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SYMPOSIUM

on
THE WELFARE-WARFARE STATE—
TEN YEARS LATER

edited by
NORMAN GOROFF
University of Connecticut

Introduction and Dedication

In 1977 the Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare published a Special Issue edited by the late Larry Northwood on The Welfare-Warfare State. This was one of the first journal publications by social workers and sociologists on this vital issue. Larry was one of the original members of the National Association of Social Workers’ Peace Committee and did much to stimulate the analysis of the relationship between a warfare and a welfare state.

Discussions were underway with Larry regarding the publication of a tenth anniversary issue when his untimely death intervened. We want to acknowledge Larry’s contribution to keeping the issue of peace in the forefront of professional concern. In addition to the Special Issue of the JSSW, Larry was instrumental in organizing sessions on the topic at the National Association of Social Workers Bi-Annual Symposiums in San Diego, California and in San Antonio, Texas.

We dedicate this symposium to his memory with our everlasting thanks for his leadership in the quest for peace. The most fundamental issue facing the human species is that of the survival of life on this planet. Larry Northwood dedicated his life to trying to assure the survival of life on this planet, as well as providing a quality of life that reaffirms the dignity of human beings. We want this symposium to be a part of his continuing legacy.

NORMAN GOROFF
The Warfare-Welfare Tradeoff: Consequences of Continuing the Nuclear Arms Race and Some Policy Alternatives

SAM MARULLO
Georgetown University
Department of Sociology

This paper provides a survey of the positive functions of the nuclear arms race for segments of society and society as a whole. The analysis of the positive functions does not serve as a justification for the status quo, but is undertaken to point out the numerous constraints mitigating against change. Massive social forces operate in such a manner as to continue and expand the arms race, indicating large scale social changes are required to stop it. A series of policy alternatives are enumerated as functional alternatives which would have fewer negative consequences while preserving our national security.

A report card on the current state of Americans' well-being would be an ambivalent one. It would contain some indicators of economic success, such as greater numbers of very affluent families and more people working than ever before. But it would also contain many indicators of economic failure, such as continued high rates of poverty and the relatively low wages associated with most new jobs. Under the "social" heading, passing grades would appear for "sense of national pride" and "plays well with allies" (except for occasional streaks of bullying), but failing grades would have to be given for the categories of "helps others in need" and "diplomatically resolves tension without resort to violence." A complete explanation for such a mixed review would necessarily entail a multidimensional analysis of economic, social, political and cultural phenomena that would cover an entire volume (or more). The purpose of this article is to examine only one part of this complex reality—the impact of the continued nuclear arms race on American society. It will do so by presenting a structural-functional analysis of the nuclear arms race as a means of suggesting policy alternatives to it.
The arms race is driven by a policy of extended nuclear deterrence. This policy is based on maintaining a weapons capability to fight and prevail at all levels of violence, from conventional battles to extended nuclear exchanges. Since both sides must presume worst-case scenarios, technological advances or build-ups on either side necessitate a response from the other side. Furthermore, the untestable nature of deterrence theory—that we can never be sure what level of threatened destruction will deter the enemy—does not enable establishing a maximum size of our arsenal (Marullo, 1985). As a result, the military requirements for extended deterrence dictate a continuous arms race.¹

The military machinery needed to sustain an extended deterrence policy is enormous and presents a large strain on the U.S. (and the Soviet) economic and political systems. During the past seven years there has been widespread criticism of U.S. nuclear warfighting preparations necessitated by our strategic policy: citizen participation in the antinuclear weapons movement has reached unprecedented levels; grassroots peace and nuclear weapons freeze groups have sprung up in even the smallest, most conservative communities; the U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops and dozens of other national church bodies have questioned the morality of deterrence and have called for a halt to further nuclear weapons build-ups; and for the first time in U.S. history, Pentagon plans for a new major weapon system have been seriously curtailed by the Congress.² In the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations, the unofficial or dissident peace movement has challenged the Communist Party's peace propaganda by organizing mass rallies in defiance of government orders and by being critical of the Soviet Union's role in the arms race.³ We should not, however, allow this outpouring of public sentiment against the arms race to obscure the role nuclear weapons play in shaping and maintaining institutional and interpersonal relations in our society. The purpose of this article is to survey the consequences of our reliance on a policy of extended nuclear deterrence with respect to the economy, the political system, individual and interpersonal relations, and culture. The analysis proceeds by briefly surveying the status quo maintaining functions of the nuclear warfighting preparations
dictated by our policy of extended deterrence. We then turn to
the consideration of a set of alternative policies which are func-
tionally equivalent but less dysfunctional than our current pol-
icies. Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is
necessary to describe the major components of our deterrence
policy and its implementation.

Current Deterrence Policy and Its Implementation

Current U.S. nuclear weapons policy is best described as
one of extended deterrence. Its purpose is to deter a Soviet (or
other aggressor's) attack on the United States, our allies, and our
strategic interests. This is accomplished by configuring our ar-
senal in such a manner as to: preserve an assured retaliatory
capability (minimally), respond successfully to a wide range of
an enemy's offensive thrusts, and assure that the U.S. can utilize
force at any level of the escalation ladder in order to attain vic-
tory. Extended deterrence also calls for the ability to prevail in
a nuclear war, which means having options at any point during
an extended nuclear exchange to force the Soviet Union to cease
hostilities on terms favorable to the United States. Former Sec-
retary of Defense Weinberger summarized this strategy as
follows:

should deterrence fail, then our strategy is to restore peace on
favorable terms at the lowest level of conflict as soon as possible . . .
we seek a flexible force structure that builds on our alliance com-
mitments and forward deployments and provides us a variety of
options for quickly responding to unforeseen contingencies in any
region where we have vital interests to defend (U.S. Senate, 1983,
pp. 10, 24).

The material and technological requisites for implementing
an extended deterrence policy are met through a multi-step proc-

ess leading to nuclear weapons being put in place ready for use
against an enemy. This process includes pure and applied sci-
centific research and development, testing of new or improved
weapons, the production processes related to manufacturing the
weapons, and the eventual deployment of the weapons. The
strategic component of nuclear warfighting preparations refers
to the development and implementation of plans that guide the
construction and configuration of our arsenal in such a way as
to best accomplish the intended objectives. Obviously this process beginning with pure research and leading to deployment does not occur in a vacuum. These objectives are determined through a political process largely dominated by an “iron pentagon” of elites in segments of government, military, university, research, and industrial bureaucracies (Adams, 1981; Melman, 1974; Mills, 1956). Nuclear warfighting preparations are thus best conceived as a set of broad enterprises that operate to determine which political objectives (beyond deterring an attack through an assured retaliatory capability) can be accomplished through the use of nuclear weapons, how they can be best accomplished, and the implementation of those decisions through the development and deployment of appropriate weapons systems.

Since 1979, our nuclear arsenal has been undergoing a “modernization” process through which each leg of the nuclear triad is upgraded. The land-based leg is being enhanced by the addition of highly accurate MX missiles, with a mobile “midget-man” missile under development. The sea-based leg has been modernized by the addition of more sophisticated Trident submarines, the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles, and the development of the Trident 2 D5 SLBM. The air-based leg has been upgraded by the deployment of air-launched cruise missiles on modernized B-52 bombers, the addition of the B-1B bomber, and the development of the “Stealth” bomber. Research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative to enhance deterrence has grown into a multi-billion dollar enterprise. Forward basing of intermediate range nuclear weapons (GLCMs and Pershing 2s in Europe) took place before the weapons were dismantled under the recent INF agreement between the United States and Soviet Union. And numerous “enhancements” to our warfighting capabilities have been undertaken, such as improving command, control and communication facilities, and hardening missile silos. Overall, roughly $1.9 trillion has been spent for national defense from 1982–1988, of which $429 billion was spent for nuclear war preparations (Center for Defense Information, 1987, pp. 2–3).

Obviously, such an enterprise with its attendant costs are likely to redound throughout the entire society. Twelve functions
of the operation of these broad enterprises are enumerated below. I have divided them into four categories for ease of presentation purposes, but they clearly overlap and are interconnected with each other. A set of alternatives is outlined in the conclusion. The functions of our extended deterrence policy are examined in the realm of the economy, the political system, social psychology, and culture.4

Functions of the Arms Race for Society

Economic Functions

Nuclear warfighting preparations are carried out through a cooperative venture by the government and the private sector. Not surprisingly, the hundreds of billions of dollars of defense spending during the past four decades has had an enormous impact on the composition of the work force and the types of goods and services produced.5 Spending for nuclear warfighting preparations has also had the effect of: stabilizing and strengthening particular industries and corporations, providing a means of upward mobility for individuals within the "iron pentagon," and reinforcing our political economy by maintaining the value of consumer goods.

Function 1. Nuclear warfighting preparations create thousands of jobs for strategic analysts, engineers, lawyers, contractors, technicians, military personnel, weapons assemblers, Defense Department officials, etc. The Department of Labor estimates that for $1 billion of Defense Department procurement, an average of 26,000 jobs are created (Anderson, 1982). In addition, many support or auxiliary jobs are created as well, such as civil defense planners and administrators, university research support staff, and public relations and advertising positions to promote new weapons and maintain a favorable public image.

Of course, this type of government spending is one of the least cost-effective methods of producing jobs. Government programs for virtually any other purpose, such as education, health, environmental regulation, etc., produce more jobs, and more less-specialized jobs, than nuclear weapons modernization outlays. In fact, even allowing taxpayers to retain the equivalent amount of money to such expenditures through lowering their tax burden would create more jobs simply by increasing demand
for consumer products (Anderson, 1982). Nevertheless, substantial numbers of jobs are directly dependent on the arms race, and it is primarily among those whose votes are taken quite seriously by elected officials. Slowing or halting the arms race will require a significant relocation of human labor. Planning for such changes and providing services for those whose lives have been dislocated or disrupted must be an essential component of any alternative policy.

Function 2. Some products originally created for nuclear warfighting purposes have been utilized in the civilian economy, partially benefitting all consumers. The U.S. government provides billions of dollars for military research and development. Some of the technology developed for use in electronic guidance systems, computer microcircuitry, laser applications, telecommunications and satellite networks, and other areas has been put to use in commercial products or otherwise serves the public good. Perhaps, in the not-too-distant future, solar energy technology, currently used for powering military satellites and remote stations, will become commercially available for use in home space and water heating.

Function 3. Military contracting practices have stabilized dozens of large corporations that otherwise might have gone out of business, creating massive economic disruptions, financial hardship for stockholders, and job loss for thousands of workers. Several major corporations receive the bulk of their revenues from government military contracts, depending on them for their survival. One of the criteria the Pentagon explicitly considers when awarding contracts is stability of the corporation; for firms that are one of but a few suppliers of a certain product, its financial instability may actually improve the chances of being awarded a contract. This has served not only to protect the investors and employees in these corporations, but since many of these corporations also produce other goods, it also benefits the consumer. Among the larger corporations whose stability has been enhanced by defense contracts in the recent past are Boeing, General Electric, Lockheed, Westinghouse, and General Motors.

Function 4. The steady increase in nuclear warfighting preparations has functioned as a source of upward mobility for thousands of individuals working in weapons production and military indus-
tries. Many careers have advanced entirely on the basis of the development of a particular weapon. The early retirement provisions for career military men, manifestly an inducement toward a military career, allow for lengthy careers in the private sector after retiring from the military. Often, these civilian positions are in the weapons industries in which the officer has worked, so the industry benefits from the retired officer’s expertise.

The careers of many engineers, technicians, analysts, etc. in the private sector benefit from their work on particular weapons systems. Although funding varies from one year to the next, and weapons undergo design changes or become obsolete, there is relatively high job stability and above average compensation for defense related specialists (Melman, 1974). In sum, the steady growth of our nation’s capacity to wage nuclear war has been good for the careers of the individuals who work in the “iron pentagon.”

Function 5. The allocation of massive amounts of our nation’s wealth to nuclear warfighting preparations contributes to a perpetual shortage of consumer goods. Nuclear weapons are obviously a non-consumable portion of our G.N.P. At first glance this may appear to be a negative consequence, but it does have the positive effect of making the remainder of the goods and services produced more valuable. Massive disruptions may occur if, instead of stockpiling nuclear weapons, the marketplace were suddenly flooded with billions of dollars worth of additional consumer goods, making them available to more households through lowered prices. The individual’s work ethic may be severely challenged, potentially undermining a necessary component of our political economy.

Political Functions

Social scientists have long been aware of the positive functions of conflict for social life. In particular, Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) theorized on the consensus building and unifying consequences that conflict has for a group, i.e. in-group differences are minimized or suppressed and animosities are directed at the external enemy. Nuclear warfighting preparations operate in a similar manner, without the actual conflict, provid-
ing a source of internal unity expressed through our disdain for the Russians (or more generally, communism). In addition, our political system has benefitted from the experience and leadership of individuals who were originally trained in warfighting. Finally, in the international realm, U.S. opinion and policy have great influence on global-decision making which is partially supported through our primacy in nuclear capabilities.

Function 6. Domestic political cohesion on foreign policy matters is enhanced by agreement on nuclear warfighting preparations felt to be necessary against the Soviet Union. The two major political parties differ in their response to the Soviet threat only in the fervor with which they articulate anti-communist policies. This bipartisan unity is a source of stability for foreign policy, which then reinforces public opinion disdain for the Russians. According to opinion polls, fear and mistrust of the Russians are among the most strongly held convictions of our political creed (Ladd, 1982; Smith, 1983; Yankelovich and Doble, 1984). Our increased nuclear warfighting preparedness is believed to be a response to an increased Soviet threat. The collective sacrifice required to respond to the threat confirms our fears, but simultaneously reinforces this bedrock belief.

This unanimity is derived from the public's limited and controlled knowledge of the Soviet Union. There is little discussion or debate over what U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should be, and that which emerges is largely dominated by the elites within the "iron pentagon" (Adams, 1982; Tobias, 1983). There is very little independent information with which to either verify or repudiate official statements, which by default become truth. The lack of knowledge, elite control of public debate, and the unchallengeable assertions of the "iron pentagon" promote public fear of the Russians, leading to increased military preparations with which to confront them, which then further reinforce public consensus on the Soviet threat. The point here is not to question whether the Soviets are not to be trusted, but that the unanimity and strength of this belief is a source of foreign policy stability and bipartisanship.

A closely related function of this widely shared definition of the Soviet threat is its utility as a domestic social control mechanism. The federal government reserves for itself the sole au-
authority to classify the secrecy of warfighting related information. This authority is used to minimize dissent by withholding information that would challenge the publicly shared definition of the Soviet threat. Individuals who disagree with official definitions are thus deviants by the mere fact of their disagreement—or at the very least they can be discredited as “harmless dupes” of the enemy. Thus boundary maintenance and social control functions are enhanced by warfighting preparations and its attendant secrecy.

Function 7. The leadership and expertise of individuals trained in and responsible for nuclear warfighting preparations have contributed to their effective fulfillment of other important positions within the political system. Many military officers and other government officials who were previously responsible for nuclear warfighting preparations have left those positions, but have used the knowledge they acquired to try to help change, improve, or otherwise serve in our political system. To name but a few of these individuals and cite the diversity of their present activities, we should look to: former General Alexander Haig, who served as Secretary of State; Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, now a private citizen and former head of a Presidential Commission to resolve conflict in Central America; Daniel Ellsberg, former analyst for Pentagon strategic nuclear war plans, now an ardent peace and disarmament activist; and Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, and current advocate for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze, no-first-use pledge, and a campaign against world hunger.¹¹

Function 8. In the international realm, our political/diplomatic status is enhanced by our primacy in nuclear warfighting capabilities. One of the explicit functions of our nuclear warfighting capabilities is to use it as a threat or form of blackmail when dealing with other countries.¹² On a somewhat less explicit level our nuclear arsenal is the “big stick” that can be used to facilitate our diplomatic efforts in dealings with our allies as well as our enemies.

Social Psychological

Nuclear warfighting preparations have several positive consequences for our emotional well-being and collective psyche.
First and foremost, our warfighting preparations help make us feel good about ourselves, our national strength and determination. However, the tasks of planning and preparing to actually fight a nuclear war are potentially disturbing ones. The division of labor in our society and the existence of a specially trained elite to handle these problems allows the rest of us to not have to worry or think about these preparations.

Function 9. Our preeminence among nations in nuclear warfighting capabilities serves as a source of national pride. We feel a collective strength and confidence that comes from being Number One in military power. Public displays of our military strength—air shows, parades, media coverage of military exercises—not only make us feel good about ourselves, but encourage us to continue our efforts. There is thus an interaction among the large cost of preparing for nuclear war, the individual sacrifices required to pay these costs (especially taxes), and the sense of reward, pride, and unity that results from sacrificing for this noble cause. This feedback is necessary to enable the next round of preparations to continue.

Nuclear warfighting preparations can be seen as a sort of contemporary, hi-tech potlatch ritual.13 Nuclear weapons are not made to be used, but rather to sit in their launchers until they become obsolete and are replaced with more sophisticated weapons. The old weapons are literally dismantled, and the new ones are, in essence, waiting for the same fate. The weapons can be seen as a gift from the taxpayer to the military, which, with our approval, ultimately destroys them (Thompson, 1982). In return, however, we receive the sense of security, satisfaction and reward which derive from being able to afford to have our wealth sit in the ground and never have to be used.

Function 10. The manner in which we prepare for fighting a nuclear war enables the vast majority to not have to worry about it. Our affluence allows us, through a highly specialized division of labor, to maintain an elite which plans and prepares for a nuclear war. Obviously, nuclear war is horrible to ponder, but the existence of a competent and well-trained group to whom we have delegated this responsibility allows us to carry out our daily routines without overwhelming despair. Lifton labels this phenomenon "psychic numbing" (Lifton and Falk, 1982, p. 101) but we should not overlook its utility for enabling the remainder
of society to continue to be productive, to enable it to generate the surplus necessary to sustain our nuclear capabilities (Canjar, 1985).

Cultural

Two different levels of culture are discussed here as having benefitted from nuclear warfighting preparations: science and popular culture.

**Function 11. The growth and acceptance of the role of science and technology in our society has been both directly and indirectly facilitated by our nuclear warfighting efforts.** In a direct manner, billions of dollars in government funds have been allocated to the enterprise of science for the purposes of pure and applied research aimed at improving nuclear weapons technology. In an indirect manner government support of the growth of science and the incorporation of its products for non-military purposes has increased the public's acceptance of science and its reliance on technological solutions to many diverse problems. Science as an institution now enjoys one of the highest ratings on public trust among the major institutions, and scientists rank near the top of occupational prestige ratings.

**Function 12. Nuclear warfighting language and scenarios have enriched our popular culture.** Motion pictures and television movies "entertain" us in their depiction of nuclear holocaust and its aftermath (e.g. "War Games," "On the Beach," "Testament," and "The Day After"); novels on world war three or life thereafter have reached the bestseller lists (Warday; Alas, Babylon); video games in which nuclear wars are fought and board games of war and the struggle for survival fill our leisure time; poets, artists and musicians incorporate nuclear imagery into their work; and the fashion industry markets military fatigues and survivalist fashions in a multi-million dollar industry. Finally, our language has become enriched by such phrases as: "it's about as easy as nuclear war" (an extremely difficult task indeed), and "nuke 'em 'til they glow."

Conclusion: Implications and Functional Alternatives

The fact that some segments in our society benefit from nuclear warfighting preparations should now be obvious. Clearly, weapons contractors, scientists, and military officials are di-
rectly rewarded for their efforts in nuclear warfighting preparations. But other groups indirectly benefit as well, for example: international diplomats, processors of important natural resources, civil defense planners, and segments of the telecommunications, fashion, and entertainment industries. In addition, several consequences benefit society as a whole rather than particular groups, through such processes as: encouraging the development of science, promoting social cohesion, and assuring our access to natural resources.

However, the functional analysis presented here also makes obvious many of the negative consequences of our policy of extended deterrence. Some segments of the population are directly adversely affected by these efforts, whereas other consequences have a more general negative impact on the whole of society. Rather than belaboring the negative consequences of our nuclear warfighting preparations, I would now like to turn to a set of functional alternatives—alternatives which preserve many of the positive consequences while mitigating the negative effects. These alternatives, which are presented here in a necessarily brief form, are discussed within the four major categories used above.

Functional Equivalents

The manifest functions of our policy of extended deterrence are the protection of the United States as a sovereign state and the preservation of our democratic form of government. On a secondary level, extended deterrence serves to sustain our current lifestyles, contain communism, define a global order compatible with our domestic needs, and secure our supplies of natural resources.

Over the past two decades, however, the challenge of maintaining our definition of a global order, backed by the use of force and ultimately our policy of extended deterrence, has become increasingly difficult and may well be beyond our capabilities in many circumstances (Sanders, 1984; Wolf, 1984). The tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations is a condition conducive to escalating hostilities between the superpowers. The technological advances in the arms race by themselves give us less and less time to evaluate data to determine if our forces are being at-
tacked by increasingly accurate weapons, making the hair-trigger ever more taut. Increased global militarization has increased the number of arenas (and the intensity of conflict in them) which could escalate into early use of tactical nuclear weapons. These factors, taken together, indicate new levels of danger which call for immediate shifts in strategic nuclear policy and our overall foreign policy.

The broad outlines of such a strategic and foreign policy should include:

1. Moving away from extended deterrence toward a policy of minimal nuclear deterrence, which would include, among other things, replacing the more vulnerable, multiple warhead land based missiles with more survivable submarine based missiles, and multilaterally reducing our strategic stockpiles by retiring the most vulnerable weapons;

2. Immediately withdrawing forward based tactical nuclear weapons and declaring a policy of no early first use. This should be followed by multilateral reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe and a no first use declaration at the completion of such reductions;

3. Halting technological advances in nuclear weapons by agreeing to multilateral proposals to cease missile flight testing, warhead testing, ASAT testing, and all weapons testing in space;

4. Asserting political initiative to reaffirm and then strengthen all existing arms control treaties;

5. Removing U.S. conventional forces based all over the globe except from where they are essential to protect vital security interests. This includes cooperating with the European NATO allies to allow them greater definition of and responsibility for their defense needs;

6. Supporting social science research and development in the areas of: crisis intervention, mediation, and negotiation; studies on the perception of deterrence; and critical explorations of the international conditions necessary for avoiding war and creating a stable peace; and establishing mechanisms for testing and implementing the results of this work; and

7. Replacing military aid with development aid for less developed countries and easing their debt repayment burdens. This would lower the likelihood of intra- and international conflict in third world countries which could escalate into superpower intervention and conflict.
The United States could make unilateral initiatives, especially in areas one, three, five and six, which would not adversely affect national security, but which could provide the basis for further incremental reductions. Accompanying these changes would be U.S. domestic policies that discourage reliance on foreign resources and provide incentives for increased energy self-sufficiency (Barnet, 1981; Lovins, 1977).

Economic

The impact of our preparations for nuclear warfighting on the economy is obvious, as partially evidenced by functions one, two, three, and five. The policy of extended deterrence leads to an open-ended arms race that is projected to consume an increasingly larger portion of our tax dollars. Moving toward a policy of minimal deterrence will demand fewer resources of our economy and allow for more growth in nonmilitary sectors. However, the influence of the military industrial complex must also be curtailed and replaced by a more consciously considered economic program. We should acknowledge the piecemeal and uneven cooperation between the public and private sector, and admit consumer and labor representatives into the process as partners. The economic reconstruction program should consider explicitly labor, development, corporate, consumption and conversion objectives.

1. Labor: A program of job creation in the areas of infrastructure repair and (re)construction, mass transit, railroads, and energy construction; and education programs to provide individuals with talents and skills needed for a changing economy. This can be done through the tax structure, providing incentives to corporations to increase the number of jobs it creates and employee education or retraining programs it operates, while reducing tax benefits to corporations who relocate or destroy jobs without adequately preparing and compensating workers who are no longer needed.

2. Development: An increase in government supported, nonmilitary research and development, including guaranteed investments where appropriate, in the following areas: eradication of health problems such as high infant mortality, cancer, AIDS, and heart disease; energy conservation; environmental protection and clean-up; more efficient mass transportation systems; and renewable energy resources.
3. **Corporate:** The explicit institutionalization of a federal planning body, answerable to Congress, that guarantees consumer and labor prominence in its composition. This body will set guidelines and priorities for a federal corporate bank, which will encourage or subsidize particular kinds of investments it deems socially desirable.

4. **Consumption:** Assure that each person has a minimally sufficient bundle of the following essential goods and services: food, shelter, clothing, health care and education. This can be accomplished with minimal market intervention by the federal government through an income tax restructuring; through a combination of a nonmarket system of allocating a minimal bundle of essentials with a market system for the remainder; or by a combination of expanding current programs and altering our tax structure to exempt these essentials from taxation.

5. **Conversion:** Some of the current military industry will no longer be required, but the workers in defense facilities and the communities in which they are located should not be abandoned. A planning body of labor, management and community representatives should explore alternative uses for no-longer-needed defense facilities, with the objective of producing socially useful products. Federal legislation can mandate the formation of alternative use committees at each contract site, and provide economic support for the process by earmarking a portion of the funds from canceled military contracts.¹⁵

**Political**

Political unity in the United States is based on the submission of individual desires and cultural diversity to a set of higher principles, such as liberty, freedom, and respect for others' rights. There is not only no need for solidarity through xenophobia, but this hysteria in fact undermines our civil rights, individuals' control of government, and our mutual respect for diversity. We should recommit ourselves to these ideals through our basic institutions of the family, schools, and church. Each of these can, in turn, benefit from increased (no strings attached) support from the federal government, through such policies as: increased funding for all forms of child care arrangements and larger tax credits for child care costs; assuring adequate pay for all laborers, especially females and minorities, in the work force; increased support of public education at all levels; and preventing
political interference in the operation of our religious institutions by strengthening the wall of separation between church and state. Once the artificial inducements for work within the "iron pentagon" are removed, the "best and brightest" will turn to serving their country in other capacities.

Social Psychological

The source of our collective pride need not be our ability to destroy, but should instead reside in our ideals and principles, and the methods we use to implement them. We should be able to "walk tall" in the knowledge that we have promoted liberty, democracy and self-sufficiency through means that are consistent with their ends, rather than through the use of force. At home, individuals will have a greater sense of pride and accomplishment in their ability to participate in the political system and control their government. Less noble, but perhaps more important for long term human survival, is the need to roll back the growing "life-boat ethic" and replace it with a social solidarity ethic (Reich, 1985). Rather than viewing the rest of the world's "have-nots" as being out to take our resources, we must begin to see our mutual interdependencies and appreciate that our own survival and lifestyle depends on the well being of others. Rather than adopting a fearful "bunker mentality," our psychological well-being will be enhanced by improvements in the quality of life of others.

Cultural

On the cultural level, there are innumerable alternatives to nuclear war based entertainment. The film, music, and videogame industries will turn to other sources of inspiration when the threat of nuclear war no longer has a mass public appeal. We have already begun to see the effects of improved communications with the Soviet Union resulting from U.S.-U.S.S.R. city-twinning projects; cultural, educational and scientific exchanges; collaborative documentaries and television specials; and other "citizen diplomacy" initiatives.

The enterprise of science also has innumerable options available to it, and is well-enough established to pursue them should the "iron pentagon" no longer require its services. Health, en-
ergy, communications, computer applications, conservation, genetic engineering, transportation and agriculture are but a few industries that could benefit from an influx of highly capable scientists and government funded basic and applied research.

The functional alternatives to nuclear warfighting preparations are obviously only briefly mentioned here; each is in itself worthy of volumes of discussion. The more detailed discussion of the functions of nuclear warfighting preparations is not intended as a rationale for the status quo. Rather, its purpose has been to demonstrate the complex interconnections of military buildups to the rest of our society and to point out the large number of vested interests outside of the "iron pentagon" in addition to the more obvious ones within. Many social forces in addition to belligerent leaders are responsible for the escalation of the arms race. We must change these too if we hope to alter our present course.

References


Footnotes

1. This implies that limits to the arms race have to be external, which could take one of two forms. The first is that technological changes can be proscribed and ceilings placed on all types of weapons, which is the goal some seek to achieve through arms control. The second is that as the resources required to maintain technological and infrastructural demands grow at an increasing rate, the military burden becomes larger than the political system can bear.

