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RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE USE OF DRUGS AND ALCOHOL AMONG LOW INCOME YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS  
John E. Poulin
The American social welfare state is approaching a crisis because of the global economy. Survival in a new world economy requires corporations to become more efficient, a strategy which leads to a rapidly changing technology, plant shutdowns, and industrial reorganization. To aid corporations, government often curbs taxes to make capital available for investment. These policies can lead to governmental debt, reduced welfare services, a deterioration in the infrastructure, and myriad social problems. This article investigates the effects of the global economy on the American welfare state.

The concept of a welfare state is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the middle 1930s, the majority of countries had only rudimentary forms of social security. However, by the 1950s most industrialized nations had developed comprehensive health care programs, unemployment compensation, state-sponsored pensions for the elderly, and various income maintenance support programs.

Grounded in John Maynard Keynes' (1936) theory of demand-side economics, welfare states in Western industrialized nations grew rapidly from the 1950s to the early 1970s. However, by the middle 1970s economic malaise, in the form of high inflation, high rates of unemployment, slow economic growth, and unacceptably high levels of taxation began to characterize Western industrial economies. During these difficult times, governments were forced to reassess their economic strategies, including the resources allocated to welfare activities. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, most Western governments either arrested or reduced their welfare programs.

The welfare state is confronting a serious crisis. Forced to survive in a highly competitive global economy, corporations and government are compelled to become more efficient. For
corporations, this can lead to economic restructuring, which in turn often leads to a rapidly changing technology, plant shut-downs, and major industrial reorganization. To increase the competitive position of its domestic industries, government is forced to lower corporate and personal taxes to free up money for investment. The subsequent loss of revenue leads to a heavy governmental debt, a reduction in welfare services, a deterioration in the public infrastructure, and myriad social and economic problems. This situation is exacerbated as governmental cuts are met by increased demands for social services stemming from global-based changes. This article investigates the emergence of the global economy and its effects on the American welfare state. Also examined are three scenarios relating to the future of the welfare state in a competitive world economy.

The Emerging Economic Order

The new world economy is marked by shifting demographic trends and novel socio-political arrangements. For example, close to 75% of the world’s population live in poorer nations, most in the Southern hemisphere. As recently as the middle 1960s, economies in developing nations primarily manufactured basic goods (e.g., clothing, shoes, toys, and simple and inexpensive consumer electronics) requiring cheap labor and relatively simple technologies. However, by the 1970s, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan began exporting products which called for sophisticated and capital-intensive modes of production. Although second-tier industrial countries such as India, the Philippines, and China were able to inherit the basic goods production of the industrialized Asian nations, they too, were forced into adopting more sophisticated technologies. By the middle 1970s, Western nations began to experience the affect of this new economic competition as their manufacturing industries declined, their growth rates flattened, and their unemployment increased (Reich, 1987).

The effects of this new economic order are illustrated by examining the United States. Once the world’s undisputed economic leader, the U.S. is now struggling to maintain an economic presence in a highly competitive world economy (Bowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983). In 1980 the United States had a
$2 billion trade surplus; by 1984 other countries were gradually catching up with its productivity and that surplus turned into a deficit of $102 billion (Thurow, 1985). To maintain prosperity and finance an increasingly (if relatively) unproductive economy, the U.S. turned to massive foreign borrowing. In 1982 America had net foreign assets of $152 billion; by 1986 it surpassed Brazil to become the world’s largest debtor nation.

The economic problems of the U.S. are compounded by several factors. From 1960 to 1980, America’s share of the world’s manufactured exports fell from 25% to 17%. By 1988 the United States had dropped to the third largest exporter ($320 billion), behind West Germany ($323 billion) and ahead of Japan ($256 billion). Even with a 27% increase in exports in 1988 (due mainly to a drop in the dollar), America imported $460 billion worth of goods, making it the world’s largest importer (International Monetary Fund, 1989). (In comparison, Germany imported $251 billion in 1988 and Britain $189 billion.) By the early 1980s the United States imported 50% of its consumer electronics, 30% of its automobiles, and a large proportion of cameras, shoes, tools, tires, machinery, and clothes (Magaziner & Reich, 1982). Apart from the trade deficit, another striking imbalance exists. In terms of dollar value, Japan’s number one export to the U.S. is motor vehicles, followed by heavy equipment, iron and steel plates, and consumer electronics. In contrast, the leading exports of the United States to Japan are soybeans, corn, fir and hemlock logs, coal, wheat, and cotton (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982). In essence, the United States has become an agriculture exporter trying to compete in a global economy.

According to Lester Thurow (1985), the roots of the economic crisis are found in the loss of the technological edge held by American industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Thurow maintains that American industry is now facing competitors who have matched and surpassed its economic achievements. This dilemma is exacerbated as America is thrust into a competitive world economy while at its most vulnerable economic point since World War II (Thurow, 1985).

Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone (1988) accept that global competition has propelled the economic crisis, but they argue that instead of going back to basics—improved product
quality, investment in new technology, and more constructive relationships with workers—American corporations responded by abandoning core businesses, investing offshore, shifting capital into highly speculative ventures, subcontracting with low-wage contractors both domestically and abroad, and substituting part-time workers for full-time employees. The economic crisis in America is manifested in other structural problems. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) document the deindustrialization of America, or in other words, the widespread and systematic disinvestment in the nation’s productive capacity. They argue (1982) that “the essential problem with the U.S. economy can be traced to the way capital—in the forms of financial resources and of real plant and equipment—has been diverted from productive investment... into unproductive speculation, mergers and acquisitions, and foreign investment” (p. 135). Indeed, high-income production jobs declined by 1.4 million between 1970 and 1982 (Day, 1989). Permanent job losses in Ohio included a 20% loss in primary metals manufacturing, a 10% loss in electronic equipment manufacturing, and a 19% loss in transportation equipment manufacturing. The loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs corresponds to increased poverty in the traditional industrial states. In Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York the poverty rates climbed from 10.4% in 1978 to 13.4% in 1985; in Michigan, Ohio and Illinois they went up from 10% to 14% (Day, 1990). In the wake of deindustrialization lay empty factories, displaced workers, bankrupt communities, and widespread social dislocation. The human misery resulting from global economic changes has put immense pressure on the welfare state.

The Affects of the Global Economy on the American Welfare State

Within the context of the global economy there are two interrelated issues that affect the welfare state: the actual trends in the global economy, and the adoption of policies believed necessary to ensure economic survival. Two conservative writers on the global economy, Alvin Rabushka of the Hoover Institution and Steve Hanke (1989) of Johns Hopkins University, have outlined the requirements for success in the new economic
community: (a) a laissez-faire economic approach emphasizing free trade and markets, no tariffs, and a commitment to the free movement of capital; (b) an emphasis on research and development; (c) dramatic reductions in corporate and progressive income taxes; (d) a decrease in governmental regulations and in the power of regulatory agencies; (e) privatizing the economy by selling off publicly owned industries, utilities, and transportation systems; (f) reducing the role of government in the marketplace, including slashing or eliminating public employment programs; and (g) a decrease in welfare activities, including major cuts in entitlement programs.

These economic schemes have clearly devolved from Reaganesomics. Taking their cue from supply-side theorists, conservative supporters of the global economy argue that it has the potential to provide untold affluence for countries willing to play by the new rules. Shrewdly omitted, however, is a discussion of the repercussions of a free-market economy. In the United States for example, these consequences include a large growth in the underclass, a high poverty rate (in 1987 the poverty rate was 13.6%), a widespread homelessness (perhaps 3 million Americans are homeless), and under- and unemployment, and a deterioration in the public infrastructure (Karger and Stoesz, 1990).

The Realities of the Global Economy and the Welfare State

The reality of the global economy stands in sharp contrast to the promises of its proponents. Moreover, much of the growth of modern corporations is not based on real growth, but on enormous debt in the form of junk bonds, mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts. The global economy has also ushered in subtle changes in the perception of corporations by stockholders, corporate executives, and boards of directors. The traditional corporation which concentrated on making money by producing a product, is being replaced by the corporation more concerned with its value to competitors and speculators than with its actual production. Hence, many Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) see the value of their corporations mainly in terms of their worth to Wall Street speculators, competitors, and deal
makers. Even many small entrepreneurs view the success of their companies in terms of finding a corporate buyer.

To ensure survival in a competitive world economy, corporations must make their operations more efficient and more profitable, a strategy which often includes expensive mergers and other forms of horizontal and vertical economic integration. Hence, CEOs and boards of directors are compelled to borrow huge sums of money at high interest rates or promise investors high rates of return. This leads to an emphasis on short-term profits at the expense of long-term corporate goals. The focus on short-term profit forces corporations to cut back on capital equipment, defer plant modernization, and may result in a significant employee reductions. While the ostensible reason for a short-term profit approach is the need to compete in the global marketplace, this tactic eventually leads to less competitive corporations.

Excessive corporate debt has several consequences for the welfare state. For one, high corporate debt—and the write-off of interest payments—produces less governmental revenues. Moreover, government must freeze or lower tax rates because of the fiscal vulnerability resulting from high corporate indebtedness. The inherent anti-tax bias of the global marketplace means that government cannot easily raise individual taxes, especially using progressive taxation. On the other hand, the requirements of the business sector for new infrastructures such as roads, advanced communications systems, and public facilities, forces government to plunge deeper into deficit spending in order to provide services for economic growth. Caught in this economic vise, government must cut back on both critical services and infrastructure. Education is pared back, social services are cut, and less important secondary roads are left to deteriorate. Despite these cutbacks, increased public and corporate demands requires government to resort to even heavier borrowing and deficit spending, thus repeating the cycle.

The scope of deficit spending in the United States is difficult to grasp. While the Gross National Product (GNP) of the U.S. was $5 trillion in 1989, the budget deficit was $3 trillion. In other words, the federal budget deficit equalled three-fifths of the GNP in 1989. Seen in another way, the world traded a total
of $2.7 trillion worth of goods in 1988, less than the $2.83 trillion federal budget deficit in late 1989. By creating an enormous debt (from about $50 billion a year in the Carter term to between $145 to $200 billion a year in the 1980s), Reagan paralyzed the growth of public services well into the next century. This federal debt has made new fiscal-based social welfare programs almost inconceivable in the near future, regardless of social problems (Moynihan, 1989).

The need to repay high interest loans requires corporations to restructure their operations. This corporate rationalization often includes the downscaling of production, a process which may involve laying-off large numbers of workers. In addition, corporations often replace full-time employees with less expensive part-time workers who are ineligible for normal employment perks, including health and pension benefits. These conditions promote the establishment of an underclass of low-wage employees. For example, although 20 million new jobs were created in the 1980s, they were not with the Fortune 500 companies, who cut their work forces by 35 million. Many of the new jobs created in the 1980s were low-paying service positions in the secondary labor market (Friedrich, 1990). Thus, despite a 6% unemployment rate, over 44% of the jobs created in the U.S. between 1979 and 1985 paid less than $7,400 per year (Harrington, 1987). Instead of achieving economic self-sufficiency, many workers in these low-paying jobs remain eligible for basic welfare benefits. In this way, government tacitly assumes the social costs of corporate competition in the new global economy.

An unstable labor market results in less tax revenues while contributing to greater pressures on unemployment compensation programs. For example, in 1989 only 31% of the short-term unemployed in the U.S. received benefits, a figure which compares unfavorably to the 75% who received benefits in the 1970s (Shapiro & Greenstein, 1988). Moreover, laying off or terminating workers affects merchants, banks, landlords, and the tax base of local and national governments. Taken together, these trends lead to greater challenges for the welfare state, eventually influencing a deterioration in the basic interpersonal and group structure. For example, previous studies have linked economy-related changes to an increase in mental illness and suicide rates.
The technological revolution, another important part of the global economy, requires new equipment and a comprehensive retraining of the workforce. Many American corporations, however, are reluctant to invest in retraining, arguing instead that it is a governmental responsibility. Faced with a huge deficit, the federal government cannot afford the costs of retraining large segments of the workforce. Citing a shortage of skilled workers, this stalemate becomes another excuse for corporations to move their manufacturing offshore. Thus, government's fiscal paralysis encourages capital flight, and instead of assuring prosperity, it helps create a fiscal crisis of the state.

Labor policy is another factor in the global economy. Corporations demand a loose labor market—high levels of unemployment—in order to bring down or stabilize wage rates and lower inflation. As part of this strategy, employers argue for loosening labor market controls while curbing the power of unions. This corporate strategy can result in a decline in both the strength and numbers of trade unions. For example, in 1945 roughly 35% of the U.S. work force was unionized, by 1986 that number had dropped to 17.5% (Karger, 1988). A decline in union strength is often correlated with diminished levels of employee security.

This labor policy has other ramifications. Thomas Donahue (1989), Secretary Treasurer of the American Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO) argues that:

[There is a] trend toward replacing long-term employees with part-time and temporary ones who have no personal stake in the company's success, no permanent home workplace, only the most transitory and superficial relationships with their fellow workers, and—of course—no regular benefits, vacations, holidays, or company life and health insurance plans, and no retirement benefits at the end of a working lifetime. If that trend prevails, there's a serious danger that a large piece of our society will be split three ways: At the top, a highly paid professional, managerial and technical group, made smaller and more tightly knit by
computer networks. Next, a layer of outside contractors providing materials and services that the corporate elites would rather buy than provide in-house. And at the bottom, doing the work, a permanent floating population of rootless functionaries, moving from job to job or to the unemployment line, who would be closer to the Marxist idea of a dispossessed proletariat than anything that America has seen so far. (p. 6)

The creation of a large lumpen proletariat presages greater dilemmas for an already overextended welfare state. Because low-paid and marginal workers have few of the traditional employment perks and protections accorded a stable workforce, they require more social welfare benefits, including various forms of income support. Moreover, with few retirement benefits and insufficient incomes to create their own retirement plan, this group will likely consume high levels of welfare benefits when they retire. By allowing corporations to create a floating labor force, government agrees to strain its present resources while mortgaging its future.

Laissez-faire labor policies also encourage greater income inequality. For example, in 1960 the average CEO was paid 41 times more than a shop floor worker; by 1988 that CEO earned 91 times more than the factor worker (Donahue, 1989). Between 1973 and 1984, families with incomes over $50,000 per year increased from 14.9% to 15.6%. During that same period, the proportion of families with incomes below $20,000 increased from 32.1% to 36.4%. These changes occurred while the traditional middle class—families with incomes of between $20,000 to $50,000 per year—fell from 53% to 47.9% (Bradbury, 1986). The economic gap between upper- and lower-income American families was wider in 1987 than at any time since the Census Bureau began recording this data (Karger & Stoesz, 1989).

The rich were getting richer while real earnings for most Americans either stagnated or fell. While the yearly earnings of the top 20% of American families rose (after adjusting for inflation) more than $9,000 (to almost $85,000), the income of the bottom 20% dropped by $576 (to $8,800) (Friedrich, 1990). Examining family income over an eleven year period provides
even bleaker figures. From 1973 to 1984 the incomes of the poorest fifth with children fell 34%. It is estimated that from 1980 to 1984, there was a net transfer of $25 billion in income from poor and middle-income families to the richest fifth of the population (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988).

While the salaries of top management dramatically increased, many of these managers lobbied to keep the minimum wage as far below the poverty line as possible. In fact, since 1981 the minimum wage remained stagnant while the cost of living has substantially risen. These figures have enormous impact for the welfare state, since not only is the number of people eligible for entitlement programs growing, but much of the clientele of these programs were once middle-class.

While alarming to liberals, monetarists and supply-side economists argue that income inequality is a socially desirable phenomenon. For these economists, social policies that promote income equality encourage coercion, limit individual freedom, and damage the economy. Furthermore, income inequality is seen as the desirable outcome of the marketplace—it reflects differences in rewards based on individual talent and initiative. According to these economists, income differentials provide an incentive to work hard for an otherwise unmotivated labor force (Walker, 1990).

Policies designed to foster corporate competition in the global economy affect the welfare state. While government arrests personal and corporate tax rates, the economic dislocation caused by plant shut-downs, erratic employment, and low wage scales results in increased numbers of people eligible for social welfare programs. Even if corporate profits are higher and governmental revenues greater, the negative consequences of economic reorganization cancel out much of the positive effects of revenue growth. In short, the effects of unregulated economic change occur at a faster rate than governmental revenues can remedy, and the social welfare activities of the state fall short of the needs and expectations of its most vulnerable constituents. Several future scenarios are possible given the realities of the global economy.
Future Scenarios for the Welfare State

The following scenarios for the welfare state seem plausible given current trends: (a) the attenuation of welfare programs through neglect and fiscal attrition, (b) the creation of a corporate welfare state, and (c) the revitalization of welfare programs in response to increased social problems.

The first scenario suggests that current trends in welfare will continue. Ramesh Mishra (1984) identifies three factors that signal a crisis in the welfare state: (a) a fiscal crisis of the state (a decrease in social welfare expenditures) and a cutback in welfare benefits, (b) a continuation of the political philosophy that views welfare expenditures as a barrier to economic growth, and (c) a crisis of legitimation (the loss of confidence in the welfare state to solve social problems). If adverse trends continue, an attrition of welfare state functions will build upon itself and eventually immobilize the welfare state. As social problems endemic to the global economy increase, and as welfare programs are curtailed, the belief that the welfare state is ineffective in addressing social problems will gain greater currency. These currents will climax when the welfare state is delegitimized and arguments for its continued existence become indefensible. At that point, dismantling the bulk of welfare state programs will become a mechanical task. Replacement programs or strategies—if any—that would supersede the welfare state are open to speculation. In effect, this scenario presupposes a political economy modelled on a laissez-faire framework. Given the economic insecurities faced by the middleclass, and the dependence of this group on key social welfare programs (e.g., social security, student loans, and housing and mortgage assistance), this scenario is unlikely.

A second scenario suggests that the growth in multinational corporations will eventually lead to a corporate welfare state. Within this scenario, economically powerful corporations will provide direct benefits to their employees, including generous retirement benefits, health care, and personal social services. Employees lucky enough to work for multinational corporations will be protected under this umbrella, while workers in the secondary labor market will be covered under governmental welfare programs. Because fewer people will be beneficiaries of the government’s largesse, less revenues will be needed.
The realization of this scenario is unlikely. For one, few precedents exist for corporations to assume, on a wholesale basis, the responsibility for meeting the full range of their employees' needs. While some corporations provide in-house employee assistance programs (Akabas & Kurzman, 1982; Googins, 1975; Googins & Godfrey, 1987), including mental health and day care services, the provision of comprehensive corporate social welfare benefits has not been adopted on a widespread basis. Moreover, given the corporate strategy of replacing full-time employees with part-time workers, it seems doubtful that corporations are on the verge of starting massive health, welfare, and economic security programs. Furthermore, since corporations must be lean to survive in a competitive global economy, the prospects of establishing expensive social welfare programs appears remote. In short, while benevolent corporations were possible when American business had secure economic standing—little competition, low debt, and unlimited markets—it is not realistic to expect generous corporate entitlements in a highly competitive global economy.

The last scenario suggests that welfare state functions will be revitalized as increased social problems threaten the stability of industrialized nations. The welfare state could be revived using several different strategies. For one, welfare activities would receive more resources as social instability grows and economic problems become worse. Secondly, the welfare state could be strengthened through what Mishra (1984) calls "corporatism"—the creation of a systematic framework for the integration of a productive market economy with social welfare functions. The corporatist welfare state is based on a consensus between important social groupings, such as government, business and labor. While the nature of welfare remains the same, corporatism provides an institutional framework for maintaining full employment and comprehensive social welfare programs within the context of a liberal free-market society.

While corporatism may be a desirable alternative to a declining welfare state, it presupposes that welfare problems can be addressed by individual nation states rather than through a concerted international effort. Because the economic transformation in Western industrialized nations is international in scope, the
restoration of welfare activities should be based on developing minimum universal need standards that are translated into social welfare programs. These need standards should be related to adequate diet, shelter, clothing, health care, economic security, and educational and economic opportunities. In addition, developing a procedure to enforce—possibly through sanctions and boycotts—international need standards for welfare benefits diminishes the economic advantage of countries operating without a comprehensive social welfare system.

While the future of the welfare state is generally open to question, certain things are clear. For one, the use of Keynesian solutions rooted in individual nation states is becoming problematic for addressing social welfare problems caused by an interdependent global economy. Specifically, the need to arrest the growth in corporate and personal taxation is resulting in governmental cutbacks even in highly developed welfare states such as Britain, France, and Italy (Friedman, et al., 1987). Moreover, as social problems attendant to economic dislocation continue to rise, governmental intervention is curtailed due to the revenue restrictions inherent in the economic makeup of the global economy. Secondly, traditional Marxian answers—i.e., the view that the economic system should be the primary social welfare program by ensuring employment to anyone who wishes to work—are largely irrelevant in a global economy where the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries are toying with privatization and are on the verge of joining the world economic community. What is clear, however, is that conventional approaches to the welfare state must be reconsidered in light of the global economy. Unfortunately, there are few models that presently address the development of a humane and efficient welfare state that does not hinder national competitiveness in a global economy. Ideally, compassionate welfare state models should be developed that actively promote international competitiveness rather than hinder it.

Conclusion

The new global economy has important consequences for the welfare state. For one, the gross revenues of many multinational corporations are greater than the GNP of many nations.
This economic strength translates into political power. For example, corporations can blackmail local and state governments by threatening plant closures, relocating operations offshore, and laying off large numbers of workers. In 1982, International Harvester began to close several of its twenty-three heavy equipment plants. It informed Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Springfield, Illinois that one of the cities would have its plant shutdown unless they bought the plant and then leased it back to Harvester. By September 1982, each city had offered to buy back its respective plant for $30 million or more, a significantly higher price than the open market would bear. In October 1982, the Fort Wayne plant was selected for closure. When Teledyne, Inc., planned to construct a new plant employing 500 workers, it pitted four South Carolina counties against each other. Oconee County got the plant only by agreeing to build it and then lease it back to Teledyne at favorable rates, something that the other three counties were unwilling to do. These threats were repeated in one form or another by General Motors and many other corporations throughout the 1980s (McKenzie, 1984). Threats such as these ensure that government will respond quickly, and often positively, to corporate demands.

While a few individuals and corporations increase their fortunes (in 1988 the richest 1 percent in the U.S. was expected to amass over $452 billion in pretax income), public institutions grow poorer. Thus, instead of ensuring a healthy public and private sector, major U.S. tax cuts and pro-corporate fiscal policies in the 1980s led to uneven economic growth (Phillips, 1990). In effect, the private sector grew wealthier as the public sector experienced unprecedented debt. One of the outcomes of this public debt has been a neglected and decaying infrastructure which, if it were now rehabilitated, would be far costlier than if it were attended to throughout the 1980s. Moreover, given a federal budget deficit of over $3 trillion, it seems unlikely that the federal government can undertake a substantial renovation of the American infrastructure. Hence, the American public sector is now poorer than before the economic upswing of the 1980s.

Perhaps the most important change resulting from the global economy is a shift in the perception of government. Instead of
viewing government as an arbiter of the public interest, neoconservatives maintain that government must stand aside and let economic force rule. This laissez-faire philosophy implies that corporations should exercise their economic muscle to ensure that government does not interfere in the marketplace, except to benefit corporate growth. The argument which calls for a diminished governmental role in the marketplace also applies to social welfare programs. A philosophy which urges government to assume a passive stance in the marketplace is inimical to the basic tenets of the welfare state. For the neoconservatives, governmental responsibility is not perceived as a commitment to the interests of the larger society, but instead to the upper socioeconomic classes. In essence, this philosophy is a repudiation of more than fifty years of welfare statism.

Neoconservatives maintain that if the marketplace is left unfettered, the resulting economic expansion will provide government with abundant revenues. This canard is repudiated by the experience of the United States. After seven years of economic recovery, the federal government is in worse shape (a huge budget deficit, increased foreign ownership of U.S. resources, an increase in poverty, and a high trade imbalance) than before the economic upswing. Despite the economic growth of the last seven years, the overall poverty rate in 1987 was 13.6%—higher than any year of the 1970s, including the recession years of 1974–5 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988).

The recent literature in social welfare policy is replete with arguments bemoaning the changes taking place in the welfare state since the late 1970s (Abramovitz, 1988; Block, et al., 1987; Harrington, 1984; Katz, 1986; Piven & Cloward, 1982; Beverly and McSweeney, 1987; Kuttner, 1987; Morris, 1986). Despite the salience of these arguments, liberals ignore the fact that neoconservatives are correct—the economic reality facing industrialized nations has changed and the traditional welfare state may not be the most suitable vehicle to protect vulnerable populations. Moreover, industrialized nations can no longer independently shape their economic future. The interdependence of the global marketplace requires nations to interact in an environment where welfare state decisions will be made in the context of a new economic reality.
On the other hand, neoconservatives are wrong when they argue that a new economic order requires nations to adopt a laissez-faire political economy. Contrary to the pronouncements of conservative pundits, no clear evidence exists that a laissez-faire economic approach ensures success. On the contrary, Japan—a country experiencing economic success—has governmental planning, restricted markets, and a labyrinth of governmental regulations.

The debate about the economic future of industrialized nations is a debate about the future of the welfare state. If neoconservatives are successful, the present attacks on the welfare state will intensify. In the end, new ways of redefining the function, role, and responsibility of the welfare state are necessary if it is to survive in a new global economy.

References

Global Economy and the American Welfare


Notes

1. Although much has been written recently about the transformation of modern corporations, one of the earliest voices documenting that change was John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), who maintained that large corporations are now controlled by the technostructure—management, scientists, and technicians—rather than by stockholders. According to Galbraith, these technocrats are more concerned with using their talents than with the actual survival and profitability of the corporation.

2. While corporate taxes have increased in absolute dollars, as a percentage of total U.S. Government revenues they have remained relatively constant throughout the 1980s. In 1980, corporate income taxes totalled $64.6 billion, or about 12.5% of total government revenues. While corporate taxes rose to $219.7 billion in 1988, they still accounted for only about 13% of total federal government revenues (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1989).

3. Although the number of families on AFDC decreased slightly from 1975 to 1984 (from 11.4 to 10.7 million families), this drop was due mainly to eligibility changes and program cuts rather than a drop in those requiring benefits (Karger & Stoesz, 1989).

4. The trend toward the breakup of traditional socialism in Eastern Europe is evident in the recent reunification of Germany, and the increased move toward economic privatization in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.

5. In 1977 the total assets of U.S. multinational corporations was $2.7 trillion. By 1988 those assets had increased to $5.3 trillion, higher than the total U.S. GNP for that year. Moreover, U.S. multinational corporations had a combined workforce of over 26 million employees in 1988, larger than the population of many medium-sized nations (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1989).

