12-1990

An Examination of the Irrelevance of the Term Neoconservative as Used in American Ideological Debates

Mark C. Stanczak

Western Michigan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/1074

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE TERM NEOCONSERVATIVE AS USED IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL DEBATES

by

Mark C. Stanczak

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate college
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 1990
AN EXAMINATION OF THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE TERM
NEOCONSERVATIVE AS USED IN AMERICAN
IDEOLOGICAL DEBATES

Mark C. Stanczak, M.A.

Western Michigan University, 1990

This study compared, by analysis of their publications, various people who are considered to be part of the neoconservative movement in the United States. A definition was developed, and a sample of neoconservatives was examined to see if they adhered to the definition. The examination centered around these people's individual views, as published, on economics and the Welfare State; the scope of government in a society; the Cold War and its effect on community; religion; and stability, the state and social justice.

The analysis of their publications leads to the conclusion that there is no cohesive movement that can be defined as neoconservative. Also, the people discussed within this work had marked differences in their viewpoints on the aforementioned topics. This in itself does not allow one to group these people together into any ideological category.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Cheryl, who fully supported me throughout my endeavor. Also, I thank my mother and father, who sacrificed a great deal so I could complete a bachelor's degree. Plus, I wish to thank my committee Dr. William A Ritchie, chairman, Dr. Alan Isaak, and Dr. Ernest Rossi.

A special thanks goes to David Isaacson, Reference Librarian at Western Michigan University’s Waldo Library, for taking time to point out the proper places to find reference materials for this study. His input will always be remembered.

Finally, it should be noted that none of these people is responsible for any of the conclusions or flaws that may appear in this work. This thesis is my responsibility alone.

Mark C. Stanczak
INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI
University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
An examination of the irrelevance of the term neoconservative as used in American ideological debates

Stanczak, Mark Conrad, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1990
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ ii

CHAPTER

I. PROBLEMATIC CLASSIFICATION ...................... 1

II. CAPITALISM, PATERNALISM, AND THE SOCIAL INSURANCE STATE ......................... 23

III. GOVERNMENTAL SCOPE ............................. 45

IV. COMMUNITY AND THE COLD WAR .................... 59

V. RELIGION ........................................ 79

VI. STABILITY, THE STATE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE .... 94

VII. NEOCONSERVATISM'S LAST STAND ................. 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................... 132
A primary goal of human society is to establish order in a chaotic world. Man created towns, cities, states, and nations hoping that in creating these he would find order. He does the same thing in his schools of thought and fields of knowledge. This is most evident throughout history in the sciences.

When trying to assemble order in the fields of science, techniques known as classification or categorization are used. These techniques enable one to take vast amounts of data and put them into manageable groups so one can better understand the objects being studied. Any student beginning to study a new discipline knows how difficult learning can be if one does not understand the terminology and how that terminology applies to certain phenomena within that discipline. Once the classification scheme of a discipline is learned much of the frustration of learning is gone.

Certain disciplines have an easier task when classifying phenomena. In astronomy a supernova is the explosion of a star. Every time a star explodes there is no confusion, it is a supernova. In biology there is no confusion in determining what animals are mammals. These
are animals that are warm-blooded, have backbones, and the female has milk glands for feeding her young. Many of the natural sciences have classification schemes that are not open to interpretation. This gives them the appearance of being more rigorous than the social sciences.

The social sciences have complications that the natural sciences do not. These complications arise from the object of study, man and his society. The reason this is referred to as a complication is that people have biases, and do not always rise above them. Ideology can distort their ability to classify phenomena appropriately. The perception by the classifier, if the person being classified is aware of being studied, or one’s socio-economic status can, in one way or another, taint a classification. Plus, a hidden agenda by the observer, or the observed can also distort a classification scheme. This is not to say that people can not be classified. What is at issue is that when classifying people one must be extremely careful.

Besides individuality, an additional problem is that people can react, in certain situations, differently than they might if they know they are being studied. People also have the ability to change their views, opinions, and reactions over time, molecules can not. Plus people can decline to be studied, again molecules can not.
The natural sciences do not have these problems. If an experiment is done in the natural sciences, and the same process is repeated to the letter, generally the same outcome will occur. Even if the experiment is flawed, every time it is repeated in the flawed manner the outcome will be the same.

Recently in American politics a classification was created that may not have been created with great care. This is the classification of neoconservatism. This so-called movement has its roots in the mid 1960s when the social and political upheaval in that decade disillusioned some people to liberal political programs. The term was coined by Michael Harrington, and was not accepted by the very people it was meant to describe, until Irving Kristol, known as the "Godfather of neoconservatives" (cited in Kristol, 1983a, p. 136), fully accepted and embraced the term. Kristol (1983a) states:

It was the socialist critic Michael Harrington who first applied the term "Neoconservative" to those who, like myself, had begun to move away from a liberalism that had lost its moral and political bearings. It is hardly surprising that I should have acquired a new political identity in this way. The key ideological terms of modern political debate have all been either invented or popularized by the left—"liberal," "conservative," and "reactionary," "socialist," and "capitalist," "Left," and "Right" themselves—so that it is extremely difficult for those on the non-left to come up with an adequate self-definition. They would have to invent a wholly new
political vocabulary. The sensible course, therefore, is to take your label, claim it as your own, and run with it. (p. ix)

The so-called neoconservative movement is being studied in this thesis for a number of reasons:

1. The movement originated in a period when traditional authority in the United States was being challenged, as seen by the unrest on college campuses and large urban areas of the country. Neoconservatism supposedly calls for the re-establishment of this authority, and an emphasis on stability eventually leading to justice.

2. This movement is associated with calling for a limitation of the federal government's activities. The 1960s were a time when the government was trying to alleviate almost all of societal problems through governmental intervention. While this goal was seen by some as an admirable undertaking, it invariably led, not only to the enlargement of the government bureaucracy, but opened up the possibility that government would become over-involved in individual's lives.

3. In the 1960s America seemed to move away from religious influences on society. This influence is viewed, by neoconservatives, as important to the civility of a people.

4. The people associated with this so-called movement are some of the most prominent political and
social commentators of our time. For example, Daniel P. Moynihan is a senator from one of the most populous states in the United States. Another neoconservative, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, was the United States ambassador to the United Nations during part of the Reagan presidency. Such people command great respect and attention. Their influence can have a significant effect on society in many ways, especially if they are part of a cohesive political movement in the United States. This last point alone is important enough to warrant an examination of whether or not this movement exists.

In order to study neoconservatism there has to be a definition to follow. This is where the first problem with the term is encountered, as there is not an agreed upon definition of neoconservatism. While there are similarities in the several extant definitions, they are not all in agreement. This stems in part, as shall be argued, from the fact that neoconservatism is not a coherent movement.

The remainder of this chapter will look at three definitions of neoconservatism, each associated with an individual commentator: (1) Michael Harrington’s, since he coined the term; (2) Peter Steinfels’, chosen because he is an adamant critic of neoconservatism and feels it is a cohesive movement; (3) Irving Kristol’s, because he has embraced the term neoconservative, and has been its
most staunch advocate.

Michael Harrington's definition of neoconservatism is taken from the article: "The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics." This article was published in a book entitled *The New Conservatives* (Coser and Howe, ed., 1974). The article attempts to group neoconservatives by the views that all neoconservatives hold, but focuses on only three so-called neoconservatives who are seen as generally representative of this class. The three men are Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Daniel Bell. After Harrington states his strategy, he writes, "there are obvious ambiguities in my choice of examples" (Harrington, 1974, p. 30), which is what many from the Left say when defining or criticizing so-called neoconservatives.

Harrington concedes that Nathan Glazer is a liberal with conservative tendencies, that Daniel P. Moynihan is a conservative with liberal tendencies, and that Daniel Bell is a liberal who believes he is further to the Left. However, Harrington (1974) states he does not care about these men's preferences because "their ideas have a consistency and import which in the recent period have been conservative" (p.30). Is it possible that Michael Harrington is letting his bias of ideology taint his view of three distinctly different men?

The first part of Harrington's (1974) definition
begins with the idea that neoconservatism came out of the 1960s thinking that "The government did too much" (p. 31). Harrington (1974), quoting Moynihan, gives the first part of his definition of neoconservatism, "The modern welfare state was getting into activities no one understood very well. It had not reached the point of picking every man a wife, but it was getting close enough to other such imponderables" (p. 31). This implies that government is overly paternalistic, too large, and consequently is overstepping its capabilities.

The next point Harrington (1974) makes is that "the government was too egalitarian in its policies" (p. 35). This, again, was written in reference to the '60s, but suggests that Harrington feels neoconservatives are against equality. However, this is clarified in a quotation from Nathan Glazer (cited in Harrington, 1974) discussing:

"the revolution of equality": "Perhaps only a Tocqueville saw its awesome potency. For it not only expresses a demand for equality in political rights and in political power; it also represents a demand for equality in economic power, in social status, in authority in every sphere." (p. 35)

If Harrington is read correctly, he is saying that neoconservatives believe in equality of opportunity, but not equality of results.

What this means is that neoconservatives would like to see society based on merit. They would not want
programs such as Affirmative Action, because merit becomes a secondary consideration. People are not bettering themselves through hard work, but by accident of birth. Neoconservatives would like to see all laws supporting discrimination repealed, but would not support legislation giving an advantage to someone considered disadvantaged. Therefore, equality of opportunity would be open to those who work hard and deserve certain results in relationship to that hard work.

A third aspect of Harrington's (1974) definition is a view that is "central to the new conservatism" (p. 42). Harrington states that "the consequences of government intervention are, more often than not, unintended and usually negative" (p.42). Harrington says this is basically taken from Edmund Burke's theory that society is organic, progresses naturally, and should not be interfered with. So, Harrington says neoconservatives believe, as Michael Oakshott has argued (Harrington, 1974, p. 42), that a change in governmental practices should follow a change in society itself. Therefore, government should not initiate programs; it should only reflect changes in society. While Harrington calls this the central theme of neoconservatism, it is probable that many people included in the neoconservative movement do not accept this proposition. That is, carefully applied, Harrington's defining characteristics preclude many
purported members of this position.

Finally, Harrington proposes a fourth criterion, what he calls the "largest, and most conservative, abstraction" (Harrington, 1974, p. 51), of neoconservatism. Harrington (1974) says this is "the preference for the unplanned, and even the irrational, as opposed to conscious government policy" (p. 51). He argues that this puts an emphasis on tradition in handling any problems society may confront. Harrington states: "This is a fundamental conservative theme, the nostalgia for the vanished Gemeinschaft, the suspicion of the contemporary Gesellschaft" (p. 51). So, this is not only an argument for the status quo, but is also an argument to retreat to an earlier period, and an earlier, largely unstructured way of handling problems.

Summing up Harrington's definition leaves one, then, with four criteria of neoconservatism. Neoconservatives are for: (1) small non-paternalistic welfare state government; (2) equality of opportunity, but not for equality of results; (3) government following the flow of society, and not controlling society; and (4) looking in the past for solutions to the future, instead of government innovation.

Criteria 2 through 4 appear to be subcategories of criteria 1. "Small, non-paternalistic" does not necessarily refer only to the welfare state aspect of
government, but it refers to all of government in this context. The reader should remember Harrington argues that, according to neoconservatives, the government in the 1960s tried to do too much. Passing legislation to eliminate formal impediments to equality, government not controlling the flow of society, and government not being an innovator could conceivably keep government small and non-paternalistic. So, while Harrington argues criteria 3 and 4 are most important to neoconservatism, it is really criterion 1 that all the others revolve around.

When Peter Steinfels' definition is examined, again, it seems that the Left hedges a bit. This is evident when one considers a passage from Steinfels' book entitled, The Neoconservatives (1979).

WHAT ARE THE CHIEF TENETS of neoconservatism? Obviously no formal answer will be forthcoming from a movement that is reluctant to identify itself, or at least reluctant to identify itself as conservative. We have no Neoconservative Manifesto, no Neoconservative Program for the Seventies and Eighties, no statements issued from the National Association of Neoconservatives. As with all political tendencies, there are inner differences, variations, and crosscurrents--as well as fringe members, fellow travelers, and vague sympathizers. All generalizations risk an injustice to this or that writer. Indeed it may be that no neoconservative is the neoconservative; the center of gravity of a collection of individuals may rest somewhere between them and outside of any single person. (p. 49)

However, having raised such doubts, Steinfels persists in applying the classification broadly. This thesis argues
that Steinfels, along with others employing the concept of neoconservative, have great problems in clearly identifying individuals who satisfy the defining criteria. This will become clear in the following discussion.

Steinfels outlines a detailed definition of Neoconservatism in chapter 3 of his book. In this chapter Steinfels confronts Irving Kristol's definition of Neoconservative, which will be discussed later. The following is what Steinfels (1979) calls "the animating spirit of neoconservative" and "the particulars of its positions" (p. 53).

First, Steinfels (1979) states that "Neoconservatism holds that a crisis of authority has overtaken America and the West generally. Governing institutions have lost their legitimacy, the confidence of leading elites has been sapped. Social stability and the legacy of liberal civilization are threatened" (p. 53). He clarifies this statement as meaning that neoconservatives put stability before justice. Steinfels argues that neoconservatives want to re-establish authority and legitimacy to the older "economic and military policies" and the political institutions of the past (p. 54).

Second, Steinfels argues that neoconservatives believe:

The current crisis is primarily a cultural
crisis, a matter of values, morals, and manners. Though this crisis has causes and consequences on the level of socio-economic structure, neoconservatives, unlike the Left, tend to think these have performed well. The problem is that our convictions have gone slack, our morals loose, our manners corrupt. (p. 55)

Again, Steinfels goes on to clarify this statement. Neoconservatives argue that the loss of conviction, loosening of morals, and the corrupting of manners all come from, as Steinfels argues, the "adversary culture" (p. 56). The adversary culture, to the neoconservative, is the "new class" (p. 56), which Steinfels (1979) defines as "the growth of science based industry, the media, and higher education" (p. 57).

Steinfels, if interpreted correctly, is saying that this new class represents modernity, and neoconservatives are against modernity. Modernity in this context refers to the adversary culture/new class rejection of bourgeois life. The new class also wants the self to transcend any social parameters. In other words one should do as one's feelings dictate, and not as society dictates. The adversary culture/new class, Steinfels (1979) argues, has no use for tradition, or history; it is estranged "from the 'ordinary' in life, family, the neighborhood, the routine job" (p. 56). This type of attitude, if seen as pervasive in a society, would undermine authority threatening society and government.
Steinfels implies that all neoconservatives agree upon the definition of the adversary culture/new class, and argues further that all neoconservatives agree the adversary culture/new class is at the heart of the crisis in America. He goes on to say that, although some neoconservatives "refer to the decline of religion, some to the lure of hedonism, some to the march of equality" (p. 56), as affecting the crisis (all three of these are attributed to modernity), all neoconservatives agree on the effect the adversary culture/new class has on the crisis of authority.

An interesting difference to note here is that while Harrington (1974) argues that neoconservatives are against equality in social and economic endeavors, Steinfels suggests that neoconservatives differ in their views on equality. In the above passage he states only some neoconservatives refer to equality as a problem.

A third part of Steinfels' (1979) definition is that "Government is the victim of 'overload.' Attempting too much, it has naturally failed and thereby undermined its own authority" (p. 58). Steinfels explains neoconservatives define overload as an increase in demands on government that surpass government's resources. Steinfels cites three neoconservative explanations for this overload: (1) the Vietnam War, and the Kennedy-Johnson administrations promising too much
domestically to the American people; (2) the needs of the American underclass, which is considered a paramount problem; and (3) the call for social and economic equality of results.

The fourth part of Steinfels' (1979) definition is that "In the face of this crisis [instability], Neoconservatism insists that authority must be restored and government protected" (p. 63). Steinfels then suggests that Neoconservatives think liberty and justice can be achieved through government so long as governmental programs are geared to protect stability.

Steinfels also argues there are three areas of society that neoconservatives want to address: "levels of government, the public, and leading elites" (p. 64). Neoconservatives want to make adjustments in these areas to protect government and re-establish authority. In the first area there should be more responsibility given to state and local governments. The second area can be affected in a positive way if the public would just lower its expectations of what government can do for it. Area number three is where Steinfels says neoconservatives are trying to "discredit the decision-making elites" (p. 65). Neoconservatives think these elites carelessly use "sentimental humanitarianism and guilt" (p. 65) to implement their programs. Therefore, people should be wary of programs that play on their sympathies and guilt.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The last point in Steinfels' definition is that:

A precarious international order requires a stable, unified society at home; renewed emphasis on the Communist threat and on the Third World's rejection of liberal values is needed to generate the requisite national allegiance and discipline. (p. 67)

This is a rather straightforward statement. Neoconservatives are staunch anti-Communists, and do not want to deal with the Third World, except to use it as a unifying element at home.

