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Assassination in Modern America: Political Participation through a Gun Barrel?

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ASSASSINATION IN MODERN AMERICA:
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
THROUGH A GUN BARREL?

by

Richard Grossenbacher

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ASSASSINATION IN MODERN AMERICA:
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
THROUGH A GUN BARREL?

Richard Grossenbacher, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1993

Assassination has been a constant companion of the world’s societies from the beginning of recorded history. Only relatively recently have social scientists begun empirical study of these acts in an effort to reveal any commonalties and possible predictive traits. Investigation of the assassination phenomenon assumed a special urgency in America as violence seemed to escalate in the 1960s, which resulted in some notable research.

The present research collected data of presidential and non-presidential assassinations and attempts that occurred from 1969 through 1992 and compared the findings with the results of earlier studies.

The data indicate that presidential assaults increased in frequency from 1969 through 1992 and that those attacks continued to be perpetrated by individuals seeking to solve their respective problems via symbolic use of the presidency. The data further reveal that non-presidential assassination differed in several respects from presidential events and was remarkably more lethal.
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I owe special thanks to my wife, Pam, for bearing with me in this effort and giving me her loving support and encouragement.

I dedicate this thesis to my colleagues, the agents of the United States Secret Service.

Richard Grossenbacher
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Assassination in modern America: Political participation through a gun barrel?

Grossenbacher, Richard, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1993
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Prologue

In mid-August 1992, the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana caused President George Bush to cancel several scheduled campaign stops in order to address the crises. It had been announced that the President was to visit Denver, Colorado, but that event became included in the postponements.

So, on September 15, after reshuffling the schedule, President Bush's trip to the Denver area took place. The Secret Service advance work had been done and an outdoor rally site was secured at Inverness Business Park in the suburb of Englewood. The visit occurred that day without apparent incident. There was nothing to indicate the ominous plan of one who sought to attend the rally.

Deborah Butler, a thirty-three year old legal secretary from the Denver suburb of Arvada, admitted herself to a local psychiatric hospital following the President's visit. There she announced that she "had just tried to shoot the President of the United States." The FBI and Secret Service were immediately notified by hospital authorities.
On September 21, 1992, Butler was arrested and charged with the federal crimes of attempting to assassinate the president and threatening the life of the president.

The depth of her plot was discovered from interviews by agents of the Secret Service and FBI and later a search of Butler's car. She told agents that she had gone to the location where the President was to speak at about 8:00 a.m. She intended to gain close proximity to the President, but was deterred by the presence of metal detectors at entry points. Butler chose instead to wait on a hillside overlooking the motorcade entrance to the park. She had a .32 caliber revolver concealed in the waistband of her slacks. While she waited, a deputy sheriff searched her backpack during a routine "sweep" of the area. The gun was not detected.

Deborah Butler told the agents that she had purchased the gun about two weeks prior and had practiced on a local range with ammunition purchased with the gun.

She further revealed to the agents that as she approached the street to await the passing motorcade, another spectator engaged her in conversation. That brief conversation reportedly diverted her attention long enough for the motorcade to pass without incident. She then drove home, where her husband found her sitting in her car. After she disclosed her activities to her husband, he drove her to the psychiatric hospital, where she gained admission.
She explained to the interviewing agents that she stalked the President in order to assassinate him and draw attention to her problems related to her marriage and job stress.

Entries into Deborah Butler's diary, found in her car, are equally revealing. Butler referred to Sara Jane Moore (attempted assassin of President Ford) as "the first feminine role model in my 33 years of living, and she's doing life without parole for presidential plinking." On August 18, in reference to the President's cancelled visit to Denver, she noted, "So close! I was so close for 24 hours! ... I guess I'll just have to wait a few weeks longer." On September 15, the day of the President's visit, she wrote, "It's Tuesday, 7:45am, and I'm as ready as I'll ever be. Please don't let me hurt anyone. Somebody please help me. I don't want to handle it on my own any more - I'm sorry."

Deborah Butler subsequently pleaded guilty to threatening the life of the president. In January 1993, she was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to undergo psychiatric treatment. The sentencing judge ruled that at the time of the offense she suffered from reduced mental capacity.

This story is for you who are tempted to look back to the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1981 and the relatively long interval since, and wishfully think that the cycle of American presidential assassinations may be broken. You may argue that this attempt was less than serious given the caliber of the handgun and the President's relative safety in an armored limousine. But consider that it may well have been the sum of the circumstances rather than the intentions of
the potential assassin that averted another national tragedy. Please read further into this thesis. You will discover parallels with other assassinations or attempts. It should become obvious that there is a need for continuing study into the phenomenon we call assassination.

Research Overview

Societies have long been compelled to live with assassinations. From the beginning of recorded history and no doubt before, leaders have been killed in a variety of ways for a variety of reasons. So significant was the event and its impact, that the assassination of Julius Caesar inspired no less a literary master than William Shakespeare to write about it hundreds of years after the fact. The assassinations of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria earlier this century is considered one of the threshold events leading to the cataclysmic World War I. And who among us able to recall the events of November 22, 1963, can forget an America thoroughly demoralized by an assassination.

The United States’ experience with assassination appears to have begun in 1835, when an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of President Andrew Jackson. No presidential assassination occurred before that and personally directed political violence in the new republic was likely to take the form of two-man duels. The death of Alexander Hamilton, resulting from a duel with Aaron Burring the early 19th century, helped turn public and official acceptance away from this practice, which was eventually outlawed.
As the Civil War ended, the United States lost its 16th president, Abraham Lincoln, to an assassin’s bullet. The Reconstruction years saw unprecedented political violence and assassinations as politically polarized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan emerged from the ashes of the war. Assassinations in those years were non-presidential and the majority were confined to the states of the old Confederacy.

Consciousness of assassination increased with the murder of President Garfield. Then, with the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the task of protecting presidents was mandated to the Secret Service, an agency created in 1865, ironically by President Lincoln, to suppress the counterfeiting of currency.

Over the next five decades there were attempts against presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt, President-elect Franklin Roosevelt and President Harry Truman. Senator Huey Long of Louisiana died from an assassin’s bullet during this period. However, there was little sense of urgency to study these events or this phenomenon. Possibly the lack of urgency existed because the victims survived three of the four assaults and the events occurred over widely spaced intervals of time, which may have created a feeling of isolation of the incidents. Whatever the reason, early studies of assassination were largely historical narratives.

Amidst this turbulent period of civil rights confrontations and an escalating war in Viet Nam were the assassinations of American Nazi George Lincoln Rockwell, Black Muslim Malcolm X, civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and presidential candidate Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
This relatively rapid succession of political murders stimulated several serious studies, mostly aimed at identifying causes and methods to prevent assassinations. Perspectives ranged from broad macro comparisons of global violence to micro issues of individual motivation to assassinate. The results were more often than not inconclusive and conflicting.

The research of this thesis uses two notable studies, one macro and one micro, as its starting point. The National Commission for the Causes and Prevention of Violence conducted a comprehensive research at the behest of President Lyndon Johnson shortly after the assassination of Senator Kennedy in 1968. Although that study included cross-national comparisons, the present research reviews only the findings from their domestic studies. The Commission’s typology of assassinations is also examined in the present study.

In its examination of the American phenomenon of assassination, the National Commission concluded that the higher the office, the more impersonal the motive for assassination. That is to say, presidential assaults appeared directed at the office as a symbol. Conversely, assassinations of lower level officials have typically been associated with various personal motives. Posed as a hypothesis, these findings will be tested by the data of the present research, which covers the time period 1969 through 1992.

James W. Clarke approached American assassination from a very different perspective in his research conducted in the late 1970s, which he subsequently followed up after the attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981. Clarke
focused on the individual assassin and those personal and situational factors that would compel one to commit this act. His research produced a typology of assassins rather than of assassinations.

These two previous investigations were chosen as a basis for this research because both are thorough, original and approach assassination from virtually opposite perspectives. Both form a very appropriate basis for the present investigation.

One of the perplexing problems of researching assassination is in defining what assassination is. Definitions range from the simplistic political murder to more complex, multi-tiered explanations. Although operational definitions are addressed later in this report, it is important for the reader to understand this study's definition up front since this phenomenon is prone to some definitional ambiguity.

Assassination is herein defined as the homicide or attempted homicide directed specifically at an elected or appointed officeholder, candidate for office, or an individual in public political life. Methods and motives of assassination are not per se defining factors.

First, let us consider some examples of what assassination is not and why they are not. Dr. David Gunn, a physician employed at a clinic that performs abortions, was killed by a "Pro-Life" activist in early 1993. While the issue for which Dr. Gunn was murdered has political elements, he was not an officeholder, candidate or person in political public life. In 1983 Gordon Kahl, a member of the tax protest group Posse Comitatus, shot and killed a U.S. Marshal and Deputy U.S. Marshal who attempted to arrest him. While the marshals were officeholders and the motive
certainly political, the marshals became targets of Kahl only as he resisted arrest. In late 1980, ex-Beatle John Lennon was shot and killed by an obsessed fan. While Lennon was often politically outspoken, he was publicly known as an entertainer, and while his murderers exhibited many of the traits and behaviors of assassins, it was his obsession of Lennon as an entertainer that induced him to kill him.

This thesis maintains an exclusive definition of assassination in order to differentiate it from other types of political murder. Political murder is not necessarily assassination, but assassination is necessarily political murder. By focusing the definition on the political status of the victim, the random killing that often occurs during the episodes of terrorism or rioting can be excluded. However, an assassination could result from terrorism or rioting, but does not receive its definition by that larger phenomenon.

Assassination is also not defined by political impact, which is elusive to quantify and complicated by normal, evolutionary changes in political and social systems. Would ensuing events have occurred anyway? Logically, political murder will have some political consequence. It may be confined to a replacement election or appointment, or it could impact the political or social system in major ways as did the assassination of President Lincoln. In any event this research will make no attempt to gauge political impact.

This research also examines and evaluates assassination as an act of political participation. Conclusions are reached not on the outcome of an assassination, but through the motive of the assassin.
So this thesis examines the phenomenon of assassination through descriptive case studies in an endeavor to learn which hypotheses and typologies, if any, are supported by the most current data.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Prior Investigations

The phenomenon of assassination in America has only received any significant, systematic attention and research since the notorious trio of assassinations in the turbulent 1960s. Two significant studies that resulted present very different orientations to assassination. The typologies developed by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and James W. Clarke will be tested by this research. Those studies and two follow-ups are presented first.

This review of literature begins with Assassination and Political Violence by James F. Kirkham, Sheldon Levy and William J. Crotty. The work, which consists of a set of researches, comprehensively looked into the phenomenon of assassination and was published as an omnibus staff report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. This select commission was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson at the end of a decade that had witnessed the murders of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., among others. This undertaking was not done for purely academic reasons, but for the purposes of prediction and prevention.
The American experience was the central focus. The study sought to reveal any patterns of relationships of assassination with other types of violence, political or non-political, as well as with the prevailing social conditions. American assassination was examined in cross-national comparisons and as a separate phenomenon. Further comparisons were made between American presidential and non-presidential incidents. Assassinations were placed in historical and social contexts as well as juxtaposed with one another.

Assassination was defined in terms of differentiating it from more "generic" definitions of homicide. By their definition an act must have: (a) involved an officeholder or candidate, (b) involved a political motive, and (c) ended with a political impact. For their purposes it was unnecessary for all elements to be present for an incident to become defined as an assassination (1969, p. 1).

In order to analyze the structure of motives for the various assassinations, a typology was developed (1969, pp. 2-5). The first type was created for the assassination of one political elite by another, such as might occur during a coup. A second type would occur in the course of a terrorism episode in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling regime. A third type would be used by the ruling elite to suppress challenges, as well-demonstrated by the Third Reich Nazis. A fourth context for assassination would be for the purpose of dramatizing a perceived injustice. The assassination of British Lord Mountbatten by the Irish Republican Army illustrates that category. And fifth, assassinations accomplished by
mentally disturbed persons were deemed as irrational acts for irrational motives. Most American presidential assassinations were typed thusly.

The study, which included all of the American assassinations which occurred between 1835 and 1968, concluded that a disproportionately high number of assassinations took place in the southern United States. Over one-third of the incidents occurred between 1865 and 1874, the so-called Reconstruction era (1969, p. 43). However, this trend did not continue.

It was further discovered that the higher the office, the more impersonal and political the motive for assassination (1969, p. 44). Regarding presidential assassination, variables such as party affiliation, political philosophy, public policy or political strength were examined and were not found to be relevant (1969, p. 21). The National Commission concluded that the preponderance of presidential assassins fell within category five, acts of the irrationally mentally ill (1969, p. 5).

Assassinations of lower level officials were found to be identified with various specific and personal motives, e.g., a judge killed by organized crime (1969, p. 44).

In the cross-national study, incidents in the United States were compared with their foreign counterparts for the time period 1918 to 1968. The researchers discovered a direct correlation between the incidence of assassination in a nation and its level of political violence, such as guerilla warfare and serious civil disturbance (1969, p. 129). Societies prone to assassination tended also to be prone to a high level of civil unrest. Most significantly, the United States stood anomalous, exhibiting a high comparative level of assassination without exhibiting those
characteristics most closely associated (1969, pp. 136-139). The study also concluded
that the United States appeared to demonstrate those characteristics latently as
exemplified by relatively high levels of external aggression, minority hostility, high
incidence of homicide and a tendency for political unrest at the time of this study

Although the study was unable to draw the type of conclusions necessary to
predict assassination events with any precision, the typology proposed by the authors
lends itself very well to the present research.

In 1971 one of the collaborators in the National Commission study, William
J. Crotty, authored Assassinations and the Political Order. The most significant
aspects of his study were the changes he proposed to the National Commission's
typology. He considered assassination in the United States to be anomic. He
proposed it as a distinct and uniquely American type. In addition to (a) anomic
assassination, he named the other types; (b) elite substitution; (c) tyrannicide; (d)
terroristic assassination; and (e) propaganda by deed (1971, pp. 10-13).

Crotty found that internationally the incidence of assassination was directly
correlated to frustration with the political or social system, inversely correlated to
modernity, and curvilinearly correlated to the coerciveness of the political system.
Highly permissive democracies and highly coercive regimes were found to be less
prone to assassination (1971, pp. 13-21). Again, he found assassination in the United
States anomic, committed by private individuals for personal motives.
In *American Assassin: The Darker Side of Politics*, James W. Clarke conducted a case history research focusing on assassins as individuals. He argued against the psychological stereotyping of American assassins, claiming that those stereotypes promoted a spurious understanding of the phenomenon by the Secret Service and other security agencies. He asserted that there is a tendency to categorize most, if not all assassins, as "nuts." He also criticized the aforementioned National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence for basing some of its conclusions on the same pathological stereotyping (1982, pp. 5-10).

Clarke argued that the psycho-pathological terms employed in previous research were used so imprecisely and indiscriminately that conceptual problems were created by the application of common descriptions to assassins who were actually very different from one another (1982, p. 10). To describe his thought, but hopefully not to oversimplify it, he outlined the common description typically used as including: a diminishment of self-esteem, emotional isolation and distrust of others. After assigning this psychological description to an assassin, many researchers would infer that the mind of the assassin would then progress to delusions of grandeur and paranoid ideations, creating a distorted sense of reality. Clarke called this set of factors and their progression a "pathological theory of assassination." He wrote that those behavior traits would be manifested "... in the irrational act of assassination. ... The conclusions are essentially the same: the act is irrational and the assassin is, therefore, delusional, deranged, or schizophrenic" (1982, p. 5). Clarke found this "theory" to be patently unacceptable.
Clarke further criticized the previous research for rarely considering the political or social context of the assassination in relation to the assassin's behavior. He contended that some of the assassin's so-called deviant or pathological behavior was in fact not that extreme, rather, that previous researchers had simply failed to consider the motives of the assassins studied within the contexts of their lives. Clarke felt that the researchers had in fact trapped themselves in too easy an interpretation; namely, that if one can characterize assassination as the manifestation of irrational mental illness, then one need not acknowledge possible rational political or social motives for an act (1982, p. 258).

