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EDUCATION, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND THE WELFARE STATE:
ALTERNATIVE POLICY CHOICES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

by

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Western welfare states have not all followed the same path in their social policy development. Still, certain similarities have been identified in the types and combinations of social insurance supported by specific groupings of these states. Titmuss (1974) described "three contrasting models or functions of social policy." Heclo (1985) argued "three broad groups of nations can be distinguished" with different models of social welfare policy. Esping-Andersen (1990) identified "three worlds of welfare capitalism," each with a unique social policy agenda and distinctive social insurance system.

Education is typically not included with other social programs in depicting the policy profiles of welfare states. I argue it should because a state's education policy is associated with, and a component of, its overall welfare strategy. Education policy can be made an instrument to serve welfare, labor, and any number of other policy objectives. Moreover, the socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize with educational achievement can become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be received through social insurance.

Heidenheimer (1981) argued a relationship between education and social insurance policies was determined during the initial stages of welfare state development. For America and Europe, "the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by
emerging welfare states" (269). Heclo (1985) spoke of an "implicit trade-off," a choice made between state investment in educational opportunities or the expansion of social insurance programs. Castles (1989) recommended that preferential state support of education or social insurance may be considered as alternative policy strategies followed by welfare states today.

Both case studies and a quantitative analysis examine the policy record for evidence of different welfare state types with such alternative policy strategies, and a "trade-off" between state investment in education and other social programs. The results indicate an association does exist between the education and social programs welfare states support. Specifically, the liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes Esping-Andersen described can be linked with characteristic education policies. There is also evidence of a "trade-off." Certain kinds of welfare regimes exhibit a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs.
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Karl G. Hokenmaier
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Western industrial nations differ greatly in the kinds of social welfare systems they support—in the types, combinations, and measures of public assistance they provide. They bear the mark, and are reflective of, the socioeconomic and political environment of their origin. A nation's social welfare provisions are the product of different intentions, capacities, structures, and histories, of the unique combinations of a myriad of variable factors and their interaction over time: levels of economic development and the global economy, war and revolution, governmental institutions and political leadership, the resources of the state and the nation, demographics, cultural and religious influences, social movements, etc. There is also the phenomenon of path dependence that affects the making of public policy. Past and present public expenditures, commitments and preferences for certain programs, may limit the available options and capacity of the state and its government to make and pursue alternative policy strategies in the future (Esping-Andersen 1996; Flora 1986; Heidenheimer 1981; March and Olsen 1989; Pierson 1994; Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 149-51).

However, and despite dissimilar evolutionary paths, scholarly research indicates a good deal of commonality exists between the welfare systems of many Western nations. Indeed, the social welfare systems of certain Western regimes have been found to be so much alike that they have collectively been characterized as
representative of a specific family, type or model of the welfare state. Even allowing
for cross-national variation attributable to distinctive “national policy styles,”
Freeman (1985) spoke of “significant trends toward the convergence of public
policies” in Western societies. He observed that policymakers more and more tended
to react in a similar way to like policy issues, and this was especially true in the area
of social insurance. Castles (1993) has distinguished “families of nations” that feature
similar and characteristic social welfare systems. Titmuss (1974) developed a
typology of welfare states based on his finding of “three contrasting models or
functions of social policy.” Heclo (1985) argued that “three broad groups of nations
can be distinguished” with different models of social welfare policy. Esping-Andersen
(1990) identified “three worlds of welfare capitalism”—liberal, conservative, and
social democratic—that could be distinguished by the similarity of their social policy
agendas and coverage for old-age benefits, healthcare, and unemployment.

Typically, education policy is not mentioned in the literature of the welfare
state, nor is it included with other social programs when the policy profiles of welfare
states are depicted. I argue that it should be because a state’s education policy is
associated with, and is an integral component of, its overall welfare strategy.
Education policy both affects and reflects the welfare strategy of the state. The
education system can be made an instrument to serve welfare, economic, labor, and
any number of other policy objectives. Moreover, as it concerns social welfare
generally and the social security systems in particular, educational achievement is
widely recognized as a vehicle of upward social mobility (Becker 1964; Janowitz
1976; Kaelble 1981). The socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize with
educational achievement—particularly at the secondary and higher levels—can
become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be secured with social insurance. As a consequence, an individual’s long-term reliance on social insurance may be lessened by their educational achievement—and so can the welfare state’s long-term requirements for income assistance and other social programs. I submit, therefore, that preferential state support of educational opportunities over social insurance may be viewed as an alternative strategy that welfare regimes may choose to follow.

Heidenheimer (1981) has argued that the basis for the relationship between education and social insurance policies in Western societies was determined during the initial stages of welfare state development. In particular, for the United States and Europe, “the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Heidenheimer 1981, 269). Over time, such a policy association was manifested by a kind of trade-off where relatively greater state attention and investment was given to the development of one sector than the other. In this vein, Heclo (1985) has written of an “implicit trade-off” made by the United States, that its welfare state has invested in public education and encouraged educational achievement over the expansion of its social insurance system. Acknowledging Heclo, Castles (1989) has submitted that “countries [generally] may choose to trade-off resources against the building of a welfare state” (431). Even today, preferential investment in education or social protection programs may be considered as alternative policy strategies that welfare states may choose to follow.

It is the work of the scholars above, and especially that of Esping-Andersen, Heclo, and Heidenheimer, that serves as the foundation for this endeavor. My object
is to discover if there is a relationship between the kinds of social programs and types of education systems that Western welfare regimes support. In particular, can the three kinds of welfare regimes described by Esping-Andersen (1990)—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—be linked with characteristic profiles for education policy, and is there evidence of a trade-off between investment in educational opportunities and other social programs?

In the following pages of this chapter I will address my research problem in greater detail. I will state and operationalize my specific research hypotheses, describe my research methodology and the organizational format that will direct this study, offer a limited discussion of some preliminary findings, and conclude with what I anticipate will be the overall findings of this study. In the second chapter I will present a review of the scholarly literature and major theoretical explanations for the making of social welfare and education policy. Because of the great similarity in theories and variables, I will propose that a single model might be used to better explain both education and social policy. A quantitative analysis of education and social insurance data for 18 OECD nations over the 1960-1990 time period is the subject of the third chapter. The purpose of that analysis is two-fold. First, Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology shall be evaluated for its usefulness as an explanation for education, as well as social policy outcomes. Specifically, is it possible to associate liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes with particular tendencies in education policy? Second, the national data will be analyzed to determine if there is evidence of a “trade-off” between welfare state expenditures for education and other social programs. In particular, do certain kinds of welfare regimes demonstrate a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs
as alternative policy strategies? Chapters IV and V provide case studies of Germany and the United States that examine the development of social insurance programs and education policy in welfare regimes that Esping-Andersen has classified respectively as "conservative" and "liberal." The final chapter contains a summary report of my findings and conclusions, recommendations for subsequent research, concluding with a discussion of the current "crisis" of the welfare state and its implications for social welfare and education policymaking.

Research Problem

A Typology of Western Welfare States

At the same time Western societies may be found to differ in "national style" (Freeman 1985), they tend to support the same types of social programs in some form or another. The welfare systems of all these nations typically includes some provision for old-age pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, and work injury compensation (Esping-Andersen 1990; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1990). If these common areas of social policy are taken as a starting point, it is possible to distinguish and group those Western welfare regimes for whom the content and measure of these provisions is similar. In other words, particular types of welfare regimes may be identified according to their similar social welfare profiles, by their tendency to produce and support comparable and distinctive public policies. Scholars finding such groupings of welfare states with similar social policies have identified them as "contrasting models or functions of social policy" (Titmuss 1974, 30),
"worlds of welfare capitalism" (Esping-Andersen 1990), and "families of nations" (Castles 1993).

Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985) and Esping-Andersen (1990) have advanced nearly identical classifications of Western welfare regimes. Based upon their separate cross-national evaluations of Western social welfare systems, each distinguished and similarly characterized three general groupings of welfare states. They even associated many of the same countries with their corresponding models of welfare regime types. In particular, Esping-Andersen argued that three kinds of welfare states could be found in advanced industrial societies—liberal, conservative, and social democratic.1 His typology arranged Western welfare states into three clusters, "each organized around its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration." Each cluster represented "qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and the family" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3, 26). These three groups could be distinguished by the similarity of their social policy agendas and coverage for healthcare, unemployment, and old-age benefits, by a likeness in the manner and extent to which their welfare policies "decommodify."

The key to Esping-Andersen's distinction between kinds of Western welfare states—"the three worlds of welfare capitalism"—is the concept of decommodification. Decommodification describes "the degree to which individuals,  

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1Titmuss (1974) describes "three contrasting models or functions of social policy." What he terms the "residual welfare" model corresponds to Esping-Andersen's liberal welfare regime type, the "industrial achievement-performance" to the conservative, and the "institutional redistributive" to the social democratic. Heclo (1985, 14-5) identified "three broad groups of nations [that] can be distinguished" based on the similarity of their social policies. Heclo's description and the countries he assigns to each group closely resembles that of Esping-Andersen's three-fold classification.
or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living” without reliance on wage labor and independent of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37).

With respect to the welfare state, decommodification is a function of its social programs, the degree to which those benefits make “living standards independent of pure market forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens’ status as ‘commodities’” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3). But decommodification is not necessarily just a function of a state’s social programs; there are often private and market alternatives. In many Western countries it is not unusual to find that an individual’s level of decommodification is the product of some combination of private insurance, personal accumulation, workforce-related benefits, and public assistance programs. It may even be possible for an individual to achieve decommodification without relying on any of the state’s social insurance provisions. Retirement income and insurance coverage for disability, healthcare and unemployment may often be obtained through market alternatives. Frequently, the benefits or return on these instruments is even more generous—more decommodifying—than those provided by the state’s safety nets.

Each of the three welfare “worlds” Esping-Andersen describes has a distinctive social policy profile, a unique package of social security programs that supports a particular welfare strategy and level of citizen decommodification. The highest levels of decommodification are achieved by social democratic regimes, where the state is the provider of a universal and comprehensive social security system. The goal of welfare policy is to guarantee individuals and families “a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation,” but without discouraging individual aspirations or denying the opportunity for private
socioeconomic achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26-8, 37). Next are the welfare systems of conservative nations, which tend to support preservation of the status quo and its inequalities. Social rights and benefits are attached to class, status, and what one has earned by their work effort. The primary provider of welfare insurance is the state, with the market and private insurance having marginal roles. The lowest levels of decommodification are achieved in the liberal cluster, where welfare coverage by the state is typically minimal, means-tested, and often stigmatized. The market and private insurance plans may be encouraged as alternatives to public welfare programs.

Esping-Andersen's contributions to welfare state research have been very significant. His studies of decommodification, the causes for different welfare state development, and of the different types of Western welfare states have been widely recognized (Goodin et al. 1999; Hicks 1991, 1999; Offe 1991; van Kersbergen 1995). The welfare state model he proposed in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) has been the object of particular critical attention, albeit typically in a constructive fashion and as the starting point for other scholarly research (Castles and Mitchell 1992; Mitchell 1992; Hicks 1999; Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Janoski and Hicks 1994; O'Connor 1996; Schmid 1996). Three criticisms have been foremost: that his three-fold classification of welfare regimes is not enough because other unique welfare "worlds" and regime types may also be distinguished;² that

²This criticism is addressed here only as it relates to the sample of 18 OECD nations studied by Esping-Andersen (1990), which is the same set examined by this work. I do not question that wholly different welfare "worlds" and kinds of regimes may exist outside this group. However, whether or not other models and kinds of welfare regimes may be identified when the sample of nations is changed and/or (continued...)
particular nations have been misclassified; and that Esping-Andersen's welfare state
typology does not consider the redistributive effect of social policies, the way welfare
dollars are actually spent. Mitchell (1992) contends that countries which have been
similarly classified, because of their comparable social policy instruments and levels
of expenditure, may not be associated with similar welfare outcomes (73). What is
even more, typologies like Esping-Andersen's suffer from "boundary problems which
result in the misclassification of some countries" (Mitchell 1992, 73). Castles and
Mitchell (1992) argue that there is actually a fourth "radical" world of welfare
capitalism when income redistribution is taken into consideration—what has been
achieved by a country's expenditures for social programs. Hicks, Misra, and Ng
(1995) also make the case for other and additional kinds of welfare regimes. They
assert that working class mobilization and the unique state institutions of the 1880-
1930 time period caused the adoption of social security programs and established
paths of welfare state development that are distinctly different than Esping-
Andersen's classification of liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes.
Therefore, "long, common, homogeneous political histories can not be inferred from
common recent policy configurations—the basis for Esping-Andersen's typology of
regimes" (Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995, 346).

2(...continued)
expanded to include any or a combination of countries from Southern Europe, Latin
America, East Asia, Eastern Europe, communist states, or different types of capitalist
states is beyond the scope of this study. A discussion of these other welfare state
models that are based on country sets different than Esping-Andersen's OECD
sample may be found in Cavanna (1998), Esping-Andersen (1996), or Goodin et al.
(1999).
I argue Esping-Andersen's welfare state model is an effective vehicle for the meaningful differentiation and classification of Western welfare regimes according to the similarity—not the equivalence—of the social insurance systems they support. Esping-Andersen's purpose was not to define mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of Western welfare states. His model only "show[s] that welfare states cluster but . . . there is no single pure case" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 28). Because there are no real welfare states that are perfect liberal, conservative, or social democratic regime types, Esping-Andersen classified nations according to their "predominant" regime traits, even though they might possess some "elements" of other welfare state types. This is akin to Weber’s notion of "ideal types," a conceptual device that permits a categorization of phenomena around referent types that are defined to possess certain key aspects of reality but need not exist in their "pure form." In other words, the ideal type need not exist; it is an analytical tool constructed to provide a baseline for comparison. Esping-Andersen could certainly have defined other types of welfare regime based on residual, non-dominant traits, or some other criteria of differentiation. He chose not to do so, and I would argue that a further classification would only have diminished the significance of his model. Moreover, given the small sample of nations, anything more than a parsimonious typology would have tended toward national explanations and been inappropriate for more general theory-building.

Castles and Mitchell (1992) and Hicks, Misra, and Ng (1995) are prominent among those scholars that have defined other and additional categories of welfare regimes. They did so, however, based on research questions and classification criteria that were very different than Esping-Andersen’s. Esping-Andersen (1990) typology is

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based on the “clustering” he observed by three groups of countries with similar social policy instruments and levels of expenditure effort. In essence, he measured the kind of welfare “effort” exhibited by each of the eighteen OECD nations in his sample, “scoring” the character of the social insurance system—tapping into “key attributes” of liberalism, socialism and corporatism—and the “potential” decommodification that might be achieved through its provisions for old-age pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990, 73, 50). Based on how groups of nations tended to cluster according to the comparable nature and measure of their welfare effort, Esping-Andersen then distinguished three kinds of welfare regimes—liberal, conservative and social democratic. It is a typology that separates countries into three groups according to which of three alternative welfare strategies their social security systems most closely resembles, not the redistributive outcome of those welfare policies a regime may support.

Castles and Mitchell (1992) identify another and “fourth world of welfare capitalism” by including the redistributive outcome of a country’s social programs as another criteria for welfare regime differentiation, in addition to its welfare effort and policy instruments. It can hardly be a surprise that they produced a model and welfare state typology different than Esping-Andersen’s. There is no question that they are right when they point out that Esping-Andersen did not distinguish between types of welfare regime based on the redistributive effects of their social programs, but that was not his intent. They are also correct when they insist their “four worlds model is a better predictor of redistributive outcomes than either a conventional welfare effort ‘leaders and laggards’ model or Esping-Andersen’s typology based on social policy instruments” (Castles and Mitchell 1992, 24). That may be so, but once again, and it

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is worth repeating, Esping-Andersen’s model is concerned with alternative policy strategies for social welfare and the potential decommodification that might be achieved by a regime’s welfare effort. That is also the concern of this work, and not the particular redistributive outcome of a regime’s welfare strategy. There is no denying the significance of income redistribution to an evaluation of welfare regime performance, but that is not the purpose of this examination. If it were, Esping-Andersen’s model would be inappropriate.

Hicks, Misra, and Ng (1995) contend that there are “other categorizations of advanced capitalist states” (346). This follows upon their examination of the development paths for social security programs at the time of the welfare state’s emergence, ranging over the 1880-1930 time period. Just like with Castles and Mitchell (1992), it should be expected that such a different study would produce another and unique typology of Western welfare states. Moreover, given the separate and very different research agendas and objectives, no finding or model can really be stipulated to invalidate any of the others.

It has also been claimed that Esping-Andersen is wrong to assert that the kinds of welfare states he describes are the product of similar political histories (Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995; Offe 1991). That does not matter, his three-fold typology of welfare regimes would remain. The method Esping-Andersen employed to determine a state’s welfare regime type—the group or cluster to which it belongs—by evaluating its welfare strategy and the potential decommodification its social programs might achieve, does not finally depend on that historical inference (Esping-Andersen 1990, Chapters 2-3). That is critical to the integrity of this examination and the use of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model.
Finally, it has been argued that Esping-Andersen has either misclassified certain nations or they simply do not fit well in any one of three welfare state groups described by his model. In particular, it has been suggested that the Netherlands should either be classified as a conservative rather than social democratic regime or as another “Christian Democratic” type of welfare regime (Schmid 1996; van Kersbergen 1995). My reply is framed by Esping-Andersen’s own acknowledgement and response to this criticism (1999, 86-8).

First, Esping-Andersen advises that the majority of data he used to distinguish the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” are from the 1980 period. Second, he cautions of his welfare state model and its application that “no regime, let alone country, is pure” and that there may be “slippery or ambiguous cases” because his typology represents, “in a sense, ideal types.” Although Esping-Andersen concedes that some countries will just not fit as well as others, he maintains there is good support for his notion of three welfare state clusters.

The real problem is how to deal with systematic deviants. The issue here is whether a three-way typology adequately exhausts the variance. If there are cases that follow a wholly different underlying logic, we would have to construct yet another, separate ideal-type—a fourth “world of welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1999, 88).

This problem is best exemplified by the Netherlands, a country that exhibits elements of both the social democratic and conservative welfare regime types. Van Kersbergen (1995) has referred to the Netherlands as an “enigma,” a Christian democracy built on corporatist foundations with extensive and generous social welfare benefits (128). Esping-Andersen classified the Dutch welfare state as social democratic because he found those traits predominant. According to his evaluation, the potential decommodification that might be achieved through the Netherlands’s
social insurance programs was so high, its welfare provisions so universal and comprehensive—factors that weigh heavily in distinguishing between types of welfare regimes—that it "appears 'social democratic.'" Esping-Andersen is not alone in making that determination. Goodin et al. (1999) have judged the Netherlands to be a "social democratic exemplar," even choosing that country for their case study of a social democratic nation (15). Esping-Andersen has also recognized, however, that the Dutch welfare state is "Janus-headed" in the respect that its social welfare system makes a male bread-winner assumption and private associations play such an important role in the delivery of social services—which would make it appear conservative. As it affects this analysis, the issue is two-fold. First, has there been a lack of due consideration for its conservative traits that has caused the Dutch welfare state to be misclassified? Second, is the welfare policy of the Netherlands fundamentally different than the three ideal types Esping-Andersen has already identified? The answer to both questions is a definite "no." Despite its variation from ideal social democratic type—the Christian democratic legacy, its family assumption, and the role played by private associations in the administration of social services—the Netherlands is neither misclassified nor does it represent a "wholly different" and deviant welfare strategy that warrants identification of another welfare regime type. It may be the worst fitting of those nations identified as social democratic—and one country in the group has to be just that—but the Netherlands clearly belongs in that cluster. The logic and attributes of the Dutch welfare state are predominantly social democratic, even though it does possess other and residual traits at variance with the ideal type.
Although education is not always recognized as part of the welfare state's social policy package it is, no less than other public programs, recognized as a core entitlement in most Western societies. After securing internal order and providing a national defense, public education was one of the earliest functions undertaken by modern governments—sometimes dating back to the late eighteenth century (Schneider 1982). Education is today an integral part of the total social policy package in all advanced industrial societies. Attendance at a public or private school is normally mandated by law for children at about five years of age until their mid-teens, and literacy levels now approach 100 percent in most Western states (OECD 1997).

Education was not included with other social programs in the policy profiles of the welfare states described by Titmuss, Heclo, or Esping-Andersen. In particular, Esping-Andersen did not identify the kinds of education systems typically supported by liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes. I argue that omission makes his depiction of welfare regime types and explanations for their overall decommodification strategies incomplete. The education system and education policy a state supports is closely associated with its welfare strategy. It is a two-way street: the education system and education policy both affect, and are affected by, the welfare strategy of the state. A regime's education system and policy can be made to serve its welfare, labor, and any number of other policy objectives. Education is both a vehicle of commodification and a means to greater decommodification. As education prepares an individual for entry into the labor market as a wage-earner, it
has a commodifying effect. However, as educational achievement enhances an individual's workplace opportunities and ability to establish the means and financial resources for an existence apart from their dependence and participation in the labor market, it can be an agency of decommodification (Furåker, Johansson, and Lind 1990). In this way, the socioeconomic benefits that may be realized as a result of educational achievement can become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, the decommodification that may be achieved through the social security programs of the welfare state.

Castles has remarked that "education offers social protection in a sense rather different than social policy" (1989, 431). Educational achievement, particularly at the secondary and higher levels, is a recognized vehicle of social mobility (Becker 1964; Janowitz 1976; Kaelble 1981). Educational achievement can diminish an individual's commodification by broadening future economic opportunities and enhancing their ability to accumulate personal wealth, thereby reducing dependence on wage labor and market forces over the long run. Moreover, just as an individual's long-term reliance on social safety nets may be lessened by education, so can the welfare state's long-term requirements for income assistance and other social programs. Therefore, I submit that state support of public educational opportunities may be viewed as alternative decommodification strategy that welfare regimes may choose to follow, and an exhibited preference for one or the other may be an additional way to distinguish between kinds of Western welfare states.
Educational Opportunity as an Alternative to Social Insurance

Kaelble (1981) traced the evolution of modern education policy in France, Germany, and Britain beginning in the nineteenth century. He focused on the social changes that accompanied the growth in postprimary educational opportunities with early industrialization until 1914. Particular attention was given to the historical expansion of educational opportunity—“the proportion of children of different social or occupational classes obtaining secondary or higher education” (Kaelble 1981, 240).

According to Kaelble’s account, neither secondary nor higher education opportunities were normally associated with economic growth and development prior to industrialization or during its initial stages (see also de Swaan 1988). The labor market for those with postprimary training was limited—to the clergy, a few professions, and the state bureaucracy. Moreover, access to a higher education was the privilege of only a few—the elite and the wealthy—who appreciated postprimary education as an instrument of mobility into important church and state positions (Kaelble 1981, 241-2). With industrialization came a new and growing requirement for a more highly educated workforce, and increasing recognition by aspiring persons of all social classes that postprimary education represented a “gateway” to

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3 The operative definitions of educational opportunity and the expansion of educational opportunities utilized in this work are consistent with Kaelble’s. First, educational opportunity is the chance to obtain a postprimary level education. Second, the expansion of educational opportunities means growing enrollments and increasing societal inclusiveness at the secondary and higher education levels. It is crucial to recognize the exclusion of mass, primary level educational achievement and expansion from these definitions. This sets them distinctly apart from the educational literature and theory like that represented by Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer (1985).
socioeconomic opportunity. "Secondary and higher education began to gain recognition as a transmitter of social status, though it was still not as important as in the second half of the twentieth century relative to other instruments such as property and family" (Kaelble 1981, 243).

Kaelble considers the period at the turn of the twentieth century a transitional era for educational opportunity and the role of the state in public education (cf. Boli, Ramirez and Meyer 1985). In what he has termed "the era of welfare opportunities," the rules of the game were changing. "The most important characteristic of the era of welfare opportunities is the change in political structure and in educational policy goals" (Kaelble 1981, 244). The state bureaucracy, organized business, and labor had emerged as the dominant forces in a new political order beginning to take shape. It was a goal of this new political constellation to make educational facilities and opportunities more available and equal, at least at a basic level. Educational opportunity was considered to be a public gateway, one that should have wide access. Therefore, it was both expected and desirable that the government should and must play a positive role in leveling the playing field and increasing educational opportunities for the benefit of everyone. Though real change and improvement in educational opportunities would occur only slowly, "the new educational entitlements were often recognized as constitutional or at least legal rights" (Kaelble 1981, 244).

Today, the belief that one is "entitled" and has a "right" to a basic education and the benefits of state-supported social welfare programs is typical of public attitudes prevalent in Europe and the United States.

Heidenheimer (1981) examined the long-term development of public entitlements in social welfare and education that occurred in Europe and the United
States with the rise of the welfare state. In particular, he hoped to discover why the social insurance and postprimary education policies of the U.S. had developed differently than those of the larger states of Western Europe. He recommends a possible explanation might be found during the initial stages of welfare state development, in a regime's preference to champion social insurance or postprimary educational expansion as policy alternatives. "Postprimary education is perceived here as an instrument for the realization of states' concern with equality and security goals, and hence the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states" (Heidenheimer 1981, 269). How welfare states have come to be institutionalized—what is their particular kind and blend of social welfare and education programs—is a legacy of this early choice. Preferential support of educational opportunity or social insurance remains today a policy option of welfare regimes (Boix 1998; Castles 1989).

Heclo (1985) believes the development of the American welfare state reflects such a choice. He claims an "implicit trade-off" was made between investment in social protections or educational opportunity in welfare state development, with public and private education emphasized over other social programs. Janowitz (1976) asserts this emphasis on education over social assistance is consistent with the American concept of welfare.

Massive support for the expansion of public education, including higher education, in the United States, must be seen as a central component of the American notion of welfare—the idea that through public education both personal betterment and national and social and economic development would take place (Janowitz 1976, 34-5).

The making of education policy is not a random exercise of government; it is clearly not independent of other public policies. Education policy is a key component
of a welfare state's total social policy package. It may be the object of certain welfare regimes to support and encourage postprimary educational opportunities, as an agent of social mobility and vehicle to personal security, as an alternative to income and other social insurance guarantees. Higher levels of public investment in postprimary educational opportunities—like that by the United States—may be viewed as an alternative policy strategy to income maintenance programs and other social insurance guarantees. On the other hand, it may be the strategy of a welfare regime to provide generous social insurance benefits as a quid pro quo for more restricted public access to the education gateway, i.e., social security in exchange for limited social mobility. Particular welfare regimes—like Germany—have historically given political and budgetary preference to social insurance over education programs, tending to limit its commitment to educational expansion and, therefore, the opportunities for social mobility (Heidenheimer 1981, 275).

Thus, where the political will and means do not exist to maintain the existing socioeconomic order, educational opportunities—particularly postprimary—may be publicly supported and encouraged as an agent of social mobility. It may be the purpose of fewer and minimal state provisions for income security to encourage greater self-reliance and to convey the message that public safety nets exist only as temporary assistance and to buffer the effects of extreme socioeconomic change, not to insulate the individual from every meanness of life, societal competition, and market forces. Under such a welfare state regime, public support of educational opportunities represents the individual's chance for protection against life's uncertainties; it is the intended alternative to other social security guarantees by the state.
... it may be argued that education offers social protection in a sense rather different from social policy in general. Certainly, state intervention is directed to the provision of a guaranteed minimum standard, but its aim is equality of opportunity rather than the equality of condition which is the rationale in other welfare arenas. Indeed, as Heclo has noted of the United States, countries may choose to trade-off resources for education against the building of a welfare state (Castles 1989, 431).

Research Questions

Is there evidence of a relationship, perhaps a trade-off, between government spending for education and social insurance programs in Western welfare states? Do some regimes exhibit a preference to invest relatively more in education, while others direct a greater share of public spending to social insurance programs? Is a welfare state’s level of financial commitment to social welfare programs a good predictor of its investment in public education, and vice versa? Do welfare states with similar social insurance provisions also support comparable education systems? Is there a difference in education systems between welfare regime types? Does the typology of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states also apply to education policy? Do Western welfare states “cluster” for the similarity of their education policies, just as they do for their social welfare programs?

Significance of the Research Problem

State-supported social welfare programs and the expansion of postprimary educational opportunities are relatively recent phenomena in Western societies. Both are associated with industrialization, political democratization, the emergence and

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evolution of the welfare state. This is not meant to suggest, however, a condition of causality between industrialization or political development and the social policies of welfare states. The same must also be said for the expansion of educational opportunities. Such connections, as well as other explanations for social welfare and education policies, are the continuing subjects of debate in the literatures of education and the welfare state. The same applies to whether a welfare regime's demonstrated preference to support social insurance programs or educational opportunities may reflect a choice between alternative policy strategies. If these are alternative policy options that welfare states may elect to follow, is there any consequence or “trade-off” in choosing one over the other? Furthermore, can particular kinds of welfare states be discerned by the similarity of their policy profiles, by the different emphasis they place on educational opportunities and social insurance programs? These are but a few of the many questions about the nature of Western welfare states, their social insurance and education policies. Most remain unanswered and many more are yet to be asked. By exploring a select few of those questions and issues, I believe this work can make a valuable contribution to the literature and what we know about the welfare state.

At issue first is a better definition of the Western welfare state and its policy portfolio. I contend that most definitions of the welfare state—including analytical models and policy profiles—are incomplete for the omission of education policy. A comprehensive definition and model of the welfare state would include education with its other social policies. It is a central component of a regime's overall welfare strategy. As it concerns typologies like those developed by Titmuss (1974) or Esping-Andersen (1990), I would submit their models are incomplete rather than
inaccurate. Second, it then follows, can it be shown that the kinds of welfare regimes Esping-Andersen has identified—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—have characteristic education policies as well? When education policy is the basis for cross-national differentiation, will welfare states array in clusters like those for social policy? Third, if the clustering by regime type for education holds close to that for social policy, with only limited exceptions, it makes sense that education policy would be included in a more comprehensive definition of the welfare state and its policy profile. It also suggests a single analytical model might be more appropriate, more powerful, and able to simultaneously explain both the education and social policies of the welfare state. Fourth, is there any evidence of a “trade-off” between a welfare regime’s support of education and social security programs? Are there certain kinds of welfare states that tend to view an emphasis on educational opportunities or social insurance programs as alternative welfare strategies? Fifth, should the literature concerning the expansion of educational opportunities continue to be considered separately and apart from that of the welfare state? If analysis does indicate an association between the two policy areas, and if a review of the relevant literature reveals a great similarity of explanations for both welfare state development and educational expansion, a melding of the two would seem both appropriate and necessary.

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5 A pure and perfect match between arrays or within regime types should not be expected. Exceptions are possible. As Esping-Andersen has instructed, his model only “show[s] that welfare states cluster, but we must recognize that there is no single pure case” (1990, 28). There are no real welfare states that are perfect liberal, conservative, or social democratic regime types. Nations are classified according to their predominant regime traits, even though they may possess elements of other welfare state types.
Finally, there is a more general issue. The specific nature of provisions for healthcare, work injury, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions and education bear important consequences for the socioeconomic opportunities and outcomes of individuals, groups, the greater society, and the state. They say much about the meaning and value of citizenship, about society's view of the state and the responsibility of the political community to protect the individual, families, and groups. It is important that everyone know—scholars, policymakers, and citizens—if certain types of welfare states are associated with specific education and social policy outcomes. It is the job of the scholarly community to find this out, to explain and predict so that the political leadership may understand its policy options and the consequences of its choices, and that the citizenry may be aware and appreciate the nature and effect of the social programs and policies that affect their daily lives and life's opportunities for them.

Hypotheses

Esping-Andersen's Welfare State Typology and Education Policy

Along with whatever provisions are defined for old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, sickness benefits, and sundry other social assistance, citizens of every Western state also have a right to at least a basic education;\(^6\) it is one component of the total social benefits package to which every citizen is entitled. The specific nature of a state's social welfare system, along with the educational

\(^6\)That right today is to a secondary level education, or ten to twelve years of formal education.
entitlements and opportunities offered, reflect a particular welfare strategy. Once again, I submit, any meaningful depiction of a welfare state's policy profile or strategy is incomplete unless its education policy is also included.

Esping-Andersen associated unique social welfare policy agendas for unemployment, health, and old-age compensation with three welfare state types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Although education policy is not considered in that welfare state model, I contend the typology will continue to hold with its inclusion. In other words, just as Western welfare regimes tend to "cluster" into three groups according to Esping-Andersen's social insurance criteria, I hypothesize they will gather in comparable arrays because of the similarity of their education policies. This will be indicated by the "goodness of fit" of regressions on national education expenditure data, when welfare regime type is controlled for as an independent variable and specific source of cross-national variation. Evidence of clustering can also be observed on graphs and plots of social insurance and education data for the 1960-1990 time period, including: real education expenditures per capita by welfare regime type, education's share of total public spending by regime type, real social insurance expenditures by real education expenditures by welfare regime, and the percentage of the secondary level students enrolled in general education programs by real education expenditures.

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7 National data records have been coded as liberal, conservative, or social democratic as specified by Esping-Andersen (1990).
The Trade-off Between Educational Opportunities and Social Insurance

I hypothesize that certain Western states may exhibit a preference to support educational opportunities or social insurance as part of an overall welfare strategy. Although public education and social insurance are but two of many programs that must compete—and policymakers must consider—for public sector support and budgetary allocations, there is also a specific competition between education and social insurance that goes beyond the common battle for a piece of the budgetary pie. This is manifested by a choice and may take the form of a "trade-off" between alternative welfare strategies. Preferential investment in educational opportunities or social insurance are alternative decommodification options welfare regimes may choose to support. Social insurance programs typically provide immediate financial benefits, decommodification in the here and now for the individual and are a current expense for the state. Spending for public education is also a current state expense, but it offers only the means for individual decommodification. Benefits are neither immediate nor guaranteed. State support of public education opportunities is an investment in the future; the social security it offers the individual is time-lagged. As educational achievement is an agency of upward social mobility it may enhance the potential for the accumulation of personal wealth, and thereby enable future social security and market independence. In this sense, support of educational opportunities represents another decommodification option that welfare states may elect to

\[\text{It would be wrong to consider the payment of social insurance benefits an expense incurred by the state without any expectation of return, however. For both the short- and long-term it may be argued that the safety net of social insurance supported by the state adds to its legitimacy in the public eye, promotes domestic tranquility, and helps to preserve the fabric of the existing social order.}\]
support. Increasing levels of support for public education programs, measured as a proportion of total public spending, is an alternative to the greater decommodification that may be achieved through more generous income substitution and health provisions.

I argue that such alternative decommodification strategies—and their blend—can be demonstrated in the policy profiles of the liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states that Esping-Andersen describes, by their unique implementations of social insurance and education programs. In particular, I hypothesize that liberal welfare regimes can be expected to spend more on education as a proportion of their total public sector spending than either the social democratic or conservative states. Furthermore, I hypothesize that regression modeling will show that state expenditures for public education are inversely related to support for social welfare policies in liberal and conservative welfare regimes. In liberal states there is a policy trade-off that favors the allocation of public monies to education over social welfare provisions. In conservative nations the relationship is reversed. In liberal welfare regimes educational opportunity is viewed as an alternative to the decommodification policies supported by social democratic states and the emphasis on work-related insurance or "earned" benefits found in conservative welfare states. Rather than broad and universal safety nets of social insurance provisions, liberal states offer educational opportunity as the individual's protection against the meanness of life, and the individual is held responsible for his or her own outcome. Given their emphasis on collective responsibility and greater concern for social order and stability, I hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to favor social insurance programs over expanded educational opportunities. The trade-off in
social democratic regimes will be less clear, however, where there is emphasis both on collective responsibility and the opportunity for individual achievement.

**Social Mobility, Curriculum Emphasis and Educational Spending**

I argue the three types of Western welfare regimes—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—have different education strategies and objectives. In particular, this variation can be demonstrated by the different emphasis given to secondary vocational and general education programs. Vocational training tends to be less socially mobilizing given the normally terminal nature of those programs—they define "end-points" in an education system and, therefore, the last stage of an individual's formal education. Vocational training is also a lesser vehicle of social mobilization because of its workforce and working class orientation. General education, on the other hand, often serves as preparation for higher education; it is the gateway to the university and other advanced studies. Educational achievement at that level is an important vehicle of social mobility and means to greater socioeconomic opportunities. In this sense, an emphasis on vocational training or general education are alternative education policies that welfare states may support.

Because of the belief in self-reliance and emphasis on educational opportunities as an agency of upward social mobility, I hypothesize that liberal welfare states can be expected to direct the highest share of public sector dollars to education and have the highest rate of secondary-level students enrolled in general education curriculums. Given their larger concern for collective decommodification, but without sacrificing individual freedom and socioeconomic opportunities, I predict social democratic states will be found to spend less on education than liberal regimes.
as a percentage of total public spending. They will also rank behind liberal regimes in secondary general education enrollments for their greater support of vocational training. However, they may demonstrate a comparable or even greater education "effort," as indicated by a higher level of spending for education as a percentage of their GDP and a larger commitment of real education dollars per capita. Finally, given their concern for socioeconomic order and stability over social mobility, I hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to score behind both the liberal and social democratic states in all educational spending categories analyzed, but to rank slightly ahead of social democratic nations in vocational training enrollments at the secondary level.

Preliminary Findings

A preliminary study of the association between education and the social insurance programs in Western societies was performed using a sample of eighteen OECD nations for which the most current and complete data were available from OECD sources (Hokenmaier 1998). Country data were organized using Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare state typology as the basis for cross-national and group comparisons of education and social insurance spending. Welfare regime type was also utilized as an independent variable in regression modeling to ascertain what, if any, cross-national variation in education and social welfare spending might be

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9 National data were coded as liberal, conservative, or social democratic according to Esping-Andersen’s specification. Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States were assigned to the liberal category. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy were put in the conservative group. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were classified as social democratic.
associated with particular constitutions of the welfare state. Castles' (1989) model to explain the different patterns of education expenditure by OECD countries provided the starting point, that equation modified to include Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology and enable an evaluation of its explanatory power.

That initial investigation offered confirmation of the relationship hypothesized between education policy and the kinds of welfare regimes described by Esping-Andersen. Evidence of that association was provided by the calculations of the regression analyses, descriptive statistics, and variable graphing of education and social insurance data by country and welfare state type. The data showed that liberal states spent the greatest proportion of total public sector dollars on education, social democratic states ranked second, and conservative nations last. However, while liberal welfare states displayed leadership in education spending as a share of total public sector expenditures, social democratic regimes exhibited a tendency to put more “effort” behind their education policies—as indicated by the higher real education dollars spent per capita and the larger percentage of their GDP given to education programs. Liberal states came in second and conservative nations brought up the rear. The data also showed that liberal welfare states led in general education enrollment rates at the secondary level, by such a wide margin that it might be considered an alternative to the education policies of social democratic and conservative nations. The liberal emphasis on general education over vocational training, together with the greater share of public sector expenditures devoted to education—and relatively less to social insurance programs—represents evidence confirming Heidenheimer’s hypothesis that support of educational opportunities, as an instrument of state policy, may be an alternative to other social welfare strategies.
Conversely, so does the greater stress by conservative regimes on vocational training and the greater share of public monies given to social insurance programs.

**Further Avenues of Investigation**

I recognize that the conclusions drawn from such a preliminary investigation are necessarily limited. They pertain only to the data from a single cross-national sample of eighteen advanced industrial states in the early 1990s. Thus, the findings may only reflect a one-time historical phenomenon relating specific welfare state types to distinctive social and education policies. Moreover, there is no evidence of a previous or more enduring association linking these or other kinds of Western welfare regimes with specific social and education policies. It remains for additional research to determine whether such distinctive policy profiles also existed in prior periods, to the beginnings of welfare state development in the later nineteenth century. Likewise, in the case of Heidenheimer's hypothesis, examination of the policy records of several nations is necessary to confirm whether or not an emphasis on public education over other social insurance programs has been an ongoing and alternative policy path followed by the governments of particular kinds of welfare states.

**Research Methodology**

Further evidence is required to support or reject my hypothesis of a trade-off between public investment in education and other social programs. Without a further examination of specific national policy development and data, it is impossible to do anything more than speculate about distinctive policy profiles or the causes for
different and particular welfare state development. Gathering and analyzing additional data is necessary to demonstrate the continuity or discontinuity of possible causal effects and variable associations with specific kinds of welfare regimes and policy profiles. In order to accomplish this task, subsequent research employs two different, but complementary methodologies: a case study of social policy development and educational expansion for the German and American welfare states and, second, a pooled and time-series cross-sectional analysis of social welfare and education expenditures for a large sample of OECD nations since 1960.

Population Definition and Sample Selection

In addition to Germany and the United States, the countries included in this study are those for whom the OECD has compiled the most complete data for the 1960-1990 time period. The eighteen nations making up this group are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Where it was necessary to obtain supplemental information from other sources it has been appropriately noted.

Literature Review

Three major theoretical explanations for welfare state development may be distinguished that can direct this investigation—structural, political conflict, and institutional models. First, that the change from pre- to industrial to post-industrial society, associated socioeconomic transformations and demographic shifts, provided the context for alternative policy choices between public education and social
insurance (Wilensky 1975; Pontusson 1995). Second, that changes in the distribution of political power among actors in the social and education policy arenas have affected the development of public policy. Democratization, mass enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process have affected the evolution of the welfare state and its programs (Castles 1982; Hicks and Swank 1984, 1989, 1992). Third, the initial institutionalization and subsequent path dependence of the maturing welfare state affected the policy choices between public education and other social programs (Skocpol 1979, 1985; March and Olsen 1984, 1989; North 1990). The level of bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for education and social policymaking, and the degree of local support over education and social policies—all these impact the trade-off between public investment in education and other social programs (Weaver and Rockman 1993).

Additional and specific literature to be drawn upon includes that of Esping-Andersen (1990), who identified three kinds of welfare regimes in advanced industrial societies. The simplicity of that typology makes it attractive for use in this analysis. That Esping-Andersen’s model has built-in assumptions about the objectives, preferences, and tendencies of each welfare regime type for its social programs makes it more so, especially as those “traits” might be associated with other public programs receiving government support. Also included is the work of Castles (1989, 1994a) to develop policy models that identify the causes for variation in education and social welfare spending by Western societies. Added to these is that of Heclo (1985), who argued an “implicit trade-off” was made between investment in social protections and educational opportunity in the development of the American welfare state, and
Heidenheimer (1981), who recommended a preference to support postprimary education or social insurance might be "viewed as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states" (269).

Organization of the Study

Both a cross-national quantitative analysis and case studies of Western welfare states will be utilized in an effort to determine whether different kinds of welfare regimes can be associated with specific policy outcomes, to see if variation in social programs and education systems can be related to particular policy profiles and constitutions of the welfare state. The case studies will examine social and education policy development and the "trade-off" thesis for Germany and the United States, beginning in the later nineteenth century. Both nations began industrialization in the nineteenth century and are today advanced industrial democracies, but each followed a very different path of welfare state development. While they share some common attributes of socioeconomic and political development, their institutional structures and public policies are very different. There are clear differences, both in the kinds of social and education programs found, and in the institutions of government that make, support, and implement public policy. According to Esping-Andersen's classification, they are different kinds of welfare regimes. Germany fits the conservative welfare state model and the United States the liberal.

Particular attention will focus on landmark events in social and education policy (e.g., the establishment of a public old-age pension system, the adoption of comprehensive schools). Three major theoretical explanations for social policy and welfare state development—structural, political conflict, and institutional
models—will be analyzed for their power to explain these events. Whether an event may demonstrate a preference by a welfare regime for education or social programs as policy alternatives will also be examined.

Another chapter will undertake a quantitative examination of the “trade-off” thesis. A pooled and time-series cross-sectional analysis will be performed using the public expenditure data for a large sample of OECD nations, beginning in 1960 and continuing through 1990. Castles’ model to explain education spending is modified to test the applicability of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model to the field of education policy. The three welfare state types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—are tested for their association with unique education policies, to see if variation in education policy can be explained by the particular constitution of the welfare state. While more limited in time horizon than the case study, it will involve the evaluation of many more data points from a wider sample of nations. Education and social policy data will be taken from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) editions of *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators* and national accounts data from *OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries* and the *OECD Political Handbook*. Three hypotheses of welfare state development—structural, political conflict, and institutional—will be investigated as possible explanations for public policy development, a relationship between kinds of public expenditure and regime type, and a “trade-off” between social and education policy—by welfare regime type and over time.
Anticipated Findings and Conclusions

I argue that a more accurate and comprehensive policy model of the Western welfare state must include education with other social programs. Education policy is a core component and not independent of a welfare regime's other social programs. Indeed, there is a specific relationship between the types of social welfare programs found in Western societies and the kinds of education policies their governments support. I hypothesize this association is demonstrated by the three kinds of welfare states Esping-Andersen describes. In other words, Esping-Andersen's typology can also be applied to the field of education policy, and Western welfare regimes will also cluster according to similarity of their education policy profiles.
CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF THE WELFARE STATE AND EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION

This chapter examines the leading explanations and factors associated with welfare state development and the expansion of educational opportunities in advanced industrial nations. Theories of welfare regime and social policy development are considered first, followed by those for educational expansion. Each section is organized according to a three-fold division—between structural, political conflict, and institutional approaches—that predominates the welfare state literature. Based on this review and analysis, three findings are submitted. First, very similar theories and variables have been offered by scholars to explain both the social programs and education policies supported by welfare states. Second, given the correlation of theories and explanatory variables, a single analytical model may be more appropriate, powerful, and provide a simultaneous explanation of both social welfare and education policy. Third, such a model must take into account the different timing and character of mass and postprimary educational expansion, particularly as the latter paralleled and is associated with the development of the modern state system, the process of industrialization, the maturation of the welfare state and its social programs. Such a policy model is specified at the end of this chapter.

1Political conflict theory is used in this text as a general heading that includes what other scholars refer to as conflict theory, political resource theory, or resource mobilization theory.
Structural Theories

The “logic of industrialism” is the most frequently offered of structural explanations for welfare state development. A Western theory of modernization, it states that welfare regimes and their social programs are the by-products of economic growth, sociocultural changes and demographic shifts. As nations undergo industrial development, become more urban and their populations age, increased public spending and new social programs are developed by the state as a structural-functional response to the expanding social needs of the national population (Cutright 1965; Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965; Wilensky 1975). An important assumption of this “logic” is that the process of industrialization will also bring a convergence in sociopolitical structures and public policies—regardless of political ideology and regime type—as states move from pre- to modern to post-industrial stages (Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 133). The tendency of this view is to emphasize what is similar among nations and overlook that which is different. Partisan politics, ideology or institutions are considered to matter little, or hardly, as structural forces are assumed to drive specific policy outcomes. This also means that comparable sequences of policy adoption for similar kinds of social programs should be expected across nations (Collier and Messick 1975). According to the “logic,” alternate paths of welfare state development and differences in the timing for social program implementation are attributable to different sociocultural conditions and variation in levels of economic development.
As with modernization theory generally, the logic of industrialism seemed to be a good explanation for Western welfare state development in the decades following World War Two. That period of economic growth and prosperity witnessed the expansion of, and increased spending for, social programs by many Western nations. Implicit too, in the Western "logic," was the wishful assumption that political development would take place as a result of economic development, i.e., there would be a movement from less to more popular and democratic forms of government as a consequence of economic growth and development. However, the failure of many new and developing nations to become more democratic with economic development, and setbacks to democratic development—the widespread military takeovers in Latin America and elsewhere—forced a critical reexamination of the logic of industrialism as an adequate explanation of welfare state and social program development. Skocpol and Amenta (1986) advise that many studies of comparative social policy development have concluded that industrialization was never a good indicator of welfare state development:

For the origins of welfare state programs, Flora and Alber (1981) demonstrate that levels of industrialization fail to predict the timing of the adoption of a social insurance program by twelve European nations between the 1880s and 1920s; Orloff and Skocpol (1984) show that in the same period policy developments in Britain and Massachusetts cannot be differentiated according to logic-of-industrialism variables; and Collier and Messick (1975) find that neither levels nor significant thresholds of industrialization explain the timing of social insurance program adoptions in 59 nations between the 1880s and the 1960s. Examining the expansion of various categories of social public expenditures in 18 democratic capitalist nations during the 1960s and 1970s, Castles (1982b, 61-70) reinforces the conclusion of the OECD (1978) that these nations have recently diverged rather than converged and that neither economic level nor economic growth can account for recent expenditure changes. Furthermore, both Stephens (1979, Ch 4) and Myles (1984, 94-7) adduce evidence against Wilensky's (1975) pivotal argument that national social welfare efforts are determined by the proportions of aged in the population (Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 133-4).
A variation on the structural theme, a neo-Marxist alternative to the logic of industrialism, is the “logic of capitalist development” or theory of “monopoly capitalism” (Gough 1975, 1979; O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984; Therbom 1978). The argument of this school is that the growth of the welfare state is caused by modern capitalism’s need to “socially reproduce”; that is, the capitalist state must implement public welfare programs—income and other social security guarantees—to safeguard and perpetuate the socioeconomic and political order upon which it is based. Like with the logic of industrialism, social programs are supported by the capitalist order as a consequence of economic development, but in order to buy-off and avoid a working class revolt against the capitalist state (Piven and Cloward 1971). Precisely such a strategy has been recognized in the social policies of the German chancellor Bismarck, by which “he sought to conciliate the working classes.” The similarity of the logic of industrialism and the logic of capitalism is clear—both consider increased social spending by the state a response to the changes brought by economic development—but they differ according to the presumption of political competition by the former and the importance placed on the class struggle and the domination of monopoly capitalists by the latter.

There has been limited systematic cross-national research to test this neo-Marxist explanation of the welfare state, and the findings have been inconclusive.

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2 Elmer Roberts, Monarchical Socialism in Germany (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), 118. Contemporary political observer Max Weber saw it similarly, and considered “a grave political error” Bismarck’s conviction “that he could create a positive attitude toward the state, and political gratitude, by granting welfare benefits out of public funds or compulsory funds.” Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 3, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press), 1390-1.
Three particular, and related, issues remain and require explanation by those who advocate this approach. First, what is the cause for cross-national variation in welfare regime development between capitalist states? The timing and content of social programs supported by the advanced industrial nations are not the same. This criticism applies also to the logic of industrialism. Second, it has seldom been the ruling class or their capitalist state that has initiated and driven the expansion of social programs. What is the explanation for the welfare agendas of traditional liberal and authoritarian governments? Finally, how and why is the development of social welfare policy in capitalist states any different than that for other societies undergoing industrialization? The social problems and state responses seem largely the same whether the economy is capitalist-dominated or not (Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 136).

Orloff and Skocpol (1984) argue that neither the logic of industrialism nor class-based (working class strength) theories can adequately explain the emergence of welfare states and the very different social welfare paths taken by modern industrial states. They claim this is particularly true for America and Great Britain. More significant were the effects and timing of political democratization, a more inclusive electorate, the process of modern state-building (especially a professional bureaucracy), and the emergence of programmatic political parties.

Political Conflict Theories

Political conflict theory developed largely as a critical alternative to the logic of industrialism and modernization perspectives. Its proponents argue that the
political process and the societal groups and interests represented in the decision-making for public policy explain the development of the welfare state and its social programs. According to this view, political struggle and changes in the distribution of power among political actors in the policy arena matter greatly, affecting the timing and development of social policy. Therefore, the process of democratization, mass enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process all influence the development of the welfare state and its social programs. This school does not deny the importance of economic factors in the shaping of public policy. They would insist, however, that even as economic changes and demographic shifts may have a tendency to increase social spending, it is a nation’s politics that explains the making of its particular social policies. An increase in state expenditures for old-age pensions may well be associated with the growth of an elderly population, but it was through the conflict and compromise of mobilized interests within the political process that the decision was made to do so.

There is a major division in this school between scholars who favor a "democratic politics" approach and those who prefer a class-oriented or "social democratic hypothesis." Those who advocate the "democratic politics" variant consider welfare state development to be the product of political democracy and the

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State support of public welfare assistance and other entitlement programs is not limited to a particular kind of political regime. In particular, there is not a necessary association between social welfare programs, other public entitlements, and political democracy. Dictators may also invest in human capital and provide social insurance against the meanness of life. Social policy is often made and public goods distributed by authoritarian states and their rulers in order to maintain order, stability, and privilege—and even for the good of the individual or the larger community. This does not mean that democratic nations never support social policies that are intended to serve status quo objectives or protect privilege—some do—but they are more inclined to serve a greater public good than the benefit of just a few.
peaceful competition of societal groups seeking to implement their own policy agendas. Social welfare policy is explained by the pluralism and competition of the political arena, its beneficiaries by the ability of citizens, social groups, and economic interests to control the decisionmaking process (Dahl 1982; Downs 1957; Flora and Alber 1981; Götting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994; Janowitz 1976; Lindert 1994; Marshall 1964; Pampel and Williamson 1985, 1988, 1989; Reese 1986). Key to this view is the idea that the conflict and compromise of groups is ongoing, that policy coalitions are ever-shifting and never permanent. Little or no consideration is given to more permanent socioeconomic structures or factors—like class or religion—as significant variables affecting public policy (Uusitalo 1984, 414). What is important to welfare state development is the ongoing political struggle and compromise between the potential recipients of social programs, the mobilization of demographic and interest groups that cross-cut and transcend socioeconomic, religious, cultural, and other societal cleavages.

