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The Work Incentive Years in Current Perspective: What Have We Learned? Where Do We Go From Here?*

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A review of the rationale, results, and research findings from work-training efforts for welfare recipients is presented. Focus is on the Work Incentive (WIN) Program from its inception in 1968 to its heydays in the 1970s and its decline during the Reagan era. The review provides a basis for examining the recent welfare legislation and recognizing the elements needed for real welfare reform.

While the War on Poverty and The Great Society efforts captured headlines during the 1960s, there were other efforts afoot to help the poor. One of these was the Work Incentive (WIN) Program. It was charged with helping welfare recipients achieve economic independence through work. This paper examines the assumptions, activities, and results of the WIN Program. The task proves extremely useful because extensive, if unpublicized, efforts were made to achieve program goals and extensive research was carried out on these efforts. Reviewing the heydays of WIN from today's perspective permits a cogent analysis of the new welfare legislation.

The paper begins by placing the assumptions and operations of WIN within a pre-WIN context. There follows a review of WIN and related efforts from 1967 until the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 1981. The next section examines in more detail what was learned from the WIN experience, drawing upon research and evaluation studies. Brief examination of work-training for welfare recipients from 1981 to the present comes

next, leading to a discussion of what is now known about training welfare recipients. The next section comments on current welfare reform, and the last section summarizes the general findings and conclusions of the paper.

WIN And Its Precursors

The first federally sponsored effort to help welfare recipients came in 1935 in the Social Security Act. The provisions for public welfare, unlike the major provisions of the Act, were aimed at supporting widowed mothers with small children, irrespective of their work history. The other provisions for Unemployment Insurance and Social Security were aimed at helping persons who had worked but had lost their jobs or had retired.

Over the years the work-related programs were readily accepted and expanded. The welfare program has been less favored. Its first serious review came after the Kennedy election of 1960. This review revealed that welfare recipients were no longer primarily mothers who had become widowed, but mothers who had never been married. Welfare was being given to mothers who had not had a relatively stable life in a traditional two-parent family, but seemed in some way to have created their own difficulties by having children out of wedlock.

The 1962 Public Welfare Amendments sanctioned efforts to provide counselling to welfare families in order that they might improve their social/psychological stability and lead out of the welfare syndrome. Also sanctioned were $2 million in demonstration funds for Community Work and Training projects (CWT) to help recipients achieve training and work that would lead to economic independence.

In 1963 $50 million were allocated to CWT projects. In 1964, President Johnson proposed and Sargent Shriver incorporated into Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act $150 million for work-training programs that had much more liberal requirements as to residence and who was qualified to participate than the CWT projects. All these programs were based in the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). They did not receive a great deal of attention in or out of Congress because they could not compare in glamor to the major "war on poverty" programs, e.g., Job Corps, VISTA, Community Action.
The important point is that the programs for welfare recipients were designed to get the recipients off the welfare rolls. While there was an intent to help people, the underlying reason for the programs was to lower welfare costs. The other programs in the Social Security Act of 1935 had a rather different rationale. Unemployment Insurance and Social Security were paid to persons who had "earned" their right to the payments. These were programs not designed to support people who had not paid their own way, but to provide more security for those who had paid their way in the past.

This difference in rationale helps account for the different attitudes and actions of policymakers regarding the two sets of programs. As evidence mounted on the ineffectiveness of CWT and Title V programs in lowering welfare rolls, members of Congress became dissatisfied. A paper summarizing the achievement of Title V showed that from 1964 to 1969 about 228,000 people had been in the program for an average of 7 months. About 35% of those found immediate employment upon leaving the program. But only 24% of all entrants to the program were known to be working 35 hours or more per week after 3 months. The average pay for the full-time workers was about $1.80 per hour. These results were disappointing given that the number of welfare families had risen from one million to 1.7 million during that period.

Part of the blame for the lackluster results of Title V was attributed to the location of the program's administration in HEW and welfare departments around the country rather than in the Department of Labor (DOL) and employment services that were more familiar with job training and placement. Upon amending the Social Security Act in 1967 Congress established an even more elaborate work-training program called the Work Incentive (WIN) Program (Conference Report on Social Security Amendments of 1967). Major authority for developing guidelines was shifted from HEW to DOL. The delivery of services was now to be provided by local employment service agencies. The local welfare agencies were still to screen welfare recipients for eligibility for WIN and to provide child care.

