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On Whose Watch? The Silent Separation of American Children from Their Fathers

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Within two generations, the primary reason that American children were deprived of a father shifted from a father's death to a woman's choice. That is, prior to the 1960s, the major cause of fatherlessness was the death of the father through illness or accident. After the 1960s, the children became deprived of fathers primarily because of women's decisions to petition for a divorce or to become a single parent mother. The path of the shift is examined, and the consequences writ small per child and writ large for the commonweal are examined.

Rule #1: "All politics are local" —Speaker Tip O'Neill
Rule #2: "All long term politics are reproduction strategies."
Rule #3: All effective long term politics camouflage Rule #2.
—Ipsoc Macquire

Around the world, the thousands of known cultures have built their social structures around some version of the nuclear family: a mother, a father and their children. Superimposed upon this core, are variations such as extended families or the avunculate. However, in 1994 nearly 2,000,000 American children became fatherless as a consequence of decisions made by individuals which were adjudged not inappropriate by the commonweal. That is, the system of American folkways & mores had been re-arranged and re-adjusted such that fatherlessness was not
viewed as a problem of sufficient severity to warrant attempts at solutions. This paper attempts to address at least part of the process by which widespread fatherlessness had been refracted as a non-problem.

Background. To develop a context, let's examine the cross-cultural character of the institution of “marriage”. Marriage is a cross-cultural universal (Van den Berghe 1979, Stephens 1964, Levinson & Malone 1980, Brown 1991). A general consensus on the universality of “marriage” is its function to legitimize the wife’s children. As Hartley (1975) wrote: “With hundreds of societies in the world having varied beliefs and customs, different environmental problems, and differences in group size and organization, the principle of legitimacy comes as near as any social rule to being truly universal”. One of the founding graybeard fathers of Anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski (1927), believed that “the principle of legitimacy” was one of the pillars upon which the organization of the family was built. Malinowski stated that: “… the most important moral and legal rule concerning the physiological side of kinship is that no child should be brought into the world without a man—and one man at that—assuming the role of sociological father, that is, guardian and protector, the male link between the child and the rest of the community…” That is, once legitimacy between a man—now a father—and a child had been publicly acknowledged, then that man is strongly pressured to provision & to protect his children. The children become his children by a ritual of “marriage” (Stephens 1963, Van den Berghe 1979). That is, marriage is for children. McCary (1975, p 289) framed the case well in noting that having children has traditionally been regarded as “the fulfillment of a marriage, if not the primary reason for marriage”. The marriage aligns the child, as well as the mother, with a particular man—now a father—who has particulate responsibility to insure that the child, as well as the mother, have adequate provisions and protection. “Provisioning” or access to resources which would be available to the mother-child dyad is a non-trivial matter and the promise of the resources is an important consideration in a prospective groom being accepted as a husband. If the promise of resources is not forthcoming after a marriage, then a divorce is often a consequence of
the unfulfilled expectations. This dynamic is widely in evidence
from such diverse places as Amazonia (Chagnon, 1968, Stearman,
1989), Tibet (Ekvall, 1968), Australian Aborigines (Hart & Pilling,
1960), the Dani of New Guinea (Heider, 1979), India (Maclachlan,
1983), Turkey (Pierce 1964), Japan (Norbeck 1976), and China

In a small minority of cultures (about 12%), it is the mother’s-
brother, the avunculus, who is the male-figure which is the prox-
imate man to his sister’s children (Schlegel 1972). Nonetheless, the
sister is expected to be married and the child is to be “legitimate”.
Although the U.S. is a modern industrialized society, it is no
exception to the catholic trend and has a de jure monogamous
marriage system.

Thus, most “families” across our planet have one husband &
one wife as a core. The women become mothers by having her
husband’s children, and the husband thereby becomes a social
father. As soon as the status of “social father” is achieved by the
man, he is strongly prescribed to provide singular attention to his
children. Failure to nurture his children with goods & services
is a source of (informal) social pressure against the man. Society
wide expectations concerning children he has sired, but has not
“legitimized”, do not usually include a similar level of nurturance
from the man.

Developing a U.S. baseline

There are three basic routes by which a child can become
fatherless: death of the father, a single parent birth (that single
parent is always the mother), and divorce wherein the mother,
not the father, receives custody of the child.

In the U.S. from the 1920s-1940s, death of the father was a
prime reason for fatherlessness. For example, in 1920, the death
rate for men 25–44 years of age was 7.3 per 1000 men. This number
dropped to 5.7 in 1958 and to 2.6 in 1992.

In 1940, only 3.5% of the live-births were out-of-wedlock. This
figure reached 3.9% in 1950 and 4.5% in 1955. But by 1993, the
figure passed the 30% mark.

In 1920, the divorce rate was 1.6 per 1,000 population. The rate
remained at 1.6 in 1930. In 1940, the figure reached 2.0. However,
by 1975, the rate had more than doubled to 4.8 and has remained
in that area ever since (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960, 1995). Accordingly, while fatherlessness from death has declined significantly, fatherlessness both from preclusion—an out-of-wedlock birth—and from judicial abrasion—divorce—had increased significantly.

Thus, between 1940 and the present, the expectations and values of the American mega-tribe had to have shifted (a) in the direction that fatherlessness was not crucial either to the fathers' children writ small or to the commonweal writ large and (b) the magnitude of the shift had to be powerful enough to cross the threshold from the potential to the manifest.

Four variables will be examined in this exercise: (1) birth rates, (2) divorce rates, (3) out-of-wedlock births, and (4) the percent of married women who were employed in the labor force. The time frame to be examined will be from the 1920s to the early 1990s.