A larger group of the political conflict school focuses on the different sociopolitical actors, the dynamics of class struggle, and the structure of political power within the welfare state. These scholars distinguish particular societal groups—principally the working class and organized labor—their political mobilization and resources, as central to the explanation of welfare state and social policy development. While they overlap, a general division falls between those advocating a “power resource,” working class mobilization or social democratic approach (Esping-Andersen 1985a, 1985b, 1990; Korpi 1983, 1989), and those who concentrate on the role of the political right—of bourgeois, conservative and

Proponents of the power resource approach consider the changing distribution of political power that occurred with the rise of organized labor and parties of the left—associated with industrialization, socioeconomic change, and democratization—crucial to the explanation of the welfare state and the expansion of its social programs. According to this view, class divisions and conflict are significant and ongoing factors in the making of public policy. It is hypothesized that working class strength, as determined by the mobilization of the working class and its representation in government by leftist or social democratic parties, is critical to development of the welfare state and the expansion of its social programs. In particular, because the working class is the primary beneficiary, the increasing political strength of organized labor and parties of the left are considered major factors in growth of social welfare spending (Castles 1982a; Esping-Andersen 1985a, 1985b, 1990; Heclo 1974; Hicks 1999; Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and Swank 1984, 1992; Korpi 1983).

Social democratic corporatist theory stresses the mutually reinforcing roles of strong left (i.e., Socialist, Labor, and Social Democratic) parties and strong Labor movements. This is the case both for works of Marxian origins, in which government control by left parties and the existence of strong unions are effective, albeit reformist, manifestations of working-class mobilization (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) and for neopluralist studies, in which these parties and unions represent consequential political forces in democratic societies (Cameron 1978; Hibbs 1987). Moreover, some scholars working in this tradition have argued that governments led by centrist secular and Christian Democratic parties have advanced income-security policy (e.g., Castles 1982; Wilensky 1981). From the social democratic corporatist perspective, the most central proposition to emerge has been that left and center (non-right) party leadership of government generates higher welfare effort than right and "indeterminate" party leadership. However, some have suggested important roles for oppositional, as well as governing, parties.
The growth of electorally consequential left parties, or "contagion from the Left," has sometimes led conservative governments to welfare-expanding reforms (Esping-Andersen 1990; Heclo 1974) (Hicks and Swank 1992, 659).

Castles (1978, 1982, 1989) is foremost among practitioners of the political conflict approach who would see other social actors—and even allow for structural effects—as the critical forces in welfare state development and the making of social policy. Particularly important would be the strength and representation in government of religious interests and political parties of the right (see also, Wilensky 1981). Proponents of this view would argue that increased social spending would be expected where parties of the political right are weak, or where denominational interests are politically mobilized, or a combination (Kangas 1994, 349). Castles' perspective is captured well in a 1981 article in which he evaluates another scholar's investigation of the causes for increased social welfare spending. Cameron (1978) argued that a nation's openness to the international economy was an important determinant of its social spending. He argued that a nation's dependence on foreign markets created the internal conditions necessary—a strong labor movement and mobilized working class electorate—that facilitated the rise to power of Labor and social democratic parties. These parties of the left, whose primary beneficiaries were organized labor and the working class, then tended to expand social welfare

\[4\] "Contagion from the left" is a term credited to Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954), xxvii. It refers to the action of political parties on the right that take up certain policy issues of a mobilized left in order to gain electoral advantage. Similarly, it may be used to explain why conservative governments—like that of Bismarck—undertake social program initiatives to gain popular support when the distribution of power resources is changing to favor more leftward-inclined sociopolitical forces.
expenditures when they held the reins of governmental power. In his reaction, Castles (1981) cautioned Cameron and others similarly inclined not to become too bound by reductionist explanations that purport similar outcomes for given societies based on one or just a few socioeconomic factors. He advised that, although the international political economy may certainly have a significant structuring effect, a nation's own institutional arrangements and partisan politics may also shape its social policies. In particular, the influence of different societal arrangements and political contexts should be recognized as important causes for cross-national variation in social policy. In other words, a nation's unique politics and institutional arrangements matter, too.

Institutional Theories

Historical institutionalists would not necessarily argue that proponents of structural or political conflict theories are wrong, but that the significance of political, social and economic institutions and institutional organization must be considered in any satisfactory explanation of welfare states and their social policies. Institutions structure, order, and modify political activities (North 1990). A nation's institutional setting, its organization and the rules for political competition, affects its policymaking process and outcomes (Hicks, Misra and Ng 1995; Lijphart 1984; March and Olsen 1984; Weaver and Rockman 1993). Institutional differences provide a powerful explanation for cross-national variation in welfare state and social policy development. An institutional perspective can provide the analyst with a "theoretical bridge" between the individuals who made history and the context in which they made it (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 10).
... in general, institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups. Thus, clearly included in the definition are such features of the institutional context as the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors like trade unions (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 2).

Institutions are also important political actors, autonomous in their own right and participants both in the making and implementation of public policy (Skocpol 1979, 1985). Institutions tend to develop vested interests in, and seek to influence, current and future public policy (March and Olsen 1989; Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 149-51). Therefore, the particular institutionalization of the state—its structure, capacity, and autonomous interests—must be considered a critical differentiating variable that affects the timing and development of the welfare state and the substance of its social programs (DeViney 1983; Pampel and Williamson 1989; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). The level of bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for education and social policymaking, and the degree of local support and control over education and other social policies—all these impact the development and public investment in social programs (Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Lipset 1959). Moreover, the initial institutionalization and subsequent path dependence of the maturing welfare state must affect its policy choices (Esping-Andersen 1990; North 1990).

According to this school, institutions may structure and influence but do not necessarily predetermine the outcome of political conflict. As they represent the legacy of prior policies and past partisan struggles, institutional arrangements may,
however, be predisposed to perpetuate certain inequalities and favor specific parties. This property of institutions, that they bear the legacy of previous political relations and policies, establishes path dependence as an important characteristic of institutional operation. Thus, as institutions carry the past into the present and into the future, they do not necessarily respond in the most efficient and effective fashion to real system requirements, contrary to assumptions of the functionalist approach. In fact, they may inhibit rather than lead to needed solutions in the most efficient manner (North 1990).

March and Olsen (1989) claim that the social programs of the American welfare state, once they become institutionalized, tend to have such a structuring and self-perpetuating effect. Programs like Medicare and Social Security's old-age pension system have created their own clientele—from recipient groups and within the administrative apparatus of the state—that have a vested interest in the ongoing policymaking and the government's continued support of those social policies. In a similar vein, Skocpol and Amenta (1986, 149-50), Skocpol (1992, 57-60), Pierson (1993, 1996) speak of a comparable "policy feedback" effect, that existing public policies may have an impact on subsequent policymaking.

Going further still, and although he is associated chiefly with the social democratic model, Esping-Andersen (1990) contends that the social policy legacies of advanced industrial societies have been institutionalized in three distinctive "worlds of welfare capitalism," in three different kinds of Western welfare state (see also Goodin et al. 1999). He claims that those welfare regime types-liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be associated with unique policy profiles for health, unemployment, and retirement benefits. Esping-Andersen's powerful institutional
argument has not been without controversy in the scholarly community, but less for his assertion about the institutionalization of three particular kinds of welfare regime types than for the modifications others would make to his three-fold classification (Castles and Mitchell 1992; Mitchell 1992; Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995).

Theories of Educational Expansion

Self-perpetuation is the least complicated of the explanations for educational expansion. From generation to generation, sons and daughters have tended at least to match the educational achievement of their parents. As populations have grown with the passage of time, so have educational institutions and student enrollments. Moreover, as ever larger segments of national populations received at least primary, and then secondary and university educations, so did a growing proportion of children as they followed in their parents' footsteps. Such an “inheritance effect” is far from a satisfactory explanation of educational expansion by itself, however. It does not account for the influence of other socioeconomic and political forces that are external to population growth and education as a self-perpetuating process (Windolf 1997, 3).

The Different Literatures of Mass and Postprimary Educational Expansion

Most studies of educational expansion have focused on the mass, or primary level. I have termed that literature the “John Meyer” school for his prominence in those works. Scholars who have investigated the expansion of secondary and higher

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5 See, for example: Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson, and Boli (1977); Meyer, Tyack, Nagel, and Gordon (1979); Ramirez and Meyer (1980); Boli, Ramirez, and
education are fewer in number. They include Ringer (1979), who examined the changes in secondary and higher education systems in Europe during the nineteenth century and Kaelble (1981), who explored the expansion of “educational opportunities”—growing school enrollments and increasing societal inclusiveness at the postprimary level—as a gateway to upward social mobility. Heidenheimer (1973, 1981, 1993, 1997) studied the relationship of postprimary education to other social programs, the role of the state in the expansion of higher education, education reforms, and state support of postprimary educational opportunities as an alternative policy strategy to investment in social insurance programs by emerging welfare states. Windolf (1992, 1993, 1997) has analyzed the structural changes and expansion of higher education in many of today's advanced industrial nations, paying particular attention to the possible effects of economic development and business cycles on higher education enrollments since the late nineteenth century.

Mass education has been linked to the process of modern state-building, to the stage of incorporation when “individuals are being reconstituted as active, purposive members of the rational society or national state” (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 170). While this explanation generally describes the Western experience, taking place before large-scale industrialization, the expansion of secondary and higher education followed a different pattern. The takeoff in those sectors was associated with the emergence and growth of the welfare state, after incorporation by the modern national state, when the process of industrialization was well underway. Given the relative coincidence in time and the contrary societal

objectives of postprimary educational expansion and social security programs—the former a vehicle of upward mobility and the latter a mechanism for status quo preservation—the political regimes of many Western societies were confronted by a most important decision to make about a policy strategy to follow with respect to the level of state investment in education versus other social programs. Where secondary and higher education opportunities were considered an alternative to social security programs “as an instrument for the realization of states’ concern with equality and security goals,” it was a choice between an “emphasis on education and social security programs . . . as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Heidenheimer 1981, 269).

Heidenheimer’s claim is examined in more detail in the cross-national quantitative analysis and case studies that follow, along with the other hypotheses of this work that stipulate there is a relationship between the education and social policies of Western welfare states. Even before those presentations, though, some evidence of that association is furnished by the discussion below. The literature on educational expansion will be found to be remarkably similar to that for the welfare state; the arguments and logic are often the same. This is not simply a matter of happenstance. There are a number of scholars who have combined study of the welfare state’s education policy with its other social programs (Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; Heclo 1985; Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Lindert 1994). At the outset they assumed there was an association between the two policy areas and, therefore, they utilized in their research many of the same or similar variables and explanations for both educational expansion and social welfare development. That was for their appreciation that the policymaking for both education and social welfare was a
response to and was affected by many of the same or similar social problems, structural forces, political actors and institutions.

**Structural Theories**

Structural explanations for the growth of public education systems are much like those for the development of the welfare state and its social programs. Educational expansion is viewed as the necessary technical-functional response by the state to the logic of industrialism and the imperatives of modernization. According to this argument, a more highly educated, skilled, and differentiated work force is required to support economic growth and modernization. The most typical structural theories are those that link educational expansion with socioeconomic growth and development (Cutright 1965; Kaelble 1981; Lipset 1959; Wilensky 1975), with economic development and investment in human capital (Becker 1964, 1993; Schultz 1961), or to the modern state-building project (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992).

Most structural arguments predict the timing of educational expansion to coincide with industrialization and economic development. Accordingly, the growth of education systems is associated with the other political and sociocultural changes and demographic shifts that accompany economic growth and development—increasing national wealth, urbanization, modern infrastructures, a healthier and aging population, etc. Urban populations and industrial areas are expected to expand earlier and more than rural, with higher overall participation rates and greater proportions of male than female enrollments. Some have even suggested the possibility that political
democratization might be associated with rising national literacy (Almond and Verba 1965; Dewey 1930; Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963).

Like its counterpart in the literature on the welfare state, a neo-Marxist alternative to the logic of industrialism would charge that the primary function of public education and educational expansion is to reproduce the class order and wage labor for the capitalist economic system (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Husén 1972, 1975; Levin 1978). As this conviction is interpreted by Rubinson (1986), educational expansion may be viewed as a capitalist strategy to control or pacify the working class. The growth of educational opportunities for the working class is expected to occur during periods of increasing immigration and labor militancy, to reinforce the class structure, absorb excess labor, and buffer potential social unrest (Rubinson 1986, 524-5).

An important variation of the technical-functional argument is offered by human capital theorists. They explain educational expansion and increasing literacy as a response to the requirement for skilled labor by economic development. To help meet this demand, the state may increase its support of education and training opportunities—invest in its human capital. These theorists claim that state investment in education and training systems is returned with value added. Educational achievement can both better the individual and benefit the nation, increasing the value and productivity of each. The expansion of educational opportunities and a workforce trained in modern skills can fuel the economic growth of the nation, reduce poverty, and be an agent of socioeconomic mobility—the gateway to individual opportunity. According to Becker (1993),
[the] evidence is now available for many points in time from over one hundred countries with different cultures and economic systems. The earnings of more educated people are almost always well above average, although the gains are generally larger in less-developed countries (17).

Proponents of human capital theory expect that citizens will behave as rational economic actors, act in their self-interest and take advantage of expanding educational and training opportunities to better their advantage in the job market. Indeed, for the socioeconomic opportunity it represents, there is powerful incentive for the individual to take advantage of such state-supported educational opportunities (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, 10-11).

The modernization argument of the logic of industrialism and its logic of capitalism alternative have been critically received by the scholarly community. As with their cousin theories concerning the development of the welfare state and social policies in early industrializing nations, the historical record simply does not support such arguments. In the particular case of the United States:

primary enrollments were already high before industrialization, and the pattern of school expansion has never moved to the rhythm of industrialization. Schooling was initially a rural, agrarian phenomenon, and enrollments in rural areas were higher than in urban, industrial areas until at least the 1920s. Enrollment rates in high schools were higher in white-collar than in blue-collar areas, and these rates have always been higher for girls than for boys. During the 1890-1924 immigration of people from the militant working class, the effect of immigration on the growth of public secondary schooling was negative, not positive (Rubinson 1986, 525-6).

The “John Meyer” school rejects those explanations for the growth of mass education that would make it a logical response to the functional requirements of industrialization, a solution to problems of socioeconomic change, an effort to reproduce the class order, or the consequence of some self-perpetuating “inheritance effect.” Instead, they contend that universal primary education is part of the greater
nation-building project in the modern world. In what has been termed the "world institution theory" (Fuller and Rubinson 1992), and a Western view of human progress, mass education is viewed as the instrument which prepares individuals for their incorporation into the organizations and institutions of the modern nation-state.

We argue that mass schooling made sense in so many contexts because it became a central feature of the Western, and subsequently the world, model of the nation-state and its development. Nation-states expand schooling because they adhere to world models of the organization of sovereignty (the modern state) and the organization of society as composed of individuals (the modern nation) (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992, 129).

Hence, compulsory and universal primary-level education systems were instituted by modernizing political regimes as part of their effort to make from traditional societies the kind of citizens required by the political and economic institutions of the modern administrative state (see also de Swaan 1988, Ch. 3). Through the device of mass schooling—an instrument of common socialization—traditional social groupings and linkages based on religion, culture, family or village were deliberately weakened or severed so that an individual's identification and allegiance would be transferred to the new "rational" state (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 156). Ergo, mass education was not necessarily caused by industrialization or the events associated with it. Mass education, like industrialization, is considered a necessary part of the larger process of modernization. In particular, the histories of educational expansion in the United States, Japan, and much of Europe do not support such a causal relationship, where large-scale industrialization actually followed mass education (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 153; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992, 130).
Political Conflict Theories

Like its welfare state counterpart, political conflict explanations for educational expansion developed largely as a critical alternative to the logic of industrialism and class reproduction theories (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1981). It is similarly argued that such grand theories fail to account for cross-national variation in the timing and development of education policy and systems. Those differences can only be explained by the societal groups and interests involved in the policymaking for education, by the struggle and changes in the distribution of political power among actors in that policy arena (Archer 1979, 1989; Boix 1998; Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; Kaelble 1981; Lindert 1994; Ringer 1979; South 1991; Windolf 1992, 1997; Windolf and Haas 1993). The level of democratization, mass enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process—all these affect the evolution of education policy. Economic development and demographic factors may also help to explain, but it is a nation's own particular politics that determines the making of its unique social policies. Increases in education expenditures may be associated with economic growth and increases in the school-age population, but it takes the conflict and compromise of societal groups and interests that are mobilized and have political agency to make it happen.

Some have coupled the expansion of primary-level educational opportunities with religious influences and then with democratization. Rokkan suggests that in the Protestant nations of northern Europe "the early development of literacy encouraged the mobilization of lower strata into mass politics" (Flora 1983, 21). However, for those European states where the Catholic Church enjoyed great influence over the
state and society, "the late development of literacy retarded spontaneous mass mobilization and the conflicts over the control of the educational system led to efforts by the Church to mobilize against the state" (Rokkan, in Flora 1983, 22). As well as with democratization, mass mobilization is also associated with the development of West European welfare states beginning in the late nineteenth century. The extension of suffrage to all adult males, the appearance of mass political parties, and the initiation of state-supported social welfare programs, all occurred at roughly the same time (Rokkan, in Flora 1983, 24). Primary-level literacy also rose during this period, but it was only with the large expansion of the welfare state following the Second World War that the great increases in postprimary educational opportunities took place.

Ringer (1979) studied the changes in European secondary and higher education systems starting with those prior to the beginnings of intensive industrialization in the later nineteenth century. Although he acknowledges parallels can be made between European industrialization and the expansion of secondary and higher education, Ringer challenges economic functionalist explanations. He rejects technical-functional theories that suggest a strong relationship between economic development and the growth of education systems, especially prior to the "late industrial phase" that began in the 1930s. Quite simply, early industrial development did not require a highly trained workforce. Only with the take-off of the "high industrial phase" in the 1860s did postprimary and technical education start to acquire greater economic significance. Enrollments in new curriculums that emphasized technical and applied studies began to increase significantly, but "it played a really decisive role only within specific sectors of the educational systems"
(Ringer 1979, 3). Not until the later nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, did educational expansion, particularly of secondary and higher education opportunities, begin to coincide with the changing manpower requirements of the economy—that is, in relation to the demands of economic development. Only in the “late industrial phase,” with the great expansion of mass education systems already completed, did the changing workforce requirements of advanced industrial economies make secondary and university preparation essential and a prerequisite to many career occupations.

...the specific contribution of education to economic development could not have been as great in 1850 as in 1900 or in 1950. The needs of the early industrial economy differed from those of its high industrial successor, for there were dramatic changes in the technological and scientific “contents” of industry... In short, a clear and direct relationship between higher education and the economy probably did not emerge until the high industrial phase in the history of European education, when certain forms of scientific and technical instruction became at least contributing causes of further economic growth (Ringer 1979, 5).

Ringer observes a better explanation for educational expansion might be found in the social conflict and political struggle that was characteristic of many Western societies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Increasing democratization and political reforms accompanied—and may have been a force behind—the expansion of educational opportunities. Such an examination might identify the array of social groups and interests behind the social changes and political reforms of that period. Also to be explained are the increases in secondary and higher education enrollments that occurred during times of economic recession in the nineteenth century. Given the assumed resistance of education systems to change and the influence of economic forces, this is a “curious phenomenon” that should not have happened (Ringer 1979, 4-6). These examples may be evidence of a linkage...
between education, the economy, and political competition that requires further exploration. Likewise does the great expansion of secondary and higher education systems that occurred in the context of the “late industrial phase.” No longer was the education system a limited transmitter of socioeconomic power and social status for just a few. The significant increase in public education facilities at the secondary and higher levels made educational attainment—for almost everyone—a virtual gateway to socioeconomic opportunity. By itself, the logic of industrialism is not an adequate explanation. The education system had undergone changes far more than that necessary to meet the functional requirements of industrialization. It had been remade as an institution. Social and political ownership of the education system had changed hands. Its primary beneficiaries were a different and greatly enlarged group. The education system’s societal mission was updated and its curriculum modernized. The real story lies in the analysis of the struggle of the social and political forces that were behind this transformation of the public education system.

Archer (1979) also looks to a society and its political system for explanations of education policy. Who is in control of the education establishment, and the degree to which education is politicized, that is what matters. She contends that public education systems are the product of the struggle between competing socio-political groups who seek to “own” them, to control and direct their resources and purpose. Therefore, the education establishment plays a subordinate role to the social and political parties and institutions upon which it depends for resources. This dependence causes a lack of autonomy for education as an institution, inhibiting change from within (endogenously), and creating a condition of high vulnerability and responsiveness of educational institutions to the group that “owns” the education
system (Archer 1979, 63ff.). According to Spring (1980), however, educational expansion in the United States has established a greater role for the state over time and, with it, a powerful education bureaucracy that has tended to marginalize working- and lower- class interests.

Another view, and a critique of the human capital approach, is advanced by proponents of "individual status competition" and "credentialist" arguments (Boudon 1977; Dore 1976). Where other conflict theorists are concerned with the struggle and political competition of social groups and other interests, the focus of these scholars is the individual. Although Boudon (1977) is associated with the actual formulation of status completion theory, it is rooted in the claim of the Prussian statistician and economist Eulenburg who, in a 1904 publication, declared that the expansion of higher education enrollments might be more encouraged by economic downturns and less, perhaps even discouraged, by economic growth and development. It was upon this idea that Boudon hypothesized his theory of individual status competition, that educational expansion might occur in a poor economy as a result of a tight job market, one that drove increasing numbers of individuals to compete for the credentials and social status of a university education—something that would make them attractive to prospective employers (Windolf 1992, 7). The underlying assumption was that "employers [would] use credentials and other indicators of educational attainment to predict the trainability and productivity of potential employees or, alternatively, that job seekers [would] use educational attainment to signal their suitability for desired position" (Craig 1981, 153). Educational achievement was a means of social differentiation, a gateway to socioeconomic
opportunity. Similarly, Dore (1976) speaks of a “diploma disease” that is characteristic of many societies and drives educational expansion.

Collins (1971, 1979) also argues that it is not technical-functional requirements, but the competition for the credentials of educational achievement that drives educational expansion in many modern societies. However, Collins sees this competition as one by groups for control of the education establishment. Domination of the education system could be used to the advantage of the group and its members, to enable preferential access to the education system by its members, permit direction of curriculum development, and even to impose a particular value system as the societal standard (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985, 153).

Proponents of a class-conflict theories consider the formal education system a tool of the ruling class and governing elites to protect and ensure the reproduction of the capitalist order that supports their privilege and dominance. According to this view, mass education systems exist to reproduce the class order and represent the interests of capital. Also termed the theory of “class imposition,” it is argued that the expansion of mass education “has reflected the need of industrial capitalism for a mechanism of class labor control to discipline the working class, to create proper work attitudes, and to block the growth of a socialist ideology” (Rubinson 1986, 524-5). Public education is viewed as an instrument of control used to socialize individuals so that they may “fit” a socioeconomic order that requires their labor but denies them a fair return. However, as Fuller and Rubinson (1992) point out, the early development of mass education in “weak states” like the United States took place before the state was greatly involved. Moreover, not only does it assume the “concerted action” of widely disparate capitalist interests, it was at a time when such
an alliance of economic interests was highly unlikely. Rubinson (1986), in a study of the determinants for educational expansion in the United States, argues that “class analyses have failed because (1) they neglect the role of the political process in transforming class interests into institutional patterns, and (2) they neglect the process by which political structures themselves become important determinants of class formation” (519). In many Western nations the expansion of mass education took place before large-scale industrialization or building of the modern administrative nation-state. Therefore, claims that mass education systems were created as instruments of ruling class domination through the concerted actions of unified economic elites or by modern administrative states lacks historical foundation (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, 11).

Representative of the class-conflict perspective, de Swaan (1988) explains the spread of mass primary education in the early industrializing nations as the consequence of societal struggles to control state institutions and the progress of nation-state development. Although de Swaan’s view does support the “world institution” thesis (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985), that mass education systems were an essential part of the modern nation-building project, his analysis goes a level further. He attempts to identify the underlying social forces—the specific social, economic, and political groups—that were mobilized, had political agency, and participated in the battle over nation-building. According to de Swaan, those engaged included the state bureaucracy, metropolitan elites, industrialists, middle class entrepreneurs, rural elites, and the clergy. In a basic sense, it was a contest between the new metropolitans and the old rural order—an alliance of modernizing secular vs. religious and traditional land-owning interests—over what vision of the state would
prevail. Those supporting a greater centralization and institutionalization of the
nation-state, an alliance of metropolitan elements, favored a standard national
curriculum. Groups that opposed the further centralization of the state, rural elites
and the clergy, preferred to retain local control over education systems (de Swaan
1988, 116-17). The education systems that have resulted reflect a greater similarity of
curriculums nationwide, but not without certain provisions for local autonomy and a
place for religion.

In the course of a long century of competition, local autonomy and
idiosyncrasy disappeared and a single national standard curriculum prevailed,
with variations in religious coloring. The struggle between traditional-local
and metropolitan elites around a centralizing state was fought out in terms of
denominational versus secular control—that is, as a conflict about religion—
the only denominator that could bring regional elites together in a national
coaition.

The outcome was a compulsory national elementary-school system
where all children are trained in the basic skills of communication in a
standard code valid throughout the nation: speaking, reading and writing the
national language, manipulating the basic operators of arithmetic,
understanding space and time in terms of a national geography and history
(de Swaan 1988, 117).

Windolf (1992, 1997) is typical of many in the academic community who do
not fit neatly into any one theoretical category or school. He finds no single
explanation for expansion of higher education satisfactory for all times, conditions,
and places. Instead, he advocates a mixed view of the causes for higher education
expansion that is part structural-functional, part political conflict. At base, though,
Windolf believes “the driving force behind university expansion in Germany and other
European countries are political struggles . . . the political struggle of different social
groups for access to universities” (1997, ix, xi). It is his further conclusion that higher
education has expanded with the increasing differentiation of education systems over
Windolf particularly discredits explanations of educational expansion that rely upon human capital theory. To those who would associate the growth of enrollments in higher education with the conditions of the market and rational actor decisions, Windolf responds that the "data show that it is not economic upswing but precisely economic downturn which accelerates educational expansion—in apparent contrast to all the laws of economic rationality" (1997, 12). In a 1992 work, Windolf evaluated the human capital and status competition theories, as well as his own "political" theory, as explanations for the expansion of higher education in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States between 1870 and 1985. His own theory belonged in the category of political conflict, with educational expansion viewed as a function of "the collective competition among social groups for political and cultural advancement and for participation in political decision making" (Windolf 1992, 8). While he could not confirm the human capital theory for any of the sample countries over the period of investigation, the data did confirm support for the expansion thesis of the status competition theory for most of the nations. Windolf and Haas (1993) conducted a similar analysis for the period between 1870 and 1990, evaluating the human capital and status competition theories as explanations for the relationship between economic conditions and the expansion of national education systems. They report that the data for France, Germany and Italy tended to support the status competition theory because educational expansion took place under unfavorable economic conditions. On the other hand, educational expansion in the
United States and Japan generally followed economic growth and development, as the human capital theory would predict.

South (1991) utilized a political conflict approach to investigate the effects of group size and political influence by school-age and elderly populations on spending for social welfare and education programs in the United States. He found that a large or growing elderly population may negatively affect public spending on programs for the young. South submits that such a conclusion would seem to counter Preston’s (1984) hypothesis that public expenditures on education and the political power of children increases with the size of the school-age group. He reasons an explanation might be found in the greater political clout of the elderly, their access to the political system and ability to advance their own interests, while children must rely upon others to represent their cause. South also recommends it could make a difference that the major programs which benefit the elderly—like Social Security and Medicare—are administered by the federal government, while those for the young—like education and welfare assistance—are largely funded and administered by the states and local governments. Given such a division of policy responsibilities between levels of government, a more complete explanation might be achieved by considering an institutional perspective as well.

Certainly, for their greater economic resources and because they can vote, the elderly have a clear advantage in political agency over school-age children. In addition, the young are disadvantaged by the institutional process that determines

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social welfare and education policy. It is not insignificant that social welfare programs which benefit the elderly are handled by the federal government or that social security is the "third rail" of American politics, while most decisions about education spending are left to state and local politics. The financial support of Social Security and Medicare does not depend on local approval of a millage proposal. The high voter turnout of the elderly population, combined with the federal attribute of public policymaking, explains much about the different characteristics of spending for old-age and youth programs in the U.S. In a study of support for increased federal funding for education by different age cohorts, Vinovskis (1993) "found that age is the best overall predictor of support . . . and that the older population is much less supportive of these increases than the younger population" (61). Lindert (1994) suggests that increasing government expenditures for an aging population have caused a reduction in support for education: "the aging of the adult population may well drag down education, presumably through unwillingness to pay more taxes for schools" (33). The consequence of an aging population for education policymaking in a democratic political system may be a trade-off between education and other social policies. This may be particularly true where education is a decentralized state activity while other social policies are directed from the center. Voter backlash and welfare state retrenchment may also be factors contributing to a trade-off where social policies and support are determined by representative bodies and education is subject to the popular will.
Institutional Theories

Institutional explanations for educational expansion fall into the mid-range of theory. They do not attempt general or grand explanations, like structural or political conflict theories, but further explication at another level of detail. Like institutional theories about the welfare state and social policy, those about education attempt to expand the analytical perspective. Unlike structural or political conflict theories, that tend to face-off as critical alternatives and compete for exclusive scholarly acceptance, institutional approaches often look to such general theories for supplemental support. In contrast to structural theories which presume cross-national convergence toward similar political institutions and policies, the object of institutionalism is to determine the causes for, and effects of, cross-national variation. To those who concentrate on the struggle, the conflict and compromise of groups within the policymaking process, the institutionalist would submit that much more can be learned through a better appreciation for the political arena. The rules and norms for political competition and institutional actors also have a very certain affect on public policy (Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams 1990; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992).

Ringer (1979) argues that education, as an institution and organizational system within society, possesses a considerable measure of autonomy that helps insulate it from the influence of other external and economic forces. Education systems possess a natural resistance to change. They tend to be managed by bureaucrats with a status quo-orientation. Equally important is the vital role education plays in political and cultural socialization. The education system is
expected to preserve and communicate a society’s political and cultural traditions. For these attributes, Ringer refers to education institutions, particularly secondary and higher, as “vehicles of a kind of cultural lag.” By their nature, they may be expected to obstruct the educational changes and expansion required by economic growth and development (Ringer 1979, 4-9).

Rubinson (1986) has undertaken an exploration of how an education system’s rules and structure affects student enrollments and progression from primary through tertiary levels. He hypothesizes that rates of primary and secondary level participation are a function of an education system’s stratification, its tracking of students into vocational or academic curricula. He argues that the United States is a more “heavily schooled population” than West European democracies because there are no formal rules or tracking systems that stratify the public education system in a way that limits student entry and progression opportunities. Traditional European systems, on the other hand may be found to have two or three tracks leading from the primary schools that determine a student’s educational career and early or later entry into the workforce. Two of the three tracks are likely terminal, providing some vocational training to the largest number, while only a small group continues on their academic work at the secondary level in preparation for university studies.

The edited work of Fuller and Rubinson (1992) examined the role of the state in educational expansion and economic development. After considering the explanatory power of three “grand explanations of school expansion”—technical-functional, world institution, and class conflict—the general finding of that volume is that the state can have an important role in the expansion of education systems, independent of other structural and social forces.
... the state's influence on school expansion is enhanced or constrained by underlying political-economic conditions. And the state's role—as variously portrayed by the three grand theories—may be observed with oscillating salience as conditions change over long stretches of time. We must keep our eye on both (1) covariation between state action and school expansion and (2) how long-term political-economic conditions mediate this relationship.

Empirical evidence to date suggests that state actions—material and symbolic—can influence school enrollments under certain conditions (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, 25).

Heidenheimer (1973, 1981, 1993, 1997) is another scholar who employed an institutional approach for the comparative study of education systems and other public policies. While he does not reject the influence of structures and factors external to the state, his analysis focuses on how different state organization, institutions, and processes may affect cross-national variation in education systems. Of especial importance to Heidenheimer was the organizational structure and power of the state, whether it is centralized or decentralized, federal or unitary, and the degree of local or regional control over social and education policy.

Archer (1979) believes “political centralization was the most important variable that affected different paths of education system development in the countries she examined, which were all European unitary states” (Heidenheimer 1997, 9). According to Heidenheimer, nations with “high stateness”—those with a unitary or more centralized government and modern bureaucracies—are better able to implement policy decisions than federal or decentralized governmental systems with lesser bureaucratic capacity. Countries with “higher stateness” may have more uniform national curricula and rules, fewer innovations but more effective policy implementation, and greater equality of spending per capita than systems with “low stateness” (Heidenheimer, in Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 270-2; Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams 1990, 24-31).
Conditions of high stateness provide a greater opportunity for a ruling regime to make education and other social programs effective instruments for the realization of their political and socioeconomic objectives (Heidenheimer 1981, 270-2). Control of social and education policy from the center permits their coordination with other national programs and goals. Whether it is their desire to preserve the existing socioeconomic and political order or bring its change, the rulers of “strong” states are better positioned to promote and implement public programs that match their ambition. They may champion new educational opportunities and social mobility, or offer deliberate state compensations like social insurance in exchange for citizen obedience and compliance with regime objectives. Germany offers the historical example of a nation with “high stateness” that instituted social security programs as an alternative to public education, in order to deflect ambitions of upward mobility by the lower classes. Britain, on the other hand, a unitary state but less centralized, took a more middle road and increased both social welfare and educational opportunities (Heidenheimer 1981, 272–5). A third case is represented by America, a federal state with lower stateness that was a laggard in the provision of social welfare but a leader in the expansion of educational opportunities. Once again, it may be argued that a preference to support education or other social insurance programs represents alternative welfare state strategies (Heidenheimer 1981, 269).

Extensive state intervention in education can be justified in that the knowledge and credentials achieved in schools broaden the choices that youth can make at later stages of their education and employment. Thus, the choice to “drop out” of education is especially restricted where national goals stress “equality of opportunity”; nations must make sure that youth stays in the education system long enough to be offered this opportunity (Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams 1990, 23).
Findings and Conclusions

The literature on the welfare state and that on educational expansion are very comparable. The same three major theoretical streams have been identified for each—structural, political conflict, and institutional—and will direct my further investigation of a linkage between the education policies and other social programs of Western welfare states. First, the structural changes associated with industrialization provided the context for development of the welfare state and educational expansion, and the association between social insurance and education policies. Second, the struggle and changes in the distribution of power among political actors in the policy arena influenced the development of social welfare programs and educational expansion. Increasing democratization, mass enfranchisement, and partisan control of the policy process affected the evolution of the welfare state, its social assistance programs, and the relationship between education and social policy. Third, the initial institutionalization and subsequent path dependence of the maturing welfare state have affected the politics and choice between expanding educational opportunities and state investment in other social programs. Whether the state organization is unitary or federal, bureaucratic development, the extent of central government control over the nation’s public policies, the different political arenas and actors for social welfare and education policy, the degree of local responsibility and control over education and other social programs—these factors all affect policymaking, public expenditures, and the relationship between education and other social programs.
A Synthesis of Welfare State and Educational Expansion Theories

Pontusson (1995) offers some valuable counsel to those constructing analytical models. Although historical institutionalists are his intended audience, his advice applies as well to proponents of structural or political conflict theories. He cautions institutionalists to not become too narrow-minded, to be aware that the institutions they study are embedded in a much larger context than states. Institutions do matter, but the state is simply too confining for an adequate explanation. States and the institutions within them must be recognized as being influenced by structures outside and "larger" than the state that "shape the configuration and operation of political and economic institutions." Therefore, political scientists should change their research agenda to focus on these larger world "structures"—the political economy, class systems, "advanced capitalism," etc.—and make "a clean break with the polity-centeredness that characterizes" historical institutionalism (Pontusson 1995, 120, 143). Such a structural approach would permit a better understanding of the larger and underlying economic forces and political relationships that affect—they do not control—institutional configurations, processes, and change.

Pontusson's advice is taken in the policy model for education and social programs that is recommended below. In the first place, no single explanation—structural, political conflict, or institutional—is so powerful that the others are made superfluous. I subscribe to an eclectic view like that of Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan (1989), Fuller and Rubinson (1992) and Windolf (1997), that any of many theories may be able to explain social and education policy at some point in time for a given nation and situation. As Fuller and Rubinson (1992) submit with reference to the
competing theories that purport to explain educational expansion: "The three general theories can be seen as simultaneous oscillating processes, each operating within a given society but with varying strength over long stretches of time" (12). I submit that the same is true for the usefulness of the structural, political conflict, and institutional theories for the evaluation of both social and education policy in Western welfare states. No one theory adequately explains—for all countries, times, and circumstances—the development of social welfare programs and educational expansion in advanced industrial societies. For individual nations, over time and in changing contexts, different theoretical explanations may prove more appropriate. What is required, therefore, is a synthesis of the relevant literature and theory—the welfare state with educational expansion literature, and structural with political conflict and institutional models.

A Common Theoretical Model for Social Welfare and Education Policy

I argue that the same analytical model can explain both education policy and the social programs supported by different types of welfare states. There is a clear foundation for this claim in the literature on the welfare state and educational expansion. In the first place, although a majority of scholars have focused either on education or the welfare state and its social programs, a number have examined both and joined them in their research (Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; Furâker, Johansson, and Lind 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989; Heclo 1985; Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Lindert 1994). It is not unfair to say that these scholars have assumed some kind of relationship between the social and education policies of the welfare state. Use of the same or similar variables and common explanations for
both education and other social programs is typical of their research endeavors. Castles (1989, 1994), in separate studies of the policymaking for education and social welfare programs by advanced industrial nations, utilized many of the same explanatory variables for each investigation. A few scholars have gone so far as to claim that the preference exhibited by certain regimes to invest in social insurance or educational opportunities may be viewed as alternative welfare strategies (Heclo 1985; Heidenheimer 1981; Janowitz 1976). Boix (1998) argues that political parties and partisan control of government matter greatly in the choice of strategies a regime may choose to follow for social welfare, education, and to promote economic growth and development. According to Boix, the strategy of social democratic governments is to favor a greater public investment in human capital—in education and training—to raise economic productivity, while maintaining social welfare benefits at the highest possible levels. The strategy of conservative governments, on the other hand, is to reduce taxes and levels of public expenditure as a way to encourage private investment and thereby stimulate economic growth and development. If there are alternative policy strategies such as those that Boix, Heclo, Heidenheimer and Janowitz speak of, and particularly if those strategies bring together education with the other social programs of the welfare state, it is logical that a single model might be devised to simultaneously explain each policy type.

There is further cause to believe explanations for social welfare and education policies may be joined in a single theory. This begins by drawing two critical distinctions between mass (primary) and postprimary education. First, the evidence is convincing that mass education is not linked with industrialization or development of the welfare state. The expansion of mass education is better associated with the initial
process of modern state-building (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985). No similar argument is made about the relationship of postprimary education, industrialization, and state-building. Put simply, the historical patterns for the expansion of mass and postprimary education are different. In fact, the growth of secondary and higher educational opportunities more closely parallels that of industrialization, the development of the welfare state and its social programs. The same socioeconomic changes and demographic shifts associated with industrialization and welfare state emergence—urbanization, increasing social mobility and stratification, an older and more healthy population—correlate highly with increasing postprimary educational opportunities and levels of literacy. Second, it is with educational achievement at the postprimary level that greater socioeconomic opportunities are linked. Not primary, but secondary and higher education are the recognized gateways to social mobility (Janowitz 1976). As educational achievement enhances an individual's ability to establish the ways and means for a future existence independent of the market and necessity for public assistance, it may be considered an alternative to state-supported social welfare programs. In terms of Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states, postprimary educational achievement may be regarded along with social insurance—but over the long term—as another agency of decommodification. This association in time between alternative instruments of decommodification—the socioeconomic opportunity of postprimary educational achievement and social insurance programs—is a strong recommendation for the explanatory power of a single model for the simultaneous explanation of welfare state decommodification in both policy areas.
A Single Model for the Explanation of Social Welfare and Education Policy

A final example is offered as evidence, first, that the literature on education and the welfare state can be joined in a common research endeavor and second, that a single model may be devised for the explanation of the social and education policies of Western welfare states. This concerns the work of Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan (1989) who, in State Responsiveness and State Activism present their findings from an analysis of the social welfare and education expenditures of France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy between 1870 and 1968. The questions that motivated the research of these scholars are different than my own, but their subject of study and variables of investigative interest are very similar. Their object was to provide a better understanding of the causes for different welfare state development by those four nations. Specifically they hoped to determine what role the state had played in the growth of social spending—whether its actions had been a response to expanding social needs as described by the logic of industrialism, a reaction to societal groups and interests with political agency, or through its own initiative as an "active state." They also hoped to discover whether there were particular situations when the state could be expected to be playing a responsive or active role. Time-series models were devised to evaluate each of the contending explanations for state activism and responsiveness: a "pluralist" model for structural theory, a class-conflict model for

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7 Educational spending was defined as funding for primary and technical schools. The expenditures for secondary and higher education, the gateway to socioeconomic opportunity that is of interest to this study, were not included. But their puzzle was different; it was not whether preferential investment in social insurance or educational opportunities are alternative policy strategies Western welfare regimes may support.
political conflict theory, and a statist model for institutional theory. Although each model found some support, none offered a conclusive and satisfactory explanation for the social spending of the sample countries. While the expanding social needs that accompanied industrialization were positively associated with increased state spending for both social welfare and education over the period of study, available state resources were not. Higher levels of working class power appeared to encourage greater social spending; but it provided a less useful explanation, along with social need, when "high stateness" figured in. "Strong" states, those with more centralized governments and greater administrative control over social policies, appeared better able to resist and tended to diminish the influence of the working class and social needs over spending. Moreover, once social insurance had been established as a public program, it tended to increase the state’s own responsiveness to social need (Amenta 1991).

There is a need for much additional research beyond and complementing the work of Castles (1989), Esping-Andersen (1990), Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan (1989), Heidenheimer (1981), and others. If my preliminary findings are any indication, there may be much opportunity in bringing such works together. The modification of Castles’ (1989) public expenditures model to evaluate Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states was one such endeavor. Though it requires the validation of additional and separate testing, it represents a new and different way—through a single model—to examine variation in cross-national social and education spending and the hypothesis that there is an association between kinds of welfare regimes and the education policies they support. It is also notable, and important to my effort, that both Castles (1989) and Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan...
(1989) employed the same explanatory variables for education policy as they did for the social programs of the welfare state. Therewith, I would argue, a limited synthesis has already been established between the literature on welfare state and that on educational expansion. However, no one has proposed such a single model for the simultaneous explanation of a welfare state's social and education policies.

Once again, my preliminary finding of a relationship between the social programs and education policies of Western welfare states requires further and more comprehensive testing. The data of that analysis may only reflect a one-time historical phenomenon. It remains for additional research to determine if there is evidence of a previous and more enduring association linking particular kinds of welfare regimes with specific social and education policies, whether distinctive social and education policy profiles existed in prior periods, even to the beginnings of welfare state development in the nineteenth century. Likewise, in the case of Heidenheimer's hypothesis, a review of the historical record is necessary to confirm whether or not an emphasis on educational opportunities or social insurance programs has been an ongoing and alternative policy trajectory followed by particular kinds of welfare states. In order to accomplish this task, two different but complementary methodologies will be employed in the chapters that follow: a statistical analysis of the spending data for education and social insurance by a sample of eighteen OECD nations, from 1960 through 1990; and case studies of German and American welfare state development, countries that represent two of Esping-Andersen's three welfare state types.
CHAPTER III

SPENDING FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE AND EDUCATION IN EIGHTEEN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES, 1960-1990: ALTERNATIVE WELFARE STRATEGIES?

Introduction

Government expenditures for social and education programs have increased with the maturing of all Western welfare states. These nations have not all followed the same paths, however, either in policy development or in the growth of public spending. Welfare state expansion has occurred at different times and rates, in particular socioeconomic and political contexts, through different institutions and implementations of government, and with distinctive policy emphases and evolutionary trajectories. Despite their different evolutionary courses, though, certain similarities have been identified in the combinations of social insurance programs supported by specific groupings of Western welfare states. Titmuss (1974) distinguished “three contrasting models or functions of social policy.” Heclo (1985) described “three broad groups of nations [that] can be distinguished” based on the likeness of their social policies. Esping-Andersen (1990) identified “three worlds of welfare capitalism” and Castles (1993) particular “families of nations” with similar social welfare systems.

In The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (1981), it is argued that an association between education and social insurance programs was determined in Western societies long ago, during the initial stages of welfare state
development. In particular, for the United States and European nations, "the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as the cores of alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states" (Heidenheimer 1981, 269). Heilo, in *The Welfare State in Hard Times* (1985), speaks of an "implicit trade-off" with respect to the development of the American welfare state, a choice made to invest in educational opportunities over the expansion of social insurance programs. More generally, Castles, in "Explaining Public Education Expenditures in OECD Nations" (1989), recommends that preferential state support of education programs or social protection programs be considered as alternative welfare state policies today.

This chapter explores the "trade-off" thesis and the relationship between education and social insurance policies for eighteen advanced industrial nations during the 1960-1990 time period. The results indicate there is an association between the social welfare and education systems of those countries. More specifically, the kinds of welfare states Esping-Andersen (1990) has described—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be linked with characteristic profiles for education policy. This finding effectively extends the boundary of the welfare state's policy definition to include education with its social security programs. There is also evidence of a policy "trade-off" and of alternative welfare trajectories followed by Western societies. Certain kinds of welfare regimes exhibit a tendency to invest relatively more in education or social security programs.
Research Questions

First, can we distinguish welfare state profiles for education policy like those of Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985) and Esping-Andersen (1990) described for social policy? Can education be included with other social programs in the policy profiles ascribed to Western welfare states? More specifically, does Esping-Andersen's typology of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states also have application to education policy? Will Western welfare regimes tend to "cluster" for the similarity of their education system, just as they do for their social insurance programs?

Second, is there evidence of a relationship, perhaps a trade-off, between government spending for education and social insurance programs in Western welfare states? Do certain welfare regimes exhibit a preference to invest relatively more in education, while others direct a greater share of public spending to social insurance programs? Is a welfare state's level of financial commitment to social welfare programs a good predictor of its investment in public education, and vice versa?

Third, do the three types of Western welfare regimes support different education strategies and objectives? In particular, is there any significant variation in secondary-level enrollment rates for vocational training and general education curriculums? Will it follow that the greater the tendency for a state to support vocational training, and the less general education opportunities are encouraged as an agent of social mobility, the more will public dollars be directed to social insurance alternatives?
Esping-Andersen (1990) has identified “three worlds of welfare capitalism” in Western societies—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Those welfare regimes differ by their unique combinations of social insurance and coverage for health, unemployment, and old-age retirement benefits. I argue that Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology can be applied to the field of education policy. There is a specific relationship between the kinds of social insurance programs found in Western societies and the education policies they support. Welfare states that cluster for the similarity of their social insurance profiles will also tend to cluster because of the likeness of their education policies. Evidence of that association would effectively expand the definition of the welfare state’s policy profile to include education with its other social programs.

Wagner (1958) argued that government activity and expenditures for public goods would increase in association with national economic growth and development. This theory has been referred to variously as Wagner’s hypothesis, the Wagner thesis, the Wagner effect, and Wagner’s Law (Castles 1989; Lindert 1996). I contend that, although such a relationship may be apparent for all Western societies over an extended period of time beginning in the late nineteenth century, there have been distinctive patterns or types of welfare state development that are evident today. In particular, this is reflected in the uneven development of educational opportunities and social insurance systems, and by different regime commitments to support those policy sectors. I hypothesize that certain kinds of welfare regimes may exhibit a preference to invest in educational opportunities or expanded social insurance...
provisions. These are explicit policy alternatives that welfare regimes may choose to support. This choice may be revealed by a trade-off between state investment in public education and social insurance programs.

Finally, I contend that the variation between different kinds of Western welfare states is demonstrated not only by their particular social insurance profiles and patterns of education expenditure, but also by the distinctive mix of general education and vocational training they support. Secondary level general education curriculums often serve as preparation for higher education, at the university or other advanced studies, and is a gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunities. A vocational training track, on the other hand, is typically terminal. It often completes a student’s formal education, it is workforce-oriented, and tends to reproduce existing class divisions in society. I hypothesize that nations with a considerable commitment to vocational training programs will tend to support complementary social insurance systems, more comprehensive welfare arrangements intended to sustain the status quo as well as to protect the individual. The security afforded by social safety nets will be less broad, though, in countries where there is a greater emphasis on general education curriculums at the secondary level and educational achievement is encouraged as a vehicle of upward social mobility.

**Esping-Andersen’s Welfare State Typology and Education Policy**

Along with whatever provisions are defined for old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, sickness benefits, and sundry other social assistance,
citizens of every Western state also have a right to at least a basic education;\textsuperscript{1} it is one component of the total social benefits package to which every citizen is entitled. The specific nature of a state’s social welfare system, along with the educational entitlements and opportunities offered, reflect a particular welfare strategy. Once again, I submit, any meaningful depiction of a welfare state’s policy profile or strategy is incomplete unless its education policy is also included.

Esping-Andersen associated unique social welfare policy agendas for unemployment, health, and old-age compensation with three welfare state types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. Although education policy is not considered in that welfare state model, I contend the typology will continue to hold with its inclusion. In other words, just as Western welfare regimes tend to “cluster” into three groups according to Esping-Andersen’s social insurance criteria, I hypothesize they will gather in comparable arrays because of the similarity of their education policies. This will be indicated by the “goodness of fit” of regressions on national education expenditure data, when welfare regime type is controlled for as an independent variable and specific source of cross-national variation.\textsuperscript{2} Evidence of clustering can also be observed on graphs and plots of social insurance and education data for the 1960-1990 time period, including: real education expenditures per capita by welfare regime type; education’s share of total public spending by regime type; real social insurance expenditures by real education expenditures by welfare regime;

\textsuperscript{1}That right today is to a secondary level education, or ten to twelve years of formal education.

\textsuperscript{2}National data records have been coded as liberal, conservative, or social democratic as specified by Esping-Andersen (1990).
and the percentage of the secondary level students enrolled in general education programs by real education expenditures.

**The Wagner Effect and the Trade-off Between Educational Opportunities and Social Insurance**

Although it is not the endeavor of this project to confirm or reject the Wagner effect, I would venture that Wagner's hypothesis is generally confirmed for a span of time beginning in the late nineteenth century to the present. Indeed, increasing government expenditures are easily associated with that extended period of national economic growth and development. However, I would hypothesize there is no specific linkage between growing state expenditures and an expanding economy; nor of reductions in public spending when an economy is shrinking or down. In particular, I would argue this applies to expenditures for education and social insurance systems for the 1960-1990 time period. There is not a necessary relationship between changes in size of the national economy—as measured by the GDP per capita—and state spending for those two policy areas. Examination of the data will support a rejection of Wagner’s hypothesis for education and social insurance programs.

Second, just as all national economies have not all grown in the same way or measure, neither have government expenditures for public goods and services. This is especially true with respect to the expansion of educational opportunities and social

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3 A Keynesian would even advise that a government should spend more to stimulate a down economy, and less to slow an economy growing too rapidly. It is also necessary to recognize that national social insurance systems like Germany’s and America’s were not established during economic booms, but instead on the back and in the aftermath of severe depressions.
insurance systems. I hypothesize that certain Western states may exhibit a preference to support educational opportunities or social insurance as part of an overall welfare strategy. Although public education and social insurance are but two of many programs that must compete—and policymakers must consider—for public sector support and budgetary allocations, there is also a specific competition between education and social insurance that goes beyond the common battle for a piece of the budgetary pie. This is manifested by a choice and may take the form of a "trade-off" between alternative welfare strategies. Preferential investment in educational opportunities or social insurance are alternative decommodification options welfare regimes may choose to support. Social insurance programs typically provide immediate financial benefits, decommodification in the here and now for the individual and are a current expense for the state. Spending for public education is also a current state expense, but it offers only the means for individual decommodification. Benefits are neither immediate nor guaranteed. State support of public education opportunities is an investment in the future; the social security it offers the individual is time-lagged. As educational achievement is an agency of upward social mobility it may enhance the potential for the accumulation of personal wealth, and thereby enable future social security and market independence. In this sense, support of educational opportunities represents another decommodification option that welfare states may elect to support. Increasing levels of support for public

4 It would be wrong to consider the payment of social insurance benefits an expense incurred by the state without any expectation of return, however. For both the short- and long-term it may be argued that the safety net of social insurance supported by the state adds to its legitimacy in the public eye, promotes domestic tranquility, and helps to preserve the fabric of the existing social order.
education programs, measured as a proportion of total public spending, is an alternative to the greater decommodification that may be achieved through more generous income substitution and health provisions.

I argue that such alternative decommodification strategies—and their blend—can be demonstrated in the policy profiles of the liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states that Esping-Andersen describes, by their unique implementations of social insurance and education programs. In particular, I hypothesize analysis will show that liberal welfare regimes spend less for social insurance—in real dollars and as a proportion of total public sector expenditures—than either social democratic or conservative nations. At the same time, the data will indicate that education expenditures by liberal states—in real dollars and as a share of the total public budget—are relatively high in comparison to conservative and social democratic regimes. I predict conservative regimes will demonstrate a spending pattern opposite that of liberal welfare nations—relatively high for social insurance but the least for education. Social democratic states will be found to spend the most for social insurance, and at a relatively high level for education. Furthermore, I hypothesize that regression modeling will show that state expenditures for education are inversely related to support for social insurance programs. In liberal states there is a policy trade-off that favors the allocation of public monies to education over social welfare provisions. In conservative nations the relationship is reversed. In liberal welfare regimes educational opportunity is viewed as an alternative to the decommodification policies supported by social democratic states and the emphasis on work-related insurance or “earned” benefits found in conservative welfare states. Rather than broad and universal safety nets of social insurance provisions, liberal
states offer educational opportunity as the individual's protection against the meanness of life, and the individual is held responsible for his or her own outcome. Given their emphasis on collective responsibility and greater concern for social order and stability, I hypothesize that conservative welfare states can be expected to favor social insurance programs over expanded educational opportunities. The trade-off in social democratic regimes will be less clear, however, where there is emphasis both on collective responsibility and the opportunity for individual achievement.