Many of Steinfels' criteria overlap each other; however, when summed up they are as follows: (a) stability is the most important factor to the good society; (b) American society has lost conviction, morals, and manners throughout, which is related to modernity; (c) overload affected government, because government in the '60s promised too much, and people's expectation of government became too high; (d) authority can be restored and government can be protected through the combination of giving more responsibility to the state and local governments, erasing emotional responses to complicated problems, and lowering public expectations on the federal government; and (e) Communism, and the Third World's rejection of liberal values can be used to unify the American public to carry out policies that will lead to greater stability at home.

Irving Kristol's definition of Neoconservatism is
the final definition that will be looked at. It seemed logical to include his definition because he appears to be the only person who willingly accepts the label of neoconservative. Kristol's definition is more difficult to ascertain. He has never really written a book on the subject of Neoconservatism, but has written articles that discuss the political philosophy of the so-called movement. His basic position is best gleaned from the articles collected in the book *Reflections of A Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead* (Kristol, 1983a). The definition in this thesis is mainly taken from the "Introduction" to the book, and the article entitled "Confessions of a True, Self-Confessed--Perhaps the Only--Neoconservative" (Kristol, 1983a).

The following passage exhibits three of seven different aspects of Kristol's (1983a) definition of Neoconservatism; others emerge at different points in his writing:

> In economic and social policy, it (Neoconservatism) feels no lingering hostility to the welfare state, nor does it accept it resignedly, as a necessary evil. Instead it seeks not to dismantle the welfare state in the name of free-market economics but rather to re-shape it so as to attach to it the conservative predispositions of the people. This re-shaping will presumably take the form of trying to rid the welfare state of its paternalistic orientation, imposed on it by Left-liberalism, and making it over into the kind of "social insurance state" that provides the social and economic security a modern citizenry demands while minimizing governmental
intrusion into individual liberties. Limited
government, as neoconservatives see it, is not
in opposition to energetic government. The two
can be and ought to be natural corollaries of
one another. (pp. xii-xiii)

The first three aspects of Kristol's (1983a) definition
implied in this quotation are:

1. The welfare state is acceptable if it is a
non-paternalistic "social insurance state" (p.76).
Social insurance state is an ambiguous phrase, therefore,
for clarity the definition used in this thesis will be
the one discussed in Kristol's (1983a) book. It refers
to giving people social security in old age, health
insurance, disability insurance, and some type of
unemployment benefits.

2. The United States economy should be a mixed
economy. The basis of the economy should be capitalism,
but some regulatory and corrective ideas and mechanisms
should be incorporated into it.

3. Government should be limited. Limited
government means that there would only be certain areas
the government would have legitimate control over. On
the other hand, restrained government means that the
bureaucracy which accompanies all contemporary
governments would be reduced.

A fourth characteristic Kristol attributes to
Neoconservatism is that it is patriotic and nationalistic
in domestic and foreign policies. Kristol (1983a)
defines patriotism as springing "from love of the nation's past," and nationalism rises "out of hope for the nation's future, distinctive greatness" (p. xiii). Kristol (1983a) goes on to say that "Neoconservatives believe--as does the left--that politics always takes some degree of priority over economics, and that in foreign policy this is most especially true" (p. xiii). This implies that in domestic and foreign affairs, policies should be developed that would assure a good political outcome as opposed to a good economic outcome.

The implication here is that neoconservatives think community is more important than individualism. This is evident because economics (capitalism) in the United States is individualistic, while politics in general is always communal. Capitalism is individualistic because one is not told what to buy or when. Companies compete for profit in a market system. Some people argue that consumers vote for certain products by purchasing them. However, a consumer in a capitalistic society does not buy things under the dictates of a central planner. Politics is stated to be communal because people work together for common goals through politics. This can hardly be called an individualistic system when compared with that of an individual's ability to purchase freely in a capitalistic system.

Kristol's fifth definitional characteristic suggests
that the government should be concerned with the "manner and morals" (Kristol, 1983a, p. 77) of the people in society. This, Kristol argues, will help people in a free market heighten their preferences. The implication is that individuals left alone will either make choices that will lessen the quality of their lives, or will choose less moral ways of spending their time.

The sixth point in Kristol’s definition is that:

Neoconservatives look upon family and religion as indispensable pillars of a decent society. Indeed, they have a special fondness for all of those intermediate institutions of a liberal society which reconcile the need for community with a desire for liberty. (p. 77)

Likewise, if government teaches people a commonalty of morals, manners, and values, society will be more stable. Teaching a commonalty, or community if you will, is good and necessary for society.

The last and seventh part of Kristol’s definition is that stability is a prerequisite to justice. He does:

not know of a single political philosopher, from Plato to Tocqueville, or any of the founding fathers (always expecting an occasional wayward remark by Jefferson), who would have thought such a commitment anything but obviously sensible. (1983a, p. 75)

Kristol comments that neoconservatives are classical realists. He calls the left modern utopians, because they have the opposite view that justice should come before stability. So, stability is extremely important to Neoconservatism.
Kristol most likely is responding to the ideas and attitudes of the New Left. Groups like Students for a Democratic Society with their anti-establishment rhetoric, their ideas of student control of university curriculum and faculty, and students controlling administration decisions, in neoconservatives opinions, would have turned society upside-down during the late '60s and early '70s. He also has in mind the recent upsurge in left liberal political philosophy, best represented by John Rawls' (1971) A Theory of Justice, and its stress on equality of results. Plus, the advent of Affirmative Action programs go against the idea of merit and try to alleviate past injustices. In short, the idea of overturning the established society warranted some type of response. Kristol, along with others, may well be that response.

Kristol's definition summed up is as follows: (a) the United States should be a non-paternalistic social insurance state; (b) capitalism should be the basis of the economy, but can be modified where necessary; (c) the scope of government should be limited; (d) community is important to domestic and foreign societal concerns; (e) the state should help influence good manners and morals; (f) family and religion are extremely important to a good society; and (g) stability is the prerequisite for justice.
What should be clear now is that there are agreements and disagreements in these three definitions of Neoconservatism. It is necessary for this study to have one clear, more or less accepted, definition of Neoconservatism. The best way to accomplish this is to see where there are agreements among these definitions. These agreements would tend to strengthen each other, and lead one to believe that they are reliable and generally accepted characteristics of Neoconservatism.

It is logical to accept Kristol’s definition as the basis of a clear definition of Neoconservatism. First, he is the only person who totally identifies himself as a Neoconservative. Second, parts of Harrington’s (1974) and Steinfels’ (1979) definitions can be found in Kristol’s definition. This second point, the overlapping elements of the three primary attempts at definition, helps to strengthen Kristol’s definition, because he is in partial agreement, on different points, with both of his critics.

As a result, the definition that will be used for this study is as follows. Neoconservatives believe that: (a) government should support modified capitalism, and a non-paternalistic social insurance state; (b) the scope of government should be limited; (c) community is important to society domestically and in foreign policy, and the Soviet threat should be used in developing this
community; (d) the state should help influence manners and morals, and support the family and religion; and (e) stability is a prerequisite to justice.

Given this definition, this study will now argue that, even so simplified, the term neoconservative is ill-conceived, because the people commonly grouped under this term do not necessarily agree with each other, nor do their positions reasonably conform to, or fit, the simplified definition of Neoconservatism. The crux of this study is that Neoconservatism is not a political movement as the Left argues, but, instead, it is either an empty ideological category, or a vague, even amorphous position, hardly worthy of the attention it has received. The following chapters will examine where these so-called neoconservatives stand on capitalism, paternalism and the social welfare state, governmental scope, community and the Cold War, religion, stability, and the state and social justice. The thesis ends with some general conclusions.
CHAPTER II

CAPITALISM, PATERNALISM, AND THE SOCIAL INSURANCE STATE

In Chapter I a definition of neoconservatism was outlined. The first point in the definition was that neoconservatives believe that government should support modified capitalism, and a non-paternalistic social insurance state. This chapter will examine the degree of agreement, or disagreement among neoconservatives on this point.

Robert Nisbet is close to being a pure capitalist, and seems to be for something less than the social insurance state. This can be seen in a quotation taken from, "Three Values and Their Modern Perversion," presented at a seminar at The Rockford College Institute, in the fall of 1977, and published in 1978, in a work entitled, Capitalism and Culture. Nisbet (1978) states:

The economic system we call variously "capitalism," "private enterprise," and "the free market," came into existence in Western Europe roughly in the late sixteenth century and achieved its full development in the nineteenth and early twentieth. It is a matter of clear record that nothing in all of history comes even close to touching this system so far as sheer productivity and mass distribution of goods is concerned. Apart from this economic system the high standard of living enjoyed by literally all Westerners, and now in rising numbers by people in the non-western world, would be inconceivable. Everything we know tells us that the only possible way the masses now on this
Earth are to be given sustenance and a higher level of material existence is through a shoring-up of our economic system in the West, especially the United States and, to the best of our ability, the extension of this system to other parts of the world, parts in so many instances now in thralldom to demonstrably unproductive, inefficient, politically despotic systems which could not exist at all apart from a perhaps too generous Western, chiefly American, capitalism. (p. 1)

Later quotations will assist in establishing that Nisbet would accept only minor modifications to the capitalist system. Also he would like to see the whole world practicing capitalism, regardless of cultural and basic economic differences.

Peter Berger is another so-called neoconservative who basically agrees with Nisbet. Berger writes in The Capitalist Revolution (1986a) that "Industrial capitalism has generated the greatest productive power in Human history" and "To date, no other socioeconomic system has been able to generate comparable productive power" (p. 36).

Berger builds these propositions trying to assemble a partial theory of why capitalism is the best economic system in history to date. Still another proposition put forth by Berger (1986a) is that:

An economy oriented towards production for market exchange provides the optimal conditions for long-lasting and ever-expanding productive capacity based on modern technology.

Or, more simply put, capitalism provides the optimal context for the productive power of
modern technology. To date, there are no empirically available countercases. (p. 37)

Nisbet (1978) goes on to write that:

date, there are no

tempirical available countercases. (p. 37)

Nisbet (1978) goes on to write that:

the economic system I have just lauded is at the present time in the severest crisis of its history.... I need only refer to the fanatical environmentalists, the ecological doomsayers, the safety freaks, the health cultists, the calculating inflationists, the bureaucrats of the regulatory agencies out of Washington, and a large and still growing class of intellectuals in and out of the schools and universities for whom "the profit system," as they so quaintly but cleverly call it, is repugnant even though every single instance in the world of an economy that is not based upon private profit is either rankly despotic, totalitarian, or saturated by the bureaucratic conformism of a Sweden or the Marxist-sparked trade union tyranny of England. (pp. 1-2)

Again it is seen that Nisbet is for a capitalistic economy. He is frightened that the fanatics, freaks, agencies, and intellectuals who view the system (capitalism) as repugnant will destroy that system. Nisbet would not allow any of their modifications. These modifications include taxation of business (and individuals) for ecological clean up, price and wage control to lower inflation, and other modifications that curtail the free market system. He also states, at the end of this quotation, that any country without capitalism is not as free as one with capitalism; it cannot be free without it. Therefore, his conclusion is that, in order to have a good society, capitalism must be the economic system, and it should not be curtailed.
The question that needs to be asked here is: If capitalism is a preferred system, what modifications would be acceptable? It is inevitable that modification will occur, because neither capitalism nor socialism exist in their purist forms. Is the welfare state acceptable? In answering the above questions, the paternalistic nature of the state will be touched on. Any modification in the capitalist system has to come from the polity. The contention is that the greater the modifications the greater chance the government will be paternalistic.

Nisbet (1978) feels that government in the United States has grown to be a:

"cradle-to-grave state," and as the argument for it increasingly goes, must be willing, through law and agency, to deal with all problems in American society: "economic, political, social, cultural, educational, religious, and even psychological and moral. The limited state has become the limitlessly intrusive state." (p. 2).

His is definitely an argument for less government, and a non-paternalistic government. His characterization of the American system is summarized in the phrase, the "cradle-to-grave state."

Clearly, Nisbet is convinced that if capitalism were left alone, there would be no need for a welfare state. However, there is one exception: Nisbet believes that if people are economically hurt, through no fault of their own, as they were in the Great Depression, they should
receive some type of assistance. Nisbet (1978) states "They deserve help until they could regain their own momentum" (p. 10). Despite this qualification, it still can be said that Nisbet does not believe in a welfare state. He would, however, accept one aspect of a social insurance state, as discussed in Chapter I, i.e., assistance would occur under catastrophic conditions. Any catastrophe that would threaten someone from fulfilling his/her basic needs (food, clothing, shelter) would be supplemented in some way by the government. This is, however, considerably less than a complete social insurance state.

Peter Berger, on the other hand, is more resigned to the welfare state. Berger (1986a) sees it as a natural outgrowth of a democratic society:

Probably intrinsically, the modern democratic state is also a welfare state. And the economic requirements of the welfare state have the strong propensity to increase ever more massively. To meet this ongoing clamor for revenues,...the Western democratic state is pushed toward massive interventions in the economy. To be sure, these interventions are incremental and generally designed not to destroy the capitalist character of the economy. But they do raise the question (posed very sharply by Hayek and others), at what point capitalism as such will have become a legal fiction.... The very political liberties guaranteed by democracy allows for the development of all sorts of intermediate or mediating institutions. That is, it creates a society marked by social and political pluralism. By their very nature, many of these institutions coalesce into political pressure groups, whose major purpose is to pressure the
state to guarantee and fund their favored entitlements. The modern democratic state, by its very nature, is a gigantic mechanism handing out entitlements. Thus modern democracy favors the growth of what Mancur Olson has aptly termed "distributional coalitions." (p. 88)

It can be seen that this is quite different from Nisbet's reductionist position on the welfare state. Nisbet accepts minor modifications to cover catastrophic conditions, while Berger sees the welfare state as a natural, if troublesome, outgrowth of a democratic society. Therefore, it appears Berger would accept any size welfare state so long as the democratic, capitalist nature of the society did not disappear. On the other hand, Nisbet is for the least amount of modification in the democratic, capitalist state.

Another neoconservative is Daniel P. Moynihan. He and Daniel Bell are less apt to agree with Nisbet than any other mainline purported neoconservative. Moynihan presents a much more favorable evaluation of the welfare state. He would entertain additional encompassing welfare programs.

Moynihan states in *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* (1973) that "An account of the history of the Family Assistance Plan or FAP as it came to be known, must hence be one of failure. The law was not enacted." (p. 3). The FAP was backed by Moynihan (1973) to give families a guaranteed base income; "The idea of a
guaranteed income went beyond subsistence. It envisioned a level of payment sufficient to maintain a reasonable, if low, standard of living." (p. 127). (The Family Assistance Plan and all other bills and acts are not cited from primary sources, because the intent of this thesis is to discuss Moynihan's relationship to these bills, and not the bills themselves).

It is not the intent of this examination to outline Moynihan's program, but to show his greater sufferance of the welfare state.

Another bill Moynihan (1986) managed in the Senate was the "Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980" (p. 49). This bill gave adopting parents a monthly payment for adopting a child. In a five year period the children in foster care dropped by over 200,000. However, more significant to this study is the fact that Moynihan (1986) wrote that this bill "represented a small but significant attempt to rationalize the welfare system" (p. 49). It rationalizes the welfare system by creating family relationships between children and adults who would have been trapped in foster care situations indefinitely, but it apparently did not change costs, because while the foster parents had received monthly payments now they became adoptive parents and still received payments. It did, however, lower the number of children in foster care.

Nisbet would read most family assistance as creating
a more paternalistic government. This would be the case because, as he sees it, one would become dependent on the governmental benefits. Plus, one would have to work hand and hand with government to receive the benefits. Forms would more than likely have to be filled out stating the exact status of the family at all times. One can see how this would create a paternalistic type relationship between the state and its citizenry.

In concluding this part of the discussion it seems correct to state that these three men do agree with the idea of a social insurance state. Daniel P. Moynihan would like to see an increase in the welfare state, while Peter Berger sees the welfare state and its growth as inevitable in a democratic, capitalistic society. Robert Nisbet would like to see something less than the social insurance state. Irving Kristol, discussed later in this chapter, is the only person who is for a capitalistic, non-paternalistic, social insurance state. It can also be pointed out that Moynihan, because of the nature of his position, would accept a more paternalistic government, while Berger and Nisbet would not. Berger sees society as controlled by pluralistic forces on a group level, and Nisbet tends to understand society as more individualistically based.

Daniel Bell has a substantially different view of capitalism, although he too, is called a neoconservative.
Bell (1976) defines capitalism as "an economic-cultural system, organized economically around the institution of property and the production of commodities and based culturally in the fact that exchange relations, that of buying and selling, have permeated most of society" (p. 14). Then he goes on to discuss the idea that while capitalism and democracy are linked historically, in modern society they part company. The polity becomes freer to act as it sees fit, while the economy needs increasing controls applied to it.

Bell believes that capitalism, after it has developed, begins to wane, and government needs to step in to control the economy. In its extreme form this would lead to some type of socialism. Indeed, Bell’s point is that capitalism and democracy have split in the modern world. However, Nisbet, and to a lesser extent Berger, argues that they coexist by their very nature. These are quite different perceptions of how capitalism and democracy develop over time.

