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"Curiously Uninvolved": Social Work and Protest against the War in Vietnam

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School of Social Work

This article reviews four leading social work journals from 1965–1975 for content on the War in Vietnam and the social issues arising from it. It finds that social work’s major journals carried nearly no articles, letters, editorials, or short subjects related to the war and concludes that the dominant discourse constructed in the journals excluded meaningful engagement with the war or protest against it.

Key words: Vietnam War, peace, protest, anti-war movement, sixties

And it’s one, two, three, what are we fighting for? Don’t ask me, I don’t give a damn. Next stop is Vietnam. And it’s five, six, seven, open up the pearly gates. Well, there ain’t no time to wonder why. Whoopee! we’re all gonna die.

Country Joe and the Fish
Feel like I’m Fixin’ to Die Rag, 1965

You all know me and are aware that I am unable to remain silent. At times to be silent is to lie. For silence can be interpreted as acquiescence.

Miguel de Unamuno, Salamanca, Spain, 1936

In 1968, according to historians Zaroulis and Sullivan (1984), the balance tipped against the United States’ military effort in Vietnam. Sentiment against the war raged among students, clergy, business leaders, teachers, and civil rights activists. Citizens increasingly reacted with skepticism to administration assurances that the nation could have both guns and butter, noting that
monthly expenditures for the war exceeded annual expenditures for poverty programs (Zinn, 1967). In Vietnam morale among the troops was plummeting. Jackie Bolen, from rural West Virginia, wanted to go home. “You don’t know what it is to have to kill men or to watch your friends die,” he wrote his grandmother. “Grandma, I don’t know what I ever done to deserve the hell I am in” (Marannis, 2003, p. 145; Terry, 1984). Television coverage of the Tet offensive of January and February gave Americans a chilling premonition that perhaps the war wasn’t winnable. And Lyndon Johnson announced in March that he would not run again for the presidency. The number of U.S. dead was 14,000 and rising.

Despite all this, in 1968 four of social work’s leading journals, Social Work, Social Service Review, Child Welfare, and Public Welfare, published among them in total one article (out of 149) that was related in any way to the conflict that was pulling the country, indeed the world, apart. None of the journals’ 181 editorials, book reviews, letters to the editors, and short subjects mentioned the war either. It was as if it did not exist. Dennis Saleeby (1998), recently discharged from the air force and a doctoral student at the University of California, Berkeley, commenting thirty years later about his experience, observed that the School of Social Welfare was “mostly and curiously uninvolved” in campus protest against the war (1998, p. 653).

This paper attempts an initial exploration of social work’s relationship with the Vietnam War by reviewing four leading journals for the years 1965–1975 and assessing them for content on the war. It concludes with an analysis of the construction of a dominant discourse in the profession which excluded not only protest against, but also any real engagement with the war.

**War and Social Work: A Review of the Literature**

From the beginning war and social work have been deeply intertwined. War has an enormous impact on social programs, contracting some and expanding others. It provides the context in which social workers’ service to soldiers, their families, veterans, and refugees takes place. Finally, it nearly always precipitates a fierce philosophical exchange within the profession. Yet in social work literature the topic of war is marked by a great and gaping
hole. Historians outside of social work, Theda Skocpol (1992), for example, have explored the relationship between war and social welfare policy (as in the provision of soldiers' pensions), and within social work there have been a few studies of social service efforts in particular wars (Chandler, 1995; Maas, 1951; Daley, 1999). Principally, however, silence reigns. A limited number of texts reference the enormous policy implications of war and peace (van Wormer, 1997; Simon, 1994); but in most, war and its relationship to social work are not discussed. Surprisingly, even the literature that addresses the social service needs of refugees and veterans, a significant area of social work practice, is relatively limited (Berthold, 2000; G. Brown, 1982; P. Brown, 1984; Early-Adams et al, 1990; Frey, 19878; Kobrick, 1993; Montera & Dieppa, 1982; Sherwood, 1991; Maas, 1951; Canda & Phaobtong, 1992; Van Wormer, 1994; Chambon et al, 2001).

Social work within the military is also nearly invisible—a great loss, because social workers within the armed forces possess an enormous store of information about war and its impact on soldiers and civilians. Two texts, Adventure in Mental Health (Maas, 1951), a description of psychiatric social workers' efforts in the military during World War II, and Social Work Practice in the Military (Daley, 1999), an overall view of military social work at the end of the twentieth century, provide insight into a professional world often hidden from view.

Nor has peace commanded much attention in the profession's literature despite the illustrious work of Jane Addams, Emily Balch, Addie Hunton, E. Frankin Frazier, Jeannette Rankin, and others in opposing war, work which stands in my view as one of the profession's finest legacies (Addams, 1907, 1922, 1930; Chandler, 2001; Giles, 1980; Sullivan, 1993). Recently a small handful of articles that identify peace—that is, standing for it—as a professional obligation have appeared (Van Soest, Johnston, & Sullivan, 1988; Verschelden, 1993; Rice & Mary, 1989).

The result is a narrow literature that greatly limits students' and others' exploration of social work's role in the historic debates on war and peace. Should the profession stand for peace—or is that outside its purview? Does war expand social work's opportunities (within the military, for example) or contract them (as guns edge out butter in the national budgets)? What are social work's
obligations re soldiers and military families? How do refugees and soldiers heal from war, if in fact they do? This is a painful and controversial, but critical area of inquiry.

Methodology

For this article, I reviewed the contents of four leading social work journals—Social Work, Social Service Review, Child Welfare, and Public Welfare—for the years 1965–1975. Although the Vietnam War officially ended in 1973 with the dramatic departure of troops from Saigon, I chose to extend the review to 1975 both because the war continued on in Cambodia and to account for some lag time in article publication. All articles, editorials, short subjects (including book reviews), and letters to the editor were counted and assessed for content on the war in Vietnam. “Content on the war” was defined broadly. The article or editorial’s principal focus did not have to be the Vietnam War; in many the war was a distinctly secondary theme. I then used theme analysis to analyze published pieces related to the Vietnam War.

Reviewing the contents of professional journals to assess a profession’s engagement with or perspective on a given issue is a well-used methodology. (In social work, McMahon & Meares’ review of journals’ perspective on race [1992] is a well-known use of journal review. Other authors who have employed this methodology include Milner and Widerman [1994] who investigated women’s health care and Frankel [1991] who investigated day care.) Journals, the voice of most professions, are “critical for the provision of current awareness, the presentation of new ideas, the exploration of topics in a timely manner, and the building of a disciplinary knowledge base” (Williams, 2002, p. 9). Further, they are a principal means through which professions define themselves and their members. They do this both by what they include, that is, by what they identify as knowledge—and by what they exclude. In this process of construction, according to the postmodern theorists, a profession’s dominant discourse is defined. We shall return to a discussion of exclusion and inclusion vis a vis the Vietnam War in the discussion, below.

Journal review has both strengths and limitations. On the strengths’ side, it provides an excellent means to identify themes
Curiously Uninvolved

in the professional literature. It is also heuristic and invariably generates ideas and hypotheses that may be profitably pursued. But while an examination of professional journals is valuable, it has its limitations as well. Journals, of course, are primarily oriented to the doctoral level of the profession. They are not the profession's "official" voice, but rather a product of the decisions of editorial boards and the output of scholars, whose work is often shaped by the requirements of academia. Further, they do not capture very well the day-to-day lives of practitioners or the people they serve. For a genuine assessment of social work's role in the Vietnam War much more research is needed.

The four journals reviewed—Social Service Review, Social Work, Child Welfare, and Public Welfare—were chosen for inclusion because they are all identified as "core journals" by Social Work Abstracts and during the period 1965–1999 were identified by 10–15 (out of 15 total) published articles analyzing social work journals as being the profession's "major journals" (Williams, 2002, p. 10).

The Findings: Coverage of the Vietnam War in Social Work Journals

Social Service Review, published by the University of Chicago Press and edited by the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago, was considered in the Vietnam era—as it is now—the most prestigious journal in social work (Williams, 2002). From 1965–1975 it published a total of 284 articles. Two of them had content on the war in Vietnam. In the same period, it carried two editorials, 332 short subjects (including book reviews), and 45 letters. None of these discussed the war. (see Table 1)

The two articles Social Service Review published, however, were quite valuable. One, "Social Action for a Different Decade" by Joseph Paull (1971), was a philosophical piece which was not focused on the war per se but did include the impact of the war on the increased legitimation of social action within social work. The second article, "Returning Black Vietnam-Era Veteran" by James Fendrich, explored the "readjustment to civilian life of 199 black Vietnam-era veterans" (1972, p. 60). This was a superb study based in personal interviews with 199 African-American
veterans in Jacksonville, Florida. The study stepped directly into the most burning issues of the day. How were black veterans faring, it asked (answer: they were having significant difficulties, especially in finding work); and how deeply were they alienated or feeling an "angry mood of discontent" (answer: fully 40 percent were "alienated" on all six of the dimensions the study measured) (pp. 67–71). In concluding the study, Fendrich wrote:

Part of the military parlance of the Vietnam War is the question, "How short are you?" Generally this is an inquiry about how much time remains in a twelve-month tour of duty under dreadful conditions. One black soldier, when asked this question, answered, "Man, I will never be short." Judging by our findings on the difficulties in adjustment, the soldier is correct (p. 72).

The Fendrich article serves as a wonderful example of the contribution that rigorous research can make to the study of war's impact on the men, and now women, who fight it. Grounded in the life experience of young black men, it avoided a methodology
that defined veterans as "cases" and asked the questions that were on everyone's mind.

*Social Work,* journal of the National Association of Social Workers, the principal organization of U.S. social workers, invariably ranks among the profession's top two journals, and is "by far the most widely distributed social work journal in the United States" (Williams, 2002, p. 12). It published articles related to the Vietnam War at an even rate lower than did *Social Service Review,* although the total number of pieces was greater. In the years from 1965-1975, *Social Work* carried three articles (out of 590) related to the war; two editorials (out of 49); two "short subjects" (out of 178); and one letter (out of 367). (See Table 2) This represented a total publishing rate of 8 pieces out of a total of 1184 or a little more than half of one percent (.67 percent).

Of the three war-related articles in *Social Work* from 1965-1975, the first (Kelman, 1967) argued on behalf of the Committee of Responsibility that war-injured Vietnamese children should be brought to the United States for treatment (the NASW Commis-

### Table 2

*Articles and other entries in Social Work, 1965-1975, with content on the War in Vietnam*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Editorials</th>
<th>Short Subjects</th>
<th>Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>0-54*</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>0-28</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>0-43</td>
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<td>3-590</td>
<td>2-49</td>
<td>2-178</td>
<td>1-367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>.51%</td>
<td>.08%</td>
<td>.12%</td>
<td>.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Read: zero out of 54 articles had content on the war.
sion on International Social Welfare had issued a statement that such a plan "may disregard basic child welfare principles [which affirm] that children have the right to grow up in their own families and their own cultures" (p. 15). A second, considerably more radical piece by John Ehrlich (1971), stated that "the credibility gap between words and deeds at the highest level of government, particularly with regard to the continuing war in Southeast Asia, threatens to become a virtually unbridgeable societal chasm" (p. 22) and described the ways in which "clients, students, and young practitioners have challenged both the relevance and commitment of social workers" (p. 22). This is one of the few articles in which one can catch a glimpse of the social action efforts of radical social workers. A third article (Marchese, 1973) described the situation at the New York Veterans Center where each month over 1,000 veterans were applying for public assistance. "There are simply not enough jobs," Marchese wrote, and drew readers' attention to the "Vietnam Syndrome" (p. 20):

Psychiatrists have reported, he wrote, finding among many veterans feelings of deep disappointment, of having been duped and maneuvered into a war the country no longer believed in. Pronounced skepticism and aloofness were noted . . . [as well as] a steady increase in cases of rage, anxiety, depression, a deep sense of guilt, and extreme alienation (p. 22).

This practice-based article, based in professional observations as opposed to interviews with the men, lacks the immediacy of Fendrich's study and is not data-based, but nevertheless makes a welcome contribution.

Of the two editorials, one (1966) mentioned the war briefly in a discussion of the US tax structure, and the other (1970), written in the context of "a war abroad and racial conflict at home that seem to drag on endlessly" (p. 2), admonished social workers to avoid pessimism and the "equally malignant cop-out . . . [of] impulsive and quixotic assaults on one bastion of privilege or another.

These efforts, which fly the bright banner of participatory democracy, widely fail because they are poorly thought out. Organizers have a ready-made excuse—the powerful, callous establishment—and cheerfully go on to other sallies that will also fail. These social
Curiously Uninvolved

workers enjoy an expressive life-style . . . but leave behind a trail of people with cynicism new or renewed (p. 2).

Social workers with “expressive life styles” might find slightly more comfort in a 1970 short subject by George Brager who referred to the “national madness”—this was shortly after the Kent and Jackson state murders—and urged colleagues to join the Movement for a New Congress (1970). Brager (1967) had earlier drawn social workers’ attention to the “debilitating effect of the Vietnam war on domestic social programs” (p. 106). These two allusions to the war, both less than a half-page in length and calling for little more response than letter-writing, seem a woefully inadequate response to the crisis.

In sum, war-related pieces in Social Work not only were extremely limited in number, but with one or two exceptions offered virtually nothing to readers desperate to stop, or at least understand, the war. There were no pointed editorials, no data-based articles on populations affected by the war, nor any extended discussions of the war’s relation to social work.

Child Welfare, the organ of the Child Welfare League of America, ranked among social work’s major journals and had a substantial circulation as well (Williams, 2002, p. 13). From 1965 to 1975, it carried only one article (out of 511) and one editorial (out of 135) that had content on the war in Vietnam. Nor was there anything related to the war in 201 short subjects and 76 letters to the editor. (See Table 3)

The one editorial and the one article, however, were remarkable. In 1970, Child Welfare reported on a resolution adopted by the Child Welfare League of America and its staff. “The Board of Directors and staff,” it began, “. . . having assumed a responsibility for the well-being of children, wish to re-affirm their commitment to a society in America that affords children their potentialities, that preserves peace, and that respects the inviolability of life” (p. 364).

The nation’s involvement in war seriously impedes the full attainment of our goals for children. We oppose those events and conditions that threaten young people’s trust in American institutions and democracy, that destroy their ideals, their hopes for their own futures and the future of their country. As national spokesmen for
Table 3

Articles and other entries in Child Welfare, 1965-1975, with content on the War in Vietnam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Editorials</th>
<th>Short Subjects</th>
<th>Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0-17</td>
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<td>.74%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Read: zero out of 54 articles had content on the war.

"...children we ask the President and the Congress to take every feasible action to end the war which is contributing to the alienation, the dehumanization, and death of children and youth, and to use the resources now spent on war to overcome the malignant inequalities and injustices in our own society (p. 364) (emphasis mine).

In the context of nearly total silence from the profession, this CWLA position is so brilliant, so precise that it takes one's breath away.

In the second article (1973), "Issues in the Residential Treatment of Children of Military Personnel," Rodney Keller, associate director of a residential treatment center, discussed "father absence" in military families and the "not uncommon" practice of referring a boy whose father is away on a distant military assignment to a residential center for treatment (p. 27). Father-absence may produce, Keller wrote, "a permissive, erotic, seductive relationship between the oldest male child and the mother [the result of which] can be an aggressive, narcissistic child." Keller's
diagnoses may not be shared by all social workers, but his discussion of the pressures felt by military families was instructive. Fathers, he thought, often felt that participation in family therapy could jeopardize chances for promotion or security clearance. Further, military families in his experience were reluctant to direct their frustrations at the absent father "because he is absent on business of national significance sanctioned by the larger civilian community" (p. 29). This is the type of practice-based wisdom that allows the profession access to the very real agonies faced by military families, and in many ways stands as a poignant statement against war.

*Public Welfare*, the widely-distributed journal of the Public Welfare Association, was the fourth journal assessed. Its record was stunning in its poverty of reference to the Vietnam conflict. In the ten year period, 1965–1974, two out of 470 articles had content on the war; zero out of 42 editorials; one out of 441 short subjects; and zero out of 17 letters. (See Table 4)

The two articles appeared in 1972 and were both speeches

Table 4

*Articles and other entries in Public Welfare, 1965-1975, with content on the War in Vietnam*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Editorials</th>
<th>Short Subjects</th>
<th>Letters</th>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>.22%</td>
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</table>

* Read: zero out of 39 articles had content on the war.
given at the annual conference of the Public Welfare Association, one by Wilbur Cohen and the other by Robert Mondlock. Cohen's comments underscored the relationship of social welfare to war: "The gigantic problems that face our country," he began, "continue to mount: the continuation of the war, the increase in poverty, difficulties in race relations.... We need continuous, vigorous leadership and intelligent action to end the war. We must continue to press President Nixon and the Congress to end not only this war, but to end all wars. Escalation of military expenditures must be ended" (p. 58). Mondlock, following the lead of Marshall McLuhan and others, focused on media. "Remember the Beatles' really big song from a couple of years ago," he asked.

I read the news today, oh, boy
About a lucky man who made the grade . . .
I saw a film today, oh boy
The English Army had just won the war.
A crowd of people turned away,
But I just had to look,
Having read the book . . .
I'd love to turn... you... on....

"When the Beatles say, 'I'd love to turn you on,'" Mondlock went on, "they weren't singing about the drug scene. They were singing about getting involved, investing your emotions, participating, caring" (p. 67) (emphasis in the original). Neither Cohen's nor Mondlock's remarks contained more than a few sentences about the war, but those few sentences brought alive the possibility of rich, engaged discourse. They are illustrative, too, of the concept that silence is never complete.

In summary, less than half of one percent (.43 percent) of the total number of articles published by four major journals had any content at all about the war. In the war-related articles that were published, only one contributed research-based knowledge of the impact of war (Fendrich, 1972); two provided some practice-based commentary (Keller, 1973; Marchese, 1973); two (Cohen, 1972; Mondlock, 1972) spoke, but relatively briefly, about engagement; and one editorial took a strong stand against war (Child Welfare League of America, 1970). In ten years of publication, it seems an astonishingly poor record.
Discussion

How shall we read the absence in social work journals of a war that resulted in the deaths of 58,000 Americans and 1,300,000 Vietnamese? Post-modern theorists' conceptualization of language, knowledge, and dominant discourse provide one avenue of analysis. Journals, as we noted earlier, are a principle means through which professions define themselves and their members. Social workers, scholars, and the public at large learn from journals what social workers do, what they believe, and what constitutes knowledge within the profession. Journals include some topics and exclude others, privilege some ideas and marginalize others. This process—which is not random, but rather proceeds from a particular perspective—results in the construction of frameworks. Michel Foucault, exploring the issues of power, points out that frameworks are a form of force, a method of social control. In time, what is seen and what is excluded becomes set, and in that process a whole cultural discourse—a dominant discourse—is constructed (Chambon, Irving, & Epstein, 1999).

An example from outside academia may help elucidate this process. If, for example, popular women's magazines of the 50s contain no mention of McCarthy or House Un-American Activities Committee activities, then we could say the "construction" of woman in popular magazines is a person not interested in McCarthyism. Women who were thinking about fashion, home design, and parenting were included; women who resisted McCarthyism—for example, the women of Women's Strike for Peace—were marginalized and excluded. Of course, this is a powerful means of social control and proceeds from the perspective of the dominant power in society.

One way to reveal that which has been constructed is to deconstruct. This examination of journal articles has attempted a deconstruction. During the Vietnam War era journals constructed an idea of what social workers were—and were not; of what constituted social work knowledge. We can conclude from the study's findings that the idea "social worker" did not include protesting—or even researching—the war. Social work practice—with young men, soldiers and their families, or refugees, for example—need not include an analysis of war, the experience of
war, or power relationships internationally. Social workers who did protest the war were marginalized—sometimes described as "impulsive" or "quixotic," but mostly invisible. Their practice and research were excluded from what the profession defined as knowledge. Social workers who protested the war were not the only ones excluded, of course; soldiers and their families were also excluded, as were Vietnamese people. It is not difficult to identify the social control at work. Opening a major journal, a student or practitioner would find no encouragement to protest, certainly, but also no encouragement to study the situation of soldiers, families, and civilians caught up in the war. There was scarcely any encouragement to explore the knowledge that social workers had—for example in the military or in veterans programs and refugee centers.

Joseph Paull in the midst of the Vietnam war wrote that social work tends to "legitimate a consensus orientation and oppose an adversary one." This ideology, he went on, produces a "flight into expertise as a way of dealing with controversial problems and value dilemmas . . . . The picturesque term, 'doing intake at Buchenwald' and its variants came to refer to individuals who show imagination in doing socially assigned tasks but do not deeply question the institutions that assign them . . . .(1971, p. 31)" This, of course, is a serious charge in a profession that prides itself on its liberalism. There will be many opinions about it. Nevertheless, it seems accurate to say that social work's leading journals kept silent in a period that called for speaking out.

Conclusion

Since this is a paper about rule-breaking—or rather the absence of rule-breaking—during a particular era in social work's history, I would like to conclude by breaking a rule of academic discourse to speak about my own involvement with this study.

In 1998 PBS aired a brilliant documentary about the Vietnam War entitled Regret to Inform (Sonneborn, 1998). The director, Barbara Sonneborn, is a Vietnam War widow who interviewed war widows, both US and Vietnamese, about their and their husbands' experience of war. It is a profoundly moving, profoundly anti-war film, and for me brought back vivid memories of the Vietnam War.
and my years protesting it. (I was thrown into protest against the war in 1966 by the demonstrations against Dow Chemical at the University of Wisconsin, and later became a full-time organizer for the Wisconsin Draft Resistance Union.) The years of intense involvement with the war flooded back, and I was struck with how much the war had shaped my life and how deeply we believed in the movement to stop it. I remembered that in the midst of the fear, how un-alienated I felt and how linked to other activists around the world. It is a sentiment that others in social work will remember well.

I saw the film at a time when I was feeling particularly alienated from social work, and prompted by that I began to examine the profession’s journals for the war years. If who I am was being built in those years, what was being built within the profession? This article has documented the results of that search.

Noam Chomsky writes, “It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies” (1997, pp. 192–93). I believe that both we and our students would be less alienated and infinitely better served if we spoke truth to power, if we said what is honest, if we provided a deeper, more critical analysis than what passes for intellectual work in much of the profession. If we were more engaged.

I’d like in conclusion to return to 1968, where we started, that year that “rocked the world” and in which social work journals were so silent. Jeannette Rankin, a social worker from Montana and the first woman elected to Congress, was 87. She’d begun her Congressional career in 1917 by voting against US entry into World War I. In 1968, after five decades of standing for peace, she was still marching (this time at the head of the 5,000 woman-strong Jeannette Rankin Brigade) and arguing for US withdrawal from Vietnam:

It is unconscionable [she told Washington, DC, protesters] that 10,000 boys have died in Vietnam, and I predict that if 10,000 American women had mind enough they could end the war, if they were committed to the task, even if it meant going to jail (quoted in Alonso, p. 222).

It’s clear, despite the silence of social work journals during the Vietnam era, that the profession has within it an activist and left
heritage. I think it is time—for the sake of ourselves, our students, and the world—to dust it off and stand with millions the world over against the present administration and war.

Reference List


Curiously Uninvolved


Legislating the Family: Heterosexist Bias in Social Welfare Policy Frameworks

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This article addresses the effects of heterosexist bias in social welfare policy frameworks on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals and families in the United States. It discusses the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), federal definitions of family and household, and stereotypes about LGBT individuals. It argues that poor LGBT individuals and families lack full citizen rights and access to needed social services as a result of these explicit and implicit biases.

Key words: Welfare reform; family policy; civil rights; gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (LGBT); heterosexism

Welfare reform is fundamentally about family policy—about promoting and privileging particular kinds of families, and about penalizing and stigmatizing others. (Cahill and Jones 2002: 1).

Two pieces of legislation were passed in 1996 that set an important tone for family policy in the United States: The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), an act that expanded welfare-to-work programs throughout the country, restricted people’s access to public assistance, and crystallized the broader restructuring of public-private boundaries; and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman. At first glance, the two initiatives appear unrelated and inconsequential, although the reality is quite different. Combined, they constitute a national policy context within which legal and cultural
definitions of "the family" have been restricted and where lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) civil rights legislation has been blocked or challenged, both on moral and legal grounds. Although some important victories have been made by LGBT civil rights activists, heterosexist biases in federal law and policy continue to have negative effects for LGBT communities. Poor LGBT individuals and families, in particular, suffer consequences from these policy decisions because they do not have full citizen rights nor, in many cases, can they access needed resources.

This article addresses the effects of heterosexist bias in social welfare policy frameworks on LGBT individuals and families. It brings together three often-disconnected arenas of public policy: social welfare, family, and LGBT civil rights. Although contemporary scholarship on social welfare and family policy have put into question the "nuclear family" as the basis for policy (Haney and Pollard eds. 2003), and rightly so, few studies have addressed the role that institutionalized heterosexuality itself plays in shaping and powerfully influencing social welfare agendas. While many scholars have addressed the gendered and racialized dimensions of social welfare frameworks, including how racism and sexism provide foundations for restricting people's access to much-needed forms of assistance and to their civil rights, few have addressed how heterosexism, too, works to restrict access and limit citizenship for individuals who do not fit within sexual and gender norms (Phelan 2001; on racism and sexism, see Gordon ed. 1990; Gordon 1994; Gordon and Fraser 1994; Mink 1990; Mink ed. 1999; Naples 1998; Moller 2002). Even fewer have addressed the ways in which gender identity discrimination intersects with heterosexism to affect the lives of transgendered as well as non-transgendered lesbians, gays, bisexuals and heterosexuals. And the few researchers and policy-makers who have made important contributions to "queering," or examining the heterosexist biases in, American social policy, have yet to be taken seriously within mainstream policy circles (Butler 1990; Sedgwick 1992; Cahill and Jones 2002). In fact, policy struggles over the meaning of family and attacks on LGBT communities and civil rights have gone hand-in-hand: "It is no accident that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) were passed and signed into
law within days of each other," as Sean Cahill and Kenneth T. Jones observe (2002: 15). In these ways, institutionalized heterosexuality is central to some of the key motivation(s) behind and design of public policy frameworks in the United States.

By "institutionalized heterosexuality" I am referring to the set of ideas, institutions and relationships that make the heterosexual family the societal norm, while rendering homosexual/queer families "abnormal" or "deviant" (Ingraham 1999). My queer analysis of social welfare involves examining how sexuality and gender can be rethought and reorganized in economic and social policy frameworks, theories and practices. Throughout the article I examine how heterosexuality is assumed to be the natural basis for defining the family, and by extension, society, both explicitly (by excluding LGBT people from the analysis and by stigmatizing certain individuals as "non-family" or "anti-family") and implicitly (by assuming that all people are heterosexual, that marriage is a given and exists only between a traditionally-defined man and woman, and that all people fit more or less into traditional gender roles; see Foucault 1978; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Ingraham 1999; Phelan 2001; Bernstein and Reimann eds. 2001; Mink ed. 1999; Cahill et al. 2002).

Historical Background: Sexuality and Public Policy

Homosexuality has been historically regulated and disciplined through various policies, laws, and institutions in the U.S. (Foucault 1978; Calhoun 2000; Bernstein and Reimann eds. 2001). Until now, gays, lesbians and bisexuals in a limited amount of states or municipalities have enjoyed certain heterosexual privileges, such as health or insurance benefits, the right to adopt or have children, the right to work in a discrimination-free environment, and the right to "marry" (e.g., Massachusetts, domestic partner laws in Vermont, California, and over 65 cities). These legal and political achievements have been obtained at the municipal or state levels rather than through federal legislation, thus extending rights to LGBT communities in a fragmented way. In addition, many of these policies and laws are laden with contradictions. Vermont’s Domestic Partner Laws, for example, are set up as a parallel system to marriage laws, thus creating
a "separate but equal" context reminiscent of earlier civil rights legislation and leaving the heterosexist institution of marriage intact and largely unchallenged. The federal "Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell" policy, signed by President Bill Clinton (1992–2000) in 1993 and implemented in 1994, is contradictory because although President Clinton authorized the policy as a way to "protect" gays in the military (as long as they remain in the closet), the reality is that more gays have been expelled from the military since 1994 than ever before (SLDN 1999), including during the explicit government campaign to expel homosexuals from the military during World War II (Berubé 1990).

Importantly, LGBT people have actively challenged and negotiated discriminatory legislation with some success. Anti-sodomy laws, which legally prohibit consensual, same-sex sexual relationships (sometimes for women too), have been repealed, although thirteen states upheld these archaic laws until the landmark decision by the Supreme Court to overturn them in June 2003 (NGLTF 2004a and b). Non-discrimination clauses have been passed by some states and dozens of municipalities, providing protection for citizens regardless of their sexual orientation and in some cases, their gender identity/expression (TLPI 2004). In addition, many private companies and public institutions (e.g., universities) have added non-discrimination clauses to their code of ethics or by-laws. The State of Connecticut is currently reviewing proposed legislation for same-sex marriage, following the lead of earlier state movements in Vermont, Hawaii, California, and Massachusetts. Thus far 3 states (California, Connecticut, and Vermont) explicitly permit second parent or stepparent adoption by same-sex couples, and an additional 20 states and the District of Colombia have legislation allowing same-sex adoption in certain cases (NGLTF 2004c). In some states such as Florida, however, gay and lesbian couples are not allowed to adopt at all, although currently this is being challenged in court (Liptak 2003).

These civil rights victories have not gone unchallenged by the Right. Anti-gay legislators and social movements (e.g., the religious right) effectively have blocked the passage of several pro-LGBT laws and policies and passed their own legislation, including the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 as a compromise with the Right.
Although DOMA is a very short piece of legislation, it has had a significant impact on the LGBT rights movement. DOMA allows states the right to not honor other states’ marriage contracts where marriage is defined differently. In this scenario, a state such as Arizona that has passed its own DOMA does not recognize domestic partnerships of same-sex couples that were “married” in a state where they are recognized (e.g., Vermont). President Clinton’s passage of DOMA at the federal level paved the way for states to actively pass their own versions of the Defense of Marriage Act, thereby passing even stronger messages about who has the right to marry and who does not. To date, 36 states have passed DOMA (NGLTF 2004d).

DOMA alone has helped to institutionalize heterosexism in profound ways because it blocks future proactive and protective legislation for gays and lesbians. LGBT activists and institutions wishing to work around DOMA have strategized to pass domestic partner laws and policies at state and local levels, including in private organizations, as a way to obtain the 1,000+ benefits for LGB employees/citizens that married couples are entitled to by default. Through this process, civil rights strategies have become localized and “privatized” along with the broader privatization of the social welfare system and economy: As with other policies, poor LGBT individuals are the most likely to be left out in this restructuring process, even by LGBT activists themselves. This has the additional consequence of creating forms of social control among non-profit and community organizations and also within LGBT communities: there may be, for example, “deserving” vs. “undeserving” homosexuals (Piven and Cloward 1993), and some are more likely to “pass” than others. As the histories of other social movements (e.g., civil rights, women’s) have shown, federal legislation alone does not create equality among all but it is crucial for providing legal equality across states.

Social Welfare Policy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities

Heterosexist biases in social welfare policy frameworks exist in at least three ways: through policies that explicitly target LGBT individuals as abnormal or deviant, such as policies that
defend the institution of heterosexual marriage; through federal definitions that assume all families are heterosexual, thereby implicitly leaving out LGBT individuals and families; and through policies that overlook LGBT poverty and social need due to stereotypes about LGBT communities being affluent. The first type of heterosexist bias has become particularly apparent since the 1990s, when conservative political sectors organized more concerted efforts to block or overturn LGBT civil rights legislation. Since the mid 1990s, social welfare policy initiatives have included explicit components about marriage that protect heterosexuality as a social institution. These policies began during the William Jefferson Clinton administration (1992–2000) but have been promoted most fervently by the George W. Bush administration (2000–present). The latest version of the TANF reauthorization bill calls for dedicated federal funding sources for “healthy marriage promotion” activities and “fatherhood programs.” Currently, provisions being considered by the House and Senate and supported by the President include $100 million in competitive matching grants to states to develop “innovative approaches to promoting healthy marriages,” including “public advertising campaigns on marriage,” education in high schools on the value of marriage, marriage enhancement and marriage skills training, divorce reduction programs, marriage mentoring programs in “at-risk communities” (Fremstad et al. 2002: 3). These provisions also call for an additional $20 million annually that would be designated specifically for fatherhood programs, such as promoting “responsible parenting,” improving fathers’ family business management skills, and premarital education programs (Fremstad et al. 2002: 3).

Under current legislation, state governments have been offered incentives to provide marriage workshops in exchange for additional funding. Since 1996, over $400 million per year in public funds have been spent across the U.S. on abstinence-only-until-marriage education. In the abstinence campaigns, gay, lesbian and bisexual adolescents have no access to sex education that pertains to their sexual experiences. In addition, many school districts throughout the country have developed laws forbidding teachers from discussing homosexuality in any form, despite the fact that, according to one major national study conducted by
the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, seventy-six percent of parents of 7–12th graders feel that sex education should cover homosexuality (Cahill and Jones 2002: 48).

The George W. Bush administration (2000–present) has made it a priority to preserve the traditional heterosexual family through legislation and policy, including through his so-called faith-based initiatives. In January 2001, President Bush created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI); in December 2002, he signed an executive order directing federal agencies to formulate and develop policies to ensure "equal protection" for faith-based organizations competing for government contracts, thereby allowing organizations to compete for federal funds while maintaining their specific religious perspective (Office of the President 2003). Thus far, the Bush administration claims that it has completed regulations that would allow religious groups to compete for nearly $20 billion in grants administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, and it is currently completing regulations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development and for the Departments of Justice, Education and Labor (Stevenson 2003). In September 2003, the Bush administration awarded $30.5 million in grants to 81 religious and community groups to develop their own social welfare programs; in 2002, $24 million was awarded under the same program to 21 groups (Stevenson 2003).

Because the executive order and subsequent acts allow faith-based service providers to operate by a different set of rules than other non-profit and for-profit organizations, they potentially pave the way for further discrimination against LGBT people and women who do not fit within faith-based organizations' visions of the family or those "in need." In addition to the general concern that the separation of church and state has been overridden through this executive order, historically marginalized groups such as LGBT people, poor single mothers, and other social sectors considered "undeserving" are especially likely to lose out in religious-based forms of service delivery. Nonetheless, OFBCI Director James Towey has stated that President Bush "was 'going to use every single tool that he has as chief executive' to advance his goal of giving religious groups a greater role" (Stevenson 2003, quote in text). This process is certain to reinforce the dominance
of institutionalized heterosexuality in American social policy and social welfare distribution. To the extent that it will exclude LGBT people from access to resources and/or from being seen as full citizens, these regulations potentially undermine the struggle for LGBT civil rights in the United States. Thus while it is important to address LGBT civil rights incrementally, it is also crucial that researchers and policy-makers examine the institution of heterosexuality as an integral part of U.S. welfare policy reform, as even policies that appear not to have anything to do with sexual or gender identity have specific implications for LGBT communities in need of assistance from the state and private social service agencies.

The second type of heterosexist bias in social welfare policy concerns how “the family” and “household” are federally defined, including in the U.S. Census. Although there is no specific question on the census about sexual orientation/identity, census data serves as a self-disciplining factor in defining sexual citizenship through self-reporting at the household level. Income, employment rates, family size, military service, citizen status, and poverty statistics are just a few of the many variables collected, all of which combined contributes to the “governmentality of the closet at the national scale,” as Michael Brown and Paul Boyle observe (2000: 90). For the purposes of data collection in the Current Population Survey (CPS), the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2003) defines family and household as separate categories. A “family” is defined as “a group of two or more (one of whom is the householder) related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together.” A household, in contrast, “consists of all people who occupy a housing unit,” and is further divided according to its status as a “family household” or “non-family household,” thus reinforcing the legal distinction between families (i.e., those that are related through blood, marriage or adoption, as defined by law) vs. non-families (e.g., same-sex households). A family household is defined as “a household maintained by a householder who is in a family (as defined above) and includes any unrelated people who may be residing there.” A non-family household is defined as a “householder living alone or where the householder shares the home exclusively with people to whom he/she is not related” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003). Clearly, these definitions privi-
lege the institution of marriage over domestic partnerships, and the status of heterosexual families over other types of families. While to some degree these definitions are contradictory and open to interpretation, they form an important basis for recent welfare legislation and related proposals to promote "two-parent families" through marriage (Brown and Boyle 2000).

Available studies show that there is an enormous disjuncture between popular conceptions of "the family" in current political discourse and the reality. For example, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, 44 percent of U.S. adults are not married, and married couples with children make up less than one-quarter of U.S. households (Cahill and Jones 2002: 12). A recent study by the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) shows that over one million same-sex unmarried partner households self-identified in the 2000 U.S. Census; for a variety of reasons, this figure is believed to be a gross undercount of same-sex unmarried partner households (Smith and Gates 2001). Based on the 2000 U.S. Census data, the HRC study estimates that over 3 million gay and lesbian people are "living together in the U.S. in committed relationships in the same residence" (Smith and Gates 2001: 2). The study also estimates that the U.S. population is comprised of over 10 million gay and lesbian people; a lower estimate than the 10% that earlier gay and lesbian activists estimated but consistent with recent studies that estimate gays and lesbians to be 5% of the total U.S. population. This research demonstrates the need for policies that address the specific needs of LGBT families in the U.S.

