esteem of many women. The RP’s women’s commissions attracted around
one million women to the RP over the course of six years (24). After the establishment of
the AKP, many of those commissions were transferred to the AKP and they have been
actively working on similar outreach programs for prospective members.

During the field work, nine interviews were made with female interviewees. Seven
of them stated that they had voted for the Islamist party in the most recent elections. The
remaining two interviewees (Fatma and Selin) described themselves as non-Islamists.135

135 Fatma works as an administrative secretary in health insurance industry. She stated that she had voted
for the MHP (nationalist) party in the January elections and Selin stated that she had voted for the CHP
(secularist) party. Although Fatma described herself as a religious person, she stated that she did not vote
for the Islamists because for her the Islamists had not been promoting the national interests of Turkey.
Fatma was against Turkey’s membership to the EU, and she believed that the Islamists had a compromising
and conciliatory attitude against the EU. Fatma found many demands of the EU (like the Copenhagen
Criteria) unacceptable and detrimental to the sovereignty and national interests of Turkey. Selin is a high
school teacher. She had many concerns about the Islamists; she claimed that the Islamists were corrupt

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Two out of seven female interviewees stated that they were regularly attending those meetings. The other four, like Necmiye, stated that they were trying to attend, indeed most of them attending every other meeting. One female interviewee stated that she attended those meetings “a few times.”

Gülsen was one of the two interviewees who actively attended those women’s meetings. Gülsen was a nurse working for small private clinic in Keçiören, one of the middle-class suburbs of Ankara. Gülsen stated that she was coming from a conservative family in a subprovince of Sivas, a small conservative city in central Anatolia. Gülsen pursued her education in Kayseri, another conservative city in central Anatolia, to become a nurse. She reported that she stayed in a private female dorm operated by an organization affiliated with the MGH because her parents arranged her accommodation before she started her education there. Gülsen reported that in the dorm the older female students, whom they referred abla (elder sister), were observant of Islam and often talked about religious topics. She also pointed out that she had regularly attended conferences organized by the MGH including some female authors and MGH activists like Şule Yüksel Şenler and Emine Şenlikoğlu. After finishing her education in Kayseri, she started working for one of the government-run hospitals in one of the eastern provinces. Several years later she married Murat, a government official working for the Ministry of Agriculture (Tarım Bakanlığı) and moved to Ankara. During the interview, I asked her what got her closer to the Islamist movement. She focused on two important factors; namely being from a conservative background, and having stayed in a private dorm operated by the Islamists.

and heavily involved in nepotism. Selin also argued that sooner or later the Islamists would bring the Shari’a to Turkey, and when it happens, she said: “They [the Islamists] will force all of us [women] to cover our heads with a scarf, allow polygamy... [and] ...ban alcoholic drinks...”
Necmiye was one of the seven interviewees who stated that she would vote for the Islamists in the July elections (I interviewed her right before the elections). Indeed, Necmiye met Gülsen through a common friend and Gülsen convinced her to attend the women’s meetings. Necmiye is an older housewife, and she had been attending women’s meetings of the AKP for the last six years. Other than sharing common conservative values (because she is coming from rural conservative origins), there were several other important factors for Necmiye’s involvement in the AKP’s women’s meetings. First, Necmiye mentioned she really enjoyed socially interacting and bonding with like-minded women. She finds other fellow women sincere and friendly. Second, often times besides formal conferences and meetings of the women’s organizations, there are also informal meetings in neighborhoods among women. Necmiye indicated to me that she was able to attend those informal meetings in her neighborhood about once a week. She indicated that she could not attend many of the formal meetings since it required her to take two busses to attend formal meetings at the party’s headquarters and she was busy with the chores as her husband works and her two kids attend high school. She told me that small groups of women regularly came together weekly at the informal neighborhood meetings often in one of the attendee’s residence. Third, Necmiye interestingly pointed out that women do not directly talk about politics; however political messages are conveyed in the general course of conversations. My other female interviewees who were regularly or occasionally attending the women’s meetings made similar comments about their experiences. The interviewees who regularly or often attended those meetings conveyed the importance of attending such meetings; and often provided a religious rationale for their participation like “the one who remains alone becomes a friend of the Satan” (yanlız kalanın dostu şeytandır) or “there is mercy of God in congregation” (cemaatte Allah’ın rahmeti vardır).
It could be understood from the responses I got from the interviewees who regularly attend meetings that those meetings were a lot different than formal party activities that took place at the party headquarters or some conference halls throughout the year. Their meetings took place in a more informal setting where different females bonded, became friends and extended their networks of friendship through other members. The female party representatives and other participants who were associated with the women's organizations often interpreted the most current political events, and from time to time read short passages about party activities and party news and informed the attendees of the recent developments during the meetings. However, they had food (many of those meetings were like potlucks), and the attendees had time to meet each other and socialize. In addition to their regular meetings, the women's organizations also arrange fundraising events (kermes) and channel charity (zekat or sadaka) through their members: unused clothes, furniture or other items are donated through the women's network; clothes, shoes and school supplies are donated to school kids living in poor gecekondu areas; and attendees of the meetings inform other fellow women of their poor neighbors so that those donations could be channeled to the appropriate places.

**Explaining Islamist Outreach, Opportunities and Constraints**

One of the ways of explaining Islamist outreach is assessing the relationship between Islam and civil society. Indeed, there is a rich array of civil society associations in the Islamic history; and contemporary Islamists often voice their demands through civil society associations in the Muslim world¹³⁶ (Al-Sayyid 1995; Bayat 1998, 2002; Clark

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¹³⁶ However, some scholars who share Gellner's (1994) views believe that Islam is one of the rivals of civil society because Islam cannot be secularized. In this argumentative view, as societies become more secular through industrialization and rationalization, the individuals become gradually more liberal; indeed, according to this argument, in such societies, religion and its role in politics eventually
Identity demands and Islamic solidarity through horizontal networks are the two most significant aspects of Islamist civil society in Turkey (Keyman 2007). As Islamic identity claims have become more and more pluralized and multi-dimensional, they have also begun to operate mainly as group-based demands for religious rights and freedoms. For Keyman (2007, 217), Islamist identity claims are a “politics of identity operating within modernity and demanding recognition.” Through “the tides and ebbs of Turkish politics”, Islamists were able to utilize several resources as well as presenting particular demands (like the headscarf issue). Utilizing resources and voicing political demands take place through a process which Tarrow (1998) labels “contentious politics.” Islamist political activism can best be understood through Tarrow’s conception of contentious politics.

Emergence of Opportunity Spaces

Tarrow argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents. Contentious politics happens when changing opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors (Tarrow 1998, 2-3). Thus, to properly understand Islamist political activism in Turkey, one should carefully examine the Islamists’ voicing their demands when opportunity spaces present themselves.

In addition to that state sanctioned Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Özal’s neoliberal free market policies also had a huge impact on the emergence of Islamist entrepreneurs labeled by many as “Anatolian Tigers” in central Anatolian cities like Kayseri, Denizli,
Gaziantep and Çorum. A significant portion of the tigers are members of the MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association, Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) which was found in 1990. Those companies made up of family businesses and small to medium-sized companies were “able to establish themselves on the world market as producers of, and suppliers for, export goods in the textile, leather, produce, construction and engineering industries” (Karakaş 2007, 21). In 2006, 2,600 companies were members of the MÜSİAD, that accounted for about 12 percent of Turkey’s GNP (Karakaş 2007, 20).

Özal’s neoliberal policies opened up opportunity spaces for the Islamist entrepreneurs who later organized themselves under the Islamist civil society associations like the MÜSİAD. Indeed, MÜSİAD was not the only Islamist civil society association that was established. Many similar groups mushroomed in the same period (early 1990s). However, it was not just the Islamist entrepreneurs who successfully utilized these new opportunity spaces. In the same period, in addition to Islamist civil society associations there was also an increase in the number of Islamic publications, journals, radio stations and television channels, banks, private schools, charity organizations, and privately run Islamist student dorms.

Another factor that significantly contributed to the Islamist movement is population shifts in Turkey. Turkey has experienced rapid urbanization since the late 1960s which gradually accelerated after the 1980s. Earlier, children of upper and upper-middle class citizens used to attend universities. Those families traditionally have been more secular than the rest of the Turkish population. However, with rapid urbanization more middle class young adults had a chance to attend universities since the early 1980s. Thus, it was...
not a coincidence to see more conservative males and females across the university campuses countrywide. Moreover, the voicing of the headscarf right for females since the late 1980s is directly related with the increasing number of females who chose to adopt the Islamic dress for themselves in the university campuses.

Another populational change in Turkey was the emergence of slum-like suburbs around big cities as a result of rapid urbanization in Turkey (gecekondu mahalleleri). Islamists have made significant openings in those neighborhoods through horizontal networks and civil society activism. Often, rural people, with hopes of finding better jobs for themselves and better educational opportunities for their children create such places around big cities. Approximately 13 million people (approximately one quarter of the total population) lived in these neighborhoods in the mid-1990s, 80 percent of whom

Political Islamism.

138 Yusuf, one of my interviewees, is a news coordinator working for an Islamist monthly. He pointed out: “I was one of the two students who were praying regularly in a class of about hundred students at the faculty of communications.” Yusuf told me that there was not a place for them to pray, so they used to go downstairs to pray in a small room where the custodians used to drink tea. He happily remarked: “Thank God! [Elhamdulillah] Now the mosques around the campus in Ankara are full of college students”. 139 Gecekondu literally means, “built during the night” (gece: night, kondu: built, placed). Many of these homes are extremely modest, and built in a short amount of time on illegally occupied state land without any construction permits.

140 As these families established themselves and found better job opportunities, they usually moved out of these neighborhoods for more affluent areas. However, they often carried their conservative outlook into those new neighborhoods. Mahmut is one such individual. In the late 1960s, he came to Ankara from his village when he was a teenager and started to live with his older brother who was married and living in Önder, a slum area of Ankara at that time. Mahmut worked in several low-skill jobs. He had a high school diploma. Later with the advice of his older brother he took dactylography classes during the nights after his shift with the hope of finding a better job, and he did. Several months after finishing his classes with his newly acquired skill, he found a new job as an office clerk at the accounting office of the Gazi University. He said: “in the exam, I was extremely excited, but tried to remain calm. The university official who administered the exam expected us to write at least hundred words in a minute with no errors, I wrote more than hundred, and they hired me.” This was a turning point in his life. Over the years he gradually excelled in the administrative echelon in the accounting office. After saving enough money, he married, moved to another apartment, and established a family of his own. When he was able to save enough money and with some help from his relatives, Mahmut bought an apartment unit in Keçiören, a recently developed middle-class suburb of Ankara.

141 Yavuz (2003, 84) points out that people living in the gecekondu are not exactly equivalent to the people of the slums one confronts in places in Latin America or South Asia. He maintains: “While squatter towns originally did not have electricity or sewage services, this underclass participated in local politics, managed to gain very basic social services, and linked the gecekondu to the city. The inhabitants of gecekondu are not alienated and isolated from urban life in the manner of many impoverished rural
could be considered part of a conservative religious population (Karakaş 2007, 24). Due to the state’s inadequacy in the social, economic, educational, and health care services in those areas, the charity groups associated with the RP distributed relief goods, the RP mayors financially supported the needy through the municipal funds, and helped their inhabitants find jobs and gave out scholarships to school and college students.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey also experienced an explosion of Islamist publications, books, and media organizations. However, the emergence of Islamist media did not happen overnight; it should be understood as an outcome of the processes resulted in the Islamists’ utilization of new opportunity spaces in the long run. For instance, when the Menderes government (1950-1960) ended the persecution of the Nur movement, the movement gradually evolved into a “textual-community” organized around small reading circles contemplating on Nursi’s Treatises of Light (Risale-i Nur). Later in the 1970s, these small reading communities “evolved into a major social movement, the Nur movement, with powerful economic, cultural, and political capital” (Yavuz 2003, 33).

Indeed, it was not just the Nur (or Nurcu) movement that was involved in the expansion of Islamist literature. In 1983, during the month of Ramazan the Religious Publications Fair (Dini Yayımlar Fuarı) was first organized in Ankara on the large courtyard of Kocatepe Mosque which is the largest mosque in the city. Many Islamic publishing houses participated to the fair which offered thousands of books in addition to Islamic media. One year later, the fair was also organized in İstanbul on the historical courtyard of Sultanahmet Mosque. Just like its counterpart in Ankara, the Istanbul migrants to Sao Paulo, or Calcutta; rather they tend to be upwardly mobile, energetic, and initiative oriented. They seek integration rather than isolation. Moreover, they generate a sense of cultural dynamism that allows them to succeed in their reinterpretation of rural traditions and adaptation to urban life.”
Religious Publications Fair also attracted hundreds of thousands of visitors during the months of Ramazan. Several years later, other smaller cities like Kütahya and Malatya also organized similar fairs for Islamic books due to large popular demand for Islamic literature. Books in those fairs range from translations of the Qur'an, Hadith books and practical guides for obligatory prayers and other worships to Islamist books by the leading Islamist writers like Ali Bulaç, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Fehmi Koru, and Ahmet Taşgetiren.

**Culture and Framing: The Role of Islamist Frames in Islamist Activism**

Atatürk and secularists after him perceived Islam as an “inferior cultural marker;” thus, “Islam constituted a threat, because Kemalist Westernization relied primarily on changing the attitudes of individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had heretofore been provided by Islam” (Sakallıoğlu 1996, 235). Sayar (2002, 20) relates the increasing ideological polarization of Turkish politics since the early 1990s based largely on the tension between the secularists and the Islamists. In other words, according to this type of perception of politics, any victory of the Islamist ideology is a loss or retreat of secular Kemalist ideology since often politics is perceived as a “zero-sum game” by the political actors of Turkish politics.

In a setting where such types of political perceptions exist, often times politics is carried out through highly charged symbols. Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) describe this type of politics as “symbolic politics.” Through the use of a symbolic language, Islamist political leaders and movement activists utilize Islamist frames to address the grievances, propose solutions for them, and mobilize movement members to redress them. In the social movement literature, a frame is described as “an interpretive schemata that signifies and

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142 Ramazan is the month of fasting for Muslims and is considered holy. It is either 29 or 30 days because it is observed according to the lunar calendar, not the solar calendar.
condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992, 137). According to Tarrow, frames are about grievance interpretation. Tarrow argues that frames make sense of emotions and direct an agent's course of action in such a way as to channel that emotion. Thus, emotions are often a crucial source of the energy which fuels movement activism. The things that move movement participants into action is that they feel injustices and feel that others are wronged. Tarrow further maintains that religion is a recurring source of social movement framing because it is a reliable source of emotion: "Religion provides ready-made symbols, rituals and solidarities that can be accessed an appropriated by movement leaders" (Tarrow 1998, 112). As “social movement organizers” (Snow and Benford 1988, 200-204), Islamist movement leaders and activists in Turkey utilize frames to i) identify and define political problems and interpret political realities, ii) define strategies and tactics of the movement, and iii) explain the rationale for political activism through highly normative arguments. Snow and Benford label these three basic types of frames as: i) diagnostic, ii) prognostic, and iii) motivational frames.

Framing and Identity Formation through Islam

Diani defines social movements as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (1992, 13). This definition is an identity oriented definition of social movements. Culture and framing are more related to the identity aspect of social movements. Identity is created through the movement participants’ “...embeddedness in associational networks that render them ‘structurally available’ for protest activity” (McAdam 1994, 36-37). In a social movement organization,
people tend to associate with people similar to themselves (Klandermans 1992, 88). Klandermans argues that people tend to validate information by comparing their interpretations of grievances with those of significant others, particularly like-minded individuals (1988, 175). Tilly uses the word *catnet* (a combination of *category* and *network*) to reflect the socially homogeneous nature of social movements by emphasizing the collective identity of those groups (1978, 62-63). Clark points out that public information campaigns, rallies, and the like can be successful for gaining new members; however, face-to-face interaction with a trusted individual within the same social network is the most successful way to ensure participation and solidify group identity (2004, 946). Therefore, as Tarrow points out, the coordination of collective action depends on the trust and cooperation among the participants by shared identities and on the collective action frames that justify and motivate collective action (1998, 21).

The framing process also has an identity aspect because through framing, the group leaders and members collectively define and redefine the “us” and “them”. Often times, movements define their enemies by real or imagined attributes or evils by relying on existing collective identities and creating new ones (Hardin 1995). However, this is a competitive process where states also constantly frame issues to legitimize their policy choices, or to mobilize people behind certain policy goals. This struggle also includes the states’ contesting the frames created by the contentious groups (Melucci 1996). Tarrow maintains that building a movement around strong ties of collective identity does much of the work that would be normally done by the organization, but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances and interaction (Tarrow 1998, 119).
The way that the Islamists use several types of frames is directly related with the process of identity formation and contesting the official secularist frames created by the secularist elites. In framing the current problems regarding Turkish secularization, Islamists often use diagnostic frames by simply arguing that secularism in Turkey never meant a clear separation of church and state; and it was simply used as a tool to oppress religion. The Turkish Islamists claim that the early secularist elites of the republic had attempted to transform the Turkish people in mind and in appearance; and by doing that they had been attempting to reach the contemporary level of Western civilization through authoritarian measures without a will to democratize the political system in Turkey.

Prominent Islamist writers/columnists also discuss secularism in length. In fact, ordinary Islamists’ perceptions of Turkish secularism are shaped mainly by the way that the prominent Islamist writers frame Turkish secularism. For example, Ali Bulaç, one of

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143 Diagnostic frames identify and define a problem or attribute blame or causality. For a detailed discussion of the frames, see Chapter 1.

144 Feyzullah, an Islamist lawyer, appeared to be quite well-informed about the political history of Turkey. Indeed, he made references to the Sapka ve Kılık Kyafet Devrimi (Revolution of Hat and Dress) which was part of Atatürk’s reform package. Atatürk visited a conservative small town in northern Turkey (Kastamonu) on August 24, 1925 and delivered a speech to the local people with a Western style hat on his hat. Atatürk made the following statements: "Biz her noktada medeniyet olmalıyız. Fikrimiz, zihniyetimiz tepeden turnağa kadar medeniyet olacaktı. Medeniyet ve beynemizde kiyafet milletimizin için layık bir kıyafettir. Onu giyiceğiz... Millet vaziyet olarak bilmelidir ki; medeniyet böyle kuvvetli bir ateşdir ki ona bigane kalanları yakar, mahveder. İşte bulunduğumuz medeniyet ailede layık olduğunu mervi bu laçak ve onu mubahaza ve ıla edeceğiz. Refah, saadet ve insanlık bundadır." We have to be civilized [modern] regarding every aspect [of social life]. Our ideas, [and] mentality are going to be modern from top to toe. Civilized and international dress is the type of dress that our nation deserves; and we are going to wear them... The [Turkish] nation should know that civilization is such a powerful fire that it burns and destroys those who are unaware of it. We are going to find the place that we deserve in the family of civilized nations, and we are going to protect and exalt it. Prosperity, felicity, and humanity are all in this endeavor. When Atatürk returned to Ankara from his trip, people greeted him with Western style hats. A few days later, the Cabinet initiated a legislation making it mandatory for governmental employees to wear hats. Later, on November 25, 1925 a law was enacted making it mandatory for all Turkish citizens to wear hats. Indeed, majority of my interviewees, like Muharrem, Feyzullah, Kamil, and Gülser made similar statements in regards to their perception of secularism in Turkey.

145 The concept of "muasır medeniyetler seviyesi," the level of contemporary civilization of the West, was often referred to by Atatürk.
the prominent Turkish Islamist intellectuals, ("Laiklik ve Başörtüsü" Zaman, 2.9.2008) argues that unlike the way that it was applied in other democratic countries, Turkish secularism was not applied in a democratic fashion. Bulac maintains that Turkish secularism was used as a tool both to mute religio-political demands and to control religion by the secularist elites. Dilipak ("Bir Başka Açýdan Başörtüsü Sorunu" Vakit, 2.6.2008) argues that the merit of obeying the state’s authority is related to the state’s commitment to protecting basic rights and freedoms including the free exercise of religion. If the state does not protect those rights and freedoms, then people have the right to self-determination. Dilipak (Vakit, 2.1.2008) further argumentatively states that “Secularists who want to ban the headscarf are a group of minority” which he calls “the White Turks who believe that they are the masters of the society, always dream about reforming Islam [according to their secular perspectives] ...and always want to be social engineers [who forcibly try to transform the society due to their secular agenda].”

An Islamist prognostic frame regarding secularism states that the secularists should give up their elitist notions of considering themselves as the saviors (or guardians) of the country (kurtarici zihniyeti), and stop interfering into peoples’ affairs. Islamists also create prognostic frames regarding the course of action for Islamists to follow. Many

146 Ali Bulac, "Laiklik ve Başörtüsü" (Secularism and Headscarf) Zaman 2.9.2008. For a similar argument see Ali Bulac, "Bir Ucube Model" (A Strange Model) Zaman 3.23.2004. Bulac is one of the most prominent Turkish Islamist writers and is one of the senior columnists in Turkish daily Zaman, an Islamist daily. Bulac writes on a variety of issues which revolve around Islam, secularism, Islamic identity, and Turkish politics. Zaman is an Islamist newspaper owned by followers of Fethullah Gülen, the leader of a prominent branch of the Nurcu movement. Zaman is the largest Islamist daily whose circulation is around 750 thousand. The second most circulated Islamist daily is Yeni Şafak whose circulation is around 130 thousand. Vakit, Bugün, Yeni Asya and Milli Gazete are other Islamist dailies. (The circulation numbers are taken from YAYSAT-MDP at: http://www.yaysat.com).

147 Like Bulac, Dilipak is also a prominent Islamist writer who writes for daily Vakit whose circulation is approximately 55 thousand. Abdurrahman Dilipak “Bir Başka Açýdan Başörtüsü Sorunu” (The Headscarf Problem from a Different Angle) Vakit 2.6.2008


149 Prognostic frames go beyond problem specification or blaming, it defines strategies, tactics and targets about ‘what is to be done.’ See Chapter 1 for details.
prominent Islamist writers including A. Bulaç, F. Koru, A. Dilipak, A. Taşgetiren, and H. Karaman urge the Islamists to stay the course and not to give up their struggle, and to stay away from the secularist provocations. It is also very interesting that Islamist commentators/columnists like Bulaç, Koru, Dilipak (and others mentioned above) often portray their struggle as a democratic struggle instead of defending a freedom of religious expression. When the headscarf debate became a controversial issue in the mid-1980s, Islamist commentators and columnists defended the Muslim females’ right to cover their heads as a religious right, and insisted that for Muslim females it is an Islamic obligation to cover themselves. And often, Islamist columnists claimed that in a Muslim-majority country like Turkey, the government could not prevent females from fulfilling a religious obligation. However, especially in the last decade or so, the Islamist intellectuals’ perception of the issue significantly changed. Their perceptions shifted from portraying the headscarf issue as an expression of religion to pursuing a democratic right. The major reason behind this shift is surely tactical because portraying the problem from a democratic rights perspective would enable the Islamist to appeal to a larger segment of the Turkish population than they would have possibly appealed to when they had portrayed the issue from an Islamic perspective.

Indeed, the Islamist intellectuals have managed to garner support for their case from some secularists whom Kuru (2007) calls “passive secularists” (as opposed to “assertive secularists”). One such passive secularist is Ali Nesin who

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150 Those columnists are the most linked and cited Islamist columnists both by the secular and Islamist media including both secular and Islamist online forums and blogs.

151 As an example of such an argument see A. Bulaç’s article in Zaman: “Başörtüsü Neyin Simgesi 1-2” 1.28.2008 and 1.30.2008. Only a limited number of Bulaç’s writings are available in English at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/listYazarlar.do

152 Recently, Ali Nesin, an atheist and a passive secularist, who is the son of a prominent Turkish writer Aziz Nesin (1915-1995) and a leading mathematics professor, issued a statement supporting the lifting of bans of headscarves. Nesin received harsh criticisms from the assertive secularists due to his support for the headscarf. For more information visit: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
recently issued a statement against the assertive secularists’ eagerness to use non-democratic measures to ban headscarves.

Motivational frames\textsuperscript{153} add a moralizing dimension to the specification of problems, culprits and strategies, and produces cognitively hot arguments that demand collective action to redress perceived injustices. More specific arguments about the nature of Islamist struggle in achieving/realizing the Islamist goals focus on the prospective rewards that will follow the current achievements accomplished by the AKP. To epitomize this, the AKP’s electoral strategists used the catchy slogan of “No halt, stay the course!” (\textit{Durmak yok, yola devam!}). Interestingly, at the provincial and peripheral levels, the AKP party officials heavily use a parochial tone, explaining the party achievements from an Islamic perspective. However, on the national media, to explain the party achievements, the party leaders/officials and the deputies use a tone that emphasizes democratic rights, economic development, and social improvements. This is clearly a tactic to gather more support from the more moderate audience by emphasizing significant goals in a secular perspective. In the literature of social movements this is known as \textit{frame amplification}.

Another aspect of Islamist frames relates to the notion of \textit{frame alignment} which is linking the movement frames with those of their potential constituents (Snow et al. 1986).\textsuperscript{154} Through the frame alignment, movement leaders “orient their movements’ frames

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{153} Motivational frames explain the rationale for action through normative statements.
\textsuperscript{154} Snow et al. (1986, 467-473) provide four basic possibilities for frame alignment through which movements formulate their messages in relation to the existing culture. These are \textit{frame bridging}, \textit{frame amplification}, \textit{frame extension}, and \textit{frame transformation}. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. \textit{Frame bridging} is the ‘linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’. Through frame bridging, movements link a movement to ‘unmobilized sentiment pools or public opinion preference clusters’ of constituents with similar views and grievances without organizational base. \textit{Frame amplification} is ‘the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events.’ This might involve persuading prospective movement participants that their values require them to support a particular cause.
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toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at the intersection between a target population’s culture and their own values and goals” (Tarrow 1998, 110). However, this process is often a contentious one which includes a constant struggle between the secularist structures and Islamists, as Islamists compete with official frames or official attempts to establish a control over the creation of meaning. To maintain their legitimacy, regimes in the Muslim world strategically either create new frames or modify the old ones for their own benefit to maintain their interests and power.

**Organic Intellectuals and Frame Resonance**

Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals: traditional and organic. Traditional intellectuals are those who regard themselves as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group and are regarded as such by the population at large. They seem autonomous and independent. The traditional intelligentsia sees itself (wrongly) as a class apart from society, and the thinking groups which every class produces from its own ranks organically. Through the language of culture such organic intellectuals articulate the feelings and experiences which the masses could not express for themselves. The second type is the organic intellectuals. They grow organically with the dominant social group, the ruling class, and the organic intellectuals are their thinking and organizing element. The organic intellectuals were produced by the educational system to perform a function for the dominant social group in society. It is through this group that the ruling class maintains its hegemony over the rest of society (Burke 2005). In his *Notebooks*, Gramsci (1971) argues that the working class movement should produce its own organic intellectuals. Gramsci or involve an attempt to amplify beliefs about the causes of particular problems and the ways of solving those problems (Crossley, 135). *Frame extension* is the process of extending the boundaries of the original frame(s) "so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents." *Frame transformation* takes place when
insisted that the ideological struggle was fundamentally important for social change. Thus, this struggle was not limited to raising the consciousness of the working class, but it must also transform their consciousness (Burke 2005). Gramsci maintained that "the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence ... but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator..." (Gramsci 1971, 10)

Gramsci's conceptualization of organic intellectuals as unifiers of belief and action has a unique place in his theory where he discusses the relationship between state and society, the role of ideology and, the role performed by organization, leadership. Organic intellectuals play a key role in establishing an organic unity among the members within the revolutionary movement, and in the long term strategies of education and preparation for the war of position. Such Gramscian conceptions have parallels in modern Islamist movements. Gramsci argued that "all men are intellectuals", i.e., they all have intellectual and rational faculties. However, "...not all men in society have the social function of intellectuals" (1971, 9). Gramsci claimed that modern intellectuals were not just thinkers, but directors and organizers who helped build movements and produce hegemony by means of ideological apparatuses such as education and the media.

For the prospective movement participants to become mobilized, there must be some "degree of resonance" between the interpretive frames of the leaders of the social movement and individuals (Snow et al. 1986, 477). Snow and Benford (1988; 2000) maintain that there are three major conditions for frame resonance:155 (1) ideational

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155 Benford and Snow (2000) also point to "salience" as the other factor of resonance, alongside with centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. In fact, Islam already had a crucial value for the audience to whom the Islamist frames were meant to address by the Islamist movement leaders and
centrality/narrative fidelity: the frame must rely on the existing traditions and values of the constituency; (2) empirical credibility: the frame must have an evidential basis; and (3) experiential commensurability: the social problems that the frame addresses must be relevant to the constituents' problems. Then, why and how did Islamist frames by the Islamist intellectuals successfully resonate with the conservative masses of Turkey? A follower of Erbakan put his experience with Milestones of Sayyid Qutb and Four Basic Qur'anic Terms of Mawdudi this way: “Those books came like a shock to us. They were talking about some terms that we heard, but we had never heard those terms taking such meanings. We never thought of the political implications of tawhid (the principle of God’s unity) up to that time” (Yenigün, 2003). Islamist frames resonated well with the masses because they became what Benford and Snow (2000) call a “master frame.” Yenigün maintains that the Islamist frames were inclusive (unlike Turkish nationalism which excludes Kurds and other ethnic groups), flexible, had a wide interpretive scope, and had a cultural resonance. The Islamist frames had more resonance because they had more empirical credibility in that empirical referents seemed as “real” indicators of the diagnostic claims. For instance, for the adherents of the Islamist movement, Qutb’s diagnosis of the current Muslim societies as jahili societies fitted more to Turkey than any other Muslim country due to Turkey’s extremely secularist regime and anti-Islamic stance of the secular political elites. Besides, the credibility of the frame articulators was high, because Qutb evidently had an exegesis of the Qur’an, while Mawdudi was considered a

intellectuals. Moreover, experiential commensurability of those frames (their resonance with everyday experience of the adherents) was evident when under different situations Islamists experienced discrimination and disdain by the secularists. Also, narrative fidelity, the degree of congruence of the Islamist frames with Islam, made it possible for the movement organizers to disseminate their messages with confidence because of Islam’s credibility as a source of common values, practices and beliefs among Muslims. In other words, Islamists were speaking the language of the masses while disseminating their messages. Thus, adherents found the attributes of a master frame in the Islamist frames, and they resonated well with them (See Clark 2005; and White 2002).
scholar. Their theoretical strength, which was expressed in a modern language, had clear superiority over the existing Turkish Islamic literature.

The Clash between the Islamist and Official Frames

The realm of frames is not far from contention. Actually, often times official Islamic frames and Islamist frames are in conflict. Dursun (2001) argues that the idea of keeping religion and politics seems attractive to everybody, however he maintains “in reality they do mix whether people like it or not”. Dursun also argues that the Friday sermons (hutbes) in Turkey have always been secular and in accordance to the governmental policies because it is not uncommon that certain governmental agencies ask the DİB to prepare sermons that would foster their policy goals. For instance, several Friday sermons repeatedly have encouraged citizens to donate money to Kızlary or THK157, or to refrain from using foreign currencies like the Euro or the U.S. dollar. Dursun contends that topics covered in sermons have to be about religious questions, not about policymakers preferences. Dursun believes that the secularists blame Islamists for using religion as a political tool; however, he maintains “the secularists also commit the same mistake.” Dursun also argues that the sermons prepared by the DİB staff have no political content, but the official position of the state, however ironically the director of the DİB often warns the prayer leaders in mosques not to get involved in politics and political topics.158

Even a cursory look at the DİB’s Friday sermon database would reveal that on various issues those sermons advance the government’s official position, and they

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156 See Chapter 2 for Qutb’s conception of jahiliyyah and jahili societies.
157 Kızlary (The Red Crescent) is a semi-official relief organization. THK (Türk Hava Kurumu- The Turkish Aeronautical Association) is a semi-official aeronautical association.
158 According to the Law of Governmental Employees, No. 657 (1965), which is still in effect, governmental employees can not become members of political parties and can not participate political demonstrations. The latter part of the law is not enforced, however the first part of the law is still strictly applied.
encourage citizens to stay away from Islamist currents by arguing that Islam and politics do not mix. For instance, the Friday sermon compulsorily recited by all *imams* (prayer leaders) in all *camis* (mosques) over Turkey on Friday, 01.31.2003 with the title of “*Milli ve Dini Değerlerimiż*” (Our National and Religious Values) interestingly juxtaposes nationalism and religion while warning Muslims against the dangers of fragmentation, political polarization and Islamism. The sermon starts with the 103rd verse of the 3rd chapter (Family of Imran) of the Qurʾan\(^{159}\) advising Muslims to remain united. The sermon analogously maintains that Turkish citizens must “…remain united” and “…should not credit foreign ideas and opinions that would threaten the national unity and destroy our values… they could also use religion to achieve their goals …” The DİB always prepares special sermons for the commemoration national holidays like the *Zafer Bayramı*\(^{160}\) (Victory Day), or *Cumhuriyet Bayramı*\(^{161}\) (Republic Day).\(^{162}\) Another interesting point about those sermons is that in many of those sermons, good deeds such as assisting disabled people\(^{163}\) are portrayed as “national duties” (*milli görev*) as well as religious ones. From an Islamic point of view, one could understand how assisting the disabled people was a good deed because helping others is instructed by Islam. However, it is hard to understand how it could be a national duty.

\(^{159}\) (3:103) “And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah’s favor on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided” (Yusuf Ali Translation).

\(^{160}\) Similar to the Memorial Day in the U.S.

\(^{161}\) An official holiday for commemoration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic on 10.29.1923.

\(^{162}\) Examples of such sermons are given in the Appendix.

\(^{163}\) The title of that particular sermon on 12.05.2003 is: “*Engelliile Yardımcı Olmak Dini ve Milli Bir Görevdir*” (Assisting the Disabled is Both a Religious and a National Duty).
The DIB’s website\textsuperscript{164} includes sermons that are sent to the mosques to be recited by the prayer leaders from September 2003 to March 2008. A wide range of issues are covered by the sermons. I have grouped the sermons under eight categories. These are: Social Issues/problems, Piety, Morals and Good Ethical Conduct, National Holidays, Religious Holidays, Islamic History, Matters of Worshipping, Creed, and Contemporary Problems. Under social issues, several social problems were addressed like drug use, alcoholism, bribery, gambling, prostitution and waste. Qur’anic verses and sayings of Prophet Muhammad are often used to discourage Muslims to get involved with such “social ills.” Under the category of piety and morals, issues like piousness, morals, respecting the elderly and helping the disabled people are covered. Again, verses from the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet are distributed throughout the text of the sermon. The third category of national holidays, the heroism and sacrifice of the heroes (recent or ancient) are narrated. For instance, there are separate sermons for all national holidays like the Republic Day (October 29), the Victory Day (August 30), the Çanakkale (Dardannels) Victory (March 15), and conquest of Istanbul (May 29). The heroism of the national figures is often explained by the power of belief (im\text{an} güv\text{u}). The other category is about the national holidays and some special holy nights like the holiday of Ramazan (at the end of the month of fasting) and of Kurban (at the end of the pilgrimage, the holiday of the sacrifice), and some special holy nights called the Kand\text{iks}. Occasionally, stories of sacrifice, piousness, and sincerity constitute the topic of sermons from the Islamic history (from Prophet Muhammad’s and the Rightly Guided Four Caliph’s period after the Prophet). In the next category, matters of worshipping are explained to the congregation such as how to fast (\textit{Oruç}) or how to perform the sacrifice (\textit{Kurban}). In the category of

\textsuperscript{164} http://www.diyanet.gov.tr

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creed, certain matters pertaining to Islamic creed are explained such as oneness of Allah (tevhid) or the belief in the doomsday (kiyamet). The last category is the contemporary issues category. Some controversial issues are briefly tackled in those sermons such as organ donation and getting bank loans with interest (interest-faiz- is forbidden in Islam).

The first three (Social Issues/problems, Piety, Morals and Good Ethical Conduct, and National Holidays) of the total eight categories constitute about more than fifty percent of all sermons. All of the sermons have a very formal language and they have no political content. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in the paragraph above, some of the sermons juxtapose nationalism and religion, and often use a tone which suggests that nationalism and being patriotic is a religious duty. Those sermons also often times warn the believers against the dangers of “political polarization” and “Islamism” on “national unity and solidarity” (milli birlik ve dayanışma) in Turkey. These are what I call official frames, which are created for the purpose of fighting against politicization of religion. Politicization of religion and Islamism are perceived as phenomena which are “detrimental to the national unity” of Turkey.165

The Debates over the DİB

As in the days of the RP government, an ideological battle about the DİB has erupted between the Kemalists and the AKP. Since early 2000, around 17,000 state-run mosques have been lacking imams. This is due to the rapid mushrooming of mosques in every newly developing neighborhood in big cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara as well as smaller cities and even villages. It is not uncommon for Turkish people to read on the newspaper something like “The disagreement between the two neighborhoods in the town

165 The Friday sermon recited in all mosques throughout Turkey on 01.31.2003 with the title of “Milli ve Dini Değerlerimiz” (Our National and Religious Values).
of X caused the locals to build two mosques in the same neighborhood." Sometimes it is a matter of pride for the locals to be able to build a mosque or to have the newest mosque in the neighborhood. Since it is a government policy to control all mosques and appoint prayer leaders for all newly established mosques by the mosque associations in every neighborhood, understandably there are a huge number of vacancies in many of those mosques because of the DÎB’s budgetary limitations. Former President Sezer repeatedly refused to approve an order to hire new imams, arguing that the AKP was only trying to place its sympathizers in the DÎB in order to “Islamize state and society from above” (Karakaş, 2007, 34). Similarly, the AKP’s plans for reforming the DÎB—according to which it was no longer supposed to be under the control of the Prime Minister, but be self-governing—met with resistance from the Turkish President and the opposition CHP. The CHP argues that an autonomous DÎB that is no longer integrated into the governmental structures would gradually spell the end of the state’s monopoly on controlling religion. Moreover, the CHP claims, the DÎB could be more easily subverted by radical Islamists who could then agitate against the laicist state.

The Alevîs have also entered the debate about the DÎB. They continue to be treated as a cultural minority and demand to be recognized as a religious community. The Alevîs asked the DÎB also to recognize differing forms of Islam. To this date, their places of worship—just like those of the Christian communities—only exist as private foundations and are not supported by the Turkish state. In line with its share of the population, the Alevîs demand 15-20 percent of the DÎB’s jobs and of its financial support. The AKP rejects this demand, as it does the idea of reforming the compulsory religious education classes in the schools, which up until now are tailored exclusively to Sunni Islam. The Alevîs demand that in the future, classes should also include their faith or that their children
should have the same right of exemption from religious instruction that was granted to Christian students following international protests in 1991 (Karakaş 2007, 34).

The Qur’anic Seminaries (Courses)

The February 28 process substantially marginalized the Qur’anic seminaries by enforcing the policy of mandatory 8-year-education. The seminaries that had been teaching students who did not finish the 8th grade were closed. Only summer classes were allowed to teach graduates of the 5th grade, and students under the age of twelve were not allowed to attend those summer classes. In their briefings to the media, the military generals exaggerated the number of students in the Qur’an course as 1,685,000 (“İşte Brifing” Sabah, 6.12.1997). According to the data from the DIB, the number of male students enrolled in the Qur’an courses was 47,291 in 1996. Due to the February 28 policies, the number decreased to 8,766 in 2000.

In December 2003, the AKP attempted to improve the conditions of the Qur’anic seminaries through a new regulation prepared by the DIB (Kuru 2006, 225-227). The new regulation included some minor changes, such as the authorization to open evening classes, the reduction of the minimum student requirement from 15 to 10, the removal of time limits (two months) in summer, and the permission to open dormitories (“Kuran Kursları Okullara Giriyor,” Radikal, 12.5.2003). These changes resulted in considerable opposition by the secularists who accused the AKP of harboring a hidden Islamist agenda. President Sezer, who opposed the new regulation, met with Minister Mehmed Aydın and successfully pressured him to cancel the regulation.

More restrictions were introduced by the Council of State for the Qur’anic seminaries in 2005. In a 16-7 vote, the Council rescinded a specific regulation, which had increased the education time from three days to five days a week in summer Qur’an
courses. Moreover, the Council applied to the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional the law that permitted teaching the Qur'an in summer to students who had finished 5th grade. According to the Council, it is the duty of the state to educate citizens loyal to secularism, thus it should not allow anti-secular education. The Court maintained that religious education, even in summer, will negatively affect a student's secular education before finishing the 8th grade (Nazi’llicak, “Laiklik Dinsizlik mi?” Tercüman, 2.10.2005).

Conclusion

The confrontational policy adopted by the Turkish secularist establishment is caused by several interrelated developments that took place in the last three decades of the Turkish political history. First, the Turkish Islamists' electoral successes and the Islamists' civil societal groups' gradual strengthening through political activism prompted the secularists to take legal action to block the Islamists. As the Islamist candidates challenged and later defeated the secularist politicians, the secularist establishment has started to perceive the Islamists as a serious political and ideological threat. Second, government control over religion and the Turkish Islamists' perception of external threats do not automatically translate into politicization of the Turkish Islamists. Indeed, politicization of the Islamists is related to the interplay of many factors like how the Islamists frame government control over religion and external threats to Muslim identity; how the Islamists perceive themselves as a collectivity and the government; and in return how the government perceives the Islamists as a political movement.

Similar to the Egyptian Islamists do, the Turkish Islamists perceive themselves as a comprehensive movement with the ability to transform both the social and political spheres. However, the Turkish secularist establishment perceives the Islamists as a threat
in regards to the political and ideological realms. The government’s position regarding the Islamists may range from accommodation to confrontation. In their struggle against the secularist regime, the Turkish Islamists frame their struggle from an Islamic perspective (politics as jihad—a religious obligation) as well as from a democratic perspective. By doing those, the Islamists seek to appeal to two distinct audiences: the Muslim audience, and the secular audience (both domestic and international). Also, the Islamists believe that they have to preserve their Muslimness; and political activism for the purpose of bringing about an Islamic order becomes one of the main vehicles of preserving the collective Islamic identity of Muslims. The next chapter will provide a selected historical account of Islam and Islamism as they relate to Islamic revivalism and politicization of Muslims within the context of Egyptian political history.

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166 There is a wide range of different governmental attitudes towards the Islamists. Inclusion, like the Jordanian government’s inclusion of the Jordanian Brotherhood could be one. Or, complete exclusion could be another option like the Syrian government’s total exclusion of the Syrian Brotherhood. Also, over time, government’s attitude towards Islamists may change.
CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF EGYPT, MODERNIZATION AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

The Early Islamic Period

With Prophet Muhammad’s death (632), the Muslim community was faced with the problem of succession. Right before his death, Muhammad pointed out Abu Bakr (572-634) as the prayer leader in his place which, after Muhammad’s death, is interpreted as a sign by the Muslims of that time for Abu Bakr’s succession. In the wake of Muhammad’s death, Abu Bakr disciplined the rebellious Arabian tribes who renounced Islam and consolidated Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. Bakr’s reign as the first caliph lasted for only two years (Donner 1981).

The period (634-644) of the second caliph ‘Umar (581-644) witnessed the expansion of the Islamic state. Adopting the title Amir Al-Muminin, "Commander of the Believers," Umar extended the Islamic state’s rule over Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Persia. Thus, within four years after the death of Muhammad the Islamic state had extended its sway over all of Syria; and near the River Yarmouk, in August 636, Umar’s army had defeated the Byzantine army commanded by King Heraclius. The Muslim victory marked the first great wave of Islamic conquests outside the Arabian Peninsula, and initiated the rapid advance of Islam into then Christian Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. This battle is also considered to be one of Khalid bin Walid’s (‘Umar’s chief commander) most decisive victories. Just one year after the Yarmouk battle, ‘Umar’s armies conquered Jerusalem; and through the end of his caliphate ‘Uthman’s army defeated the Sassanid (Persian) Empire in
the east at the Battle of Nihavand (Donner 1981). 'Umar served for ten years as the caliph and was assassinated by a Persian slave who is said to have held a personal grudge against 'Umar.

After 'Umar, 'Uthman (580-656) became the third caliph. Libya was added to the Islamic empire during 'Uthman’s caliphate (644-656); and 'Uthman’s Syrian Governor Mu’awiyyah established a navy and engaged in several battles with the Byzantine navy. Despite the continuing fast expansion witnessed during 'Uthman’s caliphate, 'Uthman was accused of favoritism to members of his family-the clan of Umayyah (Lewis 2002). Negotiations over such grievances did not succeed and 'Uthman was killed by a group of rebels who surrounded his residence.

The fourth caliph, Ali (599-661), is considered as the last of the Rashidun (the rightly guided first four caliphs) by all Sunni Muslims. Ali, during his reign (656-661) witnessed severe challenges. The legitimacy of Ali’s caliphate was questioned, especially by 'Uthman's relatives who believed 'Ali's caliphate was not legitimate because his election had been supported by those responsible for 'Uthman's death. Particularly, Mu’awiyyah, 'Uthman’s Syrian Governor, did not recognize Ali’s election. In Syria, Mu’awiyyah proclaimed himself as the caliph of Muslims while Ali was still the caliph. The conflict resulted with the Battle of Siffin in 657, near the Euphrates River, which eventually resulted in a major division between the Sunnis and the Shi’a (literally means the supporters/partisans of Ali) (Cleveland 1994; Lewis 2002). Although the mainstream Shi’a and the Sunnis agreed upon almost all the essentials of Islam, there was one prominent difference, which was essentially political rather than religious, and concerned the election of the caliph or successor of Muhammed.
The majority of Muslims supported the system of consent (*bay'a*), which based on the legitimization of Abu Bakr’s leadership after Muhammed’s death by the tribal leaders through the ancient tradition of handshaking with the person for whom the consent was provided. Both Muhammed’s appointment of Abu Bakr as the prayer leader when he was on his death bed, and the *bay'a* of the tribal leaders with Abu Bakr rendered him as the first caliph. People who accepted his caliphate are known as *AhlAl-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah* (the people of custom and community) or Sunnis, who consider the caliph to be Muhammed’s successor only in his capacity as ruler of the community. On the other hand, the Shi’a, believes that the caliphate, which they call the imamate or "leadership," is nonelective and must remain within the family of Muhammed, Ali being the first valid caliph. Another significant difference between the two major sects of Islam is about the role of the leader. For the Sunnis the caliph is a guardian of the *Shari'a*, whereas the Shi’a see the imam as a trustee inheriting and interpreting Muhammed’s spiritual power.

After the battle of Siffin, there was a dual authority in the Islamic Empire. Ali, whose major base of support was in Iraq, was the caliph in his capital (Kufa), and Mu’awiyyah proclaimed himself as the caliph in Jerusalem. In 661 Ali was assassinated. His son Hasan became caliph at Kufa; but soon afterward deferred to Mu’awiyyah which paved the way for the Umayyad dynasty (Mu’awiyyah was of the Umayyad clan) which would rule for the next ninety years. The already tense relations between the Sunnis and the Shi’a exacerbated further in 680 when Ali’s son Husain was brutally killed at Karbala in Iraq by the forces of the Umayyad ruler Yazid (Donner 1981). His death is still commemorated by the Shi’a every year during the Islamic month of Muharram.

167 Ali was Muhammed’s son in law and cousin (son of Muhammed’s uncle Abu Talib). Muhammed’s two sons passed away when they were toddlers, thus Muhammed’s bloodline continued through his daughter Fatima’s marriage with Ali.
After Mu'awiyyah, Abd Al-Malik became the Umayyad caliph in Damascus. Al-Malik minted a standard coinage which replaced the Byzantine and Sassanid coins, expanded the bureaucracy, and established a postal system. Al-Malik also introduced Arabic as the language of administration, replacing Greek and Pahlavi (ancient Persian).

Under Al-Malik, the Umayyads expanded the Islamic Empire further. To the east they extended their influence into Transoxania (the north of the Oxus River -AmuDarya- which stretches from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), and expanded to reach the borders of China. To the west, they took North Africa, with a campaign led by 'Uqbah bin Nafi, all the way to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. In Europe, the Arabs passed through Spain, defeated the Visigoths; and in 713, they reached Narbonne in France. The territorial expansion brought the Arabs into contact with new ethnic groups (like peoples of India, North Africa, and the Turkic peoples) who later embraced Islam and influenced the course of Islamic history significantly (Hodgson 1974).

With the exception of 'Umar bin Abd Al-Aziz and Hisham, the successors of Al-Malik were not successful statesmen. After Hisham, the Umayyad dynasty gradually declined. The Umayyad dynasty was troubled by internal dissention partially caused by the policy of Arab exclusivism adopted by the ruling Umayyad elite by discriminating against the continually growing non-Arab converts to Islam. The discontent grew into a revolution that destroyed the Umayyad dynasty in 750 and brought to power the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258).