Nisbet also thinks that capitalism and liberty go hand and hand, and the more capitalistic a society becomes the freer that society will be, because there is less governmental intervention in people’s lives, and they can exercise their freedom of choice. This makes sense when one considers the individualistic nature of capitalism. Liberty by definition is individualism, so logically one
concerned with liberty would expect to have an individualistic economic system in place. In general, governmental controls detract from the overall liberty of the individual, and Nisbet would accept only minor modifications by government in the economic realm.

In his book *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976) Bell discusses the idea that capitalism in America has lost its legitimacy. He basically attributes this to the decline of the Protestant ethic in society. Bell (1976) states that:

In the early development of capitalism, the unrestrained economic impulse was held in check by Puritan restraint and the Protestant ethic. One worked because of one's obligation to one's calling or to fulfill the convenant [sic] of the community. But the Protestant ethic was undermined not by modernism but by capitalism itself. The greatest single engine in the destruction of the Protestant ethic was the invention of the installment plan, or instant credit. Previously one had to save in order to buy. But with credit cards one could indulge in instant gratification. The system was transformed by mass production and mass consumption, by the creation of new wants and new means of gratifying those wants. (p. 21)

What Bell argues is that man once was satisfied simply to fulfill his basic needs, but now the capitalist system has created less basic wants. Bell (1976) states that "Wants are psychological, not biological, and are by their nature unlimited" (p. 22). He feels that hedonism, and not economic growth or the eradication of poverty, has become the justification for capitalism.
Hedonism is the biggest problem Bell sees coming out of capitalism. This leads to unlimited wants, which is tolerable if people accept large disparities in the distribution of means. However, when everyone wants the same things, and resources are limited problems arise. Bell outlines five areas which illustrate the problems attributed to hedonism: (1) "rising entitlements" (p. 23); (2) choices of how to use limited resources; (3) destruction of the ecosystem; (4) "worldwide inflation" (p. 24); and (5) relying on the polity for crucial economic and societal decisions.

Bell’s point in discussing these five problems is that capitalism can not solve them and is indeed a substantial cause of societal deterioration. Bell concludes that in response to capitalism’s contradictions state-directed economies are going to emerge in many countries that are now capitalistic.

He argues that entitlements are linked to "economic growth and a rising standard of living" (Bell, 1976, p. 23), and if a country is capitalistic, there will be an escalation of such expectations. However, Bell’s use of the term entitlements changes this relationship. No longer are these expectations in the sense of goals; they now become demands on government. Therefore, when these demands cannot be fulfilled by the economic system (having a good job, food, shelter), something must change. Bell
tells us people turn to the state when the economy cannot fill these needs.

The choices of using limited resources comes into play when one looks at society’s goals as serving community. Does a society want to concentrate on eliminating sickness, housing shortages, food shortages, poverty, crime, discrimination, etc? The United States does, as any civilized society, want to eliminate all of these problems. However, with limited financial and physical resources which problem is attacked first? These choices cannot be made by each individual in a society. Bell argues that government takes over and allocates resources accordingly.

When the standard of living rises, and some of the ills of society are being corrected, then the environment begins to be affected. Factories pollute the air, cities destroy farmlands and recreation lands:

The increase in the number of automobiles creates a stifling smog over the cities; that is relatively easy to deal with.... Increased use of chemical fertilizers to increase food yields...also results in the runoff of nitrates into rivers and lakes.... How does one make the trade-off between food and pollution or, in an analogous case, between strip-mining for coal and the large-scale scarring of the countryside? (pp 23-24)

This coupled with increased entitlements and the allocation of limited resources creates inflation throughout the world. Bell argues that inflation is
endemic to economic growth, and is concerned with whether it can be controlled at an acceptable rate.

All of these problems lead to the fifth item on Bell's list, which is the transfer of economic and societal decisions to the polity. Bell (1976) states that:

This is a consequence not of any ideological conversion...but of structural transformation of the Western polity.... The fundamental political fact of the second half of the twentieth century has been the extension of state directed-economies. These developed first because of the need to rescue the system from depression, later because of the demands of a war economy and the enlargement of military commitments, and finally because of the strategic role of fiscal policy in affecting levels of spending and patterns of investment. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, we now move to state-managed societies. (p. 24)

Another argument Bell has against capitalism and hedonism is its effect on citizen's relationships, upon community. He argues that people become soft while sitting in the lap of luxury. Men also compete with each other for luxuries, then "lose the ability to share and sacrifice" (p.83). Men become so competitive and individualistic that they lose their sense of belonging or togetherness, leading to a breakdown in society.

Bell apparently leans towards a socialist market economy. He (1976) comments:

It is important to realize that the market economy, though it is associated historically with the rise of modern private capitalism, is as a mechanism not necessarily limited to that
system. Such writers as Enrico Barone and, later, Oskar Lange argued that a socialist market economy was entirely possible, and that the market would operate more efficiently under socialism than under modern capitalism where its operations were consistently distorted by monopoly or oligopoly. (p. 223)

This can definitely be seen as an argument for a movement away from capitalism as people commonly understand it in the United States.

Bell (1976) does not use the term socialist market economy in his own writing; he coins the more inclusive term "public household" (p. 26). He defends his use of the term public household instead of some other, because of its connotation of commonalty. Bell states that "the nature of a household is that it shares things in common--the domestic goods, the village green, the defense of the city--and necessarily has to come to some common understanding of the common good" (p. 30).

What Bell suggests in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (1976) is that the public household has expanded, and now it is involved in "normative economic policy," "science and technology" fiscal support and "normative social policy." (p. 225). Bell then states:

Moreover, the public household now becomes the arena for the expression not only of public needs but also of private wants. This takes the form of governmental responsibility for economic growth, or of various social claims on the community, such as higher education for all. Above all, the basic allocative power is now political rather than economic. (p. 226)
Bell finds these developments both necessary, desired, and indeed tries to find justification for these trends in his chapter on "The Public Household" (pp. 220-282).

Another part of Bell's discussion on the public household shows the distance he would move away from capitalism. Bell (1974) quotes Michael Walzer about the desirability of "the abolition of the power of money outside its sphere...a society in which wealth is no longer convertible into social goods with which it has no intrinsic connection" (p. 59). This quotation is linked in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism to health care, which Bell thinks should not be held back because of lack of income. His reasoning for this is that health is such an important factor in one's life, that no one should be without health care.

It appears that Bell uses the criteria of biological needs to qualify what is important. If this is true, then health care would not be the only thing handled on a communal basis. Food, being necessary biologically, would have to be distributed, in general, by need and not by income level. Shelter and clothing also would fit in the category of biological needs. Moreover it would be difficult to separate the four categories of food, shelter, clothing, and health care because they are all interrelated.

Provision of all four of these needs replaces
capitalism with a massive welfare state. It also takes a non-paternalistic government and makes it a paternalistic government, because if government is providing all of these services it would inevitably want something in return. Even if it were just obedience to the laws of society, it would make government into a parental-like system. Is it possible one might obey and respect government only to receive food and shelter? The idea that government should provide basic care for its citizenry could potentially create a large paternalistic welfare state. This is in conflict with the basic tenets of neoconservatism.

Finally, this would not be a social insurance state, because among other things it would lead to a redistribution of wealth. Government would direct the flow of capital so there would be fewer discrepancies in the basic standard of living, creating a floor no one would fall below. The term standard of living refers to having adequate amounts of the four biological necessities discussed above. In order to give everyone adequate health care, food, shelter, and clothing, large sums of money would have to come from somewhere. This somewhere logically would be the middle and upper classes of a society. The lower classes, and--increasingly evident in health care costs, the middle class--in a society would be the ones who would, most likely, not be able to afford the
four basic biological necessities of life. The state would not just assist people in times of need, but would guarantee all basic necessities of life.

This agrees somewhat with Daniel P. Moynihan and his guaranteed income for families. It appears that Moynihan, Berger, and Bell all agree that the welfare state will, if not should, expand. Nisbet, however, only wants a small, and possibly less than, social insurance state.

It is plain to see that Daniel Bell does not fit under the first criterion of a neoconservative. His high emphasis on communal economic policies turns him away from capitalism, and also turns him towards a paternalistic welfare state. Both Nisbet and Bell cannot be forced into the same category of neoconservatism.

Irving Kristol appears to be the only person who completely embraces the term neoconservative. He also appears to be the only person labeled neoconservative who feels there is a cohesive movement (neoconservatism's critics, such as Steinfels, embrace the idea of a unified ideological position). This is why it has been decided to use his views in the last part of the chapter.

In his book Two Cheers for Capitalism (1978) Kristol argues vehemently for capitalism, but in a modified form. This is best stated in the "Preface":

But is it [capitalism] worth preserving? I believe it is, at least in its essentials. It is worth preserving because (and one cannot
repeat it too often) it really does work; it does deliver on its promises, limited as these promises are by certain criteria. It does improve people's material standard of living, and it does give each person the opportunity to exercise a more meaningful freedom of choice in the shaping of his life.... They may wish to mitigate some of the rigors of this freedom through measures of collective security--what we call the welfare state--but that need be no threat, in principle, to capitalism. An affluent society in which people choose to purchase (through taxes) certain goods collectively rather than individually (insurance against adversity, basic scientific research, and the like) represent no rebellion against the liberal-capitalist order. On the contrary: it tends to make the order more firmly established. (pp xii-xiii)

He believes that some redistribution should occur through taxes on a voluntary basis by the people. The word voluntary refers to the process of government, in a representative democracy, that creates taxation laws.

Kristol (1978) also discusses the social insurance state, and in the following quotation his acceptance of a social insurance state can be seen.

The state was to make it compulsory for citizens to insure themselves--and to help the less fortunate to insure themselves--against the three plagues of a dynamic, urbanized society: dependency in old age, serious illness, and unemployment. As a consequence of such social insurance, a "floor" should be provided, beneath which no one could suffer the misfortunes of sinking. (p. 247)

Kristol (1983) also states:

Practically all of the truly popular and widespread support for a welfare state would be satisfied by a mixture of voluntary and compulsory insurance schemes--old-age insurance, disability insurance, unemployment insurance,
medical insurance—that are reassuringly (if not perfectly) compatible with a liberal-capitalist society. (p. 122)

It appears that in order to establish a social insurance state under Kristol’s definition there are only three things the state would do for its citizens. The state would protect them from: (1) need in old age; (2) illness; and (3) unemployment. As we have seen, Kristol (1978) speaks about the people of a system through taxes creating "(insurance against adversity, basic scientific research, and the like)" (p. xii), making it possible, even probable that Kristol would accept more than a social insurance state.

Kristol (1978) does establish limits to the growth of the social insurance state:

The welfare system encourages various social pathologies—broken families, illegitimacy, drug addiction—which easily overwhelm the single statistical fact of "the abolition of poverty." Such an "abolition of poverty" through transfer payments—i.e., through a redistribution of income—does work for the aged, the sick, the handicapped; it seems to be counterproductive for all others. (p. 220)

Kristol does not give an explanation of how the welfare state created the problems outlined above. He merely states that these problems were created by the welfare state, and basically assumes that one understands why.

Kristol (1978) also sees another problem that the welfare system creates, the "poverty trap." Kristol (1978) states:
A huge disincentive is officially established; it becomes positively irrational for a poor family to try to move up a notch or two along the income scale. Having been defined as poor, they are encouraged to remain poor.... One can see this process only too clearly at work in New York City, where welfare benefits--taken together with Medicaid, food stamps, etc.--bring all the poor above the official poverty line. They get more money, better housing, and better medical care but suffer more crime, drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, and all the other varieties of social pathology which dependency creates. (p 236)

So chronic poverty, increased crime, and juvenile delinquency can be added to the list of problems Kristol associates with the welfare system. He believes that the social insurance state would not create these problems, because a specific group of people would not be assisted in Kristol's social insurance state. It appears that poverty would not be one of the criteria used to decide if one needed assistance. Basically, as identified previously, problems of the aged, unemployed, and seriously ill would be addressed under Kristol's concept of the social insurance state.

Kristol explains that he is against paternalistic government, and states that the rising costs of the welfare state stem from the state trying to solve all the problems of human existence. Bureaucracies have grown, and created great expenses without alleviating the problems they were set up to solve. Experts have convinced Congress to pass legislation to create these
bureaucracies, which led to rising costs of government. Kristol believes that sooner or later the welfare state will have to be revised, and a return to the basic social insurance state will be needed.

What should be obvious, after reading this chapter, is that these so-called neoconservatives, with the possible exception of Kristol, do not meet the first criterion of neoconservatism, i.e. they do not believe that government should support modified capitalism and a non-paternalistic social insurance state. They also do not agree with each other on the issues that have been discussed. Robert Nisbet and Daniel Bell do not believe in modified capitalism, or a non-paternalistic social insurance state. Nisbet is a capitalist; Bell is very close to being a democratic-socialist, and has been called a social democrat by Kristol. Kristol comes close to fitting the first criterion, because he somewhat advocates a social insurance state and non-paternalistic government. Daniel P. Moynihan would like to see the welfare state extended in some areas, and his emphasis on governmental intervention in the family leads one to believe he would support (in practice, not words) a more paternalistic government. Peter Berger feels capitalism is a great system; however, modifications occur because it is linked so closely with democracy, which creates entitlements, and expands the welfare state. Berger argues that this is all
right as long as capitalism does not disappear.

What is evident after reading Chapter II is that there is substantial disagreement in this area. The conclusions so drawn make it difficult to group the people discussed in this chapter under one cohesive term. The conclusion can be made, then, that the term neoconservative does not stand—at least the major purported members of this class do not generally meet the class’ first defining characteristic. If the term were used correctly, only Irving Kristol would be a neoconservative as far as this criterion is concerned. Even at this stage it can be argued that the term is incorrectly used, and, quite possibly, ill-conceived.
CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENTAL SCOPE

In a discussion of the general scope of government it must be kept in mind that scope does not necessarily equal size. If one were to look at the size of a government, one would look at the leaders, and the associated bureaucracy. In some cases the size of government would be large, and in others it would be small. However, if one were to look at scope, it is possible that the government which is the smallest in size could be the largest in scope. This is because scope deals with the extent to which governmental policies affect the governed. In considering scope here, our concerns go beyond the state’s economic functions.

So-called neoconservatives should believe in limited scope of national government—as discussed in Chapter I. The implication is that there would be few national policies that would affect society as a whole, and government would facilitate the greatest individual freedom with the least amount of governmental control. Most Western democracies are presumably built on this philosophy.

This chapter will focus on the fact that, contrary to immediate expectations, people grouped under the term
neoconservative do not necessarily believe in limited national governmental scope. What one finds when one examines neoconservatism and the issue of governmental scope, as with other issues, is that all so-called neoconservatives do not agree on this. They agree that government should be involved in society; however, agreement as to what part of society and to what extent government is involved eludes them. Once again those commonly identified as "neoconservatives" exhibit both marked diversity, and rejection of one of the position's defining characteristics.

Nathan Glazer, while saying that he has reservations about the term neoconservative, does accept the label. However, he accepts it with great reluctance, and does not think he neatly fits the category. He is correct in being reluctant, because on balance Glazer is by no means a neoconservative. One could argue that Glazer is a conservative, because of his strong belief in institutionalization and governmental controls.

In his book Remembering The Answers (1970), Glazer discusses universities, and their problems in the 1960s. What Glazer (1970) argues is that society has experienced increased demands and these demands "cannot be fulfilled without highly developed organizations and some limits on human freedom" (p. 24).

Glazer says that contemporary citizens are looking
for the good society, i.e., a society that would feed, clothe, house, educate, provide health care, and allow for political and social activities. The idea is that in a democratic egalitarian society everyone comes to expect these comforts, and government would have to deliver. Glazer (1970) argues:

To meet such demands means inevitably greater social control. It means heavy taxation, to provide these needs in some manageable way; it means control on house-building and town growth to maintain some measure of amenity as population and production expand; it means stricter control not only of the behavior of polluting industry but on the behavior of ordinary people, who may wish to burn leaves or to drop litter.... It may mean in the end the control of such intimate human functions as the right to bring children into the world. (p. 25)

Glazer states there would have to be greater social control to meet the demands for a good society. While this does not necessarily mean that government would have to establish this control, Glazer implies that he sees increased governmental functions as the probable outcome.

First there would be heavy taxation, which by itself would not increase governmental scope, because the money from increased taxation could fund existing programs. However, controlling the housing market, and town growth does additionally expand the scope of government if this were to be done at the federal level. Local governments naturally have control over the expansion of their cities so no increase in local governmental scope would occur.
However, if the federal government were to control town growth its scope would increase.

Controlling industries and individuals that pollute also increases the scope of government. While this type of control may be desirable, it still increases the scope of government. One who was for limited governmental scope would encourage businesses and citizens not to pollute, but would not have government dictate any specific course of action. Glazer sees such alternatives as futile.