The third type of heterosexist bias in social welfare policy frameworks is a result of stereotypes about lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) individuals and families as affluent or as "HINKs" (High Income, No Kids). These stereotypes tend to reproduce the invisibility of LGB families in social welfare policy frameworks and in research on poverty; they also completely overlook the experiences of transgendered LGB individuals. For example, lesbians, gays and bisexuals often remain invisible in studies of poverty because they are viewed as "family-less." Rather than being viewed as part of a family, it is often assumed that LGB adults have no children. Following this already tainted logic, if LGB households have no children or less children than heterosexual households, they are assumed to have fewer family fi-
nancial responsibilities and subsequently higher overall incomes than heterosexual households in their same age group—thus contributing to the common stereotype that most LGB households are wealthy or better-off than their heterosexual counterparts. This assumption, combined with other forms of heterosexism and homophobia, leads policy-makers to believe that LGB people, as a group, do not experience poverty. As a result, LGB people are seen as not in need of any economic, social and health-related services (with the important exception treatment for HIV/AIDS, in which case many gay men have been targeted as a “social problem” or as a risk to health security—see Farmer 1992; Wright 2000). In most cases, those who do have access to government subsidies, health care and social services must do so through the lens of institutionalized heterosexuality: as “single” people and as legally unmarried, and many undergo discriminatory treatment as patients as a result.

Existing studies show that economic levels among LGB people range significantly and can be differentiated by group as well. For example, in his pioneer study of gay male communities in San Francisco, Manuel Castells (1983) found that “. . . on the whole, [lesbians] are poorer than gay men . . . and are less likely to achieve local power.” (Castells 1983: 140). Gay men and lesbians experience class differently in part due to their distinct gendered experiences, although this of course varies according to other factors as well. Several studies since then have critiqued Castells’ assertion and pointed out the economic and income differentiation of LGBT households by gender in combination with race, class, citizen status, and/or geographic location (Knopp 1995; Badgett 2001). For instance, in some cities where there are larger, relatively concentrated lesbian populations, lesbians have more wealth relative to national rates of wealth among lesbians (Rothenberg 1995). More recent studies, such as that of M. V. Lee Badgett (1998), challenge the myth that LGBT people are affluent. Rather, Badgett argues, “Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons are not, as a class, richer than heterosexuals. In some cases, we appear to earn less.” (Badgett 1998: i). Recently released U.S. Census data from California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas shows that same-sex households are similar to other families in these states on variables that include income,
family size, employment rates, military service and citizen status, thus supporting the idea that LGB families are as economically diverse and stratified as heterosexual families (HRC 2003*). And although there is a paucity of data on the economic and class experiences of transgendered people, preliminary evidence based on secondary studies would indicate that many transgendered people, including self-defined transsexuals, male-to-female and female-to-male transgendered individuals, are not wealthier than heterosexuals as a class (Cahill and Jones 2002). Like anywhere, some LGB people are upper class, wealthy and/or work in high-paying professional fields. However, the stereotype of wealth among LGB people is just that: a stereotype.

Due to a combination of social, economic and cultural factors, many gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered people have difficulty finding jobs and/or keeping them (i.e., because of their appearance, because of homophobic work environment, blatant discrimination, and the disciplining of heterosexuality and/or gender identity in the workplace—see McDowell 1995), in addition to the fact that many of their families do not accept them nor provide the kinds of support that heterosexuals receive (e.g., college tuition or living expenses, support for a new house or wedding, providing advice on the job market, and associated forms of emotional support). Additionally, financial success often depends upon one’s willingness and/or ability to “pass” as heterosexual and/or as appropriately gendered in a given context (MacDowell 1995). These issues demonstrate that there is a need for a broader definition of poverty that includes, for example, personal safety and freedom of abuse as well as economic hardship (Abramovitz 1988; Cahill and Jones 2002). Policy-makers could also benefit from more research on how sexual identity shapes individuals’ views on the social welfare system, including social service agencies, non-profits, government offices, and federal agencies.

Conclusion: Implications for Research and Policy

This article has addressed three important reasons for the persistent heterosexist biases in social welfare policy frameworks: Federal legislation and policies that explicitly target homosexuality as “abnormal” or “unnatural,” such as DOMA; restricted legal
definitions of "the family" in federal policy; and stereotypes about LGBT individuals and families. In closing, I wish to offer some suggestions for future research on social welfare policies, with the aim of denaturalizing institutionalized heterosexuality and bringing LGBT communities to the center of research on poverty, families, and state policy. First, there is a need to re-envision the notion of social welfare itself. Central to social welfare policy frameworks is a heterosexist understanding of families, individuals and citizenship. Rather than being a natural, essential aspect of our society, the institution of heterosexuality is socially constructed and has been produced through these very policies and laws (in conjunction with cultural practices, the educational system, religious institutions, etc.) that establish hierarchies and power relations in our society. It is crucial that we begin to examine the connections among welfare reforms themselves and the many other forms of policy that coincide with these policies to produce an "appropriate" welfare recipient and citizen (Fraser and Gordon 1994). Furthermore, it is important that we examine such policies in a global perspective, since our policies have consequences for families in the U.S. and abroad, through immigration, foreign, and international development policies (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Luibhéid 2002; Lind and Share 2003).

The queering of welfare reform is a much-needed project. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) has produced one of the most comprehensive studies to date on the effects of welfare and family policies on LGBT communities in the United States (Cahill and Jones 2002). In order to truly construct equitable policies and systems of distribution, we would need to examine the roots of institutionalized heterosexuality as a central aspect of the U.S. welfare state, in addition to other forms of institutionalized discrimination or bias. Only this way can we envision a society with all families in mind.

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Examining the Relationship between Community Residents' Economic Status and the Outcomes of Community Development Programs

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In designing and implementing community development interventions the economic status of targeted participants is a demographic characteristic worth considering. The findings from this research indicate that even within the limited economies of rural Mexican villages there are variations in economic status that affect the ways in which the outcomes of community development programs are perceived. The poorest of the poor are likely to be less satisfied with development projects than those with average or better-off economic status. This is true whether a development project uses a bottom-up approach or a top-down approach. The more participatory approach does not attenuate the relationship between economic status and satisfaction with development programs. On the contrary, it may exacerbate it.

Key words: community development, economic status, rural Mexican villages

According to the United Nations Human Development Report (1998) the world population has become increasingly stratified economically with people living in poverty experiencing social and geographic segregation based on class. Jameson and Wilber (1996) provide strong evidence that this stratification and distancing causes hardship.

In Mexico and other developing economies wealth accumulation and capital investment are usually concentrated in urban areas, leaving rural areas largely characterized by poverty and underdevelopment in relation to cities (Lerner, 1958; Todaro, 2000;
The growing divide separating the rural poor from the sophisticated urban professional or university-educated worker is obvious and its impact upon development goals is well documented. However, the scope and types of economic differences among rural community residents and how these differences may also impact the achievement of development goals is less understood (Lawson, McGregor, & Saltmarshe, 2000).

The purposes of this paper are to estimate the scope and types of differences in economic status that exist in seemingly homogenous rural communities and to examine the relationship between the community residents' economic status and the success of community development programs, with a specific interest in whether program type mediates this relationship. To accomplish these purposes community residents in rural Mexico participating in two types of development programs were surveyed. One of the programs sought community participation and input (bottom-up), while the other did not (top-down). Findings indicate that there are variations in economic status within the limited economies of rural communities in Mexico and that these variations are associated with different perceptions of community development programs regardless of program type.

Economic Status

A frequent problem with development projects has been their exacerbation of inequality, either through their concentration of power and benefit in local elites or their failure to address unjust power dynamics (Deere & León, 1982; Esman & Uphoff, 1984; Griffen, 1987; Ugandan Ministry of Finance, 2002). This problem of unbalanced distribution of benefits also occurs in rural communities even though nearly everyone seems to fit the standard textbook picture of poverty (Todaro, 2000). Anthropologists studying poor communities have shown that despite uniform appearances of economic status among families in poor communities, differences in status do exist (Lerner, 1958; Lewis, 1959; Scheper-Hughes, 1992). However, there is no consensus on the how these differences influence the course of development projects particularly on the community level.
It is not difficult to imagine ways in which subtle class distinctions at a local level could impact development project processes and outcomes. In any disadvantaged community among the poor and near-poor there are some who participate in the modern economy's formal sector and others who are alienated from it (Lerner, 1958). There are some people who are desperately poor in the absolute sense and others living above poverty thresholds who face relatively little hardship. Often within society the wealthier benefit disproportionately from government incentives and programs. This general trend is likely to be reflected in the limited economies of rural communities. As a result of these variations in economic status, community development projects probably can not enjoy equal participation from—or deliver equal benefits to—all strata (Norgaard, 1994).

Program Type

The economic status of participants in a development project may determine the form that a project takes, especially when the development experts organizing the project use a bottom-up or empowering approach. In these sorts of Freirian approaches to development the oppressed populations decide what they want to do and how they will do it (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001). Programs using a bottom-up approach may find that psychological and logistical issues play a role in determining who participates most, even when organizers try to elicit equal participation from all community members (Kahn, 1994; Norgaard, 1994).

Expert-driven and top-down development has often been criticized because outsiders do not understand (or ignore) local social realities. As a result, outside experts are thought likely to overlook the needs of the most disadvantaged groups (Esman & Uphoff, 1994; Griffen, 1987). However, it is conceivable that an outside expert who genuinely cares about the best interests of a community or a particularly oppressed social stratum might devise programs that succeed at achieving development goals congruent with community goals. Even if bottom-up programs are generally better at eliciting appropriate development plans from community members there remains a risk that a flawed
selection processes within a community will unjustly determine who participates and who benefits.

Setting

The sample of research participants came from communities in rural Mexico with populations ranging from 89 to approximately 2,000. The local hard currency economies in these communities consisted primarily of three activities: selling small crops of potatoes or coffee, owning a small store that carried basic goods (e.g., canned beans, toilet paper, dried rice, candy, liquor, tobacco), or selling a service (e.g., telephone calls, truck rides from the village to the nearest bus station, or transportation of crops). Beyond these occupations a barter system was in place, and most families engaged in subsistence farming. As a result of land reform many of the community residents owned small plots of land. However, there was some tenant farming as well as communal sharing of land, both done in an attempt to boost salable crops. Monthly bills that required hard currency generally consisted of electricity, transportation, staple food items, and costs associated with subsistence farming (INEGI, 1998a; INEGI, 1998b, Larrison, 2002).

On the surface these communities seemed to match a textbook example of typical poverty communities (Todaro, 2000; Coordinating Committee of CASA, 2001). They did not exhibit obvious extremes of economic stratification. There were no indicators of gross inequality such as tile villas within gated compounds surrounded by shacks of earth, cardboard, and sheet metal. On the contrary, most housing was of modest size, and construction materials seemed uniform. There were no signs of political or religious factionalism, as these communities were fairly uniformly Catholic and the districts were politically uncontested. Neither observation nor conversation with them revealed general trends of farmers, shopkeepers, or service providers doing economically better than other groups. In fact, it was common for households to mix their economic activities, doing both farming and some service work.

Programs

The remoteness and poverty of these communities attracted interventions from two university-based development programs.
The two programs, Brigadas Universitarias en Servicio Social (Brigadas) and Universidad Veracruzana Proyecto (UNIR), sent students into the region to carry out service projects or assist local residents in development projects. Yet, the two programs embodied contrasting philosophies regarding who should control the development process. The presence of two development programs with similar workers from similar backgrounds working in the same region in comparable communities gave this study a remarkable opportunity to investigate development outcomes.

Examples of services provided by students included setting up clinics and teaching people about basic dental hygiene, nurses providing basic public health services, helping local farmers diversify crops in an attempt to build local self-sustaining economies, developing educational programs, and reviving local traditional arts and culture. Neither program had the resources to undertake major infrastructure projects such as building and paving roads. However, there were some important distinctions between the two programs' approaches to community development.

Brigadas. The Brigadas program was government-funded serving approximately 100 communities around the state of Veracruz, Mexico, and structured using a top-down development model. At the time of data collection the Brigadas had twelve employees that oversaw 156 students (Brigadas, 1998). The specific program interventions used by students were derived from service plans, which were based upon their professional course work and individually developed in consultation with the Brigadas staff and their professors. The plans were ultimately approved by the Brigadas director and implemented by the students when they reached their communities. Supervision was limited, with visits from Brigadas staff occurring once every two or three months, and interactions with professors limited to the times the students could find transportation from their communities to the university campus.

Although the students' plans did not include input from community residents, the Brigadas staff's past experiences with this particular set of communities insured that students' plans reflected the communities' needs. The experienced staff provided insight that most students were just starting to gain, while in a bottom-up project the students might have been expected to draw
such information from the people they were helping. This lack of input from community residents differentiated the Brigadas program from the UNIR program.

UNIR. The UNIR program was an experimental program providing services similar to the Brigadas program to nine communities in the microregion of the Cofre del Perote, located in the mountain region of Veracruz. It received outside funding from the Kellogg Foundation, which required that a bottom-up model be used to provide direction to services. There were eight staff members overseeing 76 students. The program's interventions were based upon the belief that communities have the capacity for self-directed development (Nackerud & Brooks, 1996; Blanchard, 1988).

By using a bottom-up approach, UNIR attempted to identify and include community residents interested in improving the local quality of life. UNIR further identified common problems that affected the community's health and economic stability, and helped residents develop possible solutions to these problems. Based upon this information, which was gathered through community meetings and informal interviews with community residents, plans were developed and implemented with students providing technical support and knowledge. Monthly meetings among community residents, UNIR staff, and students maintained a form of supervision over the students' plans.

Purpose

Data were analyzed to answer the following questions: 1) What (if any) differences in economic status exist within these seemingly homogenous communities? 2) How does economic status influence community perceptions of the development process and program outcomes? 3) How do various economic status groups within communities affect community residents' perceptions of women's participation, leaders' responsiveness to community needs, and level of community involvement? 4) Do the patterns of satisfaction among the different economic status groups hold when program type is distinguished?
Methods

The project was a case study. The lead author and a hired data collector/translator collected data from community residents. Researchers directly administered surveys and field work lasted between October 1998 and March 1999. The generalizability of the findings presented is limited by the cultural context of one particular region in Mexico.

Sampling

A convenience sample of 701 individuals from 21 villages completed questionnaires about the impact of each program’s interventions. The sample sizes of the community residents surveyed and the number of villages included were approximately equal for the Brigadas (residents $N = 357$, villages $N = 12$) and UNIR (residents $N = 344$, villages $N = 9$) programs. Chi-squares were conducted to compare the two program sub samples on a number of demographic characteristics. The two sub samples were comparable in terms of age, level of hunger, and ability to pay monthly bills. The two sub samples were different in gender distributions with women making up 64.6 percent of the Brigadas sample and 54.7 of the UNIR sample [$\chi^2 (1, N = 700) = 7.208$, $p = .007$].

The only requirements for individual residents’ participation in the survey were a willingness to participate, knowledge of the development programs, age over 18 years, and residency in the community. These parameters necessitated a conscious decision to include people in the survey who may only have had second-hand knowledge about the programs’ functioning. Beyond the aforementioned boundaries, all were welcomed to participate in the survey whether their perceptions of the programs were positive, negative, or neutral. The distributions of the demographic variables for the whole sample show a diversity of research participants, with a particularly good representation of various ages (26% - 18 to 25, 26% - 26 to 35, 22% - 36 to 45, 14% - 46 to 55, 7% - 56 to 65 and 5% - 66 plus), and gender (59.7% female).
Variables

The variable, economic status was finally measured using two economic indicators. These included individuals' perceptions of their ability to pay bills and affirmations of having three meals per day most of the time. The variables of program outcomes and satisfaction were measured by two paper-and-pencil instruments, a satisfaction scale and the Goals of Community Development Scale (GCDS), which was developed for this research project.

Economic Status of Community Residents. Initially, four statements were employed to quantify the variable economic status. Respondents used a four point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) to rate their level of agreement with the following statements: 1) Your family eats three meals a day most of the time. 2) The primary breadwinner of the family works in the village that you live in. 3) Your family makes enough money to pay the bills. 4) Your family makes enough money to pay the bills and save money (see table 1).

A factor score generated by principle components analysis of the four economic status items served as a scale of social and economic status. Factor analysis showed that the items concerning paying bills and eating three meals per day had the highest loadings (of .74 and .68 respectively for the unrotated loadings) on the one factor extracted from the four items. These two items related to each other significantly (p-value < .0001) with a Spearman rank correlation of .28 and a Kendall rank correlation of .25. Responses to these two items were therefore used to rank order the sample according to economic status as a complimentary measure to the factor score.

Answers to the economic questions about paying bills and eating three meals per day allowed us to divide the sample into rank-ordered groups according to economic status. At the bottom were the participants who strongly disagreed with both statements \((n = 28)\), and just above them were those who disagreed with both statements without strongly disagreeing to both \((n = 35)\). The top category strongly agreed to both statements \((n = 98)\) and the category just under them agreed with one and strongly agreed with the other \((n = 182)\). An additional group agreed with both statements without strongly agreeing to either \((n = 51)\).
Community Residents’ Economic Status

Table 1

Distribution of economic factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ate three meals per day (N = 691)</th>
<th>Income earners worked in village of residence (N = 691)</th>
<th>Families without enough money to pay bills (N = 690)</th>
<th>No long term savings (N = 690)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>45 (6.5 %)</td>
<td>67 (9.7 %)</td>
<td>243 (35.2 %)</td>
<td>517 (74.8 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36 (5.2 %)</td>
<td>22 (3.2 %)</td>
<td>99 (14.3 %)</td>
<td>69 (10.0 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>177 (25.6 %)</td>
<td>61 (8.8 %)</td>
<td>228 (33.0 %)</td>
<td>80 (11.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>433 (62.7 %)</td>
<td>541 (78.3 %)</td>
<td>120 (17.4 %)</td>
<td>25 (3.6 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A middle group mixed agreement and disagreement (n = 297). These six groups could be reduced to three by combing those who consistently disagreed into a poor group (n = 63), a better-off group that consistently agreed and gave at least one "strongly agree" response (n = 280), and a middle group (n = 348).

Community Development Outcomes. The GCDS was structured using 35 statements with a four point Likert response format. The scale’s statements encompassed four general themes, economics, health, education, and social development. Of the 35 questions, 24 were used to create the GCDS, giving the instrument a range of possible scores between 24 and 96. The remaining eleven statements were to collect a variety of demographic information, such as gender, age, economic standing, and community of residence. The GCDS had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 and a Guttman’s Lambda 2 of .89, showing a good level of reliability (Spector, 1972). It was also affirmed to have face validity among the staff and program directors of the UNIR and Brigadas programs confirming that the identified outcomes were indeed the ones sought by both programs.

Three specific items were chosen from the GCDS for chi-square tests with the economic status categories. These items were
statements: 1) More people are involved in making important decisions; 2) Local political leaders have been more responsive to your community's needs; and 3) Women have taken a more active role in community decision making.

Satisfaction. The satisfaction scale was based upon Attkison's (Department of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco) Client Satisfaction Questionnaire—8 (CSQ-8). The CSQ-8 has been normed on a wide range of clients receiving social services of various forms in the United States. It is an eight-question, standardized paper and pencil measurement instrument that uses a four point Likert scale. The range of possible scores is between 8 and 32. A score of 24 or more indicates that the respondent has been mostly to highly satisfied with the services they received (Fischer & Corcoran, 1994).

The questions originally contained in the CSQ-8 were transformed to meet the needs of the research, which were oriented towards satisfaction with community outcomes rather than individual satisfaction. The questions were then translated into Spanish. The transformed satisfaction scale had a Cronbach's alpha of .77, and a Guttman's Lambda 2 of .79, indicating the translated scale maintained an acceptable level of reliability.

Translation of Measurement Instruments. The GCDS and the satisfaction scale were initially written in English and then translated verbatim to Spanish by a hired translator. The two program directors and the staff from the UNIR and Brigadas programs had an opportunity to review the initial translation. They were encouraged to provide feedback about the instruments' validity, cultural sensitivity, and accuracy in translation. The Brigadas' director and several UNIR and Brigadas staff offered suggestions. Based upon these suggestions changes were made to the GCDS and the satisfaction scale. The instruments were then pre-tested with ten community residents. Utilizing the findings from the pretest, the GCDS and satisfaction scale were retranslated by the research project's field assistant.

Limitations

The research design is limited in several important ways. First, it is a single case study, meaning that the generalizability of the results beyond the immediate case is limited. The findings should
therefore be considered preliminary; however, the findings indicate that it is possible to build a better understanding of the relationship between community residents’ economic status and the outcomes of community development programs.

Second, the study used a convenience sample, which means that generalizing to the population should be done with care. While collecting data in the field every house within communities was typically visited to ask for participation in the research. Furthermore, only five people approached to participate refused. However, there were instances when residents were not home.

Findings

The univariate results for the two economic status questions suggest that only about nine percent in this sample regularly experiences poverty hardships related to both hunger and an inability to pay bills. About 48 percent of the sample denies regularly experiencing either type of hardship, and 43 percent sometimes experiences some hardships. Thus, the sample is not uniformly poor. On the contrary, nearly half the sample avoids severe hardship while only a small but significant minority seems to experience absolute poverty. This low level of absolute poverty hardship reflects Mexico’s position between low-income and middle-income societies, but does not match the desperation revealed in some national survey data on rural poverty (Coordinating Committee of CASA, 2001).

Dividing the sample into six rank-ordered economic status groups allowed the use of an ANOVA to compare average satisfaction and GCDS scores. This yielded a significant difference with both outcome variables. The pattern of lower satisfaction among persons in the lower status groups (F-value = 9.75, p < .0001) was mirrored by lower scores on the GCDS for the poorer groups (F-value = 8.53, p < .0001). Post-hoc tests revealed that the poorest two categories responded with significantly lower satisfaction than the other four categories with both outcome measures, while the top two categories also scored significantly higher than the “mixed response” categories.

Results suggested collapsing the six economic status categories into three (poor, middle, and better-off) would not oversimplify the measures of economic status, so this was done. These
three groups were then compared on their responses to specific items in the GCDS. Asked if they perceived that women had become more active in community decision-making, 86 percent of the economically advantaged strongly agreed while only 63 percent of the poor did so. Asked whether local leaders had become more responsive, only 43 percent of the poor strongly agreed while 71 percent of the better off did so. In evaluating whether the development programs were helping more community members get involved in important decision-making again the poor were not as strongly positive as the better off, with 41 percent of the poor strongly agreeing while 70 percent of the better off community residents did so. In all these areas the poor were more likely to strongly disagree, disagree, and agree. The better off were more likely to strongly agree.

All these apparent differences were statistically significant. Using the three-level economic status variable, table 2 reports the ANOVA results for mean scores on the GCDS and satisfaction scale as well as the Chi-square results for responses to the three specific items from the GCDS. Only in the UNIR (bottom-up) group does any item demonstrate independence from economic status; no relationship was detected between economic level and one's perceptions that the UNIR program had increased community participation. Also in the UNIR group, economic status was only marginally significantly related to perceptions of women's involvement. However, for both the UNIR and Brigadas groups the mean scores for satisfaction are very clearly different according to economic status.

For the total sample the correlation between the factor score for economic status (using the four economic indicators, rather than just the two concerning paying bills and eating three meals per day) and satisfaction measured by the satisfaction scale was 0.18, while for GCDS this correlation was 0.19. These are non-trivial but weak relationships. The correlation for 342 cases responding to the UNIR programs was higher, at 0.25 for both outcome scales (p < .0001), while for the 348 cases responding to Brigadas the correlations were only 0.11 for the satisfaction scale (p < .05) and 0.15 for the GCDS (p < .01).

Inspecting best fit lines on a scatter chart in which scores on the satisfaction scale and economic status have been standardized
Table 2

Relationships between economic status and satisfaction across development approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>UNIR</th>
<th>Brigadas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA on Satisfaction Scale</td>
<td>$F = 9.9.$</td>
<td>$F = 9.4.$</td>
<td>$F = 4.6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .0001$</td>
<td>$p &lt; .0001$</td>
<td>$p &lt; .0005$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA on GCDS</td>
<td>$F = 18.4.$</td>
<td>$F = 18.2.$</td>
<td>$F = 5.3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; .001$</td>
<td>$p &lt; .001$</td>
<td>$p &lt; .006$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community being more involved</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 21.5</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 4.6</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .0015$</td>
<td>$p = .59$</td>
<td>$p &lt; .0001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .13</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .08</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square on Leaders being more responsive</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 24.9</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 16.4</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .0004$</td>
<td>$p = .012$</td>
<td>$p = .004$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .13</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .15</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square on Women being more active</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 24.8</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 11.2</td>
<td>Chi-Square = 21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .0004$</td>
<td>$p = .082$</td>
<td>$p = .0016$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .13</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .13</td>
<td>Cramer’s V = .18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(see Figure 1), it appears there may be a curvilinear relationship so that economic status increases with satisfaction and perceptions of development goals being met until one reaches a point of status slightly above the average, at which point the association is weaker (or vanishes). This is illustrated by the locally weighted scatterplot smoother (lowess) best fit lines for each development program’s group (with tension at 66 percent of the data) shown in figure 2. The lines also show a steeper association for the UNIR group that for the Brigadas group. These UNIR/Brigadas patterns of steepness and leveling off of effect were observed with
both the GCDS and satisfaction measures. The relationships are also seen when the independent variable of economic status is made a categorical variable. When using the GCDS or satisfaction scale as a dependent variable in ANOVAs and Chi-Square tests there is always a clear difference between those with the highest economic status scores and those with the lowest, but the highest (least poor) are rarely statistically significantly different from the medium group(s), and the middle is often statistically different from the poorest group. The middle economic group looks much like the highest group in perceptions of development while the poor group is clearly different from the better-off groups.

Finally, regression models controlling for age and gender found a consistent pattern of economic status relating significantly but modestly to the GCDS and satisfaction scales (see
Table 3

Regression Models Using Economic Status to Predict Outcome Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Brigadas only (n=331)</th>
<th>UNIR only (n=340)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GCDS</td>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>GCDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.18***</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model F-value</td>
<td>8.3***</td>
<td>9.9***</td>
<td>7.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Adj. r-squared</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* sig at p < .05. ** sig. at p < .01. *** sig at p < .001

An interesting finding of these regressions was the tendency of the younger respondents in the Brigadas (top-down) group to be more favorable about outcomes while in the UNIR (bottom-up) it was the older persons who were more favorable. The substantive strength of the models ranged from a paltry two percent of variance explained (predicting satisfaction in the Brigadas group) to a more impressive ten percent (for satisfaction in the UNIR group). In both development groups the models explained about six percent of the variance in the GCDS.

Discussion

The communities included in this study were rural, with small populations and limited local economies. The data collected show first that variations in economic status do exist even within these limited economies. A small but significant minority of community residents regularly faced hunger and an inability to pay bills, while a larger fraction of the population survived without such
hardship. Second, the data suggest that these variations do affect the way community residents perceive community development programs. Residents with worse financial conditions were less impressed by the development outcomes. Residents with middle or better off economic status within the sample were more satisfied. This relationship holds true whether the development programs are organized with bottom-up or top-down models. Third, the relationship between economic status and satisfaction with a development project seems stronger in the group that participated in the bottom-up (UNIR) projects. However, on the specific issues of community participation and women's involvement, the class differences in perceptions were not significant for the UNIR participants, but were stronger and significant for residents participating in the Brigadas projects.

With the growing focus on the importance of demographic characteristics of program participants such as gender, age and culture, the findings reported in this research point to economic status as a demographic variable also worth considering when designing and implementing community development programs (Cook, 1990). Indeed, findings from the regression models suggest economic class is more important than age in how development outcomes are experienced. Furthermore, the findings suggest that whether or not purposely targeted by community development programs, people in the lowest economic strata seem to benefit less from program interventions than those individuals who already have resources of their own. Other researchers (Lawson, & et. al., 2000; Macdonald, 1995; Beck, 1989; Lecomte, 1986), as well as the United Nations Human Development Programme (1998), have cited similar problems with programs not assisting people from the poorest strata of society.

There are a number of plausible scenarios for how economic status may influence perceptions of community development programs. For example, better off community residents who grow surplus crops and run small stores may be more aware of how development projects can help them. As they are presumably more integrated into the modern economy and more aware of opportunities for improvement they may find it easier to appreciate small gains or improvements that bring indirect or long-term benefits. Complimenting this, persons in greater material
Community Residents' Economic Status

hardship may be more acutely aware of project failings. Such impoverished persons may have immediate survival needs, and projects that do not help them directly satisfy those needs may be seen as fatally flawed.

Participation may also be a mediating factor. Those who are better off have more time to participate in development projects, and participation relates to satisfaction. Those in the greatest poverty may be too ill or too busy to get involved with local events, or they may feel alienated or intimidated, or they may be overlooked or avoided by others in their community and the development workers (Ugandan Ministry of Finance, 2002). Psychological variables may also play a role, as forms of hope and optimism are sensitive to life stresses with the poorest of the poor being more pessimistic or depressed, and this in turn influences how they evaluate project success, making them more critical (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998; Taylor & Armor, 1996).

A well-designed project utilizing sensitive and dedicated workers may be sufficient to elicit satisfaction, with community input being of only slight importance. This may be especially true when emphasizing the perceptions of the poorest groups. The Brigadas approach did not use inputs from the community, yet achieved satisfaction levels nearly equivalent to those achieved by the UNIR programs in which communities determined the development projects. If one compares the satisfaction of the better off half of the sample receiving Brigadas services to that of the poorer half receiving the UNIR services the satisfaction levels are nearly the same. This means that other variables, perhaps quality of the development work and the dedication and wisdom of the development workers probably exert stronger influences on satisfaction outcomes.

As expected, there were some instances that were contrary to the trend found in the data. One example was a single mother who had few economic resources, and was not recognized as a formal or informal community leader until after her interactions with UNIR. The result of her involvement was a rise in prestige of her family, which had some tangible outcomes such as her daughter receiving a scholarship to study at a university in Costa Rica. This example, however, appeared the exception rather than the rule (Larrison, 2002). It is probable that development workers
remember other exceptional cases such as this woman's, but the
data collected here show that such anecdotes could be misleading
if they are used in generalizations about successes in helping the
poorest of the poor.

Conclusions

The findings of this research show that even in poor com-
munities, people experience variation in poverty and material
hardship and that these variations in economic status play a role in
how community residents perceive the outcomes of development
programs. This means that community development programs
need to be sensitive to how economic differences among commu-
nity residents affect the achievement of community development
goals (Lawson, et. al., 2000; United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, 1998; Iatridis, 1994).

From a program model standpoint, bottom-up community
development strategies that attempt to elicit participation from
the targets of the project should be aware that emerging leaders
may represent different status backgrounds, even in seemingly
homogenous rural communities. If local participation is elicited,
a careful development worker will encourage the very poorest to
participate rather than simply allowing whoever comes forward
to lead the process. Community organizers such as Khan (1994)
and Homen (1999) have made this observation before, and this
study offers new empirical evidence supporting the validity of
this warning.

As well, the top-down model is not immune from neglecting
the poorest strata in communities as demonstrated by the long
history of development programs that have done little to help re-
duce poverty (Iatridis, 1994; Jameson & Wilbert, 1996). Programs
using outside experts to devise community interventions must
consider whether their projects will help the most desperately
poor or the more secure persons within a disadvantaged com-
munity. This means top-down programs must have a high level
of familiarity with local culture across a number of dimensions
including economic status.
Community Residents' Economic Status

References


This paper suggests that analyses of marriage experience take into account both structures of inequality and context. Although marriage is widely viewed as producing economic well-being and family stability, this analysis of a sample of White rural families finds the likelihood of realizing these benefits to be closely related to social class position. Marriage failed to produce these benefits for many working class and poor families. Although gains in economic self-sufficiency are viewed as an explanation for White women's perceived retreat from marriage, the limited opportunity structure for women in this rural place provides a context in which women continue to rely on marriage for economic survival.

Key words: marital stability, family diversity, inequality, rural families, social class, social policy

The erosion of marriage in the U. S. family constellation is producing feverish debates both in the realm of public policy and in the conduct of social research. Much of the discussion of welfare reauthorization has focused on encouraging marriage among women on welfare (Parke, 2003). In recent years, studies promoting marriage have become academically popular. Yet those who promote marriage as a means of increasing individual and social well-being often ignore questions of context and inequality.

In this paper, we explore a dominant preoccupation associated with marital decline, namely the view that marriage provides
substantial benefits not enjoyed by the unmarried. Our approach treats marriage as a social relation that is differentiated by class and other social locations including gender and race. We use a contextual approach to examine marital benefits. More concretely, we analyze the marital experiences of a sample of White families in a small rural community with substantial social class variation. We ask, what is the relationship between marriage and economic well-being for these families? Has marriage produced stability in their lives? How does "marriage matter" to these families?

The decline of marriage in the experience of U.S. adults has been significant. The proportion of U.S. adults (age 18 and over) who are married fell from 65.5% in 1980 to 59.5% in 1999. These declines are found across racial and ethnic categories. Between 1980 and 1999, the percentage of married White adults fell from 67.2% to 62.0%, the percentage of married African Americans fell from 51.4% to 41.4%, and the percentage of married Hispanics fell from 65.6% to 59.4%. Currently 61.5% of adult men are married and 57.7% of adult women are married (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).

Perspectives on Marriage and Economic Conditions

Links between marriage and higher standards of living are well established. In 1999, median income for married couple households was $56,676, single male household income was $37,396, and single-female household income was $23,732. Single female household earnings were 35.7% of the earnings of married couple families in which wives were employed and 61.4% of the earnings in which wives were not in the labor force (U.S. Census, 2001).

Because of the strong connection between marriage and economic well-being, declining marriage rates raise concerns about increasing disparities in standards of living (McLanahan & Casper, 1995; White & Rogers, 2000). Although scholars disagree on the question of whether marriage patterns are the cause or the consequence of economic security and well-being, most agree that marital status is rapidly becoming an axis of inequality.

Marital Decline and Changing Opportunities

The economic disparities associated with marriage have prompted family scholars to investigate recent changes in marital
patterns, including less marriage, more divorce, more cohabitation, and more nonmarital childbearing. An important stream of that literature connects changes in marriage patterns to the transformation of the economy from its manufacturing base to a base in service and technology. Changes in the labor force, notably structural unemployment, the changing distribution of jobs, and the low-income generating capacity of jobs, have altered women and men’s employment patterns. In the new economy, industrial jobs traditionally filled by men are being replaced with service jobs that are increasingly filled by women. This social transformation has changed the historic understanding of marriage as a relationship in which men provide for economically dependent women and children.

The scholarship on changing economic conditions and marriage patterns divides mostly into two categories: first, studies that emphasize male economic opportunities as determinants of marital patterns; and second, those that emphasize women’s opportunities as determinants of marital patterns (For a review of scholarship in each category see Bianchi & Casper, 2000; and White & Rogers, 2000). Male-based explanations of marriage propose that men with higher earnings are more likely to marry and less likely to divorce; their employment and earnings make them attractive partners and enhance marital stability. According to this explanation, the observed retreat from marriage is associated with lower wages and diminished economic prospects for contemporary men. Men who are unlikely to be good providers are not seen as attractive marriage partners (Manning and Smock, 2002; McLanahan & Casper, 1995). Explanations calling on women’s earnings suggest that work or welfare produce an “independence effect,” which destabilizes marriage. In brief, women who, in the new economy, are no longer economically dependent are less interested in marriage because they are able to be self-sufficient without it (Becker, 1981; Cherlin, 1992). An overlapping line of analysis emphasizes the retreat from marriage for some racial minorities and those at the bottom of the class hierarchy (Edin, 2000; Wilson, 1987).

The Benefits of Marriage

A new strand of family scholarship emerged in the last half of the 1990s. Ironically, this body of research and writing has taken
shape even as the family field has grown increasingly aware that family processes are not uniform, nor do they operate in isolation from gender, class, and other social locations. Nevertheless, this body of work makes the case that marriage is a social good that advances the interests of society and individuals. This position represents one side in a debate between those who wish to promote marriage in the face of trends that diminish its importance, and those who view changing marriage patterns as part and parcel of large-scale social changes, many of which undermine the structural supports associated with high rates of marriage.