The Abbasid dynasty replaced the Umayyad dynasty after 750 and shifted the Islamic locus of power from Damascus to Baghdad. During the Abbasid dynasty the Islamic ummah (the community of believers) developed from an Arab origin to a universal empire through the Arab conquests (for additional discussion of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, refer to Chapter 2, section B). The first one and a half centuries of the Abbasid
Empire was a period of relative political stability and economic prosperity. During the Abbasid dynasty many other nations were attracted into Islam and they created a rich and diverse Islamic civilization. The Islamic Empire experienced its golden age under the Abbasid rule. When the Abbasids were at the peak of their power, simultaneously other regional Islamic dynasties and cultures were being created. Each of those dynasties formed their particular synthesis of local and Islamic practices. Thus, there was no single Islamic polity or culture that was tied to the Abbasids in Baghdad. The Abbasid dynasty was destroyed by Mongols (led by Genghiz Khan’s grandson Hülägü) in 1258. The fall of the Abbasid dynasty led to political fragmentation, however it did not lead to a total collapse of Islamic culture and did not cause a power vacuum. A period of stagnation in one segment of the Islamic ummah could be reversed by an infusion of intellectual, economic or military energy from another (Turkish-Islamic dynasties were good examples of that phenomenon). The Abbasid rule continued in distant parts of the Islamic empire (like Al-Andulus in Spain, and Mamluks in Egypt who replaced the Shi’a Fatimid dynasty there). During the eleventh century the military power and ruling authority passed from Arabs to Turks in the central Islamic lands (Cleveland 1994, 16-19; Hodgson 1974).

Islamic Rule in Egypt

Around 3100 BC the Pharaonic Egypt became a unified state and remained independent until 332 BC when Alexander the Great conquered Egypt. Egypt was subsequently ruled by Greek Ptolemaic kings. The Muslim conquest of Egypt took place between the years of 639 and 641 AC when the second caliph ‘Umar’s commander Amr ibn Al-As conquered Egypt. Until the Muslim conquest, Egypt had been under the control of a series of foreign powers: Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Ottomans, French and British (Lewis 2002). During the long history of Egypt, Egypt was independently governed
under the Ptolemies, Ikhshidids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, and Muhammed Ali\textsuperscript{168}. However, the rulers of these governments were all non-natives of Egypt.

The Fatimids who had their origins in Ifriqiya (modern day Tunisia) invaded Egypt in the 10\textsuperscript{th} century and established Cairo (Al-Qahirah) in 969. The Fatimid rule in Egypt lasted until Saladin’s (Salah Al-Din) uncle Shirkah invaded Egypt in 1167 by extended the dominance of the Ayyubid state from Syria to Palestine and Egypt. In the mid 1200s the Mamluks controlled Egypt until the Ottoman invasion of Egypt in 1517 by Yavuz Sultan Selim I. The Ottoman sultans retained the Mamluks as the Egyptian ruling class who regained much of their influence, however the Mamluk ruling elite technically remained vassals of the Ottomans in Egypt (Lewis 2002, 177-178). When Ottomans conquered Egypt and most of the Arab lands in 1517, they were recognized as the protectors of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina; moreover Sultan Selim I, who conquered those lands, received the title of caliph and enhanced the Islamic standing of the Ottoman rulers. In fact, sultans did not use their title until the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to obtain Muslim support to drive out European imperialists. The Ottomans reached their peak under the rule of Sultan Süleyman and at his death in 1566, stretched his empire from the Danube to Yemen, from Albania to the Crimean shores of the Black Sea, and from Algeria to Baghdad (Shaw 1976, 87-111).

When the Ottomans lost their dominance especially after the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, they had to sign a series of commercial treaties known as the \textit{Capitulations} including extensive privileges for European merchants. Besides their economic impact on the empire, the Capitulations had long-term political implications. Following a series of military defeats after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the Ottomans were on the defensive; the 18\textsuperscript{th} century

\textsuperscript{168} Mehmet (in Turkish) is the equivalent of Muhammed in Arabic. Turkish history books refer to Muhammed Ali Pasha as Mehmet Ali Pasha. Pasha was a one of the high civilian and military bureaucratic
was a period of disintegration as Ottomans lost their ability of control their territories (Shaw 1976, 217-223). The decline of central authority also enabled the local leaders to gain regional power.

The Modern Period in Egypt

Muhammed Ali’s Reign (1805-1848) in Egypt and Egyptian Modernization

As Ottomans lost their ability to control their territories gradually, by the late 18th century Egypt became a de facto independent state under a revived Mamluk order. After the French revolution of 1789, Britain and France were in conflict for the domination of Egypt; and Napoleon invaded the country in 1798 by defeating the Mamluk forces. The same year British forces defeated the French forces; however the French military remained in Egypt three more years until a British-Ottoman allied force drove the French out (Cleveland 1994, 61-63; Wilson 1993, 23-27).

Muhammed Ali was an ethnic Albanian born and raised in the Greek city of Kavalla. He arrived in Egypt as part of the British-Ottoman allied force as second in command of an Albanian contingent. Several people competed to fill the power vacuum left by the French and Muhammed Ali was the successful one. In 1805 Ali was recognized as the governor of Egypt by Istanbul. Ali’s basic aim was to preserve his own rule by building up a large army and navy (Owen 2000, 114-115). Through forty years, Ali achieved an amazing internal development and imperial expansion for Egypt. Ali retransformed the army and reorganized the administrative structure, increased agricultural production and introduced heavy industry. Ali wanted to be independent of the Ottoman Empire and establish a hereditary dynasty for his family. To increase his power Ali ranks in the Ottoman political system. The title of pasha was typically granted to governors and generals.
destroyed most of the local Mamluk rulers and further strengthened the armed forces (Shaw
and Shaw 1976, 10-11). Ali sent several educational missions to Europe, established
educational institutions to produce civilian and military personnel and a translation office
and government press to prepare Arabic textbooks for students. The first Arabic language
newspaper was also introduced by him, al Waqai al Misriyyah (the Official Gazette), in
1828 (Cleveland 1994, 63-73).

To increase the revenues of the state M. Ali confiscated the iltizam lands. Iltizam
was a tax farming system where tax farmers pay remitted a fixed annual sum to the treasury
and retain the surplus they get from the peasants under their control. The second measure
was to put a heavy tax on the revenues of the waqf (religious endowments) administered by
the ulema. Waqf was approved by the Shari' a that permitted the income from a property to
be channeled for charitable purposes. Traditionally, the revenues of the waqf were not
subject to tax, and the ulema acted as trustees for those endowments and assigned the
revenues to their designated purposes. Both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Egypt of M.
Ali the centralizing governments of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries sought to
break the hold of the ulema over waqf s and to gain control of the revenues because the
waqf s were outside of the states' control. M. Ali granted huge amounts of land to certain
government officials and to his relatives who were supposed to cultivate the land for some
tax exemptions (Cleveland 1994, 73-74). M. Ali also experimented with new crops; the
most important of them was the long staple cotton which became Egypt's cash crop
quickly. To irrigate more land, M. Ali also introduced forced peasant labor to build
irrigation canals. A program of industrialization was initiated with an emphasis on war
related materials and textiles.

The title, 'Pasha' was equivalent to the British title of "Lord" as an honorary title.
Muhammed Ali’s first overseas military campaign was against the puritanical Wahhabi movement in Arabia who had captured the two holy cities. The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) ordered Muhammed Ali to put down the revolt. Ali’s adopted son Ibrahim Pasha led the Egyptian forces and captured the two holy cities in 1811. Ali also aimed at Sudan and by 1820 captured the entire country. To obtain raw materials and a large market for Egypt’s new industrial output, Ali turned against the sultan and invaded Syria in 1832. Ali’s son Ibrahim led the Egyptian forces and defeated the Ottoman army. After a treaty Muhammed Ali’s son Ibrahim became the governor of Syria in 1833. In 1841 the European powers imposed a settlement on the Ottoman-Egyptian conflict known as the Treaty of London. Muhammed Ali was forced to withdraw from all territories he occupied except Sudan. Although Ali lost a lot of the land he had occupied, he achieved a major objective. The treaty stated that the governorship of Egypt was to be a hereditary office held by his family. In fact, Ali’s descendants ruled Egypt until 1952 (Cleveland 1994, 74-76).

The Gradual Decline of Ottoman Control in Egypt

The 19th century nationalist independence movements (both among the Christian and Muslim subjects) within the Ottoman Empire troubled the Ottomans until their demise since those independence movements were often manipulated by the great European powers for their own ends. Serbs and Greeks were the first to revolt. The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) invited Muhammed Ali’s forces to Greece to assist the Ottoman troops to quell the Greek rebellion. The revolt was suppressed however in 1827; the Great Power alliance (i.e., the British, French and Russian) fleet destroyed the newly established Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Navarino Bay (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 29-31).
Both for the Ottomans and Egyptians, the first half of the 19th century was marked by various reforms (For an account of Mahmud II’s reforms, see Chapter 2) which significantly expanded the role of the state. Among others, military and educational reforms were the most significant (Cleveland, 79-82; Shaw and Shaw Chapter 1 and 2). In Egypt, Muhammed Ali’s sons Abbas and Sa’id, and Ali’s grandson Ismail encouraged the development of a European educated Egyptian elite just like the reformers of Tanzimat in Istanbul. In spite of such an encouragement, the rulers of Egypt remained authoritarian and the royal traditions did not change much. To achieve some gains from the Ottomans, Ismail (1863-1879) attempted to bribe Ottoman officials. Sultan Abdülaziz elevated Ismail’s governorship status to *khedive* (1867), a Persian title, which literally meant lord or master. Ismail was able to issue his own decrees without Istanbul’s approval; he was allowed to expand its army, to issue its own currency and to contract foreign loans without Istanbul’s approval (Shaw and Shaw, 145). The most significant development during Ismail’s era was the introduction of the Mixed Courts in 1876. The Capitulations protected the foreign nationals in the Ottoman territories from the Ottoman law, including the Egyptian law, and the way of dealing with disputes including foreign nationals was to have the consul of the foreigner hear the case and make a decision based on the law of the foreigner’s country. However this created many disadvantages for Egyptians. They were dealing with all civil and commercial cases and they were governed mainly by the French civil code. The *Shari‘a* Courts remained, however their jurisdiction was limited to the areas of personal status and *waqf*. This severely limited the area of ulama legal activity in Egypt (Cleveland 1994, 89-97).

Ismail had the same general aims as his grandfather, Muhammed Ali. These were building up a modern state with a strong army, asserting Egypt’s independence against
Istanbul and Europe, and diversifying the economy. Like the Tanzimat reformers, Ismail had to borrow money from Europe to finance his projects, and Ismail’s efforts to use European capital to build up the state and economy only led to increasing dependence on Europe (Owen 2000, 115-117). The debt crisis led to creation of the Public Debt Commission ensuring that the Egyptian debt was serviced. Also the number of Europeans in Egypt rose from approximately 10,000 in 1838 to over 90,000 in 1881. The majority were dealing with the cotton trade or banking and finance. As a result of the Capitulations, the European community enjoyed a privileged position. Ismail tried to regain Egypt’s financial independence by abolishing the Public Debt Commission, but the European powers decided that his rule must end and called upon the Ottoman sultan to exercise his authority over Egypt. Sultan Abdülhamid II issued a formal decree deposing Ismail in 1879 and appointing his son Tawfiq as khedive of Egypt (Owen 2000, 117; Cleveland, 95-97).

Continuing Modernization, the British Rule and the Urabi Revolt

Tawfiq’s period was troubled with the Urabi revolt (1879-1882). Colonel Ahmad Urabi was an Egyptian who had peasant origins. He was not one of the officers educated in Europe. He studied in Al-Azhar and joined the army. The Urabi revolt had two aims: eliminating foreign control of Egypt’s finances and curtailing the autocracy of the khedive by establishing constitutional limits to his authority. Urabi gained the support of the army, a group of reformist notables and the peasants. For the British and the French the Urabi movement was a threat. In 1882 the British forces defeated Urabi and his followers. Many expected the British forces to leave Egypt; however the British remained and Egypt stayed under British occupation until 1956 (Cleveland 1994, 96-98).

The reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt created an institutional dualism. With the exception of destruction of the Janissaries (Ottoman) and Mamluks (Egyptian), most
traditional institutions remained. Although there were new courts and some changes to the legal code were made, they did not eliminate the Shari'a courts and the new elite educated in European-style institutions coexisted with the graduates of religious schools or with the ulema. There was also a large gap between the educated officials and the population. The 19th century reforms of the Ottomans and of Egypt brought certain advantages; however, they also brought economic instability, social disruption and alienation, and political crises (Cleveland 1994, 97-98).

By the end of the 19th century most of the Muslim lands were under some form of European control. Those who escaped direct occupation had severely limited sovereignty and did not have economic independence. Muslim intellectuals and activists argued that widespread degeneration of the Muslim societies and deviation from the true religion were the main causes of such defeats. That kind of a self criticism and a reaction against the adoption of European ways led to an assertion of Islamic values.

Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) was the last Ottoman sultan who exercised unrestrained royal authority. In 1878 he suspended the constitution and abolished the parliament. His period is characterized by cautious reform, conservatism and a reaction against European institutions and ideas. To maintain the integrity of the empire, Abdülhamid II stressed the Islamic heritage of the empire and instead of the idea of Ottomanism he adhered to Pan-Islamism. Adherence to Pan-Islamism and benefiting from his title as the caliph of the Islamic ummah were useful diplomacy tools. From a domestic perspective, Abdülhamid’s policies were intended to secure the loyalty of Arab subjects of the empire. In fact, during his era, many Arab notables enjoyed increasing prestige. Abdülhamid’s era also marked the increasing German influence in form of army reorganization and of investment capital in the empire (Cleveland 1994, 113-118).
Muslim intellectuals were increasingly concerned about the survival of the Islamic ummah in the Ottoman Empire increasingly dominated and penetrated by European powers. Although some members of the ulema recommended the rejection of all Western innovations, some new thinkers like Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) recognized the importance of accommodating European achievements in science and technology within the framework of Islam. Afghani's call for direct action in the name of Islamic solidarity appealed to many people. For Afghani Islam did not contradict with the spirit of science and technology, however Muslims had become ignorant of true Islam. To rediscover the true Islam, strengthening the unity of the ummah was necessary. Afghani was a believer in Pan-Islamism and he was especially critical of Muslim rulers who allowed European armies to invade Muslim territories and permitted European capital to control their economies. Thus, collective solidarity combined with action was necessary to resist exploitation and to bring the Islamic revival (Beinin and Stork 1997, 5).

Abduh was educated at Al-Azhar in Cairo, and then became a teacher there. He met Afghani when he was a student. Abduh became active in Urabi revolt and was exiled in 1882. When he returned to British-occupied Egypt, Abduh reconciled himself to the British and after serving as a judge he became the mufti (chief Islamic official) of Egypt. In his proposals and decrees as mufti he sought to demonstrate that Islam was compatible with modernity and argued that local superstitions and practices from the earlier centuries had been accepted as core parts of Islamic doctrine. Abduh argued that the basics of Islam were found in the Qur'an and the verified hadith (sayings and tradition of the Prophet). The reformist movement associated with Abduh, the Salafiyyah movement, comes from the Arabic word for ancestor, salaf. For Abduh, the study of the early community of Islam
provided the best guide for the Muslims, the practices that were created later on were the products of human reason and were for specific historical circumstances. Therefore such practices including political theory and judicial practices could be modified by human reason to meet new circumstances, they were not part of the eternally valid revelation. In Islamic terms, Abduh was talking about *ijtihad*, the application of human reason to new contexts. Abduh was both a conservatist and a reformist. Rashid Rida was Abduh's most influential student. Rida conservatively interpreted Abduh's doctrine (Ayubi 1993, 57-58).

After the Young Turk revolution of 1908 in Istanbul, the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP, *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, established in 1889 by some students in the military medical academy) deposed Sultan Abdülhamid and sent him to exile to Salonika. The CUP gradually gained the full control of the Ottoman parliament. (Ahmad 125-141). Following Arab and Balkan nationalism, Turkish nationalism emerged as a reaction. Two simultaneous trends emerged: i) Pan-Turkism, and ii) Turkism (refer to Chapter 2 for more details). From the coup of 1908 until the beginning of the First World War the *Ittihad ve Terakki* successfully silenced Arab nationalism by co-opting leading Arab dissidents by appointing them to some administrative posts (Shaw and Shaw 1976, 253-263). On October 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War after it allied itself with the Germans. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire was divided and its Arab provinces were occupied by Britain, France and Italy. Following the peace settlement and the establishment of the mandates a new regional state system came into existence in the Middle East.

The interwar era in the Middle East was an Anglo-French dominance. In the same period most of the Arab political activity was primarily devoted to achieving independence from foreign control. The war years did not produce upheaval and the same
elite that had power and prestige before 1914 continued to maintain their privileges during
the 1920s and 1930s in the Arab world. In fact local political leaders were dependent for
their positions on the discretion of the occupying power. Therefore even as the Arab
political leaders demanded independence, they tried not to upset European authorities too
much. The Second World War accelerated the end of Anglo-French dominance in the
Middle East and led to the emergence of independent Arab states in the region (Cleveland
1994, 140).

The Struggle for Independence and End of Egyptian Dynasty

In the aftermath of the First World War the British had difficulties in retaining their
control over Egypt and Iraq because of the widespread resistance against them. Therefore
the British introduced a system of a limited independence for Egypt and Iraq. The two
countries were granted the freedom to conduct their own domestic politics, but required to
allow the presence of British military on their soil. Although Egypt was not a battleground
during the First World War, its resources were used by the British, thousands of people
were conscripted into civilian labor corps or forced to join the British forces that invaded
Syria. Self determination became a major goal of the Egyptian elite; however the British
were not willing to sacrifice their interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal. In 1918 several
Egyptian elites formed a delegation, Ḥizb al-Wafda which later became the first political party of
Egypt, and started to rally popular support for full independence of Egypt. The movement
was led by Saʿd Zaghlul, a lawyer and administrator, who demonstrated a special ability to
communicate with rural Egyptians because he was also coming from a rural background.
Zaghlul started a campaign against the British refusal for lifting its protectorate on Egypt.
Zaghlul and some leaders of the Wafd were arrested and exiled by the British in 1919. The
Egyptian people showed their support for the Wafd leaders; riots and demonstrations broke
out in urban centers of Egypt. The events turned into a national upheaval known as the revolution of 1919. Having difficulties in containing the movement, the British allowed Zaghlul and his friends to represent Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference (Cleveland 1994, 181-184).

The British lifted their protectorate of Egypt and the Egyptian ruler became the king of Egypt in 1922. However this did not mean a full independence for Egypt. The Wafd introduced a constitution in 1923 and elections for the first parliament were held in 1924. The Wafd got ninety percent of the votes and Zaghlul became the first elected prime minister of Egypt. The 1924-1936 period was a short-lived experiment of parliamentary democracy in Egypt. The constitution gave sweeping powers to the king. The King could appoint prime ministers and abolish parliaments. The British also did not stop to interfere in Egyptian politics and Zaghlul was not quite a democrat either. Therefore Egyptian politics usually revolved around the power struggles between the Wafd, the King and the British. With the treaty of 1936, Egypt achieved a greater degree of internal sovereignty. However this did not change the internal dynamics of Egyptian politics substantially. After Zaghlul’s death in 1927 unpopular leaders who alienated the Egyptian population by trying to impose European values on the society succeeded him (Cleveland 1994, 184-188).

The educated members of the middle and upper classes of the Egyptian society were living in a totally different universe than that of the traditional and rural segments of the society. The inability of the party system for not providing the ordinary citizens the solutions to their economic needs and the cultural alienation turned people to organizations that operated outside of the formal political system. Many of the voluntary organizations that emerged during the 1930s were associated with Islamic activism. The most significant of them was the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in the city of Ismailiyaa in 1928 by Hasan
Al-Banna Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood grew rapidly during the 1930s and by the end of the decade it had five hundred branches in Egypt and tens of thousands of members. Banna was a school teacher in Ismailiya which was a highly Europeanized city at that time. Banna was influenced from Rida's ideas published in Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) which was a magazine established by Rida to advocate Salafiyyah movement (Beinin and Stork 1997, 6; Ayubi 1993, 130-142).

Emergence of Islamism: A Conceptual Framework

Islam is a religion, a way of life and identity for over one billion people around the world. Husain points out that in the West, the religious realm, represented by the church, and the political realm are separate and coexist with their own distinct laws and chains of authority. In Islam, however, religion and politics are inseparable; the domain of Caesar and the domain of God are mutually inclusive. Famous Muslim philosopher and theologian Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) depicts this inclusiveness by stating that "religion and temporal power are twins"; they are two sides of the same coin. Islam is more than a set of obligatory rituals; it is an integrated and holistic belief system which makes no distinction between religious and political responsibilities. In the modern world, Islam became a vehicle for political change, and it is mainly due to its historical and organic nature (Husain 2003, 38-39).

Islam as a Historical and Organic Religion

After the death of Muhammad in 632, during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, Islam spread from Spain to Central Asia and became the second largest of the world's religions. Islam was not just a spiritual community; rather it also became a state and an empire. From the time of Prophet Muhammad, Islam developed a religio-political
movement in which religion was integral to state and society (Esposito 1998, 3-5). In the western world, the religious realm and the political realm remained mostly separate and managed to coexist after a long battle. The principle of separating the church and the state in the West comes from the Christian maxim: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s" (Luke 20:25). Philosophers of the Enlightenment discussed the separation of church and state. For Europe, it wasn’t easy to implement the idea, sectarianism and bloodshed took place until the principle was established. However, in Islam, the realm of Caesar and the realm of God are mutually inclusive, and Islam makes no distinction between religious and political aspects of human life. In this regard, Islam provides models for both individual and political action (Husain 2003, 38-43).

Islam is a historical religion. Unlike ahistorical religions (like Hinduism and Buddhism), Islam perceives history as divinely ordained. Muslims see the hand of God purposefully guiding history. Religion explains the beginning, and the end of human history and the direction it must take. For Islam, particular events in history are crucial acts of revelation (Smith 1970, 248-249). For example victory in battle is considered as a sign of God’s gift, likewise defeat in battle was God’s warning and test. The following verses (8:7-9) are about the victory of Muhammad in the Battle of Badr (624):

\[
\text{Behold! Allah promised you one of the two (enemy) parties, that it should be yours: Ye wished t hat the one unarmed should be yours, but Allah willed to justify the Truth according to His words and to cut off the roots of the Unbelievers; That He might justify Truth and prove Falsehood false, distasteful though it be to those in guilt. Remember ye implored the assistance of your Lord, and He answered you: "I will assist you with a thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks."}
\]

The following verses (3:139-142) are about the defeat of Muslims in the Battle of Uhud, after an initial success the Muslims were driven back and the Prophet was also wounded:
So lose not heart, nor fall into despair: For ye must gain mastery if ye are true in Faith. If a wound hath touched you, be sure a similar wound hath touched the others. Such days (of varying fortunes) We give to men and men by turns: that Allah may know those that believe, and that He may take to Himself from your ranks Martyr-witnesses (to Truth).  And Allah loveth not those that do wrong.  Allah's object also is to purge those that are true in Faith and to deprive of blessing those that resist Faith.  Did ye think that ye would enter Heaven without Allah testing those of you who fought hard (In His Cause) and remained steadfast?

Thus, in history such particular events that are considered as acts of revelation set specific precedents for establishing a social, economic and political order that conforms to a divine design. Hence, to devout Muslims, what Muhammad did is as important as what Muhammad said and to the devout believers, Muhammad is the most significant role model. He was a charismatic religious leader, a successful statesman, a just judge, a competent administrator, a courageous military leader, a loving husband and father and a trustworthy friend (Husain 2003, 39-40).

Islam is also an organic religion. While some religions emphasize the role of a well established and well structured clerical organization that has a separate identity from both government and society, Islam as an organic religion maintains no such church hierarchy or priestly class. In an organic religion, religion is largely equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations are secondary. In organic religions the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, in fact the two systems merge. The Shari’a has something to say about every aspect of human life like marriage, divorce, hygiene, manners, crime, punishment, economics, politics, war and so forth. The society is the ummah (the brotherhood/community of the believers) and the ummah is a religious community and a political society (Husain 2003, 38-43). Thus, in Islam political institutions are designed to defend and promote Islam, not the state. Those institutions are supposed to establish and uphold an Islamic system based on the Shari’a. Thus, the primary loyalty of Muslims is to the ummah, not to the state, and to the Shari’a, not to the
ruler. As both a historical and organic religion Islam directly clashes with Western style secularization (Toprak 1995, 22-23).

Modernization, Secularization and Islamism

The modernization theory assumed that complex economic structure and political development proceed in tandem; economic specialization leads to political institutionalization; and the displacement of traditional (usually landed) elites by urban middle classes leads to the emergence of centralized commercial, bureaucratic and educational structures. According to this formulation, religion gradually recedes from the public life. Consequently, the religious establishment is seen as resistant to change. As the civic order becomes secularized, rational conduct becomes the norm and this leads to greater political participation or at least political stability. Eickelman and Piscatorì argue that the fundamental difficulty with the theory lay in the sharp contrast between two artificial constructs: modernity and tradition, and the consequent misunderstanding of the entrenched social functions of tradition (2004, 22-23).

Filali-Ansary (1996, 76-80) argues that Muslim societies did not experience secularization as an internal or autonomous move; external influences either started the process or disrupted it. However, currently secularization is a reality in the Muslim world; no Muslim society today is governed solely with reference to religious law and religious traditions are no longer predominant in the Muslim world. Thus, secularization in the Muslim world happened before religious reformation which is a complete reversal of the European experience in which secularization was more or less an outcome of such reformation. Husain (2003) argues that the failure of the Secularists in the post colonial Muslim states is one of the major factors that fuel Islamism today. During the colonial rule, the Europeans not only exploited their colonies, but used them as export markets for their
surplus capital goods and consumer goods. Moreover, Europeans introduced modernization and Western secular education. The indigenous elite initially both emulated and cooperated with the European powers, they embraced modernization and secularization. However it was the same indigenous elite that became the leaders of independence movements in those countries with the decline of colonial rule after the First World War (Husain 2003, 131-134). The Europeans never granted independence to their colonies in the Muslim world in exchange for their cooperation against the Axis nations in general, and the Ottoman Turks in particular. Nationalism also became a potent force among the Muslims replacing the loyalty of the Muslim people to the Islamic ummah.

The Muslim secularist elites filled the political void left by the departing colonial administrations. The Secularists worked to transform the predominantly rural and traditional Muslim world into modern urban nation states by pursuing programs of modernization, Westernization and secularization. Despite the Muslim Secularists' early popular support, within a few decades their credibility and legitimacy eroded and the Secularist elites were discredited.\textsuperscript{169} Muslim secularists also used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism in domestic and foreign policy to achieve greater popular support. However, instead of appeasing the Islamists, the Muslim secularists' political use of Islam legitimized Islamism and undermined secularization process in those countries. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was one of the examples of a Muslim secularist leader who used Islamic rhetoric and symbolism to gain popular support (Husain 2003, 133-139); however Sadat greatly contributed to an Islamist revival in his country during the 1970s in Egypt.

\textsuperscript{169} The rapid economic growth achieved in some Muslim countries did not significantly benefit the impoverished majority. Instead, the economic gains were enjoyed mostly by the wealthy elite. Secularists' modernization project unfortunately did not bring substantial development and wealth to the people. Muslim secularists used the Western idea of nationalism to integrate and to unify their fragmented societies and to consolidate their political power.
and he was assassinated by violent Revolutionary Islamists in 1981 for signing the Camp David Accords with Israel which meant an official recognition of the state of Israel and an end to the hostilities between two countries.

Premodern Islamic Revivalism

The imperial sultanates of the Muslim world (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal) had peaked in the 16th century, and by the 18th century their power and wealth were declining due to various internal and external factors. Political and economic decline were accompanied by a growing concern about spiritual and moral decay in 18th century Muslim societies. Both in Sunni and Shi’a Islam there is a belief of reviver of Islam and an expectation of a messianic leader, the Mahdi.  

In one of his sayings, Prophet Muhammad said: If only one day of this time (world) remained, Allah would raise up a man from my family (the Mahdi) who would fill this earth with justice as it has been filled with oppression. In another saying, the Prophet said: The Mahdi will be of my stock, and will have a broad forehead a prominent nose. He will fill the earth will equity and justice as it was filled with oppression and tyranny, and he will rule for seven years. Although perception of the Mahdi by the Sunni and the Shi’a are completely different, in both beliefs, he is an extraordinary individual who will come in the future to deliver the Muslims and the rest of the world from oppression and to restore true Islam with justice and prosperity for all.

Abu Dawud’s Sunan (one of the six major Hadith collections (Al-Sihah al-Sittah or Al-Kutub al-Sittah: The Six Authentic or The Six Books), which comprise authentic sayings of the Prophet recorded during and/or after his death; those six Hadith collections are not part of the Qur’an) has a separate chapter about the Mahdi. It is the 36th book of Abu Dawud’s Sunan, the Promised Deliverer (Kitab Al Mahdi).


Book 36, Number 4272: Narrated Abu Sa’id al-Khudri. From: -MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/036.sat.html#036.4271
The various Islamic revivalist movements sought to transform not just the religion, but the political and social life of the Muslim community. Their major goal was to initiate the moral reconstruction of Muslim societies through reinterpretation of Islamic law and the Qur'an. Previous scholars argued that Muslims had to follow the path of Islam as set forth in the previous Muslim legal and theological writings. The Islamic revivalists of the 18th and 19th centuries rejected this unquestionable following of previous legal or theological teachings (Esposito 1998, 33-42).

Premodernist Islamic revivalist movements of the 18th and 19th centuries (like Wahhabism of S. Arabia, Shah Waliullah of India, Sanusi and Mahdi movements of North Africa) largely contributed to the modern Islamic politics, however unlike modern Islamism, these movements were motivated primarily in response to internal decay rather than external colonial threat. The premodernist revivalist movements brought into sharp focus the weakened and disorganized condition of the Muslim ummah. Second, they provided the causes and solutions of the problems (departure from true Islam, return to true Islam). Third, they reasserted that religion is integral to all areas of human life. Fourth, they asserted that Islamic revival requires the rejection of an unquestioning acceptance of traditions. Fifth, the return to true Islam could only be possible by a new interpretation that was based on the sole authoritative foundations of Islam, not on the latterly invented popular beliefs (bid'ah). Sixth and the most important one, these movements emphasized that the revival of Muslim societies required political action symbolized by jihad (Esposito 1998, 42).

At the beginning of the 18th century many areas of the Middle East just like the rest of the Muslim world increasingly felt the impact of the economic and military dominance
of the West. By the late 19th century European imperial penetration of the Muslim world extended from Morocco to Indonesia. The French controlled North, West and parts of Central Africa and the Levant; the British controlled Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent; the Dutch controlled Southeast Asia. Only in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, the Muslims had self control, however the European powers had great economic interests in those areas and they established their economic dominance in those countries through the capitulations. Muslim responses to Europe’s dominance ranged from rejection to adaptation, from Islamic withdrawal to reform (Esposito 1998, 43).

Modernization in the Muslim world started in the early 19th century. Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and Egyptian Governor Muhammad (Mehmed) Ali (1805-1849) tried to emulate the West by modernizing their armies through new military training schools staffed by Europeans. Groups of students were sent to Europe to study languages, sciences and arts. Translation bureaus and printing houses were established. In addition to military modernization, those governments also modernized their central administration, law, education and economy. Muhammad Ali’s son Khedive (Viceroy) Ismail and the Sultans after Mahmud II, expanded the scope of those reforms and initiated systematic modernization projects. Mahmud’s son Abdülmecid challenged the Islamic institutions with new secular schools, new secular legal codes, and secular courts through the reforms known as the Tanzimat.

173 Capitulations are a special kind of treaties, unilateral contracts granted by a state and conferring the privilege of extra-territorial jurisdiction within its boundaries on the subjects of another state. European powers received many capitulations from the Ottomans, Persians and Egyptians during the 18th and 19th centuries due to the economic and military decline of those states. From: Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed.
174 However, modernization did not benefit the whole society because change was adopted by the state and implemented by a small group of political elites. Therefore these reforms were imposed from above by
(reorganization) reforms. Opposition to the reforms came from the religious establishment and the *ulema* (religious scholars) who perceived those reforms as nonreligious innovations (*bid'ah*) and deviation from the true religion. Later in 1876 the first Ottoman Constitution was created and a constitutional monarchy was created with a bicameral parliament. Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II refused to surrender the absolute power because his commitment to modernization was more military and technological than political and eliminated the liberals and reformists through authoritarian measures. Abdülhamid II appealed to Islamism and publicly used his caliphate title publicly and tried to promote Pan-Islamism against the growing influence of separatist nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire. The antimonarchy powers, led by the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) ousted Abdülhamid II, reopened the Ottoman parliament and installed Mehmed the fifth as the new sultan (Esposito 1998, 46, 47).

In Egypt, Khedive Ismail (1863-1879) just like his father Muhammad Ali tried to establish secular institutions parallel to their traditional Islamic counterparts. Modern nationwide secular schools were established alongside with the traditional religious schools; Islamic law and courts were restricted to family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance) since the Egyptian state adopted a new legal code primarily based on the French law. The newly emerging lawyers, engineers, doctors and journalists were challenging the political, intellectual and social leadership of the ulema. The process of modernization also bred nationalist sentiments against the British and the French. The result of the culmination of those nationalist sentiments against foreign domination of Egypt was the Urabi Revolt (1881) which was led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi. The revolt provided the pretext for the British to occupy Egypt in 1892 (Esposito 1998, 47).
As a result of 19th century reforms in the Middle East, the traditional Islamic basis of Muslim states was altered by a progressive secularization of society in which the ideology, law and institutions of state were no longer legitimated through Islam, but were indebted to imported models from the West. The result was a division of the society as the traditional religious and moderns secular schools coexisted and both institutions, secular and religious, trained two classes with divergent weltanschauungs. The modernization process also undermined the traditional power basis of the religious establishment and the ulema as new professional/administrative classes emerged in education, law, and government positions (Esposito 1998, 47).

Emergence of Modern Islamisms in Egypt

The secular reformers of the Muslim world tried to restrict Islam to the personal and moral sphere of life, however during the latter half of the 19th century a generation of Islamic reformers emerged who sought to strengthen Muslim societies through religious reform. The Islamic reformers recognized the scientific and political power of the West and they avoided the rejectionist tendency of the Traditionalist Islamists. For those Islamic reformers, modernity posed no threat to Islam and they were opposed to the traditionalism of the Muslim ulema, whom they blamed as the cause of stagnation in the Muslim world. Early Islamic modernists like Afghani, Abduh and Rida stressed the need in Islamic civilization to adopt modern science. The reformers argued that the Islamic fundamentals are fully compatible with science and the basic reason of underdevelopment of the Muslim world was lack of proper understanding of the true nature of Islam. Thus, the reformists perceived adoption of modern science as an “act of repossession”. For the Islamic modernists, Islam is more favorable to rationality than other religions (Tibi 2001, 12-18).
Jamal Al Din Al Afghani (1839-1897) is considered as the father of Islamic modernism. Born and educated in Iran and then in British India, Afghani was a teacher and a political activist who traveled most of the Muslim world as well as Europe. Afghani taught in Egypt, served as an adviser to the Shah of Iran and traveled in Europe. Afghani took up residence in Egypt in 1871 and attracted a group of young people to his ideas of political and religious reform. His activities were unwanted by Khedive Tawfiq who deported Afghani to India in 1879. Afghani resurfaced in Paris in 1884 and published an Arabic newspaper *Al Urwah Al Wuthqa* (The Indissoluble Bond/The Trustworthy handhold) with one of his disciples, Muhammad Abduh. Later Afghani became an adviser to Shah Nasir Al Din of Iran; however when the shah granted the tobacco concession of 1890, Afghani became one of the leading critics and organizers of the mass protests against it. He was expelled from Iran but his influence remained strong among oppositional groups. Afghani spent last five years of his life in Istanbul, and Sultan Abdülhamid II who was attracted to Afghani’s Pan-Islamic ideas kept Afghani under house arrest when one of Afghani’s former students assassinated Shah of Iran (Cleveland 1994, 118-119). Afghani strongly preached the need for a national unity to resist European intervention, the need for a broader unity of Muslim people and the need for a constitution to limit the ruler's power. Thus, anti-imperialism, Arab unity and Pan-Islamism and constitutionalism are the basic political themes that Afghani advocated besides Islamic modernism (Esposito 1995, 55-62).

Like many of Afghani's other disciples Muhammad Abduh adamantly followed his teacher's path. During the 1870s Abduh published newspaper articles reflecting Afghani’s

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The term actually is one of the references of the Holy Qur’an about itself: (3:31) “Whoever submits his whole self to Allah, and is a doer of good, has grasped indeed the most trustworthy hand-hold (*Al Urwah Al Wuthqa*): and with Allah rests the End and Decision of (all) affairs.”
views on Islam, and political and social reform. Abduh became involved with Afghani in a nationalist opposition movement that culminated in Urabi revolt in 1882 against the British. The British government used the Urabi revolt as a pretext to invade Egypt. Egypt was invaded and Abduh was sent to exile. Later he joined Afghani in Paris and they started publishing Al Urwah Al Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Link) which was promoting anti-imperialism and the idea of reform and revival in Islam. After returning to Cairo from exile in 1888, Abduh focused on realizing an educational reform in the country believing that a massive reform was necessary to transform the Egyptian society. In 1898 Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida published the first issue of Al Manar (The Lighthouse) which strongly propagated Islamic reform. One year later, Abduh became the Grand Mufti of Egypt. Abduh maintained that there was no conflict between religion and reason. Abduh was promoting a selective integration of Islam with modern ideas and institutions (Esposito 1998, 51-52).

The early Islamic modernists were precursors of the modern day reformists. Unlike their secular counterparts, they did not just look to the West; they tried to establish a continuity between their Islamic heritage and modernism. They both identified themselves with their Islamic identity and past, and freely borrowed from Western thought and institutions. Thus, rather than a restoration of the early Islamic practices, the modernists advocated an adaptation of Islam to the changing conditions of modern society. The Traditionalists criticized such changes as corrupt un-Islamic innovations (bid’ah). Islamic modernism established a new outlook toward both the past and the future. Pride in an Islamic past countered the sense of weakness and subjugation of the Muslims to the West.

\footnote{Mufti is an expert on Islamic Shari’a who has the authority to issue fatwa (religious verdict). However in Egyptian context, it usually refers to an official position; Grand Mufti is the highest religious authority.
Also, belief in the absolute relevance of Islam and its compatibility to modernity inspired new reformers throughout many parts of the Muslim world. The reformers’ path transformed the meaning of traditional beliefs and institutions thus the future generations of Islamists started to speak about completely new concepts like Islamic democracy, Muslim nationalism and Islamic socialism. Additionally, anti-colonialism of early Islamist modernists assured their continued influence among the new generation of Islamists throughout the Muslim world. However, Islamist modernism is not a monolith, the disciples of Abduh, Rida or other modernists diverged ideologically in the following decades (Esposito 1998, 58-61). After the early modern Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood, established by Hasan Al-Banna in 1928, became the dominant Islamist group in Egypt.

*Al Ikhwan Al Muslinin* (the Muslim Brotherhood) and Hasan Al-Banna

The Brotherhood could be considered both traditional and contemporary. It was traditional in the sense that Banna believed that the revival of Egypt was closely tied to the restoration of Islam as the guiding principle. By denouncing the secular institutions of Egypt, Banna argued that the implementation of the *Shari’ā* could heal the ills of Egyptian society. However, this was not a mere imitation of the past. Just like Abduh, Banna argued that the *Shari’ā* would be open to interpretation and would be compatible with the needs of a modern society. Banna sought an Islamic based social reform and advocated economic reforms and land redistribution, welfare programs and domestic investment instead of foreign investment. The Brotherhood also established close ties with the labor movement in Egypt and defended workers’ demands. The Brotherhood was also active economically,

in the country. Ottoman Turks used the term Şeyhülislam (Sheikh Al Islam) instead of the term Grand Mufti.
it established enterprises of its own and granted workers shareholding rights in those companies. As a response to secular education, Banna’s followers established primary schools that combined religious instruction with scientific and technical instruction. The organization also reached out to the poor with many charitable activities (Mitchell 1969, Abu-Rabi 1996, 62-91).

Initially Banna announced the organization as a purely religious and philanthropic society that aimed to spread Islamic morals and to engage in charitable activities. However the emergence of the Brotherhood was part of a general reaction of the ordinary people against a number of alarming developments in Egypt in particular, and in the Muslim world in general. Among those developments one can count colonialization of most of the Muslim lands, abolishment of the caliphate, penetration of Muslim culture by the West, and secularization attempts of the governments in power. As a school teacher and gifted orator, Banna managed to attract various members to his society such as some members of the local intelligentsia, some artisans, and a few workers from the British camp workshops (Mitchell 1969, 1-11). Abu-Rabi (1996, 77) points out that one of the changes that Banna hoped to introduce was the status of the mosque (masjid), bringing it from a place of worship to a center of Islamic revolution from below. For Banna, a mosque should have the triple function of i) being the place of worship for people, ii) a place of education, and iii) a hospital for the spiritually, mentally, and physically sick. In short, for Banna the mosque “...denotes a network of signifiers, a whole system of inner-oriented meanings, and outer-oriented practices and mores.” In addition, in Banna’s understanding, a mosque is a “dynamic domain for the propagation of Islam and the preparation of an active Muslim group...” (Abu-Rabi 1996, 78).
Moving to a new headquarters in Cairo in 1932, Banna continued to spread his message in regular evening sessions which attracted a majority of artisans and minor merchants. Influenced by the ideas of Rida, Banna called for a comprehensive and activist Islam. Banna’s ideology revolved around three basic interdependent pillars: i) a determined leadership, ii) believing workers, and iii) a proper program of action as contained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Abu-Rabi 80). However, Banna did not clearly specify the extent of that activism; he was not completely clear on the political nature of that activism. In Banna’s days the movement was still young and it did not develop its own view on politics. For the Brotherhood leaders, assuming political power was not a possibility and there were more immediate concerns such as the British occupation and the rising nationalist movement (Ayubi 131). Abu-Rabi points out that Banna was aware of the rising Third World nationalism, and for Banna wataniyyah (patriotism) and qawmiyyah (nationalism) do not essentially contradict with Islam (Abu-Rabi 1996, 79).

Banna believed that Islam had a broader meaning contrary to what most people had thought. For Banna, Islam was a comprehensive religion that involved all affairs of life. However, the starting point was the moral realm. The realization of Islamic principles requires strong morals, and all these efforts must be accompanied with a clear Islamic methodology (minhaj). If applied properly, the Islamic methodology is capable of healing all the ills of the society. The Brotherhood did not identify itself as a political party, although it was organized and run like one. Banna indicated that in achieving their goals, the Brotherhood would not necessarily require to control the government and would support whoever ruled by Islamic principles. For Banna, personal piety and good community based on Islamic morals were the major conditions for a good Islamic state.
Thus, their more immediate task was to reform souls and to enlighten minds (Al-Banna 1981; Mitchell 1969).

In 1938, the Brotherhood started two weekly, *Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin* (The Muslim Brotherhood) and *Al-Nadhir* (The Warner), and from that date the Brotherhood gained more of a political character and they had around three hundred branches throughout Egypt (Mitchell 13-16). Banna also developed the concept of “mental colonization” which, for him, refers to the consequences of Western education in Egypt in particular; and throughout the Muslim world in general. Banna believed that “the most harmful consequences of exporting Western ideas to the Muslim people, under the guise of missionary activities and colonialism, lie in the field of education.” Moreover, for Banna, what was even more harmful was that education was used as a tool by the colonial powers to create an “indigenous mercenary intellectual class” made up of the Egyptian upper class alone. For Banna, consequently the masses were deprived of basic education in religious and secular sciences. Later, Banna’s concept of “mental colonization” picked by the intellectual leaders of the Brotherhood, including Qutb (Abu-Rabi 1996, 80).

The Brotherhood was really careful in not provoking the Palace which appeared to be supportive of them to counterbalance the popular Wafd Party. The Brotherhood avoided confrontation with the British at any price and slowly developed its own organizational and paramilitary capacity. The brothers also built their own companies, schools and hospitals. During the 1940s, the Brotherhood started to attack Jewish and British interests in Egypt because for them those targets represented the Western imperialism in their country. When the Prime Minister M. F. Al Nuqrashi attempted to stop the activities of the Brotherhood, he was assassinated by the organization in 1948. The following year the
leader of the organization, Banna, was assassinated by the Egyptian security forces and the government dissolved the Brotherhood (Al-Banna 1981; Mitchell 1969).

Despite the most adverse political conditions Banna’s Brotherhood was able to influence large segments of the Egyptian society. However, Abu-Rabi argues, the Brotherhood was “unable to exert its influence over two broad social strata: i) the secularized indigenous classes, and ii) the institutionalized [official] ulema class [of Al-Azhar]” (Abu-Rabi, 87). Banna’s career ended abruptly by his assassination; however his organization continued to grow after his death and took a new shape with the contributions of other Brotherhood intellectuals, especially Sayyid Qutb’s. Banna and early Brotherhood leaders did not attempt to revive the philosophical tradition of classical Islam, nor did they deal with the scholastic theology of Abduh and his disciples’ reformist school. The early Brotherhood leadership simply focused on social and political matters and tried to respond to such issues through their interpretation of Islam (Abu-Rabi 1996, 90).

The Egyptian Republic and Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Coup of 1952 and Gamal Abd Al-Nasser

Egypt remained under the British hegemony until Gamal Abd Al-Nasser’s coup of 1952. The British were not willing to grant independence to Egypt; King Farouq failed to achieve popular loyalty especially after the defeat of Egypt in the 1949 Arab-Israeli war. In January 1952, the masses of Cairo demonstrated for the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt. The angry mobs attacked British property as well as bars, cinemas, and nightclubs that were considered as the symbols of corruption and immorality of the Egyptian upper classes. The complete disorder and chaos hastened the end of the old
regime and a group of young military officers calling themselves the Free Officers (Al-Dhubbat Al-Ahrar) carried out a coup led by Colonel Gamal Abd Al-Nasser.

The officers were not coming from an elite background but mostly from a middle class background. King Farouq was sent to exile and Egypt turned from a monarchy into a republic. The constitution of 1923 was abolished, the parliament was dissolved and all parties were banned. Before carrying out the coup, Nasser had managed to convince a respected senior officer General M. Naguib as their figurehead leader. After the coup, Naguib became the prime minister and the president, Nasser became the minister of interior, and the other officers became the members of the cabinet. The main rival of the new military government for power was the Brotherhood. In fact, most of the officers had close ties with the Brotherhood and after the coup the Brotherhood was classified as a society by the Free Officers, not as a party, which enabled the Brotherhood to escape from dissolution. The Brotherhood leadership hoped to participate directly in government after the coup; however the military government was not willing to share power. Relations between the two deteriorated quickly and resulted in a bloody confrontation. The government outlawed the Brotherhood when a member of it tried to assassinate Nasser in 1954. The Brotherhood has always argued that the assassination was staged by the government to liquidate the organization. Six of the leaders of the Brotherhood were executed and thousands of members were imprisoned. The organization went underground (Mitchell 1969, 96-104).

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Zionism politically emerged in nineteenth-century Europe. European liberal nationalism provided for the legal emancipation of the Jews. While political and social developments in Western Europe integrated Jews into national life, the situation in Russia
and Poland for the Jews considerably different. Active persecution of the Jews intensified during the last decades of the nineteenth century in Eastern Europe. Many East European Jews immigrated to the U.S. Zionism developed as Jewish groups were formed in the early 1880s to assist Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1884 several groups were organized under a central agency with the name of the Lovers of Zion. Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) believed that anti-Semitism in Europe was such a deeply rooted prejudice that it could never be eliminated by legislation. He saw emancipation as a façade designed to mask anti-Semitism. With this belief, he wrote The Jewish State in 1896. Herzl’s thesis was that the Jews constituted a nation but lacked a political state. For Herzl, Jews had to acquire political sovereignty in a state of their own. His book provided Zionism with a clearly stated political objective. With Herzl’s efforts, the first Zionist Congress was convened in Basel in 1897. The program of the Congress stated that the objective of Zionism was to secure a legally recognized home for Jews in Palestine. The delegates also agreed to establish the World Zionist Organization as the central administrative organ of the Zionist movement. The Congress met annually after 1897. However, the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II, was against the idea of large-scale European Jewish settlement in Ottoman territory; and none of the European powers was enthusiastic about supporting the movement which had offered no clear diplomatic benefits (Cleveland 1994, 223-225).

When the Ottomans decided to enter the war on the side of Germany during the First World War, Britain, France and Russia planned for the partition of Ottoman territories if the Allies gained victory. There were two principal proposals for dividing the Ottoman Empire among the Allies: The British pledge to Sharif Husayn of Mecca and the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France. On November 2, 1917, a letter from Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, was sent to Lord Rothschild, the head of the Zionist
Federation in Britain. The British cabinet approved Balfour Declaration in sympathy for Jewish Zionist aspirations. The Ottomans regarded Palestine as part of southern Syria, not as a distinctive administrative entity. The British capture of Jerusalem in December of 1917 detached Palestine from the Ottoman rule. In 1920, with the San Remo Conference the British established their mandate in Palestine. The World Zionist Organization created the Palestine Zionist Executive in 1921 and in 1929 reorganized as the Jewish Agency which later became the quasi-government of the Jewish community in Palestine under the British mandate. The Jewish Agency was managing a vast array of services that ranged from banking to health care and immigrant settlement. The chairman of the agency had regular access to the British high commissioner and other British officials. Jewish communal affairs were conducted through a hierarchy of representative institutions. The national assembly, which was an elected body of 300 members, was established in 1920. The national council was elected among the members of the national assembly. The council was making administrative decisions for the Jews in Palestine and was recognized as the legitimate representative of Palestinian Jews by the British mandate government. Jewish immigration to Palestine accelerated after 1933 when Hitler rose to power. Within three years about 170,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, doubling the size of Jewish population in Palestine, which alarmed the Arab community. Two major instances (1929, 1936-1939) of the communal violence in the interwar years in Palestine were directly related to the dislocations caused by Jewish immigration and land transfers from Arabs to Jews (Cleveland 1994, 222-241).