In formulating his typology, Clarke made a distinction between those few assassins he viewed as truly psychotic (schizophrenic) from those that from the evidence appeared to know and understand the nature of their acts. The weight of his argument was that "... violence is an emotional act and something more than simple aggression" (1982, p. 17).

Clarke's Type I assassins are political idealists who are aware and accepting of the meanings and consequences of their acts. They are rational in their extremism and consider their act a self-sacrifice for a cause. Clarke included presidential assassins Booth, Czolgosz, Collazo, Torresola and Sirhan within this type.

Clarke's Type II assassins are compellingly narcissistic. They are in no way psychotic, but the need to be recognized and accepted is overwhelming. They have so-called political personalities. He included Oswald, Byck, Fromme and Moore within this type.
Type III assassins are those Clarke considers psychopaths (sociopath is used as an interchangeable term). They have formed a perverse anger toward society and direct that anger at whomever they perceive that personifies the majority. Their acts of destruction are desirable for their own sakes. They possess no positive values and are hostile toward moral and social norms. They quite literally believe they have nothing to lose. Clarke considered Zangara and Bremer Type III assassins.

Clarke's Type IV assassins are the truly psychotic, suffering delusions and hallucinations. They have no real sense of reality and are insane. Included in that type are Lawrence, Guiteau and Schrank.

Clarke found that he was able to type fourteen of sixteen assassins he studied. Two, James Earl Ray and Carl Weiss, were termed "atypical."

Because of the subtle differences among human beings, traits reflected in some assassins crossed types. Clarke studied the personality of a given subject within situational, social and cultural contexts.

Clarke concluded that his typology was unable to be predictive; that it could provide some insights for operational security needs and determination of criminal responsibility (1982, p. 266). He suggested that since there obviously are many persons in society that possess the personality traits of the assassins, yet so few attempt the feat, that assassination is as much a function of opportunity and circumstances as personality characteristics (1982, p. 266).

Clarke commented further that in the age of instant mass media, the probability of assassination has increased. Because of their penchant for gaining
attention, his Type II and Type III assassins are likely to be more frequent (1982, pp. 267-268).

Clarke also concluded that increased domestic surveillance by security and law enforcement agencies would unlikely solve the problem of persons acting alone. It is further complicated by difficulties experienced to date by security agencies in analyzing extant data (1982, pp. 268-269).

Clarke made a recommendation for handgun control by stating his belief that opportunities for attack may be reduced, although the threat would remain (1982, pp. 269-270).

In an instance of serendipity, the above-cited study by Clarke was being published as John Hinckley shot Ronald Reagan. Closely following that attempt, Clarke conducted a follow-up research resulting in On Being Mad or Merely Angry: John W. Hinckley, Jr., and Other Dangerous People. This work further refined his previous typology by using Hinckley’s attempt within the typology.

In this book Clarke attempted to proceed beyond the development of a mere typology of assassins, once again acknowledging that his typology had little predictive value. He undertook this second study to emphasize the situational and contextual approach in understanding why some persons become assassins. In this research Clarke addressed the issues of assessment and prediction of dangerousness. By using traits of a type, particularly Type II and Type III, he attempted to demonstrate that even the situational factors of the researched assassins of these types might have had
short-term predictive value (1990, pp. 122-123). He supported his conclusions by comparing several cases, most notably between John Hinckley and Arthur Bremer.

For instance, John Hinckley was categorized as Type III, specifically, as emotionally disturbed, but exhibiting none of the delusions or hallucinations of psychosis (1990, p. 81). Since Arthur Bremer was similarly categorized, Clarke compared the various situational factors between the two (1990, pp. 81-98). Clarke considered both psychopaths and they seemed to share the same lack of conscience. Although these men came from decidedly different backgrounds, Clarke found parallels in their lives beyond psycho-pathology. Case studies of both will appear later in this thesis.

Clarke concluded by outlining his "situational approach," which utilized specific behavior traits as indicators (e.g., stalking and interest in prior assassinations) that he believed held incremental predictive value (1990, pp. 110-124).

Additional Sources - Assassination and Terrorism

This section includes additional studies, some conducted before and some after the principal researches described above. All contributed to further understanding the phenomenon of assassination.

Behavioral Science and the Secret Service, edited by Jane Takeuchi, Fredric Solomon and W. Walter Menninger, summarized a workshop held in early 1981 by the Division of Mental Health and Behavioral Medicine, Institute of Medicine. The participants were from the medical/psychiatric community, academics and researchers
from the behavioral sciences, members of the legal profession, and agents of the United States Secret Service.

Although the thrust of the conference was a behavioral approach to the study of assassination, political aspects were also addressed. While the conclusions of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence were acknowledged, these conferees dealt with various issues and problems of prediction. While not making any real breakthrough, the participants did identify problem areas for further exploration.

Addressing problems of assessing dangerousness, the conferees concluded that violent behavior is situational even in emotionally disturbed people. In other words, a person may pose no risk except at the time(s) certain psychological and situational circumstances present themselves in combination (1981, p. 29). Their findings supported Clarke's position.

While emotionally disturbed or mentally ill persons may be violent at times, it was generally held that those with better cognitive organization might present a greater risk because of their ability to carry out a planned assassination.

The conferees of this workshop also placed great emphasis on anticipating from what direction assassination may arise in future attempts. They suspected that future assassins may include women, minorities, terrorists and political dissidents (1981, pp. 39-41). Risk of assassination is enhanced by the access in the United States to firearms (1981, p. 43).
One unique aspect of this study was the consideration given to victim behavior. In assessing the potential for assassination in the United States, particularly presidential, any facilitating behavior by the assassination target is of course relevant. This is that situational factor which often pits political considerations against security. Victim behavior potentially offers the assassin the opening to circumvent security arrangements (1981, pp. 43-44).

In *American Presidential Assassination: Etiology and Prediction*, Clark R. Larsen argued against the profile of an assassin developed by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence as simplistic and often irrelevant. He demonstrated the many exceptions that have occurred before and since the profile's formulation (1986, p. 47).

Larsen explored the "mortality" aspects of presidential assassination in terms of availability of effective security and medical treatment. He found inverse correlations respectively between the modernity of security and emergency medical care and the death rate resulting from assassination attempts (1986, pp. 33-38).

Larsen considered the two most popular explanations for assassination, insanity or conspiracy, then offered his own typology (1986, p. 48). He believed that the motivation for assassination can by typed as mental, personal or political. His "mental" type included those individuals believed to be truly psychotic with distortions of reality. Within the "personal" category are persons James W. Clarke classified Type II and Type III. Larsen viewed these non-psychotic pathological traits
in common and saw no reason to make finer distinctions. Those of the "political" type are presumed to have acted from rational political motives.

Larsen concluded his study with a survey of problems in predicting assassination, both micro and macro. He observed that development of predictive models have been complicated by the relative paucity of incidents and persons to study and by the fact that the designs of the studies by necessity had to be non-experimental with no viable control group (1986, pp. 51-54).

In Assassin, J. Bowyer Bell observed that while Third World societies would appear to be particularly conducive to assassinations, it is rather in some of the most developed countries that assassins seem to thrive (1979, pp. 294-295).

In dealing with American assassins such as Lynette Fromme and Sara Jane Moore, Bell deemed their motives to be personally therapeutic (1979, pp. 71-73). He offered that their acts amounted to attempts at political murder without politics. He supported that conclusion by examining the likely political consequences of the attempts against President Ford. He conjectured that had Fromme or Moore succeeded, it likely would not have effected any real political change in the United States at the time.

Bell concluded that, "The individuals most dangerous to the President of the United States are those socially isolated who adapt to stress by symbolizing their problems in a political idiom identified with the president" (1979, p. 74).
It is also noteworthy that J. Bowyer Bell is one of few authors who significantly addressed the person whose motive for assassination is financial, a "Jackal" (1979, pp. 54-62).

James McKinley's *Assassination in America* surveyed the assassination events up to and including the 1975 attempts on the life of President Ford. He endeavored to draw parallels between assassination incidents and the effects of the incidents.

McKinley devoted much of his writing to the various conspiracy theories surrounding the respective assassinations. Not intending sensationalism, he seriously explored several conspiracy theories for their probabilities of accuracy and as competing theories of causation.

The only real prediction McKinley made was to observe that based on the current (1975) rate of presidential assaults, an assassination or attempt could be expected no later than 1984 (1977, p. 223). The 1981 attempt against President Reagan vindicated his prediction.

Equally interesting was his general commentary about the impact of this phenomenon upon American democracy. He observed that because of the rather extreme measures employed now to protect our presidents, the net effect has been to isolate them from their constituents. Thus the democratic process is eroded by inhibiting that close communication. The irony is that "... our assassins, who have so many times killed for their peculiar vision of liberty, would have split a cornerstone of the nation's true freedom" (1977, p. 223).
In Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism, Franklin L. Ford surveyed the phenomenon of political murder from an historical perspective. He established three categories, general to specific: political murder, assassination and tyrannicide. Assassination was the principle focus (1985, p. 2).

The author's endeavor was to seek explanations for the frequency/infrequency of assassination in various eras. He found that high rates of incidents do not necessarily coincide with epochs of repression or social turmoil. He also found that low incident rates do not coincide with periods of relative calm or optimism. Rather, he discovered that high incident rates occurred in periods following wars, revolutions or colonizations (1985, pp. 382-383).

In evaluating the efficiency of assassination, Ford found that the vast majority of incidents provided results beyond the stated intent of the perpetrator(s) (1985, pp. 387-388). An example might be the assassination in World War II of the Nazi commander Reinhard Heydrich by members of resistance forces, which led to the retaliation massacre of villagers by the Nazi SS. He observed that regardless the motive, assassination has disregarded the ideal of due process and as a political tool has been self-defeating.

In Assassination and Terrorism: Their Modern Dimensions, Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden and Karl Schmitt examined the relationships between the assassination events and their political contexts (1975, p. 14). They sought to find any patterns of events by examining six international cases occurring between 1934
and 1966. They also attempted to assess the systemic impact and effectiveness of these assassination events.

They concluded that assassination rates vary greatly over time, between countries and within a country. They found the systemic impact to be low in general. They offered the caution to those who would make inferences from their findings that since all political systems to some degree are in a constant state of change, it is difficult to assess or assign either short-term or long-term impacts of assassinations (1975, p. 36). The immediate shock to a system accustomed to political violence may be less and the impact may be very dependant on the nature and legitimacy of the regime (1975, pp. 40-44).

The authors found assassination, as a tactic of terrorism, to be a random phenomenon with periods of instability most conducive to its occurrence. Terrorism was found to be more widespread as a phenomenon internationally, but primarily existing in some major pockets of activity (1975, pp. 160-162).

In Perspectives on Terrorism, Harold Vetter and Gary Perlstein dealt with operational issues of terrorism. They identified the beginning of modern terrorism with the anarchists movement of the 19th century. They also identified the assassination of President McKinley as the final act of that movement in the western democracies (1991, pp. 35-36, 46).

Vetter and Perlstein considered the victimology of terrorism (1991, pp. 69-78). What differentiates terrorism in general from assassination as a tactic is the
observation that victims of terrorism are largely random, but assassination victims by
definition are specific.

The authors explored the merging role of women in terrorism, not to be
trendy, but to demonstrate real gender changes taking place in this still male-

With assassination identified as a tactic of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson
considered the larger issue of the relationship of terrorism to the liberal state. In
Terrorism and the Liberal State, he set a theoretical framework for posing problems
particularly presented by terrorism. He emphasized the rule of law in the liberal state
and the right of the state to use legitimate force to preserve order (1986, pp. 15-17).

Wilkinson asserted a different causation between political and criminal
violence (1986, p. 34). He cautioned against ascribing precise reasons and motives
for terrorism, explaining that there is no general theory to explain grievances or
perceived grievances.

He asserted that the civil rights and freedoms of a liberal state are
opportunities which can be exploited by terrorists (1986, p. 103). He cited as an
example the advantage to the terrorist (assassin) of the relative safe and anonymous
environment in which to operate a liberal state offers.

Wilkinson noted the anomaly of the very low incidence of domestic terrorism
in the United States given the diversity of its population, its relatively high crime rate
and the availability of firearms (1986, p. 107). Unlike some other authors, Wilkinson
did not make the distinction of the relatively high incidence of assassination in the United States.

Additional Sources - Political Participation

This final review section directs our attention to the issue of whether or not the act of assassination can be viewed as constituting political participation, however unconventional it may appear. If it is, must it always be so considered or are there some assassinations that are not acts of political participation? The typologies of political participation presented by the following three sources would appear to accommodate political violence as participation, although the first two deal with participation as a primarily positive and conventional activity. The third includes both conventional and unconventional acts. It is expected that the readers of this thesis, after learning about the assassinations described herein, will see clearly that assassination can be an act of political participation.

Lester Milbrath, in Political Participation, established a model for analyzing the levels of political participation by individuals. This model was based in part on the underlying hypothesis that "... the more stimuli about politics a person receives, the greater the likelihood he will participate in politics, and the greater the depth of his participation" (1965, p. 39). How one is predisposed to participate depends on the needs of the actor.

Taking any political action generally requires two decisions: one must decide to act or not to act; and one must decide the direction of his action. ... Decisions to act in a particular way often are accomplished
by a third decision about the intensity, duration, and/or extremity of action. (1965, p. 6).

Milbrath developed a hierarchy of conventional, positive participation, of which inactivity can be identified as the starting point from which involvement can be measured (1965, pp. 18, 22-29). Citizen compliance, such as obeying laws and paying taxes, are typical passive political responses (1965, p. 9). It is one's exposure to political stimulus then that triggers active participation. Depending upon the intensity of the stimulus and the needs of the individual, the activity may be limited to "spectator" acts, such as voting or initiating a political discussion. Milbrath identified a "transitional" level of participation in which an individual may make a monetary contribution or attend a political meeting or rally (1965, pp. 16-21).

Milbrath named his most active level of participation "gladiatorial" (1965, p. 20). The various activities at this level require real commitment from the participants. One may become a political party activist, become involved in strategic planning of campaigns or rallies or solicit political funds (putting the participant as an intermediary between the contributors and the decision makers). The ultimate political participation is becoming a candidate for public office or holding public office.

Milbrath found that anomic, alienated and cynical individuals are less likely to become active in politics. He also found that people with "great neurotic or psychotic problems" are unlikely participants. The are "... a different kind of
individual whose orientation toward the world of politics is not simply one of detachment, but of suspicion, distrust, hostility and cynicism" (1965, p. 79).

In this thesis we will make the argument that Milbrath’s basic hypothesis can be extended to unconventional and negative acts. Thus, if one receives political stimuli, could not that person channel his/her participation into negative acts such as demonstrations, harassment, riots or revolution? If this assertion is allowed, then it could by extension be then argued that assassination stands as the ultimate, negative political expression. This argument will be developed further.

In Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie argued against Milbrath’s participation model as a one-dimensional hierarchy (1972, pp. 44-45). Their criticism was that the hierarchy implied following his logic that that one who participates at a given activity level would have likely participated at the lower levels as well. Verba and Nie do not believe that this is necessarily so.

In place of a hierarchy of participation, Verba and Nie proposed four modes: voting, campaign activities, citizen-initiated political contacts, and communal participation (1972, pp. 51-53). Each of these modes represent methods by which citizens can influence their leaders. Each mode was also defined by the type of influence exerted. For instance, voting was considered to exert a considerable amount of pressure on someone wishing to be elected or re-elected, but to provide little in information about the specific wishes of the voter.
Other defining dimensions of the modes include conflict, scope of the outcome, and the initiative required (1972, p. 54). Conflict involves zero-sum issues among competing participants. The scope of the outcome deals with the impact that an individual's participation may have on other citizens. Initiative measures the effort to participate in an act.