The central contention of this emerging perspective is that marriage promotes well-being in many areas including health, happiness, and economic stability. By promoting healthy behaviors, marriage provides substantial benefits—benefits not enjoyed by those who are unmarried (Waite, 1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Waite & Gallagher, 2000). While earlier works had suggested that marriage confers great benefits on men, but few on women (Bernard, 1972), Waite argues that both married men and women are happier, healthier, and wealthier than those who are unmarried. The married have more economic resources because they share income, pensions, social security benefits, financial assets, and their primary residence. Married couples benefit from economies of scale (that is, two can live as cheaply as one). In addition, married people produce more than the same individuals would as single. By developing certain skills, married individuals develop greater efficiency. This advantage increases husbands' work productivity, leading to higher wages.

Simply stated, this scholarship finds that "marriage matters." Not only does it serve as an insurance policy, but marriage itself causes beneficial outcomes though connecting husbands and wives to each other, to social groups, and to other social institutions.

One of the express purposes of this literature is to inform the American public of the benefits of marriage, thus encouraging individuals to "choose marriage" when making difficult personal decisions related to matters such as nonmarital pregnancy and divorce. Just as information on the hazards of smoking led many individuals to stop smoking, likewise, it is hoped that communicating evidence that finds positive outcomes associated with
marriage will encourage individuals to marry and remain married (Waite, 1995, 1999).

Are There Benefits to Marriage?

Despite the well-established link between marriage and economic advantage, important questions can be raised about the oppositional categories "married" and "unmarried." For the most part, the pro-marriage literature fails to consider either the varied economic contexts within which marriage is embedded or the varied personal contexts in which it occurs. In reality, marriages are situated in such a range of race, class, and spatial contexts that any discussion of "benefits" must be qualified.

Although "there is little theorizing on how inequality shapes the context for patterns of marriage," (Cohen, 2001, p. 24) a growing body of empirical data offers an important corrective to the generalization that marriage is necessarily economically advantageous to the partners. The experience of individuals placed differently on a society's hierarchies of social class and race will frequently diverge. Thus, while economic shifts have reduced the relative earnings of lower income men, the earnings of men in higher paying jobs have increased; for individuals in higher social class positions, marriage continues to provide an opportunity to enhance economic stability (Teachman, Tedrow, & Crowder, 2000). Meanwhile the experience of individuals in less advantaged social class positions is different. For example, Katherine Edin found that the erratic nature of men's employment made marriage an economically risky choice for poor women (2000).

Likewise inequalities of race construct the benefits of marriage differently, depending on race/ethnicity. High rates of poverty among racial ethnic children are sometimes attributed to family structure differentials between Whites and other groups. Lower child poverty rates in two-parent families provide much of the rationale to promote marriage for single mothers on welfare. Hogan and Lichter (1995) find, however, that if racial ethnic groups had the same rate of two-parent families and the same work patterns as the White population, African American and Latino children would still have poverty rates approximately double those experienced by White children in comparable circumstances. A two-parent household is far less likely to insulate racial ethnic children
from poverty than is the case for White children. Similarly, mar-
riage is less financially beneficial for minority women than White
women due to the lower average material resources of minority
men (Catanzarite and Ortiz, 1996).

Our research analyzes the experiences of a sample of
White families. The context in which many White women make
marriage-related decisions is complex. In general, White women
experience greater gains in economic well-being by marriage than
do women of color because the White men they typically marry
tend to have higher earnings than racial ethnic men. At the same
time, comparisons across race and gender categories find that as
a group, White women have also experienced the most signifi-
cant improvements in economic opportunity in the restructured
economy (Wetzel, 1995). Higher earnings potential opens up the
option of divorce or nonmarital childbearing without economic
destitution for some of these women. Many White women have
achieved a level of economic independence that allows them to
decide to forego marriage (McClanahan & Casper, 1995). Thus
White women’s privileged racial location contributes to more
nonmarriage and increasing female headship in this population.

The Rural Economic Context

Generalizations about the relationship between economic
conditions and marriage experiences are typically made without
reference to spatial context. While economic conditions in rural
places vary widely, it is nevertheless accurate to conclude that
rural workers encounter more restrictive opportunity structures
than do urban workers. Much of the employment available in
rural areas is low-skill, low-wage work that is frequently part-
time or seasonal (Gibbs, 2001). Per capita income in rural areas is
approximately 70% of per capita income in urban areas (Economic
Research Service [ERS], 2003). The Congressional Rural Caucus
(2001) reports that rural workers are almost twice as likely to work
at minimum wages as are urban workers and that rural workers
are “40% less likely to move out of low wage jobs than central city
residents.” As a result of the disadvantages of rural labor markets,
poverty rates are consistently higher in rural than urban areas.

Women workers are especially vulnerable in the rural econ-
omy. The weekly earnings of rural women are approximately
23% less than those of urban women (Gibbs, 2001, p. 15). Comparisons of rural and urban women’s labor force experience attribute rural women’s lower wages to factors such as lower educational attainment, more limited work skills, the lower rural wage structure, inferior labor markets, and gender segregated occupational categories (Cotter et al., 1996; Lichter & McLaughlin, 1995; McLaughlin & Perman, 1991; Sachs, 1996). Analyses of the prevalence of poverty find that the highest poverty rates—across all household types, both urban and rural—are found among rural single women and rural female-headed households (ERS, 2002).

Research Questions

We explore the marital practices of a sample of families in a relatively unexamined context for family life—a rural community. We consider a principal contention about the economic benefits of contemporary marriage to ask: Has marriage promoted stability and economic well-being among this sample of rural families? In addition, we consider the following generalizations about men’s and women’s marriage behaviors: Do we find an “independence effect” among these White women? That is, have they achieved a level of economic self-sufficiency that allows them forego marriage? How important are men’s labor market credentials constructing their “marriageability?” Do men’s low wages make them unattractive marriage partners?

Method

This article is based on a larger case study that explores stability and change in the lives of a sample of thirty families with young children in a rural Michigan community (Wells, 1999, 2002). The case study uses the Family Interview data set from the Strategies for Rural Children and Families Project, Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station Project 3337. Research participants were selected through systematic stratified sampling procedures intended to produce a multi-class sample. All research participants were parents of a second or third grade child who attended one of the two public elementary schools in a small rural school district; in 28 of 30 cases, women were the respondents or
primary respondents. The data used in this article were gathered in 1995–1996 and are composed of semi-structured, face-to-face interviews and self-administered pre-interview surveys.

For this analysis, we assessed family experience and household transitions over the lifetime of the family’s second or third grade child. This strategy acknowledges that a multiplicity of family experience may exist within the same household (for example, one child may have experienced the divorce and remarriage of her parents while a step-sibling in the same household lives with both biological parents). In this article, the referent child is sometimes called the “target child.”

The small school district that is the setting for the research is situated in an economically depressed nonmetropolitan Michigan county with a poverty rate of 17.5% in 1995. The county population is predominately White (96%) and nonfarm (97%). This county offers limited economic opportunity for its residents. County employment is strongly oriented toward low-wage service employment, with 35% of private sector, non-farm employment in retail trade (compared to U.S. totals of 22% retail employment) [Gaguin & Debrandt, 2000; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996].

Characteristics of the Sample

This sample is made up of thirty White families living in households ranging from two to eleven members, with a median size of four persons. Household type and marital status are distinct and separate variables, both of which are significant to this research. Twenty-two (73%) sample families live in married couple households, two (7%) in extended family households, three (10%) in single mother households, two (7%) in cohabiting households, and one (3%) in a single father household. The marital status reported here is given in reference to the target child’s parents or custodial parent. Sample parents divide into marital status groups as follows: twenty-three (77%) married, three (10%) separated, three (10%) divorced, and one (3%) widowed. Of twenty-three married couples, fifteen (65%) are first marriages and eight (35%) are remarriages. Women in these households range in age from 25 to 48 years, with a median age of 33. Fourteen of twenty-nine (48%) women work full-time, nine (31%) are
Benefits of Marriage Reconsidered

full-time homemakers, four (14%) work part-time, one (3%) is unemployed, and one (3%) is a full-time student. Men in these households range in age from 27 to 54 years, with a median age of 34 years. Twenty-three of twenty-seven men (85%) work full-time, and four (15%) work part-time (including two men who work part-time in informal self-employment).

Establishing social class. We divide families into social class categories because economic well-being—a principal concern of this research—is closely linked to social class position. We rely on a relational model of social class advanced by Collins (1988), Lucal (1994), Vanneman and Cannon (1987), and Wright and his colleagues (1982) because it illuminates the way in which class position creates multiple contexts for family life. Social class divisions are made on the nature of one's work, with middle class work characterized by "giving orders" and working class employment characterized by "taking orders" (Collins, 1988). Middle class families are those in which one earner—either male or female—is employed full-time as an administrator, professional or manager (Higginbotham & Weber, 1992). Families of lower than middle class are divided into working class and the poor. The middle class has greater control not only over their work lives, but also over the economic aspects of their family lives. While advanced capitalism has increased job insecurity for most workers, the characteristics of middle class employment and the supports generally associated with it—higher wages, job security, pensions, and good benefits—create a more secure and stable economic base for middle class families than those of lower social classes (Rapp, 1992).

Consistent with the model described above, four sample families are categorized as middle class, seventeen as working class, and nine as poor. The occupational mix of this sample illustrates two important but frequently overlooked points about rural America: first, rural residents are not economically homogeneous, but rather, clear social class distinctions exist in this population; and second, the vast majority of rural workers earn their living in work unrelated to agriculture. Sample individuals with middle class employment include a college professor, an elementary teacher, a self-employed contractor, and a transportation super-


visor. The working class includes eight factory workers, three construction workers, three mechanics, and others. Poor workers include three self-employed individuals, two factory workers and a garbage route driver. None of these families depend on farming for their livelihood. All middle class families have incomes above $45,000. Income in the working class varies widely, with seven families with annual incomes higher than $30,000 and ten families with annual incomes lower than $30,000, but above the poverty threshold. Poor families have incomes ranging from $10,000 to $20,000.

Findings

Categorizing and Describing Family Stability Groups

We conceptualize family stability to be something different from economic well-being. We define stability in terms of steadiness, permanence, and continuity. To assess family stability, we systematically examined the family transitions and household arrangements of sample families. We analyzed the following for each family: residential mobility, marital history, household composition changes, employment stability and length of present marriage or relationship. An extensive discussion of the methodology used to assess family stability and specifics of marital histories may be found in Wells, 1999. We found that families divided into three main types that we term high stability, low stability, and moderate stability households. Ten families were high stability households. These families are characterized by stable household composition, long-term couple relationships, stable economic resources (although not necessarily high income levels), and low residential mobility. The Coles are an example of a high stability family. This family consists of Nancy, age 39, her 41 year-old husband, Steven, and their sons, ages seven and nine (all names in this article are pseudonyms). The couple is in a first marriage of 13 years. Nancy has a college degree and works part-time as a registered dietician in the WIC program. Steven has a master’s degree and works at a nearby regional state university as a professor. The target child has moved once, in infancy, when the family relocated to the area for the university appointment.
Low stability families are characterized by fluid household composition, complicated relational or marital histories, insecure economic resources, and housing insecurity or instability. These households have had a history of considerable “family trouble.” Again, ten families fit this general description. The Turner family is an example of a low stability household. Dorothy Turner, age 31, lives with her three daughters, ages ten, nine, and four in a mobile home owned by her in-laws. Dorothy is separated from her husband, Ken. After a four year period in which the Turners separated, reconciled, and separated again, the couple plans to divorce. The nine-year old target child has moved four times. Dorothy has completed an associate degree in medical records, but has been unable to land a job. Obstacles to employment include an unreliable vehicle and no telephone. This family has had long-term experience with low income and government assistance programs. Ken has had an unstable employment history of truck driving and factory work. Dorothy occasionally babysits to earn a little cash. A household income of $10,000-$15,000 includes a cash welfare grant, child support, and food stamps.

The remaining ten families fell between the extremes of high and low stability. These moderate stability households tended to fit one of two profiles. These families were made up of either households in which couples had high relational stability, but low employment stability along with moderate residential stability or households with complicated marital histories along with moderately high employment stability and secure housing. The Edwards family is an example of a moderate stability household. This family is made up of Sharon, age 28, her 29 year-old husband, Tim, and their two children, ages nine and six. The couple is in a first marriage of four years; they had a cohabiting relationship for several years prior to the marriage. The couple separated for a time during Sharon’s second pregnancy. Both are high school graduates. Sharon is employed part-time as an aide for the school district, working a split-shift, five days a week schedule, at $7.55 an hour. Tim commutes to an urban center to work full-time as a mechanic, setting up double-wide mobile homes for $8.50 an hour. He has held this job for three years; prior to this job, he was employed in construction.


Connecting Family Stability and Social Class

Next we divide families by social class and then categorize families by their placement into high, moderate, or low stability groups. A table showing family stability by social class follows. Middle class families in this sample may be characterized as having uncomplicated marital histories and household arrangements. All middle class families are in the high stability group. All four couples have conventional first marriages, that is, marriages that conform to the social convention that couples marry prior to (or close to) the birth of their first child.

The working class is made up of seventeen sample families. Among these families, six (35%) are categorized as high stability families, six (35%) are categorized as moderate stability families, and five (29%) are categorized as low stability families. The working class encompasses a broad range of economic resources. Therefore we divide working class families into two income groups—those with incomes higher than or lower than $30,000. Placement in stability groups is associated with income level; four of seven families (57%) in the higher income subgroup of the working class are categorized as high stability families while two of ten (20%) families in the lower income subgroup are categorized as high stability families. A total of seven of seventeen working class households (41%) consist of couples with conventional first marriages (of these, four of seven are in the higher-income subgroup, while three of ten are in the lower-income subgroup).

Nine sample families are poor. Among poor families, none are categorized as high stability families, four (44%) are categorized as moderate stability families, and five (56%) are categorized as low stability families. None of the poor families are couples with conventional first marriages.

These data point to a clear relationship between social class and family stability. Moving downward through the class structure, we find a pattern of increasing complexity and discontinuity in family structure and household arrangements among these sample families. All middle class children live with both parents while two of nine (22%) poor children live with both parents. All middle class families are economically secure and have highly sta-
Table

Family Stability Groups by Social Class (n=30)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle class n=4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate stability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low stability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working class n=17</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher income subgroup n=7 (income &gt; $30,000)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate stability</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low stability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower income subgroup n=10 (income &lt; $30,000)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High stability</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor n=9</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High stability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low stability</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ble household arrangements; no poor families fit this description. Working class families fall between the two ends of the spectrum.

**Marriage = Stability + Economic Well-Being:**

**Considering Multiple Social Locations**

What then about the contention made by marriage advocates that marriage promotes stability and economic well-being? The experience of middle class families is certainly consistent with this thesis. Middle class couples—all in conventional first marriages and all in the high stability category—live in comfortable homes,
drive late-model cars, and plan for their children’s college education. Middle class interviewees describe positive family interactions and cooperative couple relations. These interviewees—all women—attribute their economic success to hard work and the fact that they (along with their husbands) have made good choices in their lives.

Next we consider how the experiences of less economically privileged families hold up to the marriage promoters’ contentions by examining the experiences of two groups: first, low-income single mother families, and second, married couple families who are poor. Separation or divorce precipitates a steep economic decline for many single mothers and their children. We find, however, that of the five poor or nearly poor single mother families (Morgan, Miller, Turner, Watson, McCullen), four experienced spells of poverty prior to the break-up of the marriages. The experience of Bonnie Morgan (separated) and Norma McCullen (divorced) is similar. Both grew up on welfare, neither graduated from high school, both relied on welfare for a number of years while married, and both now have factory jobs; Bonnie’s family is working poor; Norma’s income is slightly higher than poverty level. Robin Miller divorced an abusive, unemployed husband and now does clerical work for a bank; the family is working poor. Dorothy Turner, a separated woman who is currently unemployed, has been married to a man with an unstable work history. The family has used welfare during his bouts of unemployment. Among these five single mothers families, only Colleen Watson’s family has experienced a precipitous decline in income. This woman divorced an alcoholic husband and now struggles to earn enough as a self-employed hair stylist to support her children and maintain their large, well-furnished home. For four of five single mothers, marriage did not bring economic security and marital disruption did not introduce women and children to poverty. Marriage never served as a safeguard against poverty.

The five remaining poor families have a male breadwinner; four are married couples (Patterson, Newman, Campbell, Smith) and one is a single father family. None of the married couples have conventional first marriages. Two married women—formerly poor single parents—remain poor, but have marginally
improved their families' economic status by their recent marriages. Lynn Patterson, with a seventh grade education and three nonmarital births, was on welfare long-term. Her family’s financial condition improved when she married the father of her youngest child a year and a half ago; her husband is self-employed in excavation. This family is still poor, but relatively better off; they no longer receive government assistance. Patty Newman and her children have been poor since she and her children were essentially abandoned by her first husband, who was in military service. She remained on welfare until she remarried. Her husband Kevin works in a local factory earning $6.00 an hour; they continue to receive food stamps and WIC, but she reports that she and her children are better off than before.

The poverty status of the Campbells and Smiths may be attributed to low earnings among male breadwinners. George Campbell lost his factory job when an auto accident left him unable to do the required heavy lifting. He is now self-employed in lawn mowing and at the time of the interview was employed as a seasonal postal worker. For the Smiths, low earnings and large family size result in family poverty. Andrea Smith is a developmentally disabled woman who grew up in a local working poor family. She had a nonmarital birth, eventually married the child’s father, and bore three additional children. This family of six has had difficulty living in an independent household on Randall Smith’s earnings of $8.50 an hour as a garbage route driver; they have lived in extended family households (doubling-up with his or her parents) three times over the course of their marriage.

The four poor married couples, with earnings between $10–20,000 and family size ranging between four and six members, simply do not earn enough to construct a stable family life. Day to day family life is fraught with uncertainty and insecurity. The minimal necessity of providing family housing constitutes a challenge. The Smiths are currently unable to live as an independent household. The other three poor married couple families use low cost mobile or modular housing to keep their families together.
Discussion

We find that marriage does indeed "matter" for this sample of families. But we find evidence that it matters differently for middle class families than for poor families.

Marriage did indeed mean economic well-being and stability for middle class families. Middle class research participants say they have "no problem" providing for their children. These parents provide for their children at a level that includes new computers, Disney World family vacations, and annuities for future college expenses. Alternatively, marriage has neither provided a stable context for family life nor substantially promoted economic well-being for another group of families. Most poor families are made up of individuals who have lived either in poverty or on the edge of poverty long-term. Some women and children have experienced several family and household transitions; but changes in marital status have not affected economic status dramatically. Limited economic resources has been a constant in their experience.

Finding a relationship between family stability and social class is consistent with the literature. The economic distress literature finds a strong relationship between economic instability and family instability. Economic distress is clearly associated with lower levels of marital and family satisfaction (Voydanoff, 1990). Marital conflict frequently increases as partners become hopeless, depressed or hostile in the face of financial hardship (Conger et al., 1990). We conclude that the very defining characteristics of social class are suggestive of whether a particular family will have a tendency toward family stability or instability. If we describe working class and poor families as those with less control and more susceptibility to economic insecurity, then we are also pointing to them as families more likely to have fluid family arrangements.

Although many scholars have demonstrated the decreasing significance of marriage in contemporary U.S. society, this research setting is a context in which many women and men continue to structure their lives around marriage. All sample women are either currently or previously married. While the first marriages of more than a third of sample women (38%, or 11 of 29)
ended in divorce, nearly three-quarters of divorced women have remarried. These data suggest that the social structural characteristics of this setting create a context in which marriage continues to hold advantages for women and men.

This research illustrates the difficult economic circumstances of White families living in low wage labor markets. A significant proportion of married couple families in this community are working poor. Five of nine (56%) poor families in our sample have male breadwinners. According to U.S. Census data for this almost entirely White school district, nearly one third of children in married couple households in which only their father (or stepfather) was in the labor force were poor. The poverty rate for the same group of children looked very different when both parents were in the labor force. When children lived in two parent families in which both parents were employed, only 6% were poor (State of Michigan, 1994). In our sample, none of the families with two earners are poor. Among low-skilled workers, it is multiple earners, rather than male earnings, that can be counted on to insulate families from poverty.

We find little evidence of the "independence effect" among sample women. Likewise, we do not find that women were unwilling to marry men with meager labor market credentials. The relationship between marriage and economic conditions that emerges from this study is this: marriage continues to be an important economic relationship for individuals in all social class locations. Marriage continues to be an opportunity structure for women and their children (Baca Zinn, 1989). Marriage gives women and children access to another income. Access to a man's wages is, by itself, surely no guarantee of an above-poverty level income, but marriage allows couples in this low wage labor market to construct dual earner households. A two-income household is a substantial hedge against poverty: as noted above, no dual earner households in this sample were poor. This conclusion is consistent with White and Rogers' contention that the economic advantage of married couple households is increasingly attributable to the presence of two earners (2000).

In this research we find that many married couple families were unable to access the benefits of marriage claimed by Waite and others. Stable household circumstances were more closely
related to social class position than marital status. Promoting marriage as a way of connecting to financial assets, pensions, and property is a strategy whose effectiveness is largely dependent on social class. Marriage did not enable rural men with meager labor market credentials to find stable jobs with pensions and other benefits. Living on the economic edge may mean more common debts than common assets. The shared primary residence may be a mobile home that is depreciating in value. Marriage remains an important economic relationship among these sample families, but not principally because it is a recipe for economic security.

The fact that women and men make decisions about their family lives in particular contexts and settings raises the question of how significant the rural setting was in shaping the results of this research. We believe that the principal conclusion of this study—that social class is highly significant in constructing the relative benefits of marriage—is relevant to both rural and urban contexts. Broad class-based disparities in opportunities and resources exist across spatial contexts in contemporary U.S. society. However, we believe that some findings related to the marriage-related behavior of sample families may be associated with particular characteristics of the rural research context.

The centrality of marriage in the experience of this sample may well reflect social and economic conditions that typify rural America. The rate of married couple households is indeed higher in rural than urban areas. The economic restructuring of rural areas has increased women’s employment opportunities, but new jobs are predominately low-wage service and manufacturing work. Rural women are considerably more susceptible to underemployment than urban women (Jensen, et al. 1999). McLaughlin, Gardner, and Lichter (1999) suggest that “growth in poor jobs for women may improve family economic well-being enough to reduce instability and conflict related to low incomes but does not provide enough income for women to set up their own households” (p. 412). Therefore, rural women—who have not experienced the same gains to self-sufficiency as have their urban counterparts—may be less likely to leave an unsatisfactory marriage and more likely to remarry than urban women. Although the economic prospects of rural men are also quite limited, a husband’s meager income may substantially increase
the likelihood that monthly bills get paid. In addition, rural men frequently contribute to the household economy in ways that are outside the bounds of formal employment. These contributions might include cutting wood for home heating, providing meat by hunting and fishing, and taking responsibility for keeping an old car roadworthy (the latter is a near-necessity for employment in a rural area).

The policy implications of this research are clear. Marital benefits are affected by social location. Many who promote marriage as a central public policy goal fail to acknowledge the unevenness of the benefits of marriage. Yet it is simplistic and inaccurate to assume that all marriage provides uniform economic benefits for all. Those benefits of marriage that accrue to individuals at privileged social locations are unlikely to accrue to individuals at disadvantaged social locations. Inequalities of social class and race predict that most poor single mothers are not just a husband away from economic well-being. In addition, the personal circumstances of prospective marriage partners vary broadly. Poor women on welfare who come into marriages with already complicated family histories will surely experience greater obstacles to marital success than those experienced by women with conventional first marriages.

The unqualified contention that marriage is the pathway to family stability and economic well-being is too facile. In this study marriage did not deliver these benefits for many of our research participants. Marriage did not bring stable resources, better housing, or health insurance benefits to the women already on the economic edge. Marriage is not a panacea for economic stability. An important policy issue for the foreseeable future is how to enhance opportunity structures so that individuals at more disadvantaged social locations may achieve the family stability and economic well-being that all families require.

References


Measuring and indigenizing social capital in relation to children's street work in Mexico: The role of culture in shaping social capital indicators

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Drawing from social capital theory, this study assessed the relevance of existing conceptions of social capital—largely from the United States and Canada—in the Mexican context, in an effort to contribute novel variables to the street-children literature. Using a cross-sectional survey design, 204 mothers of street-working and non-working children were interviewed within one community in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico. Factor analysis was used to corroborate the internal construct validity of two dimensions of social capital: family social capital and community social capital. Findings reveal that culture can play an influential role in how social capital indicators are defined and measured.

Key words: children’s street work, family social capital, community social capital, factor analysis

Latin America faces a critical challenge as explosive urbanization, poverty, overcrowded cities, unequal distribution of wealth, and the effects of globalizing the market-oriented economy have contributed to an increase in the number of children who migrate to the streets to supplement their family’s income as well as to survive. In many countries throughout the region, common catalysts like rapid urban population growth and urban poverty have prompted the numbers of street-working and street-living children to soar (Connolly, 1990; Peralta, 1995; De la Barra, 1998). While the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that there are more than 100 million children who live and work on the streets in the developing world, Latin America is home
to 40 million of the total street-children population (Covenant House, 1999).

To gain a deeper understanding of the movement of children into the streets to meet their basic human needs, researchers across multiple disciplines, including social work, psychology, sociology, public health, medicine and law, have sought to identify and measure the associated risk factors. Individual and familial precipitating factors, or microfactors, include such influences as school dropout and family poverty (Martínez & Silva, 1998; Raffaelli, 1996; Wittig, 1994). Structural influences, or macrofactors, include poverty, urbanization, external debt and inconsistencies between macroeconomic and social policies (Connolly, 1990; De la Barra, 1998; Fallon & Tzannotos, 1998). Community influences, or mezzofactors, are less clear within the literature, as the intrafamilial and family-community influences related to children’s street work have largely been overlooked in prior studies. Rather, the traditional focal points with this population have been the intrapersonal and familial demographic risk factors, as well as the structural risk factors. To gain a more holistic understanding of this social phenomenon, it is vital for researchers to consider the mezzosocial influences as well, such as the nature of the relationships that occur between and among families, and how these may influence children’s street work. Thus, this study focuses on the mezzosocial environment and on defining and measuring the relationships and interactions that transpire there.

In an effort to understand the effects of family- and community-based social relationships on an array of outcomes, the social capital framework has frequently been adopted as a means to further explore the intricacies of social interactions. According to Coleman (1988), family social capital refers to the relationships between parents and their children, which encompass the time, efforts, resources and energy that parents invest in their children. In contrast, exterior social capital—or community social capital—represents the family’s interactions and relationships with the surrounding community, both with residents as well as with local institutions of socialization, such as schools (Putnam, 2000). Although at present there are no empirical precedents exploring the effects of social capital on the migration of children into the streets to work, considerable research does exist
indicating the influence of social capital on children’s well-being. Many of the oft-cited indicators of children’s well-being are also correlated with children’s street work.

The present study aims to conceptualize and operationalize the notion of social capital in Mexico for the purpose of introducing a new series of variables into the street-children literature to consider in future research. It constitutes part of a larger initiative to explore the relationship between levels of family and community social capital and children’s street work in the Mexican informal economy. Given that Mexico is the geographical context for this study, and that existing social capital indicators have been largely developed in the United States and Canada, it was necessary to first consider the effect that a country’s cultural context might have on the conceptual and operational definitions of constructs.


To determine the scope of empirical literature related to social capital and children’s well-being, the systematic review method (SR) was adopted (Larson, Pastro, Lyons, & Anthony, 1992). A variety of bibliographic databases (e.g., FirstSearch, OVID, Social Work Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts and Wilson) were searched from 1980 to the present, given that the majority of the social capital literature has been developed over the past two decades (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000). A manual search was also conducted in both dissertations and academic journals related to social capital over the past decade (1990 to the present). Finally, several annotated bibliographies and working-paper series related to social capital were consulted, which were compiled and produced by the Social Capital Initiative under the auspices of the World Bank, available online at: http://www.worldbank.org.

The methodology adopted to discern relevant and non-relevant empirical literature concerning social capital consisted of four selection criteria. The study was included in the review cohort if: 1) it examined either family social capital and/or community social capital and the effects on individual and/or collective
well-being; 2) it utilized quantitative, qualitative and/or triangulation of research methods to assess levels of social capital; 3) it identified indicators of social capital at the family and/or community levels; and 4) it produced findings relevant to social work and/or social welfare policy. The SR method produced 22 peer-reviewed studies that complied with these criteria.

Review of Empirical Findings

For the review cohort, the findings are grouped within two general categories: 1) indicators of family social capital and 2) indicators of community social capital. The common variables across studies have been identified within each category.

**Indicators of Family Social Capital**

Eight of the 22 studies examined the effects of family social capital on outcomes related to children. Using Coleman and Hoffer's (1987) *High School and Beyond* study of 4,000 high school students as an empirical precedent, numerous subsequent studies have followed Coleman's initial operationalization of family social capital into five main components, namely: family structure, quality of parent-child relations, adult's interest in the child, parents' monitoring of the child's activities, and extended family exchange and support.

*Family structure.* All eight studies used family structure as a predictor of outcomes for children and youth. Across studies, high levels of uniformity exist among select indicators: single-parent vs. two-parent household, absence vs. presence of a paternal figure—either biological or stepfather, and both parents vs. one parent work(s) outside the home. Two-parent households were found to be consistently related to positive outcomes in successful social development among at-risk youth (Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995) and in successful physical and behavioral development among preschool children reared in unfavorable environments (Runyan et al., 1998). Three studies found two-parent households to be a buffer against youth at risk for dropping out of high school (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987; Teachman et al., 1996, 1997). Similarly, one study found two-parent households to be associated with lower levels of violent acts in youth (Johnson, 1999).
Quality of parent-child relations. Second, six of the eight studies sought to examine the quality of intrafamilial parent-child relations. As originally proposed by Coleman and Hoffer (1987), measuring the strength of parent-child relations reflects the quality of intrafamilial relationships in a given family. Common indicators of this construct include: number of times the parent helps the child with homework per week, number of sharing activities the parent and child participate in together per week, number of times per week the parent verbally encourages the child, and number of siblings in the household, which Coleman (1988) purports can dilute adults’ attention to children. Three studies found that a higher frequency of social interactions between parents and children decreased the children’s likelihood of dropping out of school (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987; Teachman et al., 1996, 1997), while one study found that higher levels of social interactions between parents and children were related to a lower likelihood that children fared negatively in future outcomes (Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995). Two studies found a significant relationship between a fewer number of siblings in the household and positive outcomes for children in their educational attainment (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987) as well as in their physical and behavioral development (Runyan et al., 1998).

Adult’s interest in the child. Third, six of the eight studies assessed the adult’s interest in the child. Common indicators for this component of family social capital were: the mother’s academic aspirations for the child, the parents’ levels of empathy for the child’s needs, and the parents’ involvement in the child’s school-related activities. Parents’ high expectations for children’s school performance were found to be associated with positive outcomes for children in school as well as in social and behavioral development (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987; Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995; Runyan et al., 1998; Teachman et al., 1996). Further, high parental empathy towards children’s needs were found to positively influence children’s future outcomes (Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995; Runyan et al., 1998).

Parent’s monitoring of the child. Five of the eight studies operationalized this component via the following measures: number of school meetings the parents attend; number of child’s friends
whom the parents know by sight, and number of child’s friends’ parents whom the parents know by sight. In three studies, high levels of parental monitoring of children’s activities were consistently associated with positive outcomes in the educational attainment of children (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987; Teachman et al., 1996, 1997) and in the socioeconomic achievement of youth (Furstenberg & Hughes, 1995). Two additional indicators from the literature consist of knowing what the child is doing as well as with whom the child is when not at home (National Commission on Children, 1990). In a study examining how certain parental and peer-related risk and protective factors influence adolescents’ school and emotional outcomes, Voydanoff and Donnelly (1999) found that both of these measures were related to positive outcomes, specifically, to better academic performance and to higher levels of psychological adjustment.

Extended family exchange and support. Finally, three of the eight studies explored the degree of extended family exchange and support. Coleman and Hoffer (1987), Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) and Stevenson (1998) adopted the following three indicators to measure this component: number of extended family members who lives in the home, number of interactions the child has with extended family members living in the home, and number of times the child visits extended family members living outside of the home. Two of the three studies found that high levels of social support from extended family members reduced the likelihood that children would drop out of school (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987) or experience depressive symptoms (Stevenson, 1998).

Indicators of Community Social Capital

Thirteen of the 22 studies examined community social capital and its effects on outcomes related to child welfare. Coleman and Hoffer (1987), in their seminal study, propose four general components of community social capital: 1) social support networks, 2) civic engagement in local institutions, 3) trust and safety, and 4) degree of religiosity. Each of the 13 studies assesses one or several of these components in relation to children’s well-being, in addition to other elements of community social capital.

Social support networks. Findings from multiple studies reveal that increased parental social support can have positive effects on
children's outcomes. For instance, two studies found that parents' increased relationships with schools and other parents decreased the likelihood that their children dropped out of school (Teachman et al., 1996, 1997). Putman (2000) found that the children of parents who were embedded in rich social networks were less likely to pursue gang membership, while Maccoby and colleagues (1958) discovered that the children of parents who had strong relationships with other parents were less likely to commit delinquent acts. Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) suggest that strong help networks for parents are related to favorable outcomes among youth in finishing school and attaining gainful employment. Likewise, high levels of social support for the primary maternal caregiver were associated with both positive behavioral outcomes for at-risk preschool children (Runyan et al., 1998) and lower levels of depression in at-risk teens (Stevenson, 1998). Common indicators of social support networks across studies include: number of mother's close friends and number of visits to these close friends per week.

**Civic engagement in local institutions.** Considerable empirical evidence indicates a positive relationship between parents' levels of civic participation in local community organizations and their children's overall well-being. Several studies found that there were more exchanges of resources and sharing of child-rearing responsibilities among families in neighborhoods that had higher levels of participation and activism (Garbarino & Sherman, 1980; Sampson et al., 1999). Also, Putnam (2000) cites several findings that in communities rated with high civic engagement, teachers reported higher levels of parental involvement in school-related activities and lower levels of student misconduct. The common measures of civic engagement consist of volunteering in a local group, serving as an active member of a local organization or club, participating in community meetings to solve local problems, organizing with neighbors to address local problems or to improve the neighborhood, and speaking with local politicians regarding neighborhood problems.

**Trust and safety.** Various studies explored parents' levels of neighborhood trust and safety in relation to children's well-being. Garbarino and Sherman (1980) discovered that mothers who felt safe in their surrounding environment were more likely to report
a higher quality of life as well as to rate their neighborhoods as a more positive place in which to rear their children. Similarly, Sampson and colleagues (1999) found that parents' perceptions of vulnerability were lower in high-trust neighborhoods, while in these same neighborhoods, parents' willingness to assist their neighbors was higher. Putnam's (2000) centennial analysis of social capital trends also reveals that high social trust in neighborhoods can effectively break the link between social and economic impoverishment in neighborhoods and the delinquent activity by youths residing there. Across studies, the general measure of trust and safety was a single-item indicator, assessing the extent to which parents perceived that most people in the neighborhood can be trusted.

**Degree of religiosity.** As demonstrated in Coleman and Hoffer's (1987) original study, the frequency of attendance at religious services by families was found to be a strong predictor of the dropout rate among high school students. A decade later, Teachman and colleagues (1996, 1997) found that the child's attendance at a Catholic school—a related indicator of social capital that was originally proposed by Coleman (1988)—had significant and strong effects on reducing the likelihood of school dropout. Runyan and colleagues (1998) also found mother's regular church attendance to be a significant predictor of positive behavioral outcomes for at-risk preschool children.

**Quality of school.** Although not included as an indicator in Coleman and Hoffer's (1987) original study, several subsequent studies have used school quality as a component of community social capital. Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) found that high ratings, as perceived by adolescents, were strongly related to positive socio-economic outcomes among the youths, such as graduating from high school, enrolling in college, attaining gainful employment, and remaining mentally and emotionally healthy. Similarly, Voydanoff and Donnelly (1999) discovered that parents' perceptions of high quality of the child's school were associated with positive outcomes in their children's educational achievement.

**Quality of neighborhood.** A final indicator used in 9 of the 13 studies in the review cohort, although also not included in Coleman
Measuring and indigenizing social capital

and Hoffer's (1987) original study, consists of parents' perceptions of the quality of the neighborhood. Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) found that high neighborhood quality was a significant predictor of youths' future enrollment in college. Stevenson (1998) and Johnson (1999), on the other hand, discovered that poor neighborhood quality was associated with high levels of depression in youth and high rates of violent acts by youth, respectively. Finally, findings from multiple studies indicate strong support for neighborhood quality as a correlate of positive outcomes for children, including lower levels of child maltreatment (Garbarino & Sherman, 1980; Swanson Ernst, 2001); lower levels of youth delinquency (Maccoby et al., 1958); higher levels of children's physical and mental health (Morrow, 2000); and higher levels of educational attainment for children (Putnam, 2000). The most common indicators of neighborhood quality include parents' perceptions of the following: the neighborhood as a safe place to raise their children, the presence of any safe places in the neighborhood for children to play, and the extent of signs of underlying social disorder (e.g., litter, graffiti, abandoned buildings, gangs, etc.).

