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Effects of the Great Depression on Private Higher Education: Impact On Private College and University Planning

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EFFECTS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION: IMPACT ON PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PLANNING

by

J. Michael Hostetler

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
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Private higher education has suffered a loss of dominance in enrollment over the last four decades. Increases in tuition escalated making private higher education distinctly more expensive than options in the public sector. A sharp decline in the birth rate during the 1970s indicates there will be fewer high school graduates for private higher education to recruit. Some private colleges have already been forced to close, while others appear threatened by enrollment decline in the 1990s and beyond.

The Great Depression of the 1930s was a challenging period for the country and the academic community. To discover how private institutions survived the 1930s and to discern how the lessons they learned can positively influence private colleges and universities today, historical methodology was employed. After a review of the history of American higher education with special emphasis on the depression era, three historical case studies were developed. Goshen College, the University of Notre Dame, and Valparaiso University in northern Indiana, were scrutinized and individual and shared methods of survival noted.
A clear idea of purpose and strong leadership were important in the successful efforts to survive displayed by the three case studies. Other techniques one or more of the institutions employed were active fund raising, competent business and endowment practices, strong academic standards, innovative attitudes, positive atmosphere for students, successful alumni and constituent relationships, good working environments with local towns, student recruitment, intercollegiate athletics, and close relationships with the federal government. Planning was also important, although the three institutions did not appear to have implement cogent long-term planning until later in their history.

The lessons learned from successful survivors of difficult periods of history like the Great Depression do provide present educational leaders with a synergistic outline for determining paths through the demanding climate private colleges and universities face.
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Effects of the Great Depression on private higher education: Impact on private college and university planning

Hostetler, James Michael, Ed.D.
Western Michigan University, 1989

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents and grandparents, who inspired me with love and an environment which emphasized learning as a goal and value of the highest worth. To my wife, Evelyn, and son, Andrew, I also dedicate this work. Their love, understanding, and sacrifice allowed me to pursue this degree and so is earned by them as well.

J. Michael Hostetler
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I wish to thank the members of my doctoral committee for their suggestions and assistance, and especially to acknowledge Dr. Beverly Belson, whose support during my entire doctoral program was laudatory. May there be more like her in higher education. A special thanks also goes to Father Theodore Hesburgh of the University of Notre Dame, former Presidents Paul Mininger of Goshen College and Walter Friedrich of Valparaiso University, and others for their time and assistance with my study.

J. Michael Hostetler
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CHAPTER I

PROBLEM

To accomplish the dual goals of discovering methods private colleges employed to survive the Great Depression of the 1930s and discern what their experiences say to modern administrators and faculty, this dissertation will utilize historical case study research focusing on three private institutions who successfully reacted to the threatening environment of the depression era. Thus, their historical records will live to suggest patterns of adaptation for private higher education today.

Private higher education in the United States has been an integral part of the development of our people and nation. Originally, almost all colleges in the American colonies and later, the new country called the United States, were founded as private entities unrelated to the state. This occurred because almost all colleges were affiliated with a particular religious group. Private higher education has proved to be successful but challenges at the end of the current century may be formidable.

Private higher education has been assailed from many sides in a web of increasingly complex sociological, demographic, and economic developments in American society. Decline in enrollment and an actual threat to the existence of private higher education has been predicted for some time. Prior to the Great Depression, Limbert
(1929) reported that church officials and private denominational college boards were questioning whether their small, private colleges were really necessary in the face of expanding state universities. By the 1960s, Lockwood (1968), the president of Trinity College, wondered if private, liberal arts colleges had the clarity of objectives, mission, and spirit to survive. At that time in the late 1960s the decline in the market share of students at private colleges versus state universities had become painfully evident. For example, in Indiana in the 1950s approximately 38% of all college students selected private higher education. By the 1960s the number had fallen to approximately 33% according to the Indiana Advisory Commission on Academic Facilities (1968).

The 1970s brought warning after warning about the survival of private higher education. The Carnegie Foundation (1975) published *More Than Survival* in which they predicted that as many as 200 private colleges could fail by the year 2000 while others would be severely damaged. To remedy the problem they called for increased state subsidies to private colleges because of the positive benefits the state received from private college graduates. Even strong supporters of private colleges inferred that the smaller, unselective institutions were have-nots who could be termed "invisible colleges" lacking a clear role or identity, and thus potentially doomed to failure (Astin & Lee, 1972, pp. 93-95). Pace (1974) took private colleges to task for allowing their distinctiveness to wane and he predicted that this would cost them a potentially life saving feature.
In the 1980s entire books were devoted to the plight of private higher education. Chaffee (1984) proposed at risk colleges would only survive through tough strategic planning. Scott (1983) advised a crisis management mentality for college administrators and predicted the final two decades of the current century could become a worse time for private education than the Great Depression. Pfister (1984) recommended modifications of the missions of the liberal arts indicating that a more practical, career orientation would be necessary for survival. Mingle and Associates (1981) have provided a text devoted to the topic of retrenchment, while O'Neill and Barnett (1980) authored a complete source book for trustees and other interested parties encompassing the topics of college merger, bankruptcy, and closure.

Very few writers express long-term optimism for private higher education. In the decade of the 1970s, 150 small, private colleges ceased to exist as independent entities (West, 1982). That unfortunate occurrence took place while the number of traditional college students near the age of 18 was high, and at a time when many young men wanted to stay in academia to avoid the draft.

Much of the gloom about the future of private higher education is based on demography. The number of 18-year-olds has dropped and will soon plummet dramatically. Between 1979 and 1994 their overall number will have declined from 4.3 million to 3.2 million, a loss of 26%. In the Midwest the drop will be even greater at 32% (Breneman, 1983). Few researchers believe the decline in college attendance will be so drastically affected. For example, Breneman predicted a
drop of about 15% in enrollment between 1979 and 1994. The United
States Department of Education supports Breneman and recently pre-
dicted a loss of 28,000 students to private colleges between 1986 and
1992 ("Enrollment Projections," 1988). This is especially distress­
ing news for the smallest private colleges, where a mere 10 to 15
student decline in enrollment can be hazardous to income expectations
(O'Neill, 1983). The clear decline in available tradition age stu­
dents has already cut into enrollments at liberal arts colleges by
over 100,000 students from 1970 to 1987 ("Carnegie Foundation Classi­
fication of Colleges," 1987). No matter what the decline in the
1990s, it will obviously cause great hardships for all but the more
prestigious private colleges and universities.

A second demographic trend of importance is the aging of the
college-going population. Forty-five percent of all college students
are now over 25 years of age (Hirschorn, 1988b). Between 1972 and
1982 the number of students over 35 years of age rose by 76%. This
trend, especially among women, is expected to continue through the
year 2000 and expand to in excess of 2 million over-35-year-old stu­
dents (Crimmins & Riddler, 1985). These more mature students tend to
go to college part time and their concerns are more career-oriented.
As consumers with economic and possible family responsibilities, they
seem less likely to be willing to pay expensive private college tui­
tion and identify with an environment geared to the less mature tra­
ditional student. Furthermore, many small, private colleges are
located in rural or small town settings that offer less off-campus
housing and amenities that older individuals may require. As
career-oriented consumers of higher education, they will also be more likely to question the practicality of the traditional liberal arts curriculum or religiously affiliated approaches to education. Older students will help fill some unoccupied seats in private colleges, but under the current environment at most smaller, private colleges it seems logical that community colleges and state universities will realize the greatest benefit from this phenomenon.

Minorities will make up an increasingly large percentage of the population as the turn of the century approaches. However, they currently do not attend or succeed in college at the same rate as the majority population (O'Keefe, 1983). Asian and Hispanic attendance in college is up dramatically since 1976. Taken together there are now more Asian and Hispanic students in higher education than Blacks. However, minority students seem to prefer enrollment in public college to a greater degree than majority students, while Black males are attracted to the military in growing numbers ("Minorities Share," 1988). Private education should pursue minority students; and in some states like California, results can be rewarding. Other states like Indiana and Michigan have few Asians or Hispanics and will have to hope that concentrated recruitment efforts on the Black minority may offer a partial enrollment panacea.

Falling enrollment is obviously not a situation which fosters hope for long-term health in small colleges. Religion, not just demographics, is at the historic roots of the enrollment crunch. Almost all private colleges and universities were begun by religious groups for the education of their own members. Methodists,
Lutherans, Catholics, Baptists, and others wanted to insure that their brightest young people stayed in the faith and were not overwhelmed by worldly learning or the blandishments of competing religiously affiliated colleges. Religious dogma was strong in the last centuries and first decades of the current century in a way that is difficult for contemporary society to comprehend. Church leaders wanted private colleges to train clergy, develop Christian character, produce Christian educators, and propagate a particular form of faith (Limbert, 1929). Founders of most of America's private church related colleges assumed that enrollment would be stable through an automatic church feeder system. A slackening of religious zeal was not something to be considered in America's earlier history.

In our present society with its science, medical miracles, new physics, technology, television, and alternative family patterns, religion has become an optional activity rather than an absolute expectation. The Associated Press reported recently that fewer people who say they believe in God or Jesus actually go to church or get involved in organized religion. Eighty percent of those polled by the Gallup organization believed each person should arrive at his or her own belief pattern independent of churches. Seventy-five percent of believers said a person could be a good Christian or Jew without attending church ("Gap Widens," 1988).

This leavening of the importance of organized religion has filtered down to the masses in a very short period of time from intellectual and religious authors. Perhaps the spark was the "death of God" controversy of the late 1960s. Several popular magazines
featured what had up to that time been a rather minor controversy in theological circles: the death of God. A few American theologians had written a variety of opinions on the viability of God as a functional concept in modern society. Their beliefs varied from the idea that God was literally dead, to the more accepted theory that the pervasive culture had replaced God with the self, and thirdly to the feeling that the human race simply has been unable to determine much of anything about a possible God. Their positions indicated the present form of religion was relatively irrelevant to the modern world. The authority of the church to lead the masses was rejected as was any belief which was not verifiable (Ice & Carey, 1968).

Perhaps the greatest influence of the "death of God" controversy was not the doubt of the existence of God but the public impact of actual theologians espousing the idea (Ogletree, 1966).

The controversy alerted the layman to a developing phenomenon of a great change in the nature of the beliefs of their own religious scholars. Perhaps a Catholic philosopher/theologian summed it up for all:

The crisis grows out of a fact now freely admitted by both Protestant and Catholic theologians and exegetes: that as far as can be discerned from the available historic data, Jesus of Nazareth did not think he was divine, did not assert any of the messianic claims that the New Testament attributes to him, and went to his death without intending to found a new religion called Christianity. (Sheehan, 1986, p. 5)

Sheehan went on to puncture nearly every traditional aspect of Christianity by employing the historical-critical method of scriptural research. The virgin birth, miracles, and claims to divinity for
Jesus were termed myth and propaganda by later New Testament authors. Other biblical scholars concur. Schonfield (1976) wrote that the disciples of Jesus created the myth of resurrection in the Passover Plot. Others went further by calling the gospels' legendary accounts dominated by myth (Mackey, 1979). Kung (1974) called St. Francis of Assisi a "Jesus Clown" (p. 134) and wrote that the great religions of the world, like Islam, Taoism, Hinduism, etc., should be considered legitimate means to salvation and not candidates for Christian missions. Kung would later be excommunicated by Pope John-Paul, which helped to further publicize and establish his views.

Scholars from other fields have joined the theologians in de-mythologizing religion and especially Christianity. Social psychologists note, "contrary to what the religions preach about universal brotherhood, the more religious an individual is, the more prejudiced he or she is likely to be" (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 256) The same authors concluded humans are told religion and God are good. Meanwhile, questionable activities are carried out in the name of religion. The electronic and print media constantly point this out to viewers or readers who must conclude that religion is not to be taken seriously. People who do gravitate to religion often do so for social reasons, or for a sense of superiority (Byrnes, 1984). Medical doctors have also written of rigidity of personality, mental illness, repression, and damaging feeling of guilt caused by organized religion (Chesen, 1972). Some feminist writers have branded the Bible as a sexist document continually showing women in a negative light (Collins, 1985). One feminist scholar has produced a guide to
religious myth. She equates much of Christianity with adapted ideas from earlier Persian and Jewish myth. Of Jesus, she said, "His sayings and parables came from elsewhere; his miracles were old twice-told tales" (Walker, 1983, p. 465).

Theologians and scholars have deflated religious myth. But the masses have lately been treated to the spectacle of the self-destruction of Pentecostal, right wing Christian leaders. The excesses of Jim and Tammy Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts, and others underscore the obsolescence of the "old-time" religion. In northern Indiana police and medical authorities have witnessed the deaths of guiltless infants and children whose parents allowed sons and daughters to die at the urging of their radical religious leaders rather than use modern medicine.

Private colleges who could at one time count on a certain number of enrollees based on a religious affiliation can no longer do so. For the average American religion itself has moved to a personal plane untouched by the demands of some religious leaders. Exceptions still exist. A certain number of Catholics will continue to select only a Catholic college and certain Protestant conservatives will select the Oral Roberts Universities and Bob Jones Universities of the land. But religion as a major impulse to attend many private colleges appears to have been weakened by the overall decline of interest in organized religion.

Financial problems also cripple the private college. According to the Associated Press the Number 1 concern of 17-year-olds is affording college. Half of those who would like to attend fear costs
will be a problem ("Teens Worry," 1988). The rising cost of a college education has outpaced inflation by a 2 to 1 margin since 1980 (Werth, 1988). At private colleges costs have gone up 80.8% since 1980, while the actual value of financial aid adjusted for inflation has decreased by 6.1% (Evangelauf, 1987b).

Unfortunately costs at private colleges are increasing at a greater rate than at public institutions. In 1987 average tuition at four year public colleges and universities rose 6% to $1,359. Private college costs rose 8% to an average tuition cost of $7,110 (Evangelauf, 1987a). Thus, private college tuition is roughly 5 times greater than public tuition. In the late 1950s private tuition was only 4 times greater than public tuition and in the Great Lakes area only 3.2 times greater than public tuition ("Trends in Higher Education," 1961). With total costs at private colleges for tuition, fees, room, and board averaging $11,300 for 1988, there is a real worry that private colleges are pricing themselves out of middle class consideration ("College Costs Up," 1988).

Recently, the Secretary of Education and other government officials have strongly criticized private colleges for unnecessarily raising tuition (Evangelauf, 1988). Journalists and corporate personnel directors agreed with Washington officials about inappropriate costs versus the quality of higher education ("Opinion Leaders," 1988). To exacerbate the issue the United States Justice Department is currently investigating over 40 private institutions for illegal price fixing (Cage, 1989). The importance of such negative public relations is obvious and many private colleges will be damaged.
Public fear of tuition increases has already led to the successful book by Nemko (1988) entitled, *How to Get an Ivy League Education at a State University*, and similar publications by others. The message is clear and the loser is the private college.

High tuition is not the only financial problem for small college administrators. Public institutions are using their state revenues to outspend private colleges in instruction and public service ("Revenues and Expenditures," 1987). Many of the best professors will naturally gravitate to higher salaries, better benefits, advanced labs, and released time for research available at the state institutions. Public service activities keep the state school's name in the limelight and enhance their status with students, parents, and legislators.

Salaries for professors continue to be a problem for private colleges. Twenty years ago a full professor's salary at a private college lagged behind the public university's salary by approximately 22% ("Higher Education Salaries," 1970). In 1988 the same disparity exists at least between church-related colleges and state universities (Blum, 1988).

With tuition already threatening a potential public relations nightmare, private colleges naturally have adopted fund raising as an ultimate solution to financial troubles. Development officers at private institutions are reporting the continuing spiral of fund raising goals until the level of stress and hope is unrealistic ("College Fund Raisers Report High Levels of Stress," 1988). It would seem logical that crying wolf to alumni over financial need
would increase gifts over the short term at the cost of consistency in tomorrow's giving. To exacerbate the problem, public universities have become much more aggressive in competing for gift income (Mooney, 1987). Fund raising goals are further complicated by corporations who are not as cooperative with general donations as in the past. Many believe they are too busy or unable to give gifts because of worries about corporate takeovers ("Companies' Once Strong Support," 1988). Others want to target gifts to college programs which they believe support some areas of special concern. Trouble with corporate giving is evident through noting that donations by big business to the Independent College Funds of America fell in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin from 1985 to 1987 and rose only marginally in Michigan (Bailey, 1988).

Status is another major problem for the private colleges. Naturally, Harvard, Stanford, and other prestigious schools will always be seen as high status institutions. However, the great bulk of private colleges do not convey a strong status image. Today's student raised in the television culture of Madison Avenue may not be interested in what colleges, especially liberal arts colleges, have to offer. Smallness is seen as less well-known, less important, and less worldly, where worldliness is a virtue. Prosperity and entrance to the important upper-middle-class occupations and luxuries make the liberal arts seem out-of-date. Computer science, engineering, business, and communications attract the new student, while the liberal arts wither away (Krakowski, 1985). Materialism rules the day with 75.6% of freshmen agreeing it is important to be very well off.
financially in 1987 compared to only 39.1% in 1970. Comparatively, 39.4% of freshmen in 1987 said developing a meaningful philosophy of life was important, while 82.9% thought so in 1967. It is no surprise that a full 24.6% of today's freshmen want a business major (Hirschorn, 1988a).

The whole idea of the liberal arts as a value in life and a prestigious accomplishment is atrophying (Moseley & Bucher, 1982). Students who have learned that our culture is god want success not values. With increased foreign competition for world markets, society is emphasizing research and technology to recapture first place in the business world (F. Newman, 1985). With the growing importance placed on research, the federal government gives massive awards to large state universities like the University of Michigan and Indiana University ("U.S. Funds," 1987). Naturally the large state universities trumpet their research accomplishments, thus locking in their importance in the minds of the public at the expense of small, private colleges which look lost in a rural backwater by comparison.

Big time athletics also contribute to the current fetish of prestige, bigness, worldliness, and the media event. The big game in football or basketball is symbolic of the current "American Dream": power, success, self-realization, and glory. Fans get escapism and catharsis, plus an opportunity to be part of the large status-enhancing activity. The university obtains massive public relations, enhanced recruitment, contact with alumni, gifts, influence, and legislative clout (Cady, 1978). Corporate athleticism has become big
business which plays to a society that presently worships a culture based on materialism. Big time college sports has penetrated the business world and the national society, emphasizing the importance of the state university (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986).

The value of sports beyond the classroom has filtered down to the smaller universities and colleges. They cannot hope to have the same response from alumni that results in millions of dollars of gifts at major universities. They do hope for increased enrollment. For example, Greenville College in North Carolina recently began football and believed enrollments increased because of the sport. They had studied four small, private colleges in Illinois and Indiana which had added intercollegiate athletics and enjoyed higher enrollments ("After 94 Years," 1987).

Some apologists for private higher education write that the near future will not be that negative for private colleges. Foutes and Hales (1985), Riesman (1981), and West (1982) all found a spirit of pride in the small colleges and the education offered. Other well-meaning writers seem to think frightening statistics are actually good news. O'Keefe (1985) noted the decline in enrollment caused by the fall of the number of 18-year-olds will only cause approximately an 11% decline in enrollment through the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, some small colleges cannot afford a decline of 11%. Greene (1988) optimistically reported 54% of all colleges and universities are up in enrollment since 1980. Of course, this means 46% are down. Furthermore, 28% of private colleges lost 10% of their enrollment since 1980. This has caused layoffs and an end to some programs at certain
colleges.

To pretend that things will not be so bad for many private colleges in the 1990s and beyond may be negligence of the grossest order. The closing of private colleges reported over only a few months include: Bishop in Texas ("Bishop College Is Given Two Months to Raise $200,000," 1988), Clark in Georgia ("Clark College, Atlanta U. to Merge," 1989), the College of St. Teresa in Minnesota ("College of St. Teresa Announces 1989 Closing," 1988), and Hawthorne in New Hampshire ("Hawthorne Puts Off Its Reopening," 1989). More will undoubtedly follow.