2. The MX missile funding was cut and stretched out in the FY 1983 and FY 1984 budgets, and the FY 1985 defense appropriation set conditions for delaying and halting funding altogether. In a compromise, the Administration agreed to reduced levels of funding and a cap on the number of missiles (100) for FY 1985. Further cuts, stretch-outs, and a lower cap (50) were set in the FY 1986 budget authorization. The FY 1987 budget further stretched the timeline for producing and deploying the fifty missiles. Technical problems with the guidance system and continuing Congressional skepticism regarding the utility of the MX make it highly unlikely that more than 50 missiles will ever be deployed.

3. For descriptions of the Eastern bloc dissident peace movement, see Gordon (1984), and Rubenstein (1983). Of course, the dissident groups' operations are greatly restricted in the Eastern bloc and in the U.S.S.R., but in conjunction with Gorbachev's arms control initiatives, increasing peace rhetoric, and recent glasnost efforts, the seeds for real reform may be beginning to germinate there.

4. Several caveats regarding my use of a functional analysis are in order before proceeding. 1) I would like to make it clear that I am not necessarily making claims of causality between the warfighting preparations and the function being described—sometimes the association is a spurious one, sometimes causal, and sometimes mutually causal. It is clear from the context which claim is being asserted. 2) It should be understood that the term positive function is not an evaluative term connoting goodness. 3) As with all functional analyses, the groups or segments which enjoy the positive benefits are either obvious or explicitly specified.

5. Globally, roughly $9,000 billion was spent between 1960 and 1981 for all military expenditures (Sivard, 1982:6). The United States spent roughly $1,700 billion on weapons procurement, construction, research, development and testing during this interval (U. S. Senate, 1983:11). Using a very conservative estimate of 15% of the total being dedicated to nuclear weapons (a standard defense department estimate), this implies $255 billion for nuclear weapons investment between 1960 and 1981.
6. In FY 1984, the amount authorized for military R & D was approximately $30 billion (U. S. Senate, 1983:3), and over the previous decade, 1974–83, the total was $177.6 billion (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1983:593). In contrast, the federal government provided only $1.3 billion in FY 1984 to the National Science Foundation, and $7.8 billion during the 1974–83 decade (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1983:595).

7. It should be fairly obvious that the spinoffs from nuclear warfighting weapons have been relatively few and disproportionately expensive. This is due to the secrecy requirements of military research and the atypical requirements necessitated by military objectives. High technology consumer products could be produced much more cost-efficiently through directed civilian applied research programs. For a fuller discussion, see Reppy (1985). Because the dysfunctional consequences for each of the remaining ten functions are fairly obvious, they will not be considered explicitly here.

8. In his study of the eight largest defense contractors, Adams (1981) finds that during 1970–79, defense department and NASA contracts accounted for an average of 50% of their total sales. This ranged from a low of 31% for Boeing to a high of 82% for Grumman (Adams, 1981:34). Aldridge (1983:Ch. 11) presents data demonstrating that Lockheed's corporate profitability and survival depend on defense contracts.

9. Nor can there be any firm, independent data, because a major part of our fear rests on Soviet leaders' motives or intentions, which are not observable. The manner in which these unverifiable assertions over Soviet intentions are used to serve the interests of the hard-liners within the "iron pentagon" is examined in Sanders (1983) and Wolf (1984).

10. This undoubtedly works in an identical manner within the Soviet Union—fear and mistrust of the United States become a source of social cohesion and a political rallying point. Needless to say, the effects are probably even stronger there, due to their significantly more restricted sources of information.

11. The list could obviously be extended indefinitely, but for some of the more prominent and interesting career paths, the reader could follow those of: Hans Bethe, Frank Carlucci, Eugene Carroll, Noel Gaylor, Daniel Graham, T. K. Jones, Gene LaRocque, John Lehman, Roger Molander, Richard Perle, Hyman Rickover, Eugene Rostow, and Edward Teller.

12. Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Ellsberg (1981) enumerate several episodes when nuclear threats were brandished in order to achieve desired outcomes.

13. Potlatch refers to the Kwakiutl American Indian ritual in which hosts would give their guests some of their material possessions to throw into a fire, thereby destroying them. This would be a demonstration of the host's strength or wealth—that he could afford to have his guests destroy it.

14. The Soviet Union's unilateral warhead test moratorium from August, 1985, through February, 1987, is an example of such an initiative, as is
the continuing U. S. ASAT test moratorium imposed by congressional funding cutoffs. Unfortunately, the political will to carry these initiatives further has proved to be insufficient. The recent INF agreement also could have served to increase momentum for more drastic strategic reductions (e.g. 50% cuts), but here too it is the political reluctance to take the next step that has blocked further progress.

Many writers have discerned links between the welfare state and social democracy. A few have examined the connections between the welfare state and war. The links connecting war, social democracy, and the welfare state are here examined, and it is argued that all three can be fruitfully understood as aspects of a tendency to state capitalism which prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century but which has increasingly been offset by a countervailing tendency to internationalization. The welfare state and social democracy, as national-state centered phenomena resting on the capacity of individual states to manage their own segments of the world economy, flourished in the first period but have been undermined in the second. The tendency to militarism and war has flourished in both.

As an official historian of British social policy in World War II, Richard Titmuss (1950) was impressed by the extent to which the war had stimulated and shaped the growth of social provision in Britain. In a later essay on “War and Social Policy” (1953, p. 86), he generalized the point, arguing that the “aims and content of social policy, both in peace and in war, are thus determined—at least to a substantial extent—by how far the cooperation of the masses is essential to the successful prosecution of war.” War was, then, a key determinant of the welfare state. Titmuss’s argument, I have suggested, gains explanatory force if it is modified to take account of the extent to which the war in question constitutes a crisis for the state and of the role of other crises, such as the Great Depression, in stimulating and legitimating social welfare developments. But even in the United States, where war has generally been seen as bringing to an end a period of social reform, war has had a profound impact on welfare state development. (This point was developed in an article for this journal, and subsequent book, which, taking Titmuss as its starting point, compared the impact of World War II on the state’s intervention in certain areas of health policy in
Britain and the United States (Adams, 1977, 1982). If World War II had less dramatic results for American than for British social policy, the explanation lies in the weaker threat posed by the war to the American state or capital, and the lesser vulnerability to internal pressures from the working class. In this account, the state was understood, not, as in Titmuss, as an expression of the collective will and interest, but as a condensation of the balance of class forces, which may be more or less capable of cohesion and coherence. Explanation of social welfare growth in different countries had to take account of the nature of the crisis to which the state was exposed, its vulnerability to threats from without and below, the nature of the state system itself and its capacity for coherent policy development. Social policy was seen as being pressed out between the needs of capital for a regulated supply of efficient labor power and for order on the one hand, and working class pressure for adequate standards of health education, and economic security on the other.

Social Democratic Research

A much larger body of writing has in recent years taken comparative welfare state research in a different direction while also emphasizing the importance of the capacity of the working class to assert its interests. It has pointed to the political strength of organized labor, and related institutional factors, in determining the extent to which governments pursue welfare state goals (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1978, 1980; Myles, 1984; Shalev, 1983; Stephens, 1980). While many writers have found evidence for this line of argument, critics have objected on both empirical and methodological grounds. They have argued that political parties do not make much difference in programs or redistributional effects, or that the historical specificity and limited number of countries studied do not permit the generalizations made by the theorists of working class strength (Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Pampel and Williamson, 1988).

It is not to these objections that I wish to turn, but rather to the cluster of political assumptions made by this research. One reflection of these is the choice of indicators of working class strength, commonly the presence and duration of social democratic parties in government (number of cabinet posts, years of
continuous government, etc.). A highly centralized labor movement, capable of negotiating a social contract on behalf of labor as a whole, and of enforcing the outcome on individual unions and rank-and-file workers, is also seen as indicating working class strength and as associated with higher and more redistributive social spending.

At a more general level, we find two sets of assumptions, one having to do with the relation of the state to the realization of working class interests, or socialism, the other involving the relation of those interests to social democratic parties and union leaderships. In the first case, the state is seen as the vehicle for the achievement of socialist goals. Through the election of social democratic representatives, legislation will be enacted subjecting the capital accumulation process to social control and subordinating markets to politics. The welfare state, in at least one version of this perspective (Stephens, 1980), is both an aspect and a mechanism of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The aim, then, is to win governmental power through parliamentary elections and to use the state to control the national economy in the interests of working people, to transform the nation-state into what the Scandinavian social democrats call a "people's home."

In this view the organizations of the working class are the labor unions and the social democratic party, representing respectively the economic and political aspirations of workers. The union leaders represent the workers in their industry or trade, while the social democratic party represents the class as a whole.

That these assumptions are less than self-evident is suggested by the fact they have all been strenuously challenged within the socialist and labor movements since their first appearance. For example, Marx and Engels fought fiercely against statist strands in socialist thinking, as in their opposition to Lassalle and his followers in the German movement (e.g., Marx, 1974, p. 339–59). They emphasized that socialism could only be achieved by the working class itself through its struggles against capital, that this process would involve the overthrow and dismantling of the capitalist state and its replacement by a workers' state. Many later marxists emphasized the global character of capitalism, a world system that could not be escaped or tamed
within a single national economy. In denouncing the statism, reformism, and nationalism of the social democrats (as the right wing alone of European Social Democracy came to be called), revolutionary socialists also challenged the claims of the reformist parties, and of the trade union bureaucrats to which these parties were linked, to represent the interests of the working class. Thus, Lenin (1966, p. 257–58) commented on the British Labour Party:

Of course, most of the Labour Party's members are working men. However, whether or not a party is really a political party of the workers does not depend solely upon a membership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and the contents of its actions and its political tactics.... From this, the only correct, point of view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeois party, because, although made up of workers, it is led by reactionaries, and the worst kind of reactionaries at that, who act quite in the spirit of the bourgeoisie.

And Trotsky (1973, p. 63) criticized the "characteristics of conservatism, religiosity, national conceit" of all the party's leaders and urged (1973, p. 81) the performance of "an immense service to historical progress" in the form of the discrediting of "Fabi-aniam, MacDonaldism, pacifism": "[W]e must point out to the workers the true countenance of these complacent pedants, prattling eclectics, sentimental careerists, liveried footmen of the bourgeoisie." In the view of their left critics these parties, far from representing workers' interests, played a vital role in subordinating them to the state and the national capitalist class. As for the unions, the contradiction between the bureaucracy, a conservative stratum of full time officials with distinct privileges, incomes, working conditions, life styles, and organizational priorities, and the rank-and-file became as important for revolutionary analysis as the ignoring or denial of it was for reformists (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986).

The schism between the reformist and revolutionary wings of European socialism became open and clear in the First World War. The action of the representatives in the Reichstag of the German Social Democratic Party (the SPD, the oldest and largest section of European Social Democracy) in voting for war credits on August 4, 1914 signalled the breakup of the Second Inter-
national. In country after country reformist social democrats (those who believed in a peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism) who had only yesterday vowed to oppose the imperialist war and the sending of workers to kill each other for the profits of their exploiters now found reasons to rally to the national flag. Indeed the right wing socialists played a crucial role in sustaining the war effort, as was recognized by the German chancellor, Bethmann Holweg, in 1917:

The trade unions complain that they no longer control their people, who are incited by the radicals who say that the Imperial social democrats have done nothing for them. It is absolutely essential that the right wing of the social democrats are strengthened once more. For what is to be done if the government can no longer count on the help of the trade unions in combatting the strike movement? (Kirby 1986, p. 61).

World War I ended with the triumph of socialist revolution in Russia and its defeat in Germany. The war not only brought the rift between reformists and revolutionaries to a head. It also clarified many of the points at issue, even though in several cases this only became clear to the participants in the course of their struggles, or even after the event. It was out of this war that social democracy emerged as a distinct tendency characterized by a national, reformist, and statist conception of the socialist project, a perspective that would prove remarkably well suited to claiming the welfare state for its own. One way to illuminate this development and the linkages that connect it with war and the welfare state is to examine it from the standpoint of the tradition which lost out in socialism's "great schism" (Schorske, 1955), first in Germany at the end of World War I, and then, with the resulting isolation and degeneration of the Russian Revolution, throughout the world. That is the classical marxist tradition—internationalist, revolutionary, anti-statist, anti-militarist—associated in this split with Luxemburg in Germany and Trotsky, Lenin, and the Bolsheviks in Russia, and Gramsci in Italy.

Imperialism and War

With the growth of the socialist movement in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century in a long period of crisis-free
capitalist expansion, with the enlargement, centralization, and bureaucratization of the unions, all the characteristic assumptions of reformist social democracy emerged and gathered strength. It was a period which all wings of the party recognized as non-revolutionary and as requiring a struggle for reforms rather than, in the short run, for power. The relegation of the revolutionary goal to a matter of ritual utterance detached from day to day practice affected even such champions of marxist orthodoxy as Karl Kautsky, who polemicized against the open revisionism of Fabian-influenced Eduard Bernstein. As the threat of war grew, so did the divisions within the party.

One form these differences took was the question of war itself. Kautsky had in 1909 argued the orthodox position that "the present-day arms race is above all a consequence of colonial policy and imperialism" and that therefore propaganda for peace, apart from the struggle for socialism, was of little use (Kirby, 1986, p. 1-2). Three years later he had shifted his position, now arguing that instead of the imperialist division of the world through war, the great powers might form a cartel, "a federation of the strongest" who would renounce their arms race and cooperate in the exploitation of world markets (Kautsky, 1970, p. 46). This "ultra-imperialism" offered an alternative to war, which was not a necessary or inevitable product of capitalist competition. The war, when it came despite Kautsky's misplaced optimism, was seen as a terrible mistake, a result of the failure of the capitalists to understand their own interests.

It was in response to Kautsky, as well as to understand the capitulation of the Second International parties in the face of war, that Bukharin and Lenin developed their analyses of imperialism (Bukharin, 1972; Lenin, 1964). The argument of Bukharin, one of the leading Bolshevik theoreticians and arguably the greatest marxist economist of the twentieth century, is of particular importance for understanding both war and the welfare state. For him, capitalism could only be understood as a world economy in which competition had been reduced within countries through monopolization and state intervention, only to be reproduced on an international level. He identifies not only the emergence of monopoly capital through the fusion of industrial and banking capital, as Hilferding (1981) had done in his
pioneering work, but also the further tendency to a merger of private capital and the state, that is, a tendency toward state capitalism. The argument is developed most fully in *The Economics of the Transformation Period* (Bukharin, 1971, p. 21):

Capitalist national economy has moved from an *irrational system* to a *rational organization*, from a subject-less economy to an economically active subject. This transformation has been effected by the growth of finance capitalism and the fusion of the economic and political organization of the bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, neither the anarchy of capitalist production in general nor the competition of capitalist commodity producers has been eliminated. These phenomena have not only remained but have deepened by reproducing themselves in the framework of world economy. The system of world economy is just as blindly irrational and subject-less as the earlier system of national economy.

In this conception, capitalism appears as a world system in which the competing units, or capitals (Bukharin calls them "state capitalist trusts") are states. These are national blocs of capital impelled to accumulate by competition with each other in a world economy which none controls. As Marx (1973, p. 657) puts it, "The influence of individual capitals on one another has the effect precisely that they must conduct themselves as capital." But as competition grows in scale and increasingly takes place between states so its form changes. Labor productivity is compared, that is, competition takes place, not only through the exchange of commodities, but also through foreign debt and military rivalry. Britain and Germany are locked in competition for markets, and in India, for example, British capital wins out against German, not because it is more efficient, but because the British state keeps German capital out. States protect their national economies and extend their spheres of operation by building up their military capacity, in order to ensure access to raw materials and markets or to deny it to competitors.

As Bukharin (1972, p. 125) puts it, "The struggle between state capitalist trusts is decided in the first place by the relation between their military forces, for the military power of the country is the last resort of the struggling 'national' groups of capitalists." For both Bukharin and Lenin, war was not an accident or a mistake, a failure of diplomacy or vision, but something
that grew organically out of the capitalist mode of production at the point when the tendencies to concentration and centralization, inherent in it from its beginnings, reach a certain stage, the stage of imperialism. "The capitalists divide the world," Lenin (1964, p. 253) asserted, "not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits." Since capitals grow at uneven rates, however, a disproportion tends to develop between a country's economic and its political power. Those countries (Germany and Japan are the most obvious examples) which develop later but faster are unwilling to accept the existing division of the world among imperial powers and demand its repartitioning. Periods of peace, therefore, "are inevitably nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars" (Lenin, 1964, p. 295). War, in short, is inherent in capitalist competition, above all in the epoch of imperialism.

Bukharin, as well as Lenin, developed his analysis of the world economy in order to illuminate the organic links between imperialism and war, and to show that the struggle for peace was inseparable from the struggle against capitalism. The theory of state capitalism which he developed in the process, however, has wider explanatory power. It has, for example, been applied in modified form to the analysis of the Eastern bloc countries, and the phenomenon of Stalinism, which have been seen as the purest expressions of state capitalism, as well as to certain developments in the West, including the growth of state intervention, regulation, planning, and nationalization as well as the emergence in the post-World War II world of a permanent arms economy (Cliff, 1974; Harman, 1984; Callinicos, 1982, p. 196–225). The theory also has important implications, largely unexplored, for our understanding of the welfare state and of social democracy.

The trend toward a world economy of competing state capitalisms finds expression in, and makes sense of, the often remarked linkage between imperialism and social reform in the period around the turn of the century (Searle, 1971; Semmel, 1960; Titmuss, 1958). Both conservative authoritarians like Bis-
Social Democracy

marck and reformist social democrats looked to the state as the organizer and defender of national economic development. The Boer War, as Titmuss (1958) points out, provided a traumatic lesson for the British about the importance of "national efficiency" and social solidarity for a successful imperialism. The working class became a national resource, to be educated, kept in health, and adequately maintained if productivity and military capacity were to match international levels (Harman, 1984). The mechanisms through which states took on this responsibility ranged from school meals and milk to health and retirement insurance. The welfare state, in sum, emerged as an aspect of the state's organization of the national economy for competition in a hostile world.

From its origins in Bismarck's Germany, the welfare state has been an intrinsically national institution. Vulnerable to external military and economic threats, as well as to internal pressures from their own working classes (on which they depend to meet those threats), individual states have tried by a variety of means to manage their own national segments of the world economy. In addition to various degrees of state ownership or regulation of industry, fiscal and monetary policy, these efforts have everywhere included social policy measures designed to ensure both the reproduction of the labor force at adequate levels of health, education, and economic security, and social peace between classes, so that world standards of military and economic efficiency could be attained or approximated.

The ideological support for such statist strategies has taken a number of different forms, from German romantic nationalism, through social democracy, fascism, and Stalinism, to a broad range of Third World nationalisms which mix these ingredients in varying proportions. The form that has been most closely associated with the welfare state in advanced industrial Western states is social democracy. Through its close association with the trade unions and its historical links to the socialist tradition it has arguably provided the most successful examples of incorporating the working class into modern capitalism, bringing its consumption under the management of the state, and integrating social and economic goals in order to maximize accumulation within the national economy. Thus the political scientist David
Cameron (1984) finds that large and expensive welfare states administered by what he calls "left-wing" governments have been beneficial for capital accumulation because they have facilitated the more complete and conscious subordination of social to economic policy, the use of a "social wage" policy to induce wage restraint, and hence the reduction of labor's share of the national income, higher profits, and more investment. Indeed, he argues, this restriction and control of working class consumption through "social contracts," negotiated by centralized union and employer organizations with the state, has been in the interests of labor as well as capital (because it resulted in less unemployment as well as less inflation).

Such an assertion is nicely indicative of the distance that social democracy has traveled in divorcing the socialist goal of getting rid of capitalism from the means, the "movement" for immediate reforms within it. The movement, as Bernstein (1961, p. xxix) put it, was everything, the final aim nothing. The results of this displacement have been firstly, an acceptance of the exigencies of the national capitalist economy as setting the limits of reform, so that international competitiveness becomes the fundamental criterion of social policy, and secondly, a friendly view of the state as the mechanism for transforming capitalism and subordinating it to social control.

The relation of socialism to the state was a fundamental point at issue, not only between Lenin, Luxemburg, and Bukharin on one hand, and the reformist social democrats on the other, but also even earlier, between Marx and Lassalle (Marx, 1974, p. 339-59). Already in the nineteenth century Engels had drawn attention to the tendency for the state's role in the economy to grow, not only in maintaining the social and political conditions for capital accumulation, but also as a direct capitalist. At the same time he warned against confusing that tendency with socialism. "The modern state," he argued (1969, p. 330), "no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of the productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit." Bukharin stood in this classical marxist tradition, anti-statist but recognizing the increasingly important
role of the state as a national, collective capitalist, when he wrote (1982, p. 22), echoing Engels: "In these ways state power absorbs virtually every branch of production. Not only does it preserve the general conditions of the exploitative process but, in addition, the state increasingly becomes a direct exploiter, organizing and directing production as a collective, joint capitalist."

The question is not simply one of orthodoxy or definition-of what socialism really "means"—it is also a matter of how one traces the linkages among war, the welfare state, and social democracy. Reexamining the great schism from the perspective of the revolutionary left brings into focus the observation, which both classical marxist theory and Cameron's findings imply, that for the working class, whose reproduction as labor power the welfare state organizes, national-statist strategies of economic and social development have not been simply an expression of that class's political and economic strength, as social democratic theorists typically assume. They also represent the use of state power to restrict and control its consumption in the interests of developing an internationally competitive economy and military power. This perspective enables us to see the welfare state in a new light, as, together with modern militarism and world war, an aspect of the tendency to state capitalism, to a world system of economically and militarily competing state capitals. Social democracy can then be seen as arising on the basis of this tendency and as an ideological expression of it. Its nationalism, statism, and reformism provided a redefinition of socialism as an ideology of state-organized collaboration between classes in the interest of national economic growth and development.

Internationalization, the Welfare State, and the Arms Race

At this point, some qualification of Bukharin's argument is necessary. For him capitalist development in the early twentieth century (he died under Stalin's bullets in 1938) involved complementary and contradictory tendencies to state capitalism and internationalization. That is, capitals competed more and more as national blocs within an increasingly integrated world economy. As states gained control over the accumulation process within their territories, they at the same time were subordinated to the uncontrollable pressures of competition on a world scale
from other national capitals. As this happened, competition increasingly took military forms, and ultimately the form of world war.

Bukharin's view of these phenomena is open to two kinds of objection. Firstly, as Lenin (Bukharin, 1971) pointed out in some acerbic marginal notes, he absolutized the tendency to state capitalism, exaggerating the extent to which states had been able to suppress competition internally, to organize the national economy as a single capital (or state-capitalist trust) and to overcome so far as the internal economy was concerned the contradictions and tendencies to crisis that were intrinsic to capitalism as a world system. It was this one-sided conception of the tendency to state capitalism that led him to see war as the central contradiction of capitalism in 1929, and to discount the possibility of economic catastrophe (Callinicos, 1987).

Secondly, and following from this, Bukharin's conception of internationalization as a world system of self-contained states violently bouncing off one another like billiard balls provided an inadequate, one-sided view of a complex reality in which the world market increasingly disregards and breaks down national boundaries. Recent developments in particular do not fit the pattern he outlines. We have seen in the last ten to fifteen years the emergence of economic crisis on a world scale in the context of the system's growing integration across national lines. Discussion of the world economy in terms of nation-states, or even groups of countries, fails to capture this reality. As Nigel Harris (1987, p. 200) has put it, "The conception of an interdependent, interacting, global manufacturing system cuts across the old view of a world consisting of nation-states as well as one of groups of countries, more and less developed and centrally planned—the First, the Third and the Second Worlds."

Understood as a strategy, state capitalism depends on the capacity of the state to organize a whole national economy, to deploy resources and repression to force the pace of accumulation, to forge a national capital unit, or state capitalist trust, which can compete, economically and militarily, in a hostile world. But with the growing transnational integration of production, distribution, and finance, the state has both become too small a capital unit and has undergone a diminution of its
autonomy vis a vis the world market. Attempting to create a self-sufficient, integrated national economy capable of supporting, for example, its own automobile industry, has tremendous costs in terms of technological development, optimal use of labor and capital, and therefore growth, living standards, and competitiveness. The cost of opting out of the world division of labor is, in the long run, stagnation.

Competitive pressures of the world economy have, in short, progressively undermined the capacity of nation-states to manage their own territorial segments of the system. As a result, internationalization has proceeded in a way somewhat different from that envisaged by Bukharin. Its relation to the tendency to state capitalism has become more that of a countervailing than a complementary tendency. The world economy is less an arena in which states clash against each other while insulating themselves from the pressures of global markets, and more a vehicle for the subordination and integration of nation-states into the world market.

But the welfare state, and the social-democratic project in general, depends precisely on what internationalization has undermined, the capacity of states to manage their own economic turfs. Economically and politically it is a closed system characterized by social solidarity and an intergenerational contract between members of a defined national community. It implies the capacity of the state to compete in the world economy as a unit, with its "own" labor force. But the migration of labor and capital, the need for governments at all levels to woo investment with low taxes and deregulation, the need for integration into the world economy in order to maintain high living standards and employment levels, all suggest that international market competitiveness will become an increasingly salient criterion for social policy. Peter Glotz, a leading ideologue of contemporary West German social democracy, has argued (1985) in this context that "national Keynesianism is dead" precisely because states have lost the capacity to manage their national economies. The consequence for social democracy has been either that it is completely unable to deliver in government on the promises it makes in opposition, or that it offers the uninspiring program of reformism without reforms. In either case the "social" content of
social democracy becomes exiguous to the point of nullity (Anderson, 1986).

Governmental responses to these developments have almost everywhere, East and West, involved moves in the direction, not of increased nationalization and planning, but of privatization, of market-oriented reforms. The attack on the welfare state in the context of crisis and increased international competitive pressures is well documented and perhaps requires little further explanation. It is in part an attempt to cut social consumption in order to boost profitability, a socialized wage cut. In other part it aims to reduce the labor and capital market distortions which social programs introduce and to minimize their negative impact on economic growth.

Harris (1987) has recently argued that the successes of the newly industrializing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in combining a high level of state economic management and a strong military apparatus with a ruthless orientation to production for the world market represents a triumph not of free trade, but of state capitalism in a new form. However that may be, internationalization has, for relatively clear reasons, had a corrosive effect on support for the welfare state and, in general, on earlier state-capitalist strategies and ideologies, social democratic as well as Stalinist. But what of military spending and the threat of nuclear war? If state capitalism represents a phase of capitalist development the inevitable outcome of which, short of the revolutionary overthrow of the system, is world war, should not the offsetting tendency, to transnational integration, lead to peace? Herbert Spencer (1969) argued in the nineteenth century that state intervention and protectionism tended inevitably to war and free trade to peace. Of course, for him any tendency in the direction of state capitalism was an aberration, not a fundamental and permanent feature of the capitalist mode of production. More recently, Harris (1987, p. 202) has moved some way in this direction, suggesting very tentatively that "as capital and states become slightly dissociated, the pressures to world war are slightly weakened." The reason is that, as the transnational character of the world market separates the interests of capitals from those of particular states, so the
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likelihood is reduced that competition will assume the form of military conflict between states.

It is true that within blocs, competition between advanced countries has not tended since World War II to assume military form, despite powerful protectionist pressures. In part this reflects the overwhelming hegemony of the two superpowers in this period, and the *pax americana* and *pax sovietica* they have been able to impose on their respective allies. But this postwar order, and in particular the long, arms-fueled boom, set in motion the forces that would undermine it. Both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained their preeminent positions in part by undertaking the major share of the military burden of their respective blocs. Indeed they still account between them for over half of world arms expenditures (Sivard, 1985). But those countries, particularly West Germany and Japan, which devoted smaller proportions of their investable surpluses to arms spending were able to raise their capital to labor ratios (by using robots in automobile production, for example) and thereby threaten profits of competing national economies like the United States and Britain. Newly industrializing countries like South Korea and Taiwan have further weakened American economic hegemony through carving out niches in the world economy even while maintaining very substantial military apparatuses. The result has been falling profit rates and crisis (which have been persuasively attributed in classical marxist terms to increasing capital to labor ratios, and the decreasing ability of arms spending to offset their effect on profits (Harman, 1984). The economic hegemony of the United States has faltered, while the harmony among Western national economies fostered by the long postwar boom have given way to increased protectionist pressures.