Social Mobility, Curriculum Emphasis, and Educational Spending

I argue the three types of Western welfare regimes—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—have different education strategies and objectives. In particular, this variation can be demonstrated by the different emphasis given to secondary vocational and general education programs. General education at the secondary level often serves as preparation for higher education; it is the gateway to the university and other advanced studies. Postprimary educational achievement is an important vehicle of social mobility and may lead to greater socioeconomic opportunities. Vocational training, on the other hand, tends to be less socially mobilizing given the normally terminal nature of those programs—they define "end-points" in an education system and, therefore, the last stage of an individual's formal education. Vocational training is also a lesser vehicle of social mobilization because of its workforce, working class orientation, and its tendency to reinforce the existing class order. In this sense, as Heidenheimer might have put it, vocational training and general education represent "the cores of alternative [education] strategies" welfare regimes may choose to support.
I hypothesize there is a positive association between increasing levels of enrollments in vocational training at the secondary level and the comprehensiveness of social insurance systems. Alternatively, public welfare provisions tend to be more limited where general education is the predominant curriculum offering at the secondary level. In particular, I predict that enrollment rates in general education curriculums will be highest in liberal welfare nations, in those societies where individual responsibility is emphasized and the socioeconomic benefits that may be realized with educational achievement are encouraged as an alternative to social insurance. Those states are also expected to direct the greatest share of public sector dollars to education. I predict that the rate of participation in vocational training programs will be highest in conservative welfare regimes, where social mobility is less valued and the social insurance system is geared to support societal order and stability. Conservative nations can be expected to rank last in all categories of education spending analyzed. Finally, given their concern for collective decommodification objectives without sacrificing individual freedoms and opportunities, I hypothesize that social democratic states will have higher general education enrollment rates than conservative nations but much less than liberal states. Social democratic nations will also be found to spend less than liberal regimes on education as a percentage of total public spending but, at the same time, they may demonstrate a comparable or even greater education "effort" as indicated by a higher level of spending for education as a percentage of the GDP and a larger commitment of real education dollars per capita.
Methodology

Study Design

The purpose of this investigation is to determine whether the kinds of social insurance systems supported by Western welfare states can be associated with particular education policies. It builds on the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), who has identified three kinds of welfare regimes in advanced industrial societies, and upon Castles' (1989, 1994a) efforts to identify the causes for variation in spending for education and other social programs by Western societies. Specifically, for this study, Castles' model to explain spending for education is modified to test the applicability of Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology to the field of education policy. The three welfare state types are then evaluated for their association with unique education policies, to determine if variation in education policy can be explained by the particular constitution of the welfare state. It is also explored if, as Heidenheimer (1981) and Heclo (1985) have suggested, there is evidence of a trade-off between spending for educational opportunities and social insurance systems. Do the two represent a policy choice for the welfare state? Finally, the data are examined to determine if and how different kinds of welfare states may vary in their support of educational opportunities and social mobility, as indicated by enrollment rates in general education and vocational training at the secondary level.

This study is concerned with the relationship between education and social insurance in advanced industrial societies during the inclusive 1960-1990 time period. It is not intended to discover or analyze any changes in that association over time, within or between nations, but to determine if different the kinds of welfare states
described by Esping-Andersen (1990) displayed distinctive patterns for education policy during that fixed time period. To that end, cross-sectional demographic and public spending data have been collected at every five year interval beginning in 1960. For regression modeling, the data have been categorized by welfare state type and pooled to separately test the effect of social programs on education policy and education policy on social programs. If those equations and other descriptive statistics provide evidence of an association between social insurance and education policy, the countries in this study should “cluster” by welfare regime type and the similarity of their social and education policies.

Population Definition and Sample Selection

The advanced industrial nations included in this cross-sectional study are those for whom the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and International Labour Office (ILO) have compiled the most complete education and social policy data for the inclusive time period 1960-1990. The eighteen nations comprising this group include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample is comprised of 123 observations out of 126 possible for these eighteen nations over the 1960-1990 period.5

5It was not possible to complete the 1960 records for Denmark, France, or Switzerland because the required spending data for social insurance and education were not available. Each missing record represents one of the three different welfare (continued...)

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Variables of Investigative Interest and Model Design

Castles' Public Education Expenditures Model

The regression model developed by Castles (1989) “to explain cross-national variation in public expenditure levels and change” in OECD nations between 1960 and 1981 is the starting point for this analysis (1989, 431). Following is a discussion of Castles' equation, its assumptions, and the modifications made to that model to test the hypotheses of this study.

Castles operationalized a nation's public spending for education in two ways—as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) and as real expenditures per capita—for separate hypothesis testing. The regression on education spending as a percentage of the GDP allowed examination of the Wagner effect, that as national income increases the commitment of state resources to public spending grows as a percentage of the GDP. A finding of a positive association would support the Wagner hypothesis. The regression on real education expenditures per capita permitted testing whether real expenditures per student was simply a function of national wealth, that education expenditures were a function of the state's capacity to spend. A positive association in this case would indicate that increasing national wealth creates the opportunity for additional education spending (Castles 1989, 437).

Castles examined five variables for their explanatory power in his model: right-wing party influence, Roman Catholicism, demographic factors, national state groupings. It is not believed this missing data tend to bias or compromise the analysis that follows.
economic resources, and incremental program growth. Right-wing party influence was included as an independent variable to determine if right-dominated national politics might be associated with different levels of education spending and effort than left-wing governments. Roman Catholicism, operationalized as the percentage of Catholic adherents in a nation's population, was inserted to evaluate its usefulness in explaining variations in education spending. Castles noted a positive association of Catholicism with social insurance spending, and looked for the same relationship with education. Demographic factors were included to examine what effect, if any, the size and changes in size of the school-age population might have on spending for education. National economic resources were operationalized as GDP per capita and evaluated, as described above, for a possible link between a rising GDP per capita and growth in education spending as a share of the GDP, and between an increasing GDP per capita and rises in real education spending per capita. Finally, incremental program growth was examined to test the program inertia hypothesis—that the education expenditures of a previous period could be positively correlated with, and largely explain, those of the next.

Of the five factors and relationships examined, Castles concluded that program inertia was the only variable without important explanatory power for variations in public education expenditures. He also rejected a mono-causal explanation to any of the remaining variables, attributing their explanatory power instead to interaction and combined effect. This left the search for a direct link between demographic factors and variation in education spending inconclusive, as was that for an association between economic wealth and rising public education expenditures. Right-party political strength was found to be negatively correlated
with public education expenditures, significantly but not enough to change the study's results. Most important was Castles' finding that Catholicism, though a significant negative indicator of public education expenditures in 1960, was a positive indicator in 1981. For the period of study, Castles concluded: "Catholic countries tended to expand educational effort more than others, even if their Catholicism was not the only reason for such change" (1989, 444).

Castles examined the influence of religion on public policy again in a 1994 study. This work considered the impact of Catholicism on labor market, income security, family, and gender policies. In this study, education was not included among the variables under investigation. As he had in 1989, Castles determined that religious adherence was a significant factor in explaining cross-national policy variation. He advised he was not forgetting or denying the explanatory importance of other socioeconomic factors, just that "religious differences matter" (1994, 20).

Specifically, for a "family of nations" defined as Catholic there is a characteristic set of policy outcomes that may be identified (Castles 1994a, 24). Analyzing OECD social security transfers expenditure data from 1960 and 1990, Castles found that Catholic nations spent on social insurance programs—as a portion of GDP—at a rate 4 percent higher than non-Catholic nations in 1960. This increased to 9 percent in 1990. "There is enough in these findings to vindicate amply the conclusion that in respect of social security spending at least, the notion of a Catholic world of welfare is a reality" (Castles 1994a, 25). Castles submitted that this was also support for what

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6Nations were defined as Catholic if 75 percent or more of the national population were baptized Catholic or the Christian Democratic Party had played a "pivotal" role in the formation of governments for the ten years prior to the point of analysis (Castles 1994, 24).
Esping-Andersen (1990) had proposed about types of welfare state types with characteristic social policy packages\(^7\) and what van Kersbergen (1991) had offered about "patterns of expenditure" (1994, 25).

**Public and Private Expenditure Data for Social Insurance and Education**

Like Castles' examinations, this study also seeks an explanation for variance in national education expenditures, but in relation to particular constitutions of the welfare state and as an alternative to support of social insurance programs. This analysis also attempts to associate similar patterns of state spending for social insurance with specific types of welfare regimes and as an alternative to funding education, public and private. As in Castles' studies, only public expenditure data are analyzed. Data on private funding for social insurance and education are not sufficiently available.\(^8\) More importantly, the inclusion of such data would change the unit of analysis and is at cross-purposes with this inquiry.

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\(^7\) In fact, Esping-Andersen's conservative welfare states correspond very closely to Castles' Catholic "family of nations." In 1960 the Catholic "family of nations" included Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Germany was not included in the 1990 "family" because it failed to meet the "Christian party "cut-off criterion." Castles operationalized as "Catholic" nations those where 75 percent or more of the population was baptized as Catholic or where the Christian Democratic party had been a major presence in government for the entire ten-year period prior to 1990. Despite the fact that the Christian Democrats were the ruling party from 1982-1998, Germany did not meet the second criterion.

\(^8\) The OECD has advised that the inclusion of private funding data would only raise the GDP share going to education by about 10 percent for the United States, Japan, and France (OECD 1995, 71). That would not significantly alter the findings of this study.
The addition of private funding data would change this investigation from one of welfare regime types to an examination of national patterns of expenditure for education and social insurance. Particularly for the liberal group of nations, the addition of private to state expenditures would certainly revise upward the real dollars spent nationally on education and social insurance. It would reflect the total national effort, however, and not that of the government. That is why private funding cannot be included in the expenditure data for either education or social insurance. Moreover, the exclusion of private funding data is helpful in discerning the policy preferences and objectives of welfare regimes; and society's view of the welfare state's role. What social and education programs a welfare regime supports, and how it spends for them, tells much—about its view of state and individual responsibilities; its desire for social order; and its commitment to the well-being of the individual, family, and community.

Where private funding is a significant source of funding, for either education or social insurance, this may be reflected in lower levels of government expenditures and a smaller portion of the budget allocated to that policy area. It may follow in such welfare nations that individuals have a greater responsibility for their personal well-being and socioeconomic advancement. On the other hand, where private sources of funding are less or not significant, the burden on government may be greater in real dollars and as a share of total public spending. In such welfare nations the state has a much larger role and responsibility to ensure the socioeconomic well-being and achievement of individuals, families, and the community.
Data Sources

All five-year interval national records have been coded according to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare state regimes. Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been classified as liberal. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy have been assigned to the conservative category. Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have been put in the social democratic group. Socialist electoral strength data and national GDP per capita data were taken from the OECD’s Political Data Handbook (Lane, McKay, and Newton 1997). Social security expenditures as a percentage of the GDP was obtained from the ILO’s 1996 edition of The Cost of Social Security. Social security expenditures, elsewhere referred to as social insurance, includes benefits for old-age pensions, sickness and maternity, work injury, and medical care (ILO 1996, 3). Public spending for education as a percentage of the GDP was taken from the OECD’s Political Data Handbook for the years 1960 through 1980, and the OECD’s 1997 edition of Education at a Glance for 1985 and 1990. Likewise were the figures for public spending on education as a percentage of total government expenditures. UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook was the source for data on full-time secondary level enrollments in vocational training and general education curriculums. This information permits testing whether the kinds of welfare states described by Esping-Andersen may also be associated with particular kinds of education systems and patterns of spending for education and social insurance programs. Finally, information about the size of national populations in the 5-29 age group and those over 65 years of age was taken from the United Nations’ Statistical
Yearbook. A complete map of the variables and data sources is provided in Table 1. A further discussion of variable calculations and data usage can be found in Appendix A.

Findings of Data Analysis

Descriptive Statistics and Variable Graphing

Summary and national data, graphs, and variable plotting provide support for the three-fold typology of social security states described by Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985), and Esping-Andersen (1990). They also represent evidence that those different kinds of welfare regime tend to exhibit certain traits in their education policies, that there are characteristic combinations of social insurance and education policy. Indeed, countries with comparable education policies may be divided into liberal, conservative, and social democratic clusters much like those depicted by Esping-Andersen for social insurance policies alone.

Figures 1-4 have been generated from the summary data of Table 2 to illustrate the distinctive spending profiles of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare states. Figures 1 and 2 chart the trends in real social insurance and education expenditures per capita, the spending “effort” of each welfare state type, at every
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Map and Data Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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<td>Nation</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Lane, McKay, and Newton (1997)</td>
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<td>Electoral strength of socialist parties in national elections</td>
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<td>GDP per capita / 1000</td>
<td>Product of Social insurance as % of GDP and Education as % of total public spending divided by Public spending on education as % of GDP</td>
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<td>Social insurance as % of GDP</td>
<td>Social insurance as % of total public spending divided by sum of Social insurance and Education as % of total public spending</td>
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<td>Real social insurance dollars per capita</td>
<td>Product of GDP per capita/1000 and Social insurance as % of GDP divided by 100</td>
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<td>Public spending on education as % of GDP</td>
<td>OECD (1993, 1995, 1997)</td>
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<td>Education as % of total public spending</td>
<td>OECD (1993, 1995, 1997)³</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education as % of total social spending</td>
<td>Education as % of total public spending divided by sum of Social insurance and Education as % of total public spending</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real education dollars per student</td>
<td>Product of GDP per capita/1000 and Public spending on education as % of GDP divided by % population in 5-29 age group</td>
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<td>% population in 5-29 age group</td>
<td>United Nations Statistical Yearbook</td>
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<td>% population over age 65</td>
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<td>% General education secondary students</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Vocational education secondary students</td>
<td>UNESCO Statistical Yearbook⁴</td>
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1 The number of records for which complete data was collected is 123. The 1960 records for Denmark, France, and Switzerland are missing.
2 1989 values were used for 1990.
3 1965, 1970 and 1985 values estimated for France; 1985 value was estimated for Japan.
4 1985 value estimated for Sweden; 1990 value was estimated for Belgium.
Figure 1. Real Social Insurance Dollars Per Capita, 1960-90.

Figure 2. Real Education Dollars Per Capita, 1960-90.
Figure 3. Social Insurance's Percent of Public Spending, 1960-90.

Figure 4. Education's Percent of Public Spending, 1960-90.
<table>
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<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Socialist Electoral Strength</th>
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<th>Education $</th>
<th>Population %</th>
<th>Secondary Enrollments</th>
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<td>GDPpc % Public Spending Real 000</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>28.84 6.86 8.99 33.53 0.60 4.00 15.28 0.67</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>28.81 8.04 10.23 34.63 0.82 4.76 16.23 0.91</td>
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<td>27.90 8.89 13.51 37.77 1.14 5.85 16.56 1.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>25.08 9.86 14.71 39.71 1.34 5.54 15.31 1.34</td>
<td>41.40 11.09 9.24 7.37</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>25.76 10.79 15.68 37.60 1.60 5.24 12.86 1.44</td>
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<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>32.88 3.99 14.45 45.07 0.58 3.15 10.05 0.34</td>
<td>36.27 10.91 55.34 42.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>29.90 4.98 16.16 45.67 0.81 3.91 11.12 0.54</td>
<td>36.47 11.99 59.24 38.26</td>
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<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.78 6.19 16.58 44.03 1.03 4.53 12.02 0.76</td>
<td>37.06 12.93 63.60 34.56</td>
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<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>31.28 7.04 22.16 49.89 1.57 5.50 12.38 1.01</td>
<td>38.36 13.98 66.81 32.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31.58 8.29 23.56 50.16 1.97 5.64 11.98 1.23</td>
<td>37.86 14.57 63.77 35.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>33.36 8.75 23.08 41.29 2.06 5.76 10.11 1.37</td>
<td>36.67 13.68 63.18 35.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>32.42 9.96 24.18 46.91 2.41 5.04 9.72 1.43</td>
<td>34.94 14.70 62.33 36.68</td>
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<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>37.13 5.44 10.05 35.12 0.55 4.90 17.33 0.68</td>
<td>38.85 9.78 68.16 30.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36.78 6.73 12.56 35.31 0.85 5.88 16.66 1.01</td>
<td>39.38 10.76 69.01 30.67</td>
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<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36.38 7.99 16.06 40.57 1.29 6.54 16.74 1.32</td>
<td>40.02 11.71 72.79 27.00</td>
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<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>33.32 9.12 20.96 45.44 1.91 6.92 15.24 1.59</td>
<td>39.55 12.83 76.65 23.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>35.86 10.31 25.02 47.97 2.57 6.78 13.32 1.85</td>
<td>37.93 13.78 72.06 27.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>34.30 11.41 27.22 53.09 3.13 6.22 12.10 1.98</td>
<td>36.16 14.62 66.09 33.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33.58 12.56 27.08 49.69 3.37 6.08 11.46 2.24</td>
<td>34.35 15.20 64.07 35.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>27.11 8.89 12.49 36.20 1.12 4.86 14.58 1.11</td>
<td>40.88 10.52 90.33 9.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>31.41 7.12 20.19 46.18 1.52 4.84 11.08 0.97</td>
<td>36.82 13.32 62.23 36.27</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Dem.</td>
<td>35.28 9.19 20.14 44.14 1.99 6.23 14.62 1.55</td>
<td>38.01 12.75 69.88 29.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All Welfare States</td>
<td>30.56 8.48 16.73 41.15 1.47 5.23 13.62 1.19</td>
<td>38.97 11.91 76.91 22.49</td>
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five-year interval beginning in 1960. These two graphs illustrate the unique “preferences” of liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes for the allocation of public dollars to social insurance and education programs.

A comparison of Figure 1 with 3 and of Figure 2 with 4 makes it clear that there is no automatic or positive correlation between real expenditures and budgetary shares within either policy area. In particular, changes in real spending for social insurance or education do not tell how their budgetary shares will be affected—whether they will go up, down, or stay the same. Government expenditures are neither fixed in amount nor predetermined by a constant and preset schedule of budgetary allocations. Expenditures vary with the economic capacity of the state and according to the hierarchy of preferences and priorities determined by the political process. Just as the budgetary “pie” may grow or shrink from one year to the next, so can its policy slices—in real dollars, in relation to other programs and as a percentage of the total budget.

As the summary data of Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 indicate, real spending for social insurance and education grew—along with the GDP—for each welfare state

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9Real spending is used in this study to represent “effort” as the financial commitment of a state to support a particular policy area. It is a useful measure for cross-national comparison, by itself and when it is associated with the economic resources of the state as a percentage of the GDP. But measures of real spending really do not tell what “preference” a state or states may give to one or another policy area relative to others. That preference finds expression in the percentage of the total public spending that goes to a given program, and how that share changes year-to-year relative to other program areas with which it must compete for state monies.
type at each five-year interval.\textsuperscript{10} In other words, increasing national wealth was positively associated with a greater financial commitment to social insurance and education programs for all types of welfare state. This growth occurred more rapidly in the earlier than later years of the 1960-1990 time period, and for social insurance at a slightly higher rate than that for education. In terms of the different spending commitments by welfare regime types over the 1960-1990 time period, social democratic nations led overall in real spending for both social insurance and education. Liberal regimes spent the least per capita for social insurance, but more than conservative nations for education. Looked at another way, social democratic states increased their spending effort for social insurance by greater than six-fold and 2,800 dollars per capita over the study interval, conservative states by a factor of four and 1,800 dollars, and liberal regimes by 1,300 dollars and somewhat less than four-fold. At the same time, spending for education increased by a factor of four in liberal nations, almost 3.8 in conservative states, and less than 3.3 in social democratic. As measured in real dollars per capita, social democratic nations spent over 1,550 dollars more in 1990 than 1960, liberal states 1,300, and conservative regimes 1,050.

Figures 3 and 4 add the element of “preference” to those policy profiles. They show that conservative nations tended to place a greater emphasis on social insurance than education, relative to the other welfare regime types. Conversely, liberal nations tended to place a greater relative emphasis on education than social insurance. However, the data and graphs also indicate that some preference was given by liberal

\textsuperscript{10} An examination of national data records confirms that real spending for social insurance and education also increased for each of the sample nations over the entire 1960-1990 interval, but not necessarily at every five-year interval.
states to increases in spending for social insurance programs over education. While social insurance’s share of total public spending increased over the 1960-1990 interval, education’s percentage grew during the early years only to decline, flatten out, and finish with little gain at the end. For the social democratic nations that preference is even clearer. Spending for social insurance as a share of total public spending increased significantly over the study period, while that for education showed a steady decline.

Overall then, the summary data and figures support the existence of the kinds of welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—and unique education profiles for each. In terms of spending effort measured in real dollars, social democratic countries led the conservative and liberal nations in both their education and social insurance commitments. They demonstrated a preference to increase social insurance expenditures as a share of public spending over those for education. Conservative nations spent less than social democratic for social insurance in real dollars but demonstrated a comparable policy preference, with a high percentage of total government spending directed to social insurance programs. For all measures of education spending though, conservative welfare states were behind both social democratic and liberal regimes. Liberal welfare countries tended to be laggards in all measures of social insurance spending, exhibiting a greater preference to spend for education. Although second to social democratic nations in real expenditures per capita for education, liberal nations ranked first in spending for education as a percentage of total public spending. In addition, Table 2 shows that liberal nations led in general education enrollments at the secondary level,
at a rate much higher than that of conservative and social democratic states with their considerable vocational training systems.

Wagner's Law was not supported by the data, however. Increasing national wealth—as measured by the GDP per capita—was not necessarily associated with greater state expenditures for education or social insurance as a percentage of the GDP.11 Despite steady growth in the GDP per capita for the entire sample of nations over the interval of the study, education spending as a share of the GDP began to shrink for a majority of countries by 1980, and for all by 1990. Among the liberal nations, Switzerland was the first to show this decline in 1970. Ireland was next in 1975, followed by Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1980, and Australia in 1985. Italy was first among the conservative countries in 1975, then came Belgium and France in 1980, Germany in 1985, and Austria in 1990. Finland led the social democratic countries, its decline beginning in 1965, followed by the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in 1970, and Denmark in 1980.

The national data for social insurance are different; there is not the same unanimity across the sample as there is for education, but the number of exceptions to Wagner's hypothesis are sufficient cause for its rejection. Beginning with two welfare regimes in 1980, nine of the eighteen nations had reduced levels of spending for social insurance as a percentage of the GDP by 1990. Australia was the first among liberal nations to register such a decline in 1980, followed by Ireland in 1990.

11 Castles (1989) also rejected Wagner's thesis for educational expenditures. Lindert (1994) found only "weak support" for Wagner's Law as an explanation for rising social spending during the 1880-1930 time period.
Italy led the conservative nations in 1980, followed by Germany in 1985 and then Austria, Belgium, and France in 1990. Finland and the Netherlands were the only social democratic countries to show such a decline in social insurance expenditures, in 1990.

Along with the data of Table 2, Figures 3 and 4 suggest further cause to reject Wagner’s thesis. Although GDPs and real social insurance expenditures per capita grew steadily over the study interval, Figure 3 indicates those increases were not matched by a consistent growth in social insurance’s share of total public spending. It actually declined in liberal and conservative nations between 1980 and 1990, and then for social democratic states over the 1985-1990 interval. Figure 4 reveals an even earlier decline in education’s share of total public spending, and Table 2 as a percentage of the GDP, even as real expenditures for education continued to grow. This was shown first by the social democratic nations in the 1970-1975 frame, and then by liberal and conservative regimes beginning in the 1975-1980 interval.

That expenditure levels for social insurance programs began to move downward later than those for education may be evidence of its greater “lock-in” effect (Pierson 1994), the fixed and nondiscretionary nature of social insurance expenditures relative to education and other public programs that are more vulnerable to GDP fluctuations and partisan politics. This might be manifested by a preference given to expenditures for social insurance over education and other budgetary programs when public monies are tight. Following in this vein, it is interesting to observe that changing levels of state expenditures for education as a share of total public spending more accurately reflects than social insurance the periods of welfare state growth, consolidation, and contraction cited in the literature: from the 1960s
and the “Golden Age” of welfare state expansion, the slowdown of the 1970s, to the stagnation and rollback of welfare state expenditures during the 1980s (Esping-Andersen 1999; Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999). In particular, as it relates to the slowdown and rollback of welfare state expenditures that began in the 1970s, a comparison of Figures 3 and 4 makes it apparent that changes in spending levels for education led those for social insurance. Although there are too many other public programs and factors involved for this very general budgetary association to establish a specific linkage between the education and social policies of Western societies—and certainly not a trade-off—it does provide partial support for my hypothesis that those welfare states may exhibit a preference to support and invest in educational opportunities or social insurance.

Figures 5-12 are included as additional evidence supportive of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology, and of my hypothesis that the kinds of welfare regimes he described can be linked with specific education profiles. Produced from the social insurance and education data of this study, these scatterplots reveal distinctive country arrays that correspond closely to what Esping-Andersen characterized as liberal, conservative, and social democratic clusters. The data and charts also provide support for the hypothesis that an emphasis on educational opportunities or expanded social insurance provisions represent alternative welfare paths that states may follow.

Figures 5-8 utilize real expenditures data to illustrate how the countries Esping-Andersen identified as belonging to liberal, conservative, or social democratic clusters exhibit a tendency to gather in analogous groups when their social insurance and education “efforts” are associated. A comparison of Figures 5-8, four
Figure 5. Real Social Insurance and Education Spending, 1960.

Figure 6. Real Social Insurance and Education Spending, 1970.
Figure 7. Real Social Insurance and Education Spending, 1980.

Figure 8. Real Social Insurance and Education Spending, 1990.
“snapshots” taken at ten-year intervals beginning with 1960 show the durability of those groups over time. Those welfare nations identified as social democratic—Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden—can be found from the upper center to upper right, indicative of their greater social insurance and education effort. Given lesser levels of real spending for both social insurance and education, the conservative nations—Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy—are located more to the center and beneath the social democratic countries. With the smallest state commitment to social insurance and widest variation in the commitment of public monies to education, the liberal welfare states—Japan, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States—are spread from the lower left to the upper center.

Figures 9-12 provide additional evidence of the linkage between the social insurance and education policies of Western welfare regimes. Clustering is also apparent, but for different policies than those Esping-Andersen evaluated, and on another dimension than that displayed in Figures 1-8. Using just education data, liberal, conservative, and social democratic arrays are discernible in Figures 9-12, very much like the clusters Esping-Andersen described for social insurance alone. The scatterplots portray how the three kinds of welfare state vary in their support of educational opportunities, as indicated by their secondary level general education enrollment rates and education “effort” in real dollars. Figures 9-12 also support my hypothesis, and the argument advanced by Heidenheimer (1981) and Heclo (1985), that welfare regimes may emphasize either educational opportunities and achievement or expanded social insurance systems; that the two represent alternative welfare policies. The data and charts indicate that liberal nations have the highest rates of
Figure 9. Secondary Enrollments and Real Expenditures, 1960.

Figure 10. Secondary Enrollments and Real Expenditures, 1970.
Figure 11. Secondary Enrollments and Real Expenditures, 1980.

Figure 12. Secondary Enrollments and Real Expenditures, 1990.
secondary level general education enrollments, but also have the least generous social insurance systems. Conversely, conservative nations have the lowest participation rates in secondary level general education curriculums and very well developed social insurance systems.

A comparison of the four ten-year interval snapshots shows that the liberal, conservative, and social democratic arrays are fairly consistent over the 1960-1990 period. Liberal regimes stretch from the United States at the top right to Japan, Ireland and New Zealand at the bottom and to the right of center, the result of their high rate of secondary general education enrollments and uneven spending for education. These are also the nations that tend to support the smallest social safety nets. This reflects the welfare strategy of liberal regimes, to emphasize the socioeconomic benefits that may be realized through educational opportunities and achievement as an alternative to expanded social insurance provisions. The 1980 and 1990 scatterplots (Figures 11 and 12) show Switzerland located somewhat to the left of the other liberal nations. This may be attributed to the significant growth of vocational training enrollments that occurred during the 1980 time period. The social democratic nations—Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark—tend toward the center, left and above the liberal states, given their higher real spending for education and greater emphasis on vocational training programs. These states also tend to have the most comprehensive social insurance systems. The Netherlands, a country that Esping-Andersen recognized as having conservative features although it was predominantly social democratic, is located nearer the conservative nations. The goal of social democratic welfare policy is to guarantee individuals and families “a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation,” but without
discouraging individual aspirations or denying the opportunity for private socioeconomic achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26-8, 37). The conservative welfare states are located toward the middle and left of center. The vocational training rate of conservative regimes is much like that of social democratic nations, but their financial effort to support education much less. The welfare policy of conservative regimes represents the alternative to that supported by liberal nations. The emphasis is on collective responsibility and there is a far greater concern for social order and stability. Educational opportunities at the postprimary level are fairly restricted while the security provided by work-related social insurance benefits is relatively broad.

These preliminary findings—based on national and summary data, variable graphing and scatterplots—represent initial confirmation for my hypothesis of an association between the education and social policies of Western welfare states. Just as liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes may be distinguished by the similarity of their social insurance programs, so can they by the education policies they support. In particular, liberal welfare regimes tend to be associated with lesser social insurance commitments, higher levels of spending for education, and the greatest proportion of students enrolled in general education curriculums at the postprimary level—a recognized vehicle of social mobility and opportunity, and an alternative to expanded social insurance programs. This is supportive of Heidenheimer and Heclo’s proposition that educational opportunity is the liberal state’s substitute for the social insurance and income protection that is characteristic of conservative and social democratic welfare states. This is not to overlook the greater financial “effort” of social democratic states, but there is clearly a lesser
emphasis placed on general education than in liberal welfare nations. In terms of their spending "effort," as measured in real dollar expenditures per capita, social democratic countries lead conservative and liberal nations in both their education and social insurance commitments. As compared to the other regime types, conservative nations tend to place a greater emphasis on social insurance than education. They rank first in social insurance expenditures as a percentage of total government spending, but they are last for education.

Regression Modeling

Six welfare state expenditure models (Equations 1-6 in Tables 3-5) have been specified for testing, utilizing four different measures of public spending for social insurance and education as dependent variables. Because the six models share several independent variables, a detailed explanation for the use of those variables is provided only for the first two equations presented. Discussion of the remaining four models is limited to those things that are different.

Regressions on Real Social Insurance Expenditures

The regression models in Table 3 (Equations 1 and 2) examine the "effort" of welfare regimes to fund social insurance programs—the level of their policy commitment—using real social insurance expenditures per capita as the dependent variable. The placement of real education expenditures per capita in both models permits an evaluation of the association between a regime's educational "effort" and

\[ \text{Equation 1 and 2 in Table 3, Equations 3 and 4 in Table 4, and Equations 5 and 6 in Table 5.} \]
Table 3

Regressions on Real Social Insurance Expenditures Per Capita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Equation 1 Real Social Insurance $ per capita</th>
<th>Equation 2 Real Social Insurance $ per capita</th>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.6582*</td>
<td>-2.5096*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.3584*</td>
<td>0.3065*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>0.3089*</td>
<td>0.3412*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Socialist Electoral Strength</td>
<td>0.0060*</td>
<td>0.0060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.0513</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education % of Total Public Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0751*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Education Dollars per capita</td>
<td>0.7308*</td>
<td>1.0777*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 5-29</td>
<td>0.0454*</td>
<td>0.0575*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population over 65</td>
<td>0.1412*</td>
<td>0.0805*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
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*Indicates significance at the .05 level or greater.

that for social insurance. Equation 2 includes an additional variable—education expenditures as a percentage of total public spending—to test the hypothesis that there is a policy trade-off between state spending for education and social insurance programs—an exhibited "preference" to support education or social insurance programs. The report of a significant negative association for the variable that for social insurance. Equation 2 includes an additional variable—education expenditures as a percentage of total public spending—to test the hypothesis that there is a policy trade-off between state spending for education and social insurance programs—an exhibited "preference" to support education or social insurance programs. The report of a significant negative association for the variable.

13 Real education expenditures per capita and education expenditures as a percentage of total public spending tap into very different dimensions of the political

(continued...)
coefficient by the regression would be supportive of such an inverse policy association.

Variables for conservative and social democratic regime types, socialist electoral strength, GDP per capita, the percentage of the national population aged 5-29, and the percentage of the national population over age 65 are independent variables common to all six regression equations. The dummy variables for conservative and social democratic regimes have been employed to analyze the power of Esping-Andersen's welfare state model as an explanation for the variation in education and social insurance spending by Western societies. All country data were coded as liberal, social democratic or conservative, according to Esping-Andersen's own classification, in order to perform this test.

Castles' measure of right-wing party influence has been replaced by "socialist electoral strength" in each of the six models. Intended to evaluate the effect of partisan politics on state spending for education and social insurance, this variable has been operationalized as the percentage of the vote received by socialist parties in

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13(...continued)

and budgetary process. A condition of multicollinearity is not introduced by their simultaneous use as independent variables in a regression on real social insurance expenditures. There is not a fixed association between the actual dollars spent on education and education's piece of the budgetary pie, and then with the real dollars directed to social insurance programs. The budgetary pie is not fixed in size, nor are any of its pieces in terms of real dollars or in proportion to one another. In fact, as indicated by an examination of the national data and is clearly illustrated by the graphs of spending for education in real dollars and as a percentage of total public spending (Figures 2 and 4), the two did not move in the same fashion over the 1960-1990 period. Although real spending for education and social insurance each grew over the study interval (Figures 1 and 2), education's share of total public spending tended to be fairly flat and even declined while social insurance increased (Figures 3 and 4). This difference occurred because social insurance increased more, both in terms of real dollars (effort) and in relation to all other budget sectors (preference).
national elections. The electoral strength and politics of the left are normally associated with working class interests, with the support of social insurance programs and other public policies which might benefit that constituency.

Like Castles, the GDP per capita has been used to represent national economic wealth and indicate the resources, at least the potential capacity, available to support public policies. Evidence of a positive association between either real education or real social insurance expenditures and the GDP would demonstrate the influence of national wealth on spending levels. However, varying levels of social or education expenditures per capita that are unrelated to GDP size or growth might indicate there is a choice or some intent involved in a welfare regime's "effort" to support particular policies.

Demographic variables were modified and made more inclusive than those in Castles' model. While Castles selected that proportion of the national population under 25 to represent the size of the school-age population, this study takes the percentage of the national population in the 5-29 age group. That group more accurately represents those who actually receive educational benefits from the state, excludes the preschool population, and allows more weight to be given older students and higher levels of education where the enhancement of socioeconomic opportunities tends to be greatest. Increases or decreases in the size of this group may directly affect the level of public expenditures for education, both in total dollars and real dollars per capita. In addition, the percentage of the population over age 65 was included to determine if variation in the size of this group might be associated with levels and changes in social insurance and education expenditures. Those over 65 not only tend to be the primary beneficiaries of the state's social insurance system,
but they are often among the most politically active—especially as voters. Of particular interest is whether senior citizens, major recipients of social insurance benefits, might exhibit a negative association with education spending, a program for which they may be liable for taxes but do not receive any direct benefits in return (Lindert 1994; South 1991).

Education's share of total public expenditures has been included in the second equation to examine the association of spending for that policy area with social insurance programs. After controlling for the effect of demographic factors on public spending—in particular the size of the specific population groups that are the primary beneficiaries of the state's commitment to social insurance and education—the share of total public spending that social insurance or education programs enjoy may reflect the preference of the welfare state to support and invest in that policy area relative to other policy alternatives. A negative association reported by Equation 2 between education's share of total public spending and real social insurance expenditures per capita would provide support for the hypothesis that preferential investment in education or spending for social insurance are alternative policies that welfare regimes may support, and that there is a trade-off between the two policy areas.

Castles' variable for incremental program growth was omitted. Period-to-period changes in expenditures are not being evaluated in this analysis. The measure of Roman Catholic strength has also, and necessarily, been excluded. As noted earlier, Castles' Catholic "family of nations" closely corresponds to Esping-Andersen's group of conservative welfare states; and Catholic influence is captured by the conservative welfare state variable.
The calculations for Equations 1 and 2 largely substantiate earlier findings and are further endorsement for the hypotheses of this study. As hypothesized, welfare state type and spending for education are very good indicators of expenditure levels for social insurance programs. Both equations show that the kinds of welfare states Esping-Andersen identified—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be matched with unique spending profiles for social insurance. In addition, the models suggest that what and how a nation spends for education is a good predictor of its social insurance expenditures. Both equations reveal a statistically significant association between state spending for education and that for social insurance.

A closer inspection and comparison of the calculations returned for Equations 1 and 2 yields much of what was expected, as well as some important discoveries. In the first place, and contrary to what was indicated by the summary statistics and variable graphing, the coefficient returned for the conservative variable in Equation 1 would seem to indicate a greater affinity between that regime type than social democratic with increasing social insurance expenditures. That relative ranking changes with Equation 2, when education’s share of total public spending is added and assessed for its effect on real social insurance expenditures. Including and controlling for that variable makes the regime variables more accurate in their reflection of budgetary preferences. Equation 2 correctly estimates a greater investment in social insurance programs by social democratic regimes, followed by conservative and then liberal nations.14

14The value returned for the constant in the regression models is relative, representing only the y-intercept of the equation. However, it does mark the liberal position as a reference point from which to assess the different influences of social (continued...)
But Equation 2 is not just a better explanation because it more accurately reflects the real spending preferences of the three regime types; it is also a more powerful explanation than Equation 1. Equation 2 exposes a statistically significant inverse relationship between education as a percentage of total public spending and real spending for social insurance. It is evidence of a “choice” and “trade-off” that exists between state investment in education and social insurance, that they are policy alternatives. There is no budgetary formula that determines how real spending for social insurance will be affected by education’s changing budgetary share—if it will go up, down, or stay the same—yet Equation 2 indicates their movement is connected in a meaningful way. Specifically, real spending for social insurance will decrease as education’s share of total public spending increases, and vice versa. In other words, as education is favored by an increasing share of the total budget, real spending for social insurance may be reduced. This is clearly the case for liberal regimes, and the opposite for conservative. For these two regime types the trade-off between investment in education or social insurance is very apparent. They follow very contrary social insurance and education policies. It is less clear for social democratic nations but, as was pointed out earlier, those states continued to increase real spending for social insurance even as education’s share of the budget was being reduced. The great improvement of Equation 2 is that it reveals the trade-off between investment in social insurance and education programs. This is confirmation of the

\[ \text{(...continued)} \]

democratic and conservative regimes on education and social programs, based on the value and strength of the coefficients returned for their dummy variables.
hypothesis that a preference to support and invest in education or social insurance are alternative policies that welfare regimes may support.

Both regression models report a statistically significant positive coefficient for the variable measuring the influence of socialist parties in national elections. This is not a surprise. Real spending for social insurance would be expected to increase as the political parties most closely associated with expanding those programs grew in electoral strength. The coefficient may seem rather small, though, perhaps suggesting the socialist partisan effect is minor or that it may have been captured more fully elsewhere, specifically by the social democratic welfare regime variable. It might even be questioned whether a condition of multicollinearity exists between those two variables. I believe it does not. Socialist parties also enjoyed high levels of electoral support in some conservative welfare nations, states that also demonstrated a considerable welfare “effort.” In Austria and Germany that electoral support ranged between 40 and 50 percent over the study interval. Moreover, even certain liberal welfare regimes—Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in particular—experienced high levels of socialist electoral strength, ranging from nearly 40 percent to over 50 percent (Lane 1997). Therefore, I do not believe the simultaneous use of the social democratic regime type and socialist electoral strength variables introduces a condition of multicollinearity. Rather, I would argue this suggests the institutional power of the welfare state to affect ongoing policy decisions. “Politics matter,” to be sure, as the electoral strength variable indicates, but the institutionalized welfare state may have a greater continuous effect, regardless of welfare regime type. Furthermore, the votes political parties receive, whether of the left or the right, does not automatically translate into seats and power in government. While there may be
influence on the policymaking process, there is no necessary connection between the
strength of political parties in national elections and the party or parties that actually
come to control the government and make policy—the ruling regime.

Neither equation evaluates the GDP per capita as having a significant influence
on real spending for social insurance. Although the national and summary data does
show that GDPs per capita increased across the sample over the study period, growth
in real spending for social insurance was far more a function of regime type than
national economic capacity. In short, the explanation rests with the welfare policy
supported by each regime type. Conservative and social democratic regimes
"committed" a greater share of their GDP, a higher percentage of total government
spending, and more real dollars to social insurance than did liberal nations. It needs
also to be remembered that, just as real spending for social insurance may increase in
association with a growing GDP, real expenditures for social insurance may also rise
as the consequence of a recessionary economy.

Both models reported a significant positive association between real spending
for education and social insurance. This comes as no surprise. The education and
social spending data examined in this study came from an extended period of
economic growth and prosperity, one in which school enrollments and the size of
elderly populations in most advanced industrial societies steadily grew. An increase in
the monies going to either education or social insurance is thus not difficult to
explain. It is important to recognize, however, that spending for the two policy areas

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15This is not the same as the Wagner effect, discussed earlier, that the data
did not support, i.e., that public spending increases as a percentage of the GDP with a
larger or growing GDP.
did not move in perfect synchronization over time. As discussed earlier, there were
differences between types of welfare state, as well as between education and social
insurance programs, in size, rates, and timing of expenditures growth.

It is perhaps tempting to read too much—or the wrong thing—into the results
of regression modeling for the relationships between the two age groups examined
and real spending for social insurance. First, as one would expect, increases in social
insurance spending are positively associated with the growth in the size of the
population over the age of 65. Second, and what might appear as surprising, is the
positive association shown between the 5-29 cohort and higher levels of social
insurance spending. However, what must be considered is that members of the 5-29
age group are also covered by social insurance provisions in many nations,
particularly healthcare. Especially given the economic prosperity and general
expansion of welfare states during that period—increasing coverage and benefits for
more of the population—it is not a mistake that the younger population may be
associated with increasing social insurance costs.

**Regressions on Real Education Expenditures**

The regression models of Table 4 analyze educational “effort” of welfare
regimes, using real per capita education expenditure data as the dependent measure.
Equations 3 and 4 reverse the Equation 1 and 2 relationship of social insurance and
education expenditure data as dependent and independent variables. Like Equation 2,
the calculation of a negative coefficient for social insurance as a percentage of total
public spending in Equation 4 would be interpreted as evidence of a policy trade-off
Table 4

Regressions on Real Education Expenditures Per Capita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Equation 3 Real Education $ per capita</th>
<th>Equation 4 Real Education $ per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.8853</td>
<td>-0.6144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>-0.0609</td>
<td>-0.0161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>0.2127*</td>
<td>0.2163*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Electoral Strength</td>
<td>-0.0025</td>
<td>-0.0019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.1171*</td>
<td>0.1073*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance % of Total Public Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0095*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Social Insurance Dollars per capita</td>
<td>0.1701*</td>
<td>0.2520*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 5-29</td>
<td>0.0102</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population over 65</td>
<td>0.0395*</td>
<td>0.0403*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the .05 level or greater.

between spending for educational opportunities and social insurance systems, that the two represent alternative welfare policies that states may support.

Like the models of Table 3, Equations 3 and 4 of Table 4 also support the earlier findings of this study and are further endorsement for its hypotheses. Welfare state type and expenditures for social insurance are proven to be very useful in predicting spending levels for education. Real spending for social insurance is strongly associated with that for education. The models of Table 4 also support my arguments that liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes exhibit
characteristic education policies and that there is a trade-off between the support of social insurance and educational opportunities by those regime types.

Although Equation 3 does not have the same problem as Equation 1 in estimating the significance and relative ranking of the three regime types in their support of education, it is similarly less accurate in estimating the strength of that association because it does not indicate the trade-off that exists between state expenditures for social insurance and education. That negative association is reported by Equation 4 when social insurance as a percentage of total public spending is regressed on real education dollars per capita. According to the estimate of Equation 4, real spending for education is adversely affected by the growing and higher levels of public spending given to social insurance. This is clearly indicated by the national and summary data for liberal and conservative regime types. It is also true for social democratic regimes where, although real spending did increase for both social insurance and education over the study interval, social insurance’s share of public spending increased over the 1960-1990 period while education showed a steady decline. Therefore, the regressions—along with national and summary data by regime type—support my dual contention that the kind of welfare states Esping-Andersen described may be linked with characteristic education profiles and there is a trade-off exhibited between their support of social insurance and educational opportunities.

There are also some interesting comparisons to be drawn between the models of Tables 3 and 4. First, whereas socialist electoral strength was shown to be a significant positive factor in the calculation of social insurance expenditures, it is not for education. Its effect is reported as negative, although not statistically significant. I would submit that this points out a real difference between education and social
insurance policy in Western welfare states: while the amount of real spending for
education may not be a function of particular partisan politics or regime type, as it
tends to be for social insurance, how that money will be spent—for general education
and vocational training curriculums—can be predicted according to partisan factors
and by regime type. Second, while it is not for social insurance, the GDP per capita is
a significant factor in estimating real education expenditures. Castles has reported a
similar finding: “Being rich and getting richer was clearly an important source of
variation in education output, if not in educational effort” (1989, 441-2). Education
spending is tied more immediately to the health and wealth of the national economy.
It does not enjoy the same “lock-in” effect as social insurance spending (Pierson
1994).

Neither equation computes a significant coefficient for the 5-29 age group.
This may be explained, in part, by an examination of the summary and national data.
After increasing during the early years of the study, the 5-29 age group began to
diminish as a share of most national populations and for each welfare state type
beginning in the mid-1970s. However, even as the size of that cohort declined
relative to other age groups, real education expenditures continued to rise—
confounding the attempt to discover a meaningful mathematical relationship between
the 5-29 age group and education expenditures over the entire 1960-1990 period. It
would seem logical that the association might be positive, though, given the sign of
the coefficient and because real expenditures per capita grew steadily. The
connection between a growing elderly population and increased education spending is
perhaps a bit troublesome. Given the political clout of the elderly and that they would
be inclined to favor social insurance over education expenditures, I thought an
inverse association might be indicated—another dimension of the trade-off between social insurance and education. I think the report of a statistically significant positive coefficient for the over 65 age group may be spurious. Populations have been aging in advanced industrial societies at the same time education spending per capita has been rising. The two are clearly associated in time, but probably no more.

Regressions on Social Insurance and Education as Shares of Total Public Spending

Equation 5 of Table 5 is identical to Equation 2, but with social insurance expenditures as a percentage of total public spending made the dependent variable. This model evaluates the “preference” welfare regimes may exhibit to invest in social insurance programs versus other policy choices—education, in particular. Evidence of a significant association between education and social insurance programs in the way public monies are allocated would be supportive of the hypothesis that preferential investment in social insurance or education programs are alternative policy strategies that welfare regimes may support. Equation 6 is a mirror image of Equation 4, but with education as a percentage of total public spending made the dependent variable. As with Equation 5, the policy “preference” of welfare regimes is examined, but in this case with respect to educational expenditures.

16 Neither education nor social insurance expenditures as a percentage of the GDP are examined as dependent variables by this study. Because of the great variation in GDP size between the sample nations, those spending measures may indicate more about a welfare regime’s capacity to spend than its policy preferences. For example, the United States may spend a smaller share of its GDP on education than the Netherlands but, because its GDP is so much larger, actually invests far more real dollars per capita in education.
Table 5

Regressions on Social Insurance and Education as Shares of Public Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Equation 5</th>
<th>Equation 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Insurance %</td>
<td>Education % of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Total Public</td>
<td>Total Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-15.7588</td>
<td>-7.9939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>7.7945*</td>
<td>-0.3687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>5.2122*</td>
<td>3.0806*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Electoral Strength</td>
<td>0.1017*</td>
<td>-0.0044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.4610</td>
<td>0.7294*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Insurance % of Total Public Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1176*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Social Insurance Dollars per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.4504*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education % of Total Public Spending</td>
<td>0.0195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Education Dollars per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.0514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 5-29</td>
<td>0.6532*</td>
<td>0.3887*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population over 65</td>
<td>1.8333*</td>
<td>-0.0085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates significance at the .05 level or greater.

Although neither of the “preference” models has the predictive power of its “commitment” counterparts (compare with the Adjusted R-Squares of Equations 2 and 4), the results of the regressions are comparable and also endorse the hypotheses of this study. They are further confirmation that the kinds of welfare states identified by Esping-Andersen—liberal, conservative and social democratic—have

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characteristic policy profiles for education just as they do for social insurance. What is more, the models offer additional evidence of a relationship between public spending for education and that for social insurance in Western societies, even of an inverse association between the two policy areas which supports my argument that educational opportunities and expanded social insurance systems represent alternative welfare strategies that those states may support.

There are some differences between the "preference" and "commitment" models that require mention, however. Unlike Equation 2, the Equation 5 regression on social insurance found neither measure of education spending statistically significant. Equation 5 indicates regime type, socialist electoral strength, and demographic factors are of far greater importance in estimating the share of the budget going to social insurance than any preference shown to education. Education's percentage of public spending does not seem to affect the share given to social insurance, although the coefficient for real education expenditures suggests an inverse correlation may exist like that reported in Equation 4. The higher coefficient reported for conservative than social democratic regimes also deserves mention.

What share social insurance receives of total public spending is an expression of a regime's policy "preference," not of its spending "effort." In terms of total public spending committed to social insurance, conservative and social democratic welfare nations tend to allocate somewhat comparable shares. However, when it comes to the real dollars committed, the financial "effort" expended, social democratic regimes lead by a significant margin.

The Equation 6 regression on education also yields some interesting results. Like the finding of Equation 4, regime type, the GDP, and social insurance
expenditures data are reported to be important factors in the determination of education expenditures. As was the case with Equation 2, a negative association was found between real social insurance expenditures and education's share of the budget. At the same time, a positive association is indicated between the shares of the budget given to social insurance and education. Given their common patterns of growth and decline as budgetary shares over the 1960-1990 study period, as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, this would seem logical. It really says nothing about the existence or not of a trade-off; that effect is primarily accounted for by the variables for regime type and real social insurance spending. What is somewhat different than the results of Equation 4, and more in line with expectations, are the coefficients reported for the 5-29 and over 65 age groups. Education's share of the budget varies in a significant and positive fashion with the changing size of the 5-29 age group as a proportion of the total population. This makes sense. At the same time, the relative size of the age group over 65 is shown not to have a meaningful effect on education's share of the total budget. Although this does not confirm the negative effect I thought the growth of this age group would have on education's share of the budget, it does not contradict it either, and the sign of the coefficient is negative.

Like the country and summary data, variable graphing and scatterplots, the regression analyses support my hypothesis that the kinds of welfare regimes Esping-Andersen described may be further characterized by the common and characteristic features of their education systems. However, all six equations do not support the general finding that social democratic states tend to invest more in education and social insurance, and at higher levels than both conservative and liberal welfare
regimes. In particular, the regression on social insurance in Equation 1 represents a challenge to this argument. It suggests that conservative regimes may actually have a greater affinity with increasing social insurance expenditures than do social democratic nations. In the case of Equation 1, that is because education expenditures as a percentage of total public spending is not evaluated, an indicator of a regime's budgetary "preference." The inclusion of that variable in Equation 2 remedies that condition, i.e., it makes the equation more closely model what is shown by the national and summary data. Equation 2 correctly predicts that social democratic regimes will have a stronger association with social insurance spending than either conservative or liberal nations. Moreover, the regression also revealed a statistically significant inverse relationship between education as a percentage of total public spending and real spending for social insurance. When the variable reflecting a regime's budgetary "choice" and the "trade-off" between investment in education or social insurance is captured and controlled by the appropriate variable—as it is in Equation 2—a much better explanation is produced, and all regimes types more accurately exhibit their affinity with real social insurance expenditures. A similar modification was made to Equation 4 to improve on the explanation for real education expenditures provided by Equation 3, and to expose the trade-off in the relationship between education and social insurance.

Equations 2 and 4 are clearly the most powerful of those evaluated. Equations 1 and 3 are underspecified, and Equations 5 and 6 simply have less predictive power as shown by their Adjusted R-Squares. At the same time, it must be recognized that Equations 2 and 4 are analyzing different measures of social insurance and education spending than 5 and 6. Whereas Equations 2 and 4 are concerned with welfare state
"effort," as measured in real dollar expenditures, Equations 5 and 6 analyze policy “preferences" as shares of total public spending. This difference is important, though, since all four equations produce very comparable explanations—about the different spending by liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes for education and social insurance and the relationship between those two policy areas.

Like the tabular data and variable charts, the regression models of Equations 2 and 4 indicate the tendency of social democratic regimes to invest in education and social insurance at higher levels than liberal and conservative regimes. This is further evidence of the greater social democratic "effort" and commitment to both education and social insurance programs. Although social democratic regimes tend to allocate a slightly smaller share of public spending to social insurance than conservative nations, they spend the most in real dollars on social insurance, followed by conservative and then liberal states. While conservative regimes tend to spend more on social insurance in real dollars and as a budgetary share, liberal states place a greater emphasis on education than do conservative. When it comes to education expenditures as a share of total public spending, social democratic and liberal nations spend relatively the same, but decidedly more than conservative states. Social democratic regimes rank first in real education dollars per capita, followed by liberal and then conservative nations.

As hypothesized, education and social insurance spending are strong predictors of one other. In particular, Equations 2 and 4 each report a statistically significant positive relationship between the real dollars spent for education and those for social insurance programs. This is hardly a surprise. The education and social spending data examined in this study come from an extended period of economic growth and
prosperity, one in which school enrollments and the size of elderly populations in most advanced industrial societies steadily grew. An increase in the monies going to either education or social insurance is thus not difficult to explain. It is important to recognize, however, that they did not move in perfect synchronization over time. There were differences between types of welfare state regime as well as between education and social insurance programs, in both the rates and timing of expenditure growth.