6. Outlays by foreign investors to acquire or establish U.S. business enterprises increased from $10.8 billion in 1982 to $65 billion in 1988. Foreign outlays have risen 55% per year during the past five years, and in 1985 they amounted to almost $1 trillion (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1989).
Does Social Security Redistribute Income?: A Tax-Transfer Analysis*

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Despite some forced-savings elements, social security is in reality a tax-transfer system based on pay-as-you-go financing. Using a tax-transfer approach, this paper analyzes the redistributive effects of social security by comparing the 1986 benefit distribution to the retired and disabled population, their dependents, and survivors with the 1986 payroll tax incidence of the working population. Findings indicate that a considerable degree of redistribution occurs from middle- and high-income taxpayers to poor and near-poor beneficiaries. The paper also analyzes the demographic characteristics of taxpayers and beneficiaries to measure redistribution among different genders, marital status, age, and racial groups.

From its inception, the alleviation of economic inequality through redistribution of income among different economic classes has not been an intended goal of social security. As a product of the Great Depression, social security, the most comprehensive income support program in its coverage and benefit outlays, started as an uneasy compromise between the ideology of self-help and the need for, and right to, a social mechanism for protection in old age. The strong emphasis on an individual's earned right to benefits on a contractual basis led to the financing of the system through contributions without general revenue subsidy and the benefit formula linking benefits to contributions. As a result, social security has been often seen as a compulsory savings program, redistributing income from the working years to the retirement years of an individual, rather than among classes.

*I want to thank Harry Specht for his assistance in developing this paper and for his detailed comments on earlier versions.
Regardless of some forced-savings elements, such as the flat-rate payroll tax with a maximum taxable ceiling and the earnings-related benefit formula, social security (inclusive of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance—OASDI) is in reality a tax-transfer system based on pay-as-you-go financing. Contrary to the continuous public misperception, the payroll tax collected from the working population in a given year is paid out directly to the retired and disabled populations as social security benefits. For example, in 1986, the program collected $191 billion as payroll taxes from the estimated 152 million insured workers, and $3.4 billion from the taxation of social security benefits of rich recipients. In the same year, the same program disbursed $177 billion, directly out of the payroll tax revenue, to 38 million retired and disabled workers, their dependents, and survivors (Social Security Administration, 1987). Social security has been basically an unfunded system without any general revenue subsidy and with only a minimal trust fund. (Although in recent years the trust fund has been building up as the baby-boomers are in their prime working ages, it is projected that it will be rapidly depleted when the baby-boomers start to retire at the turn of the century.) (U.S. House of Representatives, 1984) Although it has not been an intended goal, social security has thus worked primarily as an income redistributive mechanism from workers to the retired, the disabled, their dependents, and survivors.

On the basis of the reality of social security financing, many students of social security have challenged the validity of the life-cycle redistribution assumption and the compulsory savings perspective. Nonetheless, quite a few studies which have been done since the 1960s on the effects of the social security program on income distribution and redistribution did not completely shed the life-cycle redistribution assumption (See Aaron, 1964; Burkhauser & Warlick, 1981; Hurd & Shoven, 1985; Leimer, 1979; Ozawa, 1974 & 1982; Pellechio & Goodfellow, 1983). Despite the divergence in the conceptual frameworks among the compulsory-savings view, annuity-welfare view, and the tax-transfer view, the general mode of analysis of redistribution through social security has been that of cost-benefit, based on the joint consideration of the tax and the benefits. The evaluation
of individual benefits was carried out in direct connection with the payroll tax paid or that would be paid by the same individual during the working years. The focus of the analyses of this contribution-benefit relationship is, therefore, on the individual gain or loss through social security. The only methodological difference among these studies was that in the annuity-welfare model, as used by Aaron, Ozawa, and Burkhauser and Warlick, much attention was paid to the difference between actuarially-justified benefits and actual benefits paid to a retiree, while in the other cases such distinction was not made.

One possible analysis of the redistributive effects of social security as a current-year tax-transfer system, however, is the comparison of the current year benefit distribution to the retired and disabled population, their dependents, and survivors with the current year payroll tax incidence on the working population. Specifically, the analysis of the extent of redistribution from the middle- and high-income working population to the poor retired and disabled population will provide an insight into the intergenerational income-distributive and redistributive function of social security.

This paper appraises the extent of such redistribution by examining the 1986 payroll tax incidence on the working population and benefit distribution among retired and disabled populations, their dependents, and survivors in 1986. An assumption here is that payroll taxes collected from the 1986 working population were paid out to all retirees and the disabled as 1986 social security benefits. In this analysis, the high-income group is defined as family members or unrelated individuals with their pretransfer total family or personal, respectively, income 400% or higher of the official poverty line; the middle income group as those individuals whose pretransfer family or personal income is between 399–200% of it; the near-poor group as those whose pretransfer family or personal income is between 199–100% of it; and the poor group as those whose pretransfer family or personal income is lower than 100% of it. (Pretransfer income is defined as total income excluding Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits, Supplemental Security Benefits, and other welfare benefits, veteran's benefits, and social security benefits.)
The paper also analyzes the demographic characteristics of taxpayers and beneficiaries for the purpose of measuring the scope of redistribution within and among different gender, marital status, age, and racial groups.

Different Perspectives on the Redistributive Function of Social Security

Despite its obvious current-year tax-benefit financing, social security is primarily regarded as a compulsory savings scheme, with adjunctive social adequacy component (—the progressive benefit formula which produces higher earnings replacement rates for low earners—a necessary element of social insurance), by the majority of the American public and the Social Security Administration (For a discussion of different views, see Munnell, 1977; Thompson, 1983). The latter has faithfully fostered the compulsory savings-social insurance view, partly because of its political advantage in maintaining public support for the program (See Cates, 1983; Derthick, 1979; Lubove, 1968; Weaver, 1982). Under this view, benefits for each retired worker are actuarially retraceable to his/her 'contributions'—payroll taxes. The public has been led to misperceive that their benefits are direct returns from the payroll taxes they pay or have paid, plus interest. In other words, the public was encouraged to view social security as an individual worker’s investment in a particular benefits package to which he/she had an earned right by virtue of making social security contributions (Ross, 1982, p. 249). The reality of social security benefits which are proportionate to past earnings, despite the progressive benefit formula, has doubtlessly contributed to such a view. Even many economists, although they acknowledge the absence of a direct link between taxes and benefits, still buy in the linkage of the two in a quid pro quo fashion (See Tobin, 1988). So, the main thrust of this individual life-cycle transfer scheme continues to be the so-called individual equity or the actuarial fairness of the system.

Owing to the rapid expansion of eligibility and the periodic benefit increases which continued until early 1970s, however, neither a direct link nor a quid pro quo relationship between tax and benefits has been very realistic. This lack of direct link
between tax payments and benefits led some scholars to develop a more realistic annuity-welfare perspective. In the annuity-welfare model, benefits are perceived to consist of two parts—an equity part (meaning actuarially justifiable annuities) and adequacy part (meaning social transfer or welfare), and the above compulsory savings argument is applied only to the equity part. That is, on top of one’s own annuities, an actuarial equivalent of contributions by a person throughout his/her workings years, every retiree has been awarded generous intergenerational subsidies—the difference between the annuitized value of benefits and the real value of lifetime benefits, owing to the so-far comfortable worker—retiree ration. So it is argued that social security has been an intergenerational transfer scheme with respect primarily to the intergenerational subsidy, which used to be far in excess of annuities (Burkhauser & Warlick, 1981; Ozawa, 1974, 1982). But, with demographic changes and the maturity of the social security system, the situation is changing. Although the working population has come to bear an increasingly heavier payroll tax burden, the intergenerational subsidy has been markedly eroded due to an increasing proportion of the elderly in our society and, consequently, a decreasing worker-retiree ration. In addition, most covered workers are paying into the system for a longer period of time than their predecessors, thus accumulating greater annuity values of their future benefits. Under these circumstances, the decomposition of annuity and intergenerational subsidy is not likely to be possible in the near future (See Pellechio & Goodfellow, 1983).

In the tax-transfer model, social security is viewed as simply one of several government income-maintenance programs, redistributing income from the working population to the retired, the disabled, their dependents, and survivors (See Pechman, Aaron, & Taussig, 1968). As in the case of other income-maintenance programs, there is no binding reason why benefits received by an individual should bear a direct relation to taxes he/she has paid in. The taxes an individual worker pays today are not earmarked for future benefits for that particular individual tomorrow. Also, taxes levied on an individual basis, without any consideration of number of dependents, in fact, are at most tenuously related to benefits awarded largely on a family basis.
Specifically, as a means of tax transfers from current workers to those who do not work due to retirement, disablement, or death of a breadwinner, social security taxes are set at a level to finance the benefit level for those currently on the rolls (Ross, 1982).

Thus, under the tax-transfer model, the earned right to today's payroll taxpayers to a future stream of benefits does not linger on every piece of the currently legislated benefit package. The earned right has rather to be interpreted as a corresponding (moral) obligation of government to maintain a comprehensive and viable program to protect today's workers in the future (Ross, 1982, p. 249-250). The size of the transfer is more a matter of political choice.

Social security in its entirety has indeed been and will be a tax-transfer scheme with redistribution of income, from the working population to the retired, the disabled, their dependents, and survivors, as its essential function. Although some aspects of social security bookkeeping, especially the benefit computation methods based on the average indexed monthly earnings, contain the compulsory savings elements, the tax-transfer model is empirically justified and is so applied in this study.

Methodology

The source of data for this study is the public-use microdata tape of the 1987 Annual Demographic File of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS sample is based on the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States and is designed to produce representative estimates for the entire nation. As the most comprehensive source of hierarchical information on households, families, and persons, the Annual Demographic File contains the basic annual demographic and labor force data plus additional data on work experience, income from detailed sources of income, noncash benefits, and migration. This study uses data on families and individuals (as members of families and unrelated individuals) with respect to their demographic characteristics, earnings, social security benefits, and so forth.

The payroll taxes paid in by each worker are estimated by using the 1986 combined employer-employee OASDI payroll
Social Security
tax contribution rate of .114 up to the $42,000 maximum taxable earnings. (As the employer portion of payroll taxes is known to be transferred to employees in the form of reduced rates, the adoption of the combined rate has become a conventional approach in social security analyses (See Graetz, 1988). The adoption of this approach makes unnecessary a different treatment of the self-employed, because they pay 11.4% of their earnings as payroll taxes.) All federal employees were excluded from our analysis, because although federal government employees hired since 1984 are covered by social security, it is not possible to separate them from those who are not. On the other hand, all state and local employees are included, because only a small proportion of them opted out of the OASDI. It is possible that other earnings from sectors which are not covered by social security are also included. Considering the near universal coverage of social security, however, the chance of distorting the analysis with this inclusion is minuscule.

The amount of social security benefits (including Railroad Retirement benefits) of each person as well as that of each family is directly available from the data file. Although the exclusion of the institutionalized population from the CPS sample might also be a cause of bias, the effect is not judged to be serious enough to distort findings, considering the fact that only 5% of those 65 and over are institutionalized at any given time.

The Extent of Redistribution

According to the data in Table 1, which presents the proportion of families in each economic bracket and the numbers of payroll taxpayers and social security beneficiaries, the average number of earners per family is positively correlated with the family's income level. That is, each poor family has an average of .6 worker, as compared to 1.4 workers for a near-poor family, 1.8 workers for a middle-income family, and 2.0 workers for a high-income family. The proportion of unrelated individuals who work is also positively correlated with the income level of the group, increasing from .3 for the poor to .7 for the near poor, .8 for the middle-income group, and .9 for the high-income group.
Table 1

**Weighted Percentage Distribution of Payroll Taxpayers and Social Security Beneficiaries by Income Level, 1986**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRETRANSFER INCOME LEVEL</th>
<th>% UNITS</th>
<th>% PERSONS</th>
<th>% PT PAYERS&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>% RECIPIENTS&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Below 100% OPL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>20.5(8,817)</td>
<td>19.3(25,981)</td>
<td>8.2(5,513)</td>
<td>42.5(6,489)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated Inds.</td>
<td>37.0(7,683)</td>
<td>37.0(7,683)</td>
<td>15.5(1,984)</td>
<td>69.4(4,494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21.7(33,664)</td>
<td>9.4(7,497)</td>
<td>50.5(10,983)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100–199% OPL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>16.1(6,961)</td>
<td>17.0(22,866)</td>
<td>14.4(9,640)</td>
<td>20.5(3,126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated Inds.</td>
<td>16.3(3,389)</td>
<td>16.3(3,389)</td>
<td>19.5(2,495)</td>
<td>14.1(911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16.9(26,255)</td>
<td>15.2(12,135)</td>
<td>18.6(4,037)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>200–399% OPL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>30.4(13,134)</td>
<td>32.5(43,751)</td>
<td>34.5(23,161)</td>
<td>22.4(3,416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated Inds.</td>
<td>24.7(5,126)</td>
<td>24.7(5,126)</td>
<td>33.7(4,319)</td>
<td>10.7(695)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>31.4(48,876)</td>
<td>34.4(27,480)</td>
<td>18.9(4,111)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>400% + OPL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>33.0(14,247)</td>
<td>31.3(42,092)</td>
<td>42.9(28,774)</td>
<td>14.7(2,239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated Inds.</td>
<td>22.0(4,580)</td>
<td>22.0(4,580)</td>
<td>31.3(4,010)</td>
<td>5.8(373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30.0(46,672)</td>
<td>41.0(32,784)</td>
<td>12.0(2,613)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0(43,159)</td>
<td>100.0(134,690)</td>
<td>100.0(67,088)</td>
<td>100.0(15,270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>100.0(20,778)</td>
<td>100.0(20,778)</td>
<td>100.0(12,808)</td>
<td>100.0(6,474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrelated Inds.</td>
<td>100.0(155,468)</td>
<td>100.0(79,896)</td>
<td>100.0(21,744)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculation based on the 1987 CPS-Annual Demographic File

<sup>a</sup>Sample number of families and unrelated individuals in each economic stratum

<sup>b</sup>Excluding earners whose longest jobs were with the federal government and including only those whose earnings were greater than zero.

<sup>c</sup>Including recipients of railroad retirement benefits; although the distinction between social security benefits and railroad retirement benefits is not possible in the CPS data set, the beneficiaries of the latter constitute approximately 1% of all beneficiaries.

<sup>d</sup>Official poverty line (based on pretransfer income)
With respect to receipt of social security, however, the average number of beneficiaries per family and economic status is inversely associated: Down from an average of .7 person per poor family to .2 person per high-income family. For unrelated individuals, the same ratios go down from .6 to less than .1.

Because payroll taxes, unlike federal and state income taxes, are levied on an individual basis, the greater number of workers per family among the high-income group, in addition to their higher average earnings, translates into a larger share of tax revenues from this group. Likewise, the smaller number of workers with lower earnings among the low-income group indicates a smaller share of tax revenues from this group.

As shown in Table 2, earners of poor and near-poor families and unrelated individuals were responsible for a total of 10.2% of all payroll tax revenues in 1986. In other words, each earner in the poor group and in the near-poor group paid in an average of $384.71 and $986.57, respectively, as payroll taxes. The earners from middle-income families and unrelated individuals paid in a total of 31.0% of all payroll tax revenues in the same year. The average payroll taxes per earner were $1,634.85. The high-income group—earners from families and unrelated individuals with pre-transfer total income of over 400% of the poverty line—was responsible for 58.8% of all payroll tax revenues. Their average payroll tax payments were $2,619.98.

As for social security benefit distributions, the recipients from poor and near-poor families and unrelated individuals received 68.0%, or over two-thirds, of total benefit outlays in 1986. The recipients from the middle-income group had a much smaller share with 19.4% of all benefit outlays. The high-income group received an even smaller 12.6%, or one-eighth, of all benefit outlays. The average benefit amount for a recipient from the poor group was $4,849.04, whereas recipients from the near-poor, middle-income, and high-income groups received an average of $5,254.41, $5,181.77 and $5,301.25, respectively. Interestingly but mostly because of the progressive benefit formula, benefits received by the near-poor, middle-income, and high-income groups are not significantly different from one another. Although significantly smaller in absolute dollar amount, further analysis indicates that 47.6% of poor families and 62.9%
Significantly lower than all the others at a .05 level
Significantly different from one another at a .05 level.
Official poverty line (based on pretax income)
Social security recipients
Unrelated individuals

Source: Authors calculation based on the 1987 CPS Annual Demographic File

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ben. Mean</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Rec. %</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Tax Share</th>
<th>Earnings Share</th>
<th>% Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (400% &amp; over OPL)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (299-399% OPL)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near-Poor (100-199% OPL)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor (below 100% OPL)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.
of poor unrelated individuals who received social security benefits drew 75% or more of their total income from social security. On the other hand, 91.1% of high-income families and 89.8% of high-income unrelated individuals who received social security benefits indicated that social security benefits were less than 25% of their total income.

Comparisons between the tax incidence on the working population and the benefit distribution to the retired and the disabled, their dependents, and survivors of deceased beneficiaries obviously shows there is redistribution from earners in the middle- and high-income groups to recipients in the poor and near-poor groups. Specifically, those who belong to the poor group, or to the bottom fifth of families and the bottom one-third of unrelated individuals, paid approximately $3.8 billion in payroll taxes, but received $86.0 billion in benefits. The near-poor group paid $15.7 billion in taxes and received $34.4 billion as benefits. On the other hand, those who belong to the middle- and high-income groups paid approximately $59.2 billion and $112.3 billion, respectively, in payroll taxes, whereas they took back only $34.3 billion and $22.3 billion in social security benefits. (Moreover, because upper-middle and high-income beneficiaries are likely to pay taxes on half of their social security benefits, their actual share of social security benefits is a little less—by $3.4 billion—than shown here.) The difference appears to have been transferred to cover benefits to the poor and near-poor groups as well as to create the surplus in the OASDI trust fund that has been growing since 1984. Thus, $100.9 ($120.4–$19.5) billion, or the difference between the benefits received and the taxes paid in by the poor and near-poor groups, which is 52.8% of the total payroll tax revenues or 57.0% of the total benefit outlays, can be construed as the extent of redistribution from the middle- and high-income working populations to the poor and near-poor retired and disabled populations, their dependents, and survivors.

Demographics of Taxpayers and Beneficiaries

As presented in Table 3 and as expected, a majority (88.6–93.6%) of payroll taxpayers are under age 60, while a majority (87.7–90.8%) of social security recipients are age 60 or over.
When divided by income status, the poor and near-poor groups have a comparatively higher proportion of workers in the under-20 and 60-or-over age groups than the middle- and high-income groups, indicating that they may include a higher proportion of part-time workers. The poor and near-poor groups have also a slightly higher proportion of recipients who are under age 60 than the middle- and the high-income, indicating that they include a higher proportion of disabled beneficiaries and survivors.

Table 3

Weighted Percentage Distribution of Age, Sex, Marital Status, and Race Among Payroll Taxpayers and Social Security Beneficiaries by Income Status, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POOR Below 100% OPL</th>
<th>NEAR-POOR 100-199% OPL</th>
<th>MIDDLE 200-399% OPL</th>
<th>HIGH 400%+ OPL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 20</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-59</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 &amp; over</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>married</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculation based on the 1987 CPS-Annual Demographic File

aOfficial poverty line (based on pretransfer income)

bT.P.: Payroll taxpayers

cRec.: Social security recipients (including railroad retirement beneficiaries)

dIncluding the widowed, divorced, and never married.
As for the sex distribution of taxpayers, all except the poor group have a higher proportion of males. As for recipients, there are consistently more females in all income-groups, with a more marked contrast showing among the poor. Data on marital status show that poor taxpayers and recipients are less likely to be married than the other groups of taxpayers and recipients. Approximately two thirds of high-income taxpayers and recipients are married, while less than one-half of poor taxpayers and only a little over one-third of poor beneficiaries are married. The sex and marital status distribution thus indicates that poor beneficiaries are also more likely to include widowed, divorced, and never married women of both young and old ages.

As also expected, the poor and near-poor groups have a much larger proportion of nonwhites than the middle- and the high-income groups. Specifically, in terms of percentage share of nonwhites, the poor and near-poor groups have twice as many minority taxpayers and beneficiaries as the high-income group.

As presented by the data, social security benefits are intergenerational transfer payments from those under age 60 to those over age 60. Considering the higher proportion of beneficiaries aged 59 or less among the poor and near-poor groups than among the middle- and high-income groups, an element of income transfers from high-income workers to poor and near-poor disabled nonworkers and survivors also exists. To a certain extent, income transfers from male taxpayers to female beneficiaries is also possible, because, with the exception of the poor group, there is a consistently higher proportion of male taxpayers than female taxpayers, in contrast to a consistently higher proportion of female beneficiaries than male beneficiaries. Also, given that the middle- and high-income groups have a higher rate of married taxpayers, it appears that there is an income flow from middle- and high-income married taxpayers to poor and near-poor single beneficiaries.

Due to the lower proportion of nonwhites in the sample, no definitive redistribution pattern, across income strata, related to race may be stated. But given the fact that the proportion of nonwhite taxpayers are consistently higher than the proportion of nonwhite beneficiaries in all income strata, it is likely that
nonwhite workers contribute to supporting white beneficiaries within each stratum.

In short, the findings on the demographic characteristics of payroll taxpayers and social security beneficiaries mostly conform to the generally held ideas on the composition of the taxpaying workforce and of the social security recipient population. Considering the marked gender imbalance—increasing ratio of women to men—especially among the elderly, the consistently higher proportion of female beneficiaries is not surprising. With the aging of population in general and the longer life expectancy of females as compared to males, feminization of the elderly beneficiary group is expected to proceed further in the future. Likewise, the higher level of fertility among minority and immigrant populations will diversify the working population further, and thus, the income transfer from nonwhite working population to white beneficiaries will also become more salient in the future.

Discussion and Conclusions

Our findings indicate that a considerable degree of redistribution occurs from middle- and high-income taxpayers to poor and near-poor beneficiaries for following reasons: (a) Overall, there were still 3.7 payroll taxpayers per social security beneficiary in 1986; (b) The working population in general is better off than the retired and the disabled populations. That is, in comparison to the poor and near-poor groups, the middle- and high-income groups have a higher proportion of earners and a lower proportion of beneficiaries; and (c) Because of the progressive benefit formula, the average benefits received by a near-poor beneficiary is not significantly different from those received by a middle- or high-income beneficiaries. Thus, the social security program apparently works not only as an earnings replacement program for all retirees but also as a tax transfer payment from the middle- and high-income working populations to the poor and near-poor retired, disabled, and survivors.

Notwithstanding the impressive scope of intergenerational redistribution, the social security program has yet ample room to extend its redistributive potential, given that the percentage share of payroll taxes of the high-income group is still far
less than their ability to pay, while the percentage tax share of the low-income group far exceeds that. According to a Department of Treasury report in 1984, the top 5% of income—adjusted gross income—earners paid in 39.21% of the total federal income taxes, the top 10% of earners 50.93%, and the top 50% earners 92.69% of the total income taxes. On the opposite end, the bottom 50% of income earners paid in the rest 7.31% (Rahn, 1988). In contrast, according to our findings, the bottom 24.6% of all earners paid in 10.2% of the total payroll taxes, while the top 41% paid in 59% of the total payroll taxes.

The comparatively heavier burden of flat-rate social security payroll tax on the poor working population relative to the high-income working population is more vivid if we look at individual cases. In 1986, for example, a two-child married couple who had combined earnings of $11,203, the poverty line income for a family of four, had to pay $1,277 in payroll taxes, in contrast to zero dollars in federal income tax. In the same year, a couple with the same family composition but with a combined earnings of $45,000, about 400% of the poverty line, paid in $4,788 (in the case of one earner) to $5,130 (in the case of two earners) as payroll taxes, in contrast to $6,741 as the federal income tax. Earned Income Credits relieve the burden of the payroll tax for low-income families with children and reduce their effective tax rate. However, because of its limited application, singles, unrelated individuals sharing the same households, and childless couples are not able to claim the credits.

On the benefit distribution side, the progressive replacement rate apparently contributed to netting more money for the retirees with lower earnings histories than would be the case under a strict savings scheme. Nonetheless, the comparison between the proportion of beneficiaries and the percentage share of benefits in each income stratum also shows that benefits are in fact evenly distributed, with the top 12.0% of all beneficiaries receiving 12.5% of all benefit outlays and the bottom 69.1% receiving 67.3% of all benefit outlays.

Whether to materialize the redistributive potential of social security to a greater extent or not depends upon both economic and political considerations. But as the payroll tax is in fact a
form of welfare tax for the current retirees, the disabled, their dependents, and survivors, there is ample justification for making its burden as fair as possible. In the same context, as the monthly social security check is as much an intergenerational tax transfer payment as a token return of our lifetime contributions, we have reason to allocate it more according to need than according to past earnings histories.

To make social security more sensitive to the needs of the poor is entirely possible without radically transforming its basic structure and without losing popular support for the system. First, we can at least substitute a mildly progressive payroll tax rate for the current flat one. Also, the maximum taxable ceiling should be eliminated. Considering their ability to pay, those whose earnings are above the ceiling (currently about 10% of the total payroll) can bear a slightly greater burden. Second, all social security benefits, instead of just half, should be included as taxable income across the board. Third, we can adopt a less stringent permanent benefit reduction measure for low-income retirees who opt for early retirement because of ill health. Or we can relax the Disability Insurance eligibility for this group of people. Lastly, the current benefit package which awards beneficiary’s spouse benefits equivalent to 50% of the beneficiary’s primary insurance amount (PIA: social security benefit amount payable at age 65), unless the spouse has his/her own PIA higher than that, should be substituted by a reasonable flat homemaker credit. The current benefit package tends to favor high earners’ wives more, as it awards more benefits to them than to low earners’ wives.

References


Social Service Vouchers: Issues for Social Work Practice

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The current political climate has created renewed interest in vouchers as a method to finance and deliver human service programs. After explaining voucher theory and reviewing major voucher programs and experiments, this article discusses potential consequences of social service vouchers by identifying issues that are of concern to social work and related professions.

Vouchers are certificates or coupons, given by a government agency to eligible individuals, which can be used like money to purchase specific goods or services. The coupons have a cash value and can be spent at any authorized supplier—public or private—selected by the voucherholder. The supplier then redeems the vouchers at the funding agency. A popular example of vouchers is the Food Stamp Program. For instance, food stamp recipients are issued coupons (vouchers) giving them, in effect, money for food items. Recipients can spend their "voucher" at any approved retail store they choose. The retailer then exchanges the foodstamps for cash.