(1) Birth rates. The general tendency over the centuries has been for a decline in birth rates (the number of births per 1,000 population). In 1920, the birth rate was 27.7. During the depression, the birth rate dipped into the low 20s and high teens. The famous post-war baby boom increased the rates to the mid-twenties until the middle sixties. Then there was a continuous decline to the middle teens where the rates have stabilized, at least for the present. See Figure 1.

(2) Divorce rates. Divorce rates (number of divorces per 1000 population) for the 1920s and 1930s were in the 1.6 range. From the 1940's to the late sixties, the rates were in the 2.0–2.6 range: a slight increase. However, from the decade of 1968 to 1979, the rates climbed from 2.9 to 5.3. The rates then dipped and have stayed in the middle to high fours. See Figure 1.

(3) Out-of-wedlock births. In 1940, out-of-wedlock births accounted for only 3.5% of all live-births. The figure edged up to 4.1% in 1945 and dipped to 3.9% in 1950. By 1960, the percentage of all births which were out-of-wedlock rose to 5.2%. This percentage was doubled to 10.7% in 1970 and nearly trebled by 1993 to 31.0%. See Figure 1.

(4) Married women in the labor force. In 1920, about 9.0% of ever married women (including widowed divorced and separated
Figure 1

U.S. rates, across time, of divorces (number of divorces per 10,000 population), out-of-wedlock births (percentage of all live births which were out-of-wedlock), births (number of births per 1,000 population), and wives employed (percentage of wives who were employed). Note that the first five dates presented are 1920, 1930, 1940, 1945 and 1950. After 1950, each year is depicted individually until 1993.

Thus, from the pre-WWII America to the 1990s, four trends were extant and germane. First, the number of children born per woman had nearly halved. For the two decades plus of fertility per
woman, the women were averaging about two children. Second,
divorce rates had at least doubled. Third, out-of-wedlock births
had increased at least by a factor of seven. Fourth, married women
had more than quadrupled their participation in the labor force.

The patterns were not inevitable. For example, with a decrease
in the number of children per wife, women would be under less
stress and could have continued in the homemaker role now made
easier by fewer children and with an increase in income by the
husband/father due to his seniority and to a rising standard of
living in the prospering country. But such was not the reality.

As the number of children per woman decreased, women
increasingly entered the labor force and were involved in a higher
percentage of out-of-wedlock births and in an elevated number
of divorces. Why this pattern and not another? An attempt at a
reasonable answer is offered below.

*Individuals are mortal, the commonweal need not be.*

While everyone on the planet is guaranteed a death, tribes or
societies are not so obligated. As long as a community can retain
political and social integrity and as long as the communities men
and women raise competent and viable offspring (in excess of
2100 children per 1000 mothers), then the community can expect
perpetual existence. Cultural formulae which are so forged as
to churn out loyal, fecund, well-socialized citizens are cultural
formulae destined for longevity. In America of 1920, a formula
which had been honed for millennia was intact and effective. To
wit: the home was an economic unit with very strong division of
labor. Wives were homemakers. Men were breadwinners. Infant
mortality was, by contemporary standards, horrifically high. Ac-

Accordingly, if replacement value were to be achieved per family
unit, then consecutive and successive pregnancies were a simply
part of life. Artificial birth control was often inserted into the
folklore as an event which was inappropriate or unnatural or
sinful. Regardless of the level of individual discomfort or the
thwarting of personal preferences, the cultural formula which
had proven successful for the commonweal was perpetuated by
its own momentum.

Then three “ideas” began to be percolated into the worldview
of the American mega-tribe. And, as argued below, these ideas
made quite a difference. The three ideas or expectations were (1) the government can and should be able to replace the father as a primary breadwinner for a family, (2) marriage was to maximize the happiness or personal fulfillment quotient per spouse, and (3) fathers were supernumerary or optional.

**Expectation #1: Government as breadwinner.**

Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was a program begun in 1935 to give financial help widowed mothers who, by becoming a widow, were shorn of a breadwinner: a husband/father. By the 1960s, ADC had become Aid to Families with dependent children (AFDC). The focus of the aid shifted from helping the widow to helping the child. All families with children became potential recipients. Three Supreme Court decisions—King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970)—disallowed distinctions and arbitrary or discretionary decisions to be made by local/state agencies in regards to eligibility. The only criterion for becoming a recipient was that the child was in a family with a low enough level of resources. As itemized below, aid in the form of cash was soon-supplemented with aid in the form of food, housing, health care and education. With the advent of their entitlement programs, the government, whether it be local, state or federal, had become a direct competitor to the traditional father-role as a provider or a breadwinner for his children. Hence, in the context of this direct competition, the mother was in a position to exchange the husband/father for the government. By 1994, major categories of governmental aid through entitlement programs had included: cash (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC], food (food stamps; Women, Infants, & Children [WIC] benefits; and free-lunch, free-breakfast programs in schools, summer meals), medical care (Medicaid), fuel (fuel allowances), education (Head Start, Pell grants), and housing (public housing). According to average figures from national data for the model year 1994, a family which qualified for all of these entitlements could receive cash, goods, and services worth between $15,347-$23,184. See Table 1. Note that none of these benefits is taxable. Also note that state and local programs, which are not included in this analysis, spend 64% as much as did the federal programs (in 1994).
Table 1.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>National Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid to families with dependent children (AFDC)</td>
<td>$4,572.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child care</td>
<td>$1,348.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food stamps</td>
<td>$2,089.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid (AFDC)</td>
<td>$1,265.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>$4,981.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School breakfast</td>
<td>$166.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School lunch</td>
<td>$174.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer feeding</td>
<td>$100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>$270.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women, infants, children program (WIC)</td>
<td>$382.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE SUB-TOTAL</td>
<td>$15,347.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security on $15,347 @ 7.65%</td>
<td>$1,174.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$16,521.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE SUB-TOTAL ($15,347) plus Head Start at $6,146</td>
<td>$21,493.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus social security @ 7.65% plus taxes @ 15%</td>
<td>$25,106.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE SUB-TOTAL ($15,347) plus one Pell grant at $1,691</td>
<td>$17,038.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus social security @ 7.65% plus taxes @ 15%</td>
<td>$19,590.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE SUB-TOTAL ($15,347) plus Head Start and one Pell grant</td>
<td>$23,184.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus social security @ 7.65% plus taxes @ 15%</td>
<td>$27,203.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Four exemptions, standard deductions

However, if a man's earning capacity is used to develop a benchmark comparison for the value of government entitlements, a somewhat different mosaic emerges. The range computed above (from $15,347-$23,184) represents disposable income. Employees must pay Social Security taxes plus federal taxes (plus state and local taxes, depending on the locale).