Method

Measures

Drawing from the empirical review, family social capital was expected to be comprised of five sub-factors: family structure, quality of parent-child relationships, adult's interest in child, parents' monitoring of child's activities and degree of extended family exchange and support. Similarly, community social capital was expected to consist of the following six sub-factors: quality of school, quality of neighborhood, social support networks, civic engagement, trust and safety, and degree of religiosity. All items selected to measure the latent constructs were derived from and defined by existing indicators of family and community social capital.

Participants

Two hundred and four families residing in the community of Genaro Vázquez, Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico, participated in this study. Half of the sample (N=102) had at least one
child between the ages of 6 and 16 years who worked in the streets and 50% (N=102) had children who did not work. Close to 90% of the families were dual-parent households and 80% of the families had between 5 and 16 members living in the home (mean = 6.2 members). Families, on average, earned $4300.90 pesos per month (US $430.09 in 2002). The primary source of employment for families in Genaro Vázquez was commercial and ambulatory sales. Families grew, packaged and sold a variety of food items, including: fruits, semillas (seeds), chile piquín (hot chili peppers), and tunas (fruits from the nopal cactus). Twenty two percent of the families were of indigenous origin, comprised of the Otomí, Mixteco and Nahuatal groups. Fathers in the sample were on average two years older than mothers, at 37.6 and 35.5 years, respectively. Mothers, on average, had 4.8 years of formal education while fathers had slightly more education, with 5.5 years.

Results

Factor analysis was performed to test the internal construct validity of the proposed factors by verifying which of the oft-cited indicators within the social capital literature were relevant to the Mexican culture and context. In the event that factor analysis produced results that were inconsistent with the theoretical definitions of family and community social capital (e.g., loadings were under the 0.40 cut-off for theoretically important variables), theory was given preference over statistical findings. This was the case given the study’s aim to introduce novel, community-level variables into the street-children literature base for future study.

Family Social Capital

In an effort to ascertain whether all proposed indicators of family social capital were interrelated to one general construct, an initial factor analysis requesting one underlying factor was carried out on the original 22 indicators of family social capital. The extreme values for several variables as well as low-loading, individual scale items were eliminated prior to the analysis to achieve a more normal distribution among the data. Only 4 of the 22 variables, which proposed to measure family social capital, had loadings over .40. The one extracted factor accounted for 15.13%
of the variability in the original variables, which is less than the amount that the four individual variables together would have explained. In order to achieve a more substantially explicative factor structure, the eigenvalues from this analysis were reviewed and subsequent factor analyses were conducted using the Direct Oblimin rotation method to account for inter-correlations among factors. Of these analyses, the three-factor structure produced the clearest explanation of the interrelationship among factors and indicators (see Table 1 below).

Together, Family Social Capital accounts for 35.59% of the total variance in the original variables and proposes to measure the time, efforts and resources that parents invest in their children. Figure 1 below illustrates the obtained three-factor structure. The construct, Family Structure, is comprised of 5 manifest variables; Adult’s Interest in Child includes 12 indicators; and Monitoring of Child consists of 2 variables.

Regarding the correlations among the three factors, the coefficient between Family Structure and Adult’s Interest in Child was -.12; between Family Structure and Monitoring of Child was -.18; and between Adult’s Interest in Child and Monitoring of Child was -.13.

Community Social Capital

Factor analysis was then performed on 15 variables, which were proposed to measure Community Social Capital. Individual scale items with low factor loadings as well as the extreme values for several variables were deleted prior to the analysis in order to reach a more symmetrical distribution among the data. Upon selecting one general factor, only 3 of the 15 indicators had loadings over .40. The extracted factor explained 16.67% of the total variance in the original variables. In pursuit of a factor structure that explained more of the total variation, the eigenvalues from the initial analysis were examined and subsequent factor analyses were carried out using Direct Oblimin rotation. The two-factor structure presented in Table 2 resulted in the best depiction of the interrelationship among factors and variables.

Community Social Capital accounts for 32.10% of the data’s variation and purports to measure the family’s interactions and relationships with the surrounding community, both with resi-
Table 1

**Family Social Capital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s relationship to child</td>
<td>.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years living with child (mother)</td>
<td>.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father/partner’s relationship to child</td>
<td>.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years living with child (father)</td>
<td>.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of work: mom**</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of work: father</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># siblings in home</td>
<td>-0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help child with homework</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbally encourage child</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum sharing activities with child</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum school-related interactions</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s academic aspirations</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents’ empathy</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># school meetings attended</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># child’s friends</td>
<td>-0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># child’s friends’ parents</td>
<td>-0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know whom child with</td>
<td>0.541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know what child doing</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># extended family in home</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># activities w/ in-home extended family</td>
<td>0.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># visits to extended family out-of-home</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the interest of parsimony, only the highest loading is displayed.

The variables, place of mother’s and father’s work, were coded as follows: 0= in home; 1= out-of-home.

Students as well as with local institutions of socialization. Figure 2 presents the obtained two-factor structure. Neighborhood Connections includes five indicators, whereas Neighborhood Perceptions is comprised of four variables. The two factors had a correlation of less than 0.1, indicating that they are virtually orthogonal in nature.
Figure 1
Obtained family social capital factor structure.
Table 2

Community Social Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum quality of school</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood grade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe places</td>
<td>.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum neighborhood problems</td>
<td>- .216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum mom’s social networks</td>
<td>.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># mom’s close friends</td>
<td>.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># mom’s visits to friends</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum neighborhood connections</td>
<td>.968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum civic engagement</td>
<td>.234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum trust and safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># times attend church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only the highest loading for each indicator is displayed.

Discussion

Drawing from social capital theory, this study sought to test the relevance of existing conceptions of social capital, largely from the United States and Canada, in the Mexican context, in an effort to contribute novel variables to the street-children literature. To date, prior research suggests that street-working children are more likely to come from impoverished families, who reside in disadvantaged neighborhoods. However, it remains unclear what, specifically, about such families and communities can precipitate children's street work. This gap in the existing knowledge presents researchers with an opportunity to explore additional aspects of families and communities that may also be important determinants of children's informal street labor.

Findings from the factor analysis indicate that Family Social Capital, in the Mexican context, was comprised of three intercorrelated factors: Family Structure, Adult’s Interest in Child and Parents’ Monitoring of Child. With regards to family structure in
Figure 2
Obtained community social capital factor structure.
Mexico, one notable difference between the social capital literature review and the obtained factor structure concerns the variable: number of extended family members residing in the home. Findings from studies conducted largely in the United States and Canada suggest that the number of extended family members is one of several indicators of a separate factor outside of the immediate family structure (i.e., extended family exchange and support). However, given that a third of the families in the sample (33%) had between one and seven relatives living in the home, it is understandable why this indicator loaded onto the factor Family Structure in this study. Although the factor loading was considerably low (.32) in comparison to other indicators measuring Family Structure, it challenges traditional conceptions of immediate family structure as restricted solely to members of the biological family. Further, such a finding serves as a caveat to utilizing existing conceptualizations of immediate and extended family as separate factors and highlights the accompanying need to develop a more inclusive and holistic definition of "family structure"—one that is grounded in cultural relevance.

Similarly, the clear dividing line between the residence of the "immediate family" and that of the "extended family," often found in the United States, was less apparent in many Mexican families in this study. In 97% of the families, close relatives (i.e., grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins) lived next door, on the same block or close by. Thus, interactions with extended family were often a regular occurrence, which likely explains why the variables, number of activities with extended family living in the home and number of visits to extended family members living outside of the home, loaded moderately onto the factor, Adult's Interest in Child. Again, extant findings from studies performed in the U.S. and Canada suggest that such variables form a separate factor related to extended family, perhaps due to less geographical proximity between the immediate and extended family. In the Mexican context, however, children's activities and visits to kith and kin residing within and outside of the home often occurred daily. Future studies in the Mexican context would benefit from exploring the strength of the extended family as an indicator of family structure, rather than as a separate factor outside of the immediate family.
For the factor, Adult’s Interest in Child, results reveal that indicators that were originally speculated on the basis of the social capital literature to measure multiple factors in essence loaded onto one factor only. In this study, this seems reasonable, given that the indicators selected all manifest ways in which adults demonstrate interest in their children. Two interesting cultural observations can be made with respect to these findings. First, the variable, place of mother’s work, resulted as an indicator of Adult’s Interest in Child rather than as an indicator of Family Structure, as anticipated. Given that 57% of the mothers in the sample worked inside of the home, often preparing food items for sale throughout the neighborhood, it is evident how being present in the home could be positively associated with the quantity of time mothers had to spend with their children. Secondly, knowing whom the child was with as well as what the child was doing when not at home loaded moderately onto the factor Adult’s Interest in Child, rather than onto Monitoring of Child. Parents who were home with their children, or who had in-home relatives (or close-by relatives) interacting daily with their children, or who participated in daily activities (i.e., homework, play, errands, etc.) with their children, were more likely to be aware of where—and with whom—their children were when not at home.

With reference to the third construct, Parents’ Monitoring of Child, two variables demonstrated high loadings on this factor: number of child’s friends and number of child’s friends’ parents whom the mother knows. The negative loadings of both indicators are contrary to the anticipated relationship among indicators and the latent factor. This suggests that either the indicators used in this study were not valid measures of the construct, or rather, a more suitable factor label was necessary to explicate the relationship among variables and the factor. One possible explanation that may elucidate this unanticipated finding concerns the lack of a clear division between immediate and extended family, as discussed above. Because extended family members frequently lived within the home and/or nearby, children often played with siblings and relatives (i.e., cousins, nieces and nephews). Of the families in the study, 92% had between two and nine children under the age of 18 living in the home, including both biological and non-biological children. During the interviews, when mothers
were asked how many of their child’s friends they knew by sight, it was common to hear responses such as: “My child’s friends are his/her siblings and cousins” or “I know all of my child’s friends. They are all family.” This may help clarify why such a high percentage of mothers knew both their children’s friends and their children’s friends’ parents: 94% of mothers knew some or all of their children’s friends, and 87% knew some or all of the parents of their children’s friends.

Further, the number of activities per month that children participated in with extended family members residing in the home was significantly and moderately correlated with both the number of the child’s close friends (r = .27, p< 0.05) and the number of the child’s close friends’ parents (r = .24, p< 0.05) whom the mother knew. It is likely that mothers in this study were interpreting their children’s “friends” as those people outside of the immediate and extended family, and “family” as those individuals who form part of the immediate and extended clan. This, in turn, may help explain why the variables, number of child’s friends and number of child’s friends’ parents whom the mother knows, failed to load onto the factor Adult’s Interest in Child, and instead, loaded strongly and negatively onto a separate factor, Monitoring of Child. Parents’ unfamiliarity with their children’s friends and their children’s friends’ parents outside of the family may not, then, have been an indication of their lack of family social capital (i.e., ability to monitor their children), but rather, a reflection of underlying ties among immediate and extended family, which may have gone undetected using indicators developed from U.S. and Canadian realities.

For the second dimension of capital, Community Social Capital, two factors emerged, rather than the six variables that were originally speculated to exist on the basis of the social capital literature. The factor, Neighborhood Connections, was similar to the construct, social support networks, from the social capital literature, with one exception. Civic engagement, in the Mexican context, was an indicator of Neighborhood Connections, rather than a separate entity. A brief explanation of neighborhood politics in Genaro Vázquez may help clarify this finding. Within the community, residents who are involved in neighborhood associations and local politics are voted into their positions by other
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residents. As such, being embedded in rich networks of other community members is likely an advantage to securing an elected position in neighborhood associations. The significant, positive relationship found in this study between involvement in social support networks and participation in civic associations ($r = .30$, $p<0.0001$) is also consistent with findings from the existing social capital literature (Onyx & Bullen, 2000).

The second obtained factor, Neighborhood Perceptions, was comprised of three variables from the social capital literature, which measured quality of the neighborhood, as well as a fourth variable, trust and safety. Previous studies on social capital suggest that trust and safety is a separate factor; however, in this study, this composite-score variable from Onyx and Bullen's (2000) Social Capital Scale, loaded strongly onto Neighborhood Perceptions. One explanation for the high inter-correlations among trust and safety and the other neighborhood indicators found here is that many families residing in Genaro Vázquez worked as commercial and ambulatory salespeople throughout the community. It is possible that mothers who spent a considerable amount of time selling products in the neighborhood may likely be more aware of and comfortable with their surrounding environment as well as interact regularly with their neighbors. High levels of trust in neighbors would thus likely be associated with more positive perceptions of the neighborhood as a safe place to raise children and lower ratings of neighborhood problems. Development of social capital theory could certainly benefit from further exploration of the relationship among people’s daily presence in the neighborhood, levels of trust, and perceptions of neighborhood quality, especially in regions where ambulatory labor within the informal economy is prevalent.

Finally, school quality and degree of religiosity were also anticipated to form part of Community Social Capital, on the basis of extant literature. Conversely, in this study, neither indicator loaded onto a general factor, nor formed a separate factor. Church attendance was high among families in the study altogether, yet displayed a very low loading on Neighborhood Perceptions. Only 8% of mothers proclaimed no religious preference at all (71% were Catholic and 20% were Protestant). Seventy percent of families attended religious services at least once per month,
while 44% of these families attended services at least once a week. One cultural observation that may help explain the discrepancy between degree of religiosity as an indicator of social capital in the literature and its low loading in this study concerns the ubiquitous presence of churches in Genaro Vázquez, along with the accompanying opportunities for socialization provided by places of worship. In the absence of public and private secular social services in the community, many families likely partake in church activities and services (e.g., marriage counseling, clothing drives, food pantries, youth groups, sports teams and field trips) as a means to meet their needs. In this case, both mothers who spent considerable time in the neighborhood as well as those who were not as present outside of their homes, likely attended church services and activities, although higher trust in neighbors was positively associated with more frequent attendance at religious services ($r = .13, p < 0.05$). Both types of mothers were thus able to benefit from the social support and access to resources available to them. Future studies in the Mexican context could elucidate this finding by focusing on the role of religious institutions, not only as a place of worship (i.e., to measure religiosity), but also as an institution that meets the comprehensive needs of residents (i.e., to measure service provision).

Precise interpretation of the results depends upon prior analysis of the study's limitations. The reliability of the results from factor analysis is contingent upon the use of a large sample size, as well as the presence of moderate-to-high factor loadings for each manifest indicator (Mertler & Vannatta, 2001). Although the findings presented here clearly deviate from both of these criteria, social capital theory was given preference in selecting the indicators included in the obtained models of family and community social capital. By continuing to strengthen the conceptual and operational definitions of social capital, future studies can explore the relationship between social capital and children's street work in an effort to uncover new family- and community-level correlates of child street labor.

To date, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding the individual and collective effects of various dimensions of social capital on children's street work. Similarly, there are few empirical precedents identifying specific family- and community-
based influences of child street labor within the mezzosystem. Rather, most studies have focused on the characteristics of the children, themselves, as child laborers. This, in turn, has created an unrealistic and unidimensional perception of these children as individuals—disconnected from their families, schools and communities—who work and reside in the streets (Ennew & Milne, n.d.). Adopting a social capital theoretical framework, future studies can remove the street-working children phenomenon from the street environment and instead, focus primarily upon the other dimensions of the children’s lives, that is: home, school, and community life, in addition to the children’s work lives. By re-inserting child street workers within the context of their families and communities, future studies will provide a more holistic and realistic account of these children’s lives and of the lives of their families and communities. In the event that such studies can empirically demonstrate the strength of family and community influences on children’s street work, a useful measure will exist to guide street-children organizations around the world in moving from a palliative approach to a preventive one to address the root causes of children’s street work—in the family and the community.

References


Raffaelli, M. (1996). The family situation of street youth in Latin America: A cross-
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This study investigates the effects of receiving welfare as a young woman on long-term economic and marital outcomes. Specifically, we examine if there are differences between young, single mothers who receive welfare and young, single mothers who are poor but do not receive welfare. Using the 1968–1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, our findings suggest those who receive welfare for an extended period as young adults have the same pre-transfer income over a 10 to 20 year period as those who are poor but do not receive welfare as young adults. While we found some differences between the two groups in income levels and the likelihood of having relatively low income when control variables were not included in our models, once appropriate controls were used, these differences became statistically insignificant. The only statistically significant difference found between the two groups in our 10, 15, and 20 year models was the likelihood of being married in year 15. Our results indicate that it is income level as a young adult, as well as such factors as the unemployment rate in the area of residence, but not welfare receipt, that affect long-term income and marital outcomes.

Key words: AFDC, TANF, PRWORA, Poverty, Dependency

The welfare reform legislation in 1996 was motivated in part by the belief that welfare recipients had become too dependent on welfare, especially those who began using welfare at a relatively young age and who continued to rely on it for many years. Many believe that policies intended to alleviate poverty instead
intensified economic problems for the poor by making them less self-reliant. In particular, arguments have been made that welfare receipt reduces earnings and decreases the likelihood of marriage (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Horn, 2002; Mead, 1986, 1998; Murray, 1984, 2001).

In response, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). This law included provisions for limiting welfare receipt by young mothers, including requiring teen mothers to live at home with their parents. Since the passage of this Act, there has been a drastic reduction in the number of recipients of welfare. Nationally, there has been a 50 percent decline in the number of welfare recipients from 1996 to 2002 (Committee on Ways and Means, 2004). While PRWORA gives states greater authority over their welfare populations, it also imposes strong federal rules designed to increase work and decrease the length of time for welfare receipt (Albelda and Tilly, 1997). The welfare rolls may have also decreased because of the strong U.S. economy in the latter half of the 1990s, although we saw no subsequent increase in rolls when the economic conditions worsened after this period.

While government policies reflect concerns about the potential negative effects of welfare, there has been relatively little research on the actual nature of these effects in the long-term. In particular, we know little about how relatively young recipients of welfare fare economically over a 10 to 20 year period compared with young single mothers who are poor but do not receive welfare. Do young welfare recipients fare worse than those young women who have children, are poor but who do not receive welfare? And, how do those who receive welfare or are poor fare economically relative to those single mothers who are not poor at a relatively young age? This study examines these issues in order to determine if making welfare less available to relatively young women appears likely to change their probability of being married or their level of economic well-being later in life. We focus particularly on young women because it has been hypothesized or inferred that the negative effects of welfare may be more severe for young recipients (Mead, 1986; Murray, 1984; Tanner, 1996).
Our study examines income and marital status at 10, 15, and 20 years after initially receiving welfare, including the effects of the length of welfare receipt on these outcomes. While welfare proponents suggest that long-term welfare receipt has negative overall outcomes for single mothers, others have suggested that it is the impact of poverty that has deleterious effects on long-term income and marital status. We thus also examine how relatively short-run or longer-run stays in poverty or near-poverty affect economic outcomes 10 to 20 years after initially falling into poverty and leading a household as a young single mother. In particular, we focus on the differences between poor women who spend a considerable amount of young adulthood without receiving welfare and those women who spend a relatively long period receiving AFDC in young adulthood.

Previous Research

Despite public policy concerns about the effects of welfare, there has been little research that directly examines the effects of receiving welfare at a young age on an individual’s economic outcomes later in life. A considerable amount of existing research about the possible negative effects of welfare has focused on welfare-dependence issues such as the long-term use of welfare, and the intergenerational transfer of welfare dependence. Research examining the intergenerational use of welfare has generally found that adults whose parents used welfare may be more likely to themselves use welfare (An et al., 1993; Dolinsky, Caputo & O’Kane, 1989; Gottschalk, McLanahan, & Sandefure, 1994; Hill and Ponza, 1989; McLanahan, 1988; Rank and Cheng, 1995). Gottschalk (1992) and Vartanian (1999) found that for blacks, but not whites, parental welfare receipt strongly predicted welfare receipt of the daughter, although other childhood or adolescent factors such as income level and education of the head of household also contributed to higher likelihoods of welfare receipt. However, these studies only follow young parents through early adulthood.

Research on the length of AFDC receipt has generally found that characteristics such as non-completion of high school, little work experience and having young children tend to be associ-
ated with relatively lengthy receipt of AFDC (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Blank, 1989; Ellwood, 1986; Fitzgerald, 1991; O’Neill, Bassi, and Wolf, 1987; Vartanian, 1997). Other studies on the likelihood of leaving AFDC have found that residential location makes a difference in AFDC exit probabilities (Fitzgerald, 1995; Gleason, Rangarajan, and Schochet, 1998; Vartanian, 1997). Long periods on AFDC may include either a long single spell on AFDC or several spells (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Harris, 1996). Harris (1996) found, for example, that 36 percent of women who leave AFDC return within 18 months after first leaving and that 57 percent return within seven years after first leaving.

It has been hypothesized that women who receive welfare for an extended period of time may be less likely to marry and leave welfare relative to those who stay on welfare for a short time (Blank, 1989). One reason for this lower likelihood may be because women develop a “taste” for welfare after receiving aid for an extended period rather than a reliance on spouses or their own labor income for self-sufficiency (Blank, 1989). Generally, studies that have examined the effects of welfare benefits have found little or no association between benefit levels and marriage disincentives (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Gottschalk et al., 1994; Moffitt, 1992; Wilson & Neckerman, 1986). It has also been hypothesized that the use of AFDC may change household composition by increasing family size (to receive higher benefits), and thereby potentially decreasing the likelihood of marriage in the future. Blank and others (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; O’Neil, Bassi and Wolf, 1987) find relatively low rates of exits from AFDC by means of marriage but also find little evidence that the likelihood of exit from AFDC by means of marriage decreases over the length of an AFDC spell. Part of the reason for the low likelihood of leaving welfare by means of marriage (or for poor women being unmarried) may be due to the low numbers of “marriageable” men, especially for African Americans (Coontz and Folbre, 2002; Lichter, McLaughlin, LeClere, Kephart, and Landry, 1992; Wilson, 1987). Edin and Lein, (1997) find that poor single mothers often do not marry because the risks of marriage, such as the threat of domestic violence, loss of control, and potential for sexual abuse of their children, often outweigh the potential gains from entering into marriage.
Welfare use may also decrease future labor force participation by decreasing labor market experience (Blank, 1989). Lower levels of work experience due to welfare receipt may mean lower wages and thus lower income in the future. Blank (1989) and Bane and Ellwood (1994) found evidence that the longer the length of time on welfare, the lower the likelihood of exiting welfare from earnings, although Vartanian (1997) did not find evidence of such a relationship.

The concern reflected in the 1996 welfare reform law that the combination of teen childbearing and welfare use may have particularly negative effects on economic outcomes for young women has prompted research focused on the interaction between young childbearing, welfare use and later economic outcomes. Duncan and Hoffman (1990), for example, use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine whether African American teens who have children outside of marriage and who use welfare have lower economic outcomes when they reach age 26 than those who do not have children as teenagers or use welfare. After controlling for many background variables, they found that those teens who used welfare within two years of the birth of their child, whether married or not, fared far worse than those who did not. While these results suggest that the receipt of welfare is the critical factor in determining later-adult economic outcomes, sister-pair research reaches somewhat different conclusions. Corcoran and Kunz (1997) also used the PSID to examine the effects of the interaction of teen childbearing and welfare use on economic outcomes at age 26 or slightly beyond, using sister pairs in order to decrease the level of heterogeneity of the comparison groups. They found that once family background differences are controlled, the effects of having a child as a teenager and receiving welfare were less than shown in previous research. For example, the negative effects on family income for teen mothers dropped by more than 50 percent when controlling for the effects of family background in a sister-pair model as compared to a model that did not control for such factors. Sample sizes in this sister-pair study were small, however: there were 31 sister pairs where one received AFDC as a teen mother and the other sister did not. Also, the time frame for examining outcomes is relatively short in the study—soon after age 25.
Studies examining the economic situation of broader groups of former welfare recipients have generally found high poverty rates among these women (Cancian and Meyer, 2000; Meyer and Cancian, 1998; Vartanian and Gleason, 1999; Vartanian and McNamara, 2000). Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Vartanian and Gleason (1999) examined economic status in the initial period after leaving welfare and found that over 50 percent of former recipients were poor 18 months after leaving welfare, while Vartanian and McNamara (2000), using data from the PSID, found 38 percent poverty rates four years after leaving welfare. Meyer and Cancian (1998) found somewhat higher (50%) poverty rates five years post-welfare among women in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, although in subsequent work these authors noted an improvement in women’s economic status over time, with poverty rates lower in the second and subsequent years than in the first year after welfare (Cancian and Meyer, 2000). These studies, however, generally failed to find strong links between the length of time women spend on welfare and the likelihood of poverty after leaving welfare, finding instead that factors such as education and the employment status of both the recipient and her spouse had powerful effects on the likelihood of poverty after welfare (Cancian and Meyer, 2000; Meyer and Cancian, 1998; Vartanian and Gleason, 1999; Vartanian and McNamara, 2000).

The studies on the economic effects of welfare described above have a number of limitations: they usually examine outcomes only a few years following the receipt of welfare, they generally do not compare the outcomes of welfare recipients with poor non-recipients, and a number of studies are limited by small sample size and insufficient control of background variables.

Using the 1993 PSID, Dunifon (1999) examined longer-term outcomes for AFDC recipients by comparing women who received any AFDC income between 1968 and 1972 with women who were heads of households, had children and were between 21 and 39 in those years but did not receive welfare during that period. She found that 20 years following this initial period, women who had received welfare had similar income-to-needs ratios and number of hours of work as the non-welfare group, although differences in hours of work did emerge in some of
the periods examined prior to the twenty-year period. Dunifon’s study was not designed to examine the effects of AFDC receipt by young single mothers on long-term outcomes, but instead she determined the effects of receiving any AFDC relative to no cash assistance for single mothers at varying ages. Also, she examined only post-transfer income later in life (that is, total income including all transfer payments such as General Assistance and AFDC). Pre-transfer income excludes all transfer payments, including government assistance. Examining pre-transfer income later in life allows for a better assessment of the effects of welfare on single mothers’ self-sufficiency. Our study addresses these issues by examining marriage rates and pre-transfer income of a relatively large sample of young mothers to assess the effects of substantial (at least 10 percent of total income) and early welfare receipt.

Methodology

Sample

This study uses data from the 1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal data set that dates back to 1968. In 1968, there were approximately 5,000 families in the sample and 18,000 individuals. By 1997, the data contained over 6,000 families and 19,000 individuals. The longitudinal nature of the PSID allows for the examination of economic and other outcomes across a 30-year span, by selecting data on women at an early period in the survey, and then selecting data for these same women in periods that are approximately 10, 15, and 20 years after we initially examine their characteristics. When appropriately weighted, the PSID is representative of the non-immigrant, United States population. We used the individual weights in the PSID when examining our sample.

We chose three samples of women that would allow us to examine their characteristics at a relatively early age and then examine these same women again at 10, 15 and 20 years after our initial examination. First, we chose a sample of women who started in the PSID anytime from 1968 to 1987 in order to get their characteristics after 10 years (our final sample year was 1997) for our 10 year sample. Next, we chose a sample of women from 1968
to 1982 and looked to see how they were doing 15 years later. Last, we chose a sample of women from 1968 to 1977 to see how they fared 20 years hence.

We then further limited our samples by choosing women who were age 24 and under, who were heads of household when they first entered the sample, and had one of the following three characteristics: AFDC income made up at least 10 percent of their total income; total income was at or below 150% of the poverty line and AFDC income made up less than 10 percent of their total income during this period; or, AFDC income made up less than 10 percent of total income and total income was above 150 percent of the poverty line for this period. For example, a woman who was a head of household who first received a substantial amount of AFDC at age 20 would have her initial period begin at age 20. A woman who was first a head of household and had income at or below 150 percent of the poverty line at age 22 and had no substantial AFDC income at or before age 24 would have her initial period begin at age 22. A woman who was first a head of household at age 17 and had income above 150 percent of the poverty line for all years while she was a head of household until age 24 and never received a substantial amount of AFDC would have her initial period begin at age 17. Using this design allowed us to determine those female heads of household who ever received a substantial amount of AFDC at a young age, those who were ever poor or near-poor during this period without substantial AFDC receipt, and those who avoided both substantial AFDC receipt and low income during their early adult years.

We chose only single women who were mothers in order to compare similar young women who had children, as well as to focus our study on the effects of early AFDC use, rather than the effects of early childbearing. We chose women who were heads of household because the PSID contains specific income, education and other information on these women that is not available for those who are children or have some other relationship to the head of household. Also, by choosing only single mothers, we felt that our comparison groups were more comparable than by also allowing women who were married into our sample at the beginning of the period.
From these samples we wished to determine if the use of AFDC as a young woman helped to predict long-term outcomes for a number of dependent variables. Critics of welfare hypothesize that it is early welfare use that causes women to be dependent on government aid, to be poor, and to be less likely to be married (Mead, 1986, 1998; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). According to this hypothesis, relatively long-term use of AFDC as a young woman should have a more detrimental effect on outcomes than shorter-term AFDC use because women grow more dependent on AFDC the longer they use it, and because labor market skills deteriorate the longer a person is out of the labor market. In order to examine this hypothesis, we chose to compare women who received AFDC, either for a relatively short or long period, with women who were poor or near poor during young adulthood. That is, we wanted to determine whether the receipt of AFDC, and the poverty that generally accompanies AFDC, affects outcomes relative to the non-receipt of AFDC and poverty. We also included in our sample non-poor women in order to determine the relative impact of having higher levels of income at an early age on long-term outcomes. We therefore examined whether the long-term or short-term receipt of welfare at an early age directly affected long-term economic and marital outcomes, with controls for family and personal circumstances and other factors at this early age. Our goal was not to determine the possible effects of factors after this early period of a woman’s life on these long-term outcomes, but instead to be able to predict from a given set of circumstances early in adulthood, outcomes later in life.

Our primary interest in this study is the comparison between single mothers who receive AFDC for a long time during early adulthood and single mothers who were poor for an extended period of time but did not receive AFDC. These two groups were of primary interest because it is concern about long-term dependency on welfare that underlies welfare reform. In the descriptive results we present below, we found that the long-term poor group and the long-term AFDC group were of similar ages and had similar income levels when we initially examined them. We also found that the two groups spend almost the same amount of time with income levels below 150 percent of the poverty line at the beginning of the sampling period. However,
most of the income for the AFDC group during the initial four year period was from transfer payments, with a median level of 67 percent (with a median of 65 percent for welfare payments), while the median level of transfers for the long-term poor group was 16 percent (with a median of 0 percent for welfare payments). Thus, the long-term poor group appear to represent those single mothers who remain in or near poverty for an extended period in young adulthood but rely far less on financial assistance than the long-term AFDC group.

Independent Variables

Once our sample was determined, we examined a four year period during and after the initial year that the woman entered the sample. During this four year period, we examined whether AFDC recipients stayed on AFDC for one or two years, or three or four years in this four year period after they initially became heads and started receiving AFDC. Those AFDC recipients receiving AFDC for one or two years were labeled the short-term AFDC group. Those who stayed on AFDC for three or four years were labeled the long-term AFDC group. The low-income, non-AFDC sample, were grouped in a similar fashion, whereby those who had incomes at or below 150 percent of the poverty line for one or two years were labeled as the short-term poverty group and those who had low incomes for three or four years were labeled as the long-term poverty group. We use 150 percent of the poverty line instead of the poverty line because many critics of the current measure of poverty claim that the poverty line is too low, and 150 percent of the poverty line better captures a realistic measure of what is necessary to survive (Edin and Lein, 1997; Smeeding, 1992). These poverty or near poverty groups are simply indicators of low income without the receipt of AFDC. We named those who neither received a substantial amount of AFDC nor had incomes at or below 150 percent of the poverty line the "non-poor group". Each of the five groups—the short-term and long-term AFDC and poverty or near-poverty groups, and the non-poor group—was mutually exclusive.3

We then created dummy variables for each of these five groups. In the regression models that we ran, we chose four of these groups as included variables within our regression anal-
yses—the short-term and long-term AFDC groups, the short-term poverty group, and the non-poor group. The long-term poverty group was the excluded category in the regression analyses. We excluded the long-term poverty group in order to easily determine if receiving AFDC, either short-term or long-term, was a key factor in explaining future income and other outcomes or if AFDC recipients fared similarly to those who were poor for an extended period of time. We also ran models where the short-term poverty group was the excluded group in our regression analyses. Our main results were little changed from what we present here when we compared the short-term poor group and the long-term or short-term AFDC groups. We also ran models that excluded from our samples women who were in the non-poor group. We discuss these results below.

We then created other variables, including a variable that indicated whether the family had one child (the included group in our regressions) or more than a single child. We also control for the effects of having very young children when first entering the sample by using a variable in our models for whether the woman has a child who is below age 3. We did this because some women who enter our sample, especially those in their twenties, may have children who are older. We also control for the age of the woman by creating three dummy variables for age: one variable that has a value of one for those under the age of 18, another dummy variable that takes a value of one for those who are 18 to 21, and another (the excluded group) for those who are over the age of 21. We use this set of dummy variables in our models because of the possible non-linear effects of age—or the potentially highly negative effects of being very young and being a head of household—on our outcomes.

In addition, we control for the amount of money that individuals receive from relatives over a four year period, as an indication of family support. Family money support could either have negative or positive effects on long-run economic outcomes. If women become dependent on this support and work less because of it, family income support could have negative effects on future income. If women who use this family income to help them increase training or help them find work, the effects may be positive on future income.
In order to determine the effects of childhood circumstances, we control for the effects of growing up poor relative to not growing up poor for the head of the woman's household. Many of the problems associated with adult outcomes may stem from low income during adolescence or childhood. While we did not have enough years of data to directly examine the level of income for the woman during childhood, the PSID provides a variable that indicates the level of income of the head of household while growing up. To further examine the woman's childhood circumstances, we controlled for the education level of the head of household and the occupation of the head of household while the woman was growing up.

We also control for a number of other variables when the woman first enters our sample in our models, including the county unemployment rate, the region of residence, education, race, city size, and the year in which the individual first entered the sample. We also control for whether the woman had any work disabilities at the beginning of the period we examined.

Our models also include a continuous variable for family income-to-needs in the initial four year period. One reason to use such a variable is because of the potential for some families to be in the long-term poverty group but be just below 150 percent of the poverty line, or be in the non-poor group and be just above the poverty line. Such a variable would also give us a way of comparing similar AFDC recipients who may have relatively high income levels if they live in a more generously paying welfare state or who may have relatively low levels of income. We in fact found a good amount of variation of income levels within groups. We found that our standard errors changed little, and often decreased, when we included beginning income in our regression models relative to when we did not include it, indicating that the collinearity among our AFDC and poverty group variables and income was not causing the significance levels to decrease because of potentially high standard errors.

We included several variables at the end of the 10 to 20 year examination periods, including the unemployment rate of the state or county of residence, the maximum welfare payment available in the state of residence for a family of four (each state sets their own level of cash assistance available to those eligible for AFDC, and these levels differ by factors such as income and
family size), and whether work was limited by disabilities. These measures control for economic conditions and physical/mental factors associated with work.

There are a number of variables that we contemplated using in our analyses but did not because of their collinearity with AFDC receipt. These variables included hours of work, AFDC maximum payments available in the state of residence, and marital status, all over the initial four year period. When we did include these variables in our analyses, our results changed little from the main results reported here.

**Dependent Variables**

We chose a number of dependent variables to examine the effects of early adulthood AFDC receipt. As we have stated above, critics of the welfare system hypothesize that young welfare recipients are less likely to marry because they are in less need of additional income that being married may provide them. We test this hypothesis by examining the effects of receiving AFDC, either long-term or short-term, on the likelihood of being married later in life. We examined this hypothesis with the set of independent variables we described above.

Critics of the AFDC system also hypothesize that those who received welfare at an early age would be more likely to be poor or have low income later in life, claiming that being on welfare teaches young women not to work or develop the skills necessary for high earnings. We test this hypothesis by examining the woman's pre-transfer family income-to-needs ratios and the likelihood of having pre-transfer income below 150 percent of the poverty line later in life. We use pre-transfer income-to-needs instead of earnings to get a better measure of overall well-being of the woman without government cash assistance. We do this, in part, because women are sometimes the secondary earners in the family and may devote more time to child care than the primary earners. We use 150 percent of the poverty line because the poverty line is an extremely low measure of economic adequacy (as briefly described above).

We measured our set of dependent variables at three different points after first examining our sample of young women. We measured our income variables over a two year period in order to smooth out large variations in any single year. We also examined
marital status over two year periods to see if the woman was married for either of the two years. Each dependent variable was measured after 9 and 10 years, 14 and 15 years, and 19 and 20 years after we first examined respondents' characteristics as young women.

In results not shown, we also tested to determine if particular groups were more or less likely to drop out of the sample before the end of our first testing period. We only examined those women who had completed the four years of the initial period because we wanted to determine which of our groups they belonged to—the long-term AFDC or poverty groups, the short-term AFDC or poverty groups, or the non-poor sample. One hundred and nineteen women did not make it to the 10 year ending period. We did not find that the AFDC groups were any more or less likely to drop out of the sample relative to the high poverty group, both with a full set of controls for beginning circumstances and using bivariate regressions. In fact, none of the groups showed any higher likelihood of dropping out of the sample relative to other groups. Factors such as disability status and growing up poor showed positive effects for dropping out of the sample.