Through the end of the Second World War, the Palestinian Jews undertook a series of terrorist acts against the British presence in Palestine. In February 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin referred the situation to the United Nations to formulate a solution
to the Palestine mandate. The UN Special Committee on Palestine recommended the termination of the British mandate and the granting of independence to Palestine. The report recommended the partition of the mandate into two states, Arab and Jewish, with Jerusalem as an internationalized city. The report was endorsed by Zionist leaders; it was rejected by Arab leaders. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. Before the approval, the British announced in September that the Palestine mandate would be terminated on May 15, 1948. In the period between the British announcement and withdrawal, Palestine was in chaos. There was a period of civil war during which the Jewish forces tried to secure the territory designated in the partition plan. However, most of that territory was inhabited by an Arab majority. The weak Arab resistance was no match for well organized Jewish forces. Throughout the turmoil, the British administration made little effort to provide order and on May 14, 1948 the last British high commissioner, Gen. A. Cunningham left Palestine. A few hours after the departure of Cunningham, Ben-Gurion proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel. Israel was immediately recognized by the US and the USSR (Cleveland 1994, 243-248).

On May 15, 1948 units from the armies of Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq attacked Israel which is known as the first Arab-Israeli war. The war ended in December 1948 and the Arab forces were defeated, Israel enlarged its territory and the UN proposal for a Palestinian Arab state collapsed. After the ceasefire between Israel and the Arabs, Palestine was partitioned among Israel, Egypt and Transjordan. Palestinians had no state; the vast majority of the Arab population in the territory that became Israel (over 700,000 people) became refugees. The Arab flight from Palestine began during the civil war and accelerated with Jewish terror against Arabs by April 1948. The displaced
Palestinians became refugees in destitute and crowded refugee camps in various Arab states. By the time the last armistice agreement was signed in 1949, about 160,000 Arabs remained within the borders of Israel (Cleveland 1994, 248-251).

Authoritarian Reform, Arab Socialism and Pan-Arabism

Nasser believed that Egypt's future prosperity would be secured through a program of rapid industrialization. The building of the Aswan Dam was one of the main pillars of Nasser's modernization plan. Electric power generated by the dam would stimulate the economy, provide jobs, and transform the country into a modern industrial country. The dam would also control the Nile's floods and provide a dramatic expansion of Egyptian agriculture. The U.S. promised aid for the construction. In return, the U.S. pressured Nasser to join the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) as part of the containment during the Cold War era. Nasser rejected to join by arguing that the new alliance was colonialism in a new guise. Clashes between Palestinian fighters seeking shelter on Egyptian soil and Israeli forces escalated into clashes between Israeli forces and the Egyptian army at the border. Nasser demanded Western arms to resist Israeli incursions, but the U.S. refused Nasser's demands. Nasser responded by purchasing arms from the Soviets through Czechoslovakia in 1955. In response, the U.S. cancelled its aid for the Aswan Dam in 1956. Nasser boldly responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal immediately to use its revenues to finance his dam project. Israel conspired with Britain and France to occupy the Suez Canal fearful of Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world. British, French and Israeli forces occupied the canal in October of 1956 which started the second Arab-Israeli conflict (Palmer 2007, 51-53).

By 1956 the Nasser regime had already secured its power and achieved a popular loyalty through its land reform program. Additionally, Nasser's defiance of the West
through nationalization of the Suez Canal made him a hero in the Arab world. Because of the heavy U.S. and Russian pressure, the three countries quickly had to withdraw their forces from the Sinai Peninsula. Unexpectedly Nasser emerged victorious from the crisis. Besides being a national hero, Nasser also aimed to make Egypt the center of Arabism and he endorsed Pan-Arabism by creating the United Arab Republic, a union of Syria and Egypt, as a single state in 1958. However, the union did not last too long; it ended three years later. Adoption of socialism for pragmatic reasons also did not work. To generate resources for its developmental projects, the Nasser government decided to take over most of the enterprises in the country. Also starting from 1952, land reforms created a dramatic change in the distribution of land. Large estates virtually disappeared and small farms covered more than half of all the cultivated land by 1964 (Cleveland 1994, 300).

In 1962, Nasser issued the Charter for National Action, a document explaining the new policies. The Charter proclaimed that Egypt’s revolution aimed to achieve freedom, socialism and unity. Egypt was characterized as the leader of the Arab revolution by the Charter. The instrument through which the goals of the revolution were to be achieved was the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The Charter defined the ASU as a revolutionary organization open to all Egyptians except feudalists and capitalists. By the late 1960s, the ASU became a huge bureaucratic organization with more than 5 million members. Nasser headed the ASU and the top bureaucracy of the organization was filled with former military officers. The ASU was a government organization to mobilize mass opinion in the absence of political parties and civil society. Most ordinary Egyptians became members of the organization not for ideological purposes, but for patronage. Membership in the ASU increased one’s chances of securing a good position in the government sector and provided *wasta* (connections) (Palmer 2007, 54-57).
Nasser’s regime expanded education like other modernizing regimes. The purpose of the government was not only to increase the level of literacy rate, but also to indoctrinate the young children with the principles of nationalism and socialism. To encourage students to attend universities, the regime abolished tuition fees in postsecondary institutions. In 1962 Nasser boldly guaranteed a government job to every university graduate. During the 1960s, the number of university students nearly doubled. However the universities were not well equipped to deal with the sudden burden. Nasser was forced to stuff the state bureaucracy with the graduates of those universities to fulfill his promise. Such bureaucratic jobs were low-paying and offered few rewards. The lack of adequate employment opportunities increased the level of discontent among the college students (Cleveland 1994, 301).

State Islam in Egypt

Rather than diminishing the role of Islam in the Egyptian society, Nasser attempted to take them under the control of the state and then to use them in the service of the revolution. Tamir argues that Nasser understood the importance of gaining control over Al-Azhar in order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives. Nasser wanted Al-Azhar to lend legitimacy to his regime and his nationalist and socialist program. Subordinating Al-Azhar to the state also would allow Nasser to balance the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which threatened to mobilize Egyptians against the government. Moreover, Nasser believed that Al-Azhar’s influence in the Muslim world as the most respected and influential institution of Islamic scholarship would be an important tool in furthering Egypt’s leadership of Arab and Muslim countries. Tamir (2000, 5-6) argues that Nasser’s most ambitious attempt to secure the state’s dominance over Al-Azhar came in a 1961 law that radically reorganized the institution. With the reorganization, Al-
Azhar was placed under the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments. All of the finances of the university were to be directed through the appropriate state channels, giving non-Azhar state officials significant influence over the university. Under the 1961 law, the Egyptian president and the minister of endowments were also given formal jurisdiction over important issues of appointment, most notably the appointment of the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. Finally, the 1961 reorganization expanded the university from just three colleges (theology, Arabic, and Shari’a) to include many secular colleges, such as medicine, law, and engineering. The addition of new secular colleges changed the balance of power in the Azhar High Council. The changes ensured that an increasing number of deans representing non-religious colleges would be represented there. The changes made by Nasser transformed the university from an independent institution to a government-controlled institution with little autonomy.

Previously, Nasser attempted to undermine the influence of the ulema through the 1952 land-reform law just like Muhammed Ali had done more than a century earlier. This law placed all waqf properties under the control of the new Ministry of Endowments. In 1955, Nasser also abolished all Shari’a courts, which had operated parallel to the secular courts established earlier by Muhammed Ali. Tamir continues by pointing out to the fact that Nasser used his new leverage over al-Azhar to secure fatwas that supported his socialist policies, especially to legitimize his land reforms. Moreover, the Nasser government also established the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, which emphasized the supposed connection between Islam and socialism. The Supreme Council’s publication, Minbar al-Islam (The Pulpit of Islam), issued articles like “Socialism and Islam” and “The Cause of the National Charter Is the Cause of Islam.” Moreover, Nasser also used fatwas to advance his foreign-policy objectives in the Muslim world. In the rivalry
between Nasser and King Faisal of S. Arabia throughout the 1960s, Nasser used Al-Azhar's fatwas to legitimize his policies and encouraged Saudi Arabia's citizens to rise up against their government. Nasser's regime also broadcasted similar appeals throughout the Arab and Islamic world on Egypt's international radio program "Voice of the Arabs." By 1963, "Voice of the Arabs" was broadcasting in twenty-four languages with approximately 755 hours of weekly broadcasting. Similarly, Nasser financed students from all over the Muslim world to have their college education at Al-Azhar in order to increase the university's connections with other religious establishments and enhance the international influence of Al-Azhar (Tamir 2000, 7).

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Islamism after Banna

Sayyid Qutb's intellectual life spanned a period of three and a half decades during which he distinguished himself as a literary, social, and religious critic and writer. Not only during his life, but also after his death, Qutb's writings inspired a wide group of Muslim intellectuals and followers. His works can be classified in five major categories: i) poetry and literature, ii) works on the Qur'an (Qur'anic aesthetics and exegesis), iii) philosophy of social justice, iv) sociology of religion, and v) Islam and the West. For Abu-Rabi, Qutb's significance stems from three major factors. First, Qutb was "...able to construct a sophisticated and comprehensive system of Islamic thought that presented the Islamic view on a number of substantive issues and problems besetting Arab and Muslim societies." Second, in his complicated system of thought, there are still "...a significant number of themes and motifs that are still shared by a major portion of the contemporary Muslim intelligentsia." Third, "in addition to defining certain issues for the Muslim intelligentsia, Sayyid Qutb’s thought constituted the premises of many radical Muslim groups, especially in Egypt in the 1970s." (Abu-Rabi 1996, 93-94).
During the interwar years, Qutb was heavily involved in the literary and intellectual life of Egypt. He was known as a literary, cultural, and religious critic. This stage in Qutb’s life was a secular stage. Gradually through the end of the 1940s, social and religious themes appeared in Qutb’s works. At this stage, he was more committed to the plight of peasants and workers. By the early 1950s in the eve of the 1952 revolution, Qutb became ideologically more committed to the Muslim Brotherhood movement over the years eventually becoming the main ideologue of the movement (See Abu-Rabi, Chapters 4 and 5).

Like Banna, Qutb spent his early life as a schoolteacher. Later he worked at some bureaucratic positions within the Ministry of Education. He spent two years in the U.S. (1946-8) and studied educational administration. On his return to Egypt, Qutb joined the Brotherhood in the early 1950s. He was a prolific writer who wrote twenty four books and dozens of articles primarily on religion, politics, education and literary criticism. Qutb’s extensive Qur’anic commentary *Fi Zilal Al Qur’an* (In the Shade of the Qur’an) and his most famous work *Ma’alim Fil Tariq* (The Milestones) have contributed significantly to the ideology of future generation of Islamists (Esposito 1998, 139).

Like many intellectuals in Egypt in the 1940s, Qutb was first attracted to the West. Later Qutb was disillusioned with the West and the U.S. especially after the creation of Israel. During his two year stay (1948-1950) in the U.S. Qutb witnessed the widespread support of the American press for Israel. After Qutb became a member of the Brotherhood, the harsh crackdown of secularist-nationalist military government of Egypt on the Islamists pushed Qutb towards radicalism; and his increasingly radical-militant writings made him the leading ideologue of the Brotherhood during the crackdown of Nasser. In 1954, Qutb was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and released in 1964. Less than a year after the
publication of Milestones in 1964, Qutb was tried by Egyptian government with charges of conspiring against the state. Excerpts from the book were used to incriminate Qutb and he was found guilty and sentenced to death in 1966. Like Banna, Qutb is referred to as *al shaheed* (the martyr) (Haddad 69).

Qutb's thought was extensively influenced by Banna and Pakistani Islamic thinker Mawdudi. Qutb wrote more extensively than Banna, so he is the one who provided the basic guidelines for the Brotherhood. Qutb's interpretation of Islam was directly related to his political views. Qutb perceived Islam to be a complete social system. In fact, Qutb was seeking not only a new government, but also a new society. While the Brotherhood and Qutb supported the Free Officers in 1952 Revolution, he later distanced himself from the policies of the new military government of Nasser. In Qutb's view, Nasser's regime was, destructive to Egypt and Islam, because it was a nationalist-secularist regime which persecuted Islamists. Qutb had also personally witnessed the cruelty of Nasser's regime in the form of arbitrary arrests, torture, and deadly violence. In Qutb's eyes, Nasser confirmed the reality of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance) in the modern Muslim world (Sivan 73).

Qutb is also credited with theorizing approaches to enacting the widespread Islamic reforms he envisioned. His main vehicle for change was the concept of a Muslim vanguard who would instruct and lead the masses through the persuasive message of Islam. Fully formed in his final work, Milestones, Qutb's vanguard was not explicitly intended as a ruling class, but was meant to be an elite organization of highly educated and motivated Muslims dedicated to a unified cause. Qutb established complex, controversial views on several traditional Islamic ideas like *jahiliyyah*, sovereignty of God and Jihad (Esposito 1998, 140).
One of Qutb's innovations was applying the term *jahiliyyah* (ignorance), which traditionally refers to humanity's state of ignorance before the revelation of Islam, to modern-day Muslim societies. In Qutb's view, the removal of Islamic law and religious values had left the Muslim world in a condition of debased ignorance, similar to that of the pre-Islamic era. In defining the Muslim world as in a state of ignorance, Qutb concluded that all non-Islamic states were illegitimate, including that of Egypt. What was most controversial about Qutb's conception of *jahiliyyah* was his wide application of it. Qutb believed that all societies ruled by a non-Islamic government were not Islamic. Further, based on a Qur'anic interpretation of ignorance, Qutb concluded that Muslims living in such societies were religiously obligated to oppose the ruling government and to challenge its authority. In fact, Qutb's theories paired a fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an with a radical, sociopolitical ideology and among his contemporaries in the Brotherhood, Qutb's influence was great on formation of militant Islamic organizations like *Al Takfir Wal Hijra* (Excommunication and Emigration) and *Al Jihad* group (whose members later assassinated Egyptian President A. Sadat after he signed the Camp David Accords with Israel) later split from the Brotherhood (Rubin 14). For the Brotherhood neither Western capitalism, nor atheistic communism could help the Muslim community. The only answer was a return to true Islam.

Haddad argues that few Muslim thinkers had a significant impact on the reformulation of contemporary Islamic thought as Sayyid Qutb did. Since his execution in Cairo in 1966, his writings inspired various revolutionary Islamist groups in the Muslim world. Qutb's writings captured the imagination and the commitment of idealist revolutionaries and inspired them to work for the cause of Islam (Haddad 67-69). Haddad

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*Jahiliyyah* (Ignorance) is a term first coined by Prophet Muhammad and the first believers which
maintains that for the young revolutionaries, his life experiences, his writings and his execution altogether epitomized one of the processes through which a revolutionary passes. According to Haddad, it is a process:

...through which a revolutionary passes from enchantment with the West to “the helplessness and marginality that it may inspire in those who find its values and norms not only foreign but inadequate, and finally the return to the roots where reintegration, conversion and the human being becomes part of the revolutionary movement aimed at changing the world and bringing a new ethical moral order based on freedom, brotherhood, and justice for all (67).

Qutb's thought was heavily influenced by Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Mawlana Mawdudi (leader of Pakistan's Jamaat-i Islami-Islamic Association). Qutb borrowed frequently from Mawdudi in his assessment of such themes as Allah's hakimiyah (governance), jihad, and the revolutionary character of Islam. Qutb wrote more extensively than Al-Banna, and his writings became a blueprint for the Muslim Brothers. Esposito argues that Qutb took many of Mawdudi's beliefs to their more literal, militant conclusion. Mainly because of harsh government treatment on the Brotherhood during Nasser years, Qutb moved from an early phase which spoke of an Islamic alternative to Western systems to a later stage in which an Islamic alternative became the Islamic imperative that all Muslims were obligated to implement. As a result, Qutb appealed to the more radical elements among his contemporaries in the Brotherhood and became a strong formative influence on militant Islamic organizations in Egypt, including Al-Takfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration), and Al-Jihad whose members later assassinated Egyptian President A. Sadat (Esposito 1998, 139-140).

Shepard argues that Qutb is important and interesting for more than one reason (Shepard 2003, 521). First, in his last years Qutb wrote several widely read books calling

refers to the pre-Islamic era in the Arabian Peninsula.
for an Islamic revolution and indeed, he was executed on the grounds that he was plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government. Thereby, for the revolutionaries he actually became a martyr (shaheed). Shepard maintains that Qutb was a major influence on the Islamist “resurgence,” which began shortly after his death. Second, Qutb is significant because of his own pilgrimage in life, which to a degree parallels developments in the Muslim world as a whole. Almost during half of his adult life Qutb was an educator, poet, and a prolific essay and literary critic writer with secular views. Only in 1948 did he begin to write Islamist works which were comparatively moderate at first. After joining the Muslim Brothers upon his return from the U.S. in the early 1950s, he was put in prison in 1954 and like many of the Brothers, Qutb remained there for most of the rest of his life. He was released briefly in 1964–65 and then re-arrested, tried, and executed. It was in prison, particularly after 1957, that he developed his most radical ideas.

Qutb captured the hopes and dreams of those who struggle to bring about change, to create social and economic justice in society; his writings inspired many Islamist groups like Al-Jihad, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and early Iranian revolutionaries especially after 1971 when Anwar Al-Sadat (1918-1981) allowed the Islamists to resume their activities to counterbalance the socialist opposition against the regime. Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and became the editor of its weekly paper upon his return from the U.S. after completing his studies on educational administration in 1950. Qutb also served as a liaison between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser who later overthrew King Farouk of Egypt in 1952. In 1954 Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser accused the Muslim Brothers of plotting against him and arrested key leaders including Qutb. Qutb was sentenced to fifteen years in prison; many Brotherhood members were tortured and died under torture. Qutb wrote most of his latter
writings which were mainly on Islam while he was in prison (Haddad 1983, 69-73; Husain 2003, 74). Qutb's justification of violence against secularist governments was widely accepted by violent radical groups throughout the Muslim world.

Qutb became increasingly radical during his imprisonment; later, more radical and violent revolutionary groups like Muhammed's Youth, Al-Jihad and Al-Takfir extensively referred to his latter writings which were more radical than his earlier ones. On October 6, 1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of Al-Jihad as he reviewed a parade commemorating the 1973 war. Lt. Khalid Islambuli, the leader of the assassins, cried out: “I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death!” Qutb was arrested in 1954 with many members of the Muslim Brotherhood was tried and sentenced to fifteen years in prison with the charge of plotting against the life of President Nasser. After serving ten years, Qutb was released from prison by Nasser. When Qutb was released from prison, he published his most well known work, Ma 'alim Fil Tariq (Signposts on the Road, also known as Milestones) in 1964. His controversial book which legitimizes use of violence against secularist rulers resulted in his arrest in 1965. One year later he was executed by the government (Esposito 1995, 96).

Qutb popularized the concept of jahiliyyah (ignorance) which is a term used in the Qur'an178 to refer to the period of ignorance in which the Meccans lived prior to Islam. Currently the term pejoratively designates all that one considers to be alien to Islam.

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178 In fact the Qur'an uses the term literally, and also to refer to the era before Islam. The first reference below is in regards to the era before Islam, the other references are the literal meaning of the word. (From Yusuf Ali Translation of the Qur'an) (33:33) "And stay quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling display, like that of the former Times of Ignorance; and establish regular Prayer, and give regular Charity; and obey Allah and His Messenger. And Allah only wishes to remove all abomination from you, ye members of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless," (6:54) "When those come to thee who believe in Our signs, Say: "Peace be on you: Your Lord hath inscribed for Himself (the rule of) mercy: verily, if any of you did evil in ignorance, and thereafter repented, and amend (his conduct), lo! He is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful." (16:119) "But verily thy Lord,- to those
Though for Qutb, it is not a period in history, it is a condition that is repeated every time society strays away from the path of Islam whether in the past, the present or the future. The difference between the historical *jahiliyyah* and the current one is that the latter is more sinister because it is deliberately created by people who assume the role of God.

Accordingly the older *jahiliyyah* was based upon pure ignorance; however the current one depends upon knowledge, complexity and disdain. Shepard argues that Qutb posits a stark contrast between Islam and *jahiliyyah*. All societies are either one or the other, and none is both, so Qutb defines the *jahili society* as every other society than the Muslim society. *Jahili societies* may be anti-religious or religious in diverse ways, but the only thing that really matters is what they have in common, that they are *jahili* (Shepard 2003, 521-545).

Under such circumstances, the believers should be aware that there is a constant struggle between the Islamic worldview and that of *jahiliyyah*. For Qutb, any system that relegates God and religion to the personal sphere is a product of *jahiliyyah* and from that injunction there is no doubt that all non-Muslim systems belong to *jahiliyyah*. As mentioned earlier, Qutb includes the secular Muslim systems into the category of *jahiliyyah* because they operate outside the divine instructions, therefore Muslims should totally reject such systems and struggle against them by Muslims is jihad which is an essential characteristic of Islam directly commanded in the Qur’an. While evaluating Muslims in his period, Qutb argues that Muslims were not fighting because they did not

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*who do wrong in ignorance, but who thereafter repent and make amends,- thy Lord, after all this, is Qft-Forgiving, Most Merciful."

179 Jihad is one of the most controversial terms in Islam. Literally it means struggle, the root of the word is the verb *jahada* which means "to struggle". First of all, jihad signifies the struggle against one's carnal desires. Indeed, Prophet Muhammed was reported to have told his companions who were returning from a holy war: "Welcome home to all of you who are returning from a small jihad to a much bigger jihad". One of the companions asked: "What is the much bigger jihad O Prophet of God? " He replied, "It is the jihad against your carnal desires". He further said, "A true mujahid (one who struggles) is the one who struggles against his carnal desires in obedience to Allah". (Reported by Al Tirmizi and Ibn Majah). The second and most well known use of the term is for fighting for the sake of God.
exist (as a political and economic power both domestically and globally); and Qutb urges the Muslims not to be embarrassed and not to renounce force. Qutb further contemplates that Muslims inability to fulfill jihad is a temporary situation.\textsuperscript{180}

Qutb also argues that the Shari'a was eternal and God-given; however through fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Muslims can reinterpret the eternal principles to have them become relevant to modern life, its needs and problems. For Qutb, Muslim people were alienated from laws issued by their national governments that are borrowed from the West. Thus, he notes that unless the people appropriate the laws as their own, society is doomed to disintegration and anomie. For Qutb, neither communism nor Western capitalism would be a proper ideological guide for Muslim societies, thus a third alternative, the Islamic alternative, is the only option for Muslims (Haddad 1983, 167-171). Indeed, Qutb posits a complex view of the West. In short, for Qutb, the West was a reflection of Christianity and its history, Renaissance and the rebellion against the authority of the Catholic Church, colonialism, both socialism and capitalism, secularism and the separation of church and state, and an intellectual orientation (Abu-Rabi 1996, 137).

The Six-Day-War (1967)

Jews all over the world celebrated the creation of Israel in 1948; however Palestinians refer to it as Al Naqba (the Catastrophe). For a decade after the 1956 Suez War, Nasser avoided direct military confrontation with Israel while focusing on domestic issues. Before the Six-Day War, Nasser provoked Israel by forcing the UN forces out of

\textsuperscript{180} Qutb also discusses the concept of hakimiyyah (sovereignty/governance of God) in regards to rejecting any type of human sovereignty whether that be of priests, tribal chefs, princes or governors as well as the concept of jahiliyyah (ignorance). Shari'ah then is the ultimate guide for humankind. As long as a certain group of people legislate for all the people equality and absolute dignity can not be realized. Qutb has a wider view of Shari'ah. It is not just about legal principles but everything that God has decreed to organize human life. This includes the principles of faith, administration of justice, morality and human behavior as well as the principles of knowledge.
the Sinai, remilitarizing the peninsula, and proclaiming a blockade of the Strait of Tiran. Nasser perceived himself as the leader of Arab nationalism; however Israel perceived Nasser’s actions as equivalent to a declaration of war. Israel launched a preemptive air attack against Egypt and Syria that destroyed their air forces on the ground. Israel then took the Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria within six days (Husain 2003, 168).

Husain argues that Nasser turned to Islamic themes and ritual observances to relieve the trauma of the Egyptian people after the defeat as it discredited his secular socialist ideologies. Nasser after 1967 stopped using socialist rhetoric and resorted to an Islamic idiom to rationalize the shocking Arab defeat. Nasser stressed Islamic virtues, like patience and perseverance, in the face of hardship. On June 19, 1967, Nasser participated in the festivities marking the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. Nasser also fired his secular socialist advisors, introduced limited economic liberalization and made fraternal overtures to the wealthy, traditional, pro-Western, monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Nasser even relaxed the restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood by releasing many of its members from jails and by allowing relative freedom for the Islamists (Husain 2003, 169).

Islamists took advantage of the new freedom, though limited, and offered a simple explanation for the Arab defeat against Israel: Egypt and other Muslim countries had strayed from the straight path of Islam that had brought progress and glory in the past. By importing alien Western ideologies like nationalism and socialism, the Muslim world suffered chronic problems. The Muslim Brotherhood openly declared that the Arab defeat was a sign of Allah’s revenge for the oppression of Muslim by Nasser, and that Allah punished Nasser since he allied with the atheistic Soviets. The Muslim Brotherhood also associated Israel’s victory over Arabs with the power of faith: the Egyptians, who had
depended upon a secular ideology, could not defeat Israel, which was a religious state based upon the tenets of Judaism (Husain 2003, 169-170).

Anwar Al-Sadat (1918-1981), Al-Infitah and the Brotherhood

Nasser had a heart attack in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, his vice president and a charter member of the Free Officers. Upon assuming office, Sadat’s main goals were economic development, freeing Egypt from Soviet domination, and building a personal base of support among both the military and the public. At the time Sadat assumed power, there were about 21,000 Soviet advisors in Egypt. The leaders of the ASU opposed Sadat and used the ASU to undermine his authority. In 1971, Sadat crushed an attempted coup by the leftist elements in the ASU. To counterbalance the leftists in the ASU, Sadat revived the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was allowed to form branches in schools and to perform charity activities for the poor (Palmer 2007, 59-60).

For reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula from Israel, Sadat attempted to start negotiations with both Israel and the U.S. but he did not receive encouragement from neither. On October 6, 1973, the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack surprised Israelis on the day of Yom Kippur; Israel was caught unprepared. Oil producing Arab countries, like S. Arabia and Libya cut their oil exports to the U.S. and Netherlands for their support of Israel in the conflict. Although the 1973 war was a military stalemate and the Arabs did not regain the lands lost to the Israelis in 1967, the conflict began with a successful Arab attack on Israel’s fortified military positions in the Sinai Peninsula. The war added great impetus to the popularity of Islamism in throughout the Muslim world. The Arab effort was perceived as a victory, though it was limited. Arabs overcame the widely held myths of Arab disunity and military inferiority; the myth of Israeli invincibility was discredited (Palmer 2007, 61; Husain 2003, 171).
Husain argues that religious symbolism during and after the 1973 war in Egypt was clearly noticeable. First, Sadat intentionally made specific plans to launch the war during Muslim’s holy month of Ramadan. Second, the operational code name for crossing the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces was Badr, which was a reminder of the first Islamic military victory of the Muslims under Prophet Muhammed against the pagan Meccans in 623. Third, the battle cry during the war was *Allahu Akbar* (God is the greatest). Many Brotherhood members also volunteered for the war and fought in the front lines (Husain 2003, 171). The U.S. arranged for a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Canal Zone in January 1974.

After the Israeli withdrawal, Egypt under Sadat launched his new economic liberalization policy known as *Al-Infitah* (the opening). With the *Infitah*, Egypt would have a mixed economy and a revived capitalist class in the country would be a counterweight to Sadat’s leftist opponents in Egypt. The *infitah* heightened the expectations of ordinary Egyptians; however it did not have any tangible benefits to the disappointed masses. Sadat faced new difficulties in implementing the *Infitah*. The major reasons

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181 The decade following the October War of 1973 in Egypt witnessed a resource boom caused by Sadat’s *infitah*. Through the *infitah*, Sadat attracted foreign investment, stimulated the private sector, and liberalized foreign trade. However, state spending grew faster than the revenues did; thus, the resulting budget deficits were financed by foreign debt. In spite of liberalization policies of Sadat, employment in the government sector grew 6.3 percent between 1977 and 1981, and the government sector (administrative jobs and the state run industry) remained the largest job source for Egyptians. Sadat also expanded Egypt’s educational institutions. From 1975 to 1985, the country’s annual output of university graduates nearly tripled, rising from around 42,000 to around 116,000 university graduates. Maintaining the guaranteed employment policy by the state was expensive. A heavy burden of wage cost, which was growing at an annual compound rate of 22.8 percent, troubled the Egyptian state. Additionally, the policy led to severe overstaffing (Wickham 2002, 37-38).

182 For instance, by the late 1970s, hidden unemployment in the public sector was estimated to be between 15 and 20 percent. Moreover, there was an average three year period between graduation and appointment to a government job. The most worrying aspect of the whole program was the steady decrease of public salaries at a time when wages in other non-public sectors of the economy were rising. Average annual GDP growth rates of 9 percent doubled per capita incomes from 1974 to 1984 except public sector jobs. When the new earning opportunities emerged in the areas of petroleum, banking, construction, and trade; in the public sector the real wages of white collar workers dropped by 8 percent between 1974 and 1984. Thus, the ear of the resource boom did not mean more wealth for the public sector employees; the incomes of the degree holders declined relative to those of other groups in Egypt in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Wickham argues that the grievances of degree holders intensified in
were that Egypt had a staggering foreign debt, a huge foreign budget, and a high inflation rate over 20 percent. One of the existing social welfare programs in Egypt was the subsidization of some basic consumer items like bread, sugar, rice and tea. The subsidies provided cheaper basic consumer goods to the poor, but they cost the state around $1.5 billion per year. Upon the warning of IMF, in January 1977, Sadat reduced the subsidies on certain items and cancelled them altogether on others. The popular response was an outbreak of antigovernment riots in Cairo. Masses attacked government buildings and police stations. Sadat had to call in the army to suppress the riots. Sadat reluctantly restored the subsidies after the riots (Cleveland 1994, 338, 339).

Sadat also promised the Egyptians a return to democracy by declaring that Egypt would have three political parties: a party of the left, a party of the capitalist right, and a party of the center. Sadat disavowed membership in any of the three. However, virtually all government officials became members of the centrist party. In 1977, the Wafd Party also resurfaced after a long break calling itself the New Wafd Party. The communists, the Nasserists, and the Muslim Brotherhood were still proscribed from forming a political party. In July 1978, Sadat announced the creation of a new political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) whose leader would be Sadat himself. Members of the centrist party resigned from their party and became members of Sadat’s NDP which took over the buildings and organizational network of the now-defunct ASU (Palmer 2007, 62-63).

On November 20, 1977, Sadat made a speech in Knesset, the Israeli parliament, to proclaim Egypt’s willingness of peace with Israel. Sadat’s address led to the Camp David Peace Accords sponsored by U.S. president Carter. On March 26, 1979 a formal peace was signed between Egypt and Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and all the

the 1980s when Mubarak attempted to cut back on the guaranteed employment program (Wickham 2002,
Arab states, except Oman and the Sudan, broke diplomatic relations with Egypt. Additionally, the oil producing Arab states cancelled their subsidies for Egypt. Enraged by Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel which still occupied Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, Islamists in Egypt increased the dose of their criticism against Sadat. Throughout the 1970s, Islamist student organizations gained control of most of the student organizations of Egypt’s major universities.

During Sadat’s reign in the 1970s, the Islamist student organizations (gama’a) in the university campuses had attracted many followers who later in Mubarak’s period became the middle-aged leaders of the Islamist movement. As previously mentioned, Sadat encouraged Islamist groups to organize in Egyptian universities during the 1970s for the purpose of counterweighing the Egyptian left (especially the ASU), which had been trying to undermine his authority. In 1973, the Islamist student organization at Cairo University sponsored summer camps for religious education, Qur’anic studies which continued in the following years. Two years later, the organization gained control of the national information and publishing committee of the General Union of Egyptian Students which had elected branches in every university faculty as well as nationwide committees. In 1978-1979 academic year, the Islamists won a landslide victory in elections for the General Union’s national board. Shortly, Islamist student associations of the mid-1970s served as an important training ground for a new generation of Islamist leaders in Egypt. Through those associations, the Islamists leaders gained experience providing services, disseminating Islamist ideology, and outreaching new members. Thus, such experience made it possible for the Islamist leaders to gain self-confidence and political skills. Through the end of his reign, Sadat attempted to limit Islamist activism in the university.
campuses through some repressive measures. However, Islamists continued to dominate student organizations in universities in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in Cairo University in the academic year of 1990-1991, the Islamists won 47 of 48 seats on the student union's board in the science faculty, all 72 seats in the medical faculty, and all 60 seats in the engineering faculty (Wickham 2002, 116-117).

In 1977, members of Al-Takfir took hostage a former minister of religious endowments by demanding the release of imprisoned members of their organization. When Sadat refused to deal with the kidnappers, they killed the hostage. The regime retaliated by arresting and executing the leaders of Al-Takfir and imprisoning young Islamist militants associated with the organization. Agitation by the Islamists led to the cancellation of all party activity. In September of 1981, Sadat ordered the arrest of more than 1500 political activists, many of them were Islamists. When Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, another violent Islamist organization Al-Jihad condemned Sadat for surrendering Jerusalem to the Jews. The organization claimed that Sadat was an infidel and his assassination is a duty for a true believer. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of Al-Jihad in October 1981 (Cleveland 419; Palmer 63).

Conclusion

Husni Mubarak (1928- ), Sadat's vice-president, became president after Sadat's death. Sadat appointed Mubarak in 1975, and like his two predecessors Mubarak was a military officer who had received his flight training in the Soviet Union. Mubarak was also the commander of the Egyptian air force during the October War. Under Mubarak, the Islamist organizations continued their activities and pressured the government to apply the Shari'a. As Bayat (1998, 156) reports, religious observance increased in Egypt since the early 1980s, and Islamist political activism in the last two decades penetrated a variety of
civil society associations, media, education, and social services. In addition to the Brotherhood's unanticipated electoral successes in the parliamentary elections through the 1980s, by the early 1990s, the Brotherhood members took control of major professional associations such as doctors, engineers, pharmacists, lawyers, and commerce, as well as the student unions in major Egyptian universities. This came as a shock to the Mubarak regime; and the regime was not willing to relinquish power (Campagna 1996, 278-280). Mubarak swiftly changed his accommodationist approach which he had adopted towards the Brotherhood earlier in the 1980s and started to crack down on the organization.

Mubarak viewed the organization's increasingly visible participation in civil and political life as a threat to its own declining legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians. In other words, the Egyptian regime perceived the Islamists a double threat. One aspect of the regime's perception of Islamists as a threat was in regards to the political threats that the Islamists posed. The Brotherhood scored a series of victories in the national and associational elections throughout the country since the late 1980s. The second aspect was the regime's perception of the Brotherhood as an ideological threat as Islamism as a political movement sought to replace secularist principles of the regime. A series of legislative measures were taken to curtail the Brotherhood's influence in Egyptian professional associations in addition to initiating a media campaign to "...discredit the Brotherhood by labeling it a terrorist organization operating in close coordination with radical segments of the Islamic movement, despite the Brotherhood's publicly expressed commitment to non-violence in pursuit of its political goals" (Campagna 1996, 280).

Besides the legal measures and the media campaign, the government's response for the Islamist opposition during Mubarak's period included other measures. On one hand, Mubarak increasingly tried to gain control over Egypt's thousands of mosques. For the
Mubarak government, private mosques outside the government's control could pose a serious challenge to the state. On the other hand, the Egyptian government tried to seize the initiative from Islamist by adopting Islamic symbols and Islamizing some of the laws. Abaza (2006) argues that Mubarak's official discourse became more Islamic. On different occasions the regime responded to the increasing pressures to uphold the Shari'a coming from the Islamist opposition by pledging to review existing laws to see that they conformed to the Shari'a. After Sadat, Mubarak became increasingly dependent on Al-Azhar to discredit radical Islamists on theological grounds (Tamir 2000, 15-16).

The following chapter will discuss the relations between the Mubarak regime and the Brotherhood by detailing the political activities of the Brotherhood within the larger context of Egyptian politics after Sadat's assassination in 1981. By doing that a Gramscian perspective will be employed; parallels will be drawn between Gramscian "war of position" and the Islamists perception of politics as jihad. A social movement approach will be employed to analyze contemporary Islamist political activism in the last three decades through the concepts borrowed from the literature on social movements such as structural strains, opportunity spaces, constraints, and framing.

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183 Tamir reports that starting from 1952, the governments of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak participated in an ambitious program of subsidizing and nationalizing virtually all of Egypt's mosques. Under Mubarak, the government increased the pace of nationalization of the mosques considerably and curtailed the number of permits for new private mosques. By 1994, the government controlled approximately 50,000 mosques which is 71 percent of all the mosques in Egypt. In 1982, the number of the state-controlled mosques was roughly around 6000, which was just 19 percent of all the mosques in Egypt at the beginning of Mubarak's presidency (Tamir 2000, 7). Along with the nationalization of private mosques, the government also established specific regulations for controlling who preaches in state-controlled mosques and what kinds of topic are addressed in the weekly sermons. In each governmental district, committee composed of the local directors of the Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, and the director of education and social affairs, selects the prayer leaders among candidates who are later screened by the committee for any radical religious or political sympathies. Those who are approved by the committee receive a license to preach and are assigned to a specific mosque. Moreover, private mosques are also required by law to have licensed preachers who were approved through the Ministry of Endowments (Tamir 2000, 8).
CHAPTER V

ISLAMIST POLITICS IN EGYPT

Islamist politics in the contemporary world is frequently portrayed as threatening, extreme, and violent. Journalists and news agencies regularly report events and stories of Muslims that reinforce negative stereotypes. In such coverage, as Milton-Edwards (2004, 3-4) suggests, there is often a failure to recognize Islam's diverse character. Islamic politics is a multifaceted phenomenon that needs to be explored. Beinin and Stork (1997, 4-5) argue that Islamist movements have posed sharp challenges to postcolonial, nationalist regimes throughout the Muslim World. The current upsurge of Islamism, which can be said to date from the early 1970s, is not the first Islamist movement to emerge in the modern era.185

This chapter is going to examine contemporary Egyptian Islamism with an emphasis on their political activism as a comprehensive movement from a Gramscian186 and social movement perspective.187 In doing this, government's control over religion and the Islamists' perception of external threats will be used as independent variables. There are several recent works that examine Islamism from a social movement perspective. Clark (2004) and Wickham (2002) discuss the Islamists' involvement into politics from a social movement perspective. However, these two authors seem to analyze Islamism from what I

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184 *jihad* literally means struggle (not holy war), and does not essentially have a religious connotation. The word *jihad* comes from the verb *jahada* which means "to struggle" (indeed, *jahada* literally means "he struggled"; in Arabic, there is no infinitive form for verbs; instead of the infinitive, the past tense is used).

185 Early modern Egyptian Islamism was discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, a selective presentation of the contemporary Egyptian Islamist movements is going to be provided with an emphasis on their political character.

186 As they relate to Islamist political activism, Gramscian "war of position" and "counter-hegemonic struggle" were discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 3.
call a crisis (Wickham) perspective, and class (Clark) perspective. Although both authors study Islamist activism from a social movement perspective and use the methods employed by the social movement theorists, Wickham and Clark seem to overemphasize the impact of structural strains and class solidarity on politicization of Islamists\textsuperscript{188} respectively. Another author who emphasizes the role of crises in the emergence of Egyptian Islamism is Berman (2003). Berman identifies factors like the role of economic decline, demographic trends, unemployment, frustration of the masses, lack of governmental services, and the defeat of Egypt against Israel as the crises that contributed to the emergence of Islamism in Egypt (2003, 17-18). Berman (2003, 19) associates the emergence of Islamism with Huntingtonian assumption(s) on the relationship between mobilization of oppositional groups and governmental efficacy within the context of modernization:

The result of these developments [crises], in Egypt and across much of the Arab region, has been the emergence of a classic “Huntingtonian” gap, as mobilization, aspirations, and expectations have increased dramatically while existing state and political institutions have proved unable or unwilling to respond. Accompanying this has been an estrangement of the region’s citizens from their governments.

Although Berman discusses the role of civil society activism in the Islamists’ popular appeal, she fails to mention the fact that civil society activism for the Egyptian Islamists is mostly not a deliberate choice because establishing a political party based on religion is forbidden in the Egyptian constitution, thus Islamists resorted to civil society since they were not allowed to create a political party. However, as Berman points out, Islamists largely benefitted from civil society activism as they broadened their base of support by providing services for the people, trained new leaders, and conveyed their message through the civil society.

\textsuperscript{187} Please refer to the distinction made between the macro-level and micro-level analyses introduced in Chapter 3. Also note the rationale of this study in examining Islamism from the Gramscian and social movement theory.
Like Berman, Wickham also perceives Islamism as a reaction to crises caused by factors like authoritarian rule, unemployment, economic crises, center-periphery conflict. Unlike Berman and Wickham, Clark has a different approach in explaining Islamist activism. For Clark, Islamist political activism is prompted through the collaborative work and horizontal networks through middle-class solidarity. To a certain degree, my approach throughout this study recognizes the impact of those crises, and admits significance of horizontal networks between the movement participants; however by themselves, the crises and the horizontal networks are not enough in explaining the emergence of Islamism in both countries. Also, this study does not perceive Islamist activism as an outcome of solidarity of a particular class.

The Interviewees’ Profile

The people whom I interviewed were highly critical of the Egyptian regime and the secularist leadership of Mubarak’s NDP. In fact, majority of my respondents have spoken more openly as they had been contacted by my personal connections prior to the interviews, and had been informed about the interview process. Under authoritarian

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188 Please see the discussion that I made in Chapter 1 regarding the crisis theories and why such theories can not adequately help us understand emergence of Islamism in both countries.

189 Early approaches to the study of social movements derived from functionalist social psychology accounts of mass behavior according to which system equilibrium is a natural societal condition (Wiktorowicz 2004; 6). According to this approach, societies organically generate institutional infrastructure that regulates the balance between inputs and outputs in the political system. The responsive institutions accommodate societal demands and channel and address various interests to produce optimal policies. In return, those policies alleviate the demands and maintain the system equilibrium. For the functionalists, system disequilibrium comes from exogenous structural strains that produce new grievances and diminish the efficacy of institutions and cause political instability. Social frustration and political disorder (Huntington 1968) take place when political institutions can not accommodate newly mobilized societal demands. The crisis theories have a similar approach according to which various crises (structural strains) produce Islamism. A sense of isolation and helplessness was believed to drive people to Islamism. Thus, those Islamist movements were seen as “escapist coping mechanism through which individuals regain a sense of belonging and empowerment” (Wiktorowicz 2004; 6). From this type of approach, Islamist activism is a result of the structural crises produced by the failure of secular modernization projects (Waltz 1986, Dekmejian 1995, Hoffman 1995, Faksh 1997, Haddad 1992, Ibrahim 1980, Ansari 1984). In addition to the crises, socioeconomic factors are the principle cause and
settings, respondents might be cautious about disclosing their opinions regarding sensitive political issues, especially their negative opinions about the government. This could have been an impediment for my research.

However, this was not the case, because I contacted all of my interviewees through three of my personal contacts and prior to the interviews, the participants were assured by my contacts that their names would not be disclosed, and their comments made during the interviews would be used anonymously. The major reason for not revealing their names is to not to get them involved in any legal persecution because of their critical statements about the government and its policies. People could easily be persecuted about their critical statements about the government and its policies. Moreover, as part of the culture in the Middle East, interpersonal trust, friendship networks, and connections \((wasta)\) could be very important in gaining the trust of others. Thus, through the help of my connections, I was able to gain the trust of the interviewees. After completing my interviews, my contacts pointed out that my background also helped me connect with the interviewees at a personal level.

As indicated above, snowball sampling was used since I had contacted the interviewees through my personal connections in Egypt which facilitated trust between me and my interviewees. Some of my interviewees appeared to have a significant deal of information about the political events in Turkey. Those were generally the older interviewees. They indicated that they had been following several different satellite networks in Arabic (including the Al-Jazeera network) which, according to what my interviewees thought, had happened to spend more time in covering the political events in

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Turkey\textsuperscript{190}. However, the younger interviewees did not appear to be knowledgeable about the political climate in Turkey as much as the older interviewees.

I conducted a total of thirty-seven interviews in Cairo, and several larger neighborhoods of Cairo like Al-Agouza, Al-Mohandessin, Al-Dokki, Imbaba, Giza, Lazughly, and Al-Abbesseya. I used an interpreter, who was working for a prominent Egyptian publisher translating non-Arabic books into Arabic, for roughly 70\% of my interviews. Many of my interviews were in public places; however in some cases, I was invited to the office of the interviewees for the interview. I also had a chance to interview some prominent Egyptian scholars and discuss with them various issues regarding religion, politics and government in Egypt. Four out of thirty-seven interviewees described themselves as non-Islamists. One of them voted for the Tagammu party, the left wing party. Two of them voted for the Tomorrow Party, and the last interviewee stated that he did not vote, however, he indicated that he would vote for the New Wafd Party. He also mentioned that he was closely following the activities of the \textit{Kif\text{\textsuperscript{a}}ya} (Enough) movement which recently emerged in Egyptian politics. I did not have any unfinished interviews. After finishing my interviews in Egypt (and then in Turkey), from late August 2007 until late April 2008, I conducted additional seven interviews with people whom I got in touch through my contacts in Egypt. The reason for having those additional seven interviews was to arbitrarily complete the total number of my Islamist respondents to forty after having thirty-three face to face interviews with the Islamist interviewees. Three of those additional interviews were phone interviews and I did the interviews in English with

\textsuperscript{190} The same conclusion is often stated by my personal friends who are from different Arab countries and have access to Al-Jazeera network through the satellite. Many of them attribute the abundance of news items about Turkey in different Arab satellite programs to the Islamist AKP's rise to power after 2002. This could also be a topic of another interesting research for a researcher who is interested in studying the media.
interviewees who were fluent in English. Four of those additional interviews were done by one of my contacts in Egypt in Arabic and later were translated into English and were transliterated.

Sixteen interviewees had four-year college or two-year vocational school degrees; seventeen of them had high school degrees, and the remaining seven had either the basic elementary or secondary school education or were high school dropouts. Six of the forty interviewees were graduates of Al-Azhar University. Eighteen of the forty were of rural origins (recently moved to the city for finding a new job or for pursuing his/her education). Three of the forty were female interviewees; and all of the female interviewees described themselves as Islamists. It was harder for me to contact and convince prospective female interviewees since they abstained to give interviews which could be about cultural, religious or personal reasons.

There was an uneven distribution of the interviewees’ age. I am using the same age categories that I arbitrarily created for my interviewees in Turkey. Just like my interviews in Turkey, as snowball sampling was used, age was not used as a determinant of who would become an interviewee. Nine interviewees were between the ages of 18-24; fifteen were between 25-34; nine were between 35-44; five were between 45-54; and the remaining two were above the age of 55. The following sections will discuss the emergence of Islamism, the Islamists’ perception of their struggle as a comprehensive religious struggle (politics as jihad), and the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in national and associational politics through the civil society.
Emergence of Islamism

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun\(^{191}\)) Hasan Al-Banna was born in a small village in the Nile delta. His father was a student at Al-Azhar University during the time of Muhammed Abduh. After finishing a local teacher training college, Al-Banna went to Cairo to study; and there, he contacted Rashid Rida and his Salafiyyah (Salafist) movement. Al-Banna was a devoted reader of Al-Manar published by Rida and his associates. Al-Banna was particularly influenced by Rida’s writings on the political and social aspects of Islamic reform, the need for an Islamic state, and the introduction of Islamic law (Shari’a). During his career, Rida became gradually more conservative, and Al-Banna encountered the later Rida who emphasized the self-sufficiency of Islam and the dangers of Westernization (Esposito 1998, 136).

Besides his early Islamic learning and his encounters with Rida’s thought, two other factors played a crucial role in Al-Banna’s intellectual formation. The first is the anti-British revolt of 1919; the second is his membership in several Islamic associations. These associations emphasized individual religious and moral reform and a commitment to preaching and spread of Islamic message to others. After completing his studies in 1927, Al-Banna started to work as a primary school teacher in the city of Ismailiyya where he later created several Islamic discussion groups. One year later, Al-Banna organized the participants of those discussion groups into an association establishing the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969).

\(^{191}\) The Arabic word of ikhwan is the plural of akh which means brother. The Qur’an refers to believers as a single brotherhood (49:10): “The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy.”
When the Brotherhood was established, Egypt was still under the British occupation. Al-Banna, like Rida concluded that Westernization was one of the major threats to Egypt and the Islamic identity of the Egyptians. Al-Banna believed that the best way to thwart this challenge was to return to true Islam. However, unlike Islamic modernists, Al-Banna highlighted the comprehensiveness and self-sufficiency of Islam. Starting from that premise, Al-Banna called for a return to the Qur’an and Sunnah (Tradition) of Prophet Muhammed as the main sources for establishing an Islamic political and social system. Like other early Muslim puritans (like Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab and Ibn Taymiyyah) Al-Banna believed that Muslims should bypass all historical periods and return to the early normative period of the Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Al-Khulafā’ Al-Rashidun)¹⁹² (Mitchell 1969).