Verba and Nie offered a typology of "participators" to engage in activities via the modes (1972, pp. 85-86). Placed along an inactive-active continuum, they are: inactives, voting specialists, parochial participants (involvement with narrower specific issues), communalists (involvement with broader social issues), campaigners, and complete activists. The participation of the types of persons is channeled into the modes depending upon their orientation to politics. The authors argued that the interaction of modes and types enables one to identify the method by which citizens approach government, as well as the issues that attract them. A multidimensionality is thus created by measuring the quantity, quality and source of political participation (1972, pp. 93-94).

Verba and Nie addressed political participation in terms of essentially positive, conventional activity. Conflict is considered only in the context of zero-sum group participation, as would occur between political parties in an election campaign (1972, pp. 50-51, 56-57). Conflict or cleavage is confined to party affiliation or the taking of a position on an issue. They provide no space in their multidimensional model for assassination.
In *Participation in Social and Political Activities*, David Horton Smith, Jacqueline Macaulay, and Associates departed from Milbrath and from Verba and Nie by offering an "unconventional," or negative, form of political participation (1980, pp. 77, 133-152).

Their "conventional," or normal, participation category more or less reflects those of Milbrath and Verba and Nie: voting, discussing politics, campaigning, attending meetings and rallies, forming a group, contacting government officials, and belonging to a political party.

"Unconventional" political participation was found to be within the realm of political activism and included such activities as demonstrating, engaging in civil disobedience, rioting, engaging in revolutions and rebellions, assassinations and coups. Robert W. Hunt and M. Lal Goel, who authored the chapter in Smith regarding unconventional political participation (1980, pp. 133-152),

... define the dependent variables as follows: Unconventional political behavior refers to acts of disruption, destruction, and injury within a political community against the political regime, its actors, or its politics. This definition includes an exceedingly wide range of behaviors, from assassinations, to military coups, to less-focused forms of militant activities by segments of the public at large. It encompasses a range of activities from protest, which is aimed at policy change without challenging the basic authority of policymakers, to partial and finally total resistance...

(1980, p. 134). They further observed that there is tentativeness and ambiguity in the research with

... competing and often overlapping paradigms but no verified comprehensive theories. More limited explanations are plentiful, but the causal factors discussed are usually not linked systematically; and
the terms are not defined precisely enough to allow for significant comparative and cumulative research (1980, p. 134).

While the authors termed conventional participation "normal and legitimate," they acknowledged that societies may define these differently (1980, p. 77).

Smith identified some political factors facilitating unconventional participation (1980, pp. 137-139). These factors involve regime legitimacy, the ability of a regime to react to changing conditions, permissiveness/coerciveness of the regime, and the effectiveness of protest groups.

On an individual level, participation factors include social background, instinctual human aggressiveness, and attitudinal factors such as frustration and alienation (1980, pp. 139-149).

Finally, situational factors were brought into the equation (1980, pp. 149-152). The context for negative participation must exist, such as a dramatic event, contagion from one group to another or modern technology (availability of weaponry, transportation, communications). Smith clearly opens the door for looking at some assassinations/attempts as acts of political participation.

Summary of the Literature

This chapter has provided a view of significant previous studies of the assassination phenomenon. The research of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the research of James W. Clarke were particularly
highlighted since the present study is fundamentally based on their conclusions. The reader should come away with the impression that the National Commission and Clarke approached the study of assassination very differently. Moreover, the difference was reflected in their respective typologies with the National Commission addressing assassination as an event and with Clarke focusing on the assassin.

Additional sources dealing with assassination and terrorism were presented to demonstrate that assassination is frequently, but not always, a technique and tool of terrorism. These additional writings, which resulted from significant investigations in their own right, provided areas of agreement and disagreement with the findings of the National Commission and Clarke and broadened the base for this research.

The writings of several leading scholars on political participation were offered to establish a theoretical framework for examining the phenomenon of assassination in the context of political participation. Significant differences were found among these authors; in that certain researchers provided an opening for examining assassination as a potential act of political participation, while others did not directly address the idea of negative or unconventional types of political participation at all.

This research proposes a political participation model as illustrated in Figure 1 (next page). Although the reader at first may construe this model as a Milbrath-like hierarchy, it differs in fundamental ways. Certain activities of lesser efforts can represent either positive or negative forms of political participation depending upon how the initial stimulus is received by the participant. Positive and negative forms of participation can be seen to further diverge at the extremes, but remain dependent
Figure 1. Individual Political Participation.
on the effect of the stimulus to determine the direction and degree of effort. Participants need not ascend from one level to another, although in some persons that may be the case. The closer to either extreme a political actor participates, the greater is the effort required for that participation.
CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Hypothesis and Research Questions

In 1969, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence reported findings and reached conclusions that permitted the formulation of an hypothesis about assassinations for this research:

1. There is a relationship between the level of office of the intended victim and the motive for assassination attempt. The higher the office of the victim, the more impersonal and political the motive for assassination; and the lower the level of office of the victim, the more personal and less political the motive for assassination.

The following additional research questions were posed in the present study:

1. Are there any changes in the frequency of presidential assassinations/attempts?

2. Can any macro or micro trends in assassination venues be identified?

3. Is there any common assassination method?

4. Are there any differences in mortality of assassinations?

5. Do the data support including assassination as an act of political participation?
6. Do the data support the typologies developed by the National Commission and/or James W. Clarke?

Underlying Design

This study is designed to examine the phenomenon of assassination in the United States from 1969 through 1992 via the use of descriptive case studies. This most recent data is compiled to challenge previous hypotheses and typologies.

The research consists of case studies and is non-experimental and unobtrusive. Assassinations/attempts occurring in the United States during the above-cited period forms the unit of analysis. Presidential assassinations are considered separately from non-presidential assassinations, but they are also compared. There is no feasible control group for this study.

The variables include the date of the assassination/attempt, the victim and his/her political role, the location by city, the method and result of the attack, and the assailant and his/her/their motive, if known. These variables are used to order the narrative form for each case, and then the data for each variable are charted onto appropriate tables. Tables 1 and 2, pages 69 and 71 respectively, present the data for presidential assassinations and Tables 3 and 4, pages 82 and 84 respectively, for non-presidential assassinations.
Sampling and Data Collection

The sample consists of the entire population of assassination events which occurred during the selected time period. Since the entire population of such events is being considered, there is no place for the use of inferential statistics.

A list of assassinations/attempts occurring from 1969 through 1992, which fulfilled definitional parameters, was compiled. To ensure construct validity the details of each event was triangulated via multiple data sources, which included encyclopedias of assassination, murder, political violence and terrorism, as well as the database of Lexis/Nexis. Since media accounts may contain inaccuracies due to reporting or editorial time constraints, that information was in turn triangulated with other media sources contained in Nexis.

It should be noted that the National Commission, given the far greater length of its study period, was able to sample assassination events that included officials at varying levels, e.g., U.S. senators, congressmen, governors, etc. This study, using a shorter time period, can only make the distinction between presidential and non-presidential assassinations. Because of the lack of representation in some levels, the non-presidential events are not subdivided hierarchically, although the positions of the officeholders are noted.
Concepts and Operational Definitions

The following operational definitions were used to define the independent variables:

The **victim** is defined as the intended target of the assassination. Bystanders wounded or killed were not included as a variable, although those persons are acknowledged.

The **method** is defined as the weapon of assassination. The case study narratives explain the technique used for employing the weapon.

The **result** focused on the intended victim. Ancillary victims were not reported under this variable.

The **venue** of an assassination identified the city and state where the attack occurred.

The **assailant** is defined as the person or persons planning, supporting and/or carrying out the attack. For instance, in a contract killing the person who ordered or contracted the attack is listed as an assailant. A driver of a getaway car is likewise considered an assailant.

The **motive** identified the stated or discovered reasons that the victim was targeted.

The following terms are used frequently in the case studies and analysis:

**Assassination** is the extralegal homicide or attempted homicide directed at a specific officeholder, candidate for office, or an individual in public political life.
Excluded as attempts are verbal or written threats, stalking of intended victims or aggressive mass demonstrations. These behaviors, where, applicable may be considered as threshold acts to assassinations rather than as assassination events in themselves. This will also apply to cases in which the assassin initially stalks one target before assaulting another. Each case study in this thesis is considered a single assassination event although it may have resulted in multiple casualties.

Without wishing to be unduly redundant, I would like to present two more historical events to illustrate the definitional limitations used in this report. When Guiseppe Zangara attempted to assassinate Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, he missed shooting the President, but did shoot and kill Anton Cermak, the Mayor of Chicago who accompanied the President. This study would define the event as an assassination attempt against the President and the murder, but not the assassination of Mayor Cermak. The mayor was not a specific target of the assassination and thus would be considered a bystander victim. This would also be true of the wounding of Governor John Connally during the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Terrorism is the use or threat of use of force to instill fear. It is generally distinctive from assassination in that human victims of terrorism are often random and unspecific.

To be considered an individual in political public life, one must be an officeholder and/or publicly known for his/her political views. This enables this investigation to consider some non-officeholders as assassination targets.
A **psychotic** person suffers a serious mental disorder in which thought processes are so severely impaired that the individual cannot distinguish reality from that which is not real.

A **neurotic** person is one who can discern reality, but suffers an impairment of a portion of their personality.

**Personality disorders** are a set of emotional impairments that manifest in depression, antisocial behavior, violence, suicide, and are often accompanied by substance abuse. A disorder affects all areas of a subject’s life, although the sufferer may be untroubled by the illness because of poor insight. Personality disorders are typed as antisocial personality disorder (commonly known as psychopath or sociopath), narcissistic personality disorder (grandiose sense of self), borderline personality disorder (transient between neurotic and psychotic) and passive-aggressive personality disorder (unable to maintain emotional equilibrium).

To be sure, the very brief psychiatric definitions lack medical precision, but are intended to furnish the reader with a rough recognition of the terms. Since presidential assassinations are invariably diagnosed, these terms appear in the presidential case studies. The absence of psychiatric terms in non-presidential case studies should not lead to any inferences other than the greater scrutiny and information available on presidential assassins.
CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES - PRESIDENTIAL

Arthur Herman Bremer

The Assault

On May 15, 1972, in Laurel, Maryland, Arthur Herman Bremer shot and wounded Presidential Candidate George C. Wallace, Governor of Alabama.

On that day Governor Wallace attended an outdoor political rally, which was held in a shopping center parking lot. Affording candidates protection during the campaign, a Secret Service advance team had established security perimeters adjacent to the speaker's platform and contiguous areas of ingress and egress. A bullet-proof podium had also been provided. The crowds were thus restrained by ropeline barricades and there was nothing otherwise to indicate any problems. In short, the site was considered by the advance agents to be as secure as reasonably possible.

Arthur Bremer stood in the second tier of spectators behind the ropeline. Witnesses reported that he exhibited no overt signs of his intention to shoot the governor. He kept his .38 caliber revolver concealed until immediately prior to the assault. In this manner he was able to accomplish his mission at point-blank range and fire all five shots within three to four seconds.
The Intended Victim

George C. Wallace, the Governor of Alabama, became a candidate for President of the United States for the second time in 1972. After a schism within the Democratic Party in 1968, Governor Wallace mounted a third-party campaign, forming the American Independent Party. For his efforts he succeeded in garnering 13.5% of the popular vote and it was this that he used for his springboard in the 1972 Presidential Campaign. He was, by most accounts, a controversial candidate based on his record as a segregationist southern governor and his break from the Democratic Party.

His political and social views more often than not resulted in sharp encounters between the pro and anti forces who commonly attended his rallies. And Governor Wallace developed a penchant for making impromptu approaches to crowds he perceived as friendly for purposes of personal greeting and hand-shaking. It should be noted that Governor Wallace had been warned by the Secret Service of the potential hazards of his campaign style. After the assault, he publicly acknowledged receiving this warning. So there developed a deadly scenario in which a campaign style dovetailed with the determined intention of an individual to do harm.
Arthur Herman Bremer was born on August 21, 1950, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin. At the time of his assault he stood 5 feet 6 inches, weighed 145 pounds, with blue eyes and blond hair. He is white. Arthur was thought by family members to be intelligent, but he was only an average student. He graduated from high school and held a succession of odd jobs, none permanently. He was described as a loner and had no friends. In 1971 he attempted to establish a relationship with a fifteen-year-old girl, but the relationship was terminated within a few weeks at her request. There is no evidence that he ever had a successful association with anyone of the opposite sex.

His problems with interpersonal relationships apparently extended from his family life. He was upset over his father's drinking and the alleged bad marriage of his parents. He described his home as being dirty and unkept.

In January 1971, coinciding with the break-up with his one and only girlfriend, Arthur Bremer purchased a .38 caliber revolver from Casanova Guns in Milwaukee.

It was in the following year that Bremer first revealed his intention to assassinate in a diary he kept from March 2, 1972, to April 3, 1972. He began by noting, "Now I start my diary of my personal plot to kill by pistol either Richard Nixon or George Wallace. I intend to shoot one or the other while he attends a champane (sic) rally for Wisconsin Presidential Primary."
On April 14 and 15, President Nixon traveled to Ottawa, Ontario, Canada for a state visit. Arthur Bremer likewise traveled to Ottawa and stalked the President in an effort to gain close enough access for an assassination attempt. Bremer was frustrated by the tightness of the joint Canadian and American security and thus postponed his plan. He briefly considered shooting Secret Service agents, but decided that the publicity value was minimal. (Ed. Note: As an anecdotal observation, on that occasion I worked in close proximity to President Nixon as an agent of the Secret Service, Presidential Protective Division. I had the opportunity on several subsequent occasions to discuss Mr. Bremer's revelations with my colleagues who also worked that visit. We particularly noted that the Canadians were very security sensitive because of an unarmed assault against Soviet Premier Kosygin during a previous visit to Canada. In that incident, spectators had been permitted in rather close proximity to Mr. Kosygin and an individual bolted from the crowd and tackled the Soviet Premier around the neck and wrestled him to the ground before security elements could react. Canadian security officials, deeply embarrassed by that incident, were determined that it would not be repeated. Therefore, Arthur Bremer found the security to be formidable with crowds kept at a distance. In those discussions, we concluded that he had little or no real opportunity for a meaningful assassination attempt during the President's visit to Canada.)

Arthur Bremer's stalking behavior did not end there. He redirected his attention and interest toward Governor Wallace, whom he perceived as an easier
target. He stalked George Wallace in Michigan (including Kalamazoo), New York and Maryland.

The Result

As Governor Wallace concluded his speech on May 15, 1972, at Laurel, Maryland, he stepped from behind his bullet-proof podium and, instead of proceeding to the motorcade to the rear of the stage, he approached the crowd in front. As he reached to shake hands in proximity of Arthur Bremer, Bremer fired his shots in rapid succession. Special Agent in Charge Jimmy Taylor threw his raincoat in Bremer’s face to obstruct his view, but the damage had already been done. Of five shots fired, Governor Wallace had been struck three times. Also wounded were Secret Service Special Agent Nicholas Zarvos, Alabama State Trooper Captain William Dothard and a woman spectator. Arthur Bremer was subdued and as he was being led away by police, he asked the officers if they wished his autograph.

Governor Wallace never fully recovered from his wounds. A bullet wound to his abdomen had also damaged his spinal cord and he remains a paraplegic to this day. Governor Wallace has experienced several medical set-backs and complications through the years because of the injuries and some, the most recent in mid-1992, have been life threatening.