Glazer also goes one step further when he argues that, sooner or later, it may be necessary to control family birth rates, which definitely would increase governmental scope. A free democratic society would also be less free if one were told how many children one could have, if any. Again, someone who was for limited governmental scope would have the government encourage smaller family size, but not demand and legislate toward that end. Thus, Glazer does not advocate limited governmental scope. Nor does he sound like someone who is for non-paternalistic government, as discussed in Chapter II.

Glazer’s view of the nature of the social system, a position very close to a general systems approach, commits him to centralized planning and an augmented role for experts. He says that everything is so complicated now that, for a solution to a problem to be developed, there
must be input from a number of specialized fields. He even discusses the idea that fields which do not seem related to a solution must be considered, because of their potential relevance. The conclusion Glazer (1970) draws is predictable:

At the top there will be the analysts and researchers and programmers and computers and the huge machines into which many kinds of data now guarded in the files of separate organizations will constantly be fed and out of which will flow guides and aids to action.... The present specialists will still exist--the police, the teachers, the employment counselors, the social workers--but they will be developed in accordance with the central analysis. (p. 67)

Samuel P. Huntington does not generally advocate limited functions for the federal government. Huntington's chapter entitled "The United States" published in the book The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975) discusses the idea that historically there have been fluctuations in governmental scope over time. He states that there are periods when the people of a democracy demand more of, and participate more in, government. This in turn creates more governmental activity, and broadens the scope of government. Two such periods in United States history were the Jacksonian era and the 1960s.

Huntington argues that as these periods ripen, governmental scope declines because of a deterioration in governmental authority. People begin to distrust
government and, therefore, their participation drops. Governmental scope can remain large after participation drops, but it seems that over time the scope decreases until another period of increased participation occurs.

Applying this analysis to the contemporary period of American politics Huntington (1975) concludes:

The structure of governmental activity in the United States—in terms of both its size and its content—went through two major changes during the quarter-century after World War II. The first change, the Defense Shift, was a response to the external Soviet threat of the 1940s: the second, the Welfare Shift, was a response to the internal democratic surge of the 1960s. The former was primarily the product of elite leadership; the latter was primarily the result of popular expectations and group demands. (p. 65)

Huntington basically argues along predictable neoconservative lines on the above points. He discusses the governmental expenditures in the defense and welfare shifts, and concludes that the defense shift of itself did not create any undo strain on the finances of government. On the other hand the simultaneous welfare shift dramatically enlarged the deficit helping to create greater inflation.

Huntington does not have anything negative to say about the increase in defense spending in the 1950s and early 1960s; however, he does argue that the increase in welfare spending has raised the budget deficit leading to inflation. Huntington (1975) states:
The major increases in government during the 1960s occurred in education, social security and related insurance benefits, public welfare, interest on the public debt, health, and hospital.... Across the board, the tendency was for massive increases in governmental expenditures to provide cash and benefits for particular individuals and groups within society rather than in expenditures designed to serve national purposes vis-a-vis the external government. (p. 70)

Huntington's conclusion is that effective democracy needs some groups to not participate in the government. The problem, as he sees it, is that an increasing number of groups are putting demands on the government. Huntington (1975) states that:

Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system with demands which extend its function and undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self restraint on the part of all groups. (p. 114)

Huntington's answer to this "democratic distemper" is to foster self-restraint on the part of the participants. This translates into less participation, because most individuals or groups lobby government for specific reasons, which usually turn into a demand on government. He also argues that "In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents may override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority" (p. 113). These are arguments in the support of some type of elitism so democracy can be preserved.
While Huntington argues that there are fluctuations in democracy, and in participation, he seems to prefer less participation. This would not necessarily limit or increase the scope of government since controlling political elites could do what they felt was necessary for a good society. If they felt an increase in scope was necessary, so be it.

If fewer people are making demands on government, the scope of government would remain smaller than if everyone were making demands on government. However, Huntington seems to argue that the demands on government should be decided by people in, or associated with, government who have "expertise, seniority, experience, and special talents" (p. 113). This could lead to increased governmental scope if the elites so desired, and is also an absolute rejection of Populist democracy.

Daniel P. Moynihan's primary concern is with domestic policy. Like many of the other commonly identified neoconservatives, Moynihan is both a scholar and active policy advisor at the federal level, but is unique because he holds a high elected office. In Chapter VI we will see that Moynihan attempts to shift policy initiatives downward in the federal structure, and also tries to elicit the cooperation of the private sector. However, there we will also note the greatly enhanced oversight function of the federal government. The same
conclusion is reinforced by noting his legislative initiatives.

Characteristic of his beliefs is his association with the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as discussed in Chapter II. This bill was managed by Moynihan. Essentially what this bill did was give payments to people who adopted children. Foster parents, prior to the enactment of this bill, lost all of their financial assistance if they adopted their foster child. The bill was passed because it was realized that foster parents would not adopt a foster child if their benefits were lost.

This characteristic interest in strengthening the American family structure is also illustrated by Moynihan's (1986) support for the economic "job training for women on AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children]" (p. 165). Here the efforts are to reduce the need for welfare support through governmental intervention. This same primary concern with the viability of the family among the poor motivates The Child Support Enforcement Program. The program deals with fathers who leave their households, and do not send financial support to the mothers of their children. Moynihan (1986) states:

This is a matter to be pressed to the point of punitiveness. If the informal sanctions of society will not enforce the principle of
legitimacy, let the state do so. Hunt, hound, harass: the absent father is rarely really absent, especially the teenage father, but merely unwilling or not required to acknowledge his children’s presence.... The federal government should have the fullest authority to withhold payments from wages and other income (there is limited but useful authority already). And for the too-much-pitied unemployed teenage male there would be nothing wrong with a federal work program--compulsory when a court has previously ordered him to support his children--with the wages shared between the father and mother. (pp. 180-181)

The contrast between Huntington and Moynihan is obvious. While both are concerned with maintaining the United States' international position (recall Moynihan’s energetic advocacy of the national interest in the United Nations), and committed to a powerful central government, Huntington does not formally address a broad range of national issues; all is engulfed by a single domestic issue, the "democratic distemper". Moynihan, while seeking decentralized execution of public policy, is absorbed in the whole range of national problems. To what useful purpose are they to be linked by the same ideological label?

Daniel Bell, supposedly a neoconservative, has a view of governmental scope, somewhat similar to that of Nathan Glazer, albeit for different reasons. In the earlier discussion of Bell (1976) there was no difficulty in establishing that he has limited confidence in the capitalist system, stemming from the fact that capitalism
has been stripped of two of its controlling factors: "Puritan restraint and the Protestant ethic" (p. 21). In essence Bell states that people no longer work to achieve a communal end, or due to a calling to a certain type of work. Today one works to make money so one can fulfill "wants" created by capitalism itself. These wants, while artificially created, are very individualistic in nature and are closely, if not directly, related to simple gratification of fleeting wants. Bell believes that "The cultural, if not moral, justification of capitalism has become hedonism, the idea of pleasure as a way of life" (pp. 21-22), which leads to the individual questing for instant gratification as a way of life, and ignoring the needs of others. Bell argues that this translates into increased individuality, and therefore, less emphasis on community and communal needs. Individuals have become obsessed with themselves.

After Bell comes to these conclusions he introduces the idea of the public household. He sees it as the third realm of economic activity, which encompasses the other two realms: the domestic household and the market economy. Bell (1976) argues that:

The public household, as expressed in the government budget, is the management of state revenues and expenditures. More, broadly, it is the agency for the satisfaction of public needs and public wants, as against private wants. It is the arena for the register of political forces in the society. (p. 221)
Even though Bell recently coined the phrase public household he argues that it existed, in the past, to fulfill public needs such as defense, and the transportation infrastructure, (in short those things a society purchases in common). However, in this century the public household has shifted into three new areas: (1) normative economic policy; (2) the financing of science and technology; and (3) normative social policy. Bell argues that what this has done, along with creating a large welfare state, is to commit Western governments to rectify all economic and social disparities. Trying to eliminate all inequalities has the potential of overloading government with problems that it can not and should not handle. Bell (1976) argues that this is beginning to occur, as "the public household now becomes the arena for the expression not only of public need but also of private wants" (p. 226).

One of the problems with committing a government to redress these types of problems is financing. Bell (1976) says either taxes will be raised or countries' debts will rise:

The sociological dilemma for the modern public household is that it not only has to provide for public needs in the conventional sense, but it has also become, inescapably, the arena for the fulfillment of private and group wants; and here, inevitably, the demands cannot easily be matched by the revenues, or by the sociological knowledge adequate to these demands. (p. 232)
And furthermore:

What is clear is that the revolution of rising expectations, which has been one of the chief features of western society in the past 25 years, is being transformed into a revolution of rising entitlements for the next 25. (p. 233)

What this translates into is a large increase "in services--human services, professional and technical services" (p. 233). Bell points out that, in the 1960s, government, education, and the medical industry were the largest growing employers in the West. These are highly labor intensive areas, which again, translate into high cost and a growing public sector.

The interesting paradox here is that it seems that Bell argues against this growth in purchasing goods and services communally: however,

The singular point is that in "the great society" more and more goods necessarily have to be purchased communally. Defense apart, the planning of cities and the rationalization of transit, the maintenance of open spaces and the extension of recreational areas, the elimination of air pollution and the cleaning up of the rivers, the underwriting of education and the organization of adequate medical care, all are now "public institutions" which cannot be undertaken by individuals, though their creation would "more than repay it to a great society." (Bell, 1976, p. 304)

Again, what can be seen is the larger presence of government, higher cost of government, and Bell’s lack of confidence in capitalism’s ability to provide the goods and services a society uses communally. Government has to intervene and modify capitalism in order to fulfill all of
the private and public wants of Western societies. This argument basically transcends Nathan Glazer’s assertion that certain resources are owned and used in common and, therefore, government should be the one to manage these. However, this is in direct conflict with Robert Nisbet, Peter Berger, and Irving Kristol who, in the previous chapter were shown to be for few, if any, modifications in the capitalist system. These three also think that a reinvigorated capitalism is the way to achieve much of what Bell discusses.

This thesis argues that Bell does not agree with the neoconservative precept of limited governmental scope. He argues that events in the past have made it inevitable that governments will grow, and he thinks that modifications in the capitalist system, initiated and directed by Western governments, are the way to strengthen Western societies. This makes it, if not impossible, extremely difficult and unfruitful to group the likes of Bell and Glazer with Moynihan, Huntington, Berger, Nisbet, or Kristol in the same ideological category known as neoconservatism.
CHAPTER IV

COMMUNITY AND THE COLD WAR

The third criterion in this study of neoconservatives is the Soviet threat and its effect on community in the United States. Domestically, and in foreign affairs, neoconservatives should, and usually do, opt for community benefits above individual concerns. When community is discussed in this context it is in reference to people coming together politically and as a society, especially regarding international or interstate relations. This is in contrast to community as people coming together and holding or owning things in common (both definitions of community are taken from *The Oxford English Dictionary*, (Murray, Bradley, Craigie, & Onions, (eds.), 1933).

As far as neoconservatives are concerned, when the polity makes a decision in foreign affairs it would be to generate support for the first definition of community, opposed to the second definition; that is, intrastate communal concerns are not of primary policy concern, since community in this sense is seen as a function of individual interactions. This leads one to conclude that if an area of the world were economically important to the U.S., but politically damaging, a neoconservative would change the policy in favor of a good political outcome.
over a beneficial economic outcome. Is it possible that there is not much disagreement in this area? People who want the United States to be a viable nation, without fear of collapse from within or without, may agree that community in this sense is important.

This is the first of two chapters that will lend some possible credence to the term neoconservative. However, foreign policy issues are often so overgeneralized that this does not significantly weaken the case for the argument against the term neoconservative. Many Americans see the Soviet Union as a threat to democracy and freedom; this alone does not make them neoconservatives. However, neoconservatism, a position purportedly framed about the Cold War, would predictably use the Soviet threat to promote programs and policies that would increase community in the United States, limited of course, by this international objective.

Norman Podhoretz is a good person to examine when it comes to foreign policy. In his book *The Present Danger* (1980) Podhoretz discusses the change in American foreign policy over the last forty years. He feels that there has been a gross error made, which is the United States' movement away from the policy of containment, and its movement towards the policy of appeasement. He also feels that because of this the balance of power has shifted to the Soviet Union.
Podhoretz (1980) cites the Truman doctrine as stating that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" (p. 13). Podhoretz says this policy was developed in 1947 to stop the expansion of Soviet Russia. Shortly thereafter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created.

According to Podhoretz these events created the policy of containment, and spawned the Cold War. Podhoretz is not comfortable with the term Cold War because, he says, it has been so misused in Soviet propaganda that it is no longer applicable. Therefore, he relies on the term containment and is an advocate of this policy.

Containment, in Podhoretz's view, held the American people together, and made them confident in themselves and their country. Podhoretz (1980) states that:

In addition to "pulling themselves together" in this way the American people also realized Kennan's hope that they would accept "the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear." They accepted these responsibilities by supporting the Marshall Plan... and by their willingness to pay the price in blood and treasure of policies designed to hold the line against a totalitarian system which had already destroyed any possibility of freedom in large areas of the globe and aimed to extend its barbarous reign over as much of the rest as it could. For this, too, they were rewarded by a upsurge of pride and self confidence. It was a
nation that believed itself capable of assuming leadership in the course of defending freedom against the threat of totalitarianism. By the end of the decade, when John F. Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as President, only a small minority of people on the left doubted that the cause was just or that the will and the means to fight for it were there. (pp. 23-24)

Is there any doubt that Podhoretz is saying that if the people of the U.S. band together against Soviet Communism, the United States, and the world will be better off? But then the nation’s mission entered a darker and troubled stage—Vietnam.

According to Podhoretz (1980) containment was damaged during the Vietnam War:

The ground of our policy kept shifting as the years wore on. First we were countering Soviet expansionism, then we were drawing a line in Asia against Chinese expansionism similar to the one we had drawn in Europe against the Russians, then we were fighting to preserve the independence of a friendly country which had been invaded by another, and finally we were preserving the credibility of our commitments to allies in other parts of the world. In short to the casualties in blood of the Vietnam War was added another casualty—the loss of clarity which had marked the policy of the United States for twenty years through Democratic and Republican administrations alike. (pp.29-30)

Clearly, then, Podhoretz associates the foreign threat and domestic communal bonds; indeed, the foreign threat in his analysis is a primary source of such ties.

Another person commonly considered a neoconservative, who would agree with Norman Podhoretz, is Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick. She feels that the United States should
continue to practice the policy of containment, and
discusses this in an article entitled "The Atlantic
Kirkpatrick never uses the term containment, but it is
clear she sees the Soviets as a threat to democracy and
peace throughout the world.

The article discusses NATO, and whether it is still a
useful alliance after thirty-five years. Kirkpatrick
answers in the affirmative. While Kirkpatrick (1984)
points out the fact that there are constant internal
disagreements within NATO, the one agreement, sometimes
overlooked, is that the Soviets are a threat to Western
Europe, and need to be countered by NATO: "Soviet
hegemony over Western Europe remains a realistic concern"
(p. 93). Kirkpatrick (1984) asks and answers a question
which conveys her position:

Does the Soviet threat to peace, national
independence, and freedom of Western Europe,
which stimulated NATO's formation, still exist?
The answer seems to me to be found in the
sponsorship by the Soviet Union of subversion,
coups, insurgency, invasion, incorporation in
other continents, and new unilateral
vulnerabilities created for Western Europe by
Soviet deployment of new generations of missiles
targeted on Western Europe. (pp. 92-93)

This quotation not only centers on Western Europe, but
also indicates Kirkpatrick's view that the Soviets are a
worldwide threat. Kirkpatrick is confident that NATO will
exist for generations, and the United States will be ready
to assist Europe if and when trouble occurs.

In an earlier article "East/West Relations: Towards a New Definition of a Dialogue" (1981) Kirkpatrick asserts that the Soviets are at the root of almost all world problems:

In the past decade, the chief Soviet challenges to us and to our societies, to the spirit and institutions associated with free individuals, have occurred outside Europe in such areas as the Horn of Africa, South Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Central America, and the Caribbean. In the past decade the Soviets have played an expansionist game on a global chess board. Our freedom is still the principal stake.

The biggest difference between the East and West is that we in the Western Alliance are—all of us—fundamentally reluctant players in this global chess game. (pp. 29-30)

Kirkpatrick predictably and warmly approved of the policies of the Reagan administration: "The restoration of the subjective conviction that American power is a necessary precondition to the survival of liberal democracy in the modern world is the most important development in U.S. foreign policy in the past decade" (p. 27). While not as explicit as Podhoretz in linking the Soviet threat and community, Kirkpatrick’s virtual fixation upon the gravity of this threat, and the organizational strength needed to master a crisis of this order establishes her close association with Podhoretz’s position.

