Economic Development and Social Diversity: The Origin and Composition of a Systemic Growth Regime in Louisville, Kentucky, 1897-1933

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY: THE ORIGIN AND COMPOSITION OF A SYSTEMIC GROWTH REGIME IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, 1897 - 1933

by

John W. McTighe

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Sociology

Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan December 2002

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Between the years 1897 and 1933, a systemic growth regime controlled the urban development of Louisville, Kentucky. The city's growth regime was created in response to changing national patterns of production resulting from industrialization, and was dedicated to both urban economic expansion, as well as internal political and social control. The growth regime functioned in an informal manner through the formal organizations of the city by co-opting selective representatives from the various economic, ethnic, and racial leadership pools of the city. As an informal entity, the growth regime achieved a high degree of urban hegemony and was a structural hierarchy in terms of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and social class.

To decipher the structure and hegemonic control of the growth regime, a network and positional analysis was utilized. Data was compiled from the membership lists of 196 formal organizations and analyzed to determine the
hierarchy and level of influence that the growth regime achieved. A positional analysis was then employed to uncover the senior partners of the growth regime. There were only 38 senior partners identified and these partners were a mere 0.01 percent of Louisville's 1920 population. However, the senior partners were directly connected to 50 percent of the organizations and over 70 percent of the individuals contained in the data base.

It is hypothesized the senior partners were the true power brokers, and that urban government had to acquiesce to a pro-growth agenda as a result of their structural and organizational position. Thus, urban growth was a mechanism of personal enrichment for the senior partners. However, the spoils of growth were indirectly shared by all the members of the growth regime in proportion to their location within the structural hierarchy of the regime.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER</td>
<td>Aero Club of Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>American Life and Accident Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALD</td>
<td>Alderman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALK</td>
<td>Founders of American Legion of Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Allied Arts Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANB</td>
<td>American National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOH</td>
<td>Ancient Order of Hibernians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOUW</td>
<td>Ancient Order of United Workingman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Arts Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASN</td>
<td>American-Southern National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>American Turf Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATG</td>
<td>Anti-Race Track Gambling Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>Audubon Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVT</td>
<td>U S Armor Vault and Trust Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Bank of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNAI</td>
<td>B'naï B'rith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Louisville Board of Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>Bankers Trust Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Booker T Washington Community Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Louisville Country Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFT</td>
<td>Columbia Finance and Trust Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Commission on Interracial Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIT</td>
<td>City Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>Civitan Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKA</td>
<td>Catholic Knights of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLI</td>
<td>Commonwealth Life Insurance Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNB</td>
<td>Citizen's National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Councilmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Conversation Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COO</td>
<td>Co-operative Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Charity Organization Society of Louisville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Columbia Trust Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>Citizens Union Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Domestic Life and Accident Insurance Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Democratic Party Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Dramatic Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DXC</td>
<td>Democratic Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Engineer's and Architects Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELK</td>
<td>Elks Lodge No 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX</td>
<td>Business Men of Louisville</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXC</td>
<td>Exchange Club</td>
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</table>

vi
List of Abbreviations - Continued

FBT  Farmers Bank and Trust CO
FCG  Falls City German Mutual Fire Insurance Co
FCT  Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co
FIL  Filson Club
FNB  First National Bank of Louisville
FSB  First Standard Bank
FT  Fidelity Trust Company
FTT  Franklin Trust Co
FU  Fusionist Movement
GAS  Louisville Gas Co
GB  German Bank
GCL  German Club of Louisville
GI  German Insurance Co
GIB  German Insurance Bank
GFO  German Protestant Orphan Home of Louisville
GS  German Savings Bank
GSA  Gaugers and Storekeepers Association
GSB  German Security Bank
GW  German Washington Mutual Fire Insurance Co
HEL  Honest Election League
HUN  Committee of One Hundred
IC  Louisville Insurance Co
IIC  Industrial Improvement Committee
ILI  Iroquois Life Insurance Co
ILP  Independent Lincoln Party
IOH  Improved Order Heptasoph
ISL  Inter-Southern Life Insurance Co
IZA  Izaak Walton Club
JC  Jockey Club
JHC  Juniper Hunting Club
JP15  American Legion Jefferson Post 15
JUD  Judge
KC  Knights of Columbus
KCL  Kentucky Central Life and Accident Ins
KGC  Louisville Gun Club
KHK  Knights of Honor of Kentucky
KHSC  Kentucky Home Society for Colored Children
KIW  Kiwanis Club
KLM  Kentucky and Louisville Mutual Insurance Co
KNEA  Kentucky Negro Educational Association
KPAA  Knights of Pythias (Black Lodge)
KPW  Knights of Pythias (White Lodge)
KTB  Kentucky Title Savings Bank and Trust
LAS  La Societe Des 40 Hommes et 8 Chevaux
LAW  Law Club
List of Abbreviations - Continued

LBC  Louisville Boat Club
LBT  Liberty Bank and Trust Co
LC   Lawyers Club
LCC  Louisville Commercial Club
LCH  Louisville Clearing House
LEA  Louisville Employers' Association
LFI  Liberty Fire Insurance Co
LFU  Louisville Federation of Labor
LFC  Louisville Board of Fire Under-Writers
LG  Louisville Golf Club
LGM  Louisville Gas and Electric Co
LGE  Louisville Gas and Electric Co
LGF  Louisville German Mutual Fire Insurance
LHC  Louisville Chess Club
LIB  Liberty Insurance Bank
LIF  Louisville Industrial Foundation
LIO  Lions Club
LIS  Louisville Industrial School
LLC  Louisville Lighting Co
LN   L and N Rail Road
LNB  Louisville National Banking Co
LPC  Lincoln Protective Club
LRR  Louisville Railway Company
LSB  Lincoln Savings Bank and Trust
LSC  Louisville Salvage Corps
LT  Louisville Trust Company
LTC  Louisville Title Company
LUJ  Louisville and Union Stock and Land Bank
LUL  Louisville Urban League
LWC  Louisville Water Co
MAY  Mayors of Louisville
MIL  Military Order of Foreign Wars
MIN  Ministers - Protestant
MINC Ministers - Catholic
MINJ Ministers - Jewish
MLA  Aurora Lodge 633
MLAA African American Masonic Lodge Members
MLAB Abraham Lodge 8
MLAI Mammoth Life and Accident Insurance Company
MLC  Compass Lodge 223
MLCH  Crescent Hill Lodge 820
MLD  Daylight Lodge 760
MLE  Excelsior Lodge 258
MLF  Falls City Lodge 376
MLG  St George Lodge 239
MLK  Kilwinning Lodge 506
List of Abbreviations - Continued

MLL  Lewis Lodge 191
MLL  Louisville Lodge 400
MLP  Preston Lodge 281
MLPL Parkland Lodge 638
MLR  Robinson Lodge 266
MLS  Shawnee Lodge 830
MLSH Shibboleth Lodge 750
MLSU Suburban Lodge 740
MLW  Willis Stewart Lodge 224
MLZ  Mt Zion Lodge 147
MOS  Mose Green Club
NAAC National Association Advancement of Colored People
NBC National Bank of Commerce
NBK National Bank of Kentucky
NNBL National Negro Business League
ODD Independent Order of Odd Fellows
OPP Opposition Political Collation
OPT Optimist Club
PB  Prestonia Bank
PC  Park Commissioners
PCM Presbyterian Colored Mission of Louisville
PEN Pendennis Club
PIE Pierian Club
PLA Players Club
PMI Pythian Mutual Industrial Association
POL Political Active Individuals
QUI Quindecim Club
RCO Railway Clerks Organization
RCS Red Cross Sanitarium
REL Realtors
RIV River Valley Club
ROT Rotary Club
RXC Republican Executive Committee
SAR Sons of the American Revolution
SB  Security Bank
SC  Salmagundi Club
SFI State Fire Insurance Co
SHR Shriners
SIN Sinking Fund
SLE Sleepy Hollow Club
SNB Southern National Bank
SPF South Park Fishing Club
SPL Socialist Party of Louisville
ST  Standard Club
STC Southern Trust Co
SUB Suburban Club

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List of Abbreviations - Continued

SYB  Stock Yards Bank
TAV  Tavern Club
TSD  Three Seasons Dance Club
TWRC Twelve Wards Republican Convention
UC   University Club
UL   University of Louisville Trustees
UNB  Union National Bank
UST  United States Trust Company
WED  Wednesday Morning Musical Club
WRA  Wranglers Club
WYN  Wynn Stay Club
YBM  Young Business Men's League
YMD  Young Men's Democratic Club
YMHA Young Men's Hebrew Association
YMI  Young Men's Institute
ZTP  Zachary Taylor Post, American Legion
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Who influences urban growth and development by promoting or opposing critical economic, political and social policies, and to what extent do the various urban groups of the city benefit from those policies? In one form or another, these questions have been at the heart of urban studies for decades and have frequently divided social scientists who have attempted to answer them. To date and despite extensive study by sociologists, historians, political scientists, and urban geographers no commonly accepted urban theory has emerged. Nevertheless, recent studies revolving around issues of urban political economy appear to offer hope that a unified theory of urban growth and development is possible. Scholars working in this area have labeled this emerging concept the growth regime. This work is designed to build upon and contribute to that theoretical concept.

Within this analysis, a growth regime is defined as an informal and abstract entity through which political, economic and social hegemony are manifested. It is also hypothesized that urban politics are completely dominated
and controlled by the growth regime and that local government must ultimately support a pro-growth agenda as a result of the level of hegemony that the regime obtains. It is further assumed that the growth regime functions primarily in an informal and unobserved manner through the formal organizations of the city. To achieve this level of hegemony, the leadership pools of each formal organization must be co-opted by the regime and granted a position of regime partnership. The regime partners accordingly have access to and receive varying levels of advantage from their partnership position within the growth regime.

The focal point of this study is a social, historical, and sociological analysis of Louisville, Kentucky. As will be demonstrated, a growth regime emerged and matured in Louisville during the early years of the 20th century, and once established quickly dominated the political, economic and social development of the city. The Louisville growth regime was comprised of most of the significant groups within the city, and was a structural hierarchy in terms of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and social class. Perhaps the most unique aspect of this study is that it charts the initial formation of the growth regime as well as its
organizational structure and hegemonic control.

To decipher the complex organizational structure of the Louisville growth regime, and to gain a degree of insight into both partnership status and regime hegemony, a network and positional analysis has been utilized. However, it should be noted that this analysis is purely theoretical in nature, as the existence of a growth regime can not be definitively proven. This analysis suggests the possible organizational structure and level of control which the regime could have achieved. Throughout the analysis, a preponderance of circumstantial evidence will be presented which supports the existence of a growth regime and the theoretical interpretation and conclusions. Nevertheless, each individual reader must ultimately choose to accept or reject the concept of a growth regime and the conclusions presented in this work.

Regardless of whether or not the concept of a growth regime is accepted or rejected, the network and positional analysis as utilized in this work is, in and of itself, sociologically worthwhile. This work tackles the social structure of the city in a unique way, and includes issues of race, ethnicity, and stratification. Consequently, the analysis has value on a variety of
levels, and reaches beyond the concept of the growth regime.

To facilitate the reading and comprehension of the work, this introductory chapter has been divided into several primary parts, each of which serves a critical function. In the first part, "An Age of Transition," a very brief and general historical overview of urban development in the late 19th and early 20th century is presented. Also, some of the more critical issues and problems facing the American city during this period are touched upon.

The second part consists of a literature review which has been further subdivided into major theoretical categories. The literature review is not all inclusive, but an effort was made to touch upon the most significant works devoted to human ecology, elite and pluralist theory, urban political economy, and race and ethnicity. At first glance, these diverse theoretical perspectives may appear to be only minimally related but when discussing a growth regime they all serve a useful purpose.

The historical overview and literature review are designed to help place Louisville and the analysis in context and provide the reader with a structural and
An Age of Transition

When the United States was established as an independent nation, the vast majority of its residents lived on isolated farms and in small rural communities; cities were the exception rather than the rule. In 1790, the year of the first national census, only 3.35 percent of the population lived in towns of 8,000 or more residents. However, the rural nature of the nation was to be a short-lived phenomena. During the 19th century as the nation began to mature, its cities were plunged into a period of tremendous and rapid transformation. The urban population began growing at a faster pace than the total population, and by 1913 slightly over 50 percent of all Americans lived in an urban environment.¹

Through the 19th century, the cities of the East

¹ The US Census Bureau considers a population of 2,500 to be an urban area.
Coast continued to thrive and expand while new cities were created as the American frontier receded. The growth rate of some cities, particularly those in the Northeast industrial triangle, was nothing short of phenomenal. For example, between 1880 and 1900, Chicago tripled its size and entered the new century with a population of over one and a half million. New York, which had a population of one million in 1870, increased to three and a half million by 1900 and was approaching six million by 1920. During the twenty years between 1880 and 1900 the cities of Detroit, Milwaukee, Columbus, and Buffalo increased their populations by 80 percent. This rapid urban growth was not limited to cities which traced their origin to colonial times as newer American cities shared in the boom as well. St. Paul, Minneapolis and Denver more than quadrupled in size during the final decades of the 19th century. Louisville, Kentucky doubled its population and was ranked the eighteenth largest city in the nation by 1900.2

This pattern of staggering growth continued during the early decades of the 20th century as well. Massive

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2 The 1900 census listed the population of Louisville at 204,731.
immigration and internal migration were the primary reasons for the astonishing growth as millions swarmed to the city and forever altered the urban landscape. The problems and difficulties generated during this phase of development strained some cities to the brink of disaster and created a multitude of urban problems which linger to this day. In order to fully appreciate this aspect of urban development, it is necessary to comprehend immigration and migration within the contextual atmosphere of the urban environment.

It should be noted that internal migration actually drew more people to the cities than immigration. Beginning in the late 19th century, agricultural depression coupled with improved farm machinery decreased the need for agricultural labor. As a result millions of farm workers were forced off the land and compelled by necessity to seek alternative employment in urban areas. Between 1880 and 1900 as the nation’s cities grew, 40 percent of the smaller agricultural communities actually lost population.

A significant component of this rural-to-urban migration was a shift in the racial demographics of the nation as African Americans began migrating to the cities in large numbers. Granted, a small percentage of African
Americans had always lived in the Southern cities. In the antebellum South, urban slaves were typically house servants or laborers and experienced a degree of personal latitude unimaginable by their rural counterparts. Urban slaves were frequently craftsman or artisans or hired out to factories and job shops as unskilled labor. When hired out, their wages were customarily divided between slave and master. This arrangement allowed some urban slaves the opportunity to obtain a degree of capital and live independently of their owner. A few of the more prosperous urban slaves even managed to buy their freedom and that of their family. Consequently, by the eve of the Civil War, most Southern cities had racially segregated areas populated by slave and freedmen alike. Most of these areas were self sufficient as a degree of entrepreneurship had emerged providing stores, barber shops, livery stables and an assortment of other enterprises.

After the Civil War, these racial enclaves continued to grow and for a while entrepreneurship prospered. Additionally, throughout Reconstruction, African American laborers and craftsman outnumbered their white counterparts in most Southern cities and subsequently African American leadership emerged from these select
groups of urban residents. However, the urban-based African Americans still constituted only a small fraction of the total African American population. By 1890, 90 percent of all African Americans still lived in the rural south, scratching out a meager existence as independent farmers and share croppers. The subsequent changes in agriculture had a negative effect upon this portion of the population and contributed to the Great Migration to the northern industrial cities. Between 1910 and 1920 over a half million African Americans migrated from the deep south to the northern cities and forever altered the demographic patterns of the nation.

Once in the northern cities, African Americans established their own communities, struggled to find employment and tried to survive in a new and hostile environment. The arrival of large numbers of African

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3 For information on urban slavery, see Race and Economics by Thomas Sowell and Richard C. Wade's very good account, Slavery in the City. For information pertaining to urban slavery in Kentucky and Louisville, consult Anti-Bellum Kentucky by Garvin Davenport; and George C Wright's Life Behind a Veil: Blacks in Louisville, Kentucky 1865-1930.

4 The greatest period of African American migration took place between 1917 and 1960 when an estimated five million African Americans moved north. For more information on this topic, the reader should consult Racially Separate or Together by Thomas F Pettigrew and Racial Oppression in America by Robert Blauner.
Americans added a layer of racial and economic complexity which the northern industrial cities had never before experienced. As their numbers increased and their neighborhoods expanded, the African American migrants encountered a heightened level of hostility and discrimination as racism swept the nation. By 1911, every state had some form of Jim Crow legislation on the books and African Americans continued to be in subordinate positions. The consequence of this policy was that "separate but equal" became the legal arbitrator of race relations and provided legal authority to the informal codes of conduct that were already well established. By this action, the possibility of any realistic racial equality or equitable economic competition was eliminated. Since the urban racial enclaves were still relatively small and race relations were strictly defined by law and custom, the presence of African Americans in the city was not at this time viewed as a major issue by many Americans. Undoubtedly, this lack of interest and awareness greatly compounded the problems and difficulties faced by the African American leadership in their efforts to obtain a heightened degree of equality for their community. Ethnicity on the other hand was an entirely different matter and rapidly became the focal point.
point of attention by academics, politicians, and the popular press alike.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were an age of immigration, as wave after wave of the disposed of Europe gathered their belongings and journeyed to America. Some came seeking economic opportunity, some to escape political turmoil, while others were in search of religious freedoms. From all corners of Europe they came, filled with anticipation and hope for a new life in their adopted land. Between 1892 and 1924 alone, over 20 million immigrants entered the United States, with two-thirds of them settling in the nation's cities. Once in the city the immigrants clustered into distinctly ethnic communities, provided the city with a tapestry of diverse cultures and struggled to assimilate into their adopted land.5

Unfortunately, the immigrants were not welcomed with open arms and benevolent attitudes nor did they discover the land of unlimited opportunity which they were expecting. Acceptance and assimilation was a slow and

5 For more information regarding immigration, the reader should consult Ellis Island: Gateway to the American Dream by Pamela Reeves, as well as The American City, A Documentary History by Charles N. Glaab, and The Dilemma of American Immigration: Beyond the Golden Door by Cafferty, Chiswick, Greeley and Sullivan.
difficult process and the industrial city itself was a harsh and difficult location for the newly arrived. Thus rejection, hostility, and disappointment greeted many of the immigrants as they incurred the wrath of almost every social group they encountered.

The immigrants were freely competing within the economic system and consequently were perceived as a threat by the native-born working class. As a result, immigrants were discriminated against on the job sites by coworkers and managers alike. Indeed, the level of hostility initially directed against some immigrant groups nearly equaled the level of discrimination faced by African Americans. The immigrants were forced to accept the lowest paying jobs and the least desirable housing. Of course, the difference was that immigrants could in time work their way up the occupational hierarchy. Nevertheless, it was a difficult climb and it was compounded by the resentment they faced from their own economic class.

But it was not just the working class that was concerned by the presence of the immigrants. The middle class also viewed them from a position of caution as well. Many immigrants retained their religious beliefs, native languages, and cultural customs, all of which were
viewed with animosity and mistrust by the middle class. Furthermore, many immigrant groups were particularly condemned because they supported their own religious schools and adhered to non-Protestant religious doctrines. The Catholics and Jewish immigrants in particular were targeted by the native-born, Protestant, middle class. The fires of resentment were further fueled by the popular press which was filled with allegations of "Papists" and Jewish conspiracies against the principles of American values.

The middle class was also concerned by the political activity of the immigrants and troubled by their organizational ability. Many immigrants turned politics into an avenue of social mobility and created impressive urban political machines. For the price of a vote, the political machines functioned as a source of ethnic protection, as an informal employment agency, and when necessary provided social services to the immigrant community. From the middle class vantage point, the political machines were regarded as a threat and an affront to traditional American perceptions of liberty and democracy.

Perhaps the greatest wrath came from the elite industrial class who viewed the immigrants as a menace to
capitalism and the concepts of free enterprise. The immigrants were generally more ideologically militant than the native-born working class and therefore recognized as a dangerous element within a tightly controlled industrial environment. Many of the immigrants supported unionization and were instrumental in the creation of the various labor unions of the day. For example, the Irish miners of Pennsylvania formed the Molly Maguires and sabotaged and destroyed several mines in an effort to obtain higher wages and safer working conditions. At the same time in the industrial cities, the organized element of the immigrant working class launched a series of strikes with the high point of militant labor activity in 1894 when over 1,400 strikes took place nationwide. Also in that same year, the more radical element among immigrant labor gained control of the American Federation of Labor's convention and nearly succeeded in passing a resolution calling for "the collective ownership of the means of production.""\(^6\)

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\(^6\) Irish and Jewish organizers were particularly instrumental in the establishment of labor unions and extremely active in strike activity. For more information regarding this aspect of immigration and labor, see History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Volume I and II by Philip S. Foner. For more general background information, consult Strike, by Jeremy Brecher (1972); Theirs Be the Power: The Moguls of Eastern Kentucky, (1983) by Harry M. Caudill; Power and
The religious, political, and pro-labor sentiments of the immigrants, combined with their large numbers and organizational ability, led Americans of all social classes to believe immigrants posed an imminent danger to native values. Therefore the immigrant neighborhoods, newspapers, churches, and halls needed to be controlled while the immigrants themselves were assimilated into mainstream American life. But assimilation required an adjustment on the part of immigrants and native-born alike.

The industrial class that formed the backbone of the economic elite blamed the nation's ills on the immigrants which they themselves had recruited as a source of cheap labor. Now, in response to the perceived challenges facing their perception of American values, the elite launched the "Americanization" movement. Steeped in the principles of nativism, the publicly stated purpose of this broad based scheme was to promote the social and cultural assimilation of immigrants. Underlying the stated goals of its promoters lurked a secondary agenda, to utilize the banner of Americanization as a means of promoting pro-business political reform movements,

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establishing labor discipline, and imposing social controls upon the non-assimilated population.⁷

Philanthropy became the mainstay of Americanization as some of America's wealthiest families committed their capital and resources to museums, libraries, and universities. Through these institutions, an appreciation of American traditions and values, the concept of free enterprise, and the benefits of capitalism were expected to filter down to the neighborhoods and unify the ethnically diversified. To affirm and validate their messages, an enormous program of literacy and public education was launched. Between 1870 and 1900, the number of public high schools increased from 160 to over 6,000 while 150 new colleges and universities were founded. As the training ground for teachers and managers alike, the universities became a critical component of Americanization. However, in order to function in this capacity, the universities first had to be built or

⁷ There are several very good accounts of the Americanization movement. One of the older but still extremely valuable works is Edward G. Hartmann's *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrants*. For information pertaining to Americanization and the rise of the social sciences, the reader should consult *The Origins of American Social Science* by Dorothy Ross. Insight into how Americanization was utilized within industry may be found in *The Five Dollar Day: Labor Management and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, 1908 - 1921*, (1981) by Stephen Meyer.
reorganized along secular, scientific, and professional lines.⁸

Foremost among these newly created institutions of secular and scientific study was the University of Chicago. John D. Rockefeller was the premier industrialist of the day and a major supporter of Americanization. Rockefeller became the primary financial benefactor of the University of Chicago, and through his patronage the University attracted the most prestigious academics of each field. Albion Small joined the University in 1892, organized the first Department of Sociology in the nation, and served as its Chair until 1925. During his long tenure Small assembled an outstanding cast of sociologists who studied the city in painstaking detail. Consequently, for decades after the formation of the University of Chicago, American sociology was the study of the city.

The 19th and early 20th centuries were thus a pivotal time of transition when physical growth expanded the boundaries and taxed the infrastructure of the American city. It was a time when previously isolated racial and

⁸ Robert C. Bannister offers a very good account of the restructuring of the university system in Sociology and Scientism: The American Quest for Objectivity, 1880 - 1940. Also consult The Origins of American Social Science by Dorothy Ross for additional information and insight.
ethnic groups mingled and collided as diversity and bigotry both existed in an emerging urban culture. It was also a time when urbanization impacted and shaped the organizational structure of the city and urban residents alike. The ensuing turmoil of transition strained many cities as community leaders struggled to maintain pace with and gain control of the swiftly changing city. Additionally, the urban struggles which were taking place began to be systematically documented and analyzed in depth as sociology emerged as a significant academic discipline.

The modern American city is the heritage of the successes and failures of that past when growth, diversity, and organization merged on the city streets. The city, as we know it, was born in this epoch of metamorphosis, and to understand it we must understand the labor pains from which it materialized. This work will attempt to shed light upon the physical growth, social diversity, and formal organizational structures of Louisville, Kentucky during that city's critical and formative years of transition and development.
By the late 19th century, the major cities of Western Europe were undergoing the same rapid rate of growth as were their American counterparts. However, there was a fundamental difference between the European and American cities. European cities were well established and in many cases located on urban footprints over a thousand years old. They had gradually evolved from rural agricultural villages and outposts of the Roman Empire into the thriving metropolises of individual nation states. They had survived major transitions in the past and had adapted with each ebb and flow of history. Throughout all of these various transitions, the European cities had generally retained their individual social and cultural foundations. This was not the case with North American cities which were new entities founded from scratch and quickly carved out of a wilderness. The American cities had no long established traditions or cultures to steady them during periods of monumental development. They were completely new and untested commodity in a highly unstable developing nation.

Perhaps these distinctions explain in part the different levels of priority that European and American
social theorists allocated to the city. With few exceptions, European theorists did not view the city as a distinctive entity in its own right. The European theorists conceded that the city was a battleground upon which social change was played out, but did not generally consider the city to be a topic of individual inquiry. European theorists subsumed the city and its problems under the broader approach of the shift from traditional to modern society.

Accordingly, the focal point in Marx's analysis was the economic conflict between the capitalists and proletariat classes. For Marx, the city was the primary location of class conflict, but capitalism was the subject matter of his analysis. Likewise, Ferdinand Tonnies examined the breakdown of kinship and primary relationships common to village communities (gemeinschaft) and the emergence of individualistic interests in larger more complex environments (gesellschaft). Emile Durkheim was interested in how the collective conscience of mechanical solidarity was

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Two notable exceptions to this general observation were Friedrich Engels and Max Weber. Engels' descriptive masterpiece "The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844" was the first major work to examine urban social conditions. A generation later Weber published The City, a monumental cross cultural and historical analysis of urbanization.
replaced by an organic solidarity predicated upon a division of labor. Along these same lines, the transition from traditional society to a rational bureaucratic society became a major theme running throughout the work of Max Weber.

In these cases, rural and urban areas alike were the sites of changing social relationships, but it was the effect of that process which the classical theorists were essentially interested in rather than its locale. They viewed the city and its related problems as a component or byproduct of a larger macro level transformation. Therefore, they devoted scant attention to the complexity and consequences of urban growth and development.

One of the few exceptions to this general pattern of macro level analysis was presented by George Simmel. In his now classic work, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," Simmel compared and contrasted rural and urban life and introduced a psychological dimension into the discussion. For Simmel, the crowded and congested city with its traffic, noise, and rapid pace of life created an intense level of mental stimulation. The final effect of this stimulation was that urbanites became more calculating and driven by intellectual rather than emotional attachments. Additionally, the city created an attitude
of "unmerciful matter-of-factness" among its residents towards the well being of others.\textsuperscript{10} Simmel analyzed the city as an independent entity and suggested that urban life fundamentally altered the psychological orientation of its residents.\textsuperscript{11}

When viewed as a group, the European theorists attempted to understand and explain the modern age from their own unique and individual perspectives. Nevertheless, major threads of commonality bridge their individual efforts into an impressive body of work. Each theorist recognized that society was moving from the simple to the complex, and as a result, meaningful associations and commonly shared values were becoming less obtainable. Also, that complexity impacted the social, economic, and political orientations of society and in the case of Simmel, the psychological orientation of urbanites as well.

Pioneer American sociologists such as Robert Park, William I. Thomas and W.E.B. DuBois had studied in Europe and were familiar with as well as influenced by the

\textsuperscript{10} Readings in Introductory Sociology (1967) ed. by Dennis Wrong and Harry Gracey, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{11} The full text of Simmel's work has been reprinted in Wrong and Gracey (1967). For a detailed analysis of "The Metropolis and Mental Life," consult Michael P. Smith's The City and Social Theory.
classical European theorists. As a result, those same sophisticated themes acquired from classical theory were eventually incorporated into the subsequent development of a uniquely American theoretical approach, but with a twist. Early American social theorists transposed the process, gave priority to the city, and subsumed virtually everything under an urban heading.

The primacy allocated to the city was understandable given the fact that urban America was growing by leaps and bounds at precisely the same time sociology was emerging as a distinct and individual discipline. Many American cities had literally burst upon the scene within the scope of a single generation and without benefit of a long historical gestation period. American sociologists were thus consumed by a desire to understand the nature and ramification of this new and unique phenomena. As cities grew and evolved from modest beginnings to intricate entities, so too did the accompanying social theories which attempted to explain them. American urban social theory started from simplistic origins and quickly advanced through stages to more complex and multi-dimensional levels of analysis.

The first urban theories can hardly be classified as genuine theories in the truest sense of the term. These
initial efforts were independently produced by Charles H. Cooley and Adna Weber and were predominately descriptive in nature. Both Cooley and Weber centered their deliberations around issues of urban location and growth, but neither analyzed in depth the cultural diversity or social repercussions associated with urban life. Nevertheless, as factual platforms, their work functioned as springboards for more sophisticated theoretical efforts.

In *The Theory of Transportation*, Cooley determined that a city's location was critical to its formation, growth and development. "A break in transportation, even if it involves no more than a transfer of goods from one carrier to another, involves much equipment and many facilities." Therefore, "it is at the mouths or key points of rivers, meeting points on hills and plains, and other such areas that city formations appear."\(^{12}\) According to Cooley, successful cities did not occur randomly or by accident. Rather they were formed, shaped, and molded by their physical locations.

Adna Weber, like Cooley, recognized the importance of location as it related to the necessity of

\(^{12}\) Quoted on p. 16 in Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth's introduction to *The City* by Max Weber.
transportation, but Weber believed that was only part of a larger equation. In The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century, Weber concluded that the modern city was primarily the product of economic forces that were unleashed by the industrial revolution. The increased productivity of the industrial revolution was only possible within a factory system, which by its very nature was dependent upon public utilities, modern communication, transportation, and a centralized commercial and trading center. In short, the factory required all the conveniences which were most easily found in an urban setting.13

The economic aspects of the industrial revolution were the primary elements of urban development, but Weber also isolated three secondary factors which contributed to rapid urban growth. First, there was the secondary causality of employment and higher wages which the factories generated. Individuals immigrated or migrated to the cities in search of employment opportunities and a higher standard of living. Second, there were the political aspects of urban life as entrepreneurs found the centralized administration of municipal government

beneficial for their business needs. In addition to promoting commerce, the city administration could maintain and manage the public services necessary for efficient factory operations. Finally, there were the social considerations of urban life. Within the cities people had access to educational opportunities, cultural activities, and a multitude of amusement options which were lacking in the rural countryside. Within this analysis, the city offered the tools necessary to run the modern factories, which in turn created the necessary amenities to attract more people in search of a better life. In essence, the industrial revolution turned the city into an evolving and self-perpetuating entity.

Both Cooley and Weber provided convincing explanations for the location and growth of cities, but their works were primarily descriptive rather than analytical. They recognized the American city as something new and unique, but did not delve deeply into issues of internal physical growth, urban politics, social diversity, or the organizational structure of urban life. Complex issues of this nature could not be addressed until an authentic urban theory emerged.

The first genuine American urban theory was developed by the sociologists of the University of
Chicago who studied that city in depth. From their joint efforts, a sophisticated and systematic perspective emerged. Human Ecology, as this approach came to be known, was a detailed explanation in which competition for a city's natural areas profoundly influenced land use, racial and ethnic assimilation, and organizational structure. Within this perspective, natural areas were defined as locations that evolved in an organic and unplanned manner to satisfy specific needs, while competition referred to environmental rather than strictly economic conflict.

With the ecological approach, land use within each natural area of the city eventually attracted the enterprise which was best suited for that particular location. The major banks and primary retail outlets would logically locate on the most expensive and centrally located properties where they could most efficiently service the surrounding community. Likewise, wholesale and warehousing facilities would seek out areas around major cross roads, train stations, rail yards or docks, while heavy industry would become established on less desirable and less expensive land. "The modern city," wrote Robert Park in 1921, "is primarily a convenience of commerce and it owes its existence to the
marketplace around which it sprang up.\textsuperscript{14}

The ecologists maintained that land use patterns of this nature not only resulted in the physical form and structure of the city, but indirectly contributed to ethnic, racial, religious, and class segregation as well. In an age of limited transportation, specific groups were in competition for the best quality housing they could afford within quick and convenient access of their employment. Accordingly, the affluent bankers and prosperous merchants could afford the property in areas close to the central business district while the industrial working class was relegated to less desirable neighborhoods in the vicinity of the factories and warehouses. The neighborhoods were then further subdivided along ethnic and racial lines as a result of historical patterns of immigration and internal migration.

The ecologists recognized that immigration and migration occurred in waves, with each new wave bringing a different group to the city. The newest arrivals with the least economic and social capital were allocated the lowest paying, entry level jobs, and were compelled to

\textsuperscript{14} Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess. \textit{Introduction to the Science of Sociology} (1921)
accept the least desirable housing in densely populated areas. The newest arrivals thus assumed the bottom level positions within society and provided an opportunity for the preceding group to move up a notch on the occupational hierarchy, gain access to more resources, and eventually obtain better housing. Through this process, a natural sifting and sorting of the population took place in a non-planned, but non-random system of segregation.

Robert Park explained the prevailing hypothesis of the ecological approach in "Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment," the opening chapter of The City. Park recognized that the city was the natural habitat of civilized man, but also maintained that the city obeyed its own organic laws in terms of physical structure and moral order. Consequently from an ecological perspective, the city as a natural area developed a life of its own which once activated, could only be marginally influenced or controlled through human intervention. In effect, the city became more than the sum of its individual parts.

This same logic was applied to urban sub-sections

15 The City was written and edited by Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie.
and neighborhoods as well. Each residential locality was believed to be a natural area for a specific type of occupant, and thereby came to reflect the characteristics and values of its residents. Eventually, those characteristics and values were imprinted upon the neighborhood and further internalized by the residents. However, neither city nor neighborhood was completely static. The ecologists hypothesized that within the ever expanding city, there was a gradual decline of family, kinship networks, and primary associations common to smaller, more traditional communities. In the city, these pre-modern forms of social organization were steadily replaced by secondary affiliations, individual occupational interests, and neighborhood specific views. In the face of such diversity, citywide unanimity was impossible to establish and eventually only area-specific singularities survived. Nevertheless, local continuity was created and maintained as new residents psychologically adjusted to their limited surroundings.

Human ecology quickly emerged as the dominant theoretical perspective within American sociology and retained that position for decades. The concepts and ideas developed at the Chicago School served as the foundation for an astounding array of subsequent
analyses, as generations of ecologically trained sociologists tackled issues of urban growth, social diversity, and the organizational structure of the city. However, by the 1950's, ecological traditions began to be challenged as alternative theoretical interpretations questioned the evolutionary foundations and conclusions of the Chicago School. Nevertheless, when discussing the highly interrelated topics of growth, diversity, and organizational structure human ecology is still the logical and necessary starting point. It was the first genuine urban theory and the terrain from which subsequent considerations emerged.

Urban Growth and Political Economy

The sociologists of the Chicago School explored many related topics, but invariably accepted urban growth as the driving force behind the specific social phenomena they were investigating. Accordingly, they are perhaps best remembered for their analysis of the physical organization of the city. The ecologists were primarily interested in growth and believed human relationships within the city were contingent upon and molded by that growth. Ernest Burgess introduced the definitive
ecological hypothesis regarding growth with his "Concentric Zone Theory." Burgess believed that growth was the consequence of ecological factors rather than erratic and indiscriminate development. He concluded that cities, if allowed to develop in an unobstructed manner, would logically grow outward from the center with five distinct but symbiotically connected metropolitan zones unfolding in the process.16

Burgess concluded that zone 1 contained the central business district and most expensive property. Zone 2 served as a transitional area of low-income ghettos, high population density, and secondary mercantile ventures. The property in zone 2 was potentially valuable as a result of its proximity to zone 1, and was therefore held by investors who anticipated the expansion of the central business district. Zone 3 contained the modest homes of the working class, while zone 4 was comprised of primarily middle class single family housing. Zone 5 consisted of the low density, upper class housing of the

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16 "The Growth of the City" by Ernest Burgess was published in The City. It should also be noted that Burgess offered his Concentric Zone Theory as an ideal type. He recognized not all cities could conform exactly to this model since geographical features could obstruct expansion in a particular direction. This was the case in Chicago where Lake Michigan obstructed development to the North and in Louisville where the Ohio River forced the city to expand primarily south.
suburban commuter class.

Burgess' Concentric Zone Theory remained the dominant explanation of urban organization until it was challenged by subsequent interpretations. Homer Hoyt, for example maintained that the residential and commercial areas of many cities did not exist in concentric zones but were located in sectors that grew outward along the major transportation lines. Thus, the city resembled pie-shaped wedges with each wedge devoted to a particular activity. For Hoyt, a wedge's relationship to the transportation network greatly impacted its particular use and value. Sector Theory was in turn followed by the multiple-nuclei model of Chauncey Harris and Edward Ullman. These theorists suggested the city did not have a single center, but contained multiple centers, each of which attract a clustering of specialized and related activity. Accordingly, individual areas developed that were devoted to particular forms of land use as each area attracted the activity for which it was best suited. Although these theoretical perspectives deviate in how they view the outward manifestation of urban physical


organization they all are presented from a predominantly ecological standpoint. They accept that each area attracts a specific type of occupant, and eventually develops its own unique cultural identity, values, and traditions. At this point, the historical continuity of the area is preserved and remains intact as long as the area's primary land use patterns continue unaltered.

However, working from the basis of an evolutionary theory the ecologists recognized that successful cities continually expand and develop rather than remain static. Competition for urban space resulted in periodic alterations of land use as changes in transportation, the introduction of new technology, or the arrival of new groups rendered previously established areas ripe for invasion. Nevertheless, the invasion and subsequent succession of urban space was still perceived to be the result of environmental adaptation rather than calculated human intervention. From this evolutionary conviction, competition was understood to be one characteristic of a symbiotic urban ecosystem. Following this logic, urban growth was controlled by the interaction of environmental factors rather than the conscious strategies of individual competition within the environment.

As a result of this approach, the ecologists devoted
little attention to the concept that urban growth could be manipulated by the activity of political factors. When urban politics were addressed, they were primarily viewed as a consequence of declining primary relationships and the advent of secondary associations. Accordingly, the ecologists recognized two different and distinct types of urban political organization. The first was the political machine: a boss-dominated system of political power based upon the combined influence of patronage, personal loyalty, and political reward and punishment. For the ecologists, the political machine was a declining institution because it could not maintain pace with the rapidly expanding city or effectively govern the entire city. The second, and to them the more desirable form of urban government, was the type promoted by the political reform movements of the day. Proponents of reform maintained they were ending corruption, professionalizing administration and bringing organization and specialization to the public sector.¹⁹

The reform government was believed to be capable of

¹⁹ A descriptive account of the number and location of major political machines may be obtained from "A Review of Municipal Events, 1906 - 07" by Clinton Rogers Woodruff (1907). This description also reviles the sentiment held by sociologists of the day regarding the existence of the machines.
overcoming the narrow vision generated within each specific urban area and could therefore attend to the city in its entirety. However, success was contingent upon the leadership of the reform movement. Harvey Zorbaugh maintained that the members of the economic elite, from their unique position within the casino and the lounges of the racquet club, were the only group capable of seeing the city as a whole, and therefore the group most responsible for productively governing the city.\textsuperscript{20} Unfortunately, Zorbaugh never developed this line of reasoning beyond the observational level. In this manner, Zorbaugh and his colleagues dispensed with urban politics and elite involvement, as both were subsumed under the broader perspective of rational, evolutionary urban growth.

By the early 1950s, evolutionary explanations were falling from sociological grace as a new generation of theorists emerged. This group still viewed competition as a fundamental component of urban development, but did not consider it to be a consequence of simple environmental adaptation. Rather, they recognized the urban environment could be manipulated and altered through active elite

\textsuperscript{20} Zorbaugh, Harvey W. The Gold Coast and the Slum, (1929).
intervention. Transportation routes could be redirected or urban areas re-zoned by those with sufficient influence to impose their will. Activities of this nature would then provide a competitive edge to the group that controlled and influenced the institutions of the political process.

With the introduction of this theory a paradigmatic shift took place from the ecological perception of competition within the environment, to one of power and control over the environment. Likewise, the focus of investigation veered from an analysis of physical growth to an examination of the urban institutions that regulate and manipulate patterns of growth. Urban government, as the primary regulatory institution, was appropriately subjected to intensive scrutiny and analysis. In essence, the ecological perspective was turned upside down as new theorists subsumed growth under urban politics. Within this approach, whoever controlled and influenced urban government could manipulate urban growth for their own self-interest.

Foremost among this innovative group of theorists was Floyd Hunter. In his now classic work, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, Hunter revealed what he believed to be the true "power
structure" of Atlanta. This power structure may be envisioned as a pyramid, with the elite business class occupying the top level of the configuration. The second level of Hunter's power structure was occupied by the "political understructure" that contained individuals actively involved in urban politics, the political parties, civic associations, trade unions, the Chamber of Commerce, and other similar organizations. At the base of the pyramid were the politically uninvolved and therefore powerless majority. Hunter concluded that major urban issues were decided exclusively at the top level of the power structure through the power and informal control of an elite business class. Further, he believed that democracy was a myth, since urban government was subservient to the business elite which acted exclusively in its own self-interest.

Hunter developed and utilized the reputational method, which consists of soliciting nominations of persons believed to be leaders within various community segments. This list was then evaluated by a committee of individuals well versed in community affairs, and these "knowledgeables" ranked the leaders in terms of their reputed power and influence. In the case of Atlanta, the knowledgeables ranked the business elite at the top of
Hunter's leadership list and it was this group which was subjected to concentrated analysis.21

Three years after the publication of Hunter's work, C. Wright Mills provided further support for an elite approach. When conducting research and collecting data for The Power Elite, Mills utilized a positional methodology. With this method the researcher starts by studying actual political, economic, and social institutions and determines the membership of those organizations. The membership and cohesiveness of the studied institutions is then analyzed, with particular attention given to multiple and overlapping memberships. In positional analysis overlapping affiliations are, by their very nature, believed to provide economical and political advantages and connections.

In The Power Elite, Mills concluded that a small, well-positioned elite dominated decision making, economic development, and political control. Furthermore, the power elite was an interconnected, self-perpetuating business-oriented circle of individuals who manipulated public policy through the influence of position, status

and wealth. The power elite was not totally cohesive at all times, but was solidly connected through similar social backgrounds, intermarriage, and economic interests. When discussing the power elite, Mills concluded:

In every town and small city of America an upper set of families stands above the middle classes and towers over the underlying population of clerks and wage workers. The members of this set possess more than do others of whatever there is locally to possess; they hold the keys to local decisions; their names and faces are often printed in the local paper; in fact, they own the newspaper ... they also own the important local plants and most of the commercial properties along the main street; they direct the banks. Mingling closely with one another, they are quite conscious of the fact that they belong to the leading class of the leading families.  

The work of Hunter and Mills formed the nucleus of what became known as the elite perspective and stimulated a generation of scholars interested in issues of urban growth, power, and political control.  These scholars


employed reputational or positional methodologies as means of identifying urban power brokers, and were intensely critical of the effectiveness of the democratic process. According to the elite perspective, true power and ultimate control of the city (and consequentially urban growth), rested with a small number of business leaders who monopolize the city in a virtually unchecked manner for their own self interests.

The elite perspective was a radical departure from the environmentally based ecological approach and not without its critics. Foremost among the critics were political scientists who viewed the elite perspective as an affront to and infringement upon their academic jurisdiction. In *Who Governs*, political scientist Robert Dahl challenged the elite perspective and laid the cornerstone of the rival "pluralist" position.

Dahl recognized that important urban decisions are made by a relatively small number of actively involved individuals. However, unlike the elite theorists, Dahl suggests there was no one single dominant group controlling the city. According to Dahl, pivotal urban issues were supported or opposed by shifting coalitions of interested parties with each distinctive situation attracting its own "leadership pool" of partisans.
With the pluralist approach, business leaders have no more municipal influence than any other organized group, and competition among organized leadership pools obstructs the creation of a dominate urban clique. Additionally, Dahl maintained that the common citizenry have an indirect influence over community issues as a result of their voting power. Elected officials can not afford to alienate voters who could conceivably organize and overpower a special interest agenda. The voting power of the population thus functions as a check against the emergence of a dominate ruling circle. The pluralists contend that democracy is an essential function of the American urban environment and critical to the political organizational structure of the city.

Utilizing the "decisional approach" in his analysis of New Haven, Dahl focused attention upon the results of the decision making process in three key areas of urban government: urban renewal, public education, and party nominations. Dahl concluded that the leadership pools that formed around each area did not overlap into other areas. Accordingly, the leadership pools for the business elite and a citizens committee may battle over issues of urban renewal, but neither organized group would influence party nominations. Likewise, proponents of
public education issues were not likely to become involved in noneducational matters.24

After the publication of Who Governs, other political scientists adopted the decisional approach and produced studies supporting the concept of a pluralist system of urban control. These subsequent works defended the democratic process, attacked elite methodologies, and were highly critical of the elite perspective in general.25 The ensuing debate between elite and pluralist theorists became intense, with the lines of demarcation rigidly drawn. This gridlock was shattered when a subsequent group of theorists began to bridge the gap by developing a more unified theoretical interpretation.

By refining the elite and pluralist perspectives, these latter scholars moved the question of urban control into the realm of political economy. The primary assumption of urban political economy rests with the realization that cities are influenced by both political


and economic logics. Further, in a capitalist society, these two sets of logic are not separate entities but acutely co-dependent. Urban political economy is a holistic approach which recognizes that power and control are manifested in the interaction between the public political and private economic institutions of the total urban structure. Accordingly, the actors who influence and manipulate that interaction are the authentic power brokers within the urban setting.

The first step in this direction occurred with a series of critiques of elite and pluralist methodologies and the realization that both approaches had one crucial tenet in common. Theorists such as David Ricci and Paul Peterson focus on the simple fact that both viewpoints concede that urban control rests in the hands of relatively small, goal-specific groups rather than the public at large. The composition of the groups and the type and degree of checks and balances upon them may be in dispute, but clearly the city is manipulated by members of special interest groups with specific and explicit agendas.26

Others, including Ricci, Bachrach and Baratz, were

also exceedingly critical of both the elite and pluralist methodologies and conclusions, and quickly exposed their more obvious flaws and weaknesses. They maintained that by examining primarily elite groups, elite theorists created a self-fulfilling prophecy and a scenario that could only result in one conclusion: the elite have a disproportionate amount of power and influence within the total urban environment. Likewise, by solely examining concrete decisions the pluralists did not address proposals and issues which were not brought before the public. Nor, did they explain why some issues failed to reach the public where the population could actually utilize their voting power. 27

Ricci further illuminated an underlying dilemma in Dahl's logic when he observed that if the non-politically active have an indirect influence upon the political process through their voting power, then the elite must also have an indirect influence as a result of their power, prestige and influence. Ricci hypothesized that elected leaders do not wish to provoke the elite who could bring the pressure of wealth, power, and influence to bear against them. As a result the elite have both

direct and indirect leverage over urban issues.28

Another step in the direction of urban political economy was provided by Paul Peterson, who also grasped that significant urban issues are orchestrated by members of special interest groups. However, Peterson contends that this orchestration can only transpire within the parameters of well-established boundaries. Peterson suggests that the city must conform to the principle political, economic, and social standards of the nation as a whole. Thus, in an effort to realize these externally mandated norms, the city itself becomes a special interest group within the larger national context.29

Peterson further argued that the city's primary goals include maintaining urban services and fiscal responsibility. These goals transcend the sum of the city's individual parts, take on a life of their own, and exist regardless of who controls or influences city hall. The city must also continually struggle to maintain a degree of balance between these two objectives. Urban


government must maintain an acceptable level of municipal services, and these increasingly costly allocations strain the financial resources and require a corresponding escalation of municipal revenue.

Increased revenue can only be acquired through elevated taxes upon the existing population or through urban growth and expansion. Of the two options, growth is the more desirable alternative, and growth therefore becomes the city's primary objective. Unfortunately, the city cannot directly control the migration of capital or labor, the primary elements necessary for growth. As a result, the city must promote itself in an effort to convince new capital and labor to locate within its boundaries. To accomplish this task, the city must become actively involved in developmental issues.

With this analysis, Peterson introduces a national economic logic into the debate and concludes that this external pressure results in both elitism and pluralism. Urban government is pluralist in terms of allocational issues such as city services and patronage jobs. While in the realm of developmental issues, such as growth promotion, the city is dominated by the elite business class. Peterson also contends that developmental issues enhance a city's standing far more than allocational
concerns. Therefore, the elite have a disproportional degree of influence but certainly not absolute political control.

John Logan and Harvey Molotch strive to understand the source and impact of the urban developmental mentality and the resulting leverage that it provides to the elite business class. In this analysis the authors utilize the neo-Marxist distinction between use value and exchange value, and apply that viewpoint to urban property. Logan and Molotch conclude that property owners continually strive to expand the exchange value of their holdings by increasing rents and intensifying land usage. Hence, the authors present a model of urban development fueled by an elite coalition of property owners, real estate developers, the commercial business community, utility companies, local media, and other related interests.

Labeling this coalition the "growth machine," Logan and Molotch describe how the city is turned into a vehicle for the economic interests of growth machine members who have one agenda in common: the growth, development or redevelopment of their city as it is tied to the exchange value of their holdings. For Logan and Molotch, urban growth is a major issue within all
segments of the community. However, growth is the primary interest of the elite who derive their wealth from manipulating the exchange value of property.

In keeping with the elite perspective, Logan and Molotch view the political process as subordinate to the elite agenda. "Because so much of the growth mobilization effort involves government, local growth elites play a major role in electing local politicians, 'watchdoging' their activities, and scrutinizing administrative detail." Nevertheless, the growth machine differs from traditional elite theory in two significant ways. First, the elite agenda is not the only activity that local government becomes involved in, and the government must function within a pluralist atmosphere when confronting non-growth issues. Secondly, the growth machine is primarily effective on developmental issues not always dominant on non-growth issues.

Political scientist Clarence Stone further contends that local governments and the elites both have vested interests in urban growth, and thus enter into a mutually beneficial relationship in order to obtain that growth. However, since business decisions are critical to the

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30 Logan, John and Harvey Molotch, Urban Fortunes: the Political Economy of Place, (1987) p. 63,
public welfare, and since most capital is mobile, political leaders must cater to the elite agenda in most instances. Accordingly, Stone's "regime theory" recognizes that the structural power of business provides the elite with a privileged position within the urban environment.

Stone maintains that government officials are powerless to function outside the instruments of government. Public officials recognize the "systemic power" of the elite and depend upon that power to affect results which they themselves cannot reach through limited and restricted municipal avenues. For Stone, this systemic power results in a predisposition of public officials to support the elite developmental agenda. Politicians who depend upon this systemic power cannot alienate the elite who could retaliate by withholding capital and resources.

In regime theory, elected officials and the elite establish informal channels through which mutually beneficial objectives may be gained. This relationship results in the creation of self-perpetuating political regimes. Thus a regime is an informal and relatively stable group with access to organizational and institutional resources, and the ability to influence
governmental decisions. For Stone, the regime is not informal because of a lack of institutional connections, but because the regime brings together institutional connections through an informal mode of cooperation.\textsuperscript{31}

Regime theory maintains that public officials are compelled to operate under a system of dual pressure. On the one hand, city officials are held up to electoral accountability and must at least maintain the impression that they are attempting to serve the best interests of the citizens. On the other hand, city officials must contend with the elites' institutional connections and organizational resources. This fact results in the elite having a disproportional degree of both direct and indirect influence.

In a section reminiscent of Max Weber's myth of natural superiority, Stone maintains that the elite have a dynamic influence because society has a built-in inclination to cater to the aspirations of the dominant group. In this respect, regime theory differs from traditional pluralism because status ordering creates an atmosphere favorable to the adoption of the regime agenda. Generally, the regime does not even need to exert

its systemic power in order to obtain an objective, since the scales are already tipped in their favor. This is particularly true in terms of growth-related issues, where non-elite leadership pools typically bow to elite expertise. In non-growth areas, a pluralist system may exist, but the regime still influences what issues are brought before the public for consideration.

Growth machine and political regime theories have much in common. However, as they both remain true to their intellectual heritage in terms of their principle focal point. Sociologists Logan and Molotch are predominately concerned with the economic motivation of the elite actors who constitute the growth machine. Stone, reflects his political science orientation by primarily examining the actual political process. Logan, Whaley and Crowder contend these two perspectives are essentially flip sides of the same coin. Therefore, in order to gain a rational understanding of the city, a "growth regime" perspective must be utilized. The growth regime unites private economic motivations with public political transactions and strives to decipher the point of intersection between these two sets of logic. Municipal power and influence stems from this intersection of structural resources and control of that
interaction yields enormous privilege to those with authority over it.\textsuperscript{32}

However, in a highly diversified city obtaining power and influence is in large part contingent upon the level of assimilation or degree of exclusion which the leadership pools of the various urban groups encounter. From a growth regime perspective, any discussion of urban growth and political control must include a discussion of the various groups which inhabit the urban environment. Therefore, an analysis of the city must also contain a discussion of race and ethnicity, and in a social historical analysis, labor and class status to a limited degree as well.\textsuperscript{33} After all, these groups are organized and a significant part of the city, contribute to the urban environment, form influential voting blocks, and compete for an increased share of the available urban resources. Additionally, a successful growth regime must unite these diverse groups into a unified, yet hierarchically structured partnership. Consequently, an


\textsuperscript{33} For this analysis labor and class status have generally been subsumed under the broader categories of race and ethnicity. As a result no separate literature reviews regarding labor and class have been included.
understanding of race and ethnicity is critical to understanding the growth regime, particularly to the initial formation of the regime.

Racial Exclusion and Ethnic Assimilation

From the earliest days of the Chicago School, race and ethnicity were recognized and treated as separate and distinct issues. Robert Park acknowledged this fact in 1913 and set the tone for a theoretical interpretation of a bi-racial nation. Park conceded that African Americans were a subject people and denied equal access to the resources of society primarily on the basis of skin color. And even though social conditions had improved since emancipation, he was skeptical about the prospects of eventual integration because of the social duality which he witnessed.

The pre-emancipation horizontal racial line of white domination had in Park's opinion changed to a vertical line of bi-racial social organization. On each side of the vertical line were black and white professional associations, business leaders and labor. "The races no longer look up and down," stated Park, "they look
across." This vertical line of social distance was sustained through an established order of social rituals which according to Park were "fixed in the habits and customs of both races, (and) persisted long after the institution of slavery had been deprived of its legal sanctions.""35

"Common interest have drawn the blacks together, and caste sentiment has kept the black and white apart," stated Park. In "The Concept of Social Distance" Park maintained the social rituals, etiquette, and ceremonies built into society had divided and distanced the races, perhaps beyond the point of reconciliation. "Competition which had been personal," stated Park, "became racial, and race competition became race conflict."36 He further believed that under conditions of individual liberty and competition, repressed racial groups would assume the form of nationalities. Park thus maintained, that if racial integration were to take place it would be through an accommodation to cultural nationalism.37

34 Park, (1950) p. 249.
36 Park, (1924) p. 343.
37 Park, Robert E. "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups, with Particular Reference to the Negro," (1913); "The Concept of Social Distance," (1924) and Race and
At least in this respect, Park's analysis of race relations was similar to that of W.E.B. DuBois. However, DuBois took the analysis of social duality far deeper by recognizing it created a "twoness" of consciousness for African Americans. For DuBois, the existence of this "twoness" mandated the development of a formal and independent African American cultural identity.

Assimilation was not an option that DuBois embraced, a fact which he made clear when he stated "the 8,000,000 people of Negro blood in the United States of America must soon come to realize that if they are to take their just place in the van of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by the white Americans."

To combat the effects of historical exploitation, to raise consciousness and counter the prospect of assimilation, DuBois stressed the importance of maintaining and expanding African American organizations,

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38 "The Conservation of Race" p. 87, in Bernasconi, Robert (ed) Race. W.E.B. DuBois was a prolific writer and a great deal of his more significant works are widely available in secondary edited works. For DuBois' discussion of "twoness," consult "Double-Consciousness and the Veil," see also The Souls of Black Folk. A reprint of "The Spirit of Modern Europe" may be found in Charles Lemert's Social Theory: The Multiculture and Classic Reader (1993).
universities, newspapers, and businesses. DuBois believed this was necessary for racial advancement and a vehicle through which racial unity and African American heritage could be promoted. DuBois advised "Our watch word today must be Social Solidarity - Social Responsibility: Systematic and Continuous union of our individual effort to promote Justice and Freedom among ourselves and throughout this land by means of knowledge and authority." 39

Following the leads of Park and DuBois, subsequent social theorists attempted to analyze the racial duality which they witnessed. William Lloyd Warner maintained that America contained both a class and a caste system, with the white population belonging to one of several different classes while all African Americans were viewed by whites as members of an inferior social caste. Within a system such as this, individual African Americans could experience improvements in income, but were still excluded from free association with whites of an equal economic position. When individual African Americans improved economically, they did not break that caste line, the caste line merely tipped up diagonally. Thus, an individual could become a middle or upper class

African American but still not gain equal access to the larger society's resources or obtain a higher social location.\textsuperscript{40}

Additional support for this approach was provided by Davis, Gardner and Gardner who concluded that deep-seated cultural beliefs dominated attitudes of race. These cultural beliefs served to maintain the caste system and were strengthened because most whites firmly believed that God had ordained that social arrangement. Davis, Gardner and Gardner recognized that "rituals of subordination" maintained the caste system and influenced the behavior of African Americans and whites alike. For African Americans, the rituals included segregation, deferential behavior, and the use of titles. These same rituals also dictated that whites should view African Americans as inferior, mentally deficient, and in need of constant supervision.\textsuperscript{41}

Oliver Cromwell Cox expanded the discussion by recognizing that the white economic elite opposed and blocked assimilation because it was to their advantage to

\textsuperscript{40} Warner addressed these issues in several works, the best of which are "American Class and Caste," (1936) and The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans, (1959).

keep African Americans politically and economically excluded from mainstream society. Cox maintained that lynchings and other racial violence were supported by the elite as a means of maintaining African Americans in subservient roles. The violence and racism prevented black and white workers from recognizing their commonly shared grievances against the capitalist class. Consequently, no unified inter-racial organized efforts could emerge that were capable of challenging the power and privilege of the elite.

Edna Bonacich adds an additional dimension to the discussion by suggesting that racial antagonisms are intensified because of economic factors. Bonacich believes that where unequal resources and skills exist, a split labor market is possible. Unskilled and unorganized African American workers lack the resources to protect their position. Therefore, they can be played off against better organized workers in an effort to reduce wages, benefits, and the bargaining position of the stronger group.

Business owners typically seek to employ the least expensive labor, and because of historical

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discrimination, African Americans may be employed for less. As a result, African Americans are actually discriminated against on two fronts: first, by business owners who utilize them as a means of maintaining all wages at a lower level; and second, by white workers who actively seek to keep minority workers in the least desirable jobs in order to protect their own more privileged position.

Racial exclusion thus serves the self interests of the more privileged members of the working class by reducing competition. Bonacich further argued that craft unions actively worked to split the labor market and maintain control over access to skilled work. The craft unions allowed African Americans to fill low wage, unskilled non-organized positions while aggressively protecting access to the more desirable jobs. Bonacich's analysis is useful because it explains in part the vertical dimension of economic exploitation as well as the horizontal nature of discrimination across racial lines.\(^\text{43}\)

William Julius Wilson accepted the concept of a

Wilson points out that the split labor market was a consequence of and unique to the industrial stage of American production. According to Wilson, the split labor market only existed from the last decades of the 19th century until the New Deal Era of the 1930s when the modern industrial period began. Wilson believes that during this critical industrial period the pre-existing ideologies of race were solidified and formalized to preserve the split labor market. An explicit and formal ideology of race was necessary during the postbellum industrial stage in order to maintain African Americans in their lower social position, restrict mobility, and eliminate any potential of economic competition. Wilson also maintained that Jim Crow legislation was the political tool through which this process of ideological


45 Wilson's work is very good but when discussing the transition from the industrial to the modern industrial period, he neglected to point out a significant factor. The craft unions of the 19th and early 20th century were segregated institutions, however, industrial unions such as the Knights of Labor and the International Workers of the World were integrated. Also, during the Depression of the 1930s it was the industrial unions of the CIO which grew and prospered and which in part helped curb the effects of the split labor market for those working within a unionized industrial workplace.
solidification took place. The Jim Crow legislation and racial ideology thus functioned to keep African Americans from improving their structural location or obtaining an elevated degree of influence within the urban economic and political structure.