Special counsellors and manpower specialists were to be provided by the local employment services to help WIN partic-
Participants obtain better training and make a better adaptation to the job market than occurred in earlier programs. Money was provided for some participants to go into on-the-job training or into public service employment. Day care funds also were available. Hence WIN brought together all the facilities offered in previous efforts, ranging from personal counselling to training for jobs. WIN went into operation toward the end of 1968.

Between August 1968 and April 1970 about 1.6 million welfare cases eligible for WIN participation were reviewed by local welfare departments across the country. These cases included father in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) program as well as out-of-school teenagers receiving AFDC. However, the vast majority were AFDC mothers.

Only about 10% of the 1.6 million eligibles were considered suitable for enrollment in WIN. Of those terminated from WIN in 1970 only about 20% had held jobs for at least 3 months. Hence, during a period of 20 months when the welfare rolls rose about 40% to almost 8 million persons, WIN was successful in obtaining stable jobs for only 2% (20% of 10%) of the total eligible welfare population. The median wage for employed WIN mothers was approximately $2 per hour, hardly sufficient to support adequately a family of four.

Out in the field, many WIN participants were being held in remedial education longer than anticipated. That is, the educational level of many applicants was so low as to require more educational time in order to bring them to a level where they might be trained for higher level jobs. This longer-term education and training markedly depressed the rate of job placement and failed to lower the welfare rolls.

The lack of success, in terms of lowering welfare rolls, was not lost upon Russell Long, powerful chairman of the Senate Finance Committee responsible for WIN legislation. He severely criticized DOL for failure to administer the program properly, failing to enforce the rules of removing from the welfare rolls those who refused to participate in WIN. Behind this concern of Senator Long's was the belief that welfare people might be lazy, not want to work, and so had to be strongly prodded into the training programs and jobs (Goodwin, 1975, pp. 83–90).

In December 1971, Senator Talmadge, also on the Finance
Committee, amended the WIN legislation to insure greater work force participation of welfare recipients (Public Law 92-223). Training of recipients was to be lowered in favor of immediate job placement in whatever jobs were available. There were to be more stringent penalties against welfare recipients who refused for no good cause to participate in the program. The amendments went into effect in July 1972.

Subsequent years showed a marked increase in WIN job placements. During fiscal year 1975 approximately 839,000 welfare recipients were deemed eligible for WIN. About 113,000 of these people obtained unsubsidized jobs for at least 90 days. Thus, a little more than 13% of the eligible group were placed. This was a substantial jump over the 2% of earlier years, but was not very significant compared to the 3.5 million adults who were on welfare at that time (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976, p. 3).

Additional modifications were made to WIN in 1975. The WIN sponsor, usually the state employment service, became responsible for WIN registration (rather than the welfare office). This was a further step to convert WIN almost wholly to a placement rather than a training program. On the other hand, training objectives were to be attained by having this agency coordinate WIN activities with such programs as those offered through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).

Effectiveness of WIN in lowering welfare rolls did not increase markedly. During 1981, for example, 1,156,000 persons were new registrants in WIN, and 310,000, or almost 27%, obtained employment for 30 days or more. However, there were a total of 3,800,000 welfare families at that time. Thus, jobs were found for less than 10% of heads of welfare households. Moreover, the average earnings of the welfare mothers was only $3.70 per hour and for the fathers only $5.01 per hour (U.S. Department of Labor, 1982, pp. 43, 45). That level of income is hardly suited to supporting a family of three or four at the poverty level. (If there were a two parent family and both parents worked, then there would be some possibility of leaving poverty and welfare.) These data underline the small impact of the WIN effort on the welfare rolls.

This thumbnail historical review of the WIN program, may
leave the impression that WIN has been just another bureaucratic effort of limited success. What makes WIN of special interest is that a proportion of its budget was legislated for research and evaluation, and that the federal WIN Office (in the Employment and Training Administration of the Department of Labor) was directed by Merwin Hans. He had a strong commitment to discover through social science research how WIN efforts could be improved. What follows is an outline of certain research efforts which illuminate the issue of training welfare recipients for work.