Vouchers are frequently recommended as a way to finance and deliver human service programs. Since the 1960s, vouchers have been used by federal, state, and local governments to provide a variety of services including nutrition, housing, education, child care, recreation, health care, and legal services. Political agendas, especially on the conservative right, increasingly include vouchers as a method to finance and deliver services (Friedman, 1980; Savas, 1982). Yet, the use of vouchers is one of the least understood welfare reform proposals. The results of voucher experiments have done little to reassure the viability of this approach and there is considerable discussion about the usefulness of vouchers (Crompton, 1983; Wynne, 1986; Raywid,
1987; Stoesz, 1988; Parker, 1989). If social workers and other human service professionals are to contribute to the debate on vouchers, and influence policy decisions on voucher proposals, they must be knowledgeable about and involved in the issues. To that end, this article explains voucher theory, reviews results and lessons from major voucher programs, and explores fundamental issues that should be examined by social workers and related professionals.

Understanding Vouchers

In order to understand vouchers, it is helpful to examine its theoretical basis, which comes from classical economic theory. Simply stated, social service vouchers will shift human service programs into the open market and expose them to the pressures of supply and demand. The expectation is that vouchers redistribute economic power between clients and agencies by giving subsidies directly to users rather than to providers. This changes the funding scheme from a supply subsidy to a demand subsidy.

Voucher advocates believe that open markets give clients more choice in selecting services and promote competition among human service providers. Vouchers allow clients to seek out and purchase services from the human service professional they judge to be best for their needs. In theory, providers attempt to offer services, at a competitive price, and of the type and quality desired by clients. Providers who attract the most clients receive the most vouchers and, hence, the most financial resources. In contrast, providers who attract fewer clients receive fewer resources.

A basic assumption of voucher theory is that increased client choice and expanded competition bring positive changes to the marketplace which, when applied to social service markets, compel the welfare system to improve. Expected benefits from social service vouchers include: improvements in the price, supply, and quality of social services; increased innovation and diversity in welfare programming; greater program efficiency and accountability; and increased client satisfaction (Friedman, 1962, 1980; Reid, 1972).
Because few rigorous experiments have been conducted to evaluate the effects of vouchers on human service programs, proponents of vouchers look to economic theory to support their claims. As a result, there is a wide gap between theoretical models of vouchers and their proven value under actual service conditions. In the absence of scientific evidence, decisions to use vouchers have turned on theoretical and ideological speculation.

Current Voucher Programs

The G.I. Bill, the Food Stamp Program, and Medicare are major institutionalized voucher programs administered by the federal government. The starting point for gaining practical understanding of vouchers is to review the results of these programs.

The G.I. Bill

An early and very popular government voucher program is the G.I. Bill's education program of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. Designed to help veterans and service personnel to a college education or to vocational training with tuition, fees, books, and supplies paid by the government. Under the terms of the G.I. Bill, eligible veterans are given a resource allocation for educational services which can be spent at any approved school they choose. The Veteran's Administration (VA) then reimburses the educational institution. In effect, the allotment is a voucher. By most accounts, the education provisions of the G.I. Bill have helped millions of veterans to successfully adjust to civilian life (Olson, 1974; Mosch, 1975; Hyman, 1986).

It is important to note that a major function of vouchers is to encourage the consumption of particular goods or services by a particular subgroup of consumers. Although over eight million veterans have used their education benefits (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990), a study by Norman Frederikson and William Schrader (cited in Olson, 1974) indicates that 91.6% of the veterans would have attended college without the G.I. Bill. Put another way, the G.I. Bill increased veteran enrollment in educational institutions by a relatively small fraction
(9.4%)—although it undoubtedly eased the financial burdens of the veterans who attended college. The results of this study suggest that vouchers by themselves will not significantly increase the consumption of a particular good or service.

It is also worth noting that another purpose of vouchers is to improve program efficiency. Early reports show that, in an effort to increase revenues, some schools took advantage of the G.I. Bill by raising tuition, collecting nonresident tuition from veterans, falsifying attendance records or failing to inform the VA when veterans registered but did not attend classes (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1952; Yoder, 1963; Frederikson and Schrader, cited in Olson, 1974). Other fraudulent practices included establishing "diploma mills" and other profit-making schools of doubtful value to obtain funds from the government (Yoder, 1963). To check waste and inefficiency, Congress has passed a series of restrictive amendments to the original bill. Apparently, vouchers alone do not guarantee programs will operate efficiently and safeguards must be provided to ensure against abuse.

During the 1960s and 1970s, higher education was characterized by "bigness." To meet increased enrollment demands, influenced by the influx of G.I. Bill students, educators and legislators relied on larger schools and crowded classrooms. According to Olson (1974), many veterans complained of receiving a lower quality education due to "assembly line operations in the classroom...and the increased pressure to make education an impersonal affair" (p. 104). The G.I. Bill experience also indicates that vouchers do not effectively improve the quality of a particular service.

The Food Stamp Program

Created in 1964, the Food Stamp Program is one of the most widely recognized government voucher programs. The objective of the program is to increase food purchases and raise the levels of nutrition among low-income households. Eligible households are entitled to monthly food stamp allotments (vouchers) which can be spent on food items in any approved retail store they choose. The stores turn in their food stamps to the United States Department of Agriculture for cash. In 1988,
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there were 18.6 million participants in the program (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990). Referring to its size, Levitan (1985) believes the Food Stamp Program has been successful in targeting benefits to those most in need and offering assistance to the working poor.

Several evaluative studies of the Food Stamp Program have been conducted to determine how well it is meeting its primary objectives. In two major studies, William Clarkson (1975) and Maurice MacDonald (1976) conclude that food stamps failed to achieve the objectives of increased food purchases and improved diets among the poor. Instead, the program increased the general purchasing power of participating households by replacing cash expenditures formerly made for food thereby, making money that would normally be spent on food available for other uses. Clarkson also found that the cash equivalent value of food stamps is 82% of the actual market value. In other words, participating households would have been as satisfied with $82 in a cash transfer as with $100 in foodstamps. These authors conclude that the Food Stamp Program is both inefficient and ineffective, and would be better replaced with a system of cash payments.

A recent study by Thomas Fraker, Barbara Devaney and Edward Cavin (1986) supports this recommendation. The authors looked at a pilot project in Puerto Rico where eligible households received cash grants instead of food stamps. The results indicated that the cashing out of foodstamps had no detectable effect on total food expenditures of participating families. Whether these results would extend to the U.S. Food Stamp Program remains to be determined.

The significance of the Food Stamp Program studies, as a representation of vouchers, is that they provide added evidence that vouchers alone do not significantly increase consumption of a particular good or service. This is due in part because vouchers are treated as income supplements by recipients thereby increasing their purchasing power for nonvoucher items. Another finding is that vouchers are inefficient because they are not cash equivalent. The voucherholders' subjective evaluation of vouchers may be below their actual purchasing power because they must be spent on particular goods or services. This
indicates that restricted subsidies (vouchers) are more costly than unrestricted subsidies (cash).

The Medicare Program

The largest federally administered program with voucher characteristics is Medicare. Enacted in 1964, the Medicare Program provides health insurance protection for the aged and disabled. Its primary goal is to increase access to health care services and to reduce the financial burden of the high costs of medical care. Under the terms of the program, Medicare recipients are issued an enrollment card (voucher) giving them, in effect, money for medical services. Cardholders can spend their "voucher" at any authorized health care provider they choose. The provider then bills the federal government for payment.

There is no doubt that the Medicare Program has done much to extend health care coverage to virtually all elderly and disabled Americans. In 1988, Medicare served 32.9 million elderly and disabled citizens (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990). The program also receives consistent public support, with more than 90% of those surveyed agreeing with Medicare's purposes and policy goals (Dobson, Lagenbrunner, Pelovitz, and Willis, 1986). Moreover, studies confirm that the health of the elderly improved after the program's introduction (Lowenstein, 1971; Rosenwaike, Yaffe, and Sagi, 1980).

Voucher proponents argue that, through the power of competition, goods and services will be provided at the lowest possible cost. This is because voucher users are motivated to shop wisely so their vouchers will go further and they can buy more. And, providers have incentives to reduce or contain costs in order to capture a larger share of the market.

Since Medicare's inception, a major issue in the development of the program has been cost containment. Medicare expenditures have increased at an annual rate of 17.7% from 1970 to 1982 (Davis and Rowland, 1986), well ahead of the general rate of inflation. In 1988, Medicare spending reached $86.3 billion (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990). As a result of rising program costs there has been mounting pressure at the Federal level to regulate the health care market.
The Medicare experience indicates that vouchers failed to establish reasonable costs through market forces. Therefore, in an effort to bring health care costs under control, the federal government has developed policies to promote cost effectiveness and cost containment. It is important to note, however, that because of its reimbursement system the Medicare Program is not as good a voucher system as the G.I. Bill or the Food Stamp Program. Medicare operates by paying physicians on a fee-for-service basis according to a customary, prevailing, and reasonable charge method and paying hospitals on a retrospective basis according to their costs. (Effective October 1, 1983, payment rates for hospitals are prospectively determined on a case basis. The Medicare hospital prospective payment system (PPS) uses diagnosis-related groups (DRG’s) to classify cases for payment.) Since reimbursement rates are fixed, there is no incentive for the beneficiary to seek out a low-cost, good quality health care provider. If a person finds a provider who charges less than the maximum, the savings will go to the federal government not the consumer. (Under the PPS plan, accrued savings will go the hospital.) Because these conditions threaten the integrity of vouchers, evidence from the Medicare Program should not be considered conclusive.

Past Experiments with Social Service Vouchers

In addition to the programs discussed above, social experiments with vouchers have been conducted, for the most part, in three service areas—education, housing, and child day care. It is helpful to look at major studies in each of these areas as they pertain to expected benefits of social service voucher systems.

Education Vouchers

Vouchers have a long history in education, where the concept is generally traced back to Adam Smith and Thomas Paine. Smith and Paine emphasized familial responsibility for the kind of education children receive. In the same tradition, recent proposals for education voucher plans have been made by Milton Friedman (1962, 1980), Christopher Jencks (1970), and John Coons and Stephen Sugerman (1978). In 1985, the Reagan
Administration introduced the Equity and Choice Act (TEACH). Although not enacted into law, the bill called for education vouchers for low-income families. A 1987 Gallop education survey found that parents favor a voucher system—44% for to 41% against—and 71% support the principle of school choice. The Bush Administration is reviving the voucher strategy for public school reform by promoting the notion of "educational choice."

Between 1972 and 1975, a modified voucher plan was tested in the San Jose, California, Alum Rock Elementary School District. Parents received vouchers equal to their child's fair share of public education funds and were allowed to select the school and programs of their choice. The intent of the experiment was to allow greater parent choice than before in choosing schools and to encourage competition among schools. However, the theoretical benefits from this voucher scheme were not realized. On the matter of choice, few parents "shopped around" for schools. Instead, most made their selection based on geographic proximity and sent their children to the nearest school. While the experiment did yield a range of educational alternatives from which parents could choose, most favored traditional curricula. After evaluating the experiment, the Rand Corporation (1981) concluded that, at best, overall effects of vouchers were negligible, and, at worst, vouchers worked in a direction opposite from theoretical expectations.

However, the Alum Rock experiment did shed some light on social service voucher issues (Lindelow, 1979). The evidence indicates that it is difficult to create a competitive market within an established human service system in part due to the monopoly structure of human service agencies. Monopoly implies exclusive control over the market and monopolists do not willingly yield their power. Another insight from this experiment, is that educators do not like competition; they prefer to exercise professional judgment on curriculum issues rather than respond to market forces. Finally, family choice may increase social stratification between white-collar and working-class families. In the Alum Rock experiment, wealthier families chose more innovative programs for their children, while working-class and minority families selected more traditional educational programs.
Housing Vouchers

Housing vouchers have been recommended at various times since 1935. The most recent effort was in 1985 when the Reagan Administration persuaded Congress to approve a one billion dollar, five-year demonstration program in 20 urban areas across the country. This experimental program uses rent vouchers as a way to shift federal housing policy away from construction (supply) subsidies and toward consumer (demand) subsidies. The program assumes that the housing problem is one of affordability not availability and helps the poor rent rehabilitated homes.

Evaluations of this program are not yet published, however, preliminary reports point to several problems (DePalma, 1987). In New York City most vouchers are returned because the holder cannot find an affordable apartment—high rents and low vacancy rates negate any advantages of a voucher, indicating that the affordable housing supply is not expanding due to vouchers. In some demonstration areas, vouchers are unused because they do not offer as much assistance as existing federal subsidies. Other reports indicate that, on average, the renter's share of rent is higher in the voucher program while the quality of housing is unchanged. It appears that, in some cities, vouchers have a negative effect on the price of housing and no effect on the overall quality of living arrangements. Despite efforts from the White House, Congress has consistently refused to expand the housing voucher program.

In 1970, the Department of Housing and Urban Development launched one of the most rigorous voucher experiments to date—the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP). Conducted over an 11 year period, EHAP covered 30,000 low-income households in 12 sites across the country. A central objective of the study was to assess the impact of voucher subsidies on patterns of housing consumption. Unlike vouchers that can be spent only for specific services, e.g., food and education, housing allowances could be spent in any way. However, eligibility requirements were established to help channel allowances towards housing consumption.

One significant finding from the EHAP study is that most participants did not use vouchers to increase housing-related
purchases—most housing allowance payments were spent on nonhousing items such as clothing and recreation (Struyk and Bendick, 1981). In effect, the voucher plan became an income supplement, increasing the households' disposal income while leaving the housing arrangement unchanged. Put simply, the quality of housing was not improved through the use of vouchers. Another finding, one that has important implications for social service vouchers, is that individuals generally participate in a voucher program based upon a rational assessment of the benefits and costs to them in doing so. For instance, potential users must evaluate whether receiving the vouchers increases their well-being sufficiently to compensate for meeting the requirements of the program. Also, the greater the perceived transaction costs imposed by the program, such as time and trouble spent searching for information and shopping for market alternatives, the less the vouchers will be valued by the user. A fair assessment is that high costs, as perceived by potential users, are a disincentive for eligible clients to participate in this type of program.

**Child Day Care Vouchers**

Since the early 1970s, Florida, California, Minnesota, and Texas have tested child day care vouchers (Kahn and Kamerman, 1987). In 1987–88, five bills were introduced in Congress that contained voucher proposals for child day care (The Bureau of National Affairs, 1988). The Choices for Children Act of 1989, which incorporates vouchers into child day care, was also introduced in Congress. Although the bill was looked at by both the House and Senate, no action was taken. These legislative developments indicate that the voucher idea has considerable support as a policy option for development of a national child day care system.

In 1982, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) implemented a three-year pilot child day care voucher program. In the test area, low-income families received state vouchers which could be used to purchase day care services from any licensed or certified provider selected by the parents. By offering families a greater degree of choice and responsibility in selecting services and promoting competition among
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providers, it was anticipated that the price, supply, and quality of child day care would improve.

An evaluative study of the ADES child day care voucher program failed to provide evidence of the worth of day care vouchers (Parker, 1989). With regard to price, results indicate that, on average, voucher families paid more than nonvoucher families for comparable day care services—suggesting that a social service voucher system might bring about higher prices for many clients, with the poorest of the poor being at greatest risk. On the issue of supply, there was no evidence of a beneficial effect on the supply of day care available to voucher users—calling into question the economic efficiency of a social service voucher system. Finally, there was no indication that the quality of day care was improved by the voucher program—suggesting that a voucher program by itself does not improve the quality of social service programs. In conclusion, vouchers had a negligible, if not negative, effect on the price, supply, and quality of child day care in the pilot area.

Discussion

Any major change in the way human service programs are financed and delivered is certain to have consequences for social agencies, human service professionals, and their clients. Therefore, it is important for social workers and related professionals to examine the potential consequences of vouchers so that they can determine whether to support it, modify it, or accommodate to it. To better understand the important implications of vouchers, key issues are addressed below. These issues can be placed in three interrelated categories critical to economic theory—competition, information, and regulation.

Competition

Competition is a fundamental concept of classical economics. Theoretically, in a competitive market, consumers determine the allocation of resources by virtue of their demand and suppliers provide the goods and services consumers want, in the largest quantity, at the lowest possible price. It follows from this, according to voucher advocates, that encouraging competition
among human service agencies will produce similar results in social service markets.

In the past, the human service professions took pains to distance themselves from the competitive marketplace. The social work profession was largely successful in this regard and a set of values and behaviors emerged to guide the practice of its members. The resulting problem is that the interests of competition run counter to many strongly held professional values and behaviors. For instance, social workers tend to view other members of the profession as colleagues working toward a common end—not competitors. The profession promotes the concept of dedicated service for its own sake—not for economic gain or self-interest. Furthermore, there is also a general reluctance to participate in most forms of self-promotion and advertising among professional social workers.

A possible shift to vouchers raises key questions that must be explored before a competitive market strategy can be introduced into the human services. For example, will resources be allocated to the most persuasive rather than the most skilled provider? Will marketing skills become more important than professional skills in delivering services? Will name recognition and image become more important than substance? Will controversial and less popular services, such as working with AIDS patients or methadone counseling, be offered at all? How will less visible and frequently underserved clients, such as the rural poor and homeless families and children get the help they need? Finally, in a competitive market, will the general human service community become segmented, factional, and self-serving?

In sum, the voucher strategy of creating a competitive social service market, strikes directly at basic features of the human service system as it currently exists. At a minimum, a fully competitive human service system would result in a major reordering of relationships between human service professionals and their clients, with large implications for both human service organizations and the social work profession.

Information

The market system assumes that individuals are rational consumers and possess sufficient information to make intelli-
gent choices relevant to their needs. Obviously, without correct or adequate information individuals cannot make optimal choices. Following this line of thinking, if a social service voucher system is to be effective, clients must be well informed about the market.

Therein lies a problem. Traditional human service clients are disproportionately information-poor. Potential users of social service voucher programs include the ill-educated, the poor, the physically handicapped, and mentally disabled, the aged, the very young, and other disadvantaged individuals and families whose conditions or circumstances impede access to ordinary consumer information or complicate their ability to use information. This problem should be of greater-than-normal concern in a social service market for unlike other market goods, such as grocery items, human services cannot be easily compared, and the consequences for a bad choice are often more severe.

It should not be concluded from this discussion that all human service markets offer meaningful choice to consumers. Rural markets, for example, offer little in the way of consumer choice. Given the fundamental economic law of supply and demand, there is no reason to believe that vouchers will increase the range of choices in small human service markets.

Although access to information is vital to the success of vouchers the subject has received scant attention. There are many unanswered questions. For example, how can potential users be assured of having all the information they need to select the appropriate provider? What information is appropriate? Will human service agencies have to disclose information regarding their “success rate”, their treatment methods, qualifications of their workers and fees? How will information be made available to potential users? What measures will be taken to accommodate potential users who do not have the ability to make sound evaluations about alternative programs?

There is no doubt that voucher plans will require clients to evaluate human service agencies largely on the basis of their own observations and judgement. This clearly changes the primary role of individuals seeking help from clients to active selectors of human services. Under these circumstances, a social
service voucher system will empower and benefit the best informed consumer, but not necessarily the neediest client.

**Regulation**

According to classical economic theory, a competitive market will be self-regulating. That is, through free choice and intelligent purchasing, consumers maintain high standards of service by selecting superior programs over inferior ones. It follows that social service voucher plans would limit the regulatory power of government agencies by weakening their control over human service programs.

In a social service market, regulations represent society's concern for protecting the welfare of children, the elderly, the mentally and physically disabled, and other groups who are unable to safeguard their own welfare. The necessity for regulating human service programs is also apparent when one considers that human service users are frequently under emotional or environmental stresses that interfere with their ability to make rational decisions that are in their best interest. These conditions make them particularly susceptible to fraudulent practices and hucksterism that might take place in unregulated markets.

Before vouchers can be used on a large scale, without regulations, several key questions must be considered. For instance, will the market give genuine protection to all those whose welfare is at stake? Will the market provide what the community regards as desirable standards? How will the market guard against bias or caprice on the part of the community? Will deregulation lead to abuses by dishonest providers? How will defiance of standards be handled? Who will invoke authority in an unregulated market? How will standards be uniformly enforced from location to location and at different points in time as standards change? Will deregulation deflect political and social pressures that should properly be dealt with by a law-making body? Is it reasonable to expect standards to be maintained by the power of consumer choice?

Decisions on these issues should not be made arbitrarily on the basis of consumers' subjective judgement. To do so would result in uneven standards from program to program and from community to community, and open the door to lower-quality
human services. In order to establish standards that provide special protections to human service consumers and ensure quality and stability in service delivery, expert and specialized knowledge are required.

Conclusion

In recent years, the human service environment has been characterized by fiscal uncertainty, increased concern for accountability, a trend toward contracting out, and an emphasis on privatization. In this environment it seems likely that vouchers will continue to be recommended as a finance mechanism and delivery system. Unfortunately, many important questions remain unanswered. Therefore, decisions to use vouchers will continue to turn on theoretical speculation rather than on scientific evidence. Perhaps, questions such as those raised in this discussion will eventually generate research to guide policy formulation. Until then, social workers and other human service professionals must be aware of the risks that accompany the use of social service vouchers and urge policy makers to approach the idea with caution.

References


This paper explicates the hermeneutic procedure utilized in the development and interpretation of a questionnaire for consumers with a disability regarding their perspectives on the accessibility and quality of human services they are using. It finds that consumers experience difficulty in bringing into language their critique of existing services. The paper argues the value of a hermeneutic methodology in the social sciences and its usefulness in refining qualitative survey methods designed to explicate the perspectives of those experiencing relative powerlessness in using human services. It seeks, moreover, to establish the complementarity of the hermeneutics of suspicion and those of affirmation.

This paper seeks to argue that the role of hermeneutics in the social sciences (Bauman, 1978; Habermas; 1978; Hekman, 1986) is not only relevant at a theoretical level as a critique of scientism and positivism (Bleicher, 1982), but also at the level of practical application by providing certain significant outcomes. Hermeneutics has moved from its traditional role in theology (Jeanrond, 1988) and literary studies (Juhl, 1980) as a method of textual interpretation to a broader role in the explication of how all understanding takes place (Howard, 1982; Palmer, 1982). It is therefore applicable to all areas of study, including science (Rorty, 1979) and the social sciences (Winch, 1958; Bernstein, 1983; Hollinger, 1985). In this discussion, hermeneutics refers to understanding our mode of existence in the world characterized by historicity (Heidegger, 1962). Following Gadamer (1975), it is used to bring that which is alienated by distance or distortion, to be heard as in a new voice. Its practicality is demonstrated in the function of hermeneutics in a consumer study.
The consumer study sought to gain the perspectives of people with physical and intellectual disabilities on a range of human service policy and program issues. These perspectives were sought in a human service context in which personal and structural barriers appear to obstruct or weaken the consumer voice. An opportunity was sought for consumers to speak and be heard in this same context. The policy and program issues included: accessibility of information on services, exercise of consumer choice in service provision, access issues, quality of service provision, inadequacies in the service delivery system and consumer participation in program and policy decision-making.

The researchers of this study (Brown & Ringma, 1989a), took as starting point that the circumstances of persons with disabilities can generally be characterized as one of personal and structural disadvantage (Eisenberger, 1982). Such disadvantage within the context of the human services, establishes the particular social location in which the perspectives of consumers are being sought. This location is the social construction of reality on the part of persons with a disability (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) and is reflected in language (Mannheim, 1936). Following such experience of disadvantage it was assumed that the language of these persons could be repressed or inadequate.

Some refinement in qualitative survey method and in interpretation was required to emancipate and hear a potentially alienated voice. This is a factor with consumer research in the human services. Critical interpretation is required in areas in which significant gaps can be predicted in the social locations, language and perspectives of consumers, service providers and researchers, and where personal and contextual factors are active in blunting and obscuring the evaluative and critical voice of consumers. This led the researchers to adopt a hermeneutical procedure. This involved establishing a dialectical relationship between the hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1981) and those of affirmation (Gadamer, 1975). The former proceeds on the basis that there may be ideological distortion in what the researchers are doing or in what consumers are saying (Habermas, 1978). The latter, the hermeneutics of affirmation, argues that the voice of the other must be fully heard and not constrained
to comply with the concerns of the researchers. It holds, moreover, that researchers can only proceed on the basis of certain preunderstandings but that these must be risked in a dialogical relationship (Gadamer, 1975).

The hermeneutical procedure offered potential in refining qualitative survey methods to further explicate the perspectives of relative powerlessness consumers experienced in their use of human services. Refinements were needed both in the development of the open-ended questionnaire as a survey tool, and in the interpretation of qualitative data. The procedure described above had implications for the way the questionnaire was constructed, the interviews conducted, data interpreted and the study written. (Brown and Ringma, 1989a).

In applying the hermeneutical procedure it became clear that consumers were critical of services but reluctant to specify their concerns with regard to present services. They lacked but wanted participatory power in decision making but did not specify that with regard to the services they were presently utilizing. The depth of their alienation and its impact on their language was surprising to the researchers, indicating that the hermeneutic procedure has an important application in consumer studies undertaken within a human service context.

The Consumer Study

The study proceeded on the basis that in a complex and mixed welfare economy (Kramer, 1981) the consumer voice needs to be heard as significant with regard to human service policies and programs for people with disabilities. This is particularly pressing in the light of the fact that new disability legislation in Australia, the *Disability Services Act, 1986*, has maximized the consumer role in new service provision. Not only are services to demonstrate positive consumer outcomes, but consumers are to be included in the planning and management of services.

The consumer study profiled 42 people, consisting of 24 disabled consumers and 18 parents of disabled consumers. They utilized 5 nongovernment welfare agencies and a range of generic services and several community services. Twenty consumers were physically disabled, seventeen intellectually disabled
and five were classified as multiple disabled. Disability categories in the group included Downs Syndrome, Multiple Sclerosis, Spina Bifida, Blindness, Hemiplegia, Cerebral Palsy, Intellectual Disability, Spino Cerebella Ataxia, among other forms of disabling (World Health Organisation, 1980).

Consumers were interviewed by members of the research team using an extensive open-ended questionnaire. None of the interviewees were incapable of expressing their viewpoints on the range of questions asked, except in some cases where the responses of the parents of consumers with disabilities were regarded as expressive of the viewpoint of the consumer.

In this study consumers and their representatives were able to identify: inadequacies in information services which reduced their capacity to exercise choice; the limited choice that existed for them within a narrow field of service options; how access and transport issues influenced their use of services; positive aspects of services they were using; dissatisfaction with services they were no longer using; potential improvements that could be made in existing services; unmet needs; the over-stretching of family support structures; and, their desire to participate in decision-making processes, but the lack of opportunity to do so.