The other three persons wounded in the assault recovered, although Special Agent Zarvos suffered partial paralysis of his vocal cords from being shot in the throat.
A subsequent search of Bremer's Milwaukee apartment turned up mostly rambling and incoherent writings. But among items found were a list of state primaries and the notation, "How to do a bang-up job of getting people to notice you."

In subsequent interviews, he was ambivalent about the shooting. He felt that the three persons wounded with Governor Wallace were innocent bystanders who happened to get in the way.

Arthur Herman Bremer was prosecuted by the State of Maryland, which had jurisdiction for this offense. Mental health professionals testifying at his trial disagreed about his legal sanity. There were indications of personality disorder and possible schizophrenia, paranoid type. He experienced both suicidal and homicidal ideations. He was found guilty of attempted murder and remains incarcerated in the Maryland corrections system.

Samuel Joseph Byck

The Assault

On February 22, 1974, in Baltimore, Maryland, Samuel Joseph Byck attempted to hijack a Delta Airlines jet at the Baltimore Washington Airport with the expressed purpose of crashing it into the White House and killing President Nixon.
As passengers boarded a Delta flight scheduled to travel to Atlanta, Samuel Byck forcibly boarded the airplane by first shooting a security guard with a .22 caliber handgun. He also carried an explosive device in a briefcase.

He fired a warning shot inside the airplane and ordered the pilot to get the craft airborne. As he ordered the doors closed, the flight attendants escaped. When the pilot attempted to explain to Byck the physical procedures for getting underway, Byck shot the co-pilot in the abdomen. When he unsuccessfully attempted to get a passenger to serve as a co-pilot, Byck shot the co-pilot in the head and the pilot in the shoulder. Before losing consciousness, the pilot radioed the tower and advised of the emergency.

Byck then reloaded his gun and shot the pilot and co-pilot each once again. At that time the police, who had taken positions outside the aircraft, fired three gunshots at Byck, striking him twice. As he laid wounded on the floor, he turned his own gun to his head and committed suicide.

The Intended Victim

Richard Nixon had been President of the United States since 1968. On that day, February 22, 1974, his administration was in the midst of the Watergate scandal and, as we know from history, was in the final months of his presidency.
The Assassin

Samuel Joseph Byck was born on January 30, 1930, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the time of his assault, he stood 5 feet 9 inches, weighed 225 pounds, with brown eyes and brown hair. He was white. Byck attended high school, but did not graduate. He served in the U.S. Army from April 1954 to April 1956, receiving an honorable discharge. While in the service, he received standard military weapons training, but no specialized training.

His arrest history included larceny, fraud and receiving stolen goods. He had no history of crimes of violence.

In 1957, he married. After his discharge from the army, he attempted several business ventures, all of which failed. By 1968, his marriage collapsed, followed shortly thereafter by the commencement of treatment for mental illness.

He experienced periodic psychiatric hospitalizations from 1969 to 1973. He was diagnosed as manic depressive (now called bipolar personality disorder), but there was nothing in his pathology to indicate that he was dangerous.

Samuel Byck came to the attention of the Secret Service in October 1972, when his father-in-law reported that he remarked that someone should kill President Nixon. Byck denied the statement in an interview with Secret Service agents. In January, 1973, Byck’s wife and sister-in-law reported that they had read threats against President Nixon in his diary. Byck again denied the threats. By this time the Secret Service had developed a continuing interest in Samuel Byck.
1973, Byck began picketing on Pennsylvania Avenue in front of the White House. There was no violent behavior or rhetoric associated with the picketing, in which he periodically indulged until February 4, 1974.

It was at this time that he began keeping his diary in the format of tape recordings. In a tape dated February 21, 1974, Byck described a plan he labeled "Operation Pandora's Box:"

I will try to get the plan aloft and fly it towards the target area, which will be Washington, D.C., the capitol of the most powerful, wealthiest nation of the world. By guise, threats or trickery, I hope to force the pilot to buzz the White House. When the plane is in this position, I will shoot the pilot and then in the last few minutes try to steer the plane into the target, which is the White House. Whoever dies in Project Pandora's Box will be directly attributable to the Watergate scandals.

The Result

As one can readily observe, "Operation Pandora's Box" was a rather elaborate plan that failed early in its execution. Had Byck succeeded in getting airborne, his chance of success is academic. But it is clear that the potential for disaster extended significantly beyond the danger to the President.

Although Samuel Byck failed to employ the aircraft as a weapon, he nevertheless did significant damage with his intermediate weapon, a handgun. Before taking his own life, Byck shot to death a Baltimore Washington Airport security guard. Both the pilot, who survived, and the co-pilot, who did not, of the Delta Airlines flight received multiple gunshot wounds.
Lynette Alice Fromme

The Assault

On September 5, 1975, in Sacramento, California, Lynette Alice Fromme attempted to shoot Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States.

On that day President Ford paid an official visit to Sacramento. After attending an earlier meeting, he walked with members of his staff and Secret Service detail through a public park adjacent to the state capital building, where he had a meeting scheduled with Governor Jerry Brown.

There were members of the public in the park at the time. The decision to walk rather than ride in the armored presidential limousine was made impromptu and the park had not been secured in advance. As a result, the President was approached by persons wishing to shake hands, which he accommodated. In this manner, Lynette Fromme approached within arm's length of the President. She wore a long, red robe which concealed a .45 caliber automatic pistol in a holster strapped to her leg.

As she brought the gun from concealment and pointed it at President Ford, the Secret Service agents reacted. One agent grabbed the pistol from Fromme's hand as he subdued her. Other agents covered and evacuated President Ford to a place of safety. As Fromme was being subdued and arrested, she said, "It didn't go off! Can you believe it? It didn't go off! Why are you protecting him? He's not a public servant!"
The Intended Victim

Gerald R. Ford became President of the United States upon the resignation of Richard Nixon in August, 1974. He had been a congressman from Michigan and a member of the congressional leadership prior to his appointment by President Nixon to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew. Mr. Ford was generally considered to be popular among his political colleagues and was considered to be a non-controversial choice in filling the vice presidential vacancy; and, except for the pardon of the resigned President Nixon, President Ford was relatively non-controversial as the Chief Executive. He was viewed by many as a "caretaker" president, there to administer the office until the next election. As an interesting digression, it should be noted that as a congressman Mr. Ford was a member of the Warren Commission that investigated the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Assassin

Lynette Alice Fromme was born on October 22, 1948, at Santa Monica, California. At the time of her assault, she stood 5 feet, weighed 115 pounds, with hazel eyes and red hair. She is white.

She attended college, but did not complete the requirements for a degree. It was during this period that her life underwent some profound and lasting changes.
Her relationship with her parents deteriorated to the point that, in 1967, she was no longer welcome in her parents’ home. Her contact with them thereafter was minimal.

She also had a history of psychiatric treatment dating from 1966 and stemming from two suicide attempts.

It was then that she met Charles Manson, a cult figure, who was known to exploit the fragile emotions of persons in Ms. Fromme’s predicament. With Manson’s persuasion and support, Fromme became a member of what was to be known as the Manson Family. Manson even gave Fromme the nickname Squeaky because of qualities in her voice.

As it was later demonstrated, the Manson Family freely indulged in drugs, sex and crime, certainly the most notorious being the so-called Tate-LaBianca homicides. Although Fromme was a full and enthusiastic participant within the Manson Family, she was not believed to be involved in the Tate-LaBianca episode. Since those murders, however, were apparently part of a theory of revolution called Helter Skelter, proposed by Manson, Fromme’s knowledge of those crimes has long been suspected.

When Charles Manson and others were ultimately arrested and tried for the Tate-LaBianca murders, Fromme and other Manson Family members not arrested maintained a high profile in the courtroom by appearing with shaved heads and the letter "X" carved into their respective foreheads. Their demonstrations were intended as a statement of Manson’s (as well as the other defendants’) innocence. Even after
Manson's conviction and imprisonment in 1971, most Family members, including Fromme, still identified with Manson.

Fromme resided with Sandra Good, another Manson Family member, in Sacramento. Together they continued attempts to gain the release of Charles Manson. Those attempts most often consisted of threats of violence.

By 1975 Fromme and Good had contacted many business and news media sources and warned of violence if Manson was not released from prison. In an August 1975 letter to NBC, Fromme threatened in part,

... will Tate-LaBianca murders need to be repeated to tell the truth of the thoughts we have been raised into ... if Nixon's reality wearing a Ford face continues to run this country against the law without any real truth, trust or faith, if Manson is not allowed to explain what you are too sheltered to face, your houses will be bloodier than the Tate-LaBianca houses and My Lai (ed: reference to massacre in Viet Nam War) put together.

Fromme reportedly had been involved with other Manson Family members in compiling a list of business executives to be murdered. She was also named as a leader of discussions with other Family members held in late 1974 and early 1975 regarding the feasibility of assassinating former President Nixon, California Governor Brown and Vincent Bugliosi (prosecutor in the Manson trial).

The Result

In preparing her assassination attempt, Lynette Fromme neglected to place a bullet in the gun's chamber, although the magazine she placed into the gun was fully loaded. By not chambering a round, to use shooters' jargon, the pistol was not ready
to fire. Before she could accomplish that maneuver, the gun was taken from her by the Secret Service agent. Had the gun been in the proper condition to fire, it is quite likely that she could have fired at least one shot and perhaps more, and she stood at point blank range. To the President’s good fortune, it appears that assassin Fromme’s familiarity with her weapon was insufficient.

Lynette Alice Fromme was arrested as she made the attempt on President Ford’s Life. In subsequent searches of her car and residence, clippings of newspaper and magazine articles concerning President Ford and other political leaders were found. Also found were letters from Charles Manson expounding his various “philosophies.”

Fromme made repeated attempts to disrupt her trial at which she denied that she had intended to shoot President Ford. Her assertion was that her attempt and subsequent trial were designed to draw attention to the plight of Charles Manson and gain a new trial for him. The connection of this attempt symbolically with Charles Manson is certainly plausible, but her argument that she intended no harm to President Ford is unconvincing. She interestingly cited her exclamation, "It didn't go off!" and her subsequent utterances as proof of her lack of intent to shoot the President. The United States Attorney cited the same exclamation as the prosecution’s proof of her harmful intent. On November 26, 1975, Lynette Fromme was found guilty of a violation of attempting to assassinate the President under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1751. On December 17, 1975, she was sentenced
to life imprisonment and remains in the federal correctional system. She is still devoted to Charles Manson.

President Ford survived this attack only to be attacked two and a half weeks later by another woman.

Sara Jane Moore

The Assault

On September 22, 1975, in San Francisco, California, Sara Jane Moore fired a shot at President Gerald R. Ford.

President Ford had just delivered a speech to the World Affairs Council at a meeting at the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco. As he emerged, accompanied by members of his Secret Service detail, Sara Moore fired a single shot from a .38 caliber handgun at a distance of approximately 40 feet.

As a scheduled "on-the-record" event, the meeting site attended by the President had been surveyed and secured by the Secret Service and the San Francisco Police Department prior to his visit. The secured perimeters included certain outdoor areas adjacent to the hotel entrance where the motorcade was positioned. Ropeline barricades had been erected in anticipation of crowds gathering to see the President. In part because of the attempt on his life just two weeks prior, crowds were not allowed in any close proximity to the President.
Sara Moore stood within the crowd area across the street from the hotel entrance, whence she made her attempt. No one in her proximity discerned any sign of her intentions. As President Ford emerged from the hotel, Moore drew the revolver from her purse, took aim and fired one shot.

The Intended Victim

Of considerable significance surrounding this event was President Ford's survival of an assassination attempt on September 5, 1975, just eighteen days prior to this attack. It also bears repeating that he was not considered a symbol of controversy and in fact enjoyed a public image of a likeable person.

The Assassin

She was born Sara Jane Kahn on February 15, 1930, at Charleston, West Virginia. At the time of her assault she stood 5 feet 3 inches, weighed 120 pounds, with hazel eyes and brown hair. She is white.

Sara Kahn experienced a somewhat troubled adolescence, punctuated by a runaway from home for a short time while in her teens. After graduating from high school, she entered a nursing school from which she was expelled before completing one year.

It was during that time, 1947 to 1949, that she began receiving psychiatric treatment. She was diagnosed with emotional instability reaction based on several suicide attempts. She suffered from depression and received hospital treatment.
She enlisted in the Women's Army Corps in January, 1949, and it was at this time that she commenced with a series of unsuccessful marriages. Her first marriage was to an enlisted man in the Marine Corps. In 1950, she was discharged from the WACS as unsuitable for military service, roughly coinciding with the dissolution of her first marriage.

Three of her four children were born during her second marriage, that to a commissioned officer in the Air Force. At the breakup of that marriage, she sent her children to live with her parents. She maintained an estrangement from those children and her parents to the time of the assassination attempt.

She gave birth to her fourth child during her third marriage, which likewise failed. Her fourth and final marriage was annulled in 1973, because she had failed to divorce her third husband.

At this time she began using the last name Moore, which was her mother's maiden name. She briefly worked as a bookkeeper, but as was the pattern of her life, she was unable to establish permanency.

She then began an association with San Francisco radical political causes. She also became an informant for the local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Curiously, she was careless about concealing that fact to the persons on whom she was informing. As a result, she reported threats on her life. She therefore purchased a .44 caliber handgun with which she practiced and became familiar.
Her emotional instability continued. She had been examined in the mid and late 1980s and diagnosed as passive aggressive personality disorder and acutely depressed.

With this as a backdrop, Sara Moore increased her involvement in political intrigue. Her involvement became so entangled that she claimed friendships with persons in the ultra-radical New World Liberation Front and the Red Guerilla Family. She was in fact suspected of supplying the Red Guerilla Family with a floor plan sketch of the San Francisco FBI office gained from her visits there. That office was damaged from a bombing.

After two friends in the radical underground movement were killed by police in June, 1975, and after Patricia Hurst, as a member of the Symbionese Liberation Army, was arrested on September 18, 1975, Moore expressed fear of being wrongly identified by radicals as the informant in those cases.

On September 20, 1975, amid publicity surrounding President Ford’s pending visit to San Francisco, Sara Moore advised the San Francisco Police Department that she intended to test the system. Police authorities interpreted that cryptic statement to mean a test of the security surrounding the President. Her handgun was confiscated and the Secret Service was notified.

On September 21, 1975, Moore was interviewed by two Secret Service agents. She denied any threat against the President and said that she meant to test the system by participating in a demonstration, possibly while carrying a gun. Further, she claimed that her statements were misinterpreted and that the gun was for her own
personal protection. The Secret Service agents had no cause to arrest or further
detain Moore or reason to doubt the authenticity of her explanation.

On September 22, 1975, Sara Moore locally purchased a .38 caliber revolver.

The Result

At the time the shot was fired, President Ford was waving to the crowd. He
was partially concealed from spectators by the limousine and by the Secret Service
agents on either side of him. It should be noted here that President Ford often
approached such crowds for personal greeting and handshakes. However, in light of
the recent attempt on his life, the President tempered his inclination to do this,
possibly saving his life.

The bullet struck a wall behind and to one side of the President, ricocheted
and struck a taxi driver bystander several yards away. He was not seriously injured.

The Secret Service agents rushed the President into the relative safety of the
armored limousine and evacuated from the scene.

The .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was discovered to be improperly
sighted, which caused Moore’s shot to pass high and to the right as she faced her
target. Since Moore had purchased the gun that day and was literally loading it on
the drive to the St. Francis Hotel, she had no opportunity to familiarize herself with
the weapon and to correct or compensate for the sighting misadjustment. As a matter
of fact, Moore later opined that she would have hit her target had she used the gun
confiscated by the police. Given the relatively short shooting distance of forty feet, her claim had some merit.

At this point it would be useful to examine certain paradoxes in the statements given by Sara Jane Moore. As she described in subsequent interviews, her plan was to stand behind the crowd. She said that at the opportune time she would fire one aimed shot, then drop the weapon. In the confusion and chaos that was certain to follow, she planned to escape and watch the news of the assassination on television. At the same time she reported hoping to be captured.