If the federal taxes (including Social Security, but not including any state or local taxes) are added to the base salary, then a man would have to earn between $16,521 and $27,203 in salary to match the Federal programs. See Table 1. If he works at minimum wage ($4.75 in 1996) for 52 weeks at 40 hours per week, a man
will earn only $9,880 and so will not even come close to matching the benefits available through entitlement programs. The salary required to match benefits through federal programs exceeds the income of at least 27% to 58% of single men in 1994 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996). Since single men are those who are eligible to marry single women, the 27% to 58% of all single men whose incomes are below the level required to match entitlement benefits from the government are those who feel most acutely the effects of trying to compete with the federal government as a provider.

In terms of enhanced independence for the woman, the “government programs” have two advantages when compared to the husband. First, the “government program” is remarkably reliable in its payments. A “government program” cannot be laid off nor fired. A “government program” will not quit work. A “government program” has excellent credit, and vendors are profoundly confident that the goods & services rendered will be reimbursed. Women are acutely aware of the greater reliability of the “government programs” versus the husband/father. Men are equally aware that the women are acutely aware.

Second, a “government program” does not require negotiations on the dispersal and allocation of available funds. The “government program” does not sit down with the woman to prioritize a budget. Husbands/fathers are much more involved in the fate of disposable income. Informal folklore and formal marriage & family courses and textbooks are replete with the problems, friction, and frustrations of husbands and wives in their attempts to negotiate and prioritize their family finances.

Within this crucible of potential dissension between men and women, one can imagine the added parameter of a man who generates low income and, because he is poorly educated, semi-skilled, and marginally employed, his future prospects for increased access to resources are dim. The man simply is not going to be able to provide for his children at the level of resources that the “government” can and will provide in his absence. The man knows this. The woman knows this. The man knows that the woman knows this.

In the calculus of human relationships, the possibilities for reliable resources without dependence upon a spouse and without negotiations with a spouse create incentives for a woman
to preclude legal entanglements with a significant other. That is, she is less likely to get married. If she does decide to get married, the same potentials of low levels of resources from the husband/father serve as incentives to jettison the father of her children. With one husband jettisoned, the probabilities of the woman re-marrying are fairly low. Women who do receive entitlement packages from the "government" have disproportionately lower rates of re-marriage (Bennett, Bloom & Miller 1995, McLanahan & Booth 1989).

This generalized social dynamic of decision making has a negative feed-back loop. Entitlements, not unlike any other governmental entity, tend to have a one-way ratchet: programs are easier to initiate and augment than to terminate or constrict. Accordingly, with a (mythological) "middle-class" childhood as a benchmark, the "government " (whether state or federal) would always be under social and political pressures to "up the ante" or raise the threshold of an appropriate, if sub-optimal, set of entitlements. To fund the incremental entitlements, the "government" would have to raise taxes. Increased taxation on wages and salaries, but not on entitlements, systematically adds to the proportion of men who are not economically competitive with "government" programs as providers for their children.

Expectation #2: Marriage as a means to personal fulfillment

As mentioned earlier, there is a general consensus that "marriage" is a cross-cultural universal (Brown 1991, Levinson & Malone 1980, Stephens, 1963, Van den Berghe 1979). Nonetheless, the attempt to construct a definition of marriage which would neatly delineate the diverse, disparate, variegated and polyglot societies around the world has proven vexing to anthropologists. If nothing else, humans are an inventive and symbolic creature. However, at base, a couple of essentials seem to be universal in the institution of marriage. (A) Marriage publicly announces and sanctions that the married couple can have sexual relations with each other. Other avenues of sexual adventures may occur, but, (i) if two people are "married", then (ii) sexual relations would be appropriate. If (i) they were not married, then (ii) sexual relations then may or may not be appropriate. (B) Marriage aligns a man with a woman's children. That is, as mentioned earlier, marriage

Leach's (1955, p.183) list of features of marriage is a little more structured, but essentially encompasses the same two concepts as above. Leach’s list includes the following. Marriage is:

1. To establish the legal father of a woman’s children.
2. To establish the legal mother of a man’s children.
3. To give one spouse a sexual monopoly in the other spouse’s sexuality.
4. To give one spouse partial or monopoistic rights to the other spouse’s domestic and other labor services.
5. To give one spouse partial or total rights over property belonging or potentially accruing to the other spouse.
6. To establish a joint fund of property—a partnership—for the benefit of the children of the marriage.
7. To establish a socially significant "relationship of affinity" between the husband and his wife’s brothers.

"Marriage", as an institution, had not been incorporated as a vehicle for personal happiness or personal fulfillment. For most of known cultures, for most of their known existence, "romantic love" was generally viewed as a fortuitous happenstance for the betrothed couple, but was neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for marriage. The industrial revolution harbingered the death knell to peasant farming and the family as an economic unit. With economics removed, romantic love filled the gap for a rationale to be married. For twentieth century America, as elsewhere, expectations for "marriage" were transduced from economic survival to being happy.