The Role of Hermeneutics in the Interpretive Process

This century, hermeneutics as philosophical reflection and as a theoretical reflection on methodological issues, is at the centre of continental philosophy (Bernstein, 1983). Bleicher (1980) has identified hermeneutics as method, philosophy and critique. It has extended its applicability beyond literary criticism (Hoy, 1978) to the social sciences (Bauman, 1978; Hekman, 1986), the natural sciences (Rorty, 1979), legal interpretation (Betti, 1962; Dworkin, 1986), psychoanalysis (Ricoeur, 1981), and critical theory (Habermas, 1978). Its task is to explicate how understanding takes place.

In the application of hermeneutics to this consumer study, we reject the hermeneutic position of Schleiermacher (1977). He held that the interpreter through empathy had to enter the mind of the other and to reconstruct his or her thoughts. He claimed, moreover, that the interpreter through an act of "divination" can understand the author or speaker better than they know
themselves. This position would be tantamount to saying, with regard to this study, that we know what the consumers really mean even though they are not saying it. And we know what they mean by the act of creative empathy. This clearly runs the risk of projecting the horizon of the interpreter onto that of the consumer. This may lead to a practice in human services where service providers persist with normative judgements of the needs of consumers that are at variance with consumer opinion.

Dilthey (1976), who further developed Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic, is more helpful. He suggested that in understanding an author’s text, we need to understand the whole of their historical life. This contextualization is helpful. But Dilthey was not able to shake off Schleiermacher’s romanticized psychologism, when he maintained that the interpreter through an empathetic process is able to enter into the inner life of the author or speaker (Makkreel, 1975). The issue in understanding or interpretation is not to enter the inner life of the other, but to understand the matter (die Sache selbst) under consideration. In this case, the matter under consideration is the perceptions of consumers with disabilities on the accessibility and quality of services, spoken in a human service context that stresses resource scarcity and involves significant power differentials between consumers, service providers and researchers.

The hermeneutic perspective utilized in this consumer study is quite different from the above. It is a hermeneutic of suspicion cojoined with a hermeneutic of affirmation.

The hermeneutics of suspicion proceed on the basis that there can be distortion in what is said or done. This perspective has been fostered particularly by the modern masters of suspicion: Marx, Freud and Neitzsche (Ricoeur, 1981). Each in their respective areas of economics, personal psychology and philosophy, has indicated that suppression and distortion can occur. This concern has influenced Habermas in his suggestion that three cognitive interests undergird our knowledge (Habermas, 1978). The technical interest is characteristic of the empirical analytical sciences with the orientation to control the environment. The practical interest is reflected in the social sciences with its concern with meaningful communication or interaction.
The emancipatory interest characteristic of the psychoanalytic tradition, with its orientation to critical reflection, operates to expose distortion in speech and action resulting from domination. The hermeneutics of suspicion are clearly guided by the emancipatory interest.

The hermeneutics of suspicion thus entails both a critical and an advocacy stance. This stance does not proceed on the basis that the researcher has a transcendent starting point from which what ought to be, as opposed to what is, is automatically assumed. Rather the stance proceeds on the basis of sociological analysis. It is attention to "the way things are", in this particular case the disability field, that leads to understandings regarding personal and structural disadvantage, the human service context, and the impact of social location on language. Its advocacy stance is expressed in the concern to see appropriate changes take place which will result in greater equality and quality of life-style. This is reflected in the researchers' choice to focus on consumers rather than service providers and to facilitate the consumer voice being heard.

At the same time, the hermeneutics of suspicion should not be directed only at the horizon of people with disabilities but also at the horizon of the researchers. Researchers with their concerns can impose their judgements on those under consideration as much as service providers can impose their powerful ideologies on those requiring their services. This was overcome by the open-ended nature of the interview process which sought to hear the voice of consumers and not to expose consumers simply to the questions that reflect the researchers' concerns.

The hermeneutics of suspicion, however, should be co-joined with a hermeneutics of affirmation. Understanding is not achieved simply by overcoming systemic distortion. It is also achieved by dialogue (Gadamer, 1975). The latter takes seriously what the other person is saying even to the point that the researchers' assumptions or preunderstandings may be called into question. Understanding arises in the interactive process between myself and the other. The social scientist does not proceed on the basis of a value free position. Nor, contrary to Max Weber, on the basis of a neutral objectivity.
Therefore, methodology is not without particular assumptions. Scholarly procedure is always on the basis of a particular set of fore-understandings (Heidegger) or prejudices or prejudgements (Gadamer). These preunderstandings need to be legitimized as enabling prejudgements rather than blind prejudices. Gadamer, therefore, in his hermeneutics of affirmation argues for the value of the hermeneutic circle in terms of a dialogical relationship. The circle as traditionally understood, is a movement from part to whole part again and so on. From understanding, for example, a part of a story or event one moves to a fuller application which in turn modifies and enriches the part. Gadamer's position argues that understanding happens dialogically between myself and the other. Dialogue assumes openness to the other and allowing my preunderstandings to be modified by the matter at issue. For Gadamer hermeneutics is to let what is alienated through historical or cultural distance speak again, and it needs to be brought near in such a way that it speaks again with a new voice (Gadamer, 1975).

Both these hermeneutic procedures are complementary. The hermeneutics of suspicion probes for alienation and distortion. That of affirmation seeks to understand what is said by the other to the point of allowing that to modify our preunderstandings. The danger in the former procedure is to prejudge the subject matter on the basis of one's critical ideology. This in effect says, in spite of what is being said or done, this is the way I perceive things ought to be. The potential weakness in the hermeneutics of affirmation is simply to accept what is said without probing for distortion due to contextual factors, including power differentials. Brought together they provide a way of hearing what the other is saying but to hear that critically.

The Hermeneutics of the Consumer Study

This hermeneutic methodology is applied to this consumer study on the basis that something needs to be interpreted, and that this is made difficult as a gap in horizons exists between researchers and persons being interviewed and studied. We may diagram this gap as follows:
The researchers approached the horizon of the "community" of persons with disabilities on the basis of certain preunderstandings (Gadamer, 1975), and these need to be made as explicit as possible. These preunderstandings not only include the world-view of the researchers but also the particular concerns the researchers have in executing a particular piece of research. It cannot be assumed that researchers are neutral and objective. They carry with them the possibility of imposing their concerns on the matter under study. This needs to be resisted and overcome. This is not to say that the researchers can eliminate their preunderstandings. This is impossible. But they can be modified and corrected.

The researchers' preunderstandings must therefore be tested and if necessary modified in the light of the matter which is the focus of study. In this project the matter in focus is that the voice of consumers with disabilities be heard regarding their perspectives on disability services. To facilitate the matter at issue coming to light involves the use of the hermeneutical circle. The researchers' preunderstandings need to be brought into contact with the horizon of people who are disabled and may thus be modified or enlarged accordingly. This may lead to a change in the preunderstandings which in turn will lead to newer and better questions being posed. This process will continue as in the form of a dialogue so that what emerges is an understanding of "the way things are". This may be diagrammed in the following manner:
The understanding of "the way things are" is thus the end of a process and never its starting point. The end process, however, does not mean that this is the final word. In the beginning the process of understanding "the way things are", the researchers commenced with certain preunderstandings about the "world" of consumers. This could be characterized as one of personal and structural disadvantage, substantially influenced by the context of the human services, and to a lesser extent by the context provided by the researchers. The content of such preunderstanding needs to be specified. This should focus on the experience of disadvantage, on the context of the human services, particularly on the different "worlds" of consumers and service providers, and on predictions concerning the impact of such factors and social location on the language and perspectives of consumers. The researchers' preunderstandings concerning this group of consumers came out of direct contact with and analysis of disability services and was reinforced by other social research (Forder, 1974; Timms, 1973).

Structurally, for people with disabilities, disadvantage involves the lack of power and resources, while personally there are psycho-dynamic features affecting identity, perceptions of reality, hopes and aspirations. These people have devalued roles in our society, experience stigma and relative poverty, and often have to make do with an inferior quality of life-style. They experience limitations in the exercise of life-choice options relative to lack of equal employment opportunities, education, housing and recreation. They are subject to a scarcity of resources that are directed towards their particular needs. Services are inadequate and choices between services are almost nonexistent. People with disabilities lack influence, power and access to appropriate information. Their powerlessness is compounded because many choices appear to be made for them. There is a lack of structural opportunities for consumer participation in the planning and management of services (Handicapped Programs Review, 1985).

By way of contrast, service providers in the context of the human services, are significantly more powerful. They tend to define the needs of consumers and control many of the resources that are basic to social care. Service providers and other welfare
professionals also control the descriptive and evaluative processes that are meant to characterize the needs and wants of people with disabilities. They have greater access to information and their perspectives are influential because they are informed by powerful service ideologies. They, rather than consumers, define "the world" of consumers.

The above factors have a major influence on the language and perspectives of consumers. As previously indicated, the social location of consumers reflects itself in how they construct reality and influences their use of language. One result of power differentials is that consumers can assume and utilize the language of service providers and define their "world" accordingly. Their perspectives compete unfavourably with the influential perspectives of policy makers, health experts, service providers and other professionals (Forder, 1974; Brown and Halladay, 1989). Consumers tend to define their reality by the criteria of the experts. Moreover, they often feel the need to express feelings of gratitude for the services they are receiving (Timms, 1973). Thus the evaluative and critical voice of consumers, reflecting as it does a position of relative powerlessness, can frequently and significantly become blunted and obscured.

Some specific assumptions emerged concerning the hermeneutical horizons of consumers and researchers. From the consumers' horizon it was assumed that all of the above factors combined could result in some repression and alienation in their use of language. From the researchers' horizon it was assumed that our preunderstanding of the "world" of persons with disabilities could be inadequate, overly empathetic, or skewed and that the very process of questionnaire and interview could be alienating. This would, therefore, require the hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1981).

The preunderstandings of the researchers relating to disadvantage and context had implications for the way the questionnaire was constructed. This was drawn up after extensive exposure and evaluation of services provided for persons with disabilities. It moreover consciously sought to ascertain the disabled person's point of view. The hermeneutics of suspicion, as applied to this study, sensitized us to distortion arising from the
disadvantage of their social context and highlighted the need to bring the consumer voice out of possible repression and alienation. Moreover, it was assumed that consumers may use the language of the service providers rather than their own, and that they generally felt the need to express feelings of gratitude for services upon which they were currently dependent (Timms, 1973). This assumption was built into the questionnaire and resulted in various stages of the interview process in order for forms of repression and alienation to be overcome. It was also facilitated by recognizing the context referred to in these questions. For example, a critical presupposition was that people with disabilities would be reluctant to convey criticism of services upon which they currently depended. By changing the context with questions about services they no longer used, or questions about their anticipated use of new services, different perspectives may be gained that still had critical implications for services they were currently using.

The hermeneutics of suspicion also required that the researchers' preunderstandings could be ideologically distorted. Therefore interviews were open-ended and careful attention was paid to the fact that the consumers were heard more than they answered the preset questions. This allowed the preunderstandings of the researchers to be questioned, for the consumers prioritized and emphasized issues beyond that of the immediate import of the questions. The interviewers elicited verbal responses in the personal interviews with consumers and noted down their responses. Where questions elicited further responses, beyond the scope of the question, these were also recorded and included in the later analysis. The report was written in such a way that emphasis was given to the consumer voice and not simply to the analysis provided by the researchers. The matter of being heard essentially underscores the hermeneutics of affirmation. Thus the hermeneutics of suspicion and affirmation were utilized coextensively.

Illustrating the Procedure and Some Results

It is impossible within this limited space to expand on all of the results of this consumer study (Brown & Ringma, 1989a; 1989b;1989c). By way of illustration of the need to refine the
methodology used to further interpret these results, we isolate some of the outcomes. The first deals with some aspects of consumer choice and participation in decision-making. The second looks at consumer perspectives on the quality of service provision.

Question I.10 asked whether the consumers had decided to use a particular service or whether someone else made that decision. This question occurred in the section dealing with information and choice. The overwhelming response was that consumers had made their own choice: this was indicated by 19 consumers and 14 parents of consumers (N=42). In the section dealing with central and local coordination of services, consumers were asked whether they had any choice in utilizing the services of the particular organization they were now using (Question IV.1). The response of the majority was that such decisions were made for them. Only 12 consumers indicated some personal choice in this matter. In the follow-up question, 38 consumers indicated that they were happy with such decisions being made for them. Yet in a later question only 7 consumers indicated that they would not like to have a say in decisions about the provision of services for people with disabilities. All the others indicated that they should and wanted to have a say. This picture is further complicated by the response to a previous question (I.6), where 18 consumers indicated that other services that could have been of help were held to be unsuitable. And in response to a related question (I.14), 18 consumers indicated that services in their local area were either not available or were inadequate.

From this highly ambivalent and seemingly confusing picture, we can make "sense" of what is being said. First, consumers are saying that they like to, and in fact do, exercise choice regarding which agency they wish to attend. Second, this choice is made in a very narrow range of available service options because other services are unsuitable, not accessible or inadequate. Third, when it comes to having choice regarding the utilization of actual services in the agency of their "choice" most decisions are made for them by administrators and staff. Fourth, they have to accept this reality for they have no real power and few options of going elsewhere. Finally, they wish that things were
different and that they could participate in decision-making pro-
cesses, but there is little point in “rocking the boat”.

By way of further illustration, we can look at consumer perceptions on service quality. Thirty consumers indicated a positive response with regard to the present services they were using (Question I.5). Twenty-six consumers indicated they were treated very well by their service agency (VII.1), and 29 said that they had received a lot of help from their particular organization (VI.3). Moreover, 31 consumers indicated that they needed nothing else from the agency (VI.4). Yet in response to a previous question (IV.6), all except 10 consumers had many suggestions to make regarding improvements in the services they were presently using. Moreover, in response to another question (VII.2), 16 respondents indicated that they had been unsatisfactorily treated by various services they had used previously and went on to specifically name the organizations concerned and the nature of their dissatisfaction.

From this, we can again hear what consumers are saying, namely, that present services are in need of improvement; that some previously used services were quite inadequate; and that present services are regarded as very good because that is what consumers are expected to say. Moreover, in a field of narrow options, there is little point in biting the hand that feeds you.

In the above, we can see the reality of repression as characteristic of disadvantage and of location within a human service context. Consumers are supposed to be thankful for what they get. They are not to be critical of existing services. But in fact they are. They are, therefore, very careful regarding making perspicuous observations on services they were presently utilizing but quite open in their critique of previous services. And in their response to questions of a theoretical or hypothetical nature, they were clearly perceptive, innovative and arguing for change. The preunderstanding that disadvantage and context may reflect itself in language that is repressed was therefore confirmed. At the same time the researchers had not anticipated the depth of this alienation and repression.
The application of hermeneutics in consumer studies

The hermeneutic procedure took us further than qualitative survey methods we had used in previous consumer studies without such a procedure (Brown, Davey and Halladay, 1986; Brown and Halladay, 1989). While qualitative methods of research tend to focus on "thick description" rather than analytical depiction through the use of models as a heuristic device, hermeneutic procedure makes explicit the nature of preunderstanding on the part of the researchers, the possibility of distortion due to power differentials and the need for a dialogical relationship where the "I" does not subvert the "Thou". In other words where the voice of the other can be heard even to the point of changing and/or enlarging one's own preunderstandings. Emphasis, therefore, is placed on specifying preunderstandings about consumer circumstances and the context in which they are located, as well as those of the location of the researchers. A critical application of this procedure is the attention it draws to the impact of consumer circumstances and context on language. Though gaps in horizons between consumers, service providers and researchers have been recognised in human services research, the hermeneutic procedure provides a systematic approach to working this through as a research issue.

Hermeneutic procedure also assists in interpreting the confusion and contradiction often manifest in consumer studies. This can occur as a result of the loss of consumer voice, especially where the normative judgements of service providers are well established in particular human services.

The juxtaposition of the hermeneutics of suspicion and affirmation provides critical attention to alienation and distortion, and an advocacy stance, balanced with serious attention to what consumers are saying. The hermeneutic circle encourages open dialogue between consumer and researcher, or between consumer and service provider, and the potential for the modification of preunderstandings in the light of consumers speaking again with a new and emancipated voice. This points to the potential for a new chapter in consumer research and for consumer participation in the human services.
Conclusion

This paper has sought to argue the role of hermeneutics in the social sciences. It has demonstrated its relevance by application to a small study in the human services. This study of consumer perspectives on services for persons with physical and intellectual disabilities takes as its starting point that the social "world" of persons with disabilities is one of disadvantage and that they are influenced by their interaction within a human service context. Disadvantage is located in structural features such as lack of power, prestige and income and in personal psycho-dynamic realities such as loss of identity and hope. It was assumed and confirmed in this study that disadvantage expresses itself in difficulties in finding an appropriate language to express critical concerns, hopes and aspirations.

Professionals and service providers tend to define reality for consumers. Consumers are also excluded from participatory management processes. Thus they virtually have no opportunity to test their knowledge and perceptions within this context. Moreover, living within a narrow field of available service options they are subject to significant internal constraints not to express critical views on services they are presently using. These factors contribute to repression and distortion in the language of persons with disabilities.

The consumer study sought to bring the consumer voice to the fore. In order to achieve this the researchers utilized the hermeneutics of suspicion and affirmation. The former operates on the basis that there can be ideological distortion, while the latter argues that the voice of the other needs to be heard in such a way that the researchers' preunderstandings need to be put to the test.

The paper acknowledges that the hermeneutic task is to bring, that which is alienated by distance or distortion, to be heard as in a new voice. The researchers facilitated that in the construction of a questionnaire which asked similar questions in different sections in order to overcome repression and distortion due to the consumers' "world" of disadvantage. This was to bring their voice into language. It also facilitated an open-ended interview process so that the researchers did not simply
impose their questions and thus something of their “world” and their preunderstandings on the “world” of consumers.

The outcome of this procedure was to demonstrate that consumers with disabilities are critical of services and that they do wish to participate in participatory management processes. It also highlighted that the researchers, who in their own understanding sought to be sensitive in the task of talking to depowered people, were “surprised” by the actual degree of repression.

References


Hermeneutics


Social workers have sometimes seen war as part of a larger system and as linked to other forms of violence or social evil. This article considers three kinds of analysis which identify different systems (capitalism, patriarchy, and exterminism), see the links in different ways, and lead to different practical conclusions. Each perspective is examined in terms of its capacity to explain the phenomena it describes and to identify a social change strategy that can eliminate them. It is suggested that social workers may be professionally predisposed to select among these perspectives for reasons other than their explanatory power or strategic utility.

One of social work's claims to professional distinctiveness, as compared with other therapeutic occupations, is its concern with the links between private troubles and public issues, between person and environment, or between different system levels. Professionally concerned with the private violence of family life as well as with the institutionalized violence that is reflected in differential infant mortality rates and life expectancies, social workers have sometimes turned their attention to questions of war and peace. From Jane Addams to the Social Workers for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Committee of the National Association of Social Workers, they have brought their professional experience and way of looking at the world to bear on this vital question of public policy.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find the chair of the aforementioned committee, Dorothy Van Soest (1988, p. 4), challenging her colleagues to "make the connections between public and private violence and between peace and social justice." "Of necessity," she argues, "this involves self-assessment in relation to our own contributions to violence and to injustice. This means examining social work structures, paradigms, and processes to determine where they might contain and maintain the roots of
inequality and, therefore, violence.” In what follows both aspects of this challenge are taken up. In the first place, three ways of making the connections between war and other forms of violence or social evil are examined in terms of their capacity to explain the phenomena they describe and to identify an effective social change strategy. Secondly, a sub-theme is developed concerning the ways in which professional ideology may predispose social workers to select among these perspectives for reasons other than their explanatory power or strategic utility.

To put the question simply, if war is part of a violent system and linked to other forms of violence, what is the system and how is war linked to it? Among those who accept the assumption that war and violence are intrinsic to the system, at least three different systems have been identified—capitalism, patriarchy, and exterminism. In discussing these as three broad approaches there is a danger of amalgamating distinct positions and losing some shades and subtleties of argument within each, as well as of failing to do justice to attempts to combine different approaches, such as “socialist feminism”. Nevertheless, by presenting the positions in their strongest forms, we may bring most sharply into focus their respective assumptions and strategic implications.

In view of the short trajectory and lack of demonstrable success of most large peace movements, the question of how we identify the system that gives rise to war and how we seek to modify or transform it assumes considerable practical importance. Different answers to this question also imply different assessments of the prospects for the present reduction in military conflicts and tensions, and indeed for any lasting peace on the basis of existing economic and political arrangements. The issue also has implications, as Van Soest’s challenge suggests, for every area of social work practice and theory.

The most recent wave of the peace movement, that of the early 1980s, arose in a context of massive increases in arms spending and a rising level of political conflict between the superpowers. It had already ebbed well before the present reduction of tensions and cuts in planned military spending, which in turn evaporated most of what remained of the movement.
By reflecting upon the analyses and strategies that came to the fore in the early 1980s, we may take advantage of the present interlude in the hope of ensuring that the next movement can learn from the last.

All three perspectives discussed here offer ways of looking at and responding to the threat of nuclear annihilation, which was the primary concern of the last anti-war movement. Since the question of whether there can be a useful theory of war-in-general is a point at issue, the present article will focus primarily on the main wars of the twentieth century and on the threat of global nuclear war, leaving aside wars of earlier periods and their links to earlier systems.

Capitalism

The classic account of modern war as part of a larger system and as linked to other forms of social evil is that developed by marxism, primarily in the period before and during World War I. This is the most rigorous and sophisticated analysis, the product of some of the greatest minds (and fighters for social change) of their period. The more recent accounts discussed here represent in part reactions to, or efforts to improve upon, their work.

The task of clarifying the relationship between war and "the system" became especially urgent after the main socialist parties abandoned their internationalist principles upon the outbreak of the First World War. Those who had more or less explicitly rejected a revolutionary perspective, and who looked for a gradual and peaceful transition to socialism through parliament, provided an essential prop to their national war machines. These advocates of peaceful change supported and facilitated the mobilization of millions of workers for the defense of their national state, and for their mutual slaughter on the battlefields of Europe.

The gulf between reformism and classical marxism only became fully apparent with the outbreak of war and the collapse of the Second International (Kirby, 1986; Schorske, 1955). The revolutionary minority, who opposed their own states and their war machines, were faced with the challenge of reconstructing a scientific theory that explained the relation between capitalism
and war, and that showed the links between the struggle against
the state and opposition to militarism. This resulted in both a
brilliant series of polemics by Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, and
others on the socialist attitude to war, and in an important de-
velopment of the theory of imperialism, above all by Bukharin
and Lenin (Riddell, 1986; Bukharin, 1972; Lenin, 1964).

In their studies of imperialism, Lenin and Bukharin showed
that, as capitalism had developed into an integrated world econ-
yomy, the forms of competition had changed. As capital became
concentrated in larger blocks, and centralized in fewer, the state
and economy tended to fuse. Competition occurred increasingly
between whole national economies, was organized by the state,
and increasingly took nonprice, and nonmarket forms, includ-
ing those of diplomacy and war. For example, as German capital
expanded, it not only came up against British firms in its search
for markets and raw materials, but also confronted tariffs and
trade barriers erected and defended by the British state and
its armed forces. States, like firms, were locked into a global
system of competition from which they could not escape and
which operated independently of their will. "The anarchy of
world capitalism," as Bukharin put it (1979, p. 66), "is ex-
pressed in the clash between state organizations of capital, in
capitalist wars."

Both Lenin and Bukharin were concerned to refute the argu-
ment advanced by the leading German socialist, Karl Kautsky,
that the war was not an expression of the logic of capitalist com-
petition in the period of imperialism, but a mistake (Kautsky,
1970). It was quite possible, in Kautsky's view, for the leading
imperialist powers to arrive at a position of peaceful coexis-
tence, or "ultra-imperialism," in which they agreed to exploit
the colonies cooperatively. Militarism could thus be detached
from capitalism and ended, even while the economic system
continued.

For Lenin and Bukharin, on the contrary, such an arrange-
ment could not for long survive the pressures of competition.
Any given partition of the world could only be temporary, be-
cause different national economies grew at different rates, and
a large disproportion between economic and political power
would lead to demands for a larger share of the world to go to
the later but more rapidly developing powers. Periods of peace, Lenin (1964, p. 295) argued, "are inevitably nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars." This did not mean that every military conflict could be reduced directly to the economic interests of the protagonists. Military competition had a logic of its own, so that strategic considerations—the military or political importance of a territory to a rival, for instance—could lead to war even when no immediate economic advantage was at stake. The requirements of military competitiveness, furthermore, imposed demands on the economy, in particular for a heavy industrial base and for the technology that could support a sophisticated war machine. Lenin’s and Bukharin’s argument was, rather, that capitalism in its latest, imperialist phase was organically linked to war. Wars, both between the imperial powers for the division and redivision of the world, and between subject peoples and their colonial oppressors, were inscribed in the very logic of the capitalist system.

Two very important political conclusions followed from this analysis. the first was that the achievement of peace was inextricably linked to the struggle for socialism. The links that had to be made were to the everyday struggles in which workers confronted their employers or the state. Linking these struggles with the fight against every form of national, racial, and sexual oppression required, as the most consistently anti-war socialists came to see, a break with earlier forms of organization. As Chris Harman (1980, p. 22) has put it,

"Until 1914 opposition to the different aspects of capitalist society tended to flow into different channels. There was a trade unionism that was concerned chiefly (when it even did that) with the wage rates and working conditions of workers with particular skills. There was a ‘political’ socialism that only concerned itself with making propaganda and collecting votes. There was a pacifism that only made ineffectual protests against participation in wars. There was a feminism which restricted itself to fighting the legal disabilities facing women."
None of these "movements" withstood the test of war. Not only were they unable to stop it. They typically suspended their struggles for the duration or even supported the war effort.

What international socialists learned from the Russian Revolution was the need to create a new kind of party, one that was rooted in the workplaces and in the day-to-day struggles of workers, but also one that would go beyond workplace issues. Such a party "would educate, agitate, organise within each of these wider movements for the connections to be made, for the strikes against food shortages to become strikes against the militarists, for the demonstrations against the war to be demonstrations against the system that created the war" (Harman, 1980, p. 22). The need was always to link the specific issue around which people were organizing to the wider fight against the system, and to root that fight, not in the ballot or the terrorist act, but in the working class's own activity.

Another aspect of the analysis of war as an inevitable product of capitalism was the rejection of a peace strategy based on peaceful coexistence and understanding between the major powers, or as Kautsky called it, ultra-imperialism. Not only do such understandings necessarily break down, as the long history of arms limitation treaties attests, but to pursue them is typically to apologize for the crimes of the opposing imperialists and militarists and to deny solidarity to those who are fighting against them within their territories.