In revealing her motive for the attack, Moore said that the dichotomy of being an informant and becoming more deeply involved within radical groups caused her extreme ambivalence. And as her involvement deepened, she participated in several group discussions of possible targets for assassinations. It is noteworthy that Moore proclaimed assassination as an appropriate method of political change. She said that it was particularly appropriate for governments that condoned assassination, e.g., the United States. To this end she expressed the belief that her attempt forced the United States Government to change its policy and oppose the use of assassination.

She identified as the threshold event in her decision to assassinate President Ford the interview by the Secret Service on September 21, 1975. Realizing that she had come to the attention of the Secret Service, she decided to act immediately. She felt that as more was discovered about her, she would be placed under surveillance and lose the opportunity.
Moore said that she was actually able to carry out her attempt by directing her thoughts to the office rather than the officeholder. In that way she could kill the President, but not Gerald Ford personally.

Sara Jane Moore was subdued by persons in the crowd after firing one shot. She was arrested by the Secret Service and charged with attempting to kill the President under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1751. After her arrest Moore was found to be sane in the legal sense and not psychotic. She was diagnosed emotionally disturbed with narcissistic personality disorder. She was also found to be paranoid and compulsive. On December 16, 1975, she pled guilty, and on January 15, 1976, she was sentenced to life imprisonment. She is currently incarcerated in the federal correctional system.

John Warnock Hinckley

The Assault


The assault occurred after President Reagan had addressed a luncheon group and was departing the Washington Hilton Hotel. As the President exited the hotel accompanied by members of his staff and Secret Service agents, Hinckley rapidly fired six shots from a .22 caliber revolver from a distance of approximately 15 feet.
Portions of the Washington Hilton Hotel had been surveyed and secured in advance by agents of the Secret Service and officers of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. Outside the hotel, which was where the attempt took place, a roped area for public and press had been erected on the sidewalk to one side of the secondary hotel exit which was intended to be used by the President. Since the event attended by the President was not open to the general public with announced arrival and departure times, spectator numbers were expected to be minimal. At the time of the actual visit, crowd numbers were in fact as anticipated. The level of security was considered commensurate with the number of spectators.

This event was listed on the President’s daily schedule, which was published in the Washington Star newspaper. This was in fact Hinckley’s source in learning the President’s itinerary.

John Hinckley stood among a small number of press and public at the sidewalk ropeline. As President Reagan emerged, Hinckley took out the revolver, which he had kept concealed, and rapidly fired all six rounds from his revolver.

The Intended Victim

When Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, he was the oldest person ever elected to that office. He was inaugurated in January, 1981, and was in the very early days of his administration at the time of the assault. One could argue that he was in the so-called "honeymoon" period of his
administration and enjoying that relative popularity. There were no real controversies involving him or his administration at that time.

**The Assassin**

John Warnock Hinckley was born on May 29, 1955, at Ardmore, Oklahoma. At the time of his assault he stood 5 feet 9 inches, weighed 180 pounds, with blue eyes and blond hair. He is white.

For most of his life prior to the assassination attempt, Hinckley resided with his father, mother, brother and sister in the area of Denver, Colorado. He grew to communicate very little with his family and spent much of his time alone. He had no friends, male or female.

After graduating from high school, he enrolled in college in Texas, but dropped out after about two and a half years. He had no real academic or occupational direction. He fancied himself a songwriter and went to California, where he unsuccessfully attempted to sell his songs.

He supported himself on odd jobs and contributions from his parents while he resided in Texas. It was in 1979 when Hinckley began purchasing guns. It was during this time that he also purchased the exploding Devastator brand bullets he used in his assault on President Reagan.

In 1976, he first viewed the movie "Taxi Driver" in which the actress Jodie Foster starred as a teenage prostitute. Hinckley viewed the film on several occasions
and developed an obsessive love interest in the actress. It was this obsession that would provide the catalyst for his attempt on the President.

During this period Hinckley also expressed interest in white supremacist and anti-Semitic groups such as the National Socialist Party of America. He also developed a fascination with the assassination of President Kennedy and the attempt on Governor Wallace. Hinckley was known to have been personally devastated by the murder in late 1980 of ex-Beatle John Lennon, which he claimed to be a threshold event in his decision to shoot the President.

Yet it would appear that Hinckley had made his decision much earlier. In September, 1980, Hinckley traveled to Yale University, where Jodie Foster was enrolled as a student. He had convinced his parent that he wished to attend Yale and he received some financial assistance from them for that purpose. He talked to Jodie Foster at least twice on the telephone, but he was spurned in his attempts to establish any relationship with her.

On October 9 and 10, 1980, he stalked President Jimmy Carter in Dayton, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee. In Nashville, he apparently attempted to gain proximity to the President but was discouraged by the mass of the crowd between him and his objective. Interestingly, as he was preparing to board a flight departing Nashville, three handguns, ammunition, and a pair of handcuffs were detected in his luggage. He was arrested for carrying concealed weapons, fined, and released. It should be noted that Hinckley’s connection with President Carter’s visit was not
readily apparent to authorities since Hinckley was departing Nashville when the
weapons were detected.

In November and December, 1980, Hinckley traveled to Washington, D.C.,
where he stalked President-elect Reagan. On several occasions he stood across the
street from the Blair House, where the President-elect temporarily resided. One time
Hinckley waited at the Mayflower Hotel, where the President-elect was to attend an
event, but canceled.

Hinckley then traveled to New York City, where he participated in a vigil in
Central Park in connection with the John Lennon murder. He was in deep despair
over Lennon's death and stayed in New York until February, 1981.

As he returned to Washington in February, 1981, he went to the office of
Senator Edward Kennedy, where he unsuccessfully attempted to speak to the senator
in person. His intentions on that occasion are not known.

The Result

As President Reagan emerged from the Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30,
1981, Hinckley waited in the midst of a small crowd gathered at the sidewalk
ropeline. He fired his shots virtually as fast as his finger could pull the trigger. Of
six shots fired, one bullet struck Press Secretary James Brady in the forehead, one
struck Metropolitan Police Officer Thomas Delahanty in the neck and one struck
Secret Service agent Timothy McCarthy in the abdomen. The bullet that struck
President Reagan first ricocheted off the limousine expending some of its explosive energy (remember, Hinckley used an exploding bullet).

President Reagan was pushed into the car by Special Agent in Charge Jerry Paar. As they evacuated, it was discovered that President Reagan had been wounded. He was rushed to George Washington University Hospital, where he underwent surgery to extract a bullet lodged near his heart. It was feared by some that the President’s age might inhibit his recovery, but history shows that not to be the case. President Reagan made a full recovery, served two presidential terms, and is healthy in retirement.

Presidential Press Secretary Brady was brain-injured and his recovery was incomplete.

Officer Delahanty recovered insufficiently from his wound to continue with the Metropolitan Police Department. He retired on disability.

Special Agent McCarthy recovered from a severe abdominal wound and continued his career in the Secret Service.

A search of Hinckley’s room at the Park Central Hotel in Washington revealed an unmailed letter to Jodie Foster in which he stated his intention to kill President Reagan to gain her attention.

Additional searches of Hinckley’s vehicle and his room at his parents’ home revealed several pertinent items. Ammunition and used targets were recovered as well as a photograph depicting Hinckley pointing a revolver at his own head. There were books, magazines and newspaper articles concerning President Reagan, the
assassination of President Kennedy, the attempted assassination of Governor Wallace, the murder of John Lennon and the death of Elvis Presley.

As Hinckley was completing his assault, Secret Service agents subdued and arrested him. He was charged with attempting to assassinate the President under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1751, and with assaulting a federal officer under Section 111 of the same criminal code.

A psychiatric evaluation was ordered and he was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder and depression.

He was eventually found competent to stand trial, which was held from May 4 through June 21, 1982. The issue of the trial was not his commission of the assault, but his mental state at the time. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he remains.

Summary of Presidential Assassination Events

From 1969 through 1992, five men occupied the office of President of the United States spanning virtually six full presidential terms. During this period approximately three dozen men and women ran as serious major-party or viable third-party aspirants to that highest office. There occurred five attempted assassinations, four directed against incumbent presidents and one against a presidential candidate. Tables 1 and 2 reflect these attacks chronologically and appear on pages 69 and 71.
President Gerald R. Ford has the dubious distinction of being the only president in history thus far to suffer more than one attempt against his life. Those attempts in 1975 happened in a span of less than three weeks and the second was found not to be a copycat incident. Of the five presidents serving through the research period, only Jimmy Carter and George Bush avoided attack. However, since John Hinckley was known to have stalked President Carter before shooting President Reagan, and President Bush was stalked by Deborah Butler (see Prologue), their avoidance of an assault appears to be a matter of happenstance.

Of the five presidential assassination events, four occurred in connection with public events at which the victim appeared. Only President Nixon was intended to be attacked in the White House. And in connection with the assaults at public events, all occurred as the victim was in movement departing the event.

The city venues offer a more mixed view. In two of the attempts (Wallace and Reagan), the assassin traveled inter-city to their victims. Arthur Bremer in fact traveled to several cities (including Kalamazoo) in his stalking of Governor Wallace. In the two attempts against President Ford, the victim traveled to the cities where the respective assassins resided.

The four presidents attacked were Republicans, although Hinckley initially stalked Jimmy Carter, a Democrat. The presidential candidate target was a third-party independent (and formerly a Democrat), although his assailant initially stalked a Republican President. Since Republicans dominated the presidency during this study, and target changes were made by two assassins (Bremer and Hinckley), party
affiliation is not a relevant factor supportable by the data. Significant commonalties such as political philosophy, policies or surrounding controversy could not be found among the victims. Ironically, President Ford, the only president to experience two attacks, enjoyed a generally amiable public image.

All five presidential assailants were diagnosed as suffering from emotional disorders and all were deemed to have used the act of assassination as an attention-seeking device. However, this commonalty was manifested in motives unique to each of the individuals. The respective president or candidate was clearly a symbolic target of each of the five assassins. The assaults were attempts to attract public attention to their issues not at all related directly to the presidency.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Method/Result</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/12/72</td>
<td>George C. Wallace, Governor of Alabama Presidential candidate</td>
<td>Handgun/ Shot and wounded, survived</td>
<td>Laurel, Maryland/ outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/74</td>
<td>Richard Nixon, President</td>
<td>Suicide attack with airplane/thwarted before take-off, President unharmed</td>
<td>Baltimore, Maryland &amp; Washington, DC/ indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/75</td>
<td>Gerald Ford, President</td>
<td>Handgun/gun seized before firing, President unharmed</td>
<td>Sacramento, California/ outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Method/Result</td>
<td>Venue</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/22/75</td>
<td>Gerald Ford, President</td>
<td>Handgun/Shot fired, missed target, President unharmed</td>
<td>San Francisco, California/ outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/30/81</td>
<td>Ronald Reagan President</td>
<td>Handgun/ Shot and wounded, survived</td>
<td>Washington, DC/ outdoor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1—continued
Table 2
Assailant - Motive: U.S. Assassinations/Attempts (Presidential)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Assailant</th>
<th>Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>5/12/72 Wallace</td>
<td>Arthur Herman Bremer</td>
<td>Seeking attention for a perceived hopelessness of his life, diagnosed emotional disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/22/74 Nixon</td>
<td>Samuel Joseph Byck</td>
<td>Attempt to carry out a nihilistic plan, diagnosed emotional disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/75 Ford</td>
<td>Lynette Alice Fromme</td>
<td>Seeking attention for legal plight of cult leader Charles Manson, diagnosed emotional disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/22/75 Ford</td>
<td>Sara Jane More</td>
<td>Seeking attention due to stresses of being a police informer and member of the radical underground, diagnosed emotional disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/30/81 Reagan</td>
<td>John Warnock Hinckley</td>
<td>Seeking the attention of his love interest, actress Jodie Foster, diagnosed emotional disorder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER V

CASE STUDIES - NON-PRESIDENTIAL

During the years 1969 through 1992 there occurred eighteen events involving nineteen victims that fulfill the definitional parameters of assassination used in this research. A brief synopsis of each event follows.

Non-Presidential Victims

Joseph A. Yablonski

Joseph A. "Jock" Yablonski, an opposition leader in the United Mine Workers, was shot and killed in his home in Washington, Pennsylvania, on December 21, 1969. Also murdered in the break-in of his residence were his wife and daughter. Paul E. Gilly, Claude E. Vealey and Aubran W. "Buddy" Martin were arrested and convicted of the murders. A conspiracy was uncovered and United Mine Workers President W.A. "Tony" Boyle was convicted of ordering the killing. A Boyle Lieutenant, Albert E. Pass, was convicted as the person actually hiring the gunmen on Boyle's behalf. Boyle had Yablonski killed because Yablonski had continued in his effort to unseat Boyle as the union president, alleging Boyle's corruption, misappropriation of union funds and tampering with union elections.
Larry N. Kuriyama

Larry N. Kuriyama, State Senator, Hawaii, was shot and killed outside his home in Honolulu on October 23, 1970. Ronald Ching, an assassin believed to have been hired by organized crime, confessed to the murder. It was alleged, but unproven, that he had been hired by Larry Mehau, described as the "godfather" of Hawaiian organized crime. Mehau was reportedly a close friend and supporter of then-Governor George Ariyoshi and it was further alleged that the assassination was accomplished on behalf of Ariyoshi. Those allegations remain unproven.

Marcus A. Foster

Marcus A. Foster, Superintendent of Schools, Oakland, California, was shot and killed outside his office on November 6, 1973. Russell Little and Joseph Remiro, members of the radical underground Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), murdered Foster because of certain school administration policies that were opposed by the SLA. An assistant to Foster, who was not a target of the assassination, had accompanied Foster and was also shot and seriously wounded. Although Little and Remiro were convicted of the murders, their convictions were later overturned because of a legal issue in their trial. The fact that they were the killers was not in question.
James Lawless

James Lawless, Superior Court Judge, State of Washington, was killed on June 3, 1974, by a pipe bomb mailed to his Spokane office. Ricky Anthony Young was identified and convicted of the murder. Young, who was on probation for a previous offense, killed the judge because he was angry about an upcoming hearing in the judge's court to revoke his probation and incarcerate him.

James R. Hoffa

James R. "Jimmy" Hoffa, President, Teamsters Union, disappeared following a meeting at a restaurant in Bloomfield Township, Michigan, a Detroit suburb, on July 30, 1975. Although his body has not been recovered and his disappearance remains unsolved, speculation has run rampant. Conventional wisdom presumes Hoffa to be dead at the hands of organized crime with which he had an association. The disposition of his body has become the subject of legends.

Orlando Letelier

Orlando Letelier, a former Defense Minister in the cabinet of the Allende Administration, Chile, was killed as he drove in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976, by a bomb which had been planted in his car. Letelier was openly and harshly critical of the Pinochet regime and its human rights abuses at that time.
Townley, an American national who was an agent of DINA (Direccion de Intelligencia Nacional), the Chilean secret police, was identified as the assassin.

**George Moscone and Harvey Milk**

George Moscone, Mayor of San Francisco, California, and Harvey Milk, Supervisor, were shot and killed in their City Hall offices on November 27, 1978. A former Supervisor, Dan White, was arrested at the scene. White killed the mayor because he was denied reappointment as Supervisor. The conservative White killed Milk for Milk's open homosexuality and his strong advocacy of homosexual rights. Milk also opposed White's reappointment. White's mental state at the time of the offense became a trial issue with the defense alleging White's impaired capacity because of stress and the debilitating effects of junk food. This became known as the "Twinkie defense." White was convicted of manslaughter and imprisoned for seven years, which enraged the homosexual community and caused them to riot in San Francisco. Shortly after his release, White committed suicide.