Samuel P. Huntington shares some of the same views
that Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick hold. Writing in 1961 Huntington discussed a paper written by the National Security Council in the late 1940s, which outlined a containment policy of the Soviet Union coupled with a deterrence policy. Huntington (1961) stated that:

The paper, in short, outlined most of the military requirements of a strategy of deterrence to support a policy of containment. It was perhaps, a landmark in the evolution of American strategic thought from the old strategy of mobilization for general war to a new strategy of deterrence. (p. 40)

The basis of the containment/deterrence policy was to counter Soviet adventurism after World War II. A strong U.S. military (conventional and nuclear) was needed to accommodate this policy.

In a later article "After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment" (1973), Huntington argued that diplomacy was becoming more important in the world. One would think that this showed a tempering of Huntington's attitude toward the Soviets; however, it did not. In the same article Huntington argued that "The deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and its allies will clearly remain a major function of U.S. military forces for the indefinite future" (p. 7). Huntington (1973) also remarked that:

A major function of U.S. military forces is thus not only to deter future aggression, but also to support current diplomacy. This requires increased responsiveness of military forces and programs to political and diplomatic
needs. (p. 8)

This in itself does not sound hawkish, but does gravitate toward a hawkish position when coupled with the fact that Huntington (1973) believes:

In an era of confrontation, there is not much that military force can be used for except to confront, that is, deter. In an era of negotiation, paradoxically, the potential uses of military force multiply: military build-ups, weapons decisions, deployments, and even actions, all become ways not simply of deterring military aggression by the other power, but also ways of putting pressure on him to make concessions at the negotiating table. (p. 8)

Huntington has a tendency to always discuss United States military problems in relationship to the Soviet Union, and his article (1973) clearly conveys this attitude. He discusses the idea that one day U.S. forces may have to confront Soviet forces in Europe, or possibly in a Third World country. There is no mistaking that Huntington recognizes a Soviet threat to the United States and its interests throughout the world. He also advocates the policy of containment even if modified by a policy of deterrence, and argues that without strong commitment to these policies, negotiations will never bear fruit. Huntington (1975) would drastically shift domestic expenditures to increase the military budget; democracy itself, insofar as it tends to stress domestic issues becomes suspect.

Robert Nisbet (1975) would completely agree with
Huntington's priorities; he even carries matters further. He believes a dialogue with the Soviet Union is unthinkable. This is contrary to Kirkpatrick and Huntington, who might start a dialogue with the Soviets, but think it would have to be conducted from a position of strength if anything positive were to be achieved.

Nisbet, writing for a symposium published in Commentary (1985) entitled "How Has The United States Met Its Major Challenges Since 1945?," sees the Soviet Union as the United States' worst enemy, a threat of unprecedented gravity. Nisbet states that "our enemy is not, pace President Reagan, totalitarianism, or world communism. It is the Soviet Union and of course its minions" (p. 76).

The above statement cannot be misinterpreted. Not only does Nisbet feel the Soviet Union is the United States' worst enemy, but he calls for outright hatred toward it, hatred for the very idea of Russia itself.

Also we can learn from China's ancient and riveting hatred of Russia—a hatred that persists through all seasons. The essential point for us to know is that even if the Soviet Union were to be promoted by our political analysts to the state of authoritarian totalitarian rule, or even for that matter to the condition of Napoleonic plebiscitary military democracy it would still be the most dangerous country in the world to the U.S. An aggressive imperialistic, militant creed, Communism, belonging to a fierce and talented mass of people located in the world's strategic geopolitical heart, all guarantee that outlook for the U.S. (Nisbet, 1985, p. 76)
The riveting hatred of Russia, persisting through all seasons, aggressive, imperialistic, militant, is not the rhetoric of a man who thinks a dialogue with the Soviet Union should be undertaken. The quotation above comes from a man who would do anything to undermine the Soviet Union's influence and power around the globe. This is a man who, even in 1985, felt we needed a qualitative increase in our military potential: not only should the U. S. keep its large nuclear deterrent, but additional funds must be channeled into conventional forces as well. The United States' deficiency in conventional forces is one of the reasons Nisbet cites for our continuing good relations with China. He thinks China is the only country that could stand up to the Soviets in a conventional war. The extraordinary hatred of Russia itself establishes Nisbet as a unique figure, even amongst so-called neoconservatives.

Nathan Glazer does not have the same view of containment as Norman Podhoretz. Glazer (1985) writing in *Commentary* for the same symposium as Nisbet states that:

> After the gulp of Eastern Europe forty years ago, Russia's boundaries have remained fixed, and it was even made to withdraw from a piece of Austria and a piece of Iran. It wants "friends" along its frontiers, and it is not easy to distinguish the desire to keep neighbors friendly from expansionism. (p. 43)

This assessment of the Soviet Union would not lead one to develop the philosophy of containment. If one
thought that the Soviet Union was satisfied with its borders, containment is not necessary. Glazer explains further that the United States built defenses in Europe to stop Soviet expansion into Western Europe. However, Glazer (1985) feels that to think the Soviets would try to expand westward is "far-fetched" (p. 43).

He contends that there is a problem between the United States and the Soviet Union. The problem he cites is that of ideology, and especially as it is understood in the Third World. Glazer (1985) argues that the Soviet Union uses Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the Third World to show how Western capitalism generates "poverty and powerlessness" (p. 43).

Irving Kristol is a difficult person to pin down on this issue. Obviously, he equates the Soviet Union with socialism, and also equates socialism with "barbarism" stating "the last, best hope of humanity at this time is an intellectually and morally reinvigorated liberal capitalism" (1983, p. 77).

Kristol (1983) also calls the Soviet government a "mafia" (p. 271):

This Soviet mafia is, of course, a very special kind of mafia. It is an official, bureaucriticized mafia by now; so that all the tensions and conflicts inherent in any such organization are obscured to us by the fact that, instead of straightforward shoot-outs, one witnesses a lot of shuffling and reshuffling at all bureaucratic levels. (p. 271)
He goes on to say that this mafia is also "Communist and nationalistic" (p. 272). Soviet leaders want Russia to be the premier state in the world, which is an outcropping of their intense nationalism. Kristol then argues "Since we really know all this, certain conclusions seem to follow. One is the hopelessness of trying to affect Soviet intentions--to move the regime toward 'liberalization,' say--by benevolent economic transactions and a gentle diplomacy" (p. 273).

The advice Kristol gives to Western nations is that they should be more aggressive in their foreign policy activities toward the Soviet Union. He states that the Soviet government is unpopular, that it survives by coercing its citizens and countries in its bloc, and that a more aggressive Western foreign policy may bring this further into the open. Kristol argues that this would have a crippling effect on the Soviet leadership.

Kristol (1983) argues the West needs to act on this matter because:

What is certain is that we shall never get there if we persist in thinking that time is on our side, that somehow or other the Soviet regime will evolve and "progress" into something other and nicer than it is. (p. 273)

What should be evident is that Kristol writes with hostility and urgency about the Soviet threat. He does not think the Western democracies should be as accepting of the Soviet State as they seem to be. Kristol thinks
that aggressive policies that would further expose the coercive suppressive nature of the Soviet leadership should be followed. He also supports the policy containment of the Soviet Union and views it as a success.

In the early 1980s Kristol discussed the restructuring of NATO. What is important here is not the restructuring per se, but why Kristol feels it is necessary. He feels that Western Europe should build up its own conventional and nuclear forces so it can develop an aggressive strategy towards the Soviet Union in defense of itself. He states that a restructured NATO (European members, with the U.S. as an ally) should develop a strategy to fight a conventional war in Eastern Europe as opposed to fighting a conventional war in Western Europe if one should occur.

It appears that Podhoretz and Nisbet would agree with this type of strategy, as far as it goes, because it recognizes the Soviet Union as a threat to the Western World. Plus, it would promote a political community between the nations of Western Europe and the U.S. Finally, it would allow the United States to pursue additional goals in its own foreign policy.

Glazer, on the other hand, would not feel any such restructuring was necessary, because he views the idea of Soviet expansionism as remote. While he supports NATO he certainly would find no reason to actively restructure and
strengthen it against a Soviet threat to Western Europe. Glazer would tend to agree with some Western Europeans that:

the Soviet Union is a young country, that the Communist socioeconomic system has its troubles, and that as Russians "mature" they are bound to become more civil in their foreign policy.... We should help them build a more productive economic infrastructure through trade and investment, negotiate with them ceaselessly even if it is temporarily--unproductive. (cited in Kristol, 1983b, p. 38)

Kristol, Podhoretz, Nisbet, Kirkpatrick, or Huntington would not agree with this prescription of how to deal with the Soviet Union.

Obviously, these five people see the Soviets as a threat to the United States. What separates them is that Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, Huntington, and Nisbet see the threat as a physical one, while Glazer views it as a philosophical or cultural threat. Irving Kristol would again fall somewhere in the middle of foreign policy issues, because he deals equally with both the physical and philosophical threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, Kristol would confine the physical threat more to Western Europe, and the United States' response to such a threat.

These views would create different responses to the Soviet threat, which could tend to place these people into somewhat different groups. However, in the context of this chapter, these six people could all still be
neoconservatives, because they do see a substantial Soviet threat. Whether one analyzes the threat as primarily physical or ideological does not alter the fact that they address foreign policy as loosely identified neoconservatives. The threat itself can be used to promote political and social cohesiveness defined as community in this chapter.

There is, however, a specific aspect of Glazer's argument that does tend to separate him from the neoconservative ranks on this issue. He does not think that the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States will be solved through increased development of destructive power. Glazer (1985) "would prefer to put more weight on talk and even temporary halts in testing and research than on the hope that escalating to the next level will change anything" (p. 44). The separation occurs because of Glazer's suggestion of a dialogue with the Soviets. Neoconservatism, as popularly understood, lends itself to keeping the pressure on the Soviet Union in any way possible. Starting a dialogue with the Soviets, following the above agenda, does not fit the character of a true neoconservative if this public stereotype is taken seriously. Nathan Glazer's argument would relax the tension and lessen the military confrontation, thereby, decreasing the chance of using this threat to promote community in the United States; the
ideological threat is a less potent mobilizing factor.

In an article in Foreign Affairs (1985) entitled "The Reagan Road to Detente" Podhoretz discusses Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. Podhoretz (1985) argues that, at first, "in Ronald Reagan...we thought we had discovered a more legitimate heir to the mainstream Democratic tradition in foreign policy--the commitment to containment" (p. 448). However, Reagan's conversion to detente led to disillusionment. This would be in line with the extremist wing of neoconservative philosophy on how to handle the Soviet threat.

Would Robert Nisbet use the Soviet threat to pull the American people together politically and socially? Of course. How about Norman Podhoretz, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, and Samuel Huntington? The answer, while less clear, is probably affirmative. In the case of Irving Kristol, again, the answer is clouded. However, when it comes to Nathan Glazer there are strong reservations. He would like a cooling of hostile feelings between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, so progress could be made in the area of better relations between the two countries.

Glazer, basically, stands alone in this chapter, when suggesting a cooling off of tensions with the Soviet Union. Irving Kristol does not seem as inimical towards the Soviet Union as Norman Podhoretz, Jeanne J.
Kirkpatrick, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Nisbet, but he probably is somewhat closer to these four people than he is to Nathan Glazer, because he too would like to keep pressure on the Soviets.

It appears that all of these people have the potential to use the Soviet threat in promoting community in the United States. Kristol would even use the threat to promote a Western European community. Therefore, all of these people adhere to this criterion of neoconservatism. The only difference is that Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, Huntington, Nisbet, and Kristol view the Soviet threat as more of a physical threat, while Glazer sees the threat as more of an ideological one. However, recall the earlier disclaimer: It is possible that most Americans, and for that matter, many Europeans see the Soviet Union as a threat to their security. Therefore, it is possible that this criterion is not very important as a defining characteristic of neoconservatism.

Various peoples throughout the world view the Soviets as a threat to their security. NATO exists for the expressed purpose of keeping the Soviet Union in check. These are nations coming together, in a type of community, to offset the power of the Soviet Union and its minions. This work recognizes that the people who created NATO were not neoconservatives. There are liberals and conservatives in this country who view the Soviets as a
threat to the U.S., and would use this threat to create community. President Reagan used the Soviets to rally Americans behind some of his foreign policies. Michael Dukakis also recognized the Soviets as a threat during his bid for the presidency, and discussed the idea of being tough when dealing with the Soviet Union. It could be that viewing the Soviets as a threat and using them as a rallying point for community is endemic to Western nations. Therefore, while being a useful criterion, its importance may be overshadowed by its universality in the West.

Daniel Bell, another neoconservative, postulates a different viewpoint on community. This viewpoint does not discuss a threat from outside the United States, but describes the threat as being internal in nature. While Bell's discussion of community does not deal with a foreign threat it is germane to this work. It shows quite a different rallying point in the development of community, which is postulated by a so-called neoconservative. It is also a viewpoint of community not generally discussed by the other people examined in this work.

Bell's argument, it will be recalled, is that capitalism is making the individual overly competitive, which leads to a breakdown in community. Bell (1976) argues that when this breakdown is coupled with hedonism
"there is a loss of will and fortitude. More importantly, men become competitive with one another for luxuries, and lose the ability to share and sacrifice" (p. 83). Add to these two the increased demands on the polity and the economic slowdown and Bell (1976) concludes that:

The interplay of modernism as a mode developed by serious artists, the institutionalization of those played-out forms by the "cultural mass," and the hedonism as a way of life promoted by the marketing system of business, constitutes the cultural contradiction of capitalism. The modernism is exhausted, and no longer threatening. The hedonism apes its sterile japes. But the social order lacks either a culture that is a symbolic expression of any vitality or a moral impulse that is a motivational or binding force. What, then, can hold society together? (p. 84)

It is not difficult to see that Bell has a great concern for the future of community in the United States.

What should be evident is that the Soviet threat is definitely agreed upon by the people examined in this chapter; however, the extent and substance of that threat is not agreed upon. Huntington, Podhoretz Nisbet, and Kirkpatrick are extremely hawkish in how they would deal with the Soviet threat. Kristol tends to be less hawkish, and Glazer believes dialogue is the key to coping with the Soviet threat. Bell, while not oblivious to the Soviet threat, feels the greater threat to community is the overcompetitiveness and hedonism of individuals created by the capitalist economic system. This threatens the very fiber of society in the United States. Again, so-called
neoconservatives do not coalesce on this point.
CHAPTER V

RELIGION

Before examining neoconservatives and their views on religion it would be useful to discuss the traditional conservative view of religion and society. Edmund Burke is the best person to study if one wants to understand this aspect of the conservative viewpoint. A contemporary Burkian American conservative viewpoint can be gleaned from Russell Kirk.

Edmund Burke, discussing some of the irreligious tendencies of the French Revolution, stated that "We, [the British people] know and, what is better, we feel inwardly that religion, is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good, and of all comfort." Burke also thought that "man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long" (cited in Brevold and Ross, 1960, pp. 104-105).

Burke argued for a state established religion. Russell Kirk, on the other hand, being a twentieth century American Burkian, does not advocate a state established religion, but does argue that religion is extremely important and natural, individually and collectively, to a healthy society.
Kirk (1987), discussing the ability of America to attain an Augustan Age, states that "it can be said of the United States still that [as Burke said of England] 'atheists are not our law-givers'" (p. 20). Obviously, Kirk feels a closeness to Edmund Burke's philosophy on religion and society.

Another contention Kirk (1987) made about American society is that:

Try though the American Civil Liberty Union may to drive out from schools and public places any reference to religious faith, nevertheless as a people American citizens--or the majority of them--remain attached to Christian morality, with its Hebraic roots. As Tocqueville wrote a century ago, the American religion may not be imaginative, but its influence upon private life and public affairs is profoundly beneficent. The same cannot be said of any other power of the first rank in today's world. (p. 20)

What the reader should understand is that many (but not all) conservatives view religion as indispensable to a "good society." A society without a religious base, these conservatives argue, will be immoral, therefore, it can not sustain greatness for a significant length of time. If the people discussed in this chapter agree with this proposition, than it will lend some credibility to the contention that they are neoconservatives.

When discussing religion from a neoconservative perspective the person who comes most immediately to mind is Peter Berger, widely considered a neoconservative. Berger is also a Christian, a sociologist, and a political
activist. Therefore, if there is a neoconservative movement in American politics, Peter Berger can be a beginning point for a discussion on religion.

Berger classifies two different types of religions in American society: (1) "Denominational religion" and (2) "civil religion" (Berger, 1977, p. 149). Berger (1977) includes in the former the traditional Judaeo-Christian sects in America, and views civil religion as "an amalgam of beliefs and norms that are deemed to be fundamental to the American political order" (p. 150).