A second point that emerges from the classic marxist approach is the need for the concreteness in treating wars of different kinds and periods. From this perspective, a general theory of war, not to mention of violence, is probably of no more use than a general theory of holes (MacIntyre, 1978, p. 260). The violence of the oppressor, aimed at keeping a subordinate people on its knees, is not the same as the violence of the oppressed who are struggling to get up off their knees. A civil war fought for the abolition of slavery, or a war of national liberation, may be progressive and necessary, "despite all the horrors, atrocities, distress and suffering that inevitably accompany all wars," as Lenin (1950, p. 9) puts it. In contrast, a war like World War I, which he described (1950, p. 13) as "a war between the biggest slave-holders for the maintenance
and consolidation of slavery," was completely reactionary on all sides. General statements against war in principle, from this perspective, offer neither an understanding of any particular war nor a guide to what attitude to take toward it. "We Marxists," Lenin (1950, p. 9) observed, "differ from both pacifists and anarchists in that we deem it necessary to study each war historically (from the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism) and separately."

The marxist analysis that modern war is an inevitable product of a compulsively irrational system, capitalism, points to a strategy for avoiding nuclear holocaust, not by blurring morally crucial distinctions between different kinds of violence, or by symbolic protests, or by changing child-rearing practices, but by showing that such a catastrophe "can only be avoided, in the end, by striking the nuclear weapons out of the hands of the ruling classes—by revolution" (Hallas, 1982, p. 6). In its avoidance of abstract and ahistorical categories of explanation, involving biological or psychological reductionism, it is clearly an advance on previous theories of war, as well as their recent variants.

But how well could this approach guide us in the period since World War I, and in particular in a situation of nuclear rivalry between two superpowers, one of which called itself socialist? Although there have been more than one hundred wars since 1945, none has been between the advanced capitalist powers of the West. There have, on the other hand, been wars between "socialist" states, such as Vietnam and China, Vietnam and Kampuchea, as well as massive military deployments on either side of the Sino-Soviet border. The nuclear arsenals of the major powers, furthermore, held out the prospect not of a new redivision of the world but of its total destruction, an outcome that could not correspond to any capitalist interest. Such considerations led less frequently to the development of theory and analysis within the marxist tradition than to alternative accounts which identified in quite different terms the system which gave rise to the threat of nuclear war.

**Patriarchy and Violence**

According to one such view, associated with a more or less sex-segregated women's peace movement and with such
activities as the peace camps at Greenham Common in England and Senaca Falls in New York, war is one of many expressions of a male drive to power. From this perspective, which has gained considerable ground among social workers in recent years, what links the threat of nuclear war to rape, wife-beating, and destruction of the environment is a system of male domination, patriarchy. In some versions, based on a dualistic view of human nature as comprising masculine and feminine principles, patriarchy results from the domination of the former (McAllister, 1982). As one “handbook for women on the nuclear mentality” (Koen & Swaim, p. 6) puts it,

What is played out on the psychological level as domination of the animus over the anima, and on the social level as the domination of men over women, becomes on the political and economic level the domination of science/technology and capitalistic product-orientation over nature/nurture and humanistic process-orientation. . . . When the intellect and the dominating, controlling, aggressive tendencies within each individual are defined as the most valuable parts of their being and those same attributes are emphasized in the political and economic arena, the result is a society characterized by violence, by exploitation, a reverence for the scientific as absolute, and a systematic “rape” of nature for man’s enjoyment. This result is patriarchy.

This radical feminist view assumes that women, by virtue of their feminine “essence,” are naturally peace-loving, nonviolent, and nurturant, while men are naturally aggressive, dominating, and misogynist (Sayers, 1982).

A variant among women peace activists, basing itself on the psychoanalytic perspectives of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy Chodorow, explains male violence in terms of the effects of mother-dominated child-rearing on the psychosexual development of male children (Dinnerstein, 1976; Chodorow, 1978). Boys develop their sexual identity through separation from the mother, and develop a character structure that values objectivity, rationality, and the exploitation of nature and others. They confirm their uncertain masculinity through aggression, com-
petitiveness, and the hatred and domination of women and nature.

Whether the origins of these masculine propensities lie in an essential human nature or in specific child-rearing practices makes a difference in terms of what role men should be encouraged to play in rearing children. But both views see militarism and war as expressions of those tendencies, and in that way linked to other forms of male dominance. They both attribute to women a special place in the politics of peace, by virtue of their non-violent, non-competitive, and nurturant personalities, and both advocate the separate organization of women in opposition to a male system of power.

Views which employ a theory of patriarchy to identify the systemic causes of war and its links to other forms of violence or social injustice are, however, open to objection on empirical, theoretical, and political grounds. We briefly discuss each in turn.

Given the division of labor in most societies, in which men specialize in warrior functions and women in child-rearing, the evidence for female nonviolence is surprisingly weak. Although the family household is undeniably the setting where male dominance most freely takes the form of violence against women, and where women are most subject to physical assault, and even though they are much more likely than men to be injured as a result of violent incidents in the home, it does not follow that women themselves abjure (or should abjure) violence, whether in self-defense, retaliation, or preemptive strikes. This is also the setting of most violence against children, and much of that is at the hands of their mothers (Gelles & Straus, 1988; Straus; 1980; Straus & Gelles, 1986; Straus, 1983; Berk, Berk, Loseke, & Rauma, 1983).

Outside the home men are much more involved in violence, both as perpetrators and victims. It is also true that in wars men usually do the actual fighting and are trained to acquire the necessary skills and attitudes for this function. It is not clear that women have been less enthusiastic supporters of war, however, whether as political heads of nations or as private citizens. Nor, as the experience of the women's movements in Germany, Britain, and elsewhere in World War I clearly shows,
is it the case that even feminist women have consistently opposed war (Evans, 1976; Thonnessen, 1973; Mitchell, 1966; Cliff, 1984; Elshtain, 1987).

The dichotomous framework in which patriarchy theory mirrors traditional stereotypes of masculine and feminine distorts the real experience of both men and women. On the one hand, as Johanna Brenner (1988) points out, most men have no wish to serve in the military and do so in most cases only under the spur of conscription or lack of civilian job opportunity. They are even less willing to fight. "To see war as analogous to rape does not capture its reality. Few men in battle fight in terms of the ideology of the military or of masculinity. As Platoon shows us, they fight terrified and miserable; the glory of battle disappears quickly in the muck of war" (Brenner, 1988, p. 100). Military discipline is sustained only with great difficulty. A recent study of the British navy (Neale, 1985) demonstrates vividly how crucial the press-gang, the lash, and prodigious quantities of rum were to that institution in the days of its greatest glory. Under fire, even sterner measures are necessary. Trotsky, for example, built one of the great armies of modern times, as he said, not on fear, but on the ideas of the Russian Revolution. He was unsurpassed in his ability to inspire demoralized soldiers (which he did by appeals, not to their masculinity, but to their self-respect and to the cause for which they were fighting). Nevertheless he considered the death penalty an indispensable part of any army's disciplinary arsenal. So long as there are armies and wars, he argued, "the command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between the possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear" (Trotsky, 1973, p. 411).

The psychological reasons individual men enlist may also be very different from those implied in recruiting advertisements. The army, after all, offers men a total environment where they can be much more subservient, passive, and dependent than is generally possible in civilian life. On the other hand, as Brenner (1988, p. 112) argues, "The logic/emotion, abstract/concrete, aggression/nurturance framework sentimentalizes women and trivializes motherhood." For one thing, it ignores the rationality, emotional control, and power (including the opportunities for aggression and violence) involved in motherhood.
Whether it looks to biology or child-rearing patterns, theory that sees war as an expression of a system of patriarchy and links it to other forms of male violence assigns an extraordinary explanatory power to the male psyche. There are two problems with this. (a) It takes for granted what needs to be explained, why society is structured in such a way as to privilege the male psyche over the female. (b) It is open to the same kind of objection as other forms of psychological or biological reductionism, such as explanations of war in terms of innate human aggression, territoriality, national character, or authoritarian personality. Such drives, instincts, traits, or personality structures cannot explain the social institutions that give form to them or how they change, and so leave all the important questions unanswered.

Why does aggression, whether human or specifically male, lead to intense soccer rivalries in one period, and world war in another? Why does Germany appear as a land of poets and thinkers in one century, and of authoritarian militarists in another? Why does mother-dominated child-rearing, whether biologically or socially constructed, produce misogyny and male domination in one society and rough equality of the sexes in another (for example, the much-cited Iroquois) (Brown, 1975; Leacock, 1981)? Such abstract and ahistorical categories are of no use in explaining actual events or social institutions. They cannot help us understand, for example, why World War I broke out when it did, what objective interests were at stake, what forces tried to prevent it and why they failed, why soldiers and workers rebelled, why war gave way to revolution and peace in Russia and Germany, or why the revolution succeeded in the former case but failed in the latter. But these are surely all questions of vital importance to an understanding of the forces that have driven the world to war in this century and of where the power lies to resist them.

The political strategy implied and adopted by this approach gives priority to symbolic actions by groups of women. If the fundamental division in society is between the sexes, and the roots of war lie in the male psyche, then it makes sense to try to build a peace movement of women. That is, adherents of this perspective organize on the basis of sex, rather than
class, and in preference to building a peace movement of both sexes.

The best known application of this approach to the politics of peace is the Greenham Common encampment in England, a permanent picket of a missile site by women, many of whom camped at the gates for months or years (Cook & Kirk, 1983). Indeed, a small contingent remained there even after the signing of an arms agreement under which the weapons would be destroyed (Raines, 1987). At its peak the action attracted widespread sympathy and media attention. As a strategy for opposing the system that threatens the world with nuclear destruction, it had from the beginning serious shortcomings. Not only did it exclude men, however strong their interest in or commitment to ending that system, but the nature of the action was such that only women who were able and willing to abandon their jobs, houses, and families could fully participate. In at least one case of the author's knowledge, males among a group of trade unionists who traveled to the camp to express solidarity with the protesters were booed by them.

Such a strategy inevitably reduces the mass of women as well as men to the role of passive spectators. It cannot mobilize working people, men or women, in a struggle against the system, or connect with the day-to-day struggles in which they engage, but only substitute the actions of an heroic few for the activity of the many in their own behalf. Not only is it unable, therefore, to pose any serious challenge to the war machine; it also reinforces the passivity of those on whose labor that machine's economic base depends and who, if mobilized, would pose a threat to it. These are the objections that marxists have always raised to terrorism as a strategy (Trotsky, 1974). Although the symbolic acts in this case involved die-ins, dancing on missile silos, and decorating the base's perimeter with baby clothes, rather than assassinations of ministers, they were no less an expression of powerlessness and a reinforcement of passivity. In such circumstances concern with real power to challenge the system inevitably gives way to a preoccupation with the feeling of empowerment. The personal displaces and corrupts the political.
Exterminism

Another, more direct, attempt to improve on the marxist theory of imperialism and war is that of British historian E.P. Thompson, the leading intellectual figure in the revival of the movement against nuclear weapons in Europe and North America in the early 1980s. He coined the term "exterminism" to describe the system that threatens us with a global nuclear holocaust, and drew the appropriate political and organizational conclusions from his analysis (Thompson, 1980; Thompson & Smith, 1981; Thompson, 1982).

The concept of exterminism refers to those "characteristics of a society which thrust it in the direction whose outcome must be the extermination of multitudes" (Thompson, 1980, p. 22). It is seen as the consequence of "the accumulation and perfection of the means of extermination, and of the structuring of whole societies so that these are directed towards that end" (p. 22). The actors and interests that sustain this thrust toward extermination are fragmented and obscure (Davis, 1982), but the picture that emerges from Thompson's account is of two rival elites locked in an irrational competition which neither can escape. Whatever the origins of this situation in the rational pursuit of their interests by particular capitalist or bureaucratic powers, the system of competitive militarism has assumed a dynamic of its own which is in the real interest of neither side. Culture, politics, and economics become infected with the exterminist cancer, and each reinforces the disease in the other. "The USA and the USSR do not have military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes" (Thompson, 1980, p. 23).

Although Thompson's argument is hard to pin down, it differs from the analysis of Bukharin and Lenin in at least two important respects. In the first place, Thompson, like Kautsky, sees the drive to war, or exterminism, not as intrinsic to the capitalist or any other mode of production, but as a kind of cancer that infects both East and West. The whole organism is infected, both in its physical functioning (economy) and in its thinking (ideology), but the process may be reversible. He sees his strategy as "initiating a counter-thrust, a logic of process leading towards the dissolution of both blocs, the demystification of exterminism's ideological mythology, and thence permitting nations in
both Eastern and Western Europe to resume autonomy and political mobility” (Thompson, 1980, p. 30). In short, the disease could be excised, leaving the modes of production intact. First we need disarmament, then the “normal” processes of politics and social change (that is, the class struggle) can resume.

A second difference between Thompson and the classical marxist theorists of imperialism stems from this implicit “stages theory” in which class struggle is subordinated or postponed until the nuclear threat is eliminated. For Lenin and Bukharin, militarism and war were class questions. Only an effective fight against capitalism could rid the world of the horrors of imperialist war; only the working class, because of its potential for self-organization and its strategic economic location, had the capacity to lead the struggle for peace to its necessary conclusion—the revolutionary overthrow of the system that generated war. Thompson rejects this position. Whereas the “patriarchy” view leads toward a movement of women and the making of links to other kinds of male violence, and the “capitalism” view leads to the building of a revolutionary party that links the movement for peace to the day-to-day struggles in the workplace, the “exterminism” perspective looks to a broad movement focussed on a narrow issue. It embraces both sexes and all classes, and discourages the making of links to other issues, especially where they might offend supporters or divide the movement.

Thompson’s essay provoked considerable discussion on the left, not only in Britain but throughout the world. Much of the response had already been summarized by the editors of the New Left Review in their introductory remarks, when they said (New Left Review, 1980, pp. 1–2): “It may be thought that Thompson overstates the degree of symmetry between East and West... but he is surely right to insist that nuclear weapons, pregnant with holocaust, cannot simply be analysed in terms of competing class forces or social systems, but also possess a menacing dynamic of their own.” My view is the opposite. Thompson was surely right to insist that the USSR was and acted as an imperial power, albeit a weaker one than the United States, and that it could not be understood simply as a victim of Western imperialism. Indeed, the strength of Thompson’s essay
is his portrayal of a world structured by military rivalry of the two blocs, both of them locked into a deadly competition that takes on a life of its own and threatens the economic and political interests, and even the survival, of both.

But Thompson was wrong to regard this as a break with the classic theory of imperialism. As Luxemburg (1967, p. 62) wrote in 1915, "Imperialism is not the creation of any one or of any group of states. It is the product of a particular stage of ripeness in the world development of capital, an innately international condition, an indivisible whole, that is recognizable only in all its relations, and from which no nation can hold aloof at will." Bukharin (1972) showed how the growth of a world economy in which there was a tendency for the competing units to be organized into "state capitalist trusts" was inscribed in the very logic of capitalist development. As state and economy tended to fuse, so competition tended to assume the form of war and the threat of war.

Two other elements of Bukharin’s argument are of particular importance in understanding the phenomena which Thompson describes as "exterminism". The first is that the tendency to state organization of national economies in no way overcomes the irrational, compulsive, and unplanned character of capitalist competition. It merely translates these features to the international level, and thereby intensifies them and makes them more dangerous (Bukharin, 1979). From this perspective, the irrationality of "exterminism", of which Thompson makes so much, is not a new development, but an expression of the fundamental nature of the capitalist mode of production.

Secondly, the militarization of capitalism affects every aspect of society, and in particular structures the economy so that it serves the needs of military competition. Modern war requires a heavy industrial base to support a sophisticated military machine—requires, in short, a "military-industrial complex" that shapes the whole national economy (Bukharin, 1979).

The tendencies to state capitalism and to the militarization of capitalist competition that Bukharin identified are especially important because they provide the basis for an understanding of how the Soviet Union fits into the picture. In its fusion of state and economy, its organization of the whole national
economy to meet the requirements of military competition, its integration into a world system of competing capitals, including state capitals, the Soviet Union carries to the farthest degree the tendencies Bukharin saw as central to imperialism. More recent marxists have developed the theory of state capitalism to explain the course of Russian development after the isolation of the revolution and the disintegration of the working class as a political force in the 1920s (Cliff, 1974; Binns, Cliff & Harman, 1987; Harman, 1984a; 1988; Haynes, 1985). It was precisely the threat of war, they argue, that forced the pace of industrialization, dictated the concentration on heavy industry, and led to the final consolidation of power in the hands of a state bureaucracy that constituted a collective capitalist class. Because of its backwardness and its need to compete militarily with industrialized rivals, the Soviet economy was organized even more, and more ruthlessly, than that of most countries around production of the means of destruction. In short, it was through the medium of military competition that capitalism’s compulsive drive to accumulate reasserted itself in the Soviet Union and reintegrated the former workers’ state into the capitalist world economy. From this perspective, the militarism of the Soviet Union provides, not a refutation, but the strongest confirmation of the intrinsic link between capitalism and war.

If we see that the Soviet Union and similar societies are not fundamentally different in mode of production from the West, then we no longer need a concept of exterminism to refer to a dynamic that characterizes, or infects, different socioeconomic systems but is intrinsic to none. Thompson is led to make this unnecessary conceptual innovation by an impoverished understanding of imperialism on the one hand and by his view of the Soviet Union as noncapitalist on the other. He thus fails to recognize that the very phenomena that he sees as distinguishing exterminism—the irrational and compulsive character of the rivalry, the structuring of societies to ensure their capability for mass extermination, and so on—are those which the best theorists of imperialism identified seven decades ago as intrinsic to capitalism.

In short, the elements that Thompson saw as entirely new were the very things that classic marxist theory explained. The
further development of that theory in the direction indicated by Bukharin’s analysis, encompassing a theory of state capitalism and the militarization of competition, offers a coherent framework for analyzing the underlying dynamics and forces at work in the system that generates the threat of nuclear war. By rooting the phenomena of “exterminism” in the structures and contradictions of capitalism, it enables us to explain what Thompson only describes.

The Politics of Peace

Both the Thompson strategy of a broad movement around a single issue, and the women’s peace movement that looked to a theory of patriarchy, contained elements that appealed to social workers. By class position as well as professional ideology they are inclined, C. Wright Mills (1943–44, p. 171) argued in 1943, to be limited by a “professionally trained incapacity to rise above the level of individual cases.” That assertion is too strong, as the long history of social workers’ involvement in social activism attests. When social workers do “rise above” that level, it might be more accurate to say, they are likely to do so in certain specific ways. One of these is support for reform movements that take up a single issue or cluster of issues. Dealing with the effects of the larger social system as they manifest themselves in individual lives, social workers are more likely to see discrete social problems than the structural mechanisms that generate them. They typically work at the “level of appearances,” of what Erik Olin Wright (1978, p. 11) calls the “immediately encountered social experience of everyday life.”

Affirming the importance of this level, Wright (1978, pp. 11–12) observes, “People starve ‘at the level of appearances,’ even if that starvation is produced through a social dynamic which is not immediately observable. The point of the distinction between appearances and underlying reality is not to dismiss appearances, but rather to provide a basis for their explanation. . . . If we remain entirely at the level of appearances we might be able to describe social phenomena, and even predict those phenomena, but we cannot explain them.” Social workers, in short, are more likely to put their efforts for social change into a famine relief campaign or even an economic
development project than into a political strategy based on an analysis of the dynamics of world capitalism and of the social forces with the capacity to overthrow it. (The latter approach, that of marxism, may of course also dictate participation in single-issue movements, but always keeping in mind the relation between the immediate struggle for reform and the revolutionary goal.)

Another aspect of the way in which social workers tend to relate the personal to the social is by moving analytically from the individual or the small system to the larger society. Society is seen as playing out on a bigger scale the timeless battle of the sexes, or as reproducing the family drama at the level of social conflict. Patriarchy theory, as we have seen, is characterized by just this sort of psychological or biological reductionism, and has a strong appeal to social workers because of the way it corresponds to professionally trained ways of looking at the world. Indeed, it was anticipated in certain respects by Jane Addams, who believed that women and men were essentially different, and that women could, by participating in public life, further the cause of peace and social progress through the application of their feminine qualities (Addams, 1907; Addams, 1922).

Similarly, social workers have traditionally sought to "bridge the gap between the classes," not to heighten class struggle (Addams, 1893). It has even been claimed that good casework is "the only real antidote to Bolshevism" (Charity Organization Society, London, 1927, cited by Woodroofe, 1962, p. 55). Approaches to the issue of peace and nuclear disarmament that ignore or deny the significance of conflicting class interests, as both patriarchy and exterminism do, are likely to be more consonant with professional perceptions and values.

But a "natural" appeal, resulting from harmony with social workers' class position and professional ideology, does not necessarily mean either an accurate perception or a serious strategy for achieving peace. We have already examined some of the weaknesses of the women's peace movement approach to the politics of peace. Thompson's strategy differs, and appeals, by virtue of its inclusiveness in relation to people and its
narrowness in relation to issues. Let us all join together on this one question of over-riding importance, it suggests, and leave aside for the movement the things that divide us, such as class or (the question raised by Boston feminists in the peace movement) abortion rights (Levene & Magid, 1983).

Building a movement that will mobilize masses of people necessarily requires a focus on the issue that brings them into motion. At their height in the postwar period, peace movements involved hundreds of thousands of people, and mobilized some of the largest demonstrations in modern history. They attracted individuals of different classes, ages, and sexes, appalled by the horror of the nuclear threat that hangs over all humanity. They made some gains in terms of party resolutions (in Britain) and even of party formation (the Greens in Germany). The problem was that they were unable to connect to a social force capable of challenging the system they saw as driving the world toward war. That drive continued more or less unchecked as movements grew, flourished, and declined all in the space of a few years.

For Thompson, we have seen, nuclear disarmament was not a class issue and not to be linked to other issues. Although nuclear weapons threaten members of all classes, marxist critics of Thompson argued, some have an enormous stake in the system which produces them, and others have the interest and capacity, due to their location in the economy, to organize against it (Harman, 1980). From a marxist perspective, “exterminism,” the systemic tendency to nuclear holocaust, is a class issue both because it is rooted in a class system and because people vary by class in their will and structural capacity (Callinicos, 1987b) for thoroughgoing opposition to that system.

This raises the question of the links that need to be made to other aspects of the system—exploitation, poverty, unemployment, national and sexual oppression—and to the possibilities in a given period of making those links. In World War I Germany, while anti-war activists outside the factories were isolated and crushed by the military and the police, socialist workers slowly built up a movement in the factories that linked the struggle over wages and conditions to the war. Even then, it took four years of work and the experience of attacks on
living standards and union rights *directly caused by the war* to build a force that could topple the government and end the war (Müller, 1924).

The failure of the peace movements of recent decades to mobilize a social force that could pose a serious threat to the war system, however, was only partly a failure of their leaders to see nuclear disarmament as a class issue. It also reflected the distance between the immediate issues that organize workers—fights over wages and working conditions—and the nuclear threat. In the postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s, real wages grew rapidly, unemployment was low in most countries, and the welfare state expanded even as military spending was sustained at levels unprecedented in peacetime. The two aspects of the warfare-welfare state complemented each other. (The same considerations, of course, limited the capacity of the movement against the Vietnam War to appeal to workers, and so to realize the revolutionary aspirations of many of its participants.)

By the mid-seventies this was no longer the case. Economic crisis on a world scale brought attacks on workers' living standards—on wages and the social wage. The new cold war intensified the pressure on social consumption. The new weapons systems competed directly with the welfare state and with the wages, working conditions, and union protections of workers. This situation presented the possibility of making the links between the different aspects of the system, generalizing from the immediate issues that drew workers into struggle and the larger political issue of military spending and the threat of war. However, the crisis produced, not renewed working class militancy, but a long downturn in struggle. Strikes were fewer, longer, less successful, and more tightly controlled by union bureaucracies. Union membership declined as a percentage of the workforce in some countries, notably the United States, and labor leaders looked to public relations and other alternatives to struggle, to rebuild declining unions (Goldfield, 1987; Moody, 1988). The revolutionary left largely disintegrated in Europe and North America. The exceptions to this pattern were dramatic—above all working class upsurges in Poland and South Africa, but also in South Korea, Brazil, and elsewhere—but the general trend made it much harder to link the resurgent peace movement of
the early 1980s to the working class, or even to see the need for such a link.

Yet the need remains. For obvious reasons the future can hold no three or four year nuclear war in which working class opposition develops and the old regime disintegrates.

Conclusion

In contrast to the marxist theory of imperialism, which analyzes the drive toward war as integral to the capitalist system, the theories of patriarchy and exterminism shared many features in common. Both detached the phenomena they described from any organic or intrinsic link with capitalism. Both pointed to the purportedly noncapitalist nature of the Soviet Union, with its oppression of women and its subordination of every aspect of economic and social life to militarism, as evidence of a separate dynamic. Both posited a distinct system, coexisting with the socioeconomic systems of East and West, with a logic of its own. Neither credibly identified the contradictions and oppositional tendencies that could threaten that system.

It is not clear that either perspective offered an advance from classical marxism in any respect, despite the confidence with which both were offered as such. Neither is able to match marxism in offering a clear, theoretically coherent, account of the system, the central dynamic of which produces the threat of nuclear war as its most terrible expression. Marxism, furthermore, is able to explain the links between war and the other issues of social justice, of oppression, hunger, and poverty, with which social workers have traditionally been concerned, and to show how capitalism has created the preconditions for resolving these problems, but only through its own destruction. And it offers a strategy that goes beyond moralism and the expression of outrage, to locate the social force on which the system depends and to which it is ultimately mostly vulnerable.

Do nuclear weapons, however, give the threat of mutual ruin they pose to all classes, render the analysis obsolete? It may be enough in this connection to recall the prescient words of Rosa Luxemburg in 1915, at the beginning of the "period of world wars." Writing from the prison cell which her revolutionary opposition to World War I had earned her, she recalled
Engels's comment that capitalism presented humanity a fateful choice between socialism and barbarism. She wrote (1967, p. 9):

We have read and repeated these words thoughtlessly without a conception of their terrible import. At this moment one glance about us will show us what a reversion to barbarism in capitalist society means . . . . The triumph of imperialism leads to the destruction of culture, sporadically during a modern war, and forever, if the period of world wars that has just begun is allowed to take its damnable course to the last ultimate consequence. Thus we stand today, as Friedrich Engels prophesied more than a generation ago, before the awful proposition: Either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or, the victory of Socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism, against its methods, against war. This is the dilemma of world history, its inevitable choice, whose scales are trembling in the balance awaiting the decision of the proletariat. Upon it depends the future of culture and humanity.