What Has Been Learned From WIN 1968–1981

In order to adequately understand the performance of WIN or any program, it is necessary to recognize the social systems that affect it and which it affects. Figure 1 shows the systems involved in the national effort. At the top is the Donor System, the Congress and Executive Office which mandate the operation of a national program, set the broad boundaries and purposes of operation. The legislation is handed to the Federal Administrative System, for example, the Department of Labor in order to establish specific guidelines for the operation of the program.

These federal guidelines go to the State Administrative Systems where the guidelines are related to state conditions and then are passed down to local Delivery Systems that actually deliver the services intended. The Recipient System consists of persons who use the services. There are three further systems of great importance. One of these is the Job Market, which determines what kinds of jobs are available for what wages. A second one is the Family/Community System which consists of the family members, friends and other social networks of Recipient System persons. The third system is the Constituencies of the Donor System, the voters and special interest groups that affect the continuation in office of donor system members.

What this Figure helps emphasize is the complex interplay of people and social systems that goes into the operation of any national program. The effectiveness of any program can be doomed from the beginning by failure of donor system members to recognize the realities in other important systems (which is a reason for holding public hearings on legislative proposals).
In the case of WIN, there was strong suspicion on the part of certain powerful members of the donor system that members of the recipient system did not wish to work and get off welfare. Hence, one useful area of research could be determination of the attitudes of welfare recipients: did these recipients have the work ethic, did they prefer welfare to work? A related area could be determination of the employability characteristics of recipients, e.g., level of education, job experience, relative to job market demands.

A series of studies were commissioned by the WIN office to examine the characteristics of members of the recipient system and determine how these affected the goal of getting recipients into jobs and off welfare (Goodwin, 1977, pp. 5–11). Two of the studies involved large scale surveys of the attitudes and characteristics of welfare recipients in general, WIN participants in particular, and various middle class comparison groups (Goodwin, 1972, 1983).
Among the conclusions drawn from these several studies was that welfare recipients along with other Americans tended to have a strong work ethic, wanted to work, and when feasible did work. No study revealed a significant segment of the American population that preferred indolence to work. And no study was able to identify a group of persons with the same characteristics as welfare recipients but managing to get by without welfare. Substantial barriers were found in the way of welfare recipients' participating in the job market. These included lack of skills, poor health, need for child care, and lack of jobs at which they could earn enough to support their families above the poverty level (Goodwin, 1977, p. 2).

Several large scale studies were funded in order to determine which aspects of the WIN program, e.g., the orientation, educational component, work-training component, led to success in terms of job placement. These studies gathered data over time across many sites. There seemed to be higher rates of success among recipients who received some form of WIN service, rather than just placed directly in jobs (as encouraged by the Talmadge Amendments and the administrative changes of 1975).

Identification of just which services contributed to success was not clear, probably because of difficulties in taking account of differences in programs and job markets across diverse sites. These studies were precursors to a subsequent major, sophisticated effort at identifying factors that made some programs more successful than others.

Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980) gathered data from 43 WIN sites in 10 states. Through interviews with officials and reading documents they arrived at four basic aims or criteria of success for the WIN program. Their task, then, was to measure these criteria at the different sites and find the other variables that would explain them. The basic criteria (the dependent variables in their study) were: number of job entries per staff, average job entry wage, retention rate, average monthly welfare grant reduction.

The predictors of these outcome criteria were far ranging, and therein lies the importance of the study. The authors considered issues in the State Administrative System, the Delivery System, the Job Market, as well as certain background charac-
teristics of Recipients. They found for example, that the extent of local employment growth and presence of low wage industries in the Job Market System was significantly related to average entry level wage of WIN persons.

They found that bureaucratic-political activities at the state level did not affect performance at the local level. However, the more the State Administrative System emphasized training for staff, the greater the success of local programs. The more that local WIN offices (the Delivery System) dealt directly and openly with conflict within the unit, and the more flexibility within the unit combined with more accountability the greater the success of the offices.

At the level of the Recipient System, they found that institutional training was more effective with certain clients than others. Richer mixes of supportive services and more client-oriented job development went with greater success. By casting their research net broadly, these researches were able to illuminate the ways in which different social systems contributing to the WIN operation could improve their operation and achieve the stated goals. As useful as the study and the suggestions were, they were not able to revolutionize the effectiveness of WIN. There was no simple way to affect the job market system relative to recipient characteristics in order to move massive numbers of recipients into the work force.