Berger wishes to establish that each one of these religious forms benefited the other. Berger (1977) argues this in his book Facing up to Modernity:

Historically, then denominational religion and civil religion have not been antagonistic entities in America. Their relationship has rather been a symbiotic one. The denominations enjoyed a variety of benefits in a "pluralistic establishment," the existence of which was not only fostered by the state but solemnly legitimated by the civil religion to which the state adhered. Conversely, the civil religion drew specific contents and (in all likelihood) general credibility from the ongoing life of the denominations. Nevertheless, each entity has had a distinct history, with different forces impinging on the one or the other. Any assessment of the contemporary situation must allow for this distinction. (p. 152)

The point Berger goes on to make is that denominational religion during the decade of the '60s was in a crisis of secularization, which was also a problem affecting civil religion. Since civil religion in America
is centered around the polity, the religious nature of the polity is being eroded by secularization. Berger (1977) views this as a problem because he argues that Americans are a religious people, and they need religion to influence their government, adding to its legitimacy. Secularists are trying to remove religious influences from everyday life. They have stopped prayers in schools, have questioned churches' tax-exempt status, and as Berger (1977) argues, "today come dangerously close to denying the right of churches to attempt influencing public policy in accordance with religious morality" (p. 158). One case in point that Berger cites is the abortion issue in America today. With the denominational and civil religion in a crisis situation the nation itself is at risk.

Berger (1977) would like to see a return to traditional values in the churches and society and thinks churches could lead the way because:

- the likelihood that such revitalizing movements remain within the existing churches will increase as the churches return to the traditional contents of their faith and give up self-defeating attempts to transform their traditions in accordance with the myth of "modern man." (p. 161)

What can be seen is that Berger is a traditionalist, as far as religion is concerned, and thinks that civil religion would benefit from traditional religion. If America, according to Berger (1977), had the "political and intellectual leadership [and a] new unity of political
will, moral conviction, and historical imagination" (p.161) that Berger thinks are lacking, the crisis could be eradicated.

Berger in *The Noise of Solemn Assemblies* (1961) discusses the conservative nature of religion in relationship to society. He points out three values in American society that were legitimated through religion: (1) "success competitively achieved," (2) "activism," and (3) "social adjustment" (pp. 43-45). The key point here is that a society, without the legitimizing factor of the church, can experience trouble.

He returns to this theme in a more recent article, "Religion in Post-Protestant America" (1986). Berger again discusses the notion that American society is religious, and decisions such as the outlawing of a moment of silence in schools creates conflicts with the country's essence. What he goes on to say, which is significant when trying to understand how Berger (1986) views religion in society, is:

there is a deeper difficulty. As I have already noted, every society, and a democratically governed society more than others requires the belief that it is morally justified. And in the nature of the case, such legitimation cannot be invented ex nihilo, it must be credible in terms of beliefs and values that people actually hold. When a people is as religious as the American people, it is going to be very difficult to purge the official legitimations of society of all religious symbols and still have them remain credible. The doctrine of strict separation (not just between the state and specific
denominations, but between the state and religion as such) has thus contributed to a crisis of legitimation. (pp.45-46)

Berger, then, sees religion as important to American society. Not only can the fiber of a society be torn, but the political apparatus can be damaged. Berger (1977) also argues that:

Religion in itself is commonly an agency of social control internalizing within the individual the norms of society, providing him with psychological mechanisms of guilt and repentance which enable society to get along with a minimal apparatus of external controls. Since our cultural religion ratifies and sanctions the general value system, it naturally has this function within itself. (p. 72)

This indicates that Berger views religion as a controlling factor in society. It is possible that he would say a society without religion is doomed to failure. He definitely views religion as an important factor of life, and finds it difficult to separate society and religion as a whole.

Daniel Bell comes somewhat to the same conclusion that Peter Berger does, but in a different way. Bell (1976) states that:

In Western society, religion has had two functions. First it has guarded the portals of the demonic, seeking to defuse it by expressing it in emblematic terms.... And, second, it has provided a continuity with the past.... Culture when it fused with religion, judged the present on the basis of the past, and provided a continuity of both through tradition. In these two ways, religion undergirded almost all of historic Western culture. (p. 157)
Bell agrees with Berger in acknowledging that religion has been a strengthening force in Western culture, but tends to hold that religion and culture are two separate independent entities. It seems that one can exist without the other. However, the world would be quite a different place to live in depending on which one dominated.

Bell makes one think that a society without religion would be lacking a substantial source of morals and moral actions. He (1976) states that "religion always imposes moral norms on culture" (p. 157). When religion declined during the Enlightenment, secular culture began to dominate. Culture, specifically in the form of modernism (secular culture need not take this form), does not preach the limitations that religion does. Plus, culture, when separate from religion, does not put importance on the past. Bell continues:

Once culture began to take over dealing with the demonic, there arose the demand for the "autonomy of the aesthetic," the idea that experience, in and of itself, is of supreme value: Everything is to be explored, anything is to be permitted (at least to the imagination), including lust, murder, and other themes which have dominated the modernist sur-real. Thus modernism as a cultural movement trespassed religion and moved the center of authority from the sacred to the profane. (pp. 157-158)

Reading language like this can only lead one to surmise that Bell thinks a society lacking both religion and
carrying a modernist culture would be a less than good society, indeed its stability must be questioned.

Berger argues much along the same vein as Bell, but Berger appears to see the relationship between religion and culture as more critical. Berger does not seem to think culture would survive without religion. He appears to believe instability would necessarily occur should society be without religion. While Bell sees a movement away from specific moral attitudes, collapse will occur only if religion is replaced by a specific cultural form, modernism.

Berger and Bell both realize there is a relationship between religion and culture; this much is obvious. There is a difference of emphasis in that Bell sees the two influencing each other, but independent of each other. Berger sees the two as not only influencing each other, but almost dependent upon each other for their survival.

Robert Nisbet would tend to agree with Bell on the issue of religion. Nisbet thinks that secular society is influenced by religion. He uses the obvious examples of early Christianity affecting Rome and other societies, and Protestantism affecting Western societies with the introduction of the Protestant work ethic.

Nisbet discusses his views of religion using Emile Durkheim as his mentor. Durkheim saw religion as integrative to a society (cited in Nisbet and Perrin,
By declaring sacred the fundamental bonds of society—those between parent and child, husband and wife, chief and followers, and others—we plainly endow them with a degree of importance and duration that would not be the case if each were regarded as being as utilitarian as the relation between seller and buyer. Religion arises out of the processes through which these bonds become suprautilitarian. (p. 207).

Nisbet tends to agree with Berger and Bell in a crucial aspect: All feel that society is functionally dependent upon religion. Nisbet (1977) also agrees on the point of the pressure of secularization, to the extent, that some religious beliefs naturally will become secularized:

One need but look at the history of art and drama to realize the degree to which activities that once were primarily manifestations of religious ritual can become important in themselves. In the history of civilization we repeatedly find vital periods of change in the condition of a given people when the process of secularization of values and norms is dominant. (p. 213)

Much like Bell’s movement to the profane, Nisbet argues that "new values and related norms that depended upon reason or utility rather than sacred belief" (Nisbet, 1977, pp. 213-214) will surface. He points out that the scientists and engineers in the twentieth century have great influence on society. Nisbet (1977) states "Comte declared that in rationally ordered society of the future the scientist would replace the priest. The scientist has very nearly done this" (p. 217).
Nisbet does acknowledge that there is resistance to the culture of technology. The '60s were part of this resistance with hippies, and drugs, and the appearance of religious cults. However, Nisbet does not feel these pockets of resistance can stop the increasing influence of science and technology on society. He thinks that one day it is possible science and technology will lose their ability to influence; however, Nisbet (1977) goes on to say "But that age, if it ever comes, is fairly far distant, it is clear. In our day technology has no rivals among patterns of values and norms. Plainly, we live in 'postindustrial' society" (p. 218). This coincides with Daniel Bell’s view of American society.

Irving Kristol would tend to agree with Peter Berger on religion and culture going hand in hand. Kristol (1983) states that:

Neoconservatives look upon family and religion as indispensable pillars of a decent society. Indeed, they have a special fondness for all of those intermediate institutions of a liberal society which reconcile the need for community with the desire for liberty. (p. 77)

What is apparent here is that Kristol thinks that religion is a paramount element of a moral and stable society. Without religion, he, like Berger, seems to imply that instability would reign.

Kristol (1983) traces the American form of religious tolerance to the Anglo-Scottish enlightenment:
It aimed at the establishment of religious toleration, and its method of achieving this was to convert religion into a "private affair," the individual's "own business," and thereby to absorb religion into civil society. In this view, a church becomes one form of private association among many, immune (under ordinary circumstances) to governmental interference. The government itself would be secular, but not at all hostile to the religions of its citizens. (p. 144)

What is interesting to note here is the idea of secularization. Kristol has no problem with secular government, although he points out that a secular government cannot be antagonistic to its religious citizens. Bell, it is assumed, sees no problem with secular government either. However, Berger feels that secularization, while having a detrimental effect on religion, also has this same effect on society. Berger in The Heretical Imperative (1979) states that:

The modern situation, then, brings about an adversary relationship between a socially dominant secularity and the religious consciousness. (p. 99)

It is readily seen that Berger is against the total secularization of a society, and argues that some religious traditions need to be incorporated into a society's government. This is basically Berger's idea of civil religion.

Bell, Kristol, and Nisbet do not seem to think along these lines. They argue that individuals in a secular society can still have a generalized respect for authority
without having religion dominate all of society. However, Bell could go one step further, because he implies (as discussed previously) that religion may not be indispensable to a society. Nisbet, on the other hand, writes with a longing for religious tradition, but rationally realizes that technology and science are overtaking religion in the battle for influencing values and norms. It is logical to assume that Nisbet is closest to Bell in thinking that religion may be dispensable to a society. Nisbet is reluctant to make this claim outright, but it shadows his discussion. He seems to argue along the lines of Berger that religion goes hand in hand with civil society; however, it appears Nisbet thinks that religion could disappear, and society would find something else to laud.

Seymour Martin Lipset, often associated with the neoconservative movement, has recently come to the position that religion, and the moralism it preaches, is part of the reason why Americans are divided on many issues. He believes that, if moralism were less of an issue, many of the disparities in the United States might dissipate. This is completely outside the philosophy of neoconservatism.

Lipset discusses secularization and moralist reform movements as having their basis in religion. He points out that many movements in America have had a moralistic
tone, which comes from the Protestant background of American religious history. Lipset (The Public Interest, 1975) states that "Moralism is an orientation Americans have inherited from their Protestant past" (p. 143). He continues "The politics of our social movements as distinct from our parties suggests not stability but instability, and emphasizes the power of dissident groups to foster change in America" (p. 143). Lipset argues that religion can play a divisive role in a society. This is not a familiar neoconservative viewpoint, and one that Lipset himself did not hold in his earlier work (e.g., The First New Nation, 1967).

Some of the movements Lipset identifies as significant are the abolishment of slavery, the post Civil War Ku Klux Klan, the Women's suffrage movement, and prohibition. While some of these movements did not appear to be religious, their basis was in religion, and the people involved in these movements felt they were morally justified.

Reaction to foreign policy is another area Lipset (1975) addresses noting that "There have been three uniquely American stances: conscientious objection to unjust wars, non-recognition of 'evil' foreign regimes, and the insistence that wars must end with the 'unconditional surrender' of the Satanic enemy" (p. 147). All three of these can divide a nation, and all of these
can be traced to a moralism based in Protestant religious doctrine. Lipset (1975) goes on to say that "Unlike other countries we rarely see ourselves as merely defending our national interest, war is a battle of good versus evil" (p. 148). Lipset points to Communism as another great evil that needs to be defeated by the moralist spirit.

Lipset stresses that religious moralism can lead to divisions in a society. People's religion-driven reactions to the Vietnam War, Watergate, "drugs, easy sex, abortion, pornography, no prayer in schools, less stringent punishments for severe crimes, etc." (Lipset, 1975, p.153), show just how much division can be created by moral tensions in a society.

Lipset himself summarizes his position; after discussing the American two-party system, and its unifying effect in the United States, he states (1975):

The two-party system has served to moderate the moralistic passions that are inherent in what Lincoln called the American "political religion." That system, however, is finding this task of moderation increasingly difficult. The factors making for moralistic extremism, and the need for compromise politics have not declined in two centuries of American Independence. (p. 165)

What this thesis concludes is that Lipset thinks the glue that holds America together is the secular institutions of the United States government, which is quite different from what a neoconservative would predictably believe. Obviously, Lipset has no problem with secular government
especially when it moderates difference among people of differing moral persuasions.

What is evident in this chapter is that there is no consensus among putative neoconservatives regarding the social role of religion; no more consensus than we have discovered in considering neoconservatism's other defining characteristics. Kristol, Bell, and Nisbet feel secularization and religion are related yet somewhat independent of each other. Berger argues that an increase in one necessarily promotes a decrease in the other. Bell and Nisbet also seem to say that society would only be modified if religion vanished. Lipset thinks religion currently adds to the divisiveness in American society, and that the secular institutions support the stable nature of American society.

Again, if there is a neoconservative movement in America, it is in disarray. These five men, all considered neoconservatives, do not agree on the degree of importance religion should have in a society. Two view it as indispensable; two are not sure of the indispensability of religion; and the last thinks religion creates many problems in American society because moralism confuses many of the issues. Therefore, this movement is not cohesive, and more than likely is a fictional classification, the creation of others, constructed for ideological purposes.
CHAPTER VI

STABILITY, THE STATE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

The last criterion to be discussed arises from the allegation that neoconservatives believe stability is a prerequisite to justice to an extent which submerges their active concern with social justice. However, many people, even those who disagree ideologically, would tend to agree with this statement. While instability is sometimes used to depose an apparently unjust regime, the new regime tries to create stability so it can remain in power. Although the later regime may still be considered unjust, it tries to create stability so it can implement its own form of justice. So while there may not be an agreement on what is just, there is possible agreement on the fact that justice will not prevail in chaos. Therefore, this discussion will mainly focus on the structure of the polity, which creates stability, hopefully leading to justice.

There are two extremes when one discusses the make-up of the polity. The first is a strong central government that deals with virtually all of societal problems on a national level. The other is a weak central government that only gives the most basic services to a society. What will be seen in this chapter is that there is no 94
clear agreement among these nominated as neoconservatives as to the role of the central government: one of the figures discussed tends to agree with the former, two tend to agree with the latter, and others gravitate to the middle of these two extremes.

In the early '70s, Bell (1973) discussed the changes that were occurring in American society:

The decisive change taking place in our time--because of the interdependence of men and the aggregative character of economic actions, the rise of externalities and social costs, and the need to control the effects of technical change--is the subordination of the economic function to the political order. The forms this will take will vary, and will emerge from the specific history of the different political societies--central state control, public corporations, decentralized enterprises and central policy directives, mixed public and private enterprises, and the like. Some will be democratic, some not. But the central fact is clear: The autonomy of the economic order (and the power of the men who run it) is coming to an end, and new varied, but different, control systems are emerging. In sum, the control of society is no longer primarily economic but political. (p. 373)

Bell was saying that the polity will be increasingly important in the various world societies and that more decisions will be made on a governmental level. The more nationalized the society becomes the more likely decisions will be made at a national level; this is true for both democratic and authoritarian regimes. This would create centralized planning in many areas, which is one of the themes of Bell's position.
Upon examining Bell’s idea of the public household his viewpoint becomes clearer. Bell (1976) distinguished three "realms of economic activity" (p. 220): (1) the domestic household, which is concerned with private needs; (2) the market economy, which because of the bourgeois nature of modern times caters to individual wants; and (3) the public household, which exists, according to Bell (1976), for the fulfillment of "common needs, to provide goods and services which individuals cannot purchase for themselves, e.g., military defense, roads, railways, and so forth" (p. 224). The extent of these functions and their complexities consign them to the national (or federal) political system.

Since the 1930s, Bell (1976) argues, the public household has been altered. It has become concerned with "normative economic policy, underwriting science and technology, [and] normative social policy." With these changes "the public household now becomes the arena for the expression of not only public needs but also of private wants" (pp. 225-226). The point is that the public household is displacing aspects of the other two realms making the polity increasingly responsible for all decisions on private and public needs and wants. The problems that arise are what should societal funds be spent on, and how can the increased revenues needed to satisfy these needs and wants be raised?
Bell’s analysis (1976) of the function of the political center becomes quite complex:

The political and philosophical problem of the public household derives from the fact that the state has to manage the double function of accumulation and legitimization: To provide a unified direction for the economy, in accordance with some conception of the common good (as well as to have some unified conception of the national interest in foreign policy); and to adjudicate, the conflicting claims of the different constituencies. (p 232)

Daniel Patrick Moynihan argues somewhat along the lines of Bell stressing the importance of society’s political apparatus, although Moynihan tends to put less emphasis on the centralized national government. Moynihan believes that the federal government should concentrate on foreign affairs, while local and state governments should deal more vigorously with domestic affairs.