Kraus (1988) compared the coming decade in private higher education to the crash of Wall Street that signaled the Great Depression. He noted many colleges are hiding enrollment problems by padding enrollment figures while ignoring reality. J. S. Green, Levine, and Associates (1985) wrote in the Preface to Opportunity in Adversity, "For some colleges and universities a sense of crisis exists, a growing belief that decline is inevitable" (p. x).

Private colleges are in trouble but hope remains. There will always be some students and parents who prefer the concept of smallness and have money for higher tuition. A greater proportion of high school graduates may attend college as they see the need for post-secondary education in our increasingly competitive society. And private colleges have their own esprit and pride to call upon. Their smallness may also allow them to react more swiftly to change than the state Goliaths.
All of the above are not enough, however, to prevent a considerable number of private colleges from expiring over the next 20 years. Administrators and professors, alumni, and trustees must view the future and prepare for action to avoid an extinction not dissimilar to the dinosaurs. Private colleges have lived through more perilous times and flourished. Certainly the Great Depression caught most colleges with little warning. A number perished but most adapted. The present times are different in some ways than the Great Depression, but not as shattering as those wretched years of economic ruin, drought, uncertainty, and introspection. How did private colleges survive the Great Depression? The history of higher education in the 1930s can provide us with clues for an agenda to impact private college planning for tomorrow. History should not be ignored. To assume predecessors have nothing to tell modern administrators is to deny the talents and skills that solved distinct problems in higher education administration that have led to the present era. By studying methods utilized by others during the challenge of the Great Depression, one can develop insights and undertake proactive planning to insure the continuing contribution of private higher education to American society.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The Great Depression of 1929 to 1939 was a shattering experience for a bumptious and ambitious country like the United States. The collapse of the stock market brought an economic downturn that shook the confidence of the nation. People lost their jobs and their sense of purpose. American universities could have collapsed along with other societal institutions. Higher education as a meaningful community did not do so, and therein is an important story. How did higher education survive the cataclysm of desperate times? What effects or changes in higher education were wrought during the decade of the challenge? Certainly, the lessons learned by academic leaders during the depression will help modern administrators consider and plan better informed courses of action if the next decades demand retrenchment for some or many.

To provide a better understanding of American higher education and the depression, historical development demands a cursory background review. A brief history of higher education, a discussion of the stock market crash of 1929, a description of the human suffering that followed, and President Roosevelt's efforts to lead America to better times will be reviewed. The effects of the depression on higher education and its adaptation in the depression decade will provide a capstone for the chapter.
The history of American higher education is rooted in the character of the Europeans who elected to come to a land of uncertainty. What compelled one man or family to endure the tremendous experience of uprooting one's life, suffering uncomfortable and dangerous travel to arrive at a new continent minus friends, traditions, and roots? Why does one family who thinks that life in Europe is intolerable because of social issues, religious dogma, economic conditions, or war leave while their neighbors in the next house, equally miserable, remain?

The Europeans who came to what would eventually be called the United States of America were believers and doers who had a vision of literally making a better world than they had known in the motherland. They would differ on just what exactly that might mean but there was room for all, and all is precisely who came.

One thing the new Europeans did not do was waste time. Once the first decade of difficult winters passed and the native population was pushed back, a college was founded in 1636 near Boston, partially with a gift from a man named Harvard (Rudolph, 1962). The religious and genteel powers of the day wanted to copy the prestigious education of old England, but with the additional goal of purifying higher education as a training ground for ministers and gentlemen. Even laymen of the time strongly desired college training, hence the General Court of Massachusetts gave 400 pounds to show their support for Harvard's Puritan founders (Morison, 1935). Even though the theocrats who started Harvard saw their implementation of a college as fulfilling a higher reason, they instituted the classic English
liberal arts college. Religion was important but many students did not intend to go into the ministry. Literature, Greek, Latin, mathematics, physics, and chemistry were studied in a very rigid curriculum taught mostly by ministers (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962).

Many colleges followed Harvard. So many were founded that by 1860, 700 had failed (Rudolph, 1962). Most of these institutions, founded before the Civil War, were begun in a similar pattern. Each was initiated because a certain religious group or faction would decide that Harvard, as an example, was becoming too worldly and begin a Yale to counterbalance the supposed liberal learning. The founders were usually laymen who were inspired by their own particular brand of religious exegesis and a new college would spring up as an outpost to reinforce the particular biases of their group. Excellence in education seemed to be a very secondary goal. Most of these schools were Protestant because Catholics did not immigrate in large numbers until after the Civil War (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

The founders, being concerned with morality, avoided initiating colleges in more densely populated locations. The country and small towns were seen as more wholesome and less distracting to young minds. Local backers of the new colleges were also interested in keeping young people in the area for economic reasons as well as moral. Jencks and Riesman (1968) noted that, "geographical isolation was probably the most common reason for founding a new college in America" (pp. 155-156). As America expanded to the West there was a reaction against the perceived pretenses of the urban East as represented by Harvard. Western residents in effect rejected the
upper-middle-class customs of the eastern United States just as the early New Englanders believed they had rejected the home country (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

Curricular innovations were few in the first 200 years of American higher education. Undergraduates attended college to have fun, mark time, make new friends, and gain status that might help them in the future. Passing grades were rather easy to acquire and learning was basically memorization. The traditional liberal arts college in the early 1800s was often for the genteel upper-middle class or those who admired it and the institution viewed itself as "preparing the sons of the rich to discuss Plotinus in polite society" (Jencks & Riesman, 1968, pp. 91-92). Consequently, growth in enrollment was slow and steady, if not spectacular.

Historical events following the Civil War began to push higher education toward a more modern pattern. After the economy settled into place and immigration increased, America had time to contemplate some new realities. Events that coincided to push higher education forward were the explosion of new waves of immigrants, especially Catholics, social forces released by the war, industrial wealth, German universities with their emphasis on research, new knowledge and graduate study, and the Morrill Act of 1882 (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

The Morrill Act of 1882 established the state land-grant colleges. The new state colleges' purposes were:

without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical
In order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life. (Jencks & Riesman, 1968, p. 35)

The idea of more practical higher education supported by government money was established and soon the states were also voting revenues to found schools and help support the land-grant institutions. People were less interested in the traditional English model of classic learning for the elite. Instead, legislatures and taxpayers embraced the Jacksonian principle of democratization in higher education. The Hatch Act of 1887, the Second Morrill Act of 1890, and the Smith-Hughes Act of 1914 kept up the inevitable trend toward equality and practicality in advanced education for the many (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962). The new land-grant colleges publicized the fact that they were more responsive to societal needs, and the children of the risk-taking, democratic taxpayers flooded their gates.

Americans, at the end of the Civil War, were introduced to the German form of higher education. More flexible curriculums were based on new learning, research, and graduate study. The stimulation, caused by the German influence, sounded the death knell for the older, English classical curriculum. The German model of higher education was especially influential at Johns Hopkins. At Hopkins research which had practical value in advancing the industrial expansion of the country was extolled. Higher education for the purposes of religion and gentility were not strong competitors in a nation of restless achievers. Americans were more interested in bettering human conditions and profits through the new learning. Soon the rationalism introduced by Johns Hopkins pervaded American higher
education, especially at the new state universities (Rudolph, 1962).

These same state supported universities were proliferating in number and importance. The public support afforded them in Midwestern states such as Indiana and Michigan was exceptional. Jencks and Riesman (1968) described the state university and its rise:

Like medieval cathedrals, public universities in these states seem to have become symbols of communal solidarity, a focus of civic pride, and a tribute to faith in ideas that transcend the here and now. The state legislature is often dominated by men and women who share the faith—men who are anti-clerical in the sense that they fear their university is not in good hands but who are nonetheless committed to their church. (pp. 172-173)

Once the states had committed to the idea of public higher education, it seemed to set up an irreversible process to bigger, better, more prestigious institutions (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). The average American, a risk-taker, an idealist, and a doer, embraced higher education as a necessity for national and private destiny.

The traditional liberal arts and denominational colleges were under great pressure following the Civil War. Their curriculum was outdated. President Lotus D. Coffman of the new University of Minnesota said "there is nothing intellectually too undignified to teach at the university" (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962, p. 74). How could the more traditional, gentlemen's curriculum compete with this statement? Indeed, the small Protestant colleges found challenges on all sides in late Nineteenth Century America. Increased wealth and comforts in society challenged the Puritanical ethos of the day. The new sciences, research, Darwinism, and the higher, more rigorous nature of critical graduate study made fundamentalist Christology seem passe.
Professors and administrators frequently held graduate degrees and they had more loyalty to their educational discipline than to a particular denominational group. Alumni and benefactors offered contributions but often with strings attached that put control of institutional boards in their hands rather than in the hands of iconoclastic ministers (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962).

Many small, private colleges could not adjust to the new milieu and only one third of those started before the Great Depression of 1929 survived to see the stock market crash (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). Private colleges eventually did change the strict, rigid curricula. Students from diverse background, the professionalization of professors, and the interest in vocational training (especially in business) slowly made the private colleges evolve to a more modern acceptability. Religious zeal and ideology also waned as the denominational college had to accept a lowering of theological provincialism to survive (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

Most major wars unleash a cascade of social forces that were moving slowly before the conflict. The Civil War was no exception and released tremendous social forces that greatly influenced higher education and the inclusion of women, Blacks, and Catholic immigration.

Women, with few exceptions, were not allowed to pursue higher education until after the Civil War. Hundreds of thousands of young men had been killed. Many women had no marriage partners. At the same time, education at the secondary level was increasingly important to the new industrial country, yet teachers were not highly paid
employees. Women to fill the role of the teacher seemed a natural solution. Secondary and college preparation for women quickly gained acceptance so that "by 1900 60% of all high school graduates were women" (Jencks & Riesman, 1968, p. 293).

Many colleges for women were begun after the Civil War. It was not considered decorous, especially in the effete East, to mix the sexes in college, hence the famous Seven Sisters were all founded by the 1880s. Later as women won respect for their academic performance, colleges in the West moved to co-education. Many land-grant colleges were co-educational at inception. A big argument for changing male colleges to co-educational institutions concerned "the benign effect of them (girls) on the boy's social behavior. The men kept their incipient barbarism under wraps when women were around and had to work a little harder because women pushed up performance norms" (Jencks & Riesman, 1968, pp. 300-301). By 1929, 40% of college graduates were women, a remarkable success in roughly 60 years (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

In pre-1865 America, Blacks were slaves and certainly were not college attenders. A very few freemen were able to attend Oberlin College and a number of other small, denominational colleges as part of the early African missionary movement. After the Civil War many colleges for Blacks were formed with the help of White philanthropists. Most were poorly funded and equipped. Nearly a hundred Black institutions closed their doors by 1900 (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

Booker T. Washington initiated the "Tuskegee idea" of industrial education, while W. E. B. DuBois spoke for classical liberal arts...

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education. The states tended to support Washington's ideas. In the early 1890s the courts required states to organize separate but equal college facilities for Blacks. The new schools were separate but certainly not equal. Poorly supported the "Negro" institutions were viewed as normal schools and did not receive adequate funding to earn the appellation of college until 1925 (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962). By World War I, 14 land-grant colleges for Blacks had been founded. State supported colleges for Blacks were beholden to White legislatures for money and even the land-grant colleges had White boards of control. Given the racial climate, Ku Klux Klan influence, and lynching in the South, most Black institutions of higher education tended to accept the fact that adequate money and equipment would not be forthcoming (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

Catholics started to immigrate to the United States in remarkable numbers in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Irish swept to America by the Potato Famine, later Italians beset by overcrowding, and still later by Poles and Eastern Europeans looking for work and an end to their serf-like existence, bulged the New World's cities.

Colleges founded by various Catholic orders mushroomed. Their purpose was to educate future priests and service the demand for an entrance into the educated middle-class professions for the laity. There was no central plan by the Catholic Church for higher education. Its existence depended on local people for students, district clergy to initiate the structure, and local Catholic businessmen for financial assistance. Almost all Catholic colleges were arranged
much like a parish. They were there to serve on a local basis. Few institutions saw themselves as desiring or promoting a national character with the exception of Notre Dame. This Catholic localism was a possible by-product of former poverty and municipal provincialism. Even at the more influential Jesuit colleges standards were low and costs and expenditures were kept to a minimum, normally by employing priests as instructors. Prior to 1929, even Notre Dame and the Jesuit colleges provided no academic competition for the prestigious private colleges and universities. They were too concerned with doctrine, inexpensive cost, and keeping constituents in the faith to achieve academic excellence. With a combination of single sex colleges and low cost, they were, however, able to retain a large number of their youth in Catholic colleges. Over half of Irish collegians selected Catholic institutions. They were also able to keep the idea of higher education burning into the Great Depression. By that time the percentage of instructors from the clergy had dropped from a high of 88% to only 38%. Thus, even the Catholic colleges started to feel the influence of the new surge of professional academics (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

The twentieth century witnessed a remarkable expansion in the desire for education. Skyrocketing enrollments included graduate education and the junior college movement. Increasing financial success of college graduates helped make colleges and universities into the preferred institutions of socialization for emerging adults. Meanwhile, the United States entered 1900 on its way to becoming the world's political, military, and economic force. United States
agriculture fed the world and industry exported assembly line products before other countries understood assembly line technology and principles of scientific management. The middle class grew and had money and aspirations for more wealth and social pretense. World War I put a damper on growth but only briefly. Following the "war to end all wars" the United States was even more successful. The United States had won military respect and France lay in ruins while Germany and England were seriously damaged in manpower and monetary reserves. Russia was in the hands of the Communists and America was an ascending star.

Enrollment in higher education rose from 237,592 students in 1899 to 1,100,737 students in 1929, an increase of more than 400% in just three decades. A great deal of the credit goes to a burgeoning 18- to 24-year-old population and a 700% increase in the number of high school graduates between 1900 and 1930 (Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors [AAUP], 1937). Graduate school enrollment shared in the growth with 382 doctorates awarded in 1900 and 2,299 earned in 1930 (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962).

The junior college movement saw a tremendous surge in popularity in the early decades of the present century. The junior college with which modern educators are familiar started around 1900 when President William Rainey Harper of the University of Chicago established college courses in some Chicago area high schools. Outstanding students could start work on college courses with transferability to the University of Chicago. By 1904 the concept was so popular 30 high schools had converted to six year institutions with junior college
following secondary school. Close by, Joliet Junior College became the first public institution of its kind in 1902.

Initially, junior colleges tried to duplicate the first two years of established institutions. The spectacular rise of public and private junior colleges brought wide-ranging state financial support by 1920. Labor unions also were in favor of the junior college movement because it prolonged many unskilled teenagers' entry into the work force. State legislators and educators believed the junior colleges could help students who were not candidates for a bachelor's degree acquire education and skills for vocational development (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962). By 1929 over 74,000 students were attending the new junior colleges. Thus, a new educational force was firmly ensconced, especially in the West (Committee Y, 1937).

Colleges and universities had become a necessity for the rich, upper middle class, or upwardly mobile lower classes. The college scene was an exciting environment. Dancing and jazz coupled with Greek-letter societies, social clubs, drinking, and football made "college days carefree, innocent and fun" (C. B. T. Lee, 1970, p. 3). Deans outlawed dances like the "Boston Dip" and the "Tango Pirate" as too Latin and too Negro (C. B. T. Lee, 1970). But it was college football that caused the great sociological popularity of the day.

College football developed from the sport of rugby. In 1869 the first official intercollegiate football game was held between Princeton and Rutgers. Growth was swift even though students controlled the sport much like club athletics today. Soon college teams were traveling hundreds of miles to play each other. In 1873 President
White of Cornell, when told the students from the University of Michigan wanted to play Cornell in Cleveland, Ohio, said, "I will not permit 30 men to travel 400 miles merely to agitate a bag of wind" (Rudolph, 1962, pp. 374-375). Twenty years later in 1893 the city of New York was in a frenzy over the annual Yale-Princeton game. Hotels were packed and rich alumni hung school banners from the finest buildings in the city. By the turn of the century college football was wildly popular. A brief spate of violent play in 1905 led to 18 football related deaths. President Teddy Roosevelt, who had played football for Harvard, called athletic directors to the White House and demanded new rules and organization to end the mayhem (Rudolph, 1962).

Faculty had "contributed a tradition of helplessness in the presence of the extracurriculum" (Rudolph, 1962, p. 382). They wanted nothing to do with the rudeness of football. Their lethargy allowed the game to be taken over by alumni and later by highly paid professional coaches. Professors, with real justification, objected to the attention football and its stars received. In the history of Tulane University it was noted that "team play assumed in the minds of the masses an importance greater than that of professor in classroom" (C. B. T. Lee, 1970, p. 9). Fans sprang to football's defense. They extolled its democratizing influence, team play, hard work, positive effect on collegiate unity, and thought it was a good training ground for the world of business and international events. Administrators did not fail to note the recognition from the press, and the salubrious effects on fund raising, student recruitment, and
public relations caused by the sport. By the 1920s huge football stadiums were constructed. One hundred and ten thousand people watched the 1926 Army-Navy game. In 1928 Yale grossed over $1,000,000 with a net profit over $300,000 for the nine game football season. Even though many in the academic community saw the football star and coach as anti-intellectual symbols, students and the public demanded the circus (Rudolph, 1962).

World War I stymied growth in college popularity but American participation in the war was too brief to be overly troublesome. Male students left for the battlefields of France in large numbers. In just 2 years, 1916 and 1917, 108,000 male college students left the halls of ivy. Food and fuel were costly. Many college professors were opposed to United States entering into the conflict and the press attacked colleges as unpatriotic. The popularity of German graduate degrees did not go unnoticed. One fortuitous event occurred in 1918 when the War Department drafted 18-year-olds and sent them to colleges as part of the Student Army Training Corps. This development was brief but it did put many young men on campus. They used college facilities and classrooms to train for military service. Many had no association or interest in college until they viewed its positive appeal first-hand. With the end of the war in 1919, the boys came home and filled the campuses as never before (C. B. T. Lee, 1970).

The 1920s saw the Jazz Age, the Era of Excesses, take society and colleges by storm. Following victory in the "war to end all wars" America and the campuses turned hedonistic. Living for the
moment pervaded society. War had taken the innocence away from the farm boy who saw death and Paris. Freud, Fitzgerald, Darwin, H. G. Wells, Jung, and the writings of others created a new stew of ideas which boiled away old moorings and philosophies. Fitzgerald seemed to indicate that the old gods were dead and faith in the human race was badly shaken.

Students reacted with loosened sexual morals, drinking (it was more fun now that it was against the law), raccoon coats, and wild antics. C. B. T. Lee (1970), in The College Scene, noted:

> For all its talk about Freud and the profound intellectual changes that were beginning to take place this generation of college students was marked by a charming superficiality, a semi-sophistication, and a semi-innocence. In short, it was an era of fun, self-indulgence, and optimism. (p. 46).

After all, why not have fun? Prosperity in post-World War I America was immense. There was no reason to worry about the future. College years could be mad, bad, and glad (C. B. T. Lee, 1970). American industry was the envy of the world, America had defeated the Kaiser, the stock market kept going up, and the average person bought stock on margin.

The United States entered the 1920s in an envious economic situation. The leading countries of Europe were financially and physically shattered by World War I. America was untouched. The war had created shortages of manufactured goods and agricultural products overseas. Into the international vacuum stepped the new giant armed with successful scientific management principles of Frederick Taylor. The assembly lines produced quality goods in unheard of numbers while
other countries marveled at our technological, manufacturing innovations (Rees, 1970). American speculators and investors believed anything was possible as profits and capital rolled in. Rees (1970) described the success of the American economy in the 1920s, "At no time in human history has wealth increased so rapidly, or on so vast a scale, and at no time had man seemed to have come so near to solving the fundamental problems of production" (p. 18).