Robert Blauner takes the analysis of racial exclusion another step further by declaring that racial disparity has been deliberately institutionalized within America's political structures. In his view, the original Angle-Saxon settlers established an internal colony in order to take land from Native Americans and to provide cheap labor through slavery. "This nation owes its very existence to colonialism," stated Blauner and along with settlers and immigrants there have always been conquered Indians and black slaves and later defeated Mexicans -- that is, colonial subjects -- on the national soil."\(^{46}\)

Thus, racism and exclusion were created to maintain and perpetuate white control over the economic and political institutions of the nation. Blauner concludes that the political institutions provide the necessary force to preserve and sustain the internal colony.

Accordingly, continued control of the political institutions by descendants of the original colonists is necessary to protect and promote their privileged economic and social position. Africans Americans are therefore systematically denied access to full participation within the political process.

As theories of exclusion dominated the discussions of race, theories of assimilation emerged and became the focal point of ethnic investigations. The sociologists of the Chicago School pioneered this domain as well and generally concluded that ethnic assimilation was not only desirable but probable. Robert Park again set the tone for this area of analysis when he hypothesized that contact, competition, accommodation and assimilation were symbiotic components of an ecological process which would eventually eliminate ethnic distinctions.

For Park, contact among different groups first take place when immigrants move into a new area seeking employment. This influx of people results in a degree of economic competition between new and old groups as each faction scrambles to gain a share of the resources available to them. But, competition could not proceed in an uncontrolled or unregulated manner because members of diverse ethnic groups must act within the established
laws and customs of the larger environment. The political organizations of society, therefore, function to control and regulate competition among different groups. The politically controlled competition eventually results in an adaptation and the creation of a new division of labor. The restructured division of labor places the various ethnic groups on a more or less equal footing and allows a level of equitable competition to emerge. For Park, this new division of labor within a system of established laws and customs represented an inevitable social accommodation and would in time result in the assimilation of the affected parties.47

By far the most influential work on ethnic assimilation to emerge from the Chicago School was The Polish Peasant in Europe and America by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. Thomas and Znaniecki recognized the immigrant experience could not be understood solely from the vantage point of ethnicity within the American city. Immigrants arrived with habits and attitudes formed in their homelands, thus ethnicity had to be understood

47 For a more detailed explanation of this aspect of Park’s theoretical work, see Ross (1991); Aguirre, Adalberto, and Jonathan H. Turner, American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequences of Discrimination (2001); and Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf, Contemporary Sociological Theory (1999).
within the context of the social fabrics of their national origins as well as their new environment. Thomas and Znaniecki concluded that immigrant groups underwent a staged process of readjustment that included the social organization they left behind, the disorganization of ethnicity they encountered, and finally the reorganization of assimilation.

The urban ethnic community was, therefore, a critical and positive influence during the middle stage of ethnic disorganization. For Thomas and Znaniecki, the ethnic tensions which emerged during this stage were the result of unfamiliarity with the cultural institutions and traditions of the adopted nation. The ethnic neighborhoods with their cultural traditions, distinctive churches, and native language newspapers, therefore, functioned as positive buffers between the various immigrant groups and the larger environment. Ethnic organizations of this nature stabilized the immigrant community and provided a necessary staging ground for eventual assimilation into American society. With the assistance of the community, Polish-American society thus, gradually evolved as a group phenomenon.  

48 For a more detailed analysis of The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, consult Ross, (1991); Lemert, (1993); and The Discovery of Society by Randall Collins.
A generation after the publication of Thomas and Znaniecki's work, Milton Gordon added his own perspective to issues of ethnic assimilation. Gordon developed a multi-generation and multi-stage process of assimilation. For Gordon, the first step was cultural assimilation during which ethnic groups adopted the language, values, and norms of their new country. Next came achieved assimilation which resulted in the second generation making friendships and joining clubs and organizations outside the ethnic community. Gordon's third stage involved material assimilation where the immigrants intermarried in large numbers outside of their own group. This in turn was followed by identification assimilation where the immigrants' sense of themselves became linked with their new country. This opened the door to prejudice-free assimilation where individuals did not feel a sense of discrimination because of their ethnic origin. The final stage of Gordon's hypothetical interpretation was civic assimilation where immigrants no longer made demands upon their new nation because of their ethnic status.

Gordon recognized that assimilation was a difficult process and understood the reluctance of many to abandon

their original cultural identities. Nonetheless, Gordon believed that exposure to American culture at the industrial workplace and institutions of higher education plus the procession of generations would eventually result in complete assimilation into mainstream, middle class American society. In his view, ethnicity is eventually replaced by class location within the social systems of society.

Herbert Gans also takes a multi-generational approach to assimilation but Gans points to a distinction between acculturation and assimilation. In The Urban Villagers, Gans describes acculturation as the process by which primary aspects of the dominant culture rather quickly replace characteristics of ethnicity. Beginning with the second generation, surnames become Americanized, and the native language falls from common usage and there is little if any remaining identification with the nation of origin. By the third generation these outward manifestations of ethnicity have been entirely replaced by American cultural traits and the process of acculturation has been completed.

Assimilation, on the other hand, can only take place

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after the ethnic social systems have been dismantled, which for Gans is a much slower and more difficult process. Ethnic organization is created and maintained by family, peer group relationships, churches, schools, and the formal social, civic, and political organizations of the ethnic community. It is these institutions and organizations that define who the individual is while also creating an ethnic historical continuity. Also, since the ethnic social systems are internalized by the individual and the group, they persist long after the physical location of the community or neighborhood has been weakened or disbanded.50

This same line of reasoning was skillfully developed by William Lloyd Warner who analyzed the significance of ceremonies and rituals. Warner maintained that ethnic institutions are sustained through participation in formal and informal rituals, all of which function to unite the ethnic group and provide a "symbolic identity" to individuals within the group. Participation in the ceremonies and rituals reaffirms group solidarity and further supports ethnic identity every time they are reenacted. Also, participation in the ceremonies and rituals creates an in-group, out-group mentality and

50 Gans, Herbert, The Urban Villagers (1962).
provides the participants with a degree of ritual capital. Individuals who actively participate in group activities may then draw upon their invested capital when needed. Thus for Warner, ceremonies and rituals establish group solidarity, provide a support network, and create a vested interest among individuals for remaining within the ethnic group. Religious ceremonies and rituals were significant for Warner because religion was defined in large part by ethnicity. Religion therefore functioned to maintain ethnic identity and slow the process of assimilation. The church was also the symbolic center of the ethnic community and its influence spread throughout the neighborhood from the street corner to the corner bar. These institutions eventually developed their own rituals of participation and further intensified the symbolic identity of ethnicity.

Warner was not content to analyze ethnic rituals but applied the same logic to national rituals as well. For Warner, rituals such as voting, saying the Pledge of Allegiance, and Fourth of July parades were master rituals that at some level united the various and diverse groups within the city and contributed to assimilation. Patriotic rituals thus created a national symbolic identity but they also functioned to establish a
hierarchy of class status as well. Patriotic rituals provided legitimacy to the social class that led the parade, which in America's cities, was the economic elite.

This same type of approach was extensively developed and analyzed by Glazer and Moynihan who interpreted ethnicity within a pluralist framework. Glazer and Moynihan maintained that ethnic groups deliberately retain many of their cultural traditions and utilize those traditions for their own benefit and self-interest. In Beyond the Melting Pot, Glazer and Moynihan expressed the opinion that the American melting pot had not worked because common history, community ties, organizational connections, religion, and language had all functioned to unite individuals within the various ethnic groups. They believed that even when obvious ethnic customs are replaced by those of mainstream American society, many ethnic groups maintain residential and unique organizational patterns which support and promote their own ethnic identities. There is "some central tendency in the national ethos which structures people, whether those coming in afresh or the descendants of those who have been here for generations, into groups of different
status and character," stated Glazer and Moynihan.\textsuperscript{51}

They further hypothesized that external influences function to create ethnic identity as much as internal customs and traditions. For example, extreme bigotry and repression on a global scale had solidified the Jewish community and served to create an intense Jewish consciousness. Consequently, the Jewish community realized it needed a strong internal structure for self-preservation. As a result of external factors, therefore, the Jewish population struggled to maintain their unique identity by establishing Jewish schools and businesses, by discouraging marriage outside of the community, and by voting for candidates who supported their issues and concerns.

The Irish who had been systematically discriminated against and excluded from the resources of society underwent a similar process as well. In response to external challenges, the Irish became galvanized around the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church. Party and church, suggested Glazer and Moynihan, became central elements in the formation and maintenance of Irish identity.

Glazer and Moynihan also discussed the unique problems facing African Americans and pointed out how the "proletariat of the city" were confined to marginal and low wage jobs, segregated housing, and the negative effects of skin color. However, these factors also functioned to create instant group identity among African Americans that built racial solidarity. Unfortunately, ethnic and racial solidarity frequently results in the creation of conflict among various groups as well. Attitudes regarding the separation of church and state, the acquisition of patronage positions, and residential segregation all split along ethnic lines and become points of conflict among the diverse groups. This resulting conflict then further reinforces individual group identity.

The concept of special interest groups is the heart of this pluralist approach to diversity. Glazer and Moynihan insist that ethnic groups that were excluded from full social and political participation and systematically denied access to the resources of society have only one recourse open to them. They must close ranks around their identity and function as an ethnically based interest group. The formation of ethnic interest groups serves to unite the community around issues of
general interest regardless of individual status or position. This is particularly true in reference to political activity where the formation of politically based ethnic interest groups provides the disenfranchised with the most efficient means for members to achieve participatory rights in the political process. For Glazer and Moynihan, successful political participation translates into economic advantage and an elevated structural location for the entire ethnic group.

Theoretical Considerations

An overview of the primary literature easily points out the fundamental differences that exist between an ecological and a political economic approach to urban growth and political control. Additionally, major distinctions exist between theories of assimilation and exclusion as well. At first glance these various theories may appear to have little in common. Nevertheless, when viewed in unison they complement each other and greatly contribute to a comprehensive appreciation of both urban society and the growth regime.

In their own unique way all of the theories discussed recognize that internal and external factors
create a sense of group consciousness which, once established, is sustained through commonly shared interests and maintained through rituals, customs, and traditions. Group consciousness combines with rituals and traditions maintains group solidarity, individual identity, and creates a vested interest for remaining within the group. In this respect, group membership functions as both a source of stability and as a staging ground for mobility. However, the same factors that create group consciousness also divide and distance individual groups from each other.

All the theoretical viewpoints also acknowledge that conflict and competition are inherent in urban society. For the ecologists, conflict and competition is interpreted as a consequence of evolutionary development. Political economists view it as the result of active, human economic and political intervention. For theorists of diversity, it is the consequence of the creation of or a reaction to ideologies of race and ethnicity. Still, in all cases, the existence of conflict and competition is a reality and it serves to distinguish and separate urban groups from each other. All of the theoretical viewpoints agree that competition and conflict are to some extent controlled and regulated within the political arena.
Accordingly, the significance of political activity is recognized as a critical element that must be factored into any analysis of urban society.

Group interests, therefore, inevitably become linked with the political process and the institutions of government. The various theories may give priority to one aspect of their subject over another, but they all tip their hat to urban politics in some form or fashion. Political activity is recognized as a means of effectively functioning within the urban structure and maximizing resources. Political activity is the jurisdiction of special interest groups which is what the various groups must become in order to be effective. Special interest groups and the organizations from which they emerge are, therefore, key components of solidarity, mobility, and consciousness. Special interest groups influence their membership at the individual level and the city at the aggregate level.

The various theories also recognize the self-perpetuating nature of their subject matter. The neighborhood, racial and ethnic identity, and the growth regime all develop a life of their own, become larger than the sum of their individual parts and exert systemic leverage upon the affected parties. Cultural traits,
values, and traditions are then further imprinted upon the group and ultimately transmitted to subsequent generations. Therefore, an historical continuity is recognized and becomes a focal point of analysis within all of the various perspectives.

They also all recognize the critical significance of location. For the ecologists, it is physical location that influences and regulates the subsequent relationships of the affected parties. Physical location promotes segregation, class distinctions, and determines a group's relative position within society. For the theorists of diversity, it is location within the hierarchy of caste or class which determines the degree of assimilation or exclusion which a group will encounter. The higher the level of assimilation the greater the social location which in turn promotes an improved level of advantage. Political economists, on the other hand, view organization location within the growth regime as the defining element upon which everything rests. In a hierarchically arranged growth regime, a group's relative location determines the amount of power, influence and privilege that it acquires.

Thus group consciousness, conflict and competition, urban politics, historical continuity, and social
location are all intrinsically fused within urban society. These are also in large part the same elements which create and maintain the growth regime. To understand both the city and the growth regime we need to place in context the interplay of these assorted issues.

Organization and Methodology

This is a multi-dimensional work which utilizes the theoretical perspectives discussed as platforms, to describe and place in context the formation of both Louisville and its growth regime. To accomplish this task, specific issues pertaining to the social, political, and economic development of Louisville must be discussed in depth, with particular attention devoted to urban growth, racial, ethnic, and religious diversity, social class and historical continuity. Through the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods, these issues are presented from the perspective of intra-group conflict and competition within the parameters of first the emerging city, and then the growth regime.

Chapters II and III are strictly qualitative in nature and emphasize the social and historical formation of Louisville. To this end, the unfolding of Louisville
has been scrutinized with particular attention devoted to the city's location, its political and economic institutions, commerce, manufacturing, utilities, and the transportation and communication networks. These elements of topography and infrastructure are the ingredients that created and shaped the city. Within this portion of the analysis, the theoretical perspectives of Cooley, Weber, and the ecologists are self-evident.

However, that infrastructure did not develop randomly or by accident but was the result of active human intervention and manipulation. Therefore, an equally important part of this portion is the introduction of the individuals responsible for the creation of that urban infrastructure. The Bullitt, Speed, Ballard, Helm, Pope, Allen, and Belknap families, among others, have been at the economic and political center of Louisville from its founding. These individuals and their descendants have actively promoted Louisville's growth, tied that growth to their own self-interests and emerged as an elite class in the process. They established family dynasties whose members have been involved in every significant political and economic aspect of the city's life, including the creation of the growth regime. In this portion of the analysis the
significance and ramifications of elite theory is profoundly obvious.

Nevertheless, the mere existence of an elite class does not necessarily constitute an authentic growth regime. A growth regime is composed of leadership pools from many special interest groups. Granted, the elites may be the most privileged members, but a true growth regime includes participants from non-elite organizations as well. In fact, one of the unique aspects of a growth regime is the diversity of its total membership. Consequently, a major portion of the qualitative sections is a discussion of Louisville's racial, ethnic, and religious development, as well as the configuration of social class, class conflict, and the inevitable accommodations which developed as the growth regime was established and became entrenched in Louisville. Here the theories of assimilation and racial exclusion will be obvious and helpful.

Chapters IV and V are also qualitative in nature and address how the emerging growth regime gained political and economic control over the city in the early years of the 20th century. Chapter IV is devoted to the initial formation of the growth regime and explains how it was established through a political reform movement launched
by the elite and motivated as much by economic reasons as political rationality. However, it is hypothesized that once launched, the reform movement quickly developed into a genuine and systemic growth regime. Chapter V demonstrates how the growth regime marketed the city, attracted new capital and labor, and prospered from the city's economic expansion. In this section, the concepts of urban political economy are apparent and advantageous. The growth regime itself will also be more fully explained and developed beginning in this portion of the analysis. Chapters II through V are explanatory, qualitative, and social historical in nature.

In Chapter VI, the methodology changes to a quantitative approach and the analysis becomes highly sociological in formulation. This portion of the work covers a period of time between 1897 and 1933 and contains an analysis of the actual growth regime. It should be noted that this time frame is not random but was deliberately selected for specific reasons. First and foremost, this was the time period in which the Louisville growth regime was established and the analysis of its formation is one of the unique elements of this work. Many researchers have examined current growth regimes in a multitude of locations and have all
concluded they are systemic and self-perpetuating entities. But, to date, few researchers have systematically attempted to uncover when and how a growth regime first came into existence and how it initially gained control of the city. This vacuum has been identified as a major weakness within the literature by researchers working in the area.52 This work is designed to help fill that critical void.

Additionally, the time period between 1897 and 1933 was the high point of the industrial period as defined by Wilson, and the split labor market which Bonacich and Wilson both address. Since the growth regime pre-dates the modern industrial period and was established during the age of racial segregation and bi-racial social organization as interpreted by Park, DuBois, Warner and others, African Americans were largely excluded from full growth regime partnership. During the modern industrial age with the advent of the programs and policies of the New Deal, the rise of industrial unions, and the civil rights movement, African Americans began to slowly make social, political and economic advancements. However, by

then the growth regime was already in place and well established. To borrow a concept from Wilson, there was a timing miss-match which restricted African American participation in the configuration of the growth regime. This critical point sheds an additional degree of light upon the nature of institutionalized racism as well as issues of racial mobility.

Despite the time period, Chapter VI is sociological rather than historical in nature. The distinction between the two disciplines was explained by Robert Park and it is his interpretation which is being utilized here. Park believed that sociologists and historians essentially study the same subject matter but from different vantage points. For Park, sociology takes events out of their time and space "to emphasize the typical and representative." Sociology appears, stated Park, "as soon as the historian turns from the study of 'periods' to the study of institutions. The history of institutions ... becomes natural history, and natural history passes over into natural science. In short, history becomes sociology." ⁵³

The social historical investigation of the formation and development of Louisville was necessary to place in

⁵³ Park, and Burgess, (1921) p. 16.
context the establishment and social dynamics of the
growth regime. But in Chapter VI, that history is
transformed into sociology with a detailed and indepth
analysis of the institution of the growth regime.\textsuperscript{54} Here, the economic, political, and social structure of the
growth regime is revealed, with particular attention
devoted to the interconnections among growth regime
organizations. This analysis is the ultimate focal point
of the work and is based upon an organizational network
and positional analysis.

For the quantitative analysis a data set containing
20,096 individual membership slots was compiled from the
membership lists of 196 organizations.\textsuperscript{55} The organizations
and available membership slots were then divided into two

\textsuperscript{54} A growth regime exists in Louisville today and
appears to be a direct continuation of the growth regime
discussed within this work. The individual organizations
may have changed throughout the years, but the
institution, its goals, and purpose have remained
consistent. Tracing the continuity between the growth
regime of this time period and the current regime would
be a fascinating topic. Readers interested in the
Louisville growth regime today should consult Allen
Whitt's "The Role of the Performing Arts in Urban
Competition and Growth" (1988).

\textsuperscript{55} Of course, there were far more formal
organizations in the city than the 196 which were
included in the Louisville data. But these organizations
were identified in the primary and secondary literature
as significant, and were the organizations for which a
membership list was available.
time periods and three distinct types of organizations: economic, political, and social. The first time period spans the years 1897 to 1915, and roughly corresponds to the political reform movement and the formation of the growth regime. The second time period lasts from 1916 to 1933, and coincides with the growth regime's entrenchment and marketing of the city. The 36-year time span also cuts across generational lines and demonstrates in part historical continuity of the growth regime.\(^{56}\)

The economic sector of the Louisville data contains the directors of banks, insurance companies, economic development organizations, professional organizations and other economically based organizations. The political data includes members of the executive committees of the political parties, the reform organizations, and officers of municipal government. The social data which was understandably the largest section of the data contains club memberships. Positional data of this nature is typical of the type of information which has

\(^{56}\) This analysis terminates in 1933 for two reasons: first, the growth regime was well established by that date and second, the Depression temporally introduced extremely complex economic and political factors which required an adjustment on the part of the growth regime, but are not germane to this current analysis. The position of the growth regime during the Depression is a topic which must be left for future research.
traditionally been utilized in standard elite studies.

However, a growth regime is a very different entity from an elite network of the type discussed by Hunter and Mills. Since a growth regime is composed of both elite and non-elite members and contingent upon the association of members within the total institution of the regime, it would be a mistake to restrict data collection solely to elite organizations of this type. Therefore, the data for this analysis also includes officers of labor unions, working class benevolent associations, executives of the smaller ethnic and racial banks and insurance companies, religious organizations, and working class, ethnic, and racial political and social organizations. Additionally, the membership of Louisville's lodges and fraternal organizations as well as organizations like the Elks, Shriners, American Legion, Optimist Club and Rotary Club have also been included. The inclusion of organizations of this nature is of particular importance because they function as bridge organizations and provide an opportunity for individuals from diverse economic, ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds to associate in an informal and less restrictive social atmosphere.

All of the information in the Louisville data was obtained from original primary source material. The
membership lists used to create the data were procured or
compiled from various issues of the city directories,
Louisville Blue Books, organization minutes, newspapers,
archival research, organizational letter heads and a host
of related sources. Furthermore, all but eight of the
organizational classifications listed in the data were
formal organizations with charters, officers, and by­
laws.

Seven of the eight non-organizational
classifications were occupational codes which were also
included in the data. When an individual was identified
on a pre-existing membership list as a doctor, attorney,
judge, business executives, or Catholic, Jewish or
protestant religious leader, they were also separately
coded as such. Finally, some individuals in the formal
organizations were politically active but held no
municipal or party office. Therefore, a separate code was
created to identify individuals who held state or
national offices or in some other manner identified
themselves as political individuals. The generic category
of Politically Active Individual (POL) was created to
represent their involvement. The POL was the only
artificially created category in the Louisville data.

Once the data were compiled and categorized by time
period and organizational category, it was entered into a
network analysis software program (UCINET) for analysis. However, before a UCINET analysis could be conducted the
data had to be normalized to compensate for the great
membership disparities which existed across some organizations. For example, during the first period in the economic sector, the Kentucky Central Life and Accident Insurance Company contained only two members, while 440 individuals were identified as officers or committee members of the Louisville Federation of Labor. Normalization compensates for differences of this type by essentially instructing UCINET to look at only primary or direct one-to-one connections between organizations. Without normalization, UCINET computes both primary and all secondary and indirect connections. With non-normalized data and vast differences in organizational size, the very large organizations can completely overwhelm the smaller ones and render questionable results.

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58 It should be noted that some researchers support the concept of normalization while other oppose it. There are, however, no clear cut definitive guidelines regarding normalization, and both approaches are accepted and widely utilized. Within this analysis a methodological decision to normalize the data was made.
Secondary and indirect connections are of course important, but within this analysis they have been addressed by utilizing the "weak tie" or weak link approach as developed by Mark S. Granovetter. In fact, as will be demonstrated, the existence of weak ties or links is a critical component of growth regime hegemony. Consequently, Granovetter's approach is perhaps the more useful methodology in this case and far less problematic than attempting to analyze and interpret non-normalized data.

Unfortunately, normalization also limits the type of network analysis to which the data may be subjected. As a result, the organizations of the Louisville data were analyzed with eigenvector centrality only. This is not viewed as problematic for the analysis because many other UCINET routines such as Influence centrality, Information, and Bonacich Power build upon and are closely related to eigenvector centrality. Furthermore, there is to date no effective way of graphically

and the reader should be cognizant of that fact.

For additional information see "The Strength of Weak Ties" by Granovetter (1973). This theoretical approach will be more fully explained in the body of the analysis where actual and appropriate organizational examples may be utilized.

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displaying large complex networks and explaining the results of additional analysis. Even if it were possible, it would be a difficult task.

In this work eigenvector centrality has been utilized as a means of determining the hierarchal structure of the growth regime, thus allowing the identification of which organizations in the Louisville data were the most central or dominant. To accomplish this task, eigenvector centrality analyzed the data and assigned a numeric value to each organization. The organizations were then represented in descending order from the most to the least central. Eigenvector centrality is a precise and formal "way of capturing the essence of what we mean when we say we are 'in the center' of things, or "well-connected." High eigenvector

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60 The UCINET analysis "structure" has the ability to display the network and the relationship of each organization to the other. However, even the first period political sector, which was the smallest file, would not fit on a single page. The larger files filled a multitude of pages. The same problem existed when other network graphic programs like Pajek were used. Therefore, the centrality relationships among the various organizations are explained in detail.

centrality represents high network dominance, while a lower eigenvector score indicates less network power and influence. In other words:

 Those persons or organizations that are high in network centrality are likely to be in an advantaged position as compared with others ...
 ... We might expect central people or organizations, ... to have high levels of power or influence within the network, to be able to have privileged access to the group's resources, and to be disproportionately able to obtain and control flows of strategic information among the members. 62

 Eigenvector centrality is essentially an index of the central or dominant organizations, and is a measure of an organization's relationship to all the other organizations of the growth regime. In effect, it measures how organizations are tied to and connected to each other. In the case of the Louisville growth regime, interlocking boards of directors of banks and trust companies, for example, provided direct connections among virtually all of the economic organizations within the data. Interlocking boards of this nature are of particular importance because:

 62 Whitt and Moore (December, 1994) p.2. For additional information regarding eigenvector centrality consult Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2001), and Wasserman, Faust Social Network Analysis (1994).
Multiple-board trustees form links that are likely to be of considerable value and practical effect to the organizations that they tie together. A central organization is likely to be well-positioned in the network to be influential, to have access to financial resources and management skills, to receive strategic information about the community and from other organizational spheres, effectively recruit new board members, and to disseminate information about the activities and image of the home organization.63

In this analysis, high centrality organizations with significant interlocks are viewed as indicators of the power and influence of the growth regime. Therefore, the assumption is that highly central organizations have actual power and influence, and the organizations that are most closely linked with each other contain the growth regime's leadership pool. Additionally, the individuals most closely associated with that leadership pool are well positioned to personally benefit from their structural location within the regime.

In the case of Louisville, virtually all of the 196 organizations contained within the data were interconnected at some level and were accordingly components of the growth regime. But, as expected, a structural hierarchy was obvious as organizations clustered together in a configuration commensurate with

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social class, religious affiliation, and race and ethnicity. The leadership pools of each clustering of organizations were then analyzed through a traditional positional methodology to determine the membership of what has been labeled the associate, junior, and senior partners of the regime. Here, a positional methodology of the type utilized by Mills was employed rather than a software-based network analysis. The rationale for utilizing a positional methodology will be fully explained in Chapter VI.

After the positional analysis was conducted, the various levels of regime partnerships were subjected to additional analysis. This was designed to identify the level of organizational and hegemonic control which the partners and the regime itself possessed. There were only 38 senior partners identified in the growth regime, and these individuals were a mere 0.01 percent of the total 1920 population of Louisville. These 38 individuals were, however, directly connected to over 50 percent of all the organizations and over 70 percent of all the individuals contained within the data. The senior partners of the Louisville growth regime were also analyzed as individuals with eigenvector centrality as a means of determining the hierarchal arrangement of this select
The organizations of the growth regime, the various categories of partnership, the methodology through which these categories were developed, and the actual analysis will be explained in greater detail in Chapter VI. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that a handful of individuals were in a position to exploit Louisville's location, manipulate that location for their own self-interest, and create family dynasties which continued to grow and prosper throughout the 19th century. And, by the early years of the 20th century, members of those dynasties were significant players in the creation of a systemic growth regime. However, in order to be successful, the growth regime had to become more inclusive and reach an accommodation with groups within the city. Thus, the regime co-opted the leadership pools of most groups and offered positions of associate or junior partnership to them. The end result was the virtually total domination of the economic, political, and social development of Louisville by the growth regime. At the same time, the institution of the regime was completely controlled by the senior partners who obtained a disproportional degree of the city's resources as a result of their positions within the regime.

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CHAPTER II

THE QUEST FOR LOCATION

The Falls of the Ohio

In the summer of 1773, Captain Thomas Bullitt of Virginia led an assembly of men through the unsettled and largely unexplored wilderness of Kentucky. Bullitt's ultimate destination was the Falls of the Ohio: a span of fossilized coral reefs stretching across the width of the Ohio river. At the Falls, the river rapidly gushed through a series of reefs and plunged down 22 feet in two miles. This drop was the only obstacle to navigation from the head waters of the Ohio to the Gulf of Mexico, and as a result, river traffic was forced to stop at this location. Boats had to be unloaded and their passengers and cargo transported around the falls while the lightened craft attempted to shoot the rapids.

Because of the high volume of river traffic even at this early date and the Falls natural impairment to navigation, the location was a perfect site for the establishment of a thriving and profitable community. Surveying the land and founding a settlement was precisely what Captain Bullitt and his business
associates intended to do. Bullitt was in league with Doctor John Connolly and John Campbell, land speculators from Pittsburgh. The British crown had awarded Connolly a land grant of 2000 acres at the Falls for his service during the French and Indian War. Campbell had purchased an additional 2000 acres adjacent to Connolly's and the two men merged their holdings and planned to subdivide the property and sell lots to would-be homesteaders.¹

The speculators had widely advertised the sale of lots in their proposed settlement and had made the general public aware of the valuable location of the

¹ All of the historical information contained within this work (unless otherwise noted) has been compiled from general secondary sources. Since the information is widely available and consistent in nature, it is provided without individual references. Any reader wishing to verify historical facts or obtain additional information can easily do so by referring to any number of studies. Two of the best recent studies of Louisville and Jefferson County which provide a wealth of information are: Two Hundred Years at the Falls of the Ohio: A History of Louisville and Jefferson County by George H. Yater and Cities In The Commonwealth: Two Centuries of Urban Life in Kentucky (1982) by Allen J. Share. Older but still very useful works include the Memorial History of Louisville From Its First Settlement to the Year 1896, (two Vols.) by J. Stoddart Johnson (1896); A History of Kentucky by Thomas D. Clark (1933); and History of Kentucky (five Vols.) by Connelly Elsey and Ellis Merton (1922).

George Yater is one of the foremost Louisville scholars and many of his other works have also been referred to. Yater's other works will receive full citations, but from this point on, any reference to Two Hundred Years at the Falls of the Ohio, will simply be listed as Yater.
Falls. "The advantageous situation of that place, formed by nature as a ... repository to receive the produce of the very extensive and fertile country on the Ohio ... is sufficient to recommend it," proclaimed the entrepreneur's promotional literature; "but when it is considered how liberal, nay profuse, nature has been to it otherwise in stocking it so abundantly that the slightest industry may supply the most numerous family with the greatest plenty ... we may with certainty affirm that it will in short time be equaled by few inland places on the American continent."²

The outbreak of the American War of Independence doomed this initial enterprise to failure. Connolly, an opponent of independence, was stripped of his land by the Virginia Assembly and forced to flee to Canada, where he lived the remainder of his life in exile. Campbell, a supporter of independence, had been captured by the British and was held as a prisoner-of-war. Therefore,

² Share (1982) p.1. The Falls of the Ohio attracted many travelers who left journal accounts of their visit. Many of these early journals provide excellent eye-witness accounts of Louisville's development. Most of the quotations of this type used in this work were re-quoted from Share or Yater. In particular, Share did a remarkable job of collecting and presenting eye-witness accounts of historical Louisville. In this respect, his work is the more interesting volume.
even though he held title to 50 percent of the land, he could not intervene on behalf of his own interest as he was missing and presumed dead.

Despite the failure of this first endeavor, the enterprise did have secondary consequences which cannot be underrated. For over a hundred years, the Ohio River served as a main artery of trade between the British Colonies and the Spanish (and later French) settlements of New Orleans. However, only a few of the most daring frontiersmen and river merchants had actually visited the area. Before Bullitt's venture, residents of the eastern seaboard were probably, at best, only vaguely aware of the waterway and the location of the Falls. Nevertheless, through active promotion, Connolly and Campbell had made the Falls famous. "What a buzz is amongst people about Kentucky?" asked one Virginian in 1775, "to hear people speak of it one would think it was a new found Paradise... ."3

Connolly and Campbell had generated interest in the area and perhaps inadvertently, pointed out the vital military importance of the Falls, a fact which did not go unnoticed by a newly-formed government engaged in rebellion. Two years after the Declaration of

3 Yater p. 3.
Independence, Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia approved a bold military undertaking which would ultimately have major ramifications for the location. Henry ordered Colonel George Rogers Clark of the Virginia militia to lead a contingent of troops to the Falls, secure the area for the United Colonies, and establish a military outpost.

Clark landed on Corn Island near the Falls on June 1, 1778. With Clark were 150 militia troops and perhaps 20 families who intended to settle and farm the area. The exact number and ethnic composition of the settlers is unknown, but at least four of the families were Irish immigrants relatively new to the North American colonies. Additionally, there was at least one African American in the band, Cato Watts. It is believed that Watts was a slave owned by John Donne.

The small assembly of settlers who accompanied Clark became the first residents of a city not yet established. With a military presence and the area secured, a constant stream of homesteaders began making the journey to the area of the Falls. Many came down river on flatboats from Pennsylvania and Maryland, while others crossed the Cumberland Gap from Virginia and traveled overland by way of the Wilderness Trail. Thus, in the closing years of the 18th century, the locality encompassing the Falls was
attracting settlers in increasing numbers. John Floyd referred to the area's growth in 1779 when he wrote: "near three hundred large boats have arrived at the Falls this spring with families ... We have six stations on Beargrass (creek) with not less than 600 men. You would be surprised to see 10 or 15 wagons at a time going to and from the Falls every day with families..."4

Many of the more affluent homesteaders had gained title to large tracts of Kentucky land before entering the region. John Floyd of Virginia had purchased 2000 acres in 1774, but did not permanently move to his property until November of 1779. Other early residents of the area with large land holdings included Colonel Richard Anderson who built Soldiers Retreat, William Croghan who established a large farm he named Locust Grove, John Thruston who named his plantation San Souci, and John Speed, who constructed Farmington.

There was also the German immigrant Hite family, who established a land company commanding thousands of acres; John Todd who owned more than 20,000 acres, and Humphrey Marshall, who established his own 4000-acre plantation. The extended Taylor family also had tremendous land holdings, and James Farnsley held title

4 Yater, p. 15.
to the fertile land below the Falls. Isaac Miller established Clover Hill plantation, and Edward Tyler settled a large area east of Chenoweth Run Creek. One of the wealthiest early settlers was explorer and frontiersman Bland Ballard who, in addition to homesteading, blazed the trail between the Falls and the future town of Shelbyville.

Perhaps the most famous plantation even at this early date was Oxmoor with 2200 acres of choice land. Oxmoor plantation had been purchased by Alexander Scott Bullitt, the nephew of Captain Thomas Bullitt who had surveyed the area just a few years earlier. These affluent and primarily Virginia planters owned estates covering thousands of acres and were organized along the lines of traditional southern plantations complete with slave labor. Oxmoor alone had quarters for 200 slaves.5

5 These farms and plantations were not in the community of Louisville but were nevertheless close and the planters had considerable influence within Louisville. Additionally, many of the plantations were located on property which would in time be annexed by the city. Therefore many of the descendants of the original land owners became urban residents. Consequently, a discussion of their position at this early date is critical for an understanding of subsequent development of the city. For more information about the settlement of the area surrounding the Falls of the Ohio, the reader should consult Early Kentucky Land Records: 1773 - 1780 (1992) by Neal Hammon; and Louisville's First Families: A Series of Genealogical Sketches (1920) by Kathleen Jennings.
Not all of the early residents were wealthy plantation owners from old established Virginia families. Many were from the Shenandoah Valley and the mountains of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. These were intensely independent and far less affluent immigrants who as first and second generation Americans had taken the principles of the American Revolution to heart. This group came to Kentucky to establish a new life and quickly merged with the residents of Corn Island. As the number of settlers increased, Corn Island was abandoned in favor of a location directly adjacent to the Falls. Here the settlers formed a rudimentary local governing body, elected town trustees, and established provisions for the distribution of land. This first local government was an exceptional body which reflected the revolutionary sentiments of the times.

The river community was divided into half-acre parcels and the plan for allocation reflected the egalitarian predisposition of the residents. Each parcel was numbered, and settlers drew lots to determine who would occupy which tract. Through this method, everyone

6 By March, 1781, Richard Chenoweth had completed construction of Fort Nelson on the Kentucky shore of the river. Fort Nelson was located almost directly across from the Falls and with its completion, the majority of the early settlers moved to shore and within close proximity of the Fort's protection.

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had an equal chance to obtain the most desirable locations. Furthermore, no settler was allowed to possess more than one parcel nor could they sell their land to anyone who already owned a plot. This was to be an egalitarian community of middle class merchants and tradesman. Unfortunately, that dream was to be short lived.

At the end of the American Revolution, John Campbell was released by his British captors and he returned to the Falls. Campbell had a claim on the land of his former business partner John Connolly, and his reappearance created a crisis of ownership. The little settlement had been placed precisely on the acreage previously owned by Connolly. In response to this situation, the town residents petitioned the Virginia Assembly for a charter on May 1, 1780. The petition, which was signed by 39 settlers, contained the signatures of some of the most influential men in the area, including John and William Helm, Thomas Hughes, William Marshall, William Pope and James Harris.

The Virginia Legislature quickly approved the

7 Campbell's reappearance created a crisis of legitimacy which was not completely resolved until 1790, when a court settlement awarded him clear title to 1,000 acres boarding the "lower falls." That land later became the site for the town of Shippingport.
petition and ratified an act which in part stated:

WHEREAS, Sundry inhabitants of the County of Kentucky have at great expense and hazard, settled themselves upon certain lands at the Falls of the Ohio, said to be the property of John Connolly, and have laid off a considerable part thereof into half acre lots for a Town, and having settled thereon, have preferred petitions to the General Assembly to establish the said town.

BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED, That one thousand acres of land, being the forfeited property of John Connolly ... is hereby vested in John Todd, Jr. Stephen Trigg, George Slaughter, John Floyd, William Pope, James Sullivan and Marshal Brashier, gentlemen Trustees, to be by them, or any four of them, laid off into lots of half acre each, with convenient streets and public lots, which shall be ... hereby established a town by the name of Louisville.8

The town charter protected the land holdings of settlers already in the community, but at the expense of some liberties. The charter eliminated the raffling of plots, and also ended any attempt to establish a totally equal system of land acquisition. Under this charter, lots were to be sold by the Trustees at public action to the highest bidder. Moreover, there were no restrictions on the number of lots any one individual could own. By the mid-1780s, several men had purchased multiple lots within the town. William Johnston, for example, bought 35 lots. Johnston, a Virginian and graduate of William and

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8 A Brief History: The Town and City of Louisville, p.3. Louisville City Archives.
Mary College, also owned Cave Hill plantation east of the community.

The charter, which was amended several times between 1780 and 1795, also empowered the Trustees with the authority to settle boundary disputes, establish building restrictions, levy taxes, and to pass any legislation deemed necessary but not embodied in the charter. Subsequent amendments also extended the Trustees' authority to the other communities of Harrodsburg, Clarksburg and Morgan's Town. The most profound aspect of the Charter resulted in a shift in political power which placed the new town squarely in the hands of the established elite planters.

Prior to obtaining the charter, local residents had elected their own municipal leadership, but the charter stripped the settlers of that right and provided for the appointment of Trustees by the Virginia Legislature. Free local elections within Louisville were not reestablished until 1797. During that 17 year period some very prominent men with strong Virginia connections were appointed to the powerful position of Trustee: Alexander Scott Bullitt, Isaac Cox, Samuel Kirby, Abraham Hite, and John and Buckner Thruston. These men, in conjunction with some who had signed the original petition, supported the institution of slavery and linked Louisville's destiny
with the economics of the plantation South. Additionally, they established elite family dynasties which continued to grow, expand, and gain greater control of Louisville.

However, the elite were not the only residents of Louisville as the community continued to attract a wide range of residents throughout the 19th century. Louisville and the surrounding area became a destination for German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants who entered the area seeking opportunity and political and religious freedom.9 Once in the area, the immigrants clustered into their own distinct communities and provided an element of economic and ethnic diversity to the emerging town.

Although immigration was steady and continuous, it should be noted that, in general, immigrants entered the Louisville area in two separate and distinct time periods. The first period lasted from the late 18th century until the 1830s, while the second period picked up in the 1840s and continued through the remainder of

9 In the very early years of Louisville, there was a thriving community of French merchants and businessmen in the area. The most important of this group were John and Louis Taracon who built a flour mill which produced 500 barrels of flour daily. By the 1830s, French immigration ended and the French quickly ceased to exist as an independent ethnic group. Since the French made no lasting contribution to the ethnic character of the city, they were not included in this analysis. For additional information regarding this short lived community, see Dupre, Huntley, "The French in Early Kentucky," (1941) and "Louisville's French Past," (1976) by Robert Burnett.
the century. There were significant class and religious differences between the immigrants of each time period that, to a degree, split and subdivided the immigrant communities.

The first time period brought a sizable contingency of German settlers to the Louisville area who may be further sub-divided into rural and urban classifications. The earliest German arrivals to Louisville were already second or third generation Americans. This group was descended from the original Germans who began settling in Pennsylvania, and in the Hudson, Tapidan, and Mohawk River Valleys between 1684 and 1722. The rapidly growing populations of these areas combined with the large size of farming families convinced many of these Germans to relocate to new areas where land was still plentiful and relatively inexpensive. Despite the fact that the majority of this group were born in North America, most retained their native language and customs, and were culturally distinct from the larger English speaking population of Kentucky.

This group settled outside of Louisville in an area known as Brunerstown, were farmers by occupation, and
primarily Protestant. Abraham Hite was perhaps the wealthiest of these Germans and owned 3,000 acres and 15 slaves. Two of Hite's sons, Isaac and Abraham, had accompanied Bullitt's surveying expedition and each acquired over 2,000 acres of prime agricultural land in the area. The majority of the German farmers had more modest property holdings but most were still slave owners. For example, John Funk owned 910 acres and three slaves, while Augustus Frederick owned 240 acres and two slaves. More typical of the rural Germans were men such as Peter House who owned one slave and worked 200 acres, while Leonard Harbold worked his 134-acre farm with four slaves and Frederick Miller owned 100 acres and one slave.

In addition to being farmers and slave owners, the rural Germans were Protestants and quickly established their own churches. A German Lutheran congregation was established in 1795, and three years later the congregation began construction of a church building. The Lutheran church was rapidly followed by the establishment of a Presbyterian congregation which built its church in 1799.

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10 Brunerstown which was founded in 1797, was later renamed Jeffersontown and is today a suburb of Louisville.
Despite ethnicity and language, the combined effect of religion, agriculture, and slave ownership allowed these Germans to economically and politically assimilate with the Virginia planters rather easily. In time, the Germans and Virginia planters intermarried, formed a unified slave holding class and dominated agriculture in the Louisville area.

The urban Germans were an entirely different matter. Unlike their rural counterparts, the urban Germans were true immigrants who began arriving in Louisville during the second decade of the 19th century. This group was comprised primarily of merchants, craftsman, and laborers. The urban Germans owned no slaves and were generally opposed to the institution of slavery for economic reasons. Slaves were viewed as economic competition by the craftsmen and the laborers who worked for a daily wage in the emerging factories. The Germans initially settled two areas on opposite sides of Louisville. A small number of the working class settled in the western Portland area. The largest settlement was an area slightly east of Louisville where they established candle and soap factories, tanneries, cooperages, and breweries. One of the primary industries which the urban Germans quickly came to dominate was the butchering of hogs and processing of pork. It was from
this activity that the German enclave of Butchertown obtained its name. This community was the more affluent area of the German merchant and middle class.

The urban Germans, like their rural counterparts, built their own churches as soon as the community could afford them. However, church affiliation was another area which distanced the urban and rural Germans. Many of the urban Germans were Catholic or members of the Evangelical Church. St Boniface, the first German Catholic Church, was constructed in 1836, and was quickly followed by two additional Catholic churches in the German community. The first German Evangelical church in Louisville was St. Paul's which was also constructed in 1836. Within 15 years three additional Evangelical churches were built by the German community.  

The urban Germans did not easily assimilate into mainstream Louisville life as religion, culture, and occupational class functioned to maintain Butchertown's and Portland's ethnic identity. These communities were also far more densely populated than the rural areas.

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11 In addition to the historical references already listed, consult "German-American Settlers of Early Jefferson County, Kentucky," (1979) by Robert C. Jobson; The History of Louisville From its Earliest Settlement Till The Year 1852, (1852) by Ben Casseday; and Speaking Out: The Forty-Eighters in Louisville, Kentucky, (1989), a thesis by Jo Frances Ferguson Garrison.
which explains in part why ethnicity became so deeply entrenched and long lasting. Also, by the late 1840s, when the second period of immigration began, the agricultural land was already occupied and had increased tremendously in value. Consequentially, there was no new German blood locating in the rural areas to maintain that branch of German ethnicity. By mid-century, German ethnicity in the Louisville area was a distinctly urban phenomenon.

The Germans were the largest ethnic group in Louisville but not the only ethnic group. As early as 1805, there was a small unnamed Irish enclave located around Fifth Street. This community became the destination of choice for many Irish who, unlike the Germans, were almost exclusively urban residents. The vast majority of the Irish in Louisville were new immigrants to North America and supported themselves as

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12 Unfortunately, population figures by ethnicity for this period are either non-existent or very unreliable. Most of the 1800 census records for Kentucky were destroyed and all that survived are summaries. Robert C. Jobson analyzed deeds, wills, tax records, and marriage records and estimated that 166 German families totaling 692 individuals lived in the Louisville area in 1800. George Yater concluded there were 2,000 Germans living in Louisville by 1838.

13 William Croghan of Locust Grove, immigrated from County Longford and is the only rural Louisville Irishman of significance.
small businessmen, merchants, and laborers. A few of the Irish eventually gained economic and political prominence and entered the ranks of Louisville's elite class. Foremost among this select group were brothers James and Thomas Anderson. James Anderson established a wholesale dry goods business before being elected to the city council and named a Director of the Louisville branch of the Bank of the United States. Thomas Anderson established an auction and commission company and founded the Fireman's Insurance Company. Around the same time, Dennis Long and Thomas C. Coleman both established successful foundries, eventually became extremely wealthy and emerged as two of the most influential men in Louisville. Likewise Patrick Bannon, a plasterer by trade, founded a paving brick and sewer pipe company and obtained great wealth in the 1850s during Louisville's decade of modernization.14

14 The religious affiliation of the Irish economic elite at this time is generally not known, but in later life a few of them, such as the Anderson brothers, identified themselves as Protestant and "Scotch-Irish" or "Ulster Scots." The descendants of others, such as Bannon and Coleman, appeared in the Louisville data of this analysis as members of obviously Catholic organizations. From this we may assume that religious affiliation was not a significant obstacle in gaining elite status during this early period of 1800 to 1830. But, by the 1850s that situation had dramatically changed. This position is also supported by Andrew M. Greely in his work Why Can't They Be Like Us? America's White Ethnic Groups (1971).
Most of the Irish were of far more modest means. Upon arriving from Ireland, Frank Quinn worked the streets as a peddler but eventually saved sufficient funds to build a row of small houses between Tenth and Eleventh streets. The houses of "Quinn's Row" were then rented to subsequent Irish immigrants new to the area. Patrick Maxcy opened a small candle manufacturing plant, Edward Hughes owned a boarding house, Barney McGee and Martin Crowe ran grocery stores, while David Ferguson opened a bakery. These men, as well as others, comprised a small Irish middle class during the first three decades of the 19th century.

The vast majority of the Irish were working-class laborers and supported themselves as teamsters, carpenters, tanners, stonecutters, and bricklayers. Many of the working-class Irish shared the booming Portland area with working-class German Catholics. In Portland, the working class of both ethnic groups found employment associated in some fashion with the Ohio River trade. Portland became a split Irish and German enclave, and retained its working-class, ethnic identities longer than any other area in Louisville.

The Irish also established their own churches as soon as the community had sufficient capital to erect the buildings. The first Irish Catholic church was St. Louis.
which was established in 1811. This church was followed by the Cathedral of the Assumption in 1830 and Notre Dame du Port which opened in Portland in 1841.\textsuperscript{15} The Irish also established their first fraternal organization at a very early date. The Hibernian Benevolent Society was listed in the 1832 city directory but no additional information about this organization has survived. It is unknown if this organization was connected to the later Ancient Order of Hibernians which thrived in the city.\textsuperscript{16}

The remaining ethnic group in the early years of Louisville was the small Jewish population. John Jacob entered the area around 1802, and was perhaps the first Jewish citizen of Louisville. He was followed by the Heymann brothers around 1814. As the only Jews in the area, these men could not maintain their religion. Consequently, they married outside of their faith and

\textsuperscript{15} Although the French settlers of Louisville lost their ethnic identity and assimilated at a very early date, their cultural influence lingered. Louisville was named in honor of King Louis XVI and that same cultural influence no doubt explains the naming of Notre Dame du Port. Additionally, the last vestiges of a separate French community existed in Portland into the 1830s.

\textsuperscript{16} For additional information regarding the Irish in Louisville, consult the historical works already listed, plus The Irish in Louisville (1969), a thesis by Stanley Ousley; A Place in Time: The Story of Louisville Neighborhoods (1989). Also, an additional valuable source of information is The Kentucky Irish American newspaper which occasionally published articles of Louisville's Irish past.
quickly became assimilated into the community. Jacob
ultimately became successful in business and politics and
was elected to the city council ten times between 1838
and 1850.\textsuperscript{17}

By 1831 there were only about 20 Jewish families in
Louisville and in that year the Israelite Benevolent
Society was formed. Although this benevolent society
existed for less than four years, it provides the only
account of Jewish life in Louisville during this period.
Four of the men associated with the Benevolent Society
were auctioneers by profession while eight others owned
clothing or dry goods stores. Two of the members were
tavern owners and one was a manufacturer.\textsuperscript{18} After the
Israelite Benevolent Society failed, the small Jewish
community would have to wait until the late 1840s before
it underwent substantial growth as a result of increased
Jewish immigration.

\textsuperscript{17} In addition to Jacob, there were also at least two
Catholics elected to the city council during this time:
James Rudd and William Banon. Prior to 1850, religious
and ethnic affiliation were not apparently critical
issues within Louisville. That situation would change
during the decade preceeding the Civil War.

\textsuperscript{18} The officers of the Israelite Benevolent Society
were listed in the 1832 city directory which Ira
Rosenwaike utilized to uncover what little information
exists about the Jewish population at this time. See
Rosenwaike, "The First Jewish Settlers in Louisville"
(1979).
There were also African Americans in Louisville from the early days of settlement, but little is known about this rather sizable segment of the population. The 1810 population of Louisville was 1,357 of which 484 were slaves and 11 were free African Americans. To date, few African Americans from this time period have been identified by name, and only four have historical significance as individuals: Cato Watts, York, Caesar, and Reuben.

Cato Watts landed on Corn Island with the Clark expedition and is generally regarded as the first African American resident of Louisville. In 1786 Watts was charged with killing John Donne and sent to Danville, Kentucky for trial. There are no surviving records or secondary accounts of the trial, so the ultimate fate of Watts remains unknown. There is also some question about the actual status of Watts. The fact that he had a last name and was tried for murder rather than lynched has led some to speculate that he may in fact have been free rather than a slave. 19

York was owned by the Clark family and accompanied William Clark on the Lewis and Clark Expedition where he proved to be an invaluable member of the party. York was

19 Yater.
particularly competent at dealing with the Native Americans who named him "Big Medicine." Despite his slave status, York was apparently accepted as an equal while on the expedition and had an equal vote on all expedition matters. After the expedition, York returned to Louisville where he remained until Clark moved to St Louis in 1808. After a brief stay in St Louis, Clark allowed York to return to Louisville where his wife, the slave of another owner, still lived. York was then "hired out" as a driver for a local freight company. Some time between 1815 and 1832, Clark granted York his freedom and he faded into history. The date and place of York's death remains a mystery.  

Caesar was a master carpenter and the property of Lieutenant James Robertson who was among a party of militia reinforcing the Falls of the Ohio in 1779. Shortly after arriving at the Falls, Robertson left the area but allowed Caesar to remain behind to work on the construction of Fort Nelson. For the next two years, Caesar worked on the fort and lived independently of his owner (which was not an uncommon practice for urban slaves). At Robertson's death, Caesar was sold to John Campbell and remained in slavery to the Campbell family.

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until his own death in 1836. Very little is known about Reuben other than the fact that he was executed in 1812 for conspiring to rebel.

Despite the fact that African Americans comprised 36 percent of the 1810 population of Louisville, very little is known about their circumstances at this time. Nevertheless, we may assume the lives of Cato Watts, York, Caesar, and Reuben are representative of the majority in many ways. One was a skilled craftsman and three were unskilled laborors. One was separated from his wife by the institution of slavery. Two of the group were hired out and lived independently of their owners for at least part of their lives, and two faced death sentences.

The City by the River

An early description of Louisville was provided by French author Hector St. John de Crevecoeur. In Letters from an American Farmer, Crevecoeur wrote:

I saw numerous houses of two stories, elegant and well painted, and that all the streets were spacious and well laid out... The sight of this suggestive gradation of houses finished, imperfect, just commenced, of cabins built against the trees; the aspect of the cradle of this young city, destined by its situation to become the metropolis of the surrounding country -- all these objects impress me with a reverence and respect that I cannot well define... Never before have I experienced that feeling which ought, it seems to me, to attend those who
are actively engaged in founding a great settlement or a new city, and which should compensate them for their troubles and privations ... What movement, what activity, on this little theater of Louisville!21

Louisville, now in Jefferson County of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was beginning to live up to Crevecoeur's prediction.22 As the third largest town on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, Louisville was quickly developing into a major trading center complete with its own customs house.23 An increase in river traffic had bolstered the town's prosperity enormously, and in the year 1807 alone, 2000 keelboats passed through Louisville on their way south to the markets of New Orleans. At the Falls, the boats were forced to stop, unload their cargo, and transport it overland around the Falls. The empty and

21 Share, p. 5.

22 Residents of Kentucky called a constitutional convention in 1792 to discuss separation from Virginia. On June 4 of that year, Kentucky became an independent Commonwealth. Alexander Scott Bullitt was chairman of the convention, co-author of Kentucky's first constitution and was elected speaker of the Senate. On June 6, 1792, Kentucky's first governor, Isaac Shelby, appointed a five man committee to select a capital for the Commonwealth. That committee which was comprised of Robert Todd, John Edwards, John Allen, Henry Lee and Thomas Kennedy, designated Frankfort as the capital.

23 Prior to the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Louisville was the first major American town in the western region of the nation through which foreign goods passed on the journey upriver. As a result, Congress designated Louisville as a port of entry in 1799.
lightened vessels then waited for the river to rise sufficiently to attempt shooting the rapids. If successful, the keelboats were reloaded below the Falls and proceeded south. If the boats were damaged or destroyed, the commodities were stored while repairs were completed or a replacement vessel could be dispatched. Thus, the Falls propagated new industries dedicated to river commerce, and the entire economic structure of Louisville hinged upon the waterway.

At first the requirements of the river were relatively simple as manual labor was all that was needed for the "carrying trade." But as the volume of traffic increased, the human bearers became longshoreman, while actual transportation was taken over by teamsters and mule trains. The hazards of shooting the rapids created a need for dry docks which provided employment for skilled shipwrights and blacksmiths. Warehouses were constructed for the storage of goods and created employment for clerks, bookkeepers and freight managers. The river also created employment for wholesale merchants, maritime insurance agents and supported the growth of banks and lending houses. Jobs were also available at the hotels, saloons, restaurants and retail stores which were established to cater to the river men of the keel boats and their passengers.
Consequently, Louisville developed a booming river front economy at an early age. John Melish, traveling through the area in 1810, referred to Louisville as "the principle port of the western part of the state of Kentucky, a market for the purchase of all kinds of produce, and the quantity that is annually shipped down the river is immense." However, the river that was the town's greatest asset was also in some ways a hindrance to commerce.

In the early and formative years of Louisville's development, river traffic was primarily a one way venture. Cargo craft could journey down river quickly and with little difficulty, but an expedition up river was an entirely different matter. A New Orleans-to-Louisville keel boat voyage required three to four months of hard, difficult work, and as a result less than one tenth of all river traffic went upstream against the current. The flow of the river initially required that Louisville look south for its markets and economic associations. The early conditions of river traffic, plus the Virginia connections of many prominent residents, created a pattern of strong southern economic alliances and political sentiments: alliances and sentiments which

\[2^4\] Share, p.6.
would persist despite the fact that new technology would soon allow Louisville to trade north as well as south.

In the year 1804, an event took place in Philadelphia which would ultimately have significant consequences for the town of Louisville. Oliver Evans, a pioneer of American technology, perfected the high-pressure steam engine, a remarkable device which quickly revolutionized both industry and transportation. In industry, the steam engine was easily adapted to provide inexpensive and reliable power for virtually every industrial need ranging from sawmills to looms. Evans' invention also quickly transformed the transportation industry as well. The Clermont, America's first steam propelled vessel, traveled upstream on the Hudson river from New York to Albany in August, 1807. The 133-foot-long by 18-foot-wide ship made the 150 mile journey in 32 hours, with an average speed of five miles per hour.

Just four years after the voyage of the Clermont, the steamboat New Orleans arrived in Louisville. The New Orleans, which was owned by Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston, made the trip down river from Pittsburgh in eight days, a new record for that stretch of the Ohio. But down river travel by whatever means of propulsion did little to improve Louisville's economic position as the town was still limited to the southern market. However,
with the arrival of the Enterprize, a 45-ton steamer owned by Henry M. Shreve, that limitation was ended. The Enterprize left New Orleans on May 4, 1815 destined for Pittsburgh. The north-bound craft arrived at Louisville 25 days later and after a brief stopover cruised up the Falls and continued her journey. The speed at which the Enterprize made the upriver trip convinced Louisvillians that the town's future was dependent on steam power. The Governor Shelby, the first steamboat built in Louisville, and designed exclusively for trade between Louisville and New Orleans was launched in 1816.

The steamboats which traveled through the waterways of the United States were a unique breed of vessel: sleek, swift and dangerous. The high-pressure steam engines could easily explode if pushed beyond their capacity, a common occurrence as competition within the trade increased. The average life expectancy for an Ohio river steamboat was only five or six years. Despite the high risk and the boats' short tenure of service, many investors were drawn into the steam trade. The cost of constructing a new boat was minimal and the profits remarkably high. For example, the steamboat Washington paid for its construction cost and turned a profit with just two trips between Louisville and New Orleans.

The steamboats and the ever-increasing speed at
which they traveled ushered in a new age of commerce, growth, and population expansion for Louisville. Cotton, sugar, hemp, tobacco and rice from the south could now be shipped to northern industrial markets quickly and cheaply. By 1853, travel time from New Orleans to Louisville had been reduced to less than five days, while a Louisville-to-Cincinnati excursion required a mere 12 hours.25 The results of this transportation revolution reverberated along the banks of the river. Because of the steamboat villages along the Ohio River grew into towns and some such as Paducah, Covington, Owensboro, and Louisville, grew into cities.26 As a result of its location and the obstacle of the Falls, Louisville benefitted more than any other town between Cincinnati and New Orleans, a fact which is supported by the town's rapid population growth. Louisville's population reached 4,012 by 1820, then jumped to 10,341 in 1830. It reached

25 There are many reliable accounts of the river trade during this period. One of the best and the work most often referred to for this section is Steamboats on the Western Rivers (1949) by Louis Hunter. Other useful works are Western Rivermen, 1763 - 1861: Ohio and Mississippi Boatmen and the Myth of the Alligator Horse (1990) by Michael Allen; and Casseday, (1852).

26 On February 13, 1828, the Kentucky legislature approved a bill which elevated Louisville to city status. The legislation which established Louisville as the first city in the Commonwealth was written by James Guthrie.
21,210 in 1840, and then doubled again to a population of 43,194 in 1850. At that time, Louisville was ranked the fourteenth largest city in the nation.

A large part of Louisville's population growth between 1840 and 1850 can be attributed to the second period of immigration, when events in Europe compelled many to strike out in search of a new land. In Ireland, the "great hunger" was precipitated by a potato blight in 1845. This agricultural disaster resulted in several consecutive years of famine and starvation for Irish peasants. America, with its unrelenting demand for industrial workers, became the destination for over one and a half million Irishman between 1845 and 1860.

At the same time, events in Germany contributed to a mass exodus of over one million Germans from their homeland. The Germans came to America for a multitude of reasons: some were craftsmen displaced by the Industrial Revolution, others were farmers crowded off the land. Some were German Jews seeking religious tolerance. A small portion of the Germans were "Forty-Eighters," as they came to be known. These were the political refugees of the failed 1848 revolution, and it was this group and their liberal ideologies which, in large part, provoked nationalistic sentiments.

The Germans who entered America were skilled,
frequently well educated, and intensely liberal by the standards of the day. By contrast, the Irish were extremely poor, unskilled, and primarily illiterate. Despite their differences, the Irish and Germans endured the same hardships, suffered the same fates, and jointly altered the urban landscape of the nation. The majority of these immigrants settled in the cities of the northeastern section of the nation and worked in the new factories made possible by the steam engine. As a result, the Irish greatly out-numbered the Germans along the east coast. However, in the Ohio valley this population trend was reversed. Many of the Germans booked passage along the southern Trans-Atlantic crossing, and entered America by way of New Orleans. From there they could book passage on one of the many river boats destined for Louisville, Cincinnati or any of a dozen other cities of the heartland. Consequently, in 1850 there were 7,537 German-born immigrants in Louisville while the Irish immigrants numbered only 3,150.