In *Coping* (Moynihan, 1973), he puts the matter as follows:

The federal government is good at collecting revenues, and rather bad at disbursing services. Therefore, we should use the Federal fisc as an instrument for redistributing income between different levels of government, different regions and different classes. If state and local government are to assume effective roles as innovative and creative agents, they simply must begin to receive a share of Federal revenues on a permanent, ongoing basis. (pp. 193-194)

Bell argues that social planning should be something the public household does. It has already been stated that the public household is interpreted as the federal
government. One would believe that social planning entails city planning, research and development planning, assistance programs for the less fortunate, etc. Moynihan, again, argues against this in some areas. Moynihan is for governmental assistance for the family, but he looks to the private sector for additional help. Moynihan (1973) believes that:

> It is also reasonably clear that we must begin getting private business involved in domestic programs in a much more systematic purposeful manner. Making money is one thing Americans are good at, and the corporation is their favorite device for doing so. What aerospace corporations have done for getting us to the moon urban housing corporations can do for the slums. (p. 194)

Moynihan thinks that, if enough money could be made, people would become involved in these types of corporations.

> It appears that corporations would create programs to alleviate the problems under consideration. Funding, it is assumed, would primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, come from the federal government. Therefore, Congress would decide on which corporation’s program was viable. After this decision was made, the corporate decision makers would channel funds in areas they deemed necessary, and implement policies they felt would accomplish the objectives of the program.

> While this tends to centralize the process of defining a societal problem, the intricate decisions
needed to alleviate the problem would be decentralized. The federal government would retain a substantial role in determining social priorities concerned with distribution between regions and "different classes" in an overall plan, but the specifics would be left to sub-federal units and the private sector. Something of this nature might buffer the government from direct criticism if a program failed, because a private corporation in control of the program failed and not the federal government.

Moynihan basically argues against the increased centralization of government. Moynihan (1973) argues there are "two theories that are wrong" (p. 189):

The first theory is that the national government and national politics are the primary sources of liberal social innovation, particularly with respect to problems of urbanization and industrialization. I do not believe history will support this notion, for the cities and to a lesser extent the state governments have been the source of the preponderance of social programs in the twentieth century, these were the areas where such problems first appeared and where the wealth and intellect—and political will—existed to experiment with solutions. (p. 189)

Moynihan believes that cities and states should continue in this capacity, because he has no great confidence in the federal government controlling the destinies of individual cities across the nation.

Moynihan (1973) thinks the next paradox that blacks will face is that having "acquired a majority of the votes in a number of major American cities, he [the black man]
will find direction of city affairs has been transferred to Washington. Unless we start now to reverse that trend" (p. 194). The trend Moynihan is referring to is the transference of power from major cities to Washington. Moynihan thinks cities can better assess their own problems rather than the public household telling them what their problems are. Furthermore, Moynihan believes the city and state governments can find more appropriate solutions to their own problems because of their proximity to the problem. Moynihan (1973) confirms this when he states that "The second theory I have labeled false is that you can run the nation from Washington" (p.190). This establishes some distance between Bell and Moynihan.

The one area where Moynihan agrees with Bell is on centralizing decision making in reference to dealing with the underclass in a society. Moynihan, with his history of backing extensive assistance programs for the poor, is identifying, and then trying to solve an urban problem at the national level. However, he (1973) also points out that:

The biggest problem of running the nation from Washington is that the real business of Washington in our age is to pretty much run the world. A system has to be developed, therefore, under which domestic programs go forward regardless of what international crisis is preoccupying Washington at a given moment. This in effect, means decentralizing the initiative and resources for such programs. (p. 191)

Neither Bell nor Moynihan is against federal taxation
for collecting revenues. What is different is what would be done with these revenues after their collection. It appears Bell would use funds to assist experts in effectively dictating to the country what programs would best suit a given city or region. On the other hand, Moynihan would like the money given back to the state and local governments so they could implement such programs, which pass federal policy review, as they deem necessary for the betterment of their areas. Moynihan (1973) argues that "At stake is not just the viability of municipal governments, but also the sense of urban populations controlling their own destinies" (p. 194).

There is agreement here on many of the problems that plague society, but the strategies on how to deal with these ills vary substantially. Bell believes in the greater centralization of society, and in the idea that experts in Washington and elsewhere can best cope with the ills of society. Moynihan thinks Washington should deal with foreign affairs, and revenue collection, then disbursement back to the state and local governments so they can eradicate problems in their own areas. The federal government would only be retaining an oversight function, especially supervising distributional patterns. Society would be quite different depending on which one of these strategies dominated.

According to Bell not only will the United States
become more centralized in decision making, but it will also become less capitalistic. Bell (1976) argues that "In modern society, the political order increasingly becomes autonomous, and the management of the techno-economic order, or the democratic planning, or the management of the economy, becomes ever more independent of capitalism" (pp. 14-15). This, along with previous quotations from Bell, leads one to conclude that he sees the end of the market economy, and a change in the United States to some form of democratic socialism.

Bell's (1976) three new tasks, as discussed earlier, are (1) economic planning; (2) scientific and technological research and development; and (3) social planning, which explicitly "included civil rights, housing and environmental policy, health care and income support" (p. 225). What Bell emphasizes is that the United States government has decided to "redress the impact of all economic and social inequalities as well" (p. 226). This raises the cost of government and either increases governmental debt, or leads to an increase in taxation.

Bell implies, while discussing the public household, that people have to learn to pay for their increased demands on government--whether it be through increased taxes or increased governmental debt. Both can have detrimental affects on the economy as a whole.

It should be clear that Bell accepts a more
centralized form of governmental planning in many areas of life including housing, income, education, technology, etc. This would tend to end the spontaneity of life, and make it a more structured controlled affair. Moynihan, while retaining a substantial federal responsibility, would like to see a more decentralized government, with state and mainly local governments having more say in their own affairs.

Kristol (1978) states that "A just and legitimate society to Aristotle, is one in which inequalities--of property, or station, or power--are generally perceived by the citizenry as necessary for the common good" (p. 174). He explains that he believes this is the best definition of a good society that he has ever seen. Kristol (1978) states that "The social order we call 'capitalism,' constructed on the basis of a market economy, does not believe that 'society' ought to prescribe a 'fair' distribution of income. 'Society,' in this context, means government" (p. 189). He also argues:

There is no point in arguing that a particular society "ought" to be capitalist or socialist if the overwhelming majority of the people are not of a mind to be bound by the different kinds of self-discipline that these different political philosophies require, if they are to work. (1978, p. 190)

Kristol, accepting Aristotle's rule, argues that the United States has a just and legitimate society. This is because the system in place is accepted by the majority of
the people without coercion.

Kristol argues that in modern economic thought no one can decide what will make someone else happy. People can best decide happiness for themselves, and disclose their preferences in a free market. Kristol believes capitalism is the best economic system to date, but acknowledges that, if not kept in check by some philosophy of restraint, it can develop many of the ills Bell describes.

Kristol explains that the philosophy of restraint which has kept capitalism in check is religion, and specifically the Protestant religion. He believes that the movement away from this philosophy creates more egalitarian tendencies, which erode the legitimacy of capitalist bourgeois society; in this there are certain parallels with Bell's argument. Why should someone have more than another if success is not based on "such bourgeois virtues as honesty, sobriety, diligence, and thrift" (Kristol, 1978, p. 65), which are part of the Protestant ethos? Kristol does not explain how to stop the movement away from this particular religious tradition, or if it is inevitable that this occur. Kristol does not come up with a secular philosophy that could take its place along the lines of the public household Bell describes.

Kristol's qualified market preference places him closer to Daniel P. Moynihan and Peter Berger (who will
be discussed later in this chapter) than with Daniel Bell. Kristol would not like the government to be involved in many of the economic decisions in a society.

It must be understood that Kristol does not think that any society is purely capitalist, socialist, or communist, etc. There would be modifications in a capitalist economy; however, Kristol would only accept modifications that would benefit all of society. This is in opposition to those modifications that would only benefit part of a society.

Kristol cites two social programs that he believes were successful because they benefited everyone in the United States. One is Social Security, which benefits all of the elderly regardless of their socio-economic status. The other is public education. It also is a reform that benefits everyone because, as Kristol (1978) puts it, "we are all young at some time" (p. 237).

Two other reforms that Kristol would accept in a democratic-capitalistic society are: (1) a child allowance program, which would give a certain amount of money to parents for each child they had and, (2) a national health insurance program. So long as these programs were open to everyone regardless of their socio-economic standing, Kristol would be in favor of them. The reader should also note here that these two modifications are not, by any means, on the conservative
agenda in any Western country, and would tend to move Kristol to the left of the ideological spectrum.

A short but revealing paper by Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus entitled To Empower People (1977) is a good starting place to begin to understand where Berger stands on the structure of the polity. What one immediately sees is that Berger is arguing the opposite of Bell. The title of the work leads one to this conclusion. "To empower people" implies that people should have more control over their situation in society.

The first paragraph sets the tone for the whole paper when Berger and Neuhaus (1977) state that:

Two seemingly contradictory tendencies are evident in current thinking about public policy in America. First, there is a continuing desire for the services provided by the modern welfare state. Partisan rhetoric aside, few people seriously envisage dismantling the welfare state. The serious debate is over how and to what extent it should be expanded. The second tendency is one of strong animus against government, bureaucracy, and bigness as such. This animus is directed not only toward Washington but toward government at all levels. Although this essay is addressed to the American situation, it should be noted that a similar ambiguity about the modern welfare state exists in other democratic societies, notably in Western Europe. (p. 1)

What Berger and Neuhaus develop is the idea that many middle institutions in society can better perform functions that many feel the government should or could do. These institutions are deemed "mediating structures" (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977, p. 6), which include
neighborhood, family, church, and voluntary associations. The basic idea developed is that mediating structures are most effective when government stays out of them as much as possible.

Their (1977) basic assumption is that:

Mediating structures are the value-generating and value-maintaining agencies of society. Without them, values become another function of the megastructure, notably of the state, and this is a hallmark of totalitarianism. In the totalitarian case, the individual becomes the object rather than the subject of the value-propagating process of society. (p. 6)

This is not meant to imply that Bell argues for totalitarianism, but it is an example of the fact that a more communal, nationalized lifestyle is not on Berger's mind, at least not to the extent Bell would accept.

Berger and Neuhaus (1977) would make every effort to work within traditional structures:

Public policy should protect and foster mediation structures. Wherever possible, public policy should utilize the mediating structures as its agents.... Minimally, the message to government is: leave these institutions alone. Maximally, the message is see where you can use these institutions. (p. 138)

This suggests that government should not change the structure of an institution when a problem is evident. What should be done is build on what is working inside of any specific institution within society. "If it ain't broken, don't fix it."

The first mediating structure that is discussed is
the neighborhood. Berger and Neuhaus explain that there is no set definition of a neighborhood, and, therefore, they should not be treated as if they were the same throughout the nation. The definition of neighborhood changes with time, place, and people. However, they state that there are some universal values held such as "safety, sanitation, and the freedom of choice that comes with affluence" (p. 9).

The point they are stressing about neighborhoods is captured in the following quotation:

[There is a] dramatic difference between a nation and a neighborhood. This nation is constituted as an exercise in pluralism, as the unum within which myriad plures are sustained. If it becomes national policy to make the public values of Kokomo or Salt Lake City indistinguishable from those of San Francisco or New Orleans, we have as a nation abandoned the social experiment symbolized by the phrase "E Pluribus Unum." (pp. 14-13)

Berger argues against many of the forces associated with modernity. He feels that the continuation of modernity, while inevitable, can be modified to fit a democratic capitalistic society. Conversely, Bell feels that the continuation of modernity has to completely change the make-up of American society, and the governmental/economic system.

Nisbet is convinced that centralization is one of the worst things that can happen to a society, and pluralism, if promoted, can strengthen the fiber of a society. In
Twilight of Authority (1975) he addresses the question:

Few things have more grievously wounded the political community in our time than the kind of centralization that has become virtually a passion in the political clerisy during most of this century and that is increasingly becoming but another word for the Federal government today. Dispersion, division, loosening, and localization of power: these are vital needs today, and they can be brought about only when weariness with centralization and sickness of its consequences becomes so great that the philosophy of decentralization will achieve once again the prestige it had among the Founding Fathers. (pp. 237-238)

There can be no misinterpreting what Nisbet is saying: the less centralization the better off a society will be. He (1975) thinks power should be distributed among as many groups in a society as possible, i.e., "workers, enterprisers, professionals, families, and neighborhoods" (p. 237). This pluralistic view of society is comparable to Berger's idea of mediating structures in a society. Nisbet believes these groups should be autonomous, have no governmental interference, and be allowed to pursue goals they deem as important to the group.

Decentralization is one of four parts to a pluralistic philosophy that Nisbet outlines. The second, functional autonomy, touched on above, is the ability of an institution, such as religion, family, club, etc., to carry out its function in society without governmental intervention. A third is hierarchy, which Nisbet argues is natural in any human relationship, but is also dynamic.
so no one is necessarily destined to remain a subordinate. The last element of pluralism is tradition, which Nisbet says is "not formal law, but use and wont, the uncalculated but effective mechanisms of the social order, custom, folkway" (Nisbet, 1975, p. 239) that help to shape a society.

As has been discussed, Bell (1976) argues that more decisions are being made by the polity, and he offers no prescription to change this pattern, and indeed argues in this direction. Moynihan (1973), to a certain degree, agrees with this assessment yet has some areas of society that he feels government should stay out of, such as the economy as a whole. However, Robert Nisbet argues against political dominance of decision making in most areas. Nisbet (1975) realizes some decisions have to be made by the polity, but:

Of all needs in this age the greatest is, I think, a recovery of the social, with its implications of the diversity of social membership that in fact exists in human behavior, and the liberation of the idea of the social from the political. (p. 241)

Nisbet (1975) is arguing that mediating structures, which are voluntarily joined, should carry more importance in people's lives. He states that outside of the "political realm, we are in need of the creation, or recreation, of intermediate associations" (p. 278).

He further states, "In an era of prosperity and
opulence that could hardly have been imagined in 1950 we have seen the powers of government and bureaucracy increase, to the corresponding moribundity of the social order" (1975, p. 276). Nisbet is arguing that if stability is to be maintained, society's pluralism needs to be accented, which lends itself to decentralization, and less governmental influence in intermediate associations.

Berger and Nisbet are at completely different ends of the spectrum from Bell when it comes to the shape of society to achieve justice. Daniel Bell (1976) accepts the inevitability of a more centralized society where norms are dictated by experts at both the national and non-national levels, and people become less heterogeneous. He would expect to see more expert governmental control in almost all areas of public (and possibly private) life. Berger (1977) and Nisbet (1975), however, would like to see the opposite. They would like to see a more grassroots type society where many policies start at the community level, and work their way up to the national level, or possibly remain at a local level if the policy is only needed in one region of the country. They would like to see less governmental control in private (and possibly public) life. Nisbet, like Bell, accepts the role of elites, but they are not Bell's specialists.

The programs that Irving Kristol postulates for
modifying a capitalist society conflict with his idea of a social insurance state as discussed in Chapters I and II of this work. He does not advocate greater centralization as in the case of Daniel Bell, and does not quite argue, as Peter Berger does, for greater decentralization. Kristol may be closer to a Daniel Patrick Moynihan except for Kristol’s modification scheme that would affect all classes of society. Kristol does not accept policies which target specific groups, because he feels they trap people in poverty. If individuals try to get above the poverty line, they lose all of their benefits. This, Kristol argues, gives them no incentive to better themselves.

By now, nothing said should be a surprise to the reader. As in many of the previous chapters, we see that five representatives who are supposedly neoconservatives do not agree on an extremely important issue. Bell comes across as leaning towards some type of socialism, while Berger and Nisbet argue for a less centralized polity. Kristol and Moynihan fall somewhere between these two philosophies, with Kristol juxtaposed closer to Berger and Nisbet, while Moynihan gravitates closer to Bell. These men cannot logically be seen as members of the same political movement known as Neoconservativism.
CHAPTER VII

NEOCONSERVATISM'S LAST STAND

In this concluding chapter it seems prudent to restate the definition of neoconservatism used in this thesis. After this is accomplished, a summary of the analysis, accompanied by appropriate conclusions, will help to establish whether the category of neoconservative is ill-conceived. The conclusion is clear at this point that the term should not exist in its present form, as an intellectual category.

The simplified definition used in this work consisted of five parts. A neoconservative believes that: (1) government should support modified capitalism and a non-paternalistic social insurance state, (2) the scope of government should be limited, (3) community is important to society and the Soviet threat should be used to develop this community, (4) the state should influence manners and morals and support the family and religion, and (5) stability is a prerequisite to justice.

The major figures selected for analysis in this study are identified as neoconservatives by various political commentators. It follows that they should have, to some reasonable extent, conformed to the five stated criteria if they are indeed neoconservatives. This work concludes
that not one of the people examined in this thesis conforms to these five criteria. Moreover, the deviations are substantial, which tend to distance those studied from one or more of the five defining characteristics of neoconservatism.