Particularly meaningful to this inquiry is the negative association shown by Equation 2 between education as a share of total public spending and real social insurance dollars per capita, and the similar contrary relation in Equation 4 between social insurance as a share of total public spending and real education dollars per student. Expenditures for public programs are not the function of a frozen budgetary pie with fixed proportional slices committed to specific programs. The spending changes for any policy area—education, social insurance, defense, agriculture, or anything else—are not automatically matched with the spending levels for others. In other words, there is no necessary correlation between government spending in one policy area and another. Specifically, there is no a-priori reason to think that spending for education and social insurance spending must move in perfect tandem, up and down, or that the two might be inversely related. However, as the regressions of Equations 2, 4 and 6 indicate, a statistically significant negative association does exist between spending for education and that for social insurance. This finding of an inverse relationship between the two policy areas is evidence supportive of my hypothesis that a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs are alternative policy strategies that welfare regimes may support. Equation 5 reports a
similar negative association between real education expenditures and the share of total public spending going to social insurance, but it is not statistically significant.

There is another aspect of this inverse association that requires attention. Regression models 2 and 4 report that the apparent "effect" of education's changing share of public spending on real social insurance expenditures is eight times greater than that for changes in social insurance's share of total public expenditures on real spending for education. Such a difference in magnitude is truly significant, and probably attributable to more than one factor. Part of the explanation may be in the composition of the sample. Eight of the eighteen nations in the study are liberal welfare regimes, nations that tend to spend relatively more for education and the least for social insurance. Only five are conservative, countries that tend to spend relatively more on social insurance and the least for education. Given that the five social democratic regimes tend to exhibit the greatest overall commitment to both education and social programs, it may be that the majority data of the "education" states—including the social democratic, but especially the liberal welfare nations—tipped the scale and gave more weight to the education variable. More important, though, may be the differences in policymaking for education and social insurance. Once again, it may be indicative of the nondiscretionary nature of social insurance expenditures relative to education and other public programs that are more vulnerable to partisan politics and changes in the health of the economy.

The summary data of Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show that real spending for social insurance and education grew for each welfare state type at each five-year interval. The national data confirm that real spending for social insurance and
education increased for each of the sample nations over the entire 1960-1990 interval, although not necessarily at every five-year interval. As Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 indicate, however, increases in real spending for social insurance and education were not matched by a consistent growth in their shares of total public spending. In fact, education's share of total public spending began to decline for social democratic nations in the 1970-1975 interval, and for liberal and conservative regimes beginning in the 1975-1980 frame. It happened later for social insurance, declining for liberal and conservative nations between 1980 and 1990, and for social democratic over the 1985-1990 interval. As I observed earlier, the changing levels of state expenditures for education as a share of total public spending more accurately reflects than social insurance the periods of welfare state growth, consolidation, and contraction cited in the literature. Earlier and more than social insurance, education policy was affected by changes in the economy and political arena.

Once more, as compared to education, social insurance programs seem to exhibit a very strong "lock-in" effect (Pierson 1994). As well as being nondiscretionary spending programs, they have a "life force" of their own. Most social insurance programs enjoy widespread public support, especially those that benefit the middle classes. Their popularity has helped to justify ever-increasing costs, and expenditures have become less a function of politics and the condition of the national economy than public expectations and the size of the group eligible for benefits. Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O'Neill called the U.S. Social Security's old-age pension system the "third-rail of American politics." "Touch it and you die" he warned any politicians who dared consider reducing its retirement
benefits or tightening eligibility requirements. Education, on the other hand, appears more responsive to movement of the GDP and national politics, as Equations 4 and 6 indicate. The GDP is a good predictor of real spending for education and its share of the budget, but not for social insurance. Although education and social insurance both saw steady increases in real dollar expenditures per capita over the period of the study, education's share of public spending began a decline during the mid-1970s that corresponds with the economic recession of that time. Not until the 1980s does social insurance's share of public spending also show a downward movement. It may be, too, that education has a threshold beyond which additional per unit (student) costs are relatively less than that for recipients of social insurance benefits. Schools may become crowded as the school-age population grows, but expenditures do not necessarily increase in mark-step, nor are new schools necessarily built or additional teaching staff hired.

Summary and Conclusions

Foremost among the objectives of this analysis has been to establish empirical evidence of an association between the social and education policies of Western welfare states. I submit the data does confirm such a relationship, and that policy linkage effectively extends the boundary of the welfare state's definition to include education with social insurance programs in its policy profile. The data also indicate that Western nations tend to "cluster" into three groups like those Esping-Andersen described for social policy—liberal, conservative and social democratic—according

to the similarity of their education policies. Western welfare states exhibit distinctive patterns of support for education just as they do for social insurance. In particular, there is a significant association between the different social insurance alternatives supported by Western welfare states and their expenditures for education. The data show that welfare state type and social insurance expenditure data are powerful predictors of spending levels for education. Likewise, welfare state type and education expenditures are powerful predictors of spending for social insurance.

A detailed specification of the particular education profiles for liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes is beyond the scope of the current project, a subject for subsequent research. However, this much can be said. The three kinds of welfare regimes Esping-Andersen distinguished by the similarity of their social insurance provisions can be comparably grouped because of certain features their education systems have been found to share. Each regime type—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—can be identified with a different policy for education, just as they are for social insurance. The data concerning secondary level enrollments in vocational training and general education, in combination with distinctive social welfare provisions and unique patterns of spending for education and social insurance, represent evidence of these different policy profiles for the social insurance and education systems of liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare states.

The particular meaning given to “educational opportunity,” and how it is operationalized by each welfare regime type, highlights a most important difference between the policy profiles of liberal, conservative, and social democratic nations. I have argued that a preference to invest in social insurance programs or educational
opportunities are alternative policy strategies that Western welfare states may choose to follow. Liberal welfare nations tend to prefer investment in educational opportunities over the expansion of social insurance programs. Educational achievement is encouraged as a vehicle of socioeconomic mobility and security, the long-term functional equivalent of social safety nets. Alternatively, conservative nations tend to favor social safety nets. Educational achievement is less encouraged as a gateway to social mobility and may even be made unnecessary for economic security by a generous social insurance system. Social democratic regimes, even with their expansive social safety nets, also provide a high level of support for education programs. Educational opportunity and the potential socioeconomic benefits of educational achievement are offered as an option to the individual; they do not replace the protections of social insurance.

The findings of this study should not be considered as limited to an arbitrary window defined by the 1960-1990 survey data; it is not so restricted in time and space. This is more than a better explanation for the social insurance and education policies of Western societies during that time period. Indeed, rather than a snapshot analysis of nations and policies without meaning beyond its moment, I would submit that this is a report on the ongoing work-in-process in Western political systems, of the welfare state's institutionalization and its policymaking for education and other social programs. I would argue that the work-in-process on which this analysis has focused reflects long-term and deeply-rooted policy and institutional arrangements, and it is a very good predictor of future policy development.

How the welfare state and its policies for education and social welfare have been institutionalized very much determine the structure and parameters for the
enactment of new public policies and the modification or reform of existing ones.

Germany and the United States provide excellent examples. Germany's occupation-oriented guild structure for social insurance, a system with nineteenth century origins, continues to define the German welfare state, even to providing the basic model for the long-term care legislation adopted in 1994. In the United States, education is and traditionally has been a state and local matter. Despite all the campaign rhetoric during the 2000 presidential campaign about school and education reform and, particularly, of a significant new role for the federal government in that policy field, education will remain a state and local issue. For it to be otherwise would require—at least—a constitutional amendment and a massive change of tax and administrative structures at all federal levels. Some change is likely, it always is, but the institutional structure of the American education system will remain largely the same for a long time into the future.

Institutions are “sticky” (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 15); and the welfare state is one that is very durable and deeply entrenched in Western societies (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 1993, 1994, 1996). Whatever the “crisis” of the welfare state, and barring some unforeseen political or socioeconomic event of immense and revolutionary proportions, it is unlikely that either the substance of education and social policies, or the national structures and rules for political competition that affect the policymaking process of the welfare state, will undergo any kind of significant change in the near term. Incremental changes will occur, to be sure, but the institutionalized welfare state will continue to structure and resist any

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18In 2000, only about 7% of total education spending in the United States came from the federal, i.e., national government.
great change, perpetuating its own survival and policy tendencies (Heclo 1974; Hicks, Swank, and Ambuhl 1989).
CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES OF WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT:
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

In The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (1981), Heidenheimer argues that a historical trade-off took place in welfare state development between public investment in education and social security programs. In particular, for the United States and the major European countries, “the emphasis on education and social security programs are viewed as alternative strategies pursued by emerging welfare states” (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981, 269). Heclo, in The Welfare State in Hard Times (1985), speaks of a “trade-off” between public investment in education and the expansion of other social programs as a deliberate choice in welfare state development. Castles similarly recommends, in “Explaining Public Education Expenditures in OECD Nations” (1989), that the preference of some countries to spend for educational opportunities over expanded social programs is demonstration of alternative welfare state strategies. Borrowing from Esping-Andersen (1990), I argue that the types of Western welfare regimes he describes—liberal, conservative and social democratic—exhibit these alternative strategies in the different kinds and combinations of education and social policies they support. This relationship between education and social policy is purposeful, not random, made
manifest by the degree to which state policy provides educational opportunities and encourages educational achievement as an alternative to social programs.¹

This chapter and the next explore the alternative strategies and “trade-off” theses for the United States and Germany, from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the 1990s. Both were rapidly industrializing states that today are advanced industrial democracies, but they followed very different paths of welfare state development. While they share some common attributes—like democratic government and federalism—their institutional structures and social policies are decidedly different. Indeed, Germany and the U.S. represent the “best cases” of the conservative and liberal welfare regime types described by Esping-Andersen (Goodin et al. 1999, 14). Germany fits the conservative model where the primary provider of comprehensive social insurance programs is the state, while the market and private insurance have only subsidiary roles. Germany was a pioneer in the legislation of social insurance, and today has among the most comprehensive systems found in the West. The United States may be the best example of the welfare regime type that Esping-Andersen called liberal, where the market and private insurance are significant alternatives to public protection, and coverage by the state is much more limited. The American government’s entry into the field of social insurance came much later than

¹Educational achievement, particularly at the secondary and higher levels, is a recognized vehicle of social mobility (Janowitz 1976; Kaelble 1981). Educational achievement can broaden socioeconomic opportunities and enhance an individual’s ability to accumulate personal wealth, thereby reducing dependence on wage labor, market forces and public assistance programs over the long run. It is in this context that educational opportunity is operationally defined in this examination as the chance to obtain an education at the post-primary level. Actual educational opportunity may be measured by its inclusiveness, by “the proportion of children of different social or occupational classes obtaining secondary or higher education” (Kaelble 1981, 240).
most other Western nations. Today it has only an incomplete patchwork quilt of separate welfare programs, not a system. By contrast, when higher education systems are compared, that of the United States is among the most accessible while that of Germany is far more limited in the opportunities it offers (Heidenheimer 1981, 1997). Far and away, America led all other Western nations in the expansion of upper secondary and higher education opportunities, and still does today. The expansion of postprimary educational opportunities came much later in Germany, and it is still a laggard today.

I argue that from the beginnings of the German and American welfare states there is clear evidence of alternative policy strategies and a trade-off between support of public education and social security. Germany chose to focus on the development of a comprehensive social insurance system and not on the expansion of educational opportunities. America chose instead to emphasize the provision of educational opportunities and did not develop a comprehensive social insurance system. This trade-off remains clear even after many decades of policy evolution in the social welfare and educational spheres. Three hypotheses of welfare state policy development will be examined—structural, political conflict, and institutional—as explanations for the different paths Germany and the United States followed in the development of social welfare programs and the expansion of educational opportunities since the late nineteenth century. First, that the socioeconomic transformations and demographic shifts associated with the transition from pre- to industrial to post-industrial society provided the structural framework for public education and social security policymaking (Wilensky 1975). Second, that changes in the distribution of power among political actors affected the development of social
welfare and education policy. Democratization, mass enfranchisement, religious organizations, interest groups, partisan politics and control of the policy process affected both the evolution of the welfare state and its public programs (Castles 1982; Hicks and Swank 1984, 1992). Third, the initial institutionalization and subsequent path dependence of the maturing German and American welfare states have affected the policymaking for public education and other social programs (Götting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994; March and Olsen 1984, 1989; North 1990; Skocpol 1979, 1985). The level of bureaucratic development and control over public policy, whether the state organization is federal or unitary, the different political arenas and actors for education and social policymaking, and the degree of local support and control over education and social policies—all these affected the outcome and the trade-off between public investment in education and other social programs (Weaver and Rockman 1993).

The German Welfare State

The German Social Welfare System Today

Germany is generally acknowledged as the leader in welfare legislation, the origins of its social insurance system dating back to the 1880s and the government of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). Although it has been argued elsewhere that Imperial Germany was not the “pioneer” in redistributive social insurance,² it is still clear that Germany did break new ground when it moved social

²Lindert argues Bismarck’s social programs of the 1880s “did not meet the modern definitions of government redistribution or social insurance. . . . Instead, the (continued...
welfare assistance to the national policy agenda and increased the responsibility of the government for it. By 1927, under the Weimar Constitution, the German government had adopted a package of social insurance that included provisions for work injury, sickness and disability, old-age pensions, and unemployment assistance (Collier and Messick 1975). Under this system the state was made the guarantor and broker for social insurance. Benefits were determined by occupation and work record—according to one's socioeconomic status and what one had "earned"—and financed through a combination of employee and employer contributions. Traditional patriarchal assumptions were implicit. Dependent family members were covered under the terms of the working family member's insurance. It was a system that favored the protection and perpetuation of the status quo—the existing socioeconomic order—by encouraging the collective responsibility of groups for their members and associating kinds and levels of benefits to one's work "guild" and the insurance organization to which they belonged. This scheme for social insurance has largely been retained over the years, and even served as the model for the long-term care insurance adopted in 1994 (Götting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994).

Germany today has a comprehensive social insurance system, including provisions for work injury and disability, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, sickness and maternity benefits, family allowances, and long-term care. Coverage and benefits are based on an individual's profession or employment and contributions record. Dependents are covered under the terms of the working family member's social insurance provisions. Although the state is an important player, its...continued)

2(continued)

starring role in welfare-state development goes to Denmark" (1994, 9, 15).
principal role is that of broker in a social insurance system where employers and
employees are the primary contributors and administrators.\(^3\) Civil servants are
covered by a separate state-supported system, and a marginal private sector exists to
service specific professions and individuals with greater economic means.

The Development of Germany's Social Welfare System

**Social Welfare Policy in Imperial Germany**

Germany's social programs introduced in the 1880s—illness insurance in
1883, work injury in 1884, old-age and disability in 1889—were built upon existing
structures and prior state actions. German governments had a long history of
involvement in social welfare matters by the late 1800s, and particularly in the area of
public health. By the end of the seventeenth century a number of German
principalities had already established medical boards to oversee the practice of
medicine. In 1685, Brandenburg-Prussia became the first to enact a comprehensive
law that brought the practice of medicine and matters of public health under state
regulation. By an edict of the Elector Frederick William (1640-1688), the “Great
Elector,” the medical profession and all those associated with it—including doctors,
apothecaries, barbers, midwives and even bathkeepers—were placed under the
control and supervision of a state Board of Medicine. This measure was justified as a
necessary state response to existing “abuses in the practice of medicine, in the
preparation and distribution of medical remedies, and in the cure of sickness”

\(^3\) The government does subsidize the programs for old age, disability and
death, sickness and maternity, and unemployment; and it covers the whole cost of
family allowance benefits (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994).
(Dorwart 1971, 240). As its first function, the Board of Medicine was to certify and license those wanting to practice medicine. Its second was to promote higher standards in the medical profession by developing and enforcing a code of conduct for the practice of medicine and delivery of medical services by apothecaries, doctors, surgeons, midwives, etc. (Dorwart 1971, 241-5). In another area related to public health, King Frederick I of Prussia (1701-1713) established a Board of Sanitation in 1709 to fight the spread of the plague and other contagious diseases. The charter of the board was expanded in 1720 to include any actions or agents that might be harmful or a threat to an individual’s or the public health (Dorwart 1971, 254). So it was that when the new Reich government ventured into the field of public health with the Reichsimpfgesetz in 1874, legislation that made vaccination against the smallpox virus mandatory for all Germans, the practice of German governments to intervene in matters affecting the public’s health and welfare was well established. In another health-related area, the Imperial government enacted a law in 1876 to regulate the activities of independent insurance companies and to make it compulsory that all industrial workers over the age of sixteen join a medical plan if they were not already covered (Mitchell 1991, 45-6). This law was telling of the social welfare reforms that would follow over the next several years.

By the 1880s a mix of public and private welfare assistance and insurance programs existed throughout much of Germany—mostly private—supported by local governments and independent associations. About 6 percent of German industrial workers were already covered by private insurance systems in the decade prior to the social insurance initiatives of the Reich government (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 65). These insurance programs were primarily guild-based, and participation
was sometimes voluntary. These insurance funds, along with other independent and local welfare agencies that were spread throughout Germany at the time—Vereinswesen—largely provided the model and organizational structure for what would be the Bismarck government's new social programs. The welfare legislation of the 1880s affirmed that decentralization would continue as the preferred mode of administration for German social insurance. It was to be a system based on the existing foundation of guild-based insurance funds, modified to include a new role for the central government (Katzenstein 1987, 170-2; Moran 1999, 34). Indicative of its conservative origin, that part was to be minimal, particularly with respect to any new financial obligations or responsibility for the delivery of public goods. In this scheme the national government made itself the primary broker for the social insurance needs of the German working class, but without taking over what had traditionally been a local function. The role of employee-employer boards and local government was stressed. This was the "Bismarck model" for social insurance. Private insurance carriers were included in initial plans, but deliberately put at a competitive disadvantage. The private insurance funds represented the primary competition for the new government-sponsored social insurance but, at the outset, they were necessary because the state had no social insurance program and supporting bureaucracy of its own. Eventually, Bismarck intended that private and independent insurance associations would be replaced by a state-controlled system that covered all workers. Participation in that insurance system would be compulsory for all workers, benefits would be funded through taxes placed on workers and their employers, and the program administered by employee-employer boards with state oversight (Mitchell 1991, 49-51).
Sickness insurance was adopted by the Reichstag in 1883. The services included in this plan included income compensation for thirteen weeks (twenty-six in 1903), free medical care, medication, and hospitalization as necessary. This legislation did not set out to immediately replace the voluntary and private insurance associations, but instead to place them under state control while strengthening the position of new local and regional public insurance funds. Management of local insurance “funds” was entrusted to executive boards (Vorstand), staffed by labor and employers in proportion to their contribution to the group’s treasury. While worker participation in some insurance program was made mandatory (Kassenzwang), a certain degree of choice between public and private plans remained. From the standpoint of the federal structure of government, the national social welfare system was decentralized. In keeping with the federal design, a central Reich office was created (Reichsversicherungsamt) to oversee the insurance system, while daily operations remained a regional and local responsibility. From the start, it was clear that the implementation of this scheme would see the role of small private and voluntary associations greatly diminished.

... a tendency toward consolidation and centralization was evident from the outset. Compulsory organizations campaigned actively to absorb voluntary agencies. The advantages of amalgamation were soon manifest: more members in a single insurance group meant more efficient and less costly administration, broader coverage, higher allocations, and special services. ... The small and scattered independent agencies were hard pressed to match such benefits. Furthermore, they were more expensive for members. Employers were required to contribute one-third of the total income of obligatory agencies but nothing for voluntary plans; the latter were thus entirely dependent on the regular payment of premiums by workers. The law thereby created an uneven struggle, which could only tilt finally in one direction (Mitchell 1991, 51-2).
Work-related accident insurance was also proposed in 1883, but it was not passed by the Reichstag until the following year. Essentially, it broadened the coverage of the sickness insurance plan, including a provision for no-fault work-injury insurance. Local operations and claims disputes were to be managed by an executive body (Vorstand) comprised of two-thirds workers and one-third employers—in proportion to their financial support of the insurance agency. Although the Social Democratic party was not initially enthusiastic about participation in such agency directorates, it very soon changed its position to encourage worker participation. First, it was recognized that the social status of workers had actually been improved by the social insurance system. Second, it was determined that the majority status enjoyed by the working class on executive directorates could eventually play to the advantage of lower class interests (Mitchell 1991, 52; Rosenberg 1986, 111, 115). In actuality, . . . when the [accident insurance] bill was passed into law there was little in it that gave administrative responsibility to the workers. They were represented only in committees that dealt with preventive measures. For all practical purposes the system was under the control of the employers, who usually combined into industrial or regional mutual associations. These associations were under the supervision of state insurance offices that were ultimately responsible to the Imperial Insurance Office. The system was thus highly decentralized and was geared to employer self-administration. Although, in the end, the employers possessed administrative control, they also had to bear the full cost, with the exception of those costs connected with the operations of the Imperial Insurance Office (Rimlinger 1971, 119).

Legislation covering old-age pension and disability benefits passed the Reichstag in 1889. With passage of this act, in combination with the existing sickness and work injury laws, and although coverage at the outset included only 10 percent of the population, Germany is credited as having Europe's first comprehensive system of social insurance programs (Mitchell 1991, 50). In this area of social policy
the German government had broken new ground, but not without controversy. For one, eligibility for retirement benefits began at age seventy and required worker contributions for thirty years. Given life expectancy at that time, only a very small percentage of contributors could even expect to receive a pension some day. For another, those workers who did live long enough to collect a pension typically found the amount less than what was necessary to maintain their economic status in retirement. However, in a provision that was favorable to workers, individuals whose accident or sickness benefits were near exhaustion were permitted to be reclassified as disabled so that their assistance could be continued without interruption (Mitchell 1991, 53-4).

No single factor or event adequately explains the early timing of Germany’s social welfare initiative relative to other Western nations. Instead, I would argue it may be attributed to the interaction and combined effect of Germany’s unification, Bismarck’s state-building strategy, rising working class consciousness, and the socialist challenge that confronted Bismarck’s conservative government. Germany became the pioneer in social insurance a little more than ten years after its unification. At that time the legitimate policy spheres and agendas for the Länder and national governments were still a work in process, their specific responsibilities and rightful political authority not completely clear. Under these circumstances, while the Bismarck government did not necessarily want to take over functions that had traditionally been local, it may have been judged that some role for the Reich in an area like social welfare would not only be appropriate but also help to establish the legitimacy of the German state and its political leadership (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 131-2). To accomplish this task in a most effective and expedient
fashion, Bismarck borrowed and built upon the policy experience and structure of the
guild-based social insurance system that already existed in the Länder. He inserted
the Reich government as broker for the social insurance system, but he did not
fundamentally alter its local and guild-based character. Decentralization and
occupation-based provisions remained hallmarks of the social insurance system.
While the national government was given oversight and regulatory powers, local
employee and business associations enjoyed considerable administrative autonomy.

The Imperial government's social insurance initiative may also be seen "as a
strategic response by a patriarchal state to the growing strength of the socialist
workers' movement" (Hicks 1994, 102-4). Such an explanation is not in conflict with
the state-building thesis. In fact, it gives it greater depth. Likewise the view that
social reforms were undertaken by a paternal state that took as its duty the protection
of the German working class (Rimlinger 1971, 99-102). Both the tradition of a
paternalistic state and Bismarck's state-building challenge were complicated by the
many new issues and social problems associated with industrialization. In particular,
the rising expectations of the German working class were accompanied by a growing
discontent with the existing socioeconomic and political arrangements. Although any
meaningful democratization was not in the cards, that was clearly not on the
Chancellor's agenda, the time was ripe for social reforms. Industrialization and
demographic changes, coupled with the severe economic downturn of the 1870s, had
made clear the inadequacy of the existing social welfare system. The Reich
government was keenly aware that the welfare reforms advocated by the increasingly

4 Bismarck had favored a compulsory guild-based system as a member of the
Prussian Diet in 1849 (Rimlinger 1971, 100).
popular Social Democratic party were very attractive to a politicized German working class. All of these things—combined with the political acumen and determined leadership of Bismarck—provided a backdrop, purpose, and momentum for the social welfare legislation that came in the 1880s. In this context, Germany's social welfare initiatives were part of what has been referred to as “Bismarck’s project . . . an effort at state-building, quite self-consciously designed to strengthen the new German state apparatus and improve its ties with the industrial working class . . . .” (de Swaan 1988, 187).

A most important objective of Bismarck’s “project” was to meet head-on the challenge to his conservative government represented by the Social Democratic party, and particularly to weaken its appeal to the working class. This was to be accomplished without undertaking any significant reforms that might upset the hierarchical political order (Katzenstein 1987, 168). To do so, Bismarck coopted the social policy agenda that resounded so well with the working class, demonized the Social Democratic movement, and undertook legal actions to restrict the party’s growth and political activities. For a twelve-year period, from 1878-1890, the state waged a campaign against the Socialist movement under the anti-Socialist laws (Sozialistengesetz). In his speech at the opening of the Reichstag in November 1881, Bismarck spoke of the “moral foundation of the Christian community” and of a requirement for a “repression of Social Democratic excesses,” how both Christianity and restricting the politics of the left might benefit the “well-being of the workers.” For Bismarck and many other European politicians of his era, there was a lesson in the bloody violence and upheaval of revolutionary France. Acts of repression undertaken by government to ensure domestic order and otherwise fend off efforts to
subvert its authority to rule were a legitimate exercise of state power (Mitchell 1991, 48). As it turned out, though, the Social Democrats only gained in power during the period of their persecution by the state, and even faster with the enactment of the new social insurance legislation (Wehler 1993, 80-1).

Bismarck was keen at political manipulation, a master at deception and invoking the dangers posed by “enemies of the German people”—“the French, the Socialists, the Catholics”—to his own advantage. On his part, it involved a constant juggling and reevaluation of policies and objectives, of political friends and enemies. No situation or plan of action could be permanent. New circumstances and the success or failure of a policy could dictate changes in political strategy. Such was the Kulturkampf (culture war) waged against the Catholic church and Catholic Center party during the 1870s, a struggle Bismarck ended when he realized its futility. Likewise, he orchestrated a state-sponsored campaign against social democracy, to blunt its political influence. The political machinations of Bismarck help to explain, along with his state-building project, how such a conservative politician ended up playing the role of social reformer; but that is not all. German industrialization and a changing socioeconomic and political context had produced a situation ripe for welfare reform; and for a politician as astute as Bismarck, it was a call to action.

German politics were favorably disposed to new social legislation. From the left, Bismarck’s conservative government was confronted by the increasing strength of social democratic forces, who supported state-supported social welfare provisions. At the same time, those opposed to expanded public welfare programs—particularly liberal elements who were inclined to favor private and self-help solutions over state assistance—were not in an effective political position to do so. German liberalism
was generally weak and the influence of the National Liberal party was greatly diminished (Mitchell 1991, 45-6; Rimlinger 1971, 89-91). German liberalism had been at its peak from the late 1850s until the middle 1870s, a period that coincided with the “take-off” of German industrial development and ended with the depression of 1873. Successful economic development had boosted the appeal of liberalism and free market capitalism, and weakened arguments about the necessity for social insurance and state-supported safety nets. “The leading spokesmen for economic liberalism in the 1860s were optimistic and no longer viewed poverty as inevitable . . . the road to abundance was open to anyone willing to put his mind to it” (Rimlinger 1971, 103). To many Germans, particularly of the new industrial working class, the wrongness of such an argument was made very clear by the depression of 1873 and the severe unemployment that followed. Together with increasing pressure from social democracy on the left, the waning of liberal influence in German politics, combined with a “patriarchal social ideal” and “the Christian social ethic,” contributed significantly to the success of Bismarck’s social agenda (Rimlinger 1971, 91, 8-9; cited by Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988, 10-11).

If conditions had ripened by the early 1880s for the institution of new social rights, it was mainly because of pressure from below. Bismarck’s ideological justification of these rights, however, came from above, from the patriarchal conception of the duties of the state. His central political consideration was not the creation of new rights, consistent with a new interpretation of the rights of citizenship, but the preservation of the traditional relationship of the individual to the state. In a sense, social rights were granted to prevent having to grant enlarged political rights. Of course, Bismarck fully intended to alleviate poverty, and to that extent his social insurance was to reduce economic inequality. But the whole thrust of his measures was to preserve the traditional system of political inequality (Rimlinger 1971, 112).
The Bismarck Model and Unemployment Insurance in Weimar Germany

Although Germany had been a front-runner in other social insurance programs, it lagged its European counterparts in adopting unemployment insurance. Until legislation was passed by the Weimar government in 1927, unemployment assistance was left to the trade unions. That this social insurance provision came so much later in Germany than in other European nations has been attributed by some scholars to better conditions of economic growth and a lesser problem with unemployment in the period prior to World War I (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 92). Clearly, though, that was not all. Over forty years had passed since the groundbreaking social reforms of Germany’s Imperial government, a world war had been fought and lost, and a sea change had taken place in the partisan control of government and in the goals of the political leadership. Egalitarianism and the decommodification of labor,5 not the patriarchal tradition of Bismarck, motivated the democratic forces and shaped the social policies of Weimar Germany. What did not change, though, was the scheme for social insurance. The plan for unemployment insurance closely followed the “Bismarck model” established for sickness insurance. Unemployment benefits were to be funded by a combination worker and employer contributions, with each group taking part in the program’s administration. However, implementation was limited by the impending economic depression and rising unemployment, and a majority of the unemployed were still not participants and covered by unemployment insurance provisions in 1932 (Lee and Rosenhaft 1997, 

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5 Decommodification describes “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living” without reliance on wage labor and independent of market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37).
271). Nonetheless, with the addition of unemployment insurance to work accident, old-age and disability pensions and sickness provisions, the essence of Germany's comprehensive social insurance system had been established.

**Social Welfare Policy in the Third Reich**

Social welfare policy and the social insurance system were made instruments of the Nazi party and of state power in Hitler's Germany. The old decentralized social insurance system administered by workers and employers was abolished, its control taken over and centralized in the Nazi party-state and its functionaries. In the hands of the Nazis, the social insurance system and its institutions became a tool to manage the labor supply according to the economic and security requirements of the state, as well as another means for the totalitarian state to track and control its population. The Nazis also changed the rules for a worker's insurance eligibility. Contributions to an insurance fund no longer guaranteed a right to coverage and benefits; instead it was an individual's loyalty to the Nazi party and fulfilling one's duty to the state (Rimlinger 1971, 132-4).

**Social Welfare Policy in the Federal Republic**

The centralized social insurance system instituted by the Nazis collapsed with the defeat of the Third Reich. The postwar West German state saw a return of the Weimar era portfolio of social programs based on the Bismarck model of social insurance. The restoration of these social insurance programs—work injury and disability, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, sickness and maternity benefits—along with program modifications over the years and new provisions for
family allowances in 1954 and 1964, and long-term care in 1994, define the structure of the German welfare system as it exists today.

As with the history of Germany more generally since the Second World War, that of its welfare state has been eventful. Although the Bismarck model of social insurance was reinstituted by the Federal Republic, it has seen very significant changes over the years. At front and center has been the mandatory public pension system, the foundation for retirement planning and income security in old age. For most retired Germans the public pension system is their primary source of income. In 1995 over 80 percent of the eligible West German population was covered by the state pension system, and in East Germany it was even higher. Although it is primarily financed by employer and employee contributions, the pension program also receives substantial funding from the federal government (Arnold, Graetz, and Munnell 1998, 249-51).

In what was a landmark in social reform since passage of the original old-age and disability legislation in 1889, the dynamic pension was introduced in 1957. New pension laws called for an association between an individual’s lifetime earnings record and the pension amount received in retirement. This amount would be subject to a yearly recomputation in order to keep pace with developments in the economy and changes in the national wage structure. While a certain level of personal resources would also be required, the objective of the dynamic pension was clear: to provide pensions at a level that would help support and protect a retiree’s socioeconomic status at the same level as during his or her work career. Similar provisions were adopted for workers on permanent disability (Rimlinger 1971, 178-
There is little question that these reforms were intended to reinforce and protect the existing social order, not level it.

Instead of trying to wipe out income inequalities, the pension reform consciously seeks to perpetuate them. In this sense the pension reform helps to solidify rather than to alter the economic basis of the social structure. It helps to prevent the sinking of the pensioners to the bottom of socioeconomic scale, as well as to prevent a leveling of the income structure (Rimlinger 1971, 180).

In 1954 national legislation was adopted introducing family allowances, a monthly benefit that would be given to families beginning with their third child. Originally funded by employers and employee associations, the law was changed in 1964 to transfer financial responsibility to the federal government. The law has been amended over the years so that it now includes families with more than one child. Children must be under the age of 16 to qualify for the allowance, or age 27 if a student (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1993, 128).

In April 1994 federal legislation was passed adding long-term care to the policy portfolio of the German welfare state. Beginning in 1995, this new social insurance provided coverage for the medically approved long-term care needs of all employees belonging to statutory sickness funds and their family members. Long-term care insurance is funded through employer contributions and automatic employee deductions (Götting, Haug, and Hinrichs 1994, 285-6).

Pension reform has returned to the political agenda on several occasions since 1957. The permissible retirement age, without a deduction in benefits, was lowered to age 63 from 65 in 1972. In recent years, though, the primary object of pension reform has been one part of a larger effort to address the ever-rising costs of the welfare state. A reform act was passed in 1989, for implementation in 1992, that was
to help manage the long-term financing of the pension system. In 1997, a CDU-controlled government adopted legislation that lowered the pension replacement rate and increased the value-added tax by one percent to help cover rising pension expenditures (Arnold 1998). In what was heralded as “a milestone for pension reform in Germany and Europe,” legislation was adopted in May 2001 that added the option of privately funded savings accounts to the pension system. As it was implemented in January 2002, workers were allowed to contribute 1 percent of their monthly earnings, tax-free, to private accounts in 2002, increasing to 4 percent by 2008. Through these private savings accounts individuals are able to make investments for their own retirement in stocks, bonds, and other market instruments.

The inclusion of private investment accounts in the German pension system represents far more than just another retirement savings opportunity; it is indicative of the financial stress that all Western welfare states are under today. In no small way, the 2001 pension reforms were a response by the German government to the larger and growing financial insecurity of the welfare state’s total budgetary commitments, not just that of its pension system. In order to sell its pension reform the SPD-Green government argued that private investment accounts offered a way to greater income security in retirement. That may be true enough but, in framing the argument this way, they necessarily portrayed the existing pension system as insecure (Cox 2001, 495). I would submit this was a very limited admission; that the insecurity, the financial problem of the welfare state, was far greater than the pension system.

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Private investment accounts will not solve Germany’s or any other welfare state’s financial woes. It is not just old-age pensions, but the high and ever-growing costs of all its social programs that is a problem for Germany today and other Western nations. It is made more complicated by the aging populations of those countries, that chief among the causes for rising social expenditures are popular programs that most affect seniors—pensions, healthcare, and long-term care. But there are other challenges for Germany as well, some shared and some not with other Western nations. Among the most important, the German economy is in recession and there is high unemployment, the costs of reunification have been great, and then there are the expenses and requirements of the European Union.

However Germany may struggle with the crisis of its welfare state, reform will not come easily. Survey data from the early and late 1990s show that the German people are not convinced of the need for welfare reform (Cox 2001, 493). When all is said and done I am inclined to agree with Cox (2001) that, if there is to be real welfare reform in Germany, the terms of the debate must change. Whether a welfare system is comprehensive like the German, or minimal like the American, the social programs of the welfare state represent social “security” against the vagaries of capitalism and the meanness of industrialization. Whatever is the reality of the “security” provided by the welfare state’s social programs, it is highly valued by its beneficiaries, and Germany is not an exception. Although the bottom line to the crisis of the welfare state may involve any and several combinations of cost-containment measures, budgetary reductions and tax hikes, that cannot be the crux of the reform discussion. The discourse must focus on the maintenance of social security—in Germany and everywhere else.
To associate social “insecurity” with reform has so far proven an effective tactic of those opposed to change. Left unexplained and to the devices of the opposition, proposals to raise the retirement age or increase taxes sound more like social “insecurity” than security. If there is to be a meaningful debate and reforms, the proponents of welfare reform must link the changes they champion to the maintenance of social “security.” Ironically, this must be accomplished by making clear the real insecurity of the German welfare state as it now exists; that the need for reform is critical. It has not been so different in the United States where Republicans and conservatives have accused Democrats of using scare tactics on senior citizens, warning that Social Security and Medicare benefits would be at risk if Republicans are elected and their welfare reform proposals are implemented. For another example, Republicans found out it was far more effective to talk about abolishing the “death tax” than eliminating the estate tax. The terms that structure the debate are critical.

A Discussion of German Social Policy

It is not unreasonable to argue that industrialization did contribute to the development of social welfare programs in Germany (de Swaan 1988; Rimlinger 1971). The social insurance provisions adopted by the German government in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were clearly a response to the demographic changes and challenges that accompanied industrialization—socioeconomic and political. However, even if it does enhance our understanding of the context, the logic of industrialism does not explain why a conservative German regime would support those landmark social reforms. The alternative logic of capitalism offers some help in this regard, interpreting it as an action undertaken by a
political elite to protect the capitalist order, but it cannot account for the timing. The
democratic variant of the political conflict thesis also falls short. While the political
power of the working class, organized labor and Social Democracy were clearly on
the rise—those who would be expected to champion social reforms—control of the
government was not in their hands.

As industrialism advanced, democratic and other radical ideas filtered down
to the lower classes. The intensification of social problems made imperative a
reinterpretation of the rights and responsibilities of the workingman. Liberal
and conservatives became engaged in a lengthy debate on how to resolve this
social question, but the policies that finally prevailed owed their initiative and
objectives to the state. The most significant of these policies was the
introduction of social insurance.

The social insurance legislation of the 1880s made social and
economic relations among individuals an object of statecraft. It was a
conscious attempt at cementing the social fabric of the industrial order, with
the interests of the state instead of the welfare of the worker as the prime
objective (Rimlinger 1971, 93).

Political entrepreneur and opportunist, the role of the “Great Manipulator”
Bismarck cannot be overlooked in any adequate explanation of Germany’s
groundbreaking social reforms. It was the conservative government of Bismarck that
presided over Germany’s landmark social reforms, not the left. As well as a response
to the societal challenges brought about by industrialization, that legislation came in
reaction to the growing influence of the left—of the working class, organized labor,
and Social Democracy. Heidenheimer (1973) has argued that Bismarck “pursued a
pre-emptive strategy” to blunt the increasing popularity of political parties of the left
by stealing their social agenda (317). Likewise, Rosenberg (1986) submits that
Bismarck promoted national social insurance as “a way that would tie workers to the
state and wean them away from the Social Democrats” (109). It was Bismarck’s
intention that the Reich government should remain under conservative influence and
control, and he did what was necessary to make that happen. The German chancellor
recognized that social insurance programs—and education policy, too—might be
utilized as instruments of state power, tools that could serve a conservative regime’s
determination to maintain control over and perpetuate the existing socioeconomic
and political order. In this regard, Roberts (1913) reports the following remarks by
Bismarck in an exchange with the historian W. H. Dawson some years after passage
of the 1880s landmark social insurance legislation: “My idea was to bribe the working
classes, or shall I say, to win them over, to regard the state as a social institution
existing for their sake and interested in their welfare.” Max Weber, a contemporary
political observer, had reservations with Bismarck’s conviction that “he could create
[in the working class] a positive attitude toward the state, and political gratitude, by
granting welfare benefits out of public funds for compulsory private funds.” Although
Weber believed “benefits for the sick, the disabled, the veterans and the aged . . . was
certainly desirable,” he considered Bismarck’s strategy “a grave political error: every
policy that ever banked on political gratitude has failed.”

Whether it was a “political error” or not, Bismarck’s welfare reforms may be
viewed as a deliberate action taken “to undercut the appeal of German Social
Democracy,” as a way “to harness the labor force . . . to keep them slogging along”
(Mitchell 1991, 47). To do so, in addition to his campaign of repression waged
against Social Democracy, Bismarck introduced social welfare legislation before

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7Elmer Roberts, Monarchical Socialism in Germany (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), 119.

political parties representing organized labor and working class interests could achieve an electoral majority and do so themselves. Data from the period support this pre-emption thesis. In the decade prior to the 1880s only about 2 percent of the industrial workforce had so far been unionized, and parties of the left were only receiving about 8 percent of the vote (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 65). So, even given that organized labor and Social Democracy were on the ascendance, the political left was clearly not in any position to win control of the government and its policy agenda. Moreover, in terms of social insurance coverage, it was only a very small portion of the German population that received benefits from Bismarck’s social reforms of the 1880s. Initially, not quite 10 percent were covered by the provisions for sickness insurance adopted in 1883, the accident insurance in 1884, and the 1889 disability and old-age pensions system (Mitchell 1991, 50).

Far more than simply the timing of the reform legislation, Bismarck and his conservative government affected the very substance and structure of the German social insurance system as it developed and has come to be institutionalized. The German welfare state that exists today speaks loudly to its origin in the 1880s. Then and now, even with the many modifications and additional provisions that have come over the years, the social insurance system would be characterized in much the same way. It is a system based on one's occupation, on the model of guild-based associations, in which employers and employees are the primary contributors and administrators, and the role of government is principally that of broker. That scheme even served as the foundation for the long-term care insurance adopted in 1994.

One can only speculate how different the German welfare state might have turned out had Bismarck not preempted the left's social agenda. What if it had been
the Social Democrats, instead, who enacted Germany’s first social welfare programs and determined the policy model? It seems likely the structure of independent and guild-based insurance associations would have similarly been utilized as the institutional foundation for the new social insurance system. That would have made sense for the head start it gave to implementation and administration. But would a Social Democratic regime have established a social welfare system that was as socially discriminating? Would it have been more egalitarian, less committed to the protection of the status quo than to ensuring a better quality of life for everyone? Would the role defined for government have been kept to that of broker, or would it have been given greater responsibilities to finance, administer and actively intervene to ensure the fairness of the social welfare system? A most interesting question is how such a social welfare policy might have affected the German education system. Would education reformers have met more success in their efforts to eliminate the class bias and expand the opportunities of the education system? Rather than the tripartite structure of differentiated schools that exists today, might German secondary education have evolved to become a system of comprehensive schools like the American?
The American Social Welfare System Today

Despite a long tradition of private assistance to the needy, the United States was late among the early industrializing nations to adopt social welfare programs.⁹ Even today the social welfare system sponsored by the state is not comprehensive, leaving the market and private insurance plans as significant alternatives to public programs. Although public expenditures for social programs are now approaching one-half of the entire federal budget, the lion’s share goes to the old-age pension system of Social Security and the health coverage of Medicare—programs that largely benefit the elderly middle class—not to actual public assistance or welfare for the needy of society. The welfare programs that the state does support are typically limited in the population they cover, minimal in the level of benefits they provide, and with eligibility that is often work-related or means-tested. Moreover, with the administration of many social welfare programs left to the states, even those that are underwritten by federal legislation—like Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Need Families (TANF), or unemployment insurance—any real national standard is absent. Eligibility for state-administered work injury and unemployment insurance benefits are normally related to an individual’s employment and earnings record. The old-age pension of the federal government’s Social Security program provides only a modest level of income, one that must be supplemented from other sources if seniors are not

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⁹Orloff and Skocpol (1984) and Skocpol (1992) contend that the Civil War pensions system was actually the U.S. government’s first social welfare program. This old-age and disability pensions system that covered veterans and their dependents ended with the passing away of the Civil War generation.
to live in a condition of poverty. Some additional help for seniors may come from the means-tested income assistance that is also available under the Social Security system, as well as to children and those who are handicapped or destitute, but that is limited. As to the area of public health, there are no provisions for universal healthcare or for long-term care. What state-sponsored medical coverage does exist is limited to seniors and those who meet the requirements of means-testing.

The Development of America's Social Welfare System

The Origins of the American Welfare State

By most scholarly accounts the United States was a laggard in the institution of a welfare state, its system of national social insurance not established until the 1930s (Marmor and Oberlander 1995). An alternative view puts the origins of the modern American welfare state much earlier, with the pensions and disabilities system for Civil War veterans and their dependents and with the social reforms of the Progressive Era (Noble 1997; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1992). Orloff and Skocpol depict the Civil War pensions system as functionally equivalent to the old-age pension and disability systems supported by other Western governments during that period. In terms of public spending, the generosity of benefits, and the proportion of citizens covered, Skocpol claims the “Civil War system of social provision in many respects exceeded what early programs of ‘workingmen’s insurance’ were giving needy old people or superannuated industrial wage earners in fledgling Western welfare states around the turn of the century” (1992, 1-2). According to Skocpol’s estimates for 1910, nearly 18 percent of all Americans age
65 and over were beneficiaries of the Civil War pensions system—28.5 percent of all senior men and almost 8 percent of all senior women (1992, 132).

As to the Progressive Era and the origins of the American welfare state, the early 1900s saw the passage of many new laws intended to promote the welfare of women and children. This included all the legislative regulations and benefits adopted at the state and national levels, including labor laws intended to protect women and children from workplace abuses and new programs to assist mothers and expectant mothers. Forty-one states passed provisions regulating the work hours of women by 1921, and several even placed prohibitions on the kinds of work occupations in which women might be employed (Noble 1997, 49). Mothers’ pension laws were enacted by 39 states between 1911 and 1919, mainly intended to benefit working class widows (Orloff and Skocpol 1984, 726). In 1921 Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Infancy and Maternity Protection Act to provide federal grants-in-aid to the states to establish clinics for infant and maternal health care. Forty-five states did so.

As Skocpol readily points out, the kind of American welfare state she describes was not like the European; it followed another path of development. Rather than a paternalist welfare state on the European model, built around social insurance and a male breadwinner, “America came close to forging a maternalist welfare state, with female-dominated public agencies implementing regulations and benefits for the good of women and their children” (1992, 2). It is in these late nineteenth and early twentieth century regulatory activities and social programs that Orloff and Skocpol argue the origins of the modern American welfare state are really to be found. It is not true “that the U.S. federal government did virtually nothing about public social
provision until the Great Depression and the New Deal of the 1930s” (Skocpol 1992, 3-4). There is certainly merit to this claim, but criticism is also due.

Orloff and Skocpol are clearly right that American government was engaged in the business of social welfare before the 1935 Social Security Act. At least by the time of the Progressive Era, an American welfare state was starting to develop. A problem is encountered, however, in linking the social policies of this nascent welfare state with the subsequent development of the modern American welfare state that emerged from the Great Depression and with the New Deal legislation of the Roosevelt administration. Marmor and Oberlander (1995) find the connection between the Civil War pension system, old age insurance, and the 1935 Social Security Act “troublesome.” Neither the public, policymakers, nor most recipients of Civil War pensions understood those benefits as social welfare, but as a reward for that generation’s sacrifice to the nation. What is most significant, “American social reformers, neither in the late nineteenth century nor later, did not take their primary inspiration for old age insurance from the Civil War program” (Marmor and Oberlander 1995, 218-9). There was not such “policy feedback” (Pierson 1993); the Civil War pension program simply did not have “legs.” Its coverage was never expanded to include other population segments or successive generations. A proposal for a publicly-funded old-age pension system failed in the state of Massachusetts in 1903, and a plan for a national pension system was rejected by the U.S. Congress in 1909 (Noble 1997, 36). The Civil War pension program finally ended with the passing away of the Civil veterans and their dependents. Not until the New Deal was legislation finally adopted for a national system of old-age and disability benefits. As for the Sheppard-Towner Act, it also did not have “legs,” did not establish an
effective political following and permanent institutional foothold. Opposed by the medical profession, this program to promote the better health care of children and expectant mothers was terminated in 1929 when Congress did not renew its funding (Noble 1997, 52). It would take until the 1960s before federal legislation was passed to provide medical care for the elderly, eligible poor, dependent children, and the disabled.

Even if the criticism is valid, that the “maternalist welfare state” was not the foundation for the modern American welfare state, I would still submit it was an important factor and building block in its development. As Pierson says, “we know that policy choices have political consequences” (1993, 597), and the Progressive Era was not a trivial period in American history. The politics and social policy decisions of the early 1900s did influence subsequent political choices and the development of the welfare state. It may not have been immediate, but the legacy of Progressive Era reforms to promote the health and general welfare of children and mothers can be seen in the Social Security, Head Start, Food Stamp, and Medicaid programs of the U.S. welfare system today. Moreover, what Skocpol identified as the “maternalist welfare state” was just a part of the American welfare state at an early stage in its evolution, not the whole thing. In fact, a good deal of other policy activity and feedback was taking place if one looks beyond the federal level and the building of a maternalist welfare state. State governments across America were engaged in other social welfare policymaking that went beyond “protecting soldiers and mothers.” A paternalist welfare state, on the European model, was also at an early stage of development. As well as old-age pensions, work-related social insurance programs were also being proposed, considered and enacted during the Progressive Era, at the
state level. The role of the American states in the making of social welfare policy was beginning to expand in a meaningful way. Indeed, lower level governments in the United States federal system were the laboratories and proving grounds for the social insurance and welfare programs that would later be adopted by the national government.

The winds of change had already begun blowing in Washington. Theodore Roosevelt, with an eye to the 1920 presidential election, announced in November 1918 a legislative plan that included provisions for old-age pensions, health care, and unemployment insurance. Constructive social reforms were necessary, he believed, in order to avoid civil violence and even revolution. Roosevelt had not taken the significance of the Bolshevik Revolution lightly; the United States was not immune from the dangers of radicalism. He had earlier warned, when he was president in 1907, “that constructive change offers the best method of avoiding destructive change; that reform is the antidote for revolution; and that social reform is not the precursor but the preventive of Socialism.” What might have been had Roosevelt been returned to the presidency in 1920, or just waged a campaign on his reform agenda, can only be speculated upon because of his untimely death in January 1919. Change was in the air, though, social welfare reform was on the policy agenda at the highest levels of the American political system. The national government would


finally see the institution of a welfare state. It was now just a matter of time and the right circumstances.

**The “Big Bang”**

What public assistance existed in the United States before the twentieth century was provided mostly by religious groups, private voluntary organizations, and local governments (Noble 1997; Trattner 1989). With the Progressive Era of American politics and the coming of the twentieth century, this began to change—first, at the state level. By the 1920s several states had adopted provisions for work injury insurance, widows' and mothers' pensions, and other means-tested retirement programs. Maryland was the first to adopt legislation for workman's compensation, in 1902, and 43 states had done so by 1920. Employees of the federal government were given such coverage in 1908. Illinois passed the first pension law for mothers with children in 1911, and 18 more states did so by 1913. Old age pensions were adopted by Montana, Nevada and Pennsylvania in 1923, and four additional states by 1927. Pensions for the blind were enacted by Ohio in 1898, Illinois in 1903, and Wisconsin in 1907 (Popple and Leighninger 1996, 244-5). Provisions for health care and unemployment insurance were also debated at the state level, but nothing of great consequence was adopted. The social policies implemented by the federal government, beginning with the New Deal in the 1930s, built upon this foundation.

With the shock of the Great Depression, initiatives for unemployment benefits were renewed and legislation was finally adopted by many states. Wisconsin was the first to do so, in 1932, with its program to be effective by 1934. Other states also...
undertook emergency relief efforts, but the scale of unemployment and economic
dislocation were too great and widespread for the states to deal independently with
the many problems of the depression in any effective way. An adequate government
response to the crisis required the far greater resources available at the federal level.
The elections of 1932 that put Franklin Roosevelt in the White House and a
Democratic majority in both Houses of the Congress signalled the electorate’s desire
and readiness for such a change and role by the federal government. Responsibility
for the public welfare and social safety nets—at least America’s notion of them—
were recognized and placed on the policymaking agenda of the national government.
Therewith, American social welfare policy underwent a transformation, and the long
debate over a federal role in public welfare was decisively ended by the social welfare
initiatives of the Roosevelt administration.

Skocpol (1987, 1992) and de Swaan (1988) are among those who call the
legislation of the New Deal and the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935 the “big bang”
in United States welfare policy. The U.S. Congress passed laws establishing federal-
state unemployment insurance, federally-supported public assistance, and a
contributory old-age pension system. Rather than bold new initiatives from the
center, however, the Roosevelt administration and Congress worked within the
framework of welfare legislation that existed already at the state level. To a great
extent, the federal government’s new commitment made possible the strengthening
and expansion of existing public assistance programs by adding its financial resources
to those of the states.

With the exception of unemployment insurance, which by 1934 had been
enacted only in the state of Wisconsin, the provisions of the Social Security
Act were not novel. They were influenced by or based upon previous or
existing federal and state statutes, such as the Sheppard-Towner and Federal Emergency Relief Acts,\(^{12}\) and numerous state widows' aid and old age pension laws. The new statute merely strengthened, expanded, and in some cases revived these practices. Furthermore, based primarily on the insurance principle rather than on the public assistance model (which the fiscally conservative F.D.R. favored), it provided "welfare" only to the needy blind, aged, and young—the unemployable, or "deserving poor" (Trattner 1989, 264-5).

The 1935 Social Security Act included both general public assistance and contributory social insurance provisions. A system of federal-state unemployment compensation was created for the jobless. A federal formula was implemented that gave employers credits against their federal tax liability for contributions to approved state unemployment programs. Federal monies were then provided for state-level administration, where insurance plans had been formulated and approved by the federal Social Security Board. The states were held responsible to administer the unemployment program, to determine the taxes on the businesses covered, the size of employee contributions, the level of benefits and the length of the benefits period. Every state met federal requirements within two years.

"Federal legislation was proposed to spur the states to pass old-age pensions" (Amenta and Carruthers 1988, 664). Twenty-eight states had already done so by the end of 1934. All were means-tested, with different benefits and funding sources. By 1939, every state had adopted some kind of old-age retirement system. From state to state, however, those pension programs differed greatly in their funding provisions, eligibility requirements and benefit levels (Amenta and Carruthers 1988, 664).