Politics as Jihad: The Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun) as a Comprehensive Organization

During the first decade, the Brotherhood focused on preaching and educational and social welfare projects. The Brotherhood members ran small hospitals, neighborhood mosques and schools and opened local social clubs. By 1949 the Brotherhood had about two thousand branches throughout Egypt, their members were estimated around five hundred thousand. In 1933, Banna moved the center of the Brotherhood to Cairo. Banna described his movement as "a Salafiyyah message, a Sunni way, a Sufi (mystic) truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company and a social idea."(Mitchell 1969, 14). In Our Message, Al-Banna (in the chapter titled Our Islam) described the Muslim Brotherhood as a comprehensive movement:

¹⁹² The four Rightly Guided Caliphs are the four caliphs who immediately followed prophet Muhammad:
Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term 'Islamic', though this word has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by most people. We believe that Islam is an all embracing concept regulating every aspect of life, prescribing for everyone it concerns a solid and rigorous order. It does not stand helpless before life's problems, nor the steps that must be taken to reform mankind. Some people mistakenly understand that Islam is restricted to religious practices or spiritual exercises. Thus they limit their understanding to these narrow lines.

On the contrary we understand Islam broadly and comprehensively, regulating the affairs of men, in this world and the next. We do not indulge in this claim nor extend upon it on the basis of our own prejudice; rather it is what we have understood from the Book of Allah and the lives of the early Muslims. If the reader wishes to understand the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood in a sense broader than the mere word 'Islamic', let him take the Qur'an and free himself of any preconceived ideas and judgments. Only then will he understand what the Qur'an is about, and see in it the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Banna also perceived jihad comprehensively. In *The Message of the Teachings* (in the chapter titled Jihad), Al-Banna stated:

> By jihad, I mean that divinely ordained obligation which is reflected in the following saying of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) and which Muslims are to carry out until the Day of Judgment: "Whoever dies without struggling in the Way of Allah, or wishing to do so, dies a Pre-Islamic Jahiliyyah death." Its weakest degree is the heart's abhorrence of evil and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these two degrees are numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand, and speaking a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler. This call (to Islam) cannot survive without Jihad. The more lofty and far reaching the call, the greater the struggle in its path. The price required to support it is huge, but the reward given to its upholders is more generous. "And strive in the Way of Allah as you ought to." (Surat-al-Hajj (22), Ayah 78) By this, dear brothers, you know the meaning of your slogan 'Jihad is our way.'

My interview data confirms with how Al-Banna described his movement. For instance, like other Brotherhood members, Dr. Tariq, one prominent Brotherhood member argued that the Brotherhood was a “comprehensive organization.” Tariq further associated the comprehensiveness of the organization with the comprehensiveness of Islam. Tariq also contended that one of the major reasons that enabled the organization to endure many hardships since Banna was that the Brotherhood was a comprehensive organization. He further associated the success of the Brotherhood with its comprehensiveness since, he argued, “the Brotherhood was established by Banna to address a variety of the needs of the

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Egyptian people.” Tariq believed that since its establishment, Egyptian authorities tried to reduce the organization to a merely political group which they perceived as a political group trying to challenge the secularist regime. For Tariq, this would be a caricaturization of such a comprehensive organization like the Brotherhood.

Hisham, a young brotherhood member, who was a university student, also expressed similar views. Like Dr. Tariq, Hisham believed that the Brotherhood was not just a religious and political group; however it was a comprehensive organization trying to provide the Egyptians with a wide range of social and educational services. He proudly announced “we won’t stop until Islam dominates every aspect of life in Egypt.” Hisham greatly respected Al-Banna, and believed that Al-Banna established the Brotherhood for the sole purpose of disseminating Islam and serving Muslims.

Hisham’s views were parallel to Al-Banna’s views on the comprehensiveness of the Brotherhood which depends on their interpretation of Islam being an all-encompassing religion. My interviewees believed that unlike other heavenly religions Islam had the Shari’a which governed every aspect of human life. Hisham contended that in other heavenly religions, the religion was reduced to only spirituality, thus, for instance, Christianity would not have something to say about the daily affairs of its believers or prescribe certain guidelines and restrictions for the mundane deeds of its followers. Hisham thought since Christianity was reduced to a mere spiritual religion, unlike a Muslim, a Christian would be saved only by his/her faith without paying attention to deeds.

193 Dr. Tariq is the head of a professional organization in Egypt. Tariq is not his real name, like all interviewees here in this study, the real names of individuals were not disclosed. Please see my reason(s) below in the main text for opting anonymity under the section of “The Interviewees’ Profile”.

194 He was referring to Judaism and Christianity. According to the Qur’an, both Judaism and Christianity are heavenly religions, and followers of those religions have a special status in the Shari’a. Jews and Christians are known as Ahl Al-Kitaab, People of the Book (members of the other Abrahamic faiths), and in the Shari’a they are called the Dhimmis.
Hisham argued that a Muslim would be saved by his/her faith and deeds which is also another indication of Islam being an organic religion in which ordinary mundane deeds could easily become religious deeds according to the intentions of the person who performs those deeds. Just like other Brothers, Hisham's statements were reflecting his view of the Brotherhood being equal to Islam.

Dr. Naguib, a prominent scholar at the Ibn Khaldun Center of Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim also argued that the Muslim Brotherhood was a comprehensive organization:

The Muslim Brotherhood is a comprehensive movement. The Brotherhood deals with a wide range of issues simultaneously including nationalist, Islamist, cultural, political, religious and charity issues... The Egyptian state could not deal with the Muslim Brotherhood because in general, the states' ability to confront such comprehensive organizations is highly limited. Indeed, states are scared of such comprehensive organizations like the Brotherhood. States just interact with political and economic

195 Actually, this is one of the oldest debates among the Muslim scholars. There is a consensus among the scholars that one person cannot achieve eternal salvation by only his/her deeds, indeed, the faith (iman) comes first, however, the good deeds (amal salih) complement (or strengthen) the faith.
196 See the discussion of Islam as an organic and historical religion in Chapter 1 and 3.
197 For instance, if someone washes his/her hands before meals and intends to perform a Sunnah (tradition) of prophet Muhammad while doing it, that person would be rewarded for his/her deeds (Muslims believe that washing hands before meals is one of the Sunnah).
198 (From: http://www.eicds.org/) The Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies (ICDS) is a non-governmental professional institution, registered in Cairo since 1988. ICDS has its own research, advocacy, and development programs, but it also conducts commissioned research, provides consultation and training services to governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues of public policy. The Center carries out supportive activities related to its objectives, including organizing seminars, conferences and the publication and dissemination of information. On the night of June 30th 2000, the founder of the Center and 27 of its researchers and associates were arrested, detained for several weeks, interrogated, indicted and tried twice before state security courts. They were sentenced to various prison terms ranging from one to seven years of hard labor. After serving about 15 months of these sentences, all were released when Egypt's highest Court of Cassation over-ruled the lower courts. The Court acquitted the defendants of all charges and asserted the Center's constitutional rights to conduct research, receive grants and freely publish at home and abroad. This historical ruling was a vindication of the Ibn Khaldun Center and, more importantly, a forceful victory for Civil Society in Egypt. The Center reopened with a series of public discussions about the future on June 30th 2003. ICDS is named after the great Arab thinker Abdel-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), who was the founder of Arab Social Science. Ibn Khaldun's travels and public service in several Arab countries (what is now Tunisia, Morocco, Andalusia, Egypt, the Hijaz and Syria) allowed this outstanding intellectual to provide major creative insight into both the theoretical and applied aspects of social science. This is amply demonstrated in his famous study Al-Muqaddemah, which is considered a classic authoritative work on society and the state. For more information visit http://www.eicds.org/english/introduction/about.htm
199 Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim is the Chairman of ICDS Board of Trustees, and Professor of Political Sociology at the American University in Cairo. Dr. Ibrahim is also the founder of the Arab Organization for Human Rights. Dr. Ibrahim was arrested and sentenced to seven years in prison in 2000 for using European Union funds for election monitoring, and for allegedly defaming Egypt's image abroad. Dr. Ibrahim served 15 months in prison (see the footnote above).
organizations like interest groups at political and economic levels; it would be an exhausting task to fully interact with the Brotherhood, because it requires mobilization of huge resources which the Egyptian government does not have. Thus, states, including the Egyptian state, would greatly want those comprehensive organizations to identify themselves as one type of organization [i.e. interest groups, parties, religious or non-religious foundations...]. As a result, states consider such comprehensive organizations as enemies, and perceive the opponents who are members of such organizations as contenders who try to undermine the state authority piece by piece...

Politics as Jihad: The Brotherhood Goes Underground

In Cairo, the Brotherhood became a well organized religious and political organization with a wide network of branches and smaller cells. The Brotherhood followers were mainly from merchants, teachers, doctors, lawyers, civil servants, the military and university students. After the establishment of the Israeli state, the Brotherhood sent volunteers to fight in the war in Palestine between 1948 and 1949. In December 1948, King Farouk’s Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha disbanded the organization and arrested some of the key leaders of the Brotherhood except Al-Banna. Additionally, the assets that belonged to the organization were confiscated by the government (Esposito 1998, 138). King Farouk was “concerned with the increasing assertiveness and popularity of the Brotherhood, as well as with rumors that it was plotting a coup.” Within three weeks, the prime minister was assassinated by a member of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood claimed that they were not involved with the assassination; however the government blamed the organization. Martial law was declared in the country and more Brotherhood members were arrested. Shortly after the assassination of Nuqrashi Pasha, Egyptian secret police shot Al-Banna to death in February 1949, when Al-Banna was 43 (“Hasan Al-Banna” 2007).

After the Free Officers’ overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952, the junta led by Nasser let the Brotherhood to reorganize since the Brotherhood earlier had supported the Free Officers. Indeed, it was Anwar Al-Sadat, who would later become the
president of the country after Nasser’s presidency, was the Free Officers’ liaison with the Brothers. Subsequently, the relations between the junta and the Brotherhood got sour because Nasser had no intentions of either establishing an Islamic state or sharing power with the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood withdrew its initial support of Nasser’s regime. Nasser used an unsuccessful assassination attempt on his life in 1954 as an excuse to crush the entire Brotherhood or ganization; the organization was banned, and thousands of members were arrested and the key leaders were executed. After 1954, the Brotherhood became an underground organization. During those years under severe government repression, the Brotherhood became more radical. Sayyid Qutb\(^{200}\) (1906-1966) became the main ideologue of the organization after the mid 1950s.

**The Brotherhood under Nasser and Sadat**

Before Anwar Al-Sadat, Nasser preempted the rise of Islamist activism “by subordinating potential agents, sites and targets of mobilization to state control” (Wickham 2002; 21). Nasser banned all opposition groups and co-opted educated, lower-middle class youth through his policy of providing government jobs for every high school and college graduate of Egypt (known as the “graduates policy”). Through that kind of a preemptive strategy, Nasser was planning to diminish the prospects for mobilization for the Islamists. It was only after the effectiveness of this strategy declined (and was subsequently abandoned by Sadat) that Islamism re-emerged after Nasser\(^{201}\) (Palmer 2007; 51-53).

Nasser chose to silence Egypt’s educated youth by their economic, political, and ideological incorporation by the regime. However, regime’s co-optation of the educated youth became unsustainable in the long run. Sadat, after Nasser, gave up the co-optation

\(^{200}\) For Qutb’s life and Islamist ideology, please see Chapter 4.

\(^{201}\) Wickham uses the term “authoritarian populism” to characterize the Nasser era (Wickham 2002, 22).
policy and tried to formulate new means of achieving legitimacy through the *infitah*\(^{202}\) (opening-the regime-led limited economic and political liberalization). However, by the *infitah* Sadat was not able to mobilize the educated youth; in Sadat’s Egypt, Islamist groups came back stronger after the period of suppression that took place under Nasser (Esposito 1998; 235-244).

Islamism under Mubarak

The 1980s: Electoralism And Selective Accommodation Of The Brotherhood

When Husni Mubarak became president in October 1981 after Sadat’s assassination, initially he adopted an accommodative approach towards the non-violent Islamists while firmly confronting the violent groups (Esposito 1998, 248). Mubarak released the 1500 political prisoners detained during Sadat’s last month in office, permitted open criticism of government policies, and eased government control on the media. This was actually what Bianchi (1989, 93-94) termed a policy of “selective accommodation and selective repression” to diffuse tensions and to consolidate his own position. Several other factors informed Mubarak toward the Islamists. *First*, Mubarak probably did not regard Islamist private voluntary associations such as charity organizations, schools, and health clinics, as particularly threatening. In fact, Mubarak’s regime may have viewed such institutions as contributing to social stability in poor areas since the government did not have enough funds to meet the basic social and economic needs. *Second*, the authoritarian regime tended to evaluate Islamist groups according to how much they directly threatened the security in the country. Thus, the regime did not

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\(^{202}\) For more information on Sadat’s *infitah* policies, see Chapter 4.
perceive groups such as reading circles for memorization of the Qur'an or charity organizations as potentially dangerous for the security of the regime (Bianchi 1989).

By the mid-1980s the government's flexible response to Islamist activism began to change. In 1985, when the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups called for the implementation of the Shari’a, Mubarak responded harshly by placing all the private mosques under the aegis of the Ministry of Religious Endowments (MRE). The Brothers also intensified their political activities through electoral alliances with secular parties. The first coalition took place in the May 1984 elections. Before the elections, in February, the Brotherhood made a deal with the Wafd Party (Esposito 1998, 249). The Wafd provided a legal channel while the Brotherhood offered a popular base. Out of 448 seats, the Wafd slate received 58 seats, 8 of which went to the Brotherhood candidates in addition to two independent Islamist candidates (El-Ghobashy 2005, 378).

By 1987, the Brotherhood had grown their junior-partner status in the Wafd alliance and wagered on the weaker and more ideologically flexible Labor Party as a base of their political operations. In 1987, the Brotherhood formed a new electoral alliance with the Liberal (Al-Ahrar) and the socialist Labor Party. The alliance paved the way for the progressive Islamization of the Labor Party and their mouthpiece, Al-Sha’ab. The tripartite alliance won 17 percent of the vote which corresponded to 56 seats; 36 seats went to the Brotherhood. The alliance became the major opposition block in the parliament dominated by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (El-Ghobashy 2005, 379).

203 The controversial Electoral Law (114/1983) prohibited candidates of different parties from running on the same lists, in effect deterring parties from pooling their efforts. Additionally, the law also created a high national threshold of 8 percent of the national vote for a party to have representation in the People's Assembly. Votes to opposition parties that received less than 8 percent of the votes were automatically transferred to the ruling NDP. Thus the restrictions of the Parties Law and Election Law impelled the Wafd and the Brotherhood to make a coalition. Only the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance passed the threshold, by receiving 15.1 percent of the votes.
The chain of the Brotherhood’s victories in associational elections started in 1986. Through its effective mobilization of constituents, the Brotherhood took control of the Medical Association. By the end of the 1980s, it had achieved similar success within associations for engineers and pharmacists, and subsequently would exert control over all of the main professional associations (except the journalists association) by 1992, when it captured a majority in the prestigious, and formerly secular-dominated bar association. These electoral victories were particularly significant in terms of the Brotherhood’s increasing prominence in civil society. The associations, at this time, represented one of the few avenues for organization independent of the state. The Brotherhood’s gradual control of these institutions indicated symbolically that the group had for the first time gained control of “legitimate” channels to further its own political goals. This represented a significant challenge for the regime, particularly because of the weakness of the existing legal opposition parties. With their significant victories through professional associations, the Brotherhood could effectively fill the void in Egypt’s stagnant political system. The Brotherhood also expanded its activities regarding social services throughout the country. With its roots firmly planted within important sectors of society, the group was in a position to mobilize broad-based support and offer a potent challenge to the Mubarak regime (Campagna 1996: 281-282).

204 There is no directory giving the exact number of civil society organizations in Egypt. The total number is estimated to be somewhere between 14,000 Ibrahim (2003) and 22,000 (Clark 2004). Ibrahim (2003) reports that 8000 of a total 14000 private voluntary associations in Egypt were Islamic. Some of those PVOs focus on purely religious functions like maintaining and renovating local mosques, establishing Qur’anic schools for memorization of the Qur’an, organizing pilgrimage trips to Mecca, and providing charity to the needy families. Other organizations provide social services such as health care, day care, education and job-training programs. Many Islamic PVOs operate under a mosque or a religious foundation (waqf) which gives them access to charitable donations collected and distributed away from government supervision. Membership of Egyptian civil society organizations in 1992 was approximately 3 million, and the same year, the number of beneficiaries was estimated at approximately 5.5 million Egyptian citizens (Clark 2004, 50).
For most of the period from 1984 to 1989, the Mubarak regime generally pursued a consistent policy of non-confrontation. By 1989, however, the changes were already visible. For instance, in April 1989, then-Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public statement criticizing the non-violent Brotherhood for its alleged links to radical Islamist groups in a foreshadowing of language that would abound in the coming decade: "[T]he extremists are in fact a secret organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations. There is no conflict between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in fact a single association." (quoted in Campagna 1996, 285) After the Brotherhood's electoral victories, the state actively sought to confront the organization in response to its noticeably more independent and high-profile opposition to the regime.

The 1990s: Associational Politics and Increase of Governmental Pressures

By the 1990s, the Brotherhood was exceptionally attuned to the rules of the authoritarian politics in Egypt. In 1990, the Wafd Party announced their boycott of the national elections because of the concerns of fairness, and the Brotherhood followed the Wafd. The basic purpose of the boycott was to delegitimize the government's electoral engineering. The Brotherhood also raised its concerns in regards to the 1991 Madrid peace talks between the parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Brotherhood indirectly condemned the Egyptian government's active mediation in the talks (Campagna 1996, 287-288).

The Mubarak regime also tightened its grip on the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in civil society through Law 32 of 1964. Law 32 regulated voluntary associations.

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205 On 25 October, the Brotherhood organized a mass meeting in Helwan under the heading "Islam does not sanction peace with usurpers of Islamic lands and holy places", and Supreme Guide Hamid Abu Al-Nasr published additional critical statements about the peace talks. The Brotherhood-controlled Medical
According to the law, prospective societies had to apply to the MSA for a license. The Minister of Social Affairs could dissolve the board of a society and appoint his own nominees for a maximum period of three years. His appointee who was usually a ministry official had control over the association's funds. The minister also had the power to dissolve an association, or unite it with another which he judged to have similar goals. In such a case, the association had to submit to the Ministry all the records, documents, and funds of the association. Moreover, Law 32 gave the Minister the right to appoint representatives of his Ministry to the boards of any association, up to a half of its membership, for an unlimited period, and to annul any resolution passed by the association if he judged it contrary to public order (Zubaida 1997, 55).

The year 1992 was a turning point in the government's approach to the Brotherhood. Through their increasing influence within professional associations, the Brotherhood alarmed the Egyptian regime. In September 1992, it gained a majority of seats (14 out of 25) on the board of Bar Association which in the past had been a close ally of the ruling NDP by serving to legitimize government legislation and other policies. The same year, the Brotherhood candidates achieved another significant victory in the elections of Medical Association. The Brotherhood also outshone the government's inefficient and delayed response to the devastating Cairo earthquake in October 1992. In response to the Brotherhood's efficient pooling of funds to the victims, the prime minister issued Military Association also organized a mass rally with about 20,000 supporters. Following those events, 185 people were arrested on charges of distributing leaflets opposing the peace talks and disturbing peace.

206 It is estimated that in 1995, there were about 8,000 Islamist NGOs officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) as opposed to just 6,000 secular ones (Talhami 2001, 311-324).

Within those associations, the Brotherhood expanded its strategy of social welfare, implementing various programs for members such as affordable individual and family health insurance. Other similar services included projects for the construction of low-income housing for professionals, cash loans to members, and various educational programs. Moreover, the Brothers gained access to enormous financial resources by controlling associations for mobilizing members. Campagna points out that according to some estimates in 1995, total assets (including investments) added up to approximately $15 million (Campagna 1996, 291-292).

In October 1994, the younger generation of the Brotherhood organized a two-day conference in Cairo on freedoms and civil society at the medical association (Conference on Freedom and Civil Society). This was a direct result of the efforts of the young Brotherhood activists like Essam Al-Aryan and Abu Al-Ela Madi, through a well planned

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207 The Military Decree was not the only form of governmental interference over the Islamist civil society. For instance, through Law 100 of 1993, the Mubarak regime further tightened its grip on the associational activities of the Brotherhood beyond the existing limitations. The government spokesman in parliament defended the law as an effort to combat the "dictatorship of the minority," a clear reference to the effective electioneering of the Brotherhood in associational politics. The law (Law for the Guarantees of Democracy in Professional Associations) required a fifty percent quorum of registered members in board elections. With the law, the government hoped to force a greater participation of voters in order to reduce the group's chances for success. Moreover, the law also banned fundraising for stopping the organization's ability to use money for its social and political activities. Professional unions immediately mobilized against the law, and the majority of members, regardless of their ideological orientations, opposed it (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382). This was not the only example of the government becoming harsher on the Islamists due to their victories in Egypt's associational politics. For example, in May 1993, the government placed the Engineers Association under official control by court order in response to allegations of financial mismanagement of its funds. The government also made various amendments to the Egyptian Universities Act in June 1994 to weaken the Brotherhood's strong presence in university faculty clubs. The Brotherhood gained majorities in the governing councils of university faculty clubs in Zaqaziq, Asyut, and Cairo. The new amendment significantly reduced the autonomy by repealing the election of faculty deans. After the amendment, the deans were appointed by university presidents who were directly appointed by the government, rather than through elections by faculty members. The university councils, which had been mostly composed of elected members in the past, were now controlled by government appointees. Through such measures, the Egyptian government established a
alliance building with other middle-aged activists of varying political commitments. The event brought together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, including government figures, to reach a consensus on basic rights and freedoms. Also, a delegation from the conference visited Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express support and condemnation of his stabbing by a militant Islamist. In the early 1990s, the Brotherhood issued press releases condemning every attack by militant Islamists on government figures and tourists, and even brokered a cease-fire between the radical Islamists and the government during the UN’s Cairo Population Conference (El-Ghobashy 2005, 382).

As the November 1995 parliamentary elections got closer, the Egyptian state’s repression against the Brotherhood further accelerated. In January, 82 of the Brotherhood’s leading activist convening the Brotherhood’s Shura (Consultative) Council were arrested and detained by the government in a series of a large crackdown unseen since Nasser’s time. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the government and sent to a military tribunal. On 26 June, a failed assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, further exacerbated the relations between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian government. On 23 November, just one week before the parliamentary elections, the military tribunal sentenced 54 Muslim brothers to three to five years in prison. Despite the arrests of prominent Brotherhood candidates since January, about hundred Brothers ran as independents in the 29 November election and the 6 December runoffs. The Brotherhood secured only one seat after the most violent elections in Egyptian history resulting in 61 dead and 1,313 injured (El-Ghobashy 2005, 384).208

208 Between 15 November and 6 December 1995, authorities arrested 1,392 Islamist campaign workers, supporters and poll-watchers. The Cairo-based Center for Human Rights Legal Aid found that the government purposefully restricted political expression of Muslim Brotherhood and its ally, the Labor
The state's targeting of the Brotherhood's middle-aged activists in 1995 took a serious toll and the Brotherhood showed organizational stresses. From 1995 to 2000 the most active members of the organization were imprisoned. Left in the hands of the old guard, the organization's common ideological front built by the younger generation of activists gradually eroded. Organizational discontent became visible when a young group of Muslim Brothers led by Abu Al-Ela Madi, who disapproved some of the actions of the old guard, petitioned to form the Center Party (Hizb Al Wasat).

Limits of Regime Control: From Accommodation to Confrontation

An important character of the Islamist sector is about its organizational structure. The Islamic sector is extremely decentralized with thousands of independent mosques, firms, welfare organizations, hospitals, clinics, and schools, which complicates the regime's efforts at regulation and control. Besides physical dispersion of those institutions, it is often hard to track their funding and despite the high risk, some Islamist associations simply chose not to register with the government at all and operate without a permit.

209 After the death of ailing fourth general guide Muhammad H. Abu Al-Nasr in 1996, Mustafa Mashour became the leader of the organization. Contrary to the rules of the Brotherhood, a tightly knit circle composed of Guidance Bureau members Mamoun Al-Hudaibi and Mashour announced Mashour as the new general guide without election or consultation with Shura (Consultation) Council members. Mashour and Hudaibi justified their action with the security clampdown on the last Shura Council meeting in 1995. Previously, Mashour was a member of the Brotherhood's controversial paramilitary wing, the Special Apparatus (Al-Nizam Al-Khas), formed in 1940. Mashour had been imprisoned in 1954 by Nasser and later emerged in the 1970s as a key decision-maker in the organization during the tenures of general guides Al-Tilmisani and Abu Al-Nasr. Moreover, Mashour's confidant Ma'mun Al-Hudaibi carved out a high-profile position for himself as "official spokesman," though this position did not exist in the bylaws of the organization. Such arbitrary actions created a rift between old and young generations within the Brotherhood (El-Ghobashy 2005, 387).

210 The phrase "From Accommodation to Confrontation" is the subtitle of an article written by Joel Campagna on the current political activism of the Brotherhood. Campagna, Joel. (1996). "From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years" Journal of International Affairs Vol.50 No. 1, pp. 278-304.
Mobility enhances institutional autonomy, as Islamists were able to relocate their activities to other places when their activities are prevented and/or limited by the authorities. For instance, when the government took over a mosque or restrict activities there, the Islamists could evade the state by moving to another site. In 1992, the Egyptian regime initiated a plan to tighten its control over private mosques in the country. Law 175 of 1960 granted the Ministry of Religious Endowments the authority to incorporate those mosques; however the Egyptian government had to deal with a shortage of manpower and funds to do so.

Beyond the shortage of manpower and funds, the regime’s ability to control the Islamists was impeded by the fragmented nature of the state itself. Egypt is an enormous bureaucratic state employing an estimated 5 million people in the 1990s with branches in nearly every district, town and village. Although the state apparatus is enormous in size and function, it remained inefficient for implementing the regime’s major goals. In the 1960s, the Nasser regime lowered the requirements for entering to the civil service and added millions of employees to the state bureaucracy as the regime had become worried about the political consequences of high unemployment. This also had been a direct result of Nasser’s socialist principles of economic and bureaucratic management. In the 1980s and the 1990s, most state employees were poorly paid; the enormous size of the Egyptian bureaucracy, along with chronic budgetary problems, mismanagement and lack of technology, hampered the regime’s efforts to facilitate major achievements regarding its objectives. Finally, laws issued in Nasser’s era had made it difficult to fire a civil servant. (Wickham 2002, 108).

As Islamist ideas and institutions grew outside the state, they began to influence the orientations of the state employees at various positions. At the same time, various
opportunities emerged for the emergence of linkages between state employees and Islamists based on kinship or friendship, mutual economic interest, or shared ideological positions. Despite the fragmented and mostly anecdotal evidence, it appeared that some Islamists have secured the tacit cooperation of state authorities, including the staffs of the very ministries intended to control them. The MSA officials reportedly enjoy close ties with some of the Islamists associations under their jurisdiction. Moreover, MSA officials are included on the executive boards of some Islamist associations, for which they are paid a salary. These officials are reported to favor Islamist associations over non-Islamist ones. The MSA officials are also alleged to favor Islamists when issuing operational licenses and fundraising permits. Islamist activists also increased their ties with the local municipal councils despite the fact that those councils are dominated by the regime’s NDP. Additionally, some of the senior religious authorities and other government officials developed ties with Islamists based on economic self interest (Wickham 2002, 109-110). For example, several Al-Azhar sheikhs served as Islamic advisors for Islamic banks and investment companies with generous compensations. Some Islamic investment companies hired influential politicians as consultants like Al-Rayyan did when it hired former Minister of Interior Nabawi Ismail.

The 2000s: Electoral Participation and Closing the Rift between the Old and New Generations within the Brotherhood

As parliamentary elections approached in the fall of 2000, the government arrested 20 would-be candidates and sentenced by a military tribunal in November 2000. Despite the government clampdown, the independent Brotherhood candidates were able to secure 17 seats. In February 2001, the Brotherhood gained majority in the first elections at the Bar Association. In the parliament, the Brotherhood candidates primarily dealt with culture and
identity issues as well as cases of abuse by security forces and bread and butter issues, unemployment being the major issue on their list. In the meantime, most of the young Brotherhood activist cadres detained in 1995 returned from prison in 2000. Those young members upon their release from prison patched up the Wasat split and reestablished organization's ties with other political groups (El-Ghobashy 2005, 389).

The passing away of Mashour in 2002 and of Al Hudaibi in 2004, as the last of the influential old guard, was the most significant opening for the further transformation of the Brotherhood. Younger brothers took positions as two deputy general guides stipulated by Brotherhood’s bylaws. When he was elected as the general guide of the Brotherhood in January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Akef repeated their desire to operate as a political party. In a press conference on 3 March 2004, Akef announced the Brotherhood’s vision for a republican, civil government bound by law. For the first time in its history, a general guide of the Brotherhood officially announced ideas developed by the comparatively young members of the organization. Indeed, Akef’s message was intended for several audiences: the Egyptian government, opposition parties, and independent intellectuals, and foreign parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its “Greater Middle East Initiative.” El-Ghobashy (2005, 390) interprets Akef’s new stance first as an attempt to heal the rift between old and new generations, and reestablish a coherent ideological position for the members.
When he became president after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Mubarak had serious problems to tackle. One major problem was the economy. Despite the budget gap, Mubarak cautiously maintained providing newer public jobs for young Egyptians. Egypt’s labor force grew by about 2.2% per year between 1976 and 1986, whereas supply of graduates grew by 7.4% per year in the same period. Thus, the waiting period for a government job increased from approximately three years to about nine years from 1979 to 1985 (Wickham 2002; 42-62). Mubarak simultaneously attempted to increase employment and reduce the budget deficit. However, fulfilling those two at the same time proved to be impossible, thus Mubarak chose to extend the time between graduation and appointment and allowed the wages for new government employees to lag behind inflation. The greatest grievance among the new graduates is the growing perception that success depended more on connections (wasta) and luck than on merit and hard work.

Faced by such serious economic problems, Mubarak sought to maintain a policy of controlled liberalization after being suspended just before Sadat’s assassination in October 1981. The Egyptian constitution defines the Egyptian regime as a republic. The executive

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211 Egypt’s aggregate debt exceeded 115% of GDP by 1988 since Mubarak responded by increasing its borrowing abroad to address the “twin gap” between investment and savings and between imports and exports. Deficit financing increased the annual inflation rate which was between 15 to 25% annually during the late 1980s. In order to reduce the deficit, Mubarak cut back on the public spending which decreased from 63.5% of GDP in 1982 to 41.1% of GDP in 1989. Also, state employment continued to increase rising from 3.78 million in 1986 to 4.62 million in 1991 (Wickham 2002, 41-42).

212 In fact, by the mid-1980s, a number of opposition newspapers, which were openly critical of the regime, were established. Additionally, the judiciary displayed a substantial measure of independence as in a series of decisions challenging the constitutionality of the legislation introduced by the NDP-controlled parliament. Indeed, the multiparty system was further institutionalized under Mubarak’s first decade. Parliamentary elections were held in 1984, 1987, and 1990, and Mubarak attempted to accommodate non-violent Islamists. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to have national offices, and to make public statements, and to have its own journal. However the Brotherhood was not allowed to establish a political party (Fahmy 1998; 557-558).
branch consists of the President who is nominated by the People’s Assembly for a six-year term, and the Prime Minister and his cabinet who are both appointed by the President. The Presidential nomination must be validated by a national, popular referendum. Mubarak has served as president since 1981, he was elected for a fifth term in the recent (2005) presidential elections. The bicameral legislative branch consists of the People’s Assembly (444 elected and 10 presidentially-appointed members); and the Shura (Consultative) Council (176 elected members, and 88 presidentially-appointed). The Egyptian legal system is based on a combination of English and French common law. Family law is primarily based on the religion of the individual concerned, which for most Egyptians is Shari’a law. The judicial branch consists of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court and the lower courts.

In order to justify his heavy-handed policy towards the oppositional groups, Mubarak emphasized that Egypt’s priority was to have economic reform which would happen under national unity rather than debate and dissension. In his May Day speech of 1989, Mubarak called on “... all democratic parties and groups to put aside, even momentarily, their differences over public work so that all patriotic efforts could be focused on positive cooperation to achieve the undisputable national goals, over which people should not differ” (quoted in Wickham 2002; 67). Mubarak also claimed that neither the masses nor the opposition parties were mature enough to function in an open democracy. Thus, Egypt’s limited political reform and liberalization designed not to transform the authoritarian regime but to preserve it because introduction of the multiparty system as intended to strengthen the authoritarian system by enhancing its capacity to contain and moderate dissent.

213 For a brief discussion of the 2005 Presidential elections, candidates and issues, see Chapter 1.
The Brothers believe that a genuine democracy would directly benefit their movement, not the NDP leadership\textsuperscript{214}. Many Brotherhood members believed that the Mubarak regime was not willing to have democracy as it has been implemented in democratic countries because they believed that “under democracy Mubarak’s NDP would definitely lose.” Zaki, a Brotherhood member, who worked for the Ministry of Culture in Cairo as a junior bureaucratic official, shared the views of other Brotherhood members. Zaki argued that Mubarak had no intention of having a democracy in Egypt. Zaki also thought that Mubarak would transfer power to his son Gamal Mubarak as he thought “Mubarak was grooming his son to be the next Egyptian president after he leaves office\textsuperscript{215}.” Zaki, by referring to the Egyptian regime, further commented that a regime would not be a

\textsuperscript{214} For example, see Dr. Ahmed Fahmy’s letter at the Foreign Policy website at: Current Articles: Letters: “Engaging the Muslim Brotherhood” November/December 2007 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4011 Fahmy is a leading member of the Brotherhood and the Chief Executive Officer of the Ikhwanweb website (http://www.ikhwanweb.com) which is the official website of the Brotherhood in English.

\textsuperscript{215} Zaki was voicing the debates among the Egyptian people that had been revolving around the issue of Mubarak’s succession. Indeed, there have already been some developments that would indicate Mubarak’s willingness to prepare his son to succeed him. See the following section from Abaza (2006, 2) ...starting in 2004 the rise of a new elite within the ranks of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The new guard, led by President Mubarak’s son Gamal, effectively started to take control of the ruling party and to erode the power of veteran party leaders. No clear presidential successors to Mubarak have emerged in the current government. Given the increased political involvement of the president’s son, many have begun to speculate in earnest about his political future. Both the president and Gamal Mubarak have denied that they are aiming to create a Syrian-style “republican monarchy.” Nevertheless, much attention has been devoted to the implications of the first Nazif cabinet for Gamal. Two key members of the old guard were removed from the cabinet. NDP heavyweights Youssef Waly and Safawat al-Sherif, vice president and secretary-general of the party, respectively, lost their powerful portfolios (for deputy premier and agriculture, and information, respectively) after having served in them for more than two decades. Curtailing the power of the old guard and replacing some of its members with younger figures who are friendlier to Gamal Mubarak almost certainly empowers him and increases his influence over the cabinet. Moreover, seven of the new ministers are members of the influential NDP Policy Committee, which is chaired by Gamal Mubarak. The second Nazif cabinet continued curtailing the power of party veterans by replacing them with younger, dynamic technocrats closer to Gamal Mubarak. Hence, even if some of the new cabinet members do not support his ascension, they are not in a strong enough position to challenge him. The new cabinet could therefore represent a means of bolstering Gamal Mubarak’s authority.
democracy if its president remains in power for five consecutive terms and later his son replaces him.216

Interestingly, what Zaki and other Brotherhood members’ perception of democracy would be considerably different than what people who live in democracies would understand. The Brotherhood members were appreciative of what we might call the “procedural” aspects of democracy pertaining party politics, campaigns, elections, and political activism. However, they were not appreciative of some of the liberties if those liberties contradict with the Islamic precepts. For instance, things like consumption of alcohol, gambling, and prostitution would be completely unacceptable for the Islamists.217

The Brothers also believed that the US was not sincere in her attempts to promote democracy in the Middle East. Badri, a middle aged Brotherhood member, argued that the US was not completely sincere in her efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East because he believed that a country that was sincere about promoting democracy would not support an oppressive regime (i.e., the Egyptian regime). Besides other aforementioned legal and practical obstacles that prevent political groups from operating, another major obstacle that hinders the popular outreach of political movements in Egypt is the existing emergency laws since June 1967.218

216 Later I learned from a Brotherhood member that in Egypt, Islamists (Brotherhood members and others) labelled Mubarak “the last pharaoh of Egypt” for two reasons. First, Mubarak has been in power since 1981 and has not been willing to relinquish power; second, according to the Islamists, he is not willing to implement the Shari’a.

217 This topic will be elaborated in Chapter 6. The Brothers unanimously agreed that such things prohibited by the Qur’an (haram) could not be made permissible (halal) legislation. Thus, the Islamists argued, human reasoning (making laws through legislation) could not replace the rules and bans in the Qur’an. According to this view, something clearly forbidden in the Qur’an by God (like gambling) could not be legalized by the people (i.e., legislators) no matter what reasoning those people put forward for the legalization of it (like tax revenues and/or employment).

218 Emergency Law No. 162, enacted in 1958, the emergency laws have to be renewed by the Egyptian parliament every two to three years; they were renewed in 2006 (Daniel Williams, May 1, 2006, “Egypt Extends 25-Year-Old Emergency Law” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/30/AR2006043001039.html). The Mubarak regime recently renewed the emergency laws for an additional year on May 25, 2008 (Joseph Mayton, May 25, 2008, “Emergency
Under such authoritarian measures combined with severe economic problems, ordinary Egyptians appear to remain indifferent towards politics. Voter turnout rate in the parliamentary elections is one of the indicators of widespread political alienation and abstention among the Egyptian electorate. Political reform under Mubarak attempted to accommodate political opposition without easing the tight grip of the Mubarak regime on power. Mubarak’s multiparty system in Egypt included several opposition parties that functioned primarily as parties of opinion with minimal influence over politics and weak ties to the masses. Official estimates of participation in parliamentary elections under the Mubarak regime (1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005) range between 40 and 50 percent.\(^{219}\) When one looks at voting behavior, it is found that most people who voted did so as a means to secure access to government services. Thus, as Palmer (2005) and Wickham (2002) note, elections chiefly served as a mechanism for renewing patron-client relationships between the masses and the politicians of the government’s NDP rather than a mechanism for a genuine contest among different political and ideological alternatives.

In Egypt, all associations are subject to state control according to the law 32 of 1964. According to the law, all prospective associations must apply to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) for a license. The MSA can also intervene the functioning of existing

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\(^{219}\) These percentages could be misleading because they indicate the portion of eligible citizens registered to vote who actually did vote. When we consider the fact that roughly only half the adult population over eighteen was not even registered, the actual participation rate drops to roughly 20 to 25 percent of the adult population. Wickham (2002, 85-92) notes that in 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections actual voter turnout rate was slightly more than 25 percent in rural areas and between 10 and 18 percent in urban areas.
associations. Law 84/2002 enables the government to prohibit independent political or trade union activities. The regulations in articles 24 and 25 state that NGOs “may not undertake or fund election-related activities, or represent employees in discussions with employers.” Article 11 gave the security forces and the government “wide powers to harass activists and dissolve civil society groups” (“Egypt: Margins of Repression” HRW Report, 2005).

Unlike the professional associations, Mubarak did not consider the Islamic welfare organizations and health clinics as particularly dangerous for the regime (Sparre and Petersen 2007, 59-68). In fact, they may have perceived those organizations as contributing to social stability in poor areas where state services were not sufficient. However, as the Islamist associations became successful, Mubarak regime attempted to reclaim the space it had ceded to Islamist groups. Berman notes that the Islamists’ involvement in the civil society “helped the Islamists build a more powerful, flexible, and responsive movement” as well as “recruit and train new leaders” and “build a sense of community and collective identity” (2003, 15-16). However, Berman does not appear to be optimistic about the benefits of associationalism through the civil society because she believes that those benefits “can be turned to antidemocratic as well as democratic ends.” She exhibits her pessimism by drawing parallels between the Egyptian case and Weimar Germany by noting that “where existing political institutions are weak and the regime is perceived as ineffectual and illegitimate...civil society may become an alternative to traditional politics” (2003, 20). Shortly, Berman seems to appreciate what Islamist activism through the civil society contributed to the Islamist movement in general; however she does not

\[220\] For instance, the MSA can appoint members of an association’s board, demand written reports of its activities, and supervise the collection of funds and their uses. Moreover, it has the right to dissolve the association and seize its assets.
discuss how the Islamists successfully molded their rhetoric into Islamist frames which resonated better than other available frames. Berman also does not seem to be optimistic about the democratic component of Islamist civil society activism. Moreover, Berman fails to demonstrate how Islamists have conflicting views on the procedural aspects of democracy (like elections, rule of law, constitutionalism) and liberal democratic freedoms.221

Civil Society as a Mechanism to Promote Islamism and Islamist Networks

Islamist activism goes hand in hand with Islamic consciousness in Egypt. Accordingly, when analyzing the resurgence of political Islam, one has to look at the increase in Islamic consciousness at the societal level. Islamic resurgence at the societal level can be evidenced by a rise in religiosity: growing mosque attendance, growing observance of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, a noticeable increase of women wearing the hijab (Islamic headscarf for women), and the proliferation of Islamic literature. In addition, in Egypt hundreds of rooms in private homes have been converted into small prayer rooms; Qur'anic reading sessions and religious discussions also take place in houses as well as prayer. Additionally, networks of Islamic hospitals, schools, and welfare centers as well as Islamic banks and businesses emerged as models of proper Islamic social relations (Hafez 1997; 301-302).

Many people first got involved in the Islamist movement by participating in various social, religious, or cultural activities organized by a neighborhood mosque, religious reading circles, or Islamist associations. For instance, they began by participating religious lessons (dars) in a mosque, joining an informal study group, or going to prayer services in

221 A discussion of Islamists' perception of democracy and their differentiation of the procedural aspects of democracy (like elections, rule of law, constitutionalism) and liberal democratic freedoms will be
observance of an Islamic holy day. Having a religious character, such activities provide socially acceptable venues for people to participate, which in turn create a positive connotation of exemplary religious behavior attached to those events and activities (Wickham 2002; 152). My interviewees indicated that they had first met with the organization through friends, family members or through the mosque. For instance, Abbas, a middle aged Brotherhood member, stated that he had his first contact with the organization in his high school years, when one of Abbas’ friends whom he met in the neighborhood mosque invited Abbas to a weekly dars in his neighborhood given by a Brotherhood elder.222 Islamists also drew on preexisting ties among relatives, friends, and neighbors, which embedded Islamist networks into the existing social structures. Often times close social relationships between activist and non-activist peers continued. Such social networks also provided opportunities for movement participation detached from the realm of politics.

Islamists sometimes deliver their messages explicitly, for example, when they delivered their services, they did those according to Islamic norms (i.e., loans with no interest, gender-segregated health care). Islamists also used schools, tutoring, and other educational services to inculcate their views. At the same time, Islamist student groups provided students with services such as cheaper photocopied textbooks, lecture notes, and more importantly cheaper housing. While providing services, the Islamists combined practical services with the inculcation of moral standards. For instance, as a response to terribly overcrowded public transportation system, those associations purchased minibuses for female students. After this service became increasingly popular, Islamists limited it to women with the hijab (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 73-74). In fact, Islamists have been

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provided in chapters 6 and 7.
extremely successful in running these organizations and using them to provide services. By combining their message with concrete social action and offering a real alternative to the existing regime, the Islamists bolstered their standing and appeal among various social sectors in Egypt.

Islamist activism in Egypt also prompts the government to alter its policies towards religion. For instance, to counter the Islamists, the Egyptian regime seeks “to portray itself as almost as Islamic as the Islamist opposition” (Abaza 2006, vi). Although, in certain cases, the Islamists pushed the Egyptian government to make some concessions, the Egyptian government deliberately chose to concede for the sole purpose of counterbalancing the Brotherhood by displaying signs of piety or making policies that would please the Islamists. Abaza (2006, 15-19) and Berman (2003, 16) report that the government television started to air more religious programs, and legislation giving more prominence to the Shari’a was enacted by the government. The Al-Azhar ulema (Islamic scholars) began to be consulted on political, social, cultural and even economic matters. Abaza (2006, 18) notes that throughout the presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak different reasons were behind the state’s attempt to re-Islamize: “in the 1970s the aim was to counter the left; in the 1980s there was an attempt at co-opting Islamists…and in the 1990s there was an attempt at containing the Islamists challenge, as well as legitimizing authoritarian politics.” This was a strategic move on the side of the Egyptian regime as the

222 In Chapter 3, a similar account was provided.
223 The Brothers believe that this happened due to their continuous pressure and Islamist activism. For instance, Akram, who is a manager at a small convenience store in Giza, argued that over the years the Egyptian government became more conservative because of the efforts of the Brotherhood. Akram believed that the Brotherhood’s political activism “brought the government in line with Islamic values and principles” as he believed that political activism forced the Egyptian government to gradually Islamize; he did not believe that it was a deliberate effort of the Egyptian government to counterbalance the Islamists.
224 In fact, even before the climax of Islamism in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, in 1980, a constitutional amendment made Shari’a the source for legislation instead of being the main source for legislation (Abaza 2006, 16).
NDP officials led by Mubarak tried to diffuse the Islamists’ criticisms regarding the Islamists’ allegations that the Mubarak regime was unwilling to apply the *Shari’a*. One such case was the case of Abu Zaid, a university professor who was accused by the Islamists for publishing blasphemous works. The Islamists charged Zaid with heresy and also argued that he could no longer remain married to his Muslim wife as a heretic. In 1995, the Appellate Court agreed with this charge and ordered Zaid to divorce his wife. A few weeks later, the couple decided to flee to the Netherlands (Murphy 2002, 201-210; Abdo 2000, 167).

Singerman (1995) argues that social networks serve as resources for movement building. The use of informal institutions for Islamists becomes vital as regimes often limit channels of formal politics, and strategies of control, cooptation, and repression rather than inclusionary politics is mostly adopted by the Middle Eastern regimes. In Singerman’s account, through these informal mechanisms, Islamists mobilize and construct collective identities that generate solidarity within the group in an authoritarian/repressive political context. Social networks play their most significant role in terms of movement participation and recruitment. As a result, people who are part of such networks are more likely to perceive a greater chance of a positive outcome from social action than those who are not, thus they are more likely to get involved. In other words, social networks pull participants into action.

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225 According to *Shari’a* Muslim women can not marry non-Muslim men; and Muslim men can only marry Christian and Jewish women. For instance, a Muslim man can not marry a Buddhist or a Hindu woman.
226 Research on recruitment patterns from social movements around the world strongly indicates that individuals are drawn into participation not by the force of the ideas or even the individual attitudes but as the result of their embeddedness in associational networks that render them structurally available for protest activity. Social networks make people available for recruitment, make them more inclined to join, and make them the targets of recruitment. Interpersonal ties encourage the extension of an invitation to participate and they ease the uncertainties one experiences when joining a new group. In the same fashion, social bonds help potential members overcome the perceived costs of participation into a new group (Clark 2004, 22-25).
Government Control over Religion

Earlier, the Egyptian regime’s attempts to portray itself as Islamic as the Islamist opposition were discussed. During this process, Al-Azhar, the official religious establishment, significantly benefitted from the gradual increase of conservatism in Egypt as an institution. Berman notes that the power of Al-Azhar expanded greatly “in exchange for conferring Islamic legitimation on the state” (2003, 16). Additionally, Berman notes that the Al-Azhar scholars promoted the Islamization of school curricula and oversaw the religious broadcasting on the government media as religious broadcasting on the government controlled media increased by 50 percent between 1975 and 1990 (2003, 16-17). Although Berman discusses the increased role of Al-Azhar in the Islamization of the Egyptian regime in length, she fails to discuss the role of governmental control over mosques and how it politicizes the Islamists. Similarly, Berman also fails to demonstrate the role of frames (Official Islam’s frames vs. Islamist frames) on how the Islamists recruit members and convey their Islamist rhetoric through the three types of frames (diagnostic, prognostic, motivational).

Tamir (2000, 14) reports that Al-Azhar achieved significant gains by forming loose alliances with some state actors who share its conservative vision. A recent ruling of Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of State, an administrative court that deals with questions about jurisdiction within the executive branch) is one of the most significant examples of Islamists who managed to push forward their agenda within the government. In July 1993, the Sheikh Al-Azhar submitted a letter to the Majlis Al-Dawla asking which institution had jurisdiction over the censorship of audio and visual material related to Islam. By February of 1994, the court arrived at a decision in favor of Al-Azhar. Thus, Al-Azhar became the final arbiter in the assessment of such materials. Tamir (2000; 14-15) notes that the most
astonishing aspect of the court ruling was that for the first time Al-Azhar's decisions would be binding upon the Ministry of Culture. This was a clear dilemma for the Mubarak regime. On one hand, the regime had depended on Al-Azhar to discredit the Islamists on theological grounds. However, on the other hand, the government clearly understood that tight government control of the institution lends support to the Islamist's contention that the secular state is manipulating Islam for maintaining its power.

The Egyptian Constitution provides for freedom of belief and practice under Article 46. At the same time, Islam is the official state religion, the *Shari'a* is the primary source of legislation; and religious practices that conflict with the government's interpretation of the *Shari'a* are prohibited. In general, members of the non-Muslim religious minorities generally worship without legal harassment; however, members of other religious groups that are not recognized by the government, (for instance the Baha'is or the Shi'a) continue to experience hardships. All religious groups have to be recognized by the government, and for a religious group to be officially recognized, it must submit a request to the Religious Affairs Department within the Ministry of Interior. The Department determines whether the group would "pose a threat or upset national unity or social peace" ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007"). In making its decision, the Department consults the leading religious figures in the country, particularly the Pope of the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church and the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. The registration is then referred to the president, who issues a decree recognizing the new group, according to Law 15 of 1927. If a religious group bypasses the official registration process, participants are subject to detention and could also face prosecution and punishment under Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which forbids the "denigration of religions."
into political activities. The Article Five of the Egyptian constitution prohibits the establishment of political parties based on religion. The regime argues that Article Five ensures the separation of religion and politics. However, critics argue that Article Two of the Constitution contradicts with the principle of separation of religion and politics as Article Two continues the *Shari'a* the basis for legislation.