Despite the increased relevance of these words to the nuclear age, the analysis of imperialism developed by the great marxists of the early twentieth century cannot simply be taken over wholesale. As we have suggested, the rise and decline of Stalinism, of the so-called socialist countries, as well as growth of modern warfare-welfare states, has necessitated a development of Bukharin’s analysis of state capitalism and the world economy (Adams, 1988; Adams, 1990; Callinicos, 1987a). The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the consequent reduction of military threat to Western powers, renders the classic marxist analysis in certain respects even more clearly apposite. The view of world politics as a conflict between two rival power blocs, one capitalist and the other anti-capitalist, is, after all, decreasingly credible. Instead, we see a realignment and redivision of a single, and increasingly integrated, capitalist world, a breakdown of the *pax sovietica* and *pax americana* that for four decades imposed order on the world system and limited the conflicts within it. There is a new instability in the world order—in short,
a situation more closely resembling that which confronted the analysis of imperialism in the years preceding World War I than any since World War II.

On the other hand, however, there is not at present the correspondence of military and economic competition that Bukharin and others identified in the earlier period. Thus, Japan represents the main economic threat to U.S. capital but is no military threat at all. Scientific analysis of the world system in its present state, and of the extent to which a tendency to nuclear annihilation continues to be inherent in it, is an urgent task. It cannot simply be read off from the texts of the great theorists of imperialism, but requires the same kind of historically specific inquiry that those writers brought to their project. My argument is that the tradition within which they worked, and which they developed, continues to offer the best hope of understanding and transforming "the system."

References


Notes

1. Socialist feminism is a variant of feminist thought which identifies two distinct systems, patriarchy and capitalism, neither of which is explicable in terms of the other. Mimi Abramovitz (1988) provides a brief but representative exposition of this view, presenting it as an advance on marxism. Marxists have criticized the approach as a theoretically incoherent attempt to square the circle (Harman, 1984b; German, 1989), to combine two different and incompatible kinds of explanation, and two different class positions. Socialist feminists themselves have become increasingly conscious of the problems and contradictions of their position (Hansen & Philipson, 1990; Ramazanoglu, 1989). Some have rejected patriarchy theory in part or whole, while still attempting to straddle socialist and feminist traditions (Rowbotham, 1989; Segal, 1987). Insofar as they accept a version of patriarchy theory, however, and use it to explain war, socialist feminists are open to the same objections as those raised here with respect to feminists in general. A separate discussion of this tendency unfortunately cannot be pursued within the confines of this already lengthy article. Marxism and feminism, of course, offer conflicting theories and strategies in relation, not only to war, but also to women’s oppression and liberation. This dispute, too, is beyond the scope of the present article.

2. See also Gilligan (1982). For a representative application of these perspectives to questions of war and peace, see Reardon (1985).
This study deals with paraprofessional job characteristics, motivation and satisfaction. The subjects represented two paraprofessional groups—street corner workers, who enjoy a relatively high status, and homemakers, whose status is relatively low. The purpose of the study was to examine job characteristics that influence the level of job satisfaction and motivation. Analysis of responses to the Job Diagnostic Survey (Hackman & Oldham, 1975) indicates that different variables contribute to and explain the level of job satisfaction and motivation of each group. The results are discussed in the light of the effects of job characteristics on the satisfaction obtained from work, and consideration is given to what is to be done to improve the working conditions of paraprofessionals in the human services.

The term paraprofessionals is used to describe groups of workers who carry out a variety of duties alongside professionals in the human services. Each paraprofessional group performs a particular job, and has its own characteristics and perceived status. This article is concerned with the job characteristics, motivation, and satisfaction of two paraprofessional groups: street corner workers and homemakers. Paraprofessionals currently perform many roles in the human services, and the range of their responsibilities is growing (Sherer, 1986). However the nature of their work has as yet to be adequately defined, and we have no clear notion as to which aspects of their jobs motivate them in their work or, for that matter, inhibit their job motivation and performance. In an earlier report which dealt with the actual performance of street corner workers and homemakers, we concluded that paraprofessionals are inclined to broaden the scope of their job when they are given greater responsibility, which would suggest that they aspire to job
enrichment rather than to job enlargement (Sherer, 1986). An investigation of the responses of paraprofessionals to the characteristics of their job may help us to order their work in a way that would improve their performance, and the quality of service they offer to clients. To this end, the study examines the attitudes of paraprofessionals toward the characteristics of their job, and the effects of these attitudes on the levels of job satisfaction and motivation.

The growing number of paraprofessionals in the field and their rising seniority, coupled with the absence of clear guidelines concerning their employment, have created many problems on both a personal and organizational level pertaining to role division between professionals and paraprofessionals (Gidron & Katan, 1985; Schindler & Brawley, 1987). Paraprofessionals have in many ways become an integral part of the human services. However, for reasons having to do with the unique characteristics of their status and their neglect by professional colleagues, the system has not as yet been properly adjusted to meet their organizational needs, most particularly in regard to promotion and tenure. The situation is fraught with potentially undesirable consequences. Thus the ambiguities that are inherent in their position may cause paraprofessionals to lower the level of their job performance (Adams, 1975.) Since paraprofessionals tend to remain on the job for long periods it can be assumed that they will eventually pursue personal advantage at the expense of the interests of their clients. Developments along these lines have taken place in other occupations whose circumstances are similar (Ritzer, 1974).

Motivation, or the desire and efforts of a person to achieve a specific level of performance at work, is a construct which describes the fundamental psychological processes that account for an individual’s behavior on the job. Attitudes toward work and the work place are subject to constant change in a process in which they are shaped by, and in turn themselves influence, other people’s norms and behavior at work (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Generally speaking, paraprofessionals begin their careers with high levels of motivation. However this initial level may decline with accumulating seniority, as is often the case among other workers (Riley, Wagenfeld, & Robin, 1981; Ritzer, 1974;
Job Satisfaction

Wagenfeld & Robin, 1981). We assume that the attitudes of paraprofessionals toward their jobs are at least in part the result of the same factors that motivate other workers and account for the satisfaction they derive from their jobs.

Job satisfaction is a related issue that has been of concern to managers and students of management because of its presumed association with performance and production (Packard, 1989). It can be defined as the overall feeling one has about one's job (Arnold & Feldman, 1986). As in the case of motivation, many theories have been put forward to define job satisfaction, and a variety of ways have been suggested by which it might be promoted. Lawler and Porter (1967) have proposed that high levels of performance usually result in intrinsic rewards consisting of feelings of accomplishment, as well as in extrinsic rewards in the form of higher pay and promotion. We can thus expect that people who perform well are more satisfied with their jobs, given that they also value their work and the rewards they receive. Job satisfaction is also influenced by the worker's expectations as compared with what the job actually offers. Accordingly, satisfaction is a function of the interaction of an individual and the environment (Lawler, 1973). Like other workers, paraprofessionals may develop high job expectations; and since they are offered low rewards, the level of their job satisfaction may also be low. Moreover life satisfaction is closely related to job satisfaction. Stating the case in terms of a general system view, we can say that people's experiences on the job and their general environment affect their life satisfaction, and that the reverse is true as well (Lawler, 1973).

People with occupations that are assigned higher status tend to be more satisfied with their work than those employed in low-status jobs (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974). Since street corner work and homemakers are low-status occupations, we might again expect low levels of satisfaction among these two paraprofessional groups. Additionally, two variables which have been found to influence job satisfaction are of special relevance to this study—namely, the sex and age of workers (Hodson, 1985; Glenn, Taylor & Weaver, 1977). It has been found that female workers tend to have higher levels of job satisfaction than do males. This is usually explained as being the result of
downgraded expectations (Hodson, 1985; Summers & Decotiis, 1988). Regarding age, it has been found that job satisfaction tends to rise with age (Glenn, Taylor & Weaver, 1977; Lee & Wilbur, 1985; Lawler, 1973).

This study is concerned with some of the issues set forth in the foregoing discussion. Although paraprofessional job attributes are on the whole similar, there are some differences that may influence the relative levels of job motivation and satisfaction of the different groups in this category (Barber, 1986). In order to reveal these differences we examined the motivation and satisfaction of street corner workers and homemakers in Israel. These two groups were chosen because of contrast in their perceived status among paraprofessionals in the country—being regarded, respectively, as relatively high and low status occupations (Sherer, 1986; Kraus, 1976).

Street corner workers are characteristically young adults from neighborhoods and backgrounds similar to those of their clients. The latter usually consist of street corner youth aged 14–24 who are usually unemployed school dropouts with a history of delinquency. Workers in this group undergo a two-year training program; in the field they receive backup from the local agency for which they work. Their job is to reach out to their clients, and to rehabilitate them by employing the methods of case work, group work, and community work (Kerem, 1977; Klein, 1971; Sherer, 1986, 1988; Spergel, 1966). They spend many hours out in the field each day in making direct contact with clients as well as with social and community services in behalf of their clientele. As members of a welfare staff, they are expected to perform their duties within the domain that has been assigned to them, much in the same way as are their professional colleagues (Sherer, 1986).

Israeli homemakers are usually women whose age ranges from 20 to 40 years. Their clientele consists of elderly people who have to be nursed or otherwise assisted in their own homes. They provide direct aid to their clients, inform the social welfare staff about their client’s needs, mobilize community resources in order to improve their clients circumstances and enable them to remain living in their own homes. They advise their clients about available social services, and act as mediators
between the client and the welfare agencies (Barasch, 1985; Etgar, 1979; Haz, 1987; Kuperman, Meiri & Chernijovsky, 1980; Nisim, 1976). Homemakers undergo a short training program lasting for a period of two to six months (Barasch, 1985; Etgar, 1977; Kestenbaum, Shebar & Bar-On, 1987). They are subject to stricter supervision than are street corner workers, and their status is lower (Sherer, 1986).

According to Sherer (1986) both groups carry out many more tasks than they were originally expected to perform, while at the same time there are a number of expected tasks that they tend not to perform. Differences in job status, role and tasks, as well as in the personal characteristics of workers in the two groups, would lead us to expect variations in levels of job satisfaction and motivation. Our hypothesis anticipated differences between the groups in job characteristics, job satisfaction and motivation: job satisfaction among street corner workers would be higher than among the homemakers; concerning the variety of personal and job characteristics, we hypothesized that they would result in different levels of job satisfaction between the two groups.

Method

Instrument

The short version of the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS) was employed to determine the job attributes and the job motivation and satisfaction of the subjects who participated in this study (Hackman & Oldham, 1974; 1975). The short version of the JDS was chosen because it has used with paraprofessionals, and for reasons of its relative simplicity, and high levels of reliability and validity (Hackman & Oldham, 1975; Teare, 1981). The JDS is based on a theoretical model which stresses the connection between job design, motivation, and productivity. The theory behind the instrument is that five job dimensions create a critical psychological state which determines personal and work outcomes, and that these relationships are mediated by personal growth needs. Three of these job dimensions lead to a psychological state of experiencing meaningfulness of the job: Skill Variety or the degree to which a job enables a person to use
different skills and talents; Task Identity or the degree to which a job enables the worker to start and complete a particular piece of work; and Task Significance, or the perceived significance of the job. The dimension of Job Autonomy—or the degree to which a job offers freedom, independence, and discretion at work—produces a psychological state of experiencing responsibility for work outcomes. Finally, the dimension of Feedback from Job—or the degree to which the job provides workers with clear and direct information about their effectiveness—creates a psychological state of knowing the actual results of one’s work activities.

Not all people respond alike to jobs with potentially higher motivational characteristics: those who desire accomplishment and growth will respond positively, whereas those who score low on this dimension will respond negatively. Individual Growth-Need strength is therefore identified in the theory as a moderator of the relationship between core job dimensions and both personal and work outcomes. According to this theory, the JDS enables measurement of the separate entities as much as integrated scores. A quantitative score which is used to indicate an overall measure of job motivation potential can be obtained by the JDS. The Motivating Potential Score (MPS) of a job is obtained by in the following way:

\[
\text{MPS} = \frac{\text{skill} \times \text{task variety} + \text{task identity} + \text{task significance}}{3} \times (\text{autonomy}) \times (\text{feedback})
\]

In addition, two other measures are obtained by the JDS: Feedback from Agents, or the extent to which workers receive feedback regarding their performance from supervisors and co-workers; and Dealing with Others, or the extent to which workers are required to work with others while doing their jobs. These two dimensions were found to be helpful in understanding relationships on the job and employee reactions to them.

Regarding personal outcomes, the JDS provides measures of General Satisfaction, or the overall degree of satisfaction with one’s job; Internal Work Motivation, or the extent of personal motivation to perform effectively; and Work Context Satisfac-
Job Satisfaction

tion from (a) pay and other compensation; (b) job Security; (c) peers and coworkers (Social Satisfaction); (d) Supervision; and (e) opportunity for Personal Growth.

Finally, we used the JDS job choice section to measure the worker’s Growth Need Strength which is the mediator between specific job dimensions and a given worker’s desire for accomplish and growth.

Various levels of validity and reliability have been indicated for this instrument; and while there is some evidence of weakness, the instrument has been generally accepted as valid and reliable (Aldag, Barr & Brief, 1981; Cook, Hepworth, Wall & Wall, 1981; Lee & Klien, 1982).

Sample and Procedure

From a total of 250 street corner workers who were employed at the time of the study by the Israel Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, a sample of 50 workers was randomly selected. Our population of homemakers consisted of 150 workers also employed at the time by the Ministry. From among these we randomly chose 50 workers for the sample. The questionnaires and a stamped self-addressed envelop were mailed out to both groups. Thirty-seven street corner workers (74%); and 31 homemakers (62%) returned valid questionnaires. There were 36 males and 1 female among street corner workers; all 31 homemakers were female. We found significant differences between the two groups on: Age, the mean score of the street corner workers was 29.18 \( sd = 4.41 \), and for the homemakers 40.6 \( sd = 10.52 \) \( t = 5.59; df = 65; p < .05 \); on Education we found that the mean score of the street corner workers was 15.43 \( sd = 1.25 \) and for the homemakers 12.32 \( sd = 2.56 \) \( t = 7.55; df = 65; p < .05 \); street corner workers had higher seniority 5.06 years \( sd = 3.35 \) compared with 3.28 years for the homemakers \( sd = 3.07 \) \( t = 2.37; df = 60; p < .05 \). The results were analyzed using the SPSSX program.

Results

We began by examining the intercorrelations and the internal reliability of the JDS subscales (see Table 1).
Table 1

Intercorrelations among the Subscales of the Job Diagnostic Survey.

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<td>-.07</td>
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\( ^a = p < .05 \)
\( ^b = p < .01 \)
\( ^c = p < .001 \)
\( ^d = \text{Coefficient Alpha scores.} \)
Job Satisfaction

Some reliability scores of the JDS subscales were found to be relatively low as compared with results obtained in other studies (Hackman & Oldham, 1975; Teare, 1981). We believe this to be the consequence of the considerable variance in the nature of the work performed by the subjects, as well as the differences among them in matter of personal skills and expectations. Another factor involved in this may be the inconsistency in job components; in other words, some jobs are more structured, formal and demanding than are others, so that we cannot expect similar relationships among job characteristics.

Only moderate correlation was found for the job dimensions of Skill Variety, Task Identity, Task Significance, Authority, and Feedback from Job. Similar results were obtained by Hackman & Oldham (1975), although our correlation scores are much lower. While this may be due in part to the small size of the sample, it is logical to assume that the results reflect a real difference between the two groups—certainly with regard to the job attributes and personal characteristics of the workers, particularly in terms of their satisfaction at work.

Differences between the Groups on the JDS Scales

According to the theory of Hackman & Oldham (1975), general satisfaction and internal work motivation are dependent on the five job dimensions of Skill Variety, Task Identity, Task Significance, Autonomy and Feedback from Job—these being moderated by the influence of the employee's personal Growth-Need strength. To examine for possible differences between the two groups on the five job dimension scales a MANOCOVA test was employed, with control for the influence of Growth-Need strength. The test revealed a significant main effect for Group Association (Wilks = .60, $F(5,47) = 6.05, P < .001$). Univariate analysis indicated significant differences for Autonomy ($F(1,51) = 4.89, P < .03$). Differences showed up, as well, for Feedback from Job ($F(1,51) = 17.81, p < .001$). Analysis of the mean scores (see Table 2) indicates that street corner workers scored higher on the Autonomy scale, while homemakers had a higher mean score for Feedback from Job.
Table 2

*Mean and Standard Deviation Scores on the JDS Scales*

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Street Workers (n=37)</th>
<th>Homemakers (n=31)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>s.d.</td>
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<td>.97</td>
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<td>.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feedback From Job</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>50.95</td>
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<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing With Others</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth Need Strength</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A regression test was used for each group separately to reveal the influence of each of the five job dimensions on general satisfaction and on internal work motivation. Regressing the five job dimensions on general satisfaction in the case of street corner workers, Skill Variety was the only significant variable accounting for 30% of the variance ($\beta=.55$). As regards internal work motivation, Skill Variety explained 29% of the variance ($\beta=.50$), and Task Identity explained an additional 10% ($\beta=.31$). In the case of Homemakers, Feedback from Job explained 34% of the variance in regard to general satisfaction ($\beta=.53$), while Task Significance accounted for an additional 12% ($\beta=.35$); additionally, Feedback from Job explained 48% of the variance for
internal work motivation ($\beta=.69$). Concerning the two additional measures of Feedback from Agents and Dealing with Others, a significant difference between the groups was found in regard to the first. The homemakers scored higher on Feedback from agents (5.17) than did the street corner workers (4.29): $t=2.31$, $df=56$, $p<.02$.

A MANCOVA test was also used to examine for differences between the two groups in regard to affective reactions to the job, in the areas of general satisfaction, internal work satisfaction, and specific satisfaction i.e., Job Security, Pay, Social Satisfaction, Supervision, Opportunity for Growth. Here, too, we controlled for the influence of personal Growth-Need strength. The test revealed a significant main effect for Group Association (Wilks $=.72$, $F(7,46) = 2.49$, $p<.03$). Univariate analysis indicated differences approaching significance in the spheres of general satisfaction ($F(1,52) = 3.25$, $p<.07$) and on internal work motivation ($F(1,52) = 3.03$, $p<.08$). Significant differences were found in regard to the factors of Pay ($F(1,52) = 4.35$, $p.04$) and Supervision ($F(1,52) = 7.84$, $p<.007$). Analysis of the mean scores indicates that homemakers scored higher on General Satisfaction, internal work motivation, and Supervision; on the other hand, street corner workers scored higher on Pay, which only partly supports our first hypothesis (see Table 2).

A separate regression analysis was employed for each group in order to find possible influences of the personal characteristics of Age, Education, Seniority, and Growth-Need strength. The same was done for affective reaction to the job as reflected in General Satisfaction, Internal Work Motivation, and the five specific satisfaction measures. The only significant difference was found in the case of street corner workers for whom age explained 17% of the variance in General Satisfaction. Thus job satisfaction declines with increase in age ($\beta = -.41$). For the homemakers, no variable reached the required level of significance. No differences were found between the two groups in regard to Internal Work Motivation and the five specific satisfaction measures; no single variable passed the required level of acceptance.

As hypothesized, the results clearly indicate various differences between the two groups on some scales. Most of the mean
scores are high, reflecting relatively high levels of job motivation and satisfaction. The lowest mean scores were on Growth Need strength and Pay. The standard deviation scores of the two groups on the various subscales were similar and relatively high, which is indicative of the variability within the groups—a circumstance that was also found in regard to job attributes and job conditions.

Discussion

Street corner workers scored significantly higher on the Autonomy scale than did the homemakers. The considerably greater degree of Autonomy experienced by street corner workers derives from the nature of the job, much of which is performed in the afternoon and evening hours, when they are unlikely to be interfered with by other social service personnel (Sherer, 1988). Homemakers, on the other hand, are more closely supervised by social workers. The results obtained on this variable corroborate earlier findings (Sherer, 1986).

A significant difference also showed up in regard to Feedback from the Job, although this time in another direction. Feedback from the Job represents the degree to which a worker receives direct evidence of effectiveness at work. Homemakers felt that they obtained greater feedback from the job than did street corner workers. This is not an unexpected result, since homemakers have greater opportunity to receive an immediate response from their clients regarding the effectiveness of their services (such as providing meals on wheels), than do street corner workers, who sometimes have to wait weeks and even months before knowing whether their clients have benefited from their efforts (Sherer, 1988).

The results on the Feedback from Agents scale deserve some elaboration. This variable involves the extent to which support for one's performance on the job is obtained from supervisors and coworkers. Feedback from agents derives from different intentions where extremes consist of (a) positive intentions whose effect is to encourage a worker, and (b) negative intentions whereby support is withheld. This variable was covered by two items. The first of these related to feedback from supervisors and coworkers that was unsupportive. On this item no
difference was registered between the two groups. The second item related to feedback from supervisors that offered positive reinforcement, and in regard to which a significant difference was found between the two groups. In the case of the latter item, the mean score of homemakers was higher than that of street corner workers ($t=2.27; df=52.39; p<.024$). It seems clear from this finding that homemakers do receive positive feedback from supervisors on their performance at work. The results for this variable coincide with those of Hatfield, Huseman and Miles (1987), who found that positive verbal recognition is related to employee satisfaction whereas negative verbal recognition is unconnected with either satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that social workers should offer positive reinforcement to a group that poses no threat to their own position. By contrast, the relatively high status of street corner workers among paraprofessional groups, may place them in a position that approaches that of peers, so that they may even be perceived by social workers as potential competitors (Sherer, 1986). This, too, may account for the lower level of support experienced by street corner workers as opposed to homemakers.

Regarding affective reactions to the job, the street corner workers indicated that Skill Variety influenced the general satisfaction they derived from work. Skill Variety is a measure of the extent to which the job enables one to make use of the full range of one's abilities. According to McNeely (1988), the second best predictor of workers' satisfaction is the degree to which their various abilities are engaged on the job. Street corner work demands the use of a broad variety of skills which are applied to situations ranging from hazardous encounters in the streets to working in concert with professionals at the agency in solving the problems of individual clients (Sherer, 1988). In the matter of internal work motivation (the extent of self-motivation in performing on the job), street corner workers indicated that both Skill Variety and Task Identity (starting and completing a particular piece of work) had a positive influence, on the level of their motivation. This result coincides with the findings on the autonomy scale: street corner workers preferred work which offered them discretion and scope in the performance of their
tasks, enabled them to start and complete a job, and gave them an opportunity to put their skills to use.

The general satisfaction of homemakers is influenced by the feedback they receive about their performance, and by the perceived significance of the job. Feedback is the factor which also explains their internal motivation. Homemakers seem to receive tokens of warm appreciation from their clients, and they are influenced to a greater extent than are street corner workers by the significance of their work. A possible explanation for this difference may be the attitudes of the public toward the clients served by the two paraprofessional groups. The sick and elderly are usually regarded by the public as "deserving" of help, whereas street corner youth are perceived as being "undeserving". This may affect the disparity in levels of satisfaction experienced by each group from working with their respective clients. Or perhaps the situation has to do with workers of the two groups deriving their job satisfaction and motivation from quite distinct sources. So, street corner workers obtain their satisfaction and motivation from variables that depend on their own performance on the job and their personal estimation of success on the job, while the satisfaction of homemakers depends more on external factors.

We should note however, that both groups indicate satisfaction with their work, as is reflected by their relatively high scores on this variable (see Table 2). At list in the present instance there is more than a coincidental relationship between the job and the variables that accounted for satisfaction and motivation at work. Quite possibly this may be true of other groups of workers as well. It may be a rule that, in one way or another, the job itself brings with it the aspects that underlay work satisfaction and motivation; and that we tend naturally to gravitate to the kind of work likely to offer the conditions under which these responses result. On the other hand, a process of accommodation between person and a job may take place, whereby individuals learn to adapt themselves to the nature and conditions of the work while also shaping the job so it might suit their personal characteristics and needs.

The differences between the groups as regards both general job satisfaction and internal work motivation approached
Job Satisfaction

significance. Homemakers were more satisfied with their work than were street corner workers (see Table 2). The same applies to internal work motivation (see Table 2). This finding may in part have to do with the fact that female workers tend to show higher levels of satisfaction from a given job than do their male colleagues (Hodson, 1985; McNeely, Feyerherm & Johnson, 1986). However, in the present study, sex differences were ignored because each gender was concentrated in a particular work category (i.e., women in homemakers, and men in street corner work). Both groups were satisfied with the kind of work they did, and both were highly motivated on the job. These results coincide with the low scores of both groups on the variable of Growth-Need strength (the lowest mean scores for both groups on all the scales; see Table 2). The weak growth needs of both groups may well account for their high motivation on the job. If this is so, then assignment of lower-status jobs to paraprofessionals which offer no opportunities for growth would coincide with the interests of professional workers to prevent their paraprofessional colleagues from potentially threatening their standing.

Both groups scored very low on the pay variable (satisfaction from the salary; see Table 2). Even so, street corner workers scored better on satisfaction from salary, probably because their pay is higher than that of the homemakers. Indeed at times they may make even more than professional workers because they receive bonuses for working during evening hours (Sherer, 1988)—a circumstance which appears to have been without effect in significantly raising the pay satisfaction level among this group. As a general rule, paraprofessionals generally receive low salaries, mainly in regard to preserve the income advantage of professionals, who have invested far more heavily in qualifying for their work. At any rate, it is a point to be kept in mind that the lowest mean score in our sample was attained on the pay variable (2.54; see Table 2). The standard deviation scores are another noteworthy result on this variable: they are highest for both groups on the scales that yielded significant differences (1.6 for street corner workers; 1.46 for homemakers). It appears to us that this result may be partly attributed to recent policies in some agencies to increase salaries through fringe
benefits such as car maintenance payments which has divided workers into more satisfied and less satisfied groups. Noteworthy, too, if the fact that although these two categories of workers have low Growth Need strength, they have high demands regarding their pay, which may be an index of the respect they have for their work.

Higher levels of satisfaction from supervision were indicated by the homemakers (see Table 2). It may be that as a result of their lower educational levels, lesser training and lower job status, homemakers are inclined to be less demanding, and therefore to have a greater regard for supervision. On the other hand, the finding may also indicate that homemakers more readily accept supervision, which in turn would contribute to the ability of social workers to collaborate with them in servicing the clientele.

Age has been found to be positively correlated with job satisfaction (Lee & Wilbur, 1985). The homemakers in our sample were older than the street corner workers; however we did not find that the age variable accounted significantly for the differences in job satisfaction between the groups. The fact that homemakers are generally women who begin working at a relatively late stage in their lives, and have comparatively less education than the street corner workers, may also make them less demanding and thus incline them to be more satisfied with their work. Paraprofessionals have been found to have low expectations of career advancements (Birenbaum & Ahmed, 1978). Street corner workers, on the other hand, are on the whole better educated and in consequence are likely to have higher aspirations. This is why we found in their case that general satisfaction tends to decline with age. We should take into account, as well that paraprofessional workers have very little chance of promotion, and their positions have been described as dead end jobs (Edelwich & Brodsky, 1980).