Statistical Methods

We used logistic regression analysis to determine if the either of the AFDC groups were more likely to drop out of the sample than the long-term poverty group before the 10 year period. We use ordinary least squares regression analysis in our models to examine pre-transfer family income-to-needs. The likelihood of marriage and the likelihood of being at or below 150 percent of the poverty line later in life use logistic regression models because of the binary response dependent variables. In our statistical models, we use ten percent significance levels (or better), instead of five percent levels, to better see if any differences are found among the groups we examined.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents mean values and standard deviations for women when they first started in the sample and who lasted in
the sample for at least 10 years. There is some similarity between
the short-term poverty and short-term AFDC groups as well as
the long-term poverty and long-term AFDC groups in their level
of mean income over the first four years they are in the sample.
Both the short-term AFDC and poverty groups have mean income
levels that are above the poverty line. The long-term AFDC group
has income that is 9 percent below the poverty line while the
long-term poverty group has income that is 5 percent above the
poverty line for their average levels of income. Thus, these long-
term AFDC and poverty groups begin their sampling period at
roughly equal levels of income. The non-poor group have income
levels at the beginning of their sampling periods that are nearly
3 times the poverty line.

These initial comparisons examine post-transfer income in
the initial period. Part of this income for the AFDC group is from
government assistance, specifically from AFDC. Table 1 shows
that 11.09 percent of total income for the short-term AFDC group
comes from AFDC income while AFDC makes up 56.44 percent
of income for the long-term AFDC group. The table shows that
the poor groups and the non-poor groups receive almost none of
their income from AFDC.

The poor and the AFDC groups have similar numbers of chil-
dren while the non-poor have only 1.21 children, on average. Not
surprisingly, we find that the long-term AFDC group is far less
likely to be married than the other groups. We also find that the
proportion of whites in both the long-term AFDC and long-term
poor groups to be far smaller than for the other income/welfare
groups.

The level of education for the AFDC groups is lower than for
the poor groups, when examined by short-term and long-term
status. For example, 48.70 percent of the short-term AFDC group
never finished high school, while 36.05 percent of the short-term
poor group never finished high school. More than 68 percent
of the long-term AFDC group never finished high school, as
compared to 53.02 percent of the long-term poverty group and
21.15 percent of the non-poor group.

Table 2 show the means and standard deviations or percent-
ages at different periods of time after the initial examination of the
different groups of women, as well as whether there are signifi-
cant differences (without control variables) between each of the four groups (both AFDC groups, the short-term poverty group and the non-poverty group) and the long-term poverty group, for each period examined. The top portion of Table 2 shows that the proportion of women who are married is significantly lower for the long-term AFDC group relative to the long-term poor group. However, by year 20, only 31.0 percent of the long-term poor group are married, as compared to 37.9 percent of the long-term AFDC group.\textsuperscript{4} There is a gradual increase in the rates of marriage for the short-term AFDC group, while the short-term poverty group and the non-poor group see marriage rates increase in year 15 but fall by year 20.

The middle portion of Table 2 also shows that there is some upward movement in pre-transfer income levels from 10 to 20 years after the sample was initially examined for most of the groups.\textsuperscript{5} For both AFDC groups, income levels are higher 10 years after the beginning of their sampling periods, as well as 15 years and 20 years after, but for the long-term AFDC group, income is only at 30 percent above the poverty line 20 years after initially receiving AFDC as a head of household while pre-transfer income is 120 percent above the poverty line for the short-term AFDC group 20 years later. For the poor groups, there is a similar rise in income levels at the 10 year period, but the long-term poverty group has pre-transfer income that is only 40 to 60 percent above the poverty line up to 20 years after they were initially examined. Only in year 10 is pre-transfer income significantly higher for the long-term poor group relative to the long-term AFDC group. For the non-poor group, pre-transfer income is 180 percent to 270 percent above the poverty line at 10, 15 and 20 years after being first examined, somewhat higher than when the non-poor were first examined.

The bottom portion of Table 2 shows the likelihood of having pre-transfer income at or below 150 percent of the poverty line 10 to 20 years after initially entering the sample. For the long-term AFDC and long-term poor groups, well over half of their members are below this income level at each of the different periods. The levels decrease somewhat for the long-term AFDC group but rise in year 15 for the long-term poor group from year 10, then fall slightly in year 20. The only significant difference
between the two groups is in year 10, where the long-term AFDC group has a significantly greater proportion of families having pre-transfer income below 150 percent of the poverty line relative to the long-term poor group.

Without controls for characteristics when first becoming a head or first receiving AFDC, these initial results indicate that those who start off non-poor have higher income levels, lower likelihoods of pre-transfer poverty or near poverty, and higher likelihoods of marriage later in life than the long-term poverty group. The long-term AFDC group generally shows lower pre-transfer income levels than the long-term poor group but these statistically significant differences disappear by year 15. The short-term poverty and short-term AFDC groups appear to do somewhat better than the long-term poverty group over time, but not nearly as well as the non-poor group. Without the use of controls for other factors which may contribute to later life outcomes, however, it is impossible to determine whether the differences observed between the groups of women are due to the effects of welfare, the effects of poverty or the effects of background variables not included in these models. In the full models presented below, many of these effects are controlled for, allowing us to test the hypotheses about the effects of welfare receipt we presented earlier.

Full Regression Models

The Likelihood of Marriage

Table 3 shows the logistic regression results for the likelihood of marriage at different points in time. These results indicate that there is a significant difference at the .05 level for the likelihood of being married between the long-term AFDC and the long-term poverty groups in year 15, but no significant difference in years 10 and 20. The significant difference for year 10 between the long-term AFDC group and the long-term poverty group (at the .05 level) as shown in Table 2 are no longer significant once controls are used in the models. There is no significant difference in marriage likelihoods between the non-poor group, or the short-term poverty group and the long-term poverty group. In year 20,
there is a statistically significant difference between the short-term AFDC group and the long-term poverty group in marriage likelihoods, with the short-term AFDC group more likely to be married in year 20. These results show no consistent pattern for marriage differences between the long-term AFDC and poverty groups. In models where we excluded women who were in the non-poor group from our samples (results not shown), we found few differences in our main results. Interestingly, in year 20 we found that the long-term AFDC group was more likely to be married relative to the long-term poor group ($p < .05$). We also found that our adjusted $R^2$ values and $-2$ log likelihood values decreased somewhat in these models.

Other factors that negatively affect the likelihood of marriage in year 20 include being non-white, being a high school dropout, and growing up poor. State welfare maximum payments have no significant effect on marriage in years 10, then go from positive to negative in years 15 and 20. Unemployment rates at the end of the period have no effect on marriage likelihoods. We find that having higher levels of income at the beginning period has a significant effect on marriage likelihoods only in year 10.

**Income Models**

Table 4 shows the OLS regression results for pre-transfer family income-to-needs, when controlling for the effects of the women's condition and characteristics when they first entered the sample. Unlike our initial models without controls (Table 2), these results indicate that women who receive AFDC for a relatively long period at an early age have pre-transfer incomes that are no lower than those women who are poor for a relatively long time but do not receive AFDC in that early period. In fact, none of the models show that the long-term AFDC group is significantly different from the long-term poor group even at the .20 level of significance. Our results indicate that none of the groups have significantly higher pre-transfer family income-to-needs in the later periods relative to the long-term poor group, once we control for beginning family income-to-needs.

Factors affecting later pre-transfer family income-to-needs in various years include family income-to-needs at the beginning (in all years), race (in year 10), education level (in all years), work
limitations (in years 15 and 20), growing up poor (in year 20), and state welfare maximums (showing positive effects in years 10 and 20). Age has little effect on our outcomes, while having more than one child relative to those who have only one child affects outcomes (in a positive direction) only in year 10. The unemployment rate in the area of residence at the end of the period has significant negative effects in each of the three models, increasing in strength through time.

Table 5 shows similar effects to those shown in Table 4 when examining the likelihood of having pre-transfer income at or below 150 percent of the poverty line. The long-term AFDC group is no more likely to be at or below 150 percent of the poverty line relative to those in the long-term poverty group.

Tables 4 and 5 indicate that work limitations at the end of the initial period have a strong negative effect on income in years 15 and 20. Other factors strongly affecting pre-transfer income and the likelihood of having pre-transfer income below 150 percent of the poverty line include race, being a high school dropout, and to a lesser degree, the amount of money received from relatives. Being a high school dropout has a strong negative effect on income throughout the 20 year period. Interestingly, being very young at the beginning of the period, under 18 years of age, has no effect on pre-transfer income later in life relative to those who are over 21. Growing up poor shows negative effects on pre-transfer income in years 10 and 20 in both Table 4 and 5.

The evidence from our analyses indicates that with or without control variables in our models, young single mothers receiving AFDC for an extended period of time do not have significantly lower income levels relative to those young single mothers who are poor but do not receive welfare in years 15 and 20, and there are no differences in year 10 when controls are used. Income at the beginning of the period, however, has strong effects on income later in life. Growing up poor has some negative effects in both our income models.

Conclusions

We have tested the question of whether welfare use itself results in economic or other hardships, or whether simply being
poor, or the combination of poverty and other factors, produce particular outcomes for single mothers. Overall, we found that long-term welfare receipt in young adulthood is seldom associated with outcomes that are any more negative than those associated with the experience of long-term poverty or near poverty in young adulthood for these women.

First, we examined the hypothesis that those who receive welfare at a young age are less likely to marry than those who do not receive welfare early. We found only weak support for this hypothesis. We found that women who had used AFDC for a relatively long period in young adulthood were no less likely to be married 10 or 20 years after their initial receipt than women who were poor for a long period as young adults, but we did find them significantly less likely to be married at 15 years after initial receipt. Short-term AFDC recipients were never any less likely to marry than women who experienced substantial time in poverty in early adulthood, and by year 20 were in fact significantly more likely to be married.

Second, we examined the hypothesis that early receipt of AFDC is associated with lower pre-transfer income-to-needs later in life. Here, our results provide no support for this hypothesis. No significant differences were found between the two long-term groups in pre-transfer family income-to-needs in any of the years examined when appropriate controls were used. Women in the short-term AFDC group are no different from the long-term poverty group in terms of pre-transfer income-to-needs in any of the outcome periods. We found, however, that factors such as the unemployment rate, growing up poor, level of education, and initial family income-to-needs had strong effects on our outcomes.

Finally, we examined the hypothesis that early AFDC use is a cause of long-term poverty and low income. Our findings offered no support for this hypothesis. There were no differences between the long-term AFDC group and the long-term poverty group at either 10, 15 or 20 years in the likelihood of having pre-transfer income at or below 150% of the poverty line. The long-term economic well-being of young AFDC recipients appears to be no worse (or better) than non-recipients who started out with low income for an extended period in the sample. Indeed, those who use welfare for a relatively short period of time have
The Welfare Myth

...a significantly lower likelihood of having pre-transfer income at or below 150% of the poverty line by year 20 than women who were in the long-term poor group in early adulthood. In contrast to the long-term AFDC recipients, women who were poor for only a short time in early adulthood are significantly less likely to have low pre-transfer income than women who were poor for longer periods in early adulthood, perhaps suggesting that it is the persistence of poverty in early adulthood (whether or not it is associated with AFDC receipt) rather than welfare receipt itself that best predicts the likelihood of later life poverty or near poverty.

These results support the notion that it is income (or unmeasured factors associated with income) rather than welfare itself that affects the economic well-being of young women. Single mothers who are poor for a substantial period in early adulthood are just as likely to find themselves in or near poverty in later life as single mothers who receive AFDC for a substantial period at the same time of their lives. In addition, we found that these two groups have similar marriage likelihoods. The somewhat different picture of the relationship of early welfare receipt to later-life economic outcomes presented in the models where control variables were not used (Table 2) illustrates the importance of teasing out the effects of welfare itself from the effects of those background characteristics which young welfare recipients share with other young women with low incomes: a lack of education, the experience of growing up poor and the effects of institutional racism.

Our findings have clear public policy implications. The current emphasis on the reduction of welfare use rather than the reduction of poverty is unlikely, based on the results in this paper, to positively affect these women's long-term economic outcomes. Just pushing young single mothers into low-wage work, which will not necessarily lift them out of poverty, will not promote long-term economic well-being. Rather, attention to retaining at-risk young women in the education system, and providing them with further job training may be a more effective long-term strategy for reducing economic hardship among this vulnerable group. In addition, it is important that policy address the issue of the care of the children of these young, poor, single mothers, whether...
or not the mothers receive welfare. Growing up poor, for the women in our study, often had negative effects on long-term economic outcomes, and there is every reason to suppose that these women's own children will suffer similar negative effects.

If we hope to reduce poverty among women with children, denying these women public assistance seems unlikely to result in any long-term change in their economic well-being. Instead of focusing on getting women off welfare in order to improve their economic chances, policies need to instead focus on lifting young single women with children out of poverty in early adulthood.

Notes

1. We chose 10 percent of income as a cutoff for AFDC so we only included those with substantial AFDC income in the AFDC groups we define later in the paper. We also examined different cutoffs for AFDC, including 20 percent of income coming from AFDC without substantial changes to our main results.

2. It is possible for women in the AFDC group to have been poor before they received AFDC, but were put into the AFDC sample because they received AFDC later.

3. We also ran tests examining a 6 year period after initially entering the sample. To be in either the long-term AFDC group, the woman had to have "substantial" AFDC income for at least 5 out of the 6 years. To be in the long-term poverty group, the woman had to have income at or below 150% of the poverty line for at least 5 out of the 6 years without any substantial AFDC income in this period. The shorter term groups were determined by being in either poverty or receiving AFDC for 1 to 4 years. Our results changed little when using these measures relative to the measures presented in this article. If anything, our coefficient estimates (and significance levels) examining the differences between the long-term AFDC and long-term poverty groups decreased when using this alternative measure. We chose to present the results for the 4 year period because this time frame allowed us to better focus on early adulthood experiences and characteristics relative to the 6 year period.

4. We did an examination of why we got such a large reduction in the percentage of the long-term poor group who were married between years 15 and 20. We lost 20 women who were married and 24 women who were not married between year 15 and year 20. Without the PSID weights, the year 15 and 20 marriage rates would have been far closer—40 percent in year 15 and 36 percent in year 20.

5. Only post-transfer income levels were shown in Table 1. However, in results not shown, pre-transfer income has increased for all of the groups.
Table 1
Percentages, Means and Standard Deviations At the Beginning of Their Sampling Period For Women Who Stay in the Sample for At Least 10 Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>AFDC Sample</th>
<th>Poor or Near-Poor Sample</th>
<th>Non-Poor Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income and work measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income-to-needs, average over 4 year period</td>
<td>1.28 (.57)</td>
<td>.91 (.41)</td>
<td>1.92 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years with income below 150% of the pov. line in the 4 year period</td>
<td>2.71 (1.21)</td>
<td>3.36 (1.01)</td>
<td>1.46 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC income as a % of total income in the 4 year period</td>
<td>11.09 (11.00)</td>
<td>56.44 (26.72)</td>
<td>0.72 (2.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. annual hours of work</td>
<td>861.86 (600.20)</td>
<td>380.81 (433.90)</td>
<td>1293.31 (663.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>AFDC Sample</td>
<td>Poor or Near-Poor Sample</td>
<td>Non-Poor Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at the beginning</td>
<td>20.65 (2.21)</td>
<td>20.58 (2.16)</td>
<td>20.28 (2.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>1.30 (.76)</td>
<td>1.25 (.78)</td>
<td>1.43 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage married in 4 year period</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>53.37</td>
<td>35.31 (44.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years married in the 4 year period</td>
<td>1.09 (1.20)</td>
<td>.22 (.58)</td>
<td>1.31 (1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>60.19</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>41.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage white</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>53.02</td>
<td>68.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of HS dropouts</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>28.33</td>
<td>37.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage some college</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage college grads</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample size: 718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Percent Married, Family Pre-Transfer Family Income-to-Needs, and Percent with Pre-Transfer Family Income-to-Needs at or Below 150 Percent of the Poverty Line At the End of the Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>AFDC Sample</th>
<th>Poor or Near-Poor Sample</th>
<th>Non-Poor Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent married</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years later</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>36.7&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years later</td>
<td>59.8&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29.1&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>56.4&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years later</td>
<td>67.9&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-transfer family income-to-needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years later</td>
<td>1.5 (1.9)</td>
<td>0.9 (0.9)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.2 (1.6)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years later</td>
<td>1.6 (1.5)</td>
<td>1.0 (1.0)</td>
<td>2.1 (1.6)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years later</td>
<td>2.2 (1.2)&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.3 (1.2)</td>
<td>2.6 (1.5)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage with pre-transfer family income at or below 150% of the poverty line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years later</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>68.5&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.7&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 years later</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>33.3&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 years later</td>
<td>21.6&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>21.1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: a: p<.001; b: p<.01; c: p<.05; d: p<.10

All significance levels are relative to the long-term poor or near-poor group for the given year. Significance levels were determined by running regression models with the long-term poverty group as the excluded group. N=718 for the 10 year period; N=462 for the 15 year period; N=252 for the 20 year period.
Table 3

Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Logistic Regression Models for the Likelihood of Being Married in Subsequent Years After Initially Becoming a Head of Household or Receiving Welfare, for Single Mothers Age 24 and Under

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>10 Years After</th>
<th>15 Years After</th>
<th>20 Years After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal and family background variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having one child</td>
<td>.309 (.233)</td>
<td>.260 (.315)</td>
<td>-.317 (.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child under the age of 3</td>
<td>.093 (.222)</td>
<td>.339 (.297)</td>
<td>-.335 (.400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race—white</td>
<td>.940 (.223)****</td>
<td>1.286 (.298)****</td>
<td>.590 (.404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age under 18 at beginning</td>
<td>.520 (.370)</td>
<td>.738 (.501)</td>
<td>1.207 (.759)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 18 to 21 at beginning</td>
<td>.610 (.227)***</td>
<td>.317 (.313)</td>
<td>1.389 (.420)****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>-.025 (.233)</td>
<td>-.121 (.309)</td>
<td>.392 (.386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a professional while growing up</td>
<td>.793 (.441)*</td>
<td>.531 (.684)</td>
<td>-.500 (.818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a HS graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-.929 (.227)****</td>
<td>-.174 (.312)</td>
<td>-.155 (.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a college graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-.895 (.449)**</td>
<td>-.360 (.625)</td>
<td>-.1259 (.937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up poor</td>
<td>-.293 (.205)</td>
<td>.355 (.280)</td>
<td>-.823 (.405)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3  
continued  

**Income, work and education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Estimate 1</th>
<th>Estimate 2</th>
<th>Estimate 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money from relatives</td>
<td>1.050 (.325)**</td>
<td>.568 (.398)</td>
<td>.119 (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school dropout</td>
<td>-1.689 (.262)*****</td>
<td>-1.848 (.342)*****</td>
<td>-1.376 (.491)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>-.063 (.279)</td>
<td>-.435 (.370)</td>
<td>-1.183 (.490)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the end</td>
<td>.251 (.326)</td>
<td>.677 (.398)*</td>
<td>-.774 (.480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the beginning</td>
<td>.365 (.350)</td>
<td>-.095 (.432)</td>
<td>-.064 (.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the beginning</td>
<td>.093 (.058)</td>
<td>.075 (.073)</td>
<td>.279 (.136)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the end</td>
<td>.051 (.050)</td>
<td>.090 (.068)</td>
<td>-.011 (.133)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Welfare and income measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Estimate 1</th>
<th>Estimate 2</th>
<th>Estimate 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term AFDC group</td>
<td>.020 (.327)</td>
<td>-.948 (.457)**</td>
<td>.479 (.682)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term AFDC group</td>
<td>-.457 (.332)</td>
<td>.359 (.443)</td>
<td>1.095 (.666)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term poverty group</td>
<td>-.673 (.371)*</td>
<td>.030 (.497)</td>
<td>-.100 (.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-poor group</td>
<td>-.124 (.478)***</td>
<td>-.264 (.625)</td>
<td>.865 (.915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income-to-needs at the beginning</td>
<td>1.043 (.214)****</td>
<td>.410 (.284)</td>
<td>.252 (.349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State welfare maximum for AFDC at end</td>
<td>-.405 (.521)</td>
<td>1.487 (.821)*</td>
<td>-3.014 (1.143)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.138 (.812)</td>
<td>-2.275 (1.322)*</td>
<td>.560 (1.541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>741.145</td>
<td>435.778</td>
<td>251.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01; ****: p<.001. 
Note: Each model is significant at the .001 level. Each model also included variables for region of residence, year entering the sample, and whether living in a rural or more urban area.
Table 4
Coefﬁcient Estimates (Standard Errors) for Pre-Transfer Family Income-to-Needs Ratios in Subsequent Years After Initially Becoming a Head of Household or First Receiving Welfare for Single Mothers, Age 24 and Under

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>10 Years After</th>
<th>15 Years After</th>
<th>20 Years After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having one child (more than 1 child is excluded)</td>
<td>.315 (.127)**</td>
<td>-.065 (.145)</td>
<td>-.019 (.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child under the age of 3</td>
<td>-.200 (.119)*</td>
<td>-.176 (.138)</td>
<td>-.389 (.225)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race—white</td>
<td>.550 (.122)****</td>
<td>.216 (.138)</td>
<td>.188 (.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age under 18 at beginning</td>
<td>.108 (.211)</td>
<td>.099 (.239)</td>
<td>.074 (.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 18 to 21 at beginning</td>
<td>-.010 (.121)</td>
<td>-.290 (.144)**</td>
<td>.050 (.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>.125 (.124)</td>
<td>.116 (.140)</td>
<td>-.033 (.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a professional while growing up</td>
<td>.106 (.220)</td>
<td>.553 (.293)*</td>
<td>.619 (.469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a HS graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-.236 (.120)**</td>
<td>.049 (.142)</td>
<td>-.196 (.227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a college graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-.026 (.229)</td>
<td>-.038 (.269)</td>
<td>.289 (.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up poor</td>
<td>-.257 (.110)**</td>
<td>-.091 (.128)</td>
<td>-.581 (.220)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4
continued

**Income, work and education**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money from relatives</td>
<td>.105 (.120)</td>
<td>.207 (.115)*</td>
<td>.096 (.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school dropout</td>
<td>-.439 (.140)**</td>
<td>-.891 (.159)**</td>
<td>-.527 (.265)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>-.167 (.156)</td>
<td>-.595 (.174)**</td>
<td>-.509 (.272)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the end</td>
<td>-.256 (.183)</td>
<td>-.580 (.184)**</td>
<td>-.862 (.264)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the beginning</td>
<td>-.142 (.189)</td>
<td>-.222 (.207)</td>
<td>-.782 (.297)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the beginning</td>
<td>-.004 (.032)</td>
<td>.033 (.035)</td>
<td>.137 (.072)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the end</td>
<td>-.052 (.027)*</td>
<td>-.101 (.031)**</td>
<td>-.223 (.072)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Welfare and income measures**

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term AFDC group</td>
<td>-.264 (.180)</td>
<td>-.051 (.218)</td>
<td>-.045 (.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term AFDC group</td>
<td>-.207 (.182)</td>
<td>-.017 (.213)</td>
<td>.144 (.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term poverty group</td>
<td>-.274 (.198)</td>
<td>-.143 (.239)</td>
<td>.313 (.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-poor group</td>
<td>-.325 (.249)</td>
<td>.022 (.303)</td>
<td>.386 (.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income-to-needs at the beginning</td>
<td>.641 (.079)**</td>
<td>.830 (.129)**</td>
<td>.484 (.193)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State welfare maximum for AFDC at end</td>
<td>.642 (.283)**</td>
<td>.878 (.371)**</td>
<td>.484 (.628)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.199 (.434)*</td>
<td>.958 (.593)</td>
<td>3.251 (.841)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.436</td>
<td>.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01; ****: p<.001.

Note: Each model is significant at the .001 level. Each model also included variables for region of residence, year entering the sample, and whether living in a rural or more urban area.
Table 5
Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Logistic Regression Models for the Likelihood of Having Pre-Transfer Income At or Below 150 Percent of the Poverty Line in Subsequent Years After Initially Becoming a Head or Receiving AFDC for Single Mothers Age 24 and Under

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>10 Years After</th>
<th>15 Years After</th>
<th>20 Years After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having one child (more than 1 is excluded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child under the age of 3</td>
<td>-0.531 (2.27)**</td>
<td>-0.221 (3.06)</td>
<td>-0.277 (3.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race—white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age under 18 at beginning</td>
<td>-0.284 (2.26)</td>
<td>-0.281 (2.93)</td>
<td>-0.005 (5.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 18 to 21 at beginning</td>
<td>-0.345 (2.23)</td>
<td>-0.082 (2.88)</td>
<td>1.41 (5.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>-0.177 (3.99)</td>
<td>-0.076 (5.17)</td>
<td>1.575 (1.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was professional while growing up</td>
<td>-0.341 (2.27)</td>
<td>-0.138 (3.14)</td>
<td>-0.569 (3.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a HS graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-0.079 (2.36)</td>
<td>-0.382 (3.20)</td>
<td>-0.596 (3.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head was a college graduate while growing up</td>
<td>-0.070 (4.60)</td>
<td>-0.790 (6.55)</td>
<td>-1.483 (1.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up poor</td>
<td>-0.455 (2.22)**</td>
<td>-0.503 (2.96)*</td>
<td>-0.771 (5.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the 0.05 level
**Significant at the 0.01 level
***Significant at the 0.001 level
### Table 5
Continued

**Income, work and education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money From relatives</td>
<td>-.323 (.307)</td>
<td>-.366 (.416)</td>
<td>-2.858 (1.000)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school dropout</td>
<td>1.027 (.252)****</td>
<td>1.280 (.328)****</td>
<td>1.227 (.634)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>.362 (.278)</td>
<td>.837 (.356)***</td>
<td>1.530 (.648)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the end</td>
<td>.305 (.339)</td>
<td>1.865 (.525)***</td>
<td>1.286 (.622)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any work limitations at the beginning</td>
<td>.250 (.377)</td>
<td>-.140 (.469)</td>
<td>2.996 (.876)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the beginning</td>
<td>-.032 (.062)</td>
<td>-.020 (.076)</td>
<td>-.266 (.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at the end</td>
<td>.182 (.055)****</td>
<td>.109 (.067)</td>
<td>.332 (.169)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Welfare and poverty measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term AFDC group</td>
<td>-.356 (.330)</td>
<td>-.049 (.494)</td>
<td>-1.324 (.954)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term AFDC group</td>
<td>.266 (.331)</td>
<td>-.245 (.466)</td>
<td>-2.522 (.964)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term poverty group</td>
<td>.287 (.362)</td>
<td>-.370 (.521)</td>
<td>-1.610 (1.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-poor group</td>
<td>.782 (.479)</td>
<td>-.040 (.648)</td>
<td>.560 (1.168)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income-to-needs at the beginning</td>
<td>-1.656 (.241)****</td>
<td>-1.087 (.284)****</td>
<td>-1.616 (.531)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State welfare maximum for AFDC at end</td>
<td>-.058 (.544)</td>
<td>-.1758 (.790)**</td>
<td>2.535 (1.685)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.542 (.834)</td>
<td>1.654 (1.252)</td>
<td>-1.382 (2.206)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 log likelihood</td>
<td>709.963</td>
<td>440.166</td>
<td>169.516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.10; **: p<.05; ***: p<.01; ****: p<.001.

Note: Each model is significant at the .001 level. Each model also included variables for region of residence, year entering the sample, and whether living in a rural or more urban area.
## Appendix  Table 1

**Means and Standard Deviations For those Who Stayed in the Sample At Least 10 Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>AFDC Sample</th>
<th>Poor or Near-Poor Sample</th>
<th>Non-Poor Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
<td>Long-Term</td>
<td>Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money from relatives (1999 $s) Over 4 year period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>121.0 (238.6)</td>
<td>127.1 (304.3)</td>
<td>218.8 (933.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with money from relatives over 4 year period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.0 (47.5)</td>
<td>36.5 (45.6)</td>
<td>32.1 (52.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State welfare maximum for a family of 4 at the beginning of the period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>739.6 (352.8)</td>
<td>868.2 (363.8)</td>
<td>742.5 (343.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage under age 18</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage aged 18–21</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage age 22–25</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage growing up poor</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage whose father was a H.S. dropout</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage whose father was a H.S. grad</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at beginning</td>
<td>6.8 (2.0)</td>
<td>7.3 (2.1)</td>
<td>6.3 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County unemployment rate at end</td>
<td>6.5 (2.3)</td>
<td>7.4 (2.7)</td>
<td>6.1 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in South</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in West</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in North Central</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix Table 1 continued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in Northeast</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage with disabled head of household at the beginning</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage with disabled head at the end</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly state welfare maximum for a family of 4 at the end (1999 $s)</td>
<td>606.6 (252.8)</td>
<td>719.1 (296.9)</td>
<td>663.8 (329.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city in county of residence has a pop. of 500,000 or more: SAMS</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city in county of residence has a pop. of 100,000–499,999: SAMS</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city in county of residence has a pop. of 50,000–99,999: SAMS</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city in county of residence has a pop. of 25,000–49,999: non-SAMS</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest city in county of residence has a pop. of 1–24,999: non-SAMS</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year entered the sample: 1968–1971</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year entered the sample: 1972–1975</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year entered the sample: 1976–1979</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year entered the sample: 1980–1984</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year entered the sample: 1985–1987</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Adoption in the U.S.: The Emergence of a Social Movement

FRANCES A. DELLA CAVA
NORMA KOLKO PHILLIPS
MADELINE H. ENGEL
Lehman College/City University of New York
Department of Sociology and Social Work

The Adoption Movement, which has been evolving in the U.S. since the late 1970s, is now fully formed. As a proactive, reformative social movement, adoption has reached the organizational, or institutional, stage. Evidence is seen in the roles assumed by government and voluntary agencies and organizations, as well as other systems in society, to support adoption, and in the extent to which adoption has been infused in the American culture, making it a part of our everyday landscape. Implications of the adoption movement for the helping professions are discussed, as is its impact on increasing cultural and racial diversity in the U.S.

Key words: adoption; social movement; social policy

The concept of a family accepting the biological child of other parents and caring for and raising the child as its own has been familiar throughout the ages. Recorded laws relating to the adoption of children are found throughout history in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, in Hindu and Roman Law, and in the Old and New Testaments. Given its place in early Judaeo-Christian teachings, it is not surprising that adoption was known in Europe and wherever Europeans settled. Adoption took place in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the late 1600s, and in 1851 the first law focusing on considering the interests of the child in long-term planning was formulated in Massachusetts (Moe, 1998).

During the past twenty-five years, an elaborate network of efforts by the adoption community has brought about unique
and dynamic trends culminating in the emergence of adoption as a social movement—a movement that is similar to other social movements in modern America, for example the Women's, Labor and Civil Rights Movements.

The Emergence of Social Movements

As a reform process representing a particular approach to social problems, social movements require the participation of "large numbers of people who organize to promote or resist change" (Henslin, 2004, p. 427). The issue must be recognized as a social problem, rather than an individual or private trouble (Mills, 1959). Those involved in social change commonly share both a heightened sense of moral outrage at injustices resulting from the social problem, and agreement about the direction that needs to be taken. Their views may be contrary to the status quo—consequently a sense of "we" and "they" may develop, further strengthening their identification with the cause.

Social movements emerge through a process, beginning with unrest or agitation in reaction to a social problem, followed by a mobilization of interested parties. People organize, tasks are divided, leadership emerges, the public is informed, and policy decisions begin to take shape, leading ultimately to the institutionalization of the movement. The process is not smooth and there may be a period of decline in the organization when it either dies or is revitalized in an altered form. Applying these commonly agreed-upon criteria (Henslin, 2004), adoption in the U.S. today may be viewed as a social movement.

Social movements may be either proactive, with a goal of social change, or reactive, implying resistance to change. Using Aberle's (1966) typology, proactive movements can be classified according to both their target (the individual or society) and the amount of change sought (specific or total). Proactive movements that seek to change a specific aspect of an individual's behavior, such as the Women's Christian Temperance Movement, are alterative; those seeking total change of individuals, such as religious fundamentalist movements, are redemptive. The focus of the remaining two types is societal change—those with objectives of changing a specific aspect of society, as exemplified by the labor move-
ment, are reformative, and those attempting to change the entire social order, such as a socio-political revolution, are transformative (Aberle, 1966). From this perspective, the adoption movement can be classified as proactive and reformative. Adoptive families and adoption advocates, professionals, institutions, and organizations work to advance social welfare policies, resources, and services that contribute to the solution of a commonly perceived and growing social problem: the presence in the U.S. of hundreds of thousands, and in the world millions, of children who are in need of a caring, safe and permanent home. Media and commercial interests may also serve to advance the cause, even if guided by less lofty objectives.

Historical Background: Adoption and the Child Welfare Movement

The emergence of these social movements in the U.S. follows 150 years of efforts by social reformers, special interest groups, professionals, and politicians to establish policies that, at different times in history, have served to promote or curtail adoption. Adoption has always been considered a component of the child welfare movement in the U.S. Charles Loring Brace's well-known work with the Children's Aid Society in New York beginning in 1853, and his 1872 book, The Dangerous Classes of New York, were significant in raising the public's consciousness regarding destitute children and sparking the child welfare movement. By its close in 1929, his innovative and controversial Orphan Trains program had moved as many as 150,000 children, ages two to sixteen—described as poor, neglected, homeless and unruly, but not necessarily orphaned—from the slums of New York to the mid-west and the west where most found permanent homes. Replicated in other cities with large immigrant populations, the number of children affected by this program was even higher. While most of the children were not legally adopted, the intention and permanency in the placements paralleled the adoption experience.

Literary writers of the Progressive Era, social workers of the Settlement House Movement, and other social reformers concerned about the welfare of children worked to shape professional
interventions directed at helping children and families and to influence national and state policies. Since 1920, the Child Welfare League of America has represented over 600 private and public agencies concerned with such issues as child labor, child abuse, out-of-home placements, and also adoption. By the 1930s the Child Welfare Movement was addressing the deplorable conditions surrounding the care of children, with priority given to the “best interests of children.” While it was not until much later that adoption became a separate focus of agencies, the development of governmental policies to regulate procedures and institute standards protecting not only adoptees but also biological and adoptive families began on the state level. By 1929 all 48 states had statutes governing adoption (Moe, 1998); subsequently, the federal government instituted adoption policies. Although adoption policies have been highly controversial and in flux, coinciding with prevailing social attitudes and values, they have served to further societal awareness of adoption as an issue in its own right.

Family and Community Diversity

An important consequence of the changes in adoption policies is increased family and community diversity; this derives from both domestic and international adoptions. Diversity occurs along a variety of social dimensions including religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status, race and sexual orientation.

Berebitsky (2000) argues that from the mid-1800s to the end of the 1920s adoption reflected ethnic and religious diversity. Given the demographics of the day, the children involved in the various orphan train programs were disproportionately Irish and German Catholic and the waiting families were usually Protestant—a situation which the Catholic Church and other religious organizations opposed. Also at the core of adoption was socio-economic diversity, a pattern that continues today. Often, although certainly not always, it was and continues to be the poor who turn to adoption as a means of ensuring greater opportunities for their children. Moreover, age and marital status were not barriers to adoption during this period.

In line with the conservative tone of the country after World War II and the quest for predictability and sameness, policies
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aimed at racial and cultural homogeneity in adoption emerged. Adoption professionals tried to “match” adoptive parents and children for physical characteristics and religion. Non-kinship adoptions tended to be with middle-class, heterosexual couples. Procedures regarding assignment of a religion to foundlings were determined locally. For example, in New York City foundlings with no visible sign of a faith (e.g., not found clutching a holy medal in a church pew) were assigned a religion. They became Protestant, Catholic or Jewish in sequential order, with the exception that black infants were not designated Jewish.

Transracial adoption was virtually unknown before the 1950s and never exceeded more than a very small percent of adoptions in the U.S. The American Indian Movement, modeled on the Black Power Movement, led to the creation of Native American Tribal Councils, many of which opposed transracial adoption of Native American children, fearing the loss of the child’s birth culture and the development of problems of identity (Freundlich, 2000; Simon, 1994). Their concerns were in large part a reaction to the Indian Adoption Project. This project, sponsored jointly by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Child Welfare League of America, facilitated the adoption of approximately 700 Native American children by caucasians between 1958 and 1967 (Melosh, 2002). It became a repudiated social experiment; tribal concerns resulted in lobbying and protests, eventually helping to bring to fruition the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act, specifying first preference in foster care and adoption be given to persons from the child’s tribe and last to those of another culture or race. This Act, together with the unique position of Native American Tribes as sovereign nations under federal law, enabled tribes to avoid transracial adoptions by making their own custody arrangements (Melosh, 2002).