The American spirit of adventure, optimism, and risk taking came to the fore in the 1920s. "The market was then described as an orgy of speculation, a mania, a bubble, and other terms denoting a loss of contact with reality" (Kindleberger, 1986, p. 96). The madness of the crowd literally affected the boom in the economy until it became an actual panic to get on board the financial express (Patterson, 1965). Speculators, big investors, corporations, colleges, and the average citizen rushed to speculate in stocks and bonds; but most people, even the well-educated, really had little understanding of the market or the economy. Galbraith (1955), in The Great Crash, 1929, noted, "Speculation on a large scale requires a pervasive sense of confidence and optimism that ordinary people were meant to be rich" (pp. 174-175).

People were willing to throw caution to the wind and stock brokers and lending institutions were willing to be helpful. The stock market rose and rose and as the latter part of the decade drew to a close the Dow-Jones Stock Average doubled in only 2 years of furious trading between 1927 and 1929 (Kindleberger, 1986). The banks and big brokerage houses allowed almost anyone to buy on margin. In
simple terms that meant a speculator had only to pay 40% to 50% of the actual cost of a stock. Brokers' loans soared from a total figure of around $2,000,000 in 1926 to $7,000,000 just before the end of the excess in October, 1929. Six hundred thousand Americans were holding stock on margin as the disaster approached (Rees, 1970).

Most stock speculators were paying no attention to economic indicators that should have signaled trouble. The prosperity of the United States in the 1920s was limited to mostly the East and West coasts. Other sections of the country were not sharing in the good fortune. Farmers were facing markets glutted by their own productivity and the recovery of European agriculture. As much as a quarter of the population was in some financial difficulties because America was still predominantly an agricultural country. Some major industries were also declining in sales with coal, textiles, and shoes as examples. Railroad equipment manufacturing and ship building were ominously down. Unemployment rose while millions of other workers were grossly underpaid. Meanwhile the middle-class consumer was responding to the new sales pitch called installment buying, which created individual debt on a large scale. Failing banks and businesses began to appear (Seldes, 1933).

In early October the stock market started to decline but few took it seriously. However, as the fall continued into mid-month nervousness and distress were noticeable. On October 24, 1929, the panic of Black Thursday commenced in earnest (Kindleberger, 1986).

Over 12 million shares of stock were sold in an unprecedented rush. Many stocks could not be sold. Ticker tapes were unable to
keep up with the volume and rumors expanded tensions algebraically. Eleven speculators committed suicide by noon as paper millionaires became paupers. Over the noon hour J. P. Morgan and other important financiers agreed to pool resources and buy blocks of stock to stop the panic. Their efforts succeeded but only briefly. Over the weekend many stockholders must have done some deep thinking. When Monday, October 28, 1929, came the final note to the crash sounded. Many stock values of reputable companies fell to almost nothing. White Sewing Machine went from $48 a share to $1 in just 2 days. By November 13, 1929, the Times averages for 50 leading stocks had dropped from an index of 311.90 to 164.43, or a negative 47% disaster (Rees, 1970).

The effect of the drop in the market forced brokers to call in the margins given to big and small investors. Most could not pay. In turn the banks called in their loans to the brokerage houses who also could not pay. Banks failed and Rees (1970) noted that many bankers were exposed as inadequate economists and even immoral trustees of their depositors assets. Small bankers and people in general had been sure the experts at the Federal Reserve System would, in their great wisdom, never allow over-speculation to ruin the economy. However, analysis in later years revealed that Federal Reserve officials were more concerned about gains for big investors and policy to help the troubled British economy (Patterson, 1965).

Foreign banks and government officials were in no position to help, and international money withdrew from the American market. London, Paris, and Berlin investors were over-extended and could not
make large loans that might have saved Americans from the worst of the coming depression (Kindleberger, 1986). Without loans big investors called in mortgages to increase their liquidity. Foreclosures became common by 1930 and housing and construction prices dropped. Industrial production followed quickly by falling 9% in just the last 2 months of 1929. No resources were left to purchase foreign commodities because no profits were available. Thus, big loans for bulk acquisition of foreign products like coffee, tin, and silk were suppressed. Prices fell all over the world, and third world countries had no money to buy American manufactured products (Kindleberger, 1986).

President Herbert Hoover was a man in the wrong place at the wrong time. The great majority of authorities on the depression have blasted Hoover for his response to the economic disaster. Seldes, writing in 1933, called Hoover's response "vicious and immoral" (p. 85), accusing the president of a lack of feeling for his fellow human beings. Hoover believed the government should have no part in helping private industry and private individuals. Rees (1970) indicated Hoover's thinking was "the product of a system of ideas, held with the absolute conviction of dogma, which rendered him incapable of action" (p. 219). Hoover was unable to face the future or consider new ideas. When, for example, a cabinet member suggested large individual incomes would have to come down and small incomes go up, Hoover firmly opposed such a concept, thus reaffirming substandard living for many (Seldes, 1933). When Hoover finally supported some kind of action the result was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. A
protectionist tariff, Smoot-Hawley set off a wave of retaliatory tariffs by foreign competitors. This worsened trade, caused more foreign defaults on loans, and exacerbated the depth of the depression (Kindleberger, 1986).

The results of the crash of 1929 and the inactivity of Hoover in 1930 and 1931 were crushing for those who lost their jobs. They were the main victims of the despair of the Great Depression. In early 1930, 2,500,000 were unemployed. Less than a year later, in January of 1931, the out-of-work rose to 6,000,000 (Seldes, 1933). By 1934, 13,000,000 desperate people looked for work in the cities and across the farmlands of America. The time of the hobo had arrived (Lange & Taylor, 1969). Those who were fortunate enough to retain their jobs saw their wages cut by as much as 40% or more. Prices went down to offset some of the loss of purchasing power. Nevertheless most people who were employed had considerably reduced circumstances (Seldes, 1933).

People who still had adequate income thanked their stars and looked around for low cost amusement in Hoover's last presidential years. They escaped to the new miniature golf craze, movies boomed, everything Mexican took on a vogue for a time, and reading became much more popular. The social experiment that was Russia fascinated some, while others were glued to the radios for Rudy Vallee and Amos 'n Andy (Seldes, 1933).

The unemployed factory worker and failing farmer and sharecropper were not so lucky. By 1932 violence had begun. In Illinois's coal field strikers were shot and killed and the National Guard was
called in as virtual war threatened the mines. Farmers and share-croppers were the worst victims of the economy. Prices slumped, mortgages were called in, and farmers suffered a real income loss of 75%. In Iowa, 1932 saw farmers block roads and storm jails to release friends as rural violence increased (Rees, 1970). Worse would be in store for plains ranchers when drought would ruin a whole way of life in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, and other states. For example, the plains states had produced as much as 99,000 bales of cotton, but by 1934 only 12,500 bales could be coaxed from parched lands. Drought and improper farming methods sent top soil blowing to the Atlantic Ocean, while unkind fate blew the tenant farmers and their families to the Pacific coast to pick fruit or starve (Lange & Taylor, 1969).

The mood of 1932 America was frustration summed up by the sad chapter of history called the Bonus Army. Many veterans of World War I were unemployed. A movement started among them to demand the immediate payment of bonuses for war service they had been promised but were not due to receive until 1945. The concept of the demand swept the nation and ragged men and their families descended on Washington, D.C. By late spring, 1932, over 25,000 Bonus Army members were camped in a swampy area near the capitol. Led by Walter Waters, they lobbied Congress for their money. When the Senate rejected their request, many left the tension-filled city. Fifteen thousand stayed and threatened to live in their camp until 1945, if necessary, to get their bonuses.
Rumors broke out that Walter "Hot" Waters was considering his followers as a possible revolutionary movement to be called the "Khaki Shirts." On July 28, 1932, a fight between police and Bonus Army members broke out. Police were beaten with clubs, lead pipes, and bricks. They responded with pistol fire and several veterans were killed.

The U.S. Army under General Douglas MacArthur was called in to route the unemployed from their camp. With fixed bayonets, drawn sabers, tear gas, and tanks, the Bonus Army was driven out of Washington, D.C. No one will ever know if the force used was necessary, but President Hoover's last vestiges of credibility were gone. His defeat by Roosevelt was a certainty (Rees, 1970).

President Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated in March 1933. He faced a grave economic crisis. Banks were closed to stop massive withdrawals which were causing bankruptcies, especially in the Midwest. The strikes continued. Hunger and despair demoralized many. Fewer births occurred, luxuries were unaffordable, and colleges saw enrollments drop. "As factories closed and stores were emptied the country seemed to quiet down. Fewer trains sped between cities, and there was less automobile traffic on the roads" (Patterson, 1965, p. 209). Private charities were overextended. Hoboes chased rumors of work across the country or rode the rails to avoid shame at home and give some purpose to life. Apple vendors sold nickel apples in every large city. Bread lines and employment lines snaked around city blocks while the country waited for the untested Roosevelt to act.
Fortunately for the country Roosevelt was an optimist who believed in using the powers of his office to the fullest. He told the radio audience following his March inauguration that they were going to get a new deal. Within 2 weeks the banking system was open and back to normal and the people had some hope (Rees, 1970).

Roosevelt took the United States off of Hoover's precious gold standard and began the first small steps of his revolutionary New Deal. The increased political tensions with the fascists in Europe helped create some unity in the country and a tentative need for industrial production. Rees (1970) credited Roosevelt with the "gift of crystallizing and giving a revolutionary direction to the enormous body of mass discontent, desperation and frustration which the depression had engendered" (p. 282).

By 1935 the Works Progress Administration was putting 8,000,000 of the 13,000,000 unemployed back to work. The Agricultural Adjustment Act and Farm Security Administration helped farmers get back on their feet. The Social Security Program brought the promise of an old age pension. Various banking acts protected investors and established the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate stock markets (Ladenburg & Brockunier, 1971). Eventually, World War II would bring America to full production and a new era of unprecedented prosperity.

Having surveyed the background of higher education in America, the causes of the Great Depression, and its eventual solution, higher education during the 1930s will be discussed. What happened to colleges and universities? Were they blighted by the malaise of the
times? How did they respond to the challenges of survival? The answers are stimulating.

Most educators, indeed most bankers, did not really comprehend the severity of the years that would follow the stock market collapse of October 1929. College enrollment and income production from various sources had been increasing for over a decade. People had not yet lost the optimism engendered by the boom of the 1920s. Budgets and enrollment were set for the 1929-1930 academic year, so administrators must have watched the market and prayed that endowments would not be liquidated.

If officials in higher education would have possessed a crystal ball they could have known that 1930 to 1934 would be very difficult times with 1933 representing the blackest hour. President Roosevelt's New Deal restored confidence and the coming face-off with the fascists would help America's recovery and uphill climb around 1935. Higher education had to somehow live through the dangerous first half of the depression decade.

In 1929 total undergraduate enrollment stood at 1,100,787. By 1930 the effects of the depression were already noticeable as total enrolled undergraduates fell by about 2%. By 1933 the total undergraduate enrollment bottomed out at 1,055,360, a total drop of 4% since the history-making economic collapse (Committee Y, 1937).

The average decline in enrollment for all four year institutions between 1929 and 1933 was a negative 7.9%. The North Central area of the country, which included Indiana and Michigan, was hardest hit with an average decline of 10.1%. Private, endowed colleges declined
an average of 9.4%, public institutions dropped an average of 7.8%, while private, denominational colleges declined the least by an average of 4.7%. Junior colleges actually rose a phenomenal 45.5% between 1929 and 1933. Graduate school enrollment stayed steady during the early years of the depression and even showed modest gains of around 6% by 1934 (Committee Y, 1937).

By the end of the decade observing the increases in total enrollment in undergraduate, graduate, and junior college education between 1930 and 1940 the researcher would never know a catastrophic depression had taken place. Total undergraduate enrollment in four year institutions of higher education grew from 1,082,443 in 1930 to 1,499,109 in 1940 for an increase of 38.5%. Graduate school enrollment climbed from 51,064 students in 1930 to 103,276 in 1940 for a leap of 102%. Junior colleges surged from an enrollment of 54,583 students in 1930 to 149,854 individuals by the turn of the decade for a 280% increase in enrollment (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952).

One of the most surprising features of this unfortunate time was that college attendance dropped very little during the darkest financial period the U.S. taxpayers had ever seen. In the preceding section the desultory effects on unemployment and cuts in salary were duly noted. Millions of people were unemployed. Miners, farmers, factory workers, and unskilled laborers had to endure painful salary cuts. The middle class and professional white-collar employees who had retained their jobs had little extra money for the luxury of college.
Fortunately for higher education several factors helped educators weather a potentially disastrous enrollment decline. The number of people in the 18 to 21 year old age group had grown from 7,000,000 people, 6.9% of the total 1920 United States population to 9,000,000, which was 7.4% of the total 1930 United States population. There were, therefore, more potential college matriculants than in the previous decade (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952). Furthermore, the high school movement had accelerated swiftly since the turn of the century. Two and a half million young people were enrolled in high schools in 1920 while approximately 4,800,000 were studying in the secondary schools in 1930. By 1935 the number had jumped to 5,500,000 high school students (Duffus, 1936). Obtaining a high school degree had also increased in importance. Just before World War I only about 25% of high school students graduated. By the early 1930s, 43% obtained a diploma from high school and became potential college matriculants (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). Outright numbers and the secondary school movement were the great allies of higher education.

The tenacity of college enrollments during this time of scarcity had several other sociological allies. The attractiveness of college life and its rewards had been firmly planted in young minds in the Roaring Twenties. College was considered rather glamorous and colorful. Modern researchers have only to watch Mickey Rooney as "Andy Hardy" go off to college in the movies of the period to catch the flavor of the times. Tweedy lovable professors, vivacious co-eds, fun, football, and a sense that graduation with a degree would put
students in the better classes of society were obvious lessons. College attendance was prestigious and the thing to do. It gave young people an opportunity to delay responsibilities and obtain a sense of belonging with others in their own age group who would be the elite. There was even the possibility of real intellectual curiosity (Committee Y, 1937).

Another major reason for college attendance revolved around employment or the lack of employment. Students believed a college education paid off in the job market. College led to a white-collar career with clean hands and a nice pay check.

Contacts could be made at college that would help a person later in life. Jencks and Riesman (1967) pointed out:

Enrollment increases during the Depression suggests, however, that widespread unemployment makes college seem more attractive. While few families could afford to spend much on their children's education during the Thirties, and many badly needed the extra income, their children could seldom find jobs. Under those circumstances college evidently made sense to some who would not have chosen it in the Twenties. (In addition, the Depression very clearly illustrates the advantages of having a degree, for college graduates in bureaucratic, white-collar jobs suffered relatively less than other sorts of workers.) (p. 108).

The tremendous success of the junior college movement during the depression happened for all of the above reasons and more. Junior colleges already had momentum from the 1920s. Hard times were an aid to the movement which tended to be local, low cost, Western, practical, and democratic. With less money available for tuition at the more expensive four year colleges and universities, low cost, local junior colleges were a bargain. The young student could live at home and not "waste" money with frivolous residential college life. Jobs
were few and if the liberal arts did not appear to be a sure path to solid employment then the junior college student could select a vocationally oriented curriculum (Committee Y, 1937). Junior colleges seemed to appeal to all needs and all people. Hence, their growth in the less effete West was a powerful force. By 1930 California enrolled over 20% of the nation's junior college students in predominantly public institutions (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952).

If enrollments did not fall too drastically what happened to other important sources of income during the depression? Duffus (1936) reported on the immediate aftermath of the 1929 crash:

The collapse of the boom almost at once reduced most of the sources of collegiate revenues. Large gifts and bequests ceased to be common. Interest funds sometimes lost much of their productivity. Appropriations for the tax-supported institutions were drastically reduced. (p. 80)

The United States Department of Education at that time reported college and university income in six categories. Between 1929 and 1933 (the worst year for higher education) total income for the entire collegiate community fell 31% in five reliably reported categories. The sixth category of income was entitled "Other" and included profits from bookstores, dormitories, and many other projects and side industries which were not identically undertaken or reported by various institutions.

As noted, enrollments stayed remarkably stable and on the average income from student fees went down only a few percentage points. Support from the United States government actually increased slightly during the first part of the decade. The severe losses in income
were from state and local governments which fell 40% between 1929 and 1933, private gifts off 69% in 4 years, and endowment income which tumbled 27% by 1933 (Committee Y, 1937). The very next year, 1934, saw all income categories rise as the Roosevelt plan and new confidence lifted the nation out of distress.

Both public and private institutions shared in the misery. State tax revenues fell sharply and state universities saw their major source of funds evaporate. This was particularly distressing since fund raising was not as lucrative or as sophisticated as at the privately endowed and denominational colleges. Federal government money did not dry up although most of the remaining funding was for research. Fortunately, public institutions saw tax support go up in 1935 and by 1938 they received close to predepression levels of state financing (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952).

Private colleges and denominational institutions were hurt the most by the decline in the Gross National Product. With endowment income decimated by the stock market crash and alumni donors closing wallets, private college administrators faced disheartening budgetary problems. Michigan and Indiana present an example. In the first half of the depression total income in Michigan private colleges dropped by 16%, while in Indiana private institutions lost 16.5% of their total income (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952).

Between 1929 and 1931 colleges and universities tried to maintain their operations by cutting expenses for capital outlay. In just 2 years expenditures for capital outlay declined by 32.5%. By
contrast, money spent on general administration actually went up in the first 2 years of the depression (Committee Y, 1957).

By 1932 administrators understood the depth of the financial problems that faced them. In 1933 all categories of spending were slashed (Committee Y, 1937). Rohrbach (1934) noted that all institutions were economizing. New construction was canceled, new books were unpurchased, travel was reduced, with similar cuts in clerical and office expenses, publications, and research. Extension and correspondence courses were realigned on a self-supporting basis.

Between 1929 and the low point of 1933 total expenditures for higher education were cut by 28% from around $199,808,000 to $140,630,000. Capital outlay continued as the major reduction of choice, dropping by approximately 86% from a high of $42,817,000 in 1929 to a low of $6,112,000 in 1933. The other major reduction in expenditures was in general administration which included the most essential expenses for higher education such as salaries, benefits, library expenses, etc. From a high of $127,311,000 spent in 1931 general administrative expenditures fell by 13% to a low of $110,507,000 in 1933. Research stayed basically unchanged because of the support of the United States government. Extension and correspondence course expenditures fell by 27% from 1929 to 1933; but this item was becoming a profit making venture and, therefore, was not a serious difficulty. By 1934 expenditures started to rise as did income (Committee Y, 1937).

The larger, state universities had a greater decrease in expenditures during the early 1930s. The public universities' total
expenditures dropped by 38% while private colleges went down by only 20%. Junior colleges' expenditures were down by 25% and teacher training colleges cut 32% (Rohrbach, 1934). Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors (1937) noted declines in expenditures for general administration of 16.6% at state schools while privately endowed colleges decreased general administration by 5.4%. Denominational colleges actually increased spending on general administration during 1931-1933 by 1.4%.

It is interesting to observe that state universities and colleges initially bore the brunt of the depression. However, this did not last long. Private and denominational colleges had performed very well in the previous decade and major building campaigns had doubled the value of their real estate. They did not need to be overly concerned with capital outlay for a few years. The more farsighted had also built up some reserves during the good years which was uncommon at state colleges, where some legislatures did not allow discretionary reserves. The private and denominational colleges were more willing to go into debt to attempt to stem the enrollment challenge of the lower cost state institutions (Committee Y, 1937).