**William Hawkins**

William Hawkins, Mayor of Phoenix, Illinois, was shot and killed outside his home on October 16, 1979. He was murdered by two Phoenix police officers, Thomas Childs and Bobby Joe Anderson, who were allegedly contracted to do so by the Phoenix Chief of Police, Christopher Barton. Investigators first believed that the motive was because the mayor had cracked down on police corruption in connection
with bribes from a house of prostitution. Investigators later believed that the mayor was himself involved in the corruption and the murder resulted from a dispute among criminals. It was never conclusively established which of the scenarios was factual. Childs was convicted of the murder, but Anderson was acquitted despite a statement from Childs. Evidence was insufficient to prosecute Barton.

**John H. Wood**

John H. Wood, U.S. District Judge, was shot and killed in San Antonio, Texas, on November 29, 1979. Charles V. Harrelson (father of television actor Woody Harrelson) was apprehended and convicted of the murder. He was allegedly hired to kill Judge Wood by Jamiel Chagra, a reputed drug smuggler, who was not prosecuted because evidence against him was insufficient.

**Janet Smith**

Janet Smith, Mayor of St. Albans, Vermont, was shot and killed at her home on March 16, 1980, one week after assuming office. Mayor Smith was murdered by Tauno Jarva, a long-time domestic employee, who was disgruntled over being fired by the mayor.

**Russell G. Lloyd**

Russell G. Lloyd, a former Mayor of Evansville, Indiana, was shot and killed by Evansville resident Julie VanOrden. Ms. VanOrden was involved in a property
use dispute with the City of Evansville and was unaware at the time she shot Mr. Lloyd that he was no longer mayor.

Henry A. Gentile

Henry A. Gentile, a Municipal Judge in Chicago, Illinois, was shot and killed in his courtroom on October 21, 1983, by a former Chicago policeman, Hutchie T. Moore. The judge was murdered as he presided over a divorce proceeding in which Mr. Moore was a party. Mr. Moore, who was confined to a wheelchair, also shot and killed the attorney representing his wife.

Alan Berg

Alan Berg, a radio talk-show host, was shot and killed outside his home in Denver, Colorado, on June 18, 1984. He was murdered by Bruce Pierce and David Lane, members of the anti-Semitic, right-wing group The Order, a splinter cell of the racist Aryan Nation. Both were charged and convicted in connection with federal civil rights law violations, but two other associates, Jean Craig and Richard Scutari, were acquitted. The alleged organizer of the assassination, Robert Matthews, was killed later in 1984 in a shootout with agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Alex Odeh

Alex Odeh, the Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination League, was killed on October 11, 1985, by a bomb planted in his office in Los Angeles,
California. The assassin(s) was not identified, but was believed to be a member or members of the radical Jewish Defense League in a demonstration/retaliation in the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

W.L. Bailey

W.L. Bailey, a Municipal Judge in Pensacola, Florida, was shot and killed in his courthouse chambers on July 28, 1987, by Clyde Melvin. Judge Bailey was presiding over a divorce case involving Melvin, who believed he was being treated disadvantageously. Melvin also murdered his wife’s attorney and his sister-in-law, who were also in the courthouse at the time.

Robert C. Vance

Robert C. Vance, a U.S. Court of Appeals Judge, was killed on December 16, 1989, by a parcel bomb mailed to his office in Birmingham, Alabama, by a white supremacist, Walter Leroy Moody, Jr. Judge Vance was widely known for his pro-civil rights judicial decisions.

Meir Kahane

Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the radical Jewish Defense League, was shot and killed on a New York City street on November 5, 1990. El Sayyid Nosair, an Arab activist and suspected terrorist, was arrested and charged with Kahane’s
murder. He was not convicted of the murder, but was convicted of possession of a firearm in connection with the slaying. This incident was another demonstration/retaliation in connection with the conflict in the Middle East.

**Manuel de Dios Unanue**

Manuel de Dios Unanue, a journalist and editor of a Spanish-language newspaper and Spanish-language magazines published in New York, was shot and killed in a restaurant in Queens, New York on March 11, 1992. Investigators determined that a contract for de Dios’ murder was offered in the amount of $20,000 by Jose Santacruz Londono, an alleged kingpin of the Cali drug cartel in Colombia. Another cartel member, John Mena, actually arranged the killing, which was carried out by Alejandro Wilson Mejia Velez, then sixteen years old. De Dios was an outspoken and ardent crusader against drugs and had written many revealing articles about the Colombian drug cartels, the Cali cartel in particular. Mejia and Mena were indicated by a New York grand jury and arrested. Their cases are currently pending.

**Summary of Non-Presidential Assassination Events**

From 1969 through 1992, the United States experienced eighteen non-presidential assassination events. One event resulted in two assassination victims. All nineteen victims were killed as a result of the attacks. Eighteen of the victims were men. Eleven of the victims were elected officials or candidates to an election. Tables 3 and 4, which appear on pages 82 and 84, chronologically reflect these events.
The assassinations occurred in all regions of the United States with no significant concentration in any one area. There was no identifiable geographic pattern. Eleven of eighteen attacks occurred indoors. The outdoor attacks exhibited the same characteristic as the presidential incidents in that the victim was arriving or departing a site.

The gun was the preferred method of assassination with fourteen victims killed in this manner. Bombs were used in four of the attacks and the method of attack against one (Hoffa) remains unknown.

The assailants were identified in fifteen of the incidents. Six attacks were committed by multiple assailants. Three attacks resulted in ancillary murders of family members or associates not meeting the definitional criteria of an assassination victim.

Motives could be reasonably established by the data even in those cases in which the assailant(s) failed to be identified. The victims were known for views or activities with the potential to provoke assassination. In each of those cases no credible alternative explanation could be developed.

Five assassinations, those of Yablonski, Kuriyama, Hawkins, Wood and de Dios could be identified as murder by contract. Considering his known organized crime connections, in a different context to be sure, the assassination of Hoffa is strongly suspected to have been a contract killing, as well.

Five assassinations, those of Foster, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane, dramatized political causes. The victims were symbolic as well as personal targets.
One assassination, Letelier, was accomplished by an agency of a foreign government for the purpose of silencing a vocal critic of the ruling elite. The assassination of de Dios was very similar, except that it originated from foreign-based organized crime. Although the assassinations of Odeh and Kahane likely had foreign connections, the assassination of Letelier remains unique among assassinations in this research.

Also unique was the single event involving the assassinations of Moscone and Milk. The killing of Moscone was the result of a personal grievance against the mayor for his failure to reappoint the assailant to the position of Supervisor. The grievance against Milk was more symbolic in connection with Milk's open homosexuality and advocacy of homosexual causes, although Milk also openly opposed White's reappointment. Nevertheless, essentially different motives provoked two assassinations within one event.

Five assassinations, those of Lawless, Smith, Lloyd, Gentile and Bailey, were for reasons of personal grievances. Only the killing of Mayor Smith apparently had no connection with her official position. The assassins of Lawless, Lloyd, Gentile and Bailey had very personal motives stemming from official activities of the victims. Ironically, through a tragic miscalculation by the assailant, Lloyd was actually no longer a public official at the time of the attack against him.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Method/Result</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/31/69</td>
<td>Joseph A. Yablonski, Union opposition leader, United Mine Workers</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Washington, PA/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/70</td>
<td>Larry N. Kuriyama, State Senator, Hawaii</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI/outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/6/73</td>
<td>Marcus A. Foster, Superintendent of Schools, Oakland, CA</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Oakland, CA/outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/3/74</td>
<td>James Lawless, Superior Court Judge, State of Washington</td>
<td>Bomb/killed</td>
<td>Spokane, WA/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/75</td>
<td>James R. Hoffa, President, Teamsters Union</td>
<td>Unknown/presumed killed</td>
<td>Bloomfield Township, MI/unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/21/76</td>
<td>Orlando Letelier, former Defense Minister, Allende Administration, Government of Chile</td>
<td>Bomb/killed</td>
<td>Washington, DC/outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27/78</td>
<td>George Moscone, Mayor Harvey Milk, Supervisor City of San Francisco</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/79</td>
<td>William Hawkins, Mayor City of Phoenix, IL</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Phoenix, IL/outdoor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Method/Result</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/16/80</td>
<td>Janet Smith, Mayor City of St. Albans, VT</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>St. Albans, VT/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22/80</td>
<td>Russell G. Lloyd Former mayor, City of Evansville, IN</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Evansville, IN/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/21/83</td>
<td>Henry A. Gentile Municipal Judge City of Chicago</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Chicago, IL/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18/84</td>
<td>Alan Berg Radio talk-show host</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Denver, CO/outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/85</td>
<td>Alex Odeh, Director American-Arab Anti-Discrimination League</td>
<td>Bomb/killed</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/87</td>
<td>W.L. Bailey Municipal Judge Pensacola, FL</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Pensacola, FL/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/89</td>
<td>Robert C. Vance U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge</td>
<td>Bomb/killed</td>
<td>Birmingham, AL/indoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/5/90</td>
<td>Meir Kahane, Rabbi Founder, Jewish Defense League</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>New York, NY/outdoor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/92</td>
<td>Manuel de Dios Unanue Editor and journalist</td>
<td>Gun/killed</td>
<td>Queens, NY/indoor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Assailant - Motive: U.S. Assassinations/Attempts (Non-Presidential)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Assailant(s)</th>
<th>Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/31/69</td>
<td>Paul E. Gilly</td>
<td>Contract killing by U.M.W. President W.A. &quot;Tony&quot; Boyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yablonski</td>
<td>Claude E. Vealey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aubran W. Martin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/70</td>
<td>Ronald Ching and others unidentified</td>
<td>Contract killing by Hawaiian organized crime elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuriyama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/6/73</td>
<td>Russell Little</td>
<td>Demonstration of causes espoused by the Symbionese Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster</td>
<td>Joseph Ramiro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/3/74</td>
<td>Ricky Anthony Young</td>
<td>Upset over a pending hearing in the judge’s court to revoke Young’s probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawless</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/30/75</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Believed contract killing by organized crime elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/21/76</td>
<td>Michael Townley</td>
<td>Chilean secret police execution, victim was openly critical of ruling Pinochet regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letelier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/27/78</td>
<td>Dan White</td>
<td>Failure of mayor to renew White’s appointment as city supervisor; Milk’s openly avowed homosexuality and advocate for those causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/79</td>
<td>Thomas Childs</td>
<td>Contract killing by Phoenix police officers allegedly on behalf of their chief; public corruption possibly involving police and victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkins</td>
<td>Bobby J. Anderson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Assailant(s)</td>
<td>Motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/29/79</td>
<td>Charles V. Harrelson</td>
<td>Contract killing allegedly on behalf of Jamiel Chagra, an accused drug smuggler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/16/80</td>
<td>Tauno Jarvis</td>
<td>Domestic employee of victim, disgruntled over firing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22/80</td>
<td>Julie Van Orden</td>
<td>Property dispute with city; assailant unaware victim was no longer mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/21/83</td>
<td>Hutchie T. Moore</td>
<td>Killed both judge and lawyer representing assailant's spouse in divorce case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18/84</td>
<td>Bruce Pierce, David Lane</td>
<td>Killed for liberal political views by right-wing, anti-Semitic group The Order (Aryan Nation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/85</td>
<td>Unidentified member,</td>
<td>Demonstration of Arab-Israeli conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeh</td>
<td>Jewish Defense League</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/28/87</td>
<td>Clyde Melvin</td>
<td>Judge presided over divorce case in which Melvin believed he was being treated disadvantageously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/89</td>
<td>Unidentified member,</td>
<td>Racially motivated because of judge's pro-civil rights case rulings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance</td>
<td>&quot;Americans for a Competent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Judiciary&quot; (previously</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/5/90</td>
<td>El Sayyid Nosair</td>
<td>Demonstration of Arab-Israeli conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Assailant(s)</td>
<td>Motive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/11/92</td>
<td>Alejandro Mejia Velez</td>
<td>Victim an anti-drug crusader, contract by Cali, Colombia, drug cartel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>John Mena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jose Santacruz Londono</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This research was able to examine twenty-three assassination events, five of them at the presidential level, which occurred in the United States from 1969 through 1992. The data were first presented as descriptive case study narratives. Relevant factors were then extracted and listed in tables enabling the reader easier comparative access. Appropriate to this approach, analytical generalizations will be proffered in lieu of inferential statistics (Yin, 1989).

The format of this section will be to first analyze the data reflecting the respective research questions from Chapter III. Analysis of the data reflecting the National Commission hypothesis will follow. The section will conclude with analysis of any ancillary findings.

Frequency

A research question asked, are there any changes in the frequency of presidential assassinations/attempts during the research period by comparison with the time period of the National Commission study? The National Commission discovered than an average of one in four presidents as having been assassination targets prior to 1969 (1969, p. 10). Clark Larsen observed that six of nine presidents since World War II have been attacked, resulting in the death of one and the serious injury to

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The typology of James W. Clarke is more useful for categorizing the presidential assassination incidents. His focus on the situational factors and underlying motives allow typing of the people who commit the acts. His typology centers on the assassin, not the assassination. This makes his typology dependant upon collecting an abundance of data concerning the assassin, which is generally available in these high-profile assassinations.

There exists, however, a flaw in Clarke's typology. His model does not readily accommodate a hired assassin, a for-profit killer if you will. The typology of J. Bowyer Bell by contrast clearly identified a category of killers that are willing to assassinate simply for financial gain (1979, p. 54). The National Commission typology, focusing upon types of events rather than types of assassins, can accommodate a hired killer in the context of its first four types (the fifth type deals with irrational psychotics). A hired killer could coincidentally fit into Clarke's types, but not by design. If profit is the sole motivator, that person is atypical to Clarke's typology. To illustrate, Clarke found James Earl Ray, the assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to be atypical. Ray in fact has long been suspected of being a hired assassin and it could be this consideration that made the typing of Ray problematic for Clarke. Nevertheless, the presidential-related data of this study, which come from the period after King's assassination, clearly support Clarke's typology.

Both the National Commission and Clarke typologies for different reasons pose difficulties in relating to non-presidential events. Assassinations committed for non-
political motives are atypical in the National Commission typology, although the events may fulfill its definitional parameters of assassination. It was not demonstrable by the data that the assassins of Lawless, Moscone, Milk, Smith, Lloyd, Gentile and Bailey were irrational mentally ill people that would enable their attacks to be categorized into Type V. Their situations are clearly inappropriate to the remaining types.

The Clarke typology encounters difficulty in typing the contract killers of Yablonski, Kuriyama, Hawkins and de Dios. If the assassination of Hoffa was in fact murder-for-hire, as suspected, the assassin(s) would likewise be atypical. Again, while those assassins may exhibit traits described in Clarke’s types, it was a financial motive and not those psychological traits that induced them to kill or at least induced them to kill the specific target for which they were hired.

As a practical matter, one other difficulty is encountered in utilizing Clarke’s typology in non-presidential assassinations. Unless the person who is assassinated is prominent with the intense scrutiny, media coverage, and availability of information that normally accompanies such prominence, there is generally a paucity of the essential background, psychological and situational information available regarding the assassin in order to assign a type. That is not to say that the typology is not applicable, but it suggests that a researcher is likely to encounter great difficulty, if not impossibility, in gathering sufficient data to make typing meaningful. This, of course, is not likely to ever be a problem in evaluating presidential assassinations, assuming the assassin is identified.
Test of Hypothesis

A hypothesis developed by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence formed a major focus for analysis in this research. The hypothesis states that the higher the office, the more impersonal and political the motive is for assassination; and the lower the office, the more personal and less political the motive is for assassination. A comparison of the two levels of the assassination phenomenon, presidential and non-presidential, brought the meaning of the hypothesis into sharper focus and allowed for a more expansive test of it than in the research of the National Commission.