A similar trend was seen in the African-American community. In 1971, 35 percent of adoptions of African American children were transracial (Hollingsworth, 2002). The emerging black pride during the Civil Rights Movement crystallized attitudes and, as early as 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers took a stand in opposition to the adoption of black children by whites, viewing it as a form of genocide. Outcries against transracial adoption and the concomitant assimilation it
implied paralleled earlier reactions by minority religious groups, especially Roman Catholics, against interreligious adoption. Data analyzing media interviews with transracial adoptees between 1986 and 1996 lend support to concerns of the Association of Black Social Workers. The adoptees interviewed experienced racial discrimination, the absence of parental role models for racial/ethnic social identity, and a failure to feel connected to their racial/ethnic community (Hollingsworth, 2002).

Yet some researchers and media reports suggested transracial and intercultural adoptions did not have deleterious effects on the child, and racial considerations should not take precedence over what they defined as concern for the best interests of the child. This argument was supported by a 1993 *New York Times Magazine* article which stressed the importance of transracial and transcultural adoption in providing socio-economic opportunities to children born abroad and adopted by Americans (Porter, 1993). By 1994 a majority of the U.S. Congress agreed with this position and legislation was passed banning discrimination solely on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the placement of children in both foster care and adoption.

In spite of such legislation, there is resentment in many areas towards the growing diversity associated with transracial and transcultural adoption. Causes include prejudice, often resulting from xenophobia, and reactions to the worsening economic conditions, which may make anyone who is visibly different a target of hostility. This may even lead an adoptive family to move in the hope of finding a community more open to their child.

International adoptions, which also contribute to family and community diversity, date at least as far back as the late 1940s. The 1948 Displaced Persons Act opened the doors for 3,000 orphan refugees to be adopted. In the following year, the author Pearl S. Buck established Welcome House to aid Amerasian children ready for adoption. The 1953 Refugee Relief Act allowed 4,000 orphan visas over three years, and in addition there were 500 special visas for Korean orphans to be adopted by Americans. In 1956, Holt International Children’s Services was started, furthering the adoption of Korean children; that agency remains active. However, these international adoptions, which generally implied
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the creation of transracial families and communities, were the exception rather than the rule.

Socio-political events of the late 1970s led to a change in attitude towards diversity in adoption, and new regulations in international as well as domestic adoption followed. Within the U.S., the co-incidence of the 1973 Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortion and had a negative impact on birth rates, and the growth of the Women’s Movement, which led to more single women raising their biological children, caused the number of people seeking to adopt to far exceed the number of infants who were waiting for adoption. At the same time, the 1975 Vietnam “Baby Lift” following the fall of Saigon brought thousands of Vietnamese children to the U.S. for adoption. While it was clear not all were orphans, the adoption of these children in the U.S. furthered the trend towards diversity through adoption.

That trend continues today. U.S. Department of State website data reveal that over the past 14 years there has been an almost consistent rise, and a tripling of orphan visas in the past 10 years, from under 6,500 to over 20,000 per year. The first report by the U.S. Census Bureau which profiled children under the age of 18 who were internationally adopted was released in 2003. These data, collected for the 2000 Census, showed that over one-third of the children had been born in Korea (24%) and China (11%) (Peterson, 2003, p. D7). Given that the vast majority of American parents who adopt abroad are caucasian, the diversity resulting from international adoption continues and is increasing.

But State Department figures indicate that the specific countries from which the largest numbers of orphans come change from year to year. The Department’s memoranda regarding the countries of origin for visas issued to orphans coming to the U.S. highlights the importance of geo-political events; in any given year the “popular” countries of origin may shift, reflecting specific social conditions or legislation. For example, Romania, which ranked first in 1991 and 5th as recently as the year 2000, had slipped to 15th by 2002.

Also affecting diversity are population and adoption policies in China. Efforts to control the population on mainland China have intersected with the cultural devaluation of girls, making abandonment or, as of the mid-1990s, adoption of girls by foreign-
ers acceptable. The U.S. Department of State’s website shows that China has gone from 17th among countries of origin for orphan visas in 1991 to first in 2000; their first place position continued to 2002, the last year for which these data are available.

A growing number of countries view adoption of their children by Americans as yet another indication of American imperialism, arrogance and exploitation: “the taking by the rich and powerful of the children born to the poor and powerless” (Batholet, 1993, p. 42 as cited in Melosh, 2002, p. 195). When interviewed about his 2003 film, “Casa de los Babys”, film writer-director John Sayles said, “It’s tough on the countries these kids come from that these kids are not getting adopted in their home country. These countries are ashamed of the fact that they’re not able to take care of these children. For me, there’s a whiff of cultural imperialism in the transaction. You don’t see people from Korea coming here to adopt babies” (Fine, 2003).

This issue of cultural pride further impacts international adoption. When an American television reporter covering the 1988 Olympics in Seoul noted that the large number of international adoptions were “embarrassing, perhaps even a national shame” to some Koreans, the Korean government acted to markedly limit such adoptions (Melosh, 2002, p. 193). Further, when allegations of corruption surfaced and television exposés documented neglect in Romanian orphanages, the Romanian government took the position that international adoption was “buying” children and destroying the country’s culture. This led the Romanian government to introduce residence requirements for prospective adoptive parents.

The situation for many gay, lesbian, bi-sexual and transgender persons who wish to adopt remains problematic. While most states allow adoption by single gays, only eleven states permit adoption by same-sex couples (Thomas, 2003). Some states also permit same-sex second parent adoption. This controversy may reflect homophobia or differing interpretations of the criterion “in the best interests of the child” (Bell, 2001). Researchers have noted that the parents’ sexual orientation does not have a lasting effect on their children’s social development or emotional well-being (Perrin, 2002; Tye, 20003). Other research provides evidence that the parenting skills of gays are comparable to those of heterosex-
uals (Appell, 2001), and it has been found that many gay men are more nurturing than straight men (Bigner & Bozett, 1989). One can anticipate that as the Gay Pride/Gay Rights Movement gains momentum more legal challenges will be mounted in states banning adoption by gay couples.

Evidence of Adoption as a Social Movement in the U.S.

There is an abundance of evidence that adoption has emerged as a social movement in its own right within the U.S. since the late 1970s. This includes the activities of leaders, voluntary organizations and government in supporting adoption, and the extent of infusion of adoption in the American culture. Moreover, the actions of minority communities to ensure priority adoption of minority children within their own communities extends the social movement model to subgroups. While there are no federal policies specifically preventing priority adoptions, federal policies promoting inter-cultural and inter-racial adoption serve to curtail intra-cultural and intra-racial adoption.

Role of Voluntary Organizations and Government

Self-help groups have been instrumental in gaining empowerment for those involved in adoption; some also gave rise to a call for openness in adoption. The Adoptees’ Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), an international organization founded in the U.S. in 1971, advocated for open adoption and worked to reunite adoptees and their birth parents. Similar work was done by the American Adoption Congress, a national umbrella organization established in 1978. Two years later, the National Council for Adoption was formed, serving as a lobby group on behalf of open adoption. Since then the number of adoptions per year has increased, as has the number of organizations for birth parents, adopted children and adoptive parents. Some function at the community level, others at the national and international level. Such groups include the Adoptive Parents’ Committee, a grass roots organization of adoptive families; Latin American Parents Association, a national non-profit support group for families adopting from Latin America, (Moe, 1998); Voice for Adoption, focusing on special needs adoption; and the Evan B. Donaldson Institute, devoted to research, information, and education.
Adoption is not only increasingly common, it is also finding wider social acceptance. Leaders and others involved in the movement follow the model set by other social movements, such as the 1960s Civil Rights Movement or the Women's Movement. As in the case of leaders of all emerging social movements, they propagandize in the effort to gain recognition for the movement, utilizing the mass media to influence public opinion. Some set out to ameliorate the stigma of adoption and the prejudice toward intercultural or transracial adoptions, while others tackle the tenacious taboo of infertility. Leaders of the movement have emerged, such as Adam Pertman, adoptive parent and author of *Adoption Nation* (2001). As Executive Director of the Evan B. Donaldson Institute in New York City, Pertman brings great visibility to the issue of adoption through interviews on television and in the press, and lectures around the country.

In 1987, the Interagency Task Force on Adoption was formed by the Reagan administration to suggest means to promote adoption. The next step in the flurry of significant legislation came during the Clinton administration. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 stated a preference for permanent kinship placements when children cannot live with their birth parents. That same year the President launched his Adoption Initiative, with the goal of doubling the number of children in foster care adopted or placed in permanent homes by 2002.

Policy efforts were focused on children who might be endangered were they to be returned from foster care to their biological families. This became a growing concern with the deaths of children in several high-profile cases. Further, child abuse referrals had dramatically increased the number of children entering foster care during the early 1990s, due in part to the crack-cocaine epidemic. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 built upon principles established in earlier legislation, including the 1988 Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act, which addressed the issue of in-race adoption with initiatives to recruit minority families for the many minority children in foster care who were ready for adoption. As a result of the 1997 Act, child welfare agencies across the country also pursued kin-
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Ship adoption arrangements as a way of promoting permanency planning.

In spite of such efforts, however, the problem of children remaining in foster care persists. According to the August 2002 on-line report of the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System, by the year 2000, 556,000 children were in foster care, half of whom had been there over three years. During the year 2000, 17% (46,581) of the 275,000 children who exited foster care did so through adoption. This number reflected less than half of the cases for which adoption was the goal. Of those adopted, only about half were minority children, a figure somewhat lower than the percentage they comprised in the foster care system (58%).

Recognizing the problems presented by the lack of detailed, precise and consistent statistical reporting of domestic adoptions, in 1980 Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act suggesting, but not mandating, a national adoption reporting system. Two years later the Voluntary Cooperative Information System (VCIS) came into existence in order to further encourage uniform data collection. However, not all states choose to respond each year, not all are able to respond to every question, and inter-state variation in definitions further limit the usefulness of the report (Moe, 1998). While VCIS provides the most complete information available on foster care and adoptions from that system, neither it nor any other large scale database includes information on kinship or other types of domestic adoption.

In contrast to the difficulty tracking domestic adoptions, statistics relevant to international adoptions are readily available. As of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, reference to immigration of orphans to the U.S. for the purpose of adoption became a permanent part of immigration legislation. Over the years, U.S. immigration law has become more lenient vis à vis foreign orphans, culminating in the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 granting citizenship to all children adopted internationally by U.S. citizens. This Act, which was signed by President Clinton, took effect in 2001.

As noted, international adoptions have increased steadily since the 1980s (U. S. Department of State website). Conditions abroad, such as famine in parts of Africa, political unrest and
rebellion in some countries in Central America and Asia, the fall of the USSR, and epidemics such as AIDS in Africa, have left vast numbers of children orphaned. These conditions combined to provide opportunities for an increasing proportion of U.S. families seeking to adopt (Freundlich, 1998).

The international community, under the aegis of The Hague, recognizing that international adoption often degenerated into little more than the buying and selling of children who were not necessarily orphans, established a set of conventions in 1993. In the attempt to bring their policies in line with mounting world opinion, many countries began to take a careful look at their own practices and policies. While the U.S. agreed in principle with the conventions, it took until 2000 for Congress to pass the Inter-Country Adoption Law. Nonetheless, authority over adoption in the U.S. has not yet been centralized nor has the Hague convention been fully implemented.

Another sign of the growing significance of adoption can be found in the annual Presidential proclamation, beginning in 1990, of November as National Adoption Month. First proclaimed in Massachusetts in 1976, National Adoption Week eventually grew into this month-long national campaign to make the American public aware of the number of children awaiting adoption within agencies and foster care. The month also serves to increase positive media coverage of adoption. Recognition of National Adoption Month has become so widespread that The New York Times Magazine crossword puzzle of November 16, 2003, included it as a clue—the correct response was November. In addition, the Saturday before Thanksgiving has been designated National Adoption Day. It is celebrated with the finalization of the adoption of hundreds of children, and, since 1997, the Department of Health and Human Services has announced annual winners of the Adoption Excellence Awards on that day. The awards are given to states, organizations, businesses, families or individuals who help abandoned, neglected or abused children find permanent homes.

The high cost of private and international adoptions makes them inaccessible to the poor. In 2000, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 2.5% of the nation's 65 million children under the age of 18 were adopted. Their families' median income was $56,138, as
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compared with $48,200 for families with biological children only and $42,148 for all U.S. households (Peterson, 2003, p. D7). The cost of adoption derives from the network of lawyers, courts, and agencies involved, as well as required adoption homestudies and post-placement homestudies by social workers. Private domestic adoptions may involve support of the birthmothers during and immediately following the pregnancy, as well as medical costs. In the case of international adoptions there may be fees to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, country fees, contributions to orphanages, and travel expenses, which may include several trips to the country of adoption and payment for hotels, sometimes for several weeks. Private adoption becomes exclusive, which, along with access to medical care, higher education and housing, becomes one more life chance or opportunity differentially accessible to the various socio-economic classes.

Efforts to combat this exclusiveness in adoption have been seen in both the public and private sectors. Groups such as the National Coalition to End Racism in the American Child Care System, which was formed during the 1980s to address problems in the child welfare system and further policies to advance adoption, led to new policies on the federal level, including provisions for economic incentives to adoptive parents. The 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, which institutionalized the goal of permanency in child placements (Holody, 1997), clearly favored returning the child to, or keeping the child with, the biological family whenever possible. Also included in this act, were provisions for partial subsidies to those who adopted hard-to-place “special needs” children (Moe, 1998) for whom return to the biological family was not possible. States also provide partial subsidies for special needs adoptions to financially-eligible families. In addition, the 1996 Adoption Promotion and Stability Act allowed an income tax credit, which by 2003 was up to $10,000 for eligible families who adopt. The U.S. military offers adoption subsidies too, as do many civilian employers. Some banks offer low cost adoption loans, and grants and loans may be secured through private agencies, such as God's Grace Adoption Ministry, the Hebrew Free Loan Society, A Child Waits Foundation, and the National Adoption Foundation.

According to a recent survey undertaken by the Evan B.
Donaldson Institute, "58% of Americans either know someone who has been adopted, has adopted a child, or placed a child for adoption" (Peterson, 2003, p. D7). As adoption touches so many people and has become an increasingly visible part of ordinary life in the U.S., the stigma once attached to it has diminished.

**Popular Culture and Adoption**

Authors, publishers and booksellers have made adoption a focus of their work. Publishing firms such as Perspectives Press and Tapestry Books focus exclusively on topics for people interested in learning about adoption. Other firms publish books and magazines that specifically target the child who is adopted or about to become the sibling of one who is, and some bookstores, such as Alphabet Soup Books in Lawrenceville, New Jersey, specialize in adoption literature. Stories of fictional children such as *Little Orphan Annie* or the ever-popular *Madeline* have been around for years and adoptive parents have found them useful in preparing older children in the family for adoption; these have found even broader audiences due to the advent of videotapes and DVDs. Of greater interest, however, are more recent books that involve contemporary true stories of children who have been adopted, including books by Banish and Jordan-Wong (1992), Koh (1993) and Kroll (1994). Often books for the very young are based on metaphor, using adopted kittens, polar bears, birds or other animals as the main characters. Authors of this type of book include Blomquist and Blomquist (1993), Brodzinsky (1996), Kasza (1992) and Keller (1995).

Similarly there is a rash of self-help guides written with the prospective adoptive parent in mind or written for the adopted person searching for his/her birth family. Among these are Adamec (1996), Hicks (1993), Johnston (1992) and Sifferman (1994).

Popular magazines, including not only those directed toward women such as *Good Housekeeping* but those with broad-based appeal like *The New York Times Magazine* feature articles on adoption. These range from articles about AIDS orphans in Ethiopia (Greene, 2002) to exposés of conditions in orphanages abroad or human-interest stories about a particular family.

Even literature that one might assume to be irrelevant to adop-
tion sometimes focuses on the topic. Mysteries featuring female sleuths are a case in point. Since 1980 several of the most famous fictional female detectives or their husbands are described as having been adopted. Other series feature characters who decided on adoption for their child or adopted a child. Still other sleuths delve into mystery plots involving adopted persons (DellaCava & Engel, 2002). Perhaps more interesting is that in long-running series in which adoption was never previously mentioned, it has been introduced in recent novels (Barnes, 2001; Cross, 2003; Scottoline, 2003).

Adoption has also become a popular theme on television, reaching from the final episodes of the sitcom “Friends” to PBS’s favorite, Fred Rogers. Human interest films or holiday specials present celebrities’ stories about adoption, and as recently as September 2003, the Hallmark channel began to broadcast a series of Sunday programs focused on adoption stories. In 1992, NBC introduced a special segment of its news hour called “Wednesday’s Child” in the Washington, D.C. area, presenting photos of children in foster care hoping to find adoptive families. But nowhere is the emphasis more apparent than in the Discovery Health Channel’s “Adoption Stories,” shown several times each day as a parallel to its program, “Birth Day.” The show follows the adoptive family’s experiences over the course of several months, and, in the case of international adoptions, cameras follow the parents on their trip to the child’s country of origin.

The internet has become one of the richest sources of information and support for adoption. DHC’s website contains information for those who are considering adoption, as do many other sites representing parental groups, agencies, and governments. National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, AdoptionNetwork, and the U.S. Department of State are illustrations of such sites. The Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption, named for the founder of Wendy’s International, himself an adoptee, subsidizes a website that enables prospective parents to see pictures of children ready for adoption. People planning international adoptions find it particularly useful to connect with other families who adopted in the particular country. Many use the internet to maintain long-term contacts with families with whom they traveled.
Individuals, groups and organizations involved in adoption advertise. In 2003, Westchester County in New York announced that the media firm it had hired to recruit foster and adoptive parents would not only create ads, posters and brochures, but would also screen potential foster parents with an eye toward identifying families interested in adopting from the foster care system (Cohen, 2003). Creative recruitment strategies for foster and adoptive parents also take place in such unlikely places as minor league baseball games, as occurs in Charleston, South Carolina, where the public child welfare agency distributes kazoos and information to everyone attending the game.

Since the mid 1980s, newspaper classified ads have been popular, including ads placed by prospective individuals or couples describing themselves and the child they seek in terms of age, gender and perhaps race. More unusual are the ads placed by those who already have adopted once and publish a testimonial from the biological mother of their first child in the hope it will reassure another biological mother and encourage her to contact them. Ads can also be placed by biological mothers who are seeking an adoptive family for their child, and by adoption agencies, as may be found in the “Marketplace” section of Newsweek magazine (2003), alongside ads for wine and treatments for hair and feet.

The concept of adoption has been vastly broadened in the popular culture in the U.S. By the 1980s children were “adopting” Cabbage Patch Kids dolls. Animal shelters provide papers to those “adopting” pets, and individuals can “adopt” a whale. Other manifestations of adoption in today’s popular culture include “births and adoptions” announcements replacing the heading “birth announcements” in some quarters, including college alumni magazines such as that from Williams College.

Manufacturers of consumer goods cater to demographic trends. Thus it is no surprise that merchandise especially designed for the adoptive family has come to the fore. Greeting cards and announcements printed by mainstream companies proclaim the arrival of the adopted child. Christopher Radko has designed a Christmas ornament celebrating international adoption. Unique personalized gifts include coffee mugs with the criss-crossed flags of the U.S. and the child’s country of origin. The cards, ornaments and other items are available in ordinary stores; the personalized
gifts are available on a more limited scale from specialized on-line dealers including Adoption Shoppe.

At least one hotel in mainland China, the White Swan—also known as the "Baby Hotel" or "The White Stork"—offers adoptive parents "the most powerful symbol of Western values it could muster: a blond Barbie doll that holds in its grasp a baby that is unmistakably Chinese." David Barboza, the New York Times reporter filing the story, comments that the "parents said they liked the gift" (2003, p. A4). Other companies market ethnic dolls and books to appeal to adoptive families as well as to help other American children maintain a tie to their ancestral roots.

Implications of the Adoption Movement for the Helping Professions

People whose experiences with adoption have been stigmatized and kept secret—people with problems with infertility, women who have surrendered children for adoption, families who have tried unsuccessfully to adopt, adult adoptees whose questions were never answered, and perhaps never asked—are everywhere and benefit from the unveiling of the stigma and the secrecy surrounding adoption.

However, even with the growing popularity and press of adoption, not all of the stigma has been assuaged. Children beginning school, who already are dealing with separation from parents, may be particularly troubled when an adopted child or an adopted sibling of a child enters their school or social community. At this stage they can be strongly affected by the fact or the implication that a mother would give her child away; it is not uncommon for them to worry that they too will be given away and they may need repeated assurance about this (Phillips, 2002).

There are indicators of increased responses by educators and mental health professionals. These include programs in schools, professional conferences on outcomes and interventions, specialized treatment modalities for adopted children, such as application of reactive attachment disorder theory, and recognition of the special needs of some internationally adopted children.

Professionals providing interventions for people affected by
adoption have a myriad of resources that had not been available in the past. In addition to the numerous social service agencies and programs formed to assist with the adoption process, there also are now agencies to deal specifically with treatment issues surrounding adoption, such as the Center for Family Connections, founded in 1995, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. At the same time there has been a growing professional adoption literature, for example Joyce Maguire Pavao's *The Family of Adoption* (1998), the journal *Adoption Quarterly*, which is devoted to adoption issues, as well as numerous articles in other journals.

With adoption a public matter rather than a family secret, numerous support groups have sprung up, including Families for Russian and Ukrainian Adoption, Families with Children from China, and People Need Caring. There are also support groups for single adoptive parents and gay and lesbian adoptive parents, as well as groups for adopted persons of all ages. Many international adoption agencies have ongoing support programs to assist with the lifelong issues presented by adoption.

**Conclusion**

The cumulative effect of the steadily increasing adoption-related activity over the past quarter century has brought adoption to the position of a social movement in the U.S. With the supports of government policies and organizations and the popularity it has achieved in the media, much of the stigma once associated with adoption has dissipated.

The adoption movement also has brought greater diversity to American families and communities, especially through international adoptions. While there is opposition to this growing diversity by a variety of individuals and groups, if the movement continues the momentum it has achieved, one can anticipate it will increase.

The increase in attention paid to adoption has broad implications for the helping professions as new approaches, agencies, policies, and literature have been developed. The need for further development of such resources is certain to continue.
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The current study is a population-based investigation of the association between past-year exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) and current welfare use, while also accounting for the effects of other violence experienced in adulthood and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These data indicate that acute exposure to intimate partner violence is significantly over-represented among women currently on welfare. However, it appears to be a woman’s cumulative exposure to interpersonal violence and associated symptoms of PTSD that are uniquely associated with welfare participation. These data highlight the prevalence of violence against women and its consequences for this population. Results suggest that the prevention and detection of violence is an important welfare issue, and highlight the need for more research in this area.

Key words: Intimate Partner Violence; TANF; Family Violence Option; Mental Health; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Introduction

With the onset of the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Opportunity Act (PRWORA), welfare services took the form of federal block grants called Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), which place increasing responsibility and pressure on individual participants to find employment sufficient to eliminate welfare dependency. This emphasis, including work requirements and lifetime limits for participation have successfully moved many individuals from welfare to work, leaving a welfare population comprised primarily of women caring for children who experience more serious barriers to employment. As a result, much research has begun to focus on factors associated with welfare use and barriers to employment in this population.

This research suggests that intimate partner violence (IPV) may be a major barrier to education and employment (Horwitz & Kerker, 2001; Tolman & Rosen, 2001). The hypothesis that violence against women is both an etiologic and maintaining factor in women's poverty is plausible. Prospective data reveals that a history of violence predisposes women to unemployment and poverty, while poverty further increases a woman's risk for subsequent victimization (Bassuk & Rosenberg, 1988; Byrne, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Best, & Saunders, 1999). However, some data suggest that violence against women, particularly intimate partner violence, is associated not only with poverty but more specifically with the use of welfare. Studies of welfare populations have documented rates of IPV higher than those found in the general population or among low income women (Brush, 1999; Romero, Chavkin, Wise, Smith, & Wood, 2002; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000; Tolman & Rosen, 2001). These studies have also begun to document these women's problems with employment, health, and mental health. This association is notable because it suggests that violence against women may be a significant determinant of welfare utilization.

**IPV among women using Welfare**

The few published studies of IPV that have examined welfare populations suggest that the experience of IPV is over-represented among women using welfare. Tolman and Rosen (2001) administered a modified version of the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS; Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996) to a sample of 753 welfare recipients in Michigan and found that 23% of women experienced moderate to severe physical violence in the past year, with lifetime rates of 63%. Women exposed to violence
in the past year also had significantly higher rates of psychological disorders, including depression, PTSD, and substance use disorders, when compared to non-exposed women. Another study of 122 welfare recipients enrolled in welfare-to-work training found that 38% of women reported at least one episode of physical violence in their most recent intimate relationship (Brush, 1999). A study of low-income mothers of chronically ill children administered a brief 3-item screen for lifetime exposure to intimate partner violence (Feldhaus et al., 1997) and found significantly lower rates of violence among women who had never received welfare, 16.4%, as compared to women currently participating in welfare, 31.7% and women with pending welfare participation, 40% (Romero et al., 2002). While these studies lack representative samples and consistent definitions of IPV, these estimates do suggest an association between current exposure to IPV and use of welfare.

This association suggests a number of potential implications for intervention. Several authors have noted that increasing access to IPV-focused services may not only increase the safety and well-being of women and their children, but facilitate employment and transition from economic dependence (e.g., Tolman & Raphael, 2002). However, the social context of IPV must be considered, as exposure to IPV often occurs in the context of other violence. Poor women exposed to IPV are at increased risk for living in violent communities (Hien & Bukszpan, 1999), and are likely to have been “re-victimized” as adults, following exposure to violence during childhood (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Furthermore, mental health consequences of violence, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), are over represented among individuals in poverty (Bassuk, Dawson, Perloff, & Weinreb, 2001; Davidson, Hughes, Blazer, & George, 1991). In order to fully understand the mental health needs of women using welfare, investigations of the links between IPV and welfare use must also examine the role of prior violence exposure and PTSD.

Under current federal law, states have considerable flexibility to implement a range of interventions using TANF funds. Among these is the Family Violence Option (FVO) which waives federal time-limits for violence-exposed women and allows states to offer violence-related social and mental health services that may
satisfy requirements for employment support activities. Violence prevention services are also authorized under current marriage promotion initiatives, though few states utilize this opportunity. Relevant empirical data are needed to guide the development and implementation of these services in order to best facilitate safety, health, and economic independence among these women and their children.

The current study is an epidemiological analysis of the relationship between exposure to IPV and use of CalWorks, California's TANF program. We assess the occurrence of intimate partner violence in the past year in a population-based sample of California women. The ethnic diversity of the state of California makes population-based samples especially relevant for examining such issues. We expand on previous studies of the link between IPV and welfare by accounting for other episodes of violence that may have occurred prior to, or concurrent with, a past-year episode of IPV. We also examine current symptoms of PTSD as a factor that may initiate or maintain a woman's need for welfare. The goals of the current study are to: a) examine the strength of the relationship between past-year IPV and current CalWorks use after adjusting for relevant demographic factors; b) examine the strength of this relationship after accounting for the effects of other violence experienced in adulthood; and c) determine whether the effects of IPV and other violence are accounted for by their psychological sequelae, symptoms of PTSD.

Methods

Data and Sample

This study used data from the 2001 California Women's Health Survey (CWHS), a population-based, random-digit-dial, annual probability survey of California women sponsored by the California Department of Health services and designed in collaboration with several other state agencies and departments. Interviews are conducted by trained interviewers following standardized procedures developed by the Public Health Institute Survey Research Group and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The staff and procedures are identical to California's
administration of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (Stein, Lederman, & Shea, 1993). The first author, a clinical psychologist, provided additional training to interviewers for violence-related items. Interviews for the CWHS are conducted in English and Spanish and take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

The response rate for the 2001 survey is 74%, yielding a sample of 4018 women aged 18 years and older. The current investigation utilized a sub-sample of 3617 women with complete data for all violence variables. While the sample closely approximates the population of California women in terms of age, ethnicity, education, and household income, data were weighted in analysis to reflect the age and ethnicity distributions of California women.

Measures

Intimate partner violence was assessed according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommended definition (Building data systems for monitoring and responding to violence against women, 2000), with the time frame of the past 12 months. Items included physical violence, sexual violence, threats of violence, and emotional/psychological abuse. All items referenced a current or former partner. History of interpersonal violence was assessed using items from the Traumatic Stress Schedule (TSS; Norris, 1990), a widely used measure of discrete traumatic events. The TSS is a reliable and valid measure and has demonstrated efficacy in epidemiological studies (Norris, 1992; Norris & Riad, 1997). The items regarding physical assault, sexual assault, and violent robbery, and mugging/attack were used in the current study. Respondents were asked to endorse each item if they had experienced the event in their adult lifetime (aged 18 or over).

Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder were assessed using a 5 item screen demonstrated to detect clinically significant PTSD with excellent sensitivity and specificity and performed superior to a standard 17 item assessment instrument (Prins et al., in press). The items include a general trauma probe and 4 items that query the presence or absence in the past month of the four major factors of PTSD symptoms (Asmundson et al., 2000): intrusive trauma-related thoughts, avoidance of trauma-related cues, emotional numbing, and physiological hyperarousal. Par-
participants were classified as having PTSD symptoms (not a diagnosis of PTSD) if they screened positive for trauma and endorsed one or more of the symptom items. IPV and violence items immediately preceded PTSD items in the survey.

Current welfare receipt was defined as an endorsement of survey items that queried current receipt of money on a regular basis from the county, "sometimes called welfare, AFDC, or CalWorks".

Statistical Analyses

Analysis weights were calculated from year 2000 California Department of Finance population estimates for California women. Bivariate analyses and multivariable logistic regression analyses were performed to examine the association of IPV with demographic characteristics (age, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, the presence of children under age 18 living in the household and household income at or below the federal poverty level), current use of CalWorks, prior history of interpersonal violence, and symptoms of PTSD. Multivariable logistic regression analyses were then used to examine IPV, history of interpersonal violence, and symptoms of PTSD as correlates of current use of CalWorks, while adjusting for demographic characteristics. For ease of interpretation, age was entered as a continuous variable in logistic regression analyses. Race/ethnicity was entered as a categorical variable with White as the reference category. SPSS version 11.0 was used to conduct all analyses.

RESULTS

Intimate Partner Violence

Ten percent of the sample reported intimate partner violence in the past year and 2.7% utilized CalWorks services. Table 1 presents the frequencies for the intimate partner violence items. Table 2 illustrates the characteristics of IPV-exposed women as compared to non-exposed women. Women exposed to IPV in the past year were more likely than women not exposed to IPV to be African-American or Hispanic, of younger age, separated or divorced, and not to have completed high school and college.
Table 1

Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intimate Partner Violence Item</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tried to control most or all daily activities</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushed, grabbed, slapped</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frightened for your safety due to anger or threats</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrown something at you</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Followed or spied</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kicked, bit or hit</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaten up; choked</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced sex</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened with knife or gun</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used a knife or fired a gun</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate Partner Violence</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IPV exposure was significantly more common among women with children under the age of 18 living in the home, in fact, the majority of IPV-exposed women lived with children. One quarter of IPV-exposed women were living at or below the federal poverty level, a rate more than twice that of non-exposed women. Over three times as many IPV-exposed women as non-exposed women were currently using CalWorks.

Prior exposure to interpersonal violence was associated with the experience of IPV in the past year, suggesting that IPV often occurs in a life context of violence. Almost one quarter of women exposed to IPV experienced sexual assault, and one half experienced physical assault. Significantly more women exposed to IPV in the past year had also experienced a violent mugging or attack than had non-exposed women. The majority, (63.4%), of women who experienced IPV in the past year, reported current symptoms of PTSD, as compared to 24.2% of women who were not exposed to IPV. Bivariate analyses indicated robust effects for the association of each symptom domain of PTSD (intrusive thoughts, avoidance, hypervigilance, and emotional numbing) with past year exposure to IPV.
Table 2

Correlates of IPV Exposure in the Past Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past Year IPV</th>
<th>Past Year No IPV</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
<th>Chi-Square (p value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.8 (p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Other</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91.7 (p&lt;.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated / Divorced</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>(2.2, 3.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 in household</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>(1.4, 2.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No High School Education</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>(1.2, 2.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No College Education</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>(1.5, 2.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Poverty Level</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>(1.9, 3.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current CalWorks</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>(2.3, 5.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Sexual Assault</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>(2.28, 3.91)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Physical Assault</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>(3.64, 5.72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Violent Robbery</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>(1.20, 2.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nightmares and intrusive thoughts</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>(3.0, 5.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral and cognitive avoidance</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>(3.6, 5.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypervigilance, startle</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>(3.2, 5.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionally numb, detached</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>(2.8, 4.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD Symptoms</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>(4.3, 6.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Adjusted Odds of Currently Using CalWorks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusted OR (95% CI)</td>
<td>Adjusted OR (95% CI)</td>
<td>Adjusted OR (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Year Intimate Partner Violence</td>
<td>2.0 (1.2, 3.3)</td>
<td>1.6 (.94, 2.7)</td>
<td>1.3 (.76, 2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Violence History</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 (1.4, 3.8)</td>
<td>2.1 (1.3, 3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD Symptoms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9 (1.2, 3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African – American Ethnicity</td>
<td>4.3 (2.4, 7.8)</td>
<td>4.2 (2.3, 7.7)</td>
<td>4.1 (2.2, 7.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.95 (.93, .98)</td>
<td>.93 (.90, .96)</td>
<td>.93 (.90, .97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated/Divorced</td>
<td>3.0 (1.8, 5.2)</td>
<td>2.6 (1.4, 4.4)</td>
<td>2.4 (1.4, 4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Under 18 in Household</td>
<td>13.8 (5.1, 37.5)</td>
<td>17.4 (6.2, 54.5)</td>
<td>19.9 (6.7, 59.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not High School Graduate</td>
<td>4.7 (2.9, 7.7)</td>
<td>4.6 (2.8, 7.5)</td>
<td>4.4 (2.7, 7.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors Associated with Welfare Use

Among women using welfare, 27.6% experienced IPV in the past year; 53.2% experienced an episode of violence as an adult; and 45.7% reported current symptoms of PTSD. We examined the relationship between IPV exposure in the past year and current use of CalWorks using logistic regression. We examined the effects of past-year IPV, lifetime trauma, and then PTSD symptoms incrementally to detect both the unique and combined effects of these variables. Table 3 shows the results. Specifically, we first estimated a model that examined the association between past year IPV and CalWorks use adjusting for factors associated with both IPV exposure and use CalWorks: ethnicity, age, marital status, children under 18 in the household, and high school education (Model 1). African-American ethnicity, younger age, being divorced or separated, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household, and not having graduated high school were each associated with current use of welfare in the full model. Intimate partner violence in the past year was associated with current
welfare use even after adjusting for these factors. Specifically, past year IPV approximately doubled the odds that a woman was currently using CalWorks.

We then estimated a model (Model 2) that examined association of both past year IPV and a history of interpersonal violence (physical assault, sexual assault, or attack) with current use of CalWorks, adjusting for the same demographic factors as in Model 1. African-American ethnicity, younger age, being divorced or separated, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household, and not having graduated high school were each associated with current welfare use in this model, with effects of similar magnitudes as the first model. The magnitude of the effect for past year IPV was reduced to nonsignificance. However, adult lifetime history of interpersonal violence emerged as a significant correlate of current welfare use. Having been exposed to violence at any time in a woman's adult life more than doubled the odds that the woman currently used welfare.

The final model (Model 3) examined the association of past-year IPV, adult violence history, and symptoms of PTSD with current use of CalWorks, adjusting for demographic factors. Again, African-American ethnicity, younger age, being divorced or separated, the presence of children under the age of 18 in the household, and not having graduated high school were each associated with current use of welfare, with effects of similar magnitudes as the first two models. IPV remained a non-significant predictor, while adult history of violence and PTSD symptoms were each uniquely associated with current welfare use. Exposure to violence as an adult and current symptoms of PTSD each approximately doubled the odds that a woman currently participated in welfare.

Discussion

Our results identify several important issues relevant to the provision of psychological services to women receiving welfare assistance. These data are population-based and used valid questionnaire items and trained interview personnel to examine issues related to recent intimate partner violence among California women. These data provide confirmation that acute exposure to
intimate partner violence is significantly over-represented among women currently on welfare. However, it appears to be a woman’s cumulative exposure to interpersonal violence and associated symptoms of PTSD that are uniquely associated with CalWorks participation. These data highlight the important role of trauma exposure and its consequences for this population, and suggest a specific need for mental health services that target these issues.