The exact number of German Jews who entered Louisville during this period is unknown, but there were sufficient numbers to create a true Jewish community. The first formal Jewish congregation Adath Israel was established in 1842, and nine years later a second Congregation, Beth Isrel, was established. The Jewish
population of this time was large enough to retain its identity and quickly built schools and formed benevolent and fraternal organizations. For example, a Louisville lodge of the B'nai B'rith was chartered in 1852.

Throughout the remainder of the 19th century, the Jewish community continued to grow and expand while a number of Jewish men rose to positions of economic prominence.

The combined effect of the Falls, the technological innovation of the steamboat, and increased immigration were responsible for Louisville's rapid growth during the first 50 years of the 19th century. Immigration created the Jewish community and swelled the ranks of the existing German and Irish communities but at a price. Ethnic relations were becoming strained and would soon erupt into bloodshed, violence and death. As ethnic tensions mounted, the city's river location supported the expanding slave trade.

Nevertheless, the smoldering levels of ethnic suspicion and racial misery which were developing were not at this time seriously considered by the merchants, businessmen, and politicians of Louisville. They were swept up in the prosperity of growth as Louisville became the primary hub of traffic on the Ohio River. Virtually every steamer traveling the Ohio still had to stop at Louisville, and transport its cargo overland around the
Falls. The Falls represented "a valve in the river life line, a valve controlled by mercantile Louisville," a valve which Louisville's commercial rivals wished to cork. 27

In Defense of Location

Louisville and Cincinnati had been bitter trade and commercial rivals from the earliest days of settlement, and the increase of river transportation made possible by the steamboat now brought that friction to a fevered pitch. In 1818, a group of Cincinnati investors attempted to build a canal on the Indiana side of the Falls. If successful, the canal would have diverted river traffic around both the Falls and Louisville, ending Louisville's monopoly. However, this threat to Louisville's position was only the most recent attempt to circumvent the Falls. The concept of a canal was an idea which originally dated back to the first meeting of the town's trustees in 1781. The trustees petitioned the Virginia General Assembly for the right to build a canal and from that point until the mid-1820's, numerous other canal projects had been

27 Yater, p. 37.
proposed but failed due to lack of funds.\textsuperscript{28}

For a short time it appeared the new proposed Cincinnati-Indiana endeavor had a chance of success. The threat of being totally bypassed by a canal on the Indiana side of the river convinced many prominent Louisvillians of the need to build their own canal as a means of self-preservation. However, not everyone in the area supported a canal project and many Louisville residents were opposed to a canal regardless of which side of the river it was located on. The opposition was found primarily among the Main Street merchants who prospered from the mercantile trade and from the working class whose employment was linked to the carrying trade around the Falls. On the other hand, the small but growing manufacturing class and the landed elite supported the canal. These two groups supported the canal project because of an economic transformation which was then taking place within the town and surrounding

\textsuperscript{28} The most ambitious of these early ventures was launched by William Lytle in 1814. Lytle, a Cincinnati entrepreneur, purchased the land below the Falls by the community of Portland, and attempted to raise sufficient funds to dig a canal. Although Lytle's canal venture failed, the area he laid out did eventually become the site of the Louisville and Portland Canal. Additionally, the increased notoriety helped Portland develop into a thriving river community. Portland was annexed by Louisville in 1838, the town seceded from Louisville in 1843 and was permanently annexed again in 1852.

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The focal point of Louisville's economy was changing as indicated by a February 7, 1824 editorial in the Louisville Public Advertiser. The editorial pointed out that with a canal the storage and carrying trade would be diminish but the canal would prove beneficial to manufacturing. Louisville and the surrounding area was being divided into three interrelated and overlapping economic segments. First, there was the mercantile economy of the river front which was primarily dependent upon trade and warehousing. That was the segment that a canal would damage.

The second Louisville economic segment consisted of the landed elite and the rural agricultural economy which was still controlled by the original Virginia gentry. Steam transportation opened new markets for agricultural goods and turned Louisville into a regional distribution center for the produce of the suburban areas. Wheat, corn, tobacco, and hogs were raised on the farms and plantations and then shipped from Louisville throughout.

There is no empirical evidence to support the subsequent analysis concerning support for a canal project. However, the known facts are consistent with this interpretation and this analysis is offered as a logical explanation for the manufacturers' and landed elite's support. It would require a considerable amount of additional social-historical research to fully support or disprove this interpretation.
the United States. Agriculture, by its very nature, depended on rapid transportation with no delays. Steamboats could provide quick transport only if the river was high enough for the vessels to shoot the rapids. The suburban planters, attempting to compete in a growing national market, could not afford to have their harvests spoil while the water level of the river was low. A canal would eliminate frequent delays and provide more reliable transportation.

The other group which would benefit by the construction of a canal was the small but growing manufacturing class. Beginning in the second decade of the 19th century, the area surrounding Louisville's central business district expanded to manufacturing. In 1812, Paul Skidmore opened the city's first iron foundry for the production of steam engines. Shortly after Skidmore's venture, Louisville had two additional foundries: the Jefferson Foundry located at the corner of 9th and Water (later renamed River Road), and the Fulton Foundry located on Main Street between 9th and 10th Streets. There was also the Louisville Woolen Factory at the corner of Main and Brook, and the Jefferson Cotton Factory on the north side of Main and Preston. There were also two steam-powered sheet metal factories in operation by the 1830s: The Barclay & Co.'s Sheet Lead Factory at
the corner of Jefferson and Brook, and the White Sheet Lead Factory located on the south side of Jefferson between Preston and Jackson. Steam also powered the George Keats and Company Planing, Grooving and Tongueing Mill, which produced 4,000 board feet of finished lumber per day at its plant located on Brook and Main.

Kentucky-grown wheat was ground into flour in Louisville's Merchant Manufacturing Mill which was the largest mill of its kind in the west. There were four rope and bagging factories in Louisville. The first was owned by the Thurston family, a second belonging to the partnership of Hawes & Douglas, and the third and fourth were owned by John Hawes and P. McFarland, respectively. The combined production of these factories annually consumed an estimated 600 tons of hemp which was Kentucky's leading cash crop at the time.

Beginning in 1815, Kentucky corn was distilled into bourbon at the Hope Distillery Company, the largest distillery in the nation. By the 1830s, three breweries had been added to the town's production of spirits. All three breweries were located in the 7th Street area and were major consumers of Kentucky-grown corn and wheat. Kentucky burley was also processed at two tobacco plants, and there were several nail factories, a stoneworks, and the largest soap and candle factory in the west. Tallow
for the soap and candles was provided by hogs raised on the Bluegrass farms and plantations. Hogs were driven to Butchertown where they were destroyed, the tallow extracted, the hides tanned and the meat processed and preserved.\textsuperscript{30} Kentucky pork could be shipped throughout the nation as a result of high quality salt deposits which were discovered south of town. Salt, a necessary product for meat preservation, was mined at Bullitt's Lick, which was owned by the Bullitt family. The salt mine employed hundreds of men and was the first major industry in Kentucky.\textsuperscript{31}

The rural planters and urban manufacturers became mutually dependent and turned a profit only when their goods reached market. The desire for rapid transportation by these two groups can in part be deduced from their involvement and support of Kentucky's toll road system and at least one early railroad. Rural planters and urban manufacturers were involved in the toll roads from the

\textsuperscript{30} The butchering of hogs was not allowed within Louisville at this time. As a result of the possibility of disease and the complications and smell of the slaughterhouses, Butchertown was designated for this purpose. By the 1820s Butchertown had became a viable and prosperous suburb of Louisville and by 1856 had been annexed into the city.

\textsuperscript{31} The majority of the information concerning Louisville's early manufacturing was taken from various editions of the \textit{Louisville City Directory}. 132
earliest days of that industry. Charles M. Thruston was a director of the Louisville and Portland Turnpike, John Speed was president of the Louisville and Bardstown Turnpike Company, James Rudd was president of the Oldham Plank Road, and the Shelbyville Turnpike was headed by Levi Tyler. Rudd and Tyler were manufacturers and the two largest owners of real estate within the city. The Lexington and Ohio Railroad was chartered in 1830 and was under the direction of Levi Tyler. Tyler was also attempting to build a railroad which would connect the agricultural bluegrass area of Kentucky with the town of Portland which was located below the Falls.\textsuperscript{32}

Both groups had a vested interest in transportation and a canal was a logical solution to the problems of river transport created by the Falls. The elite also saw the potential for vast profits that the canal itself would generate and were determined to have an interest in any canal built at the Falls. Legislators from Louisville and Jefferson County defeated a bill on January 3, 1825, which would have placed a canal project under state control. Immediately after the defeat of this bill,

\textsuperscript{32} For additional information on the L&O, see Thomas D. Clark (1933) "The Lexington and Ohio Railroad - A Pioneer Venture." For information regarding the toll roads, see the \textit{Louisville City Directory} (1832).
Charles M. Thruston, one of the representatives from Louisville, introduced a second bill that would allow the establishment of a private corporation to build and manage a canal for profit. All three representatives from Louisville and Jefferson County supported the concept of a private canal company.

The Louisville and Portland Canal Company was chartered by the Kentucky Legislature in 1825. The directors of the new company who oversaw construction and sold stock in the venture included James Hughes and newly-elected Louisville trustee and state representative James Guthrie.\(^{33}\) Stock in the canal was purchased by the federal government and private investors. Of the 5,312 shares in private hands, over 3000 shares were purchased by capital external to Kentucky; the largest shareholders were from Philadelphia.\(^{34}\) However, actual management and control of the canal and the company's board of directors was Louisville based. Additionally, the federal

\(^{33}\) James Guthrie was a member of the Kentucky House of Representatives from 1827 to 1830 and a Kentucky State Senator from 1831 to 1840.

\(^{34}\) The Canal Company sold a total of 10,000 shares of stock, only 146 of which were purchased by Louisville investors. For a complete list of Canal investors, including the number of shares each investor owned, their state and city of residence, see "Louisville and Portland Canal," House Documents, 28 Congress, 2 Session, No. 94, 1845.
government ceded its proxy votes to James Marshall, president of the canal company. This action provided the Louisville-dominated board of directors with the largest single block of votes.\textsuperscript{35}

The 50-foot-wide by two-mile-long Louisville and Portland Canal, which was dug in part by slave labor, opened for business in December 1830. The canal company was also $190,000 in debt when the canal opened and only collected $12,750 in tolls during its first full year of operation. However, the investors soon began to see a return on their investment, and by 1839 canal stock was selling for $130 a share and paying a 17 percent dividend. By 1853, the canal was collecting tolls of over $170,000 annually.\textsuperscript{36}

It was at this point in history that the United States was in the midst of an agricultural revolution which resulted in the out-dating of the canal almost

\textsuperscript{35} "Louisville and Portland Canal," House Documents, 28 Congress, 2 Session, No. 94, 1845.

\textsuperscript{36} There are several very good accounts of the Louisville and Portland Canal. One of the best and the one most often referred to in this work is "The Louisville and Portland Canal Company, 1825 – 1874" (1958) by Paul Trescott. Other useful items are "Barging Into History at the Canal" (1974) by George H. Yater, and "The Origin and History of the Louisville and Portland Canal" a thesis by Leslie S. Wright, submitted to the Department of History of the University of Louisville in 1939.
immediately. Westward expansion had opened vast new tracts of land for agricultural purposes, and between 1800 and 1840 there was a threefold increase in the number of individuals engaged in farming. Much of this increase was the result of newly arrived European immigrants who purchased cheap land and established small farms. Agricultural technology also increased the productivity of the farmers. With the McCormick reaper, a farmer could harvest more wheat in one day than was previously possible in two weeks of work with a sickle. The Whitney cotton gin had a similar effect on the plantation economy of the south.

Increased agricultural production, combined with an expanding national market and the need for rapid transportation, resulted in a steamboat construction boom after 1830. Additionally, not only were there more boats constructed, but many of the newer boats were of greater size and tonnage than the pre-1830 boats. Louisville was the third largest boat construction site on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and reaped the benefits from the increased production (see Table 1). Also, many of Louisville's elite had invested heavily in the steamboat trade. The Hite family, for example, controlled the Louisville-to-Cincinnati route for decades.
Table 1

Steamboat Construction by City, Number and Tonnage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Pittsburgh Built</th>
<th>Cincinnati Built</th>
<th>Louisville Built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number tonnage</td>
<td>number tonnage</td>
<td>number tonnage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811-1820</td>
<td>21 3,948</td>
<td>12 2,427</td>
<td>24 5,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821-1830</td>
<td>84 14,374</td>
<td>88 16,000</td>
<td>42 5,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831-1840</td>
<td>386 53,268</td>
<td>233 33,632</td>
<td>76 13,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-1850</td>
<td>423 65,291</td>
<td>295 61,566</td>
<td>296 62,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-1860</td>
<td>533 98,234</td>
<td>288 76,157</td>
<td>266 75,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-1870</td>
<td>435 84,594</td>
<td>263 55,550</td>
<td>203 52,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1880</td>
<td>159 36,002</td>
<td>195 43,266</td>
<td>201 42,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totals</td>
<td>1,760 355,711</td>
<td>1,374 288,598</td>
<td>1,108 256,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the shipyards of Louisville became a major industry at precisely the same time as the Louisville and Portland Canal opened. However, by 1830, 40 percent of the new river steamboats were too large to fit through the narrow canal, which saved the carrying trade, warehouses and Louisville's Main Street mercantile economy from disaster. In fact, as a result of the increased river traffic, the carrying trade actually increased after the Louisville and Portland Canal opened and the merchants of Cincinnati were still forced to pay for passage through Louisville. Many Cincinnati merchants believed the canal had been deliberately sabotaged in order to protect Louisville's economy. This widely-held belief increased the hostility which the Queen City felt
toward its southern rival. The rivalry was intense and Cincinnati newspapers were filled with complaints about the canal project.\(^3\)\(^7\)

In the mid-1800s, Cincinnati was not alone in its attempt to break Louisville's monopoly. Many communities were equally determined to by-pass the Falls and the town which controlled them. Nashville was also a bitter trade rival with Louisville. Located on the Cumberland river,

\(^3\)\(^7\) Many historians who have examined this issue expressed the opinion that the canal was in fact deliberately designed to protect Louisville's carrying trade. This position was most clearly expressed by Ellis Merton Coulter in *The Cincinnati Southern Railroad and the Struggle for Southern Commerce* and by Henry Ambler in *A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley*. Ambler points out that the Cincinnati Board of Trade stationed agents in Louisville to protect and expedite Cincinnati shipments. One of the few dissenting interpretations of this issue is provided by Louis Hunter in *Steamboats on the Western Rivers*. Hunter builds a case which suggests there was no Louisville conspiracy and points out that the volume of river traffic through Louisville reached 1300 steamboats per year shortly after the canal was opened: far more than was ever anticipated by the Louisville and Portland Canal Company.

Hunter's interpretation lends credibility to the analysis presented in this work regarding the rural elites and urban manufacturers' desire for rapid transportation. Additional support for this can be extracted from actual canal developments. Shortly after the canal was opened, the Canal Company began developing plans to enlarge the structure. However, actual canal enlargement was not begun until 1860. The Canal Company was heavily in debt from the original project and could not accept any additional financial responsibility. The original construction bid for the canal in 1825 was $370,000, but actual construction costs totaled $743,000.
Nashville had an advantage over its northern neighbor. The Cumberland was a more stable river than the Ohio, and it could be navigated year round, whereas low water and freezing conditions frequently closed the Falls to navigation. During periods of drought or severe winter freezing, the merchants of Nashville posed a real threat to Louisville and siphoned off a substantial share of Louisville's trade.

Nashville merchants began looking at alternative methods of transportation as a means of undercutting Louisville's position and retaining the trade picked up during periods of low water. The railroad was viewed as the necessary tool to accomplish this end. Beginning in the late 1840s, Nashville entrepreneurs began looking at the possibility of laying tracks into the very heart of Louisville's commercial domain. Influential Louisvillians became alarmed at the proposed venture when word leaked out that the Tennessee group was striking a deal with entrepreneurs in both Bowling Green and Glasgow, Kentucky. A railroad north from Nashville through Bowling Green and Glasgow could conceivably create a corridor of trade between Cincinnati, Nashville, and south to Atlanta. Since Nashville was already connected to Atlanta by rail, a new railroad north would leave Louisville completely bypassed and effectively cut off from some of
its traditional southern markets.

The Louisville General Council responded to this new threat by approving the expenditure of one million dollars of city funds for the purchase of stock in a proposed railroad between Louisville and Nashville. This line, which would be controlled by Louisville, would undermine the Nashville plan and link Louisville with Atlanta by way of the Nashville line which already existed. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N) was chartered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky on March 5, 1850. From its conception, the L&N was under elite control and in the hands of men familiar with the commercial needs of Louisville. Among the signers of the L&N articles of incorporation were Levin Shreve, John and Joshua Speed, James Guthrie, Robert Miller, John L. Helm, and Thomas Anderson.38 These men were empowered to act as commissioners for the railroad, sell stock in the company, and receive subscription funds.39

38 Thomas Anderson was a descendant of Colonel Richard Anderson of Soldiers Retreat. John L. Helm was a descendant of the Helms, who had signed the original petition requesting a town charter. Shreve was the cousin of Henry M. Shreve, who had opened the Ohio to steamboat traffic in 1815. Guthrie was a director of the Louisville and Portland Canal Company. John Speed of Farmington was president of the Louisville and Bardstown Turnpike Company. Joshua Speed was president of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad.

39 Charter of the L&N. pp. 3-5.
Subscription books for the purchase of L&N stock were opened on September 4, 1851. The total L&N capital stock was to be $3,000,000, sold in shares of $100 each. The city of Louisville as previously agreed upon, became the largest stock holder with 10,000 shares, while the remaining shares were sold to individual investors. Theoretically, an arrangement of this nature would serve to protect the city's investment. However, an examination of the individual investors and members of the Louisville General Council reveal considerable overlap. Many of the local elites were both city officials and L&N individual investors: Bland Ballard, John Barbee, Joshua Bullitt, James Lighgow, Richard P. Lightburn, Curran Pope, Levin Shreve, Alfred L. Shotwell, and James Speed being the more notable ones.

The L&N, by virtue of its individual investors, had tremendous political power and influence, not only at the local level, but at the state and national level as well. For example, James Guthrie become Secretary of the Treasury in the administration of President Pierce. Former Kentucky Governor John Helm became the second president of the railroad, and Charles M. Thruston and Bland Ballard both served in the Kentucky Legislature.\footnote{The families of Thruston and Ballard were united through marriage in 1842.}
James Speed was elected as a city trustee and at various times a state representative and state senator. The city of Louisville may have owned the majority of L&N stock, but the road was controlled by the power and influence of the Speeds, Helms, Bullitts, Tylers, Ballards and other elite families.\textsuperscript{41}

Race in Antebellum Louisville

The physical growth and population increases of Louisville were made possible by its location and the transportation networks, both of which were exploited and maximized by the economic elite. This segment of the population won wealth and political influence by developing the city and linking that development to their own self-interest. At one level, their activity was beneficial because it provided employment and economic opportunities for craftsmen, merchants, and the working class of the city. However, not all residents benefitted equally from the expansion and increased commerce. One group was negatively impacted by the ease of the city's transportation network.

\textsuperscript{41} For a complete list of the 58 individual investors in the L&N Railroad, see "Copy of Subscription of Stock" L&N Board of Directors minute books, 1851.

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Kentucky was a slave state from its formation, but because of the area's climatic conditions, the number of slaves held in the Commonwealth never rivaled that of the deep south. Cotton did not prosper in the cooler, border states so planters in these areas concentrated on alternative and less labor-intensive crops such as hemp and tobacco. In this agricultural setting, labor was only needed during the peak planting and harvesting seasons and could easily be obtained from the increasing ranks of immigrant labor. Slaves on the other hand had to be housed, fed, and clothed year-round and cared for in sickness and old age. Given the agricultural needs of the area, free wage labor was, in the long run, less expensive than slave labor. As a result, many Kentucky planters began reducing the number of slaves they owned.

Consequently, a surplus of Kentucky slaves existed at the same time southern cotton plantations were expanding and in need of more manpower to tend the fields. Additionally, after the elimination of the legal international slave trade, southern planters no longer had access to an unlimited supply of new African slaves. The southern planters were then compelled to look to the domestic market. This drove the price up making it advantageous for Kentucky slave owners to profitably eliminate their surplus. For that reason, approximately

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82,000 Kentucky slaves were sold to the higher priced southern markets between 1830 and 1860.42

The majority of Kentucky's south-bound slaves were shipped down river through Louisville, and as the market in human cargo increased, the city developed into a major link in the expanding domestic slave trade. The rapid expansion of the slave trade can be deduced in part by an examination of Louisville's city directories. The 1838 directory listed at least 30 agents or brokers who were involved to some degree in the slave trade. The majority of these merchants were dealers in general merchandise who handled slave transactions on a commission basis. However, by the late 1840s there were over 80 individuals listed as "slave traders" in the city directories.

The largest-volume slave traders in Louisville during the period were Jordon and Tarlton Arterburn, William Kelly, Thomas Powell, W.F. Davis, and William Talbott. In addition to being listed in the city directories, these men routinely advertised their business in the local newspapers and maintained offices at either the "negro depot" on First Street, or "Garrison's Pen" on Second Street. Also between the 1840s

42 For additional information regarding this aspect of the slave trade, see "Memorial of Slavery Days in Kentucky" (1973) by Lowell H. Harrison.
and early 1860s, the newspapers were filled with advertisements of the slave traders, "negro wanted" ads, and notices of slave auctions. A typical ad was printed by W.F. Davis in the November 17, 1860, edition of the Louisville Daily Democrat. Davis' advertisement stated in part: "I wish to purchase Negroes of both sexes, for which I will pay the highest cash prices ... I have at all times Negroes for sale, and can at all times be found on my premises." 43

The vast majority of slaves sold south were field hands destined for the cotton plantations, and ranged in price from a few hundred to more than two thousand dollars, depending on age and physical condition. However, a smaller less well advertised and more profitable market also existed in the city. Louisville was one of a few locations which contained a "fancy girl market." This specialized market offered women as personal concubines or as sex labor for the brothels of New Orleans and other southern cities. The young, light-

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43 This ad can be found in the clipping files of the Louisville Free Public Library under the heading of Colored of Louisville. Louisville had several newspapers during the 1830 to 1860 period and fortunately some issues from the Public Advertiser, the Louisville Daily Journal, Louisville Daily Democrat, and Louisville Morning Courier have survived. These newspapers provide insight into the city's life and are an extraordinary source of information.
skinned mulatto women sold for these purposes could bring as much as five thousand dollars. The existence of Louisville's slave trade received national attention, was widely written about, and became a focal point of outrage among abolitionists."

Nevertheless, as agricultural slaves waited in the holding pens for the next auction and the down river journey, some of Louisville's African Americans were living a very different life. In 1860, 7.5 percent of Louisville's population were slaves and most were in domestic service as cooks, maids, butlers, laundresses, and coachmen. Generally, domestic slaves lived in the servant quarters of their owners homes or in outbuildings located on the property. A small select group of slaves also worked in the hotels, restaurants, and as stewards on the river boats. These individuals had the potential to earn a good income through tips and gratuities and frequently "lived out" and independently

"For more information on the Louisville slave trade, see Slavery in Kentucky (1918) by Ivan E. McDougle. Other more general but extremely useful works are Slave Trading in the Old South (1931) by Frederic Bancroft; and Role, Jordon, Role, The World the Slaves Made (1972) by Eugene Genovese. Another very useful work is "Slavery in Louisville During the Antebellum Period 1820 - 1860: A Study of the Effects of Urbanization on the Institution of Slavery as it Existed in Louisville, Kentucky," (1979) by Mary Lawrence O'Brien.
of their owners.\textsuperscript{45}

Perhaps as many as twenty percent of Louisville's slaves were hired out by their owners for a wage, and although illegal, some slaves hired out their own time. Skilled slaves worked as bricklayers, plasterers, blacksmiths, and carpenters and in other crafts earning a relatively good wage, which of course was divided with their owner. Unskilled slaves were hired out to local industries which where always in need of labor. The \textit{Louisville Daily Journal} contained want ads throughout the Antebellum period for men, boys, and girls to work in the rope mills and tobacco warehouses of the city. In the trades and factories of Louisville, it was common practice for African Americans and the white working class to work side by side in an integrated manner, which at the time was still an unusual practice in the free North.\textsuperscript{46}

Even though Louisville's factories and industries were integrated, slaves were still treated much harsher than white workers, and most did not have the luxury of

\textsuperscript{45} For a more detailed discussion of the various occupations that Louisville's urban slaves were engaged in see Weeden's \textit{History of the Colored People of Louisville} (1897) by H.C. Weeden and "A Century of Negro Education in Louisville," (1941) by George D. Wilson.

\textsuperscript{46} see \textit{O'Brien} (1979).
altering their condition. For example, many slaves were hired to dig the Louisville and Portland Canal and an incident recorded by Allen Lapham sheds light upon the treatment of slave labor. On February 21, 1828, Lapham wrote in his journal:

I went to Louisville this morning ... While I was going I beheld a scene, which, though very common here, I have never before seen. It was a negro slave belonging to the (canal) company, followed by his overseer on horseback who was lashing him every other step with a large cow-hide ... He had left the work without permission which was the crime for which he was so cruelly beaten.47

Obviously, being hired out did not necessarily improve the conditions of slavery, but living out generally did. Many urban slaves who were employed for a wage had the opportunity to live independently of their owners. Slaves in this category paid their own rent, supplied their own food, and were responsible for clothing themselves. Living out was therefore more expensive than living in, but provided a degree of privacy and independence which could not be obtained in any other way. Many slaves in Louisville were able to establish their own homes and maintain a relatively stable family life as a result of their urban status. Additionally, the hiring-out system provided an

47 Quoted in Yater, p. 44.
opportunity for some to accumulate a degree of capital and in some cases eventually allowed a few of the more prosperous slaves to purchase their freedom.48

Also, not all of Louisville's African Americans were slaves. Between 1830 and 1860, the number of free persons of color increased from 232 to 1,917, and constituted the only notable concentration of free African Americans in Kentucky. This group and a number of slaves who were hired out and lived out established two small racial enclaves just beyond the central business district. The racially-mixed California neighborhood was located west of Main Street while Smoketown, a strictly African American community was located to the east of Main Street. Within these two areas, a relatively stable community life developed and a degree of entrepreneurship emerged.

Beginning in the 1830s a number of small African American-owned businesses prospered and provided a modest income for their proprietors. For example, two African American-owned blacksmith shops and a wagon maker's shop existed in Smoketown. A few African Americans even

48 A good account of slavery in Louisville including hiring and living out is provided by O'Brien (1979). This work contains a description of slave expenses, housing, clothing, and an in-depth discussion of slaves who successfully purchased their own freedom or that of their family.
managed to gain a degree of success and wealth. The most notable among this group were Shelton Morris and Washington Spradling. In 1832, Morris became the first African American businessmen in the city when he opened a barbershop and bathhouse in the Louisville Hotel. Spradling was also a barber by profession but speculated in real estate as well. Spradling purchased property in Smoketown and built housing which he rented to other African Americans. By 1860, Spradling was one of the most affluent men in Louisville with a net worth of over $100,000. Spradling used his wealth to purchase and liberate 33 slaves, and founded two African American churches.49

The first exclusively African American church was the First African Baptist, founded in 1829 and located on Fifth Street. In 1841, members of the congregation opened a school, and the children of freedmen and slaves alike could attend classes. However, slave children needed written permission from their owners before being enrolled. It is unknown how many slaves actually attended the school. Nevertheless, the church and school were a success, and by 1860 there were a total of nine churches serving the African American community and several church

49 See Sketches of the Colored Race in Louisville (1897) by William H. Gibson; see also O'Brien (1979).
supported schools in existence. Residents of the African American community also established their own Masonic, Odd Fellows, and Knights of Pythias lodges beginning in the 1850s, and in 1861 founded the United Brotherhood of Friendship which quickly grew into the largest African American fraternal order in the nation.  

The African American community also gained a reputation for giving aid and assistance to runaway slaves and thus incurred the wrath of the slave-holders. In all likelihood, that reputation was based more on fear and rumor than actual facts. There are instances of slaves escaping, but these isolated cases were few in number compared to the millions held in bondage. Escape, even from Louisville which was located so close to freedom, was extremely difficult and dangerous. The legal system of the city was designed to reduce the possibility of escape by restricting the mobility of all African Americans, be they slave or free. There was a 10 p.m. curfew placed on slaves, and any slave discovered

50 For a unique examination of the African American community in Louisville during the 19th century, see History of the United Brothers of Friendship and Sisters of the Mysterious Ten (1897) by William H. Gibson, and also Weeden.

51 Using Census data as a source of information, O'Brien (1979) determined there were only 1,011 fugitive slaves from the entire South in 1850.
out after the curfew was subject to jail or the lash. The only exception to the curfew was made in cases of husbands visiting their wives, if their spouse was the property of a different owner. Slaves were further restricted from traveling about the city at any time without written permission from their owners. The slave codes functioned in a multitude of ways to restrict mobility and prevent escape. After the city charter was revised in 1851, the codes were strengthened with even more restrictive measures.

There were also limitations placed upon free African Americans as well. Free persons of color had to carry proof of status and work permits at all times. Both sets of documents had to be renewed annually, for which the state charged a fee. Freedmen who allowed their papers to expire or who left the state for any reason and then returned were subject to legal sanctions up to and including being placed back in slavery. These provisions were designed to encourage free African Americans to permanently vacate the area and to limit the possibility of helping runaway slaves by taking them across the river.

The Ohio River, the economic lifeline of the city, was also a virtual wall for the majority of Louisville's slaves. No African American could board a ferry or
steamboat without providing the appropriate
documentation, nor could they step upon the opposing
shore and then return home. For the slaves of Louisville,
freedom was within sight but out of reach.

Ethnicity and Bloody Monday

In the spring of 1849, the steamboat Winfield Scott
docked in Louisville long enough for 400 German
immigrants to unload their belongings and walk down the
gangplank. The Germans had recently completed the trans-
Atlantic crossing to New Orleans where they booked deck
passage for the upriver journey. For three dollars they
obtained a one way ticket to Louisville, had to prepare
their own meals, and sleep in the open wherever they
found space among the bails and crates of cargo.\textsuperscript{52} The
passengers of the Winfield Scott were the first group of
Forty-Eighters to enter Louisville, fleeing a failed
revolution at home and seeking a new life in America.
But, as the immigrants walked down the gangplank, they
could not know they would soon become the center of
political attention and the victims of ethnic violence.

By the time the Forty-Eighters arrived, Louisville

\textsuperscript{52} Yater.
was already a city of deep-seated contradictions. The city was at the center of the national debate regarding slavery, with each side of the issue having its share of local advocates. As a border city, Louisville had both slave owners and abolitionists, and contained both slave markets and free racial enclaves. Furthermore, it was a city with strong commercial connections to the industrial north and the plantation south, and was dependent upon both. By 1850, Louisville was struggling to maintain its equilibrium between two opposing worlds.

That equilibrium could not be sustained during the turbulent decade of the 1850 when the turmoil of ethnic conflict erupted on the streets of the city. To understand these ethnic tensions, it is necessary to view immigration in general and the role of the Forty-Eighters in particular, within the political context of the time and as a by-product of the escalating controversy over slavery.

Throughout the early 19th century, the Whig Party had been a dominant political force within the nation. But by the 1850s, it was quickly disintegrating. The death of Daniel Webster and Henry Clay in 1852 left a void in party leadership which could not be filled. This in turn was followed by a bitter debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act and a split between Northern and Southern
Whigs. Thus, a lack of leadership and the internal wounds inflicted by the issue of slavery spelled doom for the party and upset the balance of power between the Whigs and Democrats.

As the Whigs unraveled, the Democratic Party gained strength as a result of the influx of Irish and German immigrants. Once naturalized and eligible to vote, immigrants became politically active and generally joined the Democrat Party. The increasing strength and ethnic diversity of the Democrat Party became a spiraling source of political concern for native-born Americans who feared an immigrant political takeover. Additionally, the German Forty-Eighters were opposed to slavery, well organized, and extremely vocal. The expanding German influence within the Democratic Party could potentially soften the party's pro-slavery stance, weaken the slave-holding South, and threaten the very institution of slavery itself.

Compounding these political issues was the fact that the Irish and many of the German immigrants were also Catholic. By most Protestants of the day, Catholics were believed to owe political allegiance to the Pope who was viewed as a foreign sovereign. As the number of Catholic immigrants increased, wild rumors swept the nation that arms were stored in the churches and that a Papist-led
insurrection was inevitable. There were even allegations that Catholics planned to arm the slaves and turn them loose upon the white population.

The combined effects of the Whigs' demise, ethnicity, religion, party affiliation, and the issue of slavery all merged to fan the flames of nativism. From this atmosphere of fear and suspicion, the American Party emerged from the reactionary elements of the floundering Whigs. The new, quasi-secret party commonly known as the Know-Nothings supported the use of government force to impose Anglo-Saxon protestant values, called for strict limitations on immigration and nationalization, and demanded that rigorous controls be placed upon the Catholic Church.

By the mid-1850s, the Know-Nothings claimed a million members nationwide, and with 50,000 members in Kentucky were deeply entrenched throughout the Ohio Valley. In fact, the largest concentrated area of Know-Nothing support in the midwest was in Louisville. The new party had also gained a vocal public advocate in George D. Prentice, editor and publisher of the influential Louisville Daily Journal. Prentice, a pro-slavery, former Whig was the most widely read journalist in the area and is generally regarded as the individual most responsible for inflaming the anti-immigrant sentiments in
Louisville. This was the political environment that the Forty-Eighters of the Winfield Scott stepped into on that spring day in 1849. They were soon followed by others as the immigrant population of the city greatly increased. In 1850, nearly one quarter of Louisville's total population was foreign-born, with the Germans outnumbering the Irish two to one.

Although relatively small in numbers when compared to the total German population, the Forty-Eighters were seasoned activists who counted among their ranks August Willich of the London Communist League and Karl Heinzen, an influential trade unionist. Led by these men and others, the Forty-Eighters settled into the existing German enclave where their influence was immediate and obvious. For example, Louisville's two German language newspapers, the Beobachter Am Ohio (Observer on the Ohio) and Der Louisville Anzeiger (The Louisville Advertiser), both adopted the politically liberal, anti-slavery

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53 See "The Know-Nothing Movement in Kentucky" (1954) by Wallace B. Turner; Nativism in Kentucky to 1860 (1944) by Agnes G. McGann; and Yater. For a good general account of the Know-Nothing party consult Xenophobia and Immigration, 1820 - 1930 (1975) by T.J. Curran.
philosophy of the Forty-Eighters.54

Louisville also became the national headquarters of the Bund Freier Manner (League of Free Men), a would-be political party which united the most radical elements of the Forty-Eighters. The philosophy and goals of the new party were penned by Karl Heinzen and widely circulated in German and English as the "Louisville Platform." First published in 1854, the Louisville Platform was the spark which inflamed the extremes of both the political right and left and made a confrontation between immigrants and Know-Nothings all but unavoidable.

The Louisville Platform demanded the immediate emancipation of all slaves and the granting of full citizenship rights to former slaves. The Platform also advocated suffrage for women, public assistance for the poor, a minimum wage, and elimination of the death penalty. In terms of political reforms, the Platform called for direct election of the president by popular vote, a single house Congress, and a complete and total separation of church and state. The Forty-Eighters and their platform were opposed to all prayers in government buildings, the national motto "In God We Trust," and

54 The Beobachter Am Ohio was founded in 1841 and remained in publication until 1856, while the Anzeiger began publication in 1849 and remained in print until 1938.
temperance legislation.\textsuperscript{55}

By the time the Louisville Platform was published, the Know-Nothings had already taken control of the more conservative county government. By 1855, they were determined to gain political control of the city as well. A new city charter had recently been granted, and there were questions about how that charter would effect standing officers. James S. Speed, a converted Catholic, was mayor and maintained he had one full year left in his term of office. The Know-Nothings disputed Speed's claim and called for a new and immediate mayoral election.

Speed took his case to court and in early 1855 received a favorable verdict before Judge Henry Pirtle. However, the Know-Nothings ignored the court ruling, nominated John Barbee for mayor, assembled a slate for aldermen and councilmen, and scheduled an April 7 election. Speed refused to recognize the election or campaign for an office he already held. When the votes were counted, Barbee and the Know-Nothing candidates had carried the election. For three months, Louisville had two governments laying claim to office as the election case worked its way through the courts. In June, the

\textsuperscript{55} See Yater, Turner, and McGann. Another useful account of this aspect of Louisville's development may be found in Speaking Out: The Forty-Eighters In Louisville (1989) by Jo Frances Ferguson Garrison.
State Court of Appeals caved in to Know-Nothing pressure and declared Barbee and the Know-Nothings victorious.

With a Know-Nothing mayor and city council installed in office, anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant activity mounted through the summer. On July 18, a Know-Nothing rally was held on Tenth Street in close proximity to the Irish community of Quinn's Row. When the Irish challenged the Know-Nothings, a brawl broke out between the opposing groups. Throughout the remainder of July, mob violence became commonplace as immigrants were randomly attacked and beaten on the streets. Additionally, trustees of the newly created school board refused to rehire Catholic teachers, and Catholic churches were forced open and searched for weapons and ammunition.

On the night of August 4, the Know-Nothings conducted a 1,500-man torchlight march through the streets of the city. The demonstration was designed to intimidate immigrant voters and keep them from the polls during the upcoming general elections, on Monday, August 6, when citizens cast their ballots for Kentucky's governor and congressional seats. On election day, the Know-Nothings seized control of the polls and attempted to refuse admittance to anyone not presenting a yellow ticket, the sign of the party. However, the immigrants were equally well organized and determined to cast their
ballots. Many of them were voting for the first time as recent legislation had actually eased voter eligibility rules.

Random violence persisted throughout the day as immigrants and Know-Nothings clashed at the polls and on the streets. As evening approach, the conflict intensified and erupted into the riots known as "Bloody Monday." No one knows what event sparked the general rioting which swept through the immigrant communities, but before the night ended, an unknown number of immigrants met violent deaths.56

There were two major riots on Bloody Monday, the first of which took place when a mob of Know-Nothings armed with muskets and a cannon marched on the German community. When random shots were fired into the Know-Nothing ranks from the windows of homes, the Know-Nothings attacked in force. A few German homes were set on fire and businesses ransacked before the mob turned its attention to William Armbruster's brewery. Under heavy gunfire, the mob seized the brewery and looted its contents before burning the structure. Perhaps as many as ten brewery workers were burned alive in the blaze.

56 Published estimates of the death toll from the Bloody Monday Riots ranged from 14 to over 100 depending upon the source. The exact number will never be known, but at least twenty died and hundreds were wounded.
Ironically, the attack upon the brewery probably limited more extensive damage and bloodshed within the German community. After igniting the building the mob was content to drink their booty and watch the blaze. By the time the building collapsed, most of the Know-Nothings were too drunk to continue the battle.

As destructive as the attack on the German community was, the second riot of Bloody Monday was an even more vicious and serious matter. Despite the fact the Louisville Platform of the Forty-Eighters was a centerpiece of Know-Nothings hostility, it was the Irish community which received the brunt of their wrath. When a mob of Know-Nothings estimated at 500-strong marched upon Quinn's Row, they were met by Frank Quinn who offered them money to spare the community. Mob leaders accepted Quinn's cash and then shot him to death on the spot. The entire community was set aflame and many of the Irish were shot as they struggled to flee their burning homes. When Father Karl Boeswald attempted to administer the last rites to a dying member of his congregation he was stoned to death on the street. The death toll from the attack upon Quinn's Row has never been accurately
Not surprising, when the votes were tallied the following day, the Know-Nothings had won the elections in Louisville and across the state. Charles Morehead was elected governor and Humphrey Marshall was sent to the senate. Nevertheless, this was the last major victory for the Know-Nothings who, like the Whigs before them, could not survive the issue of slavery. By the time the Civil War erupted, the Know-Nothings had faded into obscurity.

But in Louisville, the aftermath of Bloody Monday reached far beyond the elections of 1855 or a short-lived political party. Bloody Monday shifted the ethnic demographics of the city and further solidified the class structure of Louisville. Butchertown had traditionally been a mixed community of Catholics and protestants, and working and middle class Germans. After Bloody Monday, the majority of German Catholics moved from Butchertown to a mosquito-infested swampland which quickly earned the name Germantown. Bordered by Broadway, Barret Avenue and Beargrass Creek, Germantown was isolated from the remainder of the city. The combined effect of limited

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57 For a detailed discussion regarding the events of "Bloody Monday," see "The Louisville Riots of August 1855" (1971) by Wallace Hutcheon; "The Know-Nothing Riots in Louisville" (1963) by Charles E. Deusner; "Louisville’s 'Bloody Monday,' August 6, 1855" (1948) by Leonard Koester; as well as McGann, and Yater.
paved roads, the creek, swamps, and numerous sinkholes made access to the area extremely difficult.

In Germantown, the Catholics, who comprised the majority of the German working class, could feel relatively secure from further attacks. Moreover, with the Catholics out of the way, the remaining middle class German protestants had little difficulty assimilating into Louisville society. Ten years after Bloody Monday, a German protestant was elected mayor and the former headquarters of the American Party had been converted into a German club.

The Irish, who were virtually all Catholic and working class, moved after Bloody Monday as well. They established two separate communities: Irish Hill and Limerick. Irish Hill was located on high ground and bordered by Beargrass Creek, Baxter Avenue, and Lexington Road. The larger community of Limerick was established in the Sixth and Seventh Street area. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad maintained repair shops in the area where many of the Irish were employed. Within a few years after the creation of these communities, the Irish became active in the emerging labor unions and supported a political machine that eventually gained control of the city.

The ethnic communities of Germantown, Irish Hill,
and Limerick, as well as the older Portland area became solid working class and predominantly Catholic areas. They closed ranks and adopted all the classic characteristics of a traditional ethnic enclave. Bloody Monday may have created the enclaves, but social class and religion maintained them.  

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58 Portland, at the extreme western edge of Louisville, was not attacked on August 6. But Bloody Monday had a chilling effect upon its residents and for decades Portland discouraged trespassers in the area.
As Kentucky entered the midpoint of the 19th century, the Commonwealth was governed by an archaic constitution which dated back to 1799. In response to the limitations of that document, the voters supported the call for a constitutional convention to draft a new document which would modernize state government. The convention was convened in 1849 with 100 delegates in attendance. Louisville and Jefferson county sent James Guthrie, William Preston, James Rudd, David Meriwether and William G. Bullitt to represent the city's interests. Guthrie, then 56 years old and one of the most prominent men in the state, was elected chairman of the convention.

A major issue facing the constitutional convention was the question of slavery. The Louisville-based Kentucky Colonization Society had a proposal placed on the floor calling for the emancipation of slaves. This motion was easily defeated and the delegates adopted a resolution which placed even greater restrictions upon the slave population. For example, slaves could no longer
be sold to free African Americans, nor could slaves who were over the age of 65, mentally deficient, or physically handicapped be emancipated by their owners. Additionally, the constitution spelled out numerous categories of felonies which could be committed by slaves and determined the punishment for each. A mandatory death sentence was appointed to major felonies while less serious crimes merited prison, a predetermined number of lashes, or both.¹

Once the issue of slavery had been addressed, the constitution was successfully drafted in 82 days and ratified the following year. A major provision of the constitution made most public positions elective offices. This provision mandated that virtually all local charters be rewritten to comply with the state's new

¹ The prohibition against selling slaves to African Americans was particularly harmful and most likely designed to limit the number of free persons of color in the state. O'Brien (1972) documents numerous example of free African Americans buying their spouses and children. Additionally, any children born into an arrangement of this nature were essentially free. There is also the case of Washington Spradling and a few other who purchased and then liberated slaves. Examples of felonies which mandated the death penalty include murder or rape of a white person, conspiracy or insurrection, and sabotage of public projects such as the Louisville and Portland Canal. Felonies which were punished by prison or beating included burning of a public building, robbery, and attacking a white person.
constitution.²

The Kentucky General Assembly granted Louisville a new modernized charter on March 24, 1851. The revamped charter redefined and sharply separated the responsibilities of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of local government. The charter lengthened the term of office for the mayor from one to three years while reducing the amount of power inherent within that position.³ Under the old charter of 1828, the mayor was empowered to appoint all department and agency heads, but the modern charter made most administrative positions elected posts. Under the old charter, the mayor presided over the police court, while the new charter established a city judge who was elected to perform that function, thereby further stripping the mayor of some of his previous powers and responsibilities.


³ Although the charter was accepted in 1851, it contained no provisions stating exactly when it would take effect which severely complicated the urban election process. James S.Speed was elected mayor annually in 1852, 1853, and 1854. After the 1854 election, Speed maintained that his term should continue for three years while Barbee and the Know-Nothings maintained it expired after only a year. For additional information regarding this aspect of Louisville's political situation, see "The History of the Government of the City of Louisville" (1948) by Attia Martha Bowmer.
The charter also established a ward-based, bicameral General Council consisting of the Common Council and the newly established Board of Aldermen. The charter also abolished the property tax qualifications for voting, which greatly extended the franchise to many poor immigrants as well as the working class. Ironically, the Know-Nothing led riots resulted in the creation of ethnic and working class enclaves at precisely the same time as immigrants and labor were given the right to vote for ward-based representation. Thus, Bloody Monday and the new charter paved the way for the eventual creation of a political machine in Louisville.

Even though the charter granted more rights to some, it further limited the freedom of movement for African Americans. For example, African American churches could only be open between sunrise and 10 p.m. on Sunday and between sunset and 10 p.m. on Wednesday. Slaves could also not enter white property, even to visit their spouses, without prior written permission from the property owner. Louisville also established the "slave patrol" to enforce these and other provisions. Before a formal police department was established the slave patrol was a branch of the local city watch.

Despite the restrictions placed upon slaves, the city charter of 1851 was a document which reflected the
fiscal growth and complexity of Louisville. In this spirit, the charter created many elective offices which had not previously existed, including a city auditor, treasurer, assessor, two tax collectors and two railroad tax collectors. Perhaps the most important and farsighted fiscal provision of the charter was the establishment of the Sinking Fund.

The Sinking Fund was to provide financing for city projects and urban improvements which could not be paid for out of the city's limited tax base. Financing for the Sinking Fund was provided by wharf fees, license taxes and the sale of municipal bonds. The key point of the charter which had a direct bearing upon the Sinking Fund was the provisions for the issuance of municipal bonds. The charter eased the restrictions upon the issuance of bonds and allowed the city tremendous fiscal flexibility in this area. In the decade of the 1850s, the city issued $3,269,000 worth of municipal bonds for needed improvements, most of which came under the jurisdiction of the Sinking Fund. Additionally, whoever controlled the fund influenced municipal investments and ultimately Louisville's pattern of growth and development.

Between the years 1850 and 1860, Louisville was turning toward rail transportation and depending less upon the river as a source of significant income. This is
reflected in the nature of the municipal bonds issued during those years. As can be seen in Table 2, the majority of money raised through the bonds was expended upon supporting and expanding the railroads. Of the total capital raised through the sale of municipal bonds during that ten year period, $1,925,000 went to the railroads while only $202,000 went into improvements for the river trade.

The decade of the 1850s was also the time in which public utilities began to become a powerful and expensive force within the city.4 Municipal bonds totaling $1,033,000 were issued for the purpose of developing and expanding Louisville's gas and water service. The city had a vested interest in these industries and was part owner with a considerable amount of stock in both the Louisville Gas Company and the Louisville Water Company.

4 An excellent account of the development of the City's public utilities and the source of Figure 2, can be found in Civic and Business Advancements in Louisville's Rioting Decade, 1850 - 1860 (1958), a thesis by James P. Sullivan.
Table 2
Organizations for Which Municipal Bonds Were Issued, by Amount and Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Amount of Bond</th>
<th>Year of Bond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gas Company</td>
<td>$77,000</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffersonville Railroad</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland Wharf</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Schools</td>
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<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>500,000</td>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1854</td>
</tr>
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<td>1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L&amp;N Railroad</td>
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<td>1856</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Water Company</td>
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<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Refuge</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>1860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Louisville Gas Company, the first of the two municipal services, was chartered in 1836 by Levin Shreve, John Jacob, James Rudd and Robert Tyler. The company authorized capital stock of 1.2 million dollars which was sold in shares of 100 dollars each. One third of company stock was purchased by the city. Shreve, Jacob, and Rudd were all city councilmen during this period.

5 Shreve, Jacob, and Rudd were all city councilmen during this period.
Mountains, and only the fifth city in the nation to have municipal gas service.6

The company charter required that gas lines and service be laid out in areas chosen by the city. The primary responsibility of the gas company was to provide the central business district with street lighting which meant that less than half of the city's streets were lit. Prior to the 1851 charter, gas service was limited to the areas bound by First, Ninth, Water and Walnut Streets. After the new charter went into effect and funding became more plentiful, the gas company began expanding its services throughout the city. In July, 1853 the city began installing gas lights between Jefferson Street and Brook, and on stretches of Market, Preston, Hancock, Campbell and Green Streets. By 1859 there were 35 miles of gas mains and 925 street lights in Louisville.7

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7 For a detailed discussion of city lighting and the route of new street lights, see Sullivan (1958). Another very useful source is "Louisville on the Eve of the Civil War" by Charles Messmer (1976).
Although Louisville had gas service at an extremely
early date, a modern municipal water supply was still
nonexistent. City residents had to depend upon wells,
cisterns and public hand pumps for their source of water.
When James Speed was elected mayor in 1853, he
immediately began promoting the construction of a
municipal water system. However, the bond issue which was
put before the public twice during Speed's term of office
was rejected both times by the voters. The residents of
Louisville rejected the bond issues for two primary
reasons. First, they believed that drinking river water
was unhealthy and would lead to an increase in disease,
particularly cholera. And second, if a municipal water
system was developed, there was concern the city would no
longer maintain the public pumps, which the poor and
laboring class depended upon.

Eventually, voters approved the expenditure of city
funds to support and purchase stock in a privately-owned
company. The residents of Louisville accepted the concept
of a private water company as a result of the manner in
which the company's services were promoted. The
promotional literature stated its product was not
primarily designed for human consumption, but rather to
aid in fire fighting, manufacturing and the construction
industry. Large amounts of water were needed by the steam
engines which powered the city's factories and by the building trades for soaking bricks and mixing mortar and plaster. The municipal water system would supply these needs and reduce the amount of well water consumed by manufacturing and construction. The supply of well and cistern water which occasionally ran low would be preserved for residential use, and the General Council assured the public the city would maintain the communal pumps.

The Louisville Water Company was incorporated on March 6, 1854 by Thomas Wilson, Bland Ballard, John Hamilton, Charles J. Clark, Andrew Graham and Curran Pope. The water company was administered by a six-man board of directors elected by the stockholders and the newly established Sinking Fund which represented the city's interest. The city invested heavily in the water company soon after it was charted. In 1856 the city bought $550,000 worth of company stock, and in 1859 an additional $220,000 was invested in stock. The stock

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8 Throughout the remainder of the 19th century, William Belknap, John Baxter, William Barrett, Bidermann Du Pont, James Lithgow, and Charles and Dennis Long were among the individuals elected to the board of the Louisville Water Company. Of the 13 men listed as connected with the water company, two (Baxter and Lithgow) served the city as mayor, while six (Baxter, Ballard, Pope, Barrett, and Charles and Dennis Long) served in the city council.
purchases, plus the bond issues of 1857 and 1859, meant the city of Louisville contributed a total of $1,726,000 to launch the new privately-owned company. With the combined city and private funding, the Louisville Water Company's pumping station was completed in 1860.9

In addition to municipal gas and water services, other measures were introduced during the 1850s to modernize and improve the quality of life in Louisville. One of the city's most pressing problems was a high instance of disease and epidemics. The heavy volume of river traffic and transient nature of the steamboat trade resulted in frequent epidemics of smallpox, cholera, as well as scarlet and yellow fever.10 The city was also surrounded by mosquito-infested ponds and creeks, which further contributed to the unhealthy atmosphere of urban life. Louisville had become widely known as the graveyard

9 For more information on Louisville's municipal water supply, see The Louisville Water Company: Its History, Rates, Statistics and a Digest of Decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky Relating to Public Water Supply, (1917) compiled by A. J. Carrol. The reader can also refer to Johnston for information on the individuals who established the water company and a description of the facility and pumping operations. Sullivan may also be consulted for a less technical but highly informative account of the water company.

10 Edward Watts, a federal engineer who was sent from Washington in 1856 to study the feasibility of enlarging the Louisville and Portland Canal, reported to the Secretary of the Treasury James Guthrie that 200,000 persons annually passed through the canal.
of the Ohio Valley. A report by the Louisville Medical Society provided proof of Louisville's medical climate and pointed out that the city had a death rate of one to 35, compared to one to 50 for Cincinnati.¹¹

During the 1850s, the General Council made a concerted effort to reduce the number of fatalities associated with the city's health problems. Beginning in November 1853, doctors, innkeepers and steamboat captains were required by law to report all cases of contagious diseases to the health department and to quarantine the victims. The city also began filling in the ponds and diverted the flow of Beargrass Creek around the city. Previously, the creek had flowed through the populated center of town.¹² Another measure which was introduced at this time to curb the spread of disease was garbage collection. By city ordinance all hotels, taverns and public buildings were required to place their refuse in proper containers which the city then picked up daily for disposal. Louisville also began laying sewer lines in the year 1850. The first sewers ran from Green street to Beargrass Creek and along Second, Eighth and Ninth as far

¹¹ See Sullivan and Messmer.

¹² When Beargrass Creek was diverted east of the central business district, it created a natural barrier between Louisville and the newly-created area of Germantown.
south as York Street. No bond issues were required for the construction of the sewer lines as the cost of construction was passed on to the owners of the property which the lines crossed. To help control diseases in the areas where the sewer lines did not reach, the General Council passed standardized building codes for the construction of outhouses, outlawed the practice of dumping human waste into the Ohio River, and forbade the disposal of waste in the streets and alleys.\textsuperscript{13}

The Ohio River trade, the growing railroad industry, improved health conditions and immigration all combined and contributed to dramatic levels of urban growth and development. Louisville was booming as indicated by the rapid population increases experienced during the mid-1800s. By the year 1860, the city's population increased to 61,213 of which 4,903 were slaves. This fast-paced growth resulted in the introduction of many needed municipal changes. For example, the public school system had to be revamped and expanded in order to maintain pace with the increased population. The city charter had removed control of the public schools from local government and placed education in the hands of an

\textsuperscript{13} For a detailed discussion of these aspects of Louisville's development, see Sullivan, Messmer, and Share.
elected board of trustees. By 1857, the board had constructed a new high school and eight new grade schools. Also, the expanding city outpaced the ability of the old volunteer fire fighting system. A new paid professional fire department was introduced, complete with steam engines and eight strategically placed station houses. This was only the second paid fire department in the nation. In May of 1861 the city also established a professional police department consisting of a superintendent, four detectives, and 90 policemen.

The city also become involved in the care of the poor, sick and delinquents as well. A $16,000 bond issue was passed to provide funds to the House of Refuge where young criminals were taught an honest trade. The city also assumed control of the Cook Benevolent Institution and the Marine Hospital during this decade of modernization.

The expanding population had other effects upon the city as well. In an age of horse and buggy transportation, increased population meant more horses, and each horse excreted 20 to 25 pounds of fresh manure onto the city streets daily. During periods of rain, the manure was turned into a smelly sticky mess, and in periods of drought, it was ground into a fine air born powder. In an effort to calm the agitation of the Main
Street merchants who complained about the dust and dung raised from street traffic, the city was forced to begin an aggressive program of street paving. By the end of the 1850s, the city had paved 60 miles of streets and 40 miles of alleys and had begun a systematic street cleaning program. In July of 1860 the General Council passed a bill authorizing the issuance of one million dollars in bonds for improvements of streets and sewers.\textsuperscript{14}

The swelling population also meant the city had an abundance of manpower and labor. By mid-century, there were over 10,000 unskilled workers in Louisville. This profusion of labor plus the city's central location and transportation networks made Louisville an attractive site for new manufacturing endeavors. Beginning in the late 1830s and early 1840s a new class of manufacturers migrated to Louisville. James Bridgeford, James S. Litgow, William H. Granger, Dennis Long, Benjamin Avery and William B. Belknap all opened profitable foundries, collectively became known as Louisville's "iron men," and quickly became important civic and political leaders. With the new facilities established by the iron men, and the older foundries which had previously existed,

\textsuperscript{14} In 1860 Louisville had a total of 700 miles of streets and alleys. For additional information regarding street paving, see Share and Messmer.
Louisville could boast of 15 major foundries by the year 1850. The L&N was a major customer of the iron works. Thomas Coleman's Louisville Rolling Mill produced rail and bridge girders for the road, while Ainslie, Cochran and Company produced steam engines, wheels and castings for rail cars.

Louisville was attracting more than just iron men during this period, the city also became a national center for book binding and paper production as well. The firm of John P. Morton and Company became the largest publishing house in the area while the city's paper production became dominated by the Du Pont's of Delaware. Alfred Victor and Antone Bidermann Du Pont left Delaware in mid-century destined for Louisville, and invested $37,500 in a paper mill which they named the A.V. Du Pont Company. The Du Pont brothers were not content to manufacture paper and quickly began investing in other Louisville industries as well. Alfred, in addition to acquiring holdings in several iron and coal companies, established the Louisville Streetcar Company and also became a director of the First National Bank. Antone became president of the Central Iron and Coal Company, president of the Central Passenger Railway Company and
owner of the Louisville Commercial Newspaper.\textsuperscript{15}

On the eve of the American Civil War, Louisville had 6,289 men and 1,080 women employed in manufacturing. There were 436 manufacturing facilities in the city generating $14.1 million worth of production. The city was a major producer of iron, sheet metal, the largest manufacturer of hemp in the nation, and the third largest in meat packing. The tracks of the L&N had reached Nashville and had connected Louisville with the cities and plantations of the south where a large market existed for the manufactured goods of the city. And the river trade was still an important and vital factor in Louisville's manufacturing and mercantile network. The value of the river to Louisville's manufacturing can be determined in part by the volume of boats built at the city's shipyards. The period of highest production accorded between July 1854 and October 1855, when 41 steam boats were built at the city's shipyards.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} The \textit{Louisville Commercial} had been previously controlled by the Ballard family, and for many years Andrew Jackson Ballard had been the paper's political editor.

\textsuperscript{16} The information contained in this section regarding Louisville's iron men and manufacturing developments within the city was condensed from various sources including Yater, Share, \textit{The Kentucky Encyclopedia}, various editions of the \textit{Louisville City Directory}, and \textit{The Memorial History of Louisville} by Johnston. Johnston's work was particularly useful as it
As the decade of modernization drew to a close, Louisville was poised to enter a new age of growth and prosperity. Furthermore, political trends were shifting quickly. The old landed elite withdrew from direct political control, and did not reappear as firsthand manipulators of city government for 50 years. Between the years 1854 and 1905 (with only one exception) the influential names of Speed, Bullitt, Ballard and Pope were absent from local government. The iron men of Louisville were taking their place and moving into the realm of political activity. The Louisville's General Council came to be dominated by the manufacturing class and the professional attorneys who served them. Men with the last names of Barrett, Barr, Mueller, Norton and Baxter took seats on the Council and filled the vacancies left by the landed elite.

contains biographical sketches of many of the city's more prominent individuals.

17 Charles Thurston Ballard was elected City Alderman in 1899.

18 Currently, there is no definitive explanation for the political shift in Louisville at this time. However, the withdrawal of the elite from local political involvement is consistent with similar situations found in other cities. In his study of New Haven, Robert Dahl made the same observation. Given the level of knowledge which we now have, three possibilities can tentatively be presented to explain the elite's withdrawal.

First, the Louisville landed elite simply moved on to
The voters of Kentucky were faced with a unique situation during the presidential election of 1860. For the first time in American history there were four major candidates running for the nation's highest office:

higher offices in the state and federal government and therefore saw no need to continue acting in local political matters at this time. This explanation is consistent with the known facts. However, the landed elite had always been involved in higher offices and an explanation of this nature, although logical, still does not explain why local politics was abandoned.

The second explanation is more plausible, yet it too has major problems. The Civil War split not only the city of Louisville, but the elite as well. It is therefore conceivable that once the war was over, the old landed elite were too fragmented to launch an effective political campaign. However, after the war many of the elite returned as heroes, and could easily have won city office on the strength of their war records, but chose not to do so.

The third possible explanation is eluded to by Thomas D. Clark (1973) in his work Helm Bruce, Public Defender: Breaking Louisville's Gothic Political Ring, 1905. Clark, who is widely considered the dean of Kentucky History, indicates that age was a factor. The older, political active generation was beginning to step down from the seat of power and the younger generation was too absorbed with business to take part local affairs.

Clark's interpretation, although not well developed, seems the more logical hypothesis and is consistent with a concept presented by Domhoff in Who Rules America. We do not currently know why the landed elite withdrew from direct control of local government and this is a topic worthy of additional research.
Republican Abraham Lincoln, Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge, and the Constitutional Union Party candidate John Bell. Lincoln and Breckinridge were both native sons of the Commonwealth, and should have split the Kentucky vote. However, neither of these two candidates carried their home state as over 45 percent of Kentucky's vote went to John Bell of Tennessee (see Table 3).