Debt became a burden for the private and denominational colleges. Between 1931 and 1934 they spent more than they earned while, pushed by state legislatures, public institutions cut costs and were in the black by 1933. For example, in 1931 private and denominational colleges overspent by 40.5%. By 1933 the same group still overspent by 16.8% as income failed to meet their image of themselves (Committee Y, 1937).
Rohrbach (1934) observed a reluctance of many private colleges to raise tuition to cover expenses. Only a 3% to 11% increase in tuition was typical. Furthermore, Rohrbach noted that between 1929 and 1933 "tuition rates have not fluctuated greatly during the last five year period" (p. 401). However, state school tuition was already lower than that of private colleges. For example, the University of Georgia cost only $41.50 a year to attend while inexpensive private colleges were typically around $365 a year (Rohrbach, 1934). A year's tuition of $365 sounds like a bargain to modern ears until one remembers many middle-class families were making less than $2,000 a year.

When a small upswing in prosperity returned around 1935 and the Gross National Product went up, state universities and public institutions rebounded more rapidly than the private colleges. Roosevelt's policies had made government assistance an accepted fact and state legislatures were soon helping state colleges outspend the private sector. In expenditures for the all-important educational and general expenses (salaries, instructional equipment, libraries, etc.) the private sector spent 51.3% of the total outflow by all of higher education in 1932. At the end of the depression in 1940 the public sector had reversed the situation and spent 51.1% of the total general and educational expenses for the higher education community. Money for capital outlay followed a similar pattern. The private sector spent 56.4% of the total higher education allotment for buildings, grounds, and new construction early in the 1930s. By 1940 the public sector owned 58.4% of capital outlay projects. Research money
had been the monopoly of the public institutions for years. About
the only area private colleges commanded by the end of the depression
was spending for noneducational purposes like scholarships, pension,
fellowships, and interest on indebtedness (Higher Education in the
Forty-Eight States, 1952). This was a dubious distinction at best.

That higher education met the challenges of the depression is
obvious by the present proliferation of colleges and universities.
The depression, however, was a tremendous shock to administrators of
the time. Regents of the University of Wisconsin announced that they
would not seek any further benefactors for foundation accounts in
1925. By 1930 chagrined officials reversed this self-reliant stance
(Rudolph, 1962).

As noted, it took higher education a year or two to realize the
seriousness of their financial problem. When they did understand it
they attacked with the zeal of a struggle for existence. Institutions
began reducing expenses in capital outlay and maintenance,
travel, clerical, office, library, publications, extension/correspon-
dence courses, and miscellaneous categories. Faculty were asked
to teach more courses, accept larger classes, and teach with reduced
pay in summer school. Some courses were switched to alternate years
and laboratory experiments were reduced. Teaching vacancies were
left unfilled, sabbaticals were postponed, and some annual appoint-
ments were not renewed. Salary reductions were considered to be a
last resort but they would occur (Committee Y, 1937).

In 1933 Kelly published a virtual blueprint for colleges to
follow in the Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges, a
widely read professional journal. In the article Kelly outlined 27 ways for colleges to "beat the Depression" (p. 294). His guidelines included suggestions on leadership, budgeting, recruitment of students, fund raising, recognition of academic structures, investment planning, and extolled sacrifice plus hard work. Among notable points, Kelly strongly recommended maintaining academic standards, avoiding drastic increases in tuition, and delaying salary cuts until unavoidable. Interestingly he also called for limiting enrollments so expansion of facilities and staff would be unnecessary.

Recruitment of students appears to have become more intense during the early years of the depression. Committee Y of the AAUP (1937) noted "there can be little doubt that financial stringency in some cases led to methods of attracting students that border on pressure salesmanship and unfair competition" (p. 167). A great number of recruitment tools were being employed including promotional dinners by alumni, speaking tours of presidents and faculty members, high school visits hundreds of miles away, scholarships as inducements for gifted students and athletes, attractive literature, holiday trips by choirs and basketball teams, newspaper publicity, college day programs, and more. However, for faculty who were used to the booming 1920s when little recruitment was necessary the practices of the 1930s seemed overwhelming.

Cost-cutting ideas and budgetary innovation abounded. The famous literary figure E. E. Cummins (1933) suggested that professors be released from committee work so they could contribute elsewhere, a self-serving but hopefully a practical idea. The Registrar's Office
at the University of Nebraska ("Professional and Personal News," 1933) found various ways to reduce printing costs, ceased mailing of grades, and started charging 50 cents for the general catalog. In a section entitled "Paying the Bills" (1934), the Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges listed a variety of ways colleges were helping needy students stay in school. One author (McNeely, 1933) unkindly suggested that small colleges with less than 200 students could not possibly compete and do an adequate job of education. The author went on to recommend small, private colleges move to junior college status with the implication that they were hurting the reputation of higher education and would face an unsuccessful struggle for existence as viable four year institutions.

New plans of financial management were proposed by Holt (1933). Holt's "Unit-Cost Plan" engendered comment in other articles of the time and seemed to be widely discussed. His idea sounds obvious to modern administrators but was apparently unique for the 1930s. The cost of tuition, board, and room were to be fixed together as a unit. Annual operating expenses were estimated and divided by the expected number of students. The unit cost of board, room, and tuition was then set to make sure annual operating expenses were covered. Students who could afford the full cost were so charged. Others who could not pay the unit cost were to get varying assistance from part of the college's endowment. Those who began following Holt's example should have enjoyed improved planning outcomes and an immediate positive effect on budgets.
The greatest attention among college financial officers and authors was given to fund raising and endowments. When recalling previous information on college income remember that, except for the loss of state dollars, gifts and endowment income fell the most dramatically up to 1933. Colleges, especially private ones, did not want to increase tuition excessively because they feared the already noticeable leakage of students to public universities and junior colleges. All institutions were loath to cut too deeply into salaries, although some college professors suffered with a drop of 50% in their salaries (Rudolph, 1962). Along with instituting various cost-cutting measures the need to win back gifts and donations would be an obvious step for administrators.

Rohrbach (1934) noted that the existence of many private colleges would depend on increasing their endowments at a time when philanthropy was down. Many colleges did not even have the common alumni fund drive in place before the depression. Older, private institutions like Yale had begun alumni fund drives on a yearly basis in 1891. Syracuse University and University of Chicago started their campaigns in 1931. The average alumni gift across the nation in 1931 was $25.29, but neophytes like Michigan State University only realized an average gift of $3.69. Yale had 7,165 individual gifts in 1931, while newcomer University of Chicago only totaled 468 gifts (Jackson, 1933). Expanded fund raising was not easy for colleges. Marts (1934) warned his readers to work hard because "unfortunately, some of the cleverest open-field side-steppers of philanthropic appeals in this generation are university and college graduates"
Fund raisers at successful colleges and various other experts with a personal interest in establishing collegiate fund raising spelled out the methodology of acquiring donations. Miel (1934), the general manager of the University of Pennsylvania Fund referred to fund raisers, such as himself, as "altruistic engineers" (p. 289). He suggested colleges should seek bequests in wills. He outlined places to make such an appeal, appropriate slogans to utilize like, "Cornell: Greater Still--By Your Will" (p. 291), and suggested publicity about bequests of all sorts. McCracken (1934) recommended bequests in wills by exhorting colleges in the following colorful fashion, "Who are the benefactors of this majestic palace of learning? Who rubs the Aladdin's lamp? I will tell you. Dead men" (p. 307). He went on to propose that colleges find alumni in the field of law who might help their elderly clients decide that certain colleges deserved largess. Stephenson (1934), a trust officer in a bank, encouraged college officials to file wish lists with trust departments. Trust officials would steer potential customers to a potpourri of projects to which they could make bequests. He went on to assure his academic readers that many trust officers were college men and wanted to do a good job for higher education. The profits for the trust department were, of course, a secondary consideration.

Discussions of investment strategy and endowment income were also focuses of attention in the literature of the day. H. T. Smith (1933) advised college administrators in the Midwest to diversify their holdings, almost half of which were in farm mortgages and real
estate. He suggested foreclosures and lower real estate values could hurt overall income. Instead, colleges were counseled to pay more attention to stocks and bonds and buy while they were low. Huebner (1934), a professor in the Wharton School of Business, recommended investing in annuities with the life insurance industry. He pointed out the remarkable wealth of insurance companies even during the worst of the depression.

This advice and cost-cutting assisted by returning prosperity had a positive effect. Gifts and endowment income rose although many private colleges would pay on indebtedness into the next decade.

Colleges, especially the public institutions, were also greatly influenced by state and federal government actions during the 1930s. State lawmakers perceived the growing state universities as part of the larger public school system. Since every state citizen paid taxes which supported the public universities, land-grant institutions, and new state teacher's colleges, politicians demanded that any state resident with a high school diploma have access to higher education (Jencks & Riesman, 1968). State institutions had little recourse but to accept the demands of the lawmakers, thus direct interference in public university affairs was established.

As the depression forced state legislators to look for budget cuts, the haphazard growth and unplanned duplication of programs in state institutions caught their attention. To control budgets state governments forced more and more institutions to accept control by boards and trustees. Local boards had become too competitive in lobbying for tax dollars. State agencies and appropriations
committees took over control from local boards in such areas as classification of professors, salary schedules, publications, reports, etc. (Committee Y, 1937).

State institutions lost independence and control of their internal affairs. Fears for academic freedom were a natural outcome. However, the forced entrance into the bureaucracy of government made state universities a part of the state team. As part of the system, state institutions received increased revenues when the economic crisis passed. They ended the decade in a stronger position than before the stock market crash.

The federal government under President Roosevelt also stepped into the affairs of higher education. Federal financial aid was granted to needy students through the Federal Relief Administration. The program was similar to the work-study program of today. Students held part-time jobs on campus and earned 20 cents to 30 cents an hour. By 1933, 65,324 students who qualified for jobs based on need worked in the program, thus aiding colleges by staying in school and providing low cost employment for higher education. In 1935 the work-study funds were allocated to over 113,000 students who earned $3,333,000 (Committee Y, 1937).

Brickman and Lehrer (1962) noted, "The Depression of the 1930s also brought federal loans and grants to the colleges and universities for the construction of buildings" (p. 35). State schools received most of the loans for construction. They could borrow 30% to 45% of the total project through the Public Works Administration. The federal government wanted these college construction projects to
keep their Works Program Administration (WPA) employees occupied. The Works Program Administration also provided funds for research projects which again went mostly to state colleges (Committee Y, 1937).

Partially because of the increased acceptance of government money and control and partially because of the times, higher education suffered from pressure aligned with conservative groups. The Ku Klux Klan harassed some colleges about Jewish professors. However, the greatest threat came from politicians and state legislators who feared campuses were hot houses of communism. The new sociologists received adverse press as did small, leftist student groups. By 1936 loyalty oaths were required of teachers and professors in 36 states including Michigan and Indiana (Committee Y, 1937).

Outside pressure notwithstanding, faculty did reasonably well during the depression. Layoffs were minimal and by 1932 only about 4.2% had lost their teaching positions. Public institutions cut back by 5.1% and private colleges by 3.9%. The instructors, lacking tenure and a protective network of relationships, bore the brunt of layoffs (Rohrbach, 1934).

Faculty salaries were cut at most institutions with the national average at a 15% reduction by 1933. Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors (1937) noted that "few college faculty members and their families faced actual want or privation. Their problems were, rather, those of adjusting a desired standard of living and an overhead built on the assumption of continuous and increasing income to a suddenly-decreased income" (p. 133).
Professors at successful colleges and universities were surprisingly well paid. One study by Columbia University found that college teaching was the sixth highest paying profession in the land. At an average salary of $3,260 professors were well ahead of the skilled trades at an average annual salary of $1,700 and public school teachers who averaged only $1,360 a year in 1933 (Holt, 1933). Furthermore, faculty members suffered a much lower reduction of income than other college-educated professionals such as engineers whose average annual incomes fell 62.2% by 1935. Finally, because of the dramatic decline of prices for staples and consumer goods, professors actually had more purchasing power in 1933 than in 1929 (Committee Y, 1937).

Beside increase workloads and reduced salaries and perks, tenure issues arose as many colleges were forced to cut back on faculty. Tenure disputes, brought to the attention of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), increased from 17 in 1929 to a high of 69 in 1933. Most cases came from smaller colleges because they had greater financial difficulty with the depression and were tempted to challenge professors they viewed as deadwood. Committee A of the AAUP (cited in "Academic Freedom and Tenure, Committee A," 1934) fielded formal complaints about tenure abuses. They were not very impressed by most cases and remarked "Committee A is not the ambulance chasing business to pick up those who have fallen by the wayside because of their own lack of ability, or laziness, or to face their reinstatement" (p. 86).

Life was not perfect for faculty in the 1930s. Certain elements thought professors were exhorting students to leftist activities,
state legislatures called for accountability and loyalty oaths, salaries were down, and the work load was increased. However, most Americans were in graver straits and professors were aware of this fact.

Students suffered during the early 1930s to a larger extent than most of their instructors. Their parents' income was down; and if they had been in the stock market, savings and reserves were slim. Families were larger than in the 1980s and the income had to stretch further. To complicate matters most families did not have the buffer of two incomes commonly experienced in the latter part of the 1980s. Furthermore, many husbands reflected societal norms and did not want their spouses to join the work force.

Most colleges raised tuition. Between 1929 and 1935 tuition increased an average of 17% at state universities. By 1933 typical expenses for tuition and fees, plus room and board were averaging $453 a year at state institutions, $979 at privately endowed colleges, $480 at Protestant denominational colleges, and $653 at Catholic colleges (Committee Y, 1937). A typical middle-class income for the day would have been around $2,000 a year. A factory worker or other blue-collar family head would have had even less yearly income to assist an aspiring offspring desiring a collegiate experience.

Increasingly, students had to seek part-time employment and summer jobs to pay for their education. Hourly jobs paid around 30 cents and if an enterprising student worked 20 hours a week during the entire academic year he or she could make $216. During the
summer, at the same wage, $144 could be earned. If the student could save at least half of their summer wages for college, a total of $288 would be realized over 12 months of careful saving.

Unfortunately, that would not put much of a dent in the total cost of the more expensive private colleges. The state universities reaped the benefits of lower fees and gained students who might have attended a private college in the 1920s (Committee Y, 1937).

Students sought other ways to pay for college. Colleges helped with loans and scholarships and by 1933 the federal government would also provide work-study assistance. Students themselves were inventive. They began cooperative living ventures complete with gardens, chickens, cows, and bulk purchasing plans. Others started dog-washing services, sold items to fellow students, and took increasingly creative responsibility for themselves (Love, 1933).

The new economic realities led to a change in the tenor of student life as a new realism overtook their philosophy. C. B. T. Lee (1970) noted:

Many of the assumptions of the American people were shaken. The assumption before the Depression had been that a college education would guarantee success. Parents with marginal means who managed to get their sons into prestigious colleges to give them advantages believed that it is not what you know but who you know. There had been a general assumption, particularly in the Twenties, that there was no end to the growth of the American economy and that hard work and ambition would bring personal success. Failure was only for the incompetent. Probably for the first time in American higher education, the college student feared for his future even though supposedly well armed with his diploma. (p. 71)

Life was suddenly more serious and students responded in a serious manner. Studying was important, grades went up, and there was less
of the old recklessness as the raccoon coat and alcohol life-styles declined. Students became more interested in the politics, economics, and sociology of the day. Reading moved up to the Number 1 leisure time activity, vaulting from 7th place in popularity for college students before 1929. Snobbery and the social whirl became less important and the influence of fraternities and sororities suffered (Rohrbach, 1934).

Prohibition ended in 1933 but legal liquor was apparently not as appealing to the new collegiate generation. Sex was not a topic of controversy as it had been previously. Marriage rates per thousand in the United States were falling in the early years of the depression. More students conversed about marriage, wondering how they could afford a family (C. B. T. Lee, 1970).

Students were also more career-oriented. Even as the movement of students to the less expensive state colleges can be seen as a practical response, so too was the student movement to majors with a pay-off. By 1934 agriculture, home economics, law, and medicine were doing well with increasing enrollments. Doctors and lawyers were still well paid and had successful careers. Agriculture was being supported by research dollars from the government and farmers were also getting federal attention. Many women still found college the right place to land a mate with a good income, and the Roosevelt New Deal included education programs for rural families that home economics majors could staff. The liberal arts enjoyed some success though mainly in fields like the new sociology, psychology, and economics as students sought explanations for hard times. Discredited or
unemployable professions caused declines in enrollments in such majors as business, off 19.3% between 1933 and 1934; architecture, down 27.6%; engineering, off 14.1%; and education, down 14.5% (Committee Y, 1937).

Student ideology also changed. The Roosevelt years established a new concept of social theory in the United States. Government was playing an everyday part in people's lives to help affect a recovery of prosperity and relieve suffering. The more serious college students saw many of their classmates move to an activist stance against big business, war, and unfair social environments (C. B. T. Lee, 1970).

Demonstrations, protests, and walkouts occurred on and off campus. Radical groups like the American Student Union could claim over 20,000 members, some of them Communists (Committee Y, 1937). Their activities, although not radical by the standards of the Vietnam War era, caused some discomfort for college administrators who were attacked by the press, especially, William Randolph Hearst, for fostering Communism (C. B. T. Lee, 1970).

Hard times brought change and innovation in the business of educating students. Duffus (1936) pointed out:

In almost every college worthy of the name some effort is being made to break down more education, to furnish individual guidance, to take advantage of the individual student's tastes, enthusiasms and abilities, to put less emphasis upon enforced classroom exercises and more upon self-propelled activities, and in short, to set the student free to educate himself and test him and his success in doing so. (p. 236)
The depression created a different feel outside and inside the ivory cloisters. The influence of the times, new social sciences, and the educational philosophy of John Dewey triggered innovation and reform in higher education. Dewey believed that education and experience should be combined into a more valuable whole. Students could learn from all experiences in life. Colleges should utilize the classroom to give students the latest facts, observations, and research produced by scholars. Students would then have a basis to face problems produced by experience and test solutions (Rudolph, 1962).

Dewey's philosophy led to a tremendous surge of experiments in higher education often emphasizing individualization, increased advising for students, curriculum oriented with the new social order, and attention to the whole person as seen in the student personnel movement. Examples are numerous and give the reader the tenor of the times. Thurber (1933) extolled the virtues of a new plan of education at Colgate. "Colgate thinks the development of the individual student in a social environment is the most important activity that the college engages in" (p. 66). To achieve their "dynamic and developmental" plan, Colgate emphasized individual advising and tutoring. Since they were only dealing with 300 freshmen, it would have been possible to provide such a service. The larger state colleges would have been less likely to respond successfully to such individual attention. Thus, Colgate and other private colleges had discovered a legitimate educational tool to utilize in making them distinctive and justifying their greater expense. They also included less dependence on objective tests and rote memory, while placing more
emphasis on assisting students to think, defend a position, and be more responsible to select elective courses.

Tolley (1934) wrote about the great success of Allegheny College's "integrated program." He noted, "The faculty of Allegheny saw that student activities, athletics, social and fraternity life, and the formal academic program of the college were often working at cross purposes" (p. 583). Allegheny reorganized athletics, placing more stress on intramurals and recreation as a health and socialization process. Coursework was redesigned to foster appreciation of different academic ideas and stress "keystone" courses in science, English, and speech. Personality development of students was extolled as an important outcome.

Maurer (1933) of Beloit College defended the liberal arts but made recommendations to improve the traditional college curriculum. He believed, given the times, that many departments in liberal arts colleges were too narrow and needed to expand their outlooks. Faculties needed to update their "illiterate" attitudes on economics and social occurrences and look outside their own narrow fields to the more contemporary concerns of the day. He exhorted liberal arts colleges to maintain their idealism, vision, and religious values less their image and focus suffer.