The data from the current study are cross-sectional, and causality cannot be inferred from the current analyses. However, plausible explanations for the relationship between IPV-exposure and welfare use have been proposed in the literature. While these theories are preliminary, their discussion may help to inform interpretation of the current results. For example, power and control is a central issue in violent relationships which often manifests in a woman’s financial dependence on her male partner. Reports from several states that have surveyed women and domestic violence shelter staff suggest that as these women leave violent marriages or cohabitation, the financial assistance from welfare is utilized to help a woman care for herself and her children (Barusch, Taylor, & Deer, 1999; Curcio, 1997). This is consistent with our findings, where the odds of welfare participation among women exposed to IPV in the past year are about twice that seen in non-exposed women. This relationship was observed in particularly conservative statistical analyses that controlled for demographic factors related to welfare participation, including age, ethnicity, education, marital status, and the presence of children under 18 living in the household. It is also possible that the direction of the relationship is reversed, where participation in welfare maintains or increases a women’s risk for exposure to IPV. For example, leaving an already violent relationship causes violence and risk of lethality to escalate (McFarlane, Campbell, & Watson, 2002; Sev’er, 1997), further strengthening the relationship between IPV exposure and welfare use. Women receiving welfare report perceptions that taking steps towards financial independence would further increase their risk of harm from former partners (Riger & Krieglstein, 2000). Research is needed which focuses on violence among women initiating welfare participation in order to disentangle these issues, however, the specific implications for intervention are similar.
One of the most striking implications for mental health services that these results yield is the importance of trauma history and PTSD. Effective services for women using welfare need to extend beyond crisis and shelter-based services for current intimate partner violence. Access to these services is absolutely imperative to ensure women’s safety. However, these services are not sufficient to help women overcome clinically significant symptoms and to cope with the challenges of employment, financial independence, and to ensure the well-being of their children. Awareness of these issues of individual and family functioning are especially important in light of the fact that the majority of IPV-exposed women had children under 18 in the household. IPV was also significantly associated with an adult history of violence and current (past-month) PTSD symptoms. When PTSD and violence history were added to the multivariate models, IPV was no longer uniquely associated with welfare use. If, as these results suggest, IPV in the past year is a marker for women with chronic histories of interpersonal violence or who are struggling with PTSD, access to both violence prevention services and formal mental health services are needed to adequately address these issues. In these data, both exposure to interpersonal violence as an adult and symptoms of PTSD demonstrated unique effects and approximately doubled the odds of using CalWorks. Interventions that help women resolve the sequelae of violence and chronic PTSD may be essential to prevent subsequent exposure to IPV and help many violence-exposed women gain independence from welfare.

However, it is important to note that facilitating women’s access to effective mental health services is not sufficient to prevent violence against women and its deleterious social and economic impact. These data suggest that violence against women may have significant economic costs to society, as has been proposed by significant economic research (Max, Rice, Golding, & Pinder-hughes, 1998). In this light, violence prevention is seen as an important social policy issue. The well-being of women exposed to violence and their children depends not only on social and mental health services, but financial resources as well. Both the Family Violence Option and marriage promotion initiatives allow specific funding for violence-focused intervention for women
using welfare. Few programs and procedures have been developed to take advantage to these funding mechanisms though implementation of such services would address important issues for these women and children.

This study represents a preliminary investigation into the links between violence against women and welfare utilization, and more research is clearly needed. The results of the current study should be interpreted in the light of several limitations. First, random digit dial techniques are not ideal methods for studying low income and underserved populations. Our estimates of the proportion of women using CalWorks services were accurate according to CDSS data sources (2.7 vs. 2.5%; CalWorks characteristics survey, 2001). The relatively large sample size of this study and the high response rate gives credence to these data, but additional studies focused on the TANF population are needed. The current study is cross-sectional, and longitudinal data would better test hypotheses concerning exposure to violence and initiation of welfare services and length of time using welfare.

Even in light of such limitations, these data highlight the potential economic and clinical benefits for collaboration between psychological services and social services. Screening and identification of violence in social services settings has potential to identify women with unmet mental health needs as well as to provide states the opportunity to implement Family Violence Option waivers and gain exemption from financial penalties for failing to meet federal welfare-to-work requirements and time limits. A large body of research has identified effective methods for screening for violence exposure in health care settings (e.g., Feldhaus et al., 1997; McFarlane, Soeken, & Wiist, 2000; Waalen, Goodwin, Spitz, Petersen, & Saltzman, 2000), but little is known about the extent to which these practices are adopted in social service settings. Psychological research that has documented methods to improve access to mental health services for poor women (e.g., Miranda et al., 2003) can further inform these collaborations. Thus, data already exist to guide implementation of psychological interventions within social service systems. Given the financial incentives for such interventions posed by federal welfare time limits, this is a unique opportunity to address significant unmet
mental health needs in this under-served population by implementing traumatic stress interventions that improve functional status and family well-being among women on welfare.

Note

Data for these analyses were provided by the California Women's Health Survey (CWHS) Group. The CWHS is coordinated by the California Department of Health Services in collaboration with the California Department of Mental Health, the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, CMRI, and the Public Health Institute. Funding for the survey was provided by collaborators and by a grant from the California Wellness Foundation. Funding for the current report was provided by the Public Health Institute. Analyses, findings, and conclusions described in this report are not necessarily endorsed by the CWHS.

References


Opinion polls probing both the narrow and broad senses of social welfare among Americans indicate hardly any substantial differences over crucial social sentiments among a variety of groups with at least theoretically divergent interests: rich and poor, men and women, blacks and whites, a variety of ethnic groups, union and nonunion households. The items mainly concern the provision of welfare to the poor through AFDC, now TANF, and Food Stamps but also cover OASDHI. Consistently over more than sixty five years of systematic opinion polling, there is an astonishing consensus, so large in fact that it may undermine any effort to move the American citizenry into a more congregational series of provisions for each other. In fact, the consensus is antagonistic to the public welfare. Americans by their very actions, opinions, and codified intentions have canceled the notions of class and caste in subverting a generous welfare state.

Key words: attitudes toward social welfare; cleavage; polarization; culture wars

The Englishman William Robson put his finger on the heart of the problem: “Unless people generally reflect the policies and assumptions of the welfare state in their attitudes and actions, it is impossible to fulfill the objectives of the welfare state” (Robson 1976). He might have gone on to point out that it is impossible to sustain any public policy in a democracy with deep divisions—cleavages—among the population.

The issue of cleavages in American attitudes toward social welfare has received surprisingly little attention except as expressed by aggregated data. Anagonism toward welfare and
welfare programs has been widely supported (Dimaggio, Evans and Bryon 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Page and Shapiro 1992; Baggette, Shapiro and Jacobs 1995; Page, Shapiro, and Young [1986]; Shiltz 1970; Erskine 1975; Public Agenda 1995). The few studies suggesting popular support to expand the welfare state (Cook and Barrett 1992; Demos 2002) or documenting a shift in attitudes over the past decades (Teles 1998) have been seriously flawed.

Income class would seem to be one of the most compelling variables in any analysis of decision-making and social attitudes. However, sixty five years of polled attitudes toward social welfare have rarely been disaggregated by income group; Page and Shapiro (1996) is a rare exception but even their treatment is cursory. Attitudes toward welfare are customarily reported by ethnicity, gender, region, and others but undifferentiated by income.

Contemporary disputes over social issues generally—the "culture wars"—and over the source of social sanction for public policy decisions (elites versus masses; class dominance versus pluralism) are sensitive to cleavages in the American polity (Domhoff 1996, 1990, 1967; Domhoff and Dye 1987; Mills 1956; Hunter 1953; Hunter 1991, 1994; Wolfe 1996; Gordon 1994; Downey 2000; Gitlin 1995). Small actual cleavages in American opinions among important political groups—a great consensus over public policy—would reduce these disputes to media events and public entertainments. Large political cleavages would begin to point to the consistent influence of particular groups in determining social policy. So far, the evidence for a general consensus rather than deep cleavages is considerable although again there is hardly any analysis by income class although somewhat more by race and gender (Dimaggio, Evans and Bryon 1996; Mouw and Sobel 2001; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002; Brooks and Cheng 2001; Miller and Hoffmann 1999; Hoffman and Miller 1998; Evans 1997; Williams 1997). Presumably the most intense debate—abortion—is distinguished by a split between the pro-choice left and the center but not with the anti-abortion right which appears to very unpopular (Dimaggio, Evans and Bryon 1996). With great support for contemporary social policy or without general support for change or even deep cleavages in attitudes toward current policy, there is little prospect for new policies in a democracy.
American Attitudes toward Social Welfare

Method

The separate polls of the General Social Surveys (1972–1998) (GSS), the National Elections Studies (1948–1998) (NES), the CBS/New York Times Polls (since 1976) (CBS/NYT) and others were analyzed to describe the cleavage—that is, welfare polarization—in American attitudes to the narrow and broader sense of social welfare and to attempt to place any consensus that may exist within the context of American policy. The narrow sense of welfare is defined as public attitudes toward AFDC, now TANF, and the Food Stamp Program, to a number of specific issues and policies closely allied with those program, mainly the federal role in underwriting the programs and to a associated attitudes especially including those toward blacks. The broader sense of welfare focuses on OASDHI (Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance), what is commonly referred to as Social Security and Medicare, as well as associated attitudes.

Cleavage is explored as the differences between rich and poor whites and blacks, men and women, and to a smaller degree, among ethnic groups and union and nonunion households. The analytic problem is not to find statistically significant differences, since only the tiniest difference will fail to be highly statistically significant with such large samples. Rather, the central task of the research is to interpret whether the differences among the study groups are substantial for purposes of social policy and social welfare. There is no quantitative test of substantiality but rather a number of far more amorphous considerations discussed in the Conclusions. The backup Appendix data tables are available online at www.univ.edu/faculty3/epstein/polls.

The narrow sense of welfare is explored with three types of questions that probe: first, attitudes toward welfare (AFDC, now TANF) and Food Stamps —e.g., whether to increase or decrease spending on them—and their effects, such as whether they decrease work incentives; second, attitudes toward the federal government’s role in sustaining these programs and toward closely related questions of public responsibility for the poor and needy; and third, attitudes toward blacks and government responsibility to secure their welfare.

The broader sense of welfare focuses first on OASDHI but also explores a variety of adjunctive attitudes that seem to underpin
the citizens' sense of general welfare: finances, family, children, education, being cultured, life satisfaction and happiness, the role of government beyond its responsibility for the poor, the trade off between social spending and taxes and so forth.

The Findings section presents highly summarized data. However, it is impossible to array all of the comparisons reported in the paper; and therefore, following current practice, the reader is invited to request specific additional information from the author.

In almost every comparison, cleavage among income groups is virtually absent for the top four quintiles or so. The data are therefore only presented at the ends of the income distributions, purposely searching for the greatest instances of cleavage.

The statistical properties and characteristics of the polls—sampling, question wording and order, representativeness and so forth—can be traced back from their separate code books (Davis and Smith 1996; Miller and Traugott 1989). Both the GSS and the NES conduct face to face interviews, the latter biannually and the former more frequently. The other polls are phone interviews.

Findings

The narrow sense of welfare

The attitude differences toward welfare, that is, cleavage, between rich and poor men, women, blacks and whites, between poor and wealthy union and nonunion households, and among ethnicities are typically small, theoretically insubstantial, or both. The cleavage between poor blacks and wealthy whites is occasionally substantial but this difference has been declining since the 1980s. It is notable that there is rarely any cleavage of note among the top four income quintiles; for all intents and purposes they are indistinguishable. Whatever cleavage exists is most pronounced between the poorest and wealthiest. There were no substantial cleavages among these groups in their attitudes toward welfare increases, personal responsibility, or a range of other associated attitudes. Except occasionally, all groups consistently preferred personal responsibility, limiting welfare payments, the stringent reform measures of 1996, and attitudes hostile toward welfare recipients.
American Attitudes toward Social Welfare

Table 1
Percent responding “we’re spending too much”* on welfare and average differences between poorest and wealthiest groups by race. GSS 1973–1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income group</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Difference white/black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quintile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decile</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Responses=too much, about right, too little

In the 21 polled years between 1973 and 1998, differences between the poorest and wealthiest quintiles were only 23.2 percentage points in reporting to the GSS that “we’re spending too much money on welfare” (Table 1). In any polled year differences infrequently exceeded thirty percentage points (Table 2). Yet the income differential between the lowest quintile and the upper quintile is enormous; the upper income threshold of the lower quintile of respondents is barely above the poverty line for a family of three (Appendix Tables 1–6). The differences between the lower decile of respondents, the best off of whom are often well below the poverty line, only adds a few percentage points totaling an average cleavage of 29.5 between them and the wealthiest decile of respondents (Table 1). Differences rarely exceeded 35 percentage points (Tables 2–3, Appendix Tables 4–6). Differentials between whites and blacks were also under thirty percentage points. The only differentials that were larger than fifty percentage points occurred between the poorest blacks and the wealthiest whites and only occasionally (Appendix Tables 4–6). There was no cleavage among ethnic groups (Western Europe, Mid or Central Europe, New World Hispanic, American Indian) and only about 30 percentage points separated blacks from Europeans (GSS tabulations).
Table 2
Percent of all respondents reporting "we're spending too much money on welfare."* Approximate lower quintile vs. approximate upper quintile family income, poverty line, income thresholds of quintile vs. approximate upper quintile family income, poverty line, income thresholds of quintiles, cumulative percent. 1972–1998 General Social Survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Those with lower 20% income brackets</th>
<th>Those with upper 20% income brackets</th>
<th>Percentage difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>188</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>48.4</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>260</td>
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<td>118</td>
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<td>181</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>65</td>
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<td>25.2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Responses=too much, too little, about right.

In contrast, with five possible responses between independence and government responsibility for the poor, average cleavage was even less between the poor and the wealthy (17.2 percentage points) and blacks and whites (14.5 percentage points) (Tables 4–6, Appendix Tables 7–12). The cleavage increased only
Table 3

Percent of all respondents reporting "we're spending too much money on welfare."* Approximate lower decile vs. approximate upper decile family income, poverty line, income thresholds of deciles, cumulative percent. 1972–1998 General Social Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Percentage difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>165</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>16.4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>42.6</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43.4</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>72.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>104</td>
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<td>21.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Responses=too much, too little, about right.

slightly in comparing deciles, 21.8 and 18.7 respectively. Whites in particular had substantial preferences for personal responsibility as opposed to government responsibility, one of the areas of consistent but not large disagreement between whites and blacks over the years but also an area of recent convergence (also see Public Agenda 1995).
Table 4
Percent strongly agreeing “that people should take care of themselves” rather than the “government should improve the living standards of all poor Americans”* and average differences between poorest and wealthiest groups by race. GSS 1975–1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income group</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Difference white/black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quintile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Responses=five responses from strongly agree with the former to strongly agree with the latter

The consensus preference for personal responsibility and consistently against increasing welfare, is even stronger in light of the fact that much larger percentages of respondents simply agreed rather than strongly agreed that people should care for themselves while about one third of respondents each year stated that welfare payments were adequate as they were. There were only small preferences for government responsibility and increases in welfare even among poor people. Indeed, on average thirty-five percent of the poorest white Americans wanted to cut welfare benefits. Again, the top four quintiles provide very similar responses to queries about both the welfare budget and government responsibility, emphasizing the centrality of the natural economic preferences of higher income groups. Continuing the suggestions of Schiltz’ (1970) earlier tabulations, the data document America’s consistent hostility since the beginning of systematic polling in the 1930s across income classes toward public assistance.

Welfare is perceived increasingly as a local administrative responsibility with enormous majorities of wealthy men, women, and whites preferring state standards and responsibility over
Table 5

Percent of all respondents stating strong agreement that "people should take care of themselves" rather than the "government should improve the living standards of all poor Americans." Approximate lower quintile vs. approximate upper quintile family income, poverty line, income thresholds of quintiles, cumulative percnet. 1972–1998. General Social Survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Percentage point difference between top and bottom quintiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>30.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

federal responsibility for welfare programs (CBS/NY Times April 1995). In fact, these attitudes strongly endorsed the reforms of 1996 (witness the large consensus reported by Public Agenda 1995) and continue to sustain their reauthorization in 2004. Near majorities of poor men women and whites felt the same way. Blacks demurred, but surprisingly poor blacks less than wealthy blacks. In the same poll, wealthy men, women, and whites overwhelmingly wished to limit "the amount of money available for welfare benefits even if this means there might not be enough money to cover all families who qualify." Approximately forty
Table 6

Percent of all respondents stating strong agreement that "people should take care of themselves" rather than the "government should improve the living standards of all poor Americans."* Approximate lower decile vs. approximate upper decile. 1975–1998. General Social Survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Approximate bottom decile</th>
<th>Approximate top decile</th>
<th>Percentage point difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Responses=strongly agree that government should improve living standards, agree, agree with both, agree that people should take care of themselves, strongly agree.

percent of poor men, women and whites agreed. However, cleavages between wealthy and poor were never even twenty percentage points. The same pattern repeats to support the Republicans in Congress as they "completely rebuild the welfare system" along these lines (CBS/NY Times April 1995).

There is a lineage to these types of responses. Only a majority of blacks, and only in 1984, agreed that "families are not getting enough welfare" is a more serious problem than families "getting more welfare benefits than they need" (CBS/NY Times September 1984, January 1988). Only very small percentages of men, women, and whites agreed. One decade later, all groups
including blacks were much less sympathetic (CBS/NY Times January 1994). Indeed, while over seventy percent of poor and wealthy males, females, blacks, and whites endorsed government “financial assistance for children raised in low income homes where one parent is missing” (CBS/NY Times July 1977), almost twenty years later, all of these groups except poor blacks cut their support in half for a more leading question: “spending on programs for poor children” (CBS/NY Times December 1994).

The hostility seems aimed toward recipients as much as toward the programs themselves, a difficult distinction to make since the recent social disapproval of racist expression may suppress certain responses. Welfare recipients are obviously considered to be able-bodied and therefore should be independent since Americans consistently agree that “it is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves” (e.g., CBS/NY Times January and April 1995). However, very large percentages of rich and poor men, women, blacks, and whites, and often more than fifty percent, agree that “most people who receive money from welfare could get along without it” rather than “most of them really need this help” or “half and half” (CBS/NY Times July 1977, March 1982, January 1994, December 1994). Cleavages were usually less than ten percentage points with even blacks infrequently demurring by much. Moreover, there was hardly any cleavage at all by ethnic descent with only small and intermittent differences, again usually less than ten percentage points, between poor and wealthy Americans who identified themselves as Italian, Slavic, German, Black, Irish, Scandinavian, Latin, British, or “other, American” with (CBS/NY Times September 1976); there was also very little cleavage among the ethnicities themselves (CBS/NY Times September 1976—three questions by ethnicity).

The tenets of unworthiness—tested by the perceived unwillingness to work—cut across almost all groups, rich and poor. Only a majority of blacks and only in December 1994 believed that “most recipients really want to work” (CBS/NY Times January 1994, December 1994, February 1995). Curiously, wealthier respondents customarily endorsed this finding slightly more than the poor perhaps tacitly confessing an ignorance of the unpleasantness of lower paid jobs—but again, hardly any cleavage. Large
majorities of poor and wealthy men, women, and whites and a near majority of poor blacks in January 1994 consistently report that "there are jobs available for most welfare recipients who really want to work" (although note that the New York Times may have really wanted this response to endorse their preference for work training or a work program) (CBS/NY Times January 1994, December 1994). But majorities of all these groups, reaching eighty percent for wealthy females report that the jobs do not "pay enough to support a family." Independence from welfare is characteristically preferred over the reduction of poverty—the presumed nobility of work no matter what its consequences.

Enormous majorities believe that "people are so dependent on welfare that they will never get off" (CBS/NY Times January 1994, April 1995) and that unmarried mothers who are under eighteen and "have no way of supporting their children" as well as other welfare recipients should enter work programs and "should stop receiving [welfare] benefits" after a period of time (CBS/NY Times February 1995). Moreover, about twenty percent of all these types of respondents believe that "giving welfare to poor people" increases crime rather than decreases it or has no effect (the dominant response) (CBS/NY Times July 1977); a slightly smaller percentage of all groups believe that "most people are on relief for dishonest reasons" (CBS/NY Times 1995).

Indeed, reported attitudes toward the programs may be proxy for attitudes toward some of the recipients. That is, respondents may make use of the opportunity offered by questions about welfare and welfare recipients to voice their attitudes toward blacks and other minorities or perhaps the poor generally, conflating a sense of moral deficiency with the relief programs themselves.

The NES, sometimes back to the 1960s, and CBS polled for the federal government's responsibility to assist and compensate blacks, for fairness in employment, and for associated attitudes. First it is obvious that little cleavage exists among the various groups and that even the black/white differentials, while consistent, are customarily small (the seemingly large differentials between wealthy blacks and other groups may be artifacts since the group often contained very few respondents and sometimes none at all). Second, recalling that five responses from strong agreement to strong disagreement were offered to the NES questions and
that agreement and disagreement customarily contained a larger proportion of responses than the extremes, antagonism to compensation, a federal role, fair treatment for blacks in employment, and others was considerable, perhaps denoting hostility toward blacks themselves and perhaps carrying over to the narrow sense of welfare.

Except for blacks, the nation appears opposed to job preference for blacks even "where there has been job discrimination . . . in the past" (CBS/NY Times July 1977, April 1995), believing that "blacks should not have special favors" (NES) (Appendix Tables 13, 13a). Again, except for blacks, few strongly agree that "over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve" while many feel that "blacks must try harder" (recalling the confusion created by "must" which may mean that whites believe they should try harder while blacks believe they are forced by racism to carry an extra load) (NES) (Appendix Tables 14, 14a). These antagonisms are even that much greater in light of the socially approved attitude of nondiscrimination and fairness. If indeed the pressures of social comformity suppressed even a modest amount of hostility, then the actual amount of racism and perhaps also hostility to the poor generally—the contemporary notion of an underclass of incorribles, deviants, and malingerers—grows as a daunting impediment to the welfare state.

*The broader sense of social welfare*

Very large proportions of all study groups between 1984 and 1996 endorsed increases in spending on Social Security; still, there is virtually no cleavage at all (Appendix Tables 15, 15a). As Page and Shapiro (1992) point out, this has become such a standard of America's reported attitudes that it is only infrequently queried. While support for a national health insurance plan seems to have eroded over the past thirty years there is again very little cleavage, on the order of twenty percentage points between wealthy and poor groups (and curiously high nonresponse rates in 1972 and 1984). Cleavage is slightly more but again under thirty percentage points in preferences to "completely rebuild" the American health care system (CBS/NY Times January 1994). At the same time, there are only insubstantial differences, remarkably small considering the income differentials, between poor and wealthy groups
in choosing between taxes and spending on “social programs” (GSS 1993). The wording is far more benign than “welfare” but it still did not elicit strong support even among very poor people.

Hardly any group places great trust in the “government in Washington to do the right thing “just about always,” even at the height of the Reagan presidency (CBS/NY Times January 1986), which is carried over as a preference for state and local government (CBS/NY Times January 1986). A majority or near majority of all groups responded yes when asked if “there are any groups in America today that are not given a fair chance to succeed economically” (CBS/NY Times 1984); it was surprising that many more did not agree with this near truism. About forty percent of all groups except blacks whose percentages were much higher reported that “government programs created in the 1960s... made things better” (CBS/NY Times January 7 1986) and majorities, sometimes very large for all groups except wealthy males, agreed that “the federal government should spend money now on a similar effort to try to improve the condition of poor people in this country”—note again the use of “poor” rather than “people on welfare” (CBS/NY Times January 7 1986). There was a strong positive response in all groups except wealthy blacks to the proposition “that it is as possible now as when [they] finished school to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become rich” (CBS/NY Times August 1988).

As elsewhere, there is hardly any cleavage at all between the poor and the wealthy relative to a variety of social attitudes: financial security, being cultured, having faith in God, having children, being married, having nice things, being self-sufficient, and having a fulfilling job (GSS 1993). The poor and the rich equally reject nihilism (“life serves no purpose”) (GSS 1998). The paradox of satisfaction is even more astonishing; consistently between 1972 and 1998, a cleavage of only about twenty five percentage points separated people well under the poverty line and the wealthy in reporting that they are “very happy... with the way things are these days” (GSS 1972–1998).

The Case of Organized Labor

Workers presumably form unions in response to the constraints of the labor market, the need to counter the natural
American Attitudes toward Social Welfare

Table 7
Percent response to “In general, how good are labor unions for the country as a whole?” by union and nonunion households. General Social Surveys 1988–91.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union household</th>
<th>Respondent in union</th>
<th>Spouse in union</th>
<th>Both in union</th>
<th>Nonunion household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How good are unions?
- Excellent: 13.1%
- Very Good: 35.7%
- Fairly Good: 39.3%
- Not very good: 7.1%
- Not good at all: 2.4%
- Can’t choose: 2.4%
- Total %: 100.0%

Tendencies of society to neglect its less well off, and the power of employers relative to individual employees. Moreover, in order to organize, unions presumably develop a greater consciousness of the right for social welfare among their members than would be present among those not in labor unions. However, union households hardly ever differ in their attitudes from non-union households suggesting perhaps that there is no distinct social philosophy underpinning the organization of American labor, only a syndicalist ambition to compel higher wages and benefits. Surprisingly, there are only modest differences between union and nonunion households toward the importance of labor unions themselves, even when their central value is probed (Table 7).

The absence of a distinct social philosophy grounded in the grievances and broader social rights of working people and the general hostility of Americans toward social welfare perhaps explains the decline of organized labor over the past forty years—their absolute decline in numbers, their startling relative decline,
and their shift from industrial organization to middle class occupations and the public sector. Today, labor organization is in the process of realizing Kuttner's prophesy of shrinking to craft union size (Kuttner 1985).

**Anomalies and differences: blacks vs. whites, broader vs. narrower welfare, ritual vs. operant values**

Until recently blacks consistently voiced greater support than whites for public welfare and the role of the federal government, blaming those in need less, and wishing more to address those needs. At the same time the data also corroborate earlier observations by Shapiro [1986] that the cleavages between blacks and whites are narrowing as are differences among income groups, including the poor and the rich. Indeed, Public Agenda's poll in 1995 reported virtually no difference at all between blacks and whites in their attitudes toward welfare and, more surprising, very few differences between them and welfare recipients who are by definition very poor. Schiltz (1970) documents a similar hostility toward public assistance between recipients of public assistance and the general population during the Depression and shortly afterwards.

Yet such as the differences are between blacks and whites, there is no consensus among blacks that suggests the indignation and rage of Malcolm X, Leroy Jones, James Baldwin, or Richard Wright. Indeed, the absence of extreme cleavages and the more recent apparent satisfaction of blacks with social policy may help to explain the decline of black civil disturbances over the past few decades. Voltaire would have been pleased, Marat horrified.

While there is a customary lack of cleavage and a general hostility to the narrow sense of social welfare, there are reported attitudes that would seem to sustain the provision of broader social welfare and some ancillary programs to TANF in contradiction of current social welfare policy. In particular, Americans consistently endorse higher Social Security benefits; many seem to want national health insurance and enhanced job training programs; there is even an enormous agreement among different ethnic groups for the federal government "to see to it that every person who wants to work has a job."

Yet, the direction of federal retirement legislation seems to
reward the wealthy who save outside of Social Security and to neglect poorer Social Security recipients. Moreover, approximately forty million Americans are without any health coverage and it is very questionable whether Medicare benefits will improve substantially, even for prescription drug coverage. There is virtually no public sector jobs program and very little job training. The stated support for a broader sense of social welfare beyond and separate from programs for the poor themselves may be illusory. Indeed, much of the apparent support for social welfare in general may be more a shallow hope for good fortune projected upon the federal government but without any strong political will to convert aspirations into enforceable claims. The polls fail to distinguish between real preferences and ritualistic affirmations of America’s ceremonial civil religion. So long as American policy making is open and uncoerced, the specific program conditions of public policy, actual policy choices rather than surveyed attitudes, may actually realize the true preferences of the public will.

Conclusions

The bifurcation of social welfare policy in the United States between modest work-related entitlements and inadequate, discretionary assistance for those outside of the labor force has been sustained by broad popular consent. Neither the bifurcation of policy nor the actual insufficiencies of America’s social welfare programs appear to be impositions of an elite that is any more predatory than the general citizenship. Rather, the American social welfare state, sustained by the embedded preferences of Americans for market-related social hierarchies and minimal relief of want, institutionalizes the triumph of classical liberalism over welfare state liberalism. Hunter and Gitlin worry with little cause over the ability of America to govern itself; polarization appears restricted to abortion and perhaps a few other "body" issues that in fact have not created much turmoil and that remain peripheral to social welfare. Not coincidentally, the cleavages, such as they may be, relate more to procedural issues of legal right (to abortion or equal protection) and far less to the substantive (financial) issues of equality and poverty. Indeed, the powerful underlying consensus on social welfare both in the
narrow sense as well as more broadly defined—TANF and Food Stamps on the one hand and OASDHI on the other—may even be strengthened by displacing social conflict to largely symbolic and procedural issues that preserve more important social values. Inflamed conflicts over abortion and perhaps even the broader feminist agenda, occurring between groups at the political margins, are like the breast thumping among apes, the head butting in goats, and the tail dancing of the stickleback herring that serve vicariously to defuse tensions, select leaders without blood, and reinforce the probity of existing social institutions. There are no culture wars in America apart from the entertainments of the media.

Judged by its social welfare policies, the welfare state in the United States contains a very modest amount of Lowi’s (1964) redistributive function, emphasizing regulation with even a tendency toward “distributive” policies (that is, social welfare as group patronage). The popular consent, even if misguided, curiously endorses Domhoff’s assertion that “classes and class conflict, along with protest and social disruption, have to be taken seriously to understand power in America” but only in the sense that the absence of turmoil is a measure of deep satisfaction with things as they are (Domhoff 1990 282); America’s ruling elite seems to enjoy pervasive permission.

Moreover the programs themselves do not seem to be triumphs of autonomous state benevolence, defying by their actual benefits the rudimentary expectations of Skocpol’s demands for broad entitlements and full employment (Skocpol 1995, 2000). Still, in the absence of frankly expressed group and class differences, it is methodologically impossible to discern whether the public has been propagandized into agreement or the leadership fairly represents prior, popular references. Contrary to Domhoff, the American state at least judged by its social welfare provisions, is hardly the product of an elite, let alone a predatory one; nor could it possibly be judged a beneficence of leadership by noble, brave, maternal, and informed heroines who act largely within the permissions and constraints of an enlightened pluralism. The reigning and deep consensus profoundly rejects greater sharing, greater entitlements, greater generosity, and more opportunity secured by public interventions. Before expanding the provisions
American Attitudes toward Social Welfare

of the social security act it may be necessary for Skocpol to first consider that the embedded displeasure with the redistributive role of government produces little support for a tutelary state of increased welfare and patrician regard.

The robustness of insubstantial cleavages even at the extremes of income and the huge common consensus across time, different surveys, a variety of groups and many different sorts of questions commands attention to a profound American social pact and one that perhaps explains the failure to achieve Robson's hopes for a generous welfare state. Americans may be very satisfied with things as they are, antagonistic toward both the narrowly focused public assistance programs and a greatly expanded government role in securing the general welfare. This uncivil complacency may well erect an insurmountable barrier to expanded entitlements or greater sharing of any sort.

Generosity and ideological diversity while perhaps goals of a vibrant public discourse in an Enlightenment society are apparently not characteristic of the American social welfare ethos, at least since the 1930s and perhaps for the past few centuries. In consideration of the technical ambiguities of the polls, it may even be the fact that America has forged a characteristic political ethos from the vast ethnic and racial ores of its peoples. Thirty percentage point differences among groups that are very differently situated, while seemingly large, are certainly not large enough to constitute class distinctions or even characteristic group attributes. The expectations of class theory and conflict theory would seem to demand far greater cleavages, perhaps on the order of sixty or seventy percentage points. Differences of this magnitude have separated poor blacks from wealthy whites but usually before 1985; they quite obviously carry along with them distinctions of caste made graphic in the cultural abyss that in fact often separates the two groups.

The American political consensus on social welfare has cemented a position quite a bit to the right of center, ideologically centered on voluntary civic participation and good character—"compassionate conservatism:" communitarianism rather than communalism. Not only are Americans antagonistic to welfare narrowly defined but the antagonism is consistent through almost every political division of the nation. Most notably, the poor and
the wealthy, blacks and whites, men and women, union and nonunion households, and the variety of ethnic groups share in the same hostile attitudes. The cleavages between the very wealthiest and the very poorest groups of Americans are insufficient to germinate a sizable constituency for more redistributive and generous social welfare policies. Americans cherish their unbounded markets and self-defeating heroic individualism, apparently willing to impose few restrictions for purposes of minimizing economic insecurity or relieving want.

The attempt to retrieve the public's actual but latent generosity from the meanness of standing policy is built on an imagined distinction between the notion of welfare and the welfare programs themselves as if to argue that Americans are for relief but against the poorly run programs that administer their generosity. However, this argument comes apart in light of the widely shared popularity of a work test (that is, the willingness to take a job, any job), the widespread support for mandatory work, and a stolid refusal to acknowledge frank need. Of course, it is a near newspeak tautology for people to support relief for those who deserve it. However, the actual meaning of policy is conferred by the conditions of deservingness.

American social welfare policy itself reflects this consensus of old liberal and new conservative, the dominance of industrial Republicanism and deep-faith traditionalists. The 1996 welfare reforms, grounded in little more than the nation's meanness of purse and spirit, continue to be extremely popular. Compassionate conservatism is laying the track of public policy. Indeed, the enormous amount of reported support for OASDHI is not a hopeful sign of greater American faith in the welfare state. Instead it may represent the nation's private attitudes authorizing the government's parsimonious public programs. Fully forty percent of OAI retirees, typically the poorest paid workers, rely for at least 80% of their income on their Social Security checks which in 1999 averaged only $804 for all beneficiaries (Social Security Administration 1998; Ways and Means Committee 2000). On the other side, OAI maximums (about $2,650 for a family in 1999) are paid to the relatively wealthy whose government checks represent only a fraction of their incomes. Obviously return on investment, not need, generosity, compassion, or forgiveness, is the abiding criterion of American fairness.
Americans appear to be consistently and historically opposed to social welfare policies for the indigent with little desire for even a generous series of social insurances for workers. Neither vertical nor horizontal redistributional policies are popular. The anomalous attitude that government should secure the general welfare is probably voiced as the vaporous hope that traditional American institutions of the market rather than the demeaning programs of public welfare will provide a fair distribution of American plenty.

Classical theoretical assumptions that apparently different social and material conditions greatly affect the attitudes of different economic groups, races, ethnicities, and genders may have been inoperative in the United States for the past seven decades or so and perhaps for even longer. American processes of socialization may enjoy a remarkable triumph over any material or social reality of caste, class, or gender. All would be well for the very large consensus around social welfare policy but for its cruelty to poor and marginal citizens as well as to lower paid workers in general. More than two thirds of recipients of TANF are poor children who are saddled with the miscreancy that the nation ascribes to their parents. Poor children in foster care are given a pauper’s mite. The poor who are permanently disabled are treated as if they willfully perpetuated their disabilities. Hardly anything at all is provided for single adults who can not or do not work while many homeless Americans endure parked cars and uninvited pedestrians in their living rooms. And so on with inadequate health and mental health services for poor people perhaps explained by a puzzling tolerance among the working poor, near poor, and the majority of all blue collar workers for their decades of stagnant and inadequate wages and their isolation from even the frankly inadequate services afforded the very poor.

Yet if many Americans are in fact oppressed, they are unaware or blithely accepting of their oppression. Any strategy to mobilize an opposition to current social welfare policies must confront the near identical dispositions of Americans and their apparently great satisfaction if not complacency with social welfare policy both in its narrow and broader senses.

The insistence among a number of the semi-proessions, notably social work, that they are liberating the oppressed—a quaint conceit in light of the obliviousness of the oppressed themselves
to their suffering—needs first to find a population that acknowledges its need before it applies a remedy. Nonetheless, the literature of the personal social services, including psychotherapy, has been engaging in a delicious irony of success for years: the liberation of the afflicted from afflictions they have do not know they are suffering. Not only is liberationism an emperor without clothes, but also a parade without an emperor, an audience, or reporters to record events—a total fabrication starting with imagination and building back to history. O'Connor's (2001) poverty knowledge and Epstein's (1997) social efficiency seem to correspond well with the popular ethos.

The reported support for increasing social security, substantial endorsements of a universal federal health insurance of one sort or another, and other preferences for an expanded welfare state documented most recently by Demos (2002) might appear to argue for the popularity of the welfare state. Yet the problems with polls may invalidate the reported preferences for expansion (Epstein forthcoming 2006). More to the point than opinions, there has been very little political activism in support of expanded social insurance. President Clinton's abortive attempt at a national health plan and the near constant inability to increase the generosity of OASDI since the 1970s suggest that the program as it exists may be far more expressive of the American consensus than the reported polls. Indeed, the social security system seems perched on retrenchment not expansion and citizen lobbies seem simply protective of the present program. Still, this line of reasoning—minimizing some reported preferences while accepting others—may seem capricious. Yet in light of the substantial methodological deficiencies of opinion polling and the drift of the nation to the right without much political dissent (indeed, with considerable acquiescence), it may be prudent to ground interpretation of reported attitudes in the facts of live political choices and traditional historical discourse. Whatever the ambiguities assigning the American consensus a point on the political continuum, the numbing consistency of reported preferences seems inescapable: there is very little cleavage in American social welfare attitudes.