The Washington WIN office under Merwin Hans not only supported research projects, but encouraged forms of action research involving members of the Delivery System in novel activities. Thus in 1972 Hans encouraged a proposal to test the giving of vouchers to WIN participants so that they could choose their own training programs. The idea was that welfare recipients would have greater commitment to and get more from a training program when they themselves could choose and pay for that program themselves (using the voucher).

The use of vouchers was tested by having the WIN office in Portland, Oregon administer them. Fears that the use of vouchers would result in totally impractical training purchases proved unfounded. However, the impact of vouchers on subsequent employment had mixed effects. The vouchers increased the employability of some WIN participants, relative to a comparison
group. For other participants, the voucher seemed to decrease their employability relative to a comparison group. The study highlighted the fact of individual differences among WIN participants (Goodwin & Milius, 1978, p. 21). It also highlighted the extreme difficulty of trying to develop research efforts with participation of the Delivery System members. Staff turnover in the local offices, changes in regulations, and differences in perception between staff members and researchers make any such effort difficult at best (Richardson & Sharp, 1974). Further use of vouchers on any kind of large scale was not pursued.

At the same time, Hans recognized that if a local WIN office became involved in research on a procedure it thought important, that procedure had a good chance of being adopted by the office and perhaps other offices across the country. With that in mind, and with a proposed research agenda which he had commissioned (Goodwin, 1976), Hans proceeded with establishing four local WIN offices as laboratories for testing the usefulness of new procedures suggested by the offices. The Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC) was designated as the agent to carry out the action research efforts, which began in 1977.

The site in Louisville tested the effectiveness of job search in increasing employment. The site in Denver tested the impact of working more closely with welfare recipients who volunteered to enter WIN. The St. Louis site worked at trying to establish a connection between WIN trainees and small business efforts. The combined sites at Madison and Racine, Wisconsin were to test the use of a monetarily enriched on-the-job training effort (Leiman, 1982).

The usual difficulties in attempting action research in a complex system were also encountered here, including the problem of WIN staff turnover (which made agreements about goals and procedures problematical when new staff arrived) and differences in viewpoints and interests between staff and researchers. Also, the imaginativeness of the projects presented by the operating offices was very limited.

Only the Louisville effort showed any positive gain in employment for WIN participants. That is, greater effort put into
job search increased employment. The idea of continuing the laboratory effort was not met with enthusiasm by any of the parties, and so it was not continued after 1981.

The importance of these lab efforts is not in the usability of the research results, but in the illumination of how research can or cannot be integrated into operating programs. Further illumination along this line was generated from a series of three ethnographic studies of WIN sites.

The idea of combining ethnographic, qualitative, research with quantitative research was in Goodwin's research program proposal (1976) that Hans commissioned. Unfortunately, personality conflicts developed between the leader of the ethnographic effort and the administrator of MDRC who was responsible for the effort (Vivelo, 1980). Nevertheless, this kind of effort again pioneered an important approach, and provided invaluable information for those concerned with understanding what actually happens in a service organization.

It was observed, for example, how a WIN team leader placed an illiterate mother in Unassigned Recipient status because the team's active caseload was high and unemployment was high. Later on, when caseloads decreased and jobs were plentiful the mother was sent to evening literacy classes and subsequently got a job as a presser in a manufacturing firm (Levy, 1981, 107–108). The decisions and actions of WIN staff seem reasonable, and highlight the real situational constraints under which WIN staff and welfare recipients operate in specific locales.

A different demonstration project, that was successful, introduced the "job club". WIN staff at experimental sites, in 1976, were trained to have WIN participants form support groups around job search activities. It was found that members of these "clubs" obtained more jobs than participants trying to get jobs on their own (Azrin, 1978). Use of the Job Club spread to other sites.

Many other efforts were made by the WIN Office in Washington to improve the training and job placement of welfare recipients. Giving tax credits to employers hiring welfare recipients was tried. Little success was observed (Goodwin, 1977). The Total Registration Involvement Project (TRIP) was initiated
in 1979. It emerged from the fact that WIN was funded at a relatively low level, $385,000,000 at its peak in 1979 which allocated an average of $259 to each person registered in WIN.

The TRIP project allocated more money to certain sites in order to see if this increased job placements (Hans, 1979). The General Accounting Office (GAO) in an overall evaluation of WIN noted that TRIP increased employment of WIN participants but that the cost of service also markedly increased (Comptroller General, 1982, p. 13). WIN's budget was on the downturn at the time of that report and nothing happened to extend project efforts after the demonstration was completed.