Duffus (1936) painted a picture of a number of private colleges like Princeton, Lawrence, and Goucher who tried to lower the walls between professors and students. Large lecture halls were broken down into smaller sections taught by young instructors. Assistance from faculty advisors, personnel bureaus, vocational counselors, and
campus psychologists are all mentioned, as well as the expansion of the student dean's office from one of a disciplinary function to an office focused on a developmental mode.

Student personnel services flowered during the 1930s. The year 1887 saw the first mention of organized guidance at a small group of women's colleges who wanted to provide vocational information for females inching into the professions. By 1926 personnel work had broadened into admissions, matriculation, and coordination of services for students. By the 1930s many small, church colleges still did not have well-established personnel departments, but three quarters of the colleges with enrollment of 3,000 students or more had such offices (Arbuckle, 1953).

Earlier in the mid-1920s the American Council on Education (1939) began studying student personnel practices. After over a decade of discussion and reports "The Student Personnel Point of View" (1937) was produced. The goal of personnel work was to "assist the student in developing to the limits of his potentialities and in making his contribution to the betterment of society" (p. 1). Students were to be developed as a whole entity with colleges to consider the intellectual, emotional, physical, social, vocational, moral, economic, and aesthetic needs of individuals. The document goes on to set 23 objectives for the new student personnel profession, as well as suggest methods for instituting "The Student Personnel Point of View" without creating unnecessary antagonisms.

The warning to avoid hard feelings was merited because faculty had attempted to perform some of these duties in the past.
Whitehouse (1934) explained the reason for specialized student personnel officers, "If the professor is loaded down with a heavy teaching schedule and the demands of committee work and is thus impoverished in his own personality, he has little to give the student outside the routine classwork" (p. 399). His statement may ring a little harshly but the point is well taken. Faculty were being asked to be increasingly well educated. The doctoral degree was a necessity and with it came the expectations to keep current with burgeoning literature. The new breed of professors were also expected to do their own research and tenure often depended on the results. Faculty had over the years won the right to have a large voice in how their university or college was run. That responsibility brought with it an unexpected amount of committee participation. Although some faculty members looked on the new student personnel professionals with mixed emotions, it had become obvious their own time was finite. Few faculty members could question that students and ultimately the institution benefited from the climate created by the student personnel philosophy and profession.

To conclude by observing that the effects of the Great Depression were pervasive and visceral does not do the period justice. Many of the changes of the depression contributed to the evolution of modern higher education. As money became scarce higher education suffered. Income was down and no one knew when an end to the economic disaster could be expected. Enrollment stumbled for the first time since World War I and colleges seemed unprepared for bad times.
The depression forced higher education to concede that it was antiquated in several ways. Contingency planning was nonexistent, the focus of education was still evolving, and business practices were not effective.

A major impact of the depression was a marked change in the type of institution which would deliver services. State controlled universities, teacher colleges, and public junior colleges overtook private and denominational colleges when measured by enrollment. It would be simple to say that lower cost for students to attend public higher education caused the decline of private colleges. Certainly it had an effect, especially in a time like the Great Depression. But forces beside outright cost were at work.

Jencks and Riesman (1968) noted,

The public sector had subordinated the old liberal arts rhetoric to a new vocabulary which stressed job training and social progress. It was devoting the bulk of its resources to terminal undergraduate curriculum geared to the real and imagined needs of employers, ... [while] the private sector on the other hand, had clung somewhat more tenaciously to the old liberal arts. (pp. 266-267)

Duffus (1936), writer of the 1930s, stated that greater increases in enrollment went to the public colleges because they did not have the power to raise their own entrance requirements, while the private colleges raised standards to control admission of the masses. His observation might be accurate but admissions standards played into the hands of the public universities and eventually would hurt the private colleges. Shear numbers at state schools kept their coffers full and prestige increased accordingly.
Private colleges, especially in the East, were not appreciated by great numbers of citizens in the western and southern three quarters of the nation. They were seen as elitist, anti-democratic in that the Westerner suspected that the Eastern elitist graduates were not likely to feel all men were created equal. Eastern college graduates were perceived as snobbish and effete. With the advent of the depression the middle class surmised that many bankers, investment speculators, and politicians from eastern private colleges had been at the helm of big business and investment banking. A number had been exposed as being selfish, morally corrupt, greedy, and poorly informed about the science of economics.

The average person began looking seriously at the state college, land-grant university, or local public junior college for the first time. When they attended they liked what they found both educationally and socially in the equalitarian ease of the middle and lower-middle classes.

It was also the public institutions that had moved to providing marketable majors in agriculture, home economics, business, and technology without the flagellating arguments of the abandonment of the liberal arts. Secondly, the major state universities and land-grant institutions had long ago outstripped the private colleges in the total amount of research they produced. Much of the research was agrarian in focus and America was still a rural, agricultural nation with industry focused in the large cities. The public image of state universities was also heightened by the utilization of many professors by the popular Roosevelt administration to act as consultants in
stemming the tide of the depression.

To further the advantages of the public sector was the growing boisterism of state government, thus "the basic question--whether the state should support higher education--was answered affirmatively years ago in all states" (Higher Education in the Forty-Eight States, 1952, p. 119). The College Blue Book published by Hurt reveals just exactly what state support could mean for four year institutions of higher education. Between the 1920s and the 1939 edition of Hurt's directory to American higher education, 57 four year colleges disappeared from the records. All were private colleges. No state supported four year institutions ceased to be listed as a functioning institution by 1939. Apparently, once state legislators made a commitment to an institution of higher education, paternalism prevented ultimate disaster.

Federal support during the depression in the form of research dollars went mostly to the state schools. The new work-study financial aid was available to both public and private college students, but the large state institutions often had more students receiving funds. Federal loans for construction were mostly for public institutions who needed new buildings for their burgeoning enrollments.

As each year of the mid to late 1930s rolled on public higher education grew stronger through increased enrollments, tax dollars, research, and public pride. The private colleges were left behind in a situation they had dominated since the founding of Harvard centuries ago.
The depression did force higher education to modernize. Colleges moved to protect themselves in the future by updating business and accounting practices and becoming more knowledgeable about investments. Universities and colleges, which had previously considered fund raising, recruitment, and public relations to be unnecessary or beneath them, established specialists to bring in gifts, students, and public goodwill.

During the depression, Committee Y of the American Association of University Professors (1937) warned colleges to continually plan for the future including bad times. They recommended colleges should constantly monitor their goals and purposes, resources, and public relations. In hard times they reminded readers to have a plan that would not jeopardize the future of the institution. Other writers already noted outlined entire plans or steps to be taken if the economic future would again turn dark (Committee Y, 1937).

The rigors of the depression also brought great pressure on professors. Some colleges, desperate to cut corners, attempted to remove tenured professors one way or another. There were many battles for security and a voice in running institutions. Through the American Association of University Professors the attacks on tenure and faculty control were publicized and vilified. The Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors regularly published accounts of odious cases of tenure abuse. They did not shrink from the battle. For example, the AAUP labeled President Oxman of DePauw College as, "blunt and tactless" and pictured the dismissed, tenured professor Dr. Hufferd as "fearless" ("Academic Freedom and Tenure,
Committee A," 1934). The Bulletin also carried a list of colleges and universities they believed could no longer be held in good standing because of tenure or academic freedom abuses ("Academic Freedom and Tenure," 1935). Faculty won their fight. The depression helped to focus their feelings of unity as a profession. They made great progress in establishing themselves as a valued group who had the power and the right to assist in organizing curriculum, establishing and assisting in hiring practices, and in university governance in general (Jencks & Riesman, 1968).

Perhaps the ultimate effect of the depression was the absolute establishment of higher education as an integral part of American society. Higher education, which had at one time been thought of as a "decorous occupation for the children of those who could afford it" (Brickman & Lehrer, 1962, p. 197), had become so important that local, state, federal governments, and taxpayers rushed to support and feed it in a time of crisis. Corporations sought its graduates with the hope that better educated employees would prevent another round of panic, greed, and gullibility which had allowed the Great Bull Market to collapse. Agriculture sought the advice of university researchers, especially when farmers understood their agricultural methods had contributed to the loss of a whole way of life during the Dust Bowl. The federal government utilized the minds of professor after professor to organize the great social programs instituted by President Roosevelt which revolutionized the very concept of American life.
Young people in America showed their confidence in higher education by increasing their attendance at the worst economic time in American history. Higher education responded with new curriculums, a more holistic approach to educating students, and provided a wide pattern of academic cultures from which students could select.

The depression made higher education falter and question its purpose. Its response was to protect itself, modernize, innovate, step out of the cloister, and begin to accept the cutting edge of progress in the industrial age.
CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY

In our present age society moves swiftly from form to evolving form propelled by the cutting edges of science and technological research. Counseling and to a lesser extent student development have responded with an outpouring of statistical studies on clients and college students. These studies strive to copy the science of the laboratory like chemistry, biology, and other physical or natural sciences. The counseling and student development professions seek increased statistically responsible information to expand and improve their knowledge base, while at the same time enhancing acceptance by the academic community. Much the same can be said for most of the social sciences.

Why study history given the emphasis in modern society on a rapidly evolving present which foreshortens the future into a reality? Why would college student development professionals and college administrators want to look at records of the past when the times seem to call for relevant scientific proofs? For the answers one must turn to historians and philosophers to understand history as an important discipline.

Historians as a group do not relate to the study of history as if it were a science. It is not a science because it cannot repeat its own experiments, control its subjects, or apply statistical
certainty as it is known (Commager, 1965). History deals with the records of the past. It is impossible to run scientific experiments on something that no longer exists in space and time. Therefore, the idea of history as science is inconceivable. The study of history could be considered science tangentially in that it also seeks the truth and its meanings (Garraghan, 1946).

Modern research is laudatory and deserves the complete support of society but it falls short of real utility when taken of and by itself. In 1964 the philosopher Ortega y Gasset wrote, "Scientific truth is exact, but it is incomplete and penultimate and of necessity embedded in another ultimate, through inexact truth which I see no objection in calling a myth" (p. 30). Ortega y Gassett is objecting to viewing science as so accurate, so exact that it produces ultimate truth at every turn, especially about the human race. Kahler (1964), an historian, joins the philosopher by writing:

There is a renewed general inclination to classify and typify phenomenon, to treat them, in a manner of science, as stable or stably recurrent, in a moment when in fact the stability of the world is at the point of collapse, and systematization appears to be losing ground; when not only biology but astronomy and nuclear physics as well, are revealing the world ever more as basically a process consisting of innumerable subprocesses. (pp. 176-177)

Science has not solved all the mysteries of the earth or of the actions of people. The discovery of the smallest particle of matter leads to a new discovery of yet a smaller particle. The most distant galaxy is soon replaced by the discovery of a more distant one, while on earth psychologists continue to strive to master the depth of human development and human actions.
Science has made a god of exactedness at the cost of thinking (Ortega y Gassett, 1964). Science is unable to analyze humanity on strictly a statistical plane. This is where history and science intertwine. Both are necessary. Rigid, scientific experiments must be continued to discover more about the physical and mental traits of humanity, and at the same time augment scientific knowledge with a consideration of the past.

History in fact refers to perceived happenings, the records of the occurrences, and interpretations of those events (Shafer, 1980). History allows present society to see the past as a continuity and enlarges the concept of the present and the directions of the future (Commager, 1965). The events of the past shape the future. Without history and records society would lose its direction because historical images direct and inspire the next generation's thoughts and actions (Barzun & Graff, 1985). History provides a comprehensive prospect for thought and action. Science too often produces supposed exact knowledge inside specialties. Fragmented knowledge on its own is not enough. Thus, history allows people the broad sweep which is necessary for the analysis of action in life (Ortega y Gassett, 1964).

If recorded history leads to study and action, then history provides a basis to meet the problems of present society with the knowledge of experience (Hockett, 1931). However, scholars cannot hope to use history to make absolute predictions because history never repeats itself exactly (Daniels, 1966). Academicians should not look for large overriding laws of history. History is not
physics, rather "history is the story of human beings and nothing else" (Renier, 1965, p. 32). History cannot teach its readers an exact lesson but it can provide shapings, traces, trends, and psychological insights which can help people make decisions (Daniels, 1966).

The traces left in history are remarkably rich. Other men and women have shared analogous problems with later generations. What they did or failed to do can help shape the present and future paths of a nation, a college, or a client's psychological health. Historical traces affect lives constantly. The Federal Reserve Board remembers the causes of the Great Depression; and hence, such an occurrence has been avoided for 6 decades. The United States government considers Viet Nam and does not invade Central America. In similar fashion private colleges can observe the successes or failures of others left in the traces of history and benefit thereof.

The historical method of research commonly called historiography centers around the strength of sources. In 1946 Garraghan wrote, "Historical method is largely a matter of reasoning about sources and the data they contain" (p. 143). Historians are totally dependent upon data from others. The researcher cannot produce sanitized or statistically strong laboratory information. Historians deal with people and the records they leave or possess from another time. Much of the historian's task becomes an effort to discover truth through the most likely probability that an occurrence in history is correctly reported (Barzun & Graff, 1985).
The researcher goes through three essential processes to produce a cogent history: gathering data; criticism of the data; and presentation of facts, interpretations, and conclusions (Hockett, 1931). Even before gathering data the historian, like his or her counterparts in the social sciences, will have determined a problem and set hypotheses to which the data gathering will be directed (Todd, 1972).

As data are sought and explored, historical researchers attempt to treat each item with doubt which takes two major forms: external criticism and internal criticism. External criticism focuses on the documents, records, or persons and seeks to validate their worth or credibility. Basically external criticism attempts to discern if a source can be trusted and therefore included in the treatise. Internal criticism determines the meaning and usefulness of facts and statements in a document (Hockett, 1931).

In performing external and internal criticism the historian is attempting to arrive at reasonable objectivity. He or she is trying to tell a story from the past which provides insights for significant consumers in the present which may or may not affect their future actions. Although no historical researcher can completely divorce themselves from their own background, they can make the likelihood of objectivity increase by practicing skepticism of all sources until the overriding pattern of evidence suggests validity (Renier, 1965). Basically, the researcher looks for traces in the historical records that point in the same direction. With each source the historian attempts to evaluate to what degree a source or witness is credible compared to other sources. Each piece of evidence is carefully
weighed as to degree of knowledge, accuracy, and the witness's ability as an expert observer (Garraghan, 1946). This must be done by weighing sources against each other not atomistically (Goldstein, 1976). Primary sources which are eye or ear witnesses to the actual historical facts are greatly desired in historiography compared to secondary sources which are accounts filtered to us through non-witnesses (Garraghan, 1946).

Though the main goal of well-written history is to tell a story as accurately as possible with varied facts, historians generally include an analysis and interpretation of their research. The analysis compares the verified facts to the hypotheses to determine plausibility (Shafer, 1980). The historian ends by interpreting his or her historical findings. This forces judgments by the historian on the quality of the actions of people in the research (Todd, 1972). Thus, the historical researcher attempts to delineate a lesson or lessons for readers.

The hypotheses of the following research are:

1. Private colleges took creative steps to survive the Great Depression.

2. The experiences of private colleges during the Great Depression can suggest survival adaptations for modern day private colleges.

Research will take the form of historical case studies of three successful private colleges or universities during the Great Depression. The three institutions to be studied are the University of Notre Dame (South Bend, Indiana), Valparaiso University (Valparaiso,
Indiana), and Goshen College (Goshen, Indiana). Notre Dame represents the larger private institution and is Catholic in orientation. Valparaiso is of medium size with a main line Protestant (Lutheran) ownership. Goshen College is a smaller school with a less well-known Protestant (Mennonite) outlook. The three institutions are separated by only 80 miles in northern Indiana, thus, holding geography constant. All three institutions survived the Great Depression. Currently they are healthy with stable to climbing enrollments, strong alumni support, and good to outstanding local and national prestige.

The historical case study method will include the source criticism and philosophical outlook already described. The case study method is frequently used in historical research. It is ideal when comparing individual units of social activity as they relate with the environment in order to compare the development of the unit and draw comparisons for other similar units. In the Forward to Yin's (1984) *Case Study Research*, Donald Campbell affirmed the applicability of case study methods for historical research. Campbell noted the method is highly suitable to discovering the plausibility or reduce plausibility of explanations for historical events, a process Campbell called "ramification extinction" (pp. 7-9).

Yin (1984) noted the definition of a case study as "inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (p. 23). Yin went on to note the historical case study deals with noncontemporary events.
The case study method allows the researcher to present an historical picture which shows relationships to events. It is not the best methodology for testing a causal theory but it is valuable for interpretations and explanations of multi-faceted events which can lead to courses of action (Runyan, 1982).

The following historical case studies will dwell on the positive. As noted, three successful institutions will be studied. A preponderance of scholarship exists on colleges which have floundered, but little has been written about colleges which continue to not only survive but flourish. This research will focus on survival techniques not the typical collegiate histories usually written as a straightforward remembrance of the past. Following the historical case studies pertinent information on private college failures will be included in an analysis of the case studies and an action plan for modern private higher education.

To initiate historical case study goals a letter of introduction was obtained from the doctoral chair to utilize with the three subject institutions (Appendix A). To initiate the search for primary and secondary sources contacts were made with the head of each institution's history department, library staff, personnel office, and alumni association. Following their advice, other individuals at the differing institutions were informed of the studies for political reasons or as significant content referrals.

To employ the historian's previously elucidated role primary sources of information sought included archival records, newspaper accounts, books, diaries, and student publications from the period in
question. When possible, oral interviews with living participants were conducted. Interview releases and questions are included in Appendix B and Appendix C. Secondary sources included historical publications and official histories about each college or university.

Following internal criticism and synthesis of the case studies an interpretation of their historical message was developed. Finally, an action plan which also considered the well-documented failures of other private colleges was developed for practical application.
CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES AND INTERPRETATION

Over the decades institutions of higher education have risen, many to succeed and many to disappear into the ruins of good intentions. Three private institutions of higher education in the extreme northern section of Indiana not only survived their birth and adolescence but excelled, receiving national attention in one form or another as well as loyal alumni support.

Valparaiso University's 3,600 students walk a well-kept campus that has grown to 70 buildings constructed mostly in the 1960s. The German Lutheran campus of red brick seems unusually functional, clean, and purposeful. Admissions standards are selective and Valparaiso's academic reputation allows it to attract enough National Merit Scholars to rank among the top 4% of all colleges and universities for such enrollments (Valparaiso University Bulletin, 1987-88).

Goshen College is a smaller institution with 950 students and an accordingly small facility. At Goshen a combination of pleasant older buildings from the predepression era contrast with newer facilities from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. A Mennonite college, Goshen reflects its early motto "Culture for Service." Mennonite students at Goshen are strongly encouraged to go into service-related occupations domestically and abroad. Goshen has won acclaim for its 2-decade old study-service term abroad which is considered a model for
international education (Goshen College Bulletin, 1988).

It seems everyone has heard of the University of Notre Dame. Its football teams continue to win without the damaging NCAA penalties suffered by so many large universities. Notre Dame's campus is also a pleasing mix of the old and new. Especially interesting is the location of the football stadium and the relatively new 14-story library. The old stadium squats on the southern edge of campus, a throwback to another time. The huge library rises directly north of the sports edifice, dominating it with its height and bulk. Facing the stadium a colorful mural of Jesus rises up almost the entire 14 stories. Jesus stands with both arms in the air as if signaling a score for Notre Dame. Easily observed from the student section of the football stadium, the mural is constantly referred to as "touchdown Jesus." To the west, the golden dome of the old administration building gleams with new leaf just applied in the summer of 1988. According to admissions personnel at Notre Dame, only 30% of applicants have a strong enough academic record to earn admission, putting Notre Dame's standards just below the Ivy League universities (Grissom, 1988).