Similar processes were at work in the Eastern bloc. Under (though not solely because of) the immense burden of arms spending, Russian growth rates slowed dramatically and promises of outstripping the West, or even of rapidly rising living standards, had to be abandoned. Rates of return on investment declined in the East as in the West, and as the Soviet Union’s economy weakened so did the stability of its sphere of influence.
China and Egypt were lost to more or less close alliance with the West. Eastern Europe, faced with economic problems and class struggles of its own, above all in Poland, became a drain on Russian resources rather than a source of direct or indirect plunder. Both the Soviet Union and its allies sought to relieve their economic difficulties (above all lack of world-level technology or the hard currency to pay for it) by closer integration with the West and its international institutions (the International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank). As this happened they became ever more closely bound to its rhythms and subject to the same crisis (Francisco, 1986; Harman, 1983).

The weakening of the economic hegemony of the two superpowers in their respective spheres, the intensification of competition within and between blocs, meant that the United States and Soviet Union could ill afford to cut their military spending in order to invest more productively. Already weak in market competition, these countries were pushed to restrain social spending. Their ability to do so depended largely on internal political requirements and rigidities. But military spending is different. Like market competition, it has a much more compulsive character than social spending. If one state builds a public hospital its rival is not directly impelled to follow suit, but a new weapons system is another matter. Every new development in weapons technology by one superpower compels the rival to match it, even when doing so weakens the national economy and ultimately the industrial base on which military power depends. Indeed the lines between economic and military competition become blurred as one power (in the present situation, the United States, the economically dominant one) inflicts blows on its rival's economy by pushing it to adopt ruinously expensive responses to its innovations in weapons systems.

The United States and the Soviet Union are pushed toward responding to their declining relative economic positions, themselves in part a consequence of the arms burden they bear, by reasserting their military hegemony. To do otherwise would be to risk losing allies, clients, or satellites, and to see the rival's position grow stronger. It would also be to lose influence, and ultimately resources, markets, and bases in the less developed
countries. Here the instability and risk are great. In the postwar peace among major powers, more than a hundred wars have been fought outside Europe, Russia, and North America, while Third World military expenditures have risen fivefold in real terms since 1960 (Sivard, 1985). The diminishing capacity of the superpowers to police the world by means of a Yalta-type "gentlemen's agreement" pushes both governments to a more aggressive and interventionist military posture.

The risk of a major war, of a nuclear holocaust, is arguably not weakened by these developments, but strengthened. Peter Binns (1983) has likened the position of the superpowers to that of competing firms using dangerous industrial processes, as in hazardous chemical plants. Each knows it faces the loss of its entire capital by ignoring costly explosion-preventing safety procedures and so long as business is expanding advocates of caution within the firms will prevail over those who want to compete more effectively by cutting safety costs. But in crisis, when competition is heightened and bankruptcy threatens, the weight of managerial opinion will shift. At some point, faced with the choice between the possibility of losing all through an explosion and the certainty of losing all to rivals through bankruptcy, the risktakers are likely to prevail. From this perspective, the increased competitive pressures deriving from internationalization, crisis, and the weakened position of the superpowers are the underlying cause of the "new cold war," with its economically ruinous build-up of arms spending, as well as of the continued elusiveness of a Kautskyan (or "ultraimperialist") solution in the form of a fundamental arms limitation agreement. They have made World War III more, not less likely.

Conclusion

World war, the welfare state, and social democracy, I have suggested, can all be fruitfully understood as aspects of a tendency to state capitalism which prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century but which has increasingly been offset by a countervailing tendency to internationalization. Both tendencies, as Callinicos (1987, p. 106) argues, "reflect fundamental and permanent features of capitalism—respectively its genuinely international character and its division into capitals with particular
interests which set them at odds with one another. . . ." But the relative importance of these tendencies has shifted in the last thirty years—"the internationalization of capital has come to predominate over its integration with the state, but not to the extent of nullifying it." The welfare state and social democracy, as national-state centered phenomena resting on the capacity of individual states to manage their own segments of the world economy, flourished in the first period but have been undermined in the second. The tendency to militarism and world war, unfortunately, has flourished in both.

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Making War Thinkable*

SHIMON S. GOTTSCHALK
Florida State University
School of Social Work

This paper identifies significant cognitive elements in Western thought which appear to undergird and lend an aura of legitimacy and credence to discussions of defense, armaments, and the preparation of war.

The prospect of war among the major nations of the world has become a mad man's nightmare, an absurd solution solving everything, and nothing (Schell, 1982). In the event of nuclear war, there will be no victors or losers; all will be victims. If not all mankind, then all that is known as humanity is threatened with extinction. War and the preparation for war depletes nations' economies and wastes the world's resources.

Since war is a wild, suicidal absurdity, why do presumably sane human beings persist in planning, and threatening such an ultimate holocaust? What is it that continues to make nuclear war thinkable among both governmental leaders and those who willingly or passively support them? Erich Fromm (1955), has interpreted this kind of collective behavior as a form of insanity. Anthropologists have developed notions such as the territorial imperative (Lorenz, 1966). The most prominent political scientists call upon us to be realistic: the balance of terror is said to prevent the very horror it portends. Alternatively, political/economists offer explanations that are based upon reconceptualizations of the class struggle and the dynamics of modern corporate capitalism (O'Connor, 1973). Still others point to the attractiveness of the "game" of war (Fuller, 1984) or the pervasive power and dramatic seductions of the media (Parenti, 1986).

The purpose of this paper is neither to challenge nor to refute any of these explanations for the persistence of planful

threats to human survival. Rather, the aim is to identify several of the most significant cognitive elements in Western thought which appear to undergird and lend an aura of legitimacy and credence to discussions of defense, armaments, and the preparation of war. Three kinds of conceptualization, those related to wealth, to truth, and to power, appear to be central to making war thinkable. Each of these clusters of ideas are discussed separately.

This paper pursues its analysis of the war mentality without specific reference to important sociological, political, psychological, or other theories because its focus is less on behaviors than on ideas, and on the thinkability of war. The question is, what are some of the meanings which have been incorporated into our way of thinking which promote these dangerous behaviors? Theories of society and of human behavior can explain much, but they cannot fully explain themselves. That is why it is necessary to dig beneath them. Every theory begins with a set of culturally, historically, and politically based assumptions (Popper, 1972).

In focusing on assumptions underlying some of the most salient cognitive integers prevalent in the modern Western world the aim is to uncover ideological biases. It is an explicit assumption of the analytic approach which is here being undertaken that human beings act intentionally, with meaning and purpose. They do not simply behave mechanistically, like automatons responding to stimuli. Intentional action implies thoughtful action, in this case, the thoughts and ideas that make war and the preparation for war thinkable, creditable, and therefore possible.

Wealth—The Economics Paradigm

All economic goods are, by definition, scarce. When there is no scarcity, there is no possibility of economic thinking in the Western sense. Both the concept, and the empirical reality of a market economy are made possible by the assumption that the goods which are exchanged are desirable (needed or wanted) and in limited supply. Thus, markets have become institutionalized systems for the exchange of economic goods. Markets are expected to function best when each of the actors behaves in a
manner which maximizes his/her self interest.

As the major alternative (or supplement) to the market system in the West, scarce and desired goods may be allocated by a legitimate authority, such as a government, a social agency, or a taxing authority. But also under this alternative allocational system the fundamental assumptions of the dominant economics paradigm are usually maintained. Were there no scarcity, or no demand, the maintenance of both markets and allocational authorities would be redundant. Under both systems it is the cognitively and normatively established view that demand, i.e., the desire to consume in theoretically unlimited quantity, scarcity, and the promotion of self-interest are rational and inevitable. The hypothetical "economic man" (sic) behaves in accordance with these strictures.

It is commonplace to assert that unlimited demand is artificially promoted in late capitalist societies and that this consumerist orientation is being successfully exported to the elites of both the socialist and the developing world. Not as commonly accepted is the idea that scarcity, too, is a social construction, a product of planful economic policy and of ideology.

Within the sphere of pragmatic economic policy both governments and multinational corporations contrive a variety of ways to limit production or to withhold surpluses of, e.g., steel, oil, and agricultural products (Barnet, 1980; Moore-Lappe, 1979). Thus scarcities are planfully produced. In addition, and for purposes of this discussion more importantly, scarcity in tandem with unlimited demand is sustained as an ideology, a system of belief which is purported to promote hard work, productivity, a sense of self worth, and other such virtues. It serves as a justification for the persistence of poverty (there is not enough) and a rationale for hard work (the need to increase productivity). Even more important than the fact that scarcity induces the raising of prices and profits is its ideological significance. The belief in the reality of scarcity lends essential institutional support to the existing world economic hegemony and to the dominant agencies of political control and economic coercion, such as banks and commodity markets.

The suggestion that the notion of scarcity and unlimited demand might be abandoned might appear, at first glance, to be
a smug, middle class fantasy, one that has no place in the "real" world of poverty, hunger and oppression. But twentieth century poverty persists precisely because it is maintained by the economics paradigm that is here being challenged. It is a system that permits of the extremes of excessive wealth and abject poverty. Or to say it differently, the social problem might be viewed as one of excessive concentrations of wealth, rather than as one of poverty. Barry Commoner (1971) and other ecologists have been arguing for years that for the foreseeable future the earth possesses sufficient material resources so that no one need live in extreme want.

The focus on economic goods as the primary source of human welfare has had the effect of trivializing non-economic goods which are not similarly subject to scarcity (Carse, 1987). Freedom, love, creativity, knowledge, joy, the sense of purpose and well being are all in unlimited supply. They are beyond scarcity, beyond the constraints of the market and yet readily perceived to be among the most significant “goods” that build peace and promote human welfare (Schumacher, 1973). The ideology associated with the economics paradigm has tended not only to devalue these very human goods, but also in many instances to commoditize them. They have thus been made scarce, granted monetary value, and been subjected to the rules of the market. Health has become medicine, love is a new sports car, honor is purchased from a public relations firm, and security is represented by bigger and better armaments.

The perpetuation of scarcity and unlimited demand within the context of an excessively individualistic society (Bellah et al., 1986; Dallmayr, 1981; Bell, 1987) has produced what Thurow (1980) has aptly called, “the zero sum society”. It is a society which tends to define human relationships in economic terms and thus promotes never ending competition for ostensibly scarce resources among individuals and nations. When property rights are elevated above all others (Helms, 1987), then war is made thinkable and easily justifiable in the effort to maintain, or to gain more economic wealth. It is not simply the existence of vast inequalities in wealth that invite violent conflict. Rather, it is the particular ideology which emphasizes, justifies, and legitimates these inequalities that make war thinkable. For an unjust peace is but a respite between wars.
The Claims of Truth

The search for certain truth is as old as the most ancient religions. Claims to the discovery of truth have commonly been associated with assertions of superiority, if not invincibility. Truth is powerful, good, and virtuous.

Similar claims for truth have been made by Western empirical science since the middle of the sixteenth century. Over a period of four hundred years this truth and its prophets have laid claim, with ever increasing success, to a superior method of knowing. The idea has been nurtured that objective knowledge is available to humankind. A specific method for the attainment of such truth has been specified. Whereas for Aristotle (Metaphysics, 982a) the search for true knowledge was conceived as its own reward, with Francis Bacon the search for causes in nature took a new turn. Prediction and control of events became the goal of the new science and the dominant human interest (Habermas, 1971). Especially since the nineteenth, and the first part of the twentieth century, advance of this meaning of truth was associated in the popular mind with normatively valued progress.

There is no need to dwell here on the significant contributions of modern science and derivative technologies to human betterment, on the one hand, and to warfare on the other. That is not our issue. Rather, our concern is with the singular claims of empirical science as the only truth, or the only path to truth. Such a claim, if supported, has profound political implications: it authorizes those who know, to dominate over nature, as well as over all those who are condemned to ignorance. (Historically, this has been known as the distinction between the saved and the damned). The truth of modern empirical science which is concerned primarily with the observable, measurable and functional excludes and denigrates knowledge of the aesthetic, the moral and the transcendental (Friedmann, 1979). A system of knowledge which emphasizes doing over being and controlling over understanding is one that tends to denude the world of its enchantment and substantially robs it of its meaningfulness (Moscivici, 1977). An approach to truth seeking which is oriented toward the maximization of control is likely to be resisted by persons who are thus controlled, made the passive objects of another's knowledge, and expected to behave normatively in
accordance with rules that are not of their own making.

These, and other criticisms of Western empirical science, especially of social science, have gained an ever greater foothold among philosophers of science during the past half century. Much like any and all other ways of knowing, the Western scientific enterprise is understood to be politically, culturally, and ideologically bound to the status quo (Peller, 1987; Raskin and Bernstein 1987; Bernstein, 1978; Capra, 1982). Not unsurprisingly, it is seen as an ideology primarily protective of existing political and social arrangements.

The most important criticism of modern scientism with respect to the issue of making war thinkable is its principled refusal to take into account the moral consequences of its claimed truths. The segmentation of modern consciousness into the separate realms of reason and emotion, or thought and feeling (Berger and Kellner, 1973) has led to the separation of knowledge from wisdom. The myth of an objective, value free modern science is thereby secured. In the physical sciences this segmented mentality has made possible rational thought about what might otherwise be considered totally irrational means and ends. In the social sciences it makes possible thinking about human persons as depersonalized subjects. At times of social conflict they are conceived variously (but always anonymously) as victims, enemies, or body counts. It has led to what Hannah Arendt (1962) called, the banality of evil, for it disvalues the kind of reflexive and ideographic knowledge of self and others which enables human beings to humanize each other. Dialogue and mutual understanding have thus been undermined as essential building blocks of knowledge and truth. Human conflict can be readily justified by an ideology which presumptuously invalidates the truth of the other, perhaps even before it has been heard.

Power and Authority

Despite the rhetoric of equality in both the capitalist and the socialist West, the dominant social institutions in both societies are invariably characterized by bureaucratically structured hierarchies. Some persons and institutions are thus conceived as being legitimately more powerful than others. They have au-
thority which derives from the passive or active societal concen-
sus. Authority, defined as legitimate power, permits of the control
of the behavior of others, even if it is against their will. Au-
thority is built upon images of strength, suggests Richard Sen-
nett (1980). It derives from a quest for images that are solid,
guaranteed, and stable. As a consequence, it constitutes a source
of both security, and of threat.

Power and authority are enhanced by wealth and by claims
to specialized knowledge. But more basic than these two sources
of strength, is the complex pattern of sentiments and emotions
that grant legitimacy, especially to governments. People have
been taught to stand in awe of the actual or potential exercise
of great power. Power is good, is masculine, is invigorating, and
its maximization is a constantly desired goal. Even as we protest
against great power, we appear to admire it (Sennett, 1980). By
contrast, to be weak is to experience social contempt. In the
competition for power, the best are alleged to rise to the top; by
inference, the least worthy remain at the bottom. This kind of
a “rational” hierarchy is expected to promote competence, pro-
duce collective prosperity, and guarantee social order. (That it
at the same time produces failure and the sense among individ-
uals that they are inadequate is a less proudly recognized
consequence).

No doubt, some important psychic gains may be claimed
for the maintenance of traditional power structures (Fromm,
1952). But that is only one side of the issue. The exercise of
power, especially the power of governments, is easily associated
with the threat or the actual use of physical violence. Claims for
the legitimacy of such violence are based on a variety of rhe-
torical propositions: patriotism, justice, security, solidarity, dig-
nity, and ironically, peace.

War, and in its most extreme form, atomic war, is an exercise
of the power of the state wherein its legitimacy and its virtue
are tested to the limit. Governments can be viewed as those
institutions that have been permitted to arrogate unto them-
selves the ultimate authority to use violence for allegedly legit-
itmate ends, as for example, in inflicting capital punishment, or
by declaring war. But the images upon which such exercise of
violence are built are tenuous. The capacity to make war relies
not only on the rhetorical justification of the cause, but also on the maintenance of received ideas of power, its virtue and goodness (Sharp, 1973).

Governments are unlikely to institutionalize the promotion of peace because such action requires the unlikely voluntary abrogation of their own power. Peace, especially a peace which is greater than the absence of war, can therefore only come from the bottom up, from people who delegitimize the use of physical violence as a form of state power. It is not that they must condemn all use of power, rather that they need lay claim to a new understanding of it, one that is other than coercive, controlling, and ultimately violent.

There is a variety of paths toward the development of a new understanding of power. It is possible to structure minimally hierarchical institutions, and to reduce presently large differentials in rewards between those who are at the bottom and those who are at the top. Most uses of physical force as a method of social control could be delegitimized, beginning with the family and moving beyond to the larger society. Non-violent resistance to what is viewed as illegitimate use of authority has been effective more frequently than is generally recognized (Sharp, 1973). Decentralization and the general down sizing of human organizations holds important promise for the reduction of depersonalization in the exercise of power (McRobie, 1981). Most crucial, however, is the need to think critically about the meaning of power and authority itself. Human differences in capacity and ability are real. How can these differences be accounted for so as to emphasize the essential core of human equality? Rather than power which controls, a new understanding of power might be one that nurtures, one that liberates the less powerful from domination. The primary goal of such a liberation would not be limited to the expansion of individual rights, but would include the maximization of liberty through mutual responsibility and caring in a manner presumably shared by many of the founders of the American republic (Bellah, et al., 1985).

Summary and Conclusion

It is difficult, if not inappropriate, to write about matters of war and peace without passion. There are those who would
define knowledge as an objective, dispassionate search for truth. They would be critical of both the substance and the style of this paper. But theirs is not the truth that gives direction and meaning to human lives. Does an ever increasing capacity to consume more of the world’s resources purchase the good life? Does the always greater power which we seek for ourselves, individually and collectively, provide the security which we seek? Do the artificial scarcities enhance human creativity and guarantee progress in a manner that promotes justice? Or is it rather, as the novelist Milan Kundera (1985) has suggested, “man thinks and the truth escapes him”? Recalling Flaubert’s historical vision he summarizes, “stupidity does not give way to science, technology, modernity, progress, on the contrary, it progresses right along with progress” (Kundera, 1985, p. 11).

Who would voluntarily choose poverty over wealth, ignorance over knowledge, weakness over power? These are the false choices that have been offered to the people and the nations of the world. The language, the concepts and the ideologies within which they have been embedded must be challenged. Fortunately, the floodgate of new ideas has begun to open (Capra, 1982; Dallmayr, 1981; Schumacher 1973; Raskin and Bernstein, 1987; Griffin, 1978; Toffler, 1980). Thoughtful analysis and creative invention are an essential antecedent to political action.

The prevention of nuclear war is possible not only to the extent that we organize, demonstrate in opposition, and refuse to cooperate, but also to the degree that we can succeed in making it unthinkable. Some will view all this as an unrealistic, idealistic fantasy. Perhaps it is, but the animus for its expression derives from the intimate awareness that the alternative fantasy is too horrid to contemplate.

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It is the thesis of this paper that the social work profession along with other human service professions has the potential of making a vital contribution in promoting peace and people oriented development and that the ultimate test of the profession's contribution to individuals, families, and communities in varying contexts is the ensuring of human survival and the enhancing of the quality of life for all people.

The social work profession has a great tradition of reform and peace related efforts, however limited and sporadic it may be. The contributions of pioneers such as Jane Addams and Harry Hopkins symbolize some of the best peace, reform and people oriented activity in social work. The profession emerged toward the turn of the twentieth century, largely as an organized response to social dislocations and problems which were part of the process of industrialization and change in western societies. Today, the profession continues to be challenged to respond to the "priestly" and the "prophetic," and "service and reform" aspects of work with people in situations of development and change (Chambers, 1962).

While the challenge to the profession historically has been to respond humanely and effectively to both service and reform concerns, in actual practice there has been at varying times shifts in emphasis from one or the other, not so much as a response to the needs of people but as a result of succumbing to pressures due to changes in political and social climate (Ehrenreich, 1985). However, it is a tribute to the profession that it has within it
educators and practitioners who persist in raising critical questions about this tendency in the profession to oscillate between individual change and societal change. It is also encouraging that educators and practitioners are engaged in constructive efforts to deal with this problem.

Related to this effort of keeping in balance the service and reform traditions of the profession is the task of introducing the much needed international perspective in social work and of viewing concerns of peace and issues of hunger, poverty and oppression in the global context. As we approach the twenty-first century in an increasingly interdependent world, the social work profession will face the challenge of responding to issues of human survival, peace and people oriented development. The basic values of the profession, from which stem the respect for life, the concern for all people and the commitment to social justice will impel us to broaden our horizons and our intervention efforts in responding to these issues of life and death in the global community. It is the thesis of this paper that the social work profession along with other human service professions has the potential of making a vital contribution in promoting peace and people oriented development and that the ultimate test of the profession's contribution to individuals, families and communities in varying contexts is the ensuring of human survival and the enhancing of the quality of life for all people.

Issues of Peace and Nuclear Threat

In today's interdependent world the issues of peace and nuclear threat are—or should be—the concern of every profession and individual. Scholars and political analysts continue to raise questions about the nuclear armament and defense build-up and the technology of exploitation of natural resources taking precedence over people development in the global community. The nuclear shadow hangs over each individual as the most awesome threat in human history. There are now, we are told, in the East and West ready to be launched an army of nuclear weapons with the destructive power of a million Hiroshima bombs. Today the U. S. constructs approximately 200 warheads every two months and possesses a total of over 30,000. Worldwide there are over 50,000. The total explosive power of these
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weapons (which at this point continue to increase) amounts to approximately 20 billion tons of TNT. In other words, a freight train carrying this amount of TNT would stretch approximately 4 million miles (Walsh, 1984, p. 13). With the shift from the earlier "balance of power" theory in international relations to the prevailing theory of a "balance of terror," thoughtful persons point out that humanity is headed for nuclear war, as "lambs to the slaughter" (Rogers et al., 1981, pp. 9–16).

The major policy issue in the international context is the issue of human survival in the global community. The Harvard Nuclear Study Group emphasizes the fact that the question of whether humanity can continue living with nuclear weapons (put differently, whether humanity can survive) is the central issue of our time (Harvard Nuclear Study Group, 1983, pp. 232–254). Similarly, Dr. Helen Caldicott (the founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and more recently women's action for nuclear disarmament) maintains that the concern related to peace, nuclear war and the threat to human annihilation is the "ultimate issue," "the only issue" (Caldicott, 1980). Critics of the nuclear arms race point to the dehumanizing effect of living in a society and a world that tends to impart the view that there is no way to respond to serious international conflict except by preparing for nuclear war (Albert et al., 1983, pp. 1–6). The Harvard Study Group takes the position that there is no reason to assume that there are only absolute alternatives of either disarmament or holocaust in efforts to deal with the nuclear threat. It is clear that the choice made by individuals, as to whether they are committed to efforts toward arms control and constructive peace efforts or alternatively are resigned to a fatalistic view that a nuclear holocaust is inevitable, will make a crucial difference in efforts to ensure human survival and promotion of global peace. Social Work's contribution in this collective effort cannot be minimized, and will be discussed later in this paper.

Another fundamental policy issue in the context of the nuclear threat that is open to question, is the use of war as an instrument of national policy in settling international disputes. Since there is the danger of even regional disputes escalating into a nuclear war, renewed efforts are called for to set up an effective mechanism for resolving international disputes without
resorting to war. It is clear that nuclear war leads only to radioactive suicide. One nation may emerge from the holocaust as a temporary victor, but ultimately the human race as a whole would not survive (Wasserman et al., 1982, p. 268). Thoughtful persons continue to speak out on this issue of the use of force and coercion to settle international differences especially in the present situation. Yet, as long as the policy of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union continues and enormous energies and resources are invested in the nuclear arms race, there will be hardly any possibility of exploring seriously alternative ways of settling international disputes.

There is also increasing concern related to the policy issue of the effects of the threat of nuclear war and nuclear testing on people, especially children. It is evident that the threat of nuclear war, the adverse consequences of nuclear testing, and the possibility of a leak in a nuclear plant are all sources of fear and anxiety to individuals and families. Parents are likely to pass on to their children their own feelings of anxiety due to the nuclear threat. Studies undertaken on the negative psychological effects of the nuclear threat indicate that nuclear issues have deeply affected both adults and children (Walsh, 1984, p. 75).

One of the surveys generated by a special task force of the American Psychiatric Association specifically examined the psychosocial effects of living with the likely threat of a thermo nuclear disaster on children and adolescents. The results revealed that not only were the children very aware of the nuclear threat, but it had deeply penetrated their consciousness. The majority of them did not think that they, their community or their country, could sustain a nuclear attack. There were also feelings of anger, powerlessness and frustration arising from this situation (American Psychiatric Association, 1982). In another survey similar sentiments were expressed. Kirk, a fifteen year old, stated: “There are old men with their fingers on the button and they’re playing with our lives, which we haven’t had yet, while they’ve had long full ones. It makes me mad” (Verdon-Roe, January 1983, pp. 24–31).

There are profound policy issues related to these reactions of children and adolescents to the threat of nuclear disaster. It is evident that adult responses to the nuclear threat shape chil-
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dren's attitude's of trust and influence patterns of personality development. Adults respond in a variety of ways to the threat of nuclear war. There may be a powerlessness, fatalism and at times a feeling of personal vulnerability (Lylan, 1982, pp. 619–629). Individuals also experience what has been referred to as "psychic numbness"—a process of denial and repression. It is evident that the sense of powerlessness, anger and fatalism that children experience are the result of growing up in an environment which ignores the threat of nuclear destruction (Escalona, 1982, pp. 600–607).

Children need to be educated to the realities of the nuclear threat and helped to overcome the fear which may partly be derived from ignorance. There are also serious concerns expressed regarding the possibility of raising a new generation of people who may have no stake in the present or the future. Perhaps the most significant toll is levied on the unborn, whose fetal size and vulnerability make them infinitely susceptible to even the tiniest amount of radiation. Radiation doses received by the mother can have enormous effects on the unborn fetus. And those who survive may be so thoroughly mutated as to scarcely warrant the label "human."

A related policy issue that cannot be glossed over is the adverse effects of the many nuclear testings, the likely nuclear spills and accidents, and dumpings of nuclear waste on the environment and the health of people. It is now four decades since the first atomic bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then the U. S. military is reported to have exploded over 700 nuclear bombs on the U. S. continental soil and the Pacific. France has had an average of ten tests per year since 1966 in the South Pacific, and testing continues on a regular basis in the Soviet Union. Public health and medical specialists warn that many of the adverse health effects are very likely currently being felt. It is claimed that thousands of tons of radioactive materials released by nuclear explosions and reactor spills are now contaminating the global environment. Toxic nuclear materials—nonbiodegradable with some likelihood of remaining potent forever—will continue to accumulate and ultimately their adverse effects on the biosphere and on human beings will be deadly (Caldicott, 1980, p. 3).
The risk of accidents, false alarms and the psychological problems related to first strike nuclear war are alarming. False alerts reportedly have been triggered by a flock of geese that the early warning systems interpreted as a fleet of Soviet missiles, by a rising moon and by a shower of a meteorites (Caldicott, 1984, p. 14). It is necessary to point out here that the nuclear weapons are controlled and monitored by the most sophisticated security system in the United States. However, they are not free from errors both human and mechanical. The North American Radar Air Defense System (NORAD) designed to signal nuclear attack had 151 false alarms considered serious and 3,703 lesser alarms during the 18 months preceding June 30, 1980. Human decision making in such a security system is minimized. A computer is likely to decide whether or not to launch a nuclear war. In military jargon they refer to taking the human out of the loop. One U. S. Congressman concerned by the danger involved in this situation made the telling comment, “I fear this may take the human out of the planet” (Walsh, 1984, p. 14).

Yet, even if there is no outbreak of a nuclear war accidentally or otherwise and the hazards of nuclear waste storage are dealt with effectively, there is still a problem—and a significant policy issue—in the enormous waste of global resources both human and material. Nuclear weapons today consume over $100 billion per year worldwide. Currently the world military expenditure is running at a historic high of over $1.7 million a minute (Sivard, 1986, p. 7). It is painfully evident that we live in a global community that is overarmed and undernourished. As Bernard Lown, the President of the International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (the international antiwar organization that was awarded this year's Nobel Peace Prize), notes: “A small fraction of these expenditures could provide the world with adequate food and sanitary water supply, housing, education, and modern health care.” The President's Commission on World Hunger estimated that it would cost only $6 billion per year to eradicate malnutrition, an amount equivalent to less than four days of arms expenditure (Walsh, 1984, p. 15). Clearly the negative impact of the nuclear arms race and military expenditure on people oriented development, especially in relation to the developing countries, weighs heavily in the conscience of the
global community. Humankind is faced with the troubling issue of the use of the world's resources for destruction rather than for human development.