In recapping the first criterion of neoconservatism, it is seen that there is no agreement on government supporting modified capitalism and a non-paternalistic social insurance state. Robert Nisbet would accept some modifications, because of the fact that no system is ever a pure system and some modification is inevitable. Nisbet would assist people economically if some catastrophic event prevented them from meeting their basic needs (food, clothes, housing). When the catastrophe subsided, the assistance would be discontinued. One could say that Nisbet would avoid modifications at almost any cost. Assistance would only be given as a last resort, which disqualifies Nisbet as a neoconservative.

Peter Berger sees democracy as spawning modifications in capitalism. Modifications are somewhat of a necessary evil to a free and democratic society. Berger would accept all modifications so long as the democratic-capitalist nature of society remained intact. This would surpass a social insurance state, and could potentially became a large welfare state, which puts Berger at some distance from Nisbet's position.
Daniel P. Moynihan would also like to see a large welfare state, which goes far beyond a mere social insurance state. This also could lead to a more paternalistic society, because families would have to report periodically and directly on the family's status to some governmental agency. The key here is not that Moynihan would require accountability for benefits received, but it is the amount of accountability involved. The larger the welfare state, the more people who would be involved in receiving benefits. This could, while not necessarily true, lead to a more paternalistic government.

Daniel Bell is furthest from accepting a modified, capitalist, non-paternalistic social insurance state. Bell argues that state directed economies will emerge, as technology and other factors develop, and he feels that they will be better at satisfying the needs of the citizenry of such a society. Further, mature capitalism, in Bell's opinion, destroys the basic fiber of society. This system makes people too competitive, and they lose their sense of community and cooperation. Bell also argues that mature capitalism transforms people from producers to consumers. People work to get money so they can purchase more consumer goods, because a capitalist society creates infinite wants, which can only be fulfilled by the accumulation of more personal capital, thus destroying the Protestant work ethic required for
effective capitalism.

Bell is not an advocate of a modified, capitalistic, non-paternalistic social insurance state. He does show some agreement with Moynihan, because Bell feels people's biological needs should be met even if this means a large redistribution of wealth in a society. This goes well beyond a social insurance state.

Irving Kristol is the only one of these individuals who argues for a modified, capitalistic, non-paternalistic social insurance state. The modifications Kristol will accept are: social security in old age, some type of health insurance, disability insurance, and unemployment benefits. This is basically what one would call a social insurance state. This could lessen the chance of a paternalistic government, because if one were healthy, employed, and under a certain age, the government would have no need to deal with the individual except for taxation.

Four out of five so-called neoconservatives do not conform to the criterion of modified capitalism with a non-paternalistic social insurance state. Irving Kristol, who embraces the term neoconservative, is the only one who apparently fits the criterion, but there are still reservations concerning him, as discussed in Chapter II.

The second criterion of limited governmental scope also brings into question whether any so-called
neoconservatives conform to it. Nathan Glazer, Samuel P. Huntington, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Daniel Bell were examined under this criterion. All were for an increase in governmental scope.

Glazer discusses the good society, and states that, in order to achieve this, government will have to control more of society. According to Glazer there will be high taxation in order to provide the citizenry with increased entitlements, which are expected in an egalitarian society. In this type of a society, Glazer points out that government would be involved in the housing market, town growth, pollution control, and Glazer even feels government will one day control birth rates. Plus, Glazer along with other so-called neoconservatives sees it as inevitable that society will become more technocratic. This means that society would be more dependent upon policy and administrative specialists.

Samuel P. Huntington thinks governmental scope should be increased in foreign affairs, notably the defense sector, but decreased in domestic affairs related to the welfare state. He argues that there are periods in history that governmental scope increases and decreases depending on certain circumstances. Huntington states that, since World War II, governmental scope has increased in defense and welfare. He makes no argument against the increase in defense, but does show an aversion to the
increase in welfare spending. What Huntington calls for is restraint by so-called "marginal social groups" (Huntington, 1975a, p. 37) which includes blacks (and one can assume other minorities would be marginal groups, too). This would lessen the demands on government and possibly lessen governmental scope. Agreeing with the increase in defense spending, and arguing against an increase in welfare spending leads one to conclude that Huntington would accept increased governmental scope in the area of defense spending and growth.

Daniel P. Moynihan by his actions lets one know he is for increased governmental scope. He backs many programs that would increase the scope of government. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, job training for women on AFDC, The Child Support Enforcement Program, and tax credits for parents with children in private schools are only a few of the programs Moynihan feels government should get involved in. These programs have significant implications for increased governmental scope. People's decisions on adoption, jobs, and schools for their children would be influenced by government. The merits of these programs are not at issue; however, governmental scope would increase with the implementation of these programs.

Bell feels much like Glazer, who thinks a central authority could handle certain societal problems much
better than a decentralized approach. Bell thinks that defense, city planning, transportation schemes, recreation areas and other open tracks of land, the eradication of air and water pollution, education, and health care should be controlled by a central government if a good society is to be achieved. If the national government were to undertake solving all the related problems in these areas, its scope would increase greatly.

In summary, only one person out of four fits the criterion of advocating limited governmental scope. Samuel P. Huntington might argue for limited governmental scope, but again this is only in the area of welfare assistance. He does advocate increased governmental scope in defense. Therefore, even Huntington would accept increases in governmental scope—however, possibly in different areas than the others discussed in this context. Glazer, Moynihan, and Bell would all like to see increased governmental scope, although in differing degrees and with differing emphasis placed on the federal government’s role. The second criterion of neoconservatism fails to hold true.

Criterion three deals with the community, and how community in the United States is affected by the Soviet threat. This criterion, when applied to the subjects, may support the idea of a neoconservative movement. However, this could be due to the fact that it is common to view
the Soviets as a threat, and it is somewhat easy to use this threat to promote community in the United States.

Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, and Samuel P. Huntington all see the Soviet Union as a great threat to the U.S. They would all like to see the policy of containment continue in American foreign policy. Kristol would even like to see a restructuring of NATO to increase its potential for fighting a war on Eastern European soil. These people all recognize the Soviet threat; however, they would utilize its existence in different ways.

Norman Podhoretz, and to a greater extent Samuel P. Huntington, would use the Soviet threat to justify increasing funding for the defense and foreign affairs sectors of government. In many of their writings they do not concern themselves with social cohesiveness at home as directed by governmental domestic policies. Robert Nisbet also would direct funding to the defense and foreign affairs sectors of government, discounting the domestic consequences of such activity. Social institutions crucial to civil society should be allowed to flourish, and help develop a social bond among the citizenry. Nisbet (1975) argues that "If, as this book [Twilight of Authority] suggests, social anemia is the necessary consequence of political hypertrophy, it is evident that renewal of strength in the social order demands a
fundamental change in present uses of political power" (p. vii). The basic thrust of Nisbet’s argument is much like Peter Berger’s idea of allowing mediating institutions to develop social order with little or no influence by political institutions.

Nathan Glazer, who was also discussed in this context, tends to view the Soviets as less of a physical threat than the others. While aware of the ideological threat imposed on the West, he feels a dialogue should be undertaken with the Soviets to reduce the hostile feelings between the two systems. Therefore, the study shows that all six of these people only loosely conform to this criterion. The term "loosely" is emphasized because of the fact that Podhoretz, Huntington, Kirkpatrick, and Nisbet are very hawkish, while the others gravitate towards a far less hawkish position.

Something that should be discussed in this context is the possibility that these people would try to manipulate the extent of this foreign threat so it can be used domestically for various reasons. While none of these people openly profess this idea, it is suggested by the overall position taken by the avowedly hawkish social commentators. What can be seen is that, if a foreign threat could be made urgent enough, the threat could assist in developing certain policies, which would achieve certain outcomes in a society.
Podhoretz, Huntington, and Kirkpatrick are less concerned with domestic social issues; they generally concentrate on foreign affairs with an emphasis on the Soviet threat. This suggests that they feel domestic social issues will be handled through the various social institutions of society. Robert Nisbet most strongly asserts this position. He argues that there should be less governmental interference in social institutions so they can flourish and assist in creating cohesiveness in a society. If more money is used for defense, especially against a great foreign threat, then less would go towards trying to influence social issues, or changing social institutions. He sees this as a side benefit of such policies. This would create quite a different situation than Glazer's idea that the United States should have an open dialogue with the Soviets who pose an ideological and not a physical threat. Without a physical threat, it is possible that less money would be spent on defense, and more would be used to assist in developing programs to eradicate domestic social problems. Bell, Glazer and Moynihan are in agreement on this point.

Irving Kristol, believing that capitalism is the best available economic system, would more than likely want to see money saved in the defense area go back into the economy to strengthen it, and so raise the standard of living in the United States. Plus, he would accept, while
not diligently work for, universal assistance programs
domestically.

Another curious assessment can be made in this area. Some of these people argue for a decrease in governmental scope on the domestic front, while arguing for an increase in governmental scope in foreign affairs. This is rather odd because how could one expect to have an omnipotent government in foreign affairs, and yet a retrograded government in domestic affairs? This does not seem possible for a superpower, because if such a system is strong in foreign affairs, more than likely, it will be strong in domestic affairs. A country of lesser foreign policy and military magnitude could probably avoid this consequence; however, it seems beyond the reach of a superpower.

The support of religion, which would influence manners, morals, and the family, was the fourth criterion looked at in this thesis. A neoconservative, it was stipulated, would deem religion as an indispensable part of society. If one deviated from this support he would not be classified as a neoconservative.

Peter Berger clearly satisfies this criterion in Chapter V. He argues that religion universally benefits the polity. Berger even sees the polity necessarily founded on a civil religion, and feels that both civil and denominational religions benefit by the existence of each
other. Berger argues that a society without religion would be unstable in the long run. He cannot separate society from religion; therefore, he does argue from a neoconservative perspective, judged by our criteria.

Daniel Bell feels that religion has been a strengthening factor in Western culture. The difference he exhibits from Berger is that Bell thinks religion and culture can exist separately. This is a critical difference, because Bell could conceptualize a society without religion as a supporting influence; however, he would view a society without religion as less than optimum. Bell (1976) even states that "modernism as a cultural movement trespassed religion and moved the center of authority [in society] from the sacred to the profane" (p. 158). Bell's point is that society without religion tends to forget the past and puts an emphasis on the future and the self. This, Bell (1976) argues, "leads only in two directions—to a life of novelty and hedonism (and eventually debauch)" (p. 158).

Nisbet thinks religion will never disappear because it is necessary to humans and the optimal social development. However, Nisbet (1977) states that:

It is clear that Western society today is more heavily laden with strictly utilitarian values than any society in human history. The greatest single impact that the West has made on other societies and cultures on the earth in the last century proceeds directly from the ascendancy within the West of technological values and...
norms. (p. 214)

His point is that technology and science are creating values and norms, and transforming society in the West and the world. Nisbet (1977) does not argue whether this is good or bad, but he does say that "conflict of traditional folkways and new technicways is, of course, a clear feature of our own society" (p. 216). Thus, the most extreme of the putative neoconservatives qualifies his position, on this point at least.

Kristol is more inclined to agree with Peter Berger that religion and culture are inseparable. Kristol, however, does differ from Berger on one key point, which is the acceptance of secular government. Berger argues that religion should directly and formally influence the government of a society, while Kristol only thinks that government should not be antagonistic to its religious sector. There tends, therefore, to be a substantial disparity of opinion between men who are supposedly in the same ideological category on this vital issue. It is evident that only two of the men examined in Chapter V think that religion is indispensable to society; however, they disagree on what role religion should play in a society.

When stability as a prerequisite to justice was discussed it was in relationship to the make-up of the polity, the relationship of government and civil society,
and of the political center to political sub-divisions. Bell argues for a more centralized government. He feels one of the responsibilities of the polity is social planning. Bell would like to see experts making decisions, on a societal basis, from the central government. This is crucial to Bell’s idea of the public household. Instead of many social issues being addressed by clubs, religious organization, etc., Bell suggests that social issues would come under governmental scrutiny, and some type of solution would be forthcoming. Bell (1976) states that the public household "is the polis writ large" (p. 252). This implies that the public household is the most important structure in society, and all other structures are subordinate to it. This is in conflict to Peter Berger’s idea of mediating structures, which he views as the most important institutions of a society.

Daniel P. Moynihan does not feel the United States can be run from Washington. He feels that the central government should collect revenues, and than disperse the funds to state and local government. The state and local governments would be better at developing programs necessary to help their areas. This is in direct conflict with Daniel Bell’s idea of centralization. However, it shows agreement in the area of allowing some type of government to address societal issues, and eventually alleviate any problems in the society.
Irving Kristol argues that the United States has a just and legitimate society, because the majority of the people accept the system without coercion. The less the government is involved in the economic life of its citizens the better. Kristol would accept modifications by the government so long as the central policies were universally applicable (i.e., not to the benefit of particular groups, but aimed at the interests of all). Social security and public education are two such universal programs Kristol would accept. This obviously is part of Kristol's social insurance state, and is more restricting of governmental policy than Moynihan's view of assistance. Kristol advocates less governmental interference in the lives of the citizenry of a country. One can assume that Kristol would be more inclined to agree with Peter Berger's idea of how a society should be made up, and mediating structures should handle the social problems in a society. Society would be different depending on which argument one followed. But it is a matter of degree: a national health program, theoretically acceptable given Kristol's position, would commit the United States to a vast increase of government functions.

Berger argues that government should let people in certain locales alleviate their own problems. The less government tries to enter people's private lives the
better. Berger's idea is to allow mediating structures to assist people instead of government intervening. The institutions Berger cites are neighborhood, family, churches, and voluntary associations. Berger's idea demands more functional decentralization than Moynihan or Kristol would accept, and is in direct conflict with Bell's idea of centralization.

Berger has another factor he would use to assist in maintaining stability. Religion, as far as Berger is concerned, should permeate all of society. This would create a shared philosophy in a society, built on tradition, and assist in achieving stability and community in a society.

There is also substantial disagreement regarding the impact of economic distribution on social order. Bell, Moynihan and Glazer see distribution as a proper public responsibility. There, agreement stops. Kristol would explicitly leave it to market forces. Huntington, Kirkpatrick and Podhoretz sacrifice such issues to the pursuit of the cold war. Nisbet's and Berger's minds are elsewhere.

All of these people believe a society needs to be stable in order to be just, but this is a proposition on which most social commentators would agree. It is, accordingly, an inadequate basis for establishing ideological agreement. Therefore, it is not surprising
that all four fit the last criterion of neoconservatism; but the criterion is not unique to neoconservatism.

Out of the five criteria that make up the definition of neoconservatism there is no overwhelming agreement by the so-called neoconservatives on any one of them. This should be disturbing to anyone who argues that neoconservatism is a cohesive movement with an agenda to reshape America's political thought. Only Kristol and Berger conformed to three of the five criteria, and they did not conform to the same three. The fact that not a single criterion was agreed upon by those surveyed shows there is no agreement on the major tenets of neoconservatism.

The conclusion of this thesis has to be that the term neoconservative is ill-conceived, and should not exist as a categorization of a social or political ideology. As recent as January 23, 1989 The New Republic published a book review entitled "The Price of Pessimism" (Starr, 1989). The review discussed Nathan Glazer's (1988) book The Limits of Social Policy. The review commences "Its intellectual influence remains, but neoconservatism has virtually disappeared as a political phenomenon" (p. 32).

Starr argues that neoconservative thinking was a "tendency:"

Until the mid-1970s, neoconservatives had emphasized caution and complexities, and were primarily concerned with domestic issues. But a
second tendency, led by Norman Podhoretz and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, became increasingly concerned with foreign policy and took an intensely ideological, highly polarized view of the world. Irving Kristol may have been unique in bridging the two wings, but the two tendencies have split irreparably in the last decade. (p. 32)

Starr goes on to say that the foreign policy wing was (and is) completely conservative, and had aligned itself actively with the Reagan Administration. At the same time, it is obvious that there is substantial doubt that neoconservatism is a coherent political movement. While Starr implies that neoconservatism was once larger and stronger than it is today, the conclusion of this study does not justify the proposition that neoconservatism ever existed as a coherent ideological category.

Neoconservatism seems to be something created by the Left, because people from the Left began to move away from the liberal policies of the '60s. Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Nathan Glazer all attended City College of New York in the 1930s. They were members of "Alcove No. 1" (Kristol, 1983, p. 5) in the lunchroom, and were considered Leftists. Kristol, Bell, and Glazer seem disillusioned by some of the liberal policies of the '60s. This may put them in disagreement with some Leftists of today; however, it does not make them neoconservatives. Moynihan, in the past, has been associated with liberal policies more than with conservative policies. It is
believed that this thesis paints him as still being a liberal; however, he too may be disillusioned by some of the failures of liberal policies in the '60s. Again, this does not make him a neoconservative.

One must also keep in mind that the term neoconservative, as discussed in this work, was coined by Michael Harrington who himself was in the ranks of the Left, and an influential social democrat. Is the term neoconservative possibly an indictment by the Left of people who have moved a little closer to the middle? However that may be, the term’s utility is open to substantial skepticism, one whose legacy is more to sow confusion than to bring order to our understanding of contemporary American ideological debate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


York: Alfred A. Knopf.