These three successful institutions will be discussed by looking at Valparaiso first, followed by Goshen, and finally Notre Dame. An exploration of their histories will focus on their efforts to survive the Great Depression. Each historical case study will be followed by a brief interpretation of the pertinent institution's survival techniques and/or individual characteristics of success. The chapter will conclude with a final interpretative effort to draw parallels
between the three institutions, note atypicality, while suggesting actions for present private colleges.

Valparaiso University

There has been a college in the small town of Valparaiso (20,000 population) for 130 years. In 1859 the Methodists founded Valparaiso Male and Female College. One of the earliest co-educational colleges in Indiana, the school was successful, rising quickly to an enrollment of 327. With the advent of the Civil War enrollment fell. After the conflict ended, many students were no longer interested in the old genteel style of education, but preferred the more practical education that led to professions which the North had utilized to win the Civil War. Professional education in business, engineering, sciences, law, and medicine had become the vogue. Valparaiso Male and Female College did not adjust and closed in 1871 (Strietlmeier, 1959).

It reopened 2 years later in 1873 under the leadership of Henry Baker Brown, a dynamic educator-entrepreneur from Ohio. He changed the name to the Northern Indiana Normal School and Business Institute. His focus was to meet the new demand for education to which the former college had failed to respond. The normal school was immediately successful. In just 5 years enrollment soared to 1,300 students. Brown's success was based on "his vigorous and sustained program of public relations, . . . [and] his careful choice of exceptionally gifted teachers for the school's faculty" (Strietlmeier, 1959, p. 30). A visiting reporter lauded the school and wrote that
Brown's success was based on an atmosphere uncluttered by overly restrictive rules, but with strong standards, inexpensive fees, and an egalitarian atmosphere.

By 1900 there were students from 42 states and 7 foreign countries. The student newspaper of the time complimented the administration for providing "competent instructors, accommodations exactly as advertised, lowest fees possible, graduates in demand by the outside world, and a good library and equipment" (Strietlmeier, 1959, pp. 44-45). By 1907 Northern Indiana Normal enrolled 5,000 students which was second in size to only Harvard in the United States. Because of such success and national attention the school's name was changed to Valparaiso University. Mr. Brown's school was becoming famous. Reporters awarded it the sobriquet of "the poor man's Harvard" (Strietlmeier, 1959, p. 53). A medical and dental school were founded in nearby Chicago, a new curriculum to educate immigrants was begun, and graduates started to move into important positions in society.

Unfortunately, Henry Baker Brown died in 1917. His wife and son inherited Valparaiso University. They were unable to adjust in a changing educational climate. Accreditation became an important movement following World War I. Professional educators wanted to force out diploma mills and strengthen standards in higher education. Valparaiso University was not accredited by the North Central Association and Mrs. Brown refused to cooperate with accreditation requirements. Mrs. Brown's son, Henry Kinsey Brown, began intercollegiate athletics, fraternities, and sororities but at the expense of...
maintaining appropriate salaries for professors. Students, worried about the acceptability of their credits and the quality of the education, began to leave. No endowment existed because under the dynamic founder none appeared necessary. In the 1920s Valparaiso fell into debt without the safety net of endowment income. By 1923 and 1924 buildings were left unrepaired, faculty members were seeking employment elsewhere, and rumors of Valparaiso's imminent demise were rife (Strietlmeier, 1959).

In 1925 the citizens of the town of Valparaiso were greatly concerned with the possible closing of the university. Efforts to lobby the state of Indiana to take over the campus as a state supported school failed ("Governor Ed Jackson," 1925). The Brown family and the Valparaiso Chamber of Commerce sought potential buyers for the campus, one of whom was the Ku Klux Klan which created negative publicity. Fortunately, negotiations began in June with the National Lutheran Education Association headquartered in Fort Wayne, Indiana ("University Committee," 1925). A month later the local newspaper, the Valparaiso Daily Vidette, took property owners near the university to task for asking for inflated prices for properties the Missouri Synod Lutherans believed they must have ("High Prices of Land," 1925). The German-American, Missouri Synod Lutherans had various seminaries for religious training but no college for the laity. The Lutheran clergy was unhappy with the morality of the Roaring Twenties and various academic trends in psychology and evolution. They wanted their young people to have a Lutheran option for higher education to counter what they believed were undesirable
atmospheres at state universities (Strietlmeier, 1959).

In August of 1925 the details of the sale were consummated and the campus was purchased from the Browns, while the town of Valparaiso cooperated by canceling $331,000 of debt to local businesses (Strietlmeier, 1959). For its part the Lutherans promised to keep the university open for the 1925-26 academic year, to not attempt to proselytize current students, and to maintain the democratic atmosphere and low fees of the past ("The Entire Property," 1925).

The Lutheran University Association was a corporate entity set up by selected Lutheran clergy and businessmen to run the new school and see to its success. They immediately hired fund raisers and acquired $645,000 by December 1925. An equally important goal was accreditation. President Dau also wanted to create a Lutheran atmosphere as quickly as possible. Within the first 3 years (1925-28) he raised the percentage of Lutheran faculty members from zero to 30% and increased the percentage of Lutheran students from 9% to 44%.

Achieving accreditation took 4 years. Instructors from the Brown era who lacked correct academic credentials were let go. Sixteen of 21 instructors inherited from "the poor man's Harvard" departed by 1929. In most cases PhDs were employed in their place. The university high school was closed and libraries across campus were consolidated with new acquisitions added to please the North Central Association. An endowment of $500,000 was established and on March 13, 1929, accreditation was achieved (Strietlmeier, 1959). It seems Dr. Dau accomplished much; however, there was unrest about his ability to deal with the public and successfully cooperate in fund raising.
(Friedrich, 1988). He resigned just as the Great Depression commenced leaving the challenge of bad economic times to Dr. O. C. Kreinheder, who became president at the start of the 1930-31 academic year (Strietlmeier, 1959).

The Lutheran University Association members seemed unaware of the commencement of hard times. The archival records of their quarterly meetings make no mention of the stock market crash and any special need for extra caution or planning. They did spend a considerable amount of time discussing fund raising. As previously mentioned, acquiring funds for endowment purposes had gone very well in the late 1920s. Earlier in the discussion of the 1920s, it was noted that for many it was a very prosperous time and university fund raisers were able to tap the successful German business community which was able to give generously. Most of the planning of the Lutheran University Association in 1929 focused on methods to bring in money to support the annual budget. Dr. Karl Heinrich suggested choir tours, mailing a university newsletter, intensive development of athletics, increased staff support for fund raising personnel, and hiring a professional promoter along with a $25,000 budget for the office. The board agreed with him and passed his request. Raising money for the annual budget was critical because they estimated annual expenses at $162,390.86 while income from students and the endowment came to only $106,000. Optimism must have been high because even in the face of business conditions and deficits, board members voted to build a new gymnasium (Lutheran University Association, 1929-1939).
By the 1932-33 academic year Valparaiso University and the Lutheran University Association understood the change in the economic times. Enrollment dropped from 627 students in 1931 to 535 in the fall of 1932. Fund raising for the annual budget plummeted from gifts totaling $74,435 in 1926 to $37,286, a 50% downturn. Total income for the 1931-32 academic year had been $181,700, while the total income for 1932-33 year was only $156,686, a 14% decline.

Action by the board was immediate and every aspect of the Valparaiso University community suffered cuts. Funds for new equipment and promotional activities suffered cuts by 20% and 40%, respectfully. Total salaries were cut by 17%, although most professors only lost 10% of their salaries. Vacancies were not filled and nonteaching staff reduced to part time or let go. Maintenance and repair was cut by 21%, scholarships down 20%, while library expenses suffered less drastically than other areas with a 15% decrease in budget. The Lutheran University Board reminded its members to look for every economy possible and indicated money would have to be borrowed to survive the year (Lutheran University Association, 1932).

By 1933 the men and women responsible for Valparaiso continued to take steps to insure the young school's survival. The promised gymnasium was put on hold, as were all major building projects. Course offerings in physical education were reduced forcing the temporary disappearance of the Physical Education Department. Religion courses were also reduced in number (Strietlmeier, 1959). To keep the university from losing excessive students, fees were lowered. In 1929 the total cost of two semesters' room, board, tuition, and fees
averaged $463 (Lutheran University Association, 1929). In 1933 the total cost for residential students was $397 with room and board and fees cut by 13% compared to 1929 (Valparaiso University Bulletin, 1933).

The university was faced with other problems. President Kreinheder noted enrollment drops in the Schools of Engineering and Pharmacy and cautioned that both situations must change. President Kreinheder strongly supported fund raising activities. He gave a large budget and more personnel to the public relations staff as they were called and placed Dr. Karl Heinrich in charge of large gifts. Dr. Kreinheder gave the registrar the responsibility to recruit students but no infusion of funds for promotional activities is noticeable in the records. Instead the registrar asked for more scholarships to utilize in competing for students, which were granted to him. Extension courses had been taken into Chicago successfully and the continuation of the program was guaranteed. Students on and off campus were allowed to defer tuition payments but with the deferments came some debts which remained outstanding (Lutheran University Association, 1933).

Enrollment continued to drop in 1934 while fund raising for the annual budget fell to $26,580, an all-time low for the 1930s. The enrollment of 509 (down from 523 in 1933) was especially discouraging since the board had projected a hoped for $10,000 increase in student fee income. To offset the double drop in fees and giving, professors took another 10% cut in salaries. The board decided to hire two student recruiters for the summer of 1935 and also involved the
public relations personnel (fund raising) in recruitment of students (Lutheran University Association, 1934).

Valparaiso University worked hard to maintain good relations with the Lutheran church. The Walthers League was a national youth league for Lutheran teenagers. The members of the league were invited on campus for an extensive activity day ("One Thousand," 1934). The program first held in 1933 was successful and attendance in April 1934 doubled to 1,700 participants ("Activity Day," 1934).

The university also organized Lutheran women by establishing auxiliaries. Their goal was to aid student life at Valparaiso. They held bake sales, contributed money for residence hall furnishings, made curtains, and helped with recruitment ("Women Pledge," 1934).

The chamber of commerce and Valparaiso town officials were continually groomed to work with the university. The local newspaper, its name changed to the Vidette Messenger in 1933, cooperated with the university, consistently reporting the successes of the school while ignoring the failures. For example, university officials were so confident enrollment would go up in 1934 that they spoke of enrollment gains in glowing terms ("Enrollment Is Sure," 1934). When enrollment actually went down the Vidette Messenger made no comment nor published the correct figure. Efforts to get the citizens of Valparaiso involved with the university were successful. Local businessmen gave funds to build new seats for the football field ("Pledge $2,000," 1934). City officials cooperated in major campus visitation events ("City Is Urged," 1935). City residents were also invited to get involved in university cultural and sports
activities ("City Players," 1935).

Signs were mixed in the fall of 1935. Enrollment fell again to 446, a 22% collapse. However, fund raising for the annual budget went up substantially to $33,667, an increase of 27% over 1934. The Lutheran University Board believed many students had not returned because of a lack of money, while other students elected to stay at home and commute to other colleges. The board also noted that more new students could have been admitted but at the cost of lowering standards. To meet the economic conditions university financial aid was increased from $10,500 to $13,500, with $8,500 for aid based on need, $4,000 for scholarships and $1,000 for loans (Lutheran University Association, 1935). Government aid was also available through the Works Progress Administration and National Youth Administration. In 1935 Valparaiso University received $65,000 dispersed to students who received $15 a month for the 9 month school year according to different types of part time jobs around campus ("Sixty-Five Thousand," 1935).

Changes continued to be required to meet the times. Italian, Greek, Spanish, and art were all dropped (Strietlmeier, 1959). In 1936 fund raising fell short of the previous year but happily student enrollment finally rose after a 4-year decline. A second decrease in faculty salaries cost Valparaiso several professors who accepted better offers elsewhere. Engineering and pharmacy enrollments continued to decline and discussion began on the possible termination of the two departments. The overall health of the university did look better at the end of spring semester, 1937, when income exceeded
expenses by $16,717. The Lutheran University Association and President Kreinheder decided to consolidate all debt into one bond totaling $150,000 with the Fort Wayne National Bank where the Lutherans had strong support. In return bank officials promised to assist the university in retiring debts early to save money on the favorable 4% interest rate. They placed endowment funds with the same bank which promised careful handling, with a possible move into bond and mortgage investments which they believed were showing new life. Secondly, they decided to place new emphasis on student recruitment. President Kreinheder began mailings to prospective students from his office. A full-time recruiter was to be hired and new strategies were to be initiated to acquire lists of potential students from churches, and to appoint volunteer student recruiters in each church district (Lutheran University Association, 1936).

The following year, 1937, saw a turning point in the era for Valparaiso. Both enrollment and fund raising for the annual budget went up, the first time both income indicators rose at the same time since 1929. Current liabilities decreased by 33% from $44,630 on December 1, 1936, to $29,846 on December 1, 1937. The board elected to open bids for a new health and recreation building. A bid of $121,970.50 was accepted. By April 1938 Dr. Heinrich had promises of $100,000 in gifts and Valparaiso would soon enjoy its first major new building of the Great Depression. In April 1938 the administration also announced the first across the board salary increases. Faculty were to receive an extra $200 to $350 for the 1938-39 academic year. A typical salary of the time at Valparaiso was $1,800 to
$2,835 so the increase was substantial. Twenty-seven of the university's 45 professors received the raise while no cuts in salary were mentioned. On the downside a specially appointed committee recommended dropping pharmacy and cutting engineering from a four-year to a two-year transfer program (Lutheran University Association, 1937).

President Kreinheder retired suddenly in 1938 because of poor health and the academic dean, Dr. Walter Friederich, was appointed as acting president. Enrollment was down but only by 3%. Fund raising rose substantially bringing in increased funds for the annual budget by a positive 14%. In December 1938 the board voted to phase out pharmacy and the four-year engineering programs. Arrangements were made for students to transfer to Purdue University (Lutheran University Association, 1938).

In the final year of the decade enrollment dropped from 494 in 1938 to 441 in 1939. This was expected because of the loss of pharmacy and engineering students. Valparaiso exited the Great Depression with increased giving for the annual budget, growing endowment, an improved and more valuable physical plant, decreasing debt, relatively stable enrollment, and firmly established Lutheran control with a Lutheran student body of 69% (Lutheran University Association, 1939).

Enrollment success followed and by 1942 total enrollment stood at 530 students (Strietlmeier, 1959). Growth continued following World War II and Korea and by 1959 Valparaiso swelled to 2,408 students (Albers, 1976).
In retrospect the odds seemed to be against the success of the Lutheran ministers-educators who took over Valparaiso University in 1925. The school was burdened with debt, bad publicity, a lack of proper accreditation, professors with questionable credentials, a student body that must have been wary of control passing to a religious group, and a declining physical plant. To complicate the issue no one was sure a Missouri Synod Lutheran-sponsored university was really desired by the average church member. Lastly, the jolt of the Great Depression was only 4 years away. Valparaiso University did survive and now stands as a testament to those who worked very hard in its initial years.

The reasons for Valparaiso's success are numerous. First, the young university was fortunate that at the time of the stock market crash in 1929 it had little to lose because it was so new (Friedrich, 1988). The Lutherans also appear to have been very prudent with their funds. They cut budgets dramatically and across the board. Large construction was delayed until they could afford it but beautification projects and small improvements were made to the campus almost yearly. Most of these projects involved buying homes near campus and tearing them down to provide green areas or remodeling them for university utilization (Strietlmeier, 1959).

The Lutheran University Association worked diligently and quickly to give Valparaiso a Lutheran focus to lock in the support of the Lutheran church. Without Lutheran students and Lutheran contributions the venture would have been highly questionable (Heinrich, 1988). The university organized Lutheran women into support groups,
developed the Lutheran youth organization as a recruiting mechanism, and lobbied Lutheran ministers and businessmen for support.

A tremendous emphasis on fund raising is the most dominant agenda in the historical sources. Although one author thought fund raising "accomplished little more than keeping the University solvent at a low level of subsistence" (Strietlmeier, 1959, p. 111), it appears the efforts of President Kreinheder and men like Dr. Karl Heinrich deserve great credit. The records of the Lutheran University Association are alive with optimism, energy, and multiple methods for fund raising. To raise money on the level of accomplishment already noted during the economic storm of the depression for a cause that was new and unsure of a positive response is laudatory.

It took the Lutheran University Association longer to realize the need for student recruitment. No full-time administrator was charged with recruitment until 1936 and even then no budget which might correspond to that of the fund raisers was forthcoming.

Valparaiso University also did a thorough job of public relations with the town of Valparaiso. Local people gave money for campus improvements, cooperated in major recruitment activities, helped the university acquire neighboring properties, cheered university athletic teams, and participated in university events. The local newspaper put "Valparaiso--Home of Valparaiso University" on its masthead and unfailingly published only positive stories about the school.

Academically the leaders of Valparaiso also succeeded. They won accreditation for all their programs. When it came time for hard
decisions they were not afraid to cut entire departments and even entire divisions when those areas threatened the fiscal stability of the school. The temptation to lower admissions standards was rejected. Professors did lose over 20% of their salary in the middle of the depression, yet the remuneration was never cut so low as to be unlivable. Professors must have felt good about their environment because only a few left for higher paying positions.

The atmosphere on campus for students also appears progressive. The Student Council was an elected body which controlled a $5,569 budget in 1934. The money came from student fees and paid for a student run newspaper (The Torch), yearbook (The Record), Student Council, University Players (theatre guild), debate society, entertainment, band, and orchestra ("Student Council Budget," 1934). The Dean of Student's Office oversaw student activities, social events, discipline, moral and religious development, counseling, residence supervision, chapel, employment aid, pastoral calls, and contact with the student's homes. The residence halls were supervised by live-in matrons along with students called proctors to help with student self-government on each floor (The Record, 1933). Dean of Students H. H. Kummich believed, "discipline becomes more and more a matter of understanding the maladjusted student and helping him to discover himself" (The Record, 1933, p. 25).

Finally, leadership was critical to Valparaiso University's success. President O. C. Kreinheder was involved in all aspects of the university. Dr. Karl Heinrich credits Kreinheder with being "a real blessing to the University" (Heinrich, 1988). Dr. Heinrich
further lauds Kreinheder with being an inspirational speaker who was able to make friends with students and faculty while also successfully dealing with the public and raising money. Former Acting President Walter Friedrich concurred and called Kreinheder a learned man and gentleman of the first order (Friedrich, 1988).

When asked what advice they thought Valparaiso University's experience during the depression might mean for private colleges today, Dr. Heinrich thought good leadership was the most important followed by being financially conservative (Heinrich, 1988). Dr. Friedrich thought good leaders were also important. He indicated that being well organized was critical and support of the church a third important factor in success.

Goshen College

Goshen College began its existence in another town and with a different name. Eight miles northwest of its present site, Dr. Henry A. Mumaw established the Elkhart Institute of Science, Industry, and the Arts in the railroad town of Elkhart, Indiana, during the summer of 1894 (Umble, 1955). Mumaw was a Mennonite medical doctor and a rarity because few Mennonites went to college. Considering the Mennonite culture of the time, Dr. Mumaw's energy in initiating a normal school to educate elementary school teachers, bookkeepers, and secretaries was unusual. Mennonites at the turn of the century were concerned with three traditions brought with them while fleeing persecution in Europe: the doctrine of separation from non-Christian, worldly practices of the dominant culture; nonconformity with the
dominant culture often symbolized by conservative and specialized
dress referred to as plain clothes; and nonresistance to violence in
any form including serving in the military (S. C. Yoder, 1940).

The Elkhart Institute, even in the face of some cultural reti-
cence, was a success. One year after its founding it was incorpo-
rated with a Mennonite board and 3 years later, in 1898, N. E. Byers
was hired as the first principal. By 1901 the board membership was
expanded to include representatives from other states and Canada.