Cherrington, Reitz and Scott (1971) propose that the relationship between satisfaction and performance at work depends greatly on the rewards offered by the job. Paraprofessionals work under the reward systems which is customary in the human services; that is, rewards are contingent on position and seniority rather than on performance and achievement. The high
levels of satisfaction found among the subjects of this study indicate that these workers derive satisfaction on the job from sources other than those of salary status, which in their case are in all events low and likely to have the opposite effect. Their satisfaction may be the result of perceiving themselves as doing important work, and of their eagerness to use their abilities in behalf of others. There may be another explanation as well; people who have had to settle for low status jobs tend to welcome the offer of any opportunity for recognition and success. Accordingly, having been given a chance to demonstrate their abilities, our subjects were motivated and felt satisfaction in excess of what the external rewards of the job might lead us to expect. That this situation may apply to the present instance is supported by the demonstration of higher satisfaction from work by the homemakers in our sample, despite the lower status of their job relative to that of street corner workers (see Table 2).

Cherrington, et al, (1971) reported that those of their subjects who were rewarded without any relation to their performance levels expressed higher satisfaction than those who received no reward. The present findings, however, point to the existence of sources of satisfaction other than those of external rewards. Thus satisfaction and motivation at work may depend on the personal experience and aspirations of the individual, as much as it depends on external reward systems both within and outside the job. The view of Perrow (1978) that workers try to use the organizations that employ them to their own advantage can still be applied, but with the understanding that when organizations are used by employees to fulfill their own desires, these fortunately often coincide with the accepted values of society and can contribute to its welfare.

Our results are not conclusive. Although differences were found between the two groups of workers, these data were not the goal of the present study, which was undertaken in the hope of revealing the variables that influence our subjects' level of satisfaction from work. In using subjects from two distinct classes of paraprofessional workers, we showed that paraprofessionals should not be treated as a single undifferentiated group, but rather that this category is divided into subgroups, each of
which has progressed in various degrees toward the acquisition of professional characteristics. Each subgroup has therefore to be studied in its own right, with the aim of improving their services. The results of this study indicate that, like other workers, paraprofessionals experience changes of outlook in the course of their careers. Street corner workers, who have obtained a higher work status, also tend to remain on the job for longer periods, and to be less satisfied with their work and less motivated than homemakers. This difference between the two paraprofessional categories would appear to be the joint result of job and personal characteristics. It is not only the personal needs of the individual which determine job motivation and satisfaction, but the characteristics of the job itself. Paraprofessional jobs offer limited opportunities for promotion and growth. Having a relatively higher status in a job that does not lead to promotion may therefore be much more frustrating than being a low achiever in a more rewarding job category.

The creation in our social services of new occupations, without proper consideration being given regarding their future, has resulted in a growing problem. So, street corner workers, who are a leading paraprofessional group, have indicated that many aspects of their jobs leave them unsatisfied. The main problem however, is that they maintain this attitude while remaining on the job—a circumstance which surely affects their level of performance. Homemakers are less troubled over the issue of job characteristics; but they probably have lower expectations from their work and are therefore relatively less concerned with the benefits they receive. However, we may expect them to develop higher demands over the coming years. There is a possibility that the workers in our sample belong to a group which has relatively little interest in personal and growth achievements (see Growth-Need strength scores in Table 2), but even if this is so, more ought to be done in their behalf.

Although the desires of individuals must be respected, we who are responsible for the paraprofessionals employed in human service organizations have a dual obligation in respect of their welfare in the work place—first in our capacity as managers and coworkers, and second as professionals charged with looking after the well-being of people in our society. We have to
do more for our fellow workers in the paraprofessions. This we can manage in two ways. First we need clearly to define their work domain as well as the tasks that fall within it (Sherer, 1986), and to institute the appropriate organizational measures that would enable them to build a respectable career in the human services. Second, we need to secure those characteristics that lead to or create job satisfaction among paraprofessional workers, by insuring that their tasks should be significant in themselves and involve the exercise of responsibility; that they should have the benefit of adequate feedback from supervision; that they should be treated as colleagues; and finally that they should have sufficient opportunity to grow on the job. The services enjoyed by our clients could only improve as a result.

References


Asian American Immigrants: A Comparison of the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos

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An historical overview of the immigration of the three most populous Asian American groups in the United States is presented. The immigrant experiences of the Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese are compared, and the implications of their experiences for current and future immigration/resettlement programs and policies are discussed.

According to the 1980 census, the Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese represent, respectively, the three most populous Asian-Pacific ethnic groups in the United States. This paper examines the immigration of these groups, provides a historical perspective of their resettlement, and discusses implications for current and future immigration programs and policies. The presentation follows the historical order of passage with the Chinese being the first to come to America, followed by the Japanese and then the Filipinos.

Chinese Americans

The majority of the Chinese immigrants came from the southeastern coastal provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. The Tai-Ping Revolution of 1850–1964, the discovery of gold in California, and a natural catastrophe simultaneously created conditions which motivated some 300,000 Chinese to emigrate from their villages in this heavily overpopulated region (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982; Lyman, 1974). These immigrants were predominantly young men who intended to stay in the United States
only long enough to accumulate wealth and then return to China.

Generally, the Chinese were regarded as a curious but welcome addition to the population of laborers and fortune seekers arriving on the West Coast. Working as field hands and domestics they performed many needed services, and they contributed significantly to the completion of the transcontinental railroad. But, in the trades and gold fields where they competed with whites, they were often brutally attacked.

The national depression which started in the 1870s led to an intensification of atrocities against the Chinese. The bullying and beating of Chinese were common occurrences. The excesses of the 1870s and 1880s included shootings and lynchings, the burning of homes and businesses, and the expulsion of all Chinese from numerous areas (Lyman, 1974). Increasing racial agitation led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. The Act effectively halted emigration from China to the United States.

Because many of the Chinese immigrants viewed their stay in the United States as temporary, they did not actively attempt to change the social and political structure of America. Furthermore, because of their self-perceived transient status, many left their wives and children in China. Unfortunately, the families that were separated by emigration were often never reunited. Lyman (1974) contends that the separation of families acted as a powerful deterrent to the creation of any sizable body of Chinese American citizenry. This left them with little numerical strength to fight discrimination or stem the tide of anti-Chinese legislation.

This latter situation was exacerbated by the shortage of eligible women. During the period of unrestricted immigration (1850-1882) 100,000 Chinese men, but only 8,848 women came to the United States (Lyman, 1974). Due to this imbalanced sex ratio it was not until 1950 that American-born Chinese came to comprise over one-half of the Chinese in the American population. Even then, discriminatory immigration practices had severely limited the number of Chinese (and Asians) in the United States. The 1980 census lists only 812,178 Chinese Americans, and they represent the most populous Asian group in the U.S.
The Chinese immigrants adapted to their situation by living in tightly knit enclaves insulated from the larger society. The enclaves were organized around prior territorial associations and often-times had one or more families that dominated the political, economic, and social life of the community (Light, 1972). Many traditional social and economic practices were directly transplanted into the enclaves, and transactions with members of the larger society were minimized.

Within the enclaves community associations served to assist new immigrants in a variety of ways. Such associations provided employment assistance, acted to mitigate disputes within the Chinese community, and served as representatives to the majority society. They also helped to underwrite the development of an entrepreneurial class by providing venture capital. Since discriminatory practices limited the immigrants access to external financial institutions, the associations developed rotating credit systems to substitute for banks (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982). Thus, community associations facilitated Chinese resettlement by fostering a degree of social and economic independence and insularity.

Japanese Americans

The majority of Japanese immigrants came from the southern prefectures of Japan during the Meiji restoration period of the late 1800s (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982). The government was attempting to industrialize Japan in order to compete with Western nations, and the transition from an agrarian to an industrial economy spawned social unrest and unemployment. Faced with a tenuous economic future, many individuals sought a better life abroad.

Needing cheap, dependable labor, developers initially welcomed the first Japanese immigrants (Issei) to the sparsely populated frontier West. Ample employment opportunities existed in agriculture, and the Issei used familiar farming skills to obtain work in the fields. Those not employed in agriculture worked in a variety of other industries, with some 10,000 Japanese being employed at one time by the mining, lumbering, canning, and railroad industries (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982). However, as increasing numbers of Japanese arrived, the reception changed.
The American populace began to perceive them as competitors in the job market and considered them to be low in "assimilative potential" (McLemore, 1980).

The peak years of Japanese immigration (1885–1924) were characterized by the development and popularization of racist ideas by native whites and by the growth of legal efforts to restrict immigrant opportunities. Anti-Asian sentiments were manifested through laws which limited immigration, restricted land-ownership, prohibited naturalized citizenship, prohibited interracial marriages, and permitted the forced expulsion of Japanese from numerous communities (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982).

Given such laws, adaptations based on necessity evolved. For example, since Japanese were denied naturalized citizenship, and since laws prohibited non-citizens from owning land, Issei bought farmland in names of their children who were citizens by virtue of their birthright. When racist policies attempted to block economic development, the Japanese developed their own lending institutions or "tanomoshi." Within the tanomoshi members pooled their money and loaned it to each other on a rotating basis. This system operated entirely on mutual trust and obligation (Light, 1974). The tanomoshi provided capital for many Issei business ventures, which formed the foundation for the development of the Japanese American community.

Another type of organization was the "kenjinkai," or prefectural organization. The kenjinkai were comprised of families and individuals who had similar geographic origins and had settled near one another in the United States. The organization acted to maintain traditional cultural values and served as mechanisms for community solidarity. The kenjinkai also provided legal advice, gave money to needy members, served as an employment bureau, and paid medical and burial expenses (Light, 1974).

In a slightly different vein, anti-miscegenation laws prohibited Japanese men from marrying white women. Since labor contractors in the United States recruited men exclusively, there existed a radically imbalanced sex ratio. In order to find mates, Japanese men enlisted traditional "go-betweens" to arrange marriages with women who desired to come to America. Literally thousands of young Japanese women were betrothed
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in this way and sent to join unknown bridegrooms in the United States (Kitano, 1969).

These adaptations coupled with hard work allowed some Issei to make remarkable gains against formidable odds. But, these gains were shortlived. With the onset of World War II came the mass evacuation of all Japanese from the West Coast. Many people sold their homes, businesses, and possessions at cut-rate prices. Others stored their goods or simply left everything in locked houses hoping that they would be safe until their return. Many farmers were forced to leave fields in which their life's savings were invested. The economic losses were monumental.

The incarceration of 110,00 Japanese Americans marks the most significant social and psychological event in their immigrant history. It was a critical period, a time when they had to carefully consider their nationality and ethnic identity. Fischer (1965) notes that only 2,300 of the 110,000 evacuees asked to be sent back to Japan. This is a surprisingly low number considering the bleak circumstances faced by these people. Those who chose to stay became committed to the American cause and believed they must vindicate themselves and their people by becoming ideal citizens. Thousands of Japanese American men enlisted in the Armed Forces to prove their loyalty. The 442nd and the 100th battalions, composed of second generation (Nisei) men from the Mainland and Hawaii, suffered more than 9,000 casualties and became the most decorated unit in American military history (Kitano, 1969).

Filipino Americans

The lure of economic opportunities was the primary motive for young Filipino men to emigrate to America. Like other Asian immigrants before them, they held dreams of accumulating great wealth and returning to their homeland. A common practice was for a family to mortgage part of its land in order to send one son to the United States. In turn, he would send money home to pay off the mortgage or to help a brother obtain a higher education (Melendy, 1976).

As was the case with previous Asian groups, the dreams and expectations of these men rarely materialized. Instead, they
found that they had to remain in America much longer than they expected. Many refused to return home as acknowledged failures. They continued to maintain family ties and send money home, but this practice became more difficult as retirement age approached (Melendy, 1976).

The immigration of Filipinos came largely in two waves. The first influx occurred during the 1920s, especially after 1924 when the Gentlemen's Agreement between the United States and Japan halted the flow of Japanese laborers entering this country. Restricting the immigration of Japanese created a vacuum in the expanding labor markets on the West Coast. Farmers in California and Hawaii had to find other workers to perform the seasonal tasks in the fields and orchards. Workers were also sought by the salmon canneries of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska (Melendy, 1976). The demand for Filipino labor was shortlived, however, as the number of available white workers increased during the depression years. Racism escalated as competition for jobs increased, and the number of Filipinos arriving in America declined sharply.

Because the Philippines was a colony of the United States, the nationals were granted some rights and privileges, but were denied the right of franchise, property ownership or the freedom to marry whom they chose. The prejudicial attitudes held towards Filipinos paralleled those held about previous Asian minorities. These attitudes kept Filipinos in low level service positions, and those who sought housing were forced to live in non-white slum areas.

The second major influx of Filipinos followed the revision of immigration laws in 1965. This group included a large proportion of well-educated and highly skilled professional men and women. Upon arrival, many of these people found themselves underemployed. They were not allowed to utilize their skills and training because professional bodies refused to recognize their credentials (Ishisaka & Takagi, 1982).

The Filipino community is extremely diverse with complex regional, generational, and dialect differences. Melendy (1976) notes that the immigrants arriving in the wake of the 1965 legislation, as well as those arriving earlier, represented at least three different island cultures. Most immigrants, therefore, had
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to adapt to their own differing cultures as well as to their new homeland. This cultural pluralism, along with the seasonal, transient work of the earlier immigrants, made it more difficult to develop strong pan-Filipino community organizations. Lott (1976) considers this lack of organizational development to be the primary reason behind the Filipinos’ inability to establish a foothold in American society. However, with time and the emergence of new indigenous generations, this situation may change.

Comparison and Implications

Common and unique strategies of adaptation are evident among the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos in America. In this section we provide a cautious and limited comparison of some of these strategies and interpret their relevance for current and future Asian American immigrants.

Early Chinese immigrants met with a harsh reception in America. They faced blatant and often violent forms of racism and were to encounter legislation which not only denied them the rights of citizenship, but the right to become naturalized citizens. Denied naturalization and franchise for nearly a century, they adapted by moving into ethnic enclaves and organizing their own benevolent, protective, and governmental bodies.

Clan associations emerged as the principal organizations within these enclaves, promoting group solidarity, mutual aid, economic support and, at times, organized vice activities. These traditional associations competed with one another for membership and community influence. Yet, during periods of anti-Chinese sentiment they tried to put aside their differences and form a united front. The associations thus helped Chinese immigrants to adapt to the New World and deal with the powerful forces of racism. However, the enclaves also served to partially insulate the Chinese from the outside community.

Like the Chinese, early Japanese immigrants faced the problems of job discrimination and racist legislation. And, they too adapted by banding together and forming benevolent and protective organizations and associations. Japanese regularly established rotating credit associations (tanomoshi) to obtain capital
outside of the white economic community (Light, 1974). They formed kenjinkai to help with cultural, economic, legal and employment matters (Light, 1974). And, Japanese farmers in California even united to form the Southern California Retail Produce Workers Union (SCRPWU) to protect their interests (Modell, 1976).

Despite the similarity of ethnic solidarity, the experiences of Japanese Americans took a dramatic and uniquely different turn from that of the Chinese. World War II and the relocation camps served to disperse Japanese away from the West Coast and disrupt the ethnic enclaves and organizations which remained intact for the Chinese. The camp experience also engendered a need among Japanese to vindicate themselves and accelerated their assimilation into the American culture.

Like the Chinese and Japanese, early Filipino immigrants worked in menial jobs. They were first recruited by the agricultural industries in Hawaii and California and by the salmon canneries of the Pacific Northwest. Although Filipinos readily found work in these two industries, when they sought employment in the cities, they encountered the same discrimination faced by their Asian predecessors.

In contrast to the Chinese and Japanese, however, community organizations did not emerge as readily among Filipino immigrants. The cultural diversity of their homeland and the transient, seasonal nature of the early immigrants' work made the formation of strong pan-Filipino organizations more difficult (Lott, 1976). A number of district and fraternal groups were organized from time to time, but none of them emerged as powerful centers of Filipino community life (Cordova, 1973). One exception to this pattern was the early emergence of farm labor organizations. Poor working conditions and negative stereotypes of Filipinos produced early demands for labor unions. These unions were instrumental in securing wage increases and improving working conditions.

The experiences of early Asian groups can be used as a reference, but not a model, for understanding current and future Asian immigrants. Possibly the most important lesson concerns the vital role of ethnic enclaves and organizations in the adaptation process. They provide immigrants with an important link
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to the customs and values of their homeland; they give their members a sense of community and familiarity; they provide services and support systems which help the immigrants to economically, socially and psychologically adapt to their new environment; they provide unified protection against racism; and they help to represent the immigrants to the outside world. Thus, current and future resettlement efforts need to support and work with these ethnic communities and organizations and "outsiders" should consult with, and include community members in any planning process.

Noncommunity personnel might even go so far as to offer technical assistance, but allow community members to design their own services. In the past, programs designed for Asians by outsiders have often failed because the planners made certain assumptions about the consumers or lacked critical knowledge about them. This was evident in recent government programs to disperse Indochinese refugees throughout various regions of the United States. Despite the threat of financial penalties, many refugees migrated from their original placements to be near others from their homeland (Montero, 1980).

A second factor prominent in the history of early Asian immigrants is racial discrimination. Racism was the most severe when the immigrants were perceived as economic or political threat to the white majority. Current immigrants have experienced similar fate as they are often seen as threats to working-class Americans who feel crowded by the Asians' growing economic success (Newsweek, May 12, 1986).

The lesson here is not that racism is an inevitable aspect of Asian American life, but that we must acknowledge its presence and formulate policies and programs to deal with it. The sociopsychological research on prejudice indicates that racism can be reduced through equal status, cooperative contact (Aronson, 1988). Such contact is rare when immigrants are relegated the most menial jobs in our society and are insulated in ethnic enclaves. Resettlement and social service programs will have to be creative in making equal status, cooperative contacts possible, Ironically, this implies that immigrants will have to be coaxed out from the ethnic communities which have helped facilitate their adaptation to this country.
Finally, the history of Asian American immigration illustrates the uniqueness of each immigrant group. While this seems too obvious to mention, it would be dangerous to ignore its implications. It is this uniqueness which makes any historical overview (including this one) an uncertain and limited reference for the present/future. For example, most of the early Asian immigrants were young men seeking their fortunes in this new land. Aside from obvious cultural differences, current Indochinese refugees consist of men, women and children; there are families and there are people of all ages. To use historical comparisons in this case may not be appropriate. The historical perspective is helpful, but it must be coupled with group-specific knowledge and sensitivity. Thus, the uniqueness of each immigrant group means that we still need to forego our preconceptions and listen to, and learn from, the immigrants themselves.

References


In a global economy, transfer of human technology via multinational Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) is a reality. Successful development and implementation of multinational EAPs require attention to the host country's political, legal frameworks, and cultural issues. The roles of occupational social workers vary based on these dimensions and issues. The targets of interventions are foreign executives and their families, host country employees and their families, and the organization itself.

The provision of social services at the workplace dates back to 1875 (Popple, 1981). The term in vogue for such counseling services for employees and their families is employee assistance program (EAP). In the United States, the number of EAPs has grown from fewer than 100 EAPs in 1950 to 10,000 by 1987 (BNA-Special Report, 1987; ALMACA, 1987) serving more than one-third of the work force (Blum & Roman, 1986). This growth clearly indicates the acceptance of EAPs in American industry. EAPs are the dominant model in contemporary occupational social work (Balgopal, 1989).

Googins and Godfrey (1987) define occupational social work "as a field of practice in which social workers attend to the human and social needs of the work community by designing and executing appropriate interventions to insure healthier individuals and environment" (p.38). In this context, the occupational social worker may address an array of individual and family needs, relationships within organizations, and broader issues and relationships of the world of work to the community at large (NASW, 1987). Given that the EAP is the dominant model in occupational social work, changes and developments occurring in EAP will impact the practice of occupational social work.
National and global changes in the economy and privatization in the provision of social services affect EAP and occupational social work practice.

Due to the contemporary nature of the global economy, expansion of multinational corporations is inevitable. In the mid-1970s multinationals accounted for 20% of the world’s output. Their production growth rate was at 10 to 12% per year, nearly twice that of the growth of the world output (Dunnings, 1981). The outflow of U.S. foreign direct investment was at 29% between 1974–79 (Dunning, 1985), and is still the largest single source. The American-based multinational corporations have significant international investments accounting for half the world’s total multinational assets (Little, 1982). Despite the widespread attention to the issue of protectionism, continued international trade is a reality for local economies throughout the world (Yandrick, 1986). Also, the recent socio-economic and political realities in the Soviet Union and the eastern block countries have created opportunities for the expansion of multinational corporations. Multinational companies are confronted with the challenge of transferring technology, while still maintaining control over their own technological and financial assets. In addition, these corporations are transferring human technology and establishing EAPs. For instance, American multinational corporations are frequently extending coverage of their EAPs to foreign based American employees and families as well as employees and families of the host country (Durkin, 1986).

If American style EAPs are to undergo successful transplantation, it is imperative to investigate and assess the suitability of the various U.S. based EAP models to the organizational climate of the host countries. For instance, in the United States the rate of unionization of the labor force has declined, there are fewer legal constraints affecting the provision of EAP services, and tolerance of alcohol and drug abuse is different compared to other countries including developing nations.

This paper focuses on a comparative analysis of EAP service delivery models, their suitability for global transplantation from the U.S., and an analysis of factors that affect the establishment of multinational EAPs. The relevant role of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to the multinational EAPs, the range
of roles for occupational social workers, and the potential client population and target of such intervention are also addressed.

Comparative Analysis of EAP Models

Knowledge about and functions of the diverse models are critical to delineating the relevant roles of social workers. EAP service delivery models identified in the literature can be broadly classified into in-house and contractual programs. In-house programs can be offered exclusively by the management, union, or as joint ventures, and their services are usually limited to diagnostic assessment, short-term counseling, and referral to the community resources. The special focus of this model is on substance abuse problems and periodic training of supervisors in procedures for referring employees. The contractual programs are sponsored by corporation or jointly by corporations and management. Under the auspices of an external contractor (family service agency, community mental health center), the various services include diagnostic assessment and referral, focus on substance abuse problems, periodic training of supervisors in procedures for referrals, and crisis intervention (Fleisher & Kaplan, 1988; Bickerton, 1989). The various in-house models include service center programs and internal programs with service center support. The contractual models include EAPs located in treatment or social service agencies (Phillips & Older, 1981), and group consortia (ALMACA, 1987).

Comparative analysis of the various models was conducted expanding Straussner’s (1988) criteria. The roles of the occupational social worker vary depending on the model of service delivery. Organizations that have between 250 and 350 employees may benefit from an internal program while smaller organizations may choose one of the contractual service options (Bickerton, 1989). The extent to which interventions are made in the person and in the environment is influenced by the service delivery system. In-house occupational social workers have familiarity with the work environment and can be effective in their advocacy role on behalf of the employees (Straussner, 1988). If the EAP is offered through a contractual arrangement outside the organization, the occupational social workers are less likely to be in a position to intervene in the work environment.
Interventions in the work environment are warranted when the source of the problem or solution lies in the work milieu.

Comparative analysis of the EAP service models reveals that models include such features as assessments, referral to community resources, and a focus on individual changes. However, the occupational social workers in the in-house programs have

**Figure 1**

*Comparison of service models on selected variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Internal Program</th>
<th>Service Center</th>
<th>Internal Program with Service Center</th>
<th>Social Service Agency</th>
<th>Union Based</th>
<th>Consortium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of Organization</td>
<td>250 to 300 Employees</td>
<td>&gt;50 &lt;100 Employees</td>
<td>250 to 300 Employees</td>
<td>&gt;50 &lt;100 Employees</td>
<td>250 to 300 Members</td>
<td>&lt;50 Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locale</td>
<td>Within Organization</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outside Organization</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Preventive Programs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Promotive Programs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosocial Assessment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling Referral</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral for Services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for Individual Change</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for Organizational Change</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
opportunities to serve as advocates and bring about organizational changes by influencing human resource managers on matters such as job enrichment and redesign. Also, those models where services are provided through the organization (as opposed to contracted out) are likely to offer counseling services, render preventive and promotive mental health programs in addition to assessment.

Establishing Multinational EAPs

Application of the ecological perspective in occupational social work is a recent development. The ecological perspective refers to the interaction of the person-in-environment (Googins, 1984; Balgopal & Nofz, 1989; Balgopal, 1989). The environment includes both personal and work environments. Successful development and implementation of multinational EAPs from an ecological perspective require close attention to the different socio-cultural and political realities in developed countries (builders of multinationals) and developing countries (receivers of multinationals). In developing countries service delivery models based on contractual programs may not be relevant and the group consortia model may not be germane because in developing countries industries tend to be labor intensive. Therefore, internal programs and union based programs may be the only viable options in developing countries. However, the spectrum of service modalities may be appropriate in developed countries. There are several factors that require consideration while developing and implementing EAPs in both developed and developing host countries: the political and legal framework, corporate culture, the role of the union, and cultural issues.

Public Sector: Politico-Legal Dimension

EAPs have developed on a voluntary basis in democratic countries that operate in capitalist economies. However, in socialist democracies, business and industries are mandated by law to provide many labor welfare programs and services that are offered by comprehensive EAPs. In communist countries these may be offered through government initiatives. The health
care policies of a nation significantly influence the structure and functioning of EAPs. Employers in socialist, socialist democracies, and nations that have socialized medicine are receptive to the establishment of EAPs as there are no additional costs (Yandrick, 1986; Bitten & Keis, 1986). In these countries clients are conditioned to expect free health services. As a result, for example, in Canada, it is difficult to motivate clients to pay for private practitioners (Bitten & Keis, 1986). Thus, the political realities of the host countries can either inhibit or encourage the development of EAPs.

Legal systems vary from one country to another. For example, legal systems in Canada and U.S. are very different, though both countries are culturally similar and highly industrialized democracies. There are major differences in legality of issues such as client/counselor privilege, drug screening, confidentiality, third party access to records, and grievances and arbitration (Bitten & Keis, 1986). Many countries vary in their legislative stipulations regarding substance use and abuse inclusive of alcohol and other drugs. These legal issues have ramifications regarding the kinds of treatment strategies that can be developed. For example, as stated earlier, in many socialist and socialist democracies services that affect the quality of life of employees are mandated through legislation. Thus, the development of EAPs in these countries will require coordinating those services in addition to providing the services that are unique to U.S. based EAPs.