Accordingly, if a "marriage" was not generating the appropriate levels of happiness, then a divorce seemed an eminently logical recourse. Recent surveys which sought out reasons for divorce found the obvious. "Divorces" were petitioned because at least one of the spouses was not happy enough (Burns, 1984, Cleek & Pearson, 1985, Gigy & Kelly 1992, Greif & Pabst, 1988: Thurnher et al. 1983; cf Greif 1985). See Appendix II for the data.

In the 1960's, with "freedom and personal liberty" given high marks for individual goals and socially sanctioned priorities,
divorce was envisioned as a reasonable solution to the problem of adults who no longer wanted to be married to each other. However, "divorce" was encumbered by the judicial, religious, and societal restraints which had been specifically constructed to prevent divorce: a fragmentation of the economic unit. In at least partial response to these restraints, California's no-fault divorce law (Family Law act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314–51) became effective in 1970 (see Kay 1987, Glendon 1989 for discussion). With California as a precedent, "no-fault" divorce, as a legal device to end a marriage, quickly swept across the nation. Within a generation, every state had adopted some version of "no-fault" divorce. Of interest, the generic version of "no-fault" divorce—across the U.S.—makes no distinctions between a marriage with minor children and a marriage with no minor children. Such was the power of the new folklore which defined that a good marriage necessitated happy spouses.

*Divorce: petitioners & respondents & children.* For the U.S., in 1993, over a million (1,075,000) minor children were involved in a divorce situation. Most of these children remained with the mother. In some jurisdictions, despite judicial edicts which have proclaimed gender neutrality in terms of custody (McIntyre & Sussman, 1995, Westfall 1994, Weyrauch & Katz 1983), mothers gained custody in 90% of the divorce cases (Sack 1987, Sitarz 1990). In fact, in 1994, more minor children were living with neither parent (4%) than with father only (3%). Twenty-eight percent were living with mother-only, and 65% lived with both parents (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995).

In terms of national data, it is important to note that women predominant in the petitioning for divorce. For divorces which involve no children, the ratio is 1.6 to 1.0. If one or more minor children are involved in a divorce, the woman's tendency to petition for divorce increases, and the man's tendency to petition for divorce decreases. Depending upon the number of minor children involved, the ratios range from 2.3–2.4 to 1.0 (National Center for Health Statistics 1989, 1996). See Chadwick & Heaton (1992) for similar data. See Table 2. Most (52.6%) of the men's petitions for a divorce involve no children. Most (57.3%) of the women's petitions for a divorce do involve one or more children. See Table 2. It
Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>Status of petitioner:</th>
<th>Ratio of Wife to husband</th>
<th>Status of petitioner:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or more</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>65.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All numbers</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
should be also be re-stated that women’s primary reasons for their willingness to end the marriage were psychological reasons, e.g. lack of fulfillment, lack of sufficient happiness in the marriage, or lack of romance.

Then, once again, the interface of science and society became in evidence. Our society wanted to be re-assured that divorce was not troublesome for the children involved. Accordingly, studies were conducted which, unsurprisingly enough, found no deficits in children of divorce. Studies which did suggest that single-mother families entail the highest risk in terms of social maladaptation and psychological well-being of the child (Kellam, Ensminger, & Turner 1977, Bohman 1971) were simply ignored. The conventional wisdom was pre-potent: surely it was better to live in a quiet house with one parent than to live in a noisy, raucous house with two parents who did not like each other. The title of Wallerstein & Kelly’s (1980) book is informative: Surviving the breakup: How children and parents cope with divorce (emphasis added).

By 1989, revisionism was occurring, Wallerstein & Blakeslee’s (1989) sequel to the 1980 book was titled: Second chances: men, women & children a decade after divorce who wins, who loses. The authors chronicle children grown to adulthood who were anything but pleased at the prior breakup of their family. See Silvestri (1992) and Wallerstein et al. (1992) for similar analyses. The much ballyhooed blended family—mine, yours, ours—was not reported by children to be as nurturing or as stress free/minimal as their biological nuclear family (Furstenberg 1987, Amato & Keith 1991, Booth & Amato 1994, Dawson 1991, Downey 1994, Hanson, McLanahan, & Thomson 1996). See Popenoe (1996) and Blankenhorn (1995) for reviews of the literature.

Expectation #3: Fathers as supernumerary or optional.

By the late 1990’s, a clear dilemma had occurred within the American society: “What to do with U.S. fathers?” Two very separate images were being generated (see Furstenberg’s [1988, pp. 193–218]) “Good dads-bad dads: two faces of fatherhood” and Coolsen’s (1993) “Half full or Half empty?” for complementary discussions). One image seemed rather pleasant and congenial: the modern, caring, in touch-with-their-feelings men, many of
whom, along the way, had somehow managed to view themselves as rather morally superior to their own fathers who were viewed as inflexible patriarchs. The second image was anything but congenial: the Deadbeat Dad. These were tawdry men who abandoned their wives and children and had absconded with the family's treasure. The "good" image will be examined first.

The image of the good Dad. A plethora of literature—a cottage industry—appeared noting that a new and improved father had arrived in America. These newest new fathers were seen as quite distinct from their male ancestors: ancestors who were clearly deficient as fathers. Kimball's (1988) 50-50 parenting advocated the equality of parenting: essentially based on the mother template. Ritner (1992) had one of the more descriptive titles: Fathers' Liberation ethics: A holistic ethical advocacy for active nurturant fathering. Garbarino (1993) who was undoubtedly dissatisfied with current fathers wrote "Reinventing fatherhood" in which he asks and then answers his own question: "What must we do? To develop a new kind of father, we must encourage a new kind of man. In My Fair Lady, Professor Higgins asks, 'Why can't a woman be more like a man?' It's time to ask the opposite question. If we are to rewrite the parenting scripts to emphasize nurturing and the investment of self in children's lives, we need to ask, 'Why can't a man be more like a woman?'"