Byers was a graduate of Northwestern University and brought
energy and high standards to the school. He quickly added secondary
education, business, Bible, and a women's seminary emphasizing liter-
ature and culture. By 1901, 261 students jammed one building. Tui-
tion, fees, room, and board was only $100 for 40 weeks. Young Mennon-
nites responded in numbers that demanded the physical expansion of
the institute.

Several sites in Elkhart were explored while towns in Ohio and
the nearby community of Goshen bid for the school. By 1902 the en-
rollment had climbed to 328 students making a new, larger facility
critical. Expansion was not possible on the original site. Finally,
for unknown reasons the owners of the favored location in Elkhart
raised their price. At the same time businessmen in Goshen led by
William Stonex offered $10,000 for the purchase of a site at the
southern end of the trolley line in Goshen. The city was pleasant
and the site mostly farmland with enough room for expansion. The
only thing the Goshen businessmen asked was that the institute's name
be changed to Goshen College.
The Mennonites accepted the offer and broke ground for a $25,000 brick building which was completed during the fall semester of 1903. A dormitory of wood was actually finished before students arrived on September 28, 1903. Seventy-seven young people were enrolled that first semester and 58 more arrived for second semester for a total of 135. President Noah Byers was considered a tough disciplinarian but was popular with students in the college and the academy (high school). However, clashing cultures within the Mennonite church caused trouble for Byers and Goshen College.

The more conservative elements thought Byers to be too intellectual. Many Mennonites were opposed to a college education as too modern and worldly, plus they objected to educated church members who were too proud (in the conservative members' view) of their learning. Although Byers and his instructors "tried to maintain cordial relations the rift between the Church and the College gradually widened" (Umble, 1955, p. 31). Students were allowed to dress in modern styles rather than the forced wearing of plain coats for men and bonnets for women. Many conservatives were incensed and withheld financial support. President Byers was further castigated when he established "Culture for Service" as the Goshen College motto in 1904. In explaining the motto he had written that the college (among other things) would provide education for church leadership. This made many Mennonite ministers angry and unsettled because most of them were lucky to have a high school education let alone college. In effect Byers and Goshen College threatened their very future as church leaders. With the public high school movement in full swing
they could see a time when people much younger than they would possess a vastly superior education.

Even with the controversy Goshen College continued to make progress. The Mennonite Board of Education took control of Goshen College and helped with church relations. New programs were added, two new dormitories constructed, and the board initiated an academy in Kansas which fed some students to the college. In 1910 the first bachelor's degree was awarded and Columbia University and other universities assured Byers that Goshen's graduates would be acceptable in their graduate programs. President Byers was able to secure good instructors, three with doctor's degrees, which were difficult to find in 1912.

However, by 1913 President Byers had had enough and announced his retirement noting "What was needed now is leadership that can win the Church in general to a loyal and hearty support of the College" (Umble, 1955, p. 50). Byers was tired of the criticism over modern dress, the criticism of non-Mennonite faculty (the conservatives feared they would corrupt Mennonite youth with ideas like evolution), and the lack of financial support for educational operations. Many conservatives never supported Byers because of his "liberal" education at Northwestern. In a more genial atmosphere, Byers accepted the presidency at Bluffton College, a Mennonite rival in Ohio run by a more liberal wing of the Mennonite church. Two popular professors resigned at Goshen and followed Byers. His departure in 1913 was a victory for ultra-conservatives that would prove costly to Goshen College over the next decade.
To compete with Byers at Bluffton, the new president, J. E. Hartzler, convinced the board to build a brick science building. Unfortunately the building cost much more than the original estimate and dangerously increased the college's debt. Hartzler also tried to start a school of agriculture but World War I kept the young farmers at home by War Department decree to produce food for relief and the war effort. Meanwhile disinterest and distrust on the part of some ministers hurt fund raising efforts. By 1917 the college was in desperate shape. The board of education seemed unable to assist with raising money and

concerned itself primarily with certain reports about the school: that some of the instructors were inclined toward liberalism, that the teaching was not sound, that the students were inclined toward levity, that the atmosphere of the school was worldly, that certain textbooks were unsound, and that some of the library books contained unorthodox teachings. (Umble, 1955, p. 71)

Sanford C. Yoder had been elected to the Mennonite Board of Education in 1916. In 1917 he traveled to campus to talk with faculty. The man who would eventually save Goshen College "came away deeply depressed with the outlook" (S. C. Yoder, 1959, p. 191) and turned down the board's treasurer position.

President Hartzler found the college's financial situation to be critical in 1917. He hired professional fund raisers from outside the Mennonite church to raise money he and fellow Mennonites were unable to acquire. Conservative leaders had "put on a whispering campaign to the effect that because J. E. Hartzler was not sound in the faith his campaign to raise endowment for Goshen College was sure to fail" (Umble, 1955, p. 82). To exacerbate Hartzler's financial
woes a smallpox epidemic hit the area in 1917 causing enrollment to fall and income to go down. The board, hearing rumors of financial irregularities, called for an external firm to audit the college books. Their fears were justified when a shocking debt of $150,000 was revealed. A desperate Hartzler and his business manager had been writing checks and securing loans in the board's name without telling the board members. The small endowment was also gone. Hartzler and his business manager resigned, while the board resolved to pay closer attention to finances in the future. S. C. Yoder (1959) noted,

"When one thinks of the lack of experience and knowledge of what was required, financially and otherwise, in such an undertaking, one need not be surprised at the misunderstandings, misjudgments, and all the other things that came to pass. What happened was perhaps the only thing that could happen under the circumstances." (p. 193)

Board members resolved to keep the college going and took complete responsibility for the huge debt. With World War I raging in 1918 they knew they could expect no help from non-Mennonites. Most Mennonite churches were counseling their young men to refuse to serve in the fight. With an anti-German feeling running throughout the country, Mennonites who often spoke a low German dialect suffered some abuse and a few ended up for a brief period in camps as virtual prisoners of the U.S. government. The Mennonite Board of Education believed it was their duty to expunge the debt as a means of saving the reputation of Mennonites as well as Goshen College. Many ministers agreed and helped solicit funds. By 1919 they had $110,000 in hand and raised the remainder over the next 5 years (S. C. Yoder, 1959).
Between 1918 and 1923 Goshen College would have four presidents, reflecting an unhappy time as the board sought someone who could balance an atmosphere students and faculty could enjoy but at the same time placate voracious ultra-conservatives. To appease the critics, extracurricular activities were curtailed which displeased students. The fourth president in the series was seen by students and faculty as too great a concession to the conservative element in the church. Some professors resigned, and some students transferred, while others threatened to leave at the end of the 1922-23 academic year (Umble, 1955). The real problem for Goshen College was that some church leaders were fighting a rear guard action to retard the cultural clock which had already run past their hour. They feared change and, therefore, tried to force old-fashioned cultural dress and worship on those who saw no need for such artifices. The atmosphere was so charged that the board of education recommended Goshen College close its doors for the 1923-24 school year to reorganize.

The reorganization of Goshen College was a critical problem for the board. They had asked Sanford C. Yoder to accept the presidency but he had refused in 1921 believing the problems were too overwhelming for him to undertake. He had a church in Iowa to run and increased responsibilities with the Mennonite Board of Missions, which was heavily involved with relief work overseas following the devastation of World War I. When asked to accept the presidency a second time Yoder accepted and officially took office on August 27, 1923. He faced a closed college, warring ideological camps, professors who had scattered to other colleges or high schools, unhappy students, a
constituency that was not committed to higher education, and debt with little endowment. As a capstone, Yoder had not yet earned a bachelor's degree. Few gave him a chance to succeed against such odds. Yet Yoder would succeed based on his exceptional character.

S. C. Yoder was an unusual man with an unusual background compared to his Mennonite contemporaries. He grew up in Iowa which was considered part of the West in the late 1800s. Iowa and the rest of the Midwest and West represented a much freer atmosphere for young Mennonites and Amish as opposed to the stolid Mennonite communities in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Yoder's father traded horses and readily accepted steam powered farm equipment. Later when S. C. Yoder's twin brother died he was so bereaved that he planned to enlist in the Spanish-American War. Guns for hunting were common on Iowa farms and he knew how to use them. To dissuade him his parents promised Yoder could go to high school if he would give up war in Cuba. They succeeded and Yoder proved to be a fine student.

As a young married man he moved to Washington territory (not yet a state) to homestead. In one of his books entitled *Horse Trails Along the Desert*, S. C. Yoder (1954) detailed his adventures as a wrangler who caught and broke wild horses in the Horse Heaven Hills along the Columbia River. He also chased rustlers and testified against a quick shooting gambler who had fired a bullet right above Yoder's head as he talked with cronies in front of a store.

Later S. C. Yoder and his family moved to Nebraska and then back to Iowa where he became a popular minister known all over the Mennonite communities from Illinois to the Rocky Mountains. As he worked
with various Mennonite communities he was continually recognized as a gifted, unshakeable individual respected by leaders and followers alike.

Yoder worked hard during the year Goshen College was closed. Using Iowa as a base so he could complete his bachelor's degree at the University of Iowa, Yoder contacted former faculty members and students assuring them of a September 1924 reopening. He was perceptive enough to understand that he would have to spend much of his future time on public relations with potential friends, while countering ultra-conservative foes. Thus, he needed a few good administrators to take responsibilities for other duties. He convinced Noah Oyer, the Dean of Hesston Junior College in Kansas, to accept a similar post at Goshen. Oyer was very popular and wanted to make Goshen College the Mennonite flagship campus with Hesston as a junior college feeder. Oyer also wanted to institute a seminary at Goshen for ministerial training. Because of past financial problems Yoder knew he needed a strong business manager. C. L. Graber in Iowa was a Mennonite minister and had banking and business experience. He had also assisted in managing a large refugee camp in Syria following World War I. He agreed to serve as Goshen's business manager. This began S. C. Yoder's western strategy which he would employ throughout his presidency. He continually sought funds, students, and personnel from the more moderate West and Midwest where his popularity assured trust.

The college reopened in 1924 with 149 students, only 10 students below the 1922 total. To improve relations with conservatives Yoder
allowed the board of education to go through the library holdings and eliminate books they thought were questionable. One hundred books were taken off the shelves. He also moved to employ an all-Mennonite faculty by 1925. Relations with the church were greatly improved because most church leaders respected Yoder and they had been shaken when the college closed. A significant number of Mennonite young people had threatened to transfer to non-Mennonite private colleges or state universities (Umble, 1955).

Money and debt were also problems for President Yoder when he reopened the college. The first local bank he asked for a loan turned him down (Mininger, 1989). The college carried a debt of $10,000; some of it owed to local businesses. Confidence in the college was low and the pacifist stance at Goshen College was not popular with some local elements. Yoder managed to win the trust of another bank in town which loaned the school enough money for working capital. Meanwhile Yoder and his business manager, C. L. Graber, raised funds to pay off the $10,000 debt in just one year. Yoder also personally recruited students by writing innumerable letters, contacting ministers for leads, and traveling to visit young people in their homes. Yoder was a large, impressive looking man, with fine communication skills, and a reputation that preceded him, especially in Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas. Enrollment rose to 266 students in 1925, a 57% increase.

Yoder and Goshen College were off to a strong start but another problem persisted. Ultra-conservatives inflamed by a self-appointed leader named George Brunk from Virginia continually assaulted the
college. In his quarterly publication, *The Sword and Trumpet*, Brunk and his writers attacked higher education, Goshen College, and Yoder in the most colored of terms. Brunk's publication referred to college professors as, "Christ-hating ignoramuses with long handles to their names to show how much schooling they have" ("Editorial Message: Self-Expression," 1935, p. 3). On Yoder an editor of *The Sword and Trumpet* wrote, "We regret the necessity of saying that the present Goshen College leadership seems to be the center of this disloyal deflexion" ("Defending Orthodoxy," 1933, p. 4). In other editorials readers were urged to withhold support because strict rules of dress and conduct were not enforced. He further threatened that his paper had the power to bring the college down. In 1937 the attacks on Goshen College and higher education declined noticeably. At approximately that time Brunk had become involved on the Board of Eastern Mennonite School, later to become Eastern Mennonite College.

Six presidents before Yoder had sooner or later retreated from the acrimony created by the ultra-conservatives. Perhaps Yoder's experiences on the Western frontier toughened him. Certainly letters or quarterlies attacking his character must not have seemed as daunting as wild horses, rustlers, and gun fighters. On the dust jacket of S. C. Yoder's (1954) *Horse Trails Along the Desert* a picture of a younger Yoder with his range horse, 10-gallon hat, lariat, spurs, rifle, and confident smile gives the viewer the impression of a man ready for anything.

Yoder countered the conservatives by taking a moderate or middle way. He correctly decided the majority of Mennonites were moderates.
The "saintly gentleman who had a way of winning people to himself" won friends for Goshen College wherever he went (Mininger, 1989). During the summers he would travel the Midwest and West talking with Mennonites from every walk of life. Support, money, and students resulted for the school (Umble, 1934).

He also wrote many letters to friends and foes alike. He was usually patient and kind, carrying the conservatives criticisms on his own shoulders so faculty could be free to teach and interact with students (P. Bender, 1989). However, he could also be forceful with detractors. In one letter to a concerned Pennsylvania critic he first apologized for something he had said in a speech that offended conservatives. However, he continued to write that he had "counted on the intelligence of listeners to not misinterpret it" (the speech). He went on to write, "I hope you will not lose any sleep over this because I am not going to" (S. C. Yoder, personal papers, 1978).

President Yoder also countered conservatives by bringing Mennonite evangelists to campus and encouraging religious activities among students. Dean Oyer and later Dean Harold S. Bender established a strong Bible curriculum and the largest Mennonite church in the area. Dean Oyer initiated annual Christian Life conferences which brought young people to campus. He also started the Young People's Institute for Bible Study and sent out gospel teams (Umble, 1955).

Harold S. Bender was appointed dean of the college when Oyer passed away. Bender brought different strengths to Goshen as opposed to Oyer. H. S. Bender was an historian and biblical scholar of the
first order. He researched and wrote about the early beginnings of the Mennonite faith. Through his scholarship he vigorously opposed the cultural bound tenets of the ultra-conservatives. He was also a noteworthy defender of the liberal arts and understood the purposes of higher education. He not only defended Goshen professors against the conservatives but inspired others to study religion at Goshen College, helping solidify Goshen's place as the intellectual center of the Mennonite faith (Mininger, 1989).

S. C. Yoder also had allies in other places to balance the reactionary threat Goshen faced. The Gospel Herald supported Goshen College and higher education as opposed to The Sword and Trumpet. Since the Gospel Herald was published in Pennsylvania, the original heart of Mennonitism in North America, it was especially important. In a typical article entitled "Maintaining Christian Education" (1934), the writer expressly supported the need for educated teachers, doctors, and editors noting, "The fact that untold harm has been done by evil educated men is no argument against education but against the wrong use of it" (p. 886), thus taking counterpoint to the negative thrust of Brunk's The Sword and Trumpet. Yoder's personality had also gained friends on the Mennonite Board of Education. A Goshen College graduate, Orie Miller, was a positive force on the board. A successful businessman he became the financial agent for the board and was a leader other board members turned to for difficult decisions. He had an intuitive sense for long-term finance and helped lead the board and the college in financial decisions that positively affected the future (Mininger, 1989).
As the decade of the 1920s drew to a close the specter of reactionary control and mere existence faded as the leadership of President Yoder blunted the critical atmosphere of earlier years. Faculty referred to the college as "The New Goshen" inferring a much improved model over "The Old Goshen" (W. Smith, 1989). Yoder's middle way helped the church relate to new times by utilizing the college "to render . . . faithful service, giving God the glory and the Church the benefit of its efforts" (The Maple Leaf, 1925, p. 1). With rising enrollments and support of the board of education an endowment campaign commenced in 1927. By 1929 only moderate success was achieved with $75,000 raised. The depression stifled further efforts (Umble, 1955).

The Great Depression caught Goshen College in a financial crisis that would lead to austere measures. Like many experts some people at the college thought the depression would be brief. A business professor wrote in the Goshen College Record that the current depression would be similar to the recession of 1920-1921 ("Business Depression," 1930). He noted, "On the whole, it may be observed that a periodic depression is a necessary purgative, . . . [and] in conclusion, there is little doubt that the current depression has about run its course" (p. 3). Hindsight allows one to know how wrong he was. Looking back from his writing desk in 1959, S. C. Yoder described the depression in The Days of My Years:

The depression which struck the United States in 1929 greatly affected the income from investments of all kinds. Institutions with millions of dollars of endowment found it difficult to operate. Some colleges that had been in existence for almost, or more than a century were forced out...
of existence. Others found it difficult to meet their obligations and were compelled to reduce their faculty. Highly trained professors and teachers, some with long and creditable records of service, were found in the bread lines of the large cities or in the stream of unemployed that lined the highways and city streets. (p. 208)

In 1929 enrollment at Goshen College was 324, up well over 100% from the reopening just 5 years before. The endowment drive had netted $75,000, and the college was confident enough to remodel Kulp Hall, including the dining and kitchen area in the basement, finishing in 1930. The early effects of the depression hurt enrollment at the college with a loss of nine students; however, the downturn was suffered in the academy not in the postsecondary population. Goshen had already taken steps to meet the changing times by starting evening classes that drew significant students where there were none in 1929. Income dropped from $75,000 in 1929 to $65,000 in 1930 and the college was forced to run a $16,264 deficit even with small across the board cuts in spending. In a trend that would forecast the future faculty and staff salaries were cut by a total of over $5,000 (Goshen College Annual Report, 1930).

Further decline in enrollment and income was suffered in 1931 when only 265 students enrolled and income fell to $56,325. Salaries were cut dramatically along with equipment and maintenance. The future of the academy was discussed and its imminent demise accepted. Some professors were furloughed from their jobs for a year or more and encouraged to go to graduate school to complete doctorates without pay from the college. Yoder, himself, worked on his doctorate under similar conditions (Goshen College Annual Report, 1931). Most
professors did not receive their full salaries. Instead the college developed a pool of money from which professors could draw in emergencies. In many cases professors were given student notes instead of their full income and they collected from individual students as well as they could (W. Smith, 1989). S. C. Yoder (1959) noted "faculty salaries were determined by the amount of money in the college treasury after other necessary expenses had been paid" (p. 54).

C. L. Graber, the business manager, became the czar of the faculty pocketbook. The administration of Goshen College counted on the dedication of its professors to accept their economic conditions. There was some complaining. One full-time professor received only $775 in actual cash during one year in the depth of the depression (G. R. Miller, 1979). However, there was a deep feeling of unity and purpose on campus. People believed they were part of a larger family and everyone helped other instructors and their dependents if they were in need (W. Smith, 1989).

In an attempt to balance the budget in 1932 the faculty actually teaching, and not away in graduate school, dropped to 15 professors. Their academic loads were increased to 15 instructional hours each and all administrators began teaching 6 hours. The academy was finally suspended. Creative steps to increase enrollment in 1932 paid off with an enrollment of 309 over the depression low point in 1931 of 265 students. Goshen College put a branch campus in nearby Elkhart and began a graduate Bible program. The employment of students to do almost all the maintenance and cleaning helped them pay their bills.
Income rose to $73,000 in 1932 and the college firmly established a policy of balancing its budget at the expense of employees. Salaries were lowered by 14% (Goshen College Annual Report, 1932).