\(^{12}\) The Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) of 1933 provided over $3 billion as a grant-in-aid to the states to assist the unemployed. Responsibility for the administration of FERA funds, the forms of relief and groups covered, was left for the states and local governments to determine (Noble 1997, 70-1; Trattner 1989, 198-200, 261).
Social Security Act created a national old-age retirement system for those over sixty-five years of age—Old Age Insurance (OAI), popularly referred to as Social Security—based on work force participation and funded by employer contributions and a tax on employee wages. The national government would both collect the revenues and distribute benefits to retired workers. Congress has gradually increased its benefits and expanded those covered to include more and more kinds of employment, as well as certain individuals who are unemployed, dependent, or otherwise satisfy the criteria of means-testing. This program has become, over the years, the cornerstone of the United States welfare system.

In the area of public assistance—welfare for the needy—the Congress also built mainly upon programs that existed in the states. Most significant among these were aid for dependent children and income assistance for the disabled and elderly poor. A federal-state Old-Age Assistance (OAA) program was established for those persons not eligible for OAI benefits or requiring assistance beyond OAI benefits. A program to assist the dependent children of single-parent families was created—Aid for Dependent Children (ADC)—that was essentially a continuation of the old Civil War Widow's pension program. However, unlike the Congressional mandate that all states were to have and support unemployment-compensation systems, no similar requirement was placed on the states for public assistance. It was left for the individual states to decide if and what of these welfare programs they would support, how they would be administered, the criteria for eligibility, and the level of benefits. Federal assistance would then be provided on a matching basis with the states.

The welfare legislation of the New Deal was very far from the establishment of a comprehensive and universal social insurance system. “The part of the
population which had historically suffered from poverty remained largely untouched by the New Deal" (Guy 1995, 302). Although the basis for a nationwide social welfare system may have been established, no national standard was set for public assistance, nor an obligation by the states to support all federal welfare programs. What is more, and a glaring omission when compared with the welfare systems of other Western societies, no provision was made for health care. This was a serious shortcoming of U.S. social policy at the time of the New Deal, and it remains so today.

Over the years the Social Security Act has been amended many times to broaden its areas of coverage and groups included. The contributory old-age pension system—Social Security—has seen both a steady increase in benefits and the inclusion of many work groups—like the self-employed—not covered by the original SSA legislation. Survivors’ Insurance (SI) was established in 1939 to cover the surviving dependents of those covered by social insurance. Unemployment benefits were extended. Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled legislation was enacted in 1950, and ADC coverage was expanded and renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Disability Insurance (DI) was added in 1956 (Trattner 1989, 284). Apart from the expansion of existing social programs, however, three decades passed between the “big bang” of 1935 and the next major development in United States social policy. This came with the presidency of Lyndon Johnson and with a Democratic majority in both Houses on Congress.
The "Great Society"

Along with political and civil rights legislation, welfare reform was an important part of President Johnson's agenda to eradicate poverty and create a "Great Society." Johnson's "War on Poverty" included both a new strategy for existing public assistance programs and the expansion of federal policy into the area of health care. An improved food distribution program for the needy, the Food Stamp Act, was passed by Congress in 1964. Although states were not required to participate, the Food Stamp program effectively increased the buying power of many low-income families' food dollars in those states and local communities that opted in (Trattner 1989, 295-6). AFDC benefits were expanded, and the program was given an additional emphasis and mission—to reduce the number of those on its welfare rolls. The administration's solution for American poverty was to put the poor to work. With the exception of mothers with young children, able-bodied adult AFDC recipients who refused employment or job training could find their benefits penalized.

National health insurance had been a long time in coming. Public interest and debate can be traced back as far as the Progressive era and the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Since that time the health care discussion was renewed, and then abated, every fifteen to twenty years (Kingdon 1995, 189). Health insurance had been considered for inclusion in the 1935 Social Security Act, but it was withdrawn when the Roosevelt administration concluded it was only possible to accomplish so much social reform with a conservative Congress and "the anticipated opposition of a coalition of medical providers, employers, hospitals, and insurers . . ." (Noble 1997, 65). That judgment was borne out a decade later when President Harry Truman's call
for national health insurance met the determined opposition of Congressional conservatives—both Democratic and Republican—as well as physicians, the American Medical Association (AMA), the manufacturers of health care products, and the health insurance industry. Truman’s health care proposal finally died, never coming to a vote, even after the Democrats took back control of both houses of Congress in the 1948 elections (Noble 1997, 69).

So, it was not until the 1960s and the presidency of Lyndon Johnson that health care finally came to be part of the federal social security system, through amendments to the SSA in 1965. Changing the terms of the health care debate to something less than a national system probably helped, blunting the ability of traditional foes to mount an effective opposition. Rather than universal health care, the Johnson administration sought to implement a program of limited medical coverage for the elderly, the eligible poor, dependent children, the blind, and the disabled. This new health care system had two parts. The first was Medicaid, which provided basic health care services for the eligible needy and the elderly poor. A compulsory federal program, it was to be administered by the states and supported by the revenues from payroll deductions and federal subsidies. The other was Medicare, a voluntary contributory insurance program for senior citizens covered by Social Security that provided supplemental health care benefits, subsidized by the general revenues of the federal government.13

13A direct payroll tax on employees and employers was later added, and is in effect today.
Welfare Reform

Over the three decades following the adoption of Medicare and Medicaid, U.S. spending for health care grew at a much faster rate than that for the cost of living. From $42 billion and about 6 percent of the GDP in 1965, total public and private spending for health care rose to over $880 billion and almost 14 percent of the GDP in 1993. With the federal government accounting for 40 percent of these expenditures, health care as a category of social spending had become second in size only to Social Security— and still nearly forty million Americans were without any health insurance (McKenna 1998, 628-30; Kingdon 1995, 217). Calls for reform of the health care system were widespread, by the public and from politicians at all levels of government. Most of the concern boiled down to two issues: containment of ever-rising medical costs and access to quality care. However, aside from a general consensus that this described the health care problem—and a "crisis" for a growing number of Americans without any healthcare coverage—there was not any substantial agreement about what should be done. As a result, and despite sometimes intense public debate at the national level about the need for reform, very little was accomplished. Jimmy Carter's presidency saw high-level discussions take place between the administration, Congress, and organized labor about comprehensive health insurance, but the parties could not agree on a single proposal (Kingdon 1995, 7-8).

Health care returned to the national agenda again with the presidency of Bill Clinton. It had been an important campaign issue, along with the economy. Some forty million Americans were already without access to medical care and with the
economy in recession, many who lost their jobs also lost their healthcare benefits. As Kingdon (1995) has depicted the policymaking process, the political and problem streams had come together—and something could happen. However, and despite broad popular agreement that there was a serious and growing health care problem, the advocates of reform—within and outside government—were unable to reach any consensus on a specific health care proposal they could all support. Lacking this unity, the plan for universal healthcare coverage that was finally submitted in September 1993 by the Clinton administration met the determined and effective opposition of Congressional conservatives and a broad community of interest groups, many of the same that had earlier opposed Truman’s plan for health insurance—doctors, the AMA, the manufacturers of medical products, and insurance companies. Just like Truman’s proposal, Clinton’s plan was rebuffed by the Congress; it never even came up for a vote (Kingdon 1995, 217-21). I would argue that a recovering economy also worked to the advantage of those resisting healthcare reform. The problem certainly did not go away but, as people returned to work or found new jobs, it lost its significance and place on the active political agenda. Health care returned to the active agenda again in September 1996, prior to the national elections, when the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act became law. This legislation required insurance companies to continue their coverage of employees who had lost or changed jobs. I hardly need argue that this should largely be viewed in terms of political expediency, a gesture to the electorate, than an attempt at real reform.

By most accounts, Social Security and Medicare are considered successful social welfare programs. Social Security pensions provide seniors with a minimum
income level, saving many millions from a life of poverty. The benefits of Medicare have been twofold: improving the health of the nation’s elderly and, by covering much of the expensive cost of medical care, saving them from poverty. According to a 1999 report by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Social Security and Medicare have reduced the rate of poverty among the nation’s elderly from almost 48 percent to less than 12 percent. Social Security and Medicare are widely popular as well as successful, benefiting the middle class and even the rich. Rather than welfare, these programs are considered an entitlement by many Americans. Although both programs are subjects for reform, the primary concern with each is in ensuring its future solvency, and this is a serious budgetary problem. But it is very unlikely either program will see any major reduction in benefits, even though there will be efforts at cost containment. In fact, Medicare may even be amended to include some kind of prescription drug coverage for seniors.

The ever-rising costs of social programs is a problem that America shares with other welfare states today. Another problem is not uniquely American, but it is especially a target for welfare reform; it is about personal responsibility and it concerns means-tested public assistance programs. Means-tested programs are what many Americans consider to be the real welfare system of the United States—Food Stamps, Head Start, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program that replaced AFDC in 1996. Although these programs account for a much smaller share of the nation’s budget than Social Security and Medicare, they are far more controversial and

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generally disliked by the general public. Temporary assistance to those down on their luck is not objectionable, but not if those programs encourage welfare dependency instead of individual responsibility for one's actions, and if they are associated with the disintegration of the traditional family unit—with single-parent households and out-of-wedlock births.

President Bill Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it." Only time will tell, but the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act does appear to have remade the welfare system it had evolved since passage of the 1935 Social Security Act. It not a great exaggeration to say that the old system of social welfare was ended. Public welfare assistance as an open-ended entitlement guaranteed by the federal government came to an end. The old AFDC program was terminated and a new block grant program (TANF) established to replace it. Under TANF the federal government would provide financial support to the states for their welfare systems, with the responsibility to design and implement welfare programs delegated (devolved) to the states under federal guidelines. According to federal rules, family head-of-households receiving welfare assistance would be required to find work after two years of benefits, a lifetime limit on benefits not to exceed five years, and with work and training requirements to be made a condition of continuing eligibility. For unmarried teenage parents to receive benefits, they would be required to stay in school and live with their parents or some other adult. Food stamp eligibility was to be restricted, and targeted particularly to needy families with children.

Proponents of the 1996 legislation argued that the reforms would end welfare dependency by encouraging workforce entry, strengthen the traditional family unit,
and help to control soaring federal expenditures. Opponents believed the new system would only lead to more poverty over the longer term, especially among children, as recipients used up their lifetime limits. Only time will really tell. Still, the results have been striking.

It happened with unpredicted suddenness. In just five years, the number of people on the welfare rolls had plummeted by 48 percent nationwide. Caseloads had peaked in 1994 but now were down in every state. What was surprising was the size of the drop. The number of families on welfare had declined by more than 80 percent in Wisconsin, Idaho, Wyoming, and by more than half in twenty-three other states. There were only three states—Hawaii, Rhode Island, and New Mexico—in which the drop was less than 20 percent. The trend defied what has been described as the welfare “reverse gravity” law: rolls that go up but do not come down. 15

I would suggest there are three factors that may account for most of this change. The first is that many of the states had individually been addressing welfare reform and reducing welfare rolls since the late 1980s, and the product of their efforts was beginning to show. Second was the robust economy of the 1990s, one in which jobs were plentiful and unemployment was low. The third was the welfare reform act that the Congress passed in 1996.

Federalism played a most important role in the 1996 reforms. Laying the groundwork for the national welfare reform legislation, the states had been engaged in their own experiments with welfare reform since at least the late 1980s. As encouragement for those experiments, the Bush and Clinton White Houses had granted hundreds of waivers to federal welfare rules for the administration of joint federal-state social welfare programs, particularly regarding eligibility requirements. Wisconsin, where current Health and Human Service Secretary Tommy Thompson

15 Thomas E. Patterson, *We the People* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 481.
became governor in 1987, was a leader in these efforts. A recurring theme of state-
level experiments was twofold: reducing welfare rolls by getting welfare recipients
into the workforce, and encouraging parental responsibility. States helped with job
training, day care, and job placement. Time limits were placed on benefits eligibility.
Young and unmarried mothers were required to live with their parents or other
adults.

Any frank evaluation of the success of state and federal welfare reforms
cannot overlook the effect of a good economy as a major contributing factor. The
verdict rests with time and harder economic times; that will tell how successful the
state and national welfare reforms really were—whether welfare rolls went down
because the reforms worked or whether the number is less primarily because of a
good economy and not as a result of welfare reform, or whether welfare rolls went
down because of the time limits placed on eligibility, even though chronic
unemployment and poverty remain problems (and may even be growing worse).

The health care debate was renewed during the closing years of the Clinton
presidency and was an important issue, along with social security and education
reform, in the 2000 general elections. However, none is in the cards for any
meaningful reform at this time. One reason is that these have now become standard
issues that all politicians must address in their campaigns, and the sound bite is
typically more important than the substance of the rhetoric. Another is the absence of
any effective political coalition to drive reform in these policy areas. In the first place,
there is no agreement about what the problems are and what should be done. In the
case of education it depends largely upon who is asked. There is not a clear national
consensus about the education problem, with clearly defined causes and solutions.
upon which everyone agrees. Moreover, the implementation of remedies is a state-level task anyway. What the effective federal role can be has been grossly overstated by opportunistic politicians in their pursuit of national offices. The most that can be expected in the area of health care is some kind of limited prescription drug program for seniors as an adjunct to the Medicare program. What to do with the Social Security retirement system and about its long-term solvency will remain unresolved because it is not now an immediate problem, and the "war" on terrorism casts a very long shadow over the current political agenda. Still, it can be expected that reform of the social security, health care, and education systems will be key issues in upcoming national elections, and especially in the 2004 presidential campaign. They must be, given the increasing magnitude of the health care crisis, the rising budgetary expenditures for social programs at all levels of government, the anxiety of many younger and working Americans about the viability of a social welfare system they are called upon to financially support but receive no benefits from, and for the political clout of the elderly who are the primary beneficiaries of the nation's social welfare programs.

A Discussion of American Social Policy

There is a kernel of truth to the logic of industrialism as an explanation for the welfare state. It does describe the socioeconomic conditions most often associated with groundbreaking social welfare legislation and higher levels of state investment in social programs. But it does not help to explain when, how, who, or even if a government will actually respond. There is not a specific point that can be identified
within the process of industrialization or a particular level of socioeconomic development that can be said to automatically trigger state action.

The logic of industrialism cannot explain the United States' relatively late adoption of social welfare programs at the national level. Industrialization and urbanization were already well advanced—and the associated societal problems—long before the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. But even if the logic of industrialism cannot explain the timing, it can certainly be argued that the New Deal does represent a logical response by the national government to the difficulties of an industrial society, to problems that exceeded the capacities of lower level governments and of private and voluntary associations to remedy. What had been absent before was a catalyst that would rouse the federal government to action. That came with the Great Depression and widespread socioeconomic dislocation, with the Hoover administration's lack of success in dealing with the nation's problems, and the 1932 general elections that brought Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency and the Democratic party to national prominence. President Hoover and a Republican Congress had done and accomplished very little to address the national crisis. In fact, Hoover would have preferred to let and leave the remedy to market forces (Popple and Leighninger 1996, 246). In this sense, the outcome of the 1932 elections may be viewed as a reaction to the Hoover administration's failure to respond to the nation's problems in a manner considered acceptable by the electorate, and the New Deal legislation as the response of a new political leadership to the previous government's failure—empowered to undertake social reforms by the mandate of the national electorate. So, it was a new political leadership and a change in the partisan control of the national government that finally mattered—and greatly—for the when, who,
what and how of the state's response. It was the elections of 1932 and the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and a Democratic Congress that explains the timing and politics of welfare reform in the United States, a paradigm shift in social welfare policy, far better than the logic of industrialism.

If the reluctance of the Hoover administration to act is put aside, an interesting question still remains: given the level of activity and all the social reforms of the Progressive Era, why did it take until the 1930s for major social welfare legislation to be enacted at the national level? Noble (1997) considers the opposition of conservative groups, business interests, and a Congress "hostile" to social reform as important factors, and so was the federal structure of the American political system. Federalism "magnified the strength of conservative opposition to change while raising the costs of coordinating the movement for reform" (44-5). First, federalism made more numerous the "veto points" in the political system, the "areas of institutional vulnerability . . . in the policy process where the mobilization of opposition can thwart policy innovation" (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 7).16 Second, because the states were the building blocks of the American political system, the factories and laboratories for social reforms that might later be adopted by the national government,

federalism hurt reformers by raising the costs of successful collective action. With Congress hostile to nationalizing legislation, reformers had to mount campaigns in dozens of state legislatures or risk the backlash caused by uneven regulation. At the same time, federalism fragmented the movements for reform (Noble 1997, 45-6).

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16 A detailed treatment of "veto points" is offered by Ellen Immergut (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 57-89).
Noble also remarks that Progressive reformers might have made a “wrong turn,” a mistake, in attempting to construct a maternalist instead of a paternalist welfare state. Based on the European experience, modern welfare states first protected male workers with social insurance. Without discounting what the Progressive Era reformers accomplished in terms of promoting the welfare of women and children, it was finally a European-style paternalist welfare state that emerged from the legislation of the New Deal (Noble 1997, 50-3).

I would add a further observation, following the logic of Pierson (1993) and political conflict theory, why it took so long for America to establish its welfare state. Although Progressive era social reforms did generate policy feedback, “policy choices [did] have political consequences” (Pierson 1993, 597), those reforms seem to have been more immediately effective in mobilizing the opponents of change than those who stood to gain the most from welfare state development. No mass mobilization of the working class or of organized labor took place, to make their interests in social welfare reform known and represented; nor did a politically effective programmatic political party appear—like the social democratic parties found in Europe—to represent the interests of labor and the working class.

Although social democratic and working class mobilization theories of the political conflict school are not very useful as explanations for America’s social welfare system, they may still offer some valuable insights. First, they may be helpful in explaining why the United States has a such a hodgepodge of social programs and not a comprehensive social welfare system. Second, even without a viable social democratic movement, it cannot be assumed that the working class and labor had no part in the policymaking for social welfare. As to the first point, America does not
share with many European democracies a tradition of labor and social democratic participation in politics and government. The U.S. has never had a programmatic, labor-based, mass political party with a legislative agenda representing working class interests that could compete for and control the major policymaking organs of government, and then drive the policymaking for social welfare. Since its beginnings, the national party system has always been dominated by two major parties, both at or near the middle of the political spectrum. While the politics of the left have not been unimportant in America and to its social reforms, it was the more centrist Democratic party that controlled both the White House and the Congress when the New Deal legislation was adopted in the 1930s and the “Great Society” reforms during the 1960s. While the Democrats have been the champions of labor and working class issues during the twentieth century, at least far more than the Republican party, it has never been with a comprehensive plan for social welfare. That is because the Democratic party’s base of political support has been, and still is, too broad and diverse to reach agreement on a comprehensive plan for such a controversial program—and still maintain necessary party unity within the electoral process or as the party-in-government. Moreover, in order to build a winning electoral coalition the Democrats have been forced to compete with the other “big tent” party, the Republicans, for the votes of American moderates, the political center. Neither party can campaign on a platform too far to the left or the right and win. As a consequence, I would argue the politics of social welfare have been very much the product of compromise between right and left. Although important social legislation has been adopted with the Democrats in control of both the White House and the Congress, that policymaking has been limited by intra- and interparty politics to the art of the
possible, with legislation produced piecemeal, sometimes in spurts, but not in any integrated fashion according to the framework of some final and comprehensive plan.

Second, concerning the role played by the working class in the policymaking process for social welfare, it was largely indirect but with a powerful effect both on and within the political system. At a very critical historical juncture, working class interests were translated into votes for the Democratic party and the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, and the New Deal legislation followed. It happened again in 1964 with the electoral “mandate” given to Lyndon Johnson and a Democratic Congress. In the context of political conflict theory, the interests of the working class, its struggle against the structure and commodifying effects of capitalism, found representation and a positive response within the American political process. But it was more than just the Democratic party that had taken up the working class cause to make something happen. It was a collection of public and private individuals, groups and organizations that had been united in a temporary coalition because of their shared interest in a particular social policy outcome. That coalition would disappear when the issue that gave it life left the political agenda. These transitory policy coalitions, America’s two-party system, its electoral politics, changes in political leadership and in the partisan control of government, all together they help to explain much about the political mandates and policy initiatives of Roosevelt’s New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society. To borrow from Kingdon’s (1995) notion of the policymaking process, “windows” of policymaking opportunity were opened when

17 I would point out that this phenomenon of ever-shifting and transitory policy coalitions is not limited to social welfare. It is characteristic of American policymaking, of its political pluralism.
"compelling" social welfare problems were joined with policy solutions and political opportunity at critical and decisive moments in time—and legislative history was made before the window closed.

. . . each cluster of policy innovations was put through by coalitions of groups in touch with sets of elected legislators, coalitions that crystallized during nationally perceived "crises" widely understood to call for positive governmental solutions. But in each episode the coalitions favoring new social policies were temporary, fragile, incapable of any permanent institutionalization—and very soon undone by conservative backlashes that drew on localist plus business and other resistance to enhanced state power in the United States (Skocpol 1987, 365).

Although those temporary coalitions of socioeconomic and political forces that had formed to produce the "big bangs" of America's welfare reform may not have survived, their landmark social reforms did, even to thwart off the conservative backlashes that followed.

The role of American labor in the politics of welfare reform presents a real contrast with the experience of many European countries. American labor has never been as politically conscious and organized at the mass level, nor its many trade unions as united at the peak level. As a consequence, American labor has simply not been as influential as European in the political arena. When it comes to social policy, however, that is something not all sectors of the labor community have necessarily wanted to change—and especially its leadership. The New Deal legislation found both support and opposition in the leadership of organized labor. Taken as a whole, organized labor was clearly not a driving and supportive force behind the social reforms of the New Deal. It had been similar in Bismarck's Germany (Rimlinger 1971, 128-9). Important labor leadership, like Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), were far more concerned with what they might gain for
the working class in their negotiations with management than with any new social
insurance provisions that might be implemented by the federal government. With the
New Deal the federal government became union management's competition in the
provision of retirement and other welfare benefits for labor. In this sense, as the New
Deal represented a threat to their job security, union management's support of the
New Deal could hardly be expected to be any more than lukewarm. This was
probably not the preference of the average American worker, though, who would
have been quite comfortable with the government's intervention on their behalf and
the institution of a state-sponsored social insurance system (Heidenheimer 1973, 318-
9; Noble 1997, 39-41). This depiction of labor's role remains fairly accurate today.

Social policy in America is also a story about political institutions, national
development, a growing polity, and democratization. The evolution and growth of
the American state and its brand of federalism must figure prominently in any
explanation of its social welfare programs. The U.S. Constitution did not establish a
strong central government to dominate the affairs of the nation, but one authorized as
minimally necessary to represent the common interests of the separate states. If
anything, there was an intention by the constitutional framers to minimize an
accumulation of power by the national government that would come at the expense
of the states and their sphere of policymaking authority. However, what began as a
loose federation of rather independent states became, over time, a close union of
lesser administrative political units joined under a powerful central government.
Many issues that were naturally addressed at the local level in early America—
security, order, and the general welfare—increasingly were passed on to the
jurisdiction of larger political and administrative units as time passed, problems grew
more complex and a greater nation coalesced. In this sense, the "big bang" of the New Deal that came out of the Great Depression made dramatically clear the inability of state and local governments, private organizations and voluntary agencies to address the challenges of an increasingly interdependent society and economy. Moreover, and what is really a statement about how resourceful and effective a federal system can be, the national government did not build social policy anew but instead drew upon the experience and policies already implemented in the states. Growing inclusiveness and democratization were also significant factors in the development of the American welfare state. An electorate that has expanded to include women and minorities has had an effect on party and campaign platforms, on the composition and policy agendas of the state and federal governments. The history of social welfare policy, at both the state and national levels, is associated with the growing inclusiveness of the body politic.
The German Education System

The German Education System Today

The history of German education policy and administration since the 1870s has largely been one of decentralized organization, except for the period of Nazi rule. Today the formal authority for education resides with the German states, or Länder, as established by the 1949 Federal Constitution. Within each Land, however, the education system is subject to centralized control. Legislative and budgetary powers belong to the Land parliament. A Land cabinet or ministry post, very often the Ministry of Culture (Kultusministerium), is charged with planning, administration, teacher training and staffing. Instead of a state ministry, a larger Land may entrust supervision of the schools to regional administrative bodies that are part of the state executive and without a parliamentary counterpart. Local communities are typically

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1 Because the central government does not make and administer a single education policy for all of Germany, but that function is delegated to the states by the Federal Constitution, Germany does not have a national education system in a strictly formal sense. At the same time, and although there are certain differences in the way the education function has been implemented by the separate Länder (discussed below), it is still reasonable to speak of a German education system owing to and representing the very great similarity of education policy and institutions across the Länder. What I refer to hereafter as Germany's "education system" are those education policies and institutions that are commonly found throughout the country.
given responsibility for infrastructure maintenance and sometimes staffing (Lehmann 1994, 2476; Nevernmann and Richter 1983, 88). All Land implementations are not alike, though, and much of the variation that exists in the German education system today can be attributed to differences between Länder—to different constitutional provisions and laws covering education, to their separate educational organizations and administration, and to state-level partisan politics.

Länder control over educational affairs is not absolute, though. Over time, through constitutional amendments and with new statutes and organizations, a greater role in educational matters has been established for the federal government. The Federal Vocational Training Act of 1969 gave the federal government new legislative and administrative authority in the area of enterprise-based vocational training—the “dual system.” Under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Science, vocational training regulations for dual system students are determined through the collaborative effort of vocational schools, labor unions, and employers with the Federal Institute for Vocational Training. The federal government decides how federal monies will be directed to support private secondary and tertiary schools, as well as the stipends for students attending those institutions. It is the federal government that works out the general regulations for public service employees that are the basis for the Länder laws affecting state employees, including almost all educators from the primary through the university level. Since 1969 it has been a constitutional requirement that the Länder and federal government cooperate in the planning and financing of higher education’s expansion. In this vein, the Joint Commission of the Federal and Länder Governments for Educational Planning and Advancement of Research was established in 1970 to coordinate educational planning.
and research support among the Länder with federal government participation (Nevermann and Richter 1983, 88-91).

Today the German education system is primarily public, government-operated and tuition-free, including higher education. The private sector is nominal, accounting for only about 5 percent of all primary and secondary-level enrollments (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 482, 488). Although they are differently organized and controlled, private and religious schools are also under the general supervision and even receive funding from the state, as mandated by the Federal Constitution. The financial support of primary and secondary education is the primary responsibility of the Länder, including personnel, with infrastructure costs covered by the local community. The major share of funding for higher education also comes from the Länder but, and especially since an amendment to the federal constitution in 1969, the national government has taken a greater role in policymaking and larger responsibility for funding. The federal government covers almost three-quarters of the funding for research programs, 65 percent of financial aid to students, covers much of the cost of education-related equipment, and shares with the Länder the construction costs for physical facilities (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 499). In addition, federal monies are directed to private secondary and tertiary schools and the students attending those institutions. For students this support has taken the form of supplementary payments or loans, and for private institutions federal assistance has often covered from 70 to 90 percent of their operating budgets. This has made many private schools essentially tuition-free, just like the public schools (Gellert and Ritter 1985, 346-7; Lehmann 1994, 2476).
Public spending for education amounted to 4.1 percent of the GDP in 1990, and 8.6 percent of all government expenditures. It is important to observe that both of these spending measures are down from 1975 highs, when a period of education reform and general post-World War Two system expansion came to a close. The data show a continuous decline since 1975, when public spending for education was 5.4 percent of the GDP and 11.4 percent of total public expenditures (OECD 1993, 1995, 1997). Private spending for education began a similar decline, starting around 1985 (Lehmann 1994, 2477). Data from the 2000 time period indicate this trend has continued since reunification, with education’s share of public expenditures now at 4.8 percent (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 482).

Primary school education is compulsory for all German children, beginning at age six. All children, ages six through ten, attend common public primary schools (Grundschulen). At about age eleven, with passage to the lower secondary level of education, a selection process takes place that channels students into a differentiated system of academic and vocational programs. Students are separated into Hauptschulen (general schools), Realschulen (intermediate schools), Gymnasien (grammar schools), or the relatively new Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools). They attend these schools until age fifteen or sixteen.

Hauptschulen and, to a large extent, Realschulen are intended for students on a vocational track, those who will enter the workforce upon completion of their secondary education. Nearly two-thirds of German youth are directed along this path and, by age fifteen or sixteen, many become participants in what is known as Germany’s dual system. The dual system refers to enterprise-based vocational training, a program that combines an apprenticeship or some other company training
with part-time attendance at a state vocational school. Federal regulations govern the conditions for the company-based portion of the dual system, but there is no national standard for vocational instruction—and that is the responsibility of the Länder. As with other educational matters, there is tremendous variety in the implementation of vocational training programs from Land to Land, with many different institutional options and curricula that combine academics with vocational instruction and in-company training. There are certain types of vocational schools that are common, however. They include the part-time Berufsschule (vocational school) that is part of the dual system and the full-time Berufsfachschule that, after two years attendance and certification, qualifies students for admission to advanced trade and technical schools (Fachschulen), vocational extension schools (Berufsausbauschulen) for those already pursuing an occupation, and vocational grammar schools (Fachgymnasien) that prepare students for further studies at vocational colleges (Fachhochschulen) (OECD 1995, 276).

Realyschulen offer an intermediate secondary level curriculum that is more demanding than that of the Hauptschule. The Realschule is meant for students headed for the workforce, apprenticeships, specialized technical schools or, today, even an upper level Gymnasium for pre-university studies. The primary educational task of the Gymnasium is university preparation and, historically, it has been students who have attended a Gymnasium and possess its school-leaving certificate (the Abitur) that have gone on to state universities in the greatest number. In the eyes of many education reformers, and many average Germans as well, the Gymnasium remains today the accepted foundation of an academic career and the preferred path to the university. Although the Gymnasium has traditionally favored the elite of
German society—and still does—the gateway has been widened somewhat in recent years. Much as the result of more flexible admission requirements and "a strengthening of parental will," the proportion of secondary level students attending a Gymnasium saw an increase from only about 7 percent in 1968 to almost 30 percent by the early 1990s (Mintrop and Weiler 1994, 253). The Gesamtschule offers an alternative path to the university, although its implementation has been much limited and has varied greatly from Land to Land. At age seventeen, as well as moving on to a variety of vocational programs, students on an academic track may continue their pre-university studies in an upper secondary level Gesamtschule or Gymnasium.

German higher education is dominated by state-run or recognized institutions. There are only a few private schools. In recent years, opportunities in higher education have increased in association with those at the secondary level, with a loosening of its traditionally rigid structure of differentiated schools and the introduction of new educational alternatives at the upper secondary and tertiary levels. Although a Gymnasium education and its Abitur remains the most travelled and preferred path to a university, it is no longer the only way to the system of higher education.

Much of the debate over school reform since the 1960s has focused on the expansion of educational opportunities at the secondary level, and in particular on the introduction of the Gesamtschule, or integrated comprehensive school. Based on the American high school model, the Gesamtschule was intended as an alternative to students who would otherwise attend either a Realschule or Gymnasium. A highly politicized experiment in German education, the acceptance and success of the Gesamtschulen has depended largely on the partisan majority in each Land. Länder controlled by the more conservative Christian Democrats have tended to look with some disfavor upon the Gesamtschulen. On the other hand, in Länder where the more liberal Social Democrats have controlled the government, the Gesamtschule has become a fourth type of secondary school. In 1992, of the 500 Gesamtschulen in operation, 80 percent were in Länder governed by the SPD, with an enrollment of almost 493,000 (Theen & Wilson 2001, 181).
education. As well as widening the gateway through Gesamtschulen implementation and by making admission requirements for the Gymnasium more flexible, upward mobility has been increased for Realschulen graduates, with many new advanced vocational training programs established at the upper secondary level. Today, virtually any German student with an upper secondary level leaving certificate may enroll at some institution of higher education. Moreover, student mobility has been enhanced laterally across academic and vocational categories within the differentiated secondary system. Graduates of the dual system may return to complete their education at a full-time vocational school, and then continue on to vocational training in the higher education system. Likewise, students completing academic studies at the secondary level may qualify to continue with their studies at Fachhochschulen, vocational colleges for students seeking application-oriented education and training. Fachhochschulen have especially gained in popularity and student numbers today in Germany's expanding system of higher education (OECD 1995, 278). Since the late 1960s, state governments have established many such non-university vocational and professional programs for students who have completed secondary level academic requirements or two-year vocational high schools (Teichler 1985, 50-1).

The Development of German Education Policy

The Origins of the German School System: Pre-Imperial Germany

Most accounts of German history since the fifteenth century are dominated by that of Prussia. As well as being central to the story of German political development prior to and following unification in 1871, Prussia also exemplifies the early
development and history of German education. Prussia’s education system provided
the model upon which many other German states built their own systems (Hage,
Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 168; Heidenheimer 1997, 13-28; Thut and Adams
1964, 76). The Prussian experience also demonstrates the importance of religion and
class in the development and organization of the German education system. Its
history illustrates the growing role of government in education beginning in the late
eighteenth century, the efforts of successive political regimes to wrest control of the
education system from church and local authorities to make it an instrument of state
power for national development and societal management—to make Germans
productive workers, faithful citizens, and loyal soldiers.

Organized religion, particularly Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, has
played a prominent and lasting role in the history and development of German
education. Before the sixteenth century and the Protestant Reformation, the influence
of the Catholic Church over educational matters was preponderant and relatively
uncontested. It was a significant factor and provider of education, with schools in
many major population centers. Its principal educational interest and objectives were
rather limited, however, to the preparation of young men, mostly of noble or other
elite origins, for the clergy and public offices. It was not to educate the population at-
large, and especially not women (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, 15).

It is the Protestant Reformation that is associated with the initial expansion of
mass education opportunities in Germany. Beginning roughly at the time of the
Reformation in the sixteenth century, there came a new and unprecedented interest in

\[3\]Likewise, Prussia is recommended by Wilson (1977) as “best” to examine
the development of education policy by the Social Democratic Party (45).
the education of the common man. Literacy, at least at a basic level, came to be viewed as a public good for a growing mass of German society—useful and necessary for secular as well as religious causes. Particularly in Protestant German states there began an effort to develop the reading skills necessary to make the Christian Bible accessible to every individual. As the Protestant movement expanded, with the formation of new Lutheran churches in many German states, so did the establishment of church-run vernacular schools organized at the parish level. These new denominational schools (Bekennnisschule), operated by the church and local authorities, became the foundation for Germany’s future public education system (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 483; Thut and Adams 1964, 79-81; Wilson 1977, 39).

Although the majority of children would not attend school regularly until the nineteenth century, a vernacular education was made compulsory by a number of German principalities and states much earlier. In the Duchy of Saxony, Weimar did so in 1619 for all children between six and twelve years of age. The pressure to establish a basic education offering at the primary level was even felt in areas that were predominantly Catholic. In Bavaria, new schools and curriculums were developed that combined practical secular with religious training. Compulsory education came to Lutheran Prussia in 1716 when King Frederick William I (1713-1740) decreed that all children between the ages of five and twelve should attend school so that they might be taught to read, write, perform arithmetic tasks, and receive religious instruction. During his reign, 2,000 new schools were built (Huebener 1962, 3-4; Thut and Adams 1964, 80).

In addition to religion, class was an important factor affecting the development of the vernacular schools and the structure of the Prussian/German
education system. The vernacular school served as the institutional vehicle to separate the schooling of the lower classes from the elite. In order to satisfy compulsory attendance requirements established by the state, the great majority of lower class children aged six to twelve were enrolled in local parish vernacular schools. These schools, with upwards to 90 percent of all school-age children enrolled, came to be known as “schools for the people,” or *Volksschulen*. They were not tuition-free, however, and only the poorest parents were exempt from contributing to the *Volksschule* education of their children. Boys were taught separately from girls, except in those places where the students were so few it was not practical to split them up. The educational program of the *Volksschule* was not intended as preparation for secondary and higher education. Instead it “offered just those studies which the government thought would make the great mass of inhabitants efficient and devoted subjects.” As it involved vernacular schools, church authorities considered that purpose to be preparation for confirmation. Whatever the case, most children left the *Volksschule* and ended their formal education by age twelve or thirteen, the normal age of confirmation. Very few *Volksschule* students moved on to the secondary level, and especially those from rural areas, even in the later 1800s when the opportunities began to expand with the growing establishment of trade and vocational schools (Thut and Adams 1964, 89-90, 97; Wilson 1977, 38).

For upper class children the rules and educational opportunities were very different. When school attendance was made compulsory by King Frederick William I of Prussia in 1716, an exception was made for those who were privately schooled at home or in small groups. Clearly, it was only the youth from wealthy and privileged backgrounds that could be expected to have the benefit of private instruction. As
with the *Volksschulen*, boys and girls were typically separated; but there was a further discrimination as well. Whereas privileged young men might continue on to an elite secondary school (*Gymnasium*) and then a university following completion of their elementary education, young women could not. In the patriarchal German society, the doors to secondary and higher education were effectively closed to women until the late nineteenth century, when more and more secondary schools for women began to appear as the result of local and private efforts. These institutions represented a variety of program offerings, from upper class finishing schools to foreign language instruction and the sciences, but not until almost the twentieth century did there begin to be the kind of academic offerings for women—like those for men—that were clearly preparatory for the university. By the beginning of the 1900s the doors to higher education were also beginning to open to women in some German states (Thut and Adams 1964, 79-89, 95-6). Since that time women have effectively overcome the barriers that excluded them from secondary and higher education, and continue to make advances against gender-bias in education and society more generally.

Although there can be no question of great change since the 1800s, the influence of class and religion remain deeply rooted in German education. Even today, educational opportunities and achievement beyond the primary level tends to reflect and perpetuate the class divisions of German society. The upper classes are still disproportionately represented in the *Gymnasien* and state universities (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, 108-9; Gellert 1996, 315-7; Lingens 1998, 44; Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 489-93). Likewise, the Lutheran and Catholic churches continue to be an important force in German society, in its politics and education system. While
religious influence has diminished as the state has taken over responsibility for the education function, and public schools have come to dominate the landscape, confessional schools remain—and even receive public funding. What is more, religious instruction continues to be a curriculum staple at the elementary level in many state-supported schools. Nonetheless, the change has been dramatic. The German education system of today is far different than that of Prussia, Imperial Germany, or the Weimar Republic. In association with Germany’s ongoing political and socioeconomic development, the mission of its education system has undergone many revisions, its institutional structure has been transformed, and its opportunities greatly expanded.

By the time of the late eighteenth century—at the dawn of the industrial age and the modern administrative state—the Prussian government was showing by its actions an interest in the education system as an instrument of state power, a new and necessary object of government policy and control. But the system of church-run schools was not something the Prussian government—and later a unified German state—could simply decide to sweep aside and replace with its own organization, personnel, and curriculum. The local parish school had become the predominant and institutionalized form, the role of the church and the clergy paramount, and religious instruction was a curriculum standard. The Lutheran and Catholic churches had a vested interest in the education system, and they would compete with the state over its administration and curriculum well into the twentieth century. Out of necessity, for a long time, the Prussian and succeeding German governments were forced to cooperate and work with organized religion on educational matters, even bringing its personnel within the state’s own administrative apparatus.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, Prussian and then German governments would increasingly challenge the role and influence of organized religion in educational affairs. This was manifested in the early part of the eighteenth century by the state's "coming out" in educational affairs under Frederick William I, by a working arrangement between the state and organized religion that recognized the central role of the church in German education (Huebener 1962, 3-4). By the later part of the century it was characterized by a struggle for control of the education system between organized religion (especially Catholicism) and those who controlled the state.

During the reign of Frederick the Great (1740-1786), the *General-Landschul-Reglement* (General School Code) of 1763 made Prussian schools institutions of the state. School attendance was made mandatory for children up to thirteen years of age. There was also an attempt by the regime of Frederick the Great to involve the state in the determination of curriculum offerings and pedagogy, but little was accomplished as official control over educational affairs remained with the clergy and church officials (Huebener 1962, 4; Thut and Adams 1964; 80-1). In 1787 a new government high commission for schools (*Oberschulkollegium*) was created, a kind of "national board of education" to oversee Prussian education. An attempt to establish secular control over the Prussian education system, this effort was opposed and effectively thwarted by the new king, Frederick William II (1786-1797), who appointed high-ranking church leadership to be seated on the commission. Similarly, because organized religion continued to be so influential in educational affairs, even the new school law of the *Preussische Allgemeine Landrecht* (Prussian General Law) of 1794 was limited in its actual effect. Although this legislation made the
Volksschule was a state institution and declared the legal superiority of the Prussian state over the church in matters of education, any real change in control was minimal (Huebener 1962, 4; Thut and Adams 1964, 81).

The General Civil Code of 1794 defined the Volksschule as an institution of the state but did not consistently carry out this principle. While the civil code proclaimed that the schools were under the supervision of the state authorities, it also recognized the church’s historical ties to the schools and entrusted school supervision to the superintendents of the church dioceses and the parish clergy. The local pastors or priests inspected the schools, watched the work and personal conduct of the schoolmasters, and reported any deficiency or disorder to the civil and church authorities (Lamberti 1989, 13-4).

The government of Frederick William III (1797-1840) renewed the effort to assert state control over Prussia’s schools. In 1808 the Oberschulkollegium was replaced by a new office of education within the Ministry of the Interior. This new agency was headed by the German scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt, who served as the Prussian minister of education until 1810. During his brief tenure as education minister, von Humboldt is credited for developing the organizational plan for Prussian education, the Humboldt reforms of 1810, that have affected the structure of the German education system ever since (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, 19).

Humboldt’s plan focused on the mission of the Gymnasium, on raising its academic standards and making it the secondary-level academic institution that prepared students for university studies. Successful completion of the Gymnasium’s leaving examination, the Abitur, became a requirement for university admission. The “elitization” of the Gymnasium that came with implementation of the Humboldt reforms not only had the effect of restricting the numbers of students moving on to the university, but it also reinforced the class-bias already given to the German education system. The opportunities in upper secondary and higher education for
children of lower class backgrounds remained very limited. Young men from the
families of civil servants and Protestant clergy were disproportionately represented in
the elite secondary- and higher-level institutions of German education (Heidenheimer
1997, 13, 22, 26). There would not be a meaningful change and expansion of
educational opportunities until a period of education reform and system growth that
began around the 1890s and continued into the twentieth century.

In 1817 the education office was moved from the Interior Ministry to
department status within the Ministry of Religion, Education and Public Health, with
separate divisions for primary, secondary and higher education. Prussian “universities
were made directly responsible to the Ministry of Education” while “secondary and
elementary education were administered through subordinate levels in the Ministry of
the Interior, namely, the provinces” (Thut and Adams 1964, 85). Provincial
government was the responsibility of crown-appointed Oberpräsident and advisory
council, who were recommended for office by the Minister of Interior. Beneath this
group a subcommittee called the Schulkollegium was established whose concern was
education within the province. Most of their effort was directed to standardization at
the secondary level, with teacher training and certification, and with the
administration of uniform school-leaving or maturity examinations (Reifeprüfung)⁴
that were the gateway to university admission. The Schulkollegium was also
responsible for the training of elementary school teachers, for which it received some
financial support from the central government (Thut and Adams 1964, 85).

⁴Today, the school-leaving examination for secondary level academic schools
is known as the Abitur.
While provincial and regional bodies were officially responsible for elementary education, the real support and administration of the primary schools took place locally, in school districts (Gemeinden) representing a parish or village, and in Kreise, administrative bodies that included a number of Gemeinden within a given area. The primary function of Kreise was to inspect the elementary schools within their jurisdiction. It was typical that the superintendent who presided over the Kreis and its school inspectors (Kreisschulinspectoren) were members of the clergy. The Prussian central government required all landowners and householders within a Gemeinde to be part of a school association (Schulverein) responsible to raise the taxes necessary to fund the local elementary schools, and that a special committee be assigned to oversee school operations.

Such a committee was called a Schulvorstand in rural areas, and a Schulkommission or Schuldeputation in urban districts that maintained several schools. In such school committees, the local clergy enjoyed privileged status. Indeed, only the clergy were permitted to supervise the instructional programs, including the deportment of the teachers. Lay members were permitted to look after the buildings, equipment, and other "external" matters (Thut and Adams 1964, 87).

Although the Prussian government began to implement its own education policy through a working arrangement with organized religion—one that recognized its central role in German education and utilized its organization, facilities and personnel—its final objective was clearly that the government should be in control of the school system. It was a most pragmatic approach; it was how the government had to begin if it wanted to enter the arena and become a real player in German education. It was the clay and foundation with which the government had to work. It also made much sense politically. For the state to enter the education arena by
working with the existing education system would not arouse as much resistance locally and by the Lutheran and Catholic churches.

At the beginning, the government limited its activities to increasing the number and quality of the schools; but after gaining acceptance as the final authority in educational matters, it gradually redirected the schools to serve national rather than religious ends. The single, most effective device used to achieve this transformation was the assumption of complete authority over the training, appointment, payment, and promotion of the teachers. Secondary school teachers, at least those appointed to the Gymnasien, were trained in state-controlled universities; elementary teachers in the state-operated teacher seminaries. As the government became more reactionary and autocratic, particularly under Bismarck, the curricula and operation of the teachers' seminaries were so minutely controlled that the elementary school teachers became not merely instruments for the regimentation of children, but also effective propaganda agents among their parents. As state institutions the Gymnasien and universities came under equally stringent controls. Municipalities lost their freedom to operate secondary schools, and many such schools were no longer permitted to be known as Gymnasien (Thut and Adams 1964, 87-8).

The Prussian government sought to control curriculum content at the primary level, in the Volksschulen, largely by overseeing the selection, training, and supervision of elementary school teachers. All schools—public and private, publicly-funded or not—were subject to inspection by state officials (Kreisschulinspectoren) to determine their compliance with curriculum objectives (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 164-5; Thut and Adams 1964, 89). The realization of state objectives was limited, however, because it was very often members of the clergy that the state entrusted to administer and inspect state-supported schools. Not until the Weimar period was the government finally able to abolish superintendence of local schools by the clergy.5

5 As late as 1918, two-thirds of Prussia's state school inspectors were members of the clergy (Wilson 1977, 39).
At the secondary level the Prussian government gave its attention first to the Gymnasium, the upper-class school of choice. An institution whose high tuition made it affordable only to the wealthy and privileged in Prussian society, a Gymnasium education was the gateway to higher education, the civil service, military commissions, to better jobs and greater socioeconomic opportunities in general. The Ministry of Education focused its efforts both on strengthening the Gymnasium and bringing it under state control. Among its objectives the Ministry targeted curriculum standardization, teacher certification procedures, Gymnasium accreditation by the state, and uniform school-leaving examinations with certificates (the Abitur) that entitled university admission. Only a select number of secondary institutions met the standards set by the state-set accreditation criteria to be certified as Gymnasien. These were mainly the exclusive Latin grammar schools, the high tuition institutions of Germany’s elite that included the study of classical languages and the humanities.

By raising the standards of academic secondary schools, the Prussians channeled the less able students into other institutions. Subsequently, the flow of students from the Gymnasium to the university was narrowed, with the consequence that the proportion of University students to their age group was reduced to the point that the ratio prevalent in the 1820s was not reached again until several generations later, in the 1890s (Heidenheimer 1997, 13).

Greater in number were the municipal and church schools not receiving Gymnasien accreditation. Many of these secondary schools came to be known as Realschulen (Thut and Adams 1964, 93). An increase in Realschulen-type institutions accompanied industrial and commercial development, and an emerging and affluent middle class. Realschulen were a response to the demand for a

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6 These are known as the Humboldt reforms of 1810, named after Baron Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian minister of education from 1808-1810.
secondary curriculum that prepared young people for careers in business and industry, not the university. A third form of emerging secondary school type may also be differentiated, an upper-level Volksschule, known today as the Hauptschule. Offering vocationally-oriented studies that were less demanding than the Realschule, this third kind of school was intended for students from the lower classes who would enter the workforce upon completion of their secondary education. This class-based tripartite structure of differentiated secondary level education would continue to evolve over the nineteenth century, coming to characterize the education system of both Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. With some variation from Land to Land, the same differentiated system of secondary-level curriculum offerings and school forms continue to exist today.

*Education in Imperial Germany, 1870-1918*

Germany’s unification in 1871 did not see great changes in the field of education. Dominated by the leadership and politics of Prussia, Imperial Germany tended to reflect Prussian interests and perpetuate its sociopolitical order. As it affected education this was not a particular problem. Prussia accounted for almost two-thirds of Germany’s entire population and a similar proportion of school-age Germans. Therefore, the education for two-thirds of Germany’s population was already supervised by Prussia’s Education Ministry. Moreover, Prussia’s education system had provided a model much copied by the other German states. It followed that the institutions and organization of education were much like Prussia’s throughout the Reich (Heidenheimer 1997, 27; Thut and Adams 1964, 76, 99).
The Reich Constitution of 1871 did not make education policy a responsibility of the national government; it was to be a *Land* function. Therefore, no great central bureaucracy was established to make and administer a uniform education policy throughout the new German state. A body called the Reich School Commission was created, but its function was to determine the level of educational achievement required to shorten a male’s period of military obligation to the state. In fact, little changed and the prerogative for education policy remained with provincial, district, and local authorities. In most areas of Germany, the role of organized religion and the clergy remained paramount despite increasing state-level administration. The institutional structures, administration, and the curricula of German schools reflected continuing influence of organized religion. Church schools remained the most common institutional form at the primary level, and religious training was a curriculum standard throughout the land. The Prussian Education Law of 1906 even recognized the confessional school as the institutional norm. At that time, only 900 of Prussia’s 37,761 elementary schools were not denominational. There was not much space for secular schools (*Weltliche Schulen*) or curricula (Wilson 1977, 37-9).

Socioeconomic and political privilege continued to be protected by an education system that mirrored and perpetuated the class divisions of society (Wehler 1993, 120-1). Indeed, class differences were institutionalized at the secondary level by restricting *Gymnasium* access—the gateway to higher education and social mobility—to the wealthy and privileged. Although primary education was made tuition-free in 1883 within Germany, and local governments (with limited central government support) even covered most of the student fees and expenses for private and religious schools, secondary and higher education opportunities remained far
more limited, with high student fees charged well into the twentieth century (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 159-60). It was an education system that taught students to revere God, love the Fatherland, and appreciate the existing socioeconomic and political order as the best for both the individual and the community. The government was not wholly successful in establishing its authority and control over educational affairs, however; far from it. For many years prior to unification political opposition had been rising, particularly on the left, that would greatly influence the politics and social policy of Imperial Germany under Chancellor Bismarck. There was also not a standard implementation for educational organization, administration, facilities and curriculums—under state control—within Prussia, let alone the Reich. Education was, and remained—particularly at the primary and secondary levels—very much a local affair subject to religious influences.

The degree of autonomy left to the provinces, districts and localities meant that there were far more education systems than there were states. Differences existed not only between Prussia and Bavaria, but also between urban and rural areas, wealthy districts and poor, not to mention the complications and variations arising from the distribution of religious groups within an administrative division. There was no typical German elementary school. The Volksschule might be an interdenominational, eight-class school with approaching one thousand pupils, or it might be a single schoolroom where the local minister or priest taught children of all ages together, provided that they were all Protestant or all Catholic. As for secondary institutions, one estimate is that thirty-seven varieties were to be found, ranging from the Gymnasium through the Realschule to the continuation and middle schools.

The local variations, important though they were, should not overshadow the fact that education in Wilhelmine Germany did reflect the political and social structure of the Reich, i.e., it was above all elitist. Education was not organized as a single, integrated system in which the pupil proceeded naturally from the elementary to the secondary level. Instead, elementary and secondary schools provided different types of education designed, one is tempted to say, for different “types” of people. . . . the cost of secondary education effectively banished the lower classes to the Volksschule. Only an essentially predetermined, privileged stratum could expect to benefit from secondary education (Wilson 1977, 38).
The significance of organized religion in educational affairs, and German politics more generally, was not lost on Bismarck. The *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle) that began soon after German unification saw Bismarck and his Liberal allies target political Catholicism as a threat to the unity of the new Reich. Anti-Catholicism was a most convenient foil for Bismarck’s political machinations, to rally the Protestant majority to his cause. So was Social Democracy, but Catholicism and Papal authority were particularly attacked as a rival to the secular authority of the new state. The Catholic Center party was declared an “enemy” of the Empire (Wehler 1993, 90-4). In addition, “the state once again made it clear that the schools belong to it, and that the churches, specifically their local clergy, were merely commissioned by the state to superintend the schools” (Nevermann and Richter 1983, 85).

The *Kulturkampf*, Otto von Bismarck’s attack on political Catholicism as a threat to national unity, was sparked by a proposal to abolish all church supervision of schools, both Catholic and Protestant; however, the *Kulturkampf* reflected as well a general liberal unease about the role of Catholicism within the newly united Reich. In this new era of nationalism, secularism, and opposition to restraints on individual freedom, the Catholic church seemed to many liberals a natural enemy, an expression of reaction and an agent of hostility to progressive change. . . .

For its part, the Catholic population of Germany, especially in the west and south, remained largely unreconciled to Protestant domination of politics, the economy, and society. . . .

Although some nationalistic liberals hailed the *Kulturkampf* as a continuation of the ancient struggle between papacy and empire, by the mid-1870s many other Germans worried that the anti-Catholic campaign had become counterproductive. Certainly, the strength of the Catholic church had not been broken in Germany (it was, in fact, getting stronger), and the emperor, crown prince, and Conservative party had all lined up against Bismarck on this issue. Never one characterized by self-delusion, Bismarck thus resolved to cut his losses. With the death of the stubborn Pope Pius IX in early 1878 and the election of the conciliatory Leo XIII as his successor, Bismarck succeeded in disengaging himself and abandoning the *Kulturkampf*. Unfortunately, this controversial political campaign had resulted only in a deepening of confessional divisions in Germany” (Fritz 1985, 415).
The Kulturkampf aside, it may be argued that Bismarck had no choice but to challenge church authority—Protestant as well as Catholic—if he wanted to establish the supremacy of the secular Reich government over German affairs. In the long run it presented something of a paradox, however. On the one hand, religion's continuing influence in government and education represented a challenge to the secular authority of the state. This was especially a problem for those politicians who saw the education system as an important instrument of state power, of societal management. On the other hand, organized religion was a conservative force in German politics. It was unlikely to challenge—and probably support—state policies intended to maintain the existing socioeconomic and political order. Acknowledgement by the Reich political leadership that religion would continue to play a very significant role in German educational affairs is shown in a May 1, 1889 decree by the Kaiser. At the same time, it reflects his determination that the education system should serve state interests. He emphasized the importance of the education system and religious training in molding a loyal citizenry, particularly one that was resistant to the ideas of a rising political left (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 164; Wilson 1977, 39).