Louv (1995) was also in favor of a re-construction of "father". In "Remaking fatherhood", Louv wrote (p. 182): "As men work toward redefining what fatherhood means, they need to call upon all their talents and capacities and hopes . . . Although these instincts are common to virtually all fathers, men are only beginning to find the words to describe what fatherhood makes them feel".

Coolsen (1993) asks a question, but does not provide an answer: "Can we create a society . . . in which fathers themselves are willing to give up their old authoritarian role and act as partners with their spouse in child rearing and everyday family life? On the dust jacket of Sears' (1991) book Keys to becoming a father a blurb reads: "Fathers today are playing a larger parenting role than ever before. Here is a doctor's advice to men on all aspects of fatherhood, from assisting at childbirth through sharing childcare
functions with mom. Most of all, this book offers insights into getting joy from being a father“.

Colman & Colman (1988) synthesized a problem and then solved it: to wit: “... we summarize the dilemma: ‘The behavior of fathers is under attack, but the concept of ‘father’ has remained relatively stable. Men who become nurturant in the family often feel that they are ‘mothering’ rather than ‘fathering’. It is difficult for a man to feel like a gentle, caring parent and like a man at the same time.”

Bronstein & Cowan’s (1988) edited book was entitled: Fatherhood Today: Men’s Changing role in the family. The editors seemed convinced any changes would be for the better. Rothman’s (1989) publication was entitled: Recreating Motherhood: Ideology & technology in a patriarchal society. On page 213, Rothman writes: “Freud was right; mother-rearing has consequences that are not good. Freud was wrong: it is not women who are so horribly damaged, but men... The loss, the ominous subhumanity, is men’s. The solution is to involve men fully in child care, enabling boy children to experience the continuity, connectedness, womanliness in themselves that would make them whole.” Streiker’s (1989) Fathering: Old game, new rules shared with the reader his view of the even more newer and more improved U.S. father (p. 36): “Dad needs a new image (or new images) of who he is, what he does, and why he is important. He needs an understanding of himself and his family that takes cognizance of the way things are and yet empowers him to make a differences. He needs to throw away and discard inappropriate images, for not only do current images of father and of the family invalidate all of us, but they are warped by outmoded expectations, unworkable models and mind boggling confusion”. Then he asks the, perhaps rhetorical, question (p. 129): “How then does a man get in touch with the tender giving and caring aspects of his own being?” Streiker then (1989, p.150) proffers the trilogy: “Great fathering requires three things: being there, being aware, and being real. Everything else is dessert”.

Pittman (1993) explains masculinity to the reader with his article: “Fathers and Sons: What it takes to be a man”. The reader is informed that “We know that raising children is the central experience of life, the greatest source of self-awareness the true
foundation, of pride and joy, the most eternal bond with a partner. We know that being a father is life's fullest expression of masculinity. So why did so many men forego this for so long, and will the current crop of post-patriarchal fathers fare any better?" (p. 52).

For those men who needed a how-to book, Levant & Kelly (1989) were able to supply *Between father and child: How to become the kind of father you want to be*. The authors are clear in their goal in that they "... want to change the terms of the father-child relationship from distant, wary and respectful to warm, open, intimate, and tender".

None of these authors mentioned that the prior generation, which they were castigating, had half-again more children, a divorce rate about half the current one, and whose percentage of out-of-wedlock births were less than half of the current percentage. There was also no mention that the prior generation had managed to survive a Great Depression and were on the winning side of World War II.

It is also useful to note that most of the literature which is described above was not intended to be seen as outgrowths of the scientific enterprise. The samples of subjects that were tested, if they existed at all, were usually very small and either self-selected and/or highly non-random. The image of the U.S. father is that which was being crafted by the authors. They were sculpting folklore. The bulk of the literature which focused on the U.S. fathers did not attempt to establish behavioral central tendencies on what they, the fathers, were, in fact, doing or even attempting.

During the same time frame, a second very different imagery on the exact same subject—the U.S. father—was being created.

*The image of the less than good Dad.* Pirani (1989) concisely states this alternate image: "Fathers are missing; away at work; separated by divorce from their children. Paternal authority has been eroded, yet paternalism is still in evidence, and under attack by the women's movement. The reliability of male political leaders is at a low point, the spiritual fathers are alienated, the God the Father is a fading concept."

Popenoe (1993) was less lyrical, but more analytical. He wrote: "Recent family decline is more serious than any decline in the past
because what is breaking up is the nuclear family, the fundamental unit stripped of relatives and left with two essential functions that cannot be performed better elsewhere: childrearing and the provision to its members of affection and companionship."

As early as the 1980s, Russell (1983) presented data that indicated that more egalitarian marriages were also more fragile and were more prone to separation or restructuring (along a more traditional format) than were less egalitarian marriages. Lewis & O'Brien's (1987) edited book Reassessing fatherhood: New observations on fathers and the modern family also waved a flag of caution. On page one, they write "In contrast to much of the literature, this book reflects critically on the 'new father'. Despite the wave of optimism driving contemporary accounts, the evidence for the existence of such a man is much less convincing." Also in the mid-1980s, Lewis (1986) interpreted his data on fathers thus: "There is no evidence to suggest that father infant relationships are closer today than they were. We might expect to see differences in the small amount of comparative data that exists, but in effect the figures which Schaffer & Emerson (1964, p. 175) produced twenty years ago are broadly similar to those presented in Chapter 7" (emphasis added).