The years of 1932 through 1934 showed continued improvement based on increasing enrollment and income, innovation, and strict frugality. Some faculty teaching loads were increased to 18 hours, while others also served as administrators (P. Bender, 1989). Enrollment in 1934 climbed to 358 students, surpassing the predepression enrollment of 324 in the fall of 1929. The freshman class contained 114 members, the largest freshman class in Goshen history. Income actually exceeded expenses in 1934 as the college turned a small profit of $332. Although Goshen did begin to spend more money on advertising, little attention was paid to student recruitment as it is known today (P. Bender, 1989). Instead the college continued to depend on word of mouth solicitation and the travels and letter writing of S. C. Yoder and various faculty members.

To help students, scholarship money was increased by over 100% from $4,837 in 1933 to $10,219 in 1934. C. L. Graber began a garment factory to provide jobs for students. The Maple City Shirt Company would produce garments for 3 years during the depression (1934-1937) and accounted for over $4,000 in wages for needy college students (S. C. Yoder, 1924-1940).

Goshen enjoyed another increase in enrollment in 1935 with a 13% gain in students to 396. Professors received small raises after a study begun by President Yoder in 1933 showed Goshen salaries to be well below those of similar institutions (S. C. Yoder, 1924-1940).
Both President Yoder and Dean Bender began campaigning for North Central accreditation, noting the library and student personnel services would have to be improved (Goshen College Annual Report, 1935). With the enrollment doing well the college felt comfortable in slowly increasing student fees throughout the depression. By 1935 the total cost for tuition, fees, room, and board was $375 a year, up 9% from 1929 when it was $340. By the close of the depression in 1939 total cost would climb to $400 a year, an 18% increase over 1929 (Goshen College Bulletin, 1929-1939).

Although enrollment of a larger student body helped finances, endowment income and donations continued to lag. In 1935 only $500 of income was earned from investments and only $4,357 was realized from donations. This comprised 1% and 7% of Goshen's total income for 1935, respectfully (Goshen College Annual Report, 1935). At the time no one person was assigned to seek donations. Most of the endowment was invested in mortgages, farms, and loans which did not produce significant income. Only $21,000 of over $120,000 was held in bonds and preferred stock. Furthermore, the college had unfortunately invested several thousand dollars in Insull utility bonds and by 1936 lost almost the entire amount (S. C. Yoder, 1924-1940).

In 1936 the college employed a full-time fund raiser, I. E. Burkhart. It was a fine year for Goshen. Enrollment went up 8% to 427 and donations rose 43% to $7,689. Investment income soared as the depression weakened and the college was able to reduce its debt from $53,000 to $50,000. Professor John Umble was given the responsibility to organize student recruitment.
The number of professors with doctoral degrees continued to expand. Goshen College was proud of the quality of its instructional staff. Yoder, Bender, and others strongly encouraged gifted students to go on to graduate school inferring possible teaching positions could be available with the college at a later date. In this way a number of instructors were acquired (Mininger, 1989). Occasionally, the college sent a professor to graduate school to acquire expertise the college lacked. For example, Dr. Paul Bender was sent to the University of Chicago in 1936 to study student personnel services (Goshen College Annual Report, 1936).

Success continued in 1937 with another increase in enrollment to 496. Full-time fund raising paid off by almost doubling the donation level over 1936. Total income was at an all-time high of $88,596. With the sure knowledge of these successes the board voted permission to raise money for a new library which was needed for Goshen's campaign to win North Central accreditation. Dean Bender noted other improvements necessary for North Central requirements including a college physician, a new departmental organization, and improved student personnel services. The college continued to spend heavily for library holdings (Goshen College Annual Report, 1937).

With President Yoder on leave to complete a doctor's degree, enrollment dipped slightly but rose again with his return in 1939. Funds were successfully raised for the library which was completed in 1940 (Goshen College Annual Report, 1939). S. C. Yoder retired from the presidency following the 1939-1940 school year. Goshen College had much to be cheerful about. North Central accreditation would
follow in 1941. Enrollment was strong, income was up, and debt continued to fall in the face of balanced budgets and increased alumni and church support.

Facing possible extinction in 1923 Goshen College rose from despair to a position of power in 1940, passing through double-barreled threats of reactionary criticism and the devastating depression. Leadership on the part of President Sanford C. Yoder was certainly the cornerstone of success. He was able to meet three critical goals he set for himself in 1923: establishing proper relations and confidence with the church and its people; acquiring administrators and a faculty with ability and appropriate graduate school credentials; and improving the physical facilities. He accomplished the goals against great odds and brought a doubling of enrollment during depression years, and ultimately the gratification of North Central accreditation (Umble, 1955). Furthermore, faculty members earned 17 doctor's degrees between 1926 and 1940 helping to assure accreditation standards. Ultimately, however, Yoder and Goshen College's greatest accomplishment was to help change the direction of the Mennonite church itself (Blackburn, 1979).

The faculty at Goshen College also deserved credit for their dedication and willingness to see a greater purpose. Their pay was very low and their work load heavy, yet few left for greener pastures. They understood their role in the future of their Mennonite students (and non-Mennonite students) and dedicated themselves to that purpose. Without their sacrifices Goshen College could not have withstood the vicissitudes of the times.
Innovation was another strength that played an important role in the college's survival. Academic innovations included night school, a temporary branch campus, graduate religious training, and summer institutes. The business department of the college located on and off campus jobs for students. The shirt factory also produced jobs and good experience for students, as well as a little income for the college. Food donations were sought from friendly farmers and barter was used to pay bills. For example, S. C. Yoder had his brother, a rancher in Colorado, ship jack rabbits he had shot for bounty to the college to defray cafeteria expenses (F. L. Yoder, 1989). S. C. Yoder and other administrators and faculty members loaned students money to stay in school. The pooling of a portion of total faculty salaries to be utilized at the discretion of the business manager was another noteworthy fiscal innovation.

Goshen learned the hard way that fund raising was important. Unfortunately full-time fund raising was not organized until the worst of the depression was over. Following the employment of a regular solicitor positive results were immediate.

Goshen also succeeded because of positive academic standards. Dean Bender worked vigorously to establish a scholarly atmosphere and a strong expectation of scholarship for faculty. Instructors were often handpicked while still undergraduate students to return to Goshen following graduate education. By 1940 the great majority of full-time faculty members had doctorates or were finishing them.

Student satisfaction was high at Goshen (W. Smith, 1989). Classes were small and professors actively participated in student
activities. There were many clubs, intramural sports, choirs, an
entertainment series, and active literary societies flourished.
President Yoder and others constantly monitored the constituent envi­
ronment and understood the atmosphere students wanted while not mov­
ing too fast for older supporters.

University of Notre Dame

Father Edward Sorin and the University of Notre Dame are one.
He founded it and his personality and drive still illuminates and
inspires the Notre Dame community. As a young priest in France,
Sarin heard an address by the first Catholic bishop of the far away
Indiana territory during a speaking tour of Europe in 1836. Five
years later Sorin, 27 years old, arrived in the Vincennes, Indiana,
area which was the dioceses seat at that time. He and his followers
began a primary school and shortly thereafter a college. However,
another group of priests had already started a similar institution
and to prevent unnecessary duplication and misunderstandings Bishop
de la Hailandiere sent Father Sorin and his clerics to sparsely set­
tled northern Indiana. Fortunately he also gave Sorin's group 543
acres of underdeveloped land which featured two small lakes near the
town of South Bend (Schlereth, 1976).

French missionaries had been in the area since the time of
LaSalle. A Father Biden had served the area and left a small log
chapel on the property. When Sorin arrived during the winter, he
decided to make Biden's cabin the location for his college (Anony­
mous, 1893). He gathered help from local people wherever he could
and commenced building a school using bricks made from marl deposits found on the Notre Dame acreage. Sorin's energy can be seen in the list of completed buildings during 1843, which included a chapel, bakery, farmhouse, house of studies for the teaching brothers, dormitory, retreat house, and headquarters building. He also convinced nuns to come to Notre Dame du Lac to help with the community efforts. By 1844 Sorin advertised for students and education commenced (Schlereth, 1976).

Father Edward Sorin was a doer. Not only did he begin an educational community on the shores of Lake St. Mary and Lake St. Joseph, his school also served as the Catholic mission for the whole region from Lake Michigan and Kalamazoo, Michigan, in the north to Plymouth and Goshen, Indiana, in the south (Anonymous, 1893). Sorin used all resources available to him to make Notre Dame successful. Farms were begun to take advantage of the high quality soil of the region. Newly educated brothers in the Congregation of the Holy Cross were sent out to found schools to serve as feeders for Notre Dame. Sorin even dispatched prospectors to the California gold rush in 1850 although they were not successful. Following the Civil War, Father Sorin plotted a portion of Notre Dame property and sold lots to Irish immigrants thus assuring loyal workers and potential students (Schlereth, 1976). Nor did Sorin ignore the education of his students. He contacted the Jesuits at Georgetown and St. Louis to better understand their academic methods and revamped Notre Dame's programs accordingly (Sullivan, 1951). Notre Dame was initially a boarding school for primary and secondary pupils with only a limited
number of real college students. Sorin believed strongly about his charges, especially the youngest group he called the Minims. He was known to get down in the dusty yards of Notre Dame and shoot marbles with them until someone would remind him of other pressing duties (Schlereth, 1976).

By 1865 Father Sorin relinquished the presidency of Notre Dame. He had secured Notre Dame's existence at a time when 51 Catholic colleges had been founded in America before the Civil War and only 7 remained after the conflict. Notre Dame's success during the nineteenth century was based on a good location with no close Catholic competitors; a swiftly growing population, especially in Chicago; philanthropy in the form of work, money, and land from many people; a dedicated, self-sacrificing staff who believed in what they were doing; and the nature of Edward Sorin who set high standards for those who followed him (Schlereth, 1976).

Sarin remained active as chairman of the board of trustees, but more importantly he became Superior-General of the Congregation of the Holy Cross. He moved the international headquarters of the order from Le Mans, France, to Notre Dame. His presence would be needed for although Notre Dame seemed strong in 1879 with 395 students, 18 buildings, and 34 instructors in liberal arts, commerce, law, science, and engineering, disaster struck in the form of fire. The six-story Main Building burned to the ground along with four other buildings. Since it served as dormitory, classroom, and library, Notre Dame's ability to function seemed doubtful. Father Sorin was away during the disaster. When he returned he surveyed the
destruction, gathered the depressed students and staff and said simply, "If it were all gone, I should not give up" (Schlereth, 1976, p. 76). He started raising money mostly in Chicago and the present administration building resulted, becoming a symbol of the university with its gold dome and statue of Mary.

Father Sorin did not live to see the new century but Notre Dame went on to continual growth and national recognition. By 1906 the preparatory school was de-emphasized and concentration placed on college with the eventual goal of university status. By 1920 Notre Dame had grown to 1,207 students, 67 faculty members, and 28 buildings on 1,550 acres. The period between 1920 to 1933 (before the depression took hold) would be a time of great change for Notre Dame. President James Burns was the first president at the university to hold a doctorate. He wanted to make Notre Dame the finest academic facility possible. He visited Harvard and was taken with their financial organization (Wallace, 1969). Burns decided his ambitious academic goals could only be accomplished with a large infusion of money. He initiated Notre Dame's first modern fund raising campaign and a lay board of trustees to manage the endowment. Burns's campaign was successful and $2 million resulted, following his careful study of the techniques of Cornell and The Ohio State University. The fund raising effort he established utilized professional advisors, printed material, alumni, campus visitations, and efforts aimed at South Bend and major corporations (Kearney, 1975). Unfortunately, President Burns died before he could use much of what he earned.
The new president, Father Matthew Walsh, took over the leadership of Notre Dame in 1922 at an enviable time. Money raised by Burns and the dramatic rise of football income triggered by the success of Coach Knute Rockne's football teams allowed Walsh the luxury of excessive capital.

Football had been played at Notre Dame since 1887. Up to the Rockne era Notre Dame's teams had been successful with a winning 145-40 record from 1887 to 1918. However, during Rockne's tutelage from 1918 to 1931 Notre Dame won 105 games, lost only 12, and tied 5 while earning two national championships. With the help of sports writers and their own public relations department, Rockne, his teams, and players became legends. The dying words of the All-American running back George Gipp have as recently as 1988 been adapted by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. People still quote Grantland Rice's prose about the Four Horsemen of Notre Dame "outlined against the blue-gray October sky" (Wallace, 1969, p. 113).

Knute Rockne had been an athlete at Notre Dame and a Protestant convert to Catholicism. He was also an honor student who graduated magna cum laude. Thus, he knew his sport, Notre Dame, and the sense of playing football as a crusade for a higher purpose. With his intelligence he was able to innovate in his football game plan. But most importantly, Rockne understood psychology and used histrionics to drive his young men to "bring down the thunder from the sky" (Wallace, 1949, p. 114).

The success of football during the 1920s brought with it some bad publicity. Notre Dame was frequently accused of being little
more than a football factory. The National Collegiate Athletic Association cited Notre Dame for spending excessively on athletics, allowing violations of academic standards, and overly subsidizing the education of athletes. Defenders of big time football at the university pointed out the advantages of the sport: educational opportunities were provided for some needy students; football helped unify school spirit; it built character in its participants; promoted the participation in intramural sports; allowed students to get rid of excess energy; and provided national publicity and income (Schlereth, 1976).

Certainly the money was important. When Rockne became coach in 1919 profits from football were $235. By 1929 football earned $529,420 annually. Seating for games grew from 2,500 in 1919 to the necessity of renting the 54,000 seat Soldier Field in Chicago for several seasons until a large stadium could be built at Notre Dame (Schlereth, 1976). The university recognized that football was a profitable business and has never apologized for football money (Wallace 1969). The extra income allowed President Walsh to build five new residence halls between 1922 and 1928. They were necessary because after World War I increasing enrollments had forced over 600 students to live off campus. Football success further stimulated enrollments. Father Walsh rejected the idea of fraternities. Walsh wanted as many students as possible to live on-campus to maintain the Notre Dame sense of community.

Charles O'Donnell took over the presidency in 1928 on the brink of the depression. Because of the football income O'Donnell
continued Walsh's physical plant expansion but not in residence halls. From 1930 to 1934 O'Donnell used football income to build a new law building, football stadium, engineering building, power plant, post office, and at least six other major to minor projects. However, the depression started to take its toll, especially after Rockne was killed in a plane crash in 1931, and college expenses began to hurt student attendance.

In 1929 Notre Dame had an enrollment of 3,128 students, almost tripling the enrollment of 1920 (Bulletin of the University of Notre Dame, 1929). The university had income in excess of expenses of $770,450.20 (Annual Financial Report, 1929). It is obvious why President O'Donnell continued Walsh's physical expansion. Growth in students appeared never ending and the money was available. However, 1931 saw the first small drop in enrollment Notre Dame had suffered since the turn of the century. It fell again, this time sharply in 1932 to 2,838, a 12% drop from a high of 3,227 in 1930. Another sharp decline in enrollment occurred the following year in 1933 when enrollment fell to 2,617, an approximate decline of another 7%. Thus, in just 3 years total enrollment decreased by approximately 19%. Notre Dame may have been well off but her clientele was suffering. To stem the downward spiral in enrollment and help students, Notre Dame slashed tuition and room and board. In 1931 it cost $985 for tuition, fees, room, and board to attend Notre Dame. In 1933 the total charge was lowered to $686, a decrease of 30%. Actually the university set up a scale depending on a student's pocketbook. Wealthier students stayed in newer, better appointed halls and paid a
higher fee. Even then the total cost was only $803 compared to the previous $985. In a further attempt to help students the charge for off-campus individuals was lowered dramatically to only $300 a year. They still received an activities ticket so they could participate in cultural activities, intramural sports, and attend the football games (Bulletin of the University of Notre Dame, 1933). As the effects of the depression eased, the fees rose slowly to $726 by 1939 but never reached predepression levels.

Students did have to tighten their belts even with the lower fees. Many students had to drop out while others had only a pair of corduroys and heavy shoes to last the school year (Hesburgh, 1989). Many needed jobs to stay in school and Notre Dame responded by employing 540 students during 1934 which was 20% of the student body. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided funds for another 260 students ("Two Hundred and Sixy Students," 1934). However, times were hard and some students questioned the value of college and staying in school ("Disillusionment," 1932; "Two Outlooks," 1932). Even the student comedy magazine had to be discontinued because of a lack of revenue and advertising. It eventually ran a deficit of $7,000 and ceased to print in 1934 ("Juggler Discontinued," 1934).

For the most part student life and the strong family feeling Notre Dame had always tried to perpetuate continued (Hesburgh, 1989). Clergy lived in every residence hall and counseled students. People helped each other and felt strongly about their beautiful campus. Football, while not as successful as under the legendary Rockne,
continued to be a matter of almost evangelistic pride for students. For example, a student editor writing about the 1936 football season gushed, "Back they came with smashing victories over the outstanding teams of the country, reaching their climax in that unforgettable, immortal defeat of the highly-touted, sensational Ohio State team" (Dome, 1936, p. 153). Twenty percent of the 352 page Notre Dame yearbook was devoted to intercollegiate and intramural sports. Students seemed truly nostalgic about the Gothic, green campus and found it a fine place to be and a difficult place to leave. One former student wrote,

As we waited for the bus to pull out ahead of us I glanced back over the quadrangle. Beyond the amber trees the Dome was shining all golden in the sun. The figure at its top was a shimmering point against the murky spread of clouds in the north.

Turning down Notre Dame Avenue toward town I caught for an instant in the car mirror the reflection of the golden brightness against the sky. Beside me the student had turned in the seat and through the rear window he was looking at it direct. (Sullivan, 1951, p. 243)

If students suffered during the depression, professors at Notre Dame did not. Because of football income, careful financial management, monitoring of investments by the lay board of trustees, and government financial aid to students lay faculty members were not dismissed nor were their salaries lowered. In fact, some professors enjoyed raises and increased staffing during the period (Schlereth, 1976). For example, in 1931 out of 97 lay professors, 22 received a raise, one had his salary cut, and the rest remained the same (Office of President O'Donnell, 1931). Salaries varied greatly but many professors were well paid indeed for the depression era receiving
between $4,000 to $6,000 and higher. Others received less but often were given room, meals, or other privileges. Notre Dame's lay faculty was augmented by around 50 clerics (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1930). These men were not paid a penny and received only room, board, and clothing (Hesburgh, 1989).

Father O'Donnell had been in poor health since 1931 and died in 1934. Father John O'Hara took over the presidency at the low point of the depression. Father O'Hara had a varied background and brought a wider experiential base to the presidency than most other men before him. He had grown up in South America as the son of a United States diplomat. He studied at the Wharton School of Business and became Notre Dame's first Dean of the School of Commerce (Business). From 1918 to 1934 he served as Prefect of Religion, an important position at the university. He oversaw the religious and social life of the student body. He vigorously campaigned to increase religious activities including daily communion and early morning chapel services. He was determined to get students to attend services and when "one student in the Corby basement locked his door, Father O'Hara came in through the window" (Wallace, 1969, p. 198). O'Hara also succeeded in involving the football team in active religious life which created tremendous publicity among Catholics nationwide. He also developed extensive religious surveys showing the positive effects of the atmosphere at Notre Dame (Hope, 1978). Immensely popular with students, O'Hara was lovingly nicknamed "the Pope," a prophetic appellation since he would later go on to become a cardinal (Wallace, 1969).
As a new president O'Hara believed he faced two challenges: continued physical expansion and increased graduate programs. He realized funding would be critical to his two interests (Hope, 1978). Notre Dame made a profit of $528,115.97 in the 1933-34 school year as O'Hara took office. However, football income was only $160,509, enrollment was at its low ebb, and endowment income had fallen to $53,319.75 (Annual Financial Report, 1934). Most universities and presidents would have been overjoyed at having half a million dollars in profits at the height of the depression but the trained businessman in O'Hara knew things could be better.

Hunk Anderson had taken over the football team after Rockne's death in 1931. Unfortunately by the 1933 season Notre Dame's proud winning record fell to a