Although not new to its “enemies list,” Social Democracy was the next target of the Reich's Kulturkampf (Wehler 1993, 102).

[The Kaiser's decree] was designed to remind the schools of their important role in combating the spread of socialist and communist ideas. They were to aim to create in their pupils reverence for God and love of the Fatherland and to convince them that “the teachings of Social Democracy not only contradict Divine commands and Christian morals, but are, moreover, impractical and in their consequences destructive alike to the individual and community” (Wilson 1977, 40).

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) was chief among the political groups and interests critical of the Reich government and its policies, particularly its social
welfare programs and the class-based education system over which the church had so much influence. These were consistent themes of the SPD from its formation in 1875 and throughout the Weimar period. As it developed, the SPD’s education program had three primary objectives. First was a unified school system (Einheitsschule) that was class-blind, cost-free, and standardized throughout Germany. School attendance was to be compulsory at the primary level. Second was the secularization of the unified school system (Weltlichkeit)—the end of denominational (confessional) schools and religious instruction. Third was the development of the Arbeitsschule—postprimary level curricula that included practical manual and technical skills and work experience—schools that elevated work-related training and education to the same status as the traditional academic. Moreover, secondary and higher education would be cost-free, with advancement to be determined by ability (Wilson 1977, 40-5).

As an opposition party in the Reichstag prior to the World War I, none of these SPD education goals were realized. However, and probably in some measure due to increasing SPD influence, the Imperial period was an important one in the evolution of German education policy and the expansion of educational opportunities. There were other very important factors, too. Among those was Germany’s industrialization, which had started to accelerate in the 1860s. In addition to generating its own demand for a more educated workforce, industrialization had aroused working class consciousness, and therewith a growing source of demand for educational opportunities as well as impetus for the Social Democratic movement. Another source of demand was the German Imperial state and its bureaucratization.
The desirability of government employment heightened the demand for higher education credentials (Heidenheimer 1993, 197).

Educational expenditures and opportunities began a phase of unprecedented expansion in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, which continued until the First World War. There was a great increase in male enrollments at the secondary level, and particularly of middle class youth. New opportunities for technical training also became available. During this period and into the Weimar years what is known today as the “dual system,” part-time vocational schooling combined with workplace training, became firmly established as a core component the German education system. Women also benefitted, as new academic opportunities at the secondary level opened for them in Prussia and other German states, even including a few Gymnasien. More liberal states even admitted women to universities (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 178; Thut and Adams 1964, 100-1). A less auspicious product of the German education system’s expansion, though, was the institutionalization of a class-biased tripartite system of differentiated schools. At a series of German educational conferences held in the late nineteenth century, “the so-called school reforms of 1892 and 1900 were derived [that] defined three parallel types of secondary schools” (Thut and Adams 1964, 100). Though they have been subject to various reforms over the years that have tended to reduce their class bias, those school types remain to this day as the Gymnasien, Realschulen, and Hauptschulen (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, 71).
Education in Weimar Germany, 1919-1933

With the end of World War One and the collapse of the Imperial German government in November 1918, the SPD was finally given an opportunity to leave its opposition benches and participate in government—to make and implement policy according to its program objectives. Indeed, the declaration of a new German Republic and the National Assembly elections scheduled for January 1919 seemed to prepare the way for a turning point in German social and education policy. But, after winning only 185 of 421 parliamentary seats, the SPD was forced to form a coalition government with the German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Catholic Center Party, and neither party was interested in major reform. In fact, for the Center party a coalition government with the SPD actually represented an opportunity to defend Catholic interests and prevent the SPD from undertaking its reform agenda.

Regarded a bulwark against a renewed *Kulturkampf* by many Catholics, the Center party had also made very clear its opposition to the program of the Social Democrats during the campaign for the National Assembly. The Center party championed religious instruction as a curriculum standard and ardently opposed the establishment of non-denominational common schools that would threaten the predominance of confessional schools in the German education system. Thus, in the final analysis, it was the politics of necessity and compromise required by coalition government that brought the SPD to forego any immediate hopes of implementing its reform agenda, and leave to trust that the democratic process would someday bring the desired

7 The DDP left the government in June 1919 over a dispute about the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
policy changes (Fritz 1985; 416; Wilson 1977, 46-7). There was some justification
for such patience, however, as the attitude of many toward education reform was
undergoing change.

... the war and revolution had brought some benefits for the SPD's position. Most parties, at the foundation of the democratic republic, were prepared to accept the idea of the "Soziale Einheitsschule," i.e., the ending of educational divisions based on class and wealth. Moreover, it became clear in the very early stages of the debates on the Constitution that an extension of the Reich's authority into the field of education was no longer a desire unique to the left. . . .

The question was no longer whether the central government should intervene in education, but to what end it should do so, and this was an issue on which the government parties—the SPD, DDP and Center—could never reach agreement in principle. The SPD still stood for secular, public schools; the Center would never sacrifice confessional schools in which R.I. [religious instruction] was an integral part of the curriculum; and between the two the DDP hovered uneasily, often appearing divided with itself, but generally favoring an interdenominational school in which some form of R.I. would be taught. The result of this situation was a prolonged and complex battle. . . . It ended in the dubious achievement of the Weimar School Compromise, the core of which was translated into Article 146 of the Constitution (Wilson 1977, 47-8).

The Weimar Constitution foresaw a greater role for the central government in education policy, a sharing of responsibility with the states and local authorities. It also established the legal basis for a unified German school system. Article 146 specified that "the public education system is to form an integral whole. Intermediate and higher education are to be based on a first school common to all." Article 147 went further to speak of a unified public education system in which private and religious elementary schools would be the exception, not the rule. Secular schools were to be recognized on a par with denominational and interdenominational schools, with official preference given to common over confessional schools.

Implementation of the Constitution's education provisions met only limited success, however, as did the SPD's program for education reforms. Real
administration and control of German education remained with the individual states, and denominational schools continued to play a predominant role. Moreover, Social Democratic participation in government had little or no important impact on education expenditures by the central government. In fact, instead of increasing the funds available to support expansion of the education system and to match the growing enrollments of the period, the SPD-led coalition was more concerned with the issue of equality (Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989, 178-9).

Nonetheless, the Weimar period did see the beginnings of reform and institutional restructuring of the German education system. Although it fell short of establishing the secular Einheitsschule, the Grundschule Law of April 28, 1920 provided for a common four-year elementary school that would bring together the children of all classes. Implementation of the law would have the effect of abolishing private primary-level institutions and make the Volkschule of the lower classes part of a unified school system. Debate was also undertaken on legislation that would define the basis of the relationship between school and church—on the propriety of religious instruction and the specific status of denominational, interdenominational and secular institutions within the German school system. In January 1922 an SPD-drafted compromise bill was introduced in the Reichstag that would have made interdenominational schools the norm. This measure went nowhere. Many rank-and-file SPD deputies objected to what they saw as a sell-out and effective victory of the church school over the secular. Members of the Center Party—along with other conservative religious interests—opposed the bill, resorting to their fundamental position that the confessional school should remain the predominant form. Unable to find any compromise acceptable to the competing parties, the SPD proposal was
abandoned in early 1924 and, with it, the period of SPD-led reform effectively ended (Wilson 1977, 48-50). The political forces favoring an education system dominated by confessional schools were not yet through, though.

In January 1927 a new conservative Center-led coalition government was formed that included the Catholic Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), the conservative Nationalist Party (DNVP) and the moderately liberal German People’s Party (DVP). That July, with the Reichstag adjourned, draft legislation was made public that would recognize the common Grundschule and denominational schools as equals, and remove the preferential status given to common schools by the Constitution. Secretly prepared, this school measure was mostly a Center party product. As proposed, the law would have favored confessional schools by permitting their expansion into areas previously restricted to common schools, while raising legal obstacles to the establishment of other types of schools. Passage of this legislation was blocked in late 1927 and early 1928 by effective liberal opposition, from within and without the government coalition, and for the unwillingness of the competing parties to compromise their positions on the status of common and confessional schools within the German education system (Fritz 1985, 421-8).

Wilson (1977) concludes that the failure of education reform is probably reflective of the greater failure of democratic government in the Weimar Germany. While the SPD demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and compromise its education objectives in the interest of democracy and a greater collective good, the other parties willing to join with the Social Democrats were too few. In particular, the Center Party seems to have cooperated with the SPD only out of its determination to protect denominational schools and religious instruction from...
secularization, and the Weimar Constitution allowed them to avoid a compromise of their basic position. “Since Article 174 guaranteed the perpetuation of the status quo—denominationally divided schools throughout the greater part of the Reich—if a Reich School Law was not passed, the Center Party was able to indulge in an all-or-nothing policy” (Wilson 1977, 51).

Weimar Germany was all but finished by 1928; the writing was on the wall. The great national experiment with democracy and parliamentary politics was nearly over. With the demise of Weimar, any further attempts at school reform were also at an end. The economic hardships and socio-political turmoil brought on by the Great Depression and the rise of National Socialism made this end certain, and the movement for education reform would remain derailed until after the Second World War.

**Education in the Third Reich, 1933-1945**

Although much control was left in the hands of local authorities, the Nazis centralized control over the German school system in 1938, making education a function and instrument of the national government. A National Ministry of Education and Youth Welfare was established to determine curriculums, texts, and administrative procedures. German teachers were made state officials and were given little choice but to become members of National Socialist organizations (Huebener 1962, 18). Organizationally, the *Mittelschule* (secondary school) with its commercial and vocational training focus was kept part of the school system. But the *Gymnasium* did not fare as well. Almost three-quarters of the students leaving *Gymnasium* went on to attend a *Deutsche Oberschule* (German secondary school), schools where...
science and German literature, history and art were emphasized instead of the classic education offered by the traditional Gymnasium. The Nazis also established the Adolf Hitler Schule and the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalt (National Socialist Training Institute) to prepare German youth for positions of leadership in the Third Reich (Huebener 1962, 16-20).

The centralized school system of the Third Reich collapsed with Germany’s defeat in World War II. The nation’s schools were shut down by the occupation forces of the Allies. The timing and conditions for the reopening of Germany’s schools was in their hands.

Reconstruction of the German Education System After World War Two

The Soviet Union quickly replaced a vanquished and devastated Germany as the focus of Western concerns and security interests in the closing days of the Second World War. With the outlines of the new Cold War conflict already taking shape, the victorious Western powers determined it was in their interest to rebuild and rehabilitate their occupation zones as quickly as possible, to make that part of postwar Germany a respected and contributing member of the West European community. A revitalized West German state—one with a functioning and de-Nazified government, a strong economy and a new military establishment—would be a critical member of the new Western political and military alliance that was pitted against a Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. This was the first order of business for the Allies in Germany’s postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. The education system was also to be addressed, but the objectives were less ambitious.
With the Western powers more absorbed by the task of German reconstruction as it most affected the emerging East-West conflict—politically, economically, and militarily—education reform was not high on the agenda. Although there were limited attempts by the Allies in the early postwar years to encourage the restructuring of German primary and secondary education on the model of America's integrated primary-secondary system with its comprehensive school structure, that campaign was largely ineffective and mostly abandoned by the early 1950s. In large measure this is because the Western allies had decided upon an expedient course for West Germany's reconstruction. They chose not to undertake a complete remaking of German society but instead to de-Nazify and rebuild, as it was practical, upon previous foundations. With the Cold War already looming on the horizon, it was realpolitik. While it was certainly desirable to instruct young Germans in democratic values as part of the reconstruction process, creating a new education system to do so was not; nor was it considered necessary. The German education system prior to the period of Nazi rule had not been that much different than others in Europe, so its restoration with de-Nazification and curriculum changes might be acceptable. This is exactly what happened when the responsibility for education was returned to the Länder by the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), the constitution that established the German Federal Republic (FRG) in 1949. With few exceptions, the tripartite system of differentiated schools of the Weimar period was reestablished

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8 In 1947, Directive No. 54 of the Allied Control Council offered guidelines for the Länder to follow in rebuilding their school systems. Among these recommendations were an end to discrimination based on social class or financial resources, the elimination of tuition fees, the introduction of democratic principles as a core curriculum element, and the establishment of comprehensive, unified school systems (Thut and Adams 1964, 105-6).
(Huebener 1962, 23; Merritt 1995, 270-90). As a consequence, education reform was effectively put on the back burner until a later time.

The Grundgesetz made official the return to the education policies and system of the Weimar period and before. Control of education was once again made the responsibility of the Länder. Thus, there would be no coordination of education policy in the West German state unless it was by the combined action and cooperation of the eleven Länder.9 Already in 1948, though, a positive step in this direction was taken with the establishment of the Permanent Conference of Ministers of Culture (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister). Today known by the acronym KMK (Kultusminister Konferenz), this voluntary working association was organized to help ensure a basic level of uniformity among the school systems of the eleven Länder and to represent their collective education interests with a single voice before the federal government. Despite operating on the principle of unanimity, and though its resolutions are non-binding on the Länder, the Conference has proven fairly effective in accomplishing that mission. It has adopted resolutions including such

9The constitutional engineering of the German federal state made a national education policy or education reforms undertaken at a national level virtually impossible. First, education was made a Land function. Second, the Basic Law stipulates that approval by the upper house of the German federal parliament, the Bundesrat, is required for all legislation that would directly affect the Länder. This applies to almost all education policy, over which the Länder already have nearly autonomous constitutional authority. The Bundesrat represents and is directly responsible to the Land governments, its members appointed—not elected—by the separate Länder governments. Bundesrat appointees are typically high-level Land politicians, very often Land ministers, and all are normally from the same party. Each Land delegation must vote as a block, not as individuals, according to the instructions of their Land government. This gives the Länder, through the Bundesrat, considerable influence in the national policymaking process and, effectively, an absolute veto over any federal legislation affecting the Länder.
items as the length of compulsory school attendance, the basic structure of the education system, core curriculum requirements, the school transfer process, and standards for promotions and upper secondary school leaving-examinations like the Abitur that entitle university admission (Nevermann and Richter 1983, 91). It has been less successful, however, in finding common ground among the Länder for education reforms.

A most important Länder accord, one that reflected resistance to education reform and the expansion of educational opportunities in the first decade after the Second World War, was the 1955 Düsseldorf Agreement. This pact affirmed the continuing commitment of the Länder to the traditional differentiated structure of primary and secondary schools, one wherein the Gymnasium would be the educational institution recognized at the secondary level that qualified students for university admission. While it did not put a halt to or prohibit Länder from undertaking any school reforms or experimentation, the Düsseldorf Agreement had the effect of limiting the scope of such activities to those which conformed to the differentiated structure of institutions it described as the standard (Baumert 1983a, 196; Baumert and Raschert 1983, 107-8). This restriction would remain until it was reversed by the Länder’s Hamburg Agreement of 1964, at the onset of a period of education reform.

Although it took until the mid-sixties before sufficient momentum would gather to drive wide-scale education reform, the nearly two decades following the Second World War were not without some very important accomplishments in German education. The restoration of the pre-Nazi tripartite education system, which had been part of the overall postwar reconstruction effort, had been completed. The
shortage of qualified faculty and staff that the war had produced was no longer a problem. There were many new schools to replace those destroyed by the war, with greater capacity at the secondary level than ever before—albeit through those kinds of institutions that conformed to the structure of differentiated schools stipulated by the Düsseldorf Agreement. Education was fully back in business throughout West Germany. It was an education system with a solid foundation, one that could both support further expansion and withstand experimentation with its basic structure (Baumert and Raschert 1983, 107-8). That time finally came in the mid-1960s, when a policymaking window opened for education.

**Education Reform in the Federal Republic**

With the major tasks of Germany’s reconstruction at a finish and the tripartite system of schools restored, the way was readied for new education reforms and expansion. Education issues were given a much higher priority on the public agenda, and received the benefit of the growing government revenues that came with Germany’s new prosperity. Support was widespread, from the left to the right on the political spectrum—from liberal SPD reformers who considered the broadening of educational opportunities a basic issue of citizen equality and civil rights, a growing middle class that wanted greater options in secondary and higher education, to conservative Christian Democrats who regarded educational investment and excellence critical to Germany’s continued economic growth and development (Katzenstein 1987, 304).

Arguments for overall expansion of education, but especially of higher education, at first stressed the significance of maintaining and improving the Federal Republic’s scientific and technological potential vis-à-vis Western and
socialist industrial competitors (late fifties/early sixties). These arguments were soon generalized and supplemented by emphasis on the school’s role in the socially expanded definition of citizenship. The improvement of equality of opportunity for groups hitherto deprived of their full citizenship in this extended sense (children of workers, Catholics, segments of the rural population, girls), was sought through the introduction of pre-school programs, through extending compulsory education and lobbying for the comprehensive school, and, lastly, through the opening up of the formerly exclusive Realschule, Gymnasium, and university (Naumann and Pfeffer 1983, 76).

The 1964 Hamburg Agreement signalled the start of an intense period of education reform and expansion that would last less than ten years. This Länder pact effectively reversed the Düsseldorf Agreement’s prohibition against school experimentation that was contrary to the traditional tripartite structure of primary and secondary education. With the door opened, new education programs and reforms were launched that saw increased Realschulen and Gymnasien enrollments, experimentation with the comprehensive school model, and greater opportunities at the university level.

In order to promote and coordinate a national discussion and make recommendations for the reform and future expansion of the German education system, the Länder and federal governments created the German Education Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat) in 1965. Comprised of important state and national figures, education administrators and academics, the Council was to address the future development and reform of the differentiated primary and secondary system. The findings and proposals of the Education Council were published in its 1970 “Structural Plan for the Educational System” (Strukturplan für das Bildungswesen, Strukturplan), a long-term plan calling for the fundamental restructuring of the education system from preschool through the secondary level. “According to the
plan, the vertically divided secondary education system with its three types of school, and the separation of the upper level of the Gymnasium with its general education from the vocational schools, were to be replaced by unitary secondary levels I and II" (Baumert and Raschert 1983, 112-3). What the Strukturplan proposed went far beyond reform of the existing system; it was revolutionary. The old education structure would essentially be torn down, the institutions of the traditional class-biased tripartite system eliminated, and a new German education system rebuilt upon the foundation of a classless comprehensive school. To realize such an objective would have been difficult enough without opposition, but it was also met by the stern resistance of conservative CDU politicians and others opposed to such dramatic change.

The key to the success of the restructuring plan was the implementation of new comprehensive schools, or Gesamtschulen. But the Strukturplan made no long-term commitment to these comprehensive schools—for or against—beyond experimentation. In 1969 the German Education Council had recommended there be no less than 40 experiments with comprehensive schools throughout Germany, and during that same year the Permanent Conference of Länder Ministers of Culture had agreed to an experimental program that would involve two types of comprehensive school, integrated and cooperative. The integrated form of comprehensive school (integrierte Gesamtschule) would eliminate the tripartite structure of differentiated secondary schools with its implementation. All students would attend a single school that merged the separate curricula of the Gymnasium, Realschule, and Hauptschule into a single curriculum combining both required and elective courses. The cooperative Gesamtschule would preserve the traditional tripartite curricular
structure, but within a single building, and make easier the process of student transfer from one school type to another (Baumert 1983b, 218).

The agreement by the Länder to experiment with integrated and cooperative forms of the comprehensive schools was a political compromise. For real education reform, meaningful expansion of the opportunities in secondary and higher education, the widespread introduction and acceptance of the integrierte Gesamtschule was key. Its implementation would widen the gateway and opportunities in secondary level academic studies, and then in higher education. The greatest support for the integrated comprehensive school came from the SPD and liberal education reformers. The cooperative comprehensive school was offered as an alternative, the fallback position of those who opposed restructuring the traditional three-track structure of German secondary education with implementation of the integrierte Gesamtschule. It was advocated by the CDU and conservative education reformers, those who wanted only very little or no real education reform.

Education reform was a major subject of partisan debate at the national level during the 1960s. It was a pivotal issue in the campaign of the Social Democrats to win control of the Bundestag. “They adopted educational reform issues as one of the keys to mobilizing additional groups of supporters and advocated a constitutional change to enhance the Federation’s say on education policy” (Heidenheimer 1997, 75). At the center of the debate over education reform was the introduction of the Gesamtschule to replace the existing tripartite system of secondary schools. When the 1969 national elections brought the Social Democrats to power in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), replacing the Grand Coalition of the CDU and SPD, it gave the forces of reform added momentum. It was the first time in West
German history that the CDU found itself on the benches of the opposition.

Heidenheimer (1993) has written that this “change in party control of the national government was significantly related to change in education policy. When the Social Democrats came to power under Willy Brandt in 1969, education reform was near the top of their agenda” (202). High on the list for reform was the differentiated school system, to overcome its class-bias and the restrictions it placed on lower- and middle class opportunities in secondary and then higher education. Central to the SPD’s reform plan was the introduction of the integrated comprehensive school.

In 1970 the Länder and federal governments established the Federal-States Commission for Educational Planning and Advancement of Research (Bund-Länder Kommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung, BLK). The mission of the BLK was intended to be like that of the Permanent Conference of Länder Ministers of Culture, to coordinate education policy among the Länder, but to also include the federal government as a participant in that process. As well as short- to long-term planning, the BLK was given responsibility to investigate the funding requirements of education programs. It was also expected to rationalize education policymaking within the federal structure, to enhance communication and foster consensus between Länder and with the federal government. In 1973 the BLK produced the Bildungsgesamtplan (General Education Plan), a comprehensive plan for German education that covered both its structural development and financial requirements. As well as encouraging the establishment of Gesamtschulen, the BLK recommended that Länder institute a two-year “observation phase” (Orientierungsstufe) during the fifth and sixth grades, delaying the decision as to which type of differentiated school a student would attend at the secondary level.
During this period, parents would participate with teachers in evaluating student progress and determining the type of secondary school they would attend. Showing its general support of the Bildungsgesamtplan, in 1974 the Permanent Conference of Länder Ministers of Culture called for the nationwide implementation of the observation phase.10

Despite its endorsement by the Permanent Conference, there was actually stern resistance to the final design of the Bildungsgesamtplan, and especially to the introduction of integrated comprehensive schools at the secondary level. It was most vigorously opposed by Christian Democrats—at the national level and in Länder controlled by the CDU—by Gymnasium teachers and administrators, and by many average Germans who simply preferred the traditional system of differentiated schools. Whether and where education reforms would be undertaken or not, what turned out to be of greatest consequence was the federal arrangement for education

10 The German Education Council had earlier made a similar recommendation. Also known as the “orientation level” or “orientation stage,” all but two Länder implemented this program in one or the other of two forms. A school-type-specific variant tended to be implemented in CDU-controlled Länder. In this model the orientation stage was linked to the different kinds of secondary schools—Gymnasien, Realschulen and Hauptschulen—and students could be reassigned during the observation period. The nonspecific form tended to be found in Länder governed by the SPD. In this version, the observation stage took place in autonomous schools that were comprehensive and not of a particular type. They were nonspecific and, therefore, reassignment to another school type within these “independent school centers” was not possible during the observation stage. “... opponents from the CDU and the teachers associations suspected that the [SPD] plans for establishing independent school centers were biased to channel more students into Gesamtschulen, rather than those of the established tripartite model” (Heidenheimer 1997, 99). In fact, the Gesamtschulen have been more successful and enrollments greater in Länder where the SPD has been dominant. More generally, social class has continued to be a very significant factor in the assignment of students to vocational or academic tracks. Children channeled into the vocational track tend to be from working-class backgrounds, and those from the middle- and upper classes to the academic track (Baumert and Raschert 1983, 120-1; Heidenheimer 1997, 98-9).
laid out by the Grundgesetz that made the Land dominant in educational affairs. Because of that provision, partisan control of Länder governments was made far more important in determining education policy and whether reforms would be instituted or obstructed than which party was in control of the national government. As a result, Gesamtschule implementation met more success in Länder where the SPD governed and little where the CDU was in charge.

Since the Federal Constitution of 1949 had established state (rather than federal) jurisdiction over educational matters, variations in the distribution of power between the major political parties within and across the Länder soon came to dominate debates about the goals of educational reform. Whereas Social Democrat (and Liberal) state governments tended to stress education as a civil right, with an emphasis on individual self-fulfillment, equality, and compensatory action (and a comprehensive school system as a corollary), the more conservative Christian Democrat state governments insisted more on collective aims and actions for the public good such as the supply of highly qualified graduates. Several attempts were made to establish a new structure for the educational system as a whole to which both sides could subscribe (e.g., the Strukturplan of 1970 and the Bildungsgesamtplan of 1973). In most respects, however, these attempts failed (Lehmann 1994, 2471).

In retrospect, it is clear that those who opposed implementation of the Strukturplan and Bildungsgesamtplan—the program of education reform—had the advantage over those who favored change. The opposition was well positioned at the Land level to thwart the SPD agenda for education reform, and that proved to be the Achilles’ heel of this campaign to reform the German education system, its “veto point.” Moreover, widespread, deep and sustained political support to push forward and carry out nationwide education reforms never really coalesced. Although initial support for education reform was widespread, it was relatively thin—a collection of

11“Veto points are areas of institutional vulnerability, that is, points in the policy process where the mobilization of opposition can thwart policy innovation” (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 7). A detailed treatment of “veto points” is offered by Ellen Immergut (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 57-89).
groups who, for their many different reasons and causes, wanted some kind of reform program or another. But there was never an organization or definitive program to unify their ranks, to deepen and sustain their commitment, to drive education policymaking and support the implementation of new reforms. With the education reformists neither well-organized nor positioned politically to make things happen, the attention of the public and government was eventually diverted to other things. In particular, the worsening economic conditions of the 1970s and worries about a swelling budget deficit blunted effective implementation of the General Education Plan and the SPD's agenda for education reform. The SPD government of Helmut Schmidt, who replaced Willy Brandt as chancellor in 1974 and remained in office until 1982 when the CDU was returned to power, folded the tent on education reform.

By the time Willy Brandt left office in 1974, 183 comprehensive schools had been established. But when the big push of the 1969-1972 period failed to win a breakthrough, educational goals lost their priority on the party agenda, and the SPD was unable to make a potentially strong issue pay off in Land-level elections (Heidenheimer 1997, 76).

Officially, education reform ended in 1975 with the demise of the German Education Council. After meeting for two five-year terms between 1965 and 1975, the Council's commission was not renewed by the Länder and federal governments beyond 1975. The experimental phase with the integrated comprehensive school was over by the beginning of the 1980s, but it was not a victory for those opposed to education reform. The increase that had been realized in postprimary educational opportunities had been truly significant.

The years from 1965 to 1975 were a period of important reforms; changes had come to the German education system that would last. In Länder where the SPD
was dominant, the integrated comprehensive school had become a fourth type of secondary school by the beginning of the 1980s. The Gesamtschule was still an institutional “midget” though, accounting for less than 25 percent of secondary level enrollments in Ländere that actively supported its establishment, and less than 10 percent across the Federal Republic (Baumert 1983b, 217-20). But that was not the end to the Gesamtschule’s effect as a driving force behind education reform and the expansion of postprimary opportunities. Indeed, the campaign to implement the Gesamtschule in Länder governed by the SPD had a profound effect on the education policy of those Länder controlled by the Christian Democrats—a reactionary one. If not the Gesamtschule then something else would have to be done, because even in Länder governed by the CDU there was mounting popular pressure to expand educational opportunities—and it required a response. But, instead of implementing the Gesamtschule that they opposed, Länder governments dominated by the CDU expanded enrollments at Gymnasien and Realschulen. As a consequence, there was a large decrease in enrollments at Hauptschulen and participation in the dual system (Heidenheimer 1993, 205-6; Leschinsky 1983a, 177-81).

The CDU-led Länder did not stop the Gesamtschule reformers by defending the status quo, but instead they met the demand for greater educational opportunity by opening the Gymnasium door wider, so that a larger proportion of students was encouraged to enter these now somewhat less selective schools. The proportion of fourteen-year-olds attending West German Gymnasien increased from 14 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 1980, and then more slowly to 29 percent in 1991. . . . Even where their diffusion was most limited, the comprehensive schools exerted pressures that made the remainder of the tripartite system less hierarchical. Länder like Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg introduced only a few Gesamtschulen, but by 1991 they were enrolling close to a third of fourteen-year-olds in Gymnasien (Heidenheimer 1997, 100-2).
German higher education also saw important changes. The introduction of Gesamtschulen and greater Realschulen and Gymnasien enrollments was matched by an increase of opportunities and participation in tertiary education. As well as to secondary level reforms that increased the number of university-bound students, much of higher education’s expansion can be attributed to the proliferation of institutional alternatives to the traditional university. Especially popular was the development of vocational colleges like the Fachhochschulen, intended to meet the training and personnel requirements of science and industry (Gellert 1985, 284; Gellert 1996, 311-2). Between 1960 and 1980 the number of universities rose from 19 to 61. There were also another 27 institutions of a university type, 26 art academies and 155 polytechnic colleges devoted to the applied sciences and technology (Fachhochschulen) (Naumann 1983, 263). Over the period from 1960 to 1982 the number of students in German higher education grew more than four-fold, from 290,000 to 1.2 million. Nearly three-quarters were enrolled at traditional universities and the rest at vocational colleges like the Fachhochschule. By the mid-1990s that number had increased six-fold, to nearly 2,000,000.\textsuperscript{12} In 1992 almost half of all those “at the most common age for starting tertiary education” were moving on to some kind of full-time program, roughly three-quarters to university studies and the remainder to alternative institutions like the Fachhochschule—just as it was a decade earlier (OECD 1995, 149-50).

\textsuperscript{12}Most of the growth in higher education enrollments occurred within the eleven Länder of the old West German state, the five Länder of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) accounted for less than 190,000 of those students.
German governments, at both the Land and national levels, were a very large factor in the growth of tertiary level opportunities. In the first place, the Länder and national governments have functioned both as the gatekeepers and controllers of supply in a higher education system that was, for all practical purposes, without a private sector. If there was to be a meaningful expansion of educational opportunities in higher education, it depended on government action. According to the original provisions of the Grundgesetz that authority rested with the Länder, education was a policy area in which the Länder were to be dominant. This was revised in May 1969, however, when the federal constitution was amended to give the national government a greater role in policymaking for higher education. Initially restricted to bilateral agreements with the Länder and providing financial assistance to students, for university facilities and research, the federal government was henceforth empowered to participate with the Länder in planning the “framework regulations” for higher education and financing its facilities expansion. This new working arrangement was institutionalized with the 1969 expansion of the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research to become the Ministry of Education and Science, and the establishment in 1970 of the Federal-States Commission for Educational Planning and Advancement of Research (BLK). The Länder still retained their power of veto over educational matters, though, both in bodies like the Joint Commission and through the Bundesrat in the federal parliament (Naumann 1983, 275-6; Nevermann and Richter 1983, 91; Peisert and Framhein 1995, 7-8).

The window for higher education reform was rather smaller than that for the primary and secondary levels, lasting from about 1969 until the mid-1970s. It was a period where some important actions were taken by the government to expand the
opportunities in higher education, but they were not the catalyst for the tremendous growth in enrollments at the tertiary level that had started some time before and continued long after. Still, it is probably fair to say that reforms undertaken by the German government did have the effect of expanding higher education opportunities and encouraging greater enrollments. Already low university tuition fees were eliminated during the early 1970s. The existing student stipend program was also revised and expanded, in particular to increase the assistance given to students from lower class backgrounds. The 1971 Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz (Federal Education and Training Assistance Act, BAföG) instituted a comprehensive system of means-tested educational grants for upper secondary and university students, tripling financial assistance between 1971 and 1977. It also offered the financial support of the federal government to assist the Länder in the expansion of their higher education facilities. Legislation was also proposed that year calling for the establishment of comprehensive universities (Gesamthochschulen) as a long-term organizational goal of German higher education. The Gesamthochschulen would combine the traditional university with Fachhochschulen-type schools, bringing together students from all social classes in a single institution (Katzenstein 1987, 305-6). This proposal would be at the center of the debate over higher education reform and expansion that ensued in the federal parliament and within the Länder over the coming years, part of the larger education controversy that continued up to and beyond the passage of national legislation in 1976 regarding the future mission and organization of German higher education.

Five years of intense partisan debate and struggle within the federal parliament culminated in passage of the Hochschulrahmengesetz (Federal Framework
Law on Higher Education, *HRG*) in 1976, legislation intended to coordinate and set forth a common higher education policy binding on all Länder and throughout the FRG. The product of many compromises, the process of reaching a final agreement was made more arduous not just for partisan conflict within the Bundestag, but also because it required the consent of the Länder-controlled Bundesrat. Upper chamber approval of the *HRG* was constitutionally required, for two reasons: it was legislation that affected the Länder, and for the authority over the education function given to the Länder by the Basic Law. This act described the guiding principles for German higher education, defined the responsibilities of the system of higher education, set the requirements for university admission, and determined the future organization of the nation’s institutions of higher education. The *HRG* called for curricula reform that would better define programs of study and limit their duration. It described a flattening of the personnel structure for professorial staff and a common administrative organization based on a presidential office. It placed the Fachhochschulen on an equal footing with traditional universities with regard to their institutional autonomy. Perhaps most important in terms of new educational opportunities, the *HRG* named the Gesamthochschule as the institutional foundation upon which the future expansion of German system of higher education would be based. This proposal met with determined partisan resistance in the Länder, like that to the Gesamtschule, and its implementation was similarly very limited nationwide (Gellert 1984, 219-20; Gellert 1996, 312; Katzenstein 1987, 308-9, 316-7).

Germany’s judicial system also played an important role in higher education reform, principally by its legal recognition and protection of a widened gateway to tertiary education. With university enrollments having doubled in the decade between
1955 and 1965, student demand for many programs was at or had exceeded the capacity of the higher education system. During the late 1960s restrictions had already been imposed on admissions to medical schools and related fields—in number or quota (\textit{numerus clausus}) and through the selection process. The wait for admission to medical and veterinary schools was more than five years, and seven for dentistry (Teichler 1982, 163). The Federal Constitutional Court finally became involved with the issue of enrollments as it concerned the restrictive university admission policies of Bavaria and the city-state of Hamburg. It ruled in July 1972 that state laws which restricted university admissions—except as a temporary measure under conditions of overcrowding and only until the legislature had devised a nondiscriminatory system for admissions—violated the constitutional right of students to pursue a university education (Katzenstein 1987, 313-4, 333-6). This was so, said the Court, “because the modern state makes the social security and cultural development of the citizen one of its central concerns” (from Heidenheimer 1981, 290). As time would show, however, the practical effect of this decision—not so much in protecting but in contributing to the further expansion of higher education opportunities—was much dampened by a recessionary economy and subsequent pressures to reduce the level of government expenditures.

Although tertiary level enrollments continued to grow throughout the 1970s, 1980s and into the 1990s, the period of proactive government support and meaningful higher education reform was clearly over by the early 1980s—probably even before passage of the \textit{HRG} in 1976. There was no concerted political attempt to match public expenditures, staff increases and facilities expansion with the pace of increasing enrollments. While the ranks of university students grew by 30 percent
during the 1977-1982 time period, staff and facilities only grew by 5 percent (Katzenstein 1987, 307). Indeed, and it was even under Schmidt's SPD government that the federal contribution to Länder facilities buildings projects began to shrink.

The "fall from grace" of education reform has been attributed to many things. As well as the ongoing partisan conflict over education policy both at the national and Land levels, among the causes most often cited are the recession of 1974-75, a second oil crisis, the long recession at the end of the 1970s, and the burden of increasing public expenditures (Gellert 1984, 220; Naumann and Pfeffer 1983, 78; Peisert and Framhein 1995, 10). Germany was not alone in facing these problems, and the consequences for its higher education system were not so different from that in other Western nations.

The German institutions of higher education, like those in other countries, went through a difficult period during the 1980s, as a result of economic problems, which occurred in the wake of the oil-crisis starting in the second half of the 1970s. The government was forced to cut public expenditure, and education has always been a first victim in such situations. Consequently, the expansion of the higher education system slowed down and began to stagnate in some areas. Although student numbers continued to rise, expenditure for personnel and equipment did not keep up with those increases (Gellert and Rau 1992, 91).

But it was not just education policy that was influenced by these events. So were many other public programs, and the balance of power in Germany's national politics was also profoundly affected. Although the SPD continued in power with the FDP after the elections of 1976 and 1980, it was divided with its coalition partner—as well as within its own party ranks—on how to best address the nation's economic problems. In 1982 the FDP finally broke its coalition with the SPD, joining the CDU in the FRG's first ever successful constructive vote of no confidence, to bring down and replace the government of Helmut Schmidt. The new CDU-led government,
under the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl and in coalition with the FDP, then went on to win the general elections of March 1983. The victory of the Kohl-led government indicated the German electorate’s readiness for cost-cutting measures and a return to a more conservative policy agenda, and education was clearly a target for budget reduction. It was also an opportunity for the CDU/FDP coalition to end and perhaps even reverse those education reforms and social policies intended to restructure not just the education system, but German society as well (Gellert 1984, 221). Especially targeted for attention were those programs and expansion plans that would create greater opportunities and access to higher education. Financial support for secondary-level students was ended and that for university students all but eliminated, the means-tested system of grants introduced in 1971 by the SPD converted to a loan program.

Criticism of these measures was heavy and reached from the parliamentary opposition to many societal and political groups outside parliament. It was argued that the cancellation of the support for pupils was going to bring an end to the social opening of the educational system, while the new loan system for university students could leave some students with debts of about 40,000 Marks after graduation, which might keep many prospective students from a low social background from entering higher education (Gellert 1985, 286).

Another analyst of this era has written that these government measures simply made clear, once again, the “hidden social class bias of the system against a pronounced redistribution of educational opportunities” (Naumann 1983, 284). Even allowing that the means-tested stipend program of the 1971 Federal Education and Training Assistance Act had encouraged greater enrollments by students from lower class backgrounds, he observes that students from the middle- and upper classes, already overrepresented at the tertiary level, did even better because of the new
"invisible subsidy"—free tuition. The cash subsidies for lower class students may have been eliminated, but free tuition was not. Moreover, it was women from middle- and upper class backgrounds that had probably benefited most from the recent expansion. It was their increased participation that largely accounted for the growth in student numbers (Naumann 1983, 283-4).

The Kohl government also halted implementation of the HRG's long-term goal to make the comprehensive university the institutional foundation of German higher education. The Gesamthochschule, an organization intended to draw students from all social classes, would not be allowed to challenge the traditional university and end its elite status in the higher education system. Instead, the institutional differentiation and "hidden social class bias" of the tertiary system would continue to persist. Notwithstanding university and Fachhochschulen enrollments that would continue to grow, this action of the conservative Kohl government ensured that the gateway to a university education—and the opportunity of upward social mobility that it represented—would be kept narrow. In particular, the flow of those from the lower social classes would be restricted because of the traditional Abitur requirement for university admission that did not exist for comprehensive universities. In combination with the conversion of the student stipend system to a loan program, killing the implementation of the Gesamthochschule was a real defeat for education reform and the further expansion of educational opportunities. According to an observer at that time, "by its decision to stick to conventional forms of higher education the conservative government is supporting a socially selective education system" (Gellert 1987, 287).
Over the years, efforts to implement Gesamtschulen and Gesamthochschulen, never great, tapered off to be insignificant. There was not a complete reversal of education policy, though, the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s introduced some changes that would "stick" and be consolidated. This is especially true with respect to the growth of new opportunities and the institutional changes that came to secondary and higher education. Although implementation of the integrated comprehensive school has been very limited, and the differentiated structure of schools not eliminated, the secondary school system is today less preferential to those of higher socioeconomic status. Hauptschule enrollments decreased dramatically between 1960 and 1990, and those at Realschulen, the Gymnasien and Gesamtschulen went markedly up. 13 In terms of university-bound students, while only around 5 percent obtained the Abitur certificate in 1960, the qualification for university admission, that number was well over 20 percent by the 1990s. This is "the enduring contribution" of the reform era German Education Council (1965-1975), "to increase greatly the proportion of students leaving secondary school entitled to enroll in universities"

13 Almost 64 percent of West German students attended a Hauptschule in 1960. For grades 7 through 9, this number had declined to 34 percent in 1990. Realschulen enrollments accounted for roughly another 29 percent, the Gymnasien for nearly 31 percent, and the Gesamtschulen for approximately 6 percent (Lehmann 1994, 2472-3). Data from the 2000 time period indicate that about 25 percent of German students now enter a Hauptschule after completing the Grundschule, nearly 40 percent enter Realschulen, roughly 25 percent enroll in Gymnasien, and 13 percent attend Gesamtschulen (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 490-3). As the enrollments of ethnic German students in Hauptschulen has continued to declined over the years, that institution has come more and more to be identified as the school of western Germany's inner cities and urban areas for minority students. Twelve percent of Germany's workforce is non-German. About half of these laborers, referred to as "guest workers," are of Turkish origin and they reside mostly in western Germany. The children of these minority workers primarily attend Hauptschulen, and they now account for as much as 70 percent of the student population in some urban schools (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 483, 491).
(Katzenstein 1987, 311). While some of these students had attended a Gesamtschule, the majority still came from Gymnasien—where the doors had been opened much wider to those from lower social strata (Heidenheimer 1997, 100-2, 119-20; OECD 1995, 276). The system of higher education has grown significantly over the same period, seeing more than a six-fold increase in student enrollments. Much of this has been in association with changes at the secondary level and in response to consumer and industry demand for new programs and opportunities at the tertiary level. The higher education system has not been transformed, however; it continues to retain a very certain class-bias in the distribution of opportunities that are upward social-mobilizing. The upper classes continue to be disproportionately overrepresented in the state universities. At the same time, German higher education today includes very many from the lower and working classes who never before had access (Gellert 1996, 315-17).

The German Education System and Reunification

With Germany’s reunification in October 1990, the five Länder of the former German Democratic Republic were incorporated into the FRG. For those Länder, as well as undertaking very dramatic political, economic and social reforms, the task of reunification has meant adapting to the education system of West Germany. The story of that effort is beyond the scope of this work. However, it does deserve mention that East Germany’s education system had been based on a structure of unified comprehensive schools from grades one through ten, after which the majority of students were directed into some kind of vocational training. Only some 10 percent moved on to an upper secondary school for two more years, acquiring the
Abitur which entitled them to university admission. Many East Germans have been less than enthusiastic about adjusting to the West German structure. That displeasure has been such that it has even supplied fuel for the fire of those calling for further reforms of the FRG school system. In 1994 the Länder Education Ministers even decided to halt the further coordination of the school systems until after 2000 (Almond, Dalton, and Powell 1999, 222; Mintrop and Weiler 1994, 254-7).

A Discussion of German Education Policy

The early expansion of mass education in Germany finds much useful explanation in the educational mission of the church associated with the Protestant Reformation, and with the project of modern state-building argued by Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer (1985). The task of state-building likewise helps to explain the expansion of educational opportunities at the secondary and university level, but not always the timing or form. The logic of industrialism and its human capital variant have something to impart, particularly with regard to the context, but they also do nothing to explain the timing or manner of secondary-level and university expansion, the class-bias of the German education system, or the particular institutional structure that distinguishes Germany’s education system today. For answers to questions such as those, political conflict and institutional theories have much to contribute. There is much to be learned from the struggle that has been waged by so many social and political groups for control of the German education system and its mission since the eighteenth century, and also from the linkage between Germany’s political democratization and expanding opportunities in its education system. The institutions and institutionalization of the German education system also have a story to tell. By
setting the rules for and structuring the political competition—and as autonomous political actors in their own right that naturally inhibit change—Germany's political, social and educational institutions have had a great effect on the policymaking for education. Particularly important has been the decentralization that has historically characterized the control of German education, and the great institutional tenacity of the traditional tripartite system of differentiated schools that has been so resistant to reform.

The history of postprimary educational expansion in Germany since the early nineteenth century has been one of slow and fitful expansion. It has been associated with Germany's unique course of political, social and economic development—most closely with its political democratization. It is a story about a struggle for control of the education system—between church and state, between national and state governments, and between political parties at the state and national levels. It bears the legacy of the important role played by the church in its early development, the preferential treatment given to society's elite, and of educational opportunities that were deliberately restricted and serviced the perpetuation of existing class divisions. Government support of public education by the Prussian state and then Imperial Germany was to further state objectives—economic development, industrialization and the personnel requirements of the administrative state—not to provide a vehicle of social mobility for the masses. It was an instrument of state power manipulated to perpetuate the socioeconomic status quo even as it served to enhance the power of the German state (Kaelble 1981, 262; Thut and Adams 1964, 81-8). The state controlled the education supply; it held the key to its expansion and was its gatekeeper.
However, it has been the *Länder* of the German state, and not the central government, that has historically exercised the greater control over education policy. Except for efforts by SPD-led governments during the Weimar era to establish a uniform national education system, and the period of authoritarian rule under National Socialism, it has been the *Länder*—and their predecessors before German unification in 1871—that have always had the greatest governmental authority over educational matters. This division of power was clear in Imperial Germany and is still today in the FRG. Indeed, the function of the Federal Ministry of Education today is more to participate in and coordinate education planning with the *Länder* than to make policy (Nevermann and Richter 1983, 83, 90).

The politics of policymaking in German education speaks to the ability of local and regional governments under a federal arrangement—and in a partisan context—to frustrate and obstruct the policy objectives and initiatives of a central government. The SPD, a long-time proponent of German education reform, provides a good example. *Länder* governed by the SPD generally have a better record in implementing education reforms than those controlled by the CDU. At the national level, however, as the party of government, the SPD has been much frustrated in realizing its agenda for education reform because of the resistance of CDU-governed *Länder*. Over the course of time, within and across the *Länder*, the Christian Democrats have enjoyed both a longer tenure and greater influence over German education policy than the Social Democrats. The only partial success of school reform in the 1960s and 1970s—as made evident by the very limited implementation of the *Gesamtschule* and *Gesamthochschule*—is testimony to the dominance of both conservative CDU politics and the *Länder* over German education policy (Mintrop
and Weiler 1994, 252-3). In addition to partisan politics and federalism, education reform has also been hindered—and the forces in opposition helped—by the very institutionalization of the education system. Germany’s education system exhibits very normal institutional behavior; it is self-perpetuating, sticky, and resistant to change.

Despite the magnitude of Germany’s recent reforms and the expansion of opportunities in secondary and higher education, educational achievement remains a restricted vehicle of social mobility. The gateway remains narrow because the class bias that has historically characterized the distribution of educational opportunities has not been eliminated. It is still institutionalized in the tripartite system of differentiated secondary schools that, even after reforms, retains its traditional class bias. That structure has been made more flexible, to be sure, but it continues to favor Germany’s upper classes and to perpetuate the existing social order.

If one remembers the history of the German school system . . . then it is not difficult to understand that the three traditional types of schools even today represent the social structure of Germany. There always have been attempts to put together children of different backgrounds into one comprehensive school system. Such well-known pedagogues as Comenius, Pestalozzi, and Humboldt have strongly advocated the idea of a comprehensive school, but without success. When the German parliament of the Weimar Republic met in 1918, the Socialists and other parties tried to found a comprehensive school system. The parliament accepted only a compromise that brought together children of all families into a comprehensive elementary school (grades 1 to 4). All the other types of schools remained the same.

The structure has not yet changed. The experiment of the Gesamtschule as the one unifying, comprehensive type of secondary school has not been politically successful. Instead of replacing three different, socially discriminating types of schools by just one, it has been added as a fourth type (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, 71).

Despite its substantial growth over recent years, the system of higher education also tends to reflect and replicate the existing class structure. Peisert and
Framhein (1995) write of the “two-type structure” of German higher education that had emerged by the end of the 1980s, comprised of the traditional universities and the less prestigious Fachhochschulen (131). Indeed, although the introduction of alternative tertiary level institutions like the Fachhochschulen have made postsecondary opportunities available to many groups that have been historically denied, “it has raised new questions about the reproduction of structural distinctions in society through the higher education system” (Gellert 1996, 313).

This is not to say that little good has come of the higher education reforms, because so many thousands of Germans have and do enjoy the opportunity and benefit of better jobs and lives as a result, but a good deal of the recent program expansion in higher education has not necessarily been of a kind that has enhanced social mobility on a large scale. In fact, many of the new vocational and functionally-oriented offerings would actually appear to reinforce existing class lines. This is illustrated by viewing social groups as users of education services, consumers that display distinct patterns in their consumption of traditional university and alternative higher education programs. Students with working class roots are disproportionately overrepresented in Fachhochschulen-type institutions and badly underrepresented in the traditional state universities, accounting for something under 15 percent. Pupils from upper-middle class backgrounds are just the opposite, most likely to be enrolled at a university and not at one of the new alternative institutions—something around 10 percent. Such patterns of education consumption tends to be reinforcing of the status quo. On the other hand, although not much has happened for the working class in terms of increasing social mobility, the middle class does seem to be reaping some benefit from the expanded educational opportunities (Gellert 1996, 315-7). So, if
there has been any sort of class restructuring with educational opportunities serving as the vehicle of change—at least so far—it has been mostly limited to the middle class.

I am hesitant about concluding too much about the expansion that has taken place in Germany’s secondary and higher education systems since the 1960s. There can be no question that meaningful change has taken place, but it is simply too soon to say in any definitive way how things will end up. Certain differences do seem evident, however. In terms of increased social mobility, secondary and higher education have become more opportunity-bearing for a greater number of students from all social groups than ever before. The secondary system has not only become more inclusive, it has also widened as a gateway to higher education. A growing proportion of German students are preparing for advanced studies at the tertiary level. At the same time, it must be observed that the restrictive system of differentiated secondary schools is still around, and the kind of program expansion that has taken place in higher education seems—at least so far—to perpetuate existing class structures. Change has been certain, though, and it seems most likely to continue with the passage of time.

Although it is a story often told in association with landmark events, educational expansion is much more a gradual process and not a one-time event. It is subject to a number of social, economic and political forces, both internal and external to the education system. One such factor is economic growth and development, which is often associated with the expansion of the education systems over the long term. Another is population growth, although that is not likely to drive expansion of Germany’s education system today. On the other hand, there is a
generational effect that may have some impact. Children often tend to follow in the footsteps of their parents, in career paths and at least matching their educational achievement. This tends to stimulate some educational expansion, with or without population growth, as societies modernize and become more literate. When this phenomenon is combined with the positive actions taken by a state to educate its citizenry in response to the requirements of economic growth and development—and democratization, too—educational expansion is given a real push. A troubled economy may have a contrary effect, which can be magnified by a slide to an authoritarian form of government. Looking back over the past two centuries, this has very much been the tale for German secondary and higher education.

Other important forces that have and will continue to variously encourage, obstruct or slow further education reform and expansion include Germany's partisan politics, the class structure of its society, and the very institutionalization of its education system. Whether a Land is governed by the CDU or SPD will continue to make a difference in its education policy, on how opportunity-bearing that education system will be. Likewise will class. German society has a most durable class structure, one that inhibits education reform and expansion that would upset its divisions; and it is supported by public policy. The class structure is reflected in the organization of the education system, in its institutionalization, and it biases the distribution of educational opportunities that may enhance individual social mobility. What is more, the class divisions of German society are deliberately perpetuated by the status-quo maintaining social insurance programs of its welfare state. In this most important respect, the education and social policies of the German welfare state are complementary, they go together hand-in-hand, even though the responsibility for
policymaking and administration falls upon different individuals and organizations at different levels of the federal government. Finally, it important to recognize that institutions will change only slowly unless the circumstances are exceptional. Under normal conditions they are very durable, self-perpetuating, and resistant to change. Germany's class structure, its social welfare and school systems all share these institutional properties. Further education reform and expansion can only be expected to be slow and fitful, and not just for its institutional dimension, but also for its close association with the class structure of German society and the other social programs of its welfare state.

The American Education System

The American Education System Today

Education in the United States is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments. There is not a national system of education. There is not one formal and integrated structure of schools—from the primary through the university level—that is administered from the center by the national government or any other authoritative body. Rather, the American school “system” is comprised of a variety of educational institutions operated by the federal, state and local governments, by independent private and religious organizations. In its entirety, the American school

14 Although the education policies and institutions found within and between the fifty states are not identical, there is far more the same than is different about the way the education function is implemented across the United States. So, as was the case with Germany, when I hereafter speak of the “school” or “education system” of the United States, I am referring to those education policies and institutions that are most commonly found throughout the country.
system is mostly public; that is where the majority of educational institutions, enrollments and opportunities are found. Religious and private schools are also important, but they play a much smaller role. At the primary and secondary levels, public schools account for over 90 percent of all spending for education and nearly 90 percent of all enrollments. At the tertiary level private institutions take on a greater significance, accounting for nearly 35 percent of the spending and 22 percent of all enrollments (OECD 1995, 82-3; Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1501, 1511).