Private Sector: Corporate-Labor Dimension

The EAP as a subunit of an organization must find a niche within the corporate culture and must fit into the existing organizational structure, values, and beliefs. In corporations where employees are unionized and represented by a bargaining agent, a joint labor-management EAP will be more effective. Attention has to be paid to treatment issues, personnel policies, confidentiality, training programs, insurance coverage, and marketing strategies. In order for an EAP to be successfully implemented and utilized, the EAP needs a full commitment of management (Scanlon, 1986), and where applicable, the union, the works councils, or other work groups.
Occupational social workers need to have a clear understanding of the labor-management relationships that exist in the host countries. In the United States in 1980 only 25% of the labor force was unionized, while it was much higher in other developed countries for the same year. For instance, it was 65% in Austria, 73% in Belgium, 72% in Denmark, 41% in Federal Republic of Germany, 56% in Great Britain, 41% in Netherlands, 62% in Norway, 87% in Sweden (Windmuller, et al. 1987). The rate of union membership varied in developing countries as well. For example in the early 1980s, union membership was at 40 to 50% in Algeria, and Tanzania, 30 to 40% in Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guyana, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (International Labour Office, 1985). In the U.S., unions have had little close direct contact with political parties, i.e., unions were not created by political parties. However, in most European as well as the developing countries, a close association exists between unions and political parties (Bean, 1987). The EAP models in the U.S. have developed in a less unionized environment, where unions have reduced political party identification.

Given the fact that unions are politically active in European and developing countries, unions are to be systematically addressed while transplanting U.S. based EAPs. Further, labor unions in Europe, Australia, and other developing nations appear more suspicious of management's motives regarding EAP than in the U.S. (Yandrick, 1986). If the suspicion of the labor unions is not structurally addressed, the success of the EAPs will be minimal. Therefore, in the development process of EAPs, establishment of credibility is needed with both the management and the union. As it is generally the practice of management to pay for social services, this could be perceived as management's infringement on the union territory. In order to avoid this confusion and the resulting suspicion, the union is to be consulted from the beginning of the planning for EAPs. Hence, a tripartite board consisting of the director of the EAP, the corporate personnel director, and the president of the union is essential and could be responsible for policy formulation (Ramanathan & Ramakrishnan, 1987). Workers' participation in decision making through works councils or worker committees is greater in
Europe and developing nations like India and Pakistan (ILO, 1981). Thus, systematically involving either works councils or worker committees in the policy formulation and implementation process will increase the success of an EAP.

Cultural Issues

In addition to the U.S., EAPs or EAP-like efforts are prevalent in Canada, Western Europe, India, Malaysia, and Australia (Ramanathan, 1990). There is a large percentage of self-referrals in the United States and Canada, while there is little emphasis on self-referral in Australia (Roman, 1983). Further, Australians and Malaysians view alcohol and drug abuse as a national threat and have stringent federal policies in response to that threat. Such differences warrant networking with host country's EAP associations so as to be sensitive to cultural nuances while transplanting EAPs.

Besides providing counseling services multinational occupational social workers need to be aware of treatment or intervention specific to that culture. For example, the occupational social workers are advised to incorporate, wherever appropriate, such cultural elements as folk theories, ethnic disease taxonomies, and indigenous curers (Green, 1982). Further, in many cultures, people often seek help from spiritual healers, extended family members as well as their natural networks (LeVine & Padilla, 1980; Mokuau, 1988; Balgopal, 1986). Occupational social workers ought to incorporate these elements in both the assessment and development of intervention strategies.

The interaction of the host society's culture, its politico-legal system, and its trade union-management relations influence the functioning of the multinational EAP. There are important challenges in adapting EAPs to developing nations. These may include government regulations (Negandhi & Baliga, 1980; Goldberg & Negandhi, 1983), and ethnic stratifications (Kumar, 1980).

ILO's Relevance to Multinational EAPs

Given the increasing levels of global economic integration, the International Labor Organization (founded in 1919) with
its 150 member countries is interested and concerned with all aspects that impinge upon the world of work. Due to the ever increasing problem of alcohol and drug abuse in the workplace, the ILO is increasing its attention to this problem. In the 1973, 1980, and 1985 sessions of the ILO in Geneva, resolutions concerning alcoholism and drug dependence were addressed and the member states were urged to implement treatment and rehabilitation programs. Thus, ILO is spearheading the need to provide substance abuse services. The “multi-media resource kit” developed by ILO and World Health Organization is available to employers and trade unions, and specifically to foremen, welfare officers, social workers, personnel managers, and medical officers to identify potential and problem cases and to develop and manage a program aimed at treating and preventing substance abuse (Shahandeh, 1987).

Roles for the Multinational Occupational Social Workers

Occupational social workers’ roles in multinational corporations will vary according to the EAP service modality in use. Roles include problem assessment, brief treatment, client follow-up, development and design of corporate-wide substance abuse policies, case consultation, referral, supervisory training (regarding referral procedures), and marketing of EAP services (Ramanathan, 1990). Other emerging roles for occupational social workers may arise in response to the legislative requirements. For example, the Indian Factories Act of 1948 mandated employers to provide child care assistance if they employ 50 women (Srivastava, 1967). According to the 1976 amendments, employers were mandated to provide child care if 30 women were employed (Srivastava, 1988).

Multinational business brings with it many unique problems in the management of human resources. The most fundamental of these is the necessity for managers raised and experienced in one culture to play bicultural and or multicultural roles. Managers of foreign subsidiaries play a buffer role between two cultures (Robock, Simmonds, Zwick, 1977). Cultural differences will add to both over all stress and job related stress.

Foreign executives and their families are likely to face environmental differences that are more pronounced than the
on-the-job differences. Robock and colleagues cite a research study of almost 2,000 employees of a multinational firm on cross national assignments. Of these 2,000 employees about 20% were of American nationality, and the findings indicate that the employee's satisfaction with the foreign assignment depended mainly on the spouse's adjustment to the assignment (Purcer-Smith, 1971 as cited in Robock, Simmonds, Zwick, 1977).

Occupational social workers in the multinational corporations are bound to work with employees who have work related stress. This work stress may be due to job ambiguity, worker alienation, repetitiveness, information overload and other structural issues in the organization. Many social workers have been concerned with bringing about intraorganizational changes (Reynolds, 1951; Patti, 1980a; Patti, 1980b; Patti & Resnick, 1980; Pawlak, 1980). However, bringing about organizational changes as a occupational social worker in the area of job stress may require different sets of strategies. For example, if a particular group of jobs, i.e., job family is over represented in work related stress, this information could be communicated to human resource managers who consequently may engage in job enrichment and job redesign. Additionally, as introduction of new technology could cause anxiety and stress, occupational social workers may serve as consultants to the human resource managers regarding stress management, and management of technology change.

Conclusion

In a global economy, expansion of multinational companies is inevitable. Transfer of human technology via multinational EAPs is a reality. Successful development and implementation of multinational EAPs require attention to the socio-cultural factors of the host countries. The socio-economic and political realities among developed countries and between developed and developing countries vary significantly. These are to be systematically addressed while transplanting U.S. EAP models. Given that the social work profession is rooted in the ecological tradition of person-in-environment, occupational social workers should provide leadership in sensitizing multinational corporations to cultural and ethnic uniqueness of host countries.
Occupational social work

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Social Support for the Black Elderly: Is There a Link between Informal and Formal Assistance?

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The University of Alabama
School of Social Work

This study explores informal and formal social support among a sample of elderly southern Blacks. The results reveal that all respondents received informal assistance and that while overall formal assistance was low, a number of respondents received support from both sources. The author discusses these findings in relation to the supplement model of elderly social support and their implications for social service providers.

Previous research suggests that the Black elderly's informal networks are particularly important because they provide substantial supportive services (Chatters, Taylor, and Jackson, 1986; Krishef and Yoelin, 1981). Jackson (1971) classifies these services as instrumental (e.g., grocery shopping and transportation) and affective (e.g., advice and encouragement). While attention has been devoted to assistance provided by the Black elderly's informal networks, there is limited discussion about the relationship between their informal support and assistance available through formal agencies.

This study explores the role of the Black elderly's informal networks in providing assistance, their use of formal community-based social services, and the relationship between informal and formal assistance.

Informal-Formal Service Linkage Models

The gerontological literature generally identifies four competing models to explain the relationship between informal and formal assistance provided the elderly. These models are substitute model, the complement model, the kin independent model, and the supplement model. The substitute model suggests that
formal services replace informal assistance (Greene, 1983). The formal system intervenes when informal caregivers are unavailable or unable to meet the service needs of their elders. While little research supports this model (Greene, 1983; Stoller, 1989), the potential for a shift to total elderly dependence on the formal system is a major concern of policy makers who anticipate less informal support because of changing work and residential trends (Jackson, 1980; Kivett, 1985; Shanas, 1979).

The complement model suggests that both informal and formal systems are structured to provide certain types of services which respond to different needs of the elderly. The informal structure provides nontechnical, nonroutine, and unpredictable services, while the formal system provides technical, routine, and predictable services (Litwak, 1985).

A number of studies are consistent with the complement model. For example, Noelker and Bass (1989) found that informal caregivers provided their elders personal care, while the formal system provided home health care. Krishef and Yoelin (1981) found that while older Blacks and Whites in the rural South relied primarily on the formal system for health care and limited income maintenance, they depended on their informal networks for other services.

The kin independent model maintains that there is no relationship between the informal support system of older persons and the formal service delivery system. The informal system is viewed essentially as the sole provider of services to older people (Noelker and Bass, 1989; Wagner and Keast, 1981).

A number of studies support the kin independent model, but their explanations for the nonexistent relationship differ. For example, some studies indicate that informal networks of older persons inhibit access to the formal service system (O’Brien and Wagner, 1980; Wagner and Keast, 1981). Other studies point to the beliefs and cultural values of older persons as factors that prevent formal service use (Gaitz, 1974; Karcher and Karcher, 1980; Moen; 1978).

While the kin independent model has not been explicitly discussed in relation to support systems of ethnic minority elderly, there are a number of research findings which suggest that it might have some utility (Aschenbrenner, 1973; Bould, Sanborn,
and Reif, 1986; Gordon, 1979; Mindel, Wright, and Starrett, 1986; Chatters, Taylor, and Jackson, 1986). Adams (1980) reported that most of his sample of African-Americans, Japanese-Americans, and Latin Americans preferred caring for themselves or making service arrangements within their informal networks. Chatters, et al. (1986) found that among older Blacks, the daughter was the most frequently desired helper. Forty-one percent of their sample expressed a preference for help from a daughter, 37.2% showed preference for a son, and 32.8% selected the spouse as the desirable helper. Others expressed preferences for a sister (28.7%), brother (20%), friend (19%), neighbor (11.9), mother (5.5%), or father (1%).

Other research attributes different attitudinal factors to nonuse of service by the Black elderly. Among these are the perception of formal assistance as a form of charity, and a level of skepticism about acceptance by a system that has historically employed discriminatory practices (Dancy, 1980; Jackson, 1972).

Structural and functional characteristics within the formal service system have also been identified as barriers to services for older ethnic minorities (Die and Seelbach, 1988; Holmes, Holmes, Steinbach, Hausner, and Rocheleau, 1979; Lee, 1987). Holmes et al. (1979) found that the lack of adequate ethnic representation within the service system and the absence of community-based services contributed to nonuse by elderly Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. Other inhibiting factors reported are inadequate dissemination of service information (Die and Seelbach, 1988; Gordon, 1979), inappropriateness of services (Sears and McConalay, 1973; Spence and Atherton, in press), eligibility problems (Spence, in press), and the negative attitudes of service providers (Dancy, 1977; Holmes et al. 1979).

Finally, the supplement model posits that the formal system augments the support provided by informal caregivers (Edelman, 1986; Noekler and Bass, 1989). The assumption is that informal caregivers provide substantial care to their elders, and that the formal system intervenes by providing similar services because of a critical need.

Findings from a number of studies (Stoller, 1989; Edelman, 1986) are consistent with the supplement model. Brody (1981)
observed that older women who received a high level of informal support also received more formal services. Similarly, Mindel and Wright (1982) found that formal service use was positively related to informal assistance provided older Blacks and Whites. They explained this finding by suggesting that those individuals who received the most help were in greatest need of assistance.

Methodology

Sample and Sampling Procedures

The study's sample was selected from a population of non-institutionalized older Blacks who resided in a northwestern county in Florida. In the absence of a complete listing of all elderly Blacks in the area, local churches, civic and social organizations, businesses, and informed individuals were contacted for identifying information. The number of individuals identified totalled 1,204 and represented 31% of the elderly Black residents in the county.

A nonprobability purposive sampling procedure was used to ensure adequate representation of the Black elderly with regard to selected background characteristics. While 105 persons were initially selected to participate in the study, the ultimate sample consisted of 100 individuals. Of the nonparticipants, three could not be contacted, and two refused to be interviewed. The data were collected by the researcher between October and December 1986.

Fifty-nine percent of the respondents were female, and 50% were 75 years of age or over. Forty-eight percent were widowed, 31% were married, 10% were divorced, and the remainder were never married or separated. Eighty-one percent of the widowed respondents were female, and 74% of the males were married. Forty-six percent of the respondents attended or completed elementary school, 24% attended and 4% completed high school, 2% attended and 15% completed college, and 9% had no schooling. Fifty-six percent reported individual monthly incomes of under $400, 33% had incomes between $400 and $1,199, and 11% had incomes over $1,200. Eighty-three percent received social
security benefits and 58% of those respondents also had supplemental security income, pensions or other government benefits. Fifty-six percent of the respondents lived with relatives or other members of their informal network and 44% lived alone. Sixty-eight of the respondents lived in the urban area.

Measurement

Formal service use was dichotomized as use and nonuse. Use was defined as respondents reporting having used one or more of the following six services within the year covered by the study: transportation, homemaker/chore (i.e., house cleaning, washing clothes, cooking, household repairs, and yard work), congregate or group meals, home-delivered meals, day care (protective support during the day), and counselling. Nonuse was defined as respondents reporting not having received any of these services within the period covered by the study.

Informal network assistance was measured by asking the respondents if they had received any of the above six services from the following individuals within the study period: family members, friends, neighbors, and/or other individuals not identified with the formal social service delivery system.

Findings

Use of Formal Services

Formal service use was low, with only 34% of the sample reporting use of one or more of the six services. The lowest percentages of use were found for day care and counselling (2% each). Eleven percent of the respondents reported use of transportation, and 8% stated that they had received home-delivered meals. The percentage of use for the entire homemaker/chore service category was 13%. The highest percentage of use was found for congregate meals (20%).

Informal Assistance

All respondents received some type of informal assistance (one or more of the selected services). Sources of assistance included family, friends, neighbors, and persons identified as
"others." The family ranked first in providing the wide range of selected services, with respondents receiving greatest support for group meals (90%), house cleaning (57%), transportation (54%), cooking (50%), and home-delivered meals (47%). Friends provided the next largest range of services, with respondents receiving greatest assistance with group meals (30%), transportation (27%), counselling (20%) and home-delivered meals (12%). Neighbors and individuals in the "other" category both ranked third in providing support. From friends, respondents primarily received transportation (20%), counselling (17%) group meals (14%), and home-delivered meals (10%). From other individuals, respondents mainly received assistance with household repairs (34%), yardwork (30%), group meals (17%), and house cleaning (8%). Services not provided by neighbors were housing cleaning and cooking and those not provided by other individuals were day care and cooking.

The Relationship between Informal Assistance and Use of Formal Social Services

For analysis purposes, informal network assistance was trichotomized to reflect three levels of assistance provided during the study period: low level of assistance (1–5 services), moderate level of assistance (6–9 services), and a high level of assistance (10 or more services). This classification was used to determine the frequency with which one or more services were provided respondents during the study period. Chi-square was employed to test the relationship between informal and formal assistance. The level of significance was set at .05.

Table 1 shows that only 14.3% of the respondents who received a low degree of informal assistance reported formal service use. In contrast, 41.9% of those who received moderate informal help and 41.4% who received a high degree of informal assistance used formal services.

Discussion and Implications

The findings of this study suggest that the supplement model may help explain social service assistance provided this sample of older Blacks. While overall use of formal service was low,
Table 1

Social Service Utilization (Use and Non-Use) by Informal Network Assistance (N=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMAL NETWORK ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Use</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 6.73, df = 2, p = .034$

the similarity of assistance provided respondents who received both informal and formal help and the positive relationship found between these sources lend support to the model.

Among the number of possible factors that may account for the above findings, two are particularly noteworthy. First, the similarity between informal and formal assistance and the positive relationship between these sources may be viewed in relation to the need factor. Respondents who received a greater degree of informal assistance perhaps were in greater need of additional help, a view similar to that reported by Mindel and Wright (1982). Second, these respondents might have been more aware of formal services because of their interactions with informed caregivers and formal service providers in general. The latter notion is consistent with the conclusion drawn by Krout (1983) regarding his study on older whites.

The findings of this study underline the importance of formal and informal assistance for older Blacks. Service providers must, therefore, play a major role in working with informal caregivers to ensure that essential services are made available to this the elderly population. Moreover, service providers must put forth efforts to assure service accessibility for all elderly Blacks in need of assistance. This assurance is particularly important since the use of formal service was low and a number
of nonusers expressed specific problems encountered including: hardships associated with the purchase of services (e.g., homemaker/chore and household repairs); the great demands placed on some informal caregivers, especially the spouse, who usually provided help; and the tension sometimes caused by these demands.

A number of approaches can be used to address the issue of accessibility. Agency outreach with a focus on service awareness would be helpful. Local Black churches, newspapers, and radio stations could serve as disseminators of service information. The addition of more Blacks to service agencies as board members, administrators, supervisors, and case managers might also facilitate awareness and service use. Observations made in relation to the social service delivery system where this study was conducted showed that few Blacks were in positions such as those noted above.

Additional research on community-based assistance provided to older Blacks is needed to determine more definitively the utility of the service models presented in this paper, or to yield information that suggests other service models.

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Black Elderly


Racial Differences
in the Use of Drugs and Alcohol
Among Low Income Youth and Young Adults

JOHN E. POULIN
Widener University
Center for Social Work Education

This study examines the use of drugs and alcohol among 284 youth and young adults of a low income urban community. Racial differences in the use of drugs and alcohol are examined for four age groups between 12 and 25.

Overall, the findings show significant racial differences in the use of both drugs and alcohol. Black youth and young adults have lower drug use and alcohol use rates than their white peers. The differences hold for the four age groups examined. Implications of the findings for drug prevention programs are discussed.

This study describes the use of drugs and alcohol among the youth and young adults of Chester, Pennsylvania. Chester is often characterized in negative terms. It is the most economically depressed community in Pennsylvania and in the 1980s it was ranked second on the Federal government list of most distressed cities in the nation (Baker, 1980). Fifty percent of the households receive some form of government assistance (Obenhouse, Schwartz, and Gray, 1984). About 34% of those on AFDC are long-term (four or more years) welfare recipients (Poulin, King, Greenberg, and Keating, 1987). Approximately 26% of the residents and 36% of the children are living below the poverty line (Baker, 1980). Chester also has the highest rate of single-parent families in Pennsylvania and out-of-wedlock births to teenage mothers (Poulin et al., 1987). It has a population of about 50,000 people of which about 66% are minorities (Census, 1980).

Chester has been characterized in the media as a center for drug activity in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware. It was the site of the largest drug raid in the history of the State of
Pennsylvania. In that raid, more than 50 high school students were arrested for possession and the selling of drugs (Maitland & DiGiacomo, 1989). Fastman and Merlaino (1989) found that many of Chester's minority youth have become caught up in the selling of drugs. Key informants from the justice system of Delaware County, Pennsylvania estimate that over 40% of the criminal justice cases derive from Chester, with a very high incidence of drug dealing arrests (Wasilchick, 1990).

Recent media attention has tended to focus on the drug problems of the urban underclass. Unfortunately, news coverage of the drug problem has tended to equate the problem with minority populations. Contrary to the prevailing stereotypes, the limited data available suggest no racial differences in the use of drugs and higher alcohol use rates for whites than for Blacks (NIDA, 1988; Poulin, 1990).

Drug and alcohol use varies by age. Young adults aged 18 to 25 have the highest use rates followed by teenagers aged 12 to 17 (NIDA, 1988). Substance use by America's youth has received considerable attention in the media. Gleaton and Gowan (1985) state that during the past decade, the United States experienced the highest rates of drug abuse by youth and young adults in the industrialized world. Macdonald (1986) states that American youth have the dubious honor and hold the unfortunate record of leading the world's industrialized nations in the use of drugs. Drug and alcohol use by low income youth and young adults and by racial groups among the poor have not been previously examined. Therefore, this article examines racial differences in the use of drugs and alcohol among the low income youths and young adults of Chester, PA.

Methods

Sample

Four hundred and ninety three residents of Chester, PA were interviewed for this study. A nonrandom stratified sampling plan was used to obtain subjects for the survey. A four way stratification based on gender and age was employed. The plan called for approximately equal proportions of males and females
Drugs and Alcohol

age 20 and under and 21 and over. This article reports the findings for those aged 12 to 25 (N = 284).

Eleven interviewers conducted the interviews during the months of May and June 1990. Four of the interviewers were students at a local university and seven were community residents. Four of the interviewers were Black, the remainder were white. The interviews took place throughout the Chester community. Interviews were conducted at twelve social service agencies in the community and on the streets of Chester. Participants were selected on a first come basis. The interviewers were instructed to determine if the subjects lived in the Chester community. If so, they were asked to participate in a confidential survey. Five hundred and fifty-two community residents were asked to participate in the study. Fifty-nine declined. Thus, 89.3% of the community residents who were asked to participate in the study completed interviews.

Demographic Characteristics

Among those aged 12 to 25, 56% (159) are between the ages of 12 and 17, and 44% (125) are aged 18 to 25. Almost 54% (153) are male and about 39% (111) are white. About 95% (270) of the subjects have never been married, 2.8% (8) are currently married and the remainder (6) are separated/divorced. About 67% (190) are currently in school, with 63% (120) of those in school attending high school. About 33% (94) are not currently in school. About 87% (82) of those not in school have completed high school. About 37% (105) live in two parent families, 37.7% (107) in single parent families, 4.2% (12) live with spouses or significant others, and almost 21% (60) have some other living arrangement. Most of those in the other category live with relatives.

The demographic characteristics of the study population appear for the most part to be representative of the Chester population. The percentage of minority subjects is close to the percentage reported in the 1980 Census. Also, the high percentage of the study subjects who live in single parent families or who live with relatives is characteristic of low income urban communities. The percentage of those not in school who have completed high school, however, is quite high. The study
population appears to under-represent youth and young adults who have dropped out of school; a population often associated with substance use and abuse. The under-representation of school dropouts could significantly lower the findings on drug and alcohol use reported in this study. The extent to which this occurs is unknown. However, caution in interpreting these data is warranted.

Measurement

The interview schedule consisted of three major components. The first section contained basic demographic information on the subjects. The second section asked questions about the family members' past substance use. The third section of the interview schedule contained questions about the respondents' substance use. The following thirteen substances were included on the interview schedule: liquor, beer, wine/wine coolers, marijuana, cocaine, crack, ice, methadone, amphetamines, barbiturates, heroin, inhalants, and prescription drugs.

Findings

There are racial differences in the use of drugs and alcohol among the youth and young adults in this study (not shown). About 88% of the white subjects had used alcohol within the past three months compared to about 53% of the Black subjects ($X^2 = 35.67, p < .001$). The difference between whites and Blacks in the use of drugs is also statistically significant. About 39% of the white subjects had used drugs within the past three months compared to about 25% of the minority residents ($X^2 = 6.20, p < .01$). A significantly larger percentage of the white youths and young adults use drugs and alcohol than their minority counterparts.

Figure 1 contains the percentages of drug and alcohol use for four age groups by race. Whites youths in all the age groups have higher percentages of drug and alcohol use than Black youths. Over 92% of the white youths and young adults aged 15 to 25 had used alcohol within the past three months compared to about 45% of the Blacks aged 15 to 17, 63.3% aged 18 to 20, and 76.5% aged 21 to 25.
Among the 12 to 14 year olds there are only slight differences in the percentages using drugs (6.7% vs. 5.9%). However, there are substantial racial differences in the use of drugs among those aged 15 through 20. Between 41.2% and 48.4% of the white youths in these age groups had used at least one type of drug during the past three months compared to 19% of the African American youths aged 15 to 17 and 30% aged 18 to 20. After age 20 radical differences in the use of drugs decrease substantially. Fifty percent of the whites in this age group had used drugs compared to 45.1% of the minority subjects.

Discussion

There are two limitations associated with these data. The first is that the information on substance use is based on self-reporting. As with all drug and alcohol studies based on
self-reports, there is the possibility of under-reporting. The interviewers were trained to stress that the interview would be strictly confidential and that the respondents would not be identified in any way. Nevertheless, it is possible that the use percentages obtained in this study are lower than the respondents' actual use of drugs and alcohol.

A second limitation of this study is the way in which subjects were selected to participate in the survey. A nonrandom sampling plan was used. As noted previously, it is possible that the survey respondents do not accurately represent Chester's youth and young adult population. The magnitude of the potential selection bias in these data is unknown.

The findings of this study show significant racial differences in the use of drugs and alcohol among the youth and young adults of Chester. The Blacks in this study have substantially lower rates of drug and alcohol use than the white teenagers and young adults.

Racial differences held for all the age groups examined. Significantly higher percentages of white youths of all ages had used alcohol than Black youths. Over 90% of the whites aged 15 to 25 had used alcohol within the past three months. This is a very high percentage of alcohol use, especially for the teenagers. Black teenagers have significantly lower percentages of alcohol use than their white peers.

Black youths aged 15 to 20 also had significantly lower rates of drug use than the same aged white youths. Among those aged 12 to 14 there were no racial differences in the use of drugs and after age 20 only small differences between the white and Black respondents.

These findings suggest that Black teenagers residing in low income urban communities are substantially less involved with drugs and alcohol than their white peers. It is the white youth of Chester who are most involved in drug and alcohol use. After age 20 racial differences in the use of drugs and alcohol remain but the magnitude of the differences are greatly reduced.

Media attention tends to focus on the drug problems of minority populations. The findings from this study indicate that drug and alcohol is not just a minority problem. Indeed, the opposite appears to hold. The low income white youth and young
adults appear to be more heavily involved in substance use than their minority peers. This is not to say, however, that a substantial number of minority persons are not involved in substance use. Prevention programs need to address the high drug and alcohol use among low income teenagers and young adults, particularly the very high percentage of white teenagers who use alcohol.

The proportion of Black teenagers who use drugs is much smaller than the proportion of white teenagers. After age 20 the differences are much smaller. It appears that Blacks become involved in the use of drugs at a later age than whites. Additional research is needed to identify the factors that contribute to the lower use rate by Black teenagers. An explanation of this phenomenon could help drug prevention programs direct their efforts at keeping minority youth drug free.

References


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