People Oriented Development

The world's arms race is a major factor in the world's economic crisis, and the negative effects of excessive military spending is especially evident in the adverse conditions of life of people in the developing countries. The global community can no longer afford the luxury of playing cowboys and Indians.

Adolfo Pe'rez Esquivel, the Argentinean advocate of peace and nonviolence, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1980, poses the agonizing question, "But could not this war economy be transformed into an economy for development and peace among the peoples? . . . Children starve to death, families live in squalor, education and medical care are non existent . . . No one has the right to create an economy at the expense of the world's poor" (Esquivel, 1984, p. 34).

It is not possible to justify the "monstrous waste" of resources which takes place even in a limited war. Consider for a moment the $25 billion per year spent on the Vietnam military effort and what the world will be like today if this amount spent each year of the war had been devoted to people development efforts—such as education, agricultural development, improvement of health services and family life education services in developing countries (Brown, 1973, p. 360).

People oriented development efforts have the potential of unleashing forces for positive change in societies and of contributing to growth, improved standards of living and enhanced quality of life for all. The traditional methods of establishing development objectives in terms of economic growth rate do not ordinarily take into account income distribution and thereby tend to contribute to further concentration of wealth among privileged groups. If the focus is on providing basic necessities, then development efforts contribute to the improvement of the conditions of life of the less fortunate people in society.

The concern in people development efforts is especially for "marginalized" people, the "little" people whom economic growth has bypassed, peasants robbed of their land, minorities who
are discriminated against, and the forgotten families of shanty towns and neglected villages. People oriented development expresses development objectives in human terms focusing on quality of life considerations such as conditions of family life, education of children, adequate income, health standards, people's participation and conservation of natural resources. In this quality of life emphasis, consideration is given to a combination of factors such as: increase in per capita goods and services; consideration of possible decrease in per capita natural amenities; distribution of income; and any likely negative effect of expanding economic activity, especially on marginalized people (Brown, 1973, pp. 321–329).

We can no longer justify the argument that there are not enough resources to provide a universal minimum living standard for all people. If we use the global community's resources responsibly through peaceful and people oriented productive efforts for most of humankind, this objective of minimum living standard is attainable in the near future. However, a breakdown of the Global Research and Development budget indicates that a major share of the resources is devoted to weaponry, followed by nuclear and space research. The more urgent human needs—for example, literacy programs, child health services and introduction of a high protein rice variety—claim only a small fraction of the total expenditure. What has been lacking is the concerted effort in the global community to mobilize scientific resources to meet pressing social needs. The challenge is to develop more appropriate and efficient technologies for use by the world's poor, techniques that would make possible the attainment of a higher level of a living at a considerably reduced cost.

Thoughtful persons point out that among the reasons why technology is not disseminated more effectively from rich to poor countries is that so much of it is not pertinent to the needs of the poor countries of the world. Additionally, scientists and technicians residing mostly in the rich countries have been somewhat indifferent to the needs of the world's poor. To ensure that scientific efforts contribute to people oriented development and quality of life, it is vital that global research and development expenditures are guided by improved knowledge and responsiveness to the social conditions in the global community.
The new technological frontier, it is argued, is not outer space or nuclear energy but rather "socially oriented technology"—technology designed to meet the needs of people. What is called for is a social vision, a social vision of what society could be like, guided by considerations of human values and enhancement of the quality of life of all people (Brown, 1973, p. 330).

Emerging Social Ethic

The growing social sensitivity to the need for peace, people oriented development, human rights and eradication of world hunger has the potential of contributing to the emergence of a social ethic in international relations. This new ethic that would at a minimum undergird positive peace efforts, and humane developments, will help to foster harmony among human beings in their interaction with each other and with nature. There is greater emphasis in the new social ethic on man's harmony with nature and his environment than on his excessive dominion over it. Additionally, the view of man as the center of the universe will be changed to a concept of man as "an integral part of the natural system." There is a strong commitment to the "ideology of global unity" in the new social ethic and to pursuing the goal of raising everyone above the subhuman conditions of life evident especially in the developing countries (Brown, 1973, p. 361).

In the emerging social ethic the current almost exclusive emphasis on production and the acquisition of wealth as an end in itself would give way to distribution and sharing. The many forms of interdependence among nations and indeed the very survival of human beings in a "deteriorating biosphere" would suggest of necessity a much more cooperative arrangement in the use of global resources for people oriented development. Considerations of human survival and concern for the preservation of the global ecosystem would also necessitate a more collaborative arrangement. It is likely that for a number of individuals self-realization may take the form of cooperative efforts to solve human problems.

It is vital that the new social ethic is a universal one, free from cultural biases. Increasingly, it will be perceived as a necessary response to the human predicament of poverty, inhu-
manity, oppression and the possibility of global suicide as we approach the twenty-first century. Such an ethic could be expected to have a significant effect on the behavior of individuals, groups, national governments and the global community. There will be a reordering of global priorities and a major commitment of resources to deal with the global problems of poverty, hunger, malnutrition, destruction of human lives and environment (Brown, 1973, pp. 340-345).

The new social ethic would also challenge the global community—especially the affluent nations—to examine critically the current lifestyles and the pursuit of what is termed “super-affluence”—the consumption of goods and services to a point where it has limited bearing on individual well being, in an ecosystem which is already under considerable stress. Critics point out that at present we are in a phase of unprecedented ecological disruption and “drawdown,” a phase in which human beings are consuming the global resources at a faster pace than they are being replaced. It is a shocking situation in which they argue that we are mortgaging our future and that of future generations (Walsh, 1984, p. 10). Currently, in the United States we consume a third or more of the world’s resources in pursuit of “super-affluence,” though we constitute only 6 percent of its people. In contrast, there are in the global community, 2 billion people with yearly incomes less than $100, an income approximately one fortieth the income of the average American (Brown, 1973, pp. 321 & 356).

If the global community impelled by a social vision makes a firm commitment to the emerging social ethic, then it will open the way to ensuring a minimum level of living for all humankind and to working toward a unified global society. For it is increasingly evident that the era of the “militaristic nation state” must end that humankind’s sustained effort toward a just unified global society is the only hope for survival and peace.

Social Work’s Response

In the discussion so far, reference has already been made to the challenge that social work concerns related to peace and people oriented development pose for the profession. However, a few more specific comments related to the profession’s re-
sponse to the concerns of peace and development in the global community seems to be in order.

As mentioned earlier, a major thesis of this paper is that the social work profession along with other human service professions could make a vital contribution to promoting peace and people oriented development. And the ultimate test of the profession in the future in the global context is the extent to which it contributes to enhancing the quality of life of all people.

Social work along with other disciplines—especially philosophy and religion—could make a significant contribution in shaping the development of a social vision and a new social ethic that would emphasize respect for life, appreciation of diversity, justice in human affairs, people oriented development and peace. As discussed earlier, the global community—in the context of the nuclear threat, the dangers to the global ecosystem, and growing world poverty—is faced with the task of establishing more humane goals and priorities in the international context, to ensure the development of a world society that is geared more to life and growth than to death. In this critical task of fostering more humane values to influence peace and development efforts, social workers at varying levels (from individual, to national and international levels) are challenged to make a renewed commitment to humane and life affirming values and to actualize them in their professional and personal lives. We cannot minimize the significance of this renewed commitment of social workers to the positive, humane life affirming values, so vital for human interactions in society at every level. For more than any other group social workers are likely on a daily basis to deal with the consequences of global conflicts, poverty, human greed, fear and hatred in the lives of people. We have only to document the experiences of refugee families, migrant farm workers, trans national adoptive children, Vietnam veterans, prisoners of war and the victims of nuclear radiation to clearly establish this point.

Scholars and analysts point out that perhaps the current unprecedented threats to humanity may create the necessary conditions and the sense of urgency for individuals to reflect on the fundamental purpose of life. To the extent that we are open and honest and are willing to acknowledge and to reflect on the
reality of our own mortality, "rampant inhumanity" and the enormous "preventable human suffering," we are likely to experience at new and deeper levels, meaning and purpose. Paul Tillich refers to the "anxiety of meaninglessness" in human beings and the contribution that social workers could make in this context, in affirming values and in nurturing enduring relationships that would be vital for life affirmation and positive growth. He refers to the key contribution of social work in giving people in an increasingly secular and global society the feeling and the assurance of being "necessary." This, he points out, is vital in the present situation where there are "individuals who have lost the feeling of a necessary place, not only in their work and community, but also in the universe as a whole" (Tillich, March 1962, pp. 13–16). In being instrumental in providing this sense of being "necessary" he points out that social workers "help to fulfill the ultimate aim of man and his world, namely the universal aim of being itself."

In the context of the global problems impacting the lives of people it is vital that the social work profession incorporates in its future educational and practice efforts the overarching philosophic theme of peace (which embodies some key social work values) and directs its energies toward constructive efforts at conflict resolution (in varying contexts and levels), people oriented development, empowerment and the commitment to social justice and nonviolent change.

If the social work profession is to be responsive to the new areas of human concern in the global community such as constructive efforts toward peace and humanizing development, we are faced with the task of radically restructuring education and practice to meet the new challenges. The profession's efforts have to be viewed in a broader, interdisciplinary context. We need to go beyond the traditional service dimension to a developmental emphasis focusing on issues of people oriented development, resource and policy development, respect for diverse people and cultural traditions and concerns such as the nuclear threat, hunger and racial conflicts, and their impact on the daily lives of people, necessitating an international/cross-cultural perspective in social work. Such a perspective will not only widen the profession's horizon to an awareness of the global problems that
have a serious adverse effect on the lives of people, but also will facilitate constructive efforts towards conflict resolution, peace and development more responsive to the needs of people. In developing a global/pluralistic perspective, there is greater appreciation and understanding of diversity and a conscious effort to break loose from limiting and distorting cultural biases. This is referred to as a process of "detribalization" by which a person matures from an "ethnocentric" to a global view, from "my country right or wrong" to "our planet," and from "exclusive identification" with a group or nation to "identification with human kind" (Walsh, 1984, pp. 79–80).

Suggestions have been made for the profession to give consideration to the potential value of using peace as a "major organizing concept" for its future practice and education (Chauncey, March 1984, p. 4). Concerns like peace, conflict resolution, people oriented development, empowerment of grassroots people, coalition building and development aid that stimulate people's capacity building by their very complexity and interrelatedness defy traditional approaches to dealing with human problems. The social work profession in responding to this challenge will, in both education and practice, explore alternate models and frameworks which would incorporate interrelated concepts, new knowledge and research in substantive areas and action oriented themes such as nonviolent change, people empowerment, development of resources, distributive justice, exploring new forms of conflict resolution and developing improved capacities for working with a variety of social movements and citizen groups in efforts to ensure resolution of conflicts and a more sustained and humane development at varying levels (Sanders, 1985).

The search for alternate systems in resource development, distribution, development aid and peace efforts is in response to the crying need for something more human, more participatory—facilitating greater collaboration and "self management"—in which human beings are not dealt with largely as objects.

Conclusion

Faced with the enormity of the task of controlling the nuclear arms race, of fostering peace and more humane development in
the global society, a familiar question raised is whether this is, in fact, the province of social work. If social work is concerned as it has been in the past with respect for human life, human freedom and the enhancement of the quality of life for all, every situation that involves threat to human life, human freedom, and indeed to the collective well being of the human family at whatever level, poses a challenge to social work.

Jane Addams (who in her time was a joint recipient of the Nobel Prize for Peace) in organizing social workers for peace in 1914, commented on the instrumentality of war as a means of settling national disputes. She stated: "We believed that war, seeking its end through coercion, not only interrupted, but fatally reversed this process of cooperating good will . . ." (Addams, 1922, p. 3). In this context, it seems pertinent for social work to help to awaken the conscience and to mobilize the collective will of people to attack the sources of fear, conflict, oppression and violence at every level. Social workers along with other groups could play a significant role in the task of development and peace, in Paulo Freire's terms, to "raise the consciousness of people" and to facilitate empowering of people to collectively speak to the issues that affect their lives (Freire, 1970). Education that involves the whole person and integrates the philosophy of living in harmony with each other and with nature, and the responsible use of global resources becomes vital. Social work education must be focused on a deep concern for human rights and justice and an openness to diversity (Sanders, 1983). Related to education is also the need for peace and development-oriented research. Stimulus should be provided for research, especially in cross-national/cross-cultural perspective in areas such as impact of social movements, non-violent change efforts, people oriented development and conflict resolution. On the more practical side, there is the essential task of "coalition building" and collaboration, especially with peace groups, labor and women's organizations and others committed to human rights and justice. Efforts could also be made to strengthen the U. N. which, despite its limitations, strives to neutralize global tensions and conflicts and serves to promote peace and development activities.

The emerging social ethic and the values that are likely to
undergird peace and development efforts represent a positive force vital to the fostering of a just and humane global society. In this context, Alexander Solzhenitsyn in commenting on the need to reassess the fundamental purposes of human life and human society raises some critical questions that are pertinent. He asks: "Is it true that man is above everything?" "Is it right that man's life and society's activities should be ruled by material expansion above all?" "Is it permissible to promote such expansion to the detriment of our integral spiritual life?" (Solzhenitsyn, 1978, p. 59). At the least this should prod us to transcend the current preoccupation with narrow technology and to pursue equally the qualitative aspects of human life and interaction so vital to the global community.

The final hope for peace and human betterment rests in what Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Schweitzer and others called the law of love. When love and concern for our fellow human beings becomes the moving force in the global community then and only then will the vision of the sages and the prophets become a reality, and the people "... shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nations shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isaiah, 1957).

References


An educationally focused non-partisan grass roots peace movement is described, as are the empowering effects of being involved in such a group. Beginning attempts to utilize this approach with senior citizens are explored, and further experimentation is encouraged.

Beyond War is a grass-roots, educationally focused peace movement that is aiming to propagate a new way of thinking that will move us to a world beyond war (Beyond War, 1987). It is not an organization that one joins; it is a way of life that one decides to live. This paper briefly describes the tenets of Beyond War and the effects of following such a new way of thinking on one's personal life. The central theme addresses possible applications to work with senior citizens, and a description of initial efforts to create such applications. Since the movement as a whole very closely reflects the principles and practices of social work, specifically the reciprocal, interactive, and mutual aid models of group work practice, such exploration will be of special interest to social workers. Hopefully, other practitioners will be encouraged to experiment with ways of involving clients in addressing and resolving the most important issue of our time—the imminence of a nuclear disaster in our world and the need for a new way of thinking that will make it possible to move to a world beyond war.

History of Beyond War

Beyond War began in 1982 as a grassroots response to the threat of nuclear war. A group of people from Silicon Valley, including business executives who were successful in all the traditional and material ways, became convinced that their success would be meaningless if the world continued on its present
course (Beyond War, 1985a). They were influenced by a film entitled The Last Epidemic (1980), which described the effects of a one-megaton bomb dropped on San Francisco, as well as by Jonathan Schell's book, The Fate of the Earth, which created national concern about the issue of post-nuclear war survivability, (Schell, 1982).

Their initial endeavors, conducted under the name of Creative Initiative, focused on educating people about the crisis. Through the process of community education, and much personal discussion and exploration, the founders came to a gradual realization that nuclear weapons were only a symptom of the underlying problem, which is, as a society, our willingness to use war to resolve inevitable conflicts. The initial efforts of the people involved in Beyond War revolved around finding a way to express a new way of thinking which would address this underlying issue.

The Premise of Beyond War

"The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe" (Nathan and Norden, 1981).

This quotation of Albert Einstein's is the essence of the premise of Beyond War. We do not live in the world that we used to live in, and because that world is so drastically different, our thinking must change as well. An analogy that is used to describe the way in which this drift has occurred is as follows. When a boat is paddling in calm water, it follows the currents, with no thought on the part of the people who are rowing the boat. As the current gradually picks up, it takes an initial awareness, and then a conscious effort, to have the boat turn in a different direction. There comes a point, however, when the current becomes so strong that no amount of effort is sufficient to change the course of the boat. We, as humans, have done basically the same thing. We have drifted along with the thinking that military strength will keep us safe, and that thinking, as it has gotten stronger and stronger, has brought us to a point that is close to no return. The same military strength that was thought to have kept us safe may be the very thing that leads to our destruction, as we are coming critically close to the point where
the current will be too strong to fight against. It was an idea that may have initially made sense, but the invention of nuclear bombs has changed all of that; in the event that a nuclear war begins, there will be no winners, or survivors. We need, using this analogy, to begin rowing, with every inch of our collective power, while we still have a choice and can change our mode of thinking, to avoid being swept away by the current.

Knowledge, Decision, and Action

From an understanding of this concept, along with the knowledge that war is obsolete because of our technology and that it is individual people who do make a difference, one of the basic premises that emerges from *Beyond War* is the idea that we are one. That knowledge is translated into action through a decision-making process that affects our lives. The remainder of this paper describes the process by which a group of senior citizens are engaging in the three step process of knowledge, decision, and action (*Beyond War*, 1985c) that is required in order for people to effect change in their own lives, and thus in society.

An Exploration by Leisure World Residents: An Illustration

I am the coordinator of a groupwork program in *Leisure World*, a private retirement community in southern California. Groups of eight to ten elderly residents meet weekly to discuss any topics of interest to them. Twice a year the entire group of sixty comes together for a workshop on a topic of interest to all residents. A speaker from *Beyond War* was invited to one of the workshops, to give an introductory presentation. Despite concerns that the topic would push people away, because older people had more pressing worries of family, health, and financial issues, the audience was riveted, and expressed interest in beginning an ongoing discussion group related to the workshop topic in larger numbers than had been true of any previous topics in the six year history of the program. Eleven residents asked to be notified of an opportunity to further discuss the concepts of *Beyond War*, and their potential involvement in achieving a world beyond war.

A followup meeting was arranged, and eight residents attended, with three people calling to say that they had conflicting
commitments, but still wanted to be kept informed. The nature of the second meeting was exciting, in its empowering ability. *Beyond War* is, above all, an empowering movement, that allows people to take control of their lives. If one becomes committed to the principles of *Beyond War*, there are implications for both personal and professional living. The first part of the meeting was used to explore the three common implications of believing, and living the principle of “We are one”.

I will resolve conflict. I will not use violence.

I will maintain a spirit of good will. I will not preoccupy myself with an enemy.

I will work together with others to build a world beyond war. (*Beyond War*, 1985b).

The discussion of these implications included concerns that are relevant to an elder’s stage of development. For example, in speaking of the resolution of the conflict that is part of the major developmental task of old age, “integrity versus despair”, Erikson (1950) describes integrity as: “the acceptance of one’s one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions”. Many of the group members had had relatives who died in concentration camps in World War II, and were struggling with accepting the notion that preoccupying themselves with an enemy (Hitler) was antithetic to living one’s life in a way that recognizes their interdependence and interconnectedness.

Similarly, members of the group struggled with the notion of working with others actively to build a world beyond war, as they do feel overburdened by their private troubles relating to health and financial issues.

The discussion allowed members to voice their concerns and to make a dent in the process of “psychic numbing” (Caldicott, 1985) that forces people to ignore the threat of nuclear war because it is so frightening. Individuals and groups engage in massive denial, because they feel, subconsciously, powerless to make an impact. Joint discussion allows those fears to surface, at the same time that a sense of hope grows, as people share experiences of having made a difference in large societal issues. One woman talked of growing up in Brooklyn, New York when the boardwalk along the Atlantic Ocean was being built. The
initial concept was an architectural, graceful wonder, with entrances and exits as far apart as possible, so as to preserve the design and flow of the boardwalk. She was involved with a group of citizens who protested such a concept, saying that people would be afraid to use the boardwalk because they wouldn’t be able to get on and off conveniently. They engaged in letter writing, lobbying, and group rallying, and were successful in changing the plans so that there are exits on almost every block, all along the four mile route. As people listened to that story, they got in touch with instances of their own lives where they had impacted a larger system such as a school system in relation to their children, city zoning regulations, or politicians in relation to the passage of certain bills.

Such exploration enabled participants to appreciate a renewed sense of power and the feeling that they did have energy to expend on a cause that was larger than their own immediate lives.

Another common theme discussed by seniors is the effect that the nuclear threat has on their sense of who their children and grandchildren are. Goroff (1987) eloquently describes his feelings upon the birth of his first grandchild, related to his sense of transience of the life of our planet. Most of the members of this group expressed that feeling in a variety of ways; they were not sure their grandchildren would have a chance to live out their lives, while as grandparents, they have had such a chance; they watched their children and grandchildren's live-in-the-present attitude with bitter understanding; and, they watched their grandchildren decide not to have their own children with sorrow. Again, the talking out of these fears alleviated the paralysis that inhibits people from taking action.

The second part of the meeting allowed, in a small way, for people to take action. The seniors discussed recent newspaper articles related to the growing relationship between the head of the Soviet Union, and the President of the United States, and what is needed for successful disarmament talks. Members of the group wrote letters, to elected officials, expressing concerns and thoughts as to what should happen in our country in the next few months related to those summit talks. The important element of this exercise was not what people wrote, although
it is estimated that politicians count each letter they receive as representing 1,000 voters (Congress-U.S. Capital Switchboard, 1987). What is vital, is the renewed sense for group members that they are the government. They elect the people to serve them, and one of the most potent ways to have politicians serve constituents' needs is to be consistent about expressing those needs. That too, was empowering, in that members left the meeting feeling that they had done something very concrete to make a difference.

The last part of the meeting involved a discussion of the future—in what way did participants want to continue their involvement? The group came up with three major suggestions. The first was that each of them should commit themselves to putting on a workshop at one of the various social and/or educational other groups to which they belong. Putting on a workshop would involve inviting a speaker from Beyond War, and initiating a discussion related to nuclear issues. One woman commented that if each of the eight people at the meeting did that, over 100 new people would be exposed to this “new way of thinking”, and have the chance to explore their own thought processes.

The second suggestion was to form a monthly discussion group about conflict. If each month, areas of the earth that are experiencing conflict were selected (Central America, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq), and people obtained information about those conflicts, a discussion of possible causes and solutions would clarify members' thinking, and enable them to have a knowledge base from which to take action. In fact, that is the project that Beyond War is engaged in—enabling a dialogue in the community about US-USSR relations. A team of Soviet and American authors will be touring the United States and the Soviet Union early in 1988, sharing their experiences on a joint project to discuss ways in which to end the threat of nuclear war (Gromyko, A. and Hellman, M., 1988). Their presentation will highlight the conflicts between the two superpowers, and possible ways to work together so that both countries' self-interests can flourish.

The third suggestion was for them to become involved in the larger Beyond War movement to whatever extent that was
possible, though they recognized that their separate needs and desires made some distinction desireable. Transportation and evening meetings are a problem for many seniors. They welcome the discussion of these issues with their age-peers. In fact, in discussing speakers for other groups, this author (who is in her mid-thirties) was kindly but firmly told that even though she might be an excellent speaker, they wanted a much older speaker to come to their groups, because that person would have much greater credibility. Their commonality of age means that they have a shared sense of experience and perspective on past, present, and future events, which leads them to feel a sense of universality. Many people have the disquieting thought (Yalom, 1985) that they are unique in their despair, which is often heightened by social isolation. The disconfirmation of a person's feelings of uniqueness is a powerful source of relief.

These group experiences, clearly, were only a beginning. Only time will tell whether the speakers materialize, the discussion group continues, and these members involve themselves with each other and the larger community on an ongoing basis. However, the brief experience of living the principle of "we are one" represented growth for the members. Living this principle on an on-going basis represents an unprecedented shift in human behavior, matched only by the unprecedented threat to our survival.

References


Transcending Despair: A Prelude to Action*

NORMAN N. GOROFF
University of Connecticut
School of Social Work

The central thesis of this essay is that in order to feel empowered to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, persons need to face and transcend their despair when they contemplate the nuclear destruction of the planet. The repression of fear of nuclear disaster results in a sense of powerlessness to do anything about the inevitable destruction and consequently nothing is done, thereby allowing the "Lovers of Death" (Fromm, 1964) to build bigger and better ways to destroy the planet.

The most fundamental issue facing the human species is that of the survival of life on this planet. We have the means to destroy all of life on this planet. At the same time we see few efforts by the over 220 million people in the United States to try to eliminate these weapons and systems of destruction. "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) may have contributed to over 40 years of a lack of direct military confrontation between the "superpowers," but the threat of total destruction is great with existing nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the development of new and sophisticated technologies increase the possibilities of technical errors and hence the probability of nuclear destruction by mistake.

In view of this condition, what contributes to the lack of public outcry against the increased probability of nuclear destruction? The central thesis of this essay is that in order to feel empowered to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, persons need to face and transcend their despair when they contemplate the nuclear destruction of the planet. The repression of fear of nuclear disaster results in a sense of powerlessness to

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do anything about the inevitable destruction and consequently nothing is done, thereby allowing the "Lovers of Death" (Fromm, 1964) to build bigger and better ways to destroy the planet.

The Problem

I have been active in SANE and other Peace groups for over thirty-five years. Other events in life required attention and the immediate concern with nuclear destruction receded to the background. The Freeze movement of the early 1980s encouraged me to join with other like-minded people to make a freeze on the development of further nuclear weapons a matter of public policy. Daily events again required attention and again peace activity tended to recede.

During all this time, I do not recall having felt the deep despair I experienced the week my first grandchild was born. I was in my study preparing an audio cassette for him when I was overcome by an intense feeling of sadness and pain. Would he have the opportunity to grow up and listen to this tape? Will we be able to avoid destroying all of life on this planet?

I sat in my study for a long time and cried. The despair that I had carried around in a repressed state broke through to full awareness. The realization of the real and present danger that Nicholas may not have the life-opportunities which thousands of generations before him enjoyed had an enormous impact. It caused an issue which I had felt to be important these many years to become a categorical imperative. On a personal level, the stakes had changed from a general sincere concern with future generations to an intense concern with very specific people.

When I was born, my grandparents took it for granted that just as there had been generations in the past, there would continue to be generations in the future. This was the way of life on this planet. Obviously, this certainty is no longer true.

Denying despair through repression indirectly causes people to accept the inevitability of death and destruction. This acceptance results in a lack of hope for the future and an ever-increasing concern with personal salvation, an existence in heaven for eternity. Death is accepted as the opportunity for an eternal existence. The issue of whether death comes as a result of the
natural processes of life or through mass destruction makes little
difference as long as the individual feels the promise of being
saved and rewarded with that eternal existence.

The sense of powerlessness that results from repression of
feelings of despair contributes to a desire for certainties and
answers to complex situations. The world is defined as a hostile
and dangerous place where one needs to be constantly prepared
for the worst. Frequently this very attitude creates a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy. Because there is no trust in others nor are others
recognized as being an interdependent part of one's existence,
the resulting alienation contributes to the creation of a hostile
and dangerous place.

We have for instance, seen a systematic attempt during these
last seven years to make nuclear war appear to allow that there
can be a victor. There have been attempts to legitimate mega-
death by talking about our ability to survive as a nation even
if we suffer one hundred million deaths. The concept of nuclear
survivability seems to somehow remove some of the intensity
of despair if one can believe that all of life on the planet will not
be destroyed.

This attempt to make nuclear war thinkable has resulted in
several counterpoints being stressed. The recent report from
M.I.T. indicating that even a limited nuclear exchange will result
in such massive disruptions of our economic means of produc-
tion and distribution as to make survivability exceedingly pain-
ful. For example, survivors would need to face issues such as
the unavailability of food, water, elementary hygiene and med-
ical care. Radioactive fallout would expose the population to
long-term consequences of radiation, including cancer, fetal de-
formities and genetic abnormalities. Other possible catastrophes
would include nuclear winter and disruption of the ozone layer.