Bell ran on a simple platform which called for preservation of the union while ignoring the critical issues of slavery and secession. Although rather naive, Bell's conciliatory platform had great appeal for Kentucky voters. As a border state and at a pivotal junction between north and south, Kentucky was bitterly divided on slavery and attempting to avoid a conflict. Lincoln was aligned with the North, while Breckinridge supported secession and the "property rights" of the South. Therefore, neither candidate could obtain a polarity of Kentucky votes. Bell's victory is testimony to the Commonwealth's deep division and inability to initially choose sides in the coming Civil War.

Kentucky was split between north and south, but there was also an equally strong urban and rural split in the 1860 election. Statewide, Breckinridge came in second with over 35 percent of the vote, which indicates that
many rural Kentuckians supported slavery and secession. However, in the metropolitan area of Louisville and Jefferson County, Stephen A. Douglas took second place, while Breckinridge trailed a distant third. Like Bell, Douglas ran on a platform supporting preservation of the union, but unlike Bell, he addressed the issue of slavery. Douglas believed slavery to be a states rights issue and proclaimed: "If the people of all states ... and each state mind its own business, attend to its own affairs, take care of its own negroes, and not meddle in its neighbors, then there will be peace between the North and South."\(^{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Louisville Vote</th>
<th>Jefferson County Vote</th>
<th>State Vote</th>
<th>National Vote</th>
<th>Per Cent of Kentucky Vote</th>
</tr>
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<td>1,073</td>
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<td>848,356</td>
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<td>2,164</td>
<td>147,647</td>
<td>4,689,568</td>
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</table>

\(^{19\text{ Excerpt from a speech by Douglas at Alton, Illinois, October 15, 1858, www.bartleby.com/251.}}\)
The pro-secession platform of John C. Breckinridge received less than 12 percent of the Louisville metropolitan vote. Despite Louisville's pro-southern orientation, the institution of slavery had been steadily declining which probably explains in part Breckinridge's poor showing. In 1820, slaves made up 25 percent of Louisville's population, and over 50 percent of the population owned at least one slave. However, in the 1830s and 1840s, the institution of slavery began to decline in the metropolitan area and by the eve of the Civil War, slaves comprised less than ten percent of the city's population. In 1860 there were 10,300 slaves in all of Jefferson County and an estimated 2,000 free persons of color in the county, and 1,917 in the city. Slavery within the city was declining even more rapidly than the rural areas surrounding it in large part because of the industrial nature of the economy and the influx of immigrant labor who generally opposed the institution. Consequently, Breckinridge's limited urban support came from Main Street merchants with southern business interests. Bell and Douglas, who received the majority of support, gathered their strength from the manufacturing segments, the working class, small locally-based retail
merchants and the professional class. Thus, while Kentucky as a whole was divided on the issue of secession, the vast majority of Louisville-area voters supported the two candidates who called for preservation of the union. Louisville was in spirit a southern city, but the majority of its residents were opposed to secession.

Nevertheless, as the war approached, Louisville became a recruiting ground for the forces of North and South alike. Throughout the early months of 1861 it was a common sight to see troops in both blue and gray uniforms marching down opposite sides of the street on their way to the train station and northern- or southern-bound transportation. An estimated 2000 Louisville-area slaves also eventually joined the Union Army in exchange for a guarantee of freedom.

When the Civil War finally did break out in April, 1861, "it was a matter little short of a miracle that Kentucky did not secede and join the Confederacy. Only by astute management of a group of citizens in Louisville

\[20\] See Yater.

\[21\] During the war, 23,703 Kentucky African Americans served in the Union Army and Louisville became the primary recruiting location for the U.S. Colored Troops.
was Kentucky set upon a neutral course."\textsuperscript{22} James Speed and
James Guthrie were two of the more vocal promoters of
Kentucky neutrality. Guthrie believed Kentucky could
become "the great mediator for the restoration of peace
and the preservation" of the union.\textsuperscript{23} The position of
Speed, Guthrie, and other influential Louisvillians
prevailed and just one month after the shelling of Fort
Sumter, the Kentucky Legislature issued a proclamation of
neutrality. In Louisville, the General Council provided
$50,000 for the establishment of a Home Guard, which was
organized to protect the city from the invading armies of
both the North and South.

While Speed, Guthrie, and others were working to
retain Kentucky's position of neutrality, Walter N.
Haldeman became the spokesman of the pro-southern
merchants. Haldeman, the Collector of Customs and editor
of the Courier newspaper, was one of the first to realize
that neutrality was an impossibility due to the
geographical position of Louisville.\textsuperscript{24} Haldeman knew that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Clark, Thomas D. (1973) p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Yater, p. 83.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Louisville was still a Port of Entry and as
  Collector of Customs, Haldeman presided over the custom
  house. From the vantage point of this position, he could
  fully appreciate the importance of Louisville and
  accurately knew the degree of commerce which passed
  through the city. Haldeman had been appointed to that
\end{itemize}

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the Louisville and Portland Canal and the L&N Railroad would make the city a prime target for the two opposing sides. In fact, Louisville's neutrality had already been challenged precisely because of the canal and the railroad.

The Treasury Department had banned all trade with the rebellious Confederacy in early May, 1861. But Louisville and particularly the L&N chose to ignore this legislation and continued doing business as usual. The L&N, now under the direction of James Guthrie, actually increased business because of the Civil War. Advancing Union troops had quickly closed the Mississippi River south of Cairo, Illinois, and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the only other major line with southern tracks, was likewise closed. The war had left the L&N with the only direct route south and provided a window of opportunity for Louisville merchants.

Throughout April, May and early June the volume of cargo shipped south from Louisville was so great that at one point the L&N had to refuse all new assignments until the yard and warehouses could be cleared out and additional storage space made available. The activity of the L&N was clearly illegal, but was allowed to continue post by President Buchanan and had not yet been replaced by the new administration of Lincoln.
for two reasons. First, Haldeman had not yet been replaced as Collector of Customs and he simply ignored the embargo. The second and primary reason was Lincoln's fear that Kentucky would still withdraw from the Union, and take the remaining border states with it. Therefore, the Federal government did not move against the L&N by attempting to enforce the southern embargo.25

Haldeman's analysis of Louisville's strategic location proved accurate, and by September much of Kentucky was under the control of the Union Army. General Robert Anderson, a Louisville native who had been born at his ancestral home of Soldiers Retreat, was placed in command of the city.26 Louisville's 2000-man Home Guard was also placed under the control of Anderson's second-in-command, General William T. Sherman.

Once in Union hands, Louisville quickly became a major link in the Union Army's supply network and a quartermaster depot for the 80,000 soldiers who were

25 Additional information on this aspect of the L&N can be obtained from Yater and from Milton Hannibal Smith and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (1958), a thesis by Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau. Also, the reader should consult Ellis M. Coulter (1919) "Commercial Intercourse With the Confederacy in the Mississippi Valley, 1861-1865."

26 Anderson had been commanding officer of Fort Sumter when that stronghold was attacked by the Confederacy.
stationed around the metropolitan area. The L&N now carried supplies to Anderson's troops, General Don Carlos Buell's brigade, and Colonel Curran Pope's Fifteenth Infantry as well as other Union regiments in the Kentucky theater. The Civil War turned Louisville into an occupied city and a boom town almost overnight.

However, numerous local merchants continued to engage in commercial traffic with the Confederacy despite the presence of the Union Army. Wagons loaded with supplies were shipped out of town and then loaded on south-bound L&N trains. As a result, charges began ringing throughout the halls of Congress that the merchants of Louisville were giving material aid and comfort to the Confederacy.²⁷

After a brief investigation of these allegations, the Department of the Army announced plans to move all quartermaster activity out of Louisville. Additionally, the federal government severely restricted the city's commercial activity and some northern states placed a trade embargo on goods being shipped from Louisville.²⁸ Aware of what such stern measures would mean to the local

economy, a small group of businessmen took direct action. At an informal meeting in February, 1862, the Louisville Board of Trade (BOT) was established by individuals representing 22 commercial establishments. The expressed purpose of the Board was to promote cooperation and understanding between Louisville merchants and the federal government and to work for the removal of sanctions against the city. 29

A special session of the Kentucky General Assembly issued the charter under which the BOT functioned. On April 1, 1862 the first board of directors for the new organization was elected and installed in office. The composition of the board is reflective of the type of commercial establishment initially represented by the BOT. Two of the board's members were wholesale grocers, one was a saddle and harness maker and one was a photographer. The BOT originally attracted small retail merchants who were already Northern supporters. The largest company represented by the BOT was the A.V. Du Pont Company. Antone Bidermann Du Pont was a board member and the most influential member of the organization. At his insistence, each new member who joined the BOT was required to take an oath of allegiance to the government

29 Johnston, 1898

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of the United States.\textsuperscript{30}

The General Assembly gave the BOT a degree of political autonomy, legal rights and jurisdictional responsibilities way out of proportion for its original size and strength. In essence, the charter granted the Louisville Board of Trade quasi-legal status. The Board had the power to enact legislation which regulated trade, commerce and transportation for all of Jefferson County.\textsuperscript{31} This charter would come to have tremendous importance for post-Civil War Louisville.

It is difficult to determine exactly why the BOT was originally provided with so much power and autonomy. Possibly the General Assembly, aware of Louisville's strategic location and the strong southern sentiments of some merchants, felt more secure having the important issues of trade in the hands of individuals who had sworn allegiance to the North and had a clear vested interests in the northern economy.

Regardless of the exact reasons for the Board's position, once established it quickly grew in size and

\textsuperscript{30} The main branch of the Du Pont family was the Union Army's primary supplier of gunpowder.

\textsuperscript{31} This information regarding the BOT's political status was provided by Joe Main, the current president of the Louisville Board of Trade. Main, an amateur historian, is in possession of the only known copy of the BOT's charter.
stabilized Louisville's economic position. Since the Board actually controlled trade, commerce and transportation for the entire county and was backed up by the federal army, it was in the self-interest of area merchants to take the oath of allegiance and formally join the organization. Within one week after the provisions of the charter were made public, Board membership grew to 67 firms and by the end of the war, the BOT had 220 members.

The BOT remained an influential force in Louisville's economic development while maintaining its position as a totally independent entity. From its inception, the Board was freed from the constraints and controls of local government. Thus in the coming years, the BOT provided the city's economic elite with the direct political tools necessary to totally control trade and commerce within their area of jurisdiction. This high degree of autonomy subsequently set the tone for all future Board activity. Consequently, economic development in Louisville was centered around activity of the BOT and in the hands of the economic elite throughout the remainder of the 19th century.
General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered at the Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. The war between the states had lasted four years, cost the lives of 620,000 soldiers and emancipated four million slaves. With Lee's surrender, the war was ended but the difficulties of Reconstruction were just beginning. Reconstruction, like the war, had lasting consequences which permanently altered the political, social and economic relations of the entire nation.

In the industrial North, the demobilization of 800,000 soldiers within six months coupled with the termination of industrial war contracts, resulted in unemployment for one million workers. The government also withdrew one hundred million dollars from circulation, paper money which had been issued during the war without sufficient gold or silver to support it. The tight money situation which resulted from this action further damaged an already fragile economy. For the North, Reconstruction translated into rapid economic recession.

The North was damaged by the war and its aftermath, but it was the South which was the most dramatically affected. At war's end the South was in total ruin, with two-fifths of all its livestock dead and half of its farm
machinery, factories, and railroads destroyed. Confederate currency was also worthless, a fact which led to the absolute loss of two-thirds of all southern wealth. Nonetheless, the economic problems of the South were minor when compared to the loss of human life. One-quarter of all southern white males had been killed in combat. And now, on top of the ravages of war came the problems of Reconstruction.

The South was under a military rule which had full authority over all judicial and civil matters. Southern representatives were excluded from Congress and most ex-Confederates were initially stripped of the right to vote and barred from holding public office. At a time when the South was desperately in need of experienced leadership, the very men who had those qualifications were disenfranchised from the political process.

The Confederate states were also required to draft new constitutions and ratify the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments before being allowed back into the Union. As necessary as these amendments were, on a purely pragmatic level, they further destroyed the Southern economy. Traditionally, slaves had been a source of collateral for mortgages and bank loans, essential elements in an agrarian economy. Emancipation stripped southern planters of the means to secure credit, purchase
seed, machinery, and plant their crops. In the first years of Reconstruction, both black and white people living in the richest agricultural region of the nation were in actual danger of starvation.  

The war and Reconstruction damaged the North and destroyed the South, but the border states actually prospered. Kentucky in particular had ended the war in relatively good condition. There had only been a few minor skirmishes within the Commonwealth, so there was little physical damage. The only hard hit Kentucky industry was the L&N, but even it had not been permanently damaged. The L&N had been a major link in the Union Army's military railroad system and an instrument of northern advancement. Therefore, the road was a prime target for southern forces. During the war John Hunt Morgan, General Simon Bolivar Buckner, and General Basil Duke all did a competent job of destruction and sabotage of the road. At one point, the L&N had only 30 miles of usable track left intact. But by war's end, the road was in better shape than before the conflict. The federal

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government, aware of the vital military service offered by the L&N, repaired and expanded the southern tracks as quickly as the Confederate Armies destroyed them. Thanks to six million dollars in government construction projects, the L&N Railroad had more miles of track after the war than before.

Louisville actually profited from Reconstruction as nimbly as it had from the war itself. The city's mercantile economy was intact and its factories in operation. Louisville was also chosen as the Union Army's headquarters for the Military Division of the South. Throughout Reconstruction thousands of federal troops were stationed in the city and a steady supply of military payrolls contributed to the local economy. Louisville was booming and the city's merchants and manufacturers were well positioned to serve their southern customers and turn a respectable profit.

The merchants and manufacturers of Louisville helped rebuild the poverty stricken South. Louisville banks provided the South with capital and low interest loans. Southern retailers stocked their stores and remained in business with Louisville products purchased on credit. The city's merchants extended credit for the purchase of seed, tools, and farm animals while the manufacturers adapted their equipment and machinery for the changing
agricultural needs of the South. Both banks and manufacturers provided long term loans for the purchase of farm implements, plows, reapers and cotton gins. The L&N supplied free transportation to and from the city for southern merchants on buying trips.

Louisville, which was expanding its economic base by catering to southern requirements, adopted a new slogan to reflect its position: Louisville became "The Gateway to the South." The slogan "appealed to southern loyalties and pride - even though Louisville itself had remained firmly in Union hands during the Civil War."\(^3\) In the post-war years, Louisville was successfully passing itself off as a southern city.

One aspect of Louisville which appealed to southern sentiment was the city's new newspaper, the Louisville Courier Journal (LCJ) which was developed and owned by William Haldeman. The city's pro-southern sentiments which had lingered in the background during most of the war, were now openly expressed on the pages of the LCJ. Under the guidance of editor Henry Watterson of Tennessee, the LCJ became an eloquent defender of the "Lost Cause" and an equally stern critic of radical

\(^{33}\) Clark, p. 6.

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reconstruction.34

The LCJ was the product of a merger between three of the city's leading papers. The merger was a major accomplishment for Haldeman and an event which significantly contributed to Louisville's political outlook for years to come. Prior to the merger, each of the three papers had represented the interest of a different political party. The Louisville Democrat was the voice of the traditional Democrat party while Prentice's Journal was pro-Unionist.35 The third paper, Haldeman's Courier, had taken a Southern Democrat position. The combined LCJ eliminated the position of The Journal and became a totally southern-oriented Democratic newspaper.

The Louisville paper quickly developed a wide circulation throughout the South and where the paper didn't reach, excerpts and editorials were reprinted in

34 See Clark for a detailed discussion of the editorial stance of the Louisville Courier Journal during this period. The reader may also refer to the Louisville Courier Journal for more information on this aspect of the newspaper's development. Beginning on September 19, 1993, the paper ran a series of articles celebrating 125 years of publication.

35 Prentice died in Louisville in 1870.
local Southern weeklies.\textsuperscript{36} The LCJ was "filled with stories of radical excesses in the South. In fact there were months when the paper published little other news."\textsuperscript{37} However, the paper did far more than just denounce Reconstruction and provide the city with a southern facade. The LCJ became a powerful force within Louisville and in a very real and direct manner made two lasting contributions to the city's political and economic structure.

First, the paper contributed to the revitalization of the Democrat Party which had been hopelessly

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{36} The Louisville Courier Journal was perhaps the most widely circulated and read newspaper in the South during Reconstruction and there are several good reasons for its popularity. The paper was clearly pro-Southern, but so too were most of the area papers published south of the Mason-Dixon line at that time. Undoubtedly, one of the primary reasons for the popularity of this particular paper can be found in the exploits of the two individuals most closely associated with the publication. Henry Watterson had served in the Confederate Army and had published a field newspaper, The Rebel, while in combat. His name was therefore well known among Confederate veterans. Likewise, the South was very familiar with the work of William Haldeman. Haldeman's Courier had been outlawed as an advocate of treason in 1861 and its publication discontinued by order of General Robert Anderson. However, Haldeman managed to escape the city and took the presses with him. Throughout the war, Haldeman followed the Confederate army and published his paper as the official newspaper of the Confederate States of America. After the war, Haldeman resumed publication in Louisville and maintained a strong southern following which was transferred to the LCJ after the merger.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{37} Clark, p. 11.
\end{quote}
fragmented and divided in Louisville. The 1860 presidential race between Bell, Douglas, and Breckinridge had bitterly split the party and this gulf had continued to widen throughout the war. The LCJ did much to heal the inter-party wounds and reunited local Democrats under a single banner. The paper nurtured and supported the party, became its greatest defender, endorsed its candidates and denounced its opponents. Republican Party candidates could not receive a favorable review and had to rely on The Commercial to advocate their positions. The Commercial (later renamed the Louisville Herald) never had the political clout nor the circulation of the LCJ. Consequentially, Republican polices and candidates never received widespread coverage. From Reconstruction through the remainder of the 19th century, Louisville was Democratic, in large part because of the editorial positions of Watterson.\textsuperscript{38}

The LCJ also made Henry Watterson one of the most influential political figures in Kentucky and leader of the New Departure Democrats, an economically progressive party faction. Under Watterson's guidance, the New

\textsuperscript{38} The power and influence of the LCJ during this period cannot be underrated and yet this is a topic which few scholars have tackled. For more information on this aspect of the LCJ, see Clark (1973) and Hambleton Tapp and James Klotter (1977) \textit{Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900}.  

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Departure Democrats supported improvements in the state's transportation network, increased industrialization, expanded utilization of Kentucky's natural resources, educational reform, and racial segregation. The Louisville-based New Departure Democrats were frequently at odds with the more conservative Bourbon Democrats of the Lexington area. The Bourbon Democrats were opposed to modernization efforts, but the two factions generally merged on issues of partisan politics. But, under Watterson's direction, these two parties jointly united with the national Democrat Party.39

The second major contribution which the LCJ made to Louisville during this time period was in the area of civic promotion. Henry Watterson never missed an opportunity to champion the city or expound upon Louisville's commercial importance. Louisville, according to Watterson, was a critical element for the future economic success of the struggling South. The LCJ advertised Louisville's employment opportunities, high wages, and the many business ventures which the city had

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39 Hambleton Tapp and James Klotter (1977) provide the best and most detailed analysis of this aspect of Kentucky's political development. The reader can also refer to Clark (1933 and 1973), and to James T. Wills (1966), Louisville Politics, 1891-1897. In the introduction to this thesis and again on pp. 33-34, Wills briefly touches upon some aspects of this topic.
to offer. Louisville's geographic position, its pro-
southern attitudes and its stable and prosperous economy
were touted, promoted, and widely known about because of
the circulation and influence of the LCJ. The paper
extended a straightforward and warm welcome to the former
soldiers of the South who were seeking economic openings
or a political base of operations.

In the years following the Civil War, the
promotional efforts of the LCJ paid off and the
population of the city increased to 100,753 by 1870. Many
of the city's new residents were disenfranchised southern
soldiers who found employment as salesmen for the
merchants and manufacturers of Louisville. The local
firms discovered the advantages of having Confederate
veterans as their representatives in the field. These
"Louisville Drummers" traveled the South and received a
warmhearted welcome wherever they went; Confederate
veterans were good for business. The BOT "looked upon the
drummers as missionaries who in carrying the gospel of
trade represented 'Main Street' as well as their
individual (commercial) houses."40

The city's African American population also
increased between 1860 and 1870 and continued to grow

40 Share, p. 58.
thereafter. Many African Americans entered Louisville during the War as refugees and runaway slaves. In response to the needs of the refugees, the African American churches organized aid societies to feed, cloth and provide medical assistance to the flood of new arrivals. After the war many of these former slaves remained in the city swelling the African American population to 14,956 by 1870. The L&N railroad also brought many African Americans to Jefferson County after the War as well. L&N recruiters traveled the south seeking track layers for the expanding road. Willing workers from the impoverished South were loaded on boxcars and shipped north to Jefferson County.

The increased population mandated the creation of new racial enclaves in both the city and county to support the growing number of African Americans. In eastern Jefferson County Berrytown and Griffeytown were established by African Americans, many of whom were employed by the L&N. These were economically mixed areas that included track workers and the more financially successful waiters and porters of the L&N Anchorage Depot. Another county enclave just south of Louisville, the agricultural area of Newburg, could actually trace its heritage to the 1820s.

Eliza Curtis Hundley Tevis was a former slave who
obtained her freedom sometime in the 1820s and purchased a small farm in what would become Newburg. Prior to the Civil War, Tevis would travel to Louisville when slaves were being loaded on boats for the down river journey. The slave traders not wishing to be burdened with small children and infants would frequently sell them to bystanders for as little as one dollar. Tevis bought many of these children and took them home. By the eve of the Civil War, Tevis was technically the largest slave owner in Jefferson County with perhaps as many as 50 slaves. It was Aunt Lize as she was known in the area, and her adopted slave children who formed the nucleus of the post-war enclave. Newburg experienced rapid growth and expansion in the postbellum period as a community of truck gardens which supplied produce to the markets of Louisville.\footnote{There are numerous accounts of Tevis' life and the area of Newburg which the reader may refer to including oral traditions which have been collected and documented by Ioa Symnes Coates and Nelson Goodwin. Both Coates and Goodwin were Newburg residents and amateur historians. For additional information about Tevis, Newburg, Berrytown and Griffeytown, see \textit{Historic Jefferson County} (1992) ed. by Leslee Key; \textit{A Time In Place: The Story of Louisville's Neighborhoods} (1990); and Yater. Coates' oral history is located at the Louisville's Filson Club.}

Despite the high employment of Berrytown and Griffeytown and the agricultural success of Newburg, many African Americans who entered the Louisville area during
the post-War years were unemployed and largely excluded from Louisville's booming economy. Many of these new arrivals settled in an area in the western part of the city which gained the name "Little Africa." This was an area of high unemployment, extreme poverty, and a subsistence-level informal economy. Slavery may have ended but the age of segregation and Jim Crow ideology was quickly beginning.42

Further evidence of segregation as well as internal racial class status can be found in the transformation of the Russell area of Louisville. Roughly bordered by Market, Broadway, 24th Streets and Wilkins Avenue, the Victorian adorned Russell neighborhood was originally built for affluent white residents. During the 1870s the prosperous African American entrepreneurs of Louisville began moving into the area as they sold their older homes in Smoketown and the California neighborhood to new African American migrants. By the 1890s the racial transformation was complete and the area became the exclusive community for "The Colored Four Hundred." This was the educated, business and politically oriented class

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42 This area eventually expanded into the Parkland neighborhood and continues to this day as the poorest and most racially segregated area of Louisville. Parkland retains a high unemployment and crime rate and is in every sense a classic slum area.
of local African American society.

During the early 20th century, the Colored Four Hundred and their children provided outstanding leadership, turned the Russell area into the center of the African American community, and became extremely active in politics and business. The Colored Four Hundred were not however the only group to emerge in the aftermath of the Civil War as another even smaller group of individuals and their children eventually dominated Louisville business and politics.

After the War Kentucky and Louisville in particular became the destination of choice for a small group of former high ranking Confederate officers. This group included John C. Breckinridge, Simon Bolivar Buckner, John B. Castleman, Basil Duke, J.J.B. Hilliard, Andrew Cowan, Bennett H. Young, Humphrey Marshall, Charles Allen, Thomas W. Bullitt, and Luke P. and C.S. Blackburn among others. These men were all from prominent families, some were native to the area while others moved to Louisville after the war. The native Louisvillians re-established their position within the local landed elite,

43 For additional information regarding the Russell community see Yater, Keys, and A Time In Place: The Story of Louisville's Neighborhoods. For information about the Russell area as well as the Colored Four Hundred, see Wright (1985) and Cary B. Lewis (1906) "Louisville and its Afro-American Citizens."
while many of the newcomers joined forces with Louisville's Iron Men. Jointly, the former officers became known as the "Brigadiers" and quickly developed into political and economic powers. The Louisville-based Brigadiers embraced the platform of the New Departure Democrats and gained control of much of the city's economic development.

Some of the Brigadiers went into politics while others began practicing law, or entered into manufacturing, real estate or commerce. Four members of the group (Buckner, Duke, Luke and C.S. Blackburn) had distinguished political careers at the state and national level. Two of them (Buckner and Luke Blackburn) were elected Kentucky governors, while two (Castleman and C.S. Blackburn) were appointed military governors of U.S. territories. At least six of the Brigadiers mentioned above were attorneys, and four of them (Marshall, Bullitt, Young and Duke) established prestigious law firms and represented the largest business interest in the city."

Andrew Cowan entered banking and finance, J.J.B. Hilliard opened a prosperous stock exchange, Charles

"Ironically, General Basil Duke, who had destroyed countless miles of L&N track during the war, became the road's chief council and lobbyist during this time period.

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Allen became a full partner in Belknap and Company, while John C. Breckinridge became president of the Elizabethtown, Lexington, and Big Sandy Railroad. John B. Castleman and his father-in-law John Barbee founded the Castleman and Barbee Insurance Company, which was the southern representative of the Royal Insurance Company of England. Bennett H. Young was a founder and president of both the Louisville Southern Railway Company and the Monon Rail Road. Young was also instrumental in financing and construction of the Kentucky and Indiana Bridge, which connected Louisville and New Albany.

The BOT, which was still attempting to defend the carrying trade and Louisville's mercantile position, was

45 The Monon ran from Chicago to Louisville while the Louisville Southern ran east to the Kentucky coal fields. Throughout the 1880s, these two roads and the Cincinnati Southern Railroad were invading the L&N's territory. The L&N board of directors had become dominated by external capital in 1880 and seemed unwilling to halt the invasion and further protect Louisville's position. For additional information on the change within the L&N, see "The Louisville and Nashville Railroad 1850-1942" by Kincaid Herr (1942) The L&N Magazine, and "A New Era: Rails to Everywhere" (1974) by George Yater. For more information about Young's activity as president of the Monon and the Louisville Southern, see George W. Hilton's (1980) Monon Route.

46 The K&I was the second bridge to span the Ohio at Louisville. The first was constructed by the L&N and opened in 1870. The L&N bridge, which connected Louisville and Clarksville was the longest iron bridge in the United States at that time. The bridge was also the last project promoted and launched by James Guthrie who passed away March 13, 1869 at the age of 77.
genuinely opposed to the rail roads and bridge projects which the New Departure Democrats were promoting. The Board still believed Louisville's economic future rested upon the monopoly of location, and on several occasions the BOT successfully suppressed developments which it viewed as harmful to Louisville's position. Perhaps the most famous of such events revolved around the Louisville, Cincinnati & Lexington Rail Road (LC&L). The LC&L wished to lay tracks from Cincinnati to Louisville and connect to the L&N. The BOT, fearing the city would be bypassed by such an arrangement, intervened and halted the project. After months of negotiation, the BOT agreed to a compromise settlement: the LC&L was allowed to lay its tracks but was not allowed to make a direct link with the L&N. With this arrangement the transhipment of cargo still had to be manually carried from one line to the other.

Although the BOT had salvaged Louisville's economic position during the Civil War, it had now become a hindrance to commerce and transportation. Furthermore, the BOT had made enemies among Louisville's Iron Men, Brigadiers, and New Departure Democrats. A contingent of

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47 Formerly the Louisville and Frankfort Rail Road.
48 Yater.
Louisville businessmen established the Mechanics' and Manufacturers' Exchange in 1874 as a counterpoint to the BOT. The two organizations existed side by side for several years, but as manufacturing increased, the power and influence of the Main Street merchants diminished. In 1879, the Mechanics' and Manufacturers' Exchange merged their organization into the BOT on an equal footing. The reconstructed BOT was now the city's undisputed business leader with representatives from the landed elite, manufacturing, and mercantile interest. "Never again would the Board (of Trade) oppose new transportation links for the city as it had done when the merchants were in the saddle, jealously guarding Louisville's older role as a trans-shipper of goods." 49

The new organization provided the Louisville elite with many of the economic elements necessary for establishment of a modern growth regime. However, a younger generation would have to assume command before that potential could be fully realized.

Urban Expansion

The Louisville General Council published a manual in 1874 promoting the various business advantages that the city had to offer: "It can be safely predicted that industrial pursuits will continue to augment and widen here in the future, because experience proves that the permanent collection of large numbers of artisans at any one place tends to continually attract others, just as capital at such a point is constantly tempted by the facility with which it can obtain ingenious labor to aid new industrial arts."

The General Council's assessment proved accurate as Louisville, under the direction and control of the reorganized BOT, continued to grow and prosper throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. Manufacturing in particular flourished with a steady increase in industrial output from $14.2 million in 1860 to $18.5 million in 1870, and $35.4 million in 1880. The total number of manufacturing establishments also increased from 436 to 1,108 between 1860 and 1880, and industrial employment increased from 7,396 to 17,448. The increase

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51 see Johnson.
in manufacturing prompted an editorial in the Commercial to observe that "Louisville aspires, and hopes to be one of these days a manufacturing town, capable of competing with such centers as Cincinnati and St. Louis."\(^5\)

As Louisville entered the last decades of the nineteenth century it was already capable of competing in a national and international market in some areas. Louisville was the world's largest tobacco market and a national leader in the production of distilled spirits. The city had 19 distilleries by 1890, the largest and most influential of which were the Barrett family's Frankfort Distilleries Inc, Brown-Forman Distillery Company, founded and owned by Owsley Brown, and Bernheim Brothers, founded and owned by Isaac and Bernard Bernheim.\(^5\) The city could boast also of Dennis Long and Company, which was the nation's largest producer of cast iron pipe. One of Long's new competitors in this market was Ahrens and Ott Manufacturing, founded by Theodore Ahrens. There were four companies producing farm equipment in Louisville, all of which greatly contributed

\(^5\) Reprinted from Yater, p. 98.

\(^5\) The Bernheim brothers were German Jewish immigrants who entered the United States shortly after the Civil War. The brothers became extremely wealthy and were prominent members within the Louisville Jewish community.
to the local economy. Under the guidance and direction of general manager Charles Huhlein, B.F. Avery & Sons had become the world's largest manufacturers of plows.

Ballard and Ballard Flour Mill was gaining national recognition, while Louisville's paper industry was still a national leader. The Louisville Paper Company, with Thomas F. Smith as president, had developed into the South's largest producer of paper products. Additionally, the J.P. Morton and Company, under the direction of Samuel B. Kirby, was capturing an increasing share of the national book publishing market. C.C. Mengel and Brothers became the world's largest producer of boxes and wooden crates. The Mengel brothers owned a fleet of ocean-going vessels and shipped their products globally.

Louisville was also the world's leading producer of denim material, a major meat packing center with 16 related leather tanneries, the largest southern producer of wagons and carriages and was becoming a national leader in the production of paint and varnish. The city was a regional pacesetter in the production of steam engines and had numerous related foundries and metal working facilities. Cement production was also a major Louisville industry in 1890. Limestone from Corn Island was processed into cement at James B. Speed's Louisville Cement Company and at Dexter Belknap's Union Cement.
Not all of the industries in Louisville were heavy industries such as steel, cement and spirits. The city was embracing modern technological developments as well. Just two years after Alexander Graham Bell displayed the telephone at the Louisville Industrial Exposition, James B. Speed was at the helm of the American District Telephone Company. The Louisville company signed up about 200 subscriptions in its first year of operations. Speed's telephone company shared quarters in the Board of Trade building with the Western Union Telegraph Company. Western Union was founded when numerous national companies consolidated, including Louisville's own People's Line, which was established by William B. Belknap, William Hite, and T. S. Bell in 1853.

Another technological advancement for the city was the creation of the Louisville Electric Light Company which was chartered in 1882 by W. L. Breyfogle, Leon Bamberger, Walter Haldeman, and John G. Baxter who was named the company's first president. Baxter and the company's board of directors, which included Attila Cox,

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5 Information regarding Louisville's manufacturing was compiled from various editions of the Louisville City Directory, and Mary Young Southard, Ed. Who's Who In Kentucky: A Biographical Assembly of Notable Kentuckians (1936), and from Yater (1987), and "Dawn of the Corporate Age" (1974) by Yater.
William Hite, John Atherton, James Speed, and A. H. Barrett, convinced the Sinking Fund to invest $925,000 in the new venture and within three years the company was stringing wires throughout Louisville. The Buckingham Theater on Green Street became the first commercial establishment within Louisville illuminated through the use of electricity.

Population increases were likewise maintaining pace with Louisville's technical and business expansion and by 1890 the city had a population of 161,129, nearly half of whom were foreign born or first generation Americans. Also, some of the old ethnic antagonisms were beginning to diminish as more members of the German and Jewish ethnic groups gained middle class status and began to move to new and larger housing. At the same time the more affluent members of the African American community were relocating to the Russell area which resulted in white flight to alternative neighborhoods. There was also a general increase in the ranks of the professional and managerial class as a result of the expanding industrial economy. Consequently, economic expansion coupled with middle class ethnic assimilation resulted in the creation of new suburbs.

Two new distinctive middle class neighborhoods were developed to meet the housing needs of the city. The Parkland area in the city's West End was subdivided and promoted as a middle class area. Over 1000 Parkland lots were offered at public action on July 10, 1871 by developers Morris, Southwick & Company. At the same time Parkland was being developed, Joshua F. Speed and James W. Henning were promoting their own middle class neighborhood at the opposite end of the city. The two real estate developers purchased and subdivided 134 acres in the area known as the Highlands.

Louisville's middle class was not the only group on the move during the last decades of the 19th century. The economic elite was moving beyond the city limits into newly developed areas. The area south of Broadway along First, Second, Third and Fourth Streets became the fastest growing elite neighborhood in the city. At the same time the streets south of Broadway were being developed, Alfred and Bidermann Du Pont opened their own Central Park Subdivision. The proximity to the downtown business district plus the ease of transportation made these areas attractive new neighborhoods for the successful business class. However, not all of the elite were moving south of Broadway; many of the city's upper class preferred the new developments of Glenview,
Prospect, Anchorage and Pewee Valley. Numerous members of the elite had maintained summer homes in these prestigious areas for years, but now as the city grew the summer homes were converted into year-round residences while new home construction increased.

As the 20th century hastily approached, Louisville had a strong economic base and was experiencing a boom in industry, population and housing. Housing and especially middle and low income housing was considered critical to the city's future continued success. The Louisville Industrial and Commercial Gazette echoed this point in many of its editorials. "If we would have cheap labor, we must have cheap living," stated the Gazette. "No city can push forward her mechanical and manufacturing interest without providing ample and cheap accommodations for the operatives upon whom we are mainly dependent for our resources."56 The new homes of Glenview, Anchorage, and even the Highlands were certainly not cheap, but they did share a common problem with the more modest residences of Germantown, Portland, Limerick and Smoketown which were also expanding. The days of the walking city were over and in order for people to move into the new developments, they needed transportation to and from

56 Yater, p. 96.
their place of employment. Thus, the rapid growth of the suburbs brought with it an increase in public transportation. Soon after Parkland was developed, the Central Passenger Railroad extended tracks into the subdivision, and into the Central Park area. Then, in rapid succession the Louisville and Portland and the Citizens Passenger Railway companies were established. One line ran up Broadway providing transportation for the residents of the Highlands, Irish Hill, and Germantown.

The residents of Glenview and the prestigious upper River Road areas solved their transportation problems by starting their own railroad. The Louisville, Harrods Creek & Westport Railroad was a narrow gauge steam powered train which ran between Prospect and First street. The Louisville, Harrods Creek & Westport Railroad was a swift, first class steam powered train, but transportation for the middle and lower class was less desirable. Most of the street railways were mule drawn clunkers which rattled along iron tracks, but they did manage to adequately cover the city. By 1890, Louisville had 94 miles of street railways which carried 19 million passengers annually.

An event took place in 1890 which would alter not only the street cars but the entire city. The Louisville Gas Company gained controlling interest in the Louisville
Electric Lighting Company. Now with the economic backing of the gas company, the electric company had sufficient resources to offer a virtual unlimited supply of electricity: a fact which did not go unnoticed by the street car promoters. The old mule cars were replaced by the electric trolley. However, stringing electric lines for the trolleys was an expensive proposition and consequentially, in 1890, the various street car companies merged and created the Louisville Railway Company.57 Within a very short time, the Louisville Railway Company came to be dominated by Theodore Ahrens, Charles Mengel, John Stites, George Norton, and Alexander Humphrey, as well as other manufacturers, bankers, and real estate developers.

The transportation system provided by the new electric trolleys further allowed the city's boundaries to expand. The trolley lines opened up the area around Churchill Downs for development, as well as the Willow Avenue area in the East, and the areas of Oakdale, Beechmont and Iroquois Park to the South. All of these new subdivisions were touched by the electric railways

57 The Louisville Railway Company was the direct predecessor to the Transit Authority of River City, the Louisville bus system.
and began to vigorously develop as a result.\textsuperscript{58} By 1890, Louisville had developed into a modern sprawling city.

Louisville was growing, but just as in many other cities of the time, secondary negative consequences were accompanying that expansion. Louisville was a "city which rapidly became more class conscious and socially stratified. The old internal city became more and more a weak copy of the poorer tenement districts of the brooding metropolises of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis."\textsuperscript{59} Only two social classes remained in the area around the central business districts, the upper class who lived in the Central Park area and along First through Fourth Streets and the laboring class who occupied the ethnic, racial, and working class enclaves. The professional and managerial middle class were moving to the new eastern and western subdivisions while the

\textsuperscript{58} Information dealing with Louisville's suburbs was compiled from various sources including A Place in Time: The Story of Louisville's Neighborhoods (1989) and Historic Jefferson County (1992). A highly interesting and informative account of the development of the Highlands and activity in the Speed-Henning subdivision is provided in The Cherokee Area: A History by Anne S. Karem (1971). Karem outlines the construction of the homes in this area and lists the major residents, their addresses and occupations. The reader may also refer to "Of Time and The City" (1974) by George Yater, as well as Yater's other works, and Clark, Johnson, and Wills for more general accounts.

\textsuperscript{59} Clark, p. v.
suburbs were taking many of Louisville's most affluent residents completely out of the city. This sifting and sorting of the population also had secondary political ramifications because it created predominately Democratic and Republican controlled wards.

Louisville's political situation was further complicated by events at the state level as well. A Constitutional Convention was called in 1890 to rewrite the 1850 document under which the Commonwealth had been governed. The new Constitution reorganized state government and as in the past, a new Constitution necessitated a revamped city charter which would more closely function within the guidelines of the state document. Passage of the new Constitution also coincided with the municipal elections in Louisville and a new city charter became a campaign issue.

Henry S. Tyler was elected mayor in 1891 after a bitter campaign. Tyler had the support of the political machine, labor, the Irish community, and traditional elite Democrats such as John B. Castleman and Alex Scott Bullitt. However, the Republicans who were gaining strength won a majority on the Board of Aldermen. Once in office, Tyler was immediately confronted with developing a new charter which would be acceptable to both Democrats and the reform-minded Republicans of the Board of
Aldermen. The charter which was written by attorney Edward McDermott, businessman Cary Peter, and the editor of the *Evening Post*, Richard Knott was clearly a compromise document.⁶⁰

The Louisville City Charter of 1893 established elections at large, the secret ballot, and created the new position of comptroller which was designed to oversee the fiscal management of the city. The comptroller could also appoint as many clerks as allowed him by ordinance.⁶¹ Additionally, the Board of Public Works was given authority over the public utilities and responsibility for construction and maintaining the streets, side walks, and public wells. The Board of Public Safety now oversaw the police and fire department as well as the department of Health and the Department of Building. The Board of Public Safety also directed the jail, city hospital, and the alms house. These provisions were all supported by the Republicans who wished to modernize and professionalize city government.

At the same time the new charter greatly enhanced the mayor's power by investing in that office the

⁶⁰ For additional details regarding the political situation surrounding the creation of this charter, see Wills.

⁶¹ *Charter of the City of Louisville*, (1893), section 116-118.
authority to appoint the comptroller and director of both Public Boards. Prior to this charter, the General Council had filled many of the municipal jobs which were now under the jurisdiction of the mayor through the comptroller and public boards. Previously under the old charter, many powerful and influential positions had been elected jobs: the fire chief, for example, had been an elected post but was now an appointed position. The new charter not only gave the mayor more authority over the city, but direct control of over 1000 jobs. The Democrats and the political machine supported this aspect of the charter because it enhanced the patronage system which was critical to machine success.62

Although the charter of 1893 was designed as a compromise document, it created a situation which eventually resulted in blood-stained streets, a fraudulent election, and state intervention. The end result of the political conflict that erupted was the emergence of a new political structure for the city. However, that confederation and realignment would not take place until the dawn of the 20th century.

62 Wills. For additional information concerning Louisville's political situation, see Jean Nance, (1974), "Inside City Hall."
The Composition of Race and Ethnicity

As the 20th century approached, the Irish, German, and Jewish populations were still the largest and most vital ethnic groups in Louisville. However, each group was undergoing significant changes. At the most basic level, the progression of generations was having an effect as native born ethnic Americans were beginning to outnumber their immigrant predecessors. Also, many of the more affluent ethnic Americans were losing touch with their heritage and were being assimilated into mainstream society. At the same time many of the working class were centering their identity around ethnicity and using it as a basis of organization and economic mobility. For the working class, and the Irish working class in particular,

63 There were perhaps 300 Italian immigrants living in Louisville in 1900 but they were scattered throughout the city, never established a designated Italian enclave, and quickly assimilated into the larger population. Therefore, no Italian organizations were included within the Louisville data. Additionally, a very small Greek community was established in Louisville around 1910. Louisville's "Greek Town" was located around Market and Liberty Streets. A couple of designated Greek organizations briefly existed but no membership list for them could be uncovered. Therefore, this group was not included in the Louisville data. For information on these communities, see "Making a Home: Italians and Jews in Louisville" (1994) by George Kent Stanley and "The Greek Community of Louisville" (1981) by Marios Stephanides.
ethnicity and social class assumed a dual significance and their neighborhoods continued to manifest classic manifestations of ethnic enclaves.

The vast majority of the Irish were Catholic, working class, and one of the groups most discriminated against within the city. The Irish continued to live in the three enclaves of Irish Hill, Portland, and Limerick well into the 20th Century. Nevertheless, despite the geographical distance of their neighborhoods they established a cohesive city-wide community bound together by church, politics, and distinctly Irish organizations. These elements provided the immigrant and native born alike with a common cultural identity and sense of social solidarity.

The Catholic Church provided the Irish with a deep-seated religious belief system but it was also important for social and economic reasons as well. Organizations like the Knights of Columbus and the Young Men's Institute provided a social outlet for the community. Additionally, church-affiliated organizations such as the Knights and Ladies of America were one of the few places where the working class Irish could get insurance and "death benefits" at a reasonable price. At the same time organizations like the St. Vincent De Paul Society dispensed charitable contributions when necessary. One of
the greatest appeals of the church may have been in terms of employment opportunities. The church and Catholic school system employed many of the Irish as teachers, clerical workers, custodians, contractors and laborers.

The religious center of the Irish community was St. Louis Bertrand Church located in the heart of Limerick. The church was built between 1869 and 1872 and was constructed exclusively by Irish contractors and craftsmen. The annual St. Patrick's Day parade, which was the principle social event within the Irish community, began every year at the front steps of St. Louis Bertrand. The parade attracted as many as 10,000 participants and was the largest ethnic demonstration in the city. From the steps of the church the Irish marched eight abreast through the central business district and from there they turned West and trekked down Market

By 1900 there were 25 Catholic Churches and parish schools in Louisville. St. Louis Bertrand was the dominate Irish church while St. Boniface held the same position among German Catholics. African American Catholics were divided between St. Peter Claver and St. Augustine. We know that St. Louis Bertrand was built by the Irish and if that same pattern of ethnic construction existed at the other locations then religion would have been a mechanism of economic mobility as well as a theological belief system. This is an interesting topic which merits further research. For a detailed discussion of the construction of St. Louis Bertrand, see The Golden Jubilee of St. Louis Bertrand Parish (1916) and One Hundred Years in Picture and Prose of Saint Louis Bertrand Church (1966).

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Street, ending the procession in front of Hibernian Hall in Portland. The annual parade united the two largest Irish enclaves and functioned to maintain the symbolic identity of the community. Additionally, the parade was a visible demonstration of Irish working class strength which the entire city could perceive.65

Ethnic identity and cohesion were also maintained by the Ancient Order of Hibernian (AOH), an Irish fraternal and benevolent organization founded in New York in 1836. A Louisville chapter of the AOH was established in 1874 and quickly became an influential force within the community. The AOH held its annual convention in Louisville in 1888, at which time the charter was amended to allow native born Americans of Irish descent into the Order. The AOH maintained an employment committee which secured jobs for unemployed members and a sick and welfare committee which paid financial benefits when necessary. In all likelihood the Louisville AOH sponsored English and citizenship classes for its members as well.66

65 See Warner for a detailed discussion and analysis of symbolic identity. The best source of information regarding the St. Patrick's Day parades is the local newspapers which always covered them in great detail.

66 No direct evidence of AOH-sponsored classes in Louisville was uncovered but there are a number of bilingual text books in Hibernian Hall which date to the turn of the 20th Century. The AOH engaged in educational activity in other cities and that fact combined with the
The AOH was also the political arm of the Irish community and an unyielding supporter of the Democratic party machine. John Nelligan, who never held a political office himself, was a key figure within the Democratic Party for decades. Nelligan was a director of the AOH, head of the Portland Democrat Club, and the political boss of Portland. Two other politically influential Hibernians were William Higgins and John Barry who began publication of the Kentucky Irish American (KIA) in 1896. Higgins was a member of Typographical Union No. 10 and president of the Central Labor Union during the early 1890s. The KIA was also designated the official newspaper of the Central Labor Union in 1899 and 1900. John Barry was a member of Louisville's Democrat Party's Executive Committee and the Mose Green Club (MOS). The MOS was an umbrella organization which united the various text books suggests the Louisville AOH functioned in this capacity as well.

67 Shortly after the turn of the century, the Central Labor Union became the Louisville Federation of Labor and received a charter from the American Federation of Labor (AFoFL). In 1912 the Louisville Federation ceased to exist as an independent body and was fully assimilated into the AFoFL.

68 There were numerous labor newspapers during this time including the Labor Journal and Labor Record as well as the KIA. The KIA remained in publication as an ethnic newspaper for 72 years and was consistently pro-labor and a staunch supporter of the Democrat Party. A micro film copy of the KIA is available at the Louisville Archives.
Democrat Clubs of the city. Because of Hibernians such as Nelligan, Higgins, Barry and others, the Irish community consistently supported the Democratic Party, endorsed and funded candidates, and turned out the vote for every election.69

Less unified but more economically successful were the Germans who were, as always, divided by economic class and religion. By 1900 the Protestant Germans had assimilated into mainstream society and had moved from the old Butchertown neighborhood. The German elite had relocated to Glenview, Anchorage, and the Central Park area. It was this group which was key in the formation and continued success of the German Club of Louisville, the German Bank, the German Insurance Bank, and the German Savings Bank. Evidence of the successful assimilation of the elite Protestant Germans can be determined by an examination of the boards of directors of these financial institutions. Individuals such as Alfred Struck, Charles Bohmer, and Udoloho Snead were on

69 For additional information about the Irish, the KIA, and the AOH see "The Irish in Louisville" (1975) a thesis by Stanley Ousley. For information about Higgins and Typographical Union No. 10, see "Organized Labor in Louisville Kentucky 1889 - 1914" (1965) a dissertation by Cloyd Herbert Finch, and the Typographical Union No. 10 minutes. Information regarding the AOH may also be obtained from the KIA and the minutes books of the AOH. The AOH minutes and other relevant documents are maintained at Louisville's Hibernian Hall.

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the German boards but also on the board of larger non-ethnic financial institutions as well.

Additionally, many members of the German elite had been accepted into the most exclusive clubs in Louisville. For example, membership in the Pendennis Club was the pinnacle of elite status in Louisville. When the membership list of the German Club and Pendennis Club were cross-referenced, it was obvious German ethnicity was not a restriction in obtaining elite status: fifty percent of the members of the German Club were also members of the Pendennis Club.

The German middle class was also experiencing a heightened level of assimilation and social mobility and those with sufficient economic resources began moving to the new suburbs of Parkland and the Highlands as those neighborhoods were opened.\textsuperscript{70} It is highly probable the existence of German financial institutions facilitated this middle class transition by making bank loans and mortgages available to members of the German community. Ethnic financial institutions of this nature provided the Germans with a resource which the city's other minority groups lacked.

\textsuperscript{70} There are many reliable ways to track residential mobility. For this analysis, city directories and organizational membership lists were utilized.
Elite and middle class Germans alike were also beginning to join the Masons, Elks, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, and the American Legion in increasing numbers. These organizations may have provided a limited degree of ethnic cohesion but they also simultaneously facilitated a general level of assimilation. For the elite and middle class Germans, social class had become a more critical factor than ethnicity.

This was not the case with the working class who were still largely Catholic and continued to live in the traditional German neighborhoods. However, unlike the Irish there was no city-wide vehicle of German working class solidarity. The German working class had no organization comparable to the AOH, nor were there demonstrations such as the St. Patrick's Day parade. As a

71 There were two American Legion Posts in Louisville during the 1920s: Jefferson Post #15 (JP15) and the Zachary Taylor Post (ZTP). There were also at least 21 white Masonic Lodges in existence. Any code beginning with the letters ML generally denotes a Masonic Lodge while subsequent letters point to the precise lodge and number. For the complete name and number of the Masonic Lodges, the reader should consult the list of abbreviations contained within this work.

72 Information on the Masonic Lodges may be obtained from the Filson Historical Club. The minute books for the ODD have been preserved and are located in the manuscript and special collection section of the Filson Club. Information regarding the Elks is available in the special collections of the Louisville Free Public Library.
result the German working class was far less unified than the Irish and prone to internal factional battles. The nature of the limited working class organizations which did exist fostered division as much as contributing to ethnic working class unity.

The Germans were active in the emerging labor unions but preferred establishing ethnic-specific unions, like the Typographical Union No. 10 and the German Typographical Union No. 12, rather than joining city-wide locals. There were also German tailor, butcher, bricklayer, and musician unions as well as other ethnic-specific craft unions. The existence of these unions frequently undermined the strength of labor because they were in direct competition with their non-ethnic counterparts.\(^7\)

Additionally, the German working class lacked a unified, published voice. The Anzeiger remained in publication but it had only limited success as a unifying force given the pre-existing divisions within the German community. While the KIA was endorsing political candidates and promoting labor issues, The Anzeiger concentrated on publicizing German-owned businesses and

\(^7\) Apparently, the Irish did not establish ethnic-based unions and were therefore more influential within the Louisville Federation of Labor.
international news of interest to the entire German community regardless of social class. The stinging political edge of the "forty-eighters" was no longer evident in the pages of The Anzeiger.

Politics was also a source of division within the German community. The working class generally remained loyal to the Democrats but the middle and elite classes were split between the two major parties. Consequently, the Germans could not deliver a unified block of votes to either party, a fact which ultimately weakened their political influence. The Germans out numbered the Irish two to one but the unified Irish had far more influence within the political machine and ultimately the patronage system of urban government.

The Jewish community was also undergoing a profound change during this same period. The older established German Jewish population was generally economically successful and most of them had gained at least middle class status. The Jewish middle class joined economic organizations such as the Young Business Men's League, the Rotary Club, and the Optimist Club. The middle class were also active in the American Legion and Jewish

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74 A microfilm copy of most issues of The Anzeiger is available at the Louisville Archives at the University of Louisville.
membership dominated Masonic Lodge number 239, the St. George Lodge.\textsuperscript{75} Some of the German Jewish families such as the Bernheims, Brandeis' and Levys had an economic elite status and were an intricate part of Louisville's financial community. However, very few of the Jewish elite were members of the Pendennis Club and the almost equally exclusive Louisville Country Club.\textsuperscript{76}

Nevertheless, the Jewish population was generally socially discriminated against and excluded from the social clubs of the city. They responded to this situation by creating their own organizations to fill the needs of the community. The Standard Country Club was opened in 1883 and the Young Men's Hebrew Association (YMHA) was founded in 1890. By 1900 these organizations were the center of Jewish social life within the city.

The Jewish population also began increasing in the 1880s as a result of a second wave of Jewish immigration. These immigrants came from Eastern Europe, spoke Yiddish, and were Orthodox in their religious beliefs. The Eastern

\textsuperscript{75} The Jewish membership of the St. George Lodge would be a very interesting study and could possibly reveal much about the Jewish community at this time.

\textsuperscript{76} During the years of analysis only two Jewish individuals gained access to the PEN and three to the CC. Additionally, four of the five individuals did not gain acceptance until the second period of analysis between 1916 and 1933.
European immigrants were less well educated than their predecessors and entered the ranks of the working class, became street vendors, or opened small retail shops and restaurants. The new immigrants established a highly cohesive and self-contained community around Preston Street and opened four new Orthodox synagogues between 1882 and 1905.

Since the older Germans were Reform Jews, the differences in religion, language, and class status initially created a degree of tension between the German and Eastern European Jews. However, despite the considerable differences between the Reform and Orthodox communities, the YMHA opened an immigrant school and began offering classes in English, history, political science, bookkeeping, and "Americanization." The YMHA also built a gymnasium and established an athletic club which sponsored six basketball teams comprised of reform and orthodox players. The YMHA also founded a Yiddish Literary Club which was opened to Reform and Orthodox participation.

The YMHA published the Twice-A-Month which covered issues of general interests to the entire community and featured articles and editorials devoted to Jewish repression throughout the United States and Europe. The Twice-A-Month denounced segregation, racial
discrimination, and Jim Crow legislation as well. Nevertheless, the editorial policy of the paper was opposed to the formation of political clubs and organized political activity. "No church has a right to employ its sacred prestige to the end that votes may be influenced or offices obtained," stated an October 15, 1901 editorial.77

Regardless of the editorial policy of the Twice-A-Month, a few members of the Jewish community did play an active role in local politics. The most notable of this group was Aaron Kohn who was a prominent figure in the Democrat political machine. Also during the years of analysis, four alderman (ALD) and six councilmen (COL) were identified as Jewish. Leadership within the parties was however unevenly divided between Democrats and Republicans with the majority of politically active favoring the GOP. The MOS contained only three Jewish members and no Jews were on the Democrat Party's Executive Committee. The Republican Executive Committee on the other hand had four Jewish members and eight members of the community-held positions of leadership

77 The Twice-A-Month October 15, 1901 p. 11. The Twice-A-Month contained numerous editorials of this nature. In this respect the editorial policy of the newsletter is consistent with the analysis of Glazer and Moynihan (1970), regarding Jewish attitudes pertaining to the separation of church and state.

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within the Republican Party. 78

Despite the various divisions which existed, the YMHA was extremely successful in uniting the Jewish community. Eventually, many of the differences between the German and Eastern European wings of the Jewish population subsided and by the early 20th Century there was essentially one Jewish community containing two versions of Judaism. The Jewish population was also internally less segregated by economic class than the German community. Since they were generally excluded from the social clubs of the city, their own organizations were open to all Jews regardless of class or occupation. The YMHA and Standard Club included tailors, bricklayers, and plasterers as well as doctors, lawyers, and bank executives. Ironically, religion, politics, and social class drove a wedge between the Germans while ethnicity overcame the same difficulties and eventually united the

78 Once again this represents only a small percentage of the total population and it would be difficult to determine the voting pattern of the community. Nevertheless, this sample probably reflects the political sentiments of the community. Additional support for this conclusion was found by examining the membership list of the Louisville Federation of Labor. The organized working class were overwhelmingly Democrats, but only three members of the Federation were identified as Jewish. The Jewish working class were probably unorganized Eastern European immigrants and there is no accurate way to speculate about their political preferences.

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Jewish population.  

During the late 19th and early 20th Centuries significant changes were taking place within the African American community as well. Geographically, the population still lived primarily in the affluent and middle class Russell area, the working class areas of Smoketown and California, and the shanties and slums of "Little Africa." After 1905 the population also began expanding into Limerick. The L&N railroad moved its jobs shops to the Highland Park area in that year and many of the Irish laborers began relocating closer to the new rail yard. This created an opportunity for the African American working classes to purchase the moderately priced cottages formerly occupied by the Irish and by 1920, Limerick was a racially-mixed community.

The racial transformation of Limerick seriously impacted both the Irish and African American Communities in ways which could not have been anticipated when it began in 1905. The dispersal of the Irish from their

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79 For additional information regarding the Jewish community, see Adath Louisville: The Story of a Jewish Community (1981) by Herman Landau; see also the Herman Landau papers contained in the Louisville Archive. Another very useful work is A History of the Jews of Louisville, Kentucky (1911) published by the Jewish Historical Society. The records and minute books of the YMHA as well as many issues of Twice-A-Month and its successor, the Chronicler, may be obtained from the Louisville Archive.
largest enclave apparently weakened the community. The last St. Patrick's Day parade in Louisville took place in 1918. At the same time the concentration of African Americans in a new area resulted in the creation of an elevated level of organization for that community.

Louisville had an African American middle class and a small economic elite during this period. The middle class was comprised primarily of entrepreneurs and small businessmen who were members of the National Negro Business League (NNBL). The NNBL was founded in 1900 by Booker T. Washington as a vehicle through which African American owned companies could be promoted. In 1909 the NNBL held its annual convention in Louisville and 70 local entrepreneurs and businessmen participated.

The members of the Louisville chapter of the NNBL were generally self-employed in service oriented occupations such as barbers, shoemakers, tailors, liverymen, cabinetmakers, blacksmiths, and hauling and freight.80 These were small operations and susceptible to

80 "Official Souvenir Program of the National Negro Business League, Louisville, KY. August 18, 19 and 20, 1909." One unique aspect of the NNBL was that it had a Women's Auxiliary, the only African American organization with a women's group. In every other researched African American organization, women were listed under their own name and held equal status with their male counterparts.
failure during times of economic recession which were then relatively common. Further, many of the African American owned businesses could not compete in an age of mass production. As the 20th century progressed, industrial production began putting the cabinetmakers, tailors, and shoemakers out of business while the automobile spelled disaster for livery stables, blacksmiths, and anyone engaged in hauling and freight without sufficient capital to buy a truck. Funding for expansion and modernization was generally unavailable since the white-controlled banks rarely loaned capital to African American businesses.

Prior to 1915, the only place where African Americans could realistically get capital and insurance was from the benevolent and fraternal organizations such as the United Brother of Friendship, Odd Fellows, and Knights of Pythias. The lack of available capital hindered the progress of the African American middle class and ten years after the NNBL Louisville convention, only a few of the entrepreneurs who participated were still in business and there were only nine Louisville members in the NNBL by 1924. \(^{81}\)

[^81]: This conclusion was reached by cross referencing the membership list of the NNBL with the 1919 city directory. See also the "Minutes of the Silver Jubilee and Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the National Negro..."

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As the NNBL and the small operations which were its mainstay declined, larger and better financed enterprises began to develop. A generational shift was taking place as a younger generation matured and began assuming positions of leadership. This generation was better educated than their parents and largely responsible for many new capital ventures. The first step in this direction occurred in 1912 when William Warley began publication of the *Louisville News*. Warley, who held a law degree from State University, encouraged patronage of African American owned companies and denounced the Republican Party for supporting segregationist policies. The *Louisville News* was an outspoken advocate of civil rights and the first sustained African American newspaper

Business League, Chicago, Aug. 20, 21, 22, 1924." The published minutes of this convention included the membership and city of residence for the entire organization. The decline of African American entrepreneurs in Louisville is consistent with the findings of DuBois' in *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899).