The responsibility of state and local governments for public education has a long tradition in America. Education is not even addressed by the Constitution of 1787 which established and defined the powers and obligations of the new federal government. No official, agency, or branch of the national government was given the constitutional authority to make education policy and run the nation’s schools, not even the president. The same is true for the national legislature. While the Congress is authorized to undertake actions and make laws for the “general welfare” under the Constitution’s “necessary and proper clause” of Article I, it does not have any specific powers in the area of education. The Constitution’s silence about educational matters and a specific role for the federal government in those affairs leaves that power, according to the Tenth Amendment, “to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Although it has no formal authority over public education in America, there is a U.S. Department of Education. The president appoints, and the Senate confirms, a cabinet secretary to head that department. While it has existed as a cabinet department only since 1979, many different “departments,” “offices” and “bureaus” of education have been around for a long time. A Department of Education was first
created in 1867 for the purpose of collecting statistics and other information related to the nation's education system. It was abolished in 1868 and moved to the Department of the Interior where it was known as the Office of Education. In 1869 its name was changed to the Bureau of Education. In 1939 it was made an office of the Federal Security Agency and in 1953 it was moved to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with the establishment of that cabinet department. In 1979 a separate Department of Education was created and its secretary was made a member of the Presidential cabinet under the administration of Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan attempted to eliminate the Department of Education, along with Energy, as part of his campaign against "big government," but he was unsuccessful. Today the Department of Education is responsible to oversee the education programs of the federal government and to collect data concerning public education. Other organizations that are involved in education at the federal level—but also without formal authority over educational matters—include the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Labor, and the National Science Foundation. Together, they accounted for almost half of federal funding for education in 1987 (Valverde 1994, 6543).

Constitutionally, each of the fifty states is responsible to support a system of public education. In practice, much of that authority has been delegated by the states to local school districts and their "school boards," bodies that are typically independent of other local governmental organizations—in their policymaking, administration and funding—and whose members are elected by the citizens of the local school district. In the early 1990s there were 15,358 such school districts in the United States, each with a school board having jurisdiction over one or more
associated schools in a specific geographic area (Valverde 1994, 6539). The specific
details of the school district arrangement are prescribed by the constitution and
statutory laws of each state. Normally, school districts are empowered to make and
administer school policy that complies with state standards, appoint or remove a local
superintendent of schools, choose school principals, hire and fire teachers and other
school personnel, raise tax revenues to support the schools, the construction and
maintenance of school facilities—all the kinds of things necessary for the day-to-day
operation of a local and largely autonomous school system. They may also be
concerned with teacher certification, curriculum development and the selection of
textbooks. At the local level there is frequently active citizen participation, at the
regularly scheduled public meetings of the school board.

State governments retain overall supervisory authority for public education,
the right to locally intercede, and provide much of the funding upon which the
budgets of local school districts depend. At the state level there are very often
departments of education, and elected or appointed state boards of education that are
headed by a state superintendent of schools. Along with the state legislature and
executive branch of government, state school boards are typically concerned with the
distribution of state and federal monies to local school districts, in determining
statewide teacher certification requirements, and may be involved with curriculum
decisions and the selection of textbooks.

According to the regulations of each state, private schools and colleges may
be established by churches, individual sponsors, and private groups. The governing
bodies of religious and private schools enjoy considerable autonomy in their
operation, but not the economic benefits of state association. The support from state
funding is far less, perhaps even negligible, and they are unable to levy local taxes as a means of revenue generation. However, in many communities children enrolled in private and parochial schools are often permitted to participate in specific courses offered by their community’s public schools on a part-time basis. The 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act provided funding for such shared-time programs.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, it is permissible for the government to contribute to private and parochial schools as it supports essentially secular ends—like school busing and student lunches, training materials, special education programs, etc.—but does not advance the cause of a specific religion.

In addition to differences between states and the great variety of alternatives offered by private and religious schools, much of the variation in American education can be attributed to the thousands of local school districts. A fundamental building block of the nation’s education system today, local school districts represent the institutionalization of local control and diversity, hallmarks of American education since early colonial times. In a very real sense, for the great differences in education policy and implementation between school districts, there are nearly as many “school systems” in the United States as there are school districts. The local school district is a highly valued and durable American institution, and its widespread support enables it to remain very much at the center of America’s public education system. In point of fact, though, the autonomy once enjoyed by local school districts has diminished. This has happened as the provision of educational opportunities has become less a

\textsuperscript{15} As well as funding for shared time programs, the $2.3 billion act provided monies to help in the education of children from low-income families, as well as monies for textbooks, audio-visual presentation materials, educational research and training facilities.
local issue and more a state and national one, as education costs have risen beyond what local school districts can provide, as American society and its education system have become more democratic and inclusive, and as government at the state and federal levels has responded to those changes.

The notion of a national school system or of state and local systems dominated by federal agencies is regarded by most Americans and by their representatives in Congress as abhorrent. Yet, the fact of federal influence is evident in Supreme Court decisions concerning integration, in the massive application of federal funds accompanied by evaluations of their use, and in the creation of instructional materials through grants by the National Science Foundation. The reluctance of local authorities to accept federal direction had diminished substantially by the late 1960s, when they found it increasingly necessary to turn to the federal government for the solution of local problems (Deighton 1971, 463-4).

In fact, the federal government has a very considerable role in American education, one that has grown especially since the Second World War. By the exercise of its power to legislate for the general welfare and national defense, the Congress has become a very powerful and influential actor in the nation's educational affairs. The federal government contributes to the financial support of the different sectors of the American education system—public, private, and religious. It oversees the national military academies and other schools affiliated with state operations at home and abroad. With the Supreme Court often at the forefront, it was the federal government that led efforts to expand educational access and opportunities for minorities, the poor and disabled. It drove the campaign to racially desegregate the nation's schools. Indeed, it is arguable that the most important ongoing educational task of the federal government has been to oversee and guarantee the expansion and more equitable distribution of educational opportunities throughout the nation.
Each one of the fifty states provides tuition-free public education at the primary and secondary level. Almost 90 percent of all children attend these state-supported schools, the remainder are enrolled at private and religious institutions. Whether at a public or private school, attendance is compulsory for children in every state, typically beginning at five or six years of age until age sixteen. The period for primary and secondary education normally lasts twelve years, thirteen where kindergarten is included. Primary level education lasts anywhere from five to seven years, depending on the local school district—and there is considerable variation both within and between states—followed by two or three years in a middle or junior high school, and then three or four more in a high school. A similar institutional division can be found in the private sector. Curriculums are also comparable, apart from the religious instruction that takes place in parochial schools. Primary and secondary schools in both the public and private sectors provide a broad and unified curriculum designed to meet the general academic and training needs of all students. All programs of education and training, for all children, typically takes place under the same roof and administration. For this reason, and to distinguish America's secondary schools from those elsewhere around the world that provide either academic instruction or vocational training—but not both in a single facility—U.S. high schools are often called comprehensive secondary schools. The principal function of the American high school is to provide a general academic education, though, not vocational training programs (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1504). Separate vocational and trade schools also exist, but they are very limited in number and enrollments.
The comprehensive school with a general education curriculum has been the predominant institutional form in the American education system since the early nineteenth century when public education opportunities began to greatly expand at the primary level. It came later at the secondary level, with the take-off of enrollments in comprehensive high schools that started around the turn of the twentieth century. Vocational and technical training programs were never established on a scale and with a separate institutional structure like the German dual system. When and what vocational education does exist in the public school system is typically found at the secondary level in the comprehensive schools. Specific federal and state legislation to support or expand vocational training programs has been meager. The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 provided federal aid, on a matching basis with the states, for vocational training programs below the university level. The act provided grants to help pay for the education of teachers who would instruct industrial, trade, business, agricultural and home economics subjects. It also contributed to the salaries of teachers of vocational courses. In 1963 the Congress adopted the ($731 million) Vocational Education Act that required each state to establish a policymaking Board of Vocational Education. Federal funding was made available to the programs those state bodies might establish. It also included a provision for a work-study program to prevent student dropouts. However, during the Reagan administration, federal support for such programs was greatly reduced with passage of the 1983 Job Training Partnership Act legislation which required demonstration of program effectiveness as a condition of receiving federal funding. In 1984 only American 225 high schools were considered “vocational” (Valverde 1994, 6542).
Following high school graduation or by otherwise satisfying secondary level requirements, students may continue their education by attending public or private two-year and four-year institutes, colleges and universities. The U.S. Department of Labor reported in 2000 that over 60 percent of all high school graduates, some 1.8 million, moved directly into higher education (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1511). Nearly 40 percent of entire 18-21 age group were found to be attending some type of tertiary institution in the 1990s (OECD 1995, 153). Students wishing to pursue occupations in advanced technical or semi-professional fields—in computer science and electronics, as dental hygienists, paralegals, etc.—may attend two-year junior colleges or technical institutes for specialized training. Students seeking advanced academic and professional careers—in academia, business, the law, medicine, etc.—may enroll at four-year universities and professional schools. More prestigious public universities and private colleges may require entrance examinations, but a high school diploma is very often all that is required for a student to enroll at many state and community colleges. Nor is age normally a factor limiting an individual’s access to higher education; nearly half of all American university students are over 25 years of age (OECD 1995, 316).

Although they are heavily subsidized by the states and federal government, America’s public colleges and universities are not tuition-free. The additional costs of higher education are left for the individual student and his or her parents to manage.

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16 As a rule, American students are not required to pass a comprehensive final examination at the end of their high school studies in order to graduate. No such system exists in the United States. The requirements for a high school degree are normally determined by local school districts, and are usually based on completing a specified program of coursework.
This task is made somewhat easier by the low-cost community college system, and the many public and private opportunities for financial assistance available to prospective students. For the typical college student, education costs are financed through some combination of state allocations, private and public student scholarships and awards, loan programs and the student's own resources. In some measure because of the individual financing requirement, as well as the quality of their educational offerings, private colleges and universities are an important component and alternative to public institutions in the American system of higher education.

According to recent OECD data, United States' spending for education amounts to about 7 percent of its GDP, 5.7 percent going to public institutions and the remainder to private. In terms of the government's budgetary pie, education accounts for just over 14 percent of total public expenditures. Indicative of the much greater size of the public sector in American education, spending by public schools far outweighs that of private and religious institutions, especially at the primary and secondary levels. Approximately 82 percent of all education spending is by public sector institutions. Almost 93 percent of education expenditures at the primary and secondary levels is by public schools, and 65 percent at the tertiary (OECD 1995, 71-6, 78-84, 122). Today, and historically, it has been the states and local governments that have provided the lion's share of financial support to the schools. Local school districts now cover almost 45 percent of primary and secondary education costs, the states 48 percent, and the federal government less than 8 percent. For higher education the distribution of financial support by level of government is very different. Local governments account for less than 6 percent of
education spending, the states for 58 percent, and the federal government for 36 percent. For all levels of education the national government provides over 15 percent of the funding, the states 50 percent, and local governments over 34 percent (OECD 1995, 117-9).

As well as for differences in state laws, the decisions of local school boards and the availability of private and religious alternatives to public schools, much of the variation in education across the United States—in policy, quality and opportunities—may be attributed to the use of the local property tax as the principal means of revenue generation by school districts. The property tax favors wealthier communities and their financial capacity. As the potential revenues that may be generated from property taxes are determined by the sum total of property valuations within a school district, an indicator of its wealth, richer school districts are in a better position than poorer—subject to local decisionmaking—to pay for education. This clearly causes differences in education policy, in the kind and quality of the education product, and in the types of educational opportunities available.\(^{17}\) In some states, greater financial parity among school districts has been achieved through state subsidies to the poorer school districts. Although such state equalization programs have not eliminated the financial gap between the richest and poorest school districts, it has helped to narrow the differences within states.

\(^{17}\)Even acknowledging that differences in per-pupil spending between school districts could affect the quality of a student’s education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez* (1973) that funding the schools was a state issue, not a problem that warranted federal action under the 14th Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
The Development of American Education Policy

Philosophical Underpinnings

The United States stands out among nations for the magnitude of its commitment to educational opportunity. Educational achievement is encouraged by a school system that is widely accessible. The United States is also outstanding for the level of uniformity that exists in the education system of a country so large. From one end of the nation to the other, education is very comparable in its administration, institutions, and curricula. What is truly remarkable is that such organizational consistency is the attribute of a country that does not have a unified national education system, one where the responsibility for education is highly decentralized. Indeed, education in the United States is largely a function of the states and local governments, with independent private and religious organizations playing a smaller but very significant role. This contradiction—the uniformity of an education system without centralized administration—is the product of a society that emphasizes individual over collective responsibility for one's well-being, that views educational achievement as an agency of self-actualization, a vehicle of social mobility, and a means to personal economic security (Janowitz 1976, 34-5). In this sense, America's investment in educational opportunities represents an alternative to the safety nets of state-supported social insurance programs (Heclo 1985, 16). While its social welfare provisions are niggardly by comparison to many other Western countries, America's educational opportunities and services are among the most generous in the world. This has not always been the case, however. Throughout America's history there has been a record of discrimination against women and minorities in the distribution of
educational and other socioeconomic opportunities (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1495, 1499-1500).

From America's beginnings until well into the twentieth century, educational opportunities were far less for women than men. This gap has closed today, and women even account for a slightly greater proportion of higher education enrollments than men. The greater problem historically, and still today, has been with racial discrimination in the distribution of public goods. A landmark decision affecting minority educational opportunities in America came in the 1954 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education that separate school facilities for different races violated the law of the land—the Constitution—and where such school systems existed they would have to be desegregated. The decision in this case came in response to the many racially segregated schools systems that existed across the United States at that time. Not only did these school systems maintain separate facilities for the different races, they offered different education products that represented unequal educational opportunities. Segregated school systems were instruments of socioeconomic control that favored the social mobility of chosen groups through the provision of educational opportunities, and denied the opportunity for educational achievement to those social groups that were looked down upon. Although the Brown ruling offered the possibility that educational opportunities might be made equal for all races, it has been a most controversial decision and never fully implemented. Meaningful desegregation of the nation's schools was not realized until the 1960s, and complete desegregation has never been
completely accomplished. Nonetheless, there has been very significant progress in expanding the educational opportunities for those social groups that have historically been discriminated against.

A tendency to prefer community solutions and local governance has typified American society and politics since colonial times. At the beginning it was largely the natural outcome of geography and politics, of the continent’s expanse and the distance between colonial settlements, limited transportation and communications facilities, and the absence of an effective central government. Even for problems and issues that were shared by communities within and across the colonies, there was no real alternative to deal with those matters except at a local level.

Although the undeveloped environment of colonial America posed a real hardship for many, to others the unsettled lands and isolation represented a great opportunity. Indeed, the American frontier was a place to be exploited because of its geopolitical reality. Many individuals and groups of European heritage emigrated to America precisely for the chance to “go it alone,” to establish new lives and communities where life could be led in the manner they chose. This was especially true for those seeking to escape the religious persecution they suffered in Europe. When they came to America, in addition to their faith, many brought with them a

Nor is it likely that all school segregation will ever be completely eliminated. Although the effort to do so has not ended, it has slowed or been discontinued in many places. Moreover, not all school segregation is de jure (deliberate) and subject to court-ordered remedies, like busing. School segregation also exists de facto. Segregated school systems exist as they match the residential pattern of their associated community. For example, what is termed “urban white flight” has been attributed as one cause of de facto segregation in the nation’s inner-city schools. (For a further discussion see Rob Gurwitt, “Getting off the Bus,” in Governing, May 1992.)
determination to live in communities of their own making and governance. It was not just faith-based communities, though, other colonial settlements and immigrant groups also preferred significant autonomy in the management of their local affairs. This was particularly true as it affected matters of community education.

Education in America has always had a strong local component. Although the overall authority for education in pre-revolutionary America rested with the colonial governments, as a practical matter it was mostly a local affair. What organized educational opportunities did exist were usually community-level private or religious schools, with limited enrollments and curricula offerings. There were not public schools systems, open to all children in the community, that linked primary with secondary and higher education. Indeed, in early America educational opportunities were very restricted, and mass education was virtually nonexistent. Most children did not attend school at all, and those who did went only for a short time—usually three years at most. In isolated and sparsely populated areas, what education did take place was often carried out in the home. In more populated areas there were sometimes private or clergy-run primary schools, sometimes even secondary schools, but enrollments were small and tended to favor the upper crust of colonial society.

What, when and where there was a concern for greater literacy, at least at some basic level, the motivation was frequently religious. Beyond an ability to read the Bible and religious instruction, however, educational objectives were typically limited to the development of only basic skills in writing and mathematics. This was not unlike the experience in many parts of Europe where the purposes and influence of religion—and especially that of Protestantism—were central during the initial stage of educational expansion at the mass level. In America, though, there was not a
church or religion that had organized and developed an institutional presence in the social and political infrastructure comparable to the Catholic and Protestant churches in many European countries. There were not politically powerful American churches like the Lutheran and Catholic in Germany, institutions with the organizational capacity and wherewithal to establish and administer a centralized vernacular school system at greater than a community level.

The Origins of Public Education in America

Americans looked to government as early as the seventeenth century for help in satisfying the educational needs of their communities. In a meaningful way this can be traced to New England, and specifically to the example of the Massachusetts colony. In 1642, a Massachusetts law became the first in America to make the schooling of children mandatory. It charged that all children be taught to read, although it was parents, guardians, or masters who were made responsible for that task. Additional legislation was adopted in 1647 directing all towns with fifty or more households to establish a primary school, and those with 100 or more to support a secondary-level grammar school as well. Education continued to be a local responsibility, though, as the colonial government did not organize to administer, provide, or otherwise support mass education. Until well after the Revolution, education would still be chiefly a function of local communities, with private and religious schools playing a key role, in Massachusetts and elsewhere across America. Formal education opportunities remained limited for most children. Mass education would not come until the early 1800s, with the movement to establish common primary schools open to all children.
The coming of the common school marks a critical stage in the development of American education. Far more than an alternative to faith-based and private education, the widespread implementation of the common school represented the expansion of educational opportunities on a grand scale. Indeed, for the many it was not a matter of choosing between alternatives at all; the common school presented the opportunity for a formal education they had never had before.

Common primary schools were opened as the result of state and local initiatives, not in response to a mandate by the federal government. Excepting for the exclusion of those individuals and groups that did not enjoy equal rights of citizenship, common schools were formally classless and open to all children, boys and girls alike. They were operated by local school authorities and financed

19 The national government was involved at the margin, however, and I would suggest that its actions are evidence and symbolic of the value placed on educational opportunities and achievement that dates to early America. Under the Articles of Confederation, land was set aside for public education in the territories west of New York and north of the Ohio River—areas that would eventually become states—by the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. This territorial policy was continued under the U.S. Constitution of 1789.

20 I would like to emphasize that the common schools were formally classless. There were not legal rules and regulations that organized children according to their class or gender into different types of educational institutions. Nor are there today. America has not institutionalized a class-based education system. However, I would not propose that class, gender, or sundry other socioeconomic and demographic variables were not factors affecting the kind of schooling children received—or did not. Race certainly did, and still does today. Moreover, all common schools were not the same. What common schools were able to offer as an educational product and opportunity depended very much on local politics and community wealth, on parental determination to educate their children, on the educational resources and personnel available. These same factors, including class, race and gender, continue to affect the kind and quality of education that individual American children receive today. At the same time, and despite very significant demographic, educational product and facility differences across the country, as well as between urban, suburban and rural schools, (continued...)
through a combination of local government funding and parent contributions. Over time, as the common school increased in popularity and number across the nation, state-level funding gradually increased and family contributions declined to zero.

The common public school was implemented in substantial numbers and somewhat sooner in New England than elsewhere. For a longer time on the middle and southern seaboard, private and religious organizations continued to play a larger role in the establishment and support of schools. Once again, Massachusetts was at the forefront of change. It was among the first to establish tuition-free public education, beginning with common elementary schools in the 1820s. By the end of

20(...continued)

the United States public education system is still formally classless today. The institutions and structure of education for all students attending America’s public schools is consistent, regardless of their background. Any student, anywhere in the country, can theoretically move within the same institutional structure from the primary to the secondary level and then on to higher education. This is so even with the “tracking” that occurs in secondary schools, the placement of students in similar curriculums but of different academic rigor, and even for students whose secondary emphasis may be more vocational than academic. Those who successfully complete their secondary studies, from any track or curriculum, can move on to the tertiary level. However, history and data show that educational opportunities and achievement tends to vary according to student background. As one example, nearly 80 percent of America’s white population over age 25 had completed at least four years of high school in 1989, while only two-thirds of the black population had done the same (Valverde 1994, 6539). For another, the United States Supreme Court ordered in its 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that the nation’s public schools should be desegregated based on its finding of fact that separate school facilities based on race were “inherently unequal” because of the different and unequal educational opportunities they represented. An equalization of educational opportunities has never been achieved. One scholar has observed that the “selection of low SES (socioeconomic status) students to vocational programs, low ability groups, ‘throw-away’ curricular tracks is a daily routine of American schools. It is simply performed more smoothly, and is less explicitly articulated than in Germany” (Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed comments, 10 July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
the nineteenth century, with state after state following the lead of Massachusetts, the basic structure of America's public education system was largely established on the institutional foundation of the common school—tuition-free schools administered and financed by the states and local school districts with little federal support.

As well as increasing educational opportunities, the common school movement may also be associated with the growing role of state government in educational matters. The later 1830s saw the beginning of state-wide organization, administration and financial support coming to public school systems. State governments began to levy taxes to finance public education, participate with local authorities in the determination of curriculum requirements and courses of instruction, set attendance requirements, and certify teachers. Massachusetts was the first to create a state board of education in 1837, with lawyer and politician Horace Mann appointed its first head. During the 1840s Pennsylvania and New York followed with public school systems of their own. Local school systems were not taken over by state governments, however, not then or since that time. Over the years, despite rising levels of state and federal assistance and the influence that might be presumed to follow, various attempts by school reformers to centralize the authority for public education, and the trend to consolidate many governmental functions in larger political and administrative units, public education has remained very much a local governmental responsibility in the United States (Bengtson and Achenbaum 1993, 47).

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21 In 1852, Massachusetts was also the first state to make school attendance mandatory for primary-level students. By 1890, twenty-seven states had also enacted compulsory attendance laws. Mississippi was the last state to do so, in 1918.
That primary and secondary education is still largely a local effort does not mean the role played by the state is inconsequential. State funding is frequently critical to the operation of local school districts across the United States, and it is state governments that set the educational standards for all school districts within their jurisdiction. However, the part played by the national government is far less. General federal aid for primary and secondary education did not even come until 1965, when Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to provide federal funding to school districts with substantial numbers of children from low-income families. Total federal spending may now reach the vicinity of $15 billion as a result of legislation passed during the administration of G.W. Bush, but that is still less than 10 percent of the total public expenditures for primary and secondary education; and the federal government has no constitutional authority to set national education standards. Furthermore, state and local governments may decide not to accept federal funds for education, depending on the "strings" (the conditions) that Congress attaches for their use.

The Expansion of Postprimary Educational Opportunities

Over the course of the nineteenth century, beginning with the proliferation of the common school, public education facilities and enrollments grew rapidly to surpass those of private and religious organizations, first at the primary level and then in secondary and higher education. Along with this growth, sooner and more widely than in Europe, new subject matter and courses of instruction were introduced to the curriculum offerings of public, private and religious schools alike. In primary schools, courses in history, geography, the physical sciences, the arts, basic bookkeeping,
homemaking and physical education were added to the “3 R’s”—reading, writing and arithmetic. New offerings at the secondary level included advanced courses in mathematics and the sciences, language instruction, the social sciences, vocational, and technical training. For the variety of subjects taught, the different kinds of education and training available under a single roof, America’s secondary schools have come to be called comprehensive schools.

The increase in public educational facilities and making of the comprehensive school was very much a response to the changing educational requirements of America’s industrialization and economic development. In the early 1800s though, and with industrialization just beginning, educational achievement for the many was defined as having a primary-level education, not more. It follows that educational opportunity meant access to a common elementary school. Not until the later nineteenth and early twentieth century would educational opportunity and achievement be considered to mean secondary and then higher education. For several generations, the expansion of secondary and university level opportunities lagged those at the primary stage. In particular, what is today known as the United States’ ladder system of education took much more time to fully develop.

America’s ladder system is a nation-wide structure of educational opportunity and entitlement. It is a mostly public three-level hierarchy comprised of primary, secondary and higher education layers. At the first level, open to all children, is elementary or primary education. Students who complete primary school may advance to the secondary level and high school. Those who satisfy requirements at that level can move on to higher education, the top of the education ladder. No formal restrictions are placed on the upward movement of any student. An individual
may climb the education ladder as high as his or her desire, abilities, and educational achievements will take them. It was well into the twentieth century, however, before all three layers were firmly in place and educational opportunities at all three levels were widely inclusive of all races and social classes. At the end of the nineteenth century only the first rung of the ladder, the common elementary school, had been established. The expansion of secondary and higher education opportunities had not kept pace with those at the primary level, but there was also not a requirement or demand that they should during the early 1800s.

This is consistent with Kaelble's findings for France, Germany and Great Britain during the same general period. He determined that an increase in postprimary educational opportunities was not associated with economic growth and development at the early stages of industrialization, that linkage only coming later with more advanced industrialization and the requirement for a more educated workforce, and as scientific and technical knowledge became critical to further economic growth and development. Another source of demand was the growing administrative state, to fill the swelling ranks of its civil service. From the standpoint of consumer demand for secondary and higher education, Kaelble found it was not until the twentieth century that aspiring individuals from all classes came to recognize postprimary education as a gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunity (1981, 241-3).

In the early nineteenth century there was not much call for educational opportunities beyond the primary level. The educational requirements of industrialization and the administrative state were still decades away, and it would be even longer before there would be any significant consumer demand. In terms of the opportunities that actually existed, secondary and higher education were very far
from being the second and third rungs of the American education ladder, and
government was not under pressure to change this situation by creating new
opportunities in the public sector. It did not matter that common secondary schools
did not exist in numbers sufficient to receive all those children who had completed
their primary education. Of the few that did go on to attend a secondary school,
many did so only to augment their primary school education, not more; and with that
their formal education would end. Some would go on to university, but not many.
America’s first public high school did not even open until 1821, in the city of Boston.
In terms of growth as measured by new public school facilities, increasing
participation rates, curriculum development, and even compulsory attendance laws,
progress came later and much more slowly at the secondary level, its take-off not
coming until the second half of the nineteenth century. It would take some time
before secondary level educational opportunities matched and were synchronized
with those at the primary level.

Secondary education has a dual mission in American society today, one that
has evolved over two centuries. The first is to provide terminal education and training
to all children who have finished elementary school. Right into the current era, for
many, formal education has ended with high school. The other is preparation for
university studies, a function that has increased much in significance over the years. A
signal event in this regard was the 1862 Morrill Act which established the land-grant
college, the basis for America’s system of state universities and agricultural colleges.
Implementation of the Morrill Act had the effect of completing the structure of
America’s education ladder, and particularly that of the public sector. By making high
school preparatory to studies at a land-grant college, the Morrill Act created a new
and growing demand for secondary education, and it achieved a functional linkage between primary, secondary and higher education.

Despite their later start, secondary schools in the public sector grew to outnumber those in the private by the beginning of the twentieth century. The political activism and zeal for reform of the Progressive era figured prominently in this expansion; it gave it momentum. The popular American attitude toward education at that time is captured well by the works of the philosopher and reformer John Dewey, and for today as well. That view holds that an educated citizenry is vital to a good society, to democracy and national prosperity, as well as to individual growth and development. A good education system combines preparation for a productive life with the making of good citizens; it is a gateway to opportunity for both the individual and society. Therefore, state investment in educational expansion and opportunities is a good thing as it can contribute to making a more productive and better citizenry. Educational expansion and achievement, as measured by increasing secondary level enrollments and graduation rates, would


\[23\] It may also be argued that school expansion, beginning in colonial times, was a vehicle to maintain the class structure. Therefore, the political conflict perspective “should not be overlooked” as an important explanation for the expansion of schooling because “concerns with social destabilization and keeping structure (class included) in place as a result of growing immigration, urbanization, legacies of the Civil War and liberation of slaves, decline in westward migration, socialism/populism/trade unionism, etc. can be considered.” Also, “John Dewey with his idealism and democratic rhetoric was only one of and not the most influential (in real terms) reformists of that time. Charles Eliot and his doctrine of efficient management of education and building social stability by means of widening educational opportunities were of major importance then and now” (Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed comments, 10 July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
seem evidence that this was a philosophy acted upon. At the beginning of the twentieth century only 10 percent of the nation’s youth received any secondary education at all, and very few graduated. This changed rapidly with the implementation and growing enrollments in comprehensive secondary schools. By 1940 more than half of those eligible were enrolled and almost 40 percent completed their studies. Enrollment was well over 90 percent by the 1990s, and the graduation rate nearly 75 percent (Ignas and Corsini 1981, 5; OECD 1995, 135, 214).

Higher education was the last level of the American ladder system to undergo a wide-scale expansion of opportunities in association with an increasing state role, the last to see the public sector finally overtake the private. American higher education finds its beginnings with Harvard College, chartered by Massachusetts colony in 1636 as a school of liberal arts. The founding of Harvard was followed by several more colleges before the Revolutionary War, including: the College of William and Mary in 1693, Yale in 1701, the University of Pennsylvania in 1740, Princeton in 1746, Columbia in 1754, Brown University in 1764, Rutgers in 1766, Dartmouth in 1769, and Dickinson in 1773. This list is really indicative of the early dominance of the private sector in that all but Rutgers and William and Mary were independent colleges, i.e., not state-related or controlled. Moreover, even though William and Mary and Rutgers were both state institutions, the first state university was not chartered until 1785—the University of Georgia, which opened in 1801. The first state university to actually hold classes was the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, chartered in 1789 and opened in 1795. For some time, the public sector would continue to lag the private in higher education facilities and opportunities. Even as the country expanded westward after the Revolution and during the early
1800s, most of the new colleges were established by private and religious organizations. Today, however, state universities and state-supported colleges and universities are found in every state—and they outnumber the private sector in facilities, opportunities and enrollments. More directly than it affected the growth of secondary education, the 1862 Morrill Act was pivotal to this development.

The Morrill Act of 1862 that created the land-grant college, was a critical step toward public sector predominance of higher education; it helped to provide the means to that growth. Through this legislation the U.S. Congress gave federal lands to state governments, 30,000 acres for each of their congressmen, to support colleges that were to provide military training as well as faculties for agricultural, mechanical and home economics studies. While the national government had given land to the states for educational purposes before, this stipulation for their use was unique. Intended to see the establishment of at least one college in every state to teach "agriculture and the mechanic arts," many of America's great universities are land-grant colleges. There are 70 such schools today. This number includes the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Michigan State University and Ohio State University. A second Morrill Act was enacted in 1890 to provide annual federal funding to higher education. Morrill only helped set the stage, though, a great expansion of opportunities in higher education did not immediately and automatically follow its enactment. Just as the requirements of the workplace and customer demand

24 The American government of the Revolutionary War period, operating under the Articles of Confederation, legislated that land be set aside in the new western territories to support education. According to the Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, a 1/16 section of every township was designated for that purpose. How that land would actually be utilized was left to the states and their local governments.
were not there to stimulate the expansion of opportunities at the secondary level, it would take even longer for there to be similar pressures for higher education.

World War II marks a critical turning point in U.S. education policy, and especially for higher education. It was during the immediate postwar period that the large-scale expansion of enrollments and opportunities in higher education really began, and that coincided with a new policymaking role for the federal government in educational affairs. In particular, the take-off in higher education is associated with passage of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act in 1944. Popularly referred to as the "G.I. Bill," this federal legislation offered financial assistance to college-bound military veterans. Between 1944 and 1951 over 2.2 million ex-servicemen benefitted from this program. In response to the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, and other scientific achievements, Congress passed the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) to provide financial assistance and encourage education in the physical sciences, in mathematics and engineering, in the social sciences and the humanities. Over the longer term, the increase in student enrollments that are associated with the G.I. Bill and other educational assistance programs like the NDEA—for veterans and non-veterans alike—inaugurated a period of expansion in American higher education enrollments and opportunities that continued into the 1990s and beyond. Almost 14 million students were enrolled at the nation's colleges in 1989. In 1992 nearly 39 percent of those in the 18-21 age group were participating in some public or private program at the tertiary level, 25 percent at universities and almost 14 percent in non-university programs. What is remarkable, and truly indicative of the open-ended and inclusive nature of the opportunity offered by America's higher education system, is the part of this expansion that may be attributed to the growing participation of older
non-traditional students. While the enrollment of students aged 24 years and younger rose by 24 percent between 1970 and 1989, those of students older than 24 increased by 141 percent over the same period (OECD 1995, 153; Valverde 1994, 6541-2).

Employment and Vocational Training Programs in American Education

A separate institutional structure for employment and vocational training like and with the magnitude of the German dual system was never established in the American education system. There are now and have been vocational programs, however. As was noted earlier, the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act provided federal matching funds to states for vocational training programs below the university level. In 1963 Congress passed the Vocational Education Act requiring each state to establish a Board of Vocational Education, with federal funding made available to the programs those bodies might establish. In 1973 Congress adopted the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) to combine the funding for the different training programs of the federal government into a single block grant. However, CETA was abolished by the Congress in 1981 amidst complaints it had mainly become a public program for the employment of the most job-ready, and not job training. In 1982 Congress tried again with the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), a program to provide federal funds to local programs that retrained adult and offered summer jobs for young people. But the JTPA, like similar efforts, has never really taken root like vocational programs in many European countries.²⁵ It has been observed of the more recent history of vocational education that “the decline in

²⁵Benjamin Ginsberg, Theodore J. Lowi, and Margaret Weir, We the People (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 729.
vocational program enrollments in the 1990s was to a great extent the result of extreme inefficiency of vocation education programs to prepare for jobs or to guarantee a job.  

In the final analysis, the primary function of the American education system is—and has been—to provide a general education, not terminal vocational training or any other specific preparation of the nation’s youth for the workplace. This objective is reflected by the relatively standard general education curriculum found in primary and secondary schools across the nation, and it is borne out by the statistics cited earlier, that 60 percent of all high school graduates moved directly into higher education in 2000, and that only 225 of America’s thousands of high schools are even considered vocational (Marlow-Ferguson 2002, 1511; Valverde 1994, 6542). Because educational achievement is defined today as having a college education, the purpose of the secondary curriculum has become the preparation of students to advance to that next level. That requires a general education including courses in the physical sciences, mathematics, history, the social sciences, languages, and the humanities. Whatever the differences borne of decentralization and local implementation responsibilities, this emphasis is very consistent in the curriculum offerings of education systems across the United States.

Education Reform

The expansion of postprimary educational opportunities is central to America’s welfare strategy. Educational achievement is encouraged by American

26Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed comments, 10 July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo.
society and through public policy as the key to personal fulfillment, socioeconomic success and security, the alternative to reliance on the safety nets of state-supported social insurance programs. While America's social welfare system is minimal in comparison to most other Western nations, no other country invests so heavily in public education relative to its other social programs.  

Given the pivotal role given the education system in the American welfare strategy, the call and movements for school reform must be viewed as natural to its national politics. Few other policy areas command such continuous and widespread attention on the political agenda at all levels of government. With educational attainment so encouraged as the leveler of social inequalities and great gateway to socioeconomic opportunities, the education system is a ready issue for the political process and a logical target for reform. Although the problems cited and the solutions are many and varied, the goal of reform can typically be distilled to a single and common objective: an education system of the very highest quality that leaves no individual behind in their preparation for an independent, productive, and successful adult life. Whether the solution advocated is additional funding for the Head Start program, higher school taxes, facilities renovation, hiring more teachers, curriculum revision, standardized testing, or vouchers, this seems to be the common theme that joins all reformers. The dilemma comes in reaching any agreement on particular problems and a specific definition of the education mission—what the objectives and curriculum of a “quality” education system are, and whether the education system

\[27\] No assumptions are made about the efficiency of that spending, how that money is distributed, or about real outcomes in terms of the distribution of educational opportunities and achievement.
should be “one size fits all” or somehow targeted to certain individual and group requirements. Absent such a consensus about the education problem and mission, it is little wonder there has been tremendous disagreement over the necessary solutions.

The quality of the education product delivered by the nation’s public schools is foremost among the concerns of many calling for education reform today. The poor performance of public school students on standardized tests like the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) are frequently cited as proof of this problem. Along with insufficient funding, poor teachers and substandard facilities, singled out as a major contributory cause are the “anti-intellectual” curricula so prevalent today, educational programs and policies that downplay academic excellence (Ravitch 2000). What is required instead, so the argument goes, are the high standards of a rigorous academic curriculum. Only with an academic curriculum will students undergo the necessary intellectual development and receive the preparation required to succeed in the workplace, in higher education, and for life in society at-large. Having a national standard for education would be best, with standardized tests utilized to measure student progress and school performance (Ravitch 2000). Whatever the merit of this recommendation, implementation would be difficult given state and local responsibilities for education.

More controversial are proposals for “school choice,” allowing parents to choose the schools their children will attend. Proponents of school choice argue that children would receive the quality education to which they are entitled with such a policy, often adding that the market-like competition that would ensue between schools to attract students would ultimately lead to a better education product. Many critics of school choice counter that such a policy would only make worse existing
inequalities in funding between schools and school districts. They point out that school choice does not address the problem of educational quality, that it would simply reward schools that were already well-financed with even greater funding while penalizing the poor and underperforming schools with even less. Opponents of school choice argue that free market analogies do not apply to education. Many parents, and especially the poor, are unable to take advantage of school choice opportunities. Transportation may be a problem and, even with vouchers, they cannot afford a private alternative to the public school system. The answer, they claim, is in providing a quality education in the public school system and that is where the focus and effort should be. Moreover, many would insist that public monies going to private and religious schools in the form of vouchers, or indirectly as tax credits, violate the constitutional separation of church and state.28

School choice proposals and implementations have taken several forms over time and across the nation. Home-schooling is a traditional option open to parents in many states. Today, though, the most popular may be the experiment with charter schools. Created first by Minnesota in 1990, charter schools are funded by state tax dollars and operate under state guidelines independent of local school boards. These schools are given considerable freedom in designing their own curricula, in staffing, and to spend as they see best fits their mission. As a real school choice option for parents, however, demand has exceeded supply. Although by 1998 over 165,000 students were enrolled in almost 800 charter schools that had been opened in twenty-three states and the District of Columbia, many schools determined

admissions by lottery while others "counseled out" students they determined ill-suited
to their programs. Another state and local implementation of school choice permits
parents to choose the public school their child will attend in the school district of
their residence. This has sometimes been extended to include nearby public school
districts that agree to be part of such an arrangement. At least sixteen states have
adopted such an out-of-district school choice option. Another version extends school
choice to private and religious schools, with parents given state vouchers or tax
credits that can be applied to tuition costs. Milwaukee and Cleveland currently
support voucher programs. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 2002 that
Cleveland's voucher program did not violate the constitutional separation of church
and state.

The 2000 presidential campaign found both the Democratic and Republican
candidates calling for a greater federal role in public education. Republican George
W. Bush called for making schools more accountable, tying a school's federal aid to
the performance of its students in grades three through eight on standardized reading
and math tests. In association, Bush proposed an increase of approximately $10
billion in federal spending to support reading programs for disadvantaged youth,
teacher recruitment and training, charter schools, and new technologies acquisition.
He also favored vouchers and federal funding to help parents pay for the costs of

29 For additional statistics and discussion on the topic of charter schools and
school choice more generally, see Thomas Toch, "The New Education Bazaar," *U.S.

30 A detailed discussion of the current status of both the school voucher and
charter school programs is provided by Gerald W. Bracey, "The Condition of Public
private schools. Democrat Al Gore's education plan focused on “fixing” the public school system. He also advocated greater school accountability, saying that failing schools should be closed and reopened under a new leadership if they did not meet specified standards. Like Bush, Gore favored the creation of charter schools, but not vouchers or federal assistance that would go to the private sector. Gore also talked about standardized tests to measure student performance, but he would have made them voluntary. Under Gore's plan, federal aid would not be made contingent upon mandatory testing. Gore also wanted improve the quality of America's teachers, especially in low-income rural areas and the inner-cities. To do so he proposed hiring more teachers and increasing teachers' salaries, in-service training and evaluation, and a plan to provide $10,000 scholarships to college students who would teach in "high need" schools for four years following their graduation.

Concerns about the quality of the nation's education system and calls for reform did not go away after the 2000 elections. Education reform is an ongoing process in America, not an event, and it continues to hold a prominent position on the political agenda at all levels of government. However, because education is a state and local function, it is unlikely any national standards will finally be set for institutional structures, curriculums, or student performance. Experiments will continue with vouchers, charter schools, and parental choice across and within the fifty states. There may be more standardized testing nationwide, but it is unlikely there will be a national standard. Although the Bush administration has been successful in seeing the enactment of legislation that attaches federal monies to the results of standardized tests conducted by the states, it remains to be seen how this new policy will be implemented. It has largely been left for the states to decide.
A Discussion of American Education Policy

The logic of industrialization does not help explain the spread of mass education in nineteenth century America. Educational expansion often took place in rural areas before more industrialized sections of the country. In the antebellum period much of the growth in public schooling occurred in the rural Midwest. In the Mid-Atlantic and more developed New England areas it began even before large-scale industrialization (Bengtson and Achenbaum 1993, 47). Nor can the actions of a ruling elite, the mobilization of working class interests, or the power of the state explain this phenomenon. Educational opportunities began to expand at the primary level prior to large-scale industrialization, when political parties were in their infancy, and before the modern administrative nation-state. Neither the states nor the national government were greatly involved in education policy.

Arguments that mass education systems were created as instruments of ruling class domination—through the concerted actions of a unified economic elites—or by modern administrative states, lack historical foundation. Any “concerted action” by capitalist interests was highly unlikely in early America (Fuller and Rubinson 1992, 11). In his study of the causes for educational expansion in the United States, Rubinson (1986) claims that “class analyses have failed because (1) they neglect the role of the political process in transforming class interests into institutional patterns, and (2) they neglect the process by which political structures themselves become important determinants of class formation” (519). Such explanations tend to overlook the infancy of the United States government, the weak national party system of the
1800s, and that class-based politics have never been a salient feature of American politics.

A better explanation may be found in the localism that is often characteristic of American politics, a legacy of the early nation and its state-building. There was not a powerful central government in the early years of the United States. Very often, even the ability of state and local governments to effectively rule was tenuous. The geographic spread of the nation, the physical insecurity of frontier environs, poor communications and difficult transportation, all these encouraged localist tendencies and a reverence for individualism. To seek local solutions in answer to local requirements—like education of the young—was the norm, not an exception. Localist tendencies were reinforced by the federal design of the Constitution and then by the evolution of the American federal state.

As for the expansion and increasing public support of secondary and higher education opportunities that began in the early twentieth century, this development really cannot be considered apart from the emergence of the American welfare state and its social programs. New educational opportunities and social entitlements grew in parallel. Skocpol goes so far as to contend that even the education benefits offered to veterans of the armed services should properly be considered within the framework of social programs undertaken by the government to promote the general welfare of society (1987, 352). Indeed, for those who took advantage of its provisions, the 1944 G.I. Bill represented a great socioeconomic opportunity. The same may be said for other tuition grants and student loan programs that are promoted by the states and federal government to encourage greater enrollments at the nation’s colleges and universities. The priority of higher education as a national
objective is underscored by the level of financial support it receives from the federal government. Whereas the national government’s contribution to combined primary and secondary funding represents only 7.6 percent of the total, its share of spending for higher education is 36.2 percent (OECD 1995, 117, 118).

A welfare strategy that stigmatizes public assistance, emphasizes self-help, and encourages educational achievement goes a long way to explain the absence of a comprehensive social welfare system in the United States. Indeed, it has been argued that state support of educational expansion and opportunity in the America is, and has been, an alternative to other social programs (Heclo 1985; Janowitz 1976; King 1973; Welter 1962). Beyond recognizing the right to a basic education as a core citizen entitlement, legislation adopted by the federal and state governments has encouraged—but not guaranteed—educational achievement as the way to individual economic independence and security. This was the case with the G.I. Bill and so many other financial grant and student loan programs supported by the states and federal government. The effort to achieve an equitable distribution of educational opportunities has not been without problems, however. Over the years there have been several instances of legislation and judicial rulings intended to promote greater equality, to advance or protect minority civil and political rights, and otherwise encourage individual achievement by opening up and expanding educational and other socioeconomic opportunities—particularly for minorities and women. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955, Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty,” and the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and beyond provide excellent examples. Likewise does the conservative welfare backlash of the 1980s and 1990s, the reforms undertaken by many states to reduce their welfare rolls, the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996, the plans for education reform of the Clinton and Bush administrations, education reform as a central issue in the 2000 national elections and beyond, the school voucher and “choice” movements. All these indicate a continuing commitment by America’s government and political leadership to a minimal welfare state and an emphasis, instead, on self-help through work and educational attainment.

Conclusions and Discussion

Explanations for Education and Social Welfare Policies: Germany and America

The adoption of social insurance and other income maintenance programs took place much later in the United States than Europe. In the particular case of public health and housing, the American lag in social legislation was far longer than a generation and the benefits provisions have been far more limited, both in comprehensiveness and the portion of the population covered (Heidenheimer 1973, 316-17). With respect to spending, while European states have committed a greater and growing proportion of their GDPs to implement social programs over recent years, social expenditures by the United States have not grown as much (Lane, McKay, and Newton 1996).

On the other hand, America set the pace in the expansion of public education at the post-primary level. The expansion of secondary level educational opportunities began long before the “big bang” of the New Deal. A generation passed before Europe followed the 1890s “takeoff” of secondary education in the United States (Heidenheimer 1973, 316, 319). Likewise, in the early years after the Second World
War, the United States led the way in the expansion of opportunities in higher education.

On the surface, a structural socioeconomic explanation for the social programs adopted by Germany in the 1880s and the United States in the 1930s seems appropriate. It is difficult not to argue that those social reforms were undertaken as state responses to the effects of industrialization, that they were measures undertaken to preserve order and the status quo. They certainly were, to a large degree. Industrialization had been underway for some time in each country, especially in the United States. In both nations, major and initial social welfare legislation was preceded by a period of national economic crisis and enacted during a time of social unrest. Germany's social programs of the 1880s came after a series of economic problems in the 1870s, America's New Deal social legislation during the Great Depression of the 1930s. However, it is just too simple and deterministic to leave the explanation with the logic of industrialism or as the response of a state controlled by a capitalist elite intent on maintaining the social order. Politics mattered too, and a great deal, both for the timing of social reforms and the substantive result. Skocpol and Ikenberry (1983) have proposed that

Pioneering social insurance innovations, especially, were not simply responses to the socioeconomic dislocations of industrialism; nor were they straightforward concessions to demands by trade unions or working-class based parties. Rather they are best understood... as sophisticated efforts at anticipatory political incorporation of the industrial working class, coming earlier (on the average) in paternalist, monarchical-bureaucratic regimes that hoped to head off working-class radicalism, and coming slightly later (on the average) in gradually democratizing liberal parliamentary regimes, whose competing political parties hoped to mobilize new working-class voters into their existing political organizations and coalitions (90).
For both countries the political process was very important, and especially their political leadership. The leadership and actions of Bismarck and Roosevelt were critical to the legislative process and outcomes, probably more so than the institutional activities of either the German Reichstag or the U.S. Congress. It was not democratization or leftist governments, but the actions of conservative authoritarian and centrist political leaderships that made social reform possible in both countries. Although leftist party rule was not a factor in either state, their political influence and that of organized labor and a restive working class most probably were—and more so in Germany than America. The political constellation of forces was changing in both nations and the actions of the political leadership may be seen as indicative of, and a reaction to, economic developments and a changing domestic political context—hard times, working class discontent, and the growing attractiveness in the political mainstream of social policies championed by the left.

Similarly, a structural socioeconomic explanation does not suffice for the expansion of educational opportunities in Germany and America. Mass education in Germany and America took place long before large-scale industrialization, in rural areas as well as urban. It was independent of industrial requirements. Therefore, the logic of industrialism is not an acceptable explanation. Nor was the growth of educational opportunities at the primary level a function of political regime type, of government organization, or particular partisan control. Instead, most scholars tend to concur with Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer (1985)—the "John Meyer" school—that mass education is best associated with the process of modern state-building. The expansion of secondary and higher education represents a decidedly different case, however. Industrialization, the political process, partisanship, democratization, the
emergence and growth of the administrative welfare state are all important variables. Educational expansion and reforms at the postprimary level correspond and appear to be associated with advancing industrialization, increasing democratization, and partisan control by those who championed social welfare programs and greater socioeconomic opportunity for all members of society. The SPD was behind many of the initiatives and reforms in Germany that expanded educational opportunities. In America it was the partisan control of government by Progressives and the Democratic party, with their agendas for socio-political reform and greater socioeconomic opportunity.

It was also not increasing democratization that triggered social reforms, as the pluralist variant of political conflict theory would predict, for that would have put America ahead of Germany in the legislation of social insurance. A more inclusive and participatory government does not explain the different timing. When Germany undertook major social reforms in the 1880s, male suffrage was still very limited and women could not vote. By comparison, the American political process was far more inclusive even though women were also denied the franchise. Part of the explanation can be found in the different political movements and party systems of the two countries. Germany's earlier adoption of a social security system may well be attributable to the catalytic influence of working class mobilization, the rise of social democratic politics, and the anticipation of greater enfranchisement, factors that did not play a similar role in development of the American welfare state. Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan (1989) argue that countries with democratic governments, like the United States, may be late in social policy development for lack of a
necessary consensus, while more authoritarian governments—like Bismarck’s—may act sooner out of their concern for legitimacy (132).

The United States does not have a tradition of labor-based and socialist parties, nor of conservative politics comparable to Germany’s. There has never been a political movement or programmatic political party in the United States like the SPD in Germany that mobilized and represented the interests of the working class and organized labor, had a chance to win elections, to form a government, and control the legislative agendas at the national and local levels. Although American labor has frequently been found aligned with the positions of the Democratic party, particularly since the 1930s when that party won the White House and a majority in the Congress, this has not meant the rise of working class consciousness or labor-based leftist parties as it did in Germany (cf. Hicks, Misra, and Ng, 1995).

At the same time, however much they were politically conscious, organized—or not—and represented in the political process, the working class and labor were the major beneficiaries of social reform in Germany and America. That remains so today and now also includes the middle class. What has been different are the roles of the working class and labor-based political parties at the front-end of the policymaking process and within the government. The growing influence of social democracy and labor-based politics spurred the conservative Bismarck to action, in order to blunt the left’s growing political support he preempted its social welfare agenda. Later years would see a change in political fortunes, and it would be the SPD as the party-in-government that would implement social programs in the name of labor and working class interests. Labor, the working class, and Social Democracy have had no comparable impact in American politics. Although there was clearly apprehension
about communists, socialists and organized labor in some Washington circles during
the time of the Great Depression, it was not fear of the left that was the motivating
force for the Roosevelt administration’s New Deal. Indeed, Roosevelt required a
political consensus of the center and the right, not pressure from the left and labor to
advance the social welfare interests of the working class. Indeed, as the story goes,
the support of organized labor may have been tough to get anyhow; important labor
leaders like Samuel Gompers preferred to keep and pursue labor and working class
interests as part of their negotiations with industrial management (Heidenheimer
1973, 318-9).

Despite their different origins and timing, however the government was
moved to action in the first place, Bismarck’s social insurance initiatives of the 1880s
and Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s similarly put social welfare on the permanent
government agenda in both countries. It is no exaggeration to say that the German
and American welfare states of today represent the institutionalization of that agenda.
Likewise, the welfare state has not become the instrument and servant of working
class interests; neither country manifests an absolute convergence of working class
and state interests in its social programs—and it would hardly be expected to be
otherwise. Germany’s social insurance programs emphasize the collective
responsibility of groups for the welfare of their members. Social safety nets are
comprehensive in their coverage and broad in their inclusiveness, but they operate to
protect and maintain the status quo; and they tend to perpetuate the existing class
structure and inequalities. America’s social welfare provisions are intended to
encourage individual responsibility for one’s own welfare. Benefits are minimal and
educational opportunity is encouraged as an alternative means and gateway to
individual social security. Like Germany's, the American welfare system tends to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic order and its inequalities.

Existing institutions and organizations also played a central role in the welfare legislation of the United States and Germany. New social programs were not created out of thin air. Private and religious groups were involved in the business of social assistance before the state in both countries, and local and regional levels of government before the national. The social policies of the German and American welfare states were built upon the experience and example of these local and regional programs. Germany had the model of the guild associations upon which to structure its government-brokered social insurance system. America had the experience of the states and local governments to draw upon. They were the incubators and laboratories for the social policies of the New Deal's "big bang." The point is, whether from an existing federal arrangement or as the result of a commitment to decentralization, the social welfare provisions of both countries drew upon local and regional experiences with public assistance, and they still reflect those local origins and influence today. That legacy is evident in the administrative decentralization of many social programs and the continued preference for local solutions today, including education. The implementation of a federal frame for government in both countries has overlaid this local foundation.

Looking back, it seems clear that much of the policymaking for social welfare programs and education—Bismarck's social insurance initiatives, school reforms during Weimar, health care insurance as part of Roosevelt's New Deal, medical coverage for just the elderly and poor under Lyndon Johnson, implementation of the Gesamtschule—reflects the tenacity of existing institutions to structure and resist
fundamental change, as well as the reality that politics is often the "art of the possible." As time passes, current policy and institutions explain very much of subsequent policymaking, for defining the structure and rules of the game—what is possible. Clearly, neither Bismarck nor Roosevelt invented anything very new in social welfare. Instead, to their credit and advantage, they evaluated what policy solutions were already "out there," judged what was politically feasible, and built upon that—social security programs already implemented locally. Likewise, one might argue that the limited health care provisions adopted under Lyndon Johnson—Medicare and Medicaid—were all that could be accomplished given the particular politics and institutionalization of American welfare state at that time.