Despair and concern are demonstrated in many different
forms. At a Presbyterian Youth Gathering at Purdue University
in 1986 the first concern voiced was the fear of nuclear war. The
second concern of youth was their choice of career. It should be
noted that although there was an awareness and fear of nuclear
destruction, there was not a concern voiced with how to work
to eliminate nuclear arsenals, but rather, "How can I get on with
my life and career?" It seemed that these young people, recog-
nizing the enormity of the problem, implicitly felt powerless to do anything about it, and focused instead on elements they assumed were within their influence.

A social worker with a group of troubled adolescents describes the sense of helplessness and hopelessness about the future that permeates this group. Such comments as “Why should we? There won’t be a chance for us to grow up.” are used as a justification for nihilistic attitudes and behavior. When questioned further, their responses specifically noted that the “grown-ups are going to blow the world up—so why bother?”

Several years ago, the United Way in Amarillo, Texas withheld support from the Catholic Charities because members of that group were helping people make choices not to work in the local nuclear assembly plant. These people were making a personal moral statement in leaving the assembly plant. The local Catholic organization was assisting them in making their choice and dealing with the consequences. The local assembly plant, the largest employer in Amarillo, was fearful that this would result in opening a flood gate and that the loss of workers would negatively impact their profitability.

The massive war production capacity which employs millions of people comprises an effective lobby in obtaining the necessary federal funds to continue to produce weapons of destruction. The availability of work in those industries frequently beclouds people’s judgments and choices. The immediate need for work to pay for the bills of living blinds many to the fact that they are in fact building the weapons of death.

A critical component of any mass movement for nuclear disarmament is to have viable alternatives available to provide employment for millions of people. How to achieve such a state is beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is not necessary to wait until there is a plan in place before we start the efforts to help people move beyond their despair.

The prevalence of repression of the fear of nuclear destruction can be seen in part by people’s reaction to the accident at Chernobyl. The amount of radiation released at that time was very little when compared to the radiation that would come from a modern nuclear weapon. Nevertheless it was enough to kill scores of people, to contaminate hundreds of acres of farm land
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so as to make it unproductive for food stuff, and to condemn residences because they became radioactive. The clouds carried the radioactive fallout great distances beyond Chernobyl. This situation is a miniature of the elements that would be involved in nuclear attacks. What was absent was the explosion and fireball from a nuclear weapon.

In none of the press reports that I read was there any reference to how this event might compare to nuclear war. One might well conclude that there was a conspiracy of silence for fear of stimulating a mass movement against nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The collusion of millions of people in trying to keep their fears repressed enabled them to avoid dealing with the significance of Chernobyl.

The movement for nuclear disarmament needs to be a two-phased project. The first phase involves millions of small groups designed to help people cope with their despair and go beyond it. The consciousness-raising groups of the beginning phases of the women's movement may be a prototype for what is being proposed.

The second phase is a mass movement in which people assert their power in order to bring about change. The balance of this essay will be devoted to a discussion of the two phases.

The most difficult phase is helping each other transcend despair. The feeling of despair is frequently so intense and so painful that it is frightening to experience when one is alone. It is also disruptive of one's life unless it can be accepted as not pathological, but as a reflection of one's basic humanity. The feeling must be engendered by the recognition that one is part of the world which has a history, and a present. If there is to be a future, we must work to allow it. The burden of the future hangs heavy upon this generation.

Awareness of the consequences of nuclear holocaust is without doubt the main deterrent to catastrophe. However, only if the fear of annihilation can lead to a destruction of nuclear weapons is there any likelihood that we can avoid the mistake that can lead to the end of the planet.

This is not an issue we can leave to the leaders of the world's nations to resolve. It is an issue requiring the involvement of all the people on this planet in order to say No in unison to the
existence of nuclear weapons. Is this an unobtainable utopian vision or can it be a reality? Of those who consider it to be an unobtainable utopian vision, the consequences may be inaction and by omission, to permit these weapons of total destruction to continue to exist. The unanticipated consequence will be to increase the odds that there will be one mistake that can lead to the end of our planet.

The process of helping each other accept our feelings of despair as an expression of our humanity and then accepting the responsibility to act to eliminate the source of this despair will be slow.

Basic Human Essences

All human beings are born with three basic essences. First and foremost, is the need and the capacity to love and be loved. This is fundamental to human existence and it is in fulfilling this essence that persons have meaning and purpose in life.

It is not necessary to teach the infant to love. It is there at birth. As the song from South Pacific says “You have to be taught to hate.” However, the opportunity to be loved is not always available to all persons and hence they grow up feeling not good enough; they grow alienated from their essence.

The second is the need and the capacity to create and be creative. Everything in the social world which human beings use is created by human labor. The need to create is an inherent part of the person and is the source for human activity.

People need to work as an expression of their need and capacity to create and feel creative. This is why so many have developed avocations which allow them to express their creativity, because their world of work denies them the opportunity.

The third essence is the need and capacity to constantly grow and develop. This essence is a key factor in human existence. It is not external motivation to grow that is necessary, but opportunities to be nurtured and to be loved which is required for growth and development. To be nurtured by others is to be confirmed as a person with dignity.

Principles of Social Group Work Practice: The Love Paradigm
The Love Paradigm Defined

The Love Paradigm is based on a fundamental relationship between persons which involves an active concern for the continuing life and growth of fellow-human beings. Love has four components, care, responsibility, respect and knowledge. In caring for others, there is concern and involvement and acknowledgement that they have become a part of one's life. Being responsible involves a readiness to respond to other persons. In one's response, there is an affirmation of the other's dignity and integrity. Having respect for others, we can see people as they are, being aware of their unique individuality and feeling concerned that they be allowed to grow and unfold. There is no exploitation of persons. Knowing a person is very different from knowing a thing. Knowledge of the person is similar to Buber's "becoming aware" of the person. It is based on the recognition that the person in one's human aspect is an unfathomable secret to oneself and to one's fellow persons. Yet one knows in the only way knowledge of that which is alive is possible for the person—by experience of union—not by any knowledge our thoughts can give. Care, respect, responsibility and knowledge are interdependent components of love—the union between two or more people.

"Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person: it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one object of love. If I truly love one person, I love all persons. I love the world. I love life." "The affirmation of one's own life, happiness, growth, freedom is rooted in one's capacity to love, i.e., in care, respect, responsibility and knowledge" (Fromm, 1964).

Love is based on the recognition that all human beings have equal dignity, integrity, are worthy of respect, and have the right to an equitable share of the resources required for human survival. Love is a phenomenon that exists between persons and not within each person.

A critical component of the Love Paradigm is the faith we have in the potentialities of others. This has its culmination in a faith in humankind. It is based on the idea that the potentialities of persons are such that given the proper conditions,
they will be capable of building a social order governed by the principles of equality justice and love.

Although we have not yet achieved the building of such a social order, we have the faith, based on wishful thinking but on evidence of past human achievements, that it can be done. The basis of rational faith is productiveness; to live by our faith means to live productively. It follows that the belief in power that exists is identical with disbelief in growth potentialities which are as yet unrealized” (Fromm, 1964).

The Love Paradigm views the person, not as an alienated individual who feels cut off and isolated, but as a reflection of the "fundamental fact of human existence, which is the person with the person" (Buber, 1955).

Buber develops this further. "Individuality makes its appearance by being differentiated from other individualities. A person makes his appearance by entering into relation with other persons. The one is the spiritual form of natural detachment, the other the spiritual form of natural solidarity of connection." “The will to power” notes Buber, “is opposed to the dignity, integrity and freedom of the person” (Buber, 1955).

Implications of the Love Paradigm

The first implication of the Love Paradigm is summarized by Buber's statement, “In spite of all similarities every living situation has, like a newborn child, a new face that has never been before and will never come again. It demands of you a reaction which cannot be prepared beforehand. It demands nothing of what is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it demands you” (Buber, 1955).

Every time people come together to interact with one another, a new living situation is upon us. We cannot plan beforehand what we will do. We need to be present and to participate in the life with the uncertainty, but also with the faith, that as we respond in a caring fashion, recognizing each person's integrity and dignity, we will help create that social entity we call a group, a network of between-persons relationships, which will nurture each of the participants.

In the Love Paradigm, it is stressed that relationships between persons are an end in themselves and not a means to-
Towards other ends. Persons need to be with one another in order to nurture each other. The relationship between persons are on an I-You basis in which each cares, responds, respects and attempts to understand one another.

When persons come together for the first time they are usually strangers to one another and the first task they face is to overcome this strangeness. In our culture, the stranger, for the most part, is viewed as someone not to be trusted. Before trust between persons can be established, they need to become acquainted and come to know each other better.

One way to help overcome distrust is to view each meeting of the group as a celebration. This is an existential concept marking the fundamental, visceral joy of a human being at not only being alive, but at being alive together with other human beings. In this existential celebration, each individual member of the group is a celebrity, visible, unique and possessing dignity. The uniqueness and humanity emerges without the label, the social category. The role is doffed and the person exists and interacts with other persons in the group in all his/her splendor.

Celebrations are frequently marked with a sharing of food. It helps overcome the strangeness when members of groups celebrate the occasion of being together by acknowledging with others and sharing food. It is immaterial who brings the food; it is the sharing that is important.

Social group work practice must simultaneously provide persons with opportunities to address their concerns and attempt to impact the social world which has contributed to the person's pain. We create the social world through our interactions with one another. Although the emotional pain we experience is real, most frequently, the cause of the pain is a consequence of how we have organized our lives together. Social change is ubiquitous. The question we face is whether our attempts to influence the direction of change towards a humane world is by overt action-commission or by inaction-omission. Omission frequently allows others, who act by commission, undue influence in effecting the direction of the change and thus a disproportionate say in creating the kind of social world we live in.

In a group, persons are responsible to one another and not for one another. To be responsible to another person requires
the recognition of the individual's basic rights to make his/her own decisions within a framework of concern for the feelings and rights of others. In the group there is the reality that each person's decisions have a direct impact on other persons in his/her immediate present. Every person makes choices and acts on the basis of the choices. A person in relative isolation may make a choice or decision which has consequences for others in the future. In interaction among persons in a group, actions by one person have immediate consequences for others. In a group where persons are responsible to one another, the individual's choices, decisions and actions are such as to preclude the infliction of avoidable pain on the others. Thus we recognize that self-determination is not a matter of individualism, of individual choices or of abstract independence; rather it is a social act reflecting the interdependence of persons and our responsibility to be concerned with each other.

Where the members of a group have developed relationships based on an affirmation of each person's dignity, there is present the opportunity to nurture and be nurtured. To be nurtured is knowing that one's existence as an individual is important and meaningful to other persons; that what happens to one impacts others; that one has become an integral part of the other's world. Nurturing others is to care for them, to have them become the subject of your concern. It is a truism that as one nurtures others, one is nurtured by that very act. The act of nurturing and being nurtured is essential to overcoming the pain that emanates from one's separateness from the prison of aloneness. Thus a major purpose of social group work is to enable people to overcome the pain of separateness and aloneness. They have the opportunity to share a collective experience and to make history for themselves with each other. They help one another deal with issues and events in their lives that have caused them pain and despair.

An important function the group performs is to dispel the myth of independence. An aspect of the individualistically-oriented culture, it is postulated that independence is the proper state of being for the person. In social work, we do not want to have persons dependent. We assume the opposite of dependency
Transcending Despair

is independence. A consequence of this myth is that persons either achieve independence and are alone and therefore lonely or, failing to achieve independence think of themselves as inadequate and failures. The reality is that persons are mutually interdependent. None of us can exist for any length of time without being dependent of others, and they in return are dependent upon us. The group is a living reality of interdependence.

Making things talkable provides the opportunity to bring into awareness many issues. For example, the frequency with which emotions are defined as irrational while the intellect is seen as rational is one such issue. The tendency to devaluate the emotions where they are defined as irrational, creates a situation in which persons feel uneasy when they experience emotional reactions. One needs to be in control of oneself reflects the wisdom that emotions are uncontrollable and therefore not to be trusted. This type of wisdom has been seen to have a particularly debilitating effect on many males in our society who feel prohibited from exhibiting tender emotions. This content area deserves frequent discussion because many members report that they feel peculiar when they react emotionally.

The role of worker in a group that is basically an egalitarian relationship between the members and the worker requires clarification. Egalitarian relationships do not deny the existence of different knowledge, wisdom and understandings among people. In egalitarian relationships one does not attempt to use knowledge and understanding to gain status advantage. Knowledge is used to enable others to try to see the world in a similar fashion, recognizing the inherent right to make one's own decisions.

The worker is not required to be passive in interactions within the group, nor is nondirective the preferred pattern. What is required is a nondominating, nonimposing, nonexploitive way for the worker to express his/her view of the world and the events therein. The worker avoids interpreting the meaning of others' behavior which might communicate the message that "I know better than you the cause or meaning of your behavior." This would be an attempt to gain a dominant status in relation to the others.
The worker makes "I" statements. "This is how I see it" or "What you are saying and doing is having this effect on me." This type of statement communicates to others that they are having an impact and is a statement that affirms the others without attempting to domi-nate them.

The worker has a commitment to a value system which affirms the importance of a dignified humane existence in a world with social and distributive justice. In being responsible for oneself and to others, there is an obligation to act upon these values. In an egalitarian, nonimposing, noncontrolling relationship the issue of "imposing one's value system upon others" is a nonissue. The worker needs to be clear as to what values she/he advocates and to express them openly.

In the interaction among persons in the group there is a mutuality of participation. No one person has greater responsibility than others to participate in the activities of the group or to enable or facilitate. In the Love Paradigm, leadership is not vested either in an individual or in a position. All members of the group have equal responsibility to participate in a way which will enable all persons to be a part of the group. The concept of leadership applicable to this focus concerns the behavior or the act which enables or facilitates the members of the group to continue to nurture one another and to continue to address their concerns. The concept of enabler, facilitator and worker when applied to a person has the consequences of establishing a status differential. However, our activity seems to be structured so that we tend to designate a person to be the worker. My point is that regardless of the external definitions, when people come together in a group to nurture one another, the distinctions of worker and member within the Love Paradigm disappear. No one empowers others because no one has the power to give to others. Within the principles and values of the approach, persons are careful not to take power that others may be willing to give up. We mutually enable one another to accept the power we have which is reflected in the recognition that we have responsibility for the choices we make and that we are the authors of an event or of an object. There is a mutual empowerment as a consequence of none claiming power over others, or willing to take the other's power.
The Proposal: Self-Help Consciousness Raising Groups

The self-help support groups involved in helping people deal with their despair when contemplating the nuclear destruction of the planet and to transcend it may be formed under any auspice: religious institutions, community organizations, civic groups, family services, public libraries, any setting where people can gather to nurture one another. It is advisable for the groups to meet on an every-other-week basis. The content and the issues involved may become too intense for the members of the group to have to deal with every week.

Once formed, the group should have a stable membership. It is very disruptive for people to come and go. The members of the group need to develop trust in one another to be able to risk the emotional pain involved in acknowledging one's despair. The size of the group must allow for all of the members to have sufficient opportunities to verbalize their feelings and reactions. Six to ten members appears to be an ideal size.

Although the content of the group meetings will arouse intense emotional responses, these are not therapeutic groups. The feelings that are aroused when contemplating our planet's destruction are symptoms of a person's basic humanity and not that of pathology.

How to introduce the idea of self-help groups for transcending despair may be a concern. One pattern that seems to work is to sponsor a community-wide meeting on issues of nuclear weapons and the future of the planet. An integral part of these events is to have an announcement ready that self-help support groups will be organized at specific sites on specific days. Obviously, there is a need for some people to do some advanced planning. In different communities, a variety of groups may take responsibility. In several communities in Maine, local peace groups affiliated with churches have sponsored community meetings followed by small group meetings. In other areas, groups interested in closing nuclear power plants have sponsored both the community and the small group meetings.

It is possible that the newly-formed national group which merged SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Movement and has appointed the Reverend William Sloan Coffin as its executive
can become a major sponsoring group for both community meetings and small group meetings.

After members of a group have introduced themselves and begin the process of overcoming their strangeness with one another, I have introduced the topic of the meetings by distributing an article by Joanna Rogers Macy entitled "Dealing With Despair" which appeared in the April 1979 issue of New Age. The reactions to reading the article varied depending upon the degree of trust the members had established.

Generally, the pattern seemed to follow that described by Mary White and Dorothy Van Soest (1984) who conceived of the process, moving from despair to action, as similar to the grieving cycle. They talk about denial, anger/rage, bargaining, depression and the final stage as acceptance and reorganization. Joanna Rogers Macy notes "Despair cannot be vanished by sermons on 'positive thinking' or injections of optimism. Like grief, it must be worked through. . . . To do so, a process analogous to grief work is in order. Despair work is distinct in that its aim is not the acceptance of loss (indeed the 'loss' has not yet occurred and is tardy to be 'accepted') but similar in the dynamics unleashed by the willingness to acknowledge, feel, and express inner pain" (Macy, 1979).

Frequently the denial phase revolves around the fear of invasion, attack or being taken over by an enemy. Nuclear weapons are seen as a security blanket. Reference is made to the fact that this is the longest period in modern history, where there has not been a war between major world powers. People seem to forget both the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. When this is discussed the issue is more focused on MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction. The denial phase seems to deal with political and ideological issues. Mutual Assured Destruction is highlighted with emphasis on the destruction component.

Getting past the denial phase involved a readiness by the members to face their sense of despair. The despair must be validated as a healthy, normal, human response to the situation of possible total destruction of the planet. One way that has been effective is to discuss how powerless each person feels to affect the process of changing the direction of national policy.
regarding nuclear disarmament. Inevitably comments such as not having sufficient knowledge or that others are more expert, is a reflection of feelings that they feel not good enough. This provides an opportunity to discuss how these feelings of personal inadequacies contribute to their abstaining from involvement in change efforts.

The process of empowerment requires that people accept that they are the best they can be and they have the right and responsibility to participate actively in the creation and recreation of the social world. It is through the utilization of the principles of group work within the Love Paradigm that the accepting and supportive setting is established which enables persons to deal with the variety of concerns they have as they move through the denial phase. The group has become a safe place where members can expose their fears, acknowledge their pain and continue to move in the direction of accepting personal responsibility to act.

The process of moving from the denial to the acknowledgement of despair will obviously vary for different persons within the group and among different groups. However, what seems universal is the recognition that experiencing the feelings involved in moving from denial to empowerment is a sane reaction to an insane situation. It helps to know that we are not alone in our fears.

It is critical for the group members to develop action projects which they can undertake in their efforts to effect change. It is imperative that during the group meetings it be recognized that the process of social change—the creation of a humane world—is a process and not an event. The process of change is cumulative.

There are a variety of individual actions such as, writing to elected officials identifying oneself as committed to nuclear disarmament and peace, participating in public demonstrations, writing letters to the editor and preparing op-ed articles which people can perform as an expression of their having transcended despair and focusing on the elimination of the source of the dread—nuclear weapons of destruction.

The intial purpose of the group’s helping the members to transcend their despair is the time-limited project. What is not
possible is to predict how long it would take any given group of people to successfully complete this task. It is important to be ready to have the members of the group reconvene from time to time as they begin to feel the "burn-out" effort of the slow pace of change.

One way the number of groups can be expanded is for those who have experienced the transcending of their despair to become facilitators of new groups, thus creating a type of reverse pyramid effect. The groups are seen as a necessary component for the development of a mass social movement.

An important function for the professional social group worker is to assist in helping people develop some rudimentary skills in facilitating the formation and function of self-help groups. We have a long history and much experience in this area. In days of old, it was sometimes called working with the untrained leaders; later it became working with indigenous leaders. No matter how we would phrase it now, social group workers have a special obligation to share knowledge and skills, and actively participate in the process of peace-making. However long and arduous the road to peace, it is the only road that will assure there will be a future for life on the planet.

References

What Social Workers Do: Implications for the Reclassification Debate

CHARLES GREEN

Hunter College of the City University of New York
Department of Sociology

The reclassification trend is one of the most formidable issues facing American social work today. Social work's vulnerability stemming from a general ambiguity about its distinct role and boundaries, competition from emerging helping occupations, and its debated professionalism is a major contributing factor. Often ignored in recent efforts to address reclassification is empirical evidence of social work's distinct performance in the human services versus other occupational groups. In this article comparative research findings supporting social work's unique performance are presented and their relevance for reclassification discussed.

The field of social work in the 1980s faces a number of competing demands that threaten its continued growth and development. There are demands for licensing and reclassification, increased specialization and broadbanding, an improved status among the established professions, and for social work to become a more radicalized voice for social change, to name a few. Of these reclassification is probably the most threatening. Reclassification questions the relevance of social work credentials as a requirement for social service positions at state and private social service agencies. Alternate job credentials for these positions have included extensive social service work experience and related social work degrees.

Reclassification has been justified on two principal grounds: first, the demand for public and private agencies to comply more strictly with equal employment guidelines by eliminating unnecessary entrance requirements and credentials; and second, that such action would help reduce states' soaring operating costs by forcing the creation of a more competitive labor market for social service positions (NASW, 1982, p. 1–6; Pecora and
Austin, 1983, p. 421–426). Underlying reclassification however is the view by some legislators, human service managers, and the general public that social work does not have a unique role in the human services as its activities are shared with many other helping occupations including community psychologists, psychiatric and public health nurses, home health attendants, and a wide range of counselors. This same view is reflected in the writings of some of the leading social work critics and human service analysts (Wilensky, 1964, pp. 141–150; Briar, 1973; Richan and Mendelshon, 1973, pp. 12–20; Epstein and Conrad, 1978; Burnfordd and Chenault, 1978, p. 6).

While the need to establish empirical validity of a social work degree for job entry and to a lesser degree job effectiveness has commanded the profession’s greatest attention in stemming reclassification, the fundamental matter of demonstrating social work’s uniqueness has been trivialized. But more recent studies by (Clearfield, 1977, pp. 23–30; O’Connor and Waring, 1981, pp. 4–6; Meyer, 1983; Rosenfeld, 1983, pp. 186–191) and others suggest otherwise. They exhort the need for increased clarity about social work’s domain in the human services in order to demystify the profession to the public and further legitimize its position in the helping arena. Ironically, their calls appear to echo earlier calls by (Bartlett, 1958, pp. 5–7; Kadushin, 1958, pp. 37–43; Bailey, 1959, pp. 60–66) and others in the 1950s for social work to develop a clearer conceptualization of self and to establish its domain. Concomitantly, conferences and professional forums around these same concerns have proliferated. In New York City for example, the local chapter of the National Association of Social Workers featured social work scholar and former NASW President, Nancy Humphreys at its annual meeting (Humphreys, 1986). The theme centered on the crucial linkage between need for building a stronger profession and the need for an improved public understanding about social work.

This article makes no sweeping claims about resolving the reclassification issue but seeks instead to contribute to the ongoing discussion. It recognizes the fact of public ambiguity about social work as inextricable from the reclassification issue and offers a set of empirical data which demonstrate social work’s unique role in the human services.
Reclassification Debate

Social Work's Response

In an effort to stem the movement toward reclassification by validating the requirement of a social work degree for social service jobs, the NASW Classification Validation Project was launched (NASW, 1982). It builds on earlier research which applied functional job analysis to the identification of tasks performed by social workers (Fine and Wiley, 1971; Austin and Smith, 1975; Teare, 1979) and employs a content validation methodology including job analysis and curriculum analysis that seeks to link training and practice. While these studies represent major efforts to define empirically the nature of social work practice and to validate education, they have not systematically compared social workers with non-social workers who are presumed to overlap into their service boundaries. Thus, the prospects for improving public understanding of the profession are minimized.

Methodology

Data

The data base for this study consists of the responses to a questionnaire and task sort administered in person to 1,444 human service workers and supervisors at 122 agencies within four of New Jersey's twenty-one counties to assess their training needs and activities. Questionnaires were mailed to workers at 1,500 agencies in the remaining seventeen counties. All of the agencies in the study were funded under Title XX of the Social Security Act. Workers in the four counties (Atlantic, Bergen, Hudson, Middlesex) were chosen for the in person task sort because they represented the broadest range of direct service occupations including: social workers, physicians, clerical workers, psychologists, counselors, visiting public health nurses, nutrition specialists, legal aides, teachers, educational specialists, and homemakers home health aides.

The study was conducted by the Human Service Manpower Project of The Rutgers University Graduate School of Social Work for the New Jersey Department of Human Services to determine training needs of employees at the state's Title XX funded agencies (Lagay, Simpson, and Tappper, 1977). The task sort consisted of eighty-seven general human service activities developed
in part by the Rutgers team of investigators which any human service worker could be expected to engage in. These centered around basic verbal, interventive, counseling, home health, client management, and general agency management areas. Each respondent stated whether he/she performed each task. For each task performed, the respondent was asked whether he/she required further training in the task. Respondents also indicated their job title, their job description, and their education level.

Subjects

Two hundred and ninety-four direct service workers from the original Rutgers sample identified themselves by job title as social workers. Two hundred and twenty-six of these were employed at four traditionally regarded social work settings, i.e., family service, mental health, public assistance, and child welfare settings with the remainder dispersed across many other types of settings. They were: family agency social workers (N=21), mental health social workers (N=29), county welfare board social workers (N=78), and child welfare social workers (N=98). Ninety percent of the mental health and family agency social workers held MSWs while 85% of the welfare board social workers and child welfare social workers held bachelor degrees. The concentration of social workers in these traditional settings underscored the importance of their selection as the social work sample in this investigation.

The remaining workers identified themselves by job title as non-social workers. Of these, 139 workers representing four occupational titles were selected for comparison with the social workers. These groups were presumed to overlap closely with social workers in at least two ways. The first of these was the degree to which they performed concrete versus non-concrete tasks. Concrete tasks (e.g. client budgeting, arranging services, information gathering) require no advanced academic preparation. Non-concrete tasks (e.g. developing treatment plans, conducting diagnostic sessions) would suggest further academic preparation and training. The second area was the degree to which their clients' problems (e.g. mental and physical health, economic dependency) overlapped. These four non-social work titles were: public health nurses (N=39), family planning coun-
Reclassification Debate

seleators (N=21), substance abuse counselors (N=42), and homemaker/health aides (N=37). Fifty-three percent of the substance abuse counselors and 64% of the family planning counselors held bachelor degrees (some with masters); 48% of the nurses held bachelor of science degrees in nursing; and 76% of the homemakers were high school graduates.

Public health nurses were selected because in providing health care they are often required to carry out interventive and supportive counseling as well as concrete services that overlap with social workers. In fact, many public health nurses feel that they now carry out a social work function. Family planning counselors were selected because they deliver concrete and non-concrete services that often overlap with the health and social services areas usually provided by social workers. Substance abuse counselors (alcohol and drug) were selected because of their reliance, at least in part, on verbal behavior changing therapies that have been traditionally associated with social workers. Finally, homemakers/health aides were selected because they deliver a set of concrete services that resemble the welfare services delivered by social workers such as budget counseling and client management.

Limitations

A key limitation of this study is that performance is measured simply as a dichotomous variable, that is to say, whether or not occupational group members performed or engaged in a certain task. Regretably, in the original Rutgers Project sample, the question of job performance did not probe frequency or intensity. A second drawback is the reliance on self-defined occupational titles, inherent to the original data set, as it assumes accuracy on the part of respondents though this may not be so as in the case of persons carrying out social work functions but calling themselves something else or vice versa. The only guard against this potential methodological flaw was an appeal to the respondents for their honest reporting and to agency administrators for their assistance in this regard. Finally, psychologists, whose activities have been closely compared with social workers are not included as they were significantly under-represented in the original data set.
Analysis and Findings

In the original study respondents were asked whether or not they performed eighty-seven human service tasks (measured as dichotomous variables). Each of these was believed to fall, a priori, into one of five general areas of activity. These areas were: basic therapeutic tasks, middle management agency tasks, specialized intervention tasks, generalized client management tasks, and budgeting tasks. As a check on this classification scheme, a Principal Component Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation was conducted. Variables with loadings of .50 or greater were considered to belong to that task domain. For each significant factor produced, (i.e., eigen values over 1.0) factor scores were generated for all respondents. The factor analysis revealed that there were indeed five significant factors that were readily interpretable and coincided with the a priori classification scheme. These factors with their respective loadings are presented in Table 1. A total of sixteen variables loaded on Factor One, Basic Therapeutic Tasks including some of the most basic and essential therapeutic/interventive activities that direct human service workers might expectedly engage in. Ten variables loaded on Factor Two, Middle Management which included agency administrative activities. Eleven variables loaded on Factor Three, Special Client Management which included certain practical yet technical activities for clients such as, chore services, first-aid, special health and home care activities. Four variables loaded on Factor Four, General Case Management including basic client management and service coordination activities. Three variables loaded on Factor Five, Budgeting including activities pertaining to client fiscal planning.