State University, later renamed Simmons University, was founded in 1869 by the General Association of Colored Baptists of Kentucky. Many of the historical papers of Simmons University (which still exists in Louisville) may be obtained from the Louisville Archive. For information regarding State University, see "A Century of Negro Education in Louisville, Kentucky" (1941) by George D. Wilson.
in the city.\textsuperscript{83}

The \textit{Louisville News} was joined by the \textit{Louisville Leader} which began publication under the direction of I. Willis Cole in 1917. Cole, a native of Memphis and graduate of LeMoyne Junior College, became one of Louisville's most prominent civil rights activists and also denounced blind allegiance to the Republican Party. Warley and Cole understood the potential strength of the African American vote if it were utilized as a bargaining tool. The two journalists continually promoted the concept of political independence in the editorial pages of their papers. The \textit{Leader} and \textit{Louisville News} provided a counterpoint to the editorial position of the larger newspapers of the city and helped galvanize the African American community on civil rights issues.

A financial counterpoint to the elite controlled banks and insurance companies was also established during this period. Mammoth Life and Accident Insurance (MLAI) was chartered in 1915 and was the first African American endeavor of its kind in Kentucky. Founded by W.H. Wright,  

\textsuperscript{83} Louisville's first African American owned newspaper was the short-lived \textit{Weekly Planet} founded in 1874. No copies of this paper have survived and little is known about the editorial policy of the paper. After the \textit{Planet} failed there were other attempts to establish a newspaper for the community but these all quickly failed as well. Unfortunately only a very few editions of the \textit{Louisville News} have survived.
H.E. Hall, Rochelle Smith and B.O. Wilkerson, Mammoth Life became a stock company in 1924 and sold two hundred thousand dollars worth of stock in 90 days. The MLAI was followed in 1920 by Domestic Life and Accident (DLA) which had one hundred thousand dollars in capital and included Charles H. Parrish, A.E. Meyzeek, W.W. Spalding, James Hathaway and W.H Witherspoon among its Board of Directors. Parrish and Meyzeek were two of Louisville's most esteemed educators and civil rights proponents. The greatest financial boost for the community came in 1921 when the First Standard Bank (FSB) opened for business. Founded by Wilson Lovett, Parrish, Meyzeek, Spalding, Witherspoon, Hathaway and others, First Standard had $375,000 in deposits, $500,000 in total assets and had loaned $300,000 to the community by the mid-1920s.

With the opening of these financial institutions, African Americans were for the first time able to get insurance and bank loans at a reasonable cost. Consequently, the 1920s were the golden years of African American business in Louisville. With available and affordable financial backing, the community soon had two additional insurance companies, two building and loan associations, three movie theaters, six real estate companies, and several new pharmacies, hotels, and
grocery stores. Additionally, the community also had a published voice and a centralized source of reliable information in the newspapers of Warley and Cole.

Despite the relative success of some African American businesses, the community as a whole was struggling to survive the restrictions of mounting racism. When Jim Crow legislation swept the nation, Henry Watterson and the *Courier Journal* became Louisville's most outspoken proponent of segregation. Watterson consistently promoted white supremacy and called for disenfranchisement of African American voters. As a leader of the Democrats, Watterson realized disenfranchisement would ultimately weaken the strength

84 The Golden age of African American business did not last long. The financial organizations did not survive the Depression, and when they failed many of the smaller enterprises were unable to secure alternative capital and eventually failed as well. For general information regarding African American business during this period, see Yater and Wright. Some records and a wealth of general information regarding these financial institutions is available at the Louisville Archive. The Archive also has the personal papers of Charles H. Parrish and A.E. Meyzeek which are a very useful source of information regarding the African American community. An absolutely invaluable source is the *Louisville Leader*, the only surviving African American newspaper from Louisville during this period. The Leader covered the economic, social, and political activity of the community in depth and is to this day the most comprehensive and definitive primary source regarding the community. Micro film copies of the *Louisville Leader* are available at the Louisville Archive.
Louisville's African American population retained the vote but witnessed the continual erosion of liberties as segregation became more deeply entrenched in the city. In the postbellum period all of Louisville's theaters, restaurants, amusement parks, private hospitals, and city parks were quickly segregated.

Louisville's street cars were also segregated but with qualifications. Traditionally, African American women were allowed to ride inside the cars while the men had to stand on the exterior platforms. In 1870 the African American community challenged this restriction and took the issue to court. Judge Bland Ballard ruled that any individual who paid their fare was eligible for interior seating. The companies complied with the ruling but designated the back of the cars as African American seating.

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85 In an October 27, 1908 editorial, "The Negro and His Vote," Secton 1, p. 4, Watterson explained how the African American vote damaged both the Democrat Party and the African American community. "Every time therefore, that a black man votes a Republican ticket," stated Watterson, "he puts a cudgel in the hands of a mean white man to lay upon the entire negro race."

86 Judge Bland Ballard was the son of Bland Ballard who had settled in the Louisville area during the 1790s.

87 Since Kentucky never succeeded from the Union it was not compelled to ratify the 13th and 14th amendments after the Civil War nor was it under a military rule and
This was the pattern that emerged in Louisville during the last decades of the 19th century. Organized and vocal segregationists continued to push for racial exclusion while the African American community fought and generally lost the battle.

This pattern would continue into the 20th century but by that time the African American community was becoming better organized. The church, fraternal organizations, and businesses such as the MLAI and FSB all functioned as staging grounds from which effective leadership emerged: a leadership with political experience, the financial resources to press their agenda, and a platform from which to publish their viewpoints. Once organized the community began to press for equality and managed to win a few concessions and victories.88

compelled to comply with the provisions of Reconstruction. Consequently, segregation emerged in Louisville at a very early date. For more information about segregation in general and the successful protest and legal case involving Louisville's street cars, see Johnston (1896) and "An Early Instance of Nonviolence: The Louisville Demonstrations of 1870-1871 (1966) by Marjorie M. Norris.

88 For additional information about these aspects of the African American community, see Yater, Wright, and Weeden. For a good general discussion regarding the significance and influence of fraternal organizations during the period, see "Negro Secret Societies" (1944) by Edward Nelson Palmer.
One of the first concessions came in 1914 from the white theater owners of the city. Traditionally, African Americans had been required to enter theaters through the back door and sit in the balcony. William Warley wrote editorials denouncing the practice and organized a boycott. To insure solidarity within the ranks, Warley published the name of anyone who continued to patronize the theaters after the boycott was called. Warley's tactics proved effective and after several months the theater owners were ready to negotiate a settlement. From that point forward African Americans could enter through the front door but balcony seating was still retained. Another significant victory came in 1918 and also involved the theaters of the city. The African American community applied sufficient pressure to have "Birth of a Nation" removed from the theaters after only two days.

89 Finch points out the women of the African American Musicians Union had the contract to play piano during silent movies. However, it is unknown if the Musicians Union and organized labor supported the boycott. This is an interesting topic involving race, gender, and labor and merits additional research.

90 See Wright for full details of these events. Wright maintains that Louisville was only one of eight cities where "Birth of A Nation" was pulled from the theaters. Since D.W. Griffith was a native of Kentucky and had worked in Louisville as a young man, this represented a major victory for the African American community.
The greatest and most far reaching victory of the community centered around the issue of residential segregation. As Irish laborers moved from Limerick, that area was shifting to a mixed race neighborhood which alarmed many white residents of the city. In response to the situation the Board of Aldermen and City Council unanimously passed the Residential Segregation Ordinance which was designed to stop the influx of African Americans into predominately white neighborhoods. The ordinance was signed into law on May 11, 1914 by Mayor John D. Buschemeyer.

Passage of the Residential Segregation Ordinance galvanized the community and prompted Charles H. Parrish, A.E. Meyzeek, William Warley, and William Stewart to establish a local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for the expressed purpose of defeating the new law. The NAACP challenged the ordinance and eventually took the case to the United States Supreme Court. In an unanimous decision in November of 1917, the Court declared the law unconstitutional. This was one of the first major decisions for the newest member of the Court, Associate
Justice Louis D. Brandeis of Louisville. After the Louisville victory the national NAACP cited the case as precedent when challenging residential segregation in other cities.

In terms of major civil rights issues, the African American community consistently formed a unified coalition. Nevertheless, there were philosophical divisions within the community that generally broke along generational lines. The senior generation, which included leaders like Parrish, Meyzeek, and Stewart, supported the Republican Party and believed in the concepts expressed by Booker T. Washington. Consequently, this group was most active in organizations such as the Louisville Urban League (LUL) and the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC). In these interracial organizations they came into contact and formed working relationships with the white economic elite of the city. They were also

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91 Brandeis had been nominated to the Supreme Court the previous year by Woodrow Wilson and confirmed after a long and difficult battle which centered around Brandeis' ethnicity.

92 See History of Louisville Segregation Case and the Decision of the Supreme Court (1918) by Charles Parrish, Albert E. Meyzeek, and J.B. Colbert for the most detailed discussion of this case. Secondary accounts may be obtained from Yater and Wright. The newspapers are also a useful source of information. The Courier Journal and the Louisville Herald both covered the case in a surprisingly neutral fashion. The Louisville Times and Evening Post covered the story but supported the ordinance.
dependent upon white support for these and other interracial organizations like the Kentucky Home Society for Colored Children and the Booker T. Washington Community Center.

The younger generation was more closely aligned with the concepts of W. E. B. DuBois and identified with the NAACP, which in Louisville was a strictly African American organization at the time. This group was also politically oriented and extremely critical of the Republican Party. They maintained the Republicans took African American votes for granted while simultaneously supporting segregationist policies. In a page one June 4, 1921 Louisville Leader editorial, I. Willis Cole blasted the Republican administration then in office and stated:

No group of people ever gave more unanswering loyalty to a party than the colored of Louisville gave to the last administration. And what has been their reward - Empty promises - high sounding and meaningless phrases and one or two insignificant positions given as a sop for the vote of twenty-thousand men and women.

On September 1st, William Warley sent a letter to the Republican leadership and predicted:

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93 Charles H. Parrish and William Stewart both resigned from the NAACP in 1920 after a bitter leadership battle. From that time on the NAACP was under the control of the younger generation and Parrish and Stewart devoted their energy and experience to the more conservative Commission on Interracial Cooperation. Parrish was the oldest African American leader in Louisville and the only one born into slavery.
There will be an open revolt against the party this fall on the part of the thoughtful element of the Colored people. The non-appointment of Colored men to office in any fair proportion to their vote and loyalty; the installation of "jim Crow" signs ... all have left a bad taste in the mouth of a thoughtful progressive Colored people.94

The Independent Lincoln Party (ILP) was hastily formed and supported by the Leader, News, the financial organizations and the NAACP. The new political party ran a full slate of African American candidates in the November, 1921 election but when the ballot boxes were opened and the votes counted, the ILP was awarded only 274 votes. The loss came as no surprise to the ILP candidates and the NAACP maintained ten times that number had been cast into the river. Chesley Searcy, boss of the Republican Party, later admitted the Republicans spent $200,000 to minimize the ILP vote.95

Although short-lived, the ILP proved its point and the African American vote was never again blindly cast for the Republican Party nor was it taken for granted. In the future both parties actively campaigned for the

94 Cole published Warley's letter in the Leader on September 3, 1921 p.1. The fact that Cole published Warley's letter was not unusual. Despite being publishing rivals, Cole and Warley worked together on many occasions and Cole frequently reprinted Louisville News editorials in his own paper.

95 Yater.
African American vote and a few additional patronage positions were awarded to the community. The newly-elected Republican administration of Mayor Huston Quin began hiring African Americans to fill clerical and white collar positions in City Hall for the first time. Additionally, the city employed four African Americans as policemen and assigned them to the African American neighborhoods. A new fire station at Thirteenth and Broadway was also constructed and manned by the city's first African American firemen. The community also received its own segregated park which like the other parks of Louisville was named after a Native American tribe.\textsuperscript{96}  

Individually these were small concessions but collectively they represented a relative improvement for the community. More significantly they demonstrated the organizational capability of the community. The formation of the NAACP and the ILP marked a dividing line between the paternalistic patterns of the past and a new direction for civil rights in Louisville.  

\textsuperscript{96} The best source of information about the ILP and the political activity of the African American community is the \textit{Louisville Leader}. Cole was instrumental in the formation of the party and its candidate for State Senator.
Organized labor developed very slowly in Louisville but by the turn of the 20th century it had critical significance for the working class as they looked to their unions for protection, organizational structure, and economic mobility. However, it took labor a long time to reach that stage and once realized, organized labor was crushed by the capitalist class of the city.

In antebellum Louisville the existence of slavery and a tightly controlled free African American work force functioned to weaken the organizational strength of wage earners. Still, by 1832, the city's printers, tailors, shoemakers, coach makers, saddlers, cabinetmakers, and tinplate workers had established labor associations. These were primarily benevolent associations but they functioned to a limited degree as bargaining agents for their members. In 1832, the tailor's association called the first recorded strike in Louisville, but very little is known about the causes, duration and eventual outcome of that action.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Yater, and Johnston (1896) present some information regarding the formation of labor associations in Louisville during this period. However, this is a topic which has not been adequately researched. Currently the best source of information regarding Louisville's early labor associations is the *Louisville City Directory*
Louisville's first true unions in the modern sense of the term were the Typographical Association and the Iron Molders Association, both of which were established in the late 1830s. These organizations successfully negotiated wages, benefits, and working conditions for their members and became relatively influential at the national level. In December of 1850, George E. Green, James L. Gibbons, and Raymond Lynch of the Louisville Typographical Association journeyed to New York where they met with printers from across the nation and established an International. The following year in Baltimore, Greene was elected president of the National Typographical Union.

Despite the existence of these organizations and a few others, labor activity was rare in Louisville prior to the Civil War. Irish laborers working for the L&N Rail Road staged a walkout in 1855 in an effort to win a ten hour day but their action was quickly suppressed. That same year German stone cutters briefly struck in protest of the events of Bloody Monday but their action was short-lived and nonproductive as well. Neither the rail road workers or stone cutters appear to have been organized which explains in part their quick defeat.

which was published for the first time in 1832.

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More successful were the teachers who called an 1857 state-wide convention in Louisville to organize their own Association. The Kentucky Educational Association had some success winning improvements in wages before the Civil War temporarily ended negotiations. However, the formation of the organization ultimately had lasting consequences because it successfully standardized wages within school districts. This action significantly impacted the African American community and by the 1890s, education was one of the more lucrative fields opened to African Americans. The existence of segregated public schools, limited as they were, assured employment for African American educators who were paid the same wage as their white counterparts. The African American middle class became dominated by educators and the community drew much of its leadership from the ranks of educators during the early 20th century.98

Another significant event took place in Louisville

98 For additional information, see Wright. It should also be noted the teachers maintained segregated organizations. The Kentucky Educational Association was the white organization while African American teachers were members of the Kentucky Negro Education Association (KNEA) which was established in 1877. Nevertheless, pay equity was maintained between the two organizations. For additional information regarding the KNEA, see the records and convention minutes of the KNEA which are located in the Kentucky State University Archives. The Louisville members of the KNEA have been included in the Louisville data.
when Robert Gilchrist of the Molders Association called for a National Federation of Labor. Gilchrist invited delegates from all the trades throughout the United States and Canada to meet in Louisville on September 21, 1864. The International Industrial Assembly of North America was formed at this convention and a constitution drafted. The constitution included language regarding economic reform and a commitment to economically support striking workers. However, the most critical aspect of the organization rested with its political and social agenda.

Delegates to the Industrial Assembly discussed establishing a Labor Party and the possibility of running a slate of candidates for public office. The convention also ratified resolutions promoting legislation which outlawed "company stores," but favored the creation of labor-supported markets. Another resolution demanded the elimination of prison labor which reduced the wage rate and unfairly competed with union labor. A resolution was also passed which advocated the creation of a Federal Department of Labor which would be supervised by workers from organized unions. 99

99 A detailed account of the International Industrial Assembly of North America may be found in Foner (1972) Vol. I.
Although the Louisville-based Industrial Assembly did not meet these goals it was significant for a variety of reasons including demonstrating the growing power and organizational capability of Louisville's workingmen. This was also the first attempt to establish a national labor organization and its constitution and resolutions expressed many of the critical problems facing labor. Furthermore, for the first time Louisville laborers ventured into politics in an organized fashion and called for social reforms. Granted, these efforts were modest in nature but they paved the way for the emergence of the more aggressive political and social reform agendas of subsequent organizations. The International Industrial Assembly of North America was the foundation upon which the far more radical and Marxist-orientated National Labor Union was built in 1867.100

Another national labor organization which was very active in Louisville was the Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor. Founded in Philadelphia in 1869, the Knights quickly gained support in Louisville and at the height of their strength had 36 labor assemblies and 23 craft unions in the city. The Knights established a

100 Officers of the National Labor Union were influenced by The Communist Manifesto and corresponded with Karl Marx. Foner provides a very good account of the National Labor Union and its political ideology.
Workingmen's Party which in 1877 elected five members to the Kentucky state legislature. This was the high point of Knight activity in Louisville and the specter of unionists in the legislature resulted in a concerted effort to undermine the Knights' credibility. Beginning in the early 1880s, The Courier Journal and Louisville Evening Post began running negative articles about the radical ideology of the Knights of Labor. So successful was the smear campaign that red flags were banned from Louisville's 1886 May Day parade. By 1890 there were only a handful of Knight Assemblies left in Louisville.101

Perhaps the one event which challenged the capitalist class more than any other during the late 19th century also involved the laborers of Louisville. During the 1870s there was a flurry of organizational activity which was led by the rail road workers. Chapters of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railway Conductors were both established in Louisville. These were complacent fraternal organizations that were not considered a major threat by

101 The best source of information regarding the Knights of Labor in Louisville is the local newspapers but these accounts must be read with a degree of caution. After the Chicago Haymarket Riots, the local press condemned the organization and this event marked the beginning of the end for the Knights, both in Louisville and nationally.
the rail roads, consequently they were largely ignored by the tycoons of the L&N.

When a series of recessions gripped the nation during the 1870s, the rail roads rapidly slashed wages and as expected, received nothing more than hollow protest from the Brotherhoods. The rail road workmen on the other hand were not complacent and demanded more aggressive action from their unions. When the established organizations proved unable to meet the challenge, workers formed the rival and militant Trainmen's Union and called the first national rail road strike in 1877. The strike started at Camden Junction just outside of Baltimore and spread along the national lines reaching Louisville by way of the L&N line. In Louisville the strike spilled out of the rail yard and greatly expanded when construction and industrial workers throughout the city spontaneously joined the strike. When African American ditch diggers laying the city's new water lines walked off the job, the insurrection was complete and a citywide general strike began. The high point of the strike occurred during the week of July 24, when 2000

For information on the formation of the Trainmen's Union, the national strike, and the ramifications of that strike at the national level, the reader should consult *Strike* (1972) by Jeremy Brecher, and Foner. Both authors provide detailed accounts of these events.

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workers roamed the streets, broke street lights, shattered windows in elite neighborhoods, and eventually sacked the L&N depot.

The Louisville general strike ended when Louis D. Brandeis organized the economic elite into a well-armed, 700-man vigilante squad that patrolled the city and suppressed the strikers. In other parts of the nation the strike was shattered when the military reopened the lines and manned the trains. After rail traffic was resumed the strike quickly ended, the Trainmen's Union was crushed and its leaders were blacklisted. Nevertheless, the image of angry workers roaming through the elite neighborhoods of Louisville no doubt had a chilling effect upon the capitalist class. It is probably not a coincidence that the prestigious rural areas of Glenview, Prospect, Anchorage and Peewee Valley began attracting the elite in increasing numbers after the 1877 general strike.

Labor organizations such as the National Labor Union, Knights of Labor, and the militant Trainmen's Union outraged the capitalist class and convinced them of

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103 An account of the 1877 general strike in Louisville may be obtained from Yater and Johnson, as well as the local newspapers. The *Louisville Evening Post* in particular covered labor events. Brecher and Foner also discuss the Louisville situation to some degree. Additionally, the L&N records contain some limited information regarding the strike and may be found at the Louisville Archive.
the necessity of breaking the unions. Labor control became a plank in the platform of virtually every political reform movement which swept through the nation’s cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, before the reform movements could be launched, labor reorganized along craft lines and temporarily gained the advantage.

Craft unions by their very nature were less difficult to establish and maintain than the occupationally diverse industrial unions. At the national level the loosely configured American Federation of Labor was established in 1886, while in Louisville the Central Labor Union was formed around the same time. The Central Labor Union which was renamed the Louisville Federation of Labor (LFL) in 1902, was an early attempt to unify the various crafts and coordinate union activity in the city.

The craft unions dominated necessary phases of production which provided workers with considerable power and control over production. As a result, highly skilled crafts such as the carpenters, printers, plasterers, and bricklayers demonstrated a degree of internal solidarity and quickly became an influential force within Louisville. Furthermore, by utilizing sympathy strikes and recognizing boycotts, the more powerful unions could enhance the bargaining position of the less skilled and
weaker unions. Semi-skilled unions such as the Brickyard Worker and Hod Carriers could easily be defeated, but the skilled crafts were indispensable to construction and their support virtually assured a union victory. Likewise, withholding support would be extremely damaging for the weaker unions. This situation provided the skilled crafts with an extremely high degree of power and control within the LFL.

Beginning in the 1890s, the craft unions successfully established many closed shops and started negotiating improved wages, benefits, and in some cases working conditions for their members. The standardized negotiated wage rate became common place in construction and many industries after the craft unions were organized. The unions enjoyed other successes during this time as well. The first major victory occurred in May 1890 when over 1000 of the city's estimated 1,400 carpenters struck for a shorter workday. After a 24-day strike the carpenters won an eight hour contract.\textsuperscript{104} The railroad workers also gained a first when they won overtime pay of 18 cents an hour after a strike, and the

\textsuperscript{104} The Carpenters were the only union strong enough to win the eight hour day during this period. The best source of information regarding the Carpenters strike is the \textit{Louisville Evening Post} which covered the event in considerable detail.
Laundry Girls union struck and won profit sharing.\textsuperscript{105}

The unions were critical to the working class and provided a variety of necessary services to the membership. In addition to negotiating wages and benefits, the unions also functioned as employment agencies and maintained benefit committee which assisted sick and injured members. The unions offered life insurance to the membership at an affordable price which was a major aid to the working class. Additionally, they provided an organizational structure and an avenue of occupational networking for membership. The unions also functioned as social outlets by sponsoring picnics, dances, and sporting events, all of which brought members together and helped create a limited degree of class solidarity. And, there was a viable labor press in Louisville which informed the working class of the conditions and progress of labor in their city and throughout the nation.

Unfortunately, working class solidarity was a fragile and frequently shattered phenomenon. The Central Labor Union and its successor the LFL were all too often

\textsuperscript{105} The overtime strike took place from July 8 to July 20, 1890. This strike was covered in depth by both the \textit{Courier Journal} and the \textit{Louisville Evening Post}. News article regarding the Laundry Girls and profit sharing appeared in the \textit{Courier Journal} and this case was discussed by Finch as well.

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racked with internal divisions and jurisdictional battles. Many trades had locals that were based on ethnicity, gender and race and were essentially in competition with each other for the same work.\textsuperscript{106} As a result, the various locals and their internal battles were frequently a hindrance to the potential strength of organized labor.

In addition to the ethnic German locals which existed, there was an African American Musicians union, the Colored Waiters' and Cooks Alliance, Coopers Union, Hod Carriers, Hackmen's, Coachmen, Brickyard Worker, Brick Layer, Warehousemen and Teamster unions. As a result of the negotiated wage rate, organized African American workers were paid the same rate as white labor, if and when their unions won the contracts. At the same

\textsuperscript{106} The LFL minute books document many of the internal divisions which existed within labor and are an invaluable source of information. However, dual locals within the LFL were only part of the problem. The situation was further complicated by the continued existence of the Knights of Labor which maintained a few assemblies in Louisville well into the 20th century. The Knights also maintained both mixed assemblies and trade specific assemblies. The mixed assemblies were open to all regardless of race, gender, or craft. The trade assemblies on the other hand were segregated by trade as well as gender and race. Also, many individuals maintained dual membership in the LFL locals and the Knight's assemblies. For additional information regarding this topic see Finch (1965) who discusses the dual unions and provides the names of many individuals who had both LFL and Knights membership.
time some locals like the Tobacco Workers and the Laundry Girls union were racially integrated and African Americans held positions of leadership within them. The most notable African American labor leader in Louisville was Thomas N. Williams who was elected International Vice-President of the Tobacco Workers during their 1900 Detroit convention. African American workers were however excluded from the more lucrative unions such as the Carpenters, Butchers, and clerical unions.

The LFL consisted of representatives from each participating local and the organization's executive board was elected by the delegates. Technically, it was an integrated organization and the African American unions had full partnership status within the Federation. The LFL also had no formal racial or gender qualifications regarding eligibility for office. Nevertheless, African American workers were however excluded from the more lucrative unions such as the Carpenters, Butchers, and clerical unions.

See Finch and LFL minute books. It is impossible to determine how many of the African American working class were members of organized labor during the period of analysis but it was probably a significant percentage. Even though the LFL minutes have survived, they do not identify individuals by race. Also, the minutes of only four individual locals have survived from this period. Without the records it is impossible to obtain a membership list which could be cross referenced with the city directories to determine the racial composition of the organized working class.

See Finch and Wright for more detailed information. The German Butchers union was one of the older and more powerful craft unions in the city and never affiliated with the LFL.
Americans were concentrated in the weaker dependent unions and a minority within the labor force. As a result, African Americans influence was negligible and LFL elections resulted in white officers. The racial composition of the LFL executive board negatively impacted the influence of the organized African American working class and undermined their success.

An incident which occurred in 1886 clearly demonstrates the weakened position of the African American unions. The Bricklayers union had a contract for construction of a new building and subcontracted part of the work to the Hod Carriers union. As the job was in progress, the Hod Carriers attempted to negotiate their contract and increase wages 25 cents per day. The Bricklayers refused to grant the increase, broke the contract, and hired replacement workers.\textsuperscript{109}

The LFL may have been an integrated organization but the status of its African American unions were definitely not equal. Additionally, the annual LFL-sponsored Labor Day parade and picnic, as well as other social events were always segregated. In the Labor Day parade African American workers marched in unison and held a separate post-parade picnic in a different location than white workers.

\textsuperscript{109} Details of this event were reported in the \textit{Courier-Journal} between July 30 and August 5, 1886.
unionists. Despite the substantial success of the unions, the working class of Louisville was seriously split along ethnic and racial lines.\textsuperscript{110}

Labor was politically split as well with the membership vote generally following ethnic and racial voting patterns. There were however some significant political victories for labor during this period. Humphrey Knecht of the German Typographical Union ran a successful campaign in 1897, and became the first known union member elected to the Board of Aldermen. The unions also began endorsing candidates and at the state level and pro-labor senators and representatives began introducing reform legislation which was backed by labor. During the 1890s, William Goebel of Kenton County introduced legislation promoting work place safety and restrictions on child labor. At the same time Representative John Bartman of Louisville introduced a bill limiting the workday to eight hours.

Bartman's eight hour day never passed but by the

\textsuperscript{110} There has been very little research conducted on the African American unions of the LFL. Finch, Wright, and Yater all touch upon the subject but do not go into great detail. Some additional information about the Louisville situation may be obtained from \textit{Organized Labor and the Black Workers 1619 - 1973} (1974) by Philip S. Foner. The best source of information about the Labor Day parades and segregated picnics is the \textit{Courier Journal} which covered the events in detail.
early 20th century the type of legislation promoted by William Goebel did make it into law. In 1902 the first state child labor laws were enacted and in 1904 compulsory education for children age seven through fourteen was established. Organized labor in Louisville had a vested interest in both of these issues and endorsed the candidates who supported them. Another political victory came in 1904 when the state legislature established a factory inspection system. After that date health and safety concerns uncovered by the inspectors began to be slowly addressed.

In spite of these victories there was an internal split within the unions regarding political activity. Many within the unions believed labor should be above politics and concentrate only on work-related issues. At the same time other labor leaders maintained that work and politics were definitely linked and the unions had an obligation to be politically active. The debate between the two opposing camps erupted in 1899 when James McGill of the Harness Makers union was running for re-election as president of the Central Labor Union. McGill was closely aligned with the Democratic Party’s political machine and that affiliation became a major campaign issue. McGill won a narrow victory after a bitter campaign and addressed the issue of political involvement
in his inaugural speech:

We are admonished by some and condemned by others for discussing social and economic questions. They say don't talk politics, it's wrong. I answer them by saying, if we don't talk politics, what in the name of God are we To talk about? Trusts and monopolies are daily being formed; the halls of Congress and Legislatures are being packed with the tools of capitalism; all laws are made in the interest of the rich against the poor; the working men are marching in party slavery to the polls, and yet we are told not to talk politics.

I am in favor of electing our own men to office, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, not as Populists, not as Socialists; for I have been educated in that Kangaroo school of political economy, and don't want to wait until the millennium shall come before we reach the goal of our hopes and aspirations, but on the ticket that guarantees recognition and representation, regardless of either party. When labor learns to elect their friends and defeat their enemies, then, and not until then, will their conditions change for the better.\textsuperscript{111}

The election of McGill resulted in a split within labor and the creation of the United Trades and Labor Assembly under the leadership of Edward Cronk. A printer by trade, Cronk already held dual membership in Typographical Union No. 10 and the Knights of Labor. Cronk was also an outspoken opponent of labor becoming involved in politics. The United Trades and Labor Assembly was designed to be an apolitical organization.

\textsuperscript{111} Quoted in the March 4, 1899 issue of the Kentucky Irish American.
The new Assembly attracted some members but was never a particularly large or influential organization. Nevertheless, the creation of the rival Assembly fractured and weakened labor at the same time labor was being externally challenged.

As the United Trades and Labor Assembly was being formed, the employers of the city were beginning to establish their own organization. The Louisville Employers' Association (LEA) was created in 1902 for the expressed purpose of breaking the unions. The Association adopted the Parry System of the National Association of Manufacturers which included promotion of the open shop, resistance to all union demands, and a commitment to actively break unions and black list union members.\footnote{\textsuperscript{112}} Thruston Ballard was president of the LEA and owner of Ballard and Ballard Flour Mill. The LFL labeled Ballard and Ballard the "arch enemies of organized labor" and "the most unfair manufacturing establishment in the

\footnote{\textsuperscript{112} It's possible the LEA was a semi-secret organization during the early years of its existence. The LFL minutes make reference to it but only three articles about the Association were listed in the \textit{Courier Journal} index. Even the usually plain spoken and direct KIA made only veiled references to LEA. In the January 24, 1903 KIA, the LEA is refered to only as the "schemers who care nothing for the interest of labor." Finch provides more information about the Association than any other source and much of his information came from interviews with individuals who were active in the LFL during this time.}
The formation of the LEA ended a period of relative labor success as the employers routinely refused to bargain with the unions and attempted to break them. The first salvo was fired shortly after the LEA was established and involved two of the largest and strongest unions in the city. In 1903, 50 percent of the Carpenters and 50 percent of the printers were members of their respective unions. In April 1904, the Typographical unions approached the printing houses in an effort to work an eight hour day. The printing houses not only refused to negotiate but locked the unions out and imported replacement printers from other cities. Two years later the Carpenters union was locked out and replacements hired as well. After a long and bitter strike which the Carpenters lost, their union was reduced

113 The LFL minutes August 10, 1903. The LFL minutes contain many negative references of this nature about Thruston Ballard and his company.

114 "Report of the Labor Inspector of the State of Kentucky, 1902-03." There was an obvious drop in the membership of the Carpenters union between 1890 and 1902 but the reason for that decline is currently unknown. The report of the Labor Inspector only counted the LFL carpenters and it is possible many had joined the United Trades and Labor Assembly. However, this is only speculation and the topic merits additional research.
to only 135 active members.\textsuperscript{115}

This was the pattern promoted by the LEA after its formation. Labor was continually forced to strike and then routinely locked out of their place of employment and replacement workers hired. The majority of the strikes and lockouts appear to have been forced purely as a way of breaking the unions. In all cases, union recognition was denied and previously closed shops were returned to open shop status. After the formation of the LEA the craft unions lost virtually every labor dispute they became involved in. The LEA was highly successful and by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, it had virtually smashed organized labor in Louisville. In 1909 Stuart Raid, an organizer for the national American Federation of Labor stated, "The Employers' Association of this city have had organized labor at their mercy ... and have enabled the employers to make successful warfare against organized labor.\textsuperscript{116}"

The defeat of organized labor was a serious blow to the working class of the city who depended upon the unions for economic advancements and necessary social services. Without the unions the working class could only

\textsuperscript{115} See Finch for full details of these events and the involvement of the LEA in them.

\textsuperscript{116} Quoted in Finch p. 91.
look to the political machine for relief. However, the Democratic political machine was itself about to be challenged.
CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

A Political Machine

At the turn of the 20th century Louisville was an economically successful and culturally progressive city. In terms of culture the Louisville Philharmonic Society provided funding for a municipal orchestra, while Macauley Theater attracted world renowned performers. The Macauley was the most prestigious local theater of the day and upon its stage white Louisvillians could enjoy performances by such nationally known performers as Sarah Bernhardt, Lillian Russell, Edwin Booth, and the city's own Mary Anderson.¹ The Macauley was the most celebrated theater but not the largest. That distinction went to a 3000-seat auditorium located on the corner of Fourth and Hill. Arts patron and financier William Norton had constructed the auditorium and for 15 years booked the finest stage acts in the nation, including the Metropolitan Opera and the Boston and New York

¹ An interesting account of the life of Mary Anderson and of the theaters of Louisville can be found in the January, 1974, issue of Louisville Magazine.
Norton's Auditorium burned to the ground in 1904.

3 The Salmagundi Club was a social organization consisting of many of the most influential men in Louisville. Alienating this group resulted in Jacob's defeat in the 1890 mayoral primary. Many of Louisville's elite supported Henry S. Tyler who ran on a platform of "sound business principles" which appealed to the elite and Republican voters of Louisville. For more information on how the elite used the issue of Iroquois Park to promote the election of Tyler and a call for a more professional city administration, see "The Park System of Louisville and the Services of Col. Andrew Cowan, With a Political History of Louisville At the Time" by Temple
Despite this controversy, the new park commissioners quickly created two additional parks, Cherokee Park located in the east end Highland area in 1891, and Shawnee Park located in close proximity to the west end Parkland area the following year. All three of these city parks were designed and planted by Frederick Law Olmsted, one of the nation's most renowned landscape architects.

Members of the Salmagundi Club probably spent very little time in the parks they helped to establish, as the elite were building their own exclusive organizations and playgrounds. Louisville was becoming a city of fashionable social clubs where business men and young professionals could associate after office hours. The importance of these organizations for the city's development was duly recognized by the local media. "The growth of a city is indicated in the number of its clubs," proclaimed an editorial of the day, "since the progress of a city increases its social progress in

\[\text{Bodley; an unpublished paper in the Temple Bodley collection located in the Filson Club Archives.}\]

\[\text{All three parks were outside city limits when they were established. Cherokee and Shawnee Parks were annexed by the city in 1895 and Iroquois Park in 1922. Chickasaw Park, the African American Park, was established in 1922 on the former estate of John Whallen.}\]
proportion to its business interest." The Salmagundi Club established in 1868 was the oldest of the elite social organizations, followed by the Conversation Club (1879), the Pendennis Club (1881), and the Filson Club (1884). Before the century ended, the elite had also created the Louisville Country Club, the Louisville Boat Club, and the Louisville Golf Club. With the formation of these exclusive organizations, the core of the elite social network was in place.

While the elite enjoyed their restricted organizations, members of the city's middle class sought their amusement in the less posh surroundings of the parks and various lower cost theaters. In addition to the Macauley and Norton auditoriums, entertainment for the general public was also provided at the Masonic Temple at Fourth and Jefferson and at Liederkranz Hall on Market.

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5 "Pronounced Growth In Club Life Spirit Developed In Louisville In the Past Year." This editorial can be found in the clipping files of the Louisville Free Public Library under the heading of Social Clubs. Unfortunately, there was no reference for this article. Judging from the type, print and style of narrative, it was probably a *Louisville Post* article, published sometime in the very early years of the 20th century.

6 Information regarding Louisville's social clubs came from *The Louisville Blue Book*, (1923).

7 For an excellent discussion and analysis of the growth and significance of social clubs in American cities during this period see *Middletown* (1929) by Robert and Helen Lynd.
The most expensive seats in Liederkranz Hall were 75 cents, but more modestly priced seats were available for the less affluent.

The majority of the lower middle class and the working class enjoyed themselves at the various beer gardens scattered throughout the city. Irish and Germans alike called Phoenix Hill Park their own, while Lion Garden and Woodland Garden were strictly German. The Hibernian Garden in Irish Hill was the principle Irish establishment. These beer gardens were typical working class establishments of the age where a worker and his family could relax and enjoy themselves. Advertisements for the Hibernian Garden in the KIA and Courier Journal provide insight into the activity common in these establishments. The advertisements promised handball, football, sack and foot races, fireworks and a musical band. "Good order insured," proclaimed the ads, "Admission 25 cents, ladies and children free."

The entertainment center of the African American community was found in the lodges and fraternal organizations. The Odd Fellows (ODD) owned a three-story building that contained a banquet hall, music hall, and
store fronts for African American businesses. The Knights of Pythias built the grandest of all the lodge buildings in Louisville, African American or white. In 1915, Pythian Temple was built at Tenth and Chestnut at a cost of 130,000 dollars. The Temple was seven stories tall and contained a ball room, banquet hall, theater, billiard parlor, a dozen office suits, guest apartments, and a roof garden.

Establishments such as the Pendennis Club, Liederkranz Hall, and even the Hibernian Garden and Pythian Temple contributed to Louisville's outward trappings of a prim and proper Victorian city. But there was also another side to Louisville, and other sources of amusements. Louisville's location as a crossroads of traffic and trade had influenced its urban development in many ways. "The river was from the outset a strong social and moral force in the life of Louisville. Every ruffian

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8 Unfortunately a membership list for the African American ODD could not be located. The ODD contained in the Louisville data was for the German lodge of this organization and their minutes were recorded in German into the 1920s. The ODD and the German Club of Louisville (GCL) are the only two German social organizations located in Louisville.

9 For additional information about the lodges and fraternal organizations, see Wright and Weeden. See also "23 Biennial Session of the Supreme Lodge: Knights of Pythias at Louisville, Kentucky, August 16 - 22, 1923." The Courier Journal covered the grand opening of Pythian Temple in detail.
who traveled the river seems to have stopped to tramp its streets and infest its rowdy sections. They patronized brothels, fought in the streets, became jail inmates, and in every other way gave unsavory color to city life."¹⁰

The transient traffic of the steam boats, railroads, and the abundance of retail buyers who regularly visited the city after the Civil War further enhanced the unsavory milieu of urban life. In short, Louisville was a wide open city in the waning years of the 19th century and offered every form of entertainment conceivable.

Louisville possessed a profusion of saloons, gambling houses, opium parlors, pool rooms, and houses of prostitution. The saloons and brothels even printed a formal directory or "blue book" for the convenience of their customers and visitors to the city. The Souvenir Sporting Guide to Louisville contained the location, prices and advertisement of the brothels of the city.¹¹

Green Street was the center of the city's netherworld of crime, corruption and vice, and John and James Whallen were Green Street's undisputed masters. John Whallen arrived in Louisville shortly after the Civil War with an impressive set of Confederate credentials to his name. As

¹⁰ Clark, p. 7.

¹¹ A copy of this directory may be found at the Louisville Archive.
a boy of 13, he had joined Schoolfields' Battery and served as scout for Captain Bart Jenkins of Louisville. After the war Whallen migrated to Louisville seeking employment, but unlike the other Confederates, Whallen had no taste for manufacturing or the life of a salesman. John Whallen was an ambitious individual and above all else a showman. By 1877, Whallen had capitalized upon his talents and become manager of the Metropolitan Theater.

The "Met" was just one more struggling bar among the city's 400 or so saloons when John Whallen took over as manager, but once in control he instituted two innovations which elevated his enterprise above the others. First, Whallen instituted the nickel schooner of beer, a mug so big it took two hands just to lift. Next, he changed the type of entertainment provided by the Met and replaced traditional vaudeville acts with burlesque performers. Under Whallen's management, the stage of the Met was filled with "the girls from the burlesque cast ... (whose) jokes were bawdy, their actions suggestive, and they appeared to be nude in their flesh-colored tights." When not performing the showgirls mingled with

12 During the 1880s, various editions of The Louisville City Directory reported that the city had over 450 bars with liquor licenses.

the customers and offered their companionship for the price of a drink. The combination of cheap beer, suggestive stage performances, and female companionship turned the Met into the most successful saloon on Green Street. There were also allegations that Whallen had introduced slot machines, gambling, and organized prostitution into the Met but these charges were never upheld.14

Much of John Whallen's success can be attributed to his personality which worked in conjunction with the Met's risque entertainment. As the son of a working class Irish immigrant, Whallen's youth had been spent in extreme poverty and hardship. Perhaps recalling his own deprived childhood, Whallen seemed to have had a real affinity for the poor, the immigrants, and the destitute of Louisville. In an age of limited social services a worker down on his luck could always receive a basket of food, a bucket of coal, a little cash, and perhaps a job from "Papa John Whallen." "The blue-collar workers, the immigrants, the common laborers, and all those who tottered between poverty and destitution knew and loved John Whallen. For most of them, the American dream had

14 For more information on these allegations, see Roberson and Gray (1981) and "Boss John Whallen: The Early Louisville Years, 1876-1883" (1984) also by Gray and (Roberson) Yates.
turned into a vicious, goal crushing nightmare. Whallen helped them cope with that reality.\textsuperscript{15}

John Whallen's personality and business tactics proved successful but he was quickly attacked for corrupting the moral standards of the community. Henry Watterson and the influential \textit{Courier Journal} publicly attacked Whallen's business activities, and claimed that he and the Metropolitan "had become an outrage to decency and a festering sore to society."\textsuperscript{16} When members of the clergy, the anti-gambling league, and the anti-saloon league united in an effort to close the Met, Whallen was placed on the defensive. In order to maintain his establishment, Whallen was forced to forge alliances with the politicians and police of the city. Consequently, self-preservation forced Whallen to enter the political arena.

Whallen served as Sixth Ward delegate to the state Democratic Convention in 1879, which met that year in Louisville. This appears to have been Whallen's first venture into politics and he clearly was not in a


\textsuperscript{16} The Louisville \textit{Courier Journal}, February, 11, 1880, section 1, p. 4. Watterson published this editorial before Whallen became boss of the Democratic Party. After Whallen created his machine the \textit{Courier Journal} was far less critical of his activity.
position of leadership. However, the following year Whallen had an opportunity to discover just how influential he had become and in the process laid the groundwork for the construction of his own machine.

Whallen had managed the Met so successfully, he soon had sufficient funds to open an establishment of his own. In the spring of 1880, John Whallen and his younger brother James, purchased the failing Grand Opera House on Jefferson Street, renamed the old structure the Buckingham Theater, and opened for business. The Buckingham was bigger and more elaborately decorated than the Metropolitan but the entertainment and atmosphere was pure Whallen. The burlesque shows of the Buckingham were also bigger and bawdier than those of the Met. The Buckingham was opened before the Whallen brothers had obtained a liquor license, which nearly spelled disaster for the new theater. When the Whallens filed for the license they ran into serious opposition from Louisville's clergy, and the anti-gambling and the anti-

17 Whallen was a charter member of the Empire Circuit Company, a national burlesque booking agency which maintained 30 companies. Empire rotated its shows throughout the nation, which meant the Buckingham had a steady diet of new offerings. In 1897, Whallen was elected treasurer of the Empire Circuit. For more information on this aspect of Whallen's life, see Karen R. Gray and Sarah Yates, (1984) "The Louisville Burlesque War: Empire Circuit Company vs. Columbia Amusement."
saloon leagues. These groups exerted pressure on the city council and mayor to deny the application. Only one councilman, Barney McAtee supported the Whallens application and largely through McAtee's influence the license was granted.

Later that year when McAtee was running for reelection against stiff opposition, he fell ill and could not canvass his ward for votes. John Whallen, never one to forget a favor, stepped in and personally managed McAtee's campaign. Whallen knocked on every door in the ward, met every voter, called in favors and made political promises. When the votes were counted, McAtee had won the election and John Whallen had created a formidable political machine.

Whallen's next major political victory came in 1885 when Booker Reed was elected mayor. Whallen had turned out the votes which Reed needed and as a reward for his support, Reed arranged to have Whallen appointed chief of police. Whallen, who held this position for just three years, acquired the loyalty and support of the city's policemen. The Whallen brothers would use the police whenever necessary to meet their political objectives and for the next 29 years, the Whallen brothers were the
undisputed bosses of Louisville's Democratic machine. 18

The support of the police department was critical to Whallen but the police were only part of a large citywide machine. The Irish community and the KIA could always be counted on by Whallen and the Democrats. At the same time James McGill of the LFL could usually deliver a large portion of labor's vote, while Aaron Kohn gathered some support within the Jewish community. However, a critical component of the machine was the Mose Green Club (MOS) which was controlled by Whallen and his lieutenants. Technically, the MOS was a benevolent association to which members paid a ten dollar initiation fee plus dues of eight dollars per year. In all probability the majority of the money collected found its way into the war chest of the political machine. The membership of the MOS included a broad cross section of the population and was one of the few organizations where Catholics, Jews, Masons, and members of the prestigious Pendennis and Louisville Boat Club could meet and

18 The Whallen brothers jointly controlled Louisville's Democrat Party. John was the outgoing and more visible public figure while James appears to have been the strategist. John died in 1913 and the party was controlled by James until his own death in 1917. With the demise of both brothers, the party machine fell into the hands of another Irishman, Micky Brennen, who controlled the machine into the 1930s.
associate.\textsuperscript{19} Because of the membership composition of the MOS, Whallen's machine stretched from the ethnic enclaves to the board rooms of the city's leading elite organizations.

From his vantage point on the floor of the Buck, Whallen controlled the machine, personally determined who would win elections, and filled political jobs. "The Buckingham Theater was a place where culture, subculture, and partisan politics fused in a single monolithic column of social and political expression. Whallen's theater, saloon, and well-publicized charities were ... a part of the Kentucky institutional structure."\textsuperscript{20}

As political bosses during the Gilded Age, the Whallens were essentially no different than other urban bosses scattered throughout the nation. Each boss had built his organization upon the same general cornerstones of patronage, the laboring class and immigrants. The Whallen brothers clearly understood their base of power

\textsuperscript{19} No members of organized labor were identified as MOS members which was perhaps a simple reflection of the relative high cost of MOS membership. There were also no African Americans in the MOS which was probably as much a reflection of party affiliation as it was discrimination. During the 1920s, the MOS had over 300 members. Unfortunately, a complete membership list for the first time period could not be uncovered. The 1920s membership list and information regarding the MOS is available at the Filson Club Historical Society.

\textsuperscript{20} Clark, p. 20.
and were candid about their support. "Give me the ragtag and bobtail, if you choose to put it that way," John Whallen once remarked, "and the enemy can have the other. And if we do not win, we will find out the reason why."²¹ On another occasion "Papa John" explained how he preferred "leech friendship." "I'd rather pick them off occasionally than to attempt to heal the wounds the boys make when they turn their double-crossing backs on me."²² Younger brother James was equally straightforward about their power base: "I reckon I have bought as many votes in my time as any man ...," James once admitted. "It has been recognized in this city for years that it is impossible to win elections without money."²³

The Whallens, like their counterparts throughout America, understood politics at this level, but genuine power existed at a far more complex level than these bosses perhaps realized. It is highly doubtful that any urban boss could have a position of authority without elite support and endorsement. After all, the elite dominated the prime real estate, the transportation networks, the utility companies, the banks, and they

²³ Yater, p. 131.
controlled the means of production. And in Louisville, the elite made up a large portion of the membership of the MOS which appears to have been the financial arm of the political machine. In reality, the political bosses owned virtually nothing and only commanded the votes of the most economically unstable elements of society. Political power was based upon patronage and had the elite wanted they could have easily outbid the bosses.

Urban bosses served the elite agenda and up to a point were good for both the community and business. The bosses functioned at several levels and were a primary element of urban society and development. They served as social workers, attended to the poor, and managed informal employment bureaus. The boss was also a necessary liaison between government and private enterprise. In a fast-paced age of urban growth and unsophisticated local government with various councils and commissions, the boss could cut through overlapping jurisdictions and get results.²⁴

²⁴ The urban political machine has been a favored topic for sociologists, historians, and political scientists for decades. Therefore a great body of material has been produced regarding this subject, as well as some very good case studies of individual bosses. Two older but highly useful works are The Great Game of Politics (1930) by Frank R. Kent, and American City Government and Administration (1929) by Austin F. Macdonald. The reader may also consult Plukitt of Tammany Hall by William L. Riordon; Mugwumps, Morals and
John and James Whallen fulfilled these functions in Louisville, and "large numbers of so-called respectable Louisville citizens no doubt secretly regarded the Whallens influence and place in the scheme of life in Louisville as an asset."25 Between the years 1880 and 1900, the Whallen brothers were not only tolerated by the elite, but funded and protected by them as well. The L&N railroad was the largest single financial contributor to the Whallen machine.26 Also, in their frequent court battles with the Good Citizen's League and the Christian Alliance, John and James Whallen were represented by Alex Scott Bullitt and the Bullitt law firm.27

Politics and Reform

By the 1890s, political conditions were beginning to change and the urban bosses came under attack by new

25 Clark, p. 31.


27 Bullitt and Bullitt was under the direction of Thomas and William Bullitt. Later, the firm became Bruce and Bullitt with Helm Bruce and William Bullitt as partners.
reform coalitions. Between 1890 and 1910, American cities witnessed a proliferation of reform organizations which challenged local political machines. The Municipal Voters League of Chicago was established in 1896 to battle crime and corruption in that city. That same year, residents of Los Angeles created the Citizens League to shut down illegal gambling which functioned with machine approval. The Municipal League of Seattle was established to rid that city of an allegedly corrupt machine while the Jefferson Club of St. Louis, the Municipal Association of Cleveland, the Good Government League of San Francisco, the Citizens' Municipal League of Boston, and the Toledo Civic Federation were all formed to promote political reform. Perhaps the most famous reform organization was the Citizens Union of New York which toppled Tammany Hall.

The leadership of these new reform movements were primarily from the elite, upper middle, and professional classes while the rank and file was comprised of more traditional elements of reform, including anti-gambling and prohibition groups. The reformers were determined to oust the bosses and fundamentally alter municipal government. They supported professionalism of city government, the introduction of a city manager system, fiscal responsibility, municipal elections at large, the
secret ballot, merit-based employment, and tighter controls on labor.\footnote{Information regarding the nationwide reform organizations was compiled from Woodruff (1907), Beard (1926), and Peterson (1961).}

A reform movement developed in Louisville which coincided with the emerging strength of the city's Republican Party. Traditionally, the party had been associated with Lincoln and radical reconstruction and had been a weak entry in Louisville's political arena. But by the late 1890s the party had successfully changed its image and focus. The party was now perceived as the party of big business and the party most able to represent the needs of businessmen. Consequently, the city witnessed substantial growth within the party and a shift in the party affiliations of some members of the local economic elite.

The Ballard and Speed families had historically been staunch Republicans, but now they were joined by individuals such as Theodore Ahrens, Thomas F. Smith, Frederic Sackett, B. F. Avery, Charles Huhlein, and William Heyburn among others.\footnote{William Heyburn was vice president and later president of Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing. Heyburn, in conjunction with Ahrens, Smith, Sackett, Avery, and Huhlein, plus the Speeds and Ballards, gave the Republican party a strong voice within Louisville's manufacturing community.} The Bullitt family became
politically split with Alex Scott Bullitt retaining his Democratic credentials, while William Bullitt defected to the Republicans. Colonel Thomas Bullitt, the family patriarch and civil war veteran, never formally embraced the Republicans, but after 1895, declared himself an Independent. James P. Helm also declared himself an Independent at this time and Helm Bruce (the grandson of Democrat governor John L. Helm) likewise distanced himself from the Democrats by adopting the Independent label.\(^{30}\)

These young Republicans, working in conjunction with a handful of Independents and anti-Whallen Democrats drawn from the Allen, Barrett, and Belknap dynasties formed the hub of Louisville's reform movement. In 1887 the reformers named industrialist Samuel Avery as Louisville's first Republican candidate for mayor. As expected, Democrat Charles Jacob won the contest by a

\(^{30}\) The Bullitt family members explained their party affiliation in the *Louisville Election Case*, Jefferson County, Kentucky, Jefferson Circuit Court, Chancery Branch, Charles L. Scholl v. Henry A. Bell, and Arthur Peter v. Charles A. Wilson. 12 vols. A copy of this critical case may be obtained at the Main Branch of the Louisville Free Public Library.

The party affiliation of Helm Bruce can be found in Clark, (1973). Information on the other individuals listed in this section can be obtained from Mary Young Southard, Ed. (1936) *Who's Who In Kentucky: A Biographical Assembly of Notable Kentuckians.*
margin of two to one while the Republicans picked up a slim majority on the Board of Aldermen. The reformers had made their initial step into politics and in the process exposed the degree of corruption which existed in municipal elections. "As a result of sharp-eyed watchers at strategic polls, vote bribers were arrested 'by the wagon load,' including an alderman and a councilman."\(^{31}\)

The corruption which the reformers exposed in this election coupled with Jacob's handling of the purchase of Iroquois Park resulted in his defeat during the next Democratic caucus. Many of the reform minded Democratic voters supported Henry S. Tyler who ran on a platform of "sound business principles."\(^{32}\) The Republicans also used these issues to their advantage and were able to gain a

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\(^{31}\) Yater, p. 132.

\(^{32}\) This is a very critical election. Finch maintains that labor was deeply divided during this campaign with James McGill supporting Jacob and Edward Cronk supporting Tyler. When Tyler was elected mayor he refused to deal with McGill who was then president of the LFL. Finch further believes that when McGill and the LFL were locked out of City Hall many union members began advocating a complete withdrawal from political activity, a position which eventually led to the creation of the United Trades and Labor Assembly. If Finch is correct then other interesting issues emerge. Since McGill was part of the political machine it is logical to assume that Whallen also supported Jacob. And if McGill could be locked out of City Hall then we must question how much influence Whallen actually had during Tyler's administration. The contest between Jacob and Tyler is clearly a topic which merits additional research.
slim majority on the Board of Aldermen during the next election. From this position they were able to influence the language of the new city charter which was passed during Tyler's administration.\textsuperscript{33}

Henry Tyler was elected to a second term but died in office in January, 1896. Tyler's death created a window of opportunity for the Republican-controlled Board of Aldermen who named George D. Todd as interim mayor. Todd, an influential member of the Board of Trade, became Louisville's first Republican mayor. The Republicans now controlled both the Board of Aldermen and City Hall and were in a position to seriously challenge Whallen's position. Feeling threatened, Whallen began turning more and more to strong-arm tactics to obtain his objectives. From this point forward Whallen utilized his allies in

\textsuperscript{33} One issue which has not been adequately addressed in the Louisville case is to what extent the national reform platform influenced the development of the city charter. Granted, Tyler was elected on a platform of sound business principles, but the literature does not indicate that he was a true reform candidate of the variety which developed in Louisville after the turn of the century. Tyler was, however, a good businessman and perhaps a precursor to the Louisville reform movement. Unfortunately, given the current level of knowledge regarding Louisville's political development, this analysis is, at best, educated speculation.
the police force with increasing regularity.\textsuperscript{34}

The following year, Todd ran for a full term while the Whallen machine offered Charles P. Weaver as the Democrat nominee. When the votes were counted, Weaver won by a slim majority in an election which the \textit{Commercial} labeled a complete fraud. The Republican newspaper claimed the polls had been controlled by detectives, fireman and the police, and that polling locations had been changed without notice and closed early. The \textit{Commercial} also charged that African American voters had been intimidated and prevented from voting by the police.\textsuperscript{35} Despite the allegations of corruption, the election was a victory for Whallen who once again controlled city hall. The victory however, came at a price. James McGill supported the political machine and used his influence to drum up labor support for Weaver. McGill's involvement in this election resulted in the split within the LFL and the formation of the United

\textsuperscript{34} See Yater, Clark, and "The Fusion Movement in Louisville, 1905 - 1907" (1969) a thesis by George P. Metcalf.

\textsuperscript{35} The city newspapers all covered this election indepth and are the best source of factual information. However, each paper was extremely biased in their coverage. The \textit{Courier Journal} and KIA reported the election from a Democratic position and therefore, present a very different perspective than the \textit{Commercial}, \textit{Herald} or \textit{Post}.

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Trades and Labor Assembly.  

After the election of Weaver, the Honest Election League (HEL) was created, and a true organized political reform movement began in Louisville. The non-partisan HEL included Democrats, Republicans and Independents and was founded by Basil Duke, Walter Harris, James P. Helm, Helm Bruce, Thomas Bullitt, James O'Neal, and David Fairleigh. The HEL exposed corruption, vote buying, fraud, the use of repeaters, and police interference in the gubernatorial elections of 1899 and 1903, and in the municipal election of 1901.

The 1903 gubernatorial election in particular was a

See Finch for additional information regarding the position of labor and McGill during this election.

The most comprehensive study of the Louisville reform movement to date has been compiled by Thomas Clark in Helm Bruce, Public Defender: Breaking Louisville's Gothic Political Ring, 1905. Clark's well developed work is very short (less than 70 pages of actual text) and primarily a biography of Bruce. Clark himself admits in the introduction that his work is a good starting point, but not a definitive study. Another interesting, but rather limited study is The Fusion Movement in Louisville, 1905 - 1907 (1969), a thesis by George P. Metcalf. As an historian, Metcalf presents a good factual account of the individuals and events of the Louisville case. Yater also devotes a few brief pages to the reform movement, but his is a general work and therefore not given to indepth interpretation.

Repeaters were individuals who registered various times under different names or in different precincts. Once registered, the repeaters could then cast as many votes as they registered for.
violent event and a precursor of things to come. J.C.W. Beckham was running for re-election on the Democratic ticket while the Republican Party's candidate was Morris B. Belknap of Louisville. During the registration period in Louisville, the machine utilized city policemen to intimidate African American voters who were attempting to register. During the actual election, armed men captured some polling locations and stole the ballot boxes. In other precincts, machine men ejected Republican election officers from the polls while the police, who witnessed the events, did nothing. When reformers attempted to block machine interference at the Ninth and Chestnut location, that precinct's voting poll was riddled with bullets. The shots were allegedly fired by machine henchman and once again, the police who witnessed the event did not intervene. When the final vote count was made, Morris Belknap had lost the gubernatorial contest by 20,000 votes state-wide.

Between elections, members of the HEL concentrated their attention on the general issues of crime and

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39 The Ninth and Chestnut poll was in a predominately African American ward. Once again the local press is the best source of information regarding the events surrounding this elections. The Courier Journal, Evening Post, and Louisville Herald all covered the election and incidents in detail, although from different perspectives.
corruption within the city. The problem of gambling, prostitution, and police corruption were the main non-election areas of HEL concern. The Republican-oriented Evening Post ran an editorial on October 4, 1901, which claimed:

Assault, murders, robberies and other crimes are unchecked. The law against gambling is suspended. The pool rooms gather in the money of the weak and ignorant and divide it with the party machine... The police are not our servants; they are our masters. They are the marching force of the Democratic organization, neglecting to perform their sworn duties and doing the thing the law says they must not do.\(^4^0\)

Aaron Kohn responded to the editorial and boldly proclaimed, "the people would gamble -- the law to the contrary -- and that he would continue to run pool rooms and faro games in defiance of the law."\(^4^1\) In addition to his political involvement Kohn was an attorney who specialized in the defense of saloon operators, gamblers, and prostitutes. Kohn became a particular target of the reformers because of his defense of Dr. Sarah Murphy who the Post referred to as the notorious woman. Murphy

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\(^4^0\) This Evening Post editorial can be found in the clipping files of the Louisville Free Public Library under the heading of Louisville Politics. Unfortunately, there was no additional reference for the editorial in the clipping files.

\(^4^1\) Quoted in Metcalf (1969) p. 19.
allegedly performed illegal abortions in her Green Street area practice.

The HEL was not a large or politically powerful organization but by 1905, it had reorganized and changed its name to the City Club. As the City Club built momentum, it alerted the general public to the political corruption within the city. The City Club also successfully pressured the grand jury into investigating issues of police corruption and political involvement. In May of 1905, the grand jury confirmed the allegations which the City Club, Evening Post, and Louisville Herald had leveled against the machine. In its summary, the grand jury confirmed that ballot violations, illegal voting and criminal manipulation of voting returns were commonplace in Louisville. The jury also confirmed that "in many instances the officers of the law not only did not seek to prevent elections crimes, but some of them actually participated in the frauds." The jury further reported that gambling, pool rooms, faro games, and crap games were "rampant in the city." And, that these illegal activities appeared to be controlled by an organized syndicate, which the police had made little or no attempt to crush.42

42 The opinion handed down by the grand jury was published on June 3, 1905 by the Louisville Herald.
The ruling of the grand jury was handed down just months before the 1905 general election which was a major contest in Kentucky. In November of that year, every state, county and city post was up for grabs, and the reformers intended to make a decisive bid for office. In preparation for the conflict, the Republican press played up the grand jury indictment with front page coverage detailing Louisville's situation. The Herald and Post persuaded a considerable number of Louisville residents that something had to be done about conditions within the city. Many individuals became "convinced that the real power structure in Louisville was in imminent danger of standing by and tolerating the re-election of a political machine which was demonstrable corrupt, highhanded in the use of police power to enforce its will, and which had become a deterrent threat to business expansion."43

Members of the City Club were intent on challenging the Democratic machine in the 1905 general election and formed the new Fusion Party, which was designed as a fusion of both major parties. The public was informed of the plans by the Post on June 27. A Post headline proclaimed: "Mass-Meeting Tonight of Vast interest To The City." The article went on to state: "The first gun in

43 Clark, p. 32.
the campaign for the redemption of Louisville will be fired this evening, when a monster mass-meeting will be held at Macauley's Theater, under the auspice of the City Club. "Speakers at the meeting were to include Helm Bruce and Charles Huhlein.