The Islamic Research Center (IRC) at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor and recommend confiscation of any media (religious or non-religious) based on Islamic criteria. The IRC has the legal right to recommend confiscation, but the actual act of confiscation requires a court order. In 2003 the Ministry of Justice issued a decree authorizing Al-Azhar to confiscate publications, tapes, speeches, and artistic materials deemed inconsistent with Islamic principles. With the 2003 decree, the Government permitted greater authority to Al-Azhar in decisions of confiscation and censorship, and acted on its recommendations ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

The Egyptian government's approach to groups that are perceived as un-Orthodox Muslims is also harsh. The government at times prosecutes members of religious groups

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228 Politics is not the only area in which people are discriminated on the basis of their religion. Government practices discriminated against Christians in hiring for the public sector, staff appointments to public universities, and in barring them from study at Al-Azhar University (a publicly funded institution). The government pays the salaries of Muslim prayer leaders, but not Christian clergy. There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. Usually, public university programs training Arabic language and literature teachers bar non-Muslims because the curriculum involves study of the Qur'an (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

229 For example, the application of family law (legal matters including marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, and burial) is based on an individual's religion. The government recognizes only the three "heavenly religions" (namely, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) in the practice of family law. Muslim families are subject to *Shari'a*, Christian families to Canon Law, and Jewish families to Jewish law. In cases of family law disputes involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, the courts apply *Shari'a*. The government does not recognize the marriages of citizens adhering to religions other than Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Under *Shari'a* as practiced in the country, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim men. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men. Under *Shari'a*, converts from Islam lose all rights of inheritance. However, because the government offers no legal means for converts from Islam to Christianity to amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, inheritance rights may appear not to have been lost (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").
whose practices are deemed to deviate from mainstream Sunni Orthodox Islamic beliefs. For instance, between March and June of 2007, the Egyptian police arrested five men affiliated with the Qurani movement. Also in 2004, Hussein El-Derini was arrested due to his affiliation with Shi'a Islam, and later was released in June 2005, after spending 15 months in administrative detention without charge or trial. Although the Christians can practice their religion freely, the government does not recognize conversions of Muslims to Christianity or other religious groups. Under Shari'a, a non-Muslim wife who converts to Islam must divorce her non-Muslim husband (because according to the Shari'a a Muslim woman can not marry a non-Muslim man). Upon the wife's conversion, local security authorities ask the non-Muslim husband if he is willing to convert to Islam; if he chooses not to, divorce proceedings begin immediately and custody of children is awarded to the mother ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

Despite some negative implementations, there have been some improvements in respect for religious freedom. For instance, a Coptic Christian woman was among 30

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230 The Qurani movement is a small group of Muslims who rely largely if not exclusively on the Qur'an as authoritative for Islam, to the exclusion of the Prophet Muhammed's traditions (Sunna) and other sources of Islamic law. There are several cases involving the Egyptian government's intimidation against people or groups that are perceived to be un-Orthodox Muslims. For instance, in May 2006 public prosecutor Maher Abdul Wahid ordered two Azharites, Abdul Sabur al-Kashef and Mohammed Radwan, to be tried by a low-level criminal court on charges of blaspheming Islam. Kashef was prosecuted for claiming to have seen God while Radwan was prosecuted for denying the existence of heaven and hell. Al-Kashef was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment while Radwan received 3 years. In mid-January 2007 El-Gamaleya Misdemeanor Court of Appeals reduced Kashef's sentence to 6 years' imprisonment and upheld the earlier ruling of 3-years for Radwan (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

231 Martial Law is still in effect in Egypt since former President Sadat's assassination in 1981. Suspects can be held for longer periods, they can also be referred to the Military Courts which are known to be harsher than the non-military courts. The Martial Law was recently extended for a year. See footnote 27.

232 This constitutes a serious problem regarding civil rights of citizens because in the absence of a legal means to register their change in religious status, some converts resorted to soliciting illicit identity papers, often by submitting fraudulent supporting documents or bribing the government clerks who process the documents. In such cases, authorities periodically charged converts with violating laws prohibiting the falsification of documents (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

233 In April 2005 the Family Court granted the divorce of Wafaa Riffat Adly, a Christian woman who had converted to Islam, from her Christian husband, Said Farouk Adly, after he refused to convert (From: "Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").
women judges appointed to the bench in early April 2007. Moreover, the government took positive steps in response to an April 2006 sectarian attack in Alexandria that led to mob violence against Coptic Christians and punished the local police officers in Alexandria who, in negligence, did not properly respond to the violent events. Recently, Al-Azhar held a small number of interfaith discussions both inside the country and abroad. The head of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Tantawi, who is a government appointee, and the Pope of Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church, Pope Shenouda III, participated in joint public events during Ramadan and Easter and in a Christian-Muslim dialogue in June 2006. Indeed, Christians and Muslims in Egypt share a common culture and live as neighbors throughout the country ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

Government Control over Mosques

All mosques must be licensed by the government (government-controlled or private). The government appoints and pays the salaries of the imams who lead prayers in government-controlled mosques and monitors their sermons. It does not contribute to the funding of Christian churches. The Ministry of Religious Endowments (MRE) reported that there were 95,000 mosques and small dedicated prayer areas called "zawiyas" nationwide as of August 2006. The government annexes new mosques every year but cannot keep pace with new mosque construction. A 2004 decree from the MRE removed the authority to issue permits to build mosques from governors and placed mosques in private homes under the Ministry's administrative control. Approximately 5,000 mosques and zawiyas remain unsupervised by the Ministry ("Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report 2007").

234 Law 175 of 1960 granted the Ministry of Religious Endowments the authority to incorporate private mosques.
Earlier, in 1992 the MRE declared that the government wanted to incorporate 10000 private mosques per year. Indeed, this was a very ambitious program considering the limitations that the Egyptian government had to overcome. The Ministry had enough money to incorporate just 400 mosques per year due to acute budgetary constraints.

Moreover, in 1992, the Ministry needed 40000 imams (prayer leaders), however it could only employ 3000. As of the mid-1990s, the majority of private mosques remained outside of governmental oversight. In 1991, the Ministry of Religious Endowments claimed that about 25000 (45 percent) of the 45000 private mosques and 10000 zawiyas (small prayer rooms, usually at the basements of buildings) had been taken under the government’s control. As one Egyptian newspaper observed: “In many cases, if you take their mosques, they proceed to the zawiyas in the basement of buildings and meet there…” (quoted in Wickham 105). In 1993, the MRE launched a new campaign to incorporate all of Egypt’s mosques under the Ministry’s control. The announcement came only five weeks after the Ministry declared that all Friday sermons at state-controlled mosques must be approved by government appointed officials, and its intention to curb the building of private mosques (Mattoon 1993). Since the early 1990s, the Egyptian government has accelerated the process of incorporating private mosques under the government’s control.

In addition to the ambitious campaign to control the mosques, in July 2004, the MRE announced that the same official sermon would be delivered in 88,000 government-controlled mosques across Egypt. According to the new regulations, the sermons would be prepared by Al-Azhar scholars and distributed by the MRE officials to the mosques. Preachers who do not stick to the text would be deprived of bonuses and will be subject to an investigation by the Legal Affairs Department at the Ministry. The new plan also required the preachers at all newly appropriated mosques to attend state-run religious
indoctrination courses. Preachers would only be appointed after clearing an examination and passing a security test ("Egypt: 88,000 Mosques, One Sermon" 2003).

Legitimizing Islamist Activism through the Islamic Concept of Da‘wa

How do Islamists respond to government control over religion? Indeed, Islamists believe that the government should serve Islam, it is not the other way around, and they find government control over religion unacceptable because they believe that this would eventually corrupt the true nature of Islam.235 However, the Islamists’ disapproval of government control over religion does not directly translate into political activism. To mobilize the believers towards the establishment of Shari‘a and to make the government subservient to religion (not the other way around), Islamists carefully (re)frame the already existing Islamic concept of da‘wa (call to God, dissemination of Islam).

The Egyptian Islamists, through the medium of da‘wa, Islamist activists engaged in an ideological project to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Egyptian citizens. By promoting a more activist conception of Islam, the Islamists claimed that it was fardh ‘ayn, an Islamic duty for very Muslim, to participate in the Islamic reform of society and state. Such participation is considered as a thawab (religiously defined/encouraged good deed) by the Islamists.236 Thus, by doing this, the Islamists challenged dominant patterns of political alienation and abstention by promoting a new ethic of civic obligation. The entry of movement participants into the Islamist activism was a gradual process in which low-risk activism was preceded high-risk activism. As “rational actor” models of participation would predict, many participants joined those groups because of various social, psychological, and emotional benefits. This may explain participation into low-risk forms

235 See the earlier debate on this issue in Chapter 3.
236 More details will be provided for the significance of da‘wa in Islamist activism in Chapter 6.
of activism (Wickham 2002, 120). However, it cannot clearly explain high-risk forms of activism. Framing activism as a moral-religious obligation by the Brotherhood demands self-sacrifice and commitment facilitates the shift of the new members from low-risk activism to high-risk activism.

Clark (2004, 14) points out that da'wa becomes the very act of activating Islam through deed in all spheres of life and also a vital component of practicing Islam. Thus, da'wa becomes incumbent upon all Muslims. In this regard, Clark reminds, the Islamist project is an attempt to create a web between religion, politics, and all forms of activism. Muslims efforts should reinforce each other and create public virtue and personal piety. All sorts of Islamist institutions (social, economic, and political) in this regard are a form of putting da'wa into practice. Participating, volunteering, or donating to an Islamist institution becomes a form of religious deed, and an expression of Islamist identity. In simple terms, for an Islamist, the major necessity of Muslims today is to heal the ills of Muslims through imitating the example of the golden era of Islam. The expected outcome of such an effort pertains to both this world and the other (hereafter). On this world, an Islamic system will be created through such an effort and the ills of Muslims will be healed; in the hereafter, such an effort will place a true believer in heaven.

My interviews suggest that the concept of da'wa is one of the crucial frames that is actually derived from an already existing concept of Islam. Prophet Muhammad describes any deed that is useful to other people as a sadaqa (charity) such as removing an obstacle from a road that hinders traffic or smiling to others. Thus, according to the niyyah (intention) of a person, an ordinary action becomes a good deed which will be rewarded by God. Thus, if one's intention is to serve Islam, any act for realizing that intention becomes a good deed. Islamists believe that if someone participates to any activity or
effort for the sake of implementing Islam as an all encompassing system, the participation itself becomes an act of da'wa which at the same time for many Islamists is a type of jihad. Therefore, da'wa becomes central to the process of disseminating and implementing Islam as an all-encompassing system. By promoting a more activist conception of Islam, the Islamists claimed that it was fardh 'ayn (an Islamic obligation for all), to participate in the Islamic reform of society and state. By the Islamists, such participation is considered as a thawab (religiously defined/encouraged good deed).  

Depending upon one's degree of involvement in a social movement organization, under new bonds of friendship, movement participants work together to achieve a goal under da'wa. Thus, increased levels of activism translate into the participants' gradually developing an activist understanding of da'wa (Clark 2004, 29). New participants usually do not identify themselves as Islamists, rather what were once perceived as acts of religiously inspired good deed gradually become forms of activism under the umbrella of da'wa. Later, often unconsciously, an increasingly greater sphere of activism is perceived as part of religious practice. This transformation of perception has a huge impact upon participants' sense of community and may also alter their self-identity since allows participants to perceive political activism as a religious duty. In sum, the underlying motive behind this perception is that Islamists, by drawing on the respected tradition of the da'wa, adapted the concept to new purposes. First, they shifted the target audience from... 

237 Qutb makes no difference between Islam and the method to revive it. Thus, Qutb directly associates any act that contributes to the revival of Islam with Islam. This could also be related to the Islamists' understanding of Islam as a comprehensive “way of life” The concept of “Islamic obligation for all” could be related to Qutb's understanding of Islamic struggle to establish the Shari'a. In Milestones, (Chapter 2), Qutb states: “Islam and the method of revival of Islam are both equally important; there is no difference between them [emphasis belongs to me]. Any other method, however attractive it may be, cannot bring about the establishment of Islam. Other methods can work for the establishment of man-made systems, but are incapable of establishing our system. Thus it is as necessary to follow this particular method for the establishment of Islam as it is to obey the way of life it outlines and to believe in its articles of faith.”
non-Muslims to the ordinary Muslims whose understanding and observance of Islam were viewed as faulty or incomplete. Second, a new content was introduced to the message of the da'wa: Religion cannot just be confined to matters of private faith and ritual, it is rather an all-encompassing belief system incorporating both the faith and the organization of society and state according to the precepts of the Shari'a (Wickham 2002, 126).238

How Does the Islamists’ Perception of External Threats Relate to Political Activism?

Perception of external threats may change based on the changing circumstances, thus how people perceive external threats is not absolute. The process is also related to the way that the movement leaders frame issues and shape the movement’s collective identity. A good example would be how the Islamists perceive the US as a threat in relation to the foreign policy options adopted by the US foreign policy makers regarding the Middle East, and the degree of military presence of the US in the region. For instance, anti-Americanism has been on the rise since the US military involvement in Iraq after 2003. Other events also shape how people perceive external threats; for instance after Israel’s military operation in southern Lebanon in summer of 2006, Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah and Iranain leader Mahmoud Ahmedinejad became highly revered figures among the Sunni Arab youth as those leaders defied the US in the region.

238 Thus, a new and more activist Muslim identity is presented by the Islamists through the concept of da'wa. For those Islamists, the Islamic reform of society first begins with a transformation of the individual. The iman (faith) prompts change in the private conduct of the individual. After the first step, the reform would ultimately expand outward in “concentric circles” to include every sector of society. The Islamists, thus, make a distinction between an ordinary Muslim and a committed Muslim. An ordinary Muslim is born into the faith and is more or less observant, but does not realize what a full commitment to Islam entails. On the other hand, a committed Muslim understands the norms of Islamic conduct and applies them in practice. Thus, one of the major functions of the da’wa for an Islamist is to encourage ordinary Muslims to become committed Muslims (Wickham 2002, 126-128). Accordingly, a committed Muslim should monitor and correct the behavior of others around him/her if possible through persuasion. An often quoted phrase by the Islamists from the Qur’an is “al-amr bi ‘l-ma ‘ruf wa ‘l-nahy ‘an il-munkar” which is commanding the good and forbidding the evil.
Another way for the Islamists to frame external threats is their linking of secularism with moral corruption and religious laxity. Islamists often perceive secularism with social engineering. In short, social engineering refers to the efforts of the government or private groups to influence popular attitudes and social behavior on a mass scale. Islamists often perceive such projects with suspicion, disapproval and opposition as they believe that the secularist government's vision of ideal society does not completely match the ideal society envisioned by the Shari'a. In this regard, the application of the Shari'a, as da'wa, becomes a highly controversial debate (almost a war in the Gramscian sense) waged through symbols regarding the ideal vision of society by each side. In both countries, Nasserism and Kemalism tried to marginalize and as well as to control Islamic institutions. However, such top-down efforts by the regimes did not lead to the disappearance of Islam from the public realm. As Kadioglu (1998) and Tamir (2000) suggest, such attempts rather paved the way to Islam's politicization in both countries.

Regarding the application of the Shari'a, the Brotherhood members whom I interviewed believed that Mubarak was not doing enough to implement the Shari'a. An overwhelming 92% of the interviewees believed that the government was not doing enough to implement the Islamic law. Unlike Turkey, secularism (Al-Almaniyyah) is not a big debate among the Egyptian Islamists; and unlike Turkish Islamists, relatively speaking, Egyptian Islamists did not believe that Islam was under oppression. Only 12% of the interviewees believed that Islam was under oppression by the government. However, Egyptian Islamists highly believed that the government in Egypt did not have an issue with

239 Earlier in Chapter 3, concepts of social and political engineering were discussed.
240 More discussion of how Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive secularism will be provided in Chapter 6.
Islam, but against the political expression of Islam. Indeed, 92% of my interviewees believed that the Egyptian regime did not want the political expression of Islam.

Additionally, 68% of the interviewees argued that governmental control over religion existed in Egypt. For instance, 74% of the interviewees mentioned governmental control over religious education (through Al-Azhar), government's attempts to incorporate private mosques, and the delivery of sermons to the government-controlled mosques by the government. Like the Turkish Islamists, Egyptian Islamists also perceive politics as a zero-sum game. This game entails the waging of a Gramscian counter-hegemonic war of position which has to be won for final victory. Additionally, like Turkish Islamists, the Egyptian Islamists appear to perceive politics not as a means to work out the optimal solution(s) for a variety of problems, but as a kind of war (in the Gramscian sense).

Islamists perceive their war as an all-out war waged at every front against the secularist regime which, according to the Islamists, pays only a lip service for implementing the Shari'a. One young Islamist was curiously wondering why a true Muslim would not vote for the Islamist candidates in elections. Since the Islamists perceive their political program in terms of religion, voting and political participation becomes a religious virtue, even a good deed (thawab) sanctioned by the religion. For the Islamists, political activism becomes a religious deed since politics, for the Islamists, would be used

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241 The interviewees' responses can be related to the organic nature of Islam which was discussed earlier in Chapter 3 and parts of this chapter. In Toprak's (1981, 23) words, in an organic religion "...religion is largely equated with society". Husain (2003) points out that in an organic religion the distinction between religious and social systems is obscured, indeed the two realms actually merge. In Islam, this merger is prescribed by the Shari'a, and the Islamists often emphasize this.

242 This topic will be elaborated later in Chapter 6.

243 Two examples might illustrate my point here. Imam Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran perceived political participation as a religious duty and a responsibility upon Muslims (since theoretically their votes determine who comes to power which according to Khomeini, associated with the fate of the nation) and equated political participation with jihad. Similarly, Necmettin Erbakan of the RP is known to have said: "The ones who did not vote for our party [the RP] are of the potato religion" [i.e., they are not true
to implement the *Shari'a*. In sum, Islamists often believe that if someone has a higher noble cause, the means to achieve that higher cause must also be noble. Muhsin, a young Brotherhood member, stated: “Our [the Brotherhood] struggle is all about establishing the true Islamic order in Egypt... It [bringing about the Islamic order] must be the purpose of all Muslims around the world...” According to the Brotherhood’s way of understanding their struggle, anything that would confront their movement would be an act of preventing them from establishing their noble cause which is establishing the *Shari’a*. Moreover, any perceived threat that would destroy the Muslim identity (or Muslimness) of the people would be a serious impediment for the Islamists to implement the *Shari’a*, because according to the Islamists, when the Muslim identity is under threat, Muslims become less committed to the goal of establishing the *Shari’a*. This “perception of threat” then urges Muslims to protect their Muslimness, or their Muslim identity as political activism and the Islamist impulse to protect Muslim identity usually go hand in hand.

The Content Analysis

Discussion of the Islamist frames represented in the Islamist literature will be evaluated via content analysis. The content analysis includes counting the frequencies of the themes taken from Yilmaz (2002) in selected books of Hasan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb which are still widely read by the Brotherhood members. Islamist journals, like Al-Sha’ab, in Egypt have been frequently and heavily censored by the government and many Islamist journals like Al-Sha’ab were indefinitely closed down by the Egyptian regime. Since the Islamist journals were either closed down or confiscated by the regime because of governmental censorship, I was unable to have access to copies of them. Instead, I made

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Muslims] implying that i) a Muslim has to vote for the Islamist party, and ii) voting is a religious obligation.
the content analysis on the selected books of Al-Banna and Qutb since those two authors are still the most widely read Islamist writers among the Brotherhood members. A second reason for choosing Al-Banna and Qutb for the content analysis is that first, both authors were prolific writers and their works heavily emphasized issues like Muslim identity or Muslimness, Islamic consciousness, Islamic zeal/passion and the ideal course of action for political activism. Second, as mentioned earlier, both authors still have a wide range of reader base. As my interviewees indicated the Brotherhood members frequently read passages from Al-Banna’s and Qutb’s books in their weekly dars (religious lecture) in their homes or dormitories, and interpret the current events and problems in the light of the selected passages from them.

In order to count the frequencies of theme categories as elaborated by Yılmaz (2002), this study included two of H. Al-Banna’s books, Between Yesterday and Today and Our Message, and S. Qutb’s Milestones. Since the literature reviewed in this section is limited, my approach here is will not be recording the frequencies of the theme categories developed by Yılmaz (2002, 76-78). Yılmaz’s categories will still be used; however, my approach will be to look at whether Al-Banna’s and Qutb’s arguments fit into the theme categories. Afterwards, just like I did in the corresponding section of Chapter 3, I will see what my interview data suggests regarding the theme categories laid out here.

244 The influence of Qutb and his work extends across the whole spectrum of Islamism. Alongside notable Islamist like Mawlana Mawdudi and Hasan Al-Banna, Qutb is often considered one of the most influential Islamic activists of the modern era. He is recognized for his application of Islamic ideology to current social and political problems, such as Westernization, modernization, and political reform. Qutb's work also expanded many themes now common in Western discourses on Islamism, including the theory of inevitable ideological conflict between Islam and the West, the notion of a transnational ummah (the brotherhood/unity of believers), and the comprehensive application of jihad in various spiritual, political, and social contexts. In terms of politics, Qutb also left a significant mark on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is still influential today. Qutb's theoretical work on Islamic advocacy, including emphasis on social justice and education, has become a cornerstone of the contemporary Brotherhood. His interpretation of jihad and its application for societal change has influenced many later Islamist activists, both violent and
Ideologically, Qutb's thought differs from that of Al-Banna's. In this section some of those differences (as well as the similarities) will be laid out. Similarities include Qutb's advocacy of an Islamic system as the only legitimate system for the state, significance of *jihad* in the struggle against non-Islamic governments to establish an Islamic order, and an uncompromising opposition to Western culture and values. However, among other differences, Qutb's conceptualization of the current Muslim societies and governments as *jahili* constitutes the major difference between Qutb and Al-Banna. Qutb despised modernity and saw the current world as *jahiliyyah*, the barbarous and ignorant condition existing before Muhammad. For Qutb, *jahiliyyah* did not allude to the particular time period in Arabia prior to the rise of Islam, as the term is traditionally interpreted, but to an antithesis of an Islamic utopia. Brothers still read Qutb's writings in addition to Al-Banna's writings. Dr. Sa'id, one of the prominent Brotherhood members, pointed out that Qutb completed his radical writings under heavy torture and that was the point when Qutb's writings took a radical turn. Dr. Sa'id believed that Qutb's radical writings, like the ones in his *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones), should be evaluated within that historical context. He also noted that later starting from the mid-1970s the Brotherhood distanced itself from radicalism; and Hasan Al-Hudaibi, the former spiritual guide of the non-violent. Also, Qutb's imprisonment and execution has led some to consider him a martyr (*shaheed*). For a detailed discussion of Qutb's ideas and the impact of his thought on other Islamists, see Chapter 4.

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245 *Jahiliyyah* literally means ignorance, *jahili* means ignorant. Indeed, Prophet Muhammed used the term to refer to the period before Islam. For a discussion of Qutb's conception of *jahiliyyah*, see Chapter 4.

246 *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* literally means Signposts on the Road, it was translated into English with the title of Milestones.

247 Dr. Sa'id argued that Qutb was more than just a radical writer, and his radical writings constituted only a small portion of his works. Dr. Sa'id reminded me that Qutb had an extensive commentary on the Qur'an named *In the Shadow of the Qur'an* (*Fi Zilal Al-Qur'an*) in thirty volumes which he wrote before Milestones. Dr. Sa'id pointed out that Qutb never got formal religious education, thus he educated himself about Islam to the point that he was able to write an extensive commentary about the Qur'an in thirty volumes.

248 Hasan Al-Hudaibi (1891-1973) led the Brotherhood between 1951-1973 after Al-Banna's assassination. His son Mamoun Al-Hudaibi (1921-2004) was the Brotherhood's sixth general guide.
Brotherhood, wrote a book (Du‘ah, la Qudah, 1977, Inviters, not Judges) for a rebuttal of radical views in Qutb’s later writings.

In Al-Banna’s and Qutb’s works, the first and the second theme categories seem to appear together because both authors directly link moral erosion of Muslims directly to European (Western) influences. The first two categories are the perceived immorality or moral erosion and Western cultural influences and perceived cultural degeneration due to Muslims’ imitation of Western culture and values. Perceived immorality is one of the most frequently repeated themes in the Islamist writings including criticism of non-Islamic lifestyle or actions considered immoral from an Islamic viewpoint. According to Al-Banna immorality is an outcome of the heavy influence of “the materialistic European civilization” in addition to Muslims’ religious laxity and blind imitation of the West (Al-Banna, Between Yesterday and Today, The Chapter titled: The Tyranny of Materialism on Muslim Land). Al-Banna is highly critical about the European civilization. In Our Message, Al-Banna argues that:

“To them [Muslims] have been assailed on the sociological side by lewdness of manners and morals, through the sloughing off of the restraints of the humanitarian virtues they inherited from their glorious, fortunate ancestors; while through imitation of the West, the viper’s venom creeps insidiously into their affairs, poisoning their blood and sullying the purity of their well being (Al-Banna, Our Message, the chapter titled To the Cure).

Al-Banna cites four sources of moral weakness and corruption and relates them to the Western cultural influences over the Muslim societies. Those sources are: apostasy

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249 Interestingly, in the Turkish case (see Chapter 3), those two categories did not seem to go hand in hand. Turkish Islamists, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, seem to perceive moral erosion as a relatively isolated issue. A discussion of this point will be made in Chapter 6 which will compare the two countries.
(disbelief in God and materialism), lust (one's devotion to his/her carnal desires, and promiscuity), individual greed, and usury. According to Al-Banna:

These purely materialistic traits of European society have corrupted the spirit, devalued morality, and made them sluggish in the war against crime, all this and the problems have multiplied, destructive ideologies have made their appearance, devastating and damning revolutions have burst forth, economic, social, and political institutions no longer stand on firm foundations. Nations have been torn apart by sects and parties, while greed and hatred have driven people to cut each others' throats. This modern civilization has substantiated its complete impotence in securing peace, tranquility and safety within society. It has failed to grant happiness to man, despite all the doors of science, knowledge, wealth and opulence it has left open for them, and despite the power and authority it enjoys throughout the earth, and even though it has not been in existence for so much as a century (Al-Banna, Between Yesterday and Today, The Chapter titled: Social Struggle).

Qutb’s approach to immorality and moral erosion is based on his concept of _jahiliyyah_ delineating the differences between a Muslim and a non-Muslim society. Qutb perceives the society of true believers and the _jahili_ societies in a dichotomous relationship. For Qutb, the _jahili_ (ignorant) society is the antithesis of the Muslim society. In that regard, Qutb argues that jahili society is a society “whose aim is to block Islam.” (Milestones, Chapter 3) For Qutb, moral erosion and immorality are direct results of the _jahili_ society. Qutb argues that in the _jahili_ societies, morality is not a priority:

“...in the Islamic society material comforts are not made into the highest value at the expense of ‘human’ characteristics—freedom and honor, family and its obligations, morals and values, and so on - as is the case in _jahili_ societies” (Milestones; Chapter 8). Qutb is also against blindly imitating the West and argues that:

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250 _Jahili_ is the adjective form of _jahiliyyah_.

251 For a discussion of Qutb’s understanding of the concept of _jahiliyyah_ and the _jahili_ societies, see Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 of Milestones, Qutb argues: “The _jahili_ society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a _jahili_ society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations.”

252 In Qutb's understanding, the reference point for the moral values should not be human understanding, rather they have to be based upon the Qur'an and the Shari'a prescribed in it: In Chapter 8 of Milestones, Qutb argues: “[In an Islamic society] moral standards are not determined by the environment and changing conditions; rather they are fixed criteria above and beyond the difference in environments. One cannot say that some moral values are 'agricultural' and others 'industrial', some are 'capitalistic' and some others
A Muslim cannot go to any source other than God for guidance in matters of faith, in the concept of life, acts of worship, morals and human affairs, values and standards, principles of economics and political affairs and interpretation of historical processes. It is, therefore, his duty that he should learn all these from a Muslim whose piety and character, belief and action, are beyond reproach (Milestones, Chapter 8).

Al-Banna and Qutb often associated moral erosion to religious laxity and weakness of faith. The most frequently suggested solutions by Al-Banna against moral erosion were learning about Islam and prophet Muhammed's life, practicing the religion (i.e., performing the daily prayers, fasting, and avoiding sins) and associating with death and thinking about the hereafter (i.e., thinking about the rewards and punishments in the hereafter). However, Al-Banna and Qutb have completely opposite views regarding the extent of European influence in Muslim societies. As stated earlier in Chapter 4, in Qutb's view, all societies are jahili societies (Muslim and non-Muslim) without any exceptions. In Chapter 5 of Milestones, Qutb argues "...all the societies existing in the world today are jahili...all the existing so-called 'Muslim' societies are also jahili societies." However, for Al-Banna, there are varying degrees of European (Western) influence in Muslim societies. Al-Banna in Between Yesterday and Today (the chapter titled The Tyranny of Materialism on Muslim Land) divides the Muslim nations that were affected by "the materialistic civilization" into three categories:

1) Countries in which this influence has reached serious proportions: Not only is this seen outwardly but has gone so far as to penetrate the minds and feelings of the people. Among these countries are Turkey and Egypt, where the slightest trace of an Islamic ideology has disappeared from all walks of life, banished to mosques and Sufi retreats.
2) Countries which have only been influenced outwardly: Emotions and feelings however remaining intact. Such as Iran and North Africa.
3) Countries which have not been influenced by this civilization, except for a particular class consisting of the well educated and the ruling group, to the exclusion of the common people and the masses: Such as Syria, Iraq, the Hijaz, many sections of the Arabian Peninsula, and the remaining Muslim countries.

'socialistic', some are 'bourgeois' and others 'proletarian'. Here, the standards of morality are independent of the environment, the economic status, and the stage of development of a society; these are nothing but superficial variations."
Like the Turkish Islamists, Egyptian Islamists maintain that the secular regime and intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and educational institutions. For the Islamists, another source of perceived moral erosion is the secularist media. Islam, according to the Islamists, is perceived as the main source of social identity, values and norms, and imposition of the strict secular policies by the state elites undermines the Muslim identity.

The third theme category is domestic suppression of Islam. Islamists argue that by secularizing Muslims, the secularist elites try to undermine Islamist movements. Al-Banna in Between Yesterday and Today (in the chapter titled Our Mission is One of Reawakening and Deliverance) points out that there would be obstacles for people who are working to establish the Shari'ah, and argues that:

The ignorance of the people as to what constitutes true Islam will remain an obstacle in your path, and you will find among the religious body and the official scholars those who will regard your understanding of Islam as outlandish, denouncing your campaign. Chiefs, leaders, and men of rank and authority will hate you. Every government without exception will rise against you, each one trying to limit your activities and hinder your path... The oppressors will use all the mechanisms to oppose you and extinguish the light of your mission. To that end they will invoke the aid of weak governments, dirty tactics and the help of those who seek their affection, while displaying animosity towards you. They will arouse suspicion and unjust accusations about your mission, trying to endow it with every possible defect and displaying it before the people in the most repugnant possible guise. They will rely on their strength, authority, wealth and influence.

Unlike Al-Banna, for Qutb, there is no way of compromising with the jahili society and the only way to establish Shari'ah is to directly confront the jahili regimes. In Milestones (Chapter 5), Qutb argues that “...the jahili society chooses to fight and not to make peace, attacking the vanguard of Islam at its very inception, whether it be a few individuals or whether it be groups, and even after this vanguard has become a well-
established community.” Qutb also believes that the jahili society and the Muslim society cannot coexist (Chapter 5):

It is clear, then, that a Muslim community cannot be formed or continue to exist until it attains sufficient power to confront the existing jahili society. This power must be at all levels; that is to say, the power of belief and concept, the power of training and moral character, the power to organize and sustain a community, and such physical power as is necessary, if not to dominate, at least to hold itself against the onslaught of the jahili society.

In Qutb’s account, there is a direct relationship between secularist regimes and oppression. Qutb argues that:

...Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of God is the oppression of His creatures (Qutb, Milestones; Introduction).

Al-Banna and Qutb disagree on how to introduce the Shari’a. Al-Banna is in favor of gradual political, social and economic reform to bring about the Shari’a. However, Qutb is for direct confrontation and action since he believes that there would be no compromises between the jahili society and the Muslim society.

The fourth theme category is the economic challenges. Islamists argue that mainly due to their selfishness, corruption, unresponsiveness, and their ignorance of Islamic principles pertaining socioeconomic justice and equality, the secularist elites kept ignoring the economic development of their country. Al-Banna and Qutb are aware of Europe’s scientific and economic ascendancy. Qutb admits that Muslim countries are backward; he also appreciates European culture and civilization. Qutb (Milestones, Introduction) states that “...Europe’s genius created its marvelous works in science, culture, law and material production, due to which mankind has progressed to great heights of creativity and material comfort. ...the ‘world of Islam’ is completely devoid of all this beauty.” Here, by
the term beauty, Qutb refers to the advanced level achieved by Europeans in the realms of sciences, law, and economic development. However, for Qutb Muslims’ backwardness could be eliminated by adhering to the principles of the Shari’a; Qutb (Milestones, Chapter 7) believes that:

A society which places the highest value on the 'humanity' of man and honors the noble 'human' characteristics is truly civilized. If materialism, no matter in what form, is given the highest value, whether it be in the form of a 'theory', such as in the Marxist interpretation of history, or in the form of material production, as is the case with the United States and European countries, and all other human values are sacrificed at its altar, then such a society is a backward one, or, in Islamic terminology, is a *jahili* society.

In Between Yesterday and Today (in the chapter titled Our Mission is One of Reawakening and Deliverance), Al-Banna relates backwardness of Egypt (and other Muslim countries) to European colonialism:

Recall too that there are more than 320 foreign companies in Egypt, monopolizing all the public utilities and important facilities in every sector of the country; the wheels of commerce, industry, and all economic institutions are in the hands of profiteering foreigners; our wealth in land is being transferred with lightning speed from our hands to those of others...Egypt is still backward, with no more than one fifth of the population possessing any form of education, and of these more than one hundred thousand have never gone further than the primary school level. Recall that crime has doubled in Egypt, and that it is increasing at an alarming rate to the point that there are more people coming out of prisons than schools; that up to the present time Egypt has been unable to properly outfit a single army division; These symptoms and phenomena may be observed in any Islamic country. Amid your aims are to work in reforming education; to fight poverty, ignorance, disease, and crime; and to create an exemplary society deserving to be associated with the Islamic Shari’a.

Both Al-Banna and Qutb believe that under the *Shari’a* with determination and hard work of Muslims, and with the principles of justice (social and economic), Muslim countries would be able to solve the problem of backwardness.

The *fifth* theme category is Western imperialism. Al-Banna, Qutb and other Islamists perceive the European (Western) countries as imperialist powers whose aim is to

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253 Both Al-Banna and Qutb use the concepts of Europe and West interchangeably.
254 Here, it is important to note that Al-Banna was writing in the 1930s, thus Egypt was still under British rule. Unlike Qutb's writings, in Al-Banna's writings, in addition to his elaboration of his thoughts about
exploit and control the Muslim world. The vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries, economic dependency on the West, and the cooperation of the ruling elites with the West. In Our Message, Al-Banna criticizes the leaders of Muslims leaders at his time:

They [Muslim Societies] have been assailed also through disorder in their policy of education and training, which stands in the way of effectively guiding their present generation, the men of the future and those who will be responsible for bringing about their resurgence. They have been assailed on the spiritual side by a death dealing despair, a murderous apathy, a shameful cowardice, an ignoble humility, an all pervading impotence, a niggardliness and an egocentricity which prevent people from making any effort, preclude self-sacrifice, and thrust the nation from the ranks of earnest strivers into those of triflers and gamesters (Al-Banna, Our Message, the chapter titled To the Cure).

Al-Banna is also critical of the East (The East is an umbrella term in Al-Banna’s writings indicating all non-Western countries including Muslim countries). Al-Banna argues that the West:

...has injured their [the East] dignity, their honor, and their independence; as well as exploited their wealth and shed their blood; and wherever they are suffering under the Western yoke which has been forced upon them, they are trying to free themselves with whatever strength, resistance, opposition, and endurance they can muster (Al-Banna, Our Message, the chapter titled Patriotism).

The authors generally assume that it is in the interests of the West to keep Muslim countries backward and weak so that the Western powers could exploit the resources of Muslim countries with ease. For Qutb, all Western systems are essentially bad, because they are not based upon divine rules and principles. Qutb (Milestones, Introduction) argues that:

...the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against God's authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by God.

various aspects of the Islamist movement, there are very powerful nationalist, liberationist and anti-colonialist undercurrents.
For Al-Banna and Qutb the best way to eliminate Western imperialism is to reject it and strive to establish the Islamic law. In Between Yesterday and Today (under chapter titled Our Mission is One of Reawakening and Deliverance), Al-Banna argues that members of the Brotherhood have two fundamental goals:

1) Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor will deny.
2) The establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland.

Qutb argues that the Shari'a is the best among the alternatives because it comes from God. For Qutb, the laws of God's creatures (people) can hardly be compared to the laws given by God himself. But for Qutb (Milestones, Chapter 2), this point is not the basis of the Islamic call. Qutb argues that "the basis of the message is that one should accept the Shari'a without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam...One who is attracted to this basic Islam has already resolved this problem; he will not require any persuasion through showing its beauty and superiority. This is one of the realities of the faith."

The last theme category is the Muslim's lack of self esteem. In their statements, Islamists frequently claim superiority of Islam as a social, political and economic system against Capitalism and Communist/Socialist systems which for Muslims are Western in origin (Please refer to Al-Banna's and Qutb's criticism of the West presented earlier under this section). Islamists, in general, frequently portray Capitalism as an excessively materialistic, competitive, exploitative and therefore inherently immoral system. Socialism is viewed as another type of exploitative unjust political system where peoples' rights are severely limited. Both Al-Banna and Qutb agree that since the decline of Islamic empires of the Middle Ages, Muslims had lost their self esteem and their hopes. In Between
Yesterday and Today, Al-Banna urges Muslims to give up despair and work hard for their ultimate goal:

Love one another, and make sure you guard your unity, for this is the secret of your strength and the buttress of your success. Stand fast until Allah judges justly between you and your people, for He is the best of Judges. Listen, and obey your leaders both in duress and comfort, in good times and bad, for this is the token of your conviction and the bond of solidarity between you (from the chapter titled Duties)... But these shackles shall not endure forever: time is change, and in the twinkling of an eye Allah changes things from one state to another. The directionlessness shall not remain so forever; guidance comes after bewilderment, and stability after anarchy, for Allah's is the command before and after! Therefore we never despair the verses of Allah (SWT) 255, the Traditions of His Apostle (PBUH) 256, His Sunnah (SWT) as regards the teaching of nations and the exaltation of peoples, and all He has related to us of these matters in His Book all of these proclaim an immense hope for us, and guide us toward the path of a genuine resurgence, for the Muslims know this if they have studied (from the chapter titled To the Cure).

Qutb also urges Muslims to be steadfast and optimistic. On the issue of self confidence, Qutb cites the following verse from the Qur'an (3: 139) and advices Muslims to remain positive: "Do not be dejected nor grieve. You shall be the uppermost if you are Believers."

The Content Analysis and the Interview Data

As stated earlier, the first and the second themes (moral corruption and Western influences) appeared together in the writings of Al-Banna and Qutb. My interview data also suggests that Egyptian Islamists also relate moral corruption and Western influences. According to my interview data, 78% 257 the interviewees believed that non-Islamic publications or media are the major causes of immorality in Egypt. The interviewees seemed to complain about the satellite channels 258, foreign movies, and particularly the internet. Respondents frequently criticized the secular media (Egyptian and non-Egyptian)

255 SWT (Subhanahu wa Ta’ala) is an expression of respect meaning “praise and glory be upon him (Allah)”
256 PBUH, Peace be upon him.
257 The percentages are rounded to integer numbers.
by contending that especially the visual media was encouraging the public to commit immoral acts like drinking, gambling, or having pre-marital sex. 46% of the interviewees believed that families were not providing enough moral education to their children in accordance to Islamic principles. Regarding the second theme, the Western influence, 82% of the interviewees believed that blindly imitating the Western style of life was causing immorality. In parallel to Al-Banna’s and Qutb’s way of argumentation, the respondents mostly agreed that Muslims should be aware of their Muslim identity (Muslimness), and instead of blindly imitating the West, they should promote their own values to prevent the corrupting influence of the Western culture and media.

The third theme is Western imperialism. As laid out earlier in Chapter 3, the vehicles of Western imperialism are specified as Western military presence in Muslim countries, Muslims’ economic dependency on the West, and the secularist Muslim elites’ cooperation with the West. This theme is different from the Western cultural influences and the Muslims’ imitation of the West because it relates to the Western influence in Muslim countries other than the cultural influences. The interviewees associated Western imperialism with concepts like colonialism, foreign rule, military intervention and economic dependency. 88% of the interviewees believed that the secularist rulers of Muslim countries could remain in power only because of Western support. Indeed, many interviewees stated that “the secularist rulers were the puppets of the West.” 78% of the interviewees perceived the West as a military threat and argued that the Western countries could pose a security threat for Muslim countries to maintain their interests in the Middle

258 Many voiced their concerns about Western satellite channels, there were also some Islamists complaining about “immoral programs” on the Lebanese satellite channels. In Egypt, satellite dishes are very popular.

259 Please see the discussion in Chapter 3 under the section titled The Content Analysis and the Interview Data.
East (Almost all of the interviewees brought up the ongoing US invasion of Iraq since 2003).

The fourth theme is domestic suppression of Islam. The interviewees carefully distinguished between two types of suppression. One is suppression of Islam as a religion. The other is about suppression of the political expressions of Islam (i.e., Islamism). Before my interviews in Egypt, I was expecting to see a higher percentage of Egyptian Islamists believing that the Egyptian government was suppressing Islam as a religion. However, my expectation turned out to be inaccurate. Indeed, only 26% of the interviewees believed that Islam was under suppression in Egypt. I believe this could be explained by the Egyptian regime’s attempts to portray itself as an Islamic alternative to the Islamist opposition by making conservative legislation and appealing to the conservative segments of the Egyptian population.\footnote{Please refer to the earlier discussion of under the section Government Control over Religion. Unlike the Turkish state, the Egyptian state implements the Shari'a in matters of family law regarding issues like} However, regarding the suppression of the political expression of Islam, 96% of the interviewees believed that the Egyptian government was using every available means to suppress Islamism. All of the interviewees found those governmental efforts as antidemocratic and unjust.

The last two themes are economic challenges and Muslim’s lack of self esteem. My interview questions did not directly handle those topics. However, in our dialogues, and in my interviewees’ responses to the open ended questions, a sizable group of interviewees voiced their concerns and complaints about these issues. In general, the interviewees believed that the economic challenges were a result of governmental corruption, and mismanagement of the economy and the waste of resources of Egypt by the politicians. The interviewees were severely critical of the politicians, and they argued that the politicians
were only mindful of maintaining their status and wealth, they were not responsive of people’s demands. The interviewees put Islam forward as a solution to those problems while emphasizing the importance of Islamic concepts of socioeconomic justice and solidarity of the ummah as a solution to economic challenges. The interviewees also complained about defeatism and believed that Muslims should have self esteem to succeed in their struggle. Jamil, one older gentleman who has been a member of the Brotherhood since his early adulthood, stated that “every birth is painful, thus the birth of the Islamic society will also be painful.” Jamil and other Brotherhood members believed that Islam would be triumphant; however, Muslims have to struggle for it. Like Jamil, many other Brotherhood members did not perceive the coming of the Islamic rule as a utopia, because they believed that Muslims in “the golden days of Prophet Muhammed and the Rightly Guided Four Caliphs” had actually had an Islamic rule which had to be a blueprint for the current Muslims for creating such an order for a second time.

Culture and Framing: Creation of and Battle over Meaning

Since the 1980s, social movement theorists (Moris and Mueller 1992; Larana et al. 1994; Johnston and Klandermans 1995) have been interested in the role of ideational factors including creation of meaning, and culture. Besides the structural and strategic dimensions of social movements outlined in RMT and the political process model, social movement literature has increasingly addressed how movement participants perceive themselves as a collectivity, how potential participants are recruited, and the ways in which meaning is produced and disseminated through the activists.

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marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Also, unlike the Turkish constitution, the Egyptian constitution recognizes the Shari’a as the primary source of legislation, and Islam as the official state religion.

261 Several Brotherhood members cited one of the verses in the Qur’an (21:105) which says: “My servants the righteous, shall inherit the earth”
In simple terms, frames are designed to mobilize participants and support. Frames represent interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of the experiences and events in the social and political environment in which the social movements operate. Social “movements must articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics to elicit collective action.” Although ideas or ideologies may underlie contentious action, they are socially processed through interpretive lenses that create intersubjective meaning and facilitate movement goals. In short, the term framing is used to describe this process of meaning construction (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988 and 1992; Benford and Snow 2000; Williams and Benford 2000).

Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish three major steps of framing for social movements. First, movements create frames which identify a situation as a problem that needs to be remedied. This process includes attributions of responsibility and targets of blame. Second, movements offer solutions to the problem. And third, movements provide a rationale for collective action. The would-be movement participants may share common understandings about reason and solutions to a particular problem, however certain frames need to be created by movement organizers to convince potential participants to engage in activism. In order to mobilize potential participants, one of the most critical dimensions of the framing process is frame resonance. Benford and Snow (2000; 619-622) also argue that the ability of a movement to transform a mobilization potential into actual mobilization depends upon the capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants. The success of frame resonance depends upon not just its compatibility with cultural (or religious)

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262 Diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. These frames are discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 3.
norms, but also the reputation of the group creating the frame, the personal significance of
the frame for potential participants, the strength, consistency and credibility of the frame.

Framing Within Islam

Like many other social movements, Islamists are also heavily involved in the
production of meaning and framing processes. The core imperative of Islamist movements
is to create a society governed by the Shari'a, and the control and reconstruction of state
institutions may be an effective instrument for accomplishing this transformation. However,
it is only one of many routes for change. In this regard, the state is a means for the
production of meaning, not an end. Islamists wage struggles through society and cultural
discourse rather than state institutions or government decision-making bodies. Through
such efforts, the Islamists aim to challenge dominant cultural codes and create a shared
meaning about the proper functions of society, groups, and the individual. However the
framing is not just related to culture and politics, in fact it is a multifaceted process that
also involves how Muslims perceive themselves, their problems, and others. Another
significant issue regarding the frames is that Islamist frames are in a position to compete
with alternative frames, especially the official Islamic or secularist/nationalist frames, to
win the hearts and minds of ordinary people.

Islamist framing involves what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) refer to as the
"invention of tradition". Islamists regard the period of Prophet Muhammad and the first
four caliphs after him as the golden age of Islam. Islamists believe that the weak state of
current Muslims was caused by the separation of din (religion) and dawla (state) -
secularism- and the aforementioned Western plot (as perceived by the Islamists) to weaken
Muslim societies. Thus, in this way of thinking, the only way to correct Muslim societies’
current ills is to close the gap between religion and state and reject Western imperialism in
Muslim countries. In this regard, Islamist frames legitimize the idea of regarding Islam as a complete social, economic, political and religious system encompassing all spheres of life. The frames also present political activism as a religious duty through the concept of \textit{da'wa}.

**Clashing Frames and Frame Resonance**

The realm of creating frames is not far from contention. Indeed, Islamist frames and official frames are often in constant conflict. Bayat (1998) points out that the alternative social and cultural sub-systems created by social movements usually coexist, though with tension, within the dominant order.\footnote{Bayat maintains that unlike insurrectionist movements, social movements try to accomplish Gramscian “passive revolution” or a “war of position” which aims not just capturing state power, but focuses on the gradual capture of the society “by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil institutions and processes.” (Bayat 1998, 141).} Islamist frames often compete with official frames as most regimes in the Muslim world utilize Islam as a form of political legitimization. Unlike Islamism, official Islam, as represented through the institution and cadres of Al-Azhar, presents Islam as a private faith designed to guide moral values of the individual believer and as a spiritual faith that focuses on good deeds rather than politics (Palmer 2007, 94).

Through Al-Azhar, the Egyptian regime routinely invokes Islamic imagery and ideas to legitimate their rule and to defend themselves against Muslim critics. This process “involves the competition and contests over both the interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain them” (Eickelman and Piscator 2004, 5). The official frames do not call for general social and political transformations, but rather emphasize individual piety and concern for salvation. This is a \textit{politically dormant} version of Islam (Tamir 2000; Wiktorowicz 2004).