The GAO report presents results from a statistical analysis, using WIN data, which sought to determine the factors affecting WIN participants working their way off welfare. Their findings indicate that economic independence goes up as there are fewer children in the family, the WIN participant has more education, is married, has been on welfare fewer years, and is younger (Comptroller General, 1982, p. 54). These findings are reasonable in that a mother with several children who has little education, has no husband (who can help support the family or look after the family), has been dependent on welfare a while and out of the labor market, and is getting on in years will have severe difficulty in working her way off welfare.

These GAO findings are sharply limited by the fact that the investigators were using already collected data and could not ask questions of recipients about attitudes. When this was done in Goodwin's 1983 study of WIN participants, certain GAO findings were substantiated and new findings added. Goodwin found that length of time on welfare militated against economic independence, and that the greater the number of children in the family the longer the time on welfare. This is consistent with the GAO model.

Goodwin also found that previous job status, which is strongly related to level of education, positively predicts economic independence, as does having others in the family who are earning money, which is another way of indicating the presence of a marital partner who is working (Goodwin, 1983, pp. 50–51).

The further contribution of Goodwin's study was to show
that certain psychological orientations predict economic independence and others do not. More specifically, he found that recipients’ attitudes toward work or welfare did not predict achievement of economic independence. The major psychological predictor was expectation of achieving such independence. This expectation in turn was influenced by whether one obtained employment or not—going up if one got a job and down if one failed to get a job.

Goodwin’s findings in combination with the GAO’s findings, and in the absence of contrary findings, suggest that people are on welfare because of inability to earn enough money in the job market to support their families at the poverty level. Moreover, they are not on welfare because they reject the work ethic or prefer welfare to work. Combining these findings and conclusions with the evidence reported above that extensive WIN efforts over the years have failed to make a dent in the national welfare rolls, suggests that there are structural, hard-to-change patterns in our society which lead millions of families on to the welfare rolls.

If the above analysis is valid, then, further efforts at work-training along the models already seen should be futile. If the above analysis is invalid, then, innovative work-training efforts should produce a dramatic decline in welfare rolls. The Reagan Administration proposed to demonstrate this dramatic decline by phasing out WIN and allocating money to the states to develop their own imaginative work-training efforts (Comptroller General, 1982, p. 61). These aims were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. At issue is what has been the results of training welfare recipients during the period from 1981–1987.

Work-Training Up To Date

The 1981 legislation made it possible for states to require welfare recipients to work for their welfare grants in a Community Work Experience Program (CWEP). States also could fund on-the-job-training by using the welfare grant as a wage subsidy with a private employer, or they could mount their own WIN Demonstration Program. Numbers of states took advantage of these opportunities. What happened?
The first fact to note is that the welfare rolls have not dramatically declined. In 1987, there were 3,788,000 families on public welfare as compared with 3,841,000 in 1981 (WIN Office, 1987). The further question is whether particular kinds of efforts made by certain states have shown remarkable results or reveal the possibility of achieving dramatic state or national changes in the welfare rolls?

This question can be answered by the work of MDRC which contracted with 11 states to evaluate their efforts. One of the more successful efforts was in San Diego. It involved mandatory participation of welfare recipients in a job-search workshop followed by individual job search, as well as up to 12 weeks work experience in public or private nonprofit agencies. After a period of 15 months persons who received these services were compared with persons who had been assigned to a control group without those services. One might expect some positive impact here since emphasis on job search had been shown to improve employability in the Louisville WIN Lab study in the “job club” study.

Results showed a significant difference between members of the control group and those who received services. The latter had statistically significant higher levels of employment and earnings, along with lower welfare payments. However, the absolute magnitude of these differences was small. Thus average total earnings over a period of 15 months was $700 more for the group receiving services. Increased earnings of less than $50 per month are unlikely to have a dramatic effect on the welfare rolls. The total average reduction in welfare payments over a period of 18 months was $288. This level of decline does not indicate dramatic welfare savings (Gueron, 1987, pp. 16, 24).