T-tests were then conducted to find out if the mean scores were significantly different between the social workers and non-social workers. Table 2 presents the results of the T-tests. Significant mean differences were observed between them on four factors. As a further step, social workers were divided into: mental health social workers, family agency social workers, welfare board social workers, and child welfare social workers. The non-social work group was divided into: public health nurses, homemakers/home health aides, family planning counselors, and substance abuse counselors. A One-Way Analysis of Variance
Table 1

Factor Analysis of Key Variable Loadings (Varimax Rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>1 Basic Therapeutic</th>
<th>2 Middle Mgmt.</th>
<th>3 Special Client</th>
<th>4 General Case Mgmt.</th>
<th>5 Budgeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop treatment plans</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use confrontation</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting limits for clients</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior modification</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct diagnoses</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity training</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictation</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation skills</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give advice/guidance</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give support/reassurance</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish relationship</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining inabilities</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish order between</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize stress</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening/understanding</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate subordinate's</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss subordinate's job</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan training program</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan new admin. unit</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspect case records</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing arrangements</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-service training</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-job training</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency operations</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseload management</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping tasks</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home health care</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing meals</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1—Continued

Factor Analysis of Key Variable Loadings (Varimax Rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1 Basic Therapeutic</th>
<th>2 Middle Mgmt.</th>
<th>3 Special Client Mgmt.</th>
<th>4 General Case Mgmt.</th>
<th>5 Budgeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor first aid</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaking</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrib/check medication</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervise client's work</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chore services</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach hygiene</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure activities</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meal delivery</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan client services</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify new clients</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify eligibility</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up after service</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare program budget</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine program cost</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client budget mgmt.</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ANOVA) was performed for each significant factor across all eight occupation groups. When an ANOVA proved significant, a Multiple Comparison of Means Test was performed to determine which of the pairwise comparisons was statistically significant. The results of this analysis appear in Table 3. The first chart in Table 3, the Basic Therapeutic Tasks, identifies this factor as falling within the domain of social work. The scores of all the social work groups with the exception of the county welfare board group are visibly different from the scores of each of the non-social work groups. As a group, the non-social workers dominate the second chart, Middle Management. However, family agency social workers and mental health social workers show the highest scores with the other social workers significantly underengaged. The third chart, Special Client Management falls within the domain of the non-social work group with the four
### Table 2

**Mean Differences in Factor Scores Between Social Workers and Non-Social Workers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Social Workers (N=226)</th>
<th>Others (N=139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1 (Basic Therapy)</td>
<td>0.2792</td>
<td>-0.4539*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2 (Middle Mgmt.)</td>
<td>-0.1578</td>
<td>0.2565*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3 (Special Client)</td>
<td>-0.4576</td>
<td>0.7440*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 4 (General Case Mgmt.)</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>-0.0084 NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5 (Budgeting)</td>
<td>0.2024</td>
<td>-0.3291*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* t-test for differences between means (two-tailed) P = < .001

Social work groups distinguishing themselves by their under-engagement. Social workers, with the exception of the welfare board group, significantly underengage in the fourth chart, *General Case Management*. The highest scores are indicated by two non-social work group members, family planning counselors and public health nurses. In the fifth chart, *Budgeting*, welfare board social workers alongside homemakers home health aides are the highest scorers.

While differences are observed among the social work titles across the five factors, they are fewer than the observed differences between social workers and the others. This fact points to the cohering tendency of social work. This comparison is illustrated in Table 4 where the actual number of significant mean differences within social work was counted and compared with the actual number of significant mean differences between social workers and the other titles. A total of eleven was counted within social work while a total of forty-eight was counted between social work and the other human service groups.
Table 3

Multiple Comparison of Group Means for Social Workers and Non-Social Workers on the Five Factor Scores
(Analysis of Variance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F.1 Basic Therapeutic</th>
<th>F.2 Middle Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMHA</td>
<td>WBSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPCL</td>
<td>CWSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBSW</td>
<td>HMHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRN</td>
<td>PHRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAACL</td>
<td>FPCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASW</td>
<td>SAACL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHSW</td>
<td>FASW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWSW</td>
<td>MHSW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F.3 Special Client Management</th>
<th>F.4 General Case Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FPCL</td>
<td>SAACL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHSW</td>
<td>FASW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASW</td>
<td>MHSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBSW</td>
<td>HMHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRN</td>
<td>CWSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMHA</td>
<td>PHRN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWSW</td>
<td>FPCL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAACL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASW</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MHSW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBSW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F.5 Budgeting</th>
<th>PHRN</th>
<th>FPCL</th>
<th>MHSW</th>
<th>FASW</th>
<th>CWSW</th>
<th>SAACL</th>
<th>WBSW</th>
<th>HMHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHRN</td>
<td>-1.3589</td>
<td>-1.0610</td>
<td>-2.031</td>
<td>-0.840</td>
<td>-1.182</td>
<td>0.5464</td>
<td>-0.6639</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPCL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MHSW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASW</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWSW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAACL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBSW</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Significant difference between groups, Scheffe's test (.10 level).
Discussion and Implications

This study was premised on the view that in order to effectively argue social work's case against reclassification a preliminary assessment of social work's uniqueness in the human services was essential. Social workers were compared with select non-social workers based on their engagement and under-engagement in eighty seven of the most basic human service activities. The findings revealed a distinctive behavioral pattern and service boundary for social work. The fact that social work and non-social work titles converged around a number of these tasks is neither surprising nor denies their distinctiveness. Since social functioning has physical as well as psychological dimensions to it, it is understood that at some point human service workers need to relate to some if not all of these in helping others. Kerlinger (1973, p. 462) makes reference to this in his discussion of valid construct measures by noting that discriminant validity implies evidence of convergent or overlapping patterns as well.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within Social Work</th>
<th>Between Social Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F.1</td>
<td>F.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.2</td>
<td>F.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.3</td>
<td>F.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.4</td>
<td>F.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.5</td>
<td>F.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 11</td>
<td>Total: 48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a group, the social workers studied here significantly engaged in a set of basic therapeutic/interventive activities. They were under represented in those areas requiring technical or specialized skills such as home care, health care, and chore services. When intra social work patterns were examined, behavioral differences became clearer. Welfare board social workers distinguished themselves from the others along three factors. This was indicated by their high mean scores on General Case
Management and Budgeting Factors and low mean score on the Basic Therapeutic Task Factor. Child welfare social workers are drawn closer to the welfare board social workers by their similar low scores on the Middle Management Factor. The duo of mental health and family agency social workers is consistent along three factors: Basic Therapeutic and Middle Management (where they fully engage) and General Case Management (where they underengage). While all social work groups significantly underengage in the Special Client Management Factor, the particularly low scores of the mental health and family agency social workers is instructive.

Although the data did not examine educational differences, this pattern among the social workers appears to support the profession’s claim that functional differences exist between social workers at differential educational levels. Mental health and family agency social workers it will be recalled reported their highest education level at the MSW while the others held mainly bachelor degrees. It is not surprising then to observe mental health and family agency social workers versus county welfare board and child welfare social workers interlocked on the Middle Management Factor and the Basic Therapeutic Factor. Many of the tasks found along these factors imply preparation beyond the bachelor level.

O’Connor and Waring (1981, pp. 4–6) have advanced that in light of increased competition among the human service providers, interdisciplinary ventures in practice and education should abound. Social work they contend can enhance its position in this interdisciplinary effort by identifying its set of unique qualities that contribute toward such a joint enterprise. Consistent with their proposal and these study findings, the preparation of bachelor level social workers for county welfare departments and child welfare agencies should consider improved and creative methods for enhancing and maximizing their delivery of certain case management and budgeting activities. This could be carried out at the expense of those activities which they currently underengage. Similarly, the preparation of graduate social workers for mental health and family service agencies should vigorously concentrate on bold new approaches for securing and promoting their roles as key providers of certain
therapeutic services and middle-management services over those areas which they show only limited involvement.

Conclusion

Social work's identification and emphasis of the basic task areas carried out by its variously trained members will not sufficiently satisfy its critics and impact the reclassification trend. This will necessitate the establishment of social work's effectiveness over other human service workers who also carry out many of these same activities. Contrary to the belief of some, demonstrating effectiveness in the helping process is not a simple procedure. Furthermore, it is not clear that this is the direction in which social work education is currently moving or for that matter, that this is the immediate objective for graduates of other human service disciplines and programs. That notwithstanding, this article focused upon the urgency for public clarity about social work's activities and the real threat to the profession's survival resulting from the waning of public clarity and support. Empirical evidence of social work's particular contribution to the human services vis à vis related human service groups was presented as essential in order for social work to reclaim public support.

The challenge now facing social work is one of linkage. That is, linking research on its domain and role performance in the human services with existing research on educational validation and task effectiveness and availing the findings to the public. Ultimately, such a strategy will not only help strengthen social work's response to states' reclassification policy initiatives but surely help improve its status in the human services.

References


Humphreys, N. (1986). A keynote address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the New York City Chapter of NASW.


Footnotes

1. Broadbanding was introduced in the 1970s by the New York City government to help reduce the operation costs of the municipal work force. It
sought to consolidate job functions and titles of various occupational
groups for example, sanitation workers, social workers, clericals. (See the
2. According to NASW, recategorization is more appropriate than the com-
monly used term, declassification, since a modification rather than a re-
moval of educational requirements is usually the case.
3. The final Rutgers task sort incorporated items from the Florida Human
Service Task Bank developed by Michael Austin and P. L. Smith (1975)
at The State University of Florida.
4. That these practice fields are the traditional domain of social work is
discussed by Roy Lubove (1980). See also, Gerald O’Connor and Mary
5. Factor analysis on dichotomous variables can be justified if the re-
searcher’s aim is to cluster these and a potentially continuous underlying
character of the variables exist. See for example: J. Kim and W. Mueller
In this paper we explore the personnel transformations which have occurred in social welfare work. Specifically, we examine the tensions between the dynamics of professionalization and deprofessionalization and how these trends have impacted upon those who work in the social welfare enterprise. Another concern of the paper is the effect of the proletarianization of social welfare work in the face of increasing efforts of some to create professional standards and to solidify the position of professionals in agencies. These struggles are examined in terms of their ability to affect the likelihood of both worker unionization and worker-client political coalitions.

In 1983 the Georgia State Senate honored, as social worker of the year, a former maid, cook, babysitter, and laundry worker who is presently director of a shelter for the homeless. Prior to this accolade, the 49-year-old Black woman had been presented

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the highest award for professional service from the Georgia Con-
ference on Social Welfare. In an interview the honoree remarked,
"The only difference between us [service providers] and them
[service recipients] is we've got a job, and they don't" (Graham

Her comment was meant to highlight similarities in peoples'
character, whatever their social position. However, both her re-
mark and her personal history open up a larger question in
social welfare theory and practice: just how similar are contem-
porary social welfare workers and their clients? Its answer holds
significant implications for understanding the occupational dy-
namics of the social work profession and relationships between
workers and their clients.

Welfare workers in the U. S. have not always been typified
by the aforementioned honoree. In the mid-to-late 1800's the
woman who performed charity work—White, Black or Jewish—
frequently came from a better off, if not wealthy, family. She was
labeled, somewhat perjoratively, a Lady Bountiful, "the chari-
table lady of wealth and social position" whose task was to offer
moral guidance to the worthy poor (Becker, 1964, p. 59). She
almost surely had never been a maid herself, and she may even
have employed one to perform her own domestic chores.

Certainly, not all contemporary social welfare workers fit the
honoree's profile, either. But the type of people recruited to wel-
fare work has shifted in the past century. So, too, have the
auspices of many social welfare undertakings, typically from
private charity organizations to government-funded agencies.
Concurrently welfare work has been transformed from a largely
volunteer effort by charitable women of social status to paid
employment by individuals whose wages represent their live-
lihood. How have these changes come about, and what impli-
cations do they have for the contemporary social welfare
enterprise? This article is an attempt to chronicle how personnel
transformations have occurred in social welfare work in the
twentieth century. In order to understand that phenomenon in
its complexity, it is also necessary to describe transformations
in the nature of social welfare work that have both preceded and
accompanied shifts in the personnel who staff the welfare
enterprise.
In the late 1800s, the activities of social welfare were increasingly believed to require greater rationalization. The shift in thinking gave rise to a new ideology termed "scientific philanthropy" (Bremner, 1956). This ideology implied a quest for particular skills and techniques of efficient case management and other social welfare endeavors. The changes which took place during this time paved the way for the professionalization of social welfare practitioners (Lubove, 1977). Gradually volunteer workers were displaced in philanthropic ventures by paid employees. This shift occurred because it was increasingly believed that those involved with the work should be specially trained. Consequently, welfare work was transformed from an avocation into an occupation. Throughout this century, trained social welfare workers, and especially those holding social work degrees, have sought professional status. The quest has been affected at times favorably, at other times negatively, by such factors as social policies, labor shortages, organizational changes, and public perceptions of the work itself, to name a few. Consequently, the issues and tensions we discuss below, which emerged in private charity work and later carried over into public social welfare, are recurrent themes within social work practice.

Two specific periods of the past century in public social welfare are most noteworthy for welfare work struggles. The first is the decade of the 1930's that witnessed the development of major public relief initiatives and a shift in the locus of charitable efforts from the private to the public sector. The second significant time period began with a resurgence of federal anti-poverty efforts in the 1960's and persists to the present as the spectre of a fiscal crisis endangers those and other programs. However, we have chosen to focus only on the latter time period in order
to provide the detail sufficient to document our theses. The de-
professionalization and proletarianization of welfare are not is-
issues that only recently emerged; rather, they accompanied the
development of federal public relief in the 1930s and have been
sustained by federal legislation and the vagaries of the private
sector labor market since that time.

Personnel Transformation

Since the 1930s public welfare efforts of the federal govern-
ment have expanded alongside the activities of private charities.
Personnel demands from both labor markets have not been met
by professionally trained social workers. Instead, periodic crit-
icl shortages of personnel with Master of Social Work degrees
(MSW's) have always been addressed through the use of non-
professional workers (Spano, 1982; Fisher, 1980; Transue, 1980;
Gartner, 1971). Most recently, the demand for MSWs accelerated
in the 1960s and 1970s with the expansion of domestic social
policies. During this time a number of factors converged that
collectively paved the way for the growth of low-skilled, low-
wage work within the social welfare industry. These included
a shortage of professionally trained social workers, a worrisome
surplus population (i.e., the poor), a socially activist federal gov-
ernment, and an intensifying fiscal crisis (Oppenheimer, 1975).
Professionally trained persons were readily absorbed into the
labor market, but still all available social work positions could
not be filled with professionals. At the same time political de-
mands of poor people were being aired with growing frequency
and volume. The stage was set for some ingenious pieces of
federal legislation that addressed both of these problems simul-
taneously and that have far-reaching implications for the current
transformation of social welfare personnel and their work. The
ideology of indigenous "paraprofessionalism" was given impe-
tus and legitimized through a series of social policies in the
mid-1960s. Indigenous paraprofessionalism refers to the creation
of work in the social welfare industry for members of the sur-
plus population who themselves are eligible for or receiving
welfare services and benefits. Successes with paraprofessionals
in smaller efforts such as Mobilization for Youth, the New Ca-
reers Development Project of NIMH, and Project CAUSE of the
U. S. Department of Labor in the early 1960s laid the groundwork for more broad-based paraprofessional utilization (Gartner, 1971). The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 called for "maximum feasible participation" by the poor in community services; later amendments reinforced the development of entry-level employment opportunities and called for educational assistance and advancement opportunities for indigenous paraprofessionals. Debate surrounded the need to alter civil service regulations and professional standards in order to achieve employment and advancement of the poor. In effect, the processes that produced the deprofessionalization of social welfare work in the 1960s were symbolically packaged as maximum feasible participation, new careers, and target group empowerment for the poor.

Other federal legislation followed the model of the Economic Opportunity Act. Openings were made in the welfare workplace for paraprofessionals or aides in education, juvenile delinquency projects, allied health programs, neighborhood crime prevention activities, rehabilitation services, and public welfare agencies (Brager, 1969; Gartner, 1971). In short, a combination of economic conditions and political pressures not only created a demand within the welfare state for paraprofessionals but also helped supply the workers from the surplus population.

The creation of low-paying, low-skilled jobs in social welfare work was timely in the 1960s as a strategy of job creation and political appeasement packaged as citizen participation. The same strategy is also timely in the 1980s whereby deprofessionalization is also being used as a vehicle for fiscal retrenchment. It is timely in the 1980s as well as a strategy of fiscal retrenchment. Recent fiscal troubles of states and the federal government have prompted many state civil service commissions to undertake job reclassification in the social services (Karger, 1983; Peccora and Austin, 1983). Reclassification is a further attempt to deprofessionalize and deskill social welfare work by reducing educational requirements for public social service jobs, combining work tasks to eliminate functions mandating higher levels of education, and breaking jobs into smaller tasks that can be organized in assembly-line fashion.

These changes prompted professional social workers to ac-
tion in order to protect their own status and jobs. Not only has the National Association of Social Workers opposed reclassification efforts (Tambor, 1983); it is also seeking state licensure of social work practitioners (NASW News, 1985) in order to consolidate the position of its credentialed membership. Limited evidence suggests that professionals may for the time have succeeded in holding their ground, as the proportion of aides to social workers appears to have peaked in 1979 and has fallen off gradually since then (figured from U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982, table B-20).

Work Transformation

The welfare industry's adoption of private sector labor practices has accelerated in response to legislation promoting the use of paraprofessionals and to the growing fiscal crisis of the state, with its consequent cutbacks in spending for social programs. Perhaps more than ever before, the state is demanding control over and efficiency and accountability from the social welfare enterprise. Social welfare agencies have responded to the cry for cost-savings by employing strategies already proven profitable for private sector operations (see Patry, 1978). Changes in social welfare work that parallel private sector dynamics include the restructuring of welfare tasks and the adoption of measures promoting work efficiency.

The restructuring of welfare work has meant dividing it into smaller, simpler components. This has produced an increased specialization of tasks among welfare workers, elaborated hierarchies within and among social welfare agencies, and opened the way for the employment of low-skilled low-wage workers. In recent years social welfare work has been restructured in at least three major ways, through: (a) the separation within organizations of eligibility screening and intake procedures from casework functions (e.g., Finch, 1976; Funiciello and Sanzillo, 1983; Piliavin and Gross, 1977; Vondracek et al., 1974); (b) the separation within organizations of circumscribed problem-solving activities and resource assistance from long-term counseling and casework (e.g., Finch, 1976), with the former functions performed by case aides, and (c) the separation across agencies of income maintenance activities and social service provision (Piliavin and Gross, 1977; Wyers, 1980).
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The foregoing separations have elaborated agencies' hierarchies in two ways. First, the separation of income maintenance activities from social service provision created a two-tiered status system of welfare agencies. Kadushin (1958) noted some time ago that the prestige of an occupation is closely related to the nature of its clientele. Because income maintenance organizations by definition serve the poor, whereas social service agencies may also draw from the middle classes, the former occupy the lower stratum in welfare agency hierarchies. Further, the separation of tasks within agencies created a two-tiered status system of welfare workers, with screening and intake workers and case aides on the bottom. The work of employees in income maintenance organizations and the work of intake and case aide personnel in all welfare organizations consequently has come to be viewed as less skilled, requiring less education or training, and thus worthy of lower pay.

Service agencies have also responded to the cry for accountability and cost-savings by placing greater emphasis on service efficiency. The measures adopted to promote efficiency are not unlike those used to extract greater profit from the manufacturing assembly-line. First, some agencies have changed their product from one that is complex to manufacture and evaluate to one that is more readily created and assessed. That is, they have switched emphasis from less tangible casework functions to more tangible and simpler forms of service delivery, such as transportation services and meal provision (Finch, 1976; Gilbert, 1983). Or they have moved away from services altogether in favor of an income strategy (Adams and Freeman, 1979). The more readily quantifiable "products" (actually inputs) generate noticeable and quick evidence of agency productivity, advantages not lost on political decision-makers (Binstock and Levin, 1976). Further, the shift in emphasis complements the separation of agency tasks and the reclassification efforts of state civil service commissions that were discussed above. It also gives administrators and policy analysts greater control over the nature of social welfare activities than they had in the past (Adams and Freeman, 1979; Groulx, 1983).

Second, some service agencies have in effect speeded up the assembly belt without hiring more workers to staff the line (e.g., Kaufman, 1982). Some workers have accommodated larger ca-
sloads by streamlining movements through the use of intake questionnaires, structured interviews, limited objectives, case recording forms, and group work rather than individual assistance (Eldridge, 1982; Patry, 1978). Alternatively, the inability or unwillingness of workers to employ various coping strategies in the face of faster-paced work has resulted in the supposedly-professional malady of “burnout” that is structurally no different from working class alienation (Braverman, 1974; Dressel, 1984; Karger, 1981; Lipsky, 1980).

A third agency response to the demand for efficiency and accountability is the growing use of computers for work such as intake and diagnosis that heretofore has been performed by service personnel (Boyd et al., 1978; Schoech and Arangio, 1979; Vondracek et al., 1974). Automation of the service assembly line effects cost-savings by replacing service professionals and paraprofessionals with still lower-paid secretarial technicians. Computers also serve supervisory functions, such as setting workers’ schedules and monitoring their progress (Schoech and Arangio, 1979).

The reorganization of welfare work and the adoption of efficiency measures are both cause and effect of the deprofessionalization of social welfare work. These transformations are critical and timely because they enable the state to obtain personnel cost-savings, afford administrators and political decision-makers more control over the nature of social welfare work, and open up jobs for a growing surplus population.

The foregoing changes in work organization and worker classification have produced social welfare agencies that are increasingly hierarchical in structure. An examination of who fills what positions in welfare organizations reveals that the social welfare labor force mirrors that of the larger society. Scattered data on the breakdown of workers by gender and race into administrators, professionals, and paraprofessionals (e.g., National Association of Social Workers, 1984; U. S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1977; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1982) allow two generalizations to be made. First, men and whites are more likely than women and Blacks, respectively, to be found disproportionately in administrative positions. Second, while the social welfare enterprise is majority female, the lowest rung is overwhelmingly
female. In other words, white men fare best in social welfare work, as they do in the private sector labor force. They are more likely than their race/sex counterparts to control others. As superordinates, their work has less tendency to be fragmented and alienating, and they will be higher paid than those whom they supervise. Alternatively, women of all racial/ethnic groups and men from oppressed racial/ethnic groups are more likely to shoulder the new burdens of a transformed welfare workplace. Workers who fill the newly created paraprofessional positions come disproportionately from their ranks. Their work is likely to be deskilled and poorly paid. As task rationalization and scientific management have infused social welfare organizations, the division of labor and managerial functions have broken down along the familiar lines of gender and racial/ethnic stratification found in the private sector workplace (Wright et al., 1982).

Implications for Workers and Clients

What are the implications of these shifts in welfare personnel and their tasks? Numerous issues can be raised, but we will focus specifically on two. First, Braverman (1974) has argued that the degradation (deskilling or proletarianization) of the labor process in the private sector fuels the drive for worker unionization. Similarly, do deprofessionalization and proletarianization set the stage for a strong union movement among social welfare workers? Second, Piven and Cloward (1982) have maintained that increasing demographic similarities between welfare workers (especially paraprofessionals) and clients create the potential for worker-client political coalitions. Indeed, legislative mandates for the use of paraprofessionals (e.g., the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964) were in part intended to foster the empowerment of marginalized groups. Consequently, we address whether the presence of paraprofessionals, many of whom are former or current welfare clientele, enhances the likelihood of political coalitions between welfare workers and their clients?

Social Welfare Workers and Unionization

Certain dynamics of social welfare work historically and contemporarily have constrained the likelihood that welfare workers as a group will coalesce under a common union umbrella. Factors inhibiting this coalition include competition be-
tween unions and professional associations and the horizontal and vertical stratification of welfare workers. On the other hand, there are other factors that could facilitate the political alignment of welfare workers, regardless of the aforementioned restraining factors. Specifically, there is some evidence which shows that professional social workers are not categorically anti-union, that there are increasing similarities among welfare workers of all strata due to the deskilling of their work, and that some union leaders and professional people recognize the need to seek common political ground.

The symbolic packaging of social welfare work as a profession, or even a semi-profession (Etzioni, 1969; Toren, 1972), has competed with efforts to unionize welfare workers (Sarfatxi Larson, 1977). Alexander (1980) summarized a number of the prototypical differences that exist between unions and professional associations, including the philosophy, goals, and tactics of each group. For example, while unions emphasize adversarial relations with management and stress economic issues, professional associations incorporate management in a quest for "public good" and professional autonomy. Union tactics frequently involve power struggles whereas professional struggles often get played out through codes of ethics and expansion of the knowledge base (e.g., studying issues). The ideology of professionalism in social welfare work encourages putting the client's welfare above one's own; matters of welfare workers' class interests become subordinated as a result (Tambor, 1979). In contrast, unions highlight class issues.

A further critical distinction noted by both Alexander (1980) and Karger (1983) is the difference in constituencies of existing welfare worker unions and professional associations. Professional associational membership is typically restricted to individuals with certain educational credentials (for example, a BSW or MSW); union membership may be open to all line staff but will exclude managerial personnel. As a result, unions and professional associations tend to break down along social class and to an extent racial/ethnic lines as well as on the basis of different philosophies, goals, and tactics. Indeed, the interests of the less trained, lower-paid union membership of social welfare workers may run headlong into the interests of social work MSWs.
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Their different interests have been made highly visible through their conflicting positions on civil service reclassification and licensure, as we described earlier.

In short, within the broad category of social welfare workers there is considerable heterogeneity both horizontally and vertically. Unions and professional associations are stratified along those lines, and their political positions on behalf of their respective constituencies are grounded in different needs. The introduction of paraprofessionals into social welfare work further differentiated practitioners, created more strata of workers, and may have reduced the potential for political alignment (see Reich, Gordon, and Edwards, 1977) under an umbrella organization. As the work of professionals has come to look much like the work of paraprofessionals, the former are likely to resist the comparison by relying on the factors of prestige to differentiate themselves (Mills, 1951; Sarfatti Larson, 1977). In doing so, they should be expected to cling tighter to the ideology of professionalism and membership in exclusive professional associations. Unlike the social welfare workers of the 1920s and 1930s, contemporary workers are disinclined to perceive their class similarities across job classifications. The current fiscal crisis has not yet provided the impetus that the Great Depression did for coalition formation.

There is evidence, however, that permits an alternative scenario wherein social welfare workers of differing backgrounds and organizational responsibilities might forge a united political front through unionization. Studies by Shaffer (1979) and Lightman (1982) have indicated that professional social workers do not necessarily harbor anti-union sentiments and do not find unionization incompatible with professionalism. Rather, there seems to be what Lightman (1982, p. 138) called ""divided zones of responsibility"" between professional organizations and unions, with the latter's arena encompassing matters of workplace treatment that have traditionally been their strength.

The deskilling of social welfare work may also have created a cadre of professional welfare workers now amenable to unionization. Mills (1951) and others (e.g., Tambor, 1983) have predicted that white-collar resistance to unions would erode with the blurring of distinctions between white-collar and wage-
workers that accompanies the deskilling of the former's work. Further, some unions have been at the forefront of efforts to reduce caseload sizes and restore various resources that enabled welfare workers to do their jobs in a more comprehensive and autonomous (i.e., "professional") way (Tambor, 1979).

A third factor that may facilitate welfare worker political coalitions is the recognition by some union leaders and individual social work professionals that a unified front is advisable in the face of declining political and fiscal support for social welfare programs. For example, Adams and Freeman (1982) have argued that social workers should align with labor unions because of the considerable political clout that the latter enjoy and that social workers lack. Issues of common concern between the two groups include pay, working conditions, racism, sexism, and support for social welfare programs. As both a professional social worker and labor organizer, Tambor (1979, 1983) has stressed the need for a coalition of professionals and paraprofessionals. He noted that unions and professional associations already have a track record of mobilization around specific issues through the Coalition of American Public Employees. He lists among the issues of common interest to both groups those of job security, improved working conditions, and the defense of human service programs.