Blankenhorn's (1995) book's title is rather straightforward Fatherless America: Confronting our most urgent social problem. One of Blankenhorn's working premises is that "Fatherlessness is now approaching a rough parity with fatherhood as a defining feature of American childhood." If a critical mass were to be reached and the fatherhood role were to be adopted by a shrinking minority of U.S. men, no one has any clue on the ramifications of such a structural shift in the U.S. culture.

The Deadbeat Dad. The phrase and specter of the "Deadbeat Dad" began to filter through the professional and popular presses/media. For example, in the mid-eighties, Cutright (1986) wrote "Child support and responsible male procreative behavior". A search in one of the current data bases—Infotrac—found that there were 38 sources which included the key word "Deadbeat". Of those 38, 20 were aligned with "Dad", hence Deadbeat Dad. A search for the key words "Deadbeat" and "mother" found four sources. All four described how mothers deal with Deadbeat
Dads. There were no sources which used the phrase "Deadbeat Mom". The titles of articles related to Deadbeat Dads included: "Collecting from deadbeat dads" (Mansnerus 1996), "Deadbeat dads under fire" (Cross 1996), "Triumphing over a deadbeat dad" (Anonymous 1995), "Clinton cracks down on deadbeat parents" (Laabs 1995), "Dunning deadbeats" (Van Biema 1995). Van Biema's abstract is informative: "The Clinton Administration has taken aim at deadbeat dads and Congress has given new child-support enforcement tools to the states. The new form of bounty hunters who seek out these deadbeat dads are discussed" (emphases added). How the men came to be separated from their children was very systematically avoided.

The role for the U.S. father. The U.S. literati and academics, starting about 1976, began the task of deciding how American men should perform their role as father. Lamb's (1976) academic book The role of the father in child development, and Levine's (1976) popular book Who will raise our children? serve as useful benchmarks. Two shifts concerning paternal expectations quickly occurred.

Shift #1: Father the underachiever. Until the mid-1970s, fathers had been viewed by academia as being irrelevant to the cognitive, social, and social development of their young children (see Demos 1986, Griswold 1993, Lamb 1976, 1981 LaRossa 1997, Mackey 1985, 1996, for further examples and discussion, cf Biller 1971, 1974, Hamilton 1977, Lynn 1974). It was the mother-child dyad which was intensively analyzed and which was the focus of theories, e.g. Bowlby (1973, 1982, 1988). For example, in the Foss series (1961–1969) on child development, there were 91 references to maternal/mother in the index, but only one reference to paternal/father. The one reference was Itani's work with the rhesus macaque monkey. But, due to Lamb and Levine inter alios, father the irrelevant became father the underachiever. The underachieving was predicated on the mother-template, i.e. men should become more like mothers. Risman (1986) summed the leitmotif clearly with her title: "Can men 'mother'?” Hanson & Bozett (1985, p. 14) summed up the worldview of the academics and the literati with their statement: "In general, we believe that men need to assume more responsibility for children rearing and homemaking... many (men) are relatively ineffective in child
care, seem reluctant to increase their participation or are unable to participate because of external circumstances". But no evidence was found or presented that indicated that American men—as a class—were going to adopt the template of the mother-role (Coverman & Sheley 1986, Lewis 1986, Shelton 1992, Hochschild 1989, Palkovitz 1988, Coltrane & Ishii-Kuntz 1992). Bartz (1978, p. 213) foreshadowed men's intransigence with: "however, fathers' unwillingness to seek education help with the parental role is a problem more resistant to change. There are emotional and attitudinal factors involved here which have not yet been thoroughly explored." What did occur was that families which did adopt gender-egalitarian families were more prone to dissolution (Booth & Amato, 1994, MacDermid, Huston, & McHale 1990, Radin 1988, Radin & Goldsmith 1989, Russell 1983, Williams & Radin 1993).

Shift #2: Father the domestic. Since men were not going to be mother surrogates, another tack was attempted: men, to become better fathers, should become better husbands by equalizing the domestic chores within the family, i.e. by becoming better wives (Hochschild 1989, Shelton 1992, Shelton & John 1993, Coltrane & Ishii-Kuntz 1992, Nakhaie 1995). Father Theodore M. Hesburgh epitomized the spirit of the new shift with his sentiment: "The most important thing a father can do for his children is to love their mother". (Dr. Charles Shedd [1977, p. 9] was simply ahead of his time when he wrote: "As I see it, my number one job as a father is to love my children's mother well." He repeated the message on page 11: "Dad's first job? To love his children's mother well." Hochschild's (1989) seminal work: The second shift; working parents and the revolution at home concisely articulated the position. Hochschild's thesis was that women were over-worked in the home and men were under-worked. Shelton's (1992) Women, men, and time: Gender difference in paid work, housework, and leisure found the same pattern, and so did Calasanti & Bailey (1991), and Coltrane & Ishii-Kuntz (1992), and Deutsch, Lussier, & Servis (1993), and Shelton & John (1993), as did Lindsey (1994). Sheley & Coverman (1986) conducted a longitudinal survey, but could find no evidence that male participation in housework was increasing. What did happen was that divorce, again with mothers
as the dominant petitioners, stabilized at a high level, and that the percentage of births which were out-of-wedlock births continued to increase.

Synopsis

Under the aegis of (1) governmental decisions to compete with the father as a breadwinner, (2) individual fulfillment and happiness, and (3) the amorphous imagery being presented by government, media, and academia on American fatherhood, fathers were being systematically and silently separated from their children.

Consequences of the Father & Child Separation

It is certainly arguable that happy divorcees are preferable to unhappy wives, that more reliable governments are an improvement over unreliable husbands, and that the traditional father was an anachronistic troglodyte whose passing both should occur and should be celebrated. Nonetheless, there is a cost to the above exchanges. By and large, children without fathers have deficits when compared to children who have their biological and social fathers residing with them. These putative deficits are examined below.

Costs to children without fathers.