Efforts in some other states showed no difference at all between those receiving services and those in the control group. This was true in West Virginia where the unemployment rate was so high that the possibility of welfare recipients obtaining a job was extremely low. One conclusion drawn from the study is that “although programs produced changes, the magnitude of those changes was relatively modest . . . Thus, while it is worthwhile to operate these programs, they will not move substantial numbers of people out of poverty” (Gueron, 1987, p. 29).

Those conclusions are remarkably similar to those reached
in an earlier MDRC experiment that involved supported work for welfare mothers. In that case, the mothers were placed in subsidized employment for a period of time with their subsequent earnings compared to earnings of welfare mothers in a control group. While there was a significant difference in earnings, it only amounted to $77 per month (Masters & Maynard, 1981, p. 108).

All the findings presented suggest that the WIN experience from 1968–1981 has been reproduced during 1981–1987. Some efforts are better able than others to help welfare recipients achieve economic independence, but these efforts are not able to make any significant impact on the welfare rolls.

Improvement in job markets can have a positive impact on welfare rolls. This is not a panacea, however. The State of Massachusetts is a case in point. In 1974 there were 330,000 persons on public welfare when the unemployment rate was 7.2% (Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 1976, p. 362). In 1987, with the unemployment rate around 3%, there were still 233,000 persons on public welfare. The overall national number of welfare recipients was about 11,000,000 at both times (WIN Office, 1987). The Massachusetts welfare rolls have been substantially depleted but are by no means negligible. This in spite of the fact that Massachusetts has heavily invested in training for welfare recipients (Nightingale, 1987, p. 112).

An unexpected problem arises when the economy is good and unemployment is low. The cost of housing rises. In the city of Worcester, for example, where this author resides, the cost of housing has doubled and tripled in the past few years. Welfare grants have not nearly kept pace (O'Hare, 1987, p. 30). Those on welfare today are less able to find adequate housing, or any housing, than they were earlier.

The welfare phenomenon does not stem from one cause that can be remedied in a quick and simple way. Welfare rolls will not totally disappear when services are put in place or when the unemployment rate dips. Low level of skills, chronic illness, negative experiences in the educational and job market systems as well as in housing and living situations that promote family disruption and psychological discouragement cannot be easily overcome.

Effectiveness of any welfare reform depends in large part
upon the amount of resources allocated to the efforts prescribed and the understanding of powerful members of the Donor and Constituency Systems about the goals of a welfare program. If these goals center around a cost-benefit lowering of welfare spending in the next year or two, the legislation will tend to be punitive and seriously underfunded as was the WIN Program.

If goals center around the long-term development of human resources the program will be adequately funded and aimed at helping disadvantaged people make use of opportunities for achieving economic independence. It is necessary for the federal government to provide substantial resources here, since, as Nightingale (1987, p. 113) has indicated, many of the States are not able to support extensive work-training efforts. How does the 1988 welfare reform measure up to these issues?

Welfare Reform 1988

In December, 1987 the House of Representatives passed a surprisingly farsighted Family Welfare Reform Act, H.R. 1720. It included virtually all the services that have been tried in the past: remedial education and education for the high school equivalency certificate; job search; skill training and on-the-job training; community work experience training; counselling for personal and family problems; job development; supportive services such as child care and Medicaid even after leaving welfare (Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 41–43).

The efforts were to be funded for a period of five years at a total of more than $7 billion. The bill also gave strong emphasis to systematic evaluation of program efforts through an inter-agency panel, an outside advisory board, and $20 million in funding (Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, pp. 125–126).

A very shortsighted welfare reform bill, S. 1511 was introduced in the Senate. The two versions went to a joint House-Senate Conference Committee in the Spring, 1988. At the end of September, 1988 the Conference Report emerged and then became law (PL 100–998). The imaginative portions of the House bill, including the adequate funding, had been scuttled. About $3.34 billion was to be provided over a period of five years. As Rep. Major Owens (NY) pointed out in the House debate, "According to CBO (Congressional Budget Office) in real dollars,
this bill will provide about half of what we spent on the WIN Job Training Program for welfare recipients during the 1970s" (1988). If WIN was unsuccessful in lowering the welfare rolls, spending less on training cannot reasonably be expected to provide better results.