All five presidential assailants were diagnosed as suffering from emotional disorders and all were deemed to have used the act of assassination as an attention-getting device. But this commonality was manifested by underlying motives unique to each of the individuals. The president or candidate was clearly a symbolic target of each of the five assassins. The assaults were attempts to attract public attention to their own issues not at all related to the presidency. In regard to attracting attention, each of their attacks succeeded, although no fatalities resulted. In such a symbolic act the victim’s death was not a prerequisite to claim some success.

The four presidents attacked were Republicans, although Hinckley initially stalked Jimmy Carter, a Democrat. George Wallace was a third-party independent candidate (and formerly a Democrat), although his assailant initially stalked a Republican president (Nixon). Since Republicans dominated the presidency during
the study period and target changes were made by two assailants (Bremer and Hinckley), a party affiliation is not a relevant factor supportable by the data. Significant commonalties such as political philosophy, policies or surrounding controversy (although Byck did refer to Watergate before attacking President Nixon) did not appear in the data. In fact, President Ford, the only president to experience two attacks, enjoyed a generally amiable public image. The National Commission observed that the assassin is able to kill a president because the office is the target rather than the officeholder (1969, p. 68). Our modern assassins have had remarkably little animosity toward their victims. The president becomes symbolic of society rather than presenting a partisan officeholder (1969, p. 98). J. Bowyer Bell deemed the individuals most dangerous to presidents as those suffering social isolation that "... adapt to stress by symbolizing their problems in a political idiom identified with the president" (1979, p. 74). Thus, based on all the above materials, it can be said that these data support the first half of the hypothesis that the higher the office, the more impersonal and political the motive for assassination.

The motives of the presidential assassins, although reflecting individual agendas, were symbolic acts with little or no personal animosity toward their victims. Non-presidential assassinations, however, revealed more diverse motives. There were contract killings to eliminate opposition, killings on behalf of causes, and killings for very individual personal grievances. Invariably the victims were selected for things they said, did or represented.
With respect to the second half of the hypothesis that the lower the level the official, the more personal and less political the motive is for assassination, the cases presented herein tend to be supportive but inconclusive. Of eighteen persons assassinated, six (Foster, Milk, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane) can be termed as symbolic and personal killings for political reasons. To be sure, the majority of the non-presidential murders were based upon specific personal grievances against the victims. The National Commission found that "... a very small portion of the deadly attacks against officeholders was rationally calculated to advance political aims of the assassin" (1969, p. 10). This seems at some variance with the data of this study. Consider, in non-presidential assassinations presented in this report, clearly eleven (Yablonski, Kuriyama, Foster, Letelier, Hawkins, Wood, Berg, Odeh, Vance, Kahane and de Dios) of the eighteen incidents had some rationally planned political impact.

None of the presidential assassination attempts during this period could be attributed to a paid assassin, unlike several of the non-presidential attacks. Paid assassins are likely to be reluctant to attempt a presidential murder because of greater perceived problems of detection and escape due to the presence of large numbers of law enforcement personnel. Escape is a prerequisite to their success.

All presidential attacks studied were perpetrated by individuals acting alone. Six non-presidential events were known to have the involvement of more than one individual. It is highly probable that, given the circumstances of the assassinations, the murders of Hoffa and Odeh may also have involved multiple assailants.
The National Commission found that officials killed by members of organized crime either involved themselves in activities with the criminals or their activities threatened the organized crime status quo (1969, p. 11). Those victims in this research who were attacked by or on behalf of organized crime were invariably found to fulfill one of these criteria.

The National Commission observed that assassinations of members of the judiciary had little discernible political content (1969, p. 38). This study contained the murders of five judges. Only the killing of U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Robert Vance in 1989 could be connected to a political motive (his position and rulings on civil rights matters). The remaining judges were murdered for specific, personal reasons in connection with court cases over which they presided.

Thus, for the second half of the hypothesis the data are not conclusive.

Gender, Race, Ethnicity

For the first time women appeared as presidential assassins (Note: Mary Surratt's participation in the Lincoln assassination considered spurious by many historians). If one considers Deborah Butler as having represented a serious potential threat to President Bush (see Prologue), then the involvement of women is even greater than the data presented in the body of this report. In any event, two of five presidential assailants from the case studies are women. Only one non-presidential attack could be attributed to a woman. This data suggests that women have clearly become full participants as presidential assailants.
Racial minorities, however, continue to be absent from the list of presidential attackers. At least three non-presidential assassinations (Foster, Hawkins and Gentile) were known to have been committed by members of racial minorities. Gentile was murdered by a member of a racial minority who was confined to a wheelchair, which constituted the only assault by a physically disabled person. Odeh and Kahane were killed by members of distinct ethnic groups. However, no conclusions based on race or ethnicity seem warranted by the data.

Assassinations of Letelier and de Dios were essentially "foreign" assassinations accomplished on American soil and are unique in this research. No conclusions, however, can be made in that regard.

This chapter has addressed the following issues vis-a-vis presidential and non-presidential assassinations and attempts: comparative frequency of presidential assaults, macro and micro venues of presidential and non-presidential incidents, weapons used at both levels of assassination, and the comparative mortality of presidential and non-presidential attacks. The issue of whether or not the act of assassination constitutes political participation was also explored. The present data was used to test the typologies of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and of James W. Clarke, which approached the assassination phenomenon from very different perspectives. Finally, one hypothesis was tested using qualitative rather than quantitative techniques and found that the data was overall supportive of the hypothesis.
another (1986, p. 1). In summing up the frequency of attacks in his 1977 study, James McKinley predicted that the next presidential assault would occur not later than 1984 (1977, p. 223). This turned out, of course, to be a conservative estimate with the attempt on the life of President Reagan in 1981. Prior to 1969, thirty-six presidents suffered seven assassinations/attempts over a period of 181 years. One of six presidents, one president-elect and one presidential candidate were attacked with an average interval of twenty-two years. During the period of this research, three of five presidents and one presidential candidate were attacked with an average interval of four and one-half years. This increase is reflected in the data presented in Table 5. No other similar block of time in American history can be created to simulate the assassination frequency of the research period. It should be noted that these data demonstrate past activity and may be of very limited value as a predictor. The issue of frequency cannot effectively be addressed with respect to non-presidential assassination events, as equivalent data for the pre-1969 period was not compiled for this research. All that can be said in that regard is that there were numerically more non-presidential attacks than presidential attacks in the time period of this study.
Table 5

Frequency of Presidential Assassinations/Attempts by Decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Victim (year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1789 - 1799</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 1809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810 - 1819</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820 - 1829</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830 - 1839</td>
<td>Andrew Jackson (1835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840 - 1849</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850 - 1859</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 - 1869</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln (1865)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870 - 1879</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880 - 1889</td>
<td>James A. Garfield (1881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890 - 1899</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 1909</td>
<td>William McKinley (1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 - 1919</td>
<td>Theodore Roosevelt - candidate (1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 - 1929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 - 1939</td>
<td>Franklin D. Roosevelt - President-elect (1932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 - 1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1959</td>
<td>Harry S. Truman (1950)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Victim (year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Nixon (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Gerald R. Ford (1975)</td>
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<td>Gerald R. Ford (1975)</td>
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Venues

Can any macro or micro trends in assassination venues be identified? Of the five presidential assassination events during the study period, four occurred in connection with public events at which the victim appeared. Only President Nixon was to be attacked in the White House. In connection with assaults at public events, all occurred as the victims were in movement departing the event. By contrast, eleven of eighteen non-presidential attacks occurred indoors at both public and private places. The non-presidential incidents that took place outdoors exhibited the same characteristic as presidential incidents in that the victims were arriving or departing respective sites.
The city venues offer a more mixed view. In two of the presidential attempts (Wallace and Reagan) the assassins traveled inter-city to their victims. In fact, Bremer had stalked Nixon in Ontario earlier in the year, and Wallace in Michigan and New York, prior to his attack. In the two attempts against President Ford and the one against President Nixon, the assassins resided near the sites where the incidents occurred. Presidential and non-presidential assassination events occurred in all regions of the United States with no significant saturation in any one area.

Considering both macro and micro venue issues, no conclusions seem warranted by the data.

Method

Is there any common assassination method? Four of five persons who attempted assassination at the presidential level used handguns of various calibers. Bremer, Moore and Hinckley used revolvers and Fromme used a semi-automatic pistol. Ironically, it was to President Ford's good fortune that Fromme selected the weapon she did, because she was apparently unaware that she had to place a bullet into the gun's chamber to be capable of firing. A very strong argument can be made that this oversight saved the President's life.

In non-presidential assassinations, guns were likewise the preferred weapons with fourteen of the victims assaulted thusly. However, another type of weapon, the bomb, was used in four of the murders. The type of weapon used against Hoffa is not known.
Samuel Byck’s planned use of a jetliner as a weapon deserves special mention. His intention to kill President Nixon by this method should be considered an aberration and perhaps a product of mental illness. The efficacy of using an aircraft to target a specific individual is tenuous at best and would require the ultimate refinement of the World War II kamikaze technique. Further, in an apparent leap of faith, Byck must have assumed that President Nixon would be at the White House, where the airplane was to be crashed.

Based on the data, guns remain the favored tool of assassins in America.

Mortality

Are there any differences in mortality between presidential and non-presidential assassination events? As presidential and non-presidential incidents are juxtaposed, it is glaringly apparent that presidential attacks during the study period resulted in no fatalities, while victims of all the non-presidential assaults were killed.

Besides chance, there are a few possible explanations for the difference in outcome. Presidents and presidential candidates receive protection from the Secret Service. While history has demonstrated that this is far from foolproof in preventing attacks, a competent protective force most certainly places obstacles and limitations on the assassin’s access to the protected person. Conversely, without those limitations of access, typical of non-presidential victims, assassins enjoy a greater selection of target opportunities to better ensure that the assault is lethal.
The issue of access coordinates with another difference: all but one presidential attack occurred in conjunction with public appearances by the victims. By contrast, all non-presidential assassinations occurred in private settings. For example, although Orlando Letelier was killed on a public street in Washington, he was not attending a public event and was in the privacy of his car, in which the bomb had been planted.

Further, within the planning efforts of the Secret Service, presidential victims have more immediate availability to emergency medicine in the event they are assaulted. The possible need for medical care is anticipated. There was nothing in the data to indicate that any of the non-presidential victims anticipated a need for medical care or were able to seek it in any timely fashion.

The data of this research leads one to conclude that non-presidential assassination attempts are more likely to result in lethal outcomes than presidential assassination attempts.

Political Participation

Do the data support including assassination as an act of political participation? "What many historians regard as the work of an unbalanced mind may in reality be the work of a mind using the symbolic content of government institutions for its own psychic needs. To say that this is not in part a political act is erroneous..." (National Commission, 1969, p. 102).
If one considers this issue from the perspective of victimology, then it would be difficult to argue that all the events presented herein are not political participation. This inference would be based on outcomes that necessarily had at least some political ramifications.

However, it is upon the intentions of the assailants which we must focus. After all, it is the assailant who is the alleged political participant. The fact that presidential assassins in this research have pursued a political outlet in which to make their symbolic statements compels one to consider their acts to be the extreme in negative political participation. It is through a political outlet, albeit a destructive one, that they sought to create change as they perceived it.

Lester Milbrath focused his book on the decisions an individual makes whether or not to participate politically, and, if so, the intensity and duration of the participation (1965, p. 6). In establishing a hierarchy of political action, he emphasized that his hierarchy is not intended to describe acts "...designed to disrupt the normal operation of democratic political processes or to dislodge a regime from office by violent means..." (1965, p. 18). He chose to have his model reflect positive and conventional acts of political input.

Milbrath acknowledged that some potential participants fail to participate because they have a sense of anomie, a term coined by Emile Durkheim. In defining his use of this concept, Milbrath said, "Anomic persons exhibit a lack of values and lack of direction; they feel ineffective; they tend to believe that authority figures do not care about them; activity loses its point and urgency" (1965, p. 78). While
reserving his hierarchy for those activities which positively reinforce the political process, Milbrath seems to acknowledge the pull of negative forces, which at the extreme could include assassination. His "anomic" person would describe some of the assassins in this study and form a basis in part for Clarke's typology.

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie defined political participation as "... those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (1972), p. 2). Although they included in their research instruments only positive activities such as regular voting, donating money and participation in civic causes, their definition of political participation does not appear to exclude the act of assassination. Further, they argued against hierarchies of political participation such as that developed by Milbrath. They asserted that those hierarchies implied that one who engages in an act requiring the greatest effort necessarily has participated in those acts of lesser efforts (1972, pp. 44-45). Their criticism supports an inference in the present study that assassins participate at the level of greatest effort and may well omit participation at lower levels. The actions of any assassin whose sole political participation is his/her act of assassination would be vindicated by the criticism of Verba and Nie, which rejected the idea of a progressive hierarchy. Lower levels of participation would not necessarily be a prerequisite for an act of assassination, and, in fact, would be unlikely actions of persons who view the society or their own circumstances as normless or meaningless (anomic persons).
David Horton Smith and associates defined unconventional political behavior as "... acts of disruption, destruction, and injury within a political community against the political regime, its actors, or its policies" (1980, p. 134). This definition readily accommodates the definition of assassination used in this research. Assassination may in fact be the ultimate extension of their definition.

In further focusing upon unconventional participation and drawing from Milbrath, Smith observed that "... if alienation is both an instigation to political violence and a cause of apathy and withdrawal, additional evidence is needed to determine when one or the other will occur" (1980, p. 149). By asserting this duality, it further accommodates an assassin as a person who may pursue a negative direction upon receipt of a political stimulus (Milbrath, 1965, p. 18).

Robert E. Lane concluded that a person suffering emotionally may well withdraw from close personal contacts, such as with family members, but may then vigorously pursue political interests as an outlet (1959, p. 116). He further concluded that political aggression is a product of frustration and is exacerbated by problems of emotional upheaval and lack of self-control of the individual (1959, pp. 118-119). "Thus a person may reveal his characteristic manner of handling aggressive feelings by withdrawal and apathy or by launching into some outburst against a political figure ..." (1959, p. 120).

As with the other topics of this research, non-presidential assassins present a more mixed picture with respect to the issue as to whether their acts constitute political participation or not. There can be no doubt that a government agent killing
a member of the political opposition (Letelier) is an intentional political participant in the politics of his own country, Chile, in this instance. Likewise, those persons that kill to demonstrate a political cause or grievance (for instance, the killers of Foster, Mascone, Milk, Berg, Odeh, Vance and Kahane) are participating in the political process at some level of government in the United States, albeit in a negative and unconventional format.

Presenting a different picture, however, are the hired assassins and the assassins with non-political personal reasons for their acts. They appear to lack any discernible political motives. Based on what is known about what caused them to kill, the assassins of Yablonski, Kuriyama, Lawless, Hawkins, Wood, Smith, Gentile, Bailey and de Dios (and likely Hoffa) are not political participants. Said another way, in the purely personal or contracted assaults the victims' political significance was only coincidental. It as meaningless as a motivator for the killers and they in no way had any intentions to abrogate political situations or make political statements. With respect to contract killings, however, it may be that the person or persons who offer the contracts are politically motivated and could be considered political participants even thought the actual killer cannot be so regarded.

Test of Typologies

Do the data support the typologies developed by the National Commission and/or by James W. Clarke? The National Commission found all presidential assaults, except the attack on President Truman, to be caused by the mental illness
of the assailant. James W. Clarke countered by saying that the phenomenon of assassination involves a more complex interaction of the assassin's personality and situational factors in his/her life (1990, p. 128). Interestingly, the National Commission years earlier had similarly made the observation that the assassin "... is by and large outside the main social and political stream of the society, and who is responding to cues that others are not likely to recognize" (1969, p. 44). The National Commission acknowledged, but did not develop, the types of situational factors considered by Clarke.