(1) Child abuse. Although rarely phrased in such a way, a resident biological father is a reliable health insurance policy for his children. As soon as any other domestic arrangement occurs, i.e. as soon as any other man other than the biological & social father becomes proximate to children which are not his own, the children are at increased risk to physical abuse (Daly & Wilson 1980, 1985, 1987, Gil 1970, Hegar, Zuravin, & Orme, 1994; Johnson 1974, Lenington 1981, Mann 1996; see Kasim, Shafie & Cheah [1994] for an example outside of the U.S.). If the child is a girl, then the increase in physical abuse risk is complemented with an increased risk to sexual abuse (Gordon & Creighton 1988, Immerman & Mackey 1997, Russell 1986, Tyler 1986, cf Wassil-Grimm, 1995).

Hence, if a mother (i) chooses not to co-reside with the biological & social father of her children, and (ii) chooses a life-style other
than unrelenting chastity, then her choices elevate the chances that her children will be physically/sexually abused. The long-term sequelae of physical abuse on either boys or girls is an unknown entity (aside from death which has a predictable future). On the other hand, the long term sequelae of sexual abuse upon girls is known and is extremely expensive to the violated-girl-grown-to-adulthood and to whatever social group in which she would find herself. The expenses are certainly psychological, as well as sociological and economic (Alexander 1993, Bagley & Ramsay 1985; Briere & Runtz 1988, Courtois 1979, DeYoung 1982, Goodwin, McCarthy, & Divasto 1981, Miller et al. 1978, Peters, 1988, Russell 1986, Sedney & Brooks 1984, Stein, Golding, Siegel, Burnam & Sorensen 1988, Schetky, Angel & Morrison 1979, see Browne & Finkelhor [1986] and Immerman & Mackey [1997] for reviews of the literature). [No long-term sequelae of sexual abuse against boys were found].

(2) Children's deficits in adjustment and well-being. Hanson, McLanahan, & Thomson (1996) surveyed data from the "1987–88 National Survey of Families and Households" to compare childhood well-being in different structures of families: original, two-parent households, single-mother households, and stepfather households. The authors began their presentation with the statement:

"One puzzling finding in the literature on disrupted families is the absence of a remarriage benefit for children in step-family households. Although the remarriage of parents increases a family's economic security and brings an additional parent figure into the household, children in step-families exhibit about the same number of adjustment problems as children in single-parent families and more problems than children in original two-parent families" (page 141).

In their analysis of the results, Hanson, McLanahan, & Thomson illustrate that well-being of children in "original, two-parent households" exceeds the well-being of children in stepfather households or single-parent households for all eight of the diagnostic indices: (i) school performance, (ii) grade point average, (iii) no school behavior problems, (iv) low externalizing (v) low internalizing, (vi) sociability, (vii) initiative, and (viii) quality of life.
(3) *Educational disengagement.* The U.S. Department of Education (Hofferth, West & Henke 1994) was concerned about students' low achievement in the educational system. In its analysis of a survey of students and their achievement levels, the Department of Education isolated eight major variables/factors which were most predictive of poor school adjustment on the part of the students. One of the eight factors was "single parent household" (read: mother-only household). A second was poverty. A term which was used to highlight the poor achievement was "disengagement". Once the child was disengaged from the school environment—and subsequently performed quite poorly in that environment—it was virtually impossible to re-engage that child into the school's mainstream (Finn 1993). In fact, living with one parent was a marker or predictor for lowered levels of attending college. Conversely, living with two parents was a predictor of an increased chance for a child to attend college (Gose 1996). Once married, children of single-parent families are also more likely to develop marital problems of their own (Morrison & Cherlin 1995; Wallerstein & Blakeslee 1989); just as individuals who are divorced and remarried have an increased likelihood to be re-divorced (Goode 1993; National Center for Health Statistics 1996).

*Out-of-wedlock births.* Across states plus D. C., an increase in the percentage of out-of-wedlock births is related to increased levels of infant mortality, of congenital syphilis, and of high-school drop-outs. See Appendix III for statistical analysis. The problem of infant mortality is self-evident. A child born with congenital syphilis can acquire a myriad of mental and physical problems which negatively affect his or her life chances. Similarly, a child who drops out of high-school is severely limited in his or her life-chances.

*Fatherlessness & the attenuation of sons' violent behavior.* If a responsible and continuous adult male role-model—i.e. a father or father-figure—is unavailable to young, developing boys, then those boys become more prone to engage in deviant or anti-social behavior. That is, there is a tendency for children from fatherless homes to be over-represented in categories of unwanted behavior (Adams, et al. 1984, Bereczkei & Csanaky 1996, Blau & Blau 1982, Chilton & Merkle 1972, Monahan 1972, Mosher 1969,

**Out-of-wedlock births and violent crime (1987–1993).** For the time interval from 1987–1993, the average correlation between rates of violent crime and percentage of all births which were out-of-wedlock births in the U.S. (fifty states plus D.C.) was significant ($r_p = .790$ [$sd = .021$]; $p < .001$; $n = 51$). The mean percentage of explained variance was 62.4% ($790^2 = .624 = 62.4\%$). See Table 3. (The level of male unemployment—an index of poverty—had no influence on these figures [see Appendix III]).

**Violent crime in the U.S. across time (1975–1993).** Taking the U.S. as a unit, from 1975 to 1993 (or 19 years or $n = 19$), the correlation between the percent of all births which were out-of-wedlock births and rates of violent crime was significant ($r_p = .949$; $p < .001$; $n = 19$). Over 90% ($949^2 = .901 = 90.1\%$) of the variability in rates of violent crime can be explained by differential levels of out-of-wedlock births.