The negative attitude of the compromise bill toward developing the human potential of welfare recipients is illustrated in Rep. Augustus Hawkins' (CA) remark about the weakening of the House provision for postsecondary education counting as job preparation: "Obviously, most welfare recipients are not ready for college, but the opportunity should never be foreclosed to those who have the motivation and capability" (1988). The final legislation is not looking toward long-term development of human resources, but rather to short-term saving of money. There will not of course be real saving as more parents and their children are unable to gain the skills to move out of poverty and welfare.

Also lost in the compromise bill was the imaginative approach to research and evaluation. These endeavors are now placed in traditional fashion solely under the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is responsible for the entire welfare effort. It is possible that even under these conditions the research efforts pioneered by the WIN Program could be expanded.

A picture could be presented of what is happening in the different social systems involved in the welfare effort (see Figure 1). A broad evaluation study could be undertaken of work-training in different locales, considering administrative arrangements and socio-environmental factors such as employment requirements of local industries following the lead of Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale (1980). Such a study could be enhanced by ethnographic accounts at the same sites of how welfare participants made use of the services and training in the context of their family/community systems.

Overall results would not only reveal the general impact of work-training on job placement of welfare recipients, but would provide detailed information on the kinds of events in local offices and in the lives of welfare recipients that promoted or hindered job efforts. This information could be used by members of
the administrative and delivery systems to improve the program and to members of Congress for possible changes in legislative mandate or level of funding.

A legislative and administrative history of the overall program could be carried forward. This material would help members of all systems, especially those who were new to the scene, to understand the assumptions guiding different aspects of the program and the views held by members of different systems. In short, an integrated set of ongoing research studies that cut across traditional academic and methodological boundaries could facilitate the functioning of a national effort to help welfare recipients achieve economic independence. It also could point up the shortcomings of current efforts.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Welfare policies and programs have changed since their inception. In 1935 the emphasis was on providing support for widows to stay at home and look after their children. In the 1960s, as welfare rolls increased, emphasis shifted to providing counselling and work-training for unwed mothers so that they could obtain employment and leave welfare.

The WIN Program in its initial phase of 1968–71 emphasized education and training. This resulted in relatively few job placements because the participants required such extensive efforts in those regards. Pressure built up for more job placements in order to lower the welfare rolls and welfare costs. The emphasis for immediate job placement increased from 1972–81, but even so the welfare rolls remained at around 11,000,000 persons.

If the WIN Program did not resolve the welfare problem, by 1981 it had undertaken a wide variety of activities aimed at that goal, including establishment of WIN Laboratories, demonstration projects such as job clubs, and research into such matters as the attitudes of welfare recipients and the administrative and socio-environmental context of WIN offices. Overall results indicated that the welfare problem could not be blamed on recipients having deviant goals or values—the latter were much like those of other Americans. Nor could the problem be attributed to lack of trying various kinds of work-training efforts, or administrative difficulties.
Work-training efforts were continued under a more varied format with the 1981 legislation, giving States a larger role in determining the activities to be undertaken. Research carried out on those activities yield essentially the same results as from WIN: work-training is useful, but in itself will not deplete the welfare rolls.

The welfare rolls continue at around 11,000,000 persons—over 3.5 million families of whom about 95% are headed by mothers—because of structural, hard-to-change patterns in our society. These patterns involve the educational system, organization of the job market, housing and living situations, and factors promoting family disruption. These social structural difficulties that encourage failure in the job market do have psychological consequences, lowering the expectations of ever succeeding. This in turn lowers effort. Thus there is an interplay between experience and psychological orientations that affect behavior.

A program that has any hope of lowering welfare rolls must have a long-range perspective. It must be aimed not merely at immediate job placement but at helping compensate for social patterns that have led to inequities in personal background and experiences. Of particular importance is helping poor fathers (who are not on welfare) to obtain employment so that there is greater chance of their staying with and supporting their families.

The new welfare law does not move beyond the thinking or experience of the WIN Program. There are some positive elements, such as, extension of child care and Medicaid beyond the welfare period and stronger provision for obtaining family support from absent fathers. However, the centerpiece of the effort, the work-training aspect, is so woefully underfunded as to provide even worse results than the WIN Program it replaces. No provision is made for upgrading welfare payments that have fallen farther and farther below the poverty level.

There is some encouragement in the fact that the House of Representatives was able to pass a welfare reform bill that contained the seeds of a new evolutionary phase in welfare programs. Those seeds may come to fruition at a later time when we finally recognize that helping the poor is helping to expand not deplete resources of our nation.
References