Whichever scenario gets played out is likely to depend on the degree to which cross-cutting schisms among social welfare workers are highlighted or obscured. For example, civil service reclassification schemes have been motivated in part by fiscal concerns and in part in response to judicial decisions surrounding affirmative action (Karger 1983). Opposition to reclassification based on professional skills and prerogatives could be perceived, fairly or not, as opposition to affirmative action. If so, it is unlikely that solid political bases can be built within professional and paraprofessional classifications, not to mention between them. The existence of both horizontal and vertical stratification has always constrained broad-based collective political expression.

Worker-Client Coalitions

The second question raised by the trends of deprofessionalization and proletarianization regards the potential for political
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coalitions between welfare clientele and agency workers, especially paraprofessionals. As noted earlier, social welfare legislation promoted, and in some cases mandated, the use of paraprofessionals. The ideological bases for the mandates included (a) the desirability of employment for indigenous peoples, (b) the enhancement of contact between professionals and clients by utilization of the local resident as mediator (e.g., Adams, 1965; Berman and Haug, 1973; Grosser, 1966), and (c) the empowerment of relatively powerless groups (e.g., Loewenberg, 1971; Gartner, 1969; Gatewood and Teare, 1976). At first glance the legislation appears to have provided the opportunity for increased alignment of social service providers and clientele. Upon further reflection, however, it seems instead to have made more visible certain paradoxes of social welfare work that mitigate against collective political action by workers and clients.

One paradox derives from the structural fact that the welfare worker is aligned with both the state and service recipients. In important ways welfare workers, especially paraprofessionals, are like other marginal workers and members of the surplus population (e.g., in demographic characteristics and the performance of deskilled work). In other important respects, however, they are structurally aligned with the state, as its employees and for whom they reproduce the social order (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1979). In fact, welfare workers need the ongoing existence of recipients to maintain their own positions (McKnight, 1980). As a result, the question of worker-client politicization is problematic.

Another paradox concerns the expressed function of paraprofessionals as mediators between clients and professional staff. Because paraprofessionals often are similar demographically to the clients with whom they interact, it is presumed that they will have more rapport with clients and thus can facilitate the latters' experience with the service system (e.g., Adams, 1965; Berman and Haug, 1973; Cudaback, 1968; Field et al., 1980). However, some sources (Adams and Freeman, 1979; Grosser, 1966) have argued that the paraprofessional is likely to develop allegiance toward the service organization and away from the target population. Indeed, Berman and Haug's (1973) study showed strong interest by paraprofessionals in upward mobility. Because interests of the welfare organization often differ from
those of the client group (Dressel, 1984), the indigenous worker may become co-opted into the ideology of the organization. Thus, the presumed benefits of hiring indigenous peoples as mediators may instead become "fatal remedies" (Sieber, 1981); in fact, indigenous workers may have a greater personal vested interest in engaging in role distancing from clients than do their non-indigenous co-workers. Furthermore, profesional social workers may object to paraprofessionals' attempts to mediate between themselves and the clients, since they have invested in professional training.

Demographic similarities between service system paraprofessionals and clients have been seen as a basis on which political coalitions can be forged (Piven and Cloward, 1982). However, there is support for the opposing claim, namely, that the similarities exacerbate worker-client tensions. People receiving assistance experience the welfare system as a series of face-to-face negotiations with service personnel. Any discontents that clients have about welfare rules, regulations, and decisions are likely to get registered with the service provider, regardless of the latter's role in shaping policy or her/his ability to alter it. Client's complaints frequently take the form of anger with or hostility toward the worker as the embodiment of an unjust or capricious welfare system. The indigenous worker in an unresponsive agency stands to be blamed further, since her/his presence is meant to facilitate the client's interface with the service system. Under these circumstances, political coalition-building between paraprofessionals and clients is threatened. Ironically, and in contrast to the argument of Piven and Cloward (1982), the present retrenchment of state welfare functions may reduce the likelihood of worker-client coalitions because of increased client dissatisfactions that get played out as anger against and mistrust of the service worker (see also Lipsky, 1981). Such dynamics are functional for the existing order: political decision-makers are buffered from welfare system discontents by multiple layers of service system functionaries who deflect the blame. Further, divisiveness is created among people who otherwise might coalesce politically.

At the same time, the presence of indigenous workers in the welfare system lends credence to the American dream of upward
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mobility for those from whose ranks the paraprofessionals come. While the workers themselves may engage in role distancing from clients, clients instead may embrace the roles of those above them and have renewed belief in the opportunity for upward mobility. Paraprofessional workers perhaps should not be described as upwardly mobile, since their employment resulted from the down-grading and deskilling of the occupation. Further, the low wages many receive do not alter their own eligibility for welfare assistance. Nevertheless, their presence in the workforce can serve to reinforce the notion that one can work out of poverty through individual effort. The predominance of this belief undermines the likelihood of collective action for social change.

In sum, the likelihood of transformation of the social welfare system via worker-client coalition is debatable. Inter-group dissension and cross-cutting allegiances obscure the common political ground on which professionals, paraprofessionals, and clients might coalesce. The developing fiscal crisis of the state has not reached a level of severity sufficient to motivate workers and clients to recognize their inherent similarities or even to overcome their immediate differences.

Concluding Remarks

We have argued that important trends are currently transforming labor in the social welfare industry. The trends are the growth of jobs requiring little formal training or education which are being filled by paraprofessionals and the deskilling of previously professional work. Professional social work associations may decry such changes, but it is fruitful to pose the following question: Is deprofessionalization "bad"? To be sure, deprofessionalization has provided a convenient rationale for proletarianization: lower pay, fragmented work, increased supervisory and managerial control in the workplace, and a shift in policy decision-making away from street-level practitioners. But there is nothing that inherently binds these features to deprofessionalization.

Consequently, the current changes in social welfare work could afford an opportunity for the examination of basic issues in welfare practice as well as an occasion for recognizing the
vulnerability of both welfare workers and clients to the demands of a political economy premised on stratification and control. Present tensions among workers arise in part because the welfare enterprise is not expansive enough to provide employment for all members of the surplus population, educated and untrained alike. Policy-makers have tried to impose the latter on a limited labor market in order to solve some of their own political problems. For the short-term they will have succeeded if the arena for conflict is limited to narrow internecine disputes among sub-groups of welfare workers.

The transformations we have described within the social welfare industry are not unique to that workplace. Indeed, the increasing bifurcation of the private sector occupational structure of the United States is attracting both scholarly attention and political concern. Issues of gender, race, and class stratification and debates over educational credentials for low-paying, deskill work have emerged there also. How these issues are negotiated in either the private sector or the public sector social welfare industry is likely to impact their resolution in the other arena as well.

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Deprofessionalization


Footnote

1. Don Tomaskovic-Devey should be credited with this observation.
An Ecological Approach for Social Work Practice

JOHN T. PARDECK
Southeast Missouri State University
Social Work Program

The ecological approach offers a comprehensive theoretical base that social practitioners can draw upon for effective social treatment. The critical concepts of the ecological approach are presented. It is suggested that the ecological perspective can be a useful treatment strategy for improving the social functioning of the client system.

The earliest pioneers in the field of social work such as Mary Richmond realized the role that environment plays in the social functioning of human beings. Consequently, in the early 1970s when social work theorists began stressing the importance of the person-in-environment perspective, little was actually being added to the traditional social work knowledge base. However, during this period, writers such as Germain (1973) and Hartman (1976) through the person-in-environment perspective developed the groundwork for the ecological approach currently being stressed in the field of social work. Even though a number of significant gains were made by these writers, their early contributions to the ecological theoretical approach had a number of limitations. In particular, they did not clearly define procedures for implementing the ecological approach in assessment and treatment of client problems. Furthermore, the ecological theory that emerged from these theorists was not well conceptualized and had other notable limitations similar to those found with the social systems theory perspective.

However, what was offered by the early ecological theorists, notably Germain, was the groundwork for a new way of viewing social work practice. Her emphasis on the importance of the adaptive balance between organism and environment, referred to as a “goodness-of-fit” between the two, offered a novel way of viewing the relationship of the person to the environment.
She suggested if there is a "misfit" between the client system and the environment, social treatment should be aimed at correcting this condition. This critical insight set the stage for the development of the ecological perspective currently being used within the field of social work.

The Ecological Perspective

The ecological approach that has emerged from the early works of Germain (1973) and others (Barker, 1973; Grinnell, 1973; Hartman, 1976) offers a rich theoretical base which practitioners can translate into effective social work practice. Presently, the ecological approach provides strategies that allow the social worker to move from a micro level of intervention to a macro level of social treatment. The ecological perspective not only helps the social worker impact a client system through policy and planning activities but also through psychotherapy and other micro level approaches. Thus, direct and indirect practice strategies for intervention can be combined into a congruent practice orientation when working with a client system through the ecological approach.

The present thinking on the ecological approach suggests that the primary premise explaining human problems is derived from the complex interplay of psychological, social, economic, political and physical forces. Such a framework accords due recognition to the transactional relationship between environmental conditions and the human condition. This perspective allows the practitioner to effectively treat problems and needs of various systemic levels including the individual, family, the small group, and the larger community. In essence, the practitioner can easily shift from a clinical role to a policy and planning role within the board framework of the ecological approach.

Presently, six distinct professional roles have evolved from the ecological framework. These roles have also been identified as an intricate part of advanced generalist practice by a number of writers (Anderson, 1981; Hernandez, Jorgensen, Judd, Gould, and Parsons, 1985). These six professional roles allow the practitioner to work effectively with five basic client systems—the individual, the family, the small group, the organization, and the community. The six professional roles are defined as follows:
1) **Conferee:** Derived from the idea of conference, this role focuses on actions that are taken when the practitioner serves as the primary source of assistance to the client in problem solving.

2) **Enabler:** The enabler role focuses on actions taken when the practitioner structures, arranges, and manipulates events, interactions, and environmental variables to facilitate and enhance system functioning.

3) **Broker:** This role is defined as actions taken when the practitioner's object is to link the consumer with goods and services or to control the quality of those goods and services.

4) **Mediator:** This role focuses on actions taken when the practitioner's objective is to reconcile opposing or disparate points of view and to bring the contestants together in united action.

5) **Advocate:** This role is defined as actions taken when the practitioner secures services or resources on behalf of the client in the face of identified resistance or develops resources or services in cases where they are inadequate or non-existent.

6) **Guardian:** The role of guardian is defined as actions taken when the practitioner performs in a social control function or takes protective action when the client's competency level is deemed inadequate.

Obviously there is a blurring of roles when a practitioner uses an ecological approach to practice. For example, the roles of conferee and enabler at times are difficult to separate. When practitioners implement the broker role, they also may find themselves enabling and advocating. The complementarity among the above roles should be noted, and the fact that they have a tendency to cluster rather than to remain distinct. This approach is a significant departure from the traditional methods (Casework, Groupwork, and Community Practice) utilized in practice, as the ecological approach results in a dynamic integration of practice roles. Along with these integrative practice roles, three concepts have evolved that serve as an organizing theme for the ecological approach; these are the *behavioral setting*, *ecosystem*, and *transaction*.

**Behavioral setting**

An important study conducted by Barker and Gump (1964) provides excellent insight into the concept of the behavioral set-
ting. Their research focused on the impact of the little high school and the large high school on the social functioning of the individual student. They found that these two ecologies, small versus large high school, resulted in different competencies of individual students. The students from the small high school developed a different niche or functional role from those students attending the large high school. The classic conclusion drawn from the Barker and Gump study suggests that the ways an individual adapts to a behavioral setting are not totally determined by the environment. They concluded that the same environment provides different inputs to different persons, and even different inputs to the same person should the individual’s behavior change.

What this research provides for social work practice is a novel way for conceptualizing the problems of clients. It suggests that the client's behavior is not only shaped by the environment, an idea long accepted in social work practice, but also that behavioral change in the client provides for different inputs from the environment. In a certain sense, the client appears to play a role in the shaping of the environment.

Through the ecological perspective, the behavioral setting can be viewed as the basic unit of analysis for social work practice. The behavioral setting of the client should be viewed in terms other than the simple behavioral approaches found in traditional psychology. In other words, the behavioral setting is more than the behaviorist's conceptualization of behavior as a stimulus-response relationship, but rather is an inextricably interwoven relationship of physical setting, time, people, and individual behavior (Plas, 1981). The conglomeration of behavioral settings of a given client forms the client's ecosystem.

Ecosystem

A client functions in more than one ecology. The client's ecosystem is the interrelationships and conglomeration of these ecologies. For example, a client's ecosystem consists of the self, family, the neighborhood, and the entire community. Obviously, as stressed earlier, conceptualizing the client's relationship to the environment is not a new idea in the profession of social work. What is powerful, however, about the concept of
ecosystem is that the client's social functioning is clearly interrelated with the environment, and the client is an inextricable part of the ecological system (Hobbs, 1980). Consequently, the client's ecosystem is composed of numerous overlapping systems including the family, the workplace, and the community, as well as other critical subsystems unique to each client.

**Transaction**

The ecological approach departs dramatically from the traditional person-in-environment orientation through the concept of transaction. The concept of transaction suggests that a bidirectional and cyclic relationship exists between the client and the environment. In essence, the environment contributes to the person's adjustment and development; the person's behaviors create unique responses with the environment, thus changing the environment and ultimately its effect on the person (Rhodes and James, 1978). Through the concept of transaction, the ecological approach shifts the focus of treatment from the client's personality and behavioral make-up to the client's interrelationship with the family, community, and other systems. The vast majority of people transact with the larger social ecology in such a fashion that the result is harmony and congruence. When this harmony no longer exists, social treatment by the practitioner may be useful.

The traditional methods of social work intervention such as casework and groupwork largely view the presenting problem of a client as individual pathology. That is, the client is viewed as deviant, behaviorally troubled, or disturbed. The ecological perspective through the concept of transaction suggests that problems of clients are not a result of individual pathology, but rather a product of a malfunctioning ecosystem. The ecological perspective suggests that emotional disturbances, for example, are disturbances resulting from a pattern of maladaptive transactions between the organism and the environment through which environmental activity shapes the person and the person's social functioning influences the environment. The practitioner may view this process as one of mutual influence; however, a more accurate interpretation may be to describe it as a sequential mutual influence where A affects B which in turn affects A or
as a simultaneous mutual influence where A and B form a unity which defines the situation. Thus problems in social functioning are viewed as interactive, reciprocal, and a dynamic set of forces operating between the client and the ecosystem.

The relationship between the ecology and problematic social functioning has been documented in a number of recent studies. For example, Nathan and Harris (1975) reported a relationship between social class and psychiatric hospitalization. The famous research by Szasz (1961) concluded that problems in social functioning do not arise until certain acts become known to others who then define or label the act as deviant or disturbed.

Clearly, the concept of transaction advances the practitioner’s understanding of the relationship between the ecosystem and the social functioning of the client system. It deemphasizes the traditional approach which suggests that a negative environment creates problems in social functioning. The practitioner realizes that the transactional model assumes that the contact between the client and environment is a transactional relationship in which each is altered by the other. For example, the parent who labels a child as difficult may in time view the child’s behavior as difficult irrespective of the child’s actual behavior. In turn, the child in time will accept the difficult label as a central part of the child’s self image, thereby becoming the difficult child for all time in all social situations.

The process of transaction has been applied to a number of problems confronting clients. In a recent longitudinal study of schizophrenic women and their children, clear evidence was found of the transaction process (Sameroff and Zax, 1978). This research concluded that the child of the schizophrenic parent learns to adapt and identify the craziness of his or her social environment and in time learns to contribute to the schizophrenic transactions with the parent. Sameroff and Chandler (1975) report a similar finding in the phenomena of child abuse. They concluded that child abuse is a transactional process between parent and child.

For the social work practitioner who is grounded in the traditional methods of intervention such as casework and groupwork, the ecological perspective offers a tremendous shift in thinking when viewing the process of assessment and treatment.
The shift is away from the individual as the core focus of intervention to a perspective defined as the individual-in-the-ecology. Obviously, traditional theories such as psychoanalysis, behavioral modification, reality therapy and so on, are dated when using the ecological perspective in social work practice. The practitioner must conceptualize treatment as a strategy that involves working with individuals, families, small groups, and larger social systems to create change that promotes the best possible transactions between people and their environments. It is an orientation that implements an integrative approach to practice stressing a dynamic combination of roles that meet the needs of clients by alleviating stress in ways that enhance or strengthen the inherent capacities of the client system. The ecological approach addresses solutions and prevention of problems at all levels of intervention—intrapersonal, familial, interpersonal, organizational, institutional, and societal. By utilizing an integrative practice approach grounded in the ecological perspective, more than one aspect of a given problem confronting a client system may be dealt with simultaneously. The practitioner using the ecological approach to practice when assessing client social functioning clearly understands presenting problems not as a result of a disturbed client, but more appropriately as a “disturbing client” confronted with a breakdown in the transaction between the client and the larger social ecology (Pardeck, 1987).

Allen-Meares and Lane (1987) in a recent article neatly summarize the core characteristics of the ecological approach to practice as follows:

1. The environment is a complex environment-behavior-person whole, consisting of a continuous, interlocking process of relationships, not arbitrary dualism.
2. The mutual interdependence among person, behavior, and environment is emphasized.
3. Systems concepts are used to analyze the complex interrelationship with the ecological whole.
4. Behavior is recognized to be site specific.
5. Assessment and evaluation should be through the naturalistic, direct observation of the intact, undisturbed, natural organism-environment system.
6. The relationship of the parts within the ecosystem is considered to be orderly, structured, lawful, and deterministic.
7. Behavior results from mediated transactions between the person and the multivariate environment.
8. The central task of behavioral science is to develop taxonomies of environments, behaviors, and behavior-environment linkages and to determine their distribution in the natural world.

Furthermore, Max Siporin (1980) concludes that the ecological approach appears to be an extremely appropriate strategy for practice given the current context of social work practice. Siporin suggests that the ecological perspective contributes to social work practice through the following points:

1. A dynamic wholistic approach is stressed emphasizing the person and the sociocultural systems surrounding the person.
2. A strategy is offered through allowing the social worker to think in terms of parts and wholes.
3. It encourages an eclectical approach to practice.
4. It allows one to move to both micro and macro levels of assessment and intervention when working with a client system.
5. It stresses treatment planning and allows the practitioner to work at altering intersystemic relationships.
6. Given its multifactorial nature, the practitioner is able to develop and utilize a strong and varied repertoire of assessment and social treatment strategies.

The ecological approach provides a balance between the person and the environment. Clearly, this balance is critical to social work treatment and facilitates practice effectiveness and accountability.

Conclusion

The ecological approach defines the problems of clients in new ways and thus demands enlightened strategies for effective social work intervention. The ecological perspective builds on the traditional concerns of social work practice dating back to Mary Richmond. It also separates social work from the more traditional approaches stressed in psychology and psychiatry. One may also conclude that the ecological perspective makes a significant departure from the traditional methods of casework, groupwork, and community practice.
Ecological Approach

Current thinking on the ecological perspective provides practitioners with an integrative approach to practice that allows for new ways of assessing and treating problems. Given this situation, social workers can now conceptualize the problems confronting clients in such a way that effective treatment involves not only working with the client, but also the systems that facilitate social functioning including the client's family, neighborhood, community and other critical social systems.

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Evaluating the Swiss Welfare State:
A Review Essay*


As the title indicates, this is an ambitious book. First, the author had the huge task of finding his way through the complexity of a relatively decentralized social insurance, welfare and social service delivery system. Presenting "the Swiss way of welfare" to others can turn into a nightmare even for Swiss specialists. Second, he evaluates this "Swiss way of welfare" in order to derive "lessons for the Western world". On both accounts the book fails. It does not live up to its ambitious task. However, the problems posed by the first task are better 'solved' than those by the second. The evaluation of the "Swiss way of welfare" is analytically quite inadequate. The outline (although concise) of the major elements of the Swiss social insurance, welfare and social service delivery system is useful. However, if interested in Switzerland and social policy, both generalists and specialists alike are better advised to rely on other sources, such as Fehlmann et al. (1987), Fragnière (1985), Sommer (1978; 1987), Staub-Bernasconi et al. (1983) and Wagner (1985). None of these, and virtually all other sources cited here, were incorporated or reported on by Segalman, even though most of them were published before 1986. Unfortunately for the American reader, none of the major books is available in English.

The best chapter is probably that on social insurance, although important sources such as Bandi (1982) are missing. However, Segalman often presents the social insurance system in an overly positive light and with a naiveté that is blind to several ongoing debates. First is the notion that the Swiss social

*The author would like to thank Peter Aebersold for his comments.
insurance system is, unlike that of other welfare states, concerned with positive outcomes in terms of justice, rationality and original intent (p. 70). Second, he believes that the "Swiss social security system seeks to plan for... emergent demographic trends by its fiscal and funding policies", and that in this system there is solidarity between the sexes (pp. 72, 74). Third, the uncritical presentation of the newly introduced compulsory occupational retirement scheme—administered by various private insurance firms and non-profit organizations—reflects Segalman's neglect to consult such sources as Rechsteiner (1984) and Wechsler (1984). The same holds for his presentation of the health (private) and accident (state) insurance system where authors such as Koch (1984), Sommer and Leu (1984) and Sommer et al. (1983) should have found entry into the text. Fourth, unlike Segalman's attempt to do so, the family allowance insurance cannot legitimately be compared with and evaluated against the United States' AFDC program, unless one wishes to compare apples with oranges. Their origin, history and social-policy goal is too different.

Last, and most significantly, Segalman's discussion of unemployment compensation and poverty is fully inadequate. Again, important authors such as Ernst (1983) and information on recent unemployment insurance adjustments and regional projects (Kurt et al., 1984; Walti and Weber, 1984) dealing with increased and prolonged unemployment are missing. Instead, the chapter on social insurance closes with the information that "90% of the population receive 70% of the income", and the meaningless statement that "the Swiss are primarily a middle class country" (p. 90). Segalman believes that the "social-insurance systems and the income distribution patterns of Switzerland serve to keep the population productive, employed, and basically self-sufficient. This cannot be claimed for many of the other Western nations" (p. 90). This is an unsubstantiated assertion.

The last mentioned theme emerges as the main theme of the book. Repetitiously, its author claims that in countries other than Switzerland, the welfare state is in financial and other trouble—social insurance systems that are deficit financed, benefit recipients who are too numerous and dependent on the welfare
state, etc. Chapter 2 journalistically lists some basic characteristics, issues and problems of the welfare state in the USA, the U.K., the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and Ireland. However, the accounts are superficial, unsystematic and sloppy. Thus, they are useless for any serious comparison. Essentially they serve to make the simple point mentioned above. It can be illustrated by the following selected summary statements (repeated in essence with respect to virtually every country analyzed (sic)):

— "Thus, the Dutch welfare state is beset with increasing demands from a less-productive population and organized interest groups at a time when it can depend on less income and considerable economic problems" (p. 25);
— "France has, at great expense, succeeded in seeing to the humane purposes of its welfare system, but in the process, because of its policies and culture (which omit emphasis of employment over welfare dependency), it has endangered its economy and trapped sizable populations in persistent dependency" (p. 33);
— "... the Dutch welfare state remains one of the most comprehensive welfare systems in Western Europe without the tax base needed to pay for it" (p. 36).

In comparison, Switzerland is presented as a country with few, if any such problems. Thereby, the author fails to see that also in Switzerland some insurance systems are, technically speaking, operating on a deficit because of government transfer payments. Furthermore, he neglects to mention that some political groups continue to argue for a less costly welfare state. Thus, the author's picture of Switzerland is too rosy and distorted, and the comparisons made with other countries are of little value.

The book reviewed here criticizes "the negative effects of welfare-state dynamics on the population of the United States and other Western nations" and glorifies "the conditions in Switzerland that have achieved the human goals of welfare state without negative effects on the population" (p. 186). The author concludes:

"In a sense, as the population accepting the programs of income redistribution grows, this creates a culture of its own, making not
learning, not training and not working an acceptable way of life. By not providing rewards for learned helplessness and by enforcing social control against such behavior, Switzerland provides an antiwelfarization example that is replicable in other countries.” (p. 192)

In order to substantiate his argument, Segalman also looks at welfare departments in Swiss cities like Zurich, Bern, Geneva, Basel and Aarau, all of which operate under different cantonal welfare stipulations. Potentially, this can be of interest. Since welfare is primarily a cantonal and communal matter, the differential treatment of welfare cases and the level of support for welfare clients could have been studied. This was recently done by Mäder and Neff (1987) for about a dozen large and small cities and towns including the Italian speaking area. Segalman, however, largely fails to ‘cash in’ on such opportunities and mostly summarizes what he believes to be the important elements commonly shared by them. Thereby, he overemphazises the formal level, overlooking daily administrative practices that have emerged. For example, he observes that monetary support can be reclaimed from relatives, family members or from the client at a later point in time, and that clients are requested to work whenever possible. But this is not universally true, since there are differences both in cantonal law and communal administrative practices. He further observes that clients can be sanctioned if they do not meet the administrator’s expectations for rehabilitation (p. 110), and he falsely asserts that clients usually cannot appeal in courts.

The author claims that, due to the small scale and local embeddedness of Swiss public welfare agencies.

“the client knows his or her worker and the worker knows his or her client. This is very much unlike the condition in other Western nations, where the client is likely to see a different worker at every agency contact.” (p. 119)

There are no studies to verify this claim and Segalman does not provide any empirical evidence either. From what this reviewer has been able to learn about case load size per worker in cities such as those studied by Segalman, it is impossible to
agree with the above statement except for welfare departments in small cities and villages.

According to Segalman, "Swiss welfare personnel, unlike their counterparts in other developed countries, tend to individualize interpretations of why a particular client is in need" (p. 112). Furthermore, "Swiss administrators . . . tend to view their world as a place where individuals have a choice; and they feel that if some are in need, it is because they have made a wrong choice or because they have been unfortunate in their circumstances or because of a combination of these factors" (p. 112). As a result, the welfare administrator and the agency are "a type of parent figure, in that the agency provides the resources for rehabilitation" (p. 118). Therefore, the Swiss welfare worker is also in a helping role, choosing an intervention and rehabilitation path and enabling the client to quickly become self-sufficient again. This help and intervention may include monetary support, finding a job or housing, mobilizing family resources, placing children into foster homes or institutions, solving debt problems, etc. In all this,

"confidentiality is particularly important in Switzerland because of the issue of stigma . . . In Switzerland, where most of the population is middle class and where public welfare dependency has a general air of stigma . . . stigma serves to promote self-sufficiency and client cooperation toward that end" (p. 111).

In sum, "the focus of Swiss welfare is primarily on rehabilitation, while the focus of other Western welfare is limited to eligibility and grant disbursement only" (p. 127).

No comparative studies exist in support of the above claim about the quality of Swiss welfare work. Segalman's conclusion, too, is only based on 'impressions'. As mentioned before, the case load per welfare worker usually is very large or even overwhelming (particularly in cities). As a consequence, the helping role and the quality of intervention imputed to Swiss welfare by Segalman is overestimated. In addition, Segalman conceals the well known fact that welfare workers and administrators rarely are trained social workers, psychologists, family counsellors,
clinical sociologists, etc.; and in small town settings they most often are politicians or political appointees. They have moved into that line of work from other, usually unrelated fields. Most professionally trained social workers are reluctant to seek employment as welfare workers in settings described by Segalman. They believe that the high workload and the bureaucratized work environment prevents them from assuming a more extended helper role, and places them too much into an administering and sanctioning one. Therefore, based on caseload, welfare work claimed by Segalman to exist in Switzerland must be seriously questioned.