**A lag between out-of-wedlock births and violent crime rates.** Let's begin with the year 1970 and record the variation of the percentage of out-of-wedlock births across (available) states and D.C. ($n = 39$). Then let's add 19 years to 1970 to arrive at the year 1989. That is, males who were born out-of-wedlock in 1970 would be 19 years of age in 1989. Approximately 30% of the individuals arrested for violent crimes are 19 years old or less (U.S. Department of Justice 1995). To avoid isolating an aberrant year, let's do the same procedure for four additional and consecutive years to have a five year interval (1970–1974) for the percentage of out-of-wedlock births and a five year interval (1989–1993) for rates of violent crime. Let's correlate the percentage of out-of-wedlock births per state (& D.C.) in 1970–1974 with the rate of violent crime per state in 1989–1993. The average correlation for the five year comparison was significant ($r_p = .882$ [s.d. = .014]; $p < .001$; $n = 39$). See Table 3. In addition, this figure is higher ($t = 3.20$; $p < .01$; 2-tailed; $df = 36$) than the mean correlation between the
Table 3.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Correlations ($r_p$)</th>
<th>Percentage of explained variance: ($r_p)^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993$^a$</td>
<td>.796*</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>.773*</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>.796*</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.815*</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>.813*</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>.780*</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>.757*</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean/(sd)</td>
<td>.790 (.021)*</td>
<td>62.4% (3.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–1993$^b$</td>
<td>.901*</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973–1992</td>
<td>.894*</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1991</td>
<td>.871*</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–1990</td>
<td>.870*</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td>.874*</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean/(sd)</td>
<td>.882 (.014)*</td>
<td>77.8% (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ An N of 51 for the years 1987–1993 (50 states plus D.C.)


* = $p < .001$

percentages of out-of-wedlock births and rates of violent crime from the interval of years (1987–1993), i.e. $r_p = .790$.

In other words, rates of violent crime can be predicted by the percentage of (out-of-wedlock) infants who were born nineteen years earlier. Of course, after nineteen years, the infants are no longer babies, but are perfectly capable of energetic, adult physical behaviors.

Summary

It is suggested here that the widespread and systematic separation of fathers from their children resulted, in part, from three shifts in the cultural expectations in the American mega-tribe.
First, the idea that the government should compete with the traditional father role as a primary breadwinner was introduced and accepted. Second, the idea that marriage was to maximize personal fulfillment or happiness rather than to socialize children was introduced and accepted. Third, the literati and academics decision that a traditional father-figure was simply inappropriate in 20th century America was introduced and accepted (at least by other literati and academics). Their own vision of a replacement for the traditional father-figure seems to be in a state of flux.

It is reasonable to assume that the separation of fathers from their children has enhanced the lives of the ex-wives or single parent mothers. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to assume that, if the women’s enhancements exceed the deficits experienced by the men, then an overall net advantage has accrued to the commonweal. However, the lives of the fathers’ children are another matter. An impressive array of evidence has been gathered to indicate that the presence of a child’s biological and social father enhances the life of the child. The absence of such a father creates deficits for the child.

References


Father-Child Relations


Schlegel, A. (1972). Male dominance and female autonomy. New Haven, Conn.: HRAF.


APPENDIX I

Correlations among the four demographic variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>Out-of-wedlock births</th>
<th>Birth rates</th>
<th>Percent of working wivesa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divorce rates</td>
<td>.844*</td>
<td>-.874*</td>
<td>.875*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>-.765*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.966*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.795*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a From 1920–1959, all (ever) married women, from 1960 onward, only married women living with their husbands.

* p < .001
APPENDIX II

Top ten reasons that women gave for petitioning for divorce (by rank and by percentage of women who “checked” the reason for the divorce) for four surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>Husband not home enough</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>Growing apart</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wife is unhappy</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Feeling unloved</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
<td>Sexual problems</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Sexual problems</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Emotional Abuse</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>Other women</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Unmet needs</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Financial problems</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>Financial problems</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Differing values</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sexual problems</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>Spouse’s drinking</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Feeling belittled</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spouse’s drinking</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>Wife’s lack of interest</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Spouse’s emotional problems</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Infidelity of spouse</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>Husband’s cruelty</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Financial problems</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Physical abuse</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>In-laws/relatives</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Conflict over gender roles</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>In-laws/relatives</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>Disagreement over children</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spouse’s drinking</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>Conflict in lifestyles</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>Marital incompatibility</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spouse has changed</td>
<td>16.95%</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>Husband was unfaithful</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Spouse is violent</td>
<td>16.45%</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>Husband had emotional problems</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strife</td>
<td>16.05%</td>
<td>Wife wants increased freedom</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>Mental abused</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>Spouse is indifferent</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>Physically abused</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conflicts over lifestyles</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>Sexual problems</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>Husband left</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spouse is demeaning</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>Spouse has changed</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>Had affair/wanted to leave</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Spouse runs around</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>Spouse is violent</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>Own emotional problems</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Financial problems</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>Spouse runs around</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>Husband immature</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sexual problems</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>Lack of communication</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX III

Correlations between percentages of births which were out-of-wedlock and rates of congenital syphilis, level of high school dropouts, and rates of violent crime (n = 51 [50 states + D.C.]).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>correlated with</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Correlation ($r_p$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Level of out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>Rates of congenital syphilis</td>
<td>.752 (sd .031)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Level of out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>Infant mortality rates*</td>
<td>.798*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Level of out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>Percent of high school dropouts</td>
<td>.545*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1993</td>
<td>Level of out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>Rates of violent crime*</td>
<td>.790 (sd .020)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1993</td>
<td>Level of out-of-wedlock births</td>
<td>Rates of violent crime</td>
<td>.776 (.021)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(with rates of male unemployment partialled)

*a* Infant deaths per 1,000 live births

*b* Number of violent crimes known to police per 100,000 population