As explained at the mass meeting, the objective of the City Club was to unite honorable and moral men regardless of party affiliation and to support their campaigns for municipal office. The "City Club's Declaration of Principles" were adopted as the Fusionist platform.45 The City Club pledged to end election fraud, increase law enforcement and provide economic and efficient municipal government. Democrat Joseph T. O'Neal was the Fusion candidate for mayor while the candidates for other municipal offices included Thomas Bullitt, Thurston Ballard, Helm Bruce, Frank Nunemacher, and William Heyburn among others.

Leadership of the Fusion Party was drawn from the ranks of the elite and represented the primary financial and social interests within the city. The composition and influence of the Fusionists can in part be determined

44 Louisville Post page 1, June 27, 1905.

45 The complete text of the City Club's Declaration of Principles may be found in the Louisville Herald, June 18, 1905.
through an analysis of 32 of its leaders. The majority of the leadership were in their mid-40s, from old established families, native Kentuckians and university educated. Fifteen of the Fusionist' leaders were attorneys, seven were owners or executives of major local companies, five were on the executive board of the BOT, and 26 were directors of 12 local banks. Four of the Fusion leaders had a close association with the L&N, four were connected with Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing, one owned the Evening Post, three of the leaders were board members of the Louisville Gas Company, one was on the board of the telephone company, and one was on the Louisville Water Company's board of directors.

These 32 Fusion leaders were socially active and jointly held 89 memberships in eight of Louisville's most exclusive clubs and organizations. Eighteen of the Fusion leaders were members of the Pendennis Club, 16 were in the Filson Club, 13 were members of the Dramatic Club, 12 were in the Louisville Country Club, 12 were in the Louisville Golf Club, seven were members of the Salmagundi Club, five the Conversation Club, and six were members of the Sons of the American Revolution. Thirteen of the Fusionist leaders represented eight of Louisville's oldest elite families and could trace their heritage to the pioneer days of the city. Only two
individuals within this group could be described as professional politicians.\textsuperscript{46}

At the opposite end of the political, economic and social spectrum was the political machine, organized labor, and the Irish community which were all committed to defeating the Fusionists. Typographical Union No. 10 unanimously adopted a resolution which expressed the attitude of labor and stated:

\begin{quote}
Whereas, F.C. Nunemacher and (Thurston) Ballard, declared enemies of organized labor, are taking leading and prominent parts in the movement among the business people of Louisville to reform the city, and Whereas, The working people of Louisville have the same interest and pride in the city, so far as the betterment of conditions are concerned, as any class of its citizens, but when called upon to follow men like F.C. Nunemacher and Ballard, men who are today doing all in their power to disorganize and destroy their (labor) organizations, in a reform movement they cannot conscientiously do so for the reason that if these men are opposed to fair conditions among one element of citizenship, it is fair to presume that they will be insincere in promoting
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{46} The 32 Fusion leaders analyzed were those individuals whose names most often appeared in the media, the Louisville Election Case, or as Fusion candidates for office. They were: Thomas, William, and Alex Scott Bullitt, David Fairleigh, Charles Wickliffe, Arthur Peter, Helm Bruce, Lafon and Arthur Allen, Basil Duke, Joseph O'Neal, Thurston Ballard, George Norton, John Stites, Andrew Cowan, Walter Harris, Robert Kinkead, Alexander and John Barrett, John Brand, William Heyburn, Frank Nunemacher, Donald McDonald, William Munn, Richard Knott, James Speed, Arthur Mueller, Frank Hartwell, James P. Helm, Lewis Humphrey, Charles Huhlein, and William Belknap.
better conditions among other elements; therefore, be it Resolved, That Typographical Union No. 10 will oppose any ticket, political or otherwise, which places before the people of this city the names of F.C Nunemacher and Ballard and will do all in its power to enlist the co-operation of all organizations toward the same end.47

The KIA was equally critical and concentrated on the class status of the Fusionists. Editorials in the KIA reminded readers that many of the Fusion candidate were not residents of Louisville but of the prestigious rural suburb of Glenview. "They are too good for Louisville," stated one KIA editorial, but "They would like to make the city a municipal despotism and change the name to Belknapville, where long hours and low salaries would rule."48

The first real clash between the Democratic political machine and Fusionists came during the October registration period. The machine attempted to register as many repeaters as possible, thereby beefing up its voting power. Anticipating the machine tactics, the Fusionists had placed observers at the polls to challenge questionable individuals. As the registration period began, it is possible the opposing factions had

47 This resolution was entered into the March 13, 1905 minutes of the LFL.

48 Kentucky Irish American, October 4, 1905.
underestimated the strength, determination, and resolve of their opposition. The voter registration period was marked by violence, bloodshed, and a physical attack upon two of Louisville's most influential elite citizens.

The first acts of violence occurred shortly after the precincts were opened on October 3, 1905. Clarence Spencer, a local photographer and Fusionist supporter, was stationed at the Eight Street poll. Spencer was attempting to photograph repeaters waiting in the registration line when he was attacked, beaten, and held at gun point while his camera was smashed. A few hours later word reached Fusion headquarters that repeaters were being registered at the 13th precinct and that the observers were powerless to stop them. Upon hearing this news, Basil Duke and John Bradburn traveled to the precinct to investigate the situation first hand. When Duke attempted to enter the polls, he was surrounded by a group of repeaters, hit in the head and pushed to the ground.

Basil Duke was 67 years old, the second highest ranking ex-Confederate officer in Kentucky, a veteran of Morgan's Brigade, and a former commonwealth attorney general. Duke was also well respected by many of the various factions within the city. Duke was unhurt in the assault, but news of the attack upon the old General did
much to undermine machine credibility with the general public. The day after the attack, the Evening Post quoted an eye witness account of the incident. "It was outrageous," stated the witness, "There were several policemen standing by when the assault was committed, and instead of interfering (they) gave vent to hearty laughter. When they discovered who had been assaulted they hurriedly left the scene."49

The events of the registration period and the attack upon Duke displayed the extent to which the machine would go to protect its position. However, it was another attack upon an elite member which sent shock waves throughout the elite community. Arthur D. Allen was a descendent of one of Kentucky's oldest families, the son of Civil War veteran Charles Allen, and the nephew of William B. Belknap.50 Allen was also a Fusionist and an observer at the Market Street precinct. While at his post, Allen was approached by police officers Jack McAuliffe and James Kinnarney. The two policeman ordered Allen to leave the area and when he refused, Allen was clubbed by McAuliffe and arrested. William Richardson Belknap immediately attempted to bail Allen out of jail

49 Quoted in Clark, p. 33.
50 Charles Allen had married William Belknap's sister.
but was unsuccessful. After several hours Belknap was allowed to see Allen and, according to Belknap's later testimony, found him unconscious and laying in a pool of blood on the cell floor. Belknap was not allowed into the cell and maintained he could not determine if Allen were alive or dead.\(^5\)\(^1\)

When the KIA reported the events surrounding the incident, the Irish paper supported the actions of McAuliffe and the police department. The KIA maintained:

Mr. Allen is not a resident of Louisville. His home is at Glenview, more than ten miles away. He is a graduate of a university and can not plead ignorance. Arthur Allen had no right to interfere in local registration matters ... He objected to the presence of policemen at the precinct. Policemen are sworn officers of the law and it is their duty to be at the polls and see that order prevails. Were not these police on hand there is no telling what violence might have been committed. Mr. Allen, it is alleged, made a movement as if to draw a weapon. Instead of Patrolman McAuliffe shooting him he hit him with the club, not once but twice. Mr. Allen was not seriously injured, but that was not his fault, considering the provocation he gave. In this case the offender was of the upper-tandem of society.\(^5\)\(^2\)

The true facts of the Allen incident may be in dispute but the event had one decisive consequence, it brought Thomas W. Bullitt into the battle for power. When

\(^5\)\(^1\) Testimony of William Richardson Belknap, the *Louisville Election Case*.

\(^5\)\(^2\) Kentucky Irish American, October 4, 1905.
Belknap was unable to secure the release of Allen, he sent Lewis Humphrey to the office of Thomas Bullitt to seek legal assistance. Thomas Bullitt at age 67 was in semi-retirement and had taken no active role in the campaign prior to this incident. However, an attack upon a respected member of the economic elite by the police, the blatant disregard for Allen's position, and the fact that Allen was the son of an old friend and comrade-in-arms was more than Bullitt could tolerate. He immediately swore out a warrant for McAuliffe's arrest, sought out Harry Brennan, director of the Board of Public Safety, and demanded the suspension of both McAuliffe and Kinnarney. Bullitt, much to his surprise and perhaps for the first time in his life, was dismissed by Brennan who refused to honor his request. Despite his wealth, position and influence, Bullitt could not free Allen or get McAuliffe and Kinnarney relieved of duty. Before leaving Brennan's office, Bullitt stated:

Gentlemen, I have taken no part in this election - this canvass, I have written no letters, I have made no speeches. I wish now to say to you if this man McAuliffe is allowed to remain at this precinct during this day, I will make it my business from this day forth to acquaint the public of this city with his conduct and with your conduct in sustaining him.  

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Colonel Thomas W. Bullitt proved to be a man of his word. Throughout the remainder of October, Bullitt produced a series of "Open Letters" addressed to the citizens of Louisville. The Republican press published these letters which can be divided into three categories. First, Bullitt systemically laid out a well documented list of grievances and complaints against the Board of Public Safety, police department, and the Democratic Administration. Second, Bullitt clearly and concisely explained the laws governing police behavior and the legal penalties for violations of those laws. Bullitt also informed the citizens of their legal rights as voters attempting to cast their ballot. And third, Bullitt endorsed the Fusion ticket and encouraged the voters of Louisville to do likewise. In addition to the open letters, Bullitt sent individual letters to every policeman, every member of the Board of Public Safety and every elected official warning them that no violation of the election laws would be tolerated in the upcoming contest.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{54} Bullitt's open letters were published by the \textit{Evening Post} and can be found in back issues of that paper. However, the individual letters have never been publicly published. Both the open letters and many of the individual letters were introduced as evidence in the \textit{Louisville Election Case} and can be found in their entirety in Vol. I, as Exhibits T.W.B. 1-10.
Thomas Bullitt was not the only one prodded into action by the activity of the machine and as the election approached a series of events served to strengthen the Fusion crusade. First, on September 17, Henry Watterson and the Courier Journal admitted that "City Hall needs some cleaning." Watterson and his paper had always been strongly pro-Democratic and had generally supported the Whallen brothers' political activity. The Fusionists were able to get a lot of mileage out of this one simple statement printed in the influential Courier. Second, the Louisville Ministerial Association endorsed the Fusion ticket and the clergy made political speeches, wrote letters to the editor and preached the message of political reform from the pulpits. Third, there was the news coverage of the events surrounding voter registration, the attacks upon Duke and Allen, and Bullitt's well-penned letters. And fourth, a Fusion rally on election eve attracted 10,000 supporters.

As election day approached both camps were confident of victory. On October 7 just after the registration period ended, the KIA reported total registration had been 48,371. Of that number 27,783 registered Democrat, 12,400 as Republican, and 8,179 listed no party

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55 Courier Journal, September 17, 1905 Section 1, p. 4.
affiliation. The Democrats out-numbered the others by over 7000 which prompted the KIA to predict "the Democratic ticket will be elected by an overwhelming majority in November." Joseph O'Neal also predicted victory and declared:

There is no doubt in my mind that we will win by a majority of from 8,000 to 10,000 (votes). In all my life I never saw such a change of sentiment in two or three weeks as that shown in favor of the Fusion movement. Two or three weeks ago I was fairly confident, but I find the sentiment now overwhelming. The whole Fusion ticket is going through.

On November 5, election day, more blood ran in the streets of the city as the contest degenerated into a bare knuckle brawl for raw political power. Both factions entered the competition prepared for battle. The Democratic machine turned out the police, firemen, and city workers in force while the reformers passed out ax handles at Fusion headquarters. The Fusionists lost, both in the vote count and in the streets. Paul Barth, the Democratic candidate for mayor, and the entire Democratic ticket gained a 3000 vote majority over the Fusionists while in the streets, scores of individuals were injured.

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56 Kentucky Irish American, October 7, 1905.

57 O'Neal's prediction was printed in the Louisville Herald on November 6, the day after the election while the votes were still being counted and before a victor had been declared.
in the battle for power. One Fusionist supporter was shot and James Speed, William Heyburn, C.A. Wickliffe, and Alex Scott Bullitt were beaten by the police and arrested. Bullitt's assault occurred in the presence of Harry Brennan, who according to Bullitt's later testimony turned away and refused to intervene.

To say the Louisville election of 1905 was a simple contest for political reform or municipal control would be an oversimplification. The political issues at stake and the desire to clean up police corruption may have been valid. But also hovering just beneath the surface were the equally critical issues of class conflict.

Members of the Democratic machine clearly recognized what an elite takeover would mean and were fighting for their livelihood and economic security. This point was perhaps best expressed by police officer Roman Leachman on October 4 during the second day of voter registration. Leachman confronted Thomas Bullitt and John Barrett at the Jefferson Street poll. "To hell with you!" declared Leachman, "This means nothing to your crowd, and it means four years to me."\(^{58}\) This same sentiment was echoed throughout the campaign and election by the KIA, labor, the police, city workers, and machine supporters. The

\(^{58}\) Quoted in Clark, p. 37.
police officer who arrested Alex Scott Bullitt reportedly stated: "You damn Fusionists have been making trouble, and no damn Bullitt or man by that name will come around this neighborhood or around my precinct today." 59

Interestingly, the name of Whallen did not appear in the news reports of the day or in subsequent descriptions of the election. In the events surrounding the 1905 election, the impersonal phrase "Democratic machine" replaced the previously used "Whallen machine" label. It is not known what part John and James Whallen played in the 1905 election or why their name escaped public scrutiny. 60 The brothers were clearly the Democratic

59 Testimony of Alex Scott Bullitt, the Louisville Election Case, Vol II.

60 George Yater very carefully implies that John Whallen was a participant in the election, but makes no further comment on the subject. Susan E. Tifft and Alex S. Jones in their work, The Patriarch: The Rise and Fall of The Bingham Dynasty, claim Whallen was the boss and was responsible for the election fraud. Chandler and Chandler take a similar position in their work on the Bingham family. George Metcalf claims that John Whallen had temporarily fallen from power and did not regain his status until 1909. According to Metcalf, during that ten year interlude Aaron Kohn functioned as city boss. Metcalf presents an interesting argument which if true would be consistent with the possible events surrounding the Jacob/Tyler caucus. However, Metcalf did not fully develop this aspect of the 1905 election. And even if Metcalf's theory were correct, it still does not explain why Kohn was not mentioned by the press or named in the election case. Thomas Clark on the other hand states that Louisville had several political bosses at the time, but that John Whallen was the "kingpin" of bosses. In this manner Clark sidesteps some very basic questions. Who was
bosses in 1903 and again in 1909 and the Republican press frequently attacked them as such in both cases. However, for some reason they were spared and perhaps even protected by the Republican press and the elite in 1905.

It is quite possible that by 1905, the Democratic machine had developed a life of its own and was totally out of control. If this basic sociological interpretation is accepted then the machine may be viewed as an overlapping bureaucracy of power with each element independently fighting for political survival, which was driven by strong overtones of class conflict. A machine of this nature would be viewed as inherently dangerous and unstable by the elite. The elite would naturally wish to crush a machine of this nature, but they would also realize that the Democratic Party would survive and would need someone to pick up the pieces. The elite knew John and James Whallen, had worked with them in the past and no doubt at some level could trust them. Perhaps the Whallen brothers were deliberately spared for that future position. If this were the case then the political reform in control of the Democratic machine? Who was responsible for orchestrating machine activity? And, can any single individual be held responsible and was anyone actually controlling the machine at this time? It is possible that the machine was totally out of control and that no single individual was calling the shots. Clearly these are questions which warrant further investigation.
movement was not designed to destroy the party boss, but rather an attempt to regain control and impose class discipline. Although this interpretation is speculative, it is consistent with the known facts and events of 1905 and supports a class conflict interpretation.

Triumph of the Elite

The Democratic machine had prevailed on November 5, but the real battle for the political control of Louisville was just beginning. With very few exceptions, the Louisville elite had been galvanized around the Fusion movement and were not prepared to accept defeat. The elite who could not win the battle on the streets prepared to move the contest onto their own turf and pursue the matter in a more formal environment. On November 11, 75 members of the elite gathered at the Galt House to discuss their options and plan a counter attack. Within a few minutes after the meeting was called to order, the Citizens Committee of One Hundred (HUN) was established and ten thousand dollars pledged to support a legal action against the political machine.61

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61 On November 11, the Louisville Herald ran a front page story covering the elite gathering which had been by invitation only. The Herald headline declared that the intent of the meeting was to establish a committee which would uncover "the real 'nigger' in the wood pile." This Louisville Herald report supports the interpretation of
The HUN filed 44 separate cases against the city and county Democratic administration. By mutual agreement and to simplify the contest, all 44 cases were tried under Scholl v. Bell and Peter v. Wilson. The evidence presented in these two cases was then used in determining the outcome of the remaining cases. Representing the plaintiffs were the combined legal expertise of Helm Bruce, James P. Helm, Huston Quinn, Alexander Barrett, Thomas Bullitt and William Bullitt. The defendants in the case were all county and municipal employees and therefore technically represented by County Attorney Robert Worth Bingham. Bingham and the administration contracted litigation out to John Dodd, J.C. Dodd, A.J. Carroll, William Smith, and William Davies.62

The Louisville Election Case was brought before Judges Samuel B. Kirby and Shackleford Miller of the Jefferson County Circuit Court on December 2, 1905. The HUN petition alleged the mayor, the board of public

this work and indicates that the elite did not know who was actually in control of the Democratic machine or responsible for the election irregularities during the 1905 contest.

62 William Davies and Robert Worth Bingham were partners in the same law firm. Bingham was therefore paid as both county attorney and defense attorney for the same litigation. In essence, Robert Worth Bingham double-dipped into public funds to defend himself against allegations of fraud and corruption.
safety, and members of the police and fire departments had conspired to prevent a free and fair election. According to the petition, this conspiracy resulted in the Democratic victory and was implemented through the use of fraud, intimidation, bribery, and violence. The HUN requested that the court either declare the Fusionists victorious or declare the election null and void and order a rematch. 63

Despite the fact that the HUN attorneys offered a strong and well researched case, on March 23, 1907, Judges Kirby and Miller ruled in favor of the defendants. In their summation, the court admitted that election irregularities had indeed taken place in 1905. However, 63 Brief prepared by Helm Bruce in the Louisville Election Case. The reader may also consult Clark, Metcalf, and Yater for a very condensed version of events surrounding this case. However, for an indepth understanding of the events in question and a detailed description of the election, charges, and the actual court case, there is no better documentation than the transcript of the actual trial.

Bruce was the primary attorney for the HUN and did an outstanding job of collecting and presenting evidence. The Louisville Election Case may be obtained in the Kentucky Room of the Louisville Free Public Library and is arranged by individual testimony and by precincts. Despite its length, the Louisville Election Case is easy to follow and contains a wealth of useful and valuable information. These 12 volumes are without question one of the most valuable and useful primary sources of information for students of Louisville's social, political and historical development during this particular time period.
the courts also ruled that these irregularities were insufficient to affect the outcome of the election and therefore, the election results could not be set aside. In their summation, the judges commented:

In Conclusion we will say that the methods employed in many of the precincts in this registration and election cannot be too severely condemned. They are abhorrent to the spirit of our civilization and our form of government, but the defendants are not responsible for any of it. If the criminal laws prove insufficient to cope with it and to successfully suppress it, the legislature should pass such additional laws as would remedy the defects.64

The verdict of the Jefferson County Circuit Court came as no surprise to the HUN. Both Kirby and Miller had been supported by the machine in their election to office. Expecting an unfavorable decision, William Bullitt had obtained an appeal date in advance of the lower court's decision.65 On May 23, 1907, the Kentucky Court of Appeals handed down a five to two decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and ordered that the entire Democratic administrations of Louisville and Jefferson County be removed from office. The higher court also ordered Governor J.C.W. Beckham to appoint interim administrations until new elections could be arranged.

64 "Opinion of the Chancellors," The Louisville Election Case.

65 Clark, p. 49.
Beckham appointed the deposed County Attorney Robert Worth Bingham as interim mayor. Despite the fact that Bingham was a member of the Democratic machine and a defendant in the Louisville election case, he proved acceptable to the HUN. Bingham appeared to have changed political sides and joined forces with the reformers shortly after the election. While still county attorney and engaged in litigation in the election case, Bingham and James P. Helm jointly drafted an election reform bill. The Bingham-Helm bill was introduced into the Kentucky General Assembly on January 22, 1906. Although never adopted by the General Assembly, the Bingham-Helm Bill did help to make Bingham's appointment as mayor more acceptable to the HUN. Helm, in addition to his position as council for the plaintiff, was also chairman of the HUN.

Once in office, Bingham pledged to "give to the people of Louisville an honest and efficient city government and an absolutely fair election in the autumn."\(^{66}\) Bingham also instituted several acts of political reform which included replacing the directors of the board of safety, appointing a new chief of police, and reducing all police officers with the rank of captain

or major back to patrolmen. Over 50 Louisville policemen resigned under pressure from Bingham and in the face of legal complaints leveled against them by Thomas and William Bullitt. Bingham also closed hundreds of gambling parlors, houses of prostitution and enforced the Sunday closing laws. Robert Worth Bingham was one of the most controversial figures in Louisville, but he did manage to hold the city together and establish a working administration. Bingham was mayor for four difficult months and served in that capacity until a new election could be arranged.67

Bingham chose not to run for re-election in November 1907 and once again the entire city administration was up for grabs. The Democratic machine was out of office but still intact and had produced a slate of candidates. The Fusionists were now completely integrated into the Republican Party and were supporting that party's slate which was headed by James Grinstead. The Republicans were also making a determined effort to turn out the vote by

67 Depending upon which reference is consulted, Bingham is either described as a true reformer or a total scoundrel willing to latch onto and support whichever side was winning. In all probability, the truth is somewhere in between the two extremes. For opposing points of view, the reader should consult both Tifft and Jones, and Chandler and Chandler.
assuring voters that the 1907 election would be safe and violence-free. William Heyburn and William Bullitt were heading up the Republican campaign and began contacting the Fusion precinct observers from 1905. In a letter addressed to William Munn, Heyburn and Bullitt stated: "Remembering the splendid loyal work which you did with us in 1905, in the face of police attacks, and the courage of all the men who worked with us, we want you again to assist us in that same work, and at the same precinct in which you worked in 1905." In a follow-up letter, Heyburn and Bullitt informed Munn that "the united Republican Party with most of the independent factions, and a very large section of the best element of the Democrat Party have decided to support Mr. Grinstead and his ticket -- as a protest against the old 'Democratic Machine Ring' ... Mayor Bingham and the Sheriff are going to see to it that everybody at the Polls is absolutely protected from violence, and therefore, you need have no fears of any trouble whatsoever."68 Heyburn and Bullitt could assure voter safety with a degree of confidence since Alex Scott Bullitt had been appointed county sheriff by Governor

68 These two letters from the Republican Campaign Committee Headquarters were dated August 29 and September 12, 1907. Both letters are in the Louisville Archives.
The 1907 municipal election was relatively trouble free and Grinstead and the entire Republican ticket easily won the contest. William Heyburn was elected president of the board of aldermen which was the second most powerful position within municipal government. And William Bullitt was named chairman of the Board of Public Safety. However, the Democrats were not out of office for long. Two years after Grinstead's election, the Whallen brothers spearheaded a successful campaign which placed Democrat William Head in the mayor's office. The Whallens employed various dirty tricks during this campaign including using race as an issue. The KIA also used race as a means of obtaining support for the Democratic ticket. In the pre-election issues of the paper the KIA printed a headlines which declared: "Every Citizen Should Vote to Guard the Safety of Homes, Kindred and Property Against Negro Domination."69

Even though the Whallen machine won in 1909 there were clearly some major differences in this election as opposed to the election of 1905. Despite some underhanded but legal maneuvers, John and James Whallen won the contest in a relatively fair, free, and open election.

69 Kentucky Irish American, October 9, 1909.
The Whallens simply out-worked their opponents. More importantly the elite were not disenfranchised from the political structure. Indeed, the elite continued to enhance their position even more firmly during Head's term in office.

The elite withdrew from the daily political operations of the city, but retained control of the real power structure of Louisville. After the 1905 political reform movement the elite controlled the regulatory agencies, municipal commissions and city-owned utility companies. J.B. Brown and William Heyburn controlled the Sinking Fund, while Caldwell Norton and Brown served on the Board of Public Works. Peter Lee Atherton, Oscar Fenley and Theodore Ahrens served as sewer commissioners. The park commission was filled by John B. Castleman, Louis Seelbach, Basil Doerhoefer and Helm Bruce. Frank Dugan was appointed Wharfmaster, while the Board of Water Works was controlled by Charles Huhlein and Charles Mengel. And the quasi-public Louisville Lighting Company and Louisville Gas Company were both controlled by Frederic M. Sackett.

The ultimate outcome of the election case of 1905 was not the destruction of a political machine, but the establishment of political conditions conducive to the formation of a systemic growth regime. As Logan and
Molotch point out, the elite were less concerned with who governed than with how and for what purpose the city was governed. Given this interpretation, the main objective of the Louisville reform movement was an elite takeover of the city's finances and the regulatory commissions which controlled the utility companies and public services: the very municipal elements which are necessary to a true growth regime. William Domhoff supports this same interpretation and in Who Rules America? points out that elite control of regulatory agencies effectively removes the budgetary and decision-making processes from the unpredictable and frequently changing control of elected politicians and the political process.

Once in control of the regulatory boards and commissions, the elite, who already controlled the banks, insurance companies and brokerage houses, were a step closer to establishing a systemic growth regime. However, before that growth regime could be fully developed the city needed to be rebuilt, a climate of economic development cultivated, and the general population won over to the philosophy of growth.

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70 See Logan and Molotch, and Stone for a detailed analysis of elite activity in urban government.
CHAPTER V

URBAN GROWTH AND THE GROWTH REGIME

Rebuilding a City

The 1910 census listed the population of Louisville at 233,928 and confirmed something which many within the city already knew: Louisville was a city in decline. Although the city had gained over 40,000 new residents between 1890 and 1900, Louisville had achieved a growth level of less than half that number between 1900 and 1910. Louisville's national ranking was declining and the city itself was physically showing the effects of a stalled economy. The downtown business district was punctuated by boarded-up store fronts and hundreds of homes were left vacant as labor migrated to the Great Lakes industrial cities in search of employment.

It's not that Louisville had no manufacturing because the city clearly did, but Louisville's manufacturing base was still dominated by the same large institutions which were established in the 19th century. The distillery and cement industries were thriving, as were Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing, Ahrens and Ott Manufacturing, The Louisville Paper Company, C.C. Mengel
and Brothers, Avery & Sons, and others. But these companies had apparently reached their peak and no new leading industries were moving into the area. By 1910, the majority of the city's manufacturing base rested upon smaller 19th century enterprises and as a result, Louisville was not sharing in the 20th century industrial economic expansion. For example, Louisville was the southern capital of carriage and wagon construction at a time when the automobile was beginning to cut deeply into that market.¹

A list of the city's manufacturing enterprises published in the November 1916, Board of Trade Journal (BTJ) further illustrates this point. In addition to the ones already listed the city's manufacturing base centered around staves and castings, clothing, leather production, woolen goods and yarn, fertilizers, harness and saddle manufacturing, wooden ware, brooms, and cooperage production. Clearly, something had to be done in order to revitalize a once thriving economy and modernize the industrial base of the city. Louisville's economy needed to be modernized and updated in order for the city to compete with its northern industrial rivals. Failure to modernize would condemn the city to further

¹ Consult The Growth of Manufacturing in Kentucky 1904 - 1929 (1932), a thesis by J.L. McConnel.
impoverishment and decline.

From the perspective of the city's economic elite, two critical steps toward the redemption of Louisville had already been achieved. First, the power of organized labor had been severely curtailed and Louisville had been turned into an open shop city. With labor and the negotiated standard wage rate out of the way, Louisville was more appealing to industries seeking new manufacturing facilities. Second, Louisville's fiscal stability had been preserved and the maintenance of necessary city services assured as a result of the political reform movement. With the economic elite in control of the regulatory boards and commissions, new business seeking to relocate could be confident that Louisville possessed a favorable business climate, had low taxes, and few labor problems to contend with.

Once these objectives were in place the economic elite launched a concerted effort to attract new business and capital to their city. The first step in this direction was the creation of the Louisville Convention and Publicity League. The League was established in 1910 by the Commercial Club and was designed to promote and attract quick money to the city. Conventions by their very nature bring a lot of money into a city and require very little long term financial commitment. Conventions
benefit a city's hotels, restaurants, retail stores, and transportation system by simply increasing usage of pre-existing capacity.

While the Commercial Club was promoting Louisville at this level, the BOT was developing a long term strategy. The economic elite who dominated the BOT began developing plans for permanently improving the financial infrastructure of the city by attracting new industries and employment. In Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, John Logan and Harvey Molotch point out that with "a transportation and communication grid already in place, modern cities typically seek growth in basic economic functions, particularly job intensive ones. Economic growth sets in motion the migration of labor and a demand for ancillary production services, housing, retailing, and wholesaling." The elite-dominated BOT understood these facts and knew that economic expansion and growth was mandatory for Louisville to improve its position.

On March 29, 1915, the BOT appointed Charles Phillips, Robert Hughes, V.H. Engelhard, Donald McDonald, and Arthur Mueller to a new Industrial Improvement Committee (IIC). The purpose of the IIC was to study and

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2 Logan and Molotch p. 58.
investigate the city's problems and make recommendations to the entire Board on how best to resolve them. The IIC began looking at successful cities in an attempt to analyze and possibly emulate their strategy. Their findings were published by the Courier Journal on July 9, 1916. The newspaper article revealed that Scranton, Pennsylvania had a $1,000,000 privately-funded Development Company which within two years had attracted 1000 new jobs into that city. Sioux City, Iowa with a $50,000 fund had lured nine new factories in less than one year. The BOT also discovered that privately funded and successful industrial expansion organizations existed in Davenport, Iowa; Easton, Pennsylvania and Madison, Wisconsin.

In many of these cities, funds were spent to purchase stock in a corporation which the organization had attracted. Thus, the stock purchases served as an incentive for the corporation to relocate. At the same time, stock ownership held out the possibility of paying dividends to investors, thereby serving as an incentive for private investment in the target company.

One successful organization in particular seems to have gripped the imagination of the IIC. The Haverhill, __________

3 Details of the formation of the IIC were published in the July 1916, Board of Trade Journal.
Massachusetts Board of Trade had created a privately-funded building association. The organization had constructed an industrial park which rented space to new industry at a favorable rate. Through this process the building association had successfully attracted industry and 4000 new jobs to that city. These jobs added $2,000,000 annually to the city in the form of wages. The Haverhill Building Association also collected the rent and paid an annual dividend of six percent to its stockholders.4

Upon completion of its investigation, the IIC recommended that the BOT create a permanent organization dedicated to the promotion and expansion of Louisville's economic and industrial development. This new sub-committee of the BOT was named the Louisville Industrial Foundation (LIF) and with its creation another critical step was taken towards the creation of a modern systemic growth regime. A growth regime which would unite all of the various competing elements of the city behind a unified commitment to urban growth and economic expansion.5

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4 Courier Journal, July 9, 1916.

5 The contemporary accounts give the BOT credit for the creation of the Louisville Industrial Foundation. However, we do not know who or what group first suggested and supported the concept of a formal growth

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As the LIF was being developed its promoters quickly realized that the first and most urgent order of business was to raise the necessary cash to launch the LIF and to prime the pump of economic growth. One million dollars was the amount of private capital targeted to be raised for the new LIF. An editorial in the July, 1916 Board of Trade Journal declared:

However opinions may vary as to the Herculean nature of the task of securing one million dollars in stock subscriptions to the Foundation, there is unanimity in the belief that Louisville needs the benefits which can be obtained through such an organization. The purpose of the leaders in this movement is to make Louisville a 100 percent city. This means that workshops, factories and stores are at full efficiency and the city is enjoying general prosperity.

organization. In all probability, the decision to upgrade Louisville's industrial base was first decided upon by a small handful of individuals and then simply channeled through the BOT. In order to more fully understand how a process of this nature could have developed, the reader should consult Community Power Structure by Hunter. Hunter presents an interview with a member of the Atlanta elite who recounted the steps his group took to form an International Trade Council. In the Atlanta case, a small group of the "inner crowd" accepted the plan in theory and then involved their own group of "followers." The "inner crowd" and "followers" then developed the concept and passed the idea and its governing principles down to "third string" men for implementation and administration. The concept of the trade council was then sold to the public as a "community proposition." This section of Hunter's work provides great insight into how the elite function in groups and achieve their goals. And even though it can not be proven, it is logical to assume that the Louisville Industrial Foundation developed in a similar manner as the Atlanta International Trade Council.

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The general public was informed of the impending million dollar fund-raising effort through a series of carefully worded editorials and news reports. All four of the city's leading newspapers endorsed the plan and devoted considerable space to reporting and detailing the need and predicted consequences of the fund drive. The Courier Journal ran a series of boxed-off slogans in large print which declared: "Speed Up Louisville! BUILD FACTORIES, Make Louisville Grow! BUILD FACTORIES, Get Louisville Talked About! BUILD FACTORIES, Put Money Into Circulation! BUILD FACTORIES, Make Louisville Hum! BUILD FACTORIES, Hitch Louisville To Prosperity! BUILD FACTORIES." 6

While the Courier Journal was promoting the positive effects of the Million Dollar Factory Fund, the Louisville Herald was warning city residents of the dire consequences which would result if the population failed to open their wallets and support the project. A July 23, 1916, Louisville Herald editorial warned:

(Should) the Foundation fall short of its requirements, the smoke-stacks will not point skyward, steeples each in its own way, of the gospel of work... (Louisville) would grow with a slow and all but imperceptible growth... but it would not have the growth, the

6 These slogans appeared on the front page of the Courier Journal all throughout March of 1916.
well-being, the impetus that are rightly its desserts.

In addition to the favorable coverage provided by the newspapers, the BOT published a series of three pamphlets which explained the need for industrial growth in Louisville. The first publication "Need of the Hour" had a picture of a large alarm clock hovering over a sleeping city. The message was clear: it was time for Louisville to wake up to the 20th century. The second pamphlet explained the nature of and purpose of the LIF. The LIF was to be a for-profit corporation, controlled by the stockholders through an elected board of directors. The third pamphlet "Questions and Answers" detailed how individuals were being invited to purchase stock which would pay dividends in the Foundation. Each share of stock was to cost the investor $100.7

The drive to raise a million dollars was launched on July 17, 1916 and scheduled to run for nine consecutive days. Campaign directors Robert E. Hughes and Thruston Ballard oversaw the activity and coordinated the efforts of over 600 volunteers. Hughes and Ballard divided the

7 The actual pamphlets published by the BOT have been lost as no actual copies could be uncovered. For abstracts of the contents of these pamphlets, the reader should consult the Louisville Times for July 5, and the Courier Journal for July 16, 1916. Both newspapers published summaries of the BOT pamphlets.
volunteers into occupational groups, with each group headed by a prominent member of the business community. In this manner all the real estate interests were in Caldwell Norton's team, retail merchants were in Charles Bensinger's team, general contractors and builders were in Alfred Struck's team, while John Barrett led the insurance agents and Thomas Floyd Smith the manufacturers, and so on, until the campaign eventually had 20 teams. Team members worked in pairs with the goal of reaching the majority of businesses, factories and households within the city.

The LIF fund-raising teams represented most of the city's business interests but did not include all segments of the population. The Jewish community was well represented by the involvement of Charles Bensinger, Walter Kohn, Isaac Bernheim, and Fred Levy. The Protestant German population was represented by Alfred Struck, Philip Tuley, Arthur Mueller and many others, but only three Catholics were identified as LIF participants. Furthermore, there were no LIF

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8 The three Catholics were Patrick Callahan, James Murphy and James Whallen who were identified as Catholic because of their membership in the Knights of Columbus. It is possible that other participants were also Catholic but held no position in the church's organizations and were therefore not identified as such. However, the data suggest Catholics were generally excluded which would be consistent with the position of Catholics during this
participants from the ranks of organized labor nor were any representatives from the African American community involved in the LIF.9

By the time the campaign fund was launched, most residents of Louisville knew the purpose and details of

period. In all probability Callahan, Murphy, and Whallen were included because of their position within the business and political establishments of the city. Callahan was president of the Louisville Varnish Company and a member of the Louisville Country Club, Audubon Country Club and the Pendennis Club. Murphy was also a member of the Country Club, Boat Club and Pendennis Club. Both Murphy and Callahan were obviously accepted members of Louisville's elite despite their religious affiliation. The involvement of James Whallen in the LIF will be discussed in a subsequent section of this work.

9 By the time the LIF was being formed organized labor had been severely weakened by the activity of the Employers' Association but it did still exist. Initially, labor was suspicious of the LIF in large part no doubt, because of the involvement of individuals such as Thruston Ballard. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated in a subsequent discussion, labor and the LIF eventually reached a working arrangement which was beneficial to both.

The African American community was excluded from most activity within the city during this period. However, it is also possible the leaders of the community did not seek involvement in the LIF as they were building their own financial establishments around the same time. Any money contributed to the LIF would be viewed as less money which could be invested in Mammoth Life and Accident Insurance as well as the other African American business ventures. Regardless of the reason, the lack of African American involvement excluded the community from any direct position within the growth regime after it was fully established and in place. Consequently, the African American community was even further eliminated from the benefits which the growth regime provided to the city and the majority of Louisville's residents.
the operation; the local media had seen to that. The Courier Journal printed excerpts from "Questions and Answers" which included the following information:

"Q. What is the purpose of the Foundation?
A. To quickly and substantially build up Louisville by the expansion of factories existing here and by bringing here new factories.

Q. Why should I subscribe for stock?
A. Because the Foundation will benefit every resident of the city."

Continuing throughout the campaign the local media hammered away at the population, encouraging them to buy stock, and all the while the newspapers preached the message of growth. A July 18, Courier Journal editorial proclaimed:

... it is plain common sense, enlightened selfishness, if you please, for we all know that if Louisville grows we must grow with it: that our individual prosperity is bound up, more or less, directly and intimately with that of the city; if it prospers we prosper with it and vice versa. If there is an owner of real estate here who has vacant houses, offices or apartments to rent, let him know that every addition to the population of the city increases his opportunity for renting his property. Is there a grocer, dry goods merchant, hardware dealer, tin-ware dealer, furniture dealer, builder, architect, doctor or lawyer present who does not know that every addition to the population of the city is an advantage to him?

At 9 a.m. on July 17, 1916, team members began
canvassing the city selling stock in the LIF: a proposed corporation which had not yet come into existence. Their campaign slogan was "more residents for Louisville, more industry for Louisville, more business for Louisville."\textsuperscript{10} The volunteers wore paper bands around their hats on which were silhouettes of factory buildings and chimneys. Across the bands in large white letters were the words "What We Are After."\textsuperscript{11}

The fund drive itself became a time of jovial civic pride and boosterism. The real estate team collected "for rent" signs and piled them up in the windows of the BOT building. Then through an imaginative use of electric fans, lights and red and yellow cheese cloth, the team made them appear to be burning. Surrounding the images were poster board factories. A lively competition also quickly developed between teams. Each night after the days totals were counted, the most successful team had its leader's name inscribed on a silver tray which became a coveted trophy.

No money was actually collected during this time however. The campaign instead was an effort to collect


\textsuperscript{11} Louisville Times, July 19, 1916.
signatures on pledge notes. The signed pledge notes would only become valid if the desired goal of one million dollars was reached. On the ninth and final day of the campaign when the teams' totals were counted, the citizens and business interests of the city had pledged $1,024,800 for industrial development. With the intended goal reached, the pledge notes became valid. Payment for each $100 share of stock was to be made in semi-annual installments of $10 each per share of stock for a five year period. Each subscriber was a stockholder in the LIF and entitled to vote for the organizations officers and attend board meetings.

The soon-to-be chartered LIF was owned by 3,118 individuals and businesses. The breakdown of stock ownership is in itself an interesting point (see Table 4). Just under 50 percent of the enterprise was owned by large business interests while the remaining stock was in the hands of individual investors. The two largest subscribers were the Louisville Gas and Electric Company and the Louisville Railway Company, each with an

12 The entire $1,024,800 was never collected. Over the course of the five year collection period, death, default and migration reduced the actual amount of paid-in-full subscriptions to $875,759.

13 Table 4 was taken from The Louisville Industrial Foundation (1945) by Ernest J. Hopkins.
investment of $25,000. Other substantial corporate investors included Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing and Bernheim Distilling Company which each invested $15,000, Peaslee-Gaulbert Paint and Varnish with a $10,000 investment, the Louisville Title Company, Carter Dry Goods Company, and the Louisville *Courier Journal* which all invested $5,000 each.

The individual investors whose subscriptions totalled $421,200 included many of the city's most prominent individuals. Fred Sackett purchased 50 shares of LIF stock and became the largest individual shareholder, while William Bullitt purchased 10 shares. The majority of individual investors were, however, more modest than Sackett's and Bullitt's. John Barrett purchased two shares of LIF stock, while Helm Bruce, William Miller, Frank Dugan and many others purchased just a single share.

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14 The Louisville Gas and Electric Company was created when the Byllesby Engineering and Management Corporation consolidated the Louisville Gas Company, the Louisville Electric Light Company, and the Kentucky Heating Company. The city of Louisville owned one third of the stock in the Louisville Gas Company and some stock in the Lighting Company, but sold off its interest with the Byllesby merger. For more information on this aspect of Louisville's development, see "Gas History of City" in the *Courier Journal*, June 17, 1924, and *Light Years: A History of Louisville Gas and Electric Company 1838 - 1988* (1988) Louisville, LG&E.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF LIF INVESTOR</th>
<th>NO. OF INVESTORS IN THIS CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOTAL AMOUNT INVESTED BY CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$60,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brick and Tile companies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building contractors</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>15,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing manufacturers</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department stores</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Companies</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor and beer manufacturers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber dealers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber manufacturers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager of companies</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paint, varnish, and oil</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidents of corporations</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>64,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printers</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate companies</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail grocers</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>17,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail liquor dealers</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries and treasurers of corporations</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>24,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice presidents of corporations</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale dry goods companies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale hardware companies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small scale and individual subscribers</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>427,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>$1,024,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, not all of the individual investors were from the elite ranks. Most of the individual investors were classified as barbers, florists, laborers, pawnbrokers, clerks, etc. Thirty seven of the single stock purchasers were listed in the subscription books as
widows.\textsuperscript{15}

Once the pledges were achieved for the necessary funds, a formal plan of how the organization would be controlled was needed. The elite who were the guiding force behind the LIF were an extremely cautious and conservative group and were determined to see to it that the LIF functioned in the same reserved manner. However, the non-profit BOT could not legally govern a for-profit corporation. Once the LIF's Articles of Incorporation were accepted by the state of Kentucky, the Foundation would have to become a separate entity from the BOT. From the elite perspective, this presented a potentially dangerous situation. As mandated by state law, the LIF Board of Directors would be elected by the stockholders and a large portion of LIF stock was in the hands of unknown elements: individuals who could not be trusted to vote for men of sound conservative business principles. The LIF's Articles of Incorporation were thus written by Frederick Sackett, John Barr and Percy Johnston, and filed by the law firm of Humphrey, Middleton and Humphrey. The men who drafted the Articles devised an

\textsuperscript{15} This information was came from the original LIF subscription books which are not catalogued, but are available from the Filson Club Archives. Hereafter, all Louisville Industrial Foundation Records in the Filson Club Archives will be referred to as LIF records.
extremely simple solution to keep the LIF under elite control. They stipulated that the number of the LIF's Directors was to be set at 15 and also that:

It shall be the policy of the Foundation to elect the President of the Louisville Board of Trade as one of the Directors, and to elect at least one-half of the remaining Directors from a list of Foundation stockholders ... nominated by the Board of Directors of the Louisville Board of Trade...\(^{16}\)

The carefully-worded Articles assured elite domination by stipulating that a majority of LIF board members would be pre-approved individuals by the elite-controlled BOT. With this provision worked out, the Louisville Industrial Foundation was incorporated on September 7, 1916. The LIF charter members included Peter Atherton, William Heyburn, Donald McDonald, Caldwell Norton, and Thomas F. Smith among others. The first LIF board of directors was elected three weeks later on September 29.

In the previous decade, the political reform movement had been dominated by attorneys, but the LIF was commanded by the city's executive class. An examination of 50 LIF leaders reveals that they jointly held 691 membership slots within the Louisville data. The category

\(^{16}\) Articles of Incorporation of the LIF, LIF records.
breakdown of these 50 individuals' membership slots includes 98 political slots, 261 economic slots, and 332 social slots.\textsuperscript{17} Six of the 50 LIF leaders were attorneys and seven of the group were also leaders of the 1905 reform movement. Twenty four of the LIF leadership analyzed were classified as executives within Louisville's business community. The LIF leadership also controlled 103 board positions on 25 individual local banks, had four members on the Louisville Board of Real

\textsuperscript{17} The 50 LIF leaders analyzed were those who served the organization or fund raising campaign in some capacity or were identified by the newspapers as having some position of leadership. The LIF leaders analyzed were: Theodore Ahrens, Lafon Allen, John Atherton, Peter Atherton, Lewis Atwood, Thurston Ballard, John Barr, John W. Barr, John Barret, Charles Bensinger, Isaac Bernheim. Curd Bridges, James B. Brown, William Bullitt, Joseph Burge, William Caldwell, Patrick Callahan, Andrew Cowan, Victor Engelhart, Oscar Fenley, Charles Gladfelter, William Head, William Heyburn, Charles Huhlein, Alexander Humphrey, Robert Hughes, Percy Johnston, David Keller, Walter Kohn, Fred Levy, Wible Mapother, Donald McDonald, John McFerran, Robert McKellar, Clarence Mengel, Arthur Mueller, James Murphy, Caldwell Norton, George Norton, Charles Phillips, Frederick Sackett, John Saunders, Thomas Smith, William Speed, Alfred Struck, Embry Swearingen, James Todd, Philip Tuley, Robert Vaughn and James Whallen.

It should also be noted that the creation of the LIF was the dividing point between the two time periods analyzed. Therefore, some of the LIF leaders appeared twice for the same organization, once for the first time period and again for the second. Since the total network has been calculated around available slots, and since one criteria for access to the top ranks of the growth regime was membership in both time periods, this is not viewed as problematic. However, the reader should be aware of this fact when examining this LIF analysis.
Estate, and four members on two of the city's largest insurance companies. The University of Louisville was also represented by five individuals who were on the University Board of Trustees.

The LIF leadership was also politically active and controlled 19 positions within municipal government. Fourteen of the individuals analyzed served as directors of the BOT, two represented the Louisville Herald, two served on the L&N Board of Directors, two on the Southern Railroad, and six on the Board of the Louisville Railroad Company. Louisville's utility companies were represented by seven individuals. Eight were leaders of the Republican Party, while three were associated with leadership of the Democratic Party. The LIF leaders also contained four individuals who could be described as professional politicians.

Socially, the 50 LIF leaders included 16 individuals who were members of the Filson Club, 33 belonged to the Louisville Country Club, and 35 were members of the Pendennis Club. The men involved in the LIF were very well integrated into the city's political, social and economic network and were a highly active group. Despite the fact that many of the LIF stockholders were small individual investors, the LIF itself was controlled by Louisville's most influential citizens. That high level
of elite domination made the LIF one of Louisville's most prominent organizations in the second decade of the 20th century.

The Louisville Industrial Foundation

The Articles of Incorporation under which the LIF functioned were extremely clear about the purpose and intent of the organization. The Articles stated that "The nature of its business shall be to advance and develop the City of Louisville and vicinity industrially...."

The LIF approached its task through a three-pronged attack. First, every available scrap of information that a potential investor might require was gathered. "The modern manufacturer insists on dealing with hard, cold facts," pronounced LIF president Lewis R. Atwood in 1917. "It is surprising but true, that comparatively few cities in this country thoroughly understand what they have to offer." Atwood, who was being quoted in the April 29 issue of the Courier Journal, explained the first prong of the LIF strategy. "Our files at this time contain complete descriptions of every available vacant factory in the city, and as soon as practicable we plan to begin

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18 Articles of Incorporation of the LIF, LIF records.

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a campaign for the purpose of offering these buildings to industries to which they are best suited."\textsuperscript{19}

Once the fact-finding stage of the endeavor was completed, the second prong of the LIF strategy was introduced. The LIF launched an active campaign to improve Louisville's image and to promote the city. In a series of LIF publications, the city was presented as a favorable location in which to engage in industrial activity. Emphasizing Louisville's central location, proximity to raw materials, transportation networks, and favorable labor climate, the LIF promotional literature undoubtedly made a pleasing impression on perspective investors. One imaginative image-building technique was the Louisville booster car, a white Model T which carried the message Fastest Growing City in the South on its silver spare-tire cover. This car made a 3000-mile, cross-country trip distributing literature to potential investors and promoting Louisville.\textsuperscript{20} In advertising efforts of this nature, the LIF was much like many similar organizations throughout the nation and

\textsuperscript{19} The Louisville \textit{Courier Journal} April 29, 1917 Section 5. p. 2.

\textsuperscript{20} For details of the booster car, see Share. Ford Motor Company began assembling Model T's in Louisville in 1913, but greatly expanded its production facility in the city with a new factory in 1918.

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functioned as a traditional Chamber of Commerce.

It was the third prong of the LIF's strategy which was unique to Louisville. In an effort to strengthen Louisville's industrial base, the majority of LIF capital was earmarked for investment. The Foundation was prepared to offer whatever financial incentives were necessary (within the limitations of its Articles of Incorporation) to entice new industry into the area. To this end, the LIF was empowered to make loans, acquire stock, purchase and refurbish buildings or purchase land. In essence, the LIF became a partner with the new, expanding or immigrating company.

Many cities at this time had organizations which operated along these lines, but Louisville's experiment offered a new wrinkle the others lacked. The promoters of the LIF wanted the Foundation to be a totally unique and permanent organization dedicated to the economic growth of Louisville. One criticism leveled against similar organizations in other cities was the one-shot nature of the ventures. Capital was raised and immediately expended upon promotions and investments. Additional capital, therefore, had to be continually raised to lure each new acquisition. The LIF would not repeat that same mistake.

The architects of the LIF were determined not to have any additional fund-raising drives. They wanted a
continuing, self-sustaining and profitable foundation. The individuals responsible for drafting the LIF's Articles of Incorporation fulfilled that desire by making the Foundation a continuing player in Louisville's economic development. This goal was achieved through careful planning and stringent guidelines.

The risk of insolvency resulting from the default or bankruptcy of a client corporation was minimized by provisions of the Articles. No more than ten percent of the Foundation's working capital could be invested in any single venture. With this provision, the LIF was assured of a broad-based portfolio. Additionally, the LIF could incur no more than $250,000 in debt or liability at any single time.\(^{21}\) Also, the Foundation's capital was placed into an interest-bearing, revolving fund. Since the actual stock purchasing plan called for ten bi-annual payments, the LIF had a guaranteed income for five consecutive years. As money invested during this period began to be repaid with interest, the Foundation's treasury was continually being replenished; even after the original investors had satisfied their debt. This strategy proved extremely successful and according to a May 8, 1949 Courier Journal article, the original

\(^{21}\) Articles of Incorporation of the LIF, LIF records.
subscribed capital had turned over 5.42 times in 33 years.

The rather conservative investment policies of the LIF is perhaps another reason for the success of the venture. The organization's Articles clearly defined the purpose of industrial investment and the type of investment that the Foundation was to engage in. Investments were restricted to the boundaries of metropolitan Louisville which not only assured that the city would benefit from the work of the LIF, but also placed the receiving corporations and companies under the watchful eye of the LIF and its parent organization, the BOT.

The Articles also restricted investments to manufacturing ventures. No money was to be allotted to service, construction or trade enterprises which were not based in the manufacturing of products. Furthermore, the amount of capital which the LIF could invest into any single venture was capped at ten percent of the Foundation's capital or 33.3 percent of the value of the receiving industry, which ever came first. In this way the Foundation could never accrue controlling interest or liability in any single business investment.

The lack of controlling interest in client corporations did not mean that the LIF was without
considerable influence. Its Articles of Incorporation assured the LIF interests by stipulating:

The Directors shall have the power to transfer to one or more Foundation stockholders a sufficient number of shares in any corporation in which the Foundation may be a stockholder to enable such Foundation stockholder or stockholders to be elected a director or directors in such corporation: and such stockholder or stockholders shall hold said stock as trustee for the Foundation.\textsuperscript{22}

With maneuvers of this nature, Louisville's economic elite, through their connections with the LIF were in a position to become interlocked with a substantial number of the city's commercial ventures. Also, this provision in the Articles could help explain why the LIF primarily recruited small and medium sized factories. "We encourage the smaller industries to locate here," commented LIF president F.B. Ayres. "We have found that the more modest enterprises are easier to handle and more stable than many large undertakings."\textsuperscript{23}

Through the LIF, Louisville's elite were interlocked with far more than simply new and expanding businesses, they had a direct connection with the area's banking community as well. The LIF, which shared directors with

\textsuperscript{22} A 1917 amendment to the Articles of Incorporation mandated that a LIF Board of Director's member be placed on the board of any company which the LIF funded.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Louisville Times, October 1, 1928, Part 2, p.2.}
all of Louisville's major banks, actively avoided competition with these banks. In fact, when a potential manufacturer in need of cash was located, the LIF worked with area banks in an attempt to first secure the necessary funds through the traditional banking organizations. The LIF would only invest in an enterprise if the commercial banks refused to lend the required money.

When the LIF did grant a loan, it was usually to ventures which were deemed too risky for the commercial banks or in cases where there was insufficient collateral to secure the loan. The LIF also charged the same interest rate as local banks, and LIF loans were for a longer period of time than conventional bank loans. Typically, an LIF loan was for five to ten years. With this agenda the LIF was able to steer clear of direct competition with the area's banks while still providing a useful service. The LIF created a successful and profitable niche for itself and supplemented the commercial banking institutions in the process.24

One of the very first investments made by the LIF was also one of its most successful. On January 4, 1917 the foundation loaned three Virginia brothers $30,000.

24 For additional information on the lending practices of the LIF, see Hopkins.
The money was spent to refurbish a vacant Louisville building into a small cleaning solvent plant. By 1940, the Reynolds Metals Company had grown into a $91,000,000 national corporation with 40 plants. Nine of those plants were located in the Louisville area and employed thousands of workers. The LIF return on its investment was only $1,056, but the benefit to the city was immeasurable. The annals of the LIF are filled with other success stories although none as dramatic as Reynolds.

The early 1920s were the glory years for the Foundation. The economy was booming in general and the LIF saw to it that Louisville won its share of industrial growth and expansion. The two most successful years for the LIF were 1921 and 1923. In these two years alone the Foundation participated in the acquisition or expansion of 89 factories. Only a very few of these businesses were actually funded by the Foundation, but all four of Louisville's newspapers gave the LIF credit for locating the ventures and persuading them to open up operations in the city. On January 25, 1924, the Post reported the acquisitions for 1923 alone added 945 employees to Louisville's work force who were collectively paid annual

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25 The May 8, 1949 Courier Journal discusses the success of the LFL and Reynolds Metals in particular.
wages of $7,000,000. A May 8, 1949, Courier Journal article credited the LIF with lending $4,749,000 in 66 individual financial ventures as of that year. The LIF was also credited with participating in the attraction of 95 plants which brought an original capital investment of $22 million into the city.

The LIF also experienced some failures, although few in comparison to its success rate. Between 1917 and 1945 only four investments failed, forcing the Foundation to write off $209,021. Undoubtedly one reason for so few failures was the conservative investment nature of the Foundation. The LIF actually invested in relatively few ventures and only in those which showed the greatest promise of success. The records indicate the LIF rejected 356 applications between 1917 and 1945.26

Despite its cautious nature, the LIF was an extremely successful organization, particularly during the first decade of its existence. The direct and indirect benefits to the city resulting from the LIF activity can never be accurately calculated, however it is clear the role played by the LIF substantially developed and broadened the city's industrial base (See

26 For details regarding these rejections, see the LFL minute books and Hopkins, 1945.
Table 5. The LIF succeeded in bringing the city's economic and industrial structure into the 20th century.

Table 5
Production Financed by the LIF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Group</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$875,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>565,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood products</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>431,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiber products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>271,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>209,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, 46</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$2,803,947</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A refers to a native Louisville industry which expanded, B refers to a totally new industry, C refers to an industry relocated to Louisville from another area, D refers to recently funded, E refers to total number of enterprises and F refers to amount of new capital provided.)

However, the real significance of the LIF rests in the fact that its creation was the final step in the establishment of a growth regime that forged a

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Table 5 was taken from *The Louisville Industrial Foundation* by Hopkins.
partnership between the competing political and economic elements of the city and established a unified and consolidated alliance dedicated to the philosophy of urban growth. From this date forward, political disputes and economic conflicts were never allowed to negatively impact urban growth.

Formation of a Growth Regime

The creation of the Louisville growth regime can be attributed to a series of complex and interrelated factors. As previously stated, organized labor was weakened and the standardized wage rate eliminated. Through this process the Louisville Employers' Association established labor discipline and could insure potential immigrating industries that Louisville was an open shop city with a favorable labor climate. Urban government was then cleaned up, stabilized, and a professional pro-business municipal orientation created. This process guaranteed fiscal security by placing the regulatory boards and city services under the direct control of the business class of Louisville. The LIF was then developed and new investment and capital attracted to Louisville. As the city expanded, its private economic and public tax base were enhanced and began to increase.
Collectively, these are the ingredients necessary for the establishment of a growth regime. However, these components in and of themselves do not necessarily assure that a sustainable regime will emerge. Labor can reorganize and once again challenge the business class or tarnish the image of the labor climate.\textsuperscript{28} Political fortunes can change and the spoils of victory awarded to an opposition with an alternative agenda. And, the population of a city can form coalitions and actively work to hinder or defeat a pro-growth itinerary.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, a successful systemic regime must unite the

\textsuperscript{28} The Louisville Federation of Labor was essentially crushed by the Employers' Association in the first decade of the century and labor would not regain its previous level of power and work place control until the Great Depression. However, in 1912 the surviving Louisville unions merged with the Kentucky Federation of Labor. This organization affiliated with the AFoFl, and the local unions began rebuilding and once again gathering strength.

leadership pools of all the urban factions under a consolidated consensus of opinion that prevents any negative events from taking place which could foil continued growth. Accordingly, a growth regime can only materialize after private economic, political, and social interests intersect and jointly embrace a philosophy of continued and sustained urban growth. Additionally, the independent factions of the city must be willing when necessary to subsume or compromise their specific agendas under a broader commitment to growth. At the same time the regime must be willing to occasionally make concessions to the independent factions in order to maintain regime harmony and solidarity. A growth regime is therefore a unified, negotiated, and self-perpetuating pro-growth consensus of opinion among the diverse factions of the city.

To accomplish this level of consensus a working partnership must be forged among the leadership pools of the various urban factions. This partnership must accept a philosophy which decrees continued growth is necessary, desirable, and beneficial to both the city and the partners of the regime. Nevertheless, not all partners are equal or obtain an equivalent level of advantage from the partnership. The spoils of growth are allocated proportionally, and contingent upon a partners location
and status within the regime.

The partnership structure of the regime may be loosely compared to that of a large law firm with senior, junior, and associate partners. The senior partners construct, control, and coordinate regime activity and have complete access to regime resources and benefits. They are in a position to visualize the entire regime and only become involved in the daily routine of regime maintenance when necessary. Generally, the senior partners delegate authority to the appropriate junior partners who are responsible for the actual maintenance and smooth operation of the regime. The junior partners lack the same high degree of control or regime-wide leverage of the senior partners but can still influence the regime as a result of their own organizational position. They also receive both direct and indirect benefits from their position within the regime. The junior partners are largely but not exclusively what Floyd Hunter referred to as second-string men. The senior and junior partners are the most critical elements of the partnership structure and will be discussed separately and in depth in Chapter VI.