Segalman goes further. He maintains that Switzerland has few welfare cases, and even fewer long term and transgenerational dependents because the insurance system and welfare work in particular are rehabilitation oriented. Numerically, he probably is correct about the rate of long term dependents. Hauser (1980, p. 34) does conclude, however, that a large majority of welfare recipients in the canton of Zurich had received welfare before. In addition, Segalman's comparison between Los Angeles County and Zurich is poorly chosen and should at least have been presented in more detail to account for socio-economic and demographic differences. Segalman suggests that other countries adopt the Swiss way of handling welfare and social insurance. Welfare, he suggests, should be decentralized, brought back to the community and again become case, rehabilitation, and self-sufficiency oriented. To quote:

"The centralization of gemeinschaft-type services by federal authority is as faulty as the reverse, the decentralizing of gesellschaft-type services. Thus, it is suggested that the local and federal separation of services be reestablished for the better fulfillment of each, as has been proved in practice in Switzerland . . . Clients not being answerable to their community because of their being served on a centralized, gesellschaft basis can become inured to continued benefits unless they are provided with the kind of relationship and supervision available only on a responsible local level . . . The Swiss lesson is apparently that when local communities and local people are given their appropriate responsibilities and the authority to carry them out, they rise to the assignment" (pp. 190–191).
It may very well be that a Swiss-type welfare administration would produce fewer long term dependents in other countries. We do not really know. Segalman (Chapter 6) also admits that certain characteristics of Swiss society are particularly conducive to keeping the number of welfare cases and long term dependents down.

For instance:

- the relatively low divorce rate
- the relatively few illegitimate children
- the strong social control in neighborhoods and at home
- the parents' efforts in preparing children for being self-sufficient
- the general family stability in terms of employment and fertility
- the general public policy concern for support to families
- the early socialization towards personal responsibility
- the social integration in the military, clubs and associations and its enhancement of cooperation, consensus and self-sufficiency
- the relative lack of 'self-fulfillment ideologies'
- the alleged absence of no-fault divorce and the low possibility of evading child support and alimony obligations
- the relatively low rate in psychiatric institutionalization

Throughout, however, Segalman relies more on impressions than on data. It is inexcusable that he neglects to consider at least some of the literature and studies on juvenile delinquency, youth culture and protest. Had he examined such sources as Blancpain (1983; 1974), Buchmann (1983), Kriesi (1984), Kriesi et al. (1981), and Wallimann and Zito (1984) quite a different picture than his would have emerged.

Despite his 'concession' that Swiss society and culture is more 'intact'—thus aiding the effort in keeping the number of welfare dependents down—Segalman's strongest emphasis remains not on culture but on welfare administration. He continues to imply that other countries, if they were to strive towards the Swiss way of dealing with welfare recipients, would certainly succeed in drastically reducing the number of long term dependents. This position is complemented by his view that poverty, if it results in welfare dependency, is a multi-dimensional problem involving social and individual 'disorganization' and 'pathology' on different levels. Therefore, a welfare worker's first task—just as Segalman claims to be true for Switzerland—
must be to intervene in the case with a view towards a speedy rehabilitation and resumed self-sufficiency. Others would argue that social and individual 'disorganization' and 'pathology' tend to primarily result from economic or other macro-social events. For Segalman, long term welfare dependency is primarily caused by the inadequate treatment of individuals or families who have (for whatever reason) become individually or socially 'disorganized' or 'pathological' in various ways.

The individual pathology model—not new in the history of social policy and social work—can only be 'tested' by looking at macro-social events or developments. Among them, unemployment may be the most salient determinant of welfare cases, long term dependency and social and individual 'disorganization'. Such processes, however, remain undiscussed by Segalman, although the international literature on this topic is quite large.

Despite his occasional concession that unemployment may be related to long term welfare dependency, he continues to insist that other welfare states—with six to twelve or more times the one percent unemployment rate than Switzerland—could drastically reduce long term welfare dependency if only they adopted the Swiss way of dealing with welfare clients. Lacking in empirical evidence, as is the case with Segalman's book, such argumentation is inadmissible and can only be regarded as a 'blind assertion'.

That Switzerland has had an extremely low unemployment rate for the last 40 years is well known. For instance, while the official U. S. unemployment rate has for long periods maintained twice the four percent level of the late sixties, that of Switzerland has rarely and only slightly exceeded one percent for the last twenty years. This looks like a fantastic economic record, also if compared with other European welfare states. However, there is nothing miraculous about the Swiss economy, nor do its 'managers' possess particular insights or magical powers inaccessible to others. The reason for this phenomenon lies solely in Switzerland's export of unemployment, especially during the critical years 1975/76. Had Swiss authorities refrained from exporting some 200,000 foreign workers during that period, the official unemployment rate would have risen to 7-8 percent. The
job total lost during that recession was between 11-12 percent (Wallimann, 1984). As a result, the Swiss unemployment rate would have been comparable to (or even higher than) that of many other European countries at the time. Instead, the national average only rose to about one percent, and thus threatening the stability and bringing about a revision of the unemployment fund. At no time does Segalman contemplate what a retention of the exported foreign workers would have done to the 'quaint' (sic) Swiss welfare system, the client-worker relationship, and the long term welfare dependency rate. Had 200,000 workers not been exported in 1975/76, today's unemployment rate would not be one, but some six to eight percent. How would long term welfare dependency have developed in Switzerland since 1975/76 under such a scenario? We can only speculate. This reviewer speculates that Segalman's thesis would have been shattered like glass dropped on a marble floor. The following table briefly illustrates the major dynamics involved:

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employment</th>
<th>Swiss Employed</th>
<th>Foreigners Employed</th>
<th>Size of Swiss Population</th>
<th>Swiss Popul. Age 20-64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,202,900</td>
<td>2,367,500</td>
<td>835,400</td>
<td>6,431,000</td>
<td>3,638,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,024,000</td>
<td>2,378,400</td>
<td>645,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,035,600</td>
<td>2,413,300</td>
<td>622,300</td>
<td>6,533,300</td>
<td>3,908,500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3,170,900</td>
<td>2,463,700</td>
<td>707,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1981 (pp. 17, 26, 364-365) and 1986 (pp. 37, 338-339). *estimate

Segalman blithely justifies the expulsion of workers, and the entire Swiss foreign worker policy on the grounds of economic necessity (chapter 4 and elsewhere). This is an ethic not shared by the present reviewer. Arguing on the level of ethics, Segalman misses the important question, namely whether or not the Swiss long-term welfare dependency rate would still be drastically lower (compared with the 'Western world') if Swiss authorities had not exported unemployment.
While justifying temporary foreign worker imports (primarily for the lowest levels of the occupational hierarchy), he does not discuss the ways in which foreign workers are subsequently exported on a case by case basis should they become ‘too great’ a burden on the local welfare agency and the community. Because of their precarious position in the economy and the workplace, foreign workers become eligible for welfare with greater frequency for a number of well known reasons (unless they are more reluctant or fear to claim eligibility). Since those with commuter, seasonal or yearly permits (about 10% of the entire labor force) can be refused reentry with great ease, it is logical to expect that, in addition to the 'bulk export' of unemployment at times of crisis, this policy would produce artificially low long term Swiss welfare dependency rates. Although he had access to several large Swiss welfare agencies, Segalman failed to probe into this important question.

There is yet another way by which Segalman fails to subject his speculative assertions to empirical test. Unemployment in certain regions has been recorded not at the national one percent but at 2-2.5 percent levels. These are, for instance, the watch manufacturing areas which are subject to significant structural unemployment. Segalman does not report on the development of welfare cases and long term welfare dependency in these regions, and none of the welfare agencies he selected falls into this geographic area. Such a sampling error should not have occurred, since these regional problems have frequently been discussed in various media nationwide. One such study, involving the city of Biel (Büschi et al. 1986), concludes that the number of welfare cases have increased significantly due to the region's high unemployment, and Hauser (1980: 36) shows that the majority of clients receive welfare for economic or health reasons and not because of deviant behavior.

This reviewer must conclude that The Swiss Way of Welfare: Lessons for the Western World is a severely flawed work. Its intellectual value, and its scholarly quality and reliability are inferior. Therefore, it is impossible to view this book as a contribution to sociology, social policy or social work. Finally, it must be said that this book violates all standards of publishing
quality, due to Praeger's and Segalman's horrible editorial job. For instance, the proper statistical sources are missing from statistical graphs. Bibliographical citations contain numerous orthographical distortions. Authors and nouns are misspelled, at least one publication date is inaccurate; one footnote is not indicated in the text; one citation is not included in the bibliography, and the publisher is missing from one citation.

Isidor Wallimann
School of Social Work, Basel
Institute of Sociology, Bern

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Wechsler, Martin

Wallimann, Isidor

Wallimann, Isidor

Wallimann, Isidor and George V. Zito

Because there are so very few pieces on the Swiss social services for the elderly and on the circumstances of the Swiss elderly population, this book on the conditions of the aged in French-speaking areas of Switzerland and on the services available to them is a welcome addition to the literature. Lalive d'Epinay and his chapter authors are members of the Geneva University Group for Interdisciplinary Research concerning Elderly People, a professional association including doctors, sociologists, and demographers. Their purpose has been to conduct research on the process of aging from both psychosomatic and socio-cultural perspectives. They envision the advancement of age as an ongoing process with unlimited parameters. The social and economic considerations, familial and extra-familial supports, health services and health conditions of the aged are taken into account. These researchers studied the degree of isolation versus integration into the community of their respondents, and their "morbidity" levels. They were especially interested in the isolation of widows, and in general, the problems of the old-old, including the limitations that accompany the advancing years, as related to health status and activity level. The writers looked at the problems in relation to existence of a nuclear, versus extended family, and the rural versus urban setting.

The research was carried out in two Swiss regions: urban Geneva and the semi-rural mountainous Central Valais. The authors interviewed 1600 elderly people, out of which 150 agreed to in-depth interviews concerning their daily activities. The authors also analysed the medical-social institutions for the elderly. The interviews of the subsample of 150 respondents were the backbone of the research, including reminiscences and oral histories. Many of the anecdotes are included, and liven up the book. Tables on responses of the larger sample are also given, along with the questionnaire. The researchers, in concentrating on the old-old, made a major effort to interview those 85 and older and gained 75 such interviews.

The book's chapter headings give some idea of its contents.
They include, "different types of old age", "the older people and their health", "isolation and integration: family and social relations", "activities and participation"; "daily life and events: higher class and intellectual bourgeois", "daily life: popular and middle classes"; and a separate section on "institutions and their clients: medical-social needs, and problems of daily life". The authors found that of those aged persons in institutions, most were in need of medical attention for serious illnesses, and most were of advanced old age. They report that survival of a spouse was a safeguard against institutionalization. The other service, besides the institution, that the researchers described in detail was the home care service. This is an extensive, well-developed service for Swiss old people.

The authors' major conclusion from all this research was that, "there is no unique and average condition of elderly people, but multiple situations". They say that, contrary to the stereotype, their findings show the actuality of diversity among older people. They point out that, "this new phase of existence as lived by men and women is a result of the interaction of the constraints they encounter and the prior and present daily activities they undertake, in keeping with their potential (in terms of) their economic, social, and health situation". They add, importantly, that it is also effected by the aged person's values and ideals.

The authors are especially interested in the crises the elderly experience, such as the fear and anguish a woman suffers in experiencing widowhood. They give such quotes as, "I live with my memories"; "one must adapt to this new life". They also look at the crisis of retirement among working class men, and compare it with the experience of those from upper class backgrounds. On the psychological side, they look at "morbidity" depression, and on the health side, the aged person's use of preventive and curative medical help.

While all through their report these writers stress the significance of the Swiss family structure and the social fabric of friends and of community participation—all shown to be strong in the Swiss rural area—they remain pessimistic about the chances for a good old age. This period of old-old age, as they say, "le vieillese", is a time of inherent problems for this "vul-
nerable" population because of their economic inadequacies and their situation of surviving within a reality of physical distress and irreparable dependence.

These authors describe a social service system that is supportive of those in the old-old group. First, there is the very adequate, localized home aid. Then there are the high quality institutions, with their high ratio of staff to patient, whether in a religious or other non profit setting.

This book's usefulness to an American research gerontologist lies not only in its overview of Swiss services but also its comprehensive coverage of the many variables that determine how the old-old live. The researchers make distinctions between those of different class backgrounds, rural versus urban setting, and different health levels. Because they have gathered their data by means of in-depth interviews, not only by survey methods, they provide a more interesting report. While such a variety of coverage is useful, there are times when this means the book's content does not always run smoothly.

For the American reader the book's news is likely to be "no news", that is, growing older in Switzerland is similar, and perhaps no easier than to grow old in America. Yet, in Switzerland there do seem to be strong family and communal ties, especially in rural areas. Most definitely they have higher quality institutions for the medically impaired than most of our for-profit nursing homes.

Elizabeth D. Huttman, California State University with the assistance of Anna Marie Rampmaier and W. and N. Weber, Geneva, Switzerland


This overview of Swiss social welfare was prepared under the auspices of the Association of Swiss Schools of Social Work. Its intended use is both as a text for social work students and as an introduction for the interested (but educated) non-specialist. American readers, especially those whose primary inter-
est lies in the teaching of policy to social work students, will be

dismayed, yet probably not surprised to learn that in Switzer-
land there has been a tendency similar to ours, to psychologize
social problems and to emphasize clinical over social/political
interventions. Wagner hopes that his book will make a contri-
bution towards righting this imbalance.

Wohlfahrtsstaat Schweiz is to be recommended to the Amer-
ican and Canadian reader on two separate, but interconnected
grounds. First, it serves, as expected, as a comprehensive, up-
to-date descriptive survey of the Swiss system of social welfare,
its policies and programs. Second, and for this reviewer at least
equally important, it projects an expansive understanding of the
concept of social welfare, and a philosophic orientation which
is both refreshing and politically inspiring.

One of the uniquenesses of the English language is the fact
that it distinguishes between the words “policy” and “politics”.
Linguistically, and thus cognitively, we tend to perpetuate a no-
tion that policy can be objective, rational, scientific, if not po-
litically neutral. In the German language there is no such verbal
and conceptual distinction. Social welfare policy is immediately
apprehended as social welfare politics. Moreover, for Wagner a
full understanding of social welfare politics (Sozialpolitik) must
quickly give way to broader concern with societal politics (Ge-
sellschaftspolitik). He suggests that the study of the modern
welfare state is not to be limited to the descriptive study of
programs and services offered within the context of a particular
nation/state. Rather, a broader view is required, one which takes
into account cultural and ethical variables, family values, edu-
cational ideals, views of health (not only illness), and of human
wellbeing. The broader view sets as its goal not only the aid and
protection of those who are weak and disadvantaged, but the
integration of all into the society as a whole. Here again, an
important difference from the dominant North American per-
spective is to be noted. The Swiss ideal is not expressed in terms
of the maximization of autonomy and of individual self-
fulfillment.

Wagner discusses the Swiss welfare state primarily in terms
of what he calls the, “economics paradigm.” This perspective
has the dual advantage of readily lending itself to quantification and of being able to draw upon available governmental data. The central issue is that of wealth redistribution horizontally (from those who have more to those who have less) and vertically (along the life course). Economic analysis is not limited, however, to what Americans know as the social welfare and the social insurance system. Rather, this study includes a multiplicity of other programs and policies that have an effect upon income distribution, e.g., labor law, minimum wage policy, employment/unemployment policy, education, public health, housing and consumer protection. The total picture is complex, reassuring from an American perspective, but certainly not without problems.

The Swiss welfare system needs to be understood as one which has evolved within a society that has for hundreds of years successfully avoided warfare and most of its associated financial and human costs. Wagner provides data which indicate that in Switzerland personal wealth is more evenly distributed than in other Western industrial societies, with the exception of Norway and Sweden. (The United States is close to the bottom of the list.) There has been only minimal unemployment over the past many decades but, as discussed in the accompanying review by Wallimann, this end has been achieved largely as a result of restrictive, and morally questionable migration and immigration policies.

In his introductory, conceptual chapter, Wagner suggests what he considers an alterantive, or supplementary perspective for the study of societal politics (Gesellschaftspolitik). His proposed, "ecological paradigm" is not limited in its focus on the distribution of monetized goods and services, but also considers the distribution of e.g., boredom, hard, demanding work, dependence/independence, opportunities for advancement, and the like. The distribution of these benefits and disbenefits in society, while partially linked to monetary income, is equally importantly related to social/structural, political, and moral/cultural variables, to differences in social understanding, beliefs, and the capacity to articulate and initiate action.

These are important ideas. It is unfortunate that Wagner, by
his own admission, only partially takes this second paradigm into account in his study of the Swiss welfare state. In essence, he is saying that social welfare is more than economic welfare. We agree. Now tell us, Professor Wagner; give us some more suggestions as to how we can best study a social welfare state in the light of your second paradigm.

In all fairness to Wagner, it should be added that it appears that he has published something close to what we are here requesting, as a chapter in another volume, one that was not available to this reviewer.¹ Too bad that it was not reprinted as a part of the present book.

One of the important virtues of this study of the Swiss welfare state is that it reminds us that, fundamentally, it is the basic social, economic, political, and moral condition of a people that determines their welfare. Supportive and remedial services focused on the disadvantaged and disabled are an essential supplement to, but not the essence of a caring society. In the future, Switzerland, as Wagner sees it, requires additional moves in the direction of democratization. In this connection, greater public access to power and decision making, the enhancement of self-help, and a parallel deprofessionalization of helping relationships constitute important next steps.

This publication would have been enhanced had it included an author/subject index. Also, a list of tables would have been helpful. We wish someone would hurry up and translate it into English. We, in North America, know so little and have so much to learn from more elaborate welfare systems than our own. It is rarely possible to transfer isolated ideas or programs from one society to another, but reading about others we gain important practical and theoretical insight into our own system and its possibilities.

Shimon S. Gottschalk  
School of Social Work  
Florida State University

Conservatives, especially those of the New Right, want to dismantle or continue to cut back spending on the welfare state in the U.S. The authors identify and critique the conservative arguments that are being used to justify such measures, describe the historical continuities with past conservative and business arguments, analyze why the influence and appeal of the New Right spread in the 1970s and 1980s, and allude to some of the effects. The main purposes of the book are to provide those on the left with an intellectual framework for understanding the interrelated New Right and business offensives against the welfare state and to familiarize them with some of the evidence and counter-arguments that will allow them to refute the views of these conservative and powerful groups. The authors do not attempt to present a comprehensive and systematic program of reforms, but they do point to some of the elements that would make up such a program.

The book is divided into five parts. The Introduction is collectively written by the four authors and identifies many of the central themes of the book and reveals the underlying logic. While the introductory chapter provides some coherence for the authors' contributions, and while it is clear that the authors share many views, there is nonetheless some inconsistency or ambiguity on a few key points; for example, on whether in fact there is an economic crisis and on the extent to which working class Americans endorse the conservative views on welfare. The next two chapters are co-authored by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward and focus on the historical sources and the contemporary aspects of the "relief debate." Fred Block is responsible for a chapter on the "Political Economy of the Welfare State," in which he challenges the economic arguments of the Right. In the final chapter, Barbara Ehrenreich critically analyzes and challenges the New Right's explanation of the causes of the alleged "moral breakdown" in the society and tries to understand the appeal of many aspects of the New Right's message.
The logic of the analyses presented by the authors goes something like this. The welfare state grew out of class conflict, particularly in the 1930s and 1960s, and represents the efforts and political victories of past mobilizations of poor and ordinary working people. But business interests have opposed the creation and expansion of welfare programs and, even in periods of economic crisis, have had the power to shape their administrative, eligibility, and benefit characteristics. However inadequate, the programs are nonetheless necessary to the well-being of most Americans. The opposition of the capitalist owners and managers to the welfare state is grounded in their desire to have access to a cheap and "disciplined" workforce and is based on the assumption that these goals are undermined when workers have options to employment in the market or when workers are unionized. Government programs that, for example, provide disability and unemployment insurance for workers and income maintenance for the impoverished, serve to undermine the incentive of workers to give employers a decent day's work or even to seek work.

In the post WWII period, many segments of the business community softened their attitudes toward the welfare state, because in this period of unprecedented economic growth business could afford to be generous. Hence, rising wages and state expenditures on social welfare programs co-existed with rising profit margins. This period of accommodation ended in the 1970s and 1980s, as government estimates of economic growth, investment, productivity, and profits all indicated a slowing down of the economy. The business and New Right attack on the non-military government spending, especially on government welfare programs, and on unions grew out of and was reinforced by these economic conditions. Business blames the drop in profits and the alleged fall in investment and productivity on the growth of government spending and taxation (and unions). From the business viewpoint, there are at least two alleged negative effects of big government. Taxes reduce the availability of investment capital. And social welfare programs give workers an option to employment in the market and thereby undermine discipline on the job, help to create a tight labor market, and, as a consequence lead to high wages and low productivity. These
developments, in turn, contribute to the falling rates of investment and profits. Fred Block argues that government measures of investment and productivity underestimate the real levels of these economic activities and suggests that the problem of slowed economic growth is not as bad as government measures make it appear. Block argues that if there was a problem it is the result of management's poor investment decisions, their short-term profit orientation, and the authoritarian organization of work. Business has had capital to invest, he contends, but it has invested available capital in unproductive ways (e.g. shopping malls, mergers).

The New Right grew out of and represents a reaction to the protest movements of the 1960s and the social legislation and social trends emerging in that decade and that continue up to the present (e.g. divorce, abortion). Barbara Ehrenreich points out that the New Right differs from the old conservatism in that while it remains "elitest" on economic issues and in its antunionism it has a populist appeal and emphasizes "social issues." The role of the intellectual and political wings of the New Right in the attacks against the welfare state is that it has generated studies and arguments in corporate-funded think tanks to legitimate the business position. And it has been successful in many ways. It has helped to make "liberal" a label to be avoided and has put liberals on the defensive. It has helped to elect a conservative President who has introduced policies that have abetted the increase in poverty, inequality, and the shrinking of the middle class. It has legitimated the continuing offensive against the unions. It has insisted that the welfare state along with the "new class" are the sources of a massive moral breakdown and of all the economic and social problems that beset the society. And it has deflected attention away from the corporations and misbegotten government policies (e.g. defense) that are among the basic causes of the economic difficulties of the U.S.

Ehrenreich argues that the New Right's influence among blue-collar workers is overstated and misrepresented, but she goes on to suggest middle America, still including many blue-collar workers, is influenced by the corporate-induced consumer culture of the society. The self-indulgence and inability to defer
gratification that the consumer culture cultivates and reinforces has turned many Americans into consumer addicts who are as "dependent" in their own way as the poor who are "dependent" on welfare. In a provocative, but speculative, leap, Ehrenreich suggests that many consumer-addicted middle Americans project their dependency onto the poor and relieve their feelings of guilt by decrying "the hedonism of the new class 'welfare statist' and the foolish dependency of their beneficiaries among the poor" (188). The implication of Ehrenreich's speculations is that those who would defend the welfare state are up against not only the powerful business and conservative forces of the society but also many ordinary Americans who are all too glad to identify a scapegoat in the form of the welfare state and its supporters and beneficiaries rather than see their own consumption-oriented life styles or particular social programs effected.

Much of the book is devoted to subjecting the New Right's "evidence" to a critical analysis and demonstrating that it is weak, misleading, contradictory, and self-serving just as conservative arguments about the effects of government spending on the economy and the poor have always been. Piven and Cloward do a particularly good job in summarizing the evidence that counters conservative views of the effects of welfare on the poor. Among the many points they make are, for example, the following:

1) Conservatives argue that public assistance demoralizes the poor because it conflicts with widely accepted American values such as the value of self-reliance. Piven and Cloward reply that it is demoralizing because of the low benefits available under public assistance programs and because of the degrading procedures to which poor people must submit in the process of getting and hold onto benefits.

2) Conservatives charge that welfare programs have caused the breakdown of the family as reflected in the dramatic increase in female-headed families and illegitimacy. Piven and Cloward retort that the trend of increasing female-headed families and illegitimacy predated the expansion of government welfare expenditures and reflects a number of factors, including: (a) the urbanization of the black population; (b) high subemployment rates, particularly in cities; (c) a rise in the proportion of young
people; (d) a falling fertility rate among the married; (e) a falling rate of marriage; and (f) the decision by the U. S. Census to start counting young mothers living at home as independent households. They also point out that changes in illegitimacy rates among black Americans have not paralleled the rise in welfare spending; for example, while spending was rising in the 1970s, the illegitimacy rate was falling.

3) Conservatives maintain that participation in the AFDC program leads to the atrophy of work habits. Piven and Cloward counter by referring to evidence which shows that (a) most recipients are not continuously on the rolls; (b) most children of long-term recipients do not go on welfare; (c) many of the women eliminated from the rolls as a result of Reagan's 1981 "welfare reforms" continued to work rather than to return to the AFDC program.

The greatest strength of the book is that a large body of rather technical articles are incorporated into understandable language and incisive analyses that provide the careful reader with the ammunition to combat the views of the business and conservative attacks on the welfare state. But the authors also have suggestive, but less persuasive, ideas on what it would take for the economy to become productive and competitive again, on the need to expand public services in a postindustrial society as a way to increase worker productivity and to reduce costs to individual firms, and on the need to begin to think about how to share work in a society that does not need so many people working fulltime schedules.

Robert Sheak
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Ohio University, Athens


Moroney presents a refreshing perspective on the old but currently intensified public debate over the relationship between government and the family. There are many who currently view
the family as a social institution in a state of deterioration and perhaps even in danger of disintegration. The solution, it is felt, is to restore the family to its earlier position based on the assumption that the family of the past was more self sufficient and therefore stronger.

Using primarily existing data and professional literature Moroney examines these and other assumptions through an analysis of such key issues as; what is the role of the family and the State; when is State intervention appropriate; and how can it be done without undermining the family. The author makes what could be an unwieldy study of the family, its past and present status, and its relationship to the social welfare system and the professionals providing it services, more manageable. He focuses on families who are caring for dependent members, in particular those caring for frail elderly parents and those caring for severely mentally retarded children. The focus on these two types of families represents an astute choice as there is little controversy over the legitimacy of dependency among the frail elderly and severely mentally retarded. The State has already committed itself to providing services for these populations, and the growing numbers of these “at risk” persons has serious implications for the allocation of future resources. In describing these two sets of families the author notes that most families are willingly caring for their dependent members. This is in contrast to the growing belief that care for dependent members is increasingly being handed over to the State. He also notes that measures taken by the State to help these handicapped people and prevent their becoming “dependent” have not been targeted toward families but toward individuals.

Moroney presents his study within the context of his belief that both family and State have a responsibility for the care of dependent members and that this shared responsibility should be characterized by a relationship of reciprocity—a mutual interchange between equals. It is his intention that policies and programs be designed to strengthen families in such a way that (a) make recipients feel they are equals to the giver; (b) give support to nondependent families in care of dependent members; and (c) assist with care, not substitute for it. Respite care and constant attendant allowances are examples of such programs.
This book defines what appears to be a good concept through which to improve the relationship between families and the State. The author recognizes the need for additional research given the identified limitations of his study. He also discusses some of the obstacles, such as limited funding, to implementation of suggested programs. Although the author gives examples of services which might help to accomplish a goal of offering support to families rather than substituting for them, he does not answer the question of how to implement the needed reorientation of public and professional thinking. While the author writes in the context of current debate, including references to Reagan and the Moral Majority, much of the data used are from the 1970's.

Those who are concerned about the status of the family particularly as providers of social services and caregivers, and who are interested in social and family policy and change, will find this book refreshingly informative in the light of current pessimism, and easy to read. Hopefully they will also be challenged to consider ways to initiate the implementation of the concept of shared responsibilities.

Christina R. Curtiss
Upper Savannah Health District
Greenwood, South Carolina
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS
(Revised December, 1987)

JSSW welcomes a broad range of articles which analyze social welfare institutions, policies, or problems from a social scientific perspective or otherwise attempt to bridge the gap between social science theory and social work practice.

Submission Process. Submit manuscripts to Robert D. Leighton, Jr., School of Social Work, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 49008. Send three copies together with an abstract of approximately 100 words. Include a stamped, self-addressed postcard if you wish acknowledgement of receipt. Since manuscripts are not returned by reviewers to the editorial office, the editorial office cannot return them to authors. Submission certificates it is an original article and that it has not been published nor is being considered for publication elsewhere.

Reviewing normally takes 60 days but can take longer in the event of split recommendations. Things move more slowly at the end of semesters and during the summer. Authors should feel free to write or call the editor if they feel an undue amount of time has elapsed.

Preparation. Articles should be typed, double-spaced (including the abstract, indented material, footnotes, references, and tables) on 8½ × 11 inch white bond paper with one inch margins on all sides.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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