In this “war of frames” Islamist intellectuals play a leading role in (re)creating and (re)interpreting frames. According to Gramsci (1971) intellectuals play an essential role in
the society because they are the vehicles of domination by the ruling class. Gramsci (1971) argues that the organic intellectuals develop organically with the dominant social group, the ruling class; and the organic intellectuals are their “thinking and organizing element.” Gramsci believes that the organic intellectuals were produced by the educational system to perform a function for the dominant social group in society. Through the organic intellectuals, the ruling class maintains its hegemony. Gramsci urges the working class movement to produce its own organic intellectuals to transform the consciousness of the working class.264 The significance of Gramsci’s conceptualization of organic intellectuals lies in his belief in the organic intellectuals as unifiers of belief and action; they also play a crucial role in conducting the war of position. In a similar vein, Islamists also recognize the significance of intellectuals. For instance, Qutb emphasizes the significance of movement leaders (Qutb calls them the vanguard) in establishing the Muslim society by rejecting the jahili societies.265 In Milestones (Chapter 3), Qutb points out to the role of the vanguard in bringing about the Shari’a and urges the Muslims to follow the vanguard.266

Another aspect that determines the success of frames in convincing the movement members to participate is frame resonance. In other words, for the prospective movement

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264 Gramsci believed that the organic intellectuals must have an active role in the society: "... the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence ... but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator..." (Gramsci 1971, 10).

265 Indeed, in the introduction of Milestones, Qutb states “I have written "Milestones" for this vanguard, which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialized.”

266 In Milestones (Chapter 3) Qutb emphasizes the role of the vanguard as follows: “It is therefore necessary that Islam’s theoretical foundation-belief-materialize in the form of an organized and active group from the very beginning...The center of this new group should be a new leadership, the leadership which first came in the person of the Prophet-peace be on him-himself, and after him was delegated to those who strove for bringing people back to God’s sovereignty, His authority and His laws. A person who bears witness that there is no deity except God and that Muhammad is God’s Messenger should cut off his relationship of loyalty from the jahili society, which he has forsaken, and from jahili leadership, whether it be in the guise of priests, magicians or astrologers, or in the form of political, social or economic leadership, as was the case of the Quraish [Prophet Muhammed’s tribe] in the time of the Prophet-peace be on him. He will have to give his complete loyalty to the new Islamic movement and to the Muslim leadership.”
participants to become mobilized, there must be some "degree of resonance" between the interpretive frames of the leaders of the social movement and individuals (Snow et al. 1986, 477). Islamist frames resonate well among the Islamist constituency because creators of the Islamist frames consider the point that "the frame must rely on the existing traditions and values of the constituency" which, in the literature of framing, is known as frame fidelity. Islamist frames also have an evidential basis and they are directly related with the current problems of Muslims (frame fidelity and experiential commensurability) since the frame creators (Islamist movement leaders and intellectuals) successfully diagnose the problems of Muslims through diagnostic frames, and later they put forward solutions created through prognostic frames in the light of Islamic principles. Finally, the frame creators motivate the believers towards making positive changes through motivational frames by claiming that working for the establishment of the Shari'a is thawab (a good deed) which will, for the Islamists, eventually create a society based on the principles of Islam and people who work for its establishment will be rewarded by God.

Conclusion

Upon the Islamists' electoral successes, and political and social activism through the Egyptian civil society, the Mubarak regime switched from an accommodationist approach to a confrontational one. Government control over religion and the Islamists' perception of external threats do not automatically and immediately cause the Islamists to be political. Indeed, politicization of the Islamists is directly linked to many factors like

Snow and Benford (1988; 2000) maintain that there are three major conditions for frame resonance: (1) ideational centrality/narrative fidelity: the frame must rely on the existing traditions and values of the constituency; (2) empirical credibility: the frame must have an evidential basis; and (3) experiential
how the Islamists frame government control over religion and external threats to Muslim identity, how the Islamists perceive themselves and the government, and in return how the government perceives the Islamists.

The Islamists perceive themselves as a comprehensive movement with the ability to transform both the social and political. In return, the government perceives the Islamists as a threat on two separate but related realms: the political and ideological. The government’s position regarding the Islamists may range from accommodation to confrontation (There is a wide range of different governmental attitudes towards the Islamists. Inclusion, like the Jordanian government’s inclusion of the Jordanian Brotherhood could be one. Or, complete exclusion could be another option like the Syrian government’s total exclusion of the Syrian Brotherhood). Islamists frame their struggle from an Islamic perspective (politics as jihad and da’wa) as well as from a democratic perspective to appeal to two distinct audiences: the Muslim audience, and the secular (both domestic and international) audience. Although the Brotherhood has no problems with the electoral politics (we may call this aspect of democracy as the procedural aspect), they have many reservations in regards to liberal democratic freedoms as they believe that fulfilling some of those freedoms would be detrimental to the Muslims’ social identity (Muslimness). The next chapter will compare and contrast both movements in regards to the points indicated above.

commensurability: the social problems that the frame addresses must be relevant to the constituents’ problems.
CHAPTER VI

A COMPARISON OF THE TURKISH AND EGYPTIAN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

This chapter will compare the Turkish and Egyptian Islamist movements based on five major criteria: i) the Islamists' self-perception, ii) governments' perception of the Islamists, iii) governments' position regarding the Islamists, iv) the Islamists' perception of external threats, and v) the relationship between Islamism, democracy-democratization, and the way that Islamists frame their message. Under the five points mentioned above, the similarities and differences between each movement in Turkey and Egypt are going to be provided. The following conclusionary chapter (7) will briefly discuss the prospects of Islamism and possible direction(s) that Islamism may take in both countries.

The Islamists' Self-Perception

In order to fully understand how the Islamists operate in the political realm in both countries, one has to look at how i) the Islamists perceive themselves as a movement, and ii) how both secularist governments perceive the Islamists. The way that both the Islamists and the state perceive each other has larger repercussions in the political system since their mutual perceptions determine how they (re)position themselves in regards to each other in the political realm. Indeed there is a wide array of options for both sides that range from confrontation to cooperation. In addition to perceiving politics as such, the secularist governments perceive Islamists as a serious threat on ideological and political grounds (these points will be discussed in the following sections respectively). Perceiving politics as a zero-sum game, and mutual distrust stimulated by the ideological and political
conflicts make it further difficult for them to find the middle ground which then can potentially escalate into severe political crises.

Another important point to reiterate here is that perceiving politics as a zero-sum game fits perfectly well into the Gramscian notion of perceiving political activism in terms of a *counter-hegemonic war of position* that has to be waged by the revolutionary forces for a final victory to destroy the hegemony of the state based on culture and ideology. In this type of war, political struggles are often times waged through politically-emotionally charged symbols what Eickelman and Piscatori call “Muslim politics” (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004). Both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive politics as a kind of war; and accordingly, any strategy that the Islamists employ can be understood in terms of gaining strategic posts (or strongholds) to conduct the “war of position.” The secularist-bureaucratic elite and Islamists in both countries are alike in regards to their perception of politics, which can be summarized as “politics is war.” This is a highly contentious and polarized conception of political activism and just like other contentious political movements do, Islamists in both countries wage their political war over identity, religion, and culture, in addition to the conventional political venues.

The following sub-sections will focus on how the Islamists perceive themselves as a collectivity in regards to the comprehensiveness of the Islamist movements, the Islamists’ perception of politics as *jihad* \( ^{269} \) and *war of position* in the Gramscian sense.

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\( ^{268} \) Earlier in Chapter 3, parallels between Gramscian war of position and Machiavellian realism were discussed in a footnote. Please see the footnote.  
\( ^{269} \) *Cihat* in Turkish. Please refer to the discussion en Chapter 1 on how the concept was interpreted by the Islamists. Pay attention to Husain’s threefold categorization of *jihad*. 
Comprehensiveness

The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive their movement as a comprehensive movement, and this was related to the Islamists’ perception of Islam as a comprehensive religion (see Chapters 3 and 5). For example, in Our Message, Al-Banna (in the chapter titled Our Islam) makes the following statement about the comprehensiveness of Islam: “On the contrary we understand Islam broadly and comprehensively, regulating the affairs of men, in this world and the next.” In a similar vein, Al-Banna also perceived jihad comprehensively. Indeed, for Al-Banna any type of struggle (political, social, economic, scientific…etc.) for the purpose of establishing the Shari‘a is included in the concept of jihad (In the following sections, this will be discussed under the concept of da‘wa). In The Message of the Teachings (in the chapter titled Jihad), Al-Banna explains what he understands from the concept:

By jihad, I mean that divinely ordained obligation which is reflected in the following saying of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) and which Muslims are to carry out until the Day of Judgment: “Whoever dies without struggling in the Way of Allah, or wishing to do so, dies a Pre Islamic Jahiliyyah death.” Its weakest degree is the heart’s abhorrence of evil, and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these two degrees are numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand, and speaking a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler. This call (to Islam) cannot survive without Jihad.

My interviewees also had a similar way of understanding their struggle. Indeed, they believed that politics should not be a realm that was completely detached from other realms of life. For them, Islam was not simply a relationship between a man and his creator; in addition to that relationship, it was indeed a complete way of life that regulated every aspect of human life. For the Islamists, politics was just one aspect of life as it

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270 In Arabic, Jihad literally means struggle; contrary to popular assumptions it does not mean “holy war” (harb muqaddes) which is not used in the Qur’an.
271 Seriat in Turkish.
272 Dava or davet in Turkish.
273 Please refer to the interviews in Chapters 3 and 5 with the Islamists (for example, my interviews with Dr. Tariq and Dr. Neguib).
related to individuals as a collectivity; and as my interviewees understood, politics was just part of their general struggle to make Islam dominate every aspect of Muslims’ lives. The interviewees in both countries expressed the major motivation that attracts them to politics and Islamist activism through the civil society was to have “an opportunity to make Islam the essence of people’s lives in their countries, to weave faith into life, and revive Islam and the Islamic consciousness of their fellow citizens.”

The Islamists whom I interviewed believed that the secularists could not adequately understand the nature of the Islamist movement, and they believed that the secularists simply reduced Islamism into an ordinary political movement. In fact, the Islamists ascribed many characteristics to their movement which, for them, appeared to be above and beyond politics. They believed that their mission was to transform their societies in accordance to the Islamic principles. Among other things, the Islamists whom I interviewed assumed a missionary-like role for themselves which would give them a chance to completely transform other individuals, and the social, political and economic institutions that exist in their societies. They believed that given the current non-Islamic and lax condition of their societies, a complete transformation was necessary. The Islamists believed that the transformation of the individual was essential to establish an Islamic order; however, it was not enough by itself to bring about that order. Thus, they agreed upon where this transformation should start (the individual), but they had different opinions about the extent of that transformation. They also believed that every good Muslim should have Islamic consciousness and zeal like a missionary and that sort of sense of
responsibility in regards to himself/herself, and then towards his/her family, friends and relatives.\footnote{In our interview, one Islamist pointed out that the first verse that was revealed to Prophet Muhammed was an order which was the order to read (iqra'). The very second revelation was another order to Prophet Muhammed to warn his tribe and to disseminate the message. Thus, he argued, it is the responsibility of every Muslim to become knowledgeable about his deen (religion) and then start disseminating the message to others starting from the individuals who are family members, friends and relatives. Despite the fact that as a religion, Islam regulates every aspect of human life, (in Sunni Islam) there is no organized church and missionary organizations (for instance like that of the Catholic Church). Thus, the}

What Dr. Tariq, a prominent member of the Brotherhood, thought about their movement exemplifies the points that I introduced above. He argued that reducing their struggle into a merely political movement would be to caricaturize the Islamist movement. He believed that Islamism was just more than politics; it was about creating a community of people who strongly adhere to the principles of Islam and apply its principles firmly in every aspect of their lives including politics. One important point that was revealed during my interviews was that the Islamists were not very pleased to be labeled as Islamists. Muharrem, a Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed, voiced his disappointment as to how the secularists portrayed them. He argued that the secularists often portrayed them as people who would deal with nothing but politics. He promptly stated that Islam was a religion, not an ideology. Thus, he was upset about the term Islamist (İslamci in Turkish) as, he believed, it was labeling them with something which did not properly describe what they actually were. In short, he thought it was like comparing apples and oranges. I inquired how he would prefer to be labeled. He said “if it is really necessary to find a label for us, then I would prefer to be labeled as a concerned Muslim who tries to do something about the condition of the [Turkish] society.”

Another important outcome of the comprehensiveness of the Islamists was their ability to interact with people at multiple levels since the comprehensiveness of the
Islamists allowed them room for being flexible and deal with a variety of different issues at once. This eventually allowed the Islamists to interact with people at multiple levels on a variety of different issues. Amr Al-Chobaki (2007, 1) of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo, Egypt), points out the comprehensiveness and flexibility of the Brotherhood, and argues that:

The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam. This conception allowed members of the Muslim Brotherhood to be politicians if they wanted, callers for good behavior if they wished, preachers on the pulpits, parliamentary members, Sufis, or revolutionists.

Similar to the Egyptian Islamists, in the 1990s Islamist politicians of Turkey were politicians, parliamentarians, mayors, preachers, members of Islamist foundations and think tanks, charity workers, and activists. Şevki Yılmaz of the RP would be a good example of such an Islamist politician. Most Turkish people know Yılmaz not just as a former mayor, and a politician, but a passionate preacher as well. Yılmaz’s audio and video cassettes, which were highly critical of the secularist regime and Kemal Atatürk, were highly popular among the followers of the RP in the 1980s and 1990s. The Islamists whom I interviewed in both countries worked as party and associational activists, volunteers, recruiters, protestors, charity workers, religious mentors and lecturers (delivering religious lectures at homes on a regular basis, dars-ders in Turkish).

Another determinant of how the Islamists position themselves in regards to the secularist regimes is related to both regimes’ official position towards the Islamists. In other words, the regimes’ attitudes towards the Islamists have a direct impact on how the Islamists perceive themselves as a group. In Turkey, despite several closure cases by the Turkish Constitutional Court (the highest court in Turkey) against the Islamists, the Turkish regime does not completely exclude the Islamists from the political process (This issue

Islamists believed that every Muslim should have a high Islamic consciousness and act like a missionary
will be discussed in length in the following sections: *Government's Perception of the Islamists* and *Government's Position Regarding the Islamists*. My interviewees in both countries do not completely trust their governments. They also believe that the judiciaries in their countries are not neutral. All the respondents who responded to the question of whether they would trust their governments or the judicial system in their countries in regards to equal treatment of Islamists indicated no as an answer.

The way that the secularist regimes’ perception of the Islamists also influence the way that Islamists articulate their policy positions. Since the Turkish Constitution prohibits establishment of political parties based on religion and ethnic identity, the Islamists create their party around a secular policy platform. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Islamists’ party platform is devoid of religious undercurrents. Indeed, the party program of the AKP includes the party’s approach to the solution of Turkey’s problems, and the religious undercurrents can easily be noticed after careful reading. For instance, the introduction of the AKP’s party program purports “uneven distribution of wealth” as a social problem that needs to be addressed. The program also addresses social solidarity as “an asset and an expression of the Turkish people’s national and religious character.” The party program also outlines the AKP’s views on religion: “Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a

to disseminate the religion.

275 My interviewees reported some instances of injustice committed by their governments in regards to official-bureaucratic procedures and by the judiciaries. The cases ranged from some well known cases like the case of Merve Kavakçı and Ismail Al-Aryan to some narratives that were reported by friends and relatives of the Islamist activists.

276 The Turkish Constitution, written after the military coup of 1980, intends to eliminate the two biggest perceived threats by the secularist establishment by that article. Those two threats are ethnic separatism (fueled by Kurdish nationalism) and Islamism.

277 The party program of the AKP can be found at (in English): http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html and (in Turkish): http://www.akparti.org.tr/program.asp?dizin=0&hangisi=0 The citations above are taken from the Introduction of the Party Program.
pre-requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience. It also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion.” The subsection of Section 2 of the party program states that the AKP “considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms.” As evident in the statements above, the AKP and its supporters believe that secularism is used against religion. My interviewees also voiced their disappointment regarding discrimination and unfair treatment of the pious people.

Regarding the social policies, the party program\textsuperscript{279} assumes that “the government is a vehicle for serving the public” and states that the AKP “…shall conduct social policies to assure the welfare and happiness of all our citizens, rather than just one class…” The concepts of “serving the public” and “welfare of the whole society” strongly indicate Islamic undercurrents in the AKP’s party program with a strong concern on socioeconomic equality and general welfare of the society. One should not assume that the AKP has a “state oriented” economic policy. Indeed, the party program emphasizes free market economy and benefits of privatization\textsuperscript{280} of the state economic enterprises (SEE) run by the

\textsuperscript{278} In the subsection “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” under Section 2-Fundamental Rights and Political Principles, at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#2

\textsuperscript{279} The first subsection (Our Perception of Social Policy) under Section 5-Social Policies, at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#5

\textsuperscript{280} The subsection on Privatization under Section 3-The Economy states (at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#3.3):
Privatization is important for the formation of a more rational economic structure. Privatization is a vehicle to increase productivity in the economy and to take the State out of activities which could disturb the full competition environment. Our Party:
· Shall make the legal and administrative arrangements to allow a fast privatization to provide the related social benefits.
· Shall carry out a fast and transparent privatization.
· Privatization transactions shall be subjected to the auditing of the Supreme Council of Public Accounts.
· The shares of the Establishments to be privatized shall initially be offered to employees of the said establishment, regional population and the concerned professional associations and their shares shall be traded in the stock exchanges.
government. The subsection on privatization suggests offering the shares of the SEEs to be privatized “to employees of the said establishment, regional population and the concerned professional associations” which is similar to the Islamic concept of kar paylaşımı (profit sharing).

In Egypt, the 88 Brothers who were elected as independents, challenge Mubarak’s NDP on a variety of different issues that range from inflation and unemployment to social and cultural issues. Since the 1980s, those independent deputies have been pressuring the Egyptian regime to Islamize the legal system in addition to emphasizing cultural and identity issues. Among the list of issues, the ones that are frequently voiced are lack of democracy and human rights, unemployment, the state of the economy (recently, governmental subsidies on food is a big issue after the global rise of prices of basic food items like wheat, rice, and corn), cases of abuse by the security forces.

Politics as Jihad

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna, a schoolteacher, had two major purposes: i) for the ultimate goal of establishing the Shari’a, orchestrating the Egyptian Muslims’ efforts under the leadership of the Brotherhood elders to increase people’s Islamic consciousness, and organizing them around social, political and economic institutions thereby making them a powerful force in Egyptian society and politics; ii) ousting the British from Egypt and challenge all sorts of imperialism including cultural imperialism, and moral corruption which, according to Al-Banna, was a direct result of the secularist elites’ blindly imitation of European (Western) attitudes, values, and way of

• The required environment of confidence shall be achieved, and our citizens living abroad shall be encouraged to participate in privatization processes.
• National strategic preferences and priorities shall be taken into consideration in the privatization of the critical sectors.
life. Al-Banna was not an Islamic scholar; however, he was coming from a deeply religious background and in his teenage years Al-Banna received his first religious education from his father, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Banna, who was a revered local imam (prayer leader) and teacher of religion at the local mosque, educated at Al-Azhar (Lia 1998, 22-24).

Before establishing the Brotherhood, Al-Banna was active in several different religious groups like the Association to Prevent the Forbidden, and Al-Hasafiyyah Charitable Association. Being influenced from Al-Afghani, Al-Kawakibi and Rida’s ideas, Al-Banna, inspired by the golden days of Islam (the era of Prophet Muhammed followed by the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs), strongly believed that Muslims should reject secularism, turn to Islam and start implementing the Shari‘a, oust the British and cleanse the Egyptian society from European values. Since the early 1930s, the Brotherhood became a major political force in Egyptian politics.

For the Islamists, jihad is not just fighting in the way of God; there are different degrees of jihad. The Islamists whom I interviewed in both countries shared similar views about the concept. Similar to what Al-Banna understands from the concept, the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists believed that working for the establishment of an Islamic order would indeed be jihad as jihad should not be understood only in terms of fighting in a war. 281 A Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed pointed out that throughout the history of Muslim empires there were periods of war and peace. He believed that in times of war, fighting was the most important type of jihad as it was necessary for defending one’s country against the enemy; and in times of peace, da’wa (call to God, dissemination of Islam) was

281 On different types of jihad, please refer to the discussion of Husain’s three-fold classification of jihad provided in Chapter 1.
the most important jihad. Thus, as opposed to the conventional understanding of the term, for the Islamists, jihad meant struggling in the way of/for the sake of God. In this regard, fighting in a war was just one type of jihad.

My interviewees believed that there were several circles of responsibility that surround Muslims; and the individual was always at the center. They believed that the family resided in the second circle; the relatives and friends and then the whole society came after the family. Indeed, both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists I interviewed had the similar views. As discussed in the previous sub-section, Islamists had a missionary-like outlook, and believed that for a Muslim, there were certain Islamic responsibilities that had to be fulfilled in regards to themselves as individuals, as family members, friends and citizens. Thus, a good Muslim should not ignore those responsibilities; otherwise the whole society would eventually suffer collectively as a result of Muslims' negligence of those responsibilities defined in Islamic terms.

The role of politics or the relationship between politics and religion for an Islamist starts at this point. Because jihad and da'wa are interconnected, and there are varying degrees of responsibilities in those "circles of responsibility," the Islamists claim that there are certain duties of true Muslims that are incumbent upon them for the establishment of an Islamic order. Indeed, the Islamists in both countries strongly emphasized the concept of responsibility by making direct references to Islamic sources. For instance, several Islamists brought up one of the sayings (hadith) of Prophet Muhammed about peoples' responsibilities as an example:

\[282\] Also, Al-Banna discusses the different types of jihad. In the Message of Teachings (in the chapter titled Jihad) Al-Banna lays out his conception of jihad as follows: "Its weakest degree is the heart's abhorrence of evil, and its highest degree is fighting in the Way of Allah. Between these two degrees are numerous forms of jihad, including struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand, and speaking a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler."
Each one of you is a shepherd. And each of you will be asked about your flock. A ruler also is a shepherd and he will be asked about his flock. And every man is a shepherd to his family. And every woman is the custodian of her husband's house and his children. Thus each one of you is a shepherd and each one will be asked about his flock. [Narrated in Bukhari and Muslim, from Abdullah ibn Umar]

The Islamists also believe that under an Islamic state ruled by the Shari'a, Muslims do not need to worry about the “circle of responsibility” as it corresponds to the Muslims’ responsibilities towards their society because those responsibilities would be carried out by the state and its institutions that abide by the rules of the Shari’a. However, the Islamists argue that because the Shari’a was not applied by their secularist states, Muslims, therefore, have a greater responsibility to establish an Islamic order as this responsibility is indeed completely antithetical to a secularist state as the secularist states clearly separate religion and politics. During my interviews with the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists, they elaborated on these issues by relating two distinct terms borrowed from Islamic jurisprudence \( (fiqh) \) with the necessity of \( \text{jihad} \) and \( \text{da'wa} \) in contemporary Muslim societies for bringing about the Shari’a through different forms of political participation and activism. Those two concepts are the concepts of Islamic jurisprudence: \( \text{fardh 'ayn} \) (individual obligation) and \( \text{fardh kifayah} \) (collective obligation).\(^{284}\)

Here, I do not have the intention to enter a theological debate about those Islamic concepts; however I would like to briefly summarize what I understood from the Islamists’ comments about those concepts and my own readings from some of the Islamic sources. Briefly, \( \text{fardh 'ayn} \)\(^{285}\) is a compulsory duty on every single Muslim like the five pillars of Islam (i.e., profession of faith, praying, fasting, pilgrimage, alms). \( \text{Fardh kifayah} \) is also an obligatory duty; however, if performed by some, the obligation falls from the rest. Also, if

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\(^{283}\) \( \text{Fikih} \) in Turkish.

\(^{284}\) Indeed, the word \( \text{kifayah} \) means sufficiency; however in this context, it is proper to translate it as collective, please see the discussion above.

\(^{285}\) \( \text{Farz-i Ayn} \) and \( \text{Farz-i Kifaye} \) in Turkish.
there are not enough people that respond to *fardh kifayah*, then all the people become responsible for not performing it; and if a sufficient number of people respond, the obligation falls from the rest. For example, if in a neighborhood, one wealthy Muslim, among the other wealthy Muslims, feeds a poor Muslim, the *fardh kifayah* would be fulfilled, and the responsibility falls from the other wealthy Muslims in that neighborhood. However, if that poor Muslim starves to death or becomes sick because of malnutrition, then *all* of the wealthy Muslims in that neighborhood would be responsible, meaning that they will be questioned by God in the hereafter for ignoring their larger responsibility that falls upon them. In a similar way of reasoning, the Islamists argue that since the secularist regimes do not have the intention to establish an Islamic order and to implement the Islamic laws (which would naturally be implemented under the *Shari’a*), the responsibility of establishing an Islamic order falls upon every Muslim; and under a secular government, Muslims become collectively responsible because the Islamic rules are not applied. The Islamists also believe that any mundane deed (including politics) performed for the purpose/with the intention\(^{286}\) of bringing about an Islamic order would be a good deed that God will reward in this world and in the hereafter because Muslims believe that God rewards peoples’ intentions as well as their deeds. The Islamists believe that the worldly reward of bringing an Islamic order would be the benefits of living under the Islamic order; and the otherworldly reward would be going to heaven (*jannah*)\(^{287}\) and gaining God’s satisfaction (*ridha*).\(^{288}\)

\(^{286}\) My interviewees recited a well-known saying of Prophet Muhammed about intentions: “The deeds are according to the intentions.”

\(^{287}\) *Cennet* in Turkish.

\(^{288}\) The word *ridha* is translated as contentment or satisfaction. 48:18 “Allah’s Good Pleasure was on the Believers…” *Riza* in Turkish.
The Islamists are also against the state’s control over religion, and they put forward two interrelated reasons for their discontent with it. *First*, the Islamists believe that the state’s control over religion corrupts Islam as the state designs religion as it fits into the state’s priorities (which are not necessarily Islamic), not the other way around. The Islamists believe that the secularist states have no intention of implementing the *Shari’a*, however they use religion (official Islam as a response to political Islam) to maintain their power and to appear as if they were respectful of religion. They believe that this is insincere and deceptive; they also argue that a state should uphold Islam, not the other way around. *Second*, the Islamists believe that the state control over religion seeks to pacify and to depoliticize the Islamists who, for the secularists, are the major political and ideological threats against the secularist regime (This topic will be discussed in the section titled: Government’s Perception of the Islamists). The Islamists believe that there are two ways to tackle this problem: either to overthrow the secularist regimes or to struggle to transform them into Islamic regimes through social and political activism.²⁸⁹ As opposed to the violent terrorist Islamist groups, the mainstream non-violent Islamists believe that violence is out of the question since it leads to *fitna* (turmoil/corruption), and they point out that Islam instructs Muslims to obey the rulers unless they openly commit a clear *haram* (forbidden) and force Muslims to commit the same action. Thus, through political activism and participation, Muslims have the power to bring about the desired changes as voting is a powerful tool to carry Islamist candidates and their policies to power.

²⁸⁹ Please refer to the ideological differences among the Brothers in the late 1970s. The ones who favored the overthrowal of the secularist regimes split from the mainstream Brotherhood and established terrorist groups. The majority of the Brotherhood elders rejected violence.
Politics as War of Position

According to the Egyptian Constitution, similar to the Turkish Constitution, establishing parties based on religion and class is forbidden. Based on that article, the secularist establishment in Egypt has been preventing the Brotherhood from establishing a political party. However, the Islamists have been running as independents and in the recent 2005 parliamentary elections, 88 Brotherhood members who ran as independents were able to secure seats from different electoral districts throughout the country. As opposed to Turkey, the secularists in Egypt have completely excluded the Muslim Brotherhood from the political process since its establishment. Unlike the Turkish Islamists, the Brotherhood has never had official recognition of the Egyptian regime (technically, the Brotherhood is still an illegal organization), this pushed the organization to expand their bases of operations and permeate into available spaces that are both politically and socially acceptable by many. In other words, unlike their Turkish counterparts, the Egyptian Islamists were not allowed to participate into politics through the electoral means as an organized group (i.e., political party), they eventually pushed through the venues that would be perceived as less politically dangerous for the secularists than challenging the regime by establishing a political party. Those available venues were the professional organizations, student unions, mosques, neighborhood associations, charities, and Islamist private organizations. This led the Egyptian Islamists to emphasize the comprehensiveness of their ideology and organization and compete with the government in the realm of providing services to the people. In other words, because the venues of electoral politics were all blocked for the Brotherhood, the Brothers redirected their efforts through other

290 This article of the Egyptian Constitution, similar to what the Turkish Constitution does, rules out the Communists and the Islamists which are perceived to be the two biggest threats by the secularist establishment.
available venues which would be perceived as politically less dangerous by the
secularists. Thus, since the late 1980s, the Brotherhood members gained significant
victories and became highly active in the Egyptian professional organizations, student
unions, and the Egyptian civil society.

Penetration of the Islamists into the civil society can be best understood in
Gramscian terms. Gramsci (1971) distinguishes two different types of wars: war of
manoeuvre, and war of position. The war of manoeuvre is a frontal attack performed for
the purpose of a quick victory. Gramsci believes that this type of strategy is recommended
for societies with a centralized and dominant state power without a strong hegemony within
the civil society (like the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917). As opposed to the war of
manoeuvre, the war of position becomes essential to take control of the civil society,
confront the dominant hegemony of the power holders, and to gain control through ideology
and culture since it is the ideal strategy for the dominant state with a strong cultural and
ideological control over the civil society.

The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists’ struggle fits well into the notion of war of
position as laid out by Gramsci because in both countries the Islamists wage their war
through identity and cultural politics with a strong emphasis on political activism through
the civil society. Comprehensiveness of Islamist activism, the Islamists’ understanding of
jihad and da’wa comprehensively, and the debates around responsibilities of Muslims
within the context of the concepts of fardh ‘ayn and fardh kifayah all fit perfectly into the
Gramscian notion of counter-hegemonic war of position.

Sayyid (1997, 73) argues that the ideological vacuum that exists in Muslim
countries was filled by the Islamism, mainly because Islam was articulated into a counter-
hegemonic discourse by the Islamists. One Islamist whom I interviewed described their
struggle as "a struggle to build up an Islamic civilization," (İslami bir medeniyet kurma mücadelesi), not just a mere political struggle. In this regard, for many Islamists politics is not an end, but a means to bring about an Islamic order, an Islamic civilization, and to revive the golden age of Islam that was realized during the time of Prophet Muhammad and of the four rightly guided caliphs. Thus, the Islamists assign a special value to politics as it becomes the means for them to bring about an Islamic order. This point becomes perfectly telling when it is placed next to the Islamists' perception of their political activism as a comprehensive movement and politics as a form of jihad (Please see the discussion above under two separate sections). Thus, the Islamists perceive politics as an all-scale war that has to be won to bring about an Islamic order; they also perceive contributing into this war effort as a religious duty.

Governments' Perception of the Islamists

When Turkey’s first Islamist party (the MNP) was established in 1971 by N. Erbakan, the secularists did not perceive the Islamist party as a big threat due to the fact that the share of the votes that the MNP got in the upcoming parliamentary elections had been insignificant until the late 1980s. Before the 1980s, the Turkish secularist regime did not perceive the Islamists as a serious political threat; however they were considered as a serious ideological threat by the secularists and the Islamist party was closed down two times until the establishment of the RP. After the late 1980s, as the RP increased its share of votes among the electorate, it became a double threat by the secularists. It was only after the military coup of 1980 when the RP had significant successes in the local elections followed by its successes in the parliamentary elections. In addition to being perceived as an ideological threat by the secularists due to its Islamist orientation, the RP was also perceived as a political threat due to its electoral successes which eventually prompted
the secularists to close down the party through the Turkish Constitutional Court. The Islamists whom I interviewed also realized this case of double threat. They believe that the secularists do not want to lose their privileged position as the Islamist opposition increasingly became a serious political threat for the secularist regimes. They also believe that the secularists do not implement a democratic version of secularism as it is applied in liberal democracies; accordingly, in their view, the state perceives the Islamists as a serious political threat.

The official approach of the Egyptian regime towards the Egyptian Islamists has varied since the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially King Farouk of Egypt did not directly confront the Brotherhood from its establishment in 1928 until the organization vastly expanded when Al-Banna moved the headquarters of the Brotherhood from Ismailiya to Cairo in 1933. Later the relations between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian monarchy got sour as the Brotherhood demanded the establishment of the Shari‘a; and Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949. The Brotherhood initially supported the Free Officers led by Nasser who ousted King Farouk and established the republic as the Brotherhood elders hoped to achieve what they had been unable to achieve. However, Nasser had no intentions of establishing the Shari‘a, thus Nasser used an alleged assassination attempt on his life as an excuse to crush the Brotherhood and push it underground. Sadat later approached the Brothers to balance out the leftists at the Arab Socialist Union who were at that time trying to undermine Sadat’s authority. Mubarak initially chose an accommodative approach towards the Brotherhood. However, as the Brotherhood achieved significant gains in the parliamentary elections and at the professional associations, Mubarak gradually became harsher on the Brotherhood.
The Turkish and Egyptian governments' perception of the Islamists can be analyzed on two separate, but related realms: ideological, and political. On the ideological base, the secularist regimes perceive the Islamists as a major threat as they find Islamism completely antithetical to secularism. Both regimes' constitutions prohibit the establishment of political parties based on religion. Although the Egyptian constitution recognizes Islam as the main source of legislation and allows some room of the implementation of the Shari'a in the matters of family law, the Egyptian regime, like the Turkish regime, seeks to keep the Islamist out of politics completely. The Turkish constitution does not allow any room for the Shari'a, and the secularist nature of the regime is strongly emphasized in the Turkish Constitution.

On Ideological Base: Threat for the Secularist Regime

The Turkish Constitutional Court (Supreme Court of Turkey) closed down the Islamist party many times after it resurfaced under different a different name. Sayari (2002, 20) relates the increasing ideological polarization of Turkish politics since the early 1990s largely on the tension between the secularists and the Islamists. Indeed, during the closure case against the RP, the indictment prepared by then Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş argued that Islam was not compatible with democracy and the Islamic identity was a threat to Turkish national identity (Kocaoğlu 2004, 449). Sakallıoğlu (1996, 235) argues that according to the Kemalists, Islam constituted a major threat, because "Kemalist Westernization relied primarily on changing the attitudes of individuals whose communal self-identity and emotional security had heretofore been

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291 Currently, there is an ongoing case at the Court regarding the closure of the AKP, the ruling party.
292 As discussed in Chapter 1, political parties in Turkey perceive politics as a "zero-sum game" where one's gain is another's loss, not necessarily as a mechanism for collective decision-making through which
provided by Islam.” In other words, in line with this type of perception of politics, any victory of the Islamist ideology is a loss or retreat of secular Kemalist ideology; consensus was often perceived as a sign of weakness and as a terrible concession. Cizre and Çinar (2002, 310) express the severe opposition between Kemalism and Islamism as follows:

Since the inception of the [Turkish] republic, Kemalism [Atatürkism] has comprised its guiding vision. It is in essence a Westernizing/civilizing ideology whose incontrovertible maxims are secularism, understood as the separation of religion from political rule; a modern/Western identity and lifestyle; and the cultural homogeneity and territorial unity of the nation. Because the Kemalist Westernization project has relied more on symbols than substance, it has associated publicly visible instances of Islamic identity with reactionism. The ideology is also marked by a visible distaste for politics as a societal activity, and an ambivalent attitude toward the notion of popular legitimacy. Over time, it has been adjusted, at times stalled, but never abandoned or discontinued.

During the February 28 (1997) process, the generals of the Turkish military forced the RP-DYP coalition to expand teaching on Atatürkism to cover almost all courses, scrap the secondary school system for the İmam Hatip schools, introduce strict age limitations for the Qur’anic seminaries, appoint staunch Kemalists as university presidents, cleanse the government bureaucracy by firing suspected Islamists, continue the strict enforcement of the ban on headscarves for females. (Cizre and Çinar 2002, 310-312). In the upcoming months after the declaration of the February 28 decisions at the monthly MGK meeting, subsequent pressure from the military through the MGK and the civilian component of the secular establishment (the bureaucracy, judiciary, and secular media) led to the collapse of the coalition government in June.

I find it very important to note that the MGK’s press declaration defined secularism as “a way of life.”293 This is curiously similar to how Islamists define Islam: a religion, and a way of life. Thus, it appears that it is not just a political and ideological rivalry between various societal groups with different ideologies and identities work out the best solution for their problems by consensus.

between the secularist states and the Islamists, it is also a clash of lifestyles between the two. The Turkish regime is completely exclusionary when it comes to Islamic demands of Turkish citizens. The Turkish civil code is translated from the Swiss civil code in the late 1920s. However, the Egyptian regime partially incorporates the *Shari'a* into its legal system and the government appears to promote pious behavior officially. Similar debates were made between the secularists and the Islamists during the recent presidential elections (2007) and parliamentary elections (2007) after which Abdullah Gül, an Islamist, became the president of Turkey, and the Islamist AKP won the elections by receiving 47 percent of the votes under R. Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership. It appears that these debates will not end as there is a current closure case for the AKP at the Turkish Constitutional Court, and recently (June 5, 2008) the Court overturned two amendments passed by the Turkish parliament to make wearing headscarves permissible for females in public and private universities.

Egyptian and Turkish Islamist intellectuals also discuss secularism to a great length and they argue that the idea of separating religion and state that originated the West was a reaction to the Catholic Church's dominance over every aspect of human life; and secular European rulers became more powerful as the authority of the Catholic Church diminished as a result of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Thus, they argue, in the West, a general consensus appeared linking enlightenment, development and modernization with secularism. However, they argue, in the Muslim world, Muslims were able to dominate the whole Middle East and establish powerful empires as they remained faithful to their religion. They believe that the Islamic civilization produced its masterpieces in sciences, arts and literatures as long as Muslims remained faithful to Islam. In short, they believe that secularism was a product of historical experience of Europe, and the Europeans became
advanced as they distanced themselves from religion and separated religion and politics. However, according to the Islamists, this would not work well in Muslim countries because as opposed to Europeans, Muslims excelled as they got closer to Islam and kept the unity between religion and politics.

The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists believe that the notion of secularism is a foreign concept for Muslims. They also believe that as secularism has been applied in their countries, it is not simply about separating religion from politics; indeed, they believe that over the years, it has been used as a tool to prevent the Islamists from coming to power. Islamists also believe that secularism, as arbitrarily implemented by the secularists, is ideologically charged and legitimizes the indiscriminate use of non-democratic measures to crush the Islamist opposition. The Islamists believe that secularism cannot be a way of life; in fact it is a principle of designing a government. They also believe that in a Muslim country, it would not be easy for the secularist politicians to be openly against Islam, thus they use secularism as a tool to shield their anti-Islamic sentiments.

On Political Base: Challengers for Power

The secularist regimes perceive the Islamists as a challenge on the political base as the major challengers for power. In both countries, as the Islamist became politically more active and scored victories against the secularist regimes the secularist establishment in both countries became more sensitive and reactionary towards the Islamists. Among other methods of intimidation, to prevent the Islamists from becoming more powerful the secularist regimes primarily used methods like mass arrests of the Islamists, clamping down on the Islamist associations and charity organizations, confiscating the assets of

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294 Also, to support their arguments, several Turkish and Egyptian Islamists made references to the Spanish inquisition and the punishment of scientists like Galileo because they contradicted with the
Islamist parties or associations, closing down Islamist parties and temporarily banning their leaders from politics, sending the arrested Islamists to military courts that are known to be harsher on the Islamists, and the like.

In Egypt, the Brotherhood is still technically an illegal organization and it is not allowed to form a political party. The 88 independent Brothers in the Egyptian parliament created a platform to criticize the Egyptian government's lack of adequate policies in addressing the country's major problems. As of Turkish politics, three recent problems exacerbated the relations between the secularists and the Islamists. The first is the election of the new president in 2007, the second is the electoral success of the Islamists in July 2007 elections, and third is the Islamists attempts to change the constitution for more educational rights for females with headscarves, and for the future, to make a new constitution.  

The election of the president by the parliament became a serious crisis from May to August 2007 when Sezer's presidential term ended in April. Erdoğan, nominated his Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül for the office. The secularist establishment mobilized to stop the process because for the secularists the presidency is not only "the house of Atatürk" but also the ultimate protector of their version of secularist Turkey. Due to the absence of the opposition CHP and of some other non-AKP deputies, the parliament had no quorum to elect Gül as President on April 26, 2007. One day later, the generals issued a powerful statement (which is known as the April 27 Memorandum) on the official

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295 The AKP convened a special convention to prepare a draft constitution which, they argued, will be more democratic than the 1982 Constitution prepared under the military rule (1980-1983). The AKP approached non-partisan secular constitutional law professors like Ergun Özbudun and Zafer Üskül to lead the project for a new constitution which the AKP labeled "civilian constitution." However, recently (fall of 2007) the headscarf issue resurfaced again and the AKP indefinitely postponed its intention to draft a new constitution.

296 In the parliamentary system of Turkey, the president is elected by the TGNA.
website of the Turkish Armed Forces that threatened to overthrow the government if necessary to protect the secular nature of the Republic.²⁹⁷ One day after the memorandum, the oppositional CHP took the results of the first round of presidential election to the Constitutional Court. The Court annulled the results of the first poll.²⁹⁸ To avoid further exacerbating the crisis, Gül withdrew his candidacy. Erdoğan called for early elections scheduled for July 22, 2007 which were supposed to be in November of 2007.²⁹⁹ During the crisis, a number of secularist civil society associations joined forces and organized mass rallies known as cumhuriyet mitingleri (republican rallies) in major cities. After the AKP’s landslide victory in the July 22 elections, A. Gül was elected as the president of the country on August 22, 2007 who will serve for the next seven years because Gül’s election

²⁹⁷ Their statement is as follows: “The problem that has emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. It has been observed that some circles have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, and have increased their efforts recently. Those activities include requests for redefinition fundamental values of the Republic, and attempt to organize alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals symbolizing the unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the mentioned activities, which turned into an open challenge against the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real goals under the guise of religion... Those who are opposed to the great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s understanding “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to change the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.” (Quoted in Yavuz and Özcan 2007, 120-121).

²⁹⁸ According to the decision of the Court, two thirds of the deputies, (i.e., 367 of 550) must be present for presidential elections.

²⁹⁹ The AKP leadership also proposed constitutional amendments which will make it possible to have popular election of the president for five years with the possibility of reelection for another five years instead of the current single seven-year presidential term. The proposals also included reducing the tenure of the parliament to four years and lowering the quorum requirement from 367 to 184 (1/3rd of the deputies). Parliament passed the proposed changes, however Sezer vetoed the legislation on May 25, 2007. When parliament voted for the legislation for a second time, President Sezer sent it out for a referendum and also applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the legislation (the secularist CHP also applied). However, the Constitutional Court ruled against both applications and a referendum took place on October 21, 2007 after the parliamentary elections took place on July 22, 2007. In the referendum, Turkish people overwhelmingly voted yes on the changes by 68.9%. Voter turnout rate was also high: 67.5%.
to the presidency was before the national referendum on constitutional amendments (see the footnote below).

Despite pressure from the military and its secularist hard-line allies, the AKP substantially increased its share of the votes and maintained its control of the parliament after the July 22 elections by getting 47% of the total votes. Out of 550 seats in the Turkish Parliament, the AKP secured 341 seats (Barkey and Çongar 2007, 65). The AKP also significantly increased its votes through the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish party, DTP, only has 20 deputies from the Kurdish provinces, whereas the AKP shared the Kurdish votes with the CHP. The MHP does not have any significance in the Kurdish areas because of its highly nationalist ideology.

The third contentious issue was the controversial headscarf ban which has been in effect since the late 1980s. The Turkish secularists believe that headscarves and other religious symbols should be totally eliminated from the public sphere. For example, Teziç, the head of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) which oversees all universities (public and private), controversially argued that civil servants could not wear headscarves even on the street (Teziç’s interview with Nur Batur, Hürriyet, 2.10.2006). The headscarf issue

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300 Public surveys indicate that supporters of the ban on headscarves at universities constitute only 21% of the population while 79% oppose the ban. Additionally, the ban on headscarves for female civil servants is supported by 24% of the people, whereas 76% are against such a ban (TESEV’s 2006 survey in Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2006, 75). Although the President Gül recently appointed a moderate director for the YÖK (Prof. Dr. Yusuf Ziya Özcan), the remaining board members (of the YÖK), who are predominantly secularists, refused to cooperate with him. Several secularist university directors followed the secularist board members and issued inflammatory remarks through press releases by proclaiming that they would not allow a religious symbol (i.e., the headscarf) in their institutions despite the new constitutional amendment.

301 In May 2004, the AKP passed a legislative bill that removed Teziç and reorganized the YÖK. The AKP for the first time attempted to remove the ban by changing the director of the board. The bill passed in the Parliament on May 13, 2004; no. 5171. Secularist President Sezer vetoed the bill, and the AKP was hesitant to pass the legislation again due to the secularist media’s campaign and the intense protests of the YÖK. As a response, recently, the AKP passed a constitutional amendment in the TGNA about basic rights and freedoms with the support of some oppositional parties including the MHP on February 22, 2008. The amendments are done by making some additions to the 10th and 42nd articles of the Turkish Constitution by further clarifying the extent of basic rights and freedoms stated in those articles. In his
seems like a double-edged sword for the AKP. On the one hand, its constituency demands an active policy to solve this problem. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the AKP deputies (including Erdoğan and Gül) have wives and daughters who wear the headscarf. On the other hand, the AKP could not attempt to solve the headscarf problem because the Constitutional Court took that issue as one of the reasons for the closure of the RP and the only reason to dissolve the FP (Kuru 2006, 219).

Government's Position Regarding the Islamists

Government’s position in regards to the Islamists may change over time due to several factors such as whether the regime perceives the Islamists as a serious threat or a leverage to be used against other groups or movements that are perceived as threats by the government, or to what extent the Islamists expect the government to apply the Shari’a. Depending upon the political climate, the Islamists were perceived as a threat either ideologically or politically (or both). In different periods, both the Egyptian and Turkish regimes used Islam to counterbalance the leftists. However, Islam promoted by the official religious establishment and the official educational system was, according to the official opinion above his approval of the amendment President Gül stated: “It has been understood that the proposed additions to the 10th and 42nd articles of the Constitution have a purpose of strengthening the right to education and equality before the law [equal protection of the law] by further explaining and reaffirming the rights and freedoms that already exist in the Turkish Constitution.” Upon the new amendments, some university administrations allowed female students wearing headscarves into the classes while some did not. The oppositional CHP challenged the constitutional amendments by applying to the Constitutional Court of Turkey on February 28, 2008.

As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, after the military intervention of 1980, through the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the government appointed by the generals of the junta, actively used a carefully “sanitized” blend of Turkish nationalism and Islam to counterbalance the leftists. A similar thing happened in Egypt under Sadat’s presidency. Sadat used the Islamists to counterbalance the leftists who were trying to undermine Sadat. Indeed, it was Gen. Kenan Evren who made it mandatory for all of the high schools in Turkey to have a one credit class named “Culture of Religion and Morals-Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi” for all levels. The textbooks for the class were prepared by the Ministry of Education, and included the basic information about major world religions as well as Islam. The basic information covered a brief history of the major world religions (Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Brahmanism and African Religions) and briefly covered the basics about major prophets-founders of those religions of
Islamists, a "sanitized" version of Islam which heavily emphasized morals (but not necessarily politics and designing life according to Islamic principles), like paying charity, being respectful towards elders, avoiding crime, and more importantly being an obedient citizen.

Inclusion/Accommodation

Sadat's liberal *Infitah* (opening) policies paved the way for a less confrontationist approach towards the oppositional groups in Egypt in the 1970s including the Islamists and leftist groups. However, through the mid-1970s, Sadat became increasingly concerned about the growing power of the leftists in Egypt, and the leftists at the ASU, a party-like organization originally established by Nasser before Sadat. Sadat eased official limitations on the Brotherhood, allowed them to operate freely in universities, eased censorship on the Brotherhood's publications and let the Brothers to open up more branches across the country. After Sadat's assassination in 1981, Mubarak initially adopted an accommodationist approach towards the Islamists. However, as Islamists pushed harder for the implementation of the *Shari'a*, and more importantly, as they scored victories in national elections as independent candidates and in professional associations and student unions, Mubarak quickly substituted his accommodationist approach with a confrontationist one. Security forces cracked down on the Islamists, harsher measures were taken to prevent the Islamists successes in professional associations, and arrested Islamists were sent to military tribunals that are known to be harsher on the Islamists.

As the Islamists became a more potent force outside the state, they began to influence the orientations of the state employees at different positions. Also, various

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the world. In the textbook more space was devoted for Islam and its prophet, Muhammed, and the students were required to memorize about 9-10 short prayers in Arabic.
opportunities emerged that prompted the state employees and Islamists to tacitly cooperate on various issues motivated by kinship, friendship, mutual economic interest, or shared ideological positions. For example, the MSA officials reportedly enjoy close ties with some of the Islamists associations under their jurisdiction. Moreover, MSA officials are included on the executive boards of some Islamist associations, for which they are paid a salary. These officials are reported to favor Islamist associations over non-Islamist ones. Islamist activists also became more influential over the local municipal councils that are dominated by Mubarak’s NDP. Also, several Al-Azhar sheikhs served as Islamic advisors for Islamic banks and investment companies (Wickham 2002; 109, 110). 303

Exclusion/Confrontation

When Islamists achieved successes in elections (at associational, local or national levels) both regimes changed their inclusionary-accommodationist policies with exclusionary-confrontationist ones towards the Islamists. As the governments perceive the Islamists as a double threat (ideological and political) they start implementing an exclusionary/confrontationist policy towards them. The secularist regimes perceive Islamism tolerable until the Islamists achieve electoral or organizational successes. A sharp turn in Mubarak’s policies towards the Islamists in the late 1980s, and several closure cases against the Turkish Islamist party (after which the Islamist party resurfaced under different names) demonstrate that the secularists cannot tolerate the Islamists and would take extreme measures to prevent them from challenging the secularist regime through political channels either directly (for example through electoral activism) or indirectly (through the media or the civil society). Exclusionary policies can also be

303 Some Islamic investment companies hired influential politicians as consultants like Al-Rayyan did when it hired former Minister of Interior Nabawi Ismail.
related to the earlier discussions of both sides' perception of politics as a *zero-sum game* and as a struggle between different *ways of life*. Additionally, when these factors are added to the intolerance and severe politicization and polarization on both sides, the exclusionary and confrontationist policies follow.