The third category of partnership is the associate partners which is the most inclusive of the three levels of partnership. The associate partners have no control or
influence but support the regime in principle. Consequently, the associate partners receive only indirect benefits from the regime. Nevertheless, in order for the regime to be successful the vast majority of the population must be co-opted as associated partners and support the concept of growth as expressed by the regime.

The Louisville growth regime began to solidify when the senior and junior partners were able to sell the philosophy of growth through the LIF to a multitude of potential and necessary associate partners. To accomplish this task, the partners first manipulated their own privately-owned and publicly-controlled organizations and united those organizations behind the goals of the LIF and ultimately the growth regime. These critical organizations were then used to convince the general public growth was necessary and desirable, and to co-opt the public and effectively turn the public into supportive associate partners. Thus the largest business and financial institutions of the city, the media, utility and transportation companies, and the University of Louisville were all instruments of associate partnership acquisition and regime hegemony. Institutions of this nature generally favor growth by the very nature of their business but their support is nevertheless critical to the formation and continued smooth operation
of the growth regime. Accordingly, the individuals who control these organizations generally obtain high status within and direct benefit from the growth regime.

The utility companies, transportation companies, newspapers, and university all supported the LIF and the growth regime's agenda.\(^{30}\) It is understandable why some of these organizations were major subscribers of LIF stock. Organizations such as these have only one avenue through which they can expand their revenue and that is through municipal growth. Increased population translates into increased circulation, new transit lines, an increased demand for utility service, and more students. Logan and Molotch recognize that organizations of this type have a vested interest in growth and are thus easily co-opted to the philosophy of growth. But also, at least in the case of Louisville, the senior and junior partners either owned or controlled these organizations. Therefore, the partners received direct benefits from growth as it was

\(^{30}\) The involvement of the Louisville media in the LIF is consistent with the national elite experience. Domhoff points out that "There is at least one newspaper owned by a Social Register listed in every city with a Social Register except Pittsburgh." Domhoff further states, "Outside of Social Register cities there are such aristocratically owned newspapers as those of the Chandlers of Los Angles, the Hobbys of Houston, and the Bambahs of Louisville." Domhoff, p. 81. However, Domhoff did not research these cities because they had no Social Register which was his primary unit of analysis.
funneled through these organizations. In short, the primary partners of the growth regime used corporate funds to partially support the LIF while pocketing direct profits generated by that growth.

For the top echelons of the partnership the growth regime as it was expressed through the LIF was a means of obtaining municipal economic growth and personal enrichment just as the Louisville and Portland Canal, the L&N, and the utility companies had been in the previous century. However, there were several major structural difference between the LIF and 19th century enterprises. In the LIF municipal funds were replaced by individual investments. The city of Louisville had been withdrawing from direct ownership of the 19th century institutions and had sold its stock in the Canal and L&N, and had started to withdraw from the utility companies. The city-owned Gas Company (GAS) had been sold at the dividing point between the two time periods of analysis and the privately-owned Louisville Gas and Electric Company (LGE) was established. By the time the LIF was founded, Louisville was rapidly getting out of the investment business.31

31 The fact that the city of Louisville withdrew from investment such as this is consistent with the experiences of other cities throughout the nation. For more information on this subject refer to Domhoff and Logan and
The substitution of individual funds over municipal money actually provided the regime with advantages which were not always available when municipal funds were depended upon. Funding by individual sources and the wording of the LIF Articles of Incorporation provided the growth regime with total control over the organization. The growth regime did not have to risk voters turning down a bond issue as they had occasionally in the past or worry about who controlled city hall. The growth regime itself directly controlled the corporation and its money. Therefore, neither municipal government nor the general voting public had any control over the LIF. In fact, urban government was needed for little more than road construction, sewerage service, and supplying utility services to the new factories and as will be demonstrated, the regime controlled the various municipal regulatory agencies responsible for these services.

The University of Louisville was also a unique player within the growth regime and served the needs of the regime on several levels. The university and its pro-growth faculty gave credibility to the regime agenda by promoting the issue of growth. It is also probably not a coincidence that the creation of the Department of Molotch.
Business coincided with the consolidation of the regime or that the first Chair of this department was one of the most influential senior partners of the regime. The University was also interlocked with both the LIF and the BOT through its board of directors and these economic institutions frequently acted as university boosters and worked to improve university enrollment. Beginning in 1916, the Board of Trade Journal (BTJ) published a series of articles explaining the need to upgrade the university.

More and more it would appear, Louisville is going to come to realize that it has in its University of Louisville a city development investment of tremendous possibilities ... it should be possible for the University of Louisville to educate men for executive positions ... to turn out business administrators ... and educate the youth of the city for employment in the mercantile and industrial establishments of the city.33

The BTJ also pointed out that there were "some immediate financial benefits" to be received by strengthening the university. The BOT estimated that 1000 Louisville students annually attended out-of-town universities. And at $500 dollars per year, per student

32 William Belknap was Chair of the Department and remained active in the Department and later the School of Business until his death in 1965.

33 This editorial appeared in the December, 1916 BTJ p. 15.
that represented a loss of "$500,000 that (was) earned in Louisville." "This money spent at home," explained the BTJ in July, 1917, "would add much to our prosperity." The BOT lobbied for and supported increased property taxes provided the revenue was used to upgrade the university. The BOT also maintained a University Bureau, and the University Club was created to promote the University. The University Club (UC) quickly became one of the growth regime's most central and significant organizations.

The activity of the regime resulted in a major expansion of the University of Louisville. Several rival medical schools within the city were squeezed out of existence after their poor quality of education received national exposure in the Flexner Report. The University of Louisville then made a concerted effort to improve its

34 BTJ July, 1917 p. 6.

35 The influence that the Louisville growth regime exerted over the University of Louisville is consistent with national elite control. According to Domhoff, "Control of America's leading universities by members of the American business aristocracy is more direct than with any other institution which they control. ... Upper-class control of major universities is achieved through such financial support as family endowments, personal gifts, foundation gifts, and corporate gifts, and through service on the board of trustees. These mechanisms give the upper class control of the broad framework, the long-run goals and the general atmosphere of the university." Domhoff, p. 77.
own medical department and fill the void left by the demise of these private medical schools.\textsuperscript{36} The College of Arts and Sciences was also revamped and expanded, and in 1923 the university was given a large tract of land by the Belknap family for the site of a new enlarged campus.

The growth regime successfully and rather easily united the utility companies, transportation companies, media, and the University of Louisville behind its agenda, and these institutions expanded as a result of urban growth. These organizations received direct benefits from their support of and position within the regime. At the same time that support served the self interest of many of the individual partners who were at the heart of the regime. The senior and junior partners controlled and manipulated these organizations and thus received both direct and indirect benefits from the pro-growth support of the organizations.

The associate partners of the growth regime were not directly controlled by the senior and junior partners and consequentially were more difficult to co-opt and manage. The associate partners consisted of the common citizens, professional politicians, and organized labor. When these

\textsuperscript{36} Cox, Dwayne (1988) "The Louisville Medical Institute: A Case History in American Medical Education."
elements were successfully co-opted to the philosophy of growth, a true systemic regime was born. Nevertheless, that process was not without difficulty and mandated some concessions on the part of the regime. In order to understand the formation and success of the regime, the process and purpose of associate partnership acquisition must be examined in some detail.

The common citizenry must be endowed with associate partnership status in order for the regime to be successful even though the citizenry derive no direct benefit from growth and urban expansion. Nevertheless, their commitment to or at least acceptance of the philosophy of growth is critical to the success of the regime. Without that acceptance there is always a danger the citizenry could challenge a pro-growth agenda or the regime itself. Consequently, it is essential that the majority of the residents be co-opted and convinced urban growth is advantageous and desirable.

However, the urban citizenry is problematic for the regime because it consists of both organized and unorganized elements. The organized elements contain the various racial, ethnic, and religious elements of the city and is easier to co-opt and control precisely because they are organized. These groups are part of the organizational structure of the city, have recognized
leadership pools which may be directly negotiated with, and when necessary compromises may be extended to those leadership pools. An example of such a compromise occurred after the formation of the ILP when political and economic concessions were made to the African American community.

The vast majority of the citizenry were unorganized but their acceptance of growth was still critical to maintain regime stability and offset any negative anti-growth sentiments which could have emerged. The unorganized general citizenry was also more difficult to control and manipulate since no leadership pools existed which could be negotiated with. To resolve this problem the regime created new and more inclusive bridge organizations. The bridge organizations brought more individuals into the organizational structure of the city, helped unify the regime, and functioned as conduits through which information was disseminated and consensus obtained. The bridge organizations will be discussed in Chapter VI of the analysis.

The greatest regime tool for bestowing associate partnership status upon the unorganized common citizenry was philosophical rather than organizational. By establishing the LIF the growth regime physically grounded the abstract concept of growth in a concrete
reality. The LIF gave the philosophy of growth an identity and a goal which could be recognized and understood by the residents of the city. The partners who were the driving force of the regime used their structural connections in the media to sell that identity and goal to the public. Logan and Molotch believe the "media have a special influence simply because they are committed to growth per se, and can play an invaluable role in coordinated strategy and selling growth to the public."37 Through a well developed media campaign surrounding the LIF, the regime was able to connect civic pride to the goal of growth and assure the support of the general population.

A large percent of LIF funding was provided by common citizens who purchased stock in the corporation. Obviously, the growth regime did not need the economic investment of average citizens to launch the LIF. What they did need, however, was the total acceptance of the concept of growth by the urban population. The selling of LIF stock helped achieve that necessary high degree of consensus. By selling stock in the LIF, the growth regime invited the general public to participate and accept a degree of ownership in urban growth. Granted, only a very

37 See Logan and Molotch p. 72, for full details of this aspect of their analysis.
small percentage of the total population actually purchased stock, but everyone was invited to participate, and everyone was informed that they would receive indirect benefits from the organization. Accordingly, the invitation and the perceived rewards served to enhance the feelings of civic pride and ownership and decrease the possibility of opposition.

This invitation and sense of ownership facilitated the creation of an illusion the entire population supported the concept of growth and development. This illusion was of vital importance because the population must favor growth in order to support the concept of economic development. This general attitude helps reassure investors that a particular locality is favorable to business and will support any incentives which are offered to business. The image of public support was perhaps of particular importance in Louisville as the regime was being established and attempting to market the city. After crushing the unions and toppling the political machine, the regime probably recognized the necessity of presenting a portrait of

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38 In addition to supplying the necessary support services, the city of Louisville also suspended local taxes for five years on new industries entering the area.
municipal stability to potential investors. Public acceptance, support, and ownership of the LIF contributed to a positive municipal image and was a selling point which could be exploited.

Through the offer of LIF stock, the small investors and citizenry of Louisville were effectively turned into associate partners in the growth regime. However, despite all outward appearances that partnership was in many cases contentious at best. One area of criticism frequently leveled against the LIF was the fact that it never actually paid dividends. Consequently, many of the small investors felt betrayed. The growth regime's leadership justified the lack of dividends by pointing to the indirect benefits to Louisville's economic development and argued that the investors were better served by having the profits reinvested into the LIF. In this way the money could be dedicated to further development.

A great many of the small investors apparently became disillusioned by the arguments for indirect benefits and this eventually created a degree of animosity between the LIF and many small investors. Some

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39 The events surrounding the political reform movement in Louisville were reported in the New York Times and national press.
individual investors never bought their stock in full and a careful reading of the Foundation's subscription books reveals that numerous small investors simply stopped making payments and forfeited their investments. Ultimately, the disaffection of some investors was negligible as the illusion of support had already been established and the dissatisfied investors never organized or formed an effective opposition to the regime.

The city's professional politicians were also co-opted and turned into associate partners in the growth regime. The senior and junior partners already controlled the Republican Party and used the LIF to co-opt the Democrat Party. James Whallen was an LIF supporter, had been actively involved in the creation of the organization, and had served as a member of the governing body of the million dollar factory. The July 9, 1916 edition of the Courier Journal discussed Whallen's involvement with and support of the LIF. Whallen's involvement implies the Democratic machine supported the LIF and signaled that fact to the Democratic voters of the city. Whallen and members of the senior and junior partners may have been political enemies but they could unite behind the concept of urban growth and function as partners within the regime.
With the Democratic and Republican Party leadership committed to growth as well as the media and general public, politicians had no option but to support the regime's agenda. Candidates running for local office had to run on a pro-growth platform or risk defeat. Consequently, the professional politicians of Louisville, regardless of party affiliation, became associate partners of the regime out of political necessity.

Organized labor was also co-opted by the growth regime and eventually threw its support behind the LIF. However, that support only came after the LIF made concessions and adopted a position of neutrality regarding labor. The LIF policy of neutrality grew out of one of the very first investments made by the LIF. In February, 1917 the LIF awarded $50,000 to the Inman Veneer and Panel Company to expand its operation to a new, larger factory. The factory was to be built by the Alfred Struck Company. Struck was a junior partner and member of the LIF Board of Directors. Shortly after the financial deal was completed and construction begun, Inman workers struck the plant in an attempt to establish a union shop. The LIF supported the employer and the AFofL supported the workers. This situation resulted in open hostilities between the unions and the growth regime as labor leaders charged the LIF was nothing more than a
front for the open shop forces.

This was a critical stage in both the LIF's and growth regime's development. Since LIF stock subscriptions were to be paid gradually over a period of five years and close to half of the funds were to be paid by small investors (including laborers), the LIF was in danger of having the negative publicity undermine the collection process. Financing was clearly a concern, but perhaps even more important was the issue of image maintenance. Even though the power of labor had been decreased, the regime realized it could not afford to have labor openly hostile or calling strikes against LIF investments. A hostile labor climate could scare off client companies considering relocating to Louisville. Therefore, the regime needed to establish a better relationship with the city's labor leaders if it were to be successful.

The unanticipated Inman strike and surrounding controversy led to a conference between the LIF directors and the labor leaders where a settlement was eventually reached. The LIF Articles of Incorporation were amended to include a provision which forbid the LIF from becoming involved in any dispute between labor and an LIF-client company. The standard contract which was to be used in all subsequent contracts between the LIF and client
companies was also negotiated at this time. The new contract specifically stated that it was "mutually agreed and understood that the said party of the second part (LIF) shall not be a party in determining or adjusting relations or disputes between said party of the first part (the client company) and its employees, or their representatives."  

Many of the senior and junior partners of the regime would continue to express their anti-labor philosophy through the Louisville Manufacturers' Association, but the LIF was to be neutral ground between the growth regime and labor. In this case the regime bowed to labor and invited labor to join the growth regime. Consequently, labor received indirect benefit from their new associate partnership status. Labor is essentially a dependable supporter of growth in virtually all cases because growth translates into more jobs, higher employment, and perhaps increased union membership. Thus, local labor leaders were like James Whallen, they were willing to join forces with their antagonists in the

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40 The complete text of the Standard Contract of the LIF may be found in the LIF Records located in the Filson Club Archives.

41 See Logan and Molotch for an analysis of the relationship between labor, the concept of growth, and labor's connection with the growth (regime) machine.
name of municipal growth.

The citizens, local government, politicians, and organized labor of Louisville were all co-opted and given associate partner status in the growth regime. Throughout the remainder of the 20th century that regime and those partnerships would become more firmly established and eventually include new organizations such as the Louisville Area Development Association (1943), the Labor-Management Council (1947), the Chamber of Commerce (1950), Louisville Central Area INC. (1958), Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority (1964), Louisville Community Design Center (1972), the Louisville International Cultural Center (1984), and the Louisville Community Foundation (2000) to name a few of the more significant formal organizations through which the growth regime has functioned.42

42 There is a direct connection between the creation of the LIF, the partnerships of the growth regime, and these subsequent organizations. Tracing those connections and the continued entrenchment of the growth regime as it was manifested through these organizations would be an extremely interesting and useful endeavor. Unfortunately, they were all created outside of the timeline of this current study and must be left for future research. The focal point of this work is dedicated to the initial formation of the growth regime which was solidified with the creation of the LIF.
CHAPTER VI

ANATOMY OF THE GROWTH REGIME

The Louisville Data and the Growth Regime

A growth regime is by nature an abstract and informal consensus of convictions collectively sanctioned by the various leadership pools of the city. Thus, it is impossible to definitely untangle the total composition and hegemony of the regime. Nevertheless, a degree of insight into the regime's structure may be found through an analysis of the formal organizations of the city. The membership of most organizations or groups of similar organizations constitutes a leadership pool which represents the interests of their specific community. For example, it is logical and reasonable to assume that members of the YMHA, the Standard Club, and B'nai B'rith represent the Jewish community and support the best interests of the community. The same assumptions may be made about members of the AOH, NAACP, the LFL and their individual communities. In essence virtually every urban community has group-specific organizations and leadership pools dedicated to the welfare of their own group.

In a successful regime those organizations and
leadership pools accept the philosophy of growth, believe growth is beneficial for their particular community, and at least passively support a pro-growth agenda. The specific organizations and leadership pools accordingly become partners to one degree or another in the regime. Therefore, a sense of the regime's structure may be gained by examining the interconnections that exist among the formal organizations of the urban environment. Furthermore, insight into the regime's level of hegemony may be grasped by examining the interconnections of the individual regime partners who emerged from the leadership pools of the various organizations. Regime hegemony as manifested by the senior and junior partners will be discussed after the economic, political, and social structure of the regime has been addressed.

It should be noted the regime's structure and level of hegemony as depicted in this work is predicated upon the reasonable hypothesis that formal organizations which are structurally interconnected form a network, and that network creates the abstract and informal channels through which the regime may function. Once this hypothesis is accepted, a UCINET Eigenvector centrality analysis can reveal the structure of the network and logically, the regime itself. An organization's Eigenvector centrality within the network suggests its
structural location within the regime and the level of access which its members have to the regime's resources.

Before an analysis of the structure of the growth regime is presented a few additional clarifying points and observations need to be made about the Louisville data. For this analysis the organizations of the Louisville data have been divided into two time periods: 1897 to 1915, and 1916 to 1933. The data was then further divided into three distinct types of organizations: the economic, political, and social sectors. In most cases the placement of an organization into a particular sector was obvious and easily arrived at. Nevertheless, a few organizations were problematic in terms of their classification. A case could be made for placement of the AOH in any one of the three sectors, while the NAACP and LFL could be considered political or economic with equal ease. The proper placement of several other organizations was equally difficult as well.

The final placement of questionable organizations was eventually achieved through experimentation, and trial and error. A series of precursor analysis were conducted where problematic organizations were shifted from sector to sector. In the end, the organizations in question were placed in the sector where they had the highest centrality. The AOH was ultimately placed in the
social sector despite the fact that it was a benevolent association and extremely politically active. The centrality of the AOH was slightly higher in the social sector than either of the other two categories. All other questionable organizations were subjected to the same level of analysis and placed accordingly. This is not viewed as problematic for the analysis since organizations were cross-referenced between sectors as a means of demonstrating regime cohesion.

It should also be noted that during the years of analysis the organizations were expanding in terms of individuals, the number of organizations, and the number of available membership slots within those organizations. This general level of expansion took place in all three sectors as indicated by Table 6. However, when viewing Table 6, the reader should do so with a degree of caution. Every analysis is controlled by the accuracy and availability of the raw data, and the Louisville case is no exception to the rule.

An analysis of Louisville's organizations is complicated by the limitations and availability of information and unfortunately, a membership list or the board of directors for some organizations was available for only one time period. The most extreme example of this situation may be found in the social sector. Both
the B'nai B'rith (BNAI) and the Elks (ELK) existed in both time periods but a membership list could only be located for the first period. Also, 19 Masonic Lodges were included in the second period which were not available for the first period. The lack of complete data by time period creates an illusion the social sector expanded more that it actually did. If a membership list were available for the first period Masonic Lodges and second period BNAI and ELK, then there would have been fewer changes in the social sector than Table 6 implies.

Table 6
Louisville's Organizations by Sector, 1897 - 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS</th>
<th>TOTAL AVAILABLE SLOTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>POLITICAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>1537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3575</td>
<td>5105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>POLITICAL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2091</td>
<td>2848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>SOCIAL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6416</td>
<td>8747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There were other inconsistencies in the social sector as well. Several organizations disappeared all together and presumably ceased to exist. The Tavern Club (TAV) was an elite social club which merged with the PEN at the end of the first time period. Accordingly, the membership of the PEN increased in the second period while the TAV was dropped from the data. The German Club of Louisville (GCL) was another organization that disappeared between the two time periods. A membership list for the GCL could not be uncovered, nor could any reference to the organization be located during the second period of analysis. The GCL was apparently disbanded which further supports the conclusion that German ethnicity was decreasing in significance. Furthermore, two Catholic organizations did not survive into the second period of analysis: the Young Men's Institute (YMI) and the Catholic Knights of America (CKA) both disappeared from the data and literature.

Even while some organizations were disappearing others were being created. The second period social sector contained two American Legion Posts which were not established until after World War I. Also, at least 12 other social clubs were created during the second period. Clearly Louisville's social and club life was increasing.
during the years of analysis.\footnote{This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Robert and Helen Lynd in their analysis of Middletown which covered roughly the same time span as this analysis.}

The analysis of the political sector also presents its own unique problems. A membership list for the Young Men's Democratic Club (YMD) was available for the first period but not the second, while the MOS is represented in the second period only. The analysis of this sector is further hampered by the fact the actual number of political organizations decreased between the first and second time periods, while the number of individuals and available political slots increased. Several of the political organizations within the first period were short-term, temporary organizations which did not survive into the second period. The reform organizations fall into this category and were either disbanded or absorbed into the Republican Party after the political reform movement of 1905. Likewise, the ILP was established when leadership of the African American community broke with the Republican Party. Consequently, the ILP existed only in the second period. And, the GAS was dropped from the first period political sector and the LGE placed in the second period economic sector.

If the political data were adjusted to exclude the
reform organizations, the number of organizations would remain virtually the same between the two periods of analysis. Nevertheless, the number of individuals and membership slots in this category would still increase. This fact suggests that more individuals were becoming politically active during the latter years of analysis.

Analysis of Louisville's economic sector is without doubt the most complicated, both in terms of the lack of complete information and by name changes and mergers. A complete membership list was uncovered for the Louisville Commercial Club (LCC) in the first period, but no list was found for the second. Likewise, the Kiwanis Club (KIW) is represented in the second period only.

Understanding the economic analysis is further confused by name changes and mergers. The Booker T. Washington Community Center (BTWC) and the Presbyterian Colored Mission (PCM) merged and formed the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC). Around the same time the LFL merged with the state organization and became the AFofL. Additionally, World War I and the declining significance of German ethnicity combined to have a profound effect upon the names of the German economic institutions. After America's entry into the war, the German Security Bank (GSB) became simply the Security Bank (SB), while the German Insurance Bank (GIB) was
renamed the Liberty Insurance Bank (LIB) and the German Insurance Company (GIB) was reincarnated as the Liberty Insurance Company (LIB). The Columbia Trust Company (CT) and the Fidelity Trust Company (FT) also merged and created the Fidelity and Columbia Trust Company (FCT).

These were all fairly straightforward mergers or name changes but they are confusing and problematic for the analysis. In some cases name changes were accompanied by alterations within the composition of the board of directors. In a case of this nature, the organizations were viewed as two separate and distinct organizations and were listed as such in the Louisville data. Further, financial mergers were always viewed as separate institutions from the original parent organizations and recorded as such. These are unavoidable facts which unfortunately make understanding the economic sector somewhat difficult.

Another problematic area concerning the Louisville data involves the African American community where data was extremely difficult to uncover. A complete list for the boards of directors of the African American financial institutions as well as the founders and candidates of the ILP were located with little difficulty. Also, the membership list for the NNBL has survived, while a membership list for the KNEA exists in the second period.
The boards of directors of interracial organizations like the CIC, BTWC, PCM, and the Kentucky Home Society for Colored Children (KHSC) were uncovered in various archives and on letter heads which have survived. The lodges and fraternal organizations and surprisingly the NAACP and the Louisville Urban League (LUL) were an entirely different matter.

The African American branch of the Knights of Pythias (KPAA) held a convention in Louisville in 1925 and fortunately a copy of the published guide from the convention has survived. This publication contains a detailed, but not complete list of the Louisville members of the KPAA. But, the first period KPAA membership and all of the African American Masonic members (MLAA) had to be compiled from news articles and obituaries. Consequently, this information is very incomplete. In fact, African American Masonic Lodge names or numbers were not listed so it is unknown if more than one African American Masonic Lodge existed. Individuals listed in the MLAA classification may have been in several different lodges so the MLAA should be viewed with a degree of prudence.

2 "23rd Biennial Session of the Supreme Lodge: Knights of Pythias, at Louisville, Kentucky August 16 - 22, 1925." This work is available in the Kentucky Room of the Louisville Free Public Library.
A membership list for the NAACP and the LUL could also not be located and had to be compiled from the newspapers of the day. The LUL and NAACP presented in the Louisville data thus contains only the leadership of these organizations which were obviously both larger than what is reflected here. Had a complete membership list been available for these organizations, the results of the analysis may have been slightly different.3

The reader should be aware that as in all analysis some inconsistencies and methodological difficulties exist. The data is not complete or all inclusive but is to date the most detailed source of information about Louisville's organizational membership available. Additionally, the data is presented as it was uncovered in the original primary source material. There was no attempt made to compensate or adjust the data to artificially overcome the inherent problems of the data. Any attempt to adjust or compress the organizations could have artificially skewed the data and introduced inaccurate and unknown errors into the analysis.

3 Since the data was normalized to compensate for the great diversity in organizational size the results may also have remained relatively consistent had a complete list been available. When the data is normalized, UCINET only looks at primary connections between organizations and ignores secondary connections. In essence, normalization discounts all non-connected individuals.
Despite the inconsistencies of the data, when the organizations of the three sectors of the Louisville data were analyzed a sense of the regime's structure is revealed. The Louisville growth regime was a tightly interconnected, unified coalition of organizations which became more inclusive and interlocked as the regime expanded and matured in the second period of analysis.

Economics and the Growth Regime

The expansion of the economic sector of the growth regime may be attributed in large part to the development of professional organizations and the creation of new insurance companies and financial organizations. The professional organizations in particular were a fast-growing element of the economic sector and reflected the continued professionalism and desired economic expansion of the regime. Eight of the 14 professional organizations contained in the Louisville data were founded during the second time period of analysis and nine of the organizations merit a brief discussion.

Two of the most central of the professional organizations were the Lawyers Club and the Law Club. The Lawyers Club (LC) was founded in 1884 and was the oldest of the professional organizations analyzed. The mission
statement of the LC proclaimed that its purpose was to "promote intercourse, to discuss matters of interest relating to the science and practice of the profession and to do what may be done to aid in the wise, orderly and firm administration of justice." The Law Club (LAW), originally the Junior Lawyers Club, was established in 1915. It was dedicated to the "discussion of legal topics of interest to the members." 4 Despite the fact that both the LC and the LAW were highly central and both dedicated to attorneys, the organizations had no members in common. As would be expected the legal associations broke along generational lines.

The LC counted among its ranks the senior and more prominent members of the Louisville Bar including: Thomas Bullitt, Lafon Allen, Alexander Humphrey, Thomas Helm, Schackelford Miller, Helm Bruce, Samuel B. Kirby, and others. When cross referenced with the social sector, the ethnic composition of the LC becomes obvious. The LC contained no African Americans, only one individual who was identified as Jewish, and one as Catholic. Twenty four of the LC's 27 members were also members of the PEN and 13 belonged to the Louisville Country Club (CC), the

4 The mission statements of the Lawyers Club and Law Club may be found on p. 21, of The Louisville Blue Book (1923).
two most exclusive clubs in the city. The LC contained no individuals who held a position of leadership in either political party.

The LAW consisted of the younger generation and included Blakey Helm, Louis Seelbach, John Stites, Neville Miller, and Schackelford Miller Jr. among others. Politically, the LAW counted three members in the Republican Party Executive Committee (RXC) and had no members in a position of Democratic Party leadership. Also, the younger members of the LAW lacked the same high social standing as the senior generation and were somewhat more open to religious and ethnic diversity. Only ten LAW members were in the PEN and seven the CC, while one was a member of the Catholic Knights of Columbus (KC) and one the YMHA.

The Rotary Club (ROT) was another professional organization and promoted "the civic, commercial, social and moral welfare" of the community, and "the interchange of ideas and of business methods as a means of increasing the efficiency and usefulness of Rotarians."\(^5\) Founded in 1912 during the final years of the first period of analysis, the ROT initially had very few members and only minor centrality. In the first period the ROT placed in

\(^5\) The Louisville Blue Book (1923) p. 30.
the bottom third of the economic organizations in terms of centrality. However, the ROT quickly developed, attracted new members, and by the second period had grown into one of the larger professional and economic organizations in the Louisville data. The ROT had the third highest centrality of all the economic organizations during the second period of analysis (See Tables 7 and 8).

The ROT had 222 members in the second period with just under one third of them holding membership in the PEN, while there were only 14 Catholics and just six Jewish members. None of the Catholic ROT members were in the AOH which was the only definitive indicator of Irish ethnicity in the Louisville data. Also, the ROT counted no members from organized labor or the African American community among its ranks. Politically, the ROT counted six RXC members among its ranks and no Democratic Party leaders.

Just slightly smaller than the ROT was The Young Business Men's League (YBM) with 215 members. Founded in 1921, the YBM was designed "To co-ordinate the energy, thought and activity of the progressive young business men of Louisville; to afford a medium through which their purpose and desires may be expressed and transformed into accomplishments; and to develop a spirit of sincere and
whole-hearted participation in the civic, commercial and political advancement of this community.  

Table 7
First Period Economic Organizations
1897 - 1915, by Eigenvector Centrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
<th>continued</th>
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<tr>
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<td>NAACP</td>
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6 The Louisville Blue Book (1923) p. 39.
### Table 8

Second Period Economic Organizations
1916 - 1933, by Eigenvector Centrality

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<td>IIC 15.148</td>
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<td>ALA 0.000</td>
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The YBM was a significant organization within the economic sector for several reasons. Like the LAW, it was devoted to the younger generation and within it were the sons of the Heyburn, Kirby, Mengel, Helm, O'Neal, and Smith families. The Law and the YBM offer two of only three clear distinctions in the Louisville data between the older and younger generations. Additionally, it is significant that both the LAW and YBM obtained such high centrality despite the fact that their members were not as prominent as the senior generation. The centrality of these organizations suggest a generational shift was taking place in the economic sector. That shift coincides with the formation of the LIF and the entrenchment of the growth regime.

The mission statement of the YBM also supports the position that a modern growth regime was developing during the second period of analysis. The YBM recognized the necessity of combining both commercial and political activity as a means of accomplishing its goals. This appears to have been the first time this combined commercial and political sentiment was formally and publicly expressed by a business-oriented organization in Louisville.

7 The generational shift which took place in the NAACP has already been addressed.
The YBM and ROT were very similar in economic, social and political orientation. The YBM had five members who were members of the Republican Party Executive Committee, while not a single YBM member held a comparable position of leadership within the Democratic Party. The YBM also counted among its ranks four Aldermen, 61 members of the PEN, 49 members of the CC, seven non-AOH Catholics, and seven individuals who were identified as Jewish.

The Optimist Club (OPT) was another high centrality professional organization with a mission statement very much like that of the ROT and YBM. Founded in 1916, the OPT had 169 members and was dedicated to "the highest business and professional standards ... and to develop interest in civic welfare ... and (to) stimulate trade through intimate personal acquaintanceships among its members." However, the OPT was the most integrated of the professional economic organizations subjected to detailed analysis. With 13 members in the PEN, the OPT was represented within the elite circles of the city, but the OPT also contained 12 Catholics with one of them identified as Irish Catholic. There were also seven OPT members who were identified as Jewish, and one who was identified as Irish Catholic. There were also seven OPT members who were identified as Jewish, and one who was identified as Jewish.

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8 The Louisville Blue Book (1923) p. 28.
identified as African American. Nevertheless, no members of organized labor appeared in the OPT. The Democratic Party leadership had one member in the OPT while the Republican leadership had three. One of Louisville's mayors (MAY), one alderman (ALD), and one councilman (COL) were also counted among the OPT membership during the second period of analysis. Thus the OPT formed a weak link between the business community, Irish, Jewish, and African American communities, both political parties, and local government.

The membership of the YBM, ROT, and OPT were filled by the junior partners of the regime as well as minor merchants, secondary attorneys, insurance agents, and salesmen. Most of these individuals had very little individual power or influence, but when combined and organized in the professional organizations they could support and efficiently carry out the agenda of the growth regime. Consequently, the professional organizations filled an essential position within the growth regime. The ROT and OPT may also have served an additional purpose as well. Both organizations were local chapters of national organizations and as such may have served as a conduit of information. It is possible that local growth regimes obtained vital information on economic developments within other urban centers through
the interaction of the membership of these organizations at the national level.

One other professional organization was an important element of the growth regime and merits discussion. The University Club (UC) founded in 1922 deserves particular attention for several critical reasons. The UC was the second most central institution within the second period economic sector, and included among its ranks the younger members of many of Louisville's most prominent dynasties including the Bruce, Helm, Heyburn, Hilliard, Humphrey, and Norton families. However, it was the UC's senior members who are of particular importance in this analysis. Four of the UC's senior members were Lafon Allen, Frederick Sackett, William Belknap, and Robert Bingham. These men were involved in the elite political revolt of 1905 and in the development of the LIF, the two tangible events which contributed to the creation of the growth regime.

Officially, the stated purpose of the UC was "the stimulation of interest among younger men in acquiring a college or university training." This mission statement is consistent with the position expressed by the BTJ in 1916, but the UC probably served a less obvious but

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9 The Louisville Blue Book (1923) p. 35.

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equally important purpose as well. Many of the UC members were also alumni of the most elite universities in the nation, including at least seven from Yale, five from Harvard, three from Princeton and many from less elite but still prestigious institutions such as the Universities of Chicago, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. All of these educational institutions maintained their own university clubs and many of Louisville's elite alumni retained membership in those clubs. For example, Lafon Allen was president of the UC, a member of the Yale Club, and president of the Louisville chapter of the Yale Club.

Numerous social scientists have analyzed these university clubs and concluded they are a vital part of the national elite network. The university clubs serve the business needs of the elite, provide a spring board into the business world for the freshly graduated, and serve as a means of maintaining contacts with former elite classmates now scattered throughout the nation. The founders of Louisville's UC undoubtedly recognized the potential benefits that such an organization could offer the local growth regime. It is feasible the elite of the city viewed the UC and other university clubs as a

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10 For more information on the elite University Clubs, the reader should consult Kavaler, Mills, and Domhoff.
bridge between the local growth regime and national business community. This interpretation would be consistent with the findings of Mills who discovered that it was not unusual for the elite to belong to three or four university-oriented organizations.

If this interpretation is correct, the local growth regime was connected to the national business community through the elite UC, as well as through the OPT and ROT connections. It is also noteworthy that membership of the UC was dominated by the city's attorneys. Twenty six percent of the UC's 114 members held law degrees. Virtually all of these attorneys received their professional degree from U of L, while their undergraduate degrees were obtained at the more prestigious national universities.

The UC was by far the most restricted of the professional organizations analyzed and contained no African Americans, no Jewish members, no Democratic Party leaders, and only two non-AOH Catholics. However, three of the UC served on the Board of Directors for the Presbyterian Colored Mission, while one each was on the Commission of Interracial Cooperation and the Louisville Urban League. By contrast, 82 UC members belonged to the PEN, 58 were members of the CC, and eight UC members were also Republican Party leaders.
These six professional organizations all had very high centrality and five of them were created after the 1905 political reform movement and the creation of the LIF. African Americans were excluded from all but one of the organizations while Catholics were marginally represented in all of them and Jewish members were minimally present in only four. Additionally, there were no representatives from organized labor in any of them. Politically, the professional organizations were decidedly pro-Republican in orientation.

None of the remaining primarily white professional organizations mandate concentrated discussion as they were simply lower centrality mirrored images of their higher centrality counterparts. Generally, the racial, religious, political, and occupational status of all the professional organizations remained relatively consistent regardless of the organization's level of centrality. The professional class, from the highest echelons of the elite to the lower middle class, was primarily racially segregated and politically conservative.

The three African American professional organizations were as would be expected, largely interlocked with the exclusively African American organizations and the city's inter-racial social and charitable organizations. During the latter years of
analysis the KNEA, NAACP, and NNBL maintained 11 interlocks with the First Standard Bank, eight with the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, and six with the Louisville Urban League. There were no direct connections between the African American organizations and the Democratic Party but five African Americans were identified in the RXC.¹¹ The African American professional organizations also maintained eight interlocks with the Independent Lincoln Party which reduced the RXC connection by one after the ILP was established. It is also noteworthy that the NNBL declined in importance during the second period, both at the local and national levels.¹²

When viewed as a group, the professional organizations are important because they support the position a growth regime was developing and becoming more consolidated in Louisville. Also, the emergence of so many of the professional organizations during the second period.

¹¹ There were actually only four interlocks between the RXC and the African American professional organizations. Mary Parrish was one of only two women in the RXC but she was not a member of any of the professional organizations.

¹² Since a membership list for the KNEA could not be uncovered for the first period, there is no basis of comparison for this organization. However with the exception of the NNBL all the African American organizations were expanding and it is logical to assume the KNEA did as well.
period of analysis indicates the regime dates to this period. Furthermore, virtually all of the professional organizations either directly shared members in common or were linked to each other through the RXC. The RXC was an extremely strong link between all of the professional organizations in the Louisville data.

Another area of expansion within the economic sector involved the increased number of insurance companies during the second time period. Two insurance companies from the first period did not survive, but seven new insurance companies were established after 1916. Only one company, the Kentucky and Louisville Mutual Insurance Company (KLM), displayed high centrality in the first time period; but during the second period of analysis the KLM lost position and dropped in centrality. This decline was probably a reflection of the rise of the larger professional organizations rather than a decrease in KLM business. All of the remaining insurance companies analyzed had very low centrality in both periods and are noteworthy only as an indication of the expanding economic sector.

13 The NNBL had no members in the RXC and even through the OPT contained African American members, no NNBL members were included among the OPT membership. During the second period of analysis the NNBL was one of the most isolated organizations in the Louisville data.
If "banks are the glue of the economic system," as William Domhoff contends, then Louisville's economic structure was tightly bound.\textsuperscript{14} The actual number of banks and trust companies remained consistent between the two time periods despite the fact the lower-end financial institutions were highly unstable. Seven banks and trust companies from the first period did not survive, but the second period witnessed the establishment of eight new financial institutions. Both the failed and the new financial institutions generally had low centrality and assets in their respective time periods.

There was also a high correlation between a financial institution's centrality and its assets (see Table 9). There were a few exceptions, but most of the inconsistencies can be easily explained.\textsuperscript{15} For example, the National Bank of Kentucky (NBK) was a statewide institution with branches scattered throughout the commonwealth. As a result, the NBK received deposits from all of Kentucky and naturally had greater financial resources than the strictly local banks.

\textsuperscript{14} See Domhoff, (1978) p. 53.

\textsuperscript{15} For the purpose of this portion of the analysis, the LIF was not included among the financial institutions. The centrality of the LIF will be discussed separately in the economic section.
Table 9

First and Second Period Financial Institutions by Eigenvector Centrality and Assets

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<td>2,654,000</td>
<td>NBK</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>FNB</td>
<td>26.168</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>LBT**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>29.067</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>FCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNB</td>
<td>20.932</td>
<td>1,060,000</td>
<td>FNB**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTB</td>
<td>30.805</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>NBC</td>
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<td>LT</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UNB</td>
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<td>FBT</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Total Assets 18,615,000</th>
<th>Total Assets 27,354,000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assets for 1910</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Assets for 1903</td>
<td>** Assets for 1922</td>
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</table>

Another easily explained example of the inconsistency between assets and centrality may be found in the American National Bank (ANB). The home office of the ANB was located in Louisville, but the ANB was a

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regional bank with branches external to the city. The ANB had an 11-man board of directors, but only six of its board members appeared in the Louisville data and presumably, the five remaining ANB directors were non-residents of the city. The combined effect of the regional nature of the ANB plus the non-resident status of its board contributed to the inconsistency between centrality and assets.

The German Insurance Bank/Liberty Insurance Bank (GIB/LIB) and the FSB both had very low centrality but relatively high assets. These institutions serviced the German and African American communities respectively and if a majority of the communities members banked at these institutions that would explain the apparent disparity between centrality and assets.

Several financial institutions shifted positions which was probably the result of a changing board of directors. The shifting position of the Kentucky Title Savings Bank and Trust Company (KTB) is representative of this type of activity. The KTB had a 21-man board of directors in the first time period, was second highest in centrality, and sixth in total assets. By the second period the KBT had a 24-man board, was the fifth highest in centrality, and had fallen to 14th in assets. The KTB's board of directors underwent a high degree of
turnover with a 12-man shift from the first to the second period. Between the two periods of analysis, the KTB board of directors lost many of its most influential members including Thomas W. Bullitt, William Bullitt, James Caldwell, and Charles Mengel.\textsuperscript{16}

Two other financial institutions that shifted positions may also have been the result of the changing composition of the board of directors. The First National Bank of Louisville (FNB) had a 17-man board in the first period and a 28-man board in the second. Of the 45 total board slots available, the FNB had a 20-man turnover. Likewise, the Citizen's National Bank (CNB) with 29 board slots divided between the two periods of analysis had an 11-man turnover.\textsuperscript{17} Despite these few inconsistencies the financial institutions display a high degree of association between centrality and assets.

16 The KBT also lost James B. Brown, George Gaulbert, and Reuben Durrett in the first time period. These men were replaced by Owsley Brown, Joseph Burge, William Caldwell, Churchill Humphrey and William Stewart.

17 We do not know why these and other financial institutions underwent such dramatic transformation on their boards, but it is logical to assume the shifting or loss of so many influential members affected the institutions stability which in turn was reflected in their capital and assets. Network analysis is highly sensitive to changes of this nature and as a result they were reflected in the relative position of the organizations.
tightly knit and unified through their interlocking boards of directors which is perhaps the most interesting and significant aspect of the financial institutions. In the first time period the directors of the top third most central institutions interlocked with all but three of the 22 banks and trusts. The first period financial institutions had a total of 280 available board slots, but 128 or 46 percent of them were located in the top seven banks and trust companies. Additionally, the directors of these seven financial institutions accounted for 117 or 57 percent of all the interlocks among the boards of directors of all 22 banks and trust companies. For example, the 21 men who served on the board of directors of the KTB also held 25 board seats on eight other Louisville banks and trust companies. Board members of the Columbia Trust Company (CT) held 25 seats on ten other banks and trust companies, while the Fidelity Trust Company's (FT) board members held 21 seats on the boards of eight other banking institutions. And, the board members of the FNB held 18 slots on six other banks and trust companies during the first period of analysis. (see Table 10)
Table 10
First Period Financial Institutions, by Board Slots and Number of Interlocking Board Slots

<table>
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<tr>
<th>A. Financial Institutions</th>
<th>B. Number of Board Slots</th>
<th>C. # of Interlocks with Other Financial Institutions</th>
<th>D. Total # of Interlocks With Other Institutions</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASN</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFT</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNB</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBT</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNB</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSB</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTB</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNB</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBK</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNB</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>280</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>204</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were four German banks and trust companies during the first period of analysis, but only two of 411
these ethnic financial institutions were interlocked with each other. And when cross-referenced with the social sector, no member of the German Club was identified as a board member of any of the ethnic financial institutions. The lack of German interconnections at this level further supports the conclusion that German ethnicity was rapidly diminishing as a significant factor in Louisville.

However, race and religion were still critical within the economic structure of the city. No African American appeared on the board of any bank or trust company and only one Catholic and two Jewish individuals held board seats. During the first period of analysis the financial institutions were overwhelmingly dominated by white Protestants.

In the second period of analysis the financial institutions had a total of 386 available board slots (see Table 11). Clearly, the financial institutions were expanding in terms of size, but other more significant transitions were taking place as well.

In the second period of analysis the density of interlocks between financial institutions was greatly increasing. For example, during the first period of analysis the 21-man board of directors of the Louisville Trust Company (LT) had five interlocks with five other financial institutions while in the second period, the
31-man LT board had 34 interlocks with six financial institutions.

Table 11

Second Period Financial Institutions,
by Board Slots and Number of Interlocking board slots.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Financial Institutions</th>
<th>B. Number of Board Slots</th>
<th>C. # of Interlocks with Other Financial Institutions</th>
<th>D. Total # of Interlocks With Other Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASN</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNB</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUB</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNB</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>FTT</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTB</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBT</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNB</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUJ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBK</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UST</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>386</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>324</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The increase of second period board positions occurred primarily in the high centrality institutions. Of the 386 available slots, 201 or 52 percent were held by the directors of the top third most central banks and trust companies and 59.5 percent of all the financial interlocks were held by these seven high centrality institutions. During the second period of analysis as the growth regime emerged, the banks and trust companies were expanding while becoming more tightly interconnected and unified.

As the growth regime developed, the financial organizational structure of Louisville was becoming somewhat more inclusive as well. During the second period, 37 of the total 386 board slots were located in the FSB which had no interlocks with other banks and trust companies. The African American community had technically entered the financial structure of the city but were still excluded from the organizational structure. However, during the same period 16 financial board slots were held by Catholics. The ethnic composition of the Catholics is unknown but no AOH members appeared among the Catholic board slots which suggest most of them were probably of German decent. At the same time, six financial slots were held by members of the Jewish community which was a very limited
improvement.

Politically the banks and trust companies were interesting as well. During the first period no members of the Republican Party leadership held a membership slot on any of the financial institutions while only one Democratic Party leader cross-referenced with one financial slot. By the second period of analysis that situation had dramatically changed. Twenty-eight financial slots were held by the Republican Party leadership while the Democrats retained their single financial slot. However, even though the Democratic leadership did not directly improve their standing within the financial community, seven members of the Democratic MOS did interlock with the second period banks and trust companies. Obviously, after the reform movement and the creation of the LIF, the financial institutions of the city were becoming politicized. Nonetheless, the Republican Party leadership had more direct financial interlocks and presumably greater influence than the Democratic leadership which had to rely on indirect links through the MOS.

For the growth regime to be successful it had to become tightly interconnected while also broadening its ranks and perpetuating a diversified substructure. The comparison of the first and second period banks and trust
companies suggest the regime was successfully accomplishing this task. The financial institutions had become more unified and had to a limited degree opened up to previously excluded groups. Additionally, the financial institutions and both political parties were directly or indirectly connected in the second period of analysis. If the financial institutions are a valid indicator, then the regime had solidified.

The economic sector provides additional indicators of regime solidification as well. There were several occupational groups included in the economic sector of the Louisville data: the attorneys (AT), business executives (EX), doctors (DOC), and members of the Protestant (MIN), Catholic (MINC) and Jewish (MINJ) clergy. In addition to the specific occupational classifications, membership in the NAACP, NNBL and the KNEA provides insight into the position of African Americans while the LFL/AFofL represents the position of the organized working class.18

As can be seen in Tables 7 and 8, the clergy had extremely low centrality in both time periods although there was a consistent status ordering among the three

18 There was one other occupational classification, the Judges (JUD), included in the data. However, because the position of JUD was an elected position, this occupation was included within the political sector.
denominations. As would be expected the MIN had higher centrality than the MINC and MINJ. Nevertheless, the clergy were insignificant to the growth regime which is consistent with the findings of Hunter in his study of Atlanta.\textsuperscript{19} The one noteworthy comment regarding the clergy centers around the African American community. In the second period of analysis there was at least one MIN in every African American and interracial social and charitable organization except the NNBL. Even though the MIN was tightly interconnected with the African American institutions, it still had no real significance for the total economic sector because of the marginal position of African Americans in general. The remaining professional classifications were an entirely different matter.

The DOC was the fastest growing professional classification in the Louisville data. There were 89 DOC listings in the first period, and with an economic sector nEigenvector centrality score of 20.406, this group placed in the top half of the economic sector (Table 7). However, the high centrality of the DOC in the less tightly unified first period may be misleading and merits an explanation. The first period DOC only held three

\textsuperscript{19} Hunter placed religious leaders in the position of "under-structure personnel." For additional information regarding the position of religious leaders within the urban power structure, see Hunter (1953).
slots on the banks and trust companies and only one slot in the Louisville Commercial Club (LCC), a lower centrality professional organization. Apparently, the high first period centrality of the DOC was the result of its interlocks with a broad cross section of organizations including labor, the African American organizations, and the interracial social and charitable organizations.

Although no DOC appeared in the LFL, three were members of the Ancient Order of United Workingmen (AOUW), a declining 19th century labor and benevolent association. Six DOC also appeared in the interracial charitable and social organizations, while two DOC appeared in the NAACP and ten in the NNBL. Both the NAACP and NNBL were strictly African American organizations and the inclusion of the DOC in these organizations represents the only organizational concentration of DOC in the first period economic sector.

During the first period of analysis the DOC was more diffused throughout the total organizational structure than any other occupational classification. This same level of DOC diffusion also held up when it was cross-referenced with the social and political sectors as well. Seventeen DOC were in the PEN, seven in the YMHA, and two each in the KC and the African American fraternal
organizations. Politically, the DOC was evenly split with seven each among the Democrat and Republican Party leaders.

The second period of analysis witnessed a dramatic shift in both the number of DOC and the structural concentration of this category. By the second period there were 295 DOC slots and this classification's economic nEigenvec centrality placed it in the top fourth most central organizations. The vast majority of the DOC category only appeared in the economic sector because of their occupational classification, but 48 DOC slots also cross-referenced with the professional organizations including twelve in the high centrality ROT, six in the OPT, and three in the UC. There were also 14 DOC members included in the financial institutions with half of that number in the FSB. Four DOC were also members of the KNEA and two in the NAACP. However, during the second period of analysis no DOC classification appeared in the NNBL which was probably a reflection of the declining significance of this professional organization.

The second period DOC is an interesting occupational classification and riddled with inconsistencies which cannot be currently explained. No DOC was connected to organized labor during this period which is not surprising, but 34 of the DOC cross-referenced with the
Catholic Knights of Columbus, and 13 with the YMHA. One DOC was in a position of Republican party leadership but none appeared in the Democratic leadership. However, 15 DOC cross-referenced with the MOS while no DOC appeared in the Twelve Ward Republican Club, which was the Republican counterpart to the MOS.

Currently, there is no definitive explanation for the rapid increase or inconsistencies of this occupational classification. Perhaps the increase was a reflection of the expansion which was taking place at the University of Louisville, or simply the result of a general pattern of increased professionalism. It may also be due to members of the African American, Jewish and Catholic communities who viewed the profession as a means of economic and social mobility and thus entered the field in increasing numbers. Additional research is needed before any conclusions may be reached to explain the increased position of the DOC category or their significance to and within the growth regime.

The AT had the highest economic centrality in both periods and were the most significant of all the occupational groups or organizations analyzed. There were 77 individual AT listed in the first period of analysis. The AT held 148 positions or 9.6 percent of the total available first period economic slots. Between 1898 and
1915 there was at least one AT on every financial board of directors in the economic sector except the six lowest centrality banks and trust companies, and four of these did not survive into the second period of analysis. Nine AT slots were on the interracial and social service organizations, and the NAACP and NNBL each held one AT slot. The highest concentration of AT slots was found in the LC and no AT was a member of any other professional organization. During the first period of analysis no AT appeared in the KC, but one held membership in the AOH, and five were identified as Jewish. At the same time 36 AT held membership in the PEN. Politically, there were 11 AT in the Democratic Party leadership and none in a comparable position within the Republican Party.

By the second period of analysis the AT classification had doubled its ranks and totaled 197 individuals. The attorneys in this period held 41 slots, or 10.8 percent of the available slots in the banks and trust companies and the AT held more total economic slots than any other category. Louisville's attorneys were also expanding their influence by joining the professional organizations and held 116 slots in ten of the professional organizations of the city. The attorneys were moving into other financial areas as well and six of the AT served on the board of directors for the LIF, two
on the BOT, and three were trustees of the University of Louisville. In fact, Louisville's attorneys were members of virtually every economic organization in the Louisville data during the second period of analysis.

Politically, the AT had only two second period slots in the Democratic Party leadership while 21 AT slots cross-referenced with Republican Party leadership. Socially, six AT were identified as Jewish, eight as Catholic and one as Irish Catholic, and four as African American, while 76 AT were members of the PEN.

The last economic occupational group looked at in the Louisville data were the executives. The EX, like the AT and DOC, achieved high centrality in both time periods, but unlike the AT and DOC, this occupational group was very stable in terms of the actual number of individuals and grew by very little. There were only 43 EX listings in the first time period and they held 4.7 percent of the economic slots. Eighteen board seats on the city's financial institutions were held by individuals with an EX classification and the high centrality of the EX was derived primarily from these banking connections. In the first period of analysis only one EX was in a professional organization and one was a trustee of U of L. Two EX held a position of Democratic leadership, one was identified as Catholic and three as
Jewish. There were no EX in Republican leadership but 26 of the group were members of the PEN.

There were 48 individuals in the second period with an EX classification and they jointly controlled 27 board slots on the banks and trust companies and 23 of the professional organization slots. Two members of the EX were trustees of the University of Louisville, 11 were members of the UC, and 23 were directly involved with the LIF. During the second period only one EX held a position of leadership in the Democratic Party while ten were in the RXC. At the same time there were two Catholics and three Jewish individuals with an EX classification while 35 EX were members of the PEN. The EX increase in the PEN and RXC during the second period suggest this classification was gaining social prestige and political influence.20

The LIF had the fourth highest economic centrality of all the organizations analyzed in its time period and was part-financial institution, part-professional organization, and totally economic development oriented. The LIF was also the economic heart of the Louisville

20 Since the EX classification was taken from the city's Who's Who, no African Americans were classified in this category. Some African Americans may have been viewed as business executives within the eyes of their own community but not by the city in general.
growth regime, and as such deserves singular consideration. There were 51 individuals officially linked with the LIF, and these men held a total of 180 slots within the economic sector. In other words, 46 percent of all the second period economic slots were controlled by the individuals who established the LIF. But it was the concentration of LIF interlocks which is of particular importance. The LIF was actually interlocked with less than half of Louisville's economic institutions. However, 80 percent of the interlocks which did exist were with other high centrality economic organizations. This strong overlap with the high centrality economic institutions further suggests that a growth regime existed and that the principles and purposes of the LIF were the outward manifestation of the regime's agenda.

One observation about the LIF merits a brief discussion. After the LIF was established and a charter obtained, the LIF was governed by a 31-man board of directors. At this point many of the most influential members of the economic elite withdrew from formal association with the LIF. Individuals such as Lafon Allen, Thurston Ballard, and William Bullitt who were all senior partners in the regime, stepped down and were replaced by junior partners. Nevertheless, the
individuals who served on the LIF board more than adequately represented the city's growth-oriented interests. Caldwell Norton and Peter Atherton represented the real estate interests, while Charles Bensinger, Fred Levy, and Victor Engelhard represented the retail merchants. Construction was represented by Alfred Struck and the insurance businesses by John Barrett. The city's major manufacturing interests were represented by Isaac Bernheim, Patrick Callahan, William Heyburn, and others. The interests of the transportation industry was protected by Walter Kohn and Robert McKellar, while Donald McDonald represented the interests of the utilities. The media was provided a voice within the LIF by Charles Gladfelter and Robert Montgomery.

These strong links between the city's growth-oriented economic interests and the LIF is consistent with the analysis of Logan and Molotch. The position of the junior partners on the LIF board is also consistent with the interpretation which Hunter applied to the Atlanta International Trade Council. And, the active involvement of the junior partners further supports the conclusion the LIF was the concrete manifestation of the growth regime. To be successful, the growth regime needed a broad base of support among the leading industries and businesses of the city. The junior partners were well
positioned to contribute to that base as a result of their occupational positions (see Table 12). The LIF sustained a direct link with all of the individual businesses represented in Table 12 and over half of the organizations included in the economic sector of the Louisville data.

Table 12
LIF Board of Directors by Their Primary Economic Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter Atherton</td>
<td>Real estate broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis Atwood</td>
<td>President of Peaslee Galbert Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Barr Jr.</td>
<td>President Fidelity and Columbia Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Barrett</td>
<td>General insurance agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Bensinger</td>
<td>President of Bensinger Department Store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernheim Isaac</td>
<td>Chairman Bernheim Distillers Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curd Bridges</td>
<td>President of Bridges and Smith Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Burge</td>
<td>Secretary of Peaslee Galbert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Caldwell</td>
<td>Machinery manufacturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Callahan</td>
<td>President Louisville Varnish Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Engelhard</td>
<td>Engelhard and Sons Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Gladfelter</td>
<td>General manager the Louisville Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Heyburn</td>
<td>President of Belknap Hardware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hughes</td>
<td>Bank president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percy Johnston</td>
<td>Bank president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Keller</td>
<td>President Louisville Tobacco Warehouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Kohn</td>
<td>Chief clerk of the L &amp; N Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred Levy</td>
<td>Retail merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald McDonald</td>
<td>President Louisville Gas and Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert McKellar</td>
<td>General manager the Southern Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Montgomery</td>
<td>Editor of the Louisville Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Mueller</td>
<td>President of Mueller and Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldwell Norton</td>
<td>Real estate broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Phillips</td>
<td>Secretary of Louisville Title Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sackett Frederick</td>
<td>President North Jellico Coal Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Saunders</td>
<td>Director of the Mercantile Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Smith</td>
<td>President of a paper company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Struck</td>
<td>President, Alfred Struck and Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embry Swearingen</td>
<td>President, the Kentucky Title Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Tuley</td>
<td>President, Louisville Cotton Mills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Vaughan</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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There was also a direct link between the LIF and the Republican Party with seven LIF board members serving on the RXC while there were no direct links with the Democratic Party leadership, the Irish AOH, organized labor, or any of the strictly African American organizations. Nevertheless, the LIF maintained "weak ties" or bridges with two of these groups.

Two members of the LIF were also members of the MOS, while three served on the board of the interracial Louisville Urban League (LUL) and two on the board of the PCM. Consequently, the LIF maintained weak ties with the Democrats through the MOS, and the African American community through the LUL and PCM. In essence, the only groups in the city not connected to the LIF through either direct or weak links were the Irish and organized labor.

The fact that only weak links existed between the LIF and the Democratic and African American community should not be dismissed as insignificant. Weak links develop social cohesion by bridging dissimilar organizations and functioning as conduits of information.

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21 The LIF also did not inter-link with six insurance companies, eight low assets banks and trust companies, two professional organizations, the MIN, MINC, and MINJ. The only significant, high centrality group which the LIF did not interlock with was the DOC.
and influence.\textsuperscript{22} For example, a link existed between the LIF and the LUL, but the LUL was strongly interlocked with 11 strictly African American organizations and the African American press. In this case the weak LUL tie formed a bridge between two otherwise completely segregated groups of organizations.\textsuperscript{23}

Through its direct interlocks and weak links, the LIF and thus the growth regime reached virtually every economic organization and group within the city. Obviously, not all organizations and groups were primary partners in the regime, but the regime at least courted and obtained the support of a broad enough base to function with little organized resistance. And presumably, most organizations and groups accepted the philosophy of growth as it was marketed by the regime and

\textsuperscript{22} For a detailed discussion regarding this subject see "The Strength of Weak Ties" (1973), and "The Strength of weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited" (1983) by Mark Granovetter.

\textsuperscript{23} When utilizing non-normalized data, UCINET will uncover all secondary connections such as this and calculate them into the analysis. Unfortunately, the Louisville data had to be normalized as a result of the disparity in organizational size which meant all of the secondary connections were discounted. Accordingly, the "weak tie" theory is presented as both an example and as supportive evidence for the existence of the growth regime. Granovetter explains and utilizes his weak tie theory in much the same way as Herbert Gans interpreted "communicators" in his work \textit{The Urban Villagers}. 428
Politics and the Growth Regime

Of the three areas of analysis, the political sector was in many ways the most consistent and stable. The number of individuals within this sector and the available slots actually changed very little between the two time periods. But it was also within this sector that the most spectacular transformation took place and where the power, influence, and development of the growth regime was the most visible and tangible.

In the first period of analysis the executive committee of the Republican Party (RXC) had the least centrality of all the political organizations analyzed (see Table 13). The RXC was a small, ineffective organization with only 12 individuals. Eleven of these RXC members held no other political slot and only one was classified as a Political Active Individual (POL), the broadest and most generic category in the Louisville data. The most interesting aspect of the RXC was not their political activity, but their economic position. When cross-referenced with the economic sector, the RXC members were found to hold only nine first period economic slots. Eight members of the RXC were medical
doctors and one was a member of the Louisville Commercial Club, a low centrality first period professional organization. The only membership list for the first period RXC was from the very early years of the century prior to the political reform movement.