Inflecting these general conclusions another note, there may be an active hostility to generosity by perhaps one third of the population that taken together with the oblivious middle has
probably undercut any serious progressive policy in the United States. Moreover, the constituency for reform—the modern American liberal and the New Democrat in the style of former president Clinton—unfortunately favors procedural equity rather than substantive equality as epitomized by support for affirmative action over compensation and job training over the provision of public jobs. There is hardly any endorsement of major budgetary initiatives to realize true structural reform. Without deep investments there is also little likelihood of addressing America’s social problems.

References


The passage of the amendments to the Social Security Act (1994) gave the United States federal government a mandate to examine the nation's child welfare service delivery system focusing on safety, permanency, and child well-being outcomes. Since 2000, states have been participating in Child and Family Services Reviews conducted by the federal Children's Bureau. While these reviews rely largely on administrative data from established management information systems, they also include examinations of a randomly selected small sample of complete case records and interviews of professional and community partners involved in child welfare services. Public policy resulting from these evaluations will affect what and how children's and family services are funded for many years.

That is why this collection of papers on conducting outcome research in child and family services is timely for evaluation researchers and practitioners to read. Originally presented at the "Outcome-based Evaluation: A Cross-national Comparison" seminar in Volterra Italy in 2001, this volume is one of two. The companion volume is entitled, *Evaluation in Child and Family Services: Comparative Client and Program Perspectives*.

The focus of this volume is on sharing perspectives on challenges raised by the intersections of evaluation design and public policy. The reader can expect to examine program evaluation using examples from the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, South Africa, and Italy. Of particular interest is the notion of how complex these evaluations can be and how similar the problems are from country to country.

Ward offers an examination of the *Looking After Children* study, a national evaluation of fifty performance indicators for children in foster care in the United Kingdom. Two themes raised here and repeated by other contributors are that management information systems are not sensitive enough to drill down to the level of...
information needed to evaluate outcomes and that social work practitioners do not understand the importance of accurate thorough individual case documentation in evaluation.

Fein, reports on the evaluation of two intensive family preservation sites first emphasizing the importance of comparing what the social workers actually did with the clients rather than measuring time spent. Secondly she articulates the necessity for the definition of a "good" outcome, that is what is considered a good evaluation depends on how "good outcomes" are defined in the beginning. Next, Chaskin applies the theory of change model of evaluation that involves convening and evoking various stakeholders' theories of change in community building efforts and how complex that can be.

In chapter four, Vecchiato notes the challenges to applying national indicators to detect regional differences, and presents discussion about "the limits of national planning." In contrast, Goerge presents the case that paying close attention to selecting intervention measurements and control groups will overcome many challenges of non-experimental designs, using national welfare reform as the example.

Chapters six through eight address specific design issues. Pilati and associates offer an example of a public health intervention evaluation for smoking and compares it to other cross-national studies. Landsverk and Davis note that system improvements in child mental health systems do not demonstrate individual clinical level improvements. Pompei promotes the importance of informed documentation and how it enables embedded program evaluation using an example of residential care.

Berry and Cash's intriguing study of risk assessment resulted in the conclusion that differential response family assessment and service provision are disconnected from the risk assessment process. Next, Wright and Paget's paper specifically discusses the genesis of the United States' federal reviews from a learning organization perspective, applying the logic model of evaluation. In chapter 11 Ainsworth discusses the cultural issues involved in the research agenda setting process and across professional disciplines, using an institutional review process example from Australia.

Finally Lightburn raises concerns about applying experimen-
tal evaluation designs before programs are mature enough to implement the services as intended, using the Family Resource Centers evaluation as an example. This reflects the condition of many new programs which target the most needy: those parents with multiple needs who live in dangerous or isolated communities, and who take longer to engage in services offered.

This book truly does not offer a cross-national comparison. However, the similarity of design and policy perspectives among nations should encourage more information sharing forums. Several contributors caution about the unintended consequences of focusing evaluations on indicators and systems, in view of lack of evidence that changes in systems influence outcomes for particular children. This book raises the caveat that, to paraphrase Amitai Etzioni in *Modern Organizations*, organizations under scrutiny of evaluation tend to neglect doing those things that are less easily measured because some things lend themselves to measurement better than others. As Vecchiato has discussed, evaluation efforts should be directed at building better theories to support effective children and family services.

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In the current national climate of increased awareness of people with disabilities and national laws, programs, and policies related to disability, Longmore’s newest work provides an engaging discussion of some of the major issues and concerns within the disability community as well as a scholarly review of the of the major events in disability history. His commitment to the vital importance of joining the scholarly and academic enterprise in disability studies with disability activism and advocacy serve as the theme and the thread that runs through each separate essay and issue he has included in his work. Like other notable writers in the field, such as John Hockenberry, Kenny Fries, John Charlton, and Lennard Davis, Longmore’s skillful blending of personal
experience and professional knowledge support Michael Oliver's impassioned statement that "the personal is the political"

Four interrelated areas are presented in 13 separate essays. The essays in the first section, *Analyses and Reconstructions*, meld Longmore's scholarship in his chosen field of U.S. History with his interest in disability. As with other traditionally marginalized groups, people with disabilities have had no voice in the mainstream of American culture, and history has been constructed from oral traditions, scraps of information, newspaper articles, posters, political speeches, photographs, institutional histories, and excerpts from laws and programs. Longmore's integration of these into a meaningful historical account is exemplified in his essay on the League for the Physically Handicapped in New York, one of the earliest disability rights organizations.

The second section, *Images and Reflections*, provides an careful analysis of film and television portrayals of people with disabilities. *Ethics and Advocacy* challenges readers to explore both personal and cultural biases that may be inherent in current views on euthanasia and assisted suicide. By asking that we consider not only "rights" and "self-determination" but who stands to gain from the early deaths of people with severe disabilities, Longmore forces readers to examine quality of life judgments, resource allocation, healthcare economics, and both societal and personal values. The final section, *Protests and Forecasts* addresses three current issues which impact people with disabilities: the movement of disability rights from its first phase, "rights" and "access", to its second, "building community", the place of disabled faculty in American universities, and the disincentives which are built into programs which assist people with disabilities but tend to penalize them for employment and personal achievement.

The book provides an in-depth accounting of disability rights history, scholarship, activism, and advocacy. It is lively and very accessible and is an important contribution to the field of disability studies, as well as broadening and deepening our national understanding of the complexity of our history, one of the author's stated goals. The section on media images is an excellent resource, and the essays on euthanasia and assisted suicide are especially thought-provoking and serve as a meaningful ground for the continued discussion which must occur on a national level.
Readers must wait for the last essay, "Why I Burned my Book", to find the intriguing answer to the book's title—a dramatic account of activism in the face of policy disincentives to scholarly effort that keeps attention and interest throughout.

While the content is readily accessible to readers with some knowledge of disability, those new to the field may have been helped by an introduction to each section framing the issues to be presented in their broader context. As this is a collection of essays rather than a book where each chapter builds upon the previous one, there is some repetition, and history appears throughout. While this is useful within the context of each discussion, it may be difficult for the less knowledgeable reader to place the historical parts into a cogent and accurate chronology.

The tone of the book appears at times quite adversarial to healthcare and social services professionals. While certainly not negating the accuracy of the descriptions, or failing to recognize the frustration and pain that these professionals regularly cause people with disabilities who must try to negotiate the "system", the author may be creating stereotypes of these professionals which may be as inaccurate on a universal level as those used to support bias and discrimination against people with disabilities. This destroys, rather than supporting, the cooperation which is necessary between the professional and disability communities if meaningful progress is to be made.

Two disability models are placed in opposition to each other and described and defined: the medical model and the minority model. Longmore also touches upon others, such as the eugenics model, the "sin and evil" model grounded in the Bible, the deficit model which is an early iteration of the medical model, the oppression model, and the social construct model. He may also be alluding to the diversity model although he does not mention it specifically. The overlap and interaction of these various ways of thinking about disability have had a foundational role in the development of current attitudes and programs in the field. Perhaps in a future work, the author might consider expanding upon his discussion of models, and drawing some helpful connections between these and current programs, policies, and societal attitudes.

While Longmore is an articulate and ardent spokesperson for
people with disabilities, he does not share with readers a vision for the future, for a society in which all people have access not only in terms of architectural barriers, accommodations at work and on airplanes, and support programs, but in which they are truly integrated into the fabric of our culture and society. Building a disability community, and partaking fully and completely in the wider community that is our society, is a challenge certainly worthy of further attention and exploration!

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The reduction of welfare budgets has been at the forefront of policy agendas of governments throughout the world and has also been consistently recommended by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Catherine Kingfisher’s edited book places the reductions in welfare programs in the context of neo-liberalism, globalization, and the feminization of poverty. Western Welfare in Decline is a very valuable contribution to the literature of these topics.

First and foremost, what the book emphasizes is that welfare reforms taking place in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand are an intrinsic part of the processes of neo-liberalism and globalization. As such, both the reforms and their consequences for poor women should be analyzed globally. Interestingly, the authors analyze not only the policies enacted in each country, but they also analyze the discourses behind those policies. The book’s chapters cover at least five different subtopics: neo-liberal policy analysis; globalization; welfare state reform, global poverty; and the feminization of poverty.

The chapter authors rightly point to the fact that neo-liberalism is not just an economic idea. On the contrary, it includes a set of social prescriptions that deal with both the public and private sphere. Neo-liberalism dictates what kinds of subjects we should be. Additionally, it is responsible for the establishment of
a minimalist state; and has resulted in a definition of the poor as irrational, and of poor single mothers as "normative strangers" who are not fully human, and whose subjectivity needs to be reformed. Consequently, neo-liberalism seeks to turn poor mothers into degendered workers who do not receive provisions for childcare and who must work to reform themselves.

Globalization, the twin companion of neo-liberalism, is characterized by a reduction/destruction of welfare state institutions. According to the authors, women have been most affected by the entire globalization of the market ideology and its policies. One of the book's most important contributions is its discussion of the cultural constructs of globalization and its analyses of the accompanying discourses, which have transformed welfare from a right into a sickness. Both in the US and abroad, welfare recipients are labeled as dependents who suffer from an addiction that can only be cured by the market. At the same time, they are blamed for the suffering economy. What the book points out is that the entire process of globalization depends on the availability of cheap, mostly female, labor. Thus while the state demands that women be active contributors to the economy and hence the process of globalization, it robs them of the few rights they had acquired in the past (such as the right to stay home and care for their families while receiving a small pension). Globalization forces women to be simultaneously at home caring for their families while working outside of the house.

The chapters focused on specific countries demonstrate the contradictions and abuses of the process of welfare reform. Judith Goode's discussion of the US Welfare Reform Act of 1986 (PRWORA) successfully shows how a racialized discourse reinforced the image of the black woman as someone who is "dependent" on welfare and who needs to be reformed through "tough love." This rhetoric, of course, failed to recognize the reality of social and political disempowerment. Goode points out that, in practice, the welfare-to-work programs—the foundation of the Reform Act—condemn women and their families to eternal poverty and not eternal salvation.

The reforms in the other countries analyzed in the book also conspire against women. In Canada, increases in poverty in the last twenty years have truly meant increases in the female wage
gap and have resulted in increased numbers of poor women. In Britain, reforms have been centered around single mothers, who, in the eyes of legislators, are responsible for the breakdown of the family (as if fathers had nothing to do with it); a gendered labor market; reductions in welfare spending; and the need to reduce welfare dependency. In Australia, reductions in welfare spending have not been followed by a state commitment to job creation. Again, single mothers bear the brunt of the combined processes of globalization and the reductions of social programs. Finally, the chapter on Aotearoa/New Zealand points to the complexities of welfare state reform in a multiethnic society.

Although the authors limit their analyses to five cases, and to countries with well developed welfare states, similar process are taking place throughout the world. In Latin America, for instance, where the welfare state was at least partially developed in a number of countries, reductions in social spending mandated either by the IMF’s structural adjustment policies or by domestic initiatives have had similar effects both in terms of reducing welfare state programs and on their specific impact on women. The connections between globalization and increased poverty have been amply demonstrated by World Bank data and through the Bank’s concern with poverty as the chief reason for the lack of development. Thus poverty is caused not only by the structural economic differences among countries, it is also a reason for the rapid increases in those differences. To the extent that women represent 70 percent of the 1.3 billion people living in absolute poverty this topic deserves a great deal of attention and analysis.

Are these processes reversible? Kingfisher argues that the dominant discourse of globalization and neo-liberalism coexists with alternative discourses that will eventually undermine the existing policies and the principles on which they are based. In the view of the authors, rays of hope here and there will ultimately lead to a transformation of the discourses and the policies. Based on the information presented in the book, it is not clear how this is going to happen. However, this does not diminish the importance of the book. The authors have certainly made a very valuable contribution to the literature of globalization, neo-liberalism, poverty and the feminization of poverty. Through their five well-researched case studies, they have effectively linked the
global with the local, and discourses with policies. Finally, the book shows that throughout the world the establishment of a market economy has been the result not of spontaneous forces, but of the very deliberate efforts of those with political power.

Silvia Borzutzky
Carnegie Mellon University


In *Newcomers to Old Towns: Suburbanization of the Heartland*, anthropologist Sonya Salamon provides an examination of rural community change in six midwestern agrarian towns located in Illinois. The examination focuses on the meanings people attach to community and how commitment to place is shaped by these meanings. Embedded in this focus is Salamon’s concern for examining the sense of community or the extent of “communityness” experienced by residents in the six agrarian towns. Salamon’s concern for examining the “sense of community” and social change are central topics in the classical and contemporary literatures in urban sociology and community studies. However, the uniqueness of this text is the focus on the effects of population shifts from more urbanized areas to rural areas.

In order to examine the sense of community and rural community change, Salamon utilized a community ethnographic method supplemented by additional research methods, and she devised a typology to examine four community dimension indicators which consisted of (1) public space and place; (2) interconnections; (3) social resources; and (4) cross-age relations. This typology was used to examine perceptions and interactions between two central groups in the six agrarian towns, the oldtimers and the newcomers.

By testing the neighborhood hypothesis which concerned the process of the towns functioning as class-segregated neighborhoods in a small-city commuting zone, Salamon supports her thesis of the emerging post-agrarian community landscape by revealing the differentiation among the agrarian towns, the population specialization within the agrarian towns, and features of
the emerging post-agrarian social fabric. According to Salamon, this new social fabric consists of towns located in productive agricultural areas, but generally lacking social and economic attachments to the areas. In addition, Salamon argues this new social fabric causes agrarian communities to become post-modern in nature, where lives are fragmented, attachment to land is seen as personal property or as an investment, and where the agrarian social fabric and values are being transformed.

In this readable and well-researched text, the strengths include an acknowledgment of earlier studies of community by Ferdinand Tonnies, Max Weber, Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim. Salamon presents a clear discussion of the community ethnographic approach, the factors resulting in the selection of the six agrarian towns, and conceptualizes important terms used in her argument which include town, community, neighborhood and the post-agrarian social fabric.

The richness of this text is further revealed when Salamon discusses the social interactions and the construction of “communityness” experienced by the oldtimers and newcomers. The interactions between both groups and the construction of meaning concerning “communityness” reveal stages of oldtimer resistance, acceptance or engulfment by the post-agrarian transformation. Salamon’s discussion of “boosters” and “pro-growth coalitions” used as development tactics by the townspeople to attract economic development provides a discussion of political and economic factors often cited in the urban sociology literature and reinforces her argument that these six agrarian towns are changing from agrarian towns to post-agrarian communities.

The weaknesses of the text concern the timing of the research, the availability of health care and the emergence of a post-modern social life affecting the residents of the six agrarian communities. Salamon admits that the community studied for the six agrarian towns were completed before 1995, although the examination is presented in present tense. This approach may raise some eyebrows about providing the most recent snapshot of social change and “communityness” occurring in the agrarian towns, particularly since the research examines processes associated with the transformation from agrarian towns to post-agrarian communities.
Unfortunately the discussion of an important social institution vital to all residents, the availability of health care, is very brief. Again, although the focus is on social change and the sense of community experienced by residents in the six agrarian towns, more discussion of the changing aspects of health care availability and delivery would have contributed to her well-reasoned argument. Finally, Salamon’s discussion of the emerging post-agrarian community is linked to post-modernism. By linking her argument to this theoretical and contentious term, a more focused examination of post-modernism and how it is affecting (or not affecting) the oldtimers in the six post-agrarian communities would have strengthened the argument about the emergence of the post-agrarian community.

*Newcomers to Old Towns: Suburbanization of the Heartland* provides a much needed analysis of social processes and social change affecting the six agrarian towns in the state of Illinois. The effort of conducting six case studies and the wealth of research cited in the text are commended. It would be interesting to see if the study could be replicated in other rural areas of the United States, a possibility Salamon leaves open. This book is recommended for students and faculty interested in rural community studies, and social change; as well as courses in urban sociology, rural sociology and community and economic development that includes a rural community component.

Joseph A. Deering
Missouri House of Representatives


With the burgeoning explosion of incarcerated individuals throughout the country, and the proliferation of prisons in which to house them, this volume explores the nation’s current policies on crime control in conjunction with issues of social justice. While the literature is replete with research on prisons, prison systems and incarcerated individuals, this collection is unique in blending the research on the criminal justice system with parallel policies
regarding criminal and social justice. Hawkins, Myers and Stone provide a seminal work that challenges the reader to think beyond the status quo.

The text is divided into three sections. The first section examines the interplay between families and high risk youth with the current political, economic and criminal justice policies in the United States. The five essays in this section provide an in-depth analysis of the economic and social ramifications of the enormous increase in both the adult and juvenile prison populations as a result of current criminal justice policies. It is an insightful and absorbing compilation of studies that emphasizes the social costs we are incurring for harsh sentencing policies particularly related to non-violent offenders and youth.

The second section of the book addresses the issues of gangs, drug law enforcement, racial discrimination in arrests, oppression of minorities and public attitudes. Examples of racial profiling arrests from gangs and drug raids to traffic stops and customs searches are highlighted throughout this section. Ample empirical evidence is provided to support the conclusion that despite the current rhetoric about anti-racial profiling legislation, minorities have a much higher chance of being arrested, incarcerated and sentenced to longer prison terms for non-violent offenses than white persons. In addition, the influence of public attitudes on crime control policies is explored.

The final section of studies takes a hard look at the disparities between crime control policies and racism, oppression and social injustice. The moral philosophy inherent in criminal justice policy is addressed. The tensions that exist between the rehabilitative viewpoint and the punitive perspective of incarceration are discussed as they relate to evolving public and political attitudes. Two studies on affirmative action and its relationship to criminal law are examined with proposals for race-consciousness awareness within the criminal justice system. The final chapter provides a summary and conclusion to the volume. In addition, Darnell Hawkins, the author, challenges readers to continue to deliberate about the social inequalities of minority populations in our neighborhoods, communities and ultimately the criminal justice system.

This scholarly volume is a fascinating analysis of current
crime control and social justice issues by leading experts in the field. The editors have woven these studies into a very readable and interesting whole that captures the reader's attention. Unlike many edited texts, this book flows smoothly in a logical and sequential fashion. The diversity of authors, from economists and sociologists to lawyers and criminologists, provide readers with the breadth and depth of these important social issues. These experts are leaders in their respective fields of study and their thorough knowledge of the subject matter is apparent throughout the collection of compositions.

Perhaps the book's only limitation is the redundant statistics on incarceration provided at the beginning of the majority of chapters. While it is not unusual to document these statistics in a scholarly work, it seems unnecessary to repeat the same information throughout the text. Despite this minor issue, each essay is full of rich material that expands the reader's knowledge of current criminal and social justice issues.

Overall, this reviewer found this volume to be a valuable resource and learning tool. Professionals and students in a wide variety of fields including economics, sociology, political science, law, criminal justice and social work among others would benefit from reading this book. It is an impressive and timely exposition of important social issues that should be openly debated and researched. The book is an enlightening and engaging anthology of studies that will surely lead to lively and intense discussions.

Elizabeth C. Pomeroy
University of Texas at Austin


It is widely believed that the United States is the wealthiest country in the world and that its citizens enjoy unprecedented prosperity. This belief is shared not only by people in the United
States but in many other parts of the world. Media representations of middle class suburban life, the widespread ownership of expensive motor cars and other symbols of prosperity have shaped the view that the average American family enjoys a high income and enviable lifestyle. But as these two books reveal, these images are not entirely accurate. While statistical data do indeed support the claim that Americans enjoy a very high standard of living, they also reveal marked inequalities in income and wealth, the persistence of poverty among a minority of the population, and a growing problem of middle class struggle to make ends meet.

Mangum, Mangum and Sum review some of the basic facts about poverty in the United States today. The book was conceived when its authors were working on a new edition the late Sar Levitan's best selling book Programs in Aid of the Poor. While compiling this project, they realized that a statistically-based account of the incidence and correlates of poverty, as well as trends in poverty over time, could serve as a useful reference book on the subject. The result is a slim, readable and informative work which provides a wealth of up to date information about poverty in the United States. This statistical information is used to draw attention to what the authors regard as a central problem in American social welfare policy today, namely the persistence of poverty in the midst of affluence. This is, of course, not a new issue. The fact that the United States has among the highest per capita incomes of any country, and is home to more billionaires than any other, has been the subject of scholarly as well as journalistic attention for some time.

The book begins by tracing trends in poverty over the last century. It shows that there was a significant decline in the official poverty rate in the immediate post Second World War decades but that the poverty rate has remained relatively stable since then, fluctuating within a range of only 3 or 4 percentage points. In the early 1970s, the poverty rate had dropped to 11.1% (the lowest point ever measured) but it climbed to 15.2% in 1983, and fell again to 12.8% in 1989. In the early 1990s, it rose to 15.1% and then declined to reach 11.3% by the year 2000. These trends are suggestive of a long-term, chronic problem of persistent poverty, particularly among women-headed families, migrant workers and people with low educational skills.
The authors also point to the structural factors that perpetuate poverty such as low wages for unskilled workers, employment barriers for those seeking work, and a fragmented and reluctant welfare system that fails to provide adequate subsidies as well as safety nets to those living on low incomes. However, they point out that some social policy measures, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, subsidized child care, and appropriate educational programs do make a difference. Accordingly, they stress the need for combining macro-economic policies that promote employment with social welfare policies that provide adequate safety nets and subsidies. Their discussion of the role of Social Security in reducing poverty among the elderly over the last half century is particularly relevant to this argument. The authors point out that poverty among the elderly has fallen dramatically not only because more elderly people now participate in the labor market, but because of the provision of an adequate income subsidy in the form of adequate Social Security benefits.

In *The Two Income Trap*, Warren and Tyagi write about the growing problem of indebtedness and bankruptcy among middle class people. They show how growing numbers of ordinary middle class people are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. In recent years, the accumulation of debt by these families has reach staggering proportions, and the number of bankruptcies has soared. The problem is particularly acute among women. Surveying the incidence of bankruptcy over the last 20 years, they found that the number of women filing for bankruptcy has increased from about 70,000 in the early 1980s to more than half a million today—an increase of more than 600%. Although explanations for this problem in the popular media and some of the social science literature stress the role of frivolous consumption, lack of foresight and other 'moral' causes, the authors point out that a variety of social and cultural changes, the deregulation of the financial industry and the widespread use of predatory lending practices are primarily to blame.

The authors discuss these factors in some detail. They point out that, paradoxically, the increasing participation of married women in the labor force has resulted in less discretionary family income, and a greater risk of falling into debt when household income is suddenly reduced through the unemployment of the
male partner or through divorce. The decline in the quality of public education has also contributed to this trend as more and more middle class families move to the suburbs to find decent schools for their children. Consequently, house prices in localities with good schools have increased exponentially, and many families have assumed huge mortgage debts. When unemployment, illness, divorce or other contingencies that reduce income arise, many of these families have no choice but to seek bankruptcy protection. The deregulation of the financial industry has also played a major role as lenders now encourage consumers to extend themselves, and to assume levels of debt that would not have been previously permitted. In a pointed critique, the authors show how the industry has successfully lobbied to prevent deregulation and how it went on the offensive to undermine the nation's bankruptcy laws. They are pessimistic about the possibility of meliorative Congressional action and call instead on local community groups, civic associations and the churches to campaign to protect bankruptcy rights and reregulate the banking industry.

Both books reviewed here make for somber reading and reveal that America's faith in the ability of free-market capitalism to abolish need and poverty is seriously misplaced. Despite the fact is that the market has been increasingly deregulated, and permitted to work its supposed magic, poverty remains a persistent and intractable problem. The perennial struggle to make ends meet not only affects unskilled workers and those with low educational qualifications but ordinary middle class families as well. On the other hand, the incomes of the top 20% of wage earners have increased, the stock market has boomed and wealth accumulation has accelerated. Clearly, appropriate policy action that draws on the insights of both books is urgently needed.

James Midgley
University of California, Berkeley
Book Notes


Few, including Cynthia Bogard, seem to remember the 1941 *American Sociological Review* article by Fuller and Meyers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," which introduced the notion that social problems were not simply objective conditions but something that had to be defined by the right people as a threat to society. But regardless of whether "social constructivism" is a re-invented wheel, it remains a useful perspective, and Bogard uses it effectively to document how homelessness came to be defined as a social problem and New York City and Washington, D.C.

The principal actors in the process were members of what Joel Blau called "the iron quadrangle": activists, the government, "experts," and the mass media. The fascinating part of Bogard's reenactment is seeing how and why homelessness came to be explained differently in each city. In the nation's capitol, activists led by Mitch Snyder and the Center for Creative Non-Violence worked to define homeless people as normal human beings who were victims of economic exploitation and entitled to shelter in fulfillment of basic social justice. In NYC, they were defined by state and city government as mentally-ill victims of deinstitutionalization.

The CCNV was good at creating events that attracted sympathetic media coverage in contrast to the Reagan administration's inept attempts to deny the problem or blame its victims. It was also good at getting prominent politicians and celebrities involved in the cause. Its religious base brought strong moral authority to the argument that here was a problem of such dimensions that only the federal government could, and was morally obligated to, deal with it.

The city administration of New York preferred the deinstitutionalization explanation because it shifted responsibility to the state and distracted attention from the fact that it was actively abetting the destruction of affordable housing via gentrification.
in hopes of reviving the city economy. This explanation suited the media because stories of crazy street people were easy to write and fit their daily experience. Advocacy groups were not sufficiently organized to present an alternative image.

Social scientists, who might have provided credible estimates of the number of homeless people, did not do so because homelessness was very difficult to study, because no independent body wanted to fund them, and because existing estimates were so politicized that credibility would have been hard to attain under any circumstances. Experts were the "weak link" in the iron quadrangle. The CCNV succeeded in persuading the nation that homelessness required federal action, but it failed otherwise. Nationally, the individual-deficit explanation won out over economic inequality. The solution came to be seen as the provision of rudimentary shelter, not the creation of decent, affordable housing.

Unlike some constructivists, Bogard is not one who sees others as having socially constructed realities while she knows what really happened. She presents her own biases for the reader to evaluate with the others. The book is grounded in exhaustive periodical research. Unfortunately, it is exhaustingly presented, making it problematic for classroom use. Nonetheless, patient scholars should welcome it.

Robert Leighninger, Arizona State University


Accessibility to health care as well as multiple and changing treatment modalities and delivery options pose significant challenges to social workers. Changes in Medicare options and coverage, as well as on-going technological advances, merge with the growing population of older adults to create particular concern for gerontological social workers. This compilation of papers by leaders and scholars in the field of social gerontology focuses on important issues at the intersection of health care and social work in an aging society.

Compiled and edited by Barbara Berkman and Linda Ha-
rootyan, *Social Work and Health Care in an Aging Society* covers a range of topics that includes clinical issues such as depression, dementia, and developmental disabilities; care delivery modalities such as assessment methods and case management, home health and community based long term care; and social concerns related to culture and care giving. The authors systematically place the significance of their topic in the context of health care and social work, discuss prior and present research including their own contributions, offer their recommendations for future research, provide implications for policy, and suggest methods for integrating the knowledge into the masters in social work educational curriculum. The concluding chapter is a review of the significant trends affecting health care for, as well as the health of, older adults.

The contributors to *Social Work and Health Care in an Aging Society* have performed a brilliant job of selecting, outlining and discussing the major health care issues for today's social workers. Most impressive was the concise coverage of each topic that includes not only significance, research, and policy implications, but also curriculum advice. Also noteworthy was the prolific use of definitions throughout the book. Because of the particular salience of educating social workers on health care and aging, chapter sections addressing social work curriculum would have been improved by the consistent inclusion of illustrative appendices containing course syllabi. The book's striking coverage of major health care issues will certainly inspire many social workers to greater participation in policy development and client empowerment; hence, readers might have benefitted from a brief instructive discussion of the basic advocacy methods available to most social workers (such as arranging community meetings and lectures on topics such as health care policies and programs, retirement policies and planning, and long-term care as well as engaging local merchants and businesses in community education efforts through distributing informational brochures). Nevertheless, the authors of *Social Work and Health Care in an Aging Society* have produced an informative handbook for all health care practitioners and an invaluable contribution to social work; it will appeal to professionals, researchers, teachers, and students alike.

*Judie Svihula, University of California, Berkeley*
James D. Orcutt and David R. Rudy (Eds.), *Drugs, Alcohol, and Social Problems*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003. $72.00 hardcover, $29.95 papercover.

The understanding of drug and alcohol problems is often confounded by competing perspectives and multiple interpretations of what are essentially ambiguous social phenomena. Attempts to attribute drug and alcohol problems to the physiological or psychological characteristics of individuals have proven inadequate particularly when considering the sociological implications of these problems. Sociological inquiry into the definition, construction, maintenance, and interpretation of social problems has provided researchers and scholars with a more veracious theoretical foundation for understanding the life cycle of drug and alcohol problems. Examining dynamics related to the historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts of drug and alcohol problems is vital to understanding the creation of these complex social phenomena.

In *Drugs, Alcohol, and Social Problems*, Orcutt and Rudy have compiled fourteen articles illustrating the rich and diverse nature drug and alcohol problems present within sociological discourse. The book is divided into five parts blending studies from social constructionism, epidemiology, and ethnographic research. Topics include the misrepresentation of drug problems by the media, the political symbolism of drug education in schools, the social organization of drug-using careers, and the relationship between HIV and heroin use among homeless drug addicts. Most of the articles are well written and easily read.

A potential disappointment to readers is that none of the articles are new. All of the studies originally appeared in the sociological journal *Social Problems* between 1977 and 1997. Most experienced drug and alcohol scholars have already read this information; however, the value of these articles is still significant. The theoretical and ideological chapters are time-tested and highly regarded in the drug and alcohol field. The ethnographic studies are equally impressive. Adler and Adler’s description of the deviant careers of drug dealers and smugglers in Southern California is a classic from the deviance field. The veracity dis-
played in Bourgois, Lettiere, and Quesada’s study of HIV risk among homeless heroin addicts in San Francisco is particularly striking and should be appreciated by all interested readers. A possible shortcoming to the text is the three epidemiological chapters. The quantitative discourse exemplified in these chapters is inconsistent with the rest of the book. Furthermore, the survey information studied in these articles is somewhat dated calling into question its contemporary relevance. Nevertheless, the articles in this text represent valuable contributions to the study of drug and alcohol problems. They are readings that all students and scholars in the drug and alcohol field will appreciate. Those interested in the social construction of social problems will find this book particularly satisfying.

Sean R. Hogan, University of California, Berkeley


The extent to which globalization creates new opportunities for world citizens or constrains already existing relationships between them has been of central importance to social scientists and policy makers. As the period of Keynesian sanctity yielded to neoliberal market efficiency, welfare state expenditures were called into question and nation states began to face serious challenges funding and maintaining social programs. A number of policy makers, economists and politicians began announcing an era of retrenchment and in some cases suggested that the welfare state, along with twentieth century definitions of welfare, would need to adapt according to the dictates of an international economy. Welfare state proponents began to readily critique this assertion, resulting in an ongoing political and intellectual debate in which the supposedly inevitable impetus for welfare state retrenchment has been called into question.

In *Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State* Junko Kato provides some useful evidence to inform this debate. The book investigates how earlier tax policy decisions resulted in a limited or open set of funding options for maintaining welfare state expenditures when globalization began to bear down in the early 1990s. Kato’s
data suggests that those nations, which relied most heavily on income tax to fund their welfare states prior to the 1970s, faced the most serious resistance to increased spending over the last two decades. By combining a multivariate analysis of eighteen OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries with nine in-depth case studies, Kato offers a compelling argument for considering the political and economic dimensions of welfare state spending. Kato looks specifically at how nations that introduced a value-added tax (VAT) early on in the development of their welfare states were able to maintain well-funded social programs into the twenty first century.

Most of the book consists of the country case studies, and most of them are situated in the West. Indeed, only one of the case studies is a newly industrialized country. The case studies allow Kato to consider the political and economic dimensions of policy-making more closely. The studies of Sweden and South Korea are good examples of this analysis as they highlight the significance of party politics and cultural history over pure economic determinism. Moreover, the case studies also highlight the varying ways governments have approached redistribution and the extent to which universal benefits have become a hallmark of nations that maintain a high level of expenditure today.

Overall, Kato provides a compelling mix of quantitative and qualitative data to equip the reader with some useful tools for considering what is at stake in the ongoing debate over the future of welfare state funding. The introductory discussion of path dependency and globalization will familiarize the reader with the current trends in welfare state spending and policy-making. The ample description of key historical periods within the nine country case studies also allows for some tentative, if not final conclusions on policy diffusion and funding structures. The quantitative data and case studies are well presented and, when taken together, they allow for good comparisons to be made between nations and within nations over time. Lastly, for those interested in the impact party politics may have on policy diffusion, the case studies suggest rethinking the alleged demise of class politics and party alliances in the West.

Michael Courville, University of California, Berkeley

Social policy scholars have long been engaged in an extensive inquiry into the many complex factors that contributed to the significant expansion of state welfare provision in the industrial countries during the 20th century. It is generally agreed that, from the end of the 19th-century, governments began slowly but steadily to expand social programs, and many believe that this process culminated in the mid-20th-century in the creation of what is often referred to as the 'welfare state.' In addition to documenting these trends, a rich body of theory has evolved to interpret and explain state welfare expansion. Theoretical perspectives ranging from functionalism to Marxism have been invoked for this purpose. In addition, comparative research has shown the similarities as well as differences in the welfare trajectories adopted by different countries. Many scholars believe that the United States diverges significantly from the trend of steady government expansion experienced in Europe.

Although it may seem that the issue has now been exhausted, Susan Sterrett's interesting and scholarly book provides new insights into the process of government welfare involvement in the United States. Although the author does not deal explicitly with the question of American welfare exceptionalism, or invoke comparative analysis, her account of the way the courts intervened in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to shape the emergence of American social policy provides helpful insights into this question. Sterret shows that efforts to introduce public pension provisions were widely contested in the courts by reluctant taxpayers and corporate interests, and that judicial decisions reflected both constitutional requirements as well as popular attitudes. The constitutional position that states could only provide social benefits to the indigent on the basis of a means test was gradually modified as the courts invoked the doctrine of public purpose which recognized the payments of benefits on the basis of service rendered to the community.

It was on this ground that the courts permitted the payments
of public pensions to the military, firefighters and finally civil servants. In contrast to this occupational-service approach, the courts ruled that the introduction of universal pensions for women with children, blind people and the elderly was unconstitutional, and that these provisions should comply with the indigent Poor law tradition. Consequently, the scope of mother’s pensions, pensions for the blind, and old-age pensions, that were introduced by the states, was severely curtailed despite the efforts of social reformers to extend these benefits on a universal rather than selective basis. These decisions affirmed the Poor Law tradition, and curtailed campaigns to introduce universal, European-style social benefits for all. They also reinforced the gendered nature of social provision. This was particularly evident with regard to mother’s pensions where the courts affirmed establish gender conceptions about the dependence of women and their ‘proper’ role in society. Despite the constitutional changes introduced during the New Deal, the gendered, dependent approach to social policy has been perpetuated.

Sterett’s scholarly book sheds important new light on the struggles that took place in the late 19th century to expand state welfare provision on a universal basis. It is carefully researched and meticulous, and is a welcome addition to literature. Although the book does not make for easy reading, it offers a new perspective that confounds the simplistic view, so often reflected in the literature, that welfare innovations can be readily secured when progressive political parties and popular leaders with the ‘right’ ideologies commit themselves to addressing pressing social needs. Sterett’s account of the role of the judiciary in shaping welfare policy reveals a far more complex process in which struggle rather than consensus characterizes welfare development.

*James Midgley, University of California, Berkeley*
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