Nevertheless, to deem each of the presidential assassins presented in this study as a psychotic person with an irrational motive overly simplifies and grossly misrepresents their cases. Herein resides the major problem with the typology developed by the National Commission. The Commission's Type V categorizes all those mentally ill persons has having irrational motives. By the limitations that define that type, an argument can be made that none of the five presidential assassins can be adequately typed according to the criteria of the National Commission. Since the cognitive distortions of reality associated with psychosis were absent (with the possible exception of Byck), one can argue that within their own logic, each had a rational motive. That was the basis for the criticism Clarke raised in developing his own typology.

James W. Clarke asserted that in the zeal to offer neat and tidy explanations for assassinations, particularly at the presidential level, the motives of the assassins are reduced to generalities and cliches of the vagaries of mental illness (1982, p. 75).
In fact he termed this a "reductionist" explanation of American presidential assassination. He argued that by ignoring the life contexts of these individuals, some political grievances that are not necessarily irrational are likewise ignored. He said that biases are thus created that hold any deviation from that which is considered normal as evidence of mental illness. Some of that "deviance" may actually fall within ranges of normal behavior.

On the other hand, it is possible to argue that Lynette Fromme committed her act to demonstrate a perceived injustice and therefore can be categorized into the National Commission's Type IV. It may also be plausible to argue that Samuel Byck was irrationally delusional because his assassination plan was so bizarre and thus be categorized into Type V. Remaining are the issues of typing Arthur Bremer, Sara Moore and John Hinckley. Bremer and Moore were found to be mentally competent, held accountable and imprisoned. Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric hospital. However, let us not become mired in the legal issue of insanity and ignore their situations, backgrounds and underlying motives. Were their solutions to life's problems so completely irrational within the contexts of their lives? Maybe so, maybe not. In any event, their acts resist typing by National Commission criteria. In applying the data of this research, the National Commission typology appears inadequate to describe the recent American experience with presidential assassination events. The attacks of Bremer and Moore, and likely Hinckley, are atypical by their standards.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

"The Jackal: a killer at the top of his profession, a man unknown to any Secret Service in the world, an assassin with a contract to kill the world’s most heavily guarded man ..." (Forsyth, 1971). The reality of the fictional Jackal has thankfully been absent from the American experience. Nevertheless, the threat of assassination remains pernicious to American society. In this concluding section we will examine where we have been and attempt to look ahead.

Retrospective

As the phenomenon of assassination has been presented in presidential and non-presidential formats, so will this retrospective.

Presidential assassinations seem to have followed past trends. Assaults against U.S. presidents continue to be symbolic and impersonal. The assassins studied in this investigation emerged from those persons in American society suffering emotionally and feeling the sense of isolation that often results. For anyone to buy into the cliche that American presidents are killed by insane people just because they are insane grossly rationalizes a problem that then makes detection and prevention tenuous. By arguing for an approach that examines situational, psychological and background factors, James W. Clarke seriously questioned the reliability of the Type V category.
of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. That type identifies an assassination as resulting from psychotic persons with irrational motives. While some individuals may well fall within those criteria, others clearly do not. Clarke vehemently criticized that category as a caricature and its overuse for many years in the operational understanding of the United States Secret Service and other security agencies. Clarke’s argument becomes cogent when examining the presidential case studies presented herein.

As the assassination attempts of Bremer, Fromme, Moore and Hinckley were researched, there were indications that these people were aware of the nature and consequences of their acts but chose to disregard those consequences. It is important to note that this observation is independent of any legal outcomes of their cases. Using Clarke’s situational approach, however, there seemed an inevitability to their acts. In their respective life situations, an assassination seemed the only recourse, a solution to a problem that had become unbearable. An attack against a president appeared designed for the maximum focus of attention on their respective problems rather than on the death of a president. They made symbolic uses of the presidency, and there appeared a certain rationality and design to each act.

Non-presidential assassinations presented quite different issues from those presidential. Non-presidential assassinations seemed to span three broad categories of motivations: purely personal, contractual to eliminate opposition, and killings to symbolize internecine struggles. The events that were studied occasionally overlapped
these categories, but suffice it to say that the many events were discernibly different from one another and almost diametrical from the presidential assassination attempts.

Remarkable was the number of non-presidential assassinations involving organized crime. Aside from a few theories surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, organized crime has been notably absent from presidential assassinations. As possible reasons, non-presidential victims presented targets of easier access. Further, the victims' connections to organized crime, whatever the context, were direct and unambiguous. Assassinations of these lower level officials may have allowed the criminals to address their goals and grievances more directly and immediately.

This research also reflected a rising problem of courtroom violence and attacks against the judiciary. It should be noted that the sampling in this study excluded several incidents of courtroom violence as it was determined that the judge was a "bystander" and not an intended target.

Assessing Assassination Impact

Assessing the impact of assassination is speculative at best and very elusive to quantify. Havens, Clark and Leiden (1975, p. 201) observed a complication in assessing impact in that all political systems are dynamic and changing to some extent with or without the occurrence of an assassination. The National Commission concluded similarly and offered the observation that the impact of assassination differs with the type of political system and type of society (1969, pp. 6-7).
The long-term impact of individual assassinations is best left to future studies; although there are a few immediate and tangible results that can be described here.

The 1972 assassination attempt against presidential candidate George Wallace not only affected his health permanently, but also ended his ability to seriously challenge for national office. He did make a brief but unsuccessful presidential bid in 1976, but the momentum of his once viable third-party candidacy had been lost. The assassination attempt temporarily at least altered the American political landscape.

James W. Clarke (1990, p. 126) observed that when John Hinckley was found "not guilty by reason of insanity," the public and legal outcry was such that it precipitated the Defense Reform Act of 1984. That new law clarified the insanity legal defense and provided the additional verdict of "guilty but insane."

After the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan, former Press Secretary James Brady, the most seriously wounded of the victims, took up the cause of promoting national control of firearms. The prominence of his involvement has caused the proposed legislation to be popularly known as the Brady Bill.

The impact of the threat of assassination can be observed in victim behavior. When security measures increased markedly after his wounding, President Reagan said in a classic bit of understatement, "I tried it the other way once outside the Hilton Hotel. I didn't like it" (Jenkins, 1983, p. 5).

Presidents invariably undergo alterations in their styles to accommodate security measures with their interaction with the public. This flexing and trading of less exposure for greater security is the fodder of new articles particularly surrounding
new presidents unaccustomed to the restrictions of stringent security. In an article written for the Washington Times on January 15, 1993, then President-elect Clinton told reporter Frank J. Murray, "You could live your whole life in that bubble if the Secret Service had its way. You can’t let the security bubble shut you down. It’s hard enough to say in touch with people as it is." Reporter Murray noted that Clinton is not the first president to "chafe against security." On May 13, 1993, USA Today reported that, "During the campaign, he [President Clinton] would plunge into crowds, 10-deep, stretching for blocks. But Wednesday, he was followed by two limousines. The crowd was confined to half-a-block. Beyond that small tableau, the streets were cleared of civilians for two blocks in all directions."

In non-presidential assassinations, there are also indications of the impact. For instance, with the increase in courtroom violence and assaults against the judiciary, courtroom security at all levels is increasing exponentially. The public can no longer enter federal courtrooms or areas of judicial chambers without passing through metal detectors. There has been a corresponding increase in court security officers and electronic monitoring equipment. This trend is rapidly spreading into lower courts, particularly those that hear family (divorce, child custody) cases.

Paul Wilkinson (1986, p. 103) noted that assassins and terrorists can exploit those rights and freedoms that define a liberal state. They can move about in anonymity, which of course impedes detection by security forces. Security forces are likewise limited in protective measures that can be undertaken.
James McKinley (1977, p. 223) laments that despite the limitations, the extremity of modern protective precautions "... reaches a critical point of diminishing returns ... that is when the leaders of a democracy are so isolated from their constituents ... that the democratic process breaks down for want of genuine communication ..." He continued with the irony that "... our assassins, who have so many times killed for their peculiar vision of liberty, would have split a cornerstone of the nation's true freedom."

Prospective

This report has examined assassinations of the recent past in an endeavor to reveal the nature of assassination in contemporary America. Forecasting trends is tricky in any business, but a modest attempt must be made here.

Paul Wilkinson stated an observation of many (including the National Commission) that the United States exhibits a relatively low incidence of political violence, which is quite remarkable given the "... size of the population, high crime levels, the wide availability of firearms, and the plethora of ethnic, religious and ideological minority groups" (1986, p. 107).

That observation notwithstanding, the general level of violence in American society seems to have risen steadily during the period of this research. As individuals and groups continue to redress their perceived grievances through the barrel of a gun, there is no reason to expect any decline in attacks against officials. As previously reported, this violent trend has manifested itself significantly in the courtroom. If a
case is not decided in one's favor, the implication seems to be that a verdict through violence can be achieved. And current levels of job-related violence would suggest that future victims similar to George Moscone and Harvey Milk are likely. Increased security measures that are taking place would seem to signal concurrence in that prognosis. In any event, there is no reason to believe that as violence increases, public or political officials will be spared.

Presidential assassination prediction is even more tenuous. James W. Clarke (1982) readily acknowledged that his typology, though insightful, has little predictive value. Still, it is of use to the Secret Service and other interested agencies. As he reported in his follow-up study (1990, p. 128), how dangerous a person may be cannot be accurately diagnosed or predicted. The mental state and the situational factors must be considered before an evaluation of dangerousness can be conducted. There is no way presently known to predict whether or not the person will be violent, or, if so, the direction of the violence. If one examines the traits associated with each of the types of Clarke's typology, it should become apparent that many people in society suffer the identical mental and emotional illnesses experienced among assassins but never become violent. Some that do exhibit those characteristics do become violent but turn the violence on themselves, family, friends, strangers or various prominent, non-politically relevant persons.

Clarke suggested that by identifying various emotional, behavioral and situational traits, patterns may emerge in common with those of previous assassins (1990), p. 129). What caused Mark Chapman to kill John Lennon, the former
Beatle, while John Hinckley chose Ronald Reagan? Security forces must continue to operate on the premise that, if enough of these emotional/behavioral/situational factors can be discovered, potentially dangerous people can be so identified. Can this be done with any precision under the best of circumstances? The short answer is no, not with the current body of knowledge (or lack of knowledge) concerning human behavior. As Clarke probably rightly observed in his first research (1982), presidential assassinations are also the results of opportunity and circumstance. There are people in the society who might well have committed an act of assassination but never had the opportunity to do so.

The National Commission has suggested that to reduce the threat of assassination, there should be an attempt to reduce the prominence and visibility of the presidency as a symbol (1969, pp. 108-109). The attempt should be to portray the president as just another cog in the giant wheel of government. Physical exposure to the public should be limited through the ample use of television. The styles and formats of our presidential campaigns should be altered. While the National Commission's observations must be taken seriously, for the most part the suggestions are unrealistic and unworkable in the real world. Presidents will resist being cloistered and will go only so far in taking precautions. They are exceptionally political beings and will only allow so much space to be created between them and their public. Likewise there is little or no chance that the American presidential electoral process will be greatly altered from the current format, which encourages and virtually requires personal contact by the candidate with the public.
Clarke (1982) saw little value in increased domestic surveillance since it would be mostly ineffective against persons acting alone, as has been our typical assassination experience up to now. He and some of the other authors studied for insights into this research did see some value in gun control, but no one suggested it as a serious major preventative measure.

The monumental task for the Secret Service continues to be the discovery of that lone, anonymous future assassin, whoever he or she may be, while at the same time remaining vigilant for the terrorist attack that may come at any time.

Future Research

There are so many aspects to the phenomenon of assassination that create a wealth of future research possibilities. Just a few will be outlined here.

First, a caveat should be offered to future researchers. Assassination as an area of study is beset with significant obstacle, namely the paucity of primary source material. Occasionally an assassin may leave a diary behind or make a public statement, but establishing motives in particular often involves dependence on secondary source material. This is even more problematic in investigating non-presidential assassinations. Strong triangulation is suggested.

The study conducted by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969) was so far-reaching that it could not possibly be replicated within the scope of this investigation. Certain hypotheses could not be tested by the present data, but should be subject to further testing.
That National Commission concluded in a cross-national comparative study that the United States exhibited a high relative incidence of assassination (1969, p. 128). The Commission also found the incidence of assassination directly correlated to extreme political violence such as guerrilla warfare and revolution (1969, p. 129). Assassination in the United States, while relatively high in incidence, has occurred without that genre of political turmoil. With the increase in frequency of presidential assassination attempts during the period of this study, further research could investigate whether or not that increase is correlated with any episodes of political turmoil or social unrest. The cross-national comparison could also be extended through the study period to determine whether or not the trend identified in 1969 has continued.

In this study women emerged as ready and willing participants as presidential assailants. Notably absent in presidential attacks were assassins representing racial minorities. The National Commission addressed that issue briefly (1969, p. 66). At that time it believed the absence of black American presidential assassins to be psychologically related to a historic underclass status. The Commission alleged that the expectations for achievement in that group were generally low, resulting in less of an expectation-achievement gap and presumably a lower level of frustration (anomie). With the absence of racial minority participation in presidential assassination attempts during this study period, that phenomenon would present an appropriate future investigation. No matter the premise, gender, racial and ethnic considerations in the American phenomenon of assassination are areas to be explored.
Epilogue

As this thesis was nearing completion, yet another assassination investigation was being jointly commenced by the Secret Service and FBI. This time the investigation involved a former president.

At the invitation of a grateful Kuwait, Former President George Bush visited that country on April 14, 1993. After basking in Kuwaiti adulation, Mr. Bush returned to the United States on April 16.

Days later Kuwaiti authorities announced that they had thwarted an elaborate attempt to assassinate the former president while he was in Kuwait. They reported that on April 13 several cars were intercepted crossing the border between Kuwait and Iraq. The vehicles contained sixteen people, eleven of whom were Iraqi nationals, and 550 pounds of explosives.

Through interrogation of the suspects, Kuwaiti officials uncovered what they described as a rather ambitious plan to assassinate Former President Bush and commit other acts of sabotage and mayhem inside Kuwait.

The plot to assassinate Bush allegedly consisted of three alternatives. The first plan called for several Iraqi agents to shoot the former president as he deplaned upon arrival. If that was found not to be possible, the next scenario was for a remote-controlled car bomb to be planted at Kuwait University, where Bush was to appear. Lastly, if the first two plans were found not to be feasible, one of the conspirators
had volunteered to strap explosives to his body, gain proximity to Bush, then detonate the pack committing suicide and killing the former president.

The Kuwaiti government kept the matter a secret until well after the Bush visit. Since then, they have characterized the plot as sanctioned by Saddam Hussein, and one of the conspirators, Wali al-Ghazali, said that he received is orders to assassinate Bush from agents of Hussein. Predictably the Iraqi Government disavowed any connection.

For a time, "the day of the Jackal was over" (Forsyth, 1971).
Appendix A

Data Collection Coding Sheet
A - Political Status of Victim
1 - officeholder
2 - non-officeholder/politically prominent
3 - candidate
4 - other

B - Victim Gender
1 - female
2 - male

C - Victim Race
1 - Asian
2 - black
3 - Hispanic
4 - white
5 - other

D - Assailant Gender
1 - female
2 - male
3 - unknown

E - Assailant Race
1 - Asian
2 - black
3 - Hispanic
4 - white
5 - other
6 - unknown

F - Method of Attack
1 - firearm
2 - knife
3 - bomb
4 - other

G - Venue of Attack
1 - indoor
2 - outdoor

H - Access by Public
1 - public
2 - private
I - Motive
1 - replacement of one political elite by another
2 - terrorize and undermine the legitimacy of ruling elite
3 - suppress political challenge
4 - dramatize/propagandize an ideology
5 - mental illness/psychopathology
6 - unknown
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