Table 13

First and Second Period Political Institutions by Eigenvector Centrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIT</td>
<td>63.307</td>
<td>RXC</td>
<td>67.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>51.941</td>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>54.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FU</td>
<td>40.444</td>
<td>POL</td>
<td>43.677</td>
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<td>POL</td>
<td>39.114</td>
<td>ALD</td>
<td>39.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>36.867</td>
<td>LWC</td>
<td>34.811</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALD</td>
<td>30.929</td>
<td>SIN</td>
<td>34.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEL</td>
<td>30.359</td>
<td>JUD</td>
<td>33.058</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUD</td>
<td>28.659</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>30.119</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>27.201</td>
<td>ATG</td>
<td>27.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>26.265</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>27.038</td>
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<td>DXC</td>
<td>26.000</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>26.077</td>
</tr>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>25.495</td>
<td>DXC</td>
<td>25.242</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TWRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>RXC</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

24 The only membership list for the first period RXC was from the very early years of the century prior to the political reform movement.
By contrast, two governing bodies were identified within the Democratic Party, the rather large Democratic Party Committee (DPC) and the nine-man Democratic Executive Committee (DXC), all of whom were also DPC members. The DPC had the second highest first period centrality and counted among its ranks 12 Aldermen (ALD), three members of the Board of Trade (BOT), 22 Councilmen (COL), 17 Judges (JUD), three Mayors (MAY), and two members on the board of directors of the Louisville Water Company (LWC), two on the Sinking Fund (SIN), and three in the Parks Commission (PC).

When cross-referenced with the economic sector the DPC was found to contain eleven AT, two EX, and two from the Louisville Federation of Labor. Socially, the DPC had eleven members in the PEN, five members in the Irish Catholic AOH, and no representatives in any German, Jewish, or African American organizations.

In the early years of the first time period there was a clear distinction between political and economic activity with very little overlap between the two sectors. In the first period, neither the RXC or the DPC could be viewed as economically powerful or socially influential. No political party committee member held a financial board seat on any bank or trust company in the Louisville data during the pre-reform period. Socially,
the DPC was open to the Irish and the working class while the RXC had only one Jewish member in its ranks.

During the early years the only category found to have any degree of political, economic, and social integration was the Judges (JUD). In the first period 17 of the 30 JUD identified were members of the DPC and none were in the RXC. One JUD was a member of the AOH, and seven were PEN members, while only one served as a director of a financial institution. No Jewish individuals held the position of JUD, but four JUDs were members of the interracial BTWC which did provide a weak link to the African American community.

The political situation and the political sector greatly changed after the reform movement of 1905. The details of the reform movement have already been sufficiently addressed, but as can be seen in Table 13, the political reform groups which supported that movement all had very high political centrality. The City Club (CIT) was the most central political organization and had 76 interlocks with 13 other political organizations. The Fusionists (FU) had 50 interlocks, the Honest Election League (HEL) had 26, and the Committee of One Hundred (HUN) 26 interlocks. Granted, the reform organizations were primarily interlocked with each other but the members of these reform organizations jointly held over 432
33 percent of the total 830 first period political slots compared to 15 percent for the DPC and 1.4 percent for the RXC.

The reformers also had 14 interlocks with the ALD, 10 with the COL, 11 with the BOT, five with the Louisville Gas Company (GAS), five with the PC, and two with the SIN. It should be noted that all but one of these non-reform organizational interlocks occurred after the 1905 reform movement.

Most of the political reformers were members of Louisville's business community and the reform organizations had very strong connections with the economic sector. Members of the CIT, FU, HEL, and HUN jointly held just under ten percent of all the first period economic slots. Furthermore, there were no Catholic members of the reform movement, and only one Jewish and two African Americans members of the reform groups. The reform organizations like the economic sector itself, were predominately white protestant organizations. And, as would be expected they were primarily represented in the elite social clubs. For example, 19 percent of the reformers were members of the PEN while only five percent were members of the less prestigious Shriners (SHR).

After the political reform victory, most of the

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reformers joined the Republican Party and that organization began to grow and acquire both new members and prestige. The reform movement also transformed the RXC from the least central first period political organization into the most central second period political organization. During the second period of analysis, the RXC had 56 interlocks with every political organization except the DPC, DXC, MOS, the Louisville Railway Company (LRR), and the Socialist Party (SPL). The RXC had 21 interlocks with the executive and legislative branches of municipal government, five interlocks with the JUD, 12 with the municipal regulatory commissions, and two interlocks with the BOT.

The true significance of the second period RXC can only be fully understood when it is cross-referenced with the economic sector. The RXC counted among its ranks 21 AT and ten EX. Members of the RXC also held 36 slots in the professional organizations, 29 slots in the city's financial institutions, and seven slots in the LIF. This strong RXC connection between the political and economic sectors indicates that a growth regime developed in large part as a result of the political and economic activity of the reformers of 1905 and further, that the second period RXC was a significant component of that regime. Additional support for this conclusion may be obtained by

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cross-referencing the RXC with the social, racial, and religious organizations.

When the men of the growth regime seized control of the RXC, it was a complete and total changing of the guard and not a single first period RXC member survived into the second period. The second period RXC also became much larger and somewhat more inclusive than its first period counterpart. In the second period of analysis, the RXC counted among its ranks two Catholics, three members of the YMHA, four KNEA members, and three from the NAACP. However, no Irish Catholics or members of organized labor appeared in the RXC.

By comparison, the nEigenvec centrality of the DPC dropped dramatically while the DXC remained low and virtually unchanged. As would be expected, the power and influence of the DPC dramatically declined as well. During the second period the DPC held only one ALD slot, and no COL or JUD slots, nor did it control a single slot on the city's regulatory boards and commissions. In the economic sector, the DPC was no better off than it was in the first period and had only one AT, one EX, one interlock with the banks and trust companies, and had lost its two labor slots. Socially, the first and second period DPC were virtually identical to each other.

The declining position of the DPC could be
interpreted as the dismantling of the party machine after the reform movement and the death of both John and James Whallen. However, that explanation does not adequately address the high centrality of the MOS which was a Democratic organization. In the second period of analysis the MOS obtained the second highest centrality and its membership included five ALD, nine COL, five JUD, four members on the regulatory commissions, 34 AT and three EX. The MOS held seven economic slots on the banks and trust companies, 21 slots in the professional organizations, and two in the LIF. Also, the MOS had 37 interlocks with the KC, four with the YMHA, and one with the KNEA but none with labor. With its high centrality and numerous interlocks the MOS was clearly the center of Democratic power during the second period of analysis.

There appears to have been a split between the MOS and the Democratic Party leadership. Only three individuals from the DPC interlocked with the MOS during the second period. This split is perhaps a reflection of

25 A membership list for the first period MOS could not be uncovered, but when the first period DPC and second period MOS were cross-referenced, 21 interlocks were uncovered. Had a first period MOS list been available, the DPC and MOS connection would have undoubtedly been even stronger. We do not know why 19 of those first to second period interlocks disappeared but a split between the MOS and party leadership appears as a likely reason. This conclusion is speculative but logical and consistent with the known facts.
the increasing integration of the growth regime. To be successful the regime needed support from a broad spectrum of the city's groups and organizations. By including the MOS the regime co-opted Democrats who were not in a position of formal party leadership while generating greater support among Catholics and the non-organized working class.²⁶ If this interpretation is correct, then a connection was established with the Democratic politicians of the MOS while the official party leadership was effectively eliminated from the regime's organizational structure.²⁷

The position of the ALD and COL remained relatively stable in both time periods in terms of centrality and economic and social structure. There were no African Americans in either category and only marginal Catholic, ²⁶

²⁶ There were 37 Catholics in the MOS but only two of them were AOH members and the ethnicity of the remaining 35 is unknown. Furthermore, none of the 37 Catholics were members of organized labor.

²⁷ Granted this interpretation is speculative as well but it is also consistent with the known facts. James Whallen supported the LIF and worked to make the Million Dollar Factory Fund a success. Whallen was a member of both the DPC and MOS until his death in 1917. His successor as party boss, Micky Brennen, was a member of the MOS but not the DPC or DXC. If the MOS was incorporated into the regime, and if Brennen in particular supported the regime, then the support of the DPC and DXC was unnecessary. Although this interpretation is consistent with a growth regime perspective, additional research is needed before a definitive conclusion may be reached.
Irish, and Jewish interconnections. Organized labor held two ALD and three COL positions in the first period which were all lost in the second. Economically neither the ALD or COL was particularly important but the ALD did obtain eleven professional slots and the COL six during the second period of analysis.

The category of mayor (MAY) was an interesting group and the smallest political category analyzed. The MAY obtained very low centrality in the first period but moved up during the second. The first period MAY category was interlocked with only seven political organizations and the MAY maintained three interlocks with the DPC. As would be expected, the first period MAY had no interlocks with any of the reform organizations. When cross-referenced with the economic sector, the first period MAY was found to contain only one interlock with the AT, one with the EX, and no interlocks with the banks and trust companies.

In the second period of analysis the MAY had six political interlocks, three of which were with the RXC and none with the DPC or DXC. The MAY also slightly increased its economic position and had two interlocks with the AT, one with the EX, and two financial and two professional organization interlocks. The MAY economic connections were all with high centrality organizations.
but as a whole, the MAY was still not particularly economically important. Interestingly, two of the six second period MAYs cross-referenced with the Knights of Columbus. This could indicate that religion was beginning to decrease as a significant political issue or that Catholics simply turned out the vote for these candidates.

No MAY, ALD, or COL was involved in the LIF during the second time period which on the surface would imply local government was excluded from economic development. However, a closer examination suggests the LIF and municipal government were deeply connected in an inconspicuous yet highly significant fashion. First, the government that existed during the second period was a reform government that had been created by many of the same individuals who would later create the LIF. Nine of the LIF leaders had been actively involved in the reform movement and had wrestled municipal control from the hands of the political machine. Additionally, three of the subsequent LIF leaders had been first period Aldermen, one was a Councilman, one a Mayor, ten were in the BOT, and 12 had served on the boards of the city-owned utilities and the regulatory commissions.

After the government was reformed and professionalized, these individuals no longer needed to
run for office and the MAY, ALD, COL, and the daily grind of municipal management were turned over to professional politicians. Nevertheless, control of the regulatory commissions was essential for the regime agenda, and these positions were retained by the senior and junior partners of the regime.

This same pattern continued to exist during the second period when politicians ran for political office while the leaders of the LIF retained control of the regulatory commissions and city services. During the second period ten LIF leaders interlocked with the BOT, six with the LRR, three with the LWC, and two each with the SIN and LGE. These positions were critical to the economic success of the LIF and the regime's philosophy of growth. The fact that many of these positions were appointed positions convincingly insinuates municipal government supported the regime's philosophy regardless of which political party controlled city hall.

It should also be noted that many individuals sat on the municipal commissions, BOT, and the city-owned utility companies who were part of the regime structure but not directly involved in the LIF. By cross-referencing all of these positions with the economic sector, a clearer view of the regime's municipal hegemony may be obtained. There were 115 interlocks between the
economic and political sector through the regulatory agencies, municipal commissions, BOT, and utilities. In addition to the 24 interlocks with the LIF, these agencies also maintained 60 interlocks with the banks and trust companies, and 31 with the professional organizations.

The men who controlled the second period regulatory agencies actually had three times the number of economic connections as they had political interlocks. The interconnections of these political regulatory agencies with the economic sector is consistent with a growth regime perspective and additional testimony that a regime existed. As this analysis demonstrates, the Louisville growth regime was highly active in both the political and economic sectors and dominated both.

The Social Structure

Social clubs are a vital element of the urban structure and analysis of their purpose and significance has a long tradition within the discipline of sociology.  

In their classic study *Middletown*, Robert and Helen Lynd uncovered not only a proliferation of club life between 1890 and 1926, but the fact that social clubs were a meaningful component of the local business structure. C. Wright Mills explained this aspect of urban life and maintained "the club provides a more intimate or clan-like set of exclusive groupings which places and characterizes a man."29 William Domhoff builds upon these sentiments and points out that social clubs "provide an informal atmosphere ... (and) a place in which economic and political differences can be smoothed over in a friendly manner."30

Louisville's social clubs fulfilled these needs and many individuals within the Louisville data maintained numerous club memberships. This was particularly true during the second period when there were more clubs in existence.31 There were 28 social clubs identified in the first period of analysis with a total of 3575 individual members, who jointly held 5105 membership slots. By the second time period the number of clubs had increased to

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29 Mills, p. 61.

30 Domhoff, p. 19.

31 For additional information on club life see Robert and Helen Lynd (1929), Herbert Gans (1962), C. Wright Mills (1956), and William Domhoff (1978).
60, containing 6416 individual members, and 8747 membership slots. It would be a difficult and unnecessary task to discuss all of these organizations so only a selection of the clubs will be addressed in depth and cross-referenced with the economic and political sectors. Nevertheless, even a brief and partial analysis of the social clubs should shed light upon the organizational structure of the city and the emerging growth regime during the second period of analysis.

The social clubs of Louisville may be very loosely lumped into several broad categories of organizations. First, there were the upper middle and elite class country clubs and sporting clubs. As a group these organizations were overwhelmingly white, protestant, and the social center of the city. The second category of clubs consists of the racial, ethnic, and/or religious organizations which have been further subdivided into the African American, Catholic, German, and Jewish organizations. The third and final category consists of what have been described as bridge organizations. These organizations were few in number but generally quite large in membership and had no or only minor membership restrictions (see Tables 14 and 15). An example of a bridge organization would be the American Legion which was open to all veterans regardless of race, gender or
religion. The bridge organizations are interesting because they had the potential to establish weak links throughout the organizational structure of the regime.

Table 14
First Period Social Sector Institutions, 1897 - 1915

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<tr>
<th>Primarily White Organizations</th>
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Table 15  
Second Period Social Sector Institutions  
1916 - 1933

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<th>White Orgs. Continued</th>
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For this portion of the analysis only the four highest centrality predominately white protestant clubs have been examined in depth. The remaining clubs in this first category were simply lower centrality versions of their higher centrality counterparts in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. However, all of the racial, ethnic, and/or religious clubs have been looked at as well as the few bridge organizations which existed.

During the first period of analysis the four most central white protestant clubs were the Pen, CC, Tavern Club (TAV) and the Louisville Golf Club (LGC). These four clubs were the most prestigious and exclusive social clubs in Louisville and to win membership in one of them was to reach the highest level of social status in the city. They counted among their membership the descendants of the prominent pioneer families such as the Bullitt, Helm, Speed and Ballard families. They also included descendants of the iron men of manufacturing like the Long, Belknap, and Mengel families. The Civil War Brigadiers, the New Departure Democrats, and the champions of the Republican Party revitalization were all represented in these four social clubs as well. Browsing through their membership lists is like reading a who's who of notable Kentuckians.

The members of the top four social clubs jointly

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held 26.5 percent of all first period social slots and interlocked with all but the two lowest centrality white protestant organizations. Also, 54 percent of the CC members, 14 percent of the TAV, and 20 percent of the LGC members were also members of the PEN, the most central and exclusive social organization in both time periods. Obviously the exclusive white clubs of Louisville and the PEN in particular, were tightly connected and interlocked.

The membership of the top four clubs also touched the ethnic and non-protestant communities as well. Each of the four clubs counted a few Catholics and Irish Catholics among their ranks. The PEN had three interlocks each with the KC and AOH while the CC had two with the KC and three with the AOH. The TAV maintained two interlocks with the AOH and one with the KC, while the LGC had one AOH member. Members of the German Club held 42 slots more or less evenly divided between the four top social clubs while the ODD had only one interlock. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes the high centrality social clubs restricted Jewish membership. Only one Jewish member of the CC was identified while the remaining three clubs

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32 The top four centrality organizations did not interlock with the Knights of Honor of Kentucky (KHK) or the Improved Order of Heptasoph (IOH).
excluded Jewish membership completely during the first period. Thus, there were some first period weak links between the high end clubs and the Catholic and Irish communities, but only one with the Jewish community, and no direct or weak link connections to the African American community.

Joint membership in a large social organizations and a few weak links are not sufficient evidence to support a growth regime perspective. Membership alone may not mean that members were political and economic allies or for that matter that they even knew each other. The real significance of the social clubs is found when their memberships are cross-referenced with the smaller political and economic sectors. Cross-referencing supports the conclusions that the Lynds, Mills, and Domhoff reached about the true nature and purpose of social clubs.

During the first period of analysis 24 percent of all the available board slots on the banks and trust companies were held by members of these four social clubs. At the same time 23 percent of the elected slots in municipal government and 54 percent of post-reform regulatory board and commission slots were held by members of the top centrality social clubs. Additionally 19.5 percent of the DPC, the entire RXC, and 54 percent
of the reform organizations slots were held by members of the top social clubs. In essence, the members of these clubs were directly involved in every major political and economic issue to arise in Louisville.

By contrast, membership in the African American, Catholic, German, and Jewish clubs jointly made up 19 percent of the total first period social sector slots. However, members of these racial, ethnic, and religious clubs collectively controlled only five individual slots on the banks and trust companies, 18 elected positions, and four individual slots on the regulatory commissions. One member of the YMHA held a slot on the RXC while 15 slots in the DPC were held by members of the Catholic clubs. Three slots in the reform organizations were held by members of the Jewish clubs, one by a member of the German ODD, and one by a member of the KPAA. Politics and economics may have been a topic of discussion at this end of the social spectrum but there were insufficient organizational interlocks for the membership of these clubs to have been even a marginal force within the political and economic development of the city.

If economic and political issues were determined on the tennis court and golf course, the upper middle class and elite of the high end social clubs controlled the field. Additionally, not only was there great disparity
between the high and low centrality social clubs, there were very few social bridges and weak links connecting the two extremes. The Elks (ELK) and Shriners (SHR) were more inclusive than the high end clubs or the racial, ethnic, and religious clubs, but their influence was probably only marginal as bridge organizations. Members of the ELK and SHR held board seats on all but four of the banks and trust companies, and interlocked with every elected position, all of the regulatory commissions, both political parties, and the reform organizations. The ELK and SHR were also fairly strongly interlocked with the Jewish community. Three percent of the ELKs were members of the Standard Club and almost three percent of the YMHA. Nevertheless, there were only two Catholic and three German ELK identified and only one German identified in the SHR. Neither of the two organizations counted African Americans among their ranks and the SHR had no Catholics.

As first period bridge organizations the ELK and SHR united the higher end social organizations as well as the political and economic sectors, but offered very few weak links to the lower end racial, ethnic, and religious social organizations.

During the first period of analysis the social clubs of Louisville were completely segregated and deeply
divided by religion and ethnicity. Also, the bridge organizations provided only negligible opportunities for the diverse elements of the city to meet and interact in an informal setting. Consequently, few if any informal social connections existed through which an agreement or consensus of opinion could be reached between the various extremes of organized groups. A true growth regime which depends upon informal channels of communication could not have developed in a social atmosphere such as the one that existed during the first period of analysis.

In order for a growth regime to emerge the social sector had to accept more diversity and stronger bridge organizations had to be created to function as informal conduits of information and personal association. This is precisely the process which took place after the political reform movement and the creation of the LIF. During the second period of analysis the leadership pools of the various factions within the city had more opportunities to meet and associate on neutral social grounds.

Even though more opportunities for association existed during the second period, the upper middle and elite class were still the dominate players. The four most central, primarily white protestant clubs were the older PEN and CC, plus the Art Club (ART), and the
Audubon Club (AUD) which were both new clubs for Louisville. These four clubs jointly accounted for 22 percent of all second period social slots, and 68 percent of the CC, 49 percent of the ART, and 34 percent of the AUD members also held membership in the PEN. These four clubs interlocked with every other social organization during the second period except the African American clubs and the Irish Catholic AOH. Consequently, in terms of social status, the African American community remained unchanged but the Irish community suffered a loss of status during the second period of analysis.

The four most central clubs were however, at least in terms of religion becoming more inclusive than their first period counterparts. The PEN counted 26 Catholics among its membership while nine Catholics appeared in the CC, two in the ART, and 17 in the AUD. The social clubs also maintained six interlocks with the ST and five interlocks with the YMHA which represented a small but absolute improvement for the Jewish community.

When cross-referenced with the economic sector the members of the top four clubs accounted for 15.6 percent of the board slots on the banks and trust companies which was a decline from the first period. Nevertheless, 63 percent of the individuals involved in the LIF were members of these social clubs. Also, 74 percent of the
slots in the six most central professional organizations were held by members of the four most central social clubs. Two of the four top social clubs, the LIF, and five of the professional organizations were established during the second period of analysis. These new organizations greatly tightened the connections between the social and economic sectors and formed additional bridges to the Catholic and Jewish communities. A very weak link was also created to the African American community through the OPT of the economic sector.

The fact that two of the high centrality clubs, the LIF, and five of the professional organizations were new organizations and more receptive to Catholics and Jewish membership also provides additional evidence that a growth regime was emerging. Further confirmation of the regime's existence may be found by cross-referencing the social clubs with the political sector. Twenty-four percent of the second period elected positions were held by members of the four social clubs which is consistent with the first period. There was, however, a marked increase in control of the boards and regulatory commissions with the top social clubs holding 59 percent of the available slots in the second time period. Political party leadership was also more evenly divided during this period with 56 percent of RXC members holding
a membership in the clubs. The DPC had dramatically
dropped in both membership and political centrality, but
in its place 13 percent of the MOS held membership in the
top four social clubs.

By the second period of analysis ethnicity was
clearly beginning to weaken as a restrictive social
factor. In fact, German ethnicity had virtually
disappeared altogether. The German Club no longer existed
and the German economic institutions had abandoned their
ethnic identification. The only formal German
organization which remained was the ODD, but it had
declined from 131 first period members to only 17 in the
second period. The ODD had only one second period
interlock with the CC and two with low centrality Masonic
Lodges.

There is also some indication that Irish ethnicity
was diminishing as well. Limerick was no longer a
strictly Irish community and the AOH membership had
declined from 387 in the first period to 100 in the
second. In the later time period members of the AOH had
only seven social interlocks with low centrality social
clubs, held no economic positions, held only two elected
slots, and had minor representation in the DPC and MOS.

Religion was also less important during the second
period and the Catholic and Jewish communities both

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gained elevated access to the organizational structure of the city and thus the resources of the growth regime. The Jewish community was making across-the-board advancements and maintained 160 interlocks with all 60 of the second period clubs, had 33 interlocks with the professional organizations, held seven financial slots, and five elected positions. Likewise, the Catholic community had 127 interlocks with all the social clubs, held 36 slots in the professional organizations, 16 on the banks and trust companies, and ten elected positions, one regulatory position, as well as 37 MOS members, but only two RXC members.

In an atmosphere such as this it is easy to envision how major political and economic issues could be informally addressed when necessary. The leadership pools of every major faction but one, had ample opportunity to meet and mingle behind the closed doors of the social clubs. African Americans were excluded from the clubs and thus denied access to this informal process and the resources of regime membership. Members of the African American social clubs had only one integrated social interlock during the second time period. One African American interlocked with a low centrality Masonic Lodge, and one African American social club members was also
interlocked with the OPT of the economic sector.\textsuperscript{33}

The second period bridge organizations consisted of two American Legion Posts which were established after the First World War. Jefferson Post Number 15 (JP15) was the larger with 1,163 members, and the suburban-oriented Zachary Taylor Post (ZTP) had 70 members. The formation of the American Legion also cast additional light upon the fabric and structure of the growth regime and provides further evidence that the senior partners of the regime were well acquainted with each other. In March of 1919, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. sent William Bullitt a telegram which stated:

\begin{quote}
A Conference will be held at St Louis about May 1st for the purpose of organizing an association composed of those who have been in the land and naval forces of the United States in this war. A convention held in France has already organized forces there in an association called the American Legion and will have representatives at this convention. The convention will be representative. Organizations already in existence will be invited to send delegates. Will you wire the names and address and rank of men from your state in the service not at present in France ... It is assumed of course that your
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} A few African Americans in organizations such as the NNBL, the RXC, and the interracial social organizations maintained economic and political interlocks with various white organizations but none of these individuals were members of the two African American social clubs. Consequently, there were no direct social club connections between the African American community and the white social clubs of the city.

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recommendations will include enlisted men.\textsuperscript{34}

Bullitt responded on April 4th and sent the names of five Majors, six Captains, two Lieutenants, and one Private. In his telegram Bullitt informed Roosevelt that "It has been difficult to get representative privates, but I will furnish them later."\textsuperscript{35} William Bullitt was one of the most influential men in Louisville and could easily have obtained the names of enlisted men had he chosen to. Bullitt's friend and colleague William Heyburn was a member of the Louisville area Selective Service Board during World War I. Apparently, Bullitt deliberately chose to exclude all but one enlisted man, Private Samuel Culbertson.\textsuperscript{36}

The American Legion of Kentucky (ALK) was formally organized by 26 men in the Board of Trade Building on April 22, 1919. The ALK members jointly held 12 slots in the top four social clubs, and included one Catholic and one Jewish member. There were no representatives from the African American community or organized labor in the new

\textsuperscript{34} Quoted in "The American Legion of Kentucky" (1927) by M.L. Sosnin, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{35} Sosnin, (1927) p. 15.

\textsuperscript{36} Samuel Culbertson was a member of the local elite class and held a total of 15 slots in the Louisville data, and was on the board of six banks, a member of the PEN, CC, and the Sons of the American Revolution (SAR).
organization. The AKL sent a full delegation to the St. Louis conference and immediately after that assembly created the JP15 and ZTP, which were opened to all veterans regardless of rank, race or gender. Only twelve members of the ALK joined the new Legion Posts once they were formed.\(^\text{37}\)

Although the true motivation of the ALK members can never be determined the fact that it was created behind closed doors in the BOT building and formed by the more economically affluent of the city is highly suggestive. It is possible the Legion was viewed as a unifying agent within the growth regime which could bridge all the factions and function as a conduit of information and consensus. Whether or not the American Legion was deliberately and consciously created to fulfill this function is perhaps a mute point because in the end, that is precisely the role the Legion preformed within the regime.

As a bridge organization the JP15 functioned extremely well and directly interlocked with 72 percent

\(^{37}\) The ALK was disbanded shortly after the JP15 and ZTP were created and was very much like the political reform organizations. Once these temporary organizations served their purpose, they were no longer needed. Actual leadership of the JP15 and ZTP was then divided between the 12 ALK founders and additional junior partners who joined them. The Legion Posts were therefore established and controlled in the same manner as the LIF.
of all second period organizations in the Louisville data. The JP15 did not interlock with the AFofL, the ODD, the African American social clubs, or the Socialist Party (SPL). Nevertheless, three interlocks were maintained with the African American economic institutions which provided a weak link to that community. The JP15 also had 50 interlocks with the Catholic community and three with the Irish AOH. There were also 51 JP15 interlocks with the Jewish community. Politically the JP15 was evenly split with 14 Democratic and 12 Republican leaders in the organization. There was also one ILP member in the Legion which provided an additional weak link to the African American community.

Membership of the JP15 interlocked with every elected position, the LIF, all but two of the regulatory boards, all of the professional organizations, and had members on the board of directors of 50 percent of the banks and trust companies. The JP15 also counted among its ranks every occupational category listed in the Louisville data except the Catholic and Jewish clergy. There were 61 AT, 83 DOC, five JUD and two EX in the JP15. And of course, all of these political, economic and social interlocks provided their own direct ties and weak links to virtually every organized faction within the city. Any position or issue which the JP15 promoted could
be quickly and effectively transmitted throughout the entire organizational structure of the regime.

A growth regime depends upon informal channels of access and communication and could only develop after the social atmosphere of Louisville became less restrictive. By the second period of analysis, selective representatives from the Catholic and Jewish communities had gained access to the club lounges, tennis courts, and golf courses and thus the informal avenues of the regime. At the same time new bridge organizations were created which cut across ethnic, religious, class, and to a very limited degree racial lines. These organizations created an opportunity for representatives from each group to meet and associate in an informal and unobserved environment. Moreover, the high level of social, economic, and political interlocks suggests those same representatives could deliberate issues, hammer out compromises, and reach a unified consensus of opinion on a wide variety of urban issues: A consensus of opinion which could then be taken back and sold to their own communities through their group-specific organizations.

**Partnership and the Growth Regime**

By the end of the second period of analysis a growth
regime had emerged in Louisville and the formal organizations of the city were the primary institutions through which the regime functioned. The economic organizations provided fiscal stability while the political institutions maintained municipal control and city services. The professional organizations of the economic sector and the bridge organizations of the social sector functioned to unite the various factions of the regime behind the philosophy of growth. At the same time the social organizations provided an opportunity for regime members from various branches and levels of the regime to gather in an informal and unobserved environment and reach political and economic compromises and agreements when necessary. Virtually all of these diverse organizations were tightly interlocked by the junior and senior partners which allowed the regime to generally function in a unified and cohesive fashion.

Each individual organization was controlled by its own internal leadership pool, but selective representatives from each group also held multiple slots in non-group specific organizations as well. And it was from the ranks of these multiple slots that the junior and senior partners of the regime emerged. This is a critical point because a position of leadership within an organization or group of similar organizations is not
sufficient to qualify for junior or senior partnership. For example, Charles Parrish was extremely influential within the African American community and held a total of ten membership slots within the Louisville data. However, eight of those positions were in African American organizations which effectively limited Parrish's influence to that community. Parrish supported growth and economic development because he believed it would create employment and benefit his community. But, Parrish's organizational concentration restricted him to associate partner status which meant only indirect benefits could be secured from that growth and development.

In order for the regime to function smoothly with an efficient level of control and coordination, the most significant partners had to be entrenched in and link together the political, economic, and social sectors of the regime. Consequently, the primary partners are those individuals who held multiple slots in all three categories of organizations. Within this analysis junior partners are defined as those individuals who interlock

38 Parrish was a member of seven economic organizations and three political organizations but held no social slot within the Louisville data. The Commission on Interracial Cooperation and the Republican Party Executive Committee were the only two integrated organizations of which he was a member.
all three sectors in a single time period, while senior partners interlocked all three sectors in both time periods. In other words, to gain access to senior partner status an individual had to be a member of at least one organization in each sector during both periods of analysis. Only 38 individuals or 0.3 percent of the Louisville data population meet that high standard. It is a logical and reasonable conjecture that these 38 individuals were the most crucial partners of the regime as a consequence of their organizational position. The senior partners were critical to the regime because of their structural positions and were able to provide continuity and stability to the regime over time.

To accomplish this portion of the analysis and to determine these partners, a straight positional methodology of the type pioneered by Mills and Domhoff was utilized. A positional methodology of this type was necessary because in a true systemic regime the partners would need to embody a relatively large and broad organizational base. The regime, therefore, needed selective representatives from numerous urban groups within the partnership in order for it to function. If Eigenvector centrality had been utilized many groups would have been automatically eliminated from the process and their selective representatives would have remained
unidentified. Partnership was therefore calculated as a deliberate effort to push the data as far as possible in an attempt to overcome this obstacle. By looking at the actual positions individuals held, the membership of the AOH had the same opportunity as that of the PEN to acquire partnership, and the membership of the NNBL and BOT were weighed in the same impartial fashion.\footnote{39}

By sifting and sorting through the membership of all three sectors and both time periods it is possible to infer who the regime partners were. Additionally, by looking at partnership interconnections, a degree of insight is gained about regime hegemony as it flowed through the partners to all the organized factions and groups within the city. Granted, this is not a perfect or flawless methodology but it is a reasonably effective procedure to identify individuals who were in all probability significant players within the growth regime.

The criteria for admission to partner status was designed to be impartial but also strict and meticulous.

\footnote{39 It should be mentioned that a person-to-person Eigenvector centrality analysis was initially utilized as a means of determining partnership but discarded as too exclusive. The centrality analysis eliminated all persons who were not white and protestant. Nevertheless, when the results of the two forms of calculation were compared, the results were virtually the same with respect to those white protestants who secured senior partner status.}
If any errors were made, it was in the omission rather than the inclusion of individuals. Therefore, if an error were discovered, it would only strengthen the case for the growth regime rather than detract from it. And, it is possible there were more partners than what is represented here. Although the identified partners may not be disputed as a result of the high admission standards, a positional methodology by its very nature is limiting.

This limitation does not undermine the validity or conclusions of the analysis, but the reader should be aware that problems exist with a positional methodology. The most fundamental and basic problem is that it relies solely on an individual's formal positions. John and James Whallen were clearly powerful and formidable men but actually held few formal positions within the Louisville data. The same statement could be made about Aaron Kohn and Micky Brennen, as well as others who we do not currently know about. The non-positioned powerful are important and one reason why so much qualitative and anecdotal material was presented throughout the pages of this work. The qualitative approach was necessary because a strictly positional methodology could never determine who the non-positioned powerful were or hint at how much influence they actually had.
Another problem with a positional methodology is that it is limited to the positions that the individual chooses to accept. For example, Milton Hanable Smith was president of the L&N Rail Road and socially and economically active. The L&N was an energetic political presence within Louisville and as president, Smith was the overseer of that presence. But Smith personally held no political slots and was therefore excluded from regime partnership in this analysis. Milton Hanable Smith, like many others, falls into the shadowy and abstract world of non-positioned political power.

Donald McDonald held a total of 17 slots in the Louisville data but did not have a first period economic slot and was accordingly excluded from partner status. McDonald was president of the city-owned Gas Company during the first period of analysis and the privately-owned Louisville Gas and Electric Company during the second period. The GAS and LGE were essentially the same company but because of ownership were placed in different sectors. With the sale of the GAS, the organization was dropped from the political sector while the new LGE was placed in the economic sector. McDonald's position within the organizational structure of Louisville and the regime was probably not affected by the sale of the GAS and had that privatization taken place a few years earlier, he
would have been counted among the senior partners. Nevertheless, even in this obvious case, no compromise to the data or methodology was made as any concession had the potential to jeopardize the validity of the data and render it questionable.

There were actually many men in the Louisville data like Smith and McDonald, who held numerous concentrated slots in two sectors and may have had as much power and influence as many of the recognized partners. These two sector men should not be dismissed, but a more detailed analysis of the two sector individuals must be left for future research and analysis.

Another problem with a positional methodology is that it can not compensate for the obvious fact that many individuals were deliberately excluded from most organizations. Despite the methodology utilized to counterbalance this fact, no African American or Irish, and only one member of the Jewish community obtained senior partnership. German, Jewish immigrant Bernard Bernheim was the only minority member to gain senior partnership although several minority members achieved junior partnership. Additionally, more minorities were junior partners in the second period than in the first period of analysis. This fact provides convincing confirmation of the existence of a regime and supports
the conclusion the regime became selectively more inclusive as it matured.

It is also important to realize the Louisville data is essentially a snap shot in time. If the dividing line between the two time periods had been earlier or later, the category of senior partners would have contained different individuals. Death, age, and retirement prevented many first period men from being recognized as senior partners. Had the dividing line been ten years earlier, individuals such as John Atherton, Thomas W. Bullitt, Morris Belknap, Charles Ballard, Bruce Haldeman, James B. Speed, James and Thomas Helm, and others would most likely have been included among the senior partners. On the other hand, had the dividing line been placed ten years later individuals such as John Heyburn, Churchill Humphrey, Charles W. Allen, Samuel B. Kirby Jr., Robert Bingham Jr., and Clarence Mengel may have been senior partners. This snap shot effect is not viewed as problematic for the analysis since the actual organizations remained relatively consistent and as will be demonstrated, senior partnership was largely hereditary in nature.

Even though a pure positional methodology is flawed it is still the most efficient way of unraveling a large and complex network like the Louisville growth regime.
Despite its shortcomings, we know that a very small number of men held tremendous social, economic, and political positions and as a result were able to exert tremendous power and influence throughout the institution of the growth regime. As C. Wright Mills has explained in *The Power Elite*:

Local society is a power as well as a hierarchy of status; at the top there is a set of cliques or 'crowds' whose members judge and decide the important community issues, ... Usually, although by no means always, these cliques are composed of old upper-class people; they include the larger businessmen and those who control the banks who usually also have connections with the major real-estate holders. ... (and) there is an industrial, a retailing, a banking clique. The cliques overlap, and there are usually some men who, moving from one to another, co-ordinate viewpoints and decisions. There are also the lawyers and administrators of solid retail families, who, by the power of proxy and by the many contacts between old and new wealth they embody, tie together and focus in decisions the power of money, credit, of organization.40

Louisville's growth regime is consistent with Mills' description in terms of how it functioned but a growth regime extends beyond the realm of pure economics. A regime is more inclusive and unites the various social groups and sectors of the city. Regime partners must therefore touch all of the groups and move with ease

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40 Mills, p. 37.
between groups and sectors as they tie the regime together and co-ordinate viewpoints and decisions. The junior and senior partners fulfilled that role.

There were 115 first period junior partners identified and they interlocked with 79 organizations and collectively held just over ten percent of all first period membership slots. One of the junior partners was African American, seven were Jewish and three were identified as Catholic. Professionally this group included 34 AT, 23 EX, 15 DOC, eight JUD, and three individuals from organized labor. Politically the group included eight Republican and 14 Democratic Party leaders, and the partners held nine ALD, four COL, and three MAY slots. Thirty seven of the group were involved in the political reform movement and the junior partners held 47 post-reform political slots on the regulatory boards and commissions. The partners also controlled 75 slots as directors of the banks and trust companies and united the most central financial institutions of the city. Socially the group included 65 PEN members but 44 of the group were also in the bridge organizations of the ELK and SHR. The first period junior partners also held nine slots on the interracial charitable and social organizations.

During the second period of analysis there were 167
junior partners identified and they directly connected 118 organizations by collectively holding 8.7 percent of all second period membership slots. There was a slight decrease in the percent of membership slots held by the junior partners from the first to the second period. The second period was considerably larger than the first as the social and economic sectors had greatly increased and more minority specific organizations were formed. These facts probably account for the slight decrease in the total percent of slots held by the partners. Nevertheless, as the second period expanded and became more inclusive so did the ranks of the junior partners.

The Jewish community and organized labor actually lost representation during this period as there were only four Jewish representatives and none from labor included among the partners. However, the African American, Irish, and Catholics communities gained representation among the junior partners. The Catholics experienced the

41 The LFL was a Louisville-based organization with representatives from most of the city's unions and as a result it had a rather large membership. However, when the LFL merged with the state AFofL, the number of representatives to the state organization had only a few representatives from each city attending the AFofL meetings in Frankfort. Thus, the AFofL numbers reflect a much smaller pool of elected officers from Louisville which perhaps in part explains this decrease.
most dramatic improvement with 18 second period partners, followed by the African American community with three and the Irish with one.

Professionally the second period partners included 70 AT, 23 EX, 10 DOC, and 19 JUD. Politically the group was evenly split with 47 RXC and 47 MOS memberships. The partners also held 14 ALD, 13 COL, and four MAY slots and retained controlled of the 47 slots on the regulatory boards and commissions. Twenty one of the junior partners were directly involved in the creation of the LIF and collectively the partners held 109 slots in the professional organizations and 92 slots as directors of the banks and trust companies. Socially the group included 85 PEN members while 35 of the group were members of the JP15 bridge organization. The combined weight of the JP15 of the social sector and the professional organizations of the economic sector represents a dramatic increase in organizations which functioned as bridge organizations. The second period junior partners also maintained 12 slots on the interracial charitable and social organizations.

Even this brief analysis of the junior partners should be sufficient to demonstrate that a tightly interwoven regime existed in Louisville. Furthermore, when this analysis is coupled with the previous analysis
of the economic, political, and social sectors it is apparent the regime was expanding, becoming more deeply entrenched within the city, and to a limited degree becoming more inclusive. As the regime developed it absorbed selective representatives from a cross section of the population out of necessity. The selective representatives were necessary and were expected to promote the growth regime's agenda within their own communities. Through this process regime hegemony was created and maintained by the partners, and the senior partners in particular.

In order to truly gain insight into the scope of the regime's level of hegemony an examination of the senior partners is necessary. The 38 senior partners were better positioned than anyone in the city to coordinate viewpoints and cultivate a consensus of opinion. Furthermore, many of these same individuals were significant players in the formation of the growth regime they dominated. Fifteen of the senior partners were involved in the political reform movement of 1905, and 14 of the group were active in the establishment of the Louisville Industrial Foundation.\footnote{It should be noted that 12 of the senior partners were active members of the reform organizations while three supported the political machine. Robert W. Bingham was part of the machine before changing sides and joining}
The 38 senior partners accounted for only 0.3 percent of the Louisville data population and 0.01 percent of Louisville's total 1920 population. However, 99 of the 196 organizations in the Louisville data were directly interlocked by the 38 senior partners, and the total membership of those 99 interlocked organizations accounted for 70.6 percent of all the membership slots. In other words, as a group the 38 senior partners had direct access to over 50 percent of the regime's organizational structure and over 70 percent of the 10,875 individuals contained within the Louisville data.

When the organizational affiliation of the senior partners was broken down by sector, it contained 24 political, 38 economic, and 37 social organizations. As would be expected, the economic and social organizations were concentrated among the high centrality organizations (see Table 16). The surprising aspect of the senior partners was their involvement in the political organizations. Their control and influence within the political sector was more extensive than their social or

the reformers and the Louisville Election case was tried before Judges Samuel B. Kirby and Shackleford Miller who both ruled against the reform movement. Both Kirby and Miller had been elected to the bench with the support of the Whallen brothers. This appears to have been the only major split among the top levels of the growth regime and it was short-lived.
economic connections. Every political organization except the Independent Lincoln Party and the Socialist Party contained senior partner members. The senior partners held 166 or 8.6 percent of all the political slots in the Louisville data. Consequently, they held a higher percentage of political slots than either economic or social slots. This provides compelling evidence that a growth regime existed and suggests that municipal government was tightly controlled by that regime.

Four of the partners had been elected to the office of ALD, two to the COL, and three to the position of MAY. Seven of these elected positions were in the first time period of analysis and only two partners held an elected post during the second period. However, the senior partners held 41 seats on the boards and regulatory commissions which supports the conclusion the regime considered these institutions of critical importance to its success.

In terms of party affiliation they were almost evenly divided with ten having a position of leadership within the Republican Party while 13 were Democratic Party leaders. Another aspect about their political position rests with their influence within the judicial branch of government. Fifty individual judges were identified and eight of them were in the ranks of the
senior partners. The fact that 21 percent of the senior partners were JUD suggests the regime had control over all three branches of government. That fact coupled with their control of the boards and regulatory commissions and their even division between party leadership supports Floyd Hunter’s conclusion that democracy is a myth.

Table 16

Louisville Growth Regime Senior Partners by Sector and Eigenvector Centrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENIOR PARTNERS</th>
<th>Slots Held</th>
<th>Total Slots by Sector</th>
<th>Individual Eigenvector Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingham, Robert W.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bullitt, William M.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey, Alexander F.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Lafon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sackett, Frederick M.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Arthur D.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellard, Thurston S.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heyburn, William</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hurlay, Oscar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruce, Helm</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Kirby, Samuel B.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Smith, Thomas F.</td>
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<td>Brown, James L.</td>
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<td>Atherton, Peter L.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bellnap, William B.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miller, Schackelford</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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Total Slots by Sector: 186 166 299 632
Per cent of Slots: 4.2 8.6 2.1 3.1
The 38 senior partners also included among their ranks 19 individuals with an AT, 15 with an EX and one with a DOC clarification. The partners held a total of 186 first and second period economic slots which meant they directly controlled just over four percent of all the economic positions within the Louisville data. They held 24 slots in the professional organizations with the highest concentration being in the LC and the UC. They also controlled 53 boards seats on the Banks and Trust Companies.

Socially the partners placed solidly in the economic elite class as evidenced by their club memberships. They jointly held 301, or just over two percent of all the social slots in the data but it was the concentration of those slots which was of particular interest. Thirty four of the partners were members of the PEN, 22 the CC, and 12 the Sons of the American Revolution (SAR). In The Private World of High Society, Lucy Kavaler maintains the SAR is an extremely reliable indicator of upper class status.\textsuperscript{43} The only two partners who did not have membership in at least one of these three exclusive and high centrality social organizations were Bernard

\textsuperscript{43} For more information on the SAR the reader should consult Kavaler.
Bernheim and Walter P. Lincoln who was Catholic.

From their position within the regime the senior partners had direct access to many of the city's organizations but they also maintained weak links to the Jewish, Catholic, and African American communities as well. Bernard Bernheim provided a weak link to the Jewish community through the ST, while Walter P. Lincoln and Robert Hagan provided weak links with Catholics through the KC. However, the strongest weak links were with the African American community. Eight of the senior partners maintained 14 interlocks with the interracial charitable and social service organizations. Consequently, the senior partners and thus the regime, had direct access to the leadership of every strictly African American organization within the Louisville data. For example, five senior partners were on the 37-person board of the Louisville Urban League (LUL). All 11 of the strictly African American organizations had at least one member on the LUL board. The NAACP provided three LUL board members and the NNBL five. Three senior partners were on the board of the BTWC which also had board members from nine of the African American organizations. Senior partner

"Walter Lincoln and Robert Hagan were the only two partners identified as Catholic. However, Hagan was a member of the PEN."
representation on the CIC provided links to six African American organizations while the PCM interlocked with one.

In essence, the senior partnership had direct one-to-one access to the leadership of every African American organization in the Louisville data. Ironically, the most oppressed and excluded group within the city had the most numerous and strongest weak links with the most affluent and privileged group. At the same time obviously lacking in either direct connections or weak links to the senior partners were the Irish community and organized labor, the two second most oppressed groups. The only explanation for this inconsistency must rest with the distinction between race and class.

Organized labor had been seriously weakened after the formation of the Louisville Employees Association but it had also reached a working agreement with the LIF and accepted associate partnership status. Therefore, there was no pressing need for the regime, let alone the senior partners, to become actively involved with organized labor. As long as labor was weak and LIF projects progressed smoothly, the numerous secondary weak links to

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45 The German organizations also had no connections to the partners in the second time period, but by then all but one German organization had disappeared and presumably German ethnicity was no longer a factor.

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individual workers through the bridge organizations were sufficient. Likewise, the Irish were free to join most low centrality organizations if they wished and organizations such as the OPT and JP15 provided sufficient secondary weak links to that community.

The African American community on the other hand was a very different matter. Because of race African Americans were excluded from most of the white organizations and as a result the regime had to create new acceptable organizations through which the community could be reached and supervised. George C. Wright maintains the white members of the interracial organizations of Louisville perpetuated a condescending and paternalistic postbellum racial attitude. Nevertheless, the African American community was largely dependent upon their good will and patronage for social services and employment. The interracial organizations were thus as much about regime control as they were improving race relations and conditions within the African American community.

Although speculative, this interpretations regarding organized labor, the Irish, and African American

\[46\] For a very good discussion of the purposes, problems and successes of the interracial organizations, consult Wright (1985).

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communities is supported by the known facts and further supports a growth regime perspective. No groups were completely excluded from the direct or indirect influence and control of the regime even though there were varying levels of social acceptance and integration within the city. Naturally, the senior partners had the highest level of acceptance and the greatest access to the regime's resources. Of course a positional methodology can not confirm the hypothesis the senior partners conferred among themselves and reached informal political and economic agreements. Nevertheless, the opportunity for such activity existed and the assumption they did is consistent with well established sociological theory. A brief general examination of the senior partners will further reinforce this hypothesis and theoretical assumptions, support the conclusions of Mills which were expressed in the opening portion of this chapter, and bolster the growth regime perspective.

Many of the senior partners were descendants of the historically prominent dynasties of Louisville. At least ten of the senior partners were direct descendants of the first settlers of the city and included Arthur and Lafon Allen, Ellis Duncan, Thurston Ballard, Peter Atherton, Helm Bruce, William and Alex Scott Bullitt, Alexander
Humphrey, and Samuel Kirby. ⁴⁷

An additional 11 senior partners were themselves or were descendants of Louisville's Iron Men, the manufacturers of the late 19th century or the executives of those manufacturing companies. This group included: William Belknap, Theodore Ahrens, Bernard Bernheim, Peter Atherton, Charles Mengel, William Heyburn, Charles Huhlein, Frederick Sackett, Thomas F. Smith, and the two members of the Allen family. Added to the manufacturing class were the Civil War brigadiers or their descendants, the most notable of which included John B. Castleman, William and Alex Scott Bullitt, Arthur and Lafon Allen, and William Head. The Bullitt and Allen dynasties were also strongly interconnected with the pioneer dynasties and the manufacturers.

This high level of senior partner integration is greatly enhanced when family relationships and the institution of marriage is introduced into the analysis. The senior partners includes two sets of brothers, several cousins, and 22 of the senior partners, or members of their immediate families including parents,

⁴⁷ Information for this part of the analysis was taken from various editions of the Who's Who and from the Filson Club archives. The Filson Club has a very good genealogy section that attempts to record the genealogy of its prominent members.
children and siblings, were connected to each other through marriage. In other words, over 60 percent of the senior partners were relatives, brother-in-laws, son-in-laws, father-in-laws or some other combination of family interconnections. Additionally, a high percentage of the senior partners were also linked to the junior partners through marriage, or their families were united through marriage at some point during the 19th century. This high level of partnership intermarriage is one of the most interesting aspects of the analysis and it appears likely that 40 percent of the senior and junior partners were united through marriage.48

No individual businesses were listed in the Louisville data but we can gain a degree of insight into which companies were the most influential by examining the occupation of the senior partners. Belknap Hardware and Manufacturing had no less than four high ranking

48 The Louisville Social Register of 1930 contained a list of women's names before and after marriage. This list was cross-referenced with the membership of Louisville's women's clubs contained in the 1923 edition of the Louisville Blue Book, and then both lists were cross-referenced with the Louisville data. Once the final list was determined, the calculations were made. Despite the care and effort which went into this portion of the analysis there were most likely some errors made. Many of the last names were the same and it was difficult and often impossible to determine which branch of what families were actually united through marriage. However, the 40 percent figure is believed to be accurate and a good indication of partnership integration.
executives among the senior partners, followed by Ballard and Ballard Flour Mill, Ahrens and Ott Manufacturing, C.C. Mengel and Brothers, B.F. Avery & Sons, the Frankfort Distilleries INC., Bernheim Distilling Company, the Louisville Paper Company, and J.P. Morton and Company, all of which were represented by senior partners. It is also noteworthy that these were the largest employers and companies in Louisville at the time and most of then maintained a regional or national market. Belknap Hardware, Ballard and Ballard, Ahrens and Ott, and B.F. Avery & Sons dominated the southern market in their respective fields. At the same time C.C. Mengel and Brothers was the world's largest producer of boxes and crates and maintained its own fleet of ocean-going vessels. The Bernheim Distilling Company was one of the nation's leaders in the production of distilled spirits and the company maintained the largest bourbon warehouse in the world.

By contrast no members of the Louisville's large retailing families appeared among the senior partners but 18 members of the Bensinger, Engelhard, Kaufman, Levy, and Stewart families jointly held 121 slots in the Louisville data. Nevertheless, the retailing families were restricted to junior partnership which is the one inconsistency between the Louisville data and the

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findings of Logan and Molotch. However, Louisville's real estate interests were well represented among the senior partners by Peter Atherton and Caldwell Norton who were both members of the Louisville Board of Realtors. The high status of the real estate interest is consistent with the perspective of many social scientists working in this area.

The city's newspapers were also well represented by the senior partners which assured the message of the regime and a pro-growth ideology would receive continuous media support. James B. Brown purchased the *Post* and *Louisville Herald* in 1924 and merged the two papers establishing the Republican-oriented *Louisville Herald-Post*. But without question the most prominent media personality and senior partner was Robert W. Bingham. Bingham purchased the *Courier Journal* and *Louisville Times* in 1918 from Henry Watterson and Bruce Haldeman. After Walter Haldeman's death, the remaining members of the family bitterly split over the direction of the paper and the manner in which the family fortune should be distributed. Henry Watterson and Bruce Haldeman were the two senior stockholders of the company and when they proved unable to heal the family split, they decided to sell the paper.

49 After Walter Haldeman's death, the remaining members of the family bitterly split over the direction of the paper and the manner in which the family fortune should be distributed. Henry Watterson and Bruce Haldeman were the two senior stockholders of the company and when they proved unable to heal the family split, they decided to sell the paper.
The senior partners were thus a unified group connected through family ties, business interests and organizational affiliations. They had the economic, political and social connections to tie the growth regime together, maintain political and judicial control, and they could broadcast their message to the junior and associate partners through their organizational connections and to the general public through their control of the media. Power and information flowed through the senior partners and touched every corner of the city. The senior partners were the heart and soul of the Louisville growth regime and the foremost supporters of growth. Urban growth translated into both direct and indirect benefits for the senior partners by strengthening their businesses and assuring the successful continuation of their family dynasties.

Summation

This was admittedly an ambitious work but despite its complexity several objectives were accomplished. The analysis demonstrates that an integrated theoretical approach to urban growth and development is not only desirable but necessary and feasible. To accomplish this
task the social-historical development of Louisville was surveyed from the perspective of the major urban theories and the case of Louisville conformed to those theoretical concepts.

As the American frontier expanded west the area by the falls of the Ohio River was a logical location for the establishment of a thriving and prosperous city. The city grew and developed in the nineteenth century in large part because of the influence of the industrial revolution and new innovative technology. Thus, as the city grew it was compelled to expand outward and become a convenience of commerce. At this level the formation, development, and growth of Louisville is completely consistent with the theoretical approach of Cooley, Weber, Park, and the ecologists of the Chicago School.

But Louisville was also a location which attracted a heterogeneous collection of settlers, slaves, immigrants and migrants. Consequently, it instantaneously became a city deeply divided by social class, religion, and racial and ethnic diversity. From its inception a social hierarchy existed in the city with an economic elite class occupying the top level of that hierarchy.

The early settlers with pre-existing capital and resources, seized political control of the area and manipulated the political process to their own advantage.
This elite group reconfigured local government in order to secure additional property and real estate and the entire subsequent economic and political development of Louisville revolved around their quest for wealth. As time passed and the city grew, the elite expanded, intermarried, entered new business ventures, formed partnerships and continued to utilize the city as a means of accruing additional capital and assets. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries construction and control of the urban infrastructure from the Louisville and Portland Canal to the L and N Rail Road to the development of municipal services were all manipulated to increase the financial resources of the elite. Additionally, Louisville's position within the Civil War, the political reform movement and the creation of the Louisville Industrial Foundation were all contrived to preserve and protect the position of the economic elite. When viewing the city from this perspective the theories of Hunter, Mills, Domhoff, and Blauner are convincing and highly useful.

However, the city was also settled by a less privileged working class, immigrants and African Americans who struggled to gain an economic and political foothold within the face of repression and discrimination. The Germans, Irish, Jewish and African
Americans were required to close ranks around their race or ethnicity and turn it into a vehicle of stability and mobility as they made the transition to a new environment. Here the work of Thomas and Znaniecki is particularly helpful in understanding the ethnic and racial enclaves which developed as well as the critical role religion played within those communities.

Additionally, as immigration and migration increased dual social structures developed which served to perpetuate and maintain ethnic and racial identity as the process of acculturation took place. In this respect the social development of Louisville was consistent with the theories of Park, DuBois, and Gans. However, assimilation proved to be a more difficult task than acculturation and was achieved with varying levels of success. The Germans were the most successful and German ethnicity quickly ceased to be an issue while assimilation for the Irish and Jewish populations was a much slower process. At the same time the African American population was systematically denied access to the process of assimilation despite the best efforts of their community leaders.

The difficulties of assimilation can be attributed to several primary factors. First, as Gordon, Gans, Warner, and Glazer and Moynihan have all pointed out,
racial and ethnic identity created a high degree of internal group solidarity that functioned to maintain and prolong group identity. Thus, individuals had a vested interest in adhering to their ethnic or racial identity. That was true in all cases but particularly so where external pressure and discrimination existed. External pressure also functioned to galvanize each group into a special interest for self-preservation and in an effort to secure a greater share of the available resources. At the same time the special interest nature of group identity worked to divide and distance one group from another and create an opening for the development of a split labor market as discussed by Bonacich as well as an ideologically based caste or class system of the type discussed by Warner, Cox, Wilson, and Davis, Gardner and Gardner.

The political process and organized labor should have been an effective means of securing additional resources by the working class racial and ethnic groups. Unfortunately, these avenues of mobility were also problematic on several levels. Since groups functioned as special interests, politics and labor all too frequently followed the same path as group identity. The Democratic political machine functioned much like the split labor market. The Irish who largely controlled the machine
achieved limited advancements through the patronage system but denied political access to most of the non-Irish of the city. Likewise, organized labor was severely fractured and riddled by internal divisions based in large part upon racial and ethnic divisions. Thus the bargaining power of labor was undermined from within as well as challenged on external fronts. Ultimately, Glazer and Moynihan were correct in determining that race and ethnicity functioned as special interest groups but what they failed to conclude was that the elite also officiate as a stronger and more unified special interest. Furthermore, working class ethnic and racial groups lacked the unity and long standing organizational connections and political influence to effectively defend their position when challenged by the special interest of the elite. This allowed the unions and the political machines of Louisville to be easily crushed by the more cohesive and powerful elite.

The elite of Louisville were the principle gatekeepers of assimilation and contributed to the perpetuation of ethnic and racial identity. Throughout the 19th century the special interest of the elite used race and ethnicity as a means of playing one group off against another to keep wages artificially low and increase their own profit margin. The continued existence
of ethnic and racial identity also helped facilitate the unified elite's hegemonic control of the city. Acculturation was possible and necessary but the path to assimilation was restricted by the elite class for their own self-interest.

This situation started to slowly change in the early 20th century and it is hypothesized that successful assimilation began to take place after the elite realized it had become economically expedient. As the industrial revolution matured a national market developed and competition between cities became more intense. The local elite recognized their city and thus their primary source of wealth was being bypassed by that expanding market. To retain their position they needed to augment the economic base of Louisville, attract additional capital and labor, and conform to the requirements of the national market. These goals were beyond the resources and organizational capability of the local elite and to achieve them the elite needed the support and resources of the entire city.

As Peterson and to a lesser extent Logan and Molotch have explained, in a situation such as this, the city must become a special interest and actively promote itself. To accomplish the task of turning the city into a special interest the elite needed three critical
elements: labor control, political stability, and a
docile citizenry which accepted and supported the
philosophy of growth. In short, the elite needed a growth
regime to maintain and protect their position in the face
of an expanding national market. The elite also realized
they had to reach an accommodation with previously
excluded groups in order to create a successful growth
regime.

To facilitate the creation of a growth regime and
maintain it once it was established, the elite were
compelled to include selective representatives from
previously excluded groups. Ethnic and non-protestant
individuals were invited to join the growth regime so
they could function as informal conduits of information
and consensus to their respective communities. As the
selective representatives moved up the hierarchal
structure of the regime, a ripple effect was created that
generated additional opportunities for members of their
communities.

A pro-growth partnership was formed which provided
the elite with both direct and indirect benefits, while
labor, ethnic groups, and the general public received
primarily indirect benefits from growth. True
assimilation into Louisville's mainstream political,
economic, and social structure began with that
partnership and the growth regime. Nevertheless, assimilation was a lopsided endeavor and contingent upon the requirements of the elite. Because African Americans were in a marginal position nationally, their inclusion in the regime was unnecessary and continued control of the community was all that was required. Protestant Germans had already assimilated and German ethnicity was no longer a factor. On the other hand the Irish, Jewish, and Catholics were increasing in numbers and purchasing power and their assimilation was now advantageous to the elite. These groups were a potential economic and political force and were thus offered partnership status within the growth regime.

The local elite also had no option to assimilation because the Americanization movement was promoting assimilation at the national level. Louisville had to conform to that national pattern in order to attract the necessary labor to fill the needs of the expanding industrial base of the city. In an age of massive

50 There is currently no definitive explanation to account for the rapid assimilation of the German population. However, German immigrants were in the Louisville area from the first days of settlement. Additionally many of those immigrants had married into the agricultural elite class so many of Louisville's elite were of partial-German ancestry. Also, many of the Germans were protestant and originated from Western Europe. It is possible that these factors all contributed to German assimilation.
immigration and a rapidly developing industrial economy, ethnic labor, like capital, had to be provided with an incentive to migrate to or remain in Louisville.

However, the elite retained absolute control of the growth regime, urban development, and the process of assimilation and utilized them as a mechanism to preserve and promote their privileged position. As Stone points out, this was possible because of the systemic power of the elite and that systemic power was strikingly obvious in the analysis of Louisville's growth regime. The elite dominated the economic and political agenda and determined which issues would be promoted by the growth regime and placed before the general public. In this respect the Louisville growth regime was consistent with the perspectives of Stone, Logan and Molotch, Bachrach and Baratz, and further supports Hunter's conclusion that democracy was a myth.

In conclusion the senior partners of the growth regime were the true power brokers of Louisville as they controlled the critical intersection of social status, economic power, and political influence. The growth regime like the city itself was an avenue of opportunity and mobility but the spoils of the regime, like that of the city, were divided disproportionately. The individuals who arrived first and with the most resources
gained the most while those who arrived with nothing but their labor power achieved only a marginal position.

Although the factual events recounted in this work are well documented, their interpretation and the concept of the growth regime are theoretical and offered as a hypothesis. The existence of a growth regime can never be definitively proven, nor can it be completely discounted at this time. This study would need to be duplicated in other cities before we could reject or fail to reject the hypothesis of the growth regime. Until that time this interpretation is presented as a logical and reasonable explanation for the development, growth, and social structure of Louisville during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
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