Perception of the External Threats by the Islamists

The Islamists' perception of external threats varies through time, circumstances, and how the movement organizers and intellectuals interpret the outer world and frame issues. Even though the Turkish and Egyptian Islamist movements emerged and evolved differently, evolutionary processes, there are significant similarities between the two as to what they consider as external threats. In addition, the two movements are similar in regards to how they should react to those external threats. Both movements perceive the secularist regime as one of the biggest threat against the Muslim identity (or Muslimness); the Islamists also tend to associate moral corruption with the secularist elites as they believe that the secularists are the agents of moral corruption and Westernization of their countries. Islamists believe that the secularists have a particular agenda to *secularize* the Muslims' collective identity and culture. Islamists in both countries voice their concerns regarding the corruption of Muslimness, and mainly blame the secularist elites and the media for that.  

In Islamists' way of interpretation, the secularists' attempts to secularize Muslim societies serves two major functions: *social engineering* (top-down shaping of the societies), and *political manipulation*. In other words, Islamists believe that the secularist elites' efforts to secularize Muslim societies serve two main purposes: i) ideologically, through secularization the society would be less susceptible to the appeal of the Islamism,
and ii) politically, secularization would eventually create a more homogenized society which would be easier to rule as it would be easier to mobilize the society towards common policy objectives and to legitimize policy options adopted by the secularist elites.

**Powerful Nationalist Undercurrents**

Islamism in both countries also has powerful nationalist undercurrents. Al-Banna established the Brotherhood for two main purposes: to revive the golden days of Islam through a revival of Islamic consciousness of the Egyptians with a very strong emphasis on piousness and strengthening Muslim identity, and to oust the British from Egypt. As opposed to Qutb (because Qutb despised nationalism as he believed that nationalism was a kind of poison to weaken the Islamic ummah), to a certain degree Al-Banna can be considered as a nationalist. The commercial/financial presence of the Europeans in Egypt, and the secularist elites’ adoption of European values and customs “irritated Egyptian sensibilities and nurtured anti-European sentiment and a desire to curtail foreign influence” (Commins 2005, 126). In 1923, when Al-Banna left his hometown, Mahmudiyyah, for Cairo to attend Dar Al-Ulum (the teacher training college in Cairo), he “experienced Egypt’s cultural westernization which he equated with atheism and immorality” (Commins 2005, 130).

It is important to note that Al-Banna’s nationalism was different than territorial nationalism. Indeed, despite the very strong nationalist undercurrents in Al-Banna’s Islamism, Islamic nationalism305 promoted by Al-Banna “repeatedly emphasized the

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304 See the interview data in Chapters 3 and 5.
305 Al-Banna, in *To What Do We Invite Humanity?* points out to the significance of Islamic unity: “The second fruit is that Islamic brotherhood compelled every Muslim to believe that every foot of ground supporting any brother who held to the religion of the Noble Qur’an was a portion of the larger Islamic homeland. It was the duty of every single Muslim to work for its protection and prosperity. The result was that the horizons of the Islamic homeland expanded and transcended the bounds of mere geographical and ethnic patriotism to one of lofty principles, pure, accurate articles of belief, and truths which Allah set
universal characteristics of the Islamic faith” by rejecting territorial nationalism (Gershoni and Janowski 2002, 80). What Al-Banna came up with was, in Gershoni and Janowski’s words, “supra-national Egyptian nationalism” which, unlike territorial nationalism, allowed the Islamists to have “multiple identifications and loyalties”. 306 However, all other loyalties and identifications were “subordinate to a primary religious identity and allegiance” (Gershoni and Janowski 2002, 83). Thus, Al-Banna’s strong emphasis on Islam in his understanding of nationalism did not necessarily mean a total rejection of other loyalties.

Indeed, in his writings Al-Banna often mentioned “patriotism of affection” which was a term that he sued to refer to patriotism that emanates from one’s love of homeland. My interviewees also revealed their nationalist feelings when they were talking about historical topics like the British presence in Egypt or the Turkish independence war. They associated colonialism and war with concepts like “greed of Europeans” or “expansionist/imperialist policies of the West” as well as “anti-Islamism of Europe.”

When compared, I found the Turkish Islamists to be more influenced by nationalist sentiments than the Egyptian Islamists. This can be a topic of a different study and have

down as a guiding light for the world. For Islam, when it points this concept out to its people and fixes it firmly within their souls, imposes upon them the unavoidable obligation to protect the territory of Islam from the attack of the aggressor, to deliver it from occupation, and to fortify it against the ambitions of the transgressor.” (From the chapter titled “Horizons of the Islamic Homeland”)

306 Al-Banna, in Our Message, clarifies his views regarding patriotism: The bone of contention between us and them is that while we define patriotism according to the creed of Islam, they define it according to territorial borders and geographical boundaries. For every region in which there is a Muslim saying: ‘There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.’, is our homeland, inviolable and sacred, demanding love, sincerity, and sincere effort for the sake of its welfare. All Muslims in these geographical regions are our people and brethren: we are concerned about them, and share their feelings and sensitivities. Advocates of patriotism alone are not like this, since all that concerns them lies within a specific and narrowly defined region of the earth. This obvious difference is manifested whenever any nation desires to expand itself at the expense of others, for we would not approve of this at the expense of any Muslim nation. We only seek power so that we may all share it. But the advocates of fanatical patriotism see problem in this; and as a result, bonds of amicable relationship are snapped, power is dispersed, and the enemy strikes out by pushing each one against the other. (From the chapter titled “Patriotism”)
multiple causes. However, for the purpose of brevity I have to point out that the dose of secularism in the newly established Turkish republic was heavier than the dose of secularism in the newly established Egyptian republic. Secularism relies on the idea of modern citizenship which is a byproduct of modern nation-state. Also, the early Turkish republican elites completely rejected the cultural/historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire; thus they based the ideology of the new republic on the concept of homogenous nation-state with a homogenous culture and united nation under the secular regime. In the early Turkish republic, politics was completely out of the public realm (even visually). Because the Egyptian case did not completely abolish the Shari’a, Islam and the blending of Islam with nationalism remained or survived alongside the official ideology in Egypt.\(^{307}\)

The pioneers of the Islamist movement of Turkey were also highly nationalist. For instance, Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-1936),\(^{308}\) a prominent Islamist of the late Ottoman and early Turkish republican era, blended Islamist and nationalist ideas in his poems. Indeed, as Çetinsaya (1999) points out, Turkish nationalism and Islamism have been closely linked, they were both influenced by the same intellectual sources, and those who rejected Islamism among the nationalists and those who rejected nationalism among the Islamists.

\(^{307}\) The topic of social engineering is also relevant here in this discussion. I find the early republican Turkish elites to be more willing to employ policies towards social (and political) engineering to completely transform the Turkish society than the Egyptian elites. Egyptian elites did not follow an enthusiastic policy of completely transforming the Egyptian society, instead they focused on transforming the governmental institutions and expected the society to follow suit. In other words, unlike the early Turkish elites, transforming the Egyptian society was not a huge priority for the Egyptian secularist elites.

\(^{308}\) M. Akif Ersoy is the author of the Turkish National Anthem which was embellished with a blend of nationalist and Islamic themes. For example, Ersoy refers to the Turkish flag as the crescent (\(\text{hı́lal}\)), which appears on the Turkish flag. The crescent is also considered as the symbol of Islam. Later, in the anthem, Ersoy mentions the phrase “my courageous race” by referring to the Turkish nation. Interestingly, Ersoy uses the concepts of race (\(\text{ırk}\)) and nation (\(\text{millet}\)) interchangeably. The national anthem has ten quatrains, however only the first two quatrains of Ersoy’s “Independence Anthem” (\(\text{İstiklal Marşı, Turkish National Anthem}\)) were composed and those first two quatrains are sung in official ceremonies. Originally, Ersoy was of Albanian origin, not ethnically a Turk. Through the end of his life, Ersoy moved to Egypt as a result of a self-imposed exile since Ersoy and Atatürk completely disagreed on the role of religion in the newly established Turkish Republic (1923). Ersoy died in Egypt.
were the exception. For example, Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) believed that Islam could be incorporated into Turkish nationalism and culture as Gökalp perceived Islam as a force that would enhance solidarity among the masses, and the religious ties would strengthen the Turkish nation. Indeed, Gökalp’s formulation of Turkish nationalism can be summarized in his well-known statement: “I am a member of the Turkish nation (millet), the Islamic community (ümmet) and Western civilization (medeniyet).” Prominent Turkish nationalists of the early 1900s, like Peyami Safa, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, like Ziya Gökalp, emphasized the role of Islam in providing national solidarity and unity among the Turkish citizens.

Yenigün (2003, 2) argues that “...it was not possible to identify an Islamist discourse clearly distinguishable from nationalism fifty years ago...” He points out that the convergence between the two movements during the single-party era in Turkey (1923-1950) happened because Islamism was under the heavy pressure of the secularist single-party regime; thus, Yenigün (2003, 36) argues, “nationalist discourse became the only means to express Islamic ideas.” In other words, as Yenigün (2003, 37) puts it succinctly, during the single-party era “deprived of its Islamist discourse, Islamic views sought refuge in the nationalist discourse ... which would never cease to be an ideological part of the broader Islamic movement during the subsequent periods.” Çetinsaya (1999) and Yenigün (2003) argue that after Turkey embraced the multiparty era after 1950, many Islamist writers like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983), Osman Yüksel Serdengecti (1917-1983),

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309 Please refer to Chapter 5 for a discussion of the MGH’s (The National Outlook Movement) blending of Islamism with nationalist views.
310 Z. Gökalp is the founder of Turkish nationalism through the end of the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp’s ideas deeply influenced M. Kemal Atatürk’s views on Turkish nationalism.
311 Another prominent Turkish nationalist was Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) who, like Gökalp, argued that Islam and nationalism can enhance each other; and Islam could be an important factor in the construction of Turkish nationality. For a detailed discussion of early Turkish nationalists and their views on Islam, see the article written by Çetinsaya (1999).
Cevat Rüfat Atılıhan, Hüseyin Hilmi Işık and Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975), did not give up nationalist sentiments; and they heavily continued using nationalist themes in their writings. Islamists of that period were expressing their opinions in different journals like Büyükdoğu (the Great Orient) and Serdengeçti magazines. Those magazines were similar to the ones published during and after the single-party era such as Sebilürrüşad, Büyük Cihat (Greater Jihad), Hür Adam (Free Man), and Selamet (Salvation). In the early 1970s there did not seem to be huge differences between the nationalists and the Islamists. For example, Alparslan Türkeş’s “Nine Lights” and Necmettin Erbakan’s blending of the national (millî) and sacred (mukaddes) were actually similar in many ways. In a gradual fashion, after the 1970s, Islamists and nationalists crystallized into two distinct movements. However, both movements continued to heavily borrow from each other in the following decades.312 Çetinsaya (1999, 376) succinctly points out that the mainstream Turkish Islamists “have always reached an accommodation between Islam and nationalism.” The organization of “The Intellectuals’ Hearth” (Aydınlar Ocaklı) was used to promote this aforementioned official blending of Islam and nationalism by the secularist elites.313 However, the organization could not reach the masses and have a large scale impact on the people. Later, in the late 1970s, as a result of translations of prominent Islamists’ works into Turkish (like Mawdudi and Qutb’s works) the Islamist youth in Turkey became more radical and the distinctions between the Islamist youth and the nationalist youth became clearer. Another

312 Later in the late 1980s, a big debate took place within the ranks of the nationalist party (the MHP) regarding the role of religion in the nationalist movement, and in 1992, the more conservatist group within the MHP split and formed their own party (the BBP, Büyük Birlik Partisi, The Grand Unity Party) under the charismatic leader Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu.

313 Especially after the military coup of 1980, the secularist elites attempted to use a careful blending of Islam and nationalism under the umbrella of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (TIS) to counterbalance the growing power of the extreme right and the emergent Islamists as well as to depolitize the masses by creating an apolitical version of Islam and nationalism. The TIS was also intended to neutralize the leftists as the military rule established after the military coup of 1980 attempted to counterbalance the secularist
commonality between the Islamist and nationalist youth was their strong anti-communist sentiments. Yenigün (2003, 44) argues that the translated works of the prominent non-Turkish Islamists “had found a wide appeal in a highly politicized environment of the late 1970s among the Imam-Hatip educated students, whose political aspirations were hardly met by the traditionally apolitical or nationalist communities or [predominantly apolitical] Sufi orders.”

Although Islamism and nationalism are currently two separate ideologies represented by different political parties, there are still some overlapping areas between the two ideologies. The group among the Islamists, what Yenigün calls “universalist Islamists,” appears to be minority among the general body of the Islamists in Turkey. Despite their differences from the nationalists, the majority of the Turkish Islamists today still define themselves in nationalist terms. The Gülen movement, which is considered as the largest Islamist community in Turkey, can be counted as another example. The leader of the movement, F. Gülen (1938 ), uses a heavy nationalist rhetoric in his sermons and books which is evident in his frequent references to the Ottoman period as the golden days of the glorious (sanlı) Turkish nation motivated by Islamic zeal. Here, it is important to note that in general, the Islamists’ notion of nationalism is similar to the official secular nationalism with one big exception. While secular Kemalism (Atatürkism) forms the basis of the official nationalism, Islamists in general have a nationalist approach without Kemalism. In other words, Islamists’ nationalism and the secularists’ nationalism are similar in many ways except the Kemalist ideology. Those two types of nationalism also

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leftist opposition. The generals believed that a mixture of non-political religion and nationalism would be an antidote against the leftists.

314 This is a minority group within the Turkish Islamists who believe in the unity of the Islamic ummah. They have distanced themselves from nationalism; and they perceive nationalism as a divisive ideology which caused the demise of the Islamic empire(s) of the past.
differ in their approach towards the past. The Turkish Islamists' nationalism embraces and glorifies the Ottoman period, while Kemalist (Atâtürkist) nationalism simply ignores and even condones that period, and focuses on the pre-Islamic ancient Turkish history.

Despite the nationalist undercurrents in the Islamist thought, as Yenigün (2003, 50) points out, after the mid-1990s a segment of the Islamists in Turkey, which is still a minority among the Islamists, were ideologically able to detach themselves from nationalism. As a result of such a detachment, Islamists in Turkey developed an Islamic solution to the Kurdish problem, which was completely different than that of the nationalists'. This new group within the general body of the Turkish Islamists maintained “a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural view of society” on ethnic issues which significantly differs from the official-Kemalist view of society.

Conservative Protectionism of the Muslim Identity (Muslimness)

Since the late 1970s, due to the proliferation of means of communications and the growing access of the Islamists to the media, Islamists have been increasingly concerned about preservation of their social identity (Muslim identity or Muslimness). The current debates on Islamism, though useful, often revolve around the concepts of security, democracy, or stability. However, those debates often times ignore how Islamists’ concern for preserving social identity against perceived external threats contribute to their politicization. Moreover, the current debates on Islamism do not generally link Islamist political activism to Islamist frames which are vigorously used by Islamists to call people to take a stance against those threats and the state control over religion as they relate to the Muslim identity.

315 Earlier in Chapter 5, Erbakan’s highly nationalist perception of the Turkish history and his reference to the Turkish-Ottoman period in history were discussed.
Diani defines social movements as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (1992, 13). Social identity refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities. Jenkins (1996) argues that a consequence of defining the other is the imposition of “negative and putative characteristics” on a collective other, whose politics, culture and lifestyle must be resisted and repelled. Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that the group members aim to preserve group identity and unity, and ultimately self-purity due to self-attachment to the group. For the Islamists, the outgroup norms can be non-Islamic values, attitudes, lifestyles and practices, Western power and dominance (i.e., cultural and/or military), Western culture and symbols, and secularism (Ozbudun 1976; Mardin 1973; Narlı 1999; Çarkoğlu 2002; Toprak 1981, 1996). Tarrow (1998, 119) maintains that building a movement around strong ties of collective identity does much of the work that would be normally done by the organization, but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances and interaction.

The way that the Islamists frame the external threats and the proper response to eliminate those threats can be best understood by using Gramscian theory, because Gramscian theory is “distinctively effective in explaining the political implications of oppressive as well as liberatory ideologies” (Simms 2002, 564). In many ways, the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive Islamism as a liberatory ideology challenging secularism and the secularist elites through a Gramscian war of position. It was Erbakan’s MGH which first explicitly articulated the Islamic identity in the political domain (Yavuz

316 Refer to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, pay attention to Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) discussion
Yavuz points out that through this new identity formulated by Erbakan and the ideologues of the RP, "devout Muslims evoked Islamic symbols and institutions to express their discontent" and "...to construct their own vision of modernity by reactivating Islamic tradition" (Yavuz 2003, 221). Clark (2004) and White (2002) maintain that identity demands and Islamic solidarity through horizontal networks are the two most significant aspects of Islamist civil society in Turkey. Additionally, Keyman (2007) points out that as Islamic identity claims have become more and more pluralized and multi-dimensional; they have also begun to operate mainly as group-based demands for religious rights and freedoms. For Keyman, Islamist identity claims are a "politics of identity operating within modernity and demanding recognition" (2007, 217).

Secularist political and social arrangements are perceived with suspicion by the Islamists as the Islamists perceive group identity that has to be protected from any external threat including the secularist threats. The content analysis done in Chapter 3 and 5 suggest that anything that would threaten the Muslim way of life or Muslims' daily practices or their religious or social obligations is perceived as a direct threat against Muslim identity. Additionally, the Islamists believe that Islam constitutes (or should constitute) the main source of social identity, values and norms, and the imposition of strict secular policies by the secularist state elites undermines the Muslim identity. Thus, the secularist states' attempts to control religion and Western cultural influences (as they lead to moral corruption) constitute the biggest concerns for the Islamists. This "perception of threat" then urges Muslims to protect their Muslimness, or their Muslim identity. The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists shared similar concerns and perceived the external threats in a similar

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317 Please see the debate of the Adil Düzên (Just Order) of the RP in Chapter 3.
318 Please refer to the interview data and the content analysis in Chapter 3 and 5.
fashion. Another important finding of my interviews is that Islamists in both countries use Muslim identity and their national identity equivocally (and often interchangeably).\footnote{This could be related to the nationalist undercurrents in both Islamist traditions. Please refer to the relevant subsection in this chapter.} In my interviews with the Islamists, the respondents raised their concerns in regards to the threats on Muslimness which I believe is an outcome of a mental situation which I call “the siege mentality.” They believe that both Islam and their Muslimness is under a serious threat and they are besieged the secular external threats.

Another finding of my interviews is that both the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists perceive the Muslim's imitation of the West as the primary source of perceived moral erosion, and corruption of Muslim identity. The Islamists also maintain that the secularist regimes and intellectuals are the main vehicle of such influences, as the regime and the secular elites are believed to impose Western norms through the secular law and educational institutions. The Islamists’ criticism of the secular media revolves around two major points. First, for the Islamists, the secular media is one of the powerful agents of perceived moral erosion; and second, as the Islamists argue, the secularist media and the secularist elites often cooperate to attack the Islamists and portray them in a negative light (i.e., reactionaries).

As a response to the secular external threats, the Islamist frames, created by the Islamist movement organizers and intellectuals, link those perceived threats to political activism through the need for preserving Islamic social identity with a protectionist viewpoint. The reach of this type of protectionist approach extends from protecting Islamic way of life to preserving some of the social attitudes recommended by the religion which often reside in the gray area between religion and culture. In other words, with a great
enthusiasm, the Islamists seek to protect the religious, and the cultural which is in many ways an expression of religion.\footnote{320}

Another aspect of the Muslim identity is related to the political means that the Islamists employ to protect it from the perceived threats. My interviewees believed that as individuals, Muslims are obliged to protect their Muslim identity;\footnote{321} however, the Islamists argued that there were certain things that would be impossible to carry out by Muslims on an individual basis. Here, as they argued, the government comes into the picture. They believed that on the individual level, people should be pious. However, if the government does not fulfill its responsibilities to protect the Muslim identity, the individuals’ piousness would not be enough to protect the Muslim identity from those external threats. My interviewees also believed that under a secular regime Muslims could be pious; however, they would not be fully living according to the precepts of Islam since Islam was also about designing the social, economic and political life according to its teachings. They believed that the government, as an umbrella organization over all of the social organizations, should protect the Muslim identity and make it possible for Muslims to practice Islam to the fullest extent by using its power.

Parallel to what Wickham argues (2004, 127-128), my interviewees believed that the Islamic transformation of society was essential. This transformation first begins with a renovation of the individual. The iman (faith) brings about serious changes in the life of the individual. After the first step, the transformation would gradually but ultimately spread out

\footnote{320}{For example, one Egyptian Islamist was complaining about the modern city life because he believed that it prevented Muslims from strengthening their ties with their neighbors. He argued that in a big city, if someone’s next-door neighbor dies, he/she would not be aware of it. He pointed out that Islam instructed Muslims to pay attention to their social obligations including those towards their neighbors. He also argued that Islam aims to improve social solidarity to the extent that if a Muslim sleeps on a full stomach while his/her neighbor is hungry, he/she would not be a mature Muslim.}

\footnote{321}{One of the Islamists whom I interviewed recited a well known saying of Prophet Muhammed: "The one who imitates a [non-Muslim] nation is of them."}
to incorporate every sector of society. The Islamists, thus, clearly distinguish an ordinary Muslim and a committed Muslim. The Islamists believe that an ordinary Muslim is "born into the faith" and is somewhat observant, but does not completely comprehend how a complete/mature Muslims should live by the precepts of Islam. My interviewees referred to such a Muslim as a "Muslim by culture." However, the Islamists believe, a committed Muslim fully absorbs Islamic values and applies them in his/her life without any laxity, and more importantly struggles for the implementation of those norms and practices on the larger societal scale. My interviewees referred to such a Muslim as a "mature/complete Muslim." Thus, one of the major functions of the da 'wa for an Islamist is to encourage first the self, and then other ordinary Muslims to become committed Muslims. A committed Muslim should monitor and correct the behavior of others around him/her if possible through persuasion (iqna'). Islamists often refer to the following Qur'anic verse, "al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa'l-nahy 'anil-munkar," which is commanding the good and forbidding the evil. For them, commanding the good and forbidding the evil, which is a form of jihad (the concept of ummaic jihad discussed in Chapter 1), could be done "with the hand, the tongue, and the heart." The hand refers to the actions, the tongue refers to the words, and the heart refers to prayers and intentions of the Muslims. In this regard, struggling for the dissemination of religion is considered the highest form of da 'wa, and struggling for the establishment of a political and social order, where Muslims practice their religion and the

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322 Please refer to the concept of "ummaic jihad" discussed in Chapter 1.
323 Other labels were used for the two types of Muslims. For the ordinary Muslims, my interviewees used the terms like lax, weak, unconscious, and superficial. For the committed Muslims, they used the terms like dedicated, loyal, faithful, and devoted. One interviewee distinguished between faith by imitation and faith by investigation. He argued that faith by imitation belongs to the ordinary Muslims as they imitate their families and friends. Thus, they are Muslims by culture. However, faith by investigation belongs to the committed Muslims as they absorb the faith and sincerely apply the Islamic principles in their lives, and thus work for the establishment of an Islamic order with determination.
324 Actually, this is another saying of Prophet Muhammed which is often used by the Islamists.
government promotes Islam, and protects the Muslim identity, is perceived equally important by the Islamists.

My interviewees expressed similar views regarding the significance of the da'wa in bringing about an Islamic order earlier highlighted by Wickham (2004) and Clark (2004). Similar to what Wickham expressed, Clark (2004, 14) points out that through the deeds of concerned Muslims, da'wa becomes the act of establishing Islam as the main source of norms in all spheres of life so that Islam could be fully practiced by its adherents. Thus, according to the Islamists, da'wa becomes incumbent upon all Muslims. Clark also reminds that the Islamist project, for the Islamists, is an attempt to create a web between religion, politics, and all forms of political and social activism. In a similar vein, my interviewees believed that Muslims efforts should reinforce each other for the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic order. From this type of understanding of da'wa, all sorts of Islamic institutions (social, economic, and political) become a form of putting da'wa into practice. Participating, volunteering, or donating money and time to an Islamist institution becomes a form of religious deed, and an expression of Islamist identity. More importantly, as the Islamists perceive the secularist elites and the state as an obstacle to their goal of establishing an Islamic order and as cultural agents corrupting Muslim identity, struggling against the secularist state and waging an all-inclusive war of position becomes a form of religious deed. My interviews with the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists identically revealed that for the Islamists political activism is more than just a political act, in fact (since it is actually da'wa), it becomes a religious act as well.\textsuperscript{325}

\textsuperscript{325} Remember one of the references regarding Imam Ayatollah Khomeini's description of political participation as a good deed sanctioned by Islam (\textit{thawab}) in one of the earlier chapters.
The Relationship between Islamism and Democracy-Democratization

Since its establishment, the Brotherhood remained as an illegal organization because neither the Egyptian monarchy under the auspices of the British, nor the new republic established after the military coup of the Free Officers of Nasser recognized the Brotherhood as a legal political group. The Brotherhood remained highly political and went underground during the Nasser period. Later, Sadat allowed the Brotherhood to operate for counterbalancing the leftists in ASU. In the late 1970s, several violent radical factions within the Brotherhood split from the organization and created terrorist groups like the Egyptian Jihad and Al-Takfir. The Brotherhood elders most of whom represented the mainstream Brotherhood strongly denounced violence. Thus, the split was caused by the denunciation of violence by the elders and the disagreement between the elders and some young members of the Brotherhood on how to bring about the Shari’a. The majority of the elders believed that transforming the society from below and simultaneously working for the introduction of the Shari’a by social and political activism would be the best way to follow. However, the violent radical groups which split from the Brotherhood believed that the introduction of the Shari’a could only be possible through a violent revolution, and forcibly removing the secularists from power.

Islamism and Democracy-Democratization

Shahin (2007, 1) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood “made a clear and deliberate departure from its traditionally cautious approach.” Until the early 1980s, the Brothers “rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process,” and focused their efforts on building the bases of their organization. However, starting from the early 1980s,

\[326\] For a detailed discussion of the relations between the Brotherhood and the consequent regimes, see Chapters 4 and 5.
the Brotherhood, focused its efforts on electoral and associational politics. The organization was not allowed to create a political party; thus, its participation into politics took place through the independent candidates of the organization or through electoral alliances with other political parties which included Brotherhood members under their electoral lists.\textsuperscript{328} A parallel strategy of the Brotherhood was to get involved in the associational politics of Egypt. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Brotherhood took control of the most significant and politically active professional associations like the lawyers, engineers, doctors, and pharmacists associations.\textsuperscript{329} Ismail (1995, 45) argues that "...in a context in which political parties have been virtually ineffective, the syndicates were appropriated as political space by those denied admission through regular channels." Yaşar (2006, 167) argues that the professional associations "acted like opposition parties in a political system characterized by weak political parties." In addition to limited electoral activism and associational involvement, the Brotherhood also focused on providing social services through hundreds of charity and social service organizations. Through those services, the Brotherhood became widely popular among the people who directly benefitted from those services. As Yaşar (2006, 170) points out the network of services created by the Brotherhood "...gives a sense of community to neighborhoods by helping citizens obtain food, jobs, and healthcare...free textbooks, housing and transportation..."\textsuperscript{330}

As Shahin (2007, 2) points out, the reform initiative of 2004 and the electoral platform of the Brotherhood during the campaign period for the 2005 parliamentary

\textsuperscript{327} For a discussion of the disagreements among the ranks of the Brotherhood, see Chapter 4. 
\textsuperscript{328} The Brothers first made an electoral alliance with the New Wafd Party in 1984 elections. Later in 1987 elections, they made an alliance with the Socialist Labor Party. 
\textsuperscript{329} See Fahmy's (1998) and Campagna's (1996) articles on the Brotherhood's performance in the Egyptian professional associations.
elections marked a major turning point for the Brotherhood regarding the organization’s willingness to embrace democratic values and principles. Hawthorne (2004) reports that the initiative called on the Egyptian regime to repeal the emergency law and the restrictions on political activity. The initiative also called for “reducing the military’s role in politics, privatizing Egypt’s economy and reforming it according to Islamic principles, purging non-Islamic material from Egypt’s media, fostering an independent judiciary…” Shahin (2007, 2) summarizes the Brotherhood’s 2004 reform initiative and 2005 campaign messages in regards to their relationship to democracy:

In essence the documents and statements reassert a commitment to the civic nature of political authority, notwithstanding their adherence to the principles of the Shari’a and respect for the basic values and instruments of democracy; respect for public freedoms; acceptance of pluralism; transfer of power through clean and free elections; sovereignty of the people; separation of power; rejecting the use of violence and adopting gradual and legal means to achieve reform; acceptance of citizenship as the basis for rights and responsibilities for Muslims and non-Muslims; and support of human rights, including those of women and the Copts.

The changes within the ranks of the Brotherhood towards a highly receptive attitude regarding democracy could be ascribed to the efforts of the Brothers since the mid-1990s “to rebuild their structures and better position themselves to engage in the political process and interact with other political actors” as a younger generation of Islamists carrying varying political experiences “with a more proactive political culture” were able to affect the Brotherhood’s orientations (Shahin 2007, 2).

330 See the detailed discussion of the extent of the services provided by the Brotherhood in Chapter 5.
331 Indeed, in 1995, as a result of some of the Brotherhood elders’ uncompromising stance, several young members split from the organization forming the Wasat Party. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, after the passing away of Mashour in 2002 and of Al-Hudaibi in 2004, as the last of the influential old guard, the most significant opening for the further transformation became possible for the Brotherhood. Muhammed Mahdi Akef became the general guide of the Brotherhood in 2004 and younger Brothers took positions as two deputy general guides stipulated by Brotherhood’s bylaws. When he was elected as the general guide, Akef repeated their desire to operate as a political party. Indeed the reform initiative was prepared under the auspices and encouragement of Akef. As El-Ghobashi (2005, 390) points out, for the first time in its history, a general guide of the Brotherhood officially announced ideas developed by the comparatively young members of the organization. Indeed, Akef’s message was carefully devised for the intention of appealing to several audiences: “the Egyptian government, opposition parties, and independent
Given the authoritarian conditions under which the Brotherhood operate and participate into politics, the results of 2005 elections can be interpreted as an impressive victory for the Brotherhood. Indeed, 88 of the Brotherhood members running as independent candidates became members of the Egyptian parliament. This translates into approximately 20 percent of the seats in the lower camera (Majlis Al-Sha'ab) of the bicameral Egyptian parliament (Khalil 2006, 44). Contrary to the general assumptions, the Brotherhood candidates voiced mundane concerns of the electorate as well as their demands for the implementation of the Shari'a. In other words, the Brotherhood members were paying attention to bread and butter issues as well as the Holy Scripture. My interviews also indicated the same. For example, one member of the Egyptian parliament from the Brotherhood whom I interviewed emphasized the same point. He was elected as an independent deputy from a small rural area north of Cairo. As he indicated during our interview, during his electoral campaign, he went door to door and explained his plans on how to solve the rural community's problems like increasing the government's investment on the irrigation system, enhancing various existing governmental subsidies for farmers, quality of public schools in the area, sanitation, governmental health services and the like.

Regarding the democratic model as applied in the Western democracies, the Islamists whom I interviewed believe that although some fundamental universal principles of democracy exist (like free and fair elections, one man one vote principle, the rule of law...etc.), application of democracy may change from one context to the other. Two high rank Brotherhood members whom I interviewed emphasized this point while they were expressing some of their reservations about Western democracies. They believed that western democracies were designed according to the culture and religion of the western intellectuals, and foreign parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its
countries; thus, they argued, it would be a huge mistake to identically “copy and paste” western democratic models onto Muslim societies. One of the Egyptian Islamists gave the example of Richard Gere who, during his visit to India, kissed an Indian celebrity on the TV. This then caused a lot of controversy in India because kissing in public is illegal there. The Islamist referred to this incident and argued that India was a parliamentary democracy and they had been maintaining their democracy for a long time without any major problems, however they still respect their cultural and religious values. Thus, Islamists believe that they can take what would work best for themselves from democracy and leave out the rest. A Turkish Islamist whom I interviewed said: “we want a democracy that is respectful of religion and our Islamic demands…”

Framing Islamism from a Democratic Point of View and Vice Versa

Even a cursory reading of the Islamist books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces on different blogs would show that within the last three decades, the Islamist jargon on democracy and democratization has significantly expanded. Islamists have increasingly started to use concepts borrowed from the democracy-democratization literature and in both countries, at least for the last three decades they have been framing their struggle from a democratic point of view. Islamists also frame democracy from an Islamist point of view. In this section, first, I will discuss how and why the Islamists frame their struggle from a democratic point of view, and second, I will discuss the Islamists’ framing of democracy from an Islamist point of view.

The Islamists tend to differentiate two different aspects of democracy. As Shahin (2007, 4) succinctly points out, although the Egyptian Islamists “explicitly declare their

"Greater Middle East Initiative."

I also reminded him that in many states in India, slaughtering a cow is a serious crime.
commitment to democracy”, they “distinguish between democracy as a system of values and democracy as a policy instrument.” As Shahin highlights, most Islamists have no problem with the latter (like respect for human rights, freedom of expression, free and fair elections...etc.); indeed they urge their governments to expand democratic rights and freedoms, and to assure free and fair elections. However, they have reservations with some of the values on which Western liberal democracies were built upon. For example, the Islamists are completely against things like gambling, prostitution, and consumption of alcohol that are allowed in liberal Western democracies. The Turkish Islamists also share the views of the Egyptian Islamists. The Islamists whom I interviewed were supportive of democracy as a policy instrument; however like their Egyptian counterparts, they believed that through collective decision making, the parliamentarians did not have the right to change what is permissible (halal) and what is forbidden (haram) that were clearly stated in the Qur’an. Islamists believe that the Qur’an, being the major authoritative source of the Shari’a, is absolute and human reasoning (i.e., legislation) cannot challenge it. For example, gambling is strictly prohibited by the Qur’an. Thus, according to what the Islamists think, the parliament cannot make it legal through legislation, on the basis of liberal freedoms or of some benefits of gambling for the local community like local taxes or creation of jobs.

333 Helal in Turkish.
334 Haram in Turkish.
335 There are four major sources of the Shari’a (Islamic law). First is the Qur’an. Second is the Hadith (sayings of Prophet Muhammad recorded in 6 separate volumes known as Kutub Sitta) and the Sunnah (tradition of Prophet Muhammad). Third is Ijma (a group of scholars issuing a fatwa-religious verdict-on a question). Fourth is Qiyas (independent reasoning through analogies). Ijma and Qiyas can not contradict with the Qur’an and Sunna/Hadith. In the Shari’a, when answering a legal question, the Muslim jurist first has to consult the Qur’an, then if an answer is not available there, the Sunna and the Hadith collections have to be consulted. If there is still no answer for the question, then the jurist can consult other scholars or use his independent reasoning by looking at precedents.
Islamists also relate democracy and Islam by drawing parallels between the two. They are always cautious about comparing the two, because the Islamists believe that Islam is a religion, and a complete way of life; however for them, democracy is a set of principles that evolved over the years based on the shared experiences and lessons of the people who created it. They argue that the concept of *Shura* (consultation) in Islam has a democratic essence; indeed they believe that Islam instructs Muslims to solve their problems through consultation. Additionally the Islamists frequently point out the election of the caliphs by the tribal leaders after Prophet Muhammed’s death. One Islamist critically stated: “the Umayyads and Abbasids steered away from the example set by the first four caliphs and introduced monarchies... Today, after fourteen hundred years we still discuss the same matters that actually had been resolved by the first four rightly guided caliphs.”

**Conclusion**

In order to understand how the Islamists and the secularist regimes interact, one first has to look at how the Islamists and the secularist regimes define: i) themselves, ii) politics, iii) threats, and iv) each other. Indeed, in regards to how both sides perceive each other, there is a wide range of options from confrontation to cooperation. In both countries, perceiving politics as a zero-sum game and mutual distrust between both sides make it further difficult for them to compromise which then can potentially escalate into severe crisis situations. Moreover, both sides perceive politics as a kind of war which is a highly contentious and polarized conception of politics.

The Islamists in both countries define their movements in terms of comprehensiveness of their movement defined by the Islamic terms of *da’wa* and *jihad*.

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336 This topic was covered in Chapters 2 and 4.
The interviewees in both countries pointed out “the opportunity to make Islam the essence of people’s lives and to bring about an Islamic order” as the major motivation that attracts them to politics and Islamist activism. They believed that their mission was to transform their societies in accordance to the Islamic principles. They also believed that given the current non-Islamic and lax condition of their societies, a complete transformation was necessary. For them, the societal transformation would start with the individual transformation; however, it was not enough by itself to bring about the Islamic order.

Islamist politicians/parliamentarians have multi-issue policy platforms with powerful Islamic undercurrents. They gain the confidence of ordinary citizens by framing through Islam (regarding the three types of frames-diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational). For the movement participants, *jihad* is not just fighting in a war; there are different degrees of *jihad*. Similar to what Al-Banna understands from the concept, the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists believed that working for the establishment of an Islamic order would indeed be *jihad*.

All Islamists (movement organizers and participants) emphasize the significance of recognition of respect for their basic rights by the government. However, in their relationship with their rank and file, they more focus on the responsibilities of Muslims than the rights. The Islamists also distinguish between the two types of Muslims (ordinary and committed). They believe that since *jihad* and *da'wa* are interconnected, and there are varying degrees of responsibilities for each and every Muslim; the most important of those would be being a good Muslim at the individual level and struggling for the establishment of an Islamic order at the collective/societal level.

My interviewees also argued that because the *Shari'a* was not applied by their secularist states, Muslims, therefore, have a greater responsibility to establish an Islamic
order as this responsibility falls upon every Muslim and it becomes completely antithetical
to secularism (please refer to the discussion of fardh ‘ayn and fardh kifayah made earlier
in the chapter). The Islamists whom I interviewed were also against the state’s control
over religion, and they put forward two interrelated reasons for their discontent with it.

*First,* the Islamists believed that the state’s control over religion corrupts Islam as the state
designs religion as it fits into the state’s priorities (which are not necessarily Islamic), not the other way around. *Second,* the Islamists also believed that the state control over
religion sought to pacify and to depoliticize the Islamists who, for the secularists, were the
major political and ideological threats against the secularist regime. Here, I consider it
very important to note that the Turkish Islamists believe that the Turkish state is openly
against Islam; however, the Egyptian Islamists make the very nuanced argument about their
state that the Egyptian state is not necessarily against Islam, but definitely against Islamism
(please refer to the debates in Chapter 3 in regards to the Egyptian state’s attempts to
Islamize itself as a response to Islamism; however, the Turkish state chose a complete
confrontationist approach in regards to the Turkish Islamists).

The Turkish and Egyptian Islamists whom I interviewed believed that secularism
was not an indigenous Muslim concept. For them, secularism was not simply about
separating religion from politics; indeed, over the years, it had been used as a tool to
prevent the Islamists from coming to power (in addition to this point, the Turkish Islamists
believe that secularism, as arbitrarily implemented by the secularists, became a tool of
oppressing Islam in Turkey). My interviewees also believed that secularism legitimized
and masked the arbitrary use of authoritarian measures to squash the Islamist opposition.
As opposed to the secularists, the Islamists believe that secularism cannot be a way of life;
in fact it is a principle of designing a government.
Both movements are similar in regards to how they should react to those external threats. Both movements perceive the secularist regime and religious/cultural corruption and blindly imitation of the West as the biggest threat against the Muslim identity (or Muslimness). For the Islamists, the secularists are the agents of moral corruption and Westernization of their countries. My interviewees also argued that the secularist elites' efforts to secularize Muslim societies serve two main purposes: i) ideologically, through secularization the society would be less susceptible to the appeal of the Islamism, and ii) politically, secularization would eventually create a more homogenized society which would be easier to govern.

My interviewees also revealed their nationalist feelings and associated colonialism and war with concepts like “greed of Europeans” or “expansionist/imperialist policies of the West” as well “anti-Islamism of Europe.” When compared, I found the Turkish Islamists to be more influenced by nationalist sentiments than the Egyptian Islamists because Islam was completely erased from the public realm during the single-party era in Turkey, thus Islam found nationalism as the only vehicle to express itself.

Most of my interviewees had a state of mind which I would call “the siege mentality.” They believed that both Islam and their Muslimness were under a serious threat and they were besieged by the external threats. They were also highly critical regarding the secularist media and mostly blamed it for the moral corruption and misrepresentation of Muslims. They believed that the best way of getting out of the siege was to Islamically transform their societies. For them, this transformation first begins with a renovation of the individual. The iman (faith) brings about serious changes in the life of the individual. After the first step, the transformation would gradually but ultimately spread out to incorporate every sector of society.
My interviewees also believed that although some fundamental universal principles of democracy existed, application of democracy might change from one context to the other. They voiced their demands for an “Islamic democratic option” that would respect their beliefs and allow them to practice their faith without any obstacles. They also appeared to make a distinction between the procedural aspects of democracy and liberal democratic principles. They had no problems with the first part; however they had serious reservations with the second part. The Islamists also appeared to frame their issues within the democratic jargon; they also claimed that Islam was compatible with democracy (at least with the procedural aspect of democracy). Furthermore, regarding the aspect of democracy as it relates to liberties, my interviewees had serious reservations; however, although they did not seem to be well articulated on this issue, they believed that a middle ground was possible by making democracy more compatible with/respectful of Islam.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Since the collapse of the Soviets, the prospects for a worldwide third wave of democratization have become one of the major questions of those who are students of politics. The democratic transformation of the former Eastern Bloc took place incredibly fast; however, the Middle East appears to be exceptional in regards to democratization with long lasting dictatorships/authoritarian regimes, and a poor record of human rights and rule of law.

The political expression(s) of religion is not something new; indeed, globally the relationship between religion and politics is one of the most contentious topics of contemporary politics and governance. In some regions of the world, religious revivalist movements coincide with the formation of more democratic political systems; in other areas, the two forces are in conflict. One of the crucial issues determining the political future of Muslim countries is the relationship between the secularist governments and the Islamist movements' increasing participation into the political processes (Esposito and Voll 1996).

Unfortunately there has always been a certain confusion of concepts both in the West and in the Muslim world due to the interchangeable use of the terms such as Muslim, Islamist, Salafist, fundamentalist, radical, extremist and terrorist. Besides lack of proper understanding of the Islamists and of the politics of Muslim countries, one possible reason for this interchangeable use of the concepts above is the mistaken idea that Islamist groups
throughout the Muslim world are a monolith. In fact, the Islamist resurgence is characterized by factions that diverge on their approach to major themes such as how the nature of ideal Muslim society should be; relationship between Islamist activists and the political system; method of solving socioeconomic problems; ideology; interpretation of the mutual relationship of religion and state; and organization of social life according to the Islamic law. More radical or militant of these groups follow a violent revolutionary path that must be imposed from the top, while more moderate groups call for gradual change that must happen from within the system through widespread support of the masses. Far from being a monolith, the mainstream Islamist movements in the Muslim world differ greatly from the extremist ones at the margins (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999). Another possible reason for the interchangeable use of the concepts is the influence Orientalism, which was discussed earlier in this study (For categorization of the Islamists, and the similarities and differences between them, see Table 1, 2, and 3 in the appendix).

Islamist revivalist movements are not a new phenomenon; in fact there are several examples of revivalist movements in Islamic history. The Kharijites are considered to be as the first revolutionaries/revivalists in the early days of Islam. The 18th and the 19th

337 Tibi (1998) points out that according to the rationale of the top-down violent revolutionaries, all secularist regimes are illegitimate because they represent or are direct products of jahiliyyah which is the other extreme of God's hakimiyyah (sovereignty). For them, only Allah rules, humans can have no sovereignty and Islamic revelation takes precedence over the reason-centered view of the world. Following the footsteps of Qutb, current violent revolutionary Islamists consider the struggle to be their ultimate duty against secularist Muslim governments and against those individual Muslims who have fallen into jahiliyyah, and only jihad can bring the nizam Islami (Islamic order) to the Muslim world. They also accuse their fellow Muslims not only of being infected by secular modernity and thus to have lapsed into jahiliyyah, but also of kufr (heresy). Thus, according to this notion, current Islamic societies are generally characterized as a mix of jahiliyyah and kufr; true Muslims should retreat from these societies by emulating Prophet Muhammad's hijra which is the retreat of the small group of Muslims including Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622, marking the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Accordingly, going underground for battling the secularist regimes becomes a modern version of hijra as well as jihad. The Muslims who question and reject these arbitrary interpretations of the violent Islamists are renounced as infidels. Egyptian violent Revolutionaries ridiculed even the dignified former Sheikh (head, director) of Al-Azhar, Jadhulhaq, who denounced violence in his various statements (Tibi 1998, 56-59).
centuries witnessed significant Islamic revivalist movements like those of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab (Wahhabism), Sayyid Muhammad Ibn Ali Al Sanusi (Sanusi Movement) and Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (the Barelvis) in different parts of the Muslim world (Husain 2003, 63-64). However, contemporary revivalist movements differ from those of earlier times in that they are modern, not traditional, in their leadership, ideology, and organization. Thus, it would make more sense to characterize the current Islamist movements as neo-fundamentalist or neo-revivalist for they look to the sources of Islam, the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet not simply to replicate the past, but to respond to a new age (Esposito 1998, 129).

Another important point to reiterate is that being Muslim and being Islamist are not synonymous (Ismail 2004, 614-631). Thus, the assertion of a Muslim identity does not necessarily represent an endorsement of these movements. For Ismail, Islamism entails a political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government which implements the *Shari’a*. However, Islamization signifies a drive to Islamize the society which involves a process through which “various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions.” Islamist politics both diverge and converge with the process of Islamization. Thus, Islamists and Muslims who seek Islamization of their societies may not necessarily be the same group of people. Ordinary practicing Muslims may be interested in Islamizing their societies, however the project of Islamization would mainly focus on social institutions and practices, not necessarily on political institutions.\(^{338}\) As opposed to

\(^{338}\) The version of Islam proposed by the Islamists in general has heavy political overtones. For the Islamists, Islam is a holistic way of life, not just a religion, which encompasses every aspect of human life. As a result, Islamists plead to redesign the state by implementing the *Shari’a*, despite the fact that among the Muslims, various interpretations of the *Shari’a* exist. Islamism in the modern sense basically grew as an aspiration to have a government based on Islam and it manifests itself in three different
the violent Islamists, the bottom-up Islamists are puritanical, preaching, and populist, who seek to re-Islamize the society and establish the Shari'a by social and political action. Their basic purpose is to transform the society from within. They strongly believe that the ultimate end-Islamization of the society and government does not (and should not) legitimize violence because they believe that the means through which you achieve your end should be justifiable and non-violent as well as the end ( Fuller 2002; Esposito 1995).

The Turkish and Egyptian cases represent most different political systems with their different backgrounds (history, language, national identity, and politics). However, both countries have been witnessing Islamism. Thus, casual observers might associate the emergence of political Islam in both countries with the popular appeal of Islamist revivalist movements in the twentieth century. However, this appears to be a tautological assumption. Neither does political Islam emerge in every Muslim society, nor do all political Islamist movements share the same characteristics.

The evolution of political Islam in Egypt is very similar to the evolution of political Islam in Turkey although as countries they have very different backgrounds. Indeed, Egyptian Islamism emerged earlier than its Turkish counterpart did. Thus, the Egyptian Islamist movement lags behind the Turkish movement. I associate this lag with the differences between the two countries' level of democratic inclusiveness and institutionalization. Turkey embraced the multi-party system in 1950 and allowed Islamism

dispositions: Revolutionary, Traditionalist and Modernist (Husain 2003). Although all Islamists (not necessarily all Muslims) would like to have an Islamic state and prefer living under an Islamic state to living under a secular state, they greatly differ in their willingness, determination and methods for achieving that ultimate end. Therefore, Islamists do not constitute a monolith in many aspects. For instance, the Modernist Islamists and the Traditionalist Islamists would be more active regarding Islamization of their societies than politically pursuing programs for the establishment of the Shari'a. Other Muslim groups such as sufis (mystics) do not advocate Islamism at all although they would be willing to Islamize their societies. Inside the same society, several types of Islamist movements can often be found, and those separate movements usually hardly cooperate (Husain 2003, 261-285).
to organize politically. However, Egypt did not experience a similar process, and this created severe political constraints on the institutionalization of Islamism by excluding the Islamists from the electoral politics.

This study contributes to our understanding of Islamism and state-society relations in Egypt and Turkey in two major aspects: the causal aspect and the conceptual aspect. Causally, this study relates the government control over religion with politicization of the Islamists within the context of state-society relations. Conceptually, this study relates Islamism with social movement literature, frames, and Gramscian struggle of anti-hegemonic war of position.

In regards to the causal aspect, through a critique of the dominant conceptual models (i.e., modernization and crisis theories), this study provides better explanatory tools to understand Islamism because such theories generally interpret the rise of Islamism as a reactionary response to deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions in Muslim societies. The adherents of crisis theories often fail to focus on many crucial aspects of Islamist activism such as how the Islamists create their frames and discourses, build alliances, initiate and get involved in grassroots social and political activism, and recruit members. In regards to the conceptual aspect, this study analyses Islamism in both countries through a selective reading of the social movement theory because it provides better explanatory tools than those of the Modernization and/or (Neo)Orientalist theories.