Institutions like the welfare state are the legacy of prior political activities, but they are not the stuff from which history is made and written. Institutions only affect, they do not determine political behavior and outcomes. Although institutional structuring is a very important factor in determining what is "politically possible"—what may happen at a moment in time—that opportunity is modified, made greater or less, by the occurrence of particular events and/or the presence of certain individuals. Institutions can help to explain the "how" and "why" of political phenomena but, at best, it is a partial account. Institutions do not tell the "who," "what," and "when" that is the substance of history, nor do they provide the human component of the "how" and "why." A more complete and satisfactory explanation for political phenomena also includes consideration for the individuals who make history—the Bismarcks and Roosevelts—and the cataclysmic events—like economic depressions and war—that are the stuff and shapers of history. In this respect, Kingdon's (1995) model of the policymaking process may bring something essential to explanations of
social welfare and education policies in the United States and Germany. His hypothesis that a “window” for policymaking may open when particular problems, policy solutions (ideas), and political opportunities (mandates and political entrepreneurs) come together helps to separate and highlight the variables of interest, to ascertain the timing and decisive nature of the context in which policies are produced—history is made.

The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely when a policy window—an opportunity to push pet proposals or one’s conceptions of problems—is open.

Policy windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream. Hence, there are “problems windows” and “political windows” (Kingdon 1995, 194).

The institutionalization of a welfare state and the development of its social programs depends very much upon the circumstances of origination. Appreciation for existing institutions is certainly important, but recognition of “compelling problems” and “happenings in the political stream” is essential to any meaningful explanation of welfare state development and policymaking in Germany and the United States. As it concerns social welfare policies, the state of the economy, unemployment, partisan politics, and the role of individuals in political leadership are especially significant. For Germany of the 1880s and the United States in the 1930s, the state of the economy, political institutions, political leadership, and the existence of local solutions were decisive factors in social welfare outcomes. It has not been the same for education policy, however. Like the welfare state, postprimary educational expansion can be associated with economic development. But the history of educational expansion and reform has been mostly of gradual change, not of sudden
"big bangs." The state of the economy and unemployment levels can have a temporary effect on enrollments—with student populations growing during times of rising unemployment—but without being a catalyst for education reforms or a permanent expansion of educational opportunities. Although partisan politics have been important to educational reform in both Germany and America, the role of specific political leaders has been much less a factor, especially at the national level. Education policy in Germany and America has been more subject to the influence of local forces and politics than social welfare policy. It has tended to evolve slowly, building on the cumulative experience and lessons learned at the state and local level. One might be able to point to a state—or a school district—that "started the ball rolling" in education reform, but nothing in education policy happened all at once in every state across either nation.

The Association Between Education and Social Welfare Policies: Germany and America

Only a limited number of scholars have actually addressed a specific relationship between state provisions for social welfare and education (Castles 1989; de Swaan 1988; Furáker, Johansson, and Lind 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Hage, Hanneman, and Gargan 1989; Hecllo 1985; Heidenheimer 1973, 1981; Janowitz 1976; Lindert 1994). Of the literature that does exist and is relevant to this discussion, more has been written about Germany than the United States.

While it is certainly far more than mere conjecture, the policy association that exists between social welfare and education in Germany and America—and other Western societies as well—must largely be established by inference. Although
education and other social welfare policies reflect common societal objectives, there is not a specific and ongoing empirical linkage between the two—within the political system, the organization of government, the legislative process, or in administration and support. Indeed, and once again, it would be unusual to find a single government official or agency that has real and comprehensive authority over both policy areas. This does not mean to say that political leaders and others within government do not have or do not advocate complementary policy stances on social welfare and education—in fact, they often do, and what they have to say and how they act is most telling of the relationship that does exist between the two policy areas—but no one individual or group has the power to implement a particular policy strategy for education and social welfare. Bismarck attempted to do so, but he failed in his attempt to implement a strategy for social welfare and education that would make them both instruments of state power for societal control. Indeed, there was effective resistance to his linkage of social and education policy—from the working class, from local and religious authorities, from partisan opposition and other vested interests, because of the implementation and institutionalization of government, and from the bureaucracy (Mitchell 1991, 49-50; Nevermann and Richter 1983, 85; Rimlinger 1971, 114-15, 126-9; Wehler 1993, 116-21). As powerful as the German chancellor and American president are, those offices are no exception.

In Western nations the decisionmaking authority and implementation responsibilities for education and social policy are normally divided and shared between branches and levels of government. Primarily it is legislatures and parliaments that make policy—through a partisan process that often includes specialists and other vested interests—and then some government bureaucracy is
charged with the task of program implementation. Education and social programs are normally administered by bureaucracies that are functionally separate, even in cases where they have been agencies in the same government ministry or department. It is also very common to find decisionmaking authority and implementation responsibilities decentralized—particularly for education, but also for social welfare—even absent a federal arrangement or some other constitutionally mandated division of governmental powers.

The Problem With Federalism

The federal attribute of the German and American states makes it more difficult—but not impossible—to identify the linkage between education and social policy. It is a challenge because the responsibility for education and social programs is divided and shared between branches, organizations, and levels of government. Education is primarily a state and local function in both Germany and the United States. Social welfare, on the other hand, has a decidedly national character. It is far more pronounced in Germany with its more mature and comprehensive social insurance system than in the U.S. with its hodgepodge of social programs, where the protection of social safety nets can vary so greatly from state to state.

31 First created as an agency within the Ministry of the Interior, in 1817 the Education Ministry of the Prussian government was moved to department status within the Ministry of Religion, Education and Public Health, with separate divisions for primary, secondary and higher education. Only in 1969 did the German federal government finally establish a Ministry of Education. In the United States, education was included with other social welfare programs when the Eisenhower administration established the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953. A separate Department of Education was established by the Carter administration in 1979.
The constitution of neither country includes any instructions about a necessary association of education with social policy. If one is looking for specific institutional linkages or common policymakers and processes, then the governmental organization and delegations of power that are detailed by each federal constitution offer very little to illuminate that relationship. As a matter of fact, the provisions of neither constitution really tell exactly how the federal system actually works, how the policymaking for education and other social programs actually takes place, or how those programs have finally been implemented. In both countries the executive and legislative bodies that were given constitutional authority over social welfare and/or education policy at the national and state levels have delegated much of that power to bureaucracies and lower levels of government, that were then made responsible for program administration and support. In both countries there are participants and processes in the policymaking for education and social policy that are not constitutionally defined.

But even without a constitutional road map, the linkage between education and social policy is clear in the manner those programs were developed, implemented, and institutionalized over time, across and between levels of the German and American federal systems. In the first place, the current education and social programs of each welfare state developed in response to many of the same political and socioeconomic forces. Whatever the functional separation of governmental responsibilities for each policy sector, they were products of the same political system and the same world. It makes sense that they might reflect complementary societal objectives. Second, such a linkage is supported by the history of government organization and policy administration in both countries. For extended
periods of time in both Germany and the United States, the government offices charged with educational affairs were agencies within the ministries or departments responsible for other social programs. A separate federal Ministry of Education was not established in Germany until 1969, and a U.S. Department of Education was not created until 1979. Third, the lines of debate for the partisan conflict over social and education policy have been fairly constant in both countries over time. There has been a remarkable continuity in the platforms of the major political parties and the policy positions that their leaderships have advocated over the years.

The individuals and groups that have made and administered education and social policies in Germany and America represent strong evidence of the association between those two policy areas. The division of responsibilities in a federal arrangement does not mean that elected and appointed public officials, even bureaucrats—whatever their function in government—have not formed a coherent opinion that brings together education and social welfare programs. This is particularly true of those holding or seeking elective offices. Candidates for public office are normally pressed to declare their policy positions as a matter of public record during the campaign process, so that the electorate might evaluate and determine which candidate should receive their vote to participate in the decisionmaking process for education, social welfare and other public policy matters. Moreover, federal systems see a good deal of personnel movement, within and between the local, state and national governments. Over the course of a public career it is likely that elected and appointed office-holders—and many bureaucrats, too—will become exposed to and involved with education or social welfare policy—and frequently both. For legislators, who often advance from state-level seats
to national, it is normal. I would argue it is not illogical to conclude a complementarity to the social and education policies a legislator might champion.

Judges likewise, who may be elected or appointed to a number of benches throughout the state and federal systems during their career, may preside over cases concerning both education and social programs. There are not separate courts for social welfare and educational matters. One would presume some consistency of thought in their legal decisions.

It is a nation's political leadership, though, who may best illustrate at the individual level the relationship between education and social policy. They are expected to have a comprehensive view of education and social welfare. Moreover, with political careers that often have roots in state and local government, they typically have experience with the substantively different issues and programs of education and social welfare at the state and national levels. In this regard, four of the last five U.S. presidents served as state governors—Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and G. W. Bush—before moving on to the White House. This applies as well to the German chancellor and to the leadership of the Bundestag and U.S. Congress. Those individuals, the policies that they and their national political parties represent, speak loudly to the harmony that exists between education and social policies.  

32 This is not meant to imply that the education and social welfare policies of Germany and the United States are or should be perfectly matched, that they represent the precise implementation of one or another party's plan for education and social policy, or that there are no logical inconsistencies between the two policy areas. A welfare state's portfolio of education and social policies is a slow-to-evolve work-in-process. Its education and social programs were not all given birth at the same historical moment by the same government with the same societal objectives in response to the same socioeconomic and political forces, after which time all provisions remain forever unchanged. Although I would argue that there is a (continued...)
As well as at the individual level, there is another important policy linkage at the group level—one that operates both within and outside the government. Political parties develop policy positions on social welfare and education in order to mobilize electoral support, win elections and run the government. Their campaign platforms and rhetoric of the major German and American political parties provide excellent examples. Germany's Social Democrats might be associated with calls for a more generous social welfare system and a more egalitarian education system, the CDU/CSU for social insurance that supports the existing socioeconomic order and an education system to match. From the American Republican Party are heard calls for reform of the nation's social welfare programs, for private insurance alternatives, greater personal responsibility, and support of educational opportunities that would include an expansion of private sector alternatives. Republican president G.W. Bush is representative of the belief in personal responsibility, less and minimal public assistance programs, and a greater reliance on private market insurance alternatives.

32(...continued)

A common theme to the social and education policies of each welfare state—Esping-Andersen (1990) has described three general types—a theme that becomes ever stronger as the welfare state matures and institutionalizes, its programs need not ever be in complete harmony in terms of their societal objectives. Individual education and social programs will reflect their enactment as a response to different socioeconomic forces at different points in time by different partisan governments for different societal objectives—all which affect a program's implementation, institutionalization and subsequent path dependence. However, as the welfare state continues to mature over time its portfolio of education and social policies can be expected—as a consequence of exposure to the same socioeconomic and political forces, and because of subsequent legislative amendments and reforms—to converge within their separate policy sectors. The provisions of new programs will tend to reflect similar objectives and methods of implementation. Germany's long-term care insurance is a good example. If a prescription drug program for seniors is adopted by the U.S. government, it will likely build upon the existing foundation of Medicare and Medicaid.
As a strategy of education reform he supports a market-like competition for students by the nation's public and private schools, with vouchers given to parents that would permit them to make a school "choice." Democrats also make the case for welfare reform, but they would advocate a broadening of the social safety net and champion its expansion to include new provisions for health care. Their notion of education reform means improving the quality of the public school system. Former vice-president and presidential candidate Al Gore advocated reforms of the current social welfare system that he believed were necessary to put it on a firm financial ground for future generations, expansion of its safety net—particularly in the area of public health—and "fixing" the public schools over the expansion of private sector alternatives.

In the final analysis, although the policy linkage is very real, individual politicians and bureaucrats generally have only very limited or no simultaneous policymaking authority over both education and social programs. There is no one individual or agency of government in the United States or Germany that is completely in charge and responsible for either and all areas of social or education policy. Even a president or chancellor whose party also controls the national and many state governments, the political agenda and decisionmaking process, is limited in his or her ability to create or modify the public policy for education or social welfare in any wholesale fashion. The U.S. president and Congress have no formal

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Governors of American states may come closest, with some powers and responsibilities in each policy area. However, not only is a governor’s authority typically very limited—checked and circumscribed by other organizations and layers of government—but it does not touch on all social welfare and education programs supported by their state and the federal government.
authority over the policymaking and administration of local school districts, and local
school boards have no control over the administration of Social Security or
Medicare. A similar compartmentalization of social welfare and education programs
exists in Germany, and it is unlikely to change. This structural separation of education
and social policy sectors is institutionalized in both countries, it is the way things are
done, and it will naturally resist change that is too fast or too radical a departure from
the existing rules of the game.

**Summary Conclusions**

The difficulties of federalism aside, what can be said about the social and
education policies of Germany and the United States? What is the nature of the
association between the two policy areas in each country, and what differences can be
cited between Germany and the United States? There are several points that stand
out.

**First,** and certainly the most obvious, the social welfare and education
systems of the two countries are not the same. Germany and the United States are
two very different kinds of welfare states, with unique education and social policy
profiles that reflect distinctive societal goals and objectives. The institution of
Germany’s welfare state presumes the collective responsibility of groups for the
general welfare and social security of their members. Its comprehensive suite of
compulsory social programs were structured to ensure that protection, and
simultaneously to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic and political order. The
state’s primary role is that of broker in a social insurance system where employers
and employees are the primary contributors and administrators. Benefit levels are
determined by one’s occupation group and what has been “earned.” Dependent family members are covered under the provisions of the working family member’s insurance coverage—who is assumed to be male. Only a marginal private sector exists, to service the insurance needs of specific professions and those individuals with greater economic means.

Germany’s education system complements the social policies of its welfare state despite the different local, state, and national responsibilities for the implementation of those programs. Even considering the substantial expansion of opportunities over the last fifty years in secondary and higher education, the German education system still tends to mirror and serve the preservation of existing socioeconomic divisions. Even though the education system may be tuition-free from primary through the university level, the gateway and access to greater educational opportunities remains restricted. “The considerable expansion of the higher education system is not in itself a sufficient indication of greater equalization of opportunities in German society” (Gellert 1996, 317). There is still a clear class bias in the distribution of educational opportunities, one that is institutionalized in the “socially discriminating” tripartite secondary school system (Dichanz and Zahorik 1998, 71). It is an education system with a greater commitment to vocational training for the many and lower classes than greater access to higher education—the vehicle of upward social mobility. At the tertiary level, students from working class backgrounds remain disproportionately underrepresented in traditional universities, while those from middle class backgrounds or whose fathers were graduates of a university are overrepresented. The converse is true for the newer Fachhochschulen, where the
working class is overrepresented and the upper strata of German society is underrepresented (Gellert 1996, 313-7).

In comparison to Germany, the American welfare state is minimal. It is reflective of a society that emphasizes personal responsibility for one's outcome. The old-age retirement system (Social Security) provides only a minimum pension. Benefits for unemployment and work injury insurance are employment-based and earnings-related. Eligibility for income assistance programs is determined by means-testing. There are no provisions for universal health insurance or long-term care. The state-supported health coverage that does exist is available only to those who meet age or means-tested requirements. It is a welfare state where the private insurance sector remains a most important and necessary alternative for work injury insurance, income protection, old-age pensions, and health care services.

In the United States, public policy encourages educational achievement over reliance on broad social safety nets. Generous public investment in educational opportunities represents educational achievement as the gateway and vehicle of upward social mobility, an alternative means to individual socioeconomic security that is functionally equivalent to state-supported social insurance. Indeed, and with the additional economic benefits that may be realized through educational achievement, it is expected that individuals will be in an even better position to ensure their own income security and protection through private sector investments and insurance products. This alternative welfare strategy is supported by a public school system that is tuition-free through the secondary level. Although higher education is not tuition-free, it is heavily subsidized by public funding and financial assistance is widely available to students from both public and private sources. There are not
formal obstacles to educational advancement and achievement like a differentiated system of secondary schools or an *Abitur*. Although bias has not been eliminated in the distribution of educational opportunities, progress has been made against past discriminations based on differences on class, race, and gender.

*Second*, the relationship between social and education policies has been of a specific and enduring nature since the origins of each nation's welfare state. In both countries social and education policies complement one another. From their beginnings, and still today, Germany’s social insurance and education policies have tended to support perpetuation of the existing social order. The occupation-oriented guild structure for social insurance has been retained, even to providing the basic design for long-term care insurance in 1994. To a great extent the German education system has mirrored and continues to reproduce the existing socioeconomic order. In the United States, on the other hand, there has been a greater emphasis on general education—the gateway to university studies—and far less on separate vocational training alternatives. In America, there is not an two-year "orientation phase" at the primary level, at the end of which students are directed into a class-biased tripartite secondary system with very specific vocational training and general education curriculums. There are not secondary level "leaving" examinations in the United States, nothing comparable to the German *Abitur* that restricts the gateway to university education. A low Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score may limit the

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34Germany is not alone. Other nations also employ exit or admission examination systems that may restrict educational advancement and achievement. Japan and the United Kingdom are among that number. Others have instituted differentiated school systems, including Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Elena Lisovskaya, dissertation defense of author, notes and detailed comments, 10 July 2002, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo).
number of colleges an American student may be admitted to, but it is unlikely to eliminate the opportunity to attend any and all institutions of higher education.

Third, in both countries politics and powerful politicians mattered greatly to social reform. Groundbreaking social welfare initiatives are associated with individuals who played central and pivotal roles in their nation’s political history—Bismarck in Germany and Franklin Roosevelt in the United States. It has been less the case with educational expansion. Particular individuals have certainly been important, but I would argue they were not as significant to the actual politics and process of educational reform. Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany and John Dewey in America did not “make it happen” in education the same way that the leadership of a Chancellor Bismarck or a President Roosevelt did in social policy. The Humboldt reforms of 1810 were clearly a landmark event in German education, they have affected the structure of the education system ever since, but Humboldt alone does little to help to explain the timing or the politics. Neither does Dewey. The expansion of educational opportunities has been more the product and consequence of other sociopolitical forces and events—organized religion and the tradition of local control, state-building, industrialization, interested social and economic groups, and programmatic national parties like the German SPD.

Fourth, although controlling education and social welfare policy for common national purposes was clearly an objective of German governments—in Prussia and later in Imperial Germany—it was never clearly so in the United States, largely for the tradition of local control and the authority given to the states over educational affairs within the federal arrangement. What is more, the national government of the United States has never competed with local authorities for control of primary- and
secondary-level education, let alone to wrest control of the education system from organized religion. Although the politicians of both countries have shown an appreciation for the importance of the nation’s education system to socioeconomic development and political socialization, it was not always the same way or for the same reasons. Bismarck saw the German education system as an instrument for societal management that could service his political agenda and facilitate his state-building task; for this he had no counterpart in American politics. Even though education policy has been, and is, the object of political rhetoric by national politicians in the United States, real governmental authority for educational affairs falls within the sphere of state and local politics, and for primary and secondary education is most often delegated to district school boards.

Fifth, education has traditionally been a state and local matter in both the United States and Germany. In America, the federal government subsidizes state-level activities and it is responsible for the achievement of national political objectives in education policy—primarily, to ensure the equality of educational opportunity. Although Germany’s national government has had greater responsibilities than the American for higher education since 1969, education policy is also primarily a state

35 The federal government has certainly interfered, however. The U.S. Supreme Court ordered the desegregation of the nation’s public schools in its 1954 Brown decision, and it outlawed prayer in the public schools in its 1962 Engel v. Vitale ruling. It also weighed in to given its approval to busing children away from their neighborhood schools as a remedy to segregation, and allowed the government to assist parochial schools by funding such things as textbooks of a secular nature, special education programs, school lunches, and health services. The Court has also ruled on affirmative action, but not definitively, and school vouchers are currently on its agenda. The interference of Congress and the executive branch is no better indicated than by all the Civil Rights laws enacted over the years and the actions taken to enforce that legislation. Recent years have also seen the Clinton and Bush administrations, with the Congress, promote national education reform.
and local matter. Both countries also share common features of decentralization and federalism in the making and administration of their public policies. However, and unlike the United States, "Germany is one of numerous European systems that operates without local school boards or significant community influence on education policy" (Heidenheimer 1997, 87). This has probably tended to give German political parties organized at the state level a greater role in education policymaking than in America. Educational expansion and reform has also been very different. Germany’s tradition of state control over educational affairs, its federal arrangement, the greater policymaking role of its political parties in education, and the traditional tripartite structure of its education system has contributed to a much livelier debate between and within the Länder about the goals of the education system and its reform. This dialogue is given meaning and reinforced by the different state governments—by their constitutional provisions and partisan control—and the education platforms of the Social Democratic, Liberal, and Christian Democratic parties. While the power exercised by local school boards in America has not muted the national debate over the education system and its reform—and the chorus is very loud—it sings with many voices about many different and contradictory things, and without political organization and coordination.

Sixth, the United States has never had a national political party like the German SPD representing labor and working class interests, an ideological party that was a real competitor for control of the national and state governments, with a platform that actually associated and coordinated an agenda for social welfare with that for education. Political parties, particularly those of an ideological bearing like the German SPD, that are organized at the state and national levels and share a
common policy agenda, represent a different opportunity for coordinated policymaking and implementation, one which the highly decentralized and fragmented American party system does not.

Seventh, increasing secondary and higher education opportunities in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were linked with industrialization and the personnel requirements of the swelling administrative state (Kaelble 1981, 242). It was the same with America, but the take-off of secondary level enrollments came sooner, at the beginning of the twentieth century. It happened first in a country where education was very early considered a public good. America’s experience with public education was very different than the European, where churches and private organizations had played pivotal roles in mass education. In America, citizens looked to and expected government to be the primary supplier of educational opportunities. Private and parochial schools were important, albeit as alternatives and lesser components of the total education system. The private sector was too small, exclusive, and financially prohibitive to satisfy the expanding educational needs of America and all its citizens. That left it for government to satisfy the expanding requirement for educational opportunities as consumer demand grew.

The American take-off in secondary education was also associated with an earlier and higher level of democratization relative to Europe generally, and particularly to Germany. This was coupled with a growing American consciousness sooner, across classes, that postprimary educational achievement was “a transmitter of social status” (Kaelble 1981, 243). So it was that democratic government across the United States began responding sooner to rising consumer demand for postprimary education. Not only were secondary education opportunities much
expanded, but postprimary curriculums were also broadened to include new kinds of education and training programs that would be beneficial in the workplace, serve as preparation for tertiary level education, and otherwise supportive of individual socioeconomic opportunities.

*Eighth*, organized religion was an early and important factor in welfare assistance and the elimination of mass illiteracy in both Germany and America. Religious organizations were involved with public assistance long before government. Many of the first schools established in both countries were run by religious organizations and members of the clergy. However, I would argue that the role of religion in the politics and administration of social welfare and education followed very different courses in the two countries. Especially in the field of education over the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, organized religion played a more important role in Germany than in America.

Just as the church figured prominently in the early development and structuring of Germany's education system, I would argue American education evolved on a different track for the rather weaker role of religion in society and politics. In the first place, mass education came later to America, not taking off until the early nineteenth century. There was no counterpart in American society to the educational mission of the church in Europe, no organization that made mass education a goal at an earlier time. When the initiative was finally taken, it was by state and local governments to satisfy the new and expanding educational requirements of a society at the initial stages of industrialization and experimenting with democratic government. Given the scale of the state's response to the public's demand for new education services, the little competition and institutional presence
of church-based alternatives—and the private sector, as well—government quickly
became the major provider and dominant force in U.S. education. There was never a
contest between church and state for control of public education like that in
Germany. Religious instruction did remain a curriculum staple in many American
public schools for some time, but it was not a priority of the education system.
Instead, common schools with their more secular curriculums proliferated to become
the nation’s predominant educational form.

*Ninth*, religion has been a conservative political force in both Germany and
the United States over the years, but it has had a much greater influence over the
politics, on the party system, and on the government and public policy of Germany.
One cannot speak of a separation between church and state in Germany, or less
generally between religion and politics, that is even remotely comparable to the
American experience. Although organized religion has always been able to pursue its
interests within the American political process, it has never been as a permanent
participant in the continuing and general political competition, nor has it been
institutionalized in the party system. Organized religion and religious issues have just
never been as important in American politics, and this is reflected by the political
party system. More important in differentiating between parties in United States are
the different political philosophies, socioeconomic interests, and specific issues they
represent.

Religion has not provided the basis for any meaningful distinction between the
major American political parties and the education policies they supported, not like
that between the SPD and Catholic Center party during Germany’s Weimar period,
or between the SPD and CDU/CSU more recently. There has never been a major
political party in the United States representing a religious denomination like the Catholic Center party at the turn of the twentieth century, nor one like the SPD that made the elimination of religious influence in the nation's schools one of its primary goals. More conservative German political parties and governments have tended to champion and protect vested class and religious interests. They have been less disposed toward the expansion of education systems and opportunities. Conversely, more leftward German parties and governments have generally been associated with social democracy and secularism. They have been more supportive of educational expansion and greater equality in educational opportunities.

Looking back to their origins and as works-in-progress today, Germany and the United States have produced very different kinds of welfare states, with education and social policy profiles reflecting unique societal goals and objectives. The legacy of nineteenth century Imperial Germany remains strong in the welfare state of the FRG. One hundred-plus years of tumultuous change and increasing democratization have not “rubbed out” the lasting effects of that paternal state, the essence of its education policy and social insurance programs. The German welfare state of today still emphasizes the collective responsibility of groups for the welfare of their members. The government remains the primary broker for, what is now, a comprehensive social insurance system that is still occupation-based and supportive of the status quo. Benefits are based on one's occupation, work record, and earnings. Education policy complements the social, also tending to reinforce and reproduce the existing socioeconomic order. Educational achievement is less encouraged by public policy as a vehicle of social advancement and means to socioeconomic security. Albeit for limited reforms in some Lander, the gateway to secondary and higher
education opportunities remains restricted and tends to favor the already well-off. This is changing, but only gradually. As Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth (1992) would put it, the German welfare state has been, and is, a "sticky" institution, its policies self-perpetuating and resistant to change. It also enjoys widespread popular and bipartisan support. Therefore, although recent budgetary pressures have seen changes in eligibility requirements and benefits coverage for certain social and education programs (e.g., old-age pensions and student grants), it is very unlikely the German welfare system faces dismantlement or that any of its major planks will be eliminated.

The education and social welfare policies of America are likewise complementary. The American welfare state emphasizes individual responsibility, encouraging self-realization and individual achievement as the key to one's socioeconomic security. The provisions of the social welfare system are minimal. Eligibility for many public assistance programs is means-tested, its recipients stigmatized. A comprehensive social security system does not now exist, nor is it foreseeable. Private insurance solutions are preferred, encouraged, and represent a significant alternative to state-sponsored social insurance programs. Rather than broad social safety nets, state investment in educational opportunities is encouraged as the gateway and vehicle of social mobility, the means to economic security for every able individual. Like the German welfare state, that of the United States is deeply entrenched and will naturally resist any changes that would threaten to alter or diminish its current institutionalization in any major way.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Discussion and Recommendations

A Summary of the Research Problem and Findings

The goal of this work has been to determine if Western welfare states display distinctive patterns of support for education just as they do for social insurance. In particular, can the three kinds of welfare regime identified by Esping-Andersen (1990)—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—be linked with characteristic profiles for education policy, and is there evidence of a trade-off between investment in educational opportunities and other social programs? It is not an attempt to address the appropriateness of those policies, the issues of welfare dependency or gender, nor what many currently refer to as the “crisis” of the welfare state (Cox 2001; Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999; Marmor 1993; O’Connor 1996; Skocpol 2000; Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999). Although certain of these issues are addressed below, they should really be judged apart from the balance of this undertaking. That said, the significance of this research is established in the following four objectives. The first is to increase our knowledge of the Western welfare state by learning if there is an association between the kinds of social programs and education policies those regimes support. Demonstration of such a relationship would effectively extend the boundaries of the welfare state’s policy definition to include education with its
other social programs. Second, and following with the first, given general agreement within the scholarly community that Western welfare states can be classified according to the similarity of their social security systems, it would contribute to our further understanding of the welfare state to know if welfare states with comparable social security policies can also be identified with similar kinds of education systems. Third, it is important that policymakers, as well as scholars, are aware of and understand the relationship that exists between education and social welfare policies, of the consequences of alternative policy choices and strategies. Fourth, it is crucial that citizens appreciate the nature of their country's social security and education systems, the way those systems are associated and how they may affect the lives and opportunities of individuals, families, and other social groups. Students and the parents of school-age children can then make more informed decisions about school choice and curriculums, about academic and vocational career paths. Individuals can better plan and prepare for the security of their retirement years during their working lives. I would argue that with such knowledge the quality of citizen participation in public affairs and government can be improved, and perhaps the frequency of participation as well. Voters could better decide how to cast votes for candidates and on issues, as it meets their own social welfare and educational needs and interests. Some citizens might even choose to participate more directly in the policymaking process—within or outside the government—as the best way to give expression to and advance their own policy preferences for social welfare and education.

Following Titmuss (1974), Heclo (1985), and Esping-Andersen (1990), I have argued that three kinds of welfare states may be distinguished in Western societies by the similarity of their social policies. I have identified these welfare state
types as liberal, conservative, and social democratic, just as Esping-Andersen (1990) depicted them. I have gone a step further, however, by claiming that education should be included with social security programs in the policy profiles of those regime types because a state's education policy is associated with, and an integral component of, its overall welfare strategy. Education policy both affects and reflects the welfare strategy of the state. Educational achievement is widely recognized as a vehicle of upward social mobility (Becker 1964; Janowitz 1976; Kaelble 1981), and the socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize through educational achievement—particularly at the postprimary level—can be functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, that which may be secured with social insurance. As a result, an individual’s long-term reliance on social insurance may be lessened by their educational achievement—and so can a welfare state’s long-term financial requirements for income assistance and other social programs. Therefore, I have argued that preferential state support of educational opportunities or social insurance programs may be viewed as alternative policy strategies welfare regimes may choose to follow. It thus follows that the characteristic policy profile Esping-Andersen ascribed to each of the three welfare regime types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—should be expanded to include education with other social programs, extending the boundary of the welfare state’s definition.

Like Esping-Andersen, I have been less concerned with specificity and an exhaustive classification of welfare regime types and more with general similarities. In particular, I have been more interested in the way Western welfare states tend to gather into three “clusters” because of their similar policy profiles for education and social security. I contend that two of those three clusters, the liberal and
conservative, exhibit alternative welfare strategies. Liberal regimes demonstrate a tendency to encourage and invest in education, as a gateway to individual socioeconomic opportunity, over social insurance programs. In conservative states, on the other hand, educational opportunities as a vehicle of social mobility tend to be more restricted, and social insurance is emphasized instead as a device to protect and perpetuate the existing social order. As well as a quantitative analysis of the education and social insurance data for 18 OECD nations, I performed case studies of Germany and the United States to examine more closely and test the utility of Esping-Andersen's typology and my hypothesis of alternative welfare strategies. The U.S. exemplifies the liberal type, where educational achievement is portrayed as a vehicle of upward social mobility and state investment in social welfare programs is relatively less. Germany is representative of the alternative model, where social safety nets are relatively wide, but educational opportunities and social mobility are more limited. In the third type, the social democratic, there is a greater state effort to support both social welfare programs and educational opportunities. A comprehensive social security system is intended to guarantee "a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation," but without discouraging individual ambitions or denying the opportunity for socioeconomic achievement (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26-8, 37). State policy also invites educational achievement as a vehicle of social mobility and gateway to greater socioeconomic opportunities, but as an option to the individual and not a substitute for the protections of the social insurance system.
As a test to determine if Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model might be expanded to include education policy, and to examine the relationship between the social insurance and education policies of Western welfare states, an analysis was performed on the spending data for education and social insurance by eighteen advanced industrial nations between 1960 and 1990.¹ That study demonstrated the utility of Esping-Andersen’s model as an explanation for variation in social welfare and education spending by Western welfare states, and that there is a significant association between education and social security programs in the kinds of welfare regimes he described. The data confirmed both that policy linkage and the usefulness of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state model. Western welfare states exhibit distinctive patterns of support for education just as they do for social insurance. There is a significant association between the kinds of social insurance systems supported by Western welfare states and their expenditures for education. The data indicate that welfare state type and social insurance expenditure data are powerful predictors of spending levels for education. Likewise, welfare state type and education expenditures are powerful predictors of spending for social insurance. Liberal nations tended to spend relatively more on education and less on social insurance programs than conservative or social democratic welfare regimes.² Liberal welfare states also

¹An attempt was made to collect data for 1995 and 2000, but the required variable data were not sufficiently available for all eighteen nations beyond the 1990 time period.

²Only public expenditure data were analyzed. I recognize that private spending for education or insurance may be relatively greater where the state’s financial support of those programs is relatively less—and vice versa—but it was not the object of this study to evaluate the total national effort to support education and

(continued...)
had the highest rate of secondary-level participation in general education curriculums, by such a significant margin it suggests that an emphasis on general education or vocational training are alternative education strategies that Western welfare regimes may choose to follow. On the other hand, conservative regimes tended to support broader social safety nets than liberal nations. They funded education at a lower level, and were found with far greater enrollments in vocational programs at the secondary level. Social democratic states exhibited the highest level of public “effort” to fund both policy areas, with enrollment rates in vocational training approaching that of conservative regimes. Even with their expansive social safety nets, social democratic regimes also provide a high level of support for education programs. However, the potential socioeconomic benefits of educational achievement are offered as an option to the individual; they do not replace the protections of the state’s social insurance.

These findings are supportive of my argument that the boundary of the welfare state’s policy definition should be extended to include education with its social security programs. The data of Chapter III also support my hypothesis that a preference to invest in education or social insurance programs may represent alternative policy choices of Western welfare regimes. Liberal and conservative states exhibited a statistically significant inverse association between spending for education and that for social welfare. Furthermore, the different emphasis on secondary-level general education or vocational training also indicates a policy choice, one supportive

2(...continued)

social security programs, only that of the welfare state. The inclusion of private funding data would have changed this from an investigation of spending tendencies by welfare regime type to one examining total expenditures for education and social insurance by nation. Therefore, in order to isolate the financial activity attributable to the welfare regime, it was necessary to exclude private funding data.
of the welfare state's social insurance system. Higher rates of general education enrollments in liberal nations tend to be associated with relatively lower levels of state investment in social insurance programs. The socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize with educational achievement—particularly at the postsecondary level—may become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be secured with social insurance. Conversely, higher rates of vocational training enrollments in conservative and social democratic countries tend to be associated with a relatively greater public investment in social insurance programs. The typical individual's social security—income maintenance, medical coverage, etc.—depends far less on educational achievement and private market alternatives than is the case in liberal welfare states.

Additional support for these findings was provided by the case studies of Germany and the United States which examined their welfare state expansion and the development of their education and social welfare systems. At least for those two countries, the historical record showed that preferential state support and investment in social safety nets or educational opportunities are alternative policy paths that Western welfare regimes may follow. Germany, a country with a comprehensive social insurance system that Esping-Andersen has identified as conservative, was a pioneer among Western nations in the area of social welfare and a laggard in expanding access to postprimary educational opportunities. The United States, on the other hand, a country with a minimal social insurance system that Esping-Andersen has identified as liberal, was a leader among Western nations in the development of postprimary educational opportunities and a laggard in the area of social welfare.
The Future of the Welfare State

While this study is significant mainly for its attempt to provide a better explanation for the social security and education policies of Western societies, it is also important for the clues it may provide about the future of the welfare state. Indeed, I would argue that the findings of this examination are not limited to an arbitrary window defined by the 1960-1990 data or to the period covered by the two case studies. It is not so restricted in time and space. Far more than a snapshot without meaning beyond its moment, I would submit that this is a status report about a work-in-process in Western societies—the welfare state and its associated education and social programs. This work-in-process reflects long-term policy development and deeply-rooted institutional arrangements that have and are likely to endure and change only slowly (Pierson 1994, 1996; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). As the case studies show, the history of social welfare and education programs precedes the emergence of the welfare state. When the welfare state assumed social welfare and educational functions it often took over responsibility and expanded upon programs that had already been implemented on a smaller scale elsewhere within society and at lower levels of government. Instead of breaking new ground, this transfer of policy authority represented another step in the continuing evolution and institutionalization of existing social welfare and education systems, now within the additional and greater institutional framework of the modern administrative welfare state. Rather than greatly altering or weakening the existing social welfare and education systems, the welfare state tended to “harden” those systems—made them more durable and resistant to change—as they were
institutionalized within its structure. This property has been referred to as "the 'stickiness' of historically evolved institutional arrangements" (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 15). This "stickiness" and process of "hardening" has characterized the expansion of the institutional welfare state as new social welfare and education programs have been enacted, implemented, and as those with a vested interest in the programs of the welfare state have grown in numbers and political power (Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999, 167).

In the sense that the welfare state is identified by a political regime's institutionalization of certain types of social programs, it is as much the product as the maker of policy. "Welfare state" is the name that has been given to political regimes that support particular configurations of social policy. It is not a neutral term, however. To each kind of welfare state he depicted, Esping-Andersen attributed different objectives for the social welfare programs they supported. Such differences also carry to the individual level, and find expression by those in politics and government. Although "welfare state" describes for some what good and proper government is all about, to others it is a pejorative term used to characterize a host of social programs and regulations that are held to be too expensive, too wasteful, ineffective and a drain on the economy, in addition to being a questionable exercise of the state's legitimate power. To its most adamant opponents, the welfare state is a thing that if it is not completely dismantled should at least undergo major reforms. As it concerns the real and ever-rising cost of the welfare state's programs, even its most ardent supporters would agree that changes are necessary (Stephens, Huber, and Ray 1999, 193).
The cost of the welfare state and those in opposition to its programs are the catalysts for political action today. Together they will undoubtedly affect the adoption of cost management measures and certain reforms over the near term, perhaps even influence the direction of subsequent policy development, but they will not control that process. The welfare state is too deeply entrenched. I would contend that, although the future of that thing called the “welfare state” is by no means certain—and it is clearly under attack from many quarters—it will not be dismantled or fundamentally altered. The education and social welfare systems found in Western societies today began to evolve and institutionalize long before the emergence of the welfare state that they are now associated with (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996). They are certainly not immune to change, but the durability and resistance of those systems to radical reform over time suggests they are a solid indicator of how state policies and programs will continue to look for some time to come (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 1994, 1996).

Existing social and education policies very much determine the parameters for new programs and the modification or reform of existing ones. Germany and the United States provide excellent examples. Germany’s occupation-oriented guild structure for social insurance, a system with pre-industrial origins, continues to define the German welfare state, even to providing the basic model for the long-term care legislation adopted in 1994. In America, education is and has traditionally been a state and local matter. Despite all the rhetoric during the 2000 presidential campaign about school and education reform and, particularly, of a pivotal new role that the federal government would play in that policy field, education will likely remain a state and local issue. A new and far greater role for the national government in the
country’s education system would dictate a major alteration of the current federal arrangement. It would mean massive changes to the tax and administrative structures that now have state and local foundations. An institutional transformation of such mammoth proportions would not just require constitutional amendments for implementation, but also a complete change in the mind-set of the American people about government and responsibility for the education function.

**Recommendations for Subsequent Welfare State Research**

A detailed specification of the education systems that are characteristic of liberal, conservative, and social democratic states, like those that Esping-Andersen (1990) described for social insurance, was beyond the scope of the current project. Such an undertaking is not only appropriate as a next stage, but essential to more detailed comparative analyses. Second, given the findings of this work, I argue a better theoretical and methodological approach to the study of the Western welfare state would join the literature and competing theories for education and social policy together in a single model. All three schools of thought examined in this study—structural, political conflict, and institutional—made valuable contributions to a better explanation of welfare state development and its policymaking for education and other social programs. Rather than a question about which theory performs better or worse than the others, the issue really boils down to deciding which explanation is most appropriate for a given situation, and in what combination with the others. Third, and also based on the results of this study, there is good cause to claim the same model for social and education policy can be utilized for Germany, America, and other Western welfare states. The great similarity of the scholarly literature, of
the theories and variables used for the explanation of both social programs and education policy, suggests a single model may be appropriate for both policy areas. The case studies of Germany and the United States showed that comparable political and socioeconomic variables and events, although associated with different policy outcomes, were common to the histories and explanations for their social and education programs. The different and distinctive policy profiles of those welfare states can be attributed to differences in the salience of particular variables and events, i.e., socioeconomic development, social democratic strength, religion, bureaucratic development, federalism and centralization, general education enrollments, economic depression, war, etc.

A Classification of the Education Systems Found in Western Welfare States

The production of a typology of the education systems found in Western welfare states is a logical follow-on to this work, a preliminary to subsequent comparative analyses. Such an enterprise, as well as further detailing and clarifying the distinctions between kinds of Western welfare states, would also serve to validate the real similarity—or not—of education policies within welfare regime type. Because this study identified certain statistical “tendencies” in the education policies of liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes—and not specific education systems in a qualitative sense—it is possible that unique education profiles within those groups were “averaged out,” or that an education profile common across all welfare state types was not recognized. Another kind of welfare state might even be identified, because of some particular combination of social and education policies. Only additional analysis will tell. Such a classification would also provide the
basis for comparisons of welfare state performance, both individually and comparatively by type. As an example, individual and group dependency on public assistance programs could be compared across kinds of education systems by welfare state type. For another, the data from studies of academic performance that have been conducted on a national level with such testing instruments as the 1994-95 Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and 1998-99 repeat of TIMSS (TIMSS-R) could be evaluated by kind of education system and welfare state type to determine if there is a relationship with academic achievement.

A Synthesis of Competing Explanatory Theories in a Common Welfare State Model

My second point about future research concerns a better theoretical approach for the study of Western welfare regimes, one that would bring together the major theoretical streams of social policy development and educational expansion into a single and comprehensive model of the welfare state in advanced industrial societies. Each of the three main schools of thought examined in this study—structural, political conflict, and institutional—has something to contribute. More than any one approach being better or worse than the others, the question really comes down to which one was most appropriate for a given situation, and in what combination with the others. Clearly, far greater specificity was required than that provided by the logic of industrialism. Knowledge of the who, what, when and how—the particular players, institutions, substance, and timing of social and education policymaking—was required for a more satisfactory explanation. Theories of the mid-range, like political conflict and historical institutionalism, are of particular help in this regard.
So also is the policymaking model of Kingdon (1995). His policymaking paradigm offers the opportunity for a synthesis, bringing together the explanation offered by the logic of industrialism with those of the political conflict and institutional theories. His notion of “policy windows” that are opened by the coming together of problems, policies, and political “streams” is very useful in this respect. It improves our awareness of where to look, at who, what and when.

Structural theories describe the conditions of a likely event but they cannot predict if and when such an event will actually occur. Thus, while the logic of industrialism correctly depicts the socioeconomic conditions most often associated with new social legislation and higher levels of state investment in social programs, it cannot determine if and when a government will actually respond. There is not a specific point within the process of industrialization or a particular level of development that automatically triggers government activity—if at all. Neither can the logic of industrialism predict the strategy of the political regime or the specific policy outcome. However, foreknowledge that specific socioeconomic conditions may be associated with certain other political events does constitute recognition of a “problem” that may cause the government to respond. What is still required for a “policy window” and policymaking to occur, according to Kingdon’s paradigm, is the “political opportunity” and “policy alternatives.”

The strength of political conflict theory is its identification of the “political opportunity” and associated “policy coalitions,” those groups and interests that are active, organized, have access to and can affect the policymaking process (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988). Recognition of new social groups, increasing interest mobilization, or changes in the partisan control of government may indicate the
presence of a new "political opportunity" that, combined with a particular "problem," may lead to the opening of a "policy window." By identifying the mobilization and activity of significant social and political actors, political conflict theory may add to the explanation of the timing for important junctures in social welfare and education policies, to changes in direction or new initiatives. However, while political conflict theory can help to make clear the policy preferences of those with the "political opportunity," it fails to address many other policy alternatives that are also available and perhaps more likely, or the constraints on preferences imposed by institutions and the political process. It is here that institutional theory can make its contribution.

Institutional theory adds clarity to the "policy window," a better understanding of the actual political opportunity and real policy alternatives. It brings together the "streams" of problems and political opportunities with political solutions. Institutions and institutional organization introduce rules and structure to the political process that affect policy outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). State institutions, particularly bureaucratic organizations, may have vested interests in certain policy solutions and important influence over the selection process. As they represent the legacy of prior policies and political struggles, institutions are predisposed to path dependence, to a limited policy options and incremental change (Esping-Andersen 1990; March and Olsen 1984, 1989; North 1990; Skocpol 1979, 1985; Weaver and Rockman 1993). Very often, it is institutional differences that best explain the cross-national variation in educational expansion and social policy development. As an example, and the U.S. and Germany are excellent examples, the policy authority and activities of states in a federal arrangement may dramatically affect the implementation of national policies.
In the last analysis, I judge that all three theoretical streams—structural, political conflict, and institutional—contribute to a better understanding of the welfare state and the development of its social security and education policies. Structural-functional explanations accurately depict the societal context, the circumstances, issues, and problems brought by industrialization and modernization. Political conflict approaches help explain the who, what, when, why and how of policy development. Politics and politicians matter greatly, especially for new policy initiatives like those of Bismarck in the 1880s, the paradigm shift of Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, or Johnson’s “Great Society” programs of the 1960s. “Political parties and politicians link ideas, political institutions, and policy” (King 1992, 242). Over the longer run, although “they are not a substitute for interests and ideas as the ultimate motors of political action” (Hall 1992, 109), it is institutions and path dependence that begin to explain more and more about the making and shaping of education and social policies. Incremental change becomes the political norm and certain ways of doing things become institutionalized. The long-term care legislation enacted by Germany in 1994 was adopted on the model of social insurance introduced by Bismarck in the 1880s. Over time, institutions and the programs they support also tend to create vested interests, both in government bureaucracies and clientele. Public bureaucracies are recognized to have a life and policy agenda of their own (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Rourke 1986); and the old-age pensions of the U.S. Social Security system has become the “third rail” of American politics, one that no politician or political party dares to touch.
A Common Welfare State Model for Education and Social Policies

Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states and Castles’ (1989) model to explain the variation in education expenditures between OECD nations provided the starting point for the regression equations and other statistical analyses of this study. Also useful as reference and as potential foundations for future research have been the works of Cameron (1978), Hicks (1994), Hicks and Misra (1993), Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993), Lindert (1994), Pampel and Williamson (1988), Western (1989), and Wilensky (1975) who operationalized variables and developed regression equations for the explanation of social program spending by advanced industrial democracies.

Based on the results of the regression modelling, data analysis, and other findings of this study, I would argue it is logical that education should be combined with social security programs in describing the policy profile of the Western welfare state. In other words, the boundaries of the welfare state’s policy definition should be extended to include education. Moreover, because of the linkage that has been shown to exist between the education and social policies of the Western welfare state, there should not be separate welfare state models and typologies for its education and social security programs.

I have provided evidence of the association between the welfare state’s education and social security policies in a review of the relevant literature, by quantitative analysis, and through case studies. The two literatures show that explanations for the development of social welfare policy and educational expansion share similar, if not the same, explanatory theories and variables. The same holds for
education and social welfare spending. I illustrated with “cluster charting” and statistical data the association that exists between the education and social policies of Western welfare states. I demonstrated with regression analyses that education and social insurance data can be usefully combined in the same analytical model. As I hypothesized, with knowledge of welfare regime type, state spending for education and social insurance programs are strong predictors of one other. The case studies of Germany and the United States showed that preferential support given to the expansion of educational opportunities or social insurance programs are alternative policy trajectories along which welfare states may develop.

A single analytical model for the welfare state makes more sense. It is appropriate, more powerful, and provides a simultaneous explanation for both social and education policy. Finally, I would submit that education and social security programs should be combined in the same model because both are policy instruments that welfare states can employ to accomplish functionally equivalent objectives. The social mobility and economic benefits an individual may realize with their educational achievements—over the long run—may be equal to, and even exceed, those of state-sponsored social welfare provisions for such programs as old-age pensions, disability, unemployment compensation, medical and long-term care.

Therefore, both in general and as it applies specifically to the familiar welfare state model of Esping-Andersen, a depiction of the education system as an agency of social mobility and policy alternative to social insurance should be added to the description of a welfare regime’s policy portfolio. In this study I have used for that purpose the data for general education enrollments at the secondary level and the spending tendencies for education and social security programs. Although the list of
variables could certainly be made longer, subsequent research could investigate participation and completion rates by course of study in secondary and higher education, broken down by race, ethnic group, gender, and class. Welfare state performance could also be examined, both individually and comparatively by type. As an example, socioeconomic outcomes and dependence on social insurance systems could be evaluated, within welfare states by societal groups by level of educational achievement, and across societal groups for individuals with the same or similar levels of educational achievement. For another, changing levels of educational achievement and dependence on social insurance systems could be compared by welfare state type. Esping-Andersen's index of decommodification for a welfare state's social security programs may also warrant another look. A new index that also included a measurement of the decommodification that might be achieved by a state's education policies could be very useful in helping to distinguish between and classifying kinds of welfare regimes.

In the Introduction to this dissertation I argued that education should be included with other social programs in defining the policy profile of the Western welfare state. A state's education policy is associated with, and is an integral component of, its overall welfare strategy. Education policy both affects and reflects the welfare strategy of the state. That is because the socioeconomic benefits an individual may realize with educational achievement—particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels—can become functionally equivalent to, and even exceed, what may be secured with social insurance. As a consequence, an individual's long-term reliance on social insurance may be lessened by their educational achievement—and so can a welfare regime's long-term requirements to support income assistance and
other social assistance programs. I argued, therefore—following upon the scholarship of Heidenheimer (1981), Heclo (1985), and Janowitz (1976)—that preferential state investment in educational opportunities over social insurance might be viewed as an alternative policy strategy Western welfare regimes may choose to follow. I claimed that evidence of such an alternative policy strategy could be found in the kinds of welfare regimes that Esping-Andersen (1990) identified in advanced industrial societies—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. I argued each type of welfare regime could be linked with a distinctive profile for education policy just as it could for social insurance programs, and that there was evidence of a trade-off between investment in education and other social programs in liberal and conservative regime types.

In the chapters that followed I presented evidence to support these propositions. Case studies of Germany and the United States explored the historical development and association of social insurance and education policy in welfare states Esping-Andersen classified respectively as “conservative” and “liberal.” Those examinations showed Germany and America to be very different welfare states, each with a distinctive policy profile for education and social insurance programs. Germany’s welfare state supports a comprehensive social insurance system. Germany was a pioneer among Western nations in area of social policy, but it has been a laggard in the development of postprimary educational opportunities. On the other hand, the United States has been a leader in the expansion of educational opportunities, and educational achievement has been encouraged in a welfare state where the social insurance system is minimal. For these two countries, the record does demonstrate that welfare regimes may develop along alternative paths: one that
favors the expansion of educational opportunities over social insurance, as with the
United States; and another that supports the building of social safety nets over
increasing access to educational opportunities, as was the case with Germany.

Next, I analyzed education and public expenditures data for eighteen Western
industrial nations over the 1960-1990 time period to test the explanatory power of
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology, the nature of the relationship between
The results indicate an association does exist between the education and social
policies that Western welfare states support. Specifically, the kinds of welfare
regimes Esping-Andersen described—liberal, conservative, and social democratic—
can also be linked with characteristic education policies. Liberal welfare states have
the highest rate of secondary-level participation in general education curriculums, by
such a great margin it suggests an emphasis on general education or vocational
training are alternative education policies Western welfare regimes may support. On
the other hand, conservative nations tend to have broader social safety nets than
liberal nations. They fund education at a lower level, and have far greater enrollments
in vocational programs at the secondary level. Social democratic states exhibit the
highest level of public “effort” to fund both policy areas, with enrollment rates in
vocational training approaching that of conservative regimes. There is also evidence
of a “trade-off.” Conservative and liberal welfare regimes exhibit a tendency to invest
relatively more either in social insurance or education, respectively.

The unique patterns and association of social welfare and education systems
that this study has identified in Western societies are the products of long-term
development. Both systems, social welfare and education, are characterized by

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enduring social arrangements and institutional settings that, as they structure the policymaking process and influence its outcomes, naturally resist massive system changes. With respect to Western welfare regimes today I agree with Esping-Andersen (1999) that "existing institutional arrangements heavily determine, maybe even overdetermine, national trajectories" (4). Nevertheless, just as change is inevitable with the passage of time, so will social welfare and education programs continue to evolve. It is even very likely that many countries will enact certain reforms and corrective measures in the near term, to address the particular "crisis" of their welfare state. It is unlikely, however, barring some unforeseen and calamitous event of immense proportions, that the substance of any welfare state's education and social insurance systems, much less the structures and rules for political competition that affect those programs and the policymaking process, will radically change in the near term. The welfare state will continue to evolve, but it will certainly not be altered or dismantled beyond recognition.
Appendix A

Notes on Data Sources, Calculations, and Usage
The calculation of social insurance as a percentage of total public expenditures is based on ILO data for social insurance as a percentage of the GDP and knowing the ratio between education as a percentage of total public spending and education expenditures as a portion of the GDP. Real social insurance dollars per capita is the product of social insurance as a percentage of the GDP and the GDP per capita. It has been divided by 100 in order to be in the same meter as other GDP-based statistics. Social insurance as a percentage of total social spending is calculated by dividing the value of social insurance as a percentage of total public spending by the sum of social insurance and education as shares of total public spending. Likewise, education as a percentage of total social spending is derived by dividing the value of education as a percentage of total public spending by the sum of social insurance and education as shares of total public spending. Real education dollars per student is the product of education spending as a percentage of the GDP times the GDP per capita, divided by the percentage of the population who are aged 5-29. This age group most accurately reflects a nation's student population—those who are eligible, attending, and actually receiving public education benefits. Because of the variety of functions and demographic groups that social security programs serve, it is not possible to similarly identify a specific population group that is the primary target of those programs. Consider, for example, the combination of groups covered by old-age pensions, sickness and maternity benefits, and unemployment compensation. Therefore, social insurance expenditures were distributed over the entire national population, calculated as the product social insurance spending as a percentage of the GDP and the GDP per capita, divided by 100 for metering. Although not distributing total social insurance expenditures over the smaller eligible population has the net
effect of understating the true per capita figure, it in no way affects the findings of this analysis.
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