339 In fact establishing a party purely on grounds of religion or race is unconstitutional in Turkey; however, the MNP, the first Islamist party in Turkey was established in 1971. Earlier during the single-party era (1923-1950), various external and internal pressures forced the single party government in Turkey to create a multi-party system: the pressures from the U.S. and some of the European states, the prospective NATO membership for Turkey in the forthcoming years-1952- and a strong internal dissent under the single-party rule of the Republican Peoples' Party).

340 Islamism is not an institution, but I have borrowed the terminology here for clarification. One might argue that if the constraints on the Egyptian Islamists were eliminated in Egypt, the path that the Islamists follow would be very similar to the path followed by the Turkish Islamists.
Also, there is abundant literature on identity politics and political activism in various Western contexts; however such studies are lacking within the context of Middle Eastern societies. Thus, another contribution of this study is analyzing political activism in non-Western contexts. Additionally, being an in depth cross-national and cross-cultural comparative study, this dissertation of two culturally and politically different countries of the Middle East becomes a significant contribution to the literature on Islamism.

The Struggle Continues: Turkey

The Islamist struggle and the tension between the secularists and Islamists in Turkey seem to be far from over; and it is expected that the struggle will continue in the following years. The next parliamentarian elections are scheduled for November of 2011. It is not unwise to assume that the Islamists will try to maintain and defend the positions that they have taken up to this point; whereas the secularists will attempt to defeat the Islamists in this Gramscian war of position because both sides perceive politics as a “zero-sum game.” The Islamist AKP managed to elect\textsuperscript{341} its Foreign Minister A. Gül as the new president and it should be expected that through President Gül, more appointments will be done for critical bureaucratic positions from the ranks of the AKP. One should also expect a continuous resistance from the secularist establishment, i.e., the secularist media, judicial system, major public universities, public bureaucracy and military. It is not difficult to guess that AKP’s priority in its second parliamentarian term will be on strengthening its position in the judiciary by appointing judges who are more sympathetic to AKP’s ideological position. It should also be expected that the AKP will continue its

\textsuperscript{341} Under the Turkish parliamentarian system, the National Assembly elects the president for one seven-year period. In the fall of 2007, the AKP initiated a national referendum which was favorably voted by the Turkish citizens. The current president’s term ends in 2014, and after that date, there will be popular elections of presidents who will be able to serve for five years for two terms (if elected).
political struggle through a more democratic discourse since that strategy worked out well since 2002 due to the fact that the AKP was able to pull some liberal secularists to their lines and get their consent on a variety of policy issues, thus creating a larger consensus through its emphasis on democratic freedoms and rights.

In the upcoming years, it seems that the AKP will focus its efforts on completing the preparation of a new constitution which is labeled as a “civilian constitution.” Turkish Constitutions (1924, 1961, and 1982) have typically subordinated the individual to the state, instead of protecting individual from the state. \(^{342}\) However, preparing a new constitution is going to be a contentious process as the secularist establishment and the oppositional parties regard the AKP’s motives for change as suspicious (Barkey and Çongar, 67). The headscarf debate, which is one of the most symbolic and contentious ideological/political fight between the two camps, is unlikely to disappear. On one hand, the conservative constituency of the AKP increasingly pressures the second Erdoğan government to relax the ban; on the other hand, the secular establishment is upset about such a relaxation as they strongly believe that such a relaxation would be against the secularist nature of the Turkish regime. \(^{343}\)

It should also be expected that the AKP will be more sensitive to the expectations of Turkish Kurds in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. The Kurds’ show of support for the AKP in the recent elections means that there will be more demands coming from the Kurds for greater cultural freedoms and governmental investments to industrialize the region. However, the nationalist military and the oppositional nationalist MHP have

\(^{342}\) The last two of the three Turkish Constitutions were prepared under the auspices of the junta regime after the coups of 1960 and 1980.

\(^{343}\) Currently, there is a closure case against the AKP in the Turkish Constitutional court going on. In a separate case, the Court overturned two constitutional amendments making it possible for Muslim
been uncompromising on providing more cultural freedoms to the Turkish Kurds. The overtly pro-Kurdish DTP’s poor record in local and national elections can be attributed to “its inability to offer a realistic vision for the future of Turkey’s Kurds” (Barkey and Çongar, 68).

Turkey’s most important recent foreign policy challenges have been Turkey’s prospective membership for the EU and Turkey’s policy regarding Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. Turkish foreign policy makers’ major concern since the Gulf War of 1991 has been directly related to Turkey’s difficulties with her own Kurdish population in the southeastern region. The Kurdish separatist PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan -Kurdish-Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has been using northern Iraq as a base of operations for the last three decades. In fact, Turkish foreign policy makers and Turkish military have been highly concerned about Iraqi Kurds moving towards a federal structure as this would set an example for the Turkish Kurds. During the last week of February 2008, the Turkish military carried out a brief military operation\footnote{In fact, this is not the first military operation against the PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq. There have been 25 other similar military operations since the early 1980s.} against the Kurdish PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq.

Anti-Americanism\footnote{Females with headscarves to be able to attend universities without being forced to take their headscarves off.} is also on the rise in Turkey mainly due to the course of American foreign policy after September 11, and the Iraq war and its impact on Kurdish ambitions in northern Iraq.

Regarding Turkey’s membership for the EU, several opinion polls revealed that the support for Turkey’s EU membership among the Turkish citizens has dropped from roughly 75 percent to 60 percent in the last decade. In the last decade or so several important domestic and foreign policy issues have overshadowed Turkey’s EU membership (i.e., the
US invasion of Iraq, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the resurfacing of the Kurdish separatism).

However, as Çavdar (2006, 488) argues the AKP government is committed to Turkey’s EU accession unlike the RP’s earlier anti-EU stance because the AKP realized that the EU could play a critical role in achieving some domestic political objectives. It is the AKP’s hope that the EU would help achieve civilian control over the military and enhance religious freedoms. Çavdar also maintains that the AKP government takes Turkey’s EU membership as a vehicle for greater political action and the promotion of human rights and religious freedoms. Indeed, many legal changes and their implementation have resulted from Turkey’s wish to comply with the EU standards (2006, 496). Regarding Turkey’s Iraq policy and Turkey’s prospective EU membership, the military and the nationalist right (the MHP and BBP) and left (the DSP and CHP) joined forces in accusing the AKP politicians for being overly conciliatory and following a pro-US and pro-EU foreign policy. However, this does not mean that the AKP intended to pursue a pro-American foreign policy. Indeed, the AKP elaborated a new foreign policy that sought to improve relations with the Middle East and Russia without abandoning its ties with the US and the EU.

It is also expected that the Cyprus and Armenia issues will continue to be among the significant foreign policy issues for Turkey. Although Cyprus is a member of the EU, Turkey still does not recognize the Cypriot government. Thus, Turkey still has not fulfilled its commitment to Brussels by extending to Nicosia Customs Union provisions, such as the use of ports. The Cypriot government also has not done much to help the situation by rejecting an internationally recognized solution in 2004 proposed by the Turkish Cypriots in the north and Turkey. The Armenian issue was complicated more by the US, in an earlier

attempt by the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to pass an Armenian Genocide resolution (Barkey and Çongar, 72).

As suggested by Çavdar (2006), Islamists of Turkey have been in a process of political learning. Although Çavdar only focuses on the AKP's reign regarding the learning process of the Turkish Islamists, it would be more appropriate to date back this learning process to the early 1970s when Islamists of Turkey for the first time emerged as an organized political movement. As Çavdar argues, the Turkish Islamist model is marked by "electoral participation and moderation" and it is a unique model since "...it is the specific product of a transformation based on a set of distinct political and economic conditions" (478). It is highly debatable whether the AKP model could be exported to other Muslim countries; however the AKP's political learning process seems to be far from being complete. Indeed, it also appears that the political learning process of the AKP will be shaped by a combination of domestic and international policy issues which will likely to challenge the second AKP government until the end of its tenure in 2011.347

The Struggle Continues: Egypt

2004 and 2005 witnessed an “unprecedented opening of the political system” in Egypt. Mubarak announced a new plan to make a legislative reform to amend article 76 of the Constitution in February 2005. With the new amendment, despite some restrictions, the first ever multi-candidate presidential election became possible in September 2005 (Antar 2007, 54). 348 Abaza (2006, 5) argues that the Brothers in parliament “supported other

346 It is ironic that the secularist elite who earlier initiated the process of joining the EU now resist Turkey’s EU membership.
347 This could be even earlier because early elections can take place before 2011. Indeed, against the ongoing closure case at the Turkish Constitutional Court, the AKP
348 Originally, article 76 of the Egyptian Constitution stated: “The People's Assembly shall nominate the President of the Republic... The candidate who wins the two thirds of the votes of the Assembly shall be referred to the people for a plebiscite.” For a discussion of the restrictions, see Abaza (2006). The new
opposition members of parliament in their protest against the amendment, describing it as not conducive to free and fair elections.” For the first time in Egypt’s history, some opposition leaders were able to freely address the Egyptian people with their concerns and criticisms in regards to a wide range of issues. The two main contenders, Nooman Gomaa (Waf Party) and Ayman Nour (Al-Ghad Party), were able to organize large-scale rallies in the Nile Delta, Cairo area, and upper Egypt (Abaza 2006, 9). The Brotherhood did not have a particular preference of the candidates, however M. Akef, the leader of the Brotherhood, advised the Brotherhood members to review the different candidates’ platform and decide which vision would best serve the Egyptian people.349

In November 2005 parliamentarian elections, 88 of 150 Brotherhood members, which translates into 20 percent of the lower house, running as independents were elected to the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament only two months after the presidential election.350 Antar (2007, 55) argues that the first multi-candidate presidential election had an impact on the Brotherhood’s success because the introduction of competition into the presidential elections “showed that the regime had reached an unprecedented impasse and was eager to prove its legitimacy.” Also, the Egyptian regime sought to counter the recent emergence of secular opposition movements, like the liberal-secular Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party and the secular Kifaya (Enough) moment.

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349 For a more detailed discussion of the election results, see Chapter 3.
350 As stated earlier in Chapter 5, the Brothers did not run in all of the electoral districts. They ran only in 150 districts and 88 of them were able to win. This translates into a 59 percent success as to the number of elected parliamentarians. The independent Brotherhood candidates got 20.7 percent of the votes, and Mubarak’s NDP got 69.7 percent.
Following the Brotherhood’s success after the 2005 parliamentarian elections, the Mubarak regime tightened its grip on the Brotherhood by postponing the local elections two years which were supposed to be held in 2006. In the spring of 2006, the government arrested numerous members of the Brotherhood as well as freezing their assets in Egyptian banks and later confiscating them altogether. In February 2007, Mubarak ordered the arrest of 16 prominent Brotherhood members to be tried at the military tribunals. Additionally, the NDP hastily amended article 179 of the Constitution, a counter-terrorism article, which, after the amendment, provided sweeping powers for the regime making it easy for the Egyptian government to crack down on the suspected Islamists, refer the suspects to the military courts at speed, and arbitrarily arrest the suspects. As discussed earlier, these measures strongly indicate that the Egyptian regime does not tolerate the Islamists if they start having political successes and begin to challenge the authority of the government (either in the political realm or in the ideological realm).

An important part of the Brotherhood’s success lies in its ability to establish a powerful grassroots base with its capability to successfully mobilize people. This is due to the “horizontal networks” and grassroots activism based on the Brotherhood’s strong presence in the Egyptian civil society. Antar (2006, 56) reports that forty percent of the people in Egypt live below the poverty line. Under such circumstances, providing social services in various areas proves to be essential in gaining support of the people. Also, as discussed earlier, the Brotherhood successfully frames its message in a religious fashion which is the common language among the masses. The Brotherhood’s framing of their messages through a religious rhetoric could be best understood considering the fact that Egypt’s history and political culture lacks genuine democratic experience and acquaintance
with liberal democratic values, and the adult illiteracy rate is quite high (28.6 percent).\footnote{351 “Human Development Report: Egypt-The Human Development Index” Prepared by the UNDP,} This could be a topic of another study; however, it appears that religion seems to be the only common language through which the Egyptian Islamists could transmit their message across the masses. The Brotherhood’s success mostly stems from its organizational abilities and their success over the years in expanding their organizational base while carefully adapting to changing political climate. Although the core Islamist message of the Brotherhood still remains the same, its “message and rhetoric have evolved and adapted to the social and political realities of Egypt” (Antar 2007, 58).

Egyptian secularist critics argue that despite the fact that the Brotherhood has been undertaking to participate through peaceful venues in the political process, it is not clear whether it is genuinely a democratic movement or will use democratic means to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Another criticism is about the compatibility of the Shari’a with democracy. Although the Brotherhood argues that the Shari’a does not contradict with democracy, they are not completely clear on the application of the Shari’a in regards to complex social, political and economic problems. Their policy platform does not lay out the details regarding the implications of the Shari’a within the context of larger secular political system. Here, some important questions still remain to be answered.

As discussed earlier in Chapters 5 and 6, the Brotherhood does not have an issue with the procedural aspects of democracy like elections, popular representation, and collective decision making. However, they have strict reservations in regards to the liberal freedoms in democratic systems. Thus, the following questions have to be satisfactorily answered by the Brotherhood. For instance, does the Brotherhood plan to abolish liberal freedoms once they come to power because some of the liberal freedoms contradict with
Islam (like consumption of alcohol, gambling or pre/extra marital sex)? In other words, once they come to power, will they force Muslims to abide by the Shari'a? And, will the Islamists allow the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) to participate into politics? Throughout the Islamic history, Jewish and Christian minorities were not allowed to have a say in the political process (they were completely excluded from the political process; however, they were free to practice their religion) and had a special status in the Shari'a (Dhimmis—the ones who are under protection). They were not also required to serve in the military; however, they had to pay higher taxes in return (jizya tax) because Muslims considered the defense of the Muslims lands as a religious obligation. Thus, according to this logic, one could not force non-Muslims to perform an Islamic obligation. For these reasons, the Dhimmis did not serve in the military and they were denied political participation. In regards to modern democratic standards of citizenship, this could create an enormous crisis of political participation in regards to religious minorities in Egypt if the Brothers were to follow the same principles, and the Brotherhood is silent about what would happen to the religious minorities under their rule.

Similar concerns, as discussed above, also occupy the minds of the secularists in Turkey. As the Turkish secularists often define secularism as a “way of life,” they are highly concerned about the possibility that the Islamists would interfere with their secular way of life by introducing restrictions on alcohol consumption or banning it altogether, and discriminating against the secularists. The Islamists respond to such criticisms by arguing

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Islam recognizes Jews' and Christians' (The People of the Book) freedom of religious practice, thus they cannot be forced to convert to Islam; and the People of the Book have their own legal system separately exists and applied by them under the Shari'a. Muslims believe that forcing people to convert would create hypocrisy, and they often recite verses from the Qur'an like: "...there is no compulsion in religion" or "your religion is to you, and my religion is to me."

available at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_factsheets/cty_fs_EGY.html

352 Islam recognizes Jews' and Christians' (The People of the Book) freedom of religious practice, thus they cannot be forced to convert to Islam; and the People of the Book have their own legal system separately exists and applied by them under the Shari'a. Muslims believe that forcing people to convert would create hypocrisy, and they often recite verses from the Qur'an like: "...there is no compulsion in religion" or "your religion is to you, and my religion is to me."
that the AKP had been in power since 2002, and they have not done anything to interfere with the secular way of life.

Recently, Alevis\textsuperscript{353} have intensified their criticism of the AKP. Indeed, being largely an unorthodox secular group, Alevis have always been critical of the Turkish government’s policies in regards to religion. For example, since the beginning of the Turkish republic, the government has been building Sunni mosques in Alevi villages and towns. Over the years, this official practice has raised intense criticisms from the Alevis. Alevis do not pray in the mosques as they have their own places of worship known as \textit{cemevis} (in Turkish \textit{cemevi} literally means house of gathering). They don’t fast in the month of Ramadan since they fast only for ten days in the month of Muharrem for commemoration of Kerbela victims.\textsuperscript{354} Alevis believe that the government’s policy of building mosques in Alevi villages and towns is a deliberate policy of converting Alevis into Sunnis (\textit{Sünnileştirme}, literally Sunni-zation). As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, Alevis also criticize the Turkish government and the DIB because through the DIB the government pays the salaries of prayer leaders in mosques; however there is no such policy designed for the Alevi clergy. The Alevi \textit{cemevis} are maintained completely by the Alevi citizens, and the Alevis are not represented in the DIB.\textsuperscript{355}

\textsuperscript{353} The Alevis are an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, however there are significant differences between the Shi’a and the Turkish Alevis. Turkish Alevis have their own religious hierarchy (actually there is not one single Alevi authority representing the Alevis, there are several) which has no association with the Iranian Shi’a, or any other Shi’a religious hierarchy. The Turkish Alevi belief system depends upon an oral tradition that has passed over the generations. Alevis are known to be more secular than the rest of the population and they predominantly vote for the leftist Republican People’s Party. The Alevis’ criticism of the DIB was provided in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{354} In Kerbela (Karbala), members of Ali’s (the fourth caliph after Muhammed) family including Ali’s son Imam Hüseyin, Hüseyin’s son and cousins were massacred in 680 by Caliph Yezid I’s forces (Yezid I is Muaviye’s son, Muaviye fought against Hüseyin’s father Ali in Siffin in 657). The day of the massacre was the tenth of the month of Muharrem.

\textsuperscript{355} However, this seems to be a complicated debate because some Alevis claim that if Alevis are represented in the DIB and the government appoints religious leaders for \textit{cemevis}, then the Alevi community will lose its autonomy. In short, Alevis claim that the AKP has a secret agenda to dominate and transform the Alevi community in Turkey.
What Can Possibly Happen?

The tension between the Islamists and the secularist establishments in both countries are far from over. Given the direction of the current events in both countries, it appears that the conflict between the two sides is going to be around in the following years. Both sides have their own opposing scenarios: the optimistic and the pessimistic.

According to the optimistic scenario by the Islamists, through piecemeal achievements by conducting the Gramscian war of position, they will be able to achieve more power and gradually transform their societies into Islamic societies. The pessimistic scenario of the Islamists is that they fail in the social and political sense either because they give up their Islamic goals due to laxity or because they are crushed by a violent secularist takeover.

The secularists’ optimistic scenario is that they will either maintain the status-quo or be able to reverse the Islamist achievements over time. Their pessimistic scenario is that the Islamists will become so powerful that they will not be able to maintain their struggle against the Islamists and eventually the Islamists will win.

The current course of events provides us some hints regarding the possibilities for the future. In both countries, the secularist establishment, being prompted by the Islamists’ recent political gains, has moved on to reverse them. Indeed, in both countries, the secularists appear to be heavily relying on the legislative process to reverse the Islamist’s recent gains. For instance, Mubarak’s regime has tightened its grip on the Islamists by legislating harsher laws on the Islamists, and the Turkish secularist establishment has challenged the AKP through the Turkish Constitutional Court which is known to be highly secularist. As a response, the Turkish and Egyptian Islamists have come up with an emphasis democratic values and principles as they believe that democratic venues would provide more openings for them in the political processes in the upcoming years.
APPENDIX A

Turkish National Security Council Decisions
February 28, 1997
(28 Şubat MGK Kararları)

1. There shall be no compromise to the anti-regime activities that target the Turkish Republic, which is a democratic, secular, social, and law-based state. The Revolution Laws defended by the article 174 of the Constitution should be implemented without a compromise. It is the government’s duty to make its policies compatible with the Revolution Laws.

2. The public attorneys should act against violation of the Revolution Laws. The tarikat lodges that violate the Revolution Laws should be closed.

3. It is observed that wearing "sank" (turban) and cloak is encouraged. Those whose dresses contradict the Revolution Laws should not be honored.

4. The abolishment of the article 163 of the Constitution created a legal vacuum and that resulted in the strengthening of Islamic reactionary movements and anti-secular attitudes. There should be new legal regulations to fill this vacuum.

5. The education policies should again be compatible with the spirit of the Law on the Unification of Education.

6. Obligatory education should increase to 8 years.

7. The Imam-Hatip schools were open to satisfy a societal need [of imams]. The Imam-Hatip schools which are beyond this need should be converted to vocational schools. Additionally, the Qur'an courses controlled by fundamentalist groups should be closed and their schools should be regulated by the Ministry of Education.

8. There is an ongoing fundamentalist infiltration into the state bureaucracy and municipalities, the government should stop this infiltration.

9. All actions, which aim to abuse religious issues (such as mosque construction) for political purposes should be ended.

10. The pump rifles should be taken under control and, if it is necessary’, the sales of the pump rifles should be banned.

11. Iran’s attempts that aim to destabilize the regime in Turkey should be closely watched. There should be policies to prevent Iran to intervene Turkey’s domestic affairs.

12. The regulations, which maintain effective working of the judiciary, guarantee judicial independence, and protect it from the activities of the government, should immediately be created.

13. Recently, there is a huge increase of provocations that target the members of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). These provocations have resulted in discontent in the TAF.
14- The officers and petty officers who were expelled from the TAF because of their involvement in Islamic reactionary activities have been hired by the municipalities. That should be prevented.

15- The speeches and behaviors of parties’ mayors, regional chairmen, and town chairmen should be accountable by the Law on Political Parties.

16- The tarikats’ economic strengthening through their finance institutions and foundations should be carefully monitored.

17- The messages transmitted by the TV channels and particularly the radio stations, which have anti-secular attitudes, should be carefully monitored and these broadcastings should adapt to the Constitution.

18- The illegal money transfers of the National Outlook Foundation to some municipalities should be stopped.

Source: Milliyet, April 27, 1997
APPENDIX B

Selected Sermons

31.01.2003 - MILLİ VE DİNİ DEĞERLERİMİZ

Aziz Müslümanlar!


Değerli Mü’münler!


Aziz Cemaat!

Uğutmayalım ki, bizi ayakta tutan, milli ve manevi değerlerimizdir. Dün olduğu gibi bugün de, birlik ve beraberliğimizi bozmayan, kutsal değerlerimi zâtmaça çalışanlar bulunabilir. Bunlar, kendi sınısi emellerine ulaşamak için her şeyi mubah görür, her kilğa bürünür, hatta bu amaçla dini bile kullanabilirler. Son günlerde bazı yörenlerde, İncil’i tanıttı, insan severlik ve dünya barışını sağlamak gibi maskeler altında bazı bölücü propagandalar ortaya çıktığı çeşitli haber kaynaklarından öğrenilekteir. Bunlar, “Dünya barışını sağlama, insanlık âleminin birliği, gerçek araştırmalı, din birliği gidilmesi, peygamberlerle ilahîk sıfatının bulunduğu, dünyanın

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son bulmayacaği, kıyametin kopmayacağı, cennet ve cehennemin birer sembol olduğu ve namazın
da sabah, öğle ve akşam vakitlerinde kalben Allah’i anmaktan ibaret bulunduğu...” gibi baltul ve
hayali iddialarla, aziz milletimizin nezih inancını bulundurmaya ve böylece birliğini bozmaya
uğramaktadırlar.

Bunlar, sağduyu sahibi milletimizin sağlam ve sarsılmaz inanç karşısında elbette tükenecelerdir.
Çünkü Müslüman milletimiz, kesin olarak bilmektedir ki, son ilahi kitap Kur’an-ı Kerim, son
Peygamber de Hz. Muhammed (s.a.v.’)’dir. Kur’an-ı Kerim’de Cenab-ı Hak mea’len, “İşte bu, benim
dosdoğru yolum. Artık ona uyun. Başka yollara uymayın. Yoksə o yollar, sizi parça parça edip,
doğru yoldan ayırır. İşte bunları, sakınmazsınız diye Allah size emredir”[5] buyurarak, Kur’an’ın
çizdiği dosdoğru yolu göstermiş ve bu yoldan sapmanın, parçalanarak haktan sapmak olduğunu
bildirmiştir.

[1] Âl-i İmran, 3/103
[2] Enfal, 8/46
[4] Bakara, 2/204-206

Source: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/hutbe.asp?h_id=54 at:
29.08.2003 - VATAN, MILLET, DEVLET... İLELEBET

Muhterem Müslümanlar!

Ağustos ayt, şanlı tarihimizde zaferler ayt olarak bilinir. Bu hafta Malazgirt Zaferi’nin 932’nci; Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi’nin 81’nçi yıldönümünü kutluyoruz. Hepimize kutlu olsun...

Aziz Kardeşlerim!

Bu mubahere vatanda, asrır boylu yan yana, gönl gönlü beraber yaşayoruz... bundan sonra da; kardeşçe, hep birlikte yaşamaya devam edeceğiz. Yüzyılarda beraber ağlayan beraber guildüğümüz bu aziz vatanda, her şey bizim istediğimiz şekilde olmamalıdır. İçinde bulunduğumuz şartların gereği, maddi ve manevi sıkıntılar zuhur edebilir. Elbette bütün bu sıkıntılar geçicidir. Milletimiz geçmiş ve geleceğini ile bu cennet vatanda daimi ve ebedidir.


Bundan 81 yıl önce vatanımızın bağımsızlığını, milletimizin hürriyetine kasteden düşmanlara karşı milletimiz Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK’ün önderliğinde ayyıldızı bayrağını, canımızdan aziz biliğimiz vatanımızı koruyarak düşmanların yurdumuzdan kovmuş, özgürülüğümüzü ve bağımsızlığını yenden yeniden tesis etmiştir.

Değerli Mü’minerler!

Üzerinde yaşadığımız bu aziz vatan, sadece mutlu günlerimizin ve müreffeh zamanlarımızın toprağı değildir! O; ak günlerimizin olduğu kadar, kara günlerimizin de vatandır... Biz, sadece bu ülkenin nimetinden faydalanmak için değil; aynı zamanda külvetini çekmek, hatta uğrunda canımızı feda etmek için de yaşayoruz. Çünkü bu ülkesin, sadece gündüzleri değil; geceleri de bizimdir!... Biz; şehitlerimizle beraber yaşayan bir milletiz!... Birimiz hepimiz; hepiniz birimiz için!.. Ben, sen, o yok; sadece biz varız...! Zira bizler, Peygamber efendimizin: "Allah’ın yardımı, topluluk üzerinde." hadisinin şurur ve bilincindeyiz.

Yüce Allah’ımız ve Sevgili Peygamberimiz, bizi birlik ve beraberliğe çağırıyor... Düşmanlar ise; sürekli bizi bolup parçalamak için uğraşıyor!... Sakın olaki düşmanlara aklanmamalı! Bizden��nuşerik üzerinde suzan bozguna ve kıkırtıcılardan tahriklerine kapılmamalı! Huzur ve güven ortamının bozulmasına fırsat vermeyelim.

Millet ve devletin üstünlüğü; maddi gücü, birlik ve beraberliği, vatan ve millet büttünüğü nispetinde artar veya azalır. Bizler, tarihin en parlak medeniyetini; çalışma azınızı, adaleti, insan ve millet
sevgisini, önce ülkemizin hudutları; sonra da kainatın boyutları kadar büyüttüğümüz zaman kurmuş olacağız..!

Rabbim, milletimizi; ülkemizi her türlü tehlikeden korusun.

Milletimizi; ikinci bir Kurtuluş Savaşı vermekten muhafaza buyursun.

Bu vesileyle, toprağın kara bağına düşen bütün şehitlerimizi rahmetle amyor, kahraman gazilerimizi minnetle yadediyoruz.

Muhterem Cemaat!


Her zaman olduğu gibi bu asıl millet, istiklal ve hürriyetini, vatan ve mukaddesatını korumak için; Gazi Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK önderliğinde şahlanarak, her türlü yokluga ve olumsuzluga rağmen, büyük bir istiklal mücadelesi vererek, namusu saydığı vatanın, düşman işgâlinden kurtarmıştır. Asırlardan beri hakim olduğu Anadolu topraklarında, milli egemenliğini ayırt etmiş, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti adıyla yeni bir devlet kurmuş ve 29 Ekim 1923 tarihinde de bunu, bütün dünyaya ilan etmiştir.

Değerli Müslümlar!

80. yıl dönümünü idrak etme mutluluğunu yaşadığımız, Cumhuriyet, çoğunluk sisteminin ve milli iradeyi temsil etme esasına dayanan, yaratılıştan insanlarda var olan çeşitli kabiliyetlerini ortaya koyabilmelerine, düşüncede ve inançları serbestçe ifade edip yaşamalarına inkâr veren, iştiresiye dayalı bir idare şeklidir.

İslam dini, iştiresiye büyük önem verir. Yüce Allah, bu konuda Hz. Peygamber (s.a.v.)’e ve bize, şöyle emreder: “İş konusunda onlarla müsavere et. Bir kere de karar verip azmettin artık Allah’a tevekkül et, (Ona dayamp güven). Şüphesiz Allah tevekkül edenleri sever”[1].


Aziz Müslümanlar!

Cumhuriyeti kuran milli irade, insanların dini inanç ve yaşamalarında serbest bırakılmasını, dünyevi işlerde ise, vatan ve milletin yararına yönlendirilmesini ve düzenlenmesini amaçlamıştır.

Bize düşen görev, cumhuriyet ruhunu gayesinden saptırmadan, devletimizi iyakatlı ellerde yükseltmek, yücelmek ve bu mukaddes emaneti bizden sonraki nesillere, en iyi şekilde devretmek olmalıdır.

[1] Al-i İmran, 3/159
Muhterem Müslümanlar!


Aziz Mü'minler!

Özürlü kardeşlerinizizin yaşadığınız zorluklar sadece kendileriyle sınırlı değildir. Bu durum, anne, baba ve kardeşi başta olmak üzere, bütün yakınlarını etkilemektedir, onları üzüntü ve stres içinde yaşamaya mahkum etmektedir. İnsanın olduğu her yerde hastalık, derin, sıkıntı ve musibetlerin bulunduğuna da rastlanır. Belki de kişinin sabır ve tahammülierenin bir testi olabilmesi, bununla mücadele etme gereksinimi, uzun ve stresli yaşamaya mahkum etmektedir. İnansız ve biliriz ki, hastalık ceza değildir. İnsanın olduğu her yerde hastalıktır, derin, sıkıntı ve zahmetli günlerimiz de olacaktr.

Yüce Allah;

“Andolsun ki sizi biraz korku ve ahlaka; bir de mallar, canlar ve ürünlerden eksilerek deneriz.”2“Ey Peygamber! Sabredenleri müjdele.”3 buyurmuş; Peygamberimiz (s.a.v) de bu hususu:

“Mü'mine isabet eden her yorgunluk, hastalık, üzüntü, sıkıntı ve hatta ayağını batıp rahatsız eden diken bile eğer Allah yolunda keffaret olur.”4

Değerli Mü'minler!


Engellileri topluma kazandırmının üç basamağı bulunmaktadır: Birincisi, ağır bir stres ve yük altında bulunan ailelerin sıkıntılarını hafifletmesi. İkincisi, engellinin de yaşam hakkının olduğu, ayrıca diğer sosyal öneme de yaraları ve gerektiğinde gerekli bilincin geliştirilmesi. Üçüncü şekli, engellilerin yetenek ve becerilerinin geliştirilmesi, toplumsal ülkelerde katkıda bulunmalarının sağlanmasını. Özürlüleri bu talihsizlik kabul ederek bu insanların topluma dişi bırakmak yerine, onlara da bakmak, eğitip ve düzenine bir hayat hakları olduğu unutulmayarak onlara gerekli hizmet vermek gerekir. Bu bilincin, toplumun her kesimince benimsemesi ve desteklenmesi çok önemlidir.

Engelliler konusunda aile ve okul başta olmak üzere, bütün kurumlar kendi içinde düşen görev ve sorumluluğu yerine getirmelidirler. Bu amaçla kurulan vakif, dernek, eğitim, sağlık ve rehabilitasyon merkezlerine maddi manevi açıdan ve özellikle aracı ve gerçek yönünden yardımcı olmak, dini ve

1- Buhari Rıka; Tirmızı Zühd 1, (2301)
2- Tirmızı, Davât, 105, 128; İbn-i Mace Dua 5; Buhari Cihat, 112, 156; Müslüman Cihad 20
3- Bakara, 155.
4- Müslüman Bîr H. No: 2573
5- Buhari Edeb, 27

APPENDIX C

Principles of Dava

Man of Service

Man of service must for the sake of the cause he has given his heart to be resolved to cross over seas of filth. When he has attained his object he must be so mature that he will attribute everything to its Rightful Owner and be respectful and thankful to Him. His voice and each breath are spent in the glorification and magnifying of God the Sublime Creator. He holds everyone in high regard and esteem. He is so balanced and faithful to God's will that he will not turn into idols those whom he praises for their services. He knows himself first of all to be responsible and answerable for work left undone. He has to be considerate and fair-minded to everyone who comes to his aid and support the truth. He is extraordinarily resolved and hopeful even when his institutions have been destroyed his plans upset and his forces put to rout. He is moderate and tolerant when he has taken wing anew and soared to the summits. So rational and sagacious that he admits in advance that this path is very steep. So zealous persevering and confident that he can pass through all the pits of hell that he may encounter on his way. So faithful to the cause to which he has devoted his life that deeply in love with it he can sacrifice his life and all that he loves for its sake. So sincere and humble that he will never bring to mind all that he has accomplished.

Source: http://en.fgulen.com/content/view/2548/41/

People of Service

People of service must resolve, for the sake of the cause to which they have given their heart, to cross over seas of "pus and blood." When they attain the desired object, they must be mature enough to attribute everything to its Rightful Owner, and be respectful and thankful to Him. Their voices and breaths glorify and magnify God, the Sublime Creator. Such people hold everyone in high regard and esteem, and are so balanced and faithful to God's Will that they do not idolize those whom they praise for their services. First of all, they understand that they are responsible and answerable for work left undone, must be considerate and fair-minded to everyone who seeks their help, and must work to support the truth. They are extraordinarily resolved and hopeful even when their institutions are destroyed, their plans upset, and their forces routed. People of service are moderate and tolerant when they take new wings and once again soar to the summits, and so rational and wise that they admit in advance that the path is very steep. So zealous, persevering, and confident are they that they willingly pass through all the pits of hell encountered on the way. Such people are so faithful to the cause to which they have devoted themselves that, deeply in love with it, they willingly sacrifice their lives and whatever they love for its sake. So sincere and humble are such people that they never remind others of their accomplishments.

Source: http://en.fgulen.com/content/view/1105/41/
Appendix D

Tables

Table 3.1—Rural v. Urban Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20,947,188</td>
<td>15,702,851</td>
<td>5,244,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27,754,820</td>
<td>18,895,089</td>
<td>8,859,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35,605,176</td>
<td>21,914,075</td>
<td>13,691,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44,736,957</td>
<td>25,091,950</td>
<td>19,645,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56,473,035</td>
<td>23,146,684</td>
<td>33,326,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67,803,927</td>
<td>23,797,653</td>
<td>44,006,274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Table 3.2—The Percentage of the National Budget Reserved for the DIB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 1.01</td>
<td>% 0.92</td>
<td>% 0.84</td>
<td>% 0.92</td>
<td>% 0.83</td>
<td>% 0.76</td>
<td>% 0.74</td>
<td>% 0.34</td>
<td>% 0.36</td>
<td>% 0.36</td>
<td>% 0.33</td>
<td>% 0.31</td>
<td>% 0.29</td>
<td>% 0.26</td>
<td>% 0.24</td>
<td>% 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-</td>
<td>% 0.25</td>
<td>% 0.23</td>
<td>% 0.22</td>
<td>% 0.19</td>
<td>% 0.16</td>
<td>% 0.18</td>
<td>% 0.15</td>
<td>% 0.24</td>
<td>% 0.23</td>
<td>% 0.23</td>
<td>% 0.20</td>
<td>% 0.61</td>
<td>% 0.67</td>
<td>% 0.69</td>
<td>% 0.68</td>
<td>% 0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-</td>
<td>% 0.89</td>
<td>% 0.85</td>
<td>% 0.55</td>
<td>% 0.15</td>
<td>% 0.85</td>
<td>% 0.76</td>
<td>% 0.76</td>
<td>% 0.21</td>
<td>% 0.90</td>
<td>% 1.15</td>
<td>% 1.89</td>
<td>% 1.78</td>
<td>% 0.85</td>
<td>% 0.76</td>
<td>% 0.72</td>
<td>% 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-</td>
<td>% 0.94</td>
<td>% 0.85</td>
<td>% 0.92</td>
<td>% 0.83</td>
<td>% 0.81</td>
<td>% 0.66</td>
<td>% 0.58</td>
<td>% 0.77</td>
<td>% 0.85</td>
<td>% 0.69</td>
<td>% 0.69</td>
<td>% 0.69</td>
<td>% 0.60</td>
<td>% 0.63</td>
<td>% 0.65</td>
<td>% 0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-</td>
<td>% 0.62</td>
<td>% 0.71</td>
<td>% 1.23</td>
<td>% 1.16</td>
<td>% 1.1</td>
<td>% 1.1</td>
<td>% 1.0</td>
<td>% 1.0</td>
<td>% 0.9</td>
<td>% 0.8</td>
<td>% 0.7</td>
<td>% 0.6</td>
<td>% 0.6</td>
<td>% 0.7</td>
<td>% 0.6</td>
<td>% 0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3-Number of Mosques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Mosques</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Mosques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>42744</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>68675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>45152</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>69523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>47645</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>54667</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>71293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>57060</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>59460</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>73772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>61532</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>74356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>62947</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>64675</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>75369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>66000</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>75941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>66674</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>76445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>68202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: DİB, APK İstatistikleri

Table 3.4-Number of the DİB Personnel Between 1970-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25 236</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>75 090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30 970</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>74 772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>43 197</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>75 043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>44 369</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>76 087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>46 665</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>81 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>49 784</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>79 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>22 380</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>77 795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>61 929</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75 433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>65 361</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>76 037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>70 099</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>74 368</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>74 930</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>74 789</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>74 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>76 232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: DİB, APK İstatistikleri
### Table 3.5-Directors of the DIB Since the Establishment of the Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Rifat Börekçi</td>
<td>04.04.1924</td>
<td>03.05.1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şerafettin Yaltkaya</td>
<td>01.14.1942</td>
<td>04.23.1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Hamdi Akseki</td>
<td>04.29.1947</td>
<td>01.09.1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyüp Sabri Hayırloğlu</td>
<td>04.12.1951</td>
<td>06.10.1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen</td>
<td>06.29.1960</td>
<td>04.06.1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Hüsnü Erdem</td>
<td>04.06.1961</td>
<td>10.13.1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Tevfik Gerçeker</td>
<td>10.15.1964</td>
<td>12.16.1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İbrahim Bedrettin Elmalı</td>
<td>12.17.1965</td>
<td>10.25.1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Riza Haksess</td>
<td>10.25.1966</td>
<td>01.15.1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lütfü Doğan (By Proxy)</td>
<td>01.15.1968</td>
<td>08.25.1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Ateş</td>
<td>07.28.1976</td>
<td>02.07.1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayyar Altıkulaç</td>
<td>02.09.1978</td>
<td>11.10.1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Said Yalanci</td>
<td>06.17.1987</td>
<td>01.02.1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz</td>
<td>01.02.1992</td>
<td>03.18.2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Bardakoğlu</td>
<td>05.31.2003</td>
<td>Currently Presiding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.6-Number of Qur'anic Seminaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Qur'anic Seminaries</th>
<th>Number Closed Down</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Qur'anic Seminaries</th>
<th>Number Closed Down</th>
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<td>3047</td>
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<td>5011</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>4058</td>
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<td>3498</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>3119</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>4715</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>4557</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3811</td>
<td>3124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIB APK Statistics
APPENDIX D

The Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

1- Founder & First Leader: Hassan Al-Banna
2- Second Leader: Hasan Al-Hudaibi
3- Third Leader: Omar Al-Tilmisani
4- Fourth Leader: Muhammed Hamed Abu Al-Nasr
5- Fifth Leader: Mustafa Mashour
6- Sixth Leader: Mamoun Al-Hudaibi
7- Seventh and Current Leader: Muhammed Mahdi Akef
## APPENDIX E

The Sheikhs of Al-Azhar

(from: [http://www.sunnah.org/history/Scholars/mashaykh_azhar.htm](http://www.sunnah.org/history/Scholars/mashaykh_azhar.htm))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Sheikh Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>[?? ??] - 1690</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Kharashi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1690 - 1694</td>
<td>Shaykh Ibrahim al-Baramawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1694 - 1708</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Nasharti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1708 - 1711</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Baqi al-Qillini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1711 - 1720</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad Shannan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>1720 - 1724</td>
<td>Shaykh Ibrahim al-Fayyumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1724 - 1757</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd-Allah al-Shabravi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>1757 - 1767</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Hifni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1767 - 1768</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sijjini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1768 - 1776</td>
<td>Shaykh Ahmad al-Damanhuri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>1778 - 1793</td>
<td>Shaykh Ahmad al-Arousi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>1793 - 1812</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd-Allah al-Sharqawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>1812 - 1818</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Shanawani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>1818 - 1829</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Arousi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>1829 - 1830</td>
<td>Shaykh Ahmad al-Damhugi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>1830 - 1834</td>
<td>Shaykh Hassan al-Attar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>1834 - 1838</td>
<td>Shaykh Hassan al-Quwaisni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>1838 - 1847</td>
<td>Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Jawwad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>1847 - 1860</td>
<td>Shaykh Ibrahim al-Bayguri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>1864 - 1870</td>
<td>Shaykh Mustafa al-Arousi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>1870 - 1882</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Abbasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>1882 - 1882</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Inbabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>1882 - 1886</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Abbasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>1886 - 1895</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Inbabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>1896 - 1900</td>
<td>Shaykh Hassouna al-Nawawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>1900 - 1900</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Nawawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>1900 - 1904</td>
<td>Shaykh Selim al-Bishri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>1904 - 1905</td>
<td>Shaykh Ali al-Biblawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>1905 - 1909</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Shirbini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>1909 - 1909</td>
<td>Shaykh Hassouna al-Nawawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>1909 - 1916</td>
<td>Shaykh Selim al-Bishri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>1916 - 1927</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Gizawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>1928 - 1929</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>1929 - 1935</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Ahmedi al-Zawahri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>1935 - 1945</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>1945 - 1947</td>
<td>Shaykh Mustafa Abd al-Raziq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>1948 - 1950</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad Ma'moon al-Shinnawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>1950 - 1951</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Majid Selim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>1951 - 1952</td>
<td>Shaykh Ibrahim Hamrush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>1952 - 1952</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Majid Selim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>1952 - 1954</td>
<td>Shaykh Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>1954 - 1958</td>
<td>Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Taj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>1958 - 1963</td>
<td>Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
44. [1963 - 1969] Shaykh Hassan Ma'moon
47. [1979 - 1982] Shaykh Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Bisar
49. [1996 - Currently] Shaykh Muhammad Sayid Tantawi
APPENDIX F

Tables

Table 7.1-The differences between the top-down violent Islamists and the bottom-up non-violent Islamists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Issues</th>
<th>Top-down violent Islamists</th>
<th>Bottom-up non-violent Islamists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Achieving political power</td>
<td>Through violent revolution; they do not value political activism for achieving political power.</td>
<td>Through parliamentary elections and political activism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Transformation of society</td>
<td>Top-down; after achieving political power, first thing to be done is the Islamization of society through force.</td>
<td>Bottom-up; transformation (Islamization) of society has to happen to have an Islamic rule. Islamization of society has to happen from within.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Application of the Shari’a</td>
<td>It is indispensable; a Muslims cannot be a true Muslims unless they live under the Shari’a.</td>
<td>It is the ultimate goal; however Islam can be fully practiced under any type of political system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Popular Sovereignty</td>
<td>Completely reject popular sovereignty as it is the complete opposite of sovereignty of Allah.</td>
<td>Cautiously accept popular sovereignty; however does not completely reject sovereignty of Allah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- End Justifies the Means?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-The nature of holy struggle</td>
<td>All societies today are jahili societies, therefore violence against secular Muslims and Muslims who do not accept the sovereignty of Allah is justifiable in Islamic terms. Violent destruction of jahili societies is the only way towards the Shari’a. Define jihad narrowly only in terms of material conflict.</td>
<td>The best way to approach people would be through enlightening and winning their minds and hearts. To establish the Shari’a, violence is not justifiable in Islamic terms. Social and political activism is the only way towards the Shari’a. Define jihad as it is described by Prophet Muhammad in one of his sayings both as at the social and personal level in a larger context.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.2-Examples of the two types of Islamists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Bottom-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Al-Jihad</td>
<td>Non-existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Al-Takfir wal Hijra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• IBDA-C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Turkish Hizbullah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent</td>
<td>Governments that implement the Shari’a like:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iran (Shi’a)</td>
<td>The Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• S. Arabia(Sunni)</td>
<td>The MGH (Milli Görüş Hareketi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pakistan under Gen. Zia ul-Haq</td>
<td>The Nationalist View Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Groups that follow Said-i Nursi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>including Fethullah Gülen Movement and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yeni Asya Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Tabligh Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Characteristic</td>
<td>Traditionalist Islamists</td>
<td>Modernist Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1-Belief in the basics of Islam</strong></td>
<td>All three believe in the basics of Islam such as <em>tawhid</em>; the attributes of Allah such as the omnipotence, omnipresence, justice, and infinite mercy of Allah; prophethood of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet among other prophets of Allah starting from Adam and including Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus; the Qur'an as the last of Allah’s holy books along with the Torah and the Bible; the angels Gabriel being the archangel; and the day of judgment.</td>
<td>Practicing; devout to very devout; eclectic, and not rigid or puritanical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2-Degree of Devoutness</strong></td>
<td>Practicing; extremely devout; relatively dogmatic and orthodox, but tolerant of <em>folk Islam</em>.</td>
<td>Practicing, devout to very devout; eclectic, and not rigid or puritanical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3-Influence of non-Islamic ideas</strong></td>
<td>Almost none, often reject non-Islamic (e.g., Western) ideas and practices.</td>
<td>Significantly influenced by non-Islamic (especially Western) ideas and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4- Clerical Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>Virtually all are from the ranks of the ulema.</td>
<td>Some from the ulema, the majority are non-clerics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5- Normative Periods</strong></td>
<td>A. Look nostalgically to both classical and medieval periods of Islam for inspiration. B. Consider Islam’s immutability and perfection to transcend time and space.</td>
<td>A. Look to classical period of Islam as well as to the Western capitalist and socialist worlds for inspiration and ideas. B. Place all adopted popular and beneficial non-Islamic concepts, practices and institutions within Islamic framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6-Tradition vs. Change (Taqlid vs. Ijtihad)</strong></td>
<td>Adhere to <em>taqlid</em>, support <em>folk Islam</em>; opposed to <em>ijtihad</em> (except for some Shi’a sects).</td>
<td>Strongly against <em>taqlid</em>; actively advocate <em>ijtihad</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7- Secularization</strong></td>
<td>Opposed to secularization. However, the majority do little to reverse secularization processes.</td>
<td>Opposed to secularization in principle, but conveniently tolerate secularization with either benign neglect or as a necessary evil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8- Islamic State</strong></td>
<td>Advocate an Islamic state, though its character differs significantly in each case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Nature of the State</td>
<td>Prefer one with traditional theocratic manifestations.</td>
<td>Prefer one with liberal democratic manifestations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Constitution and Laws</td>
<td>Would like to implement a constitution that is Islamic in both letter and spirit. The Islamic state should be governed by the shari’a.</td>
<td>Would like to implement a constitution consonant with the letter and especially the spirit of Islam. Believe in revision of the shari’a to cope with contemporary problems and would not remove many secular laws already implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Basis of Sovereignty</td>
<td>Sovereignty primarily rests with Allah. Believe all Muslims should reject sovereignty of humanity. With a few exceptions, have come to accept parliamentary democracy in the modern period implying that they do give importance to popular sovereignty.</td>
<td>Believe in Allah’s sovereignty, but next in popular sovereignty. The latter is manifested in a form of parliamentary democracy legitimized as essentially Islamic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Degree of Fatalism</td>
<td>Vary in their fatalism believing in such notions as kismet, taqdir (fate), predestination and preordination.</td>
<td>Moderately to very fatalistic, though extremely dynamic reformers of Islam and Muslim societies. Desire to promote the spirit of Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Degree of Activism</td>
<td>Very fatalistic, often passive, apolitical, contemplative, and mystical scholars of traditional Islamic doctrine and practice. However, do get involved in politics if and when they perceive that Islam is threatened by non-Muslims or “wayward” Muslims.</td>
<td>Often relatively cosmopolitan, broad-minded and highly principled pragmatists. Exponents of a united</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Major Foreign Policy Orientations</td>
<td>Often extremely insular and parochial, exponents of a united Muslim world or an Islamic bloc. Believe</td>
<td>Often extremely insular and parochial, exponents of a united</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15-Common Stereotypes</th>
<th>16- Prominent Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Critics: Fundamentalists; fanatics; militarists; religious zealots; puritans; iconoclasts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Islamic bloc. Hardly preoccupied with the dichotomy of *dar al Islam* and *dar al harb*. versus *dar al harb* (Adobe of the war) dichotomy of the world. End up with a Us-Them, Good-Evil distinction.
APPENDIX G

HSIRB Approval Letter

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

Date: June 18, 2007

To: Kevin Corder, Principal Investigator
    Alper Dede, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D., Chair

Re: HSIRB Project Number: 07-05-24

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Islam, State Control of Religion and Social Identity: Turkey and Egypt" has been approved under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as described in the application.

Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In addition, if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.

The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

Approval Termination: June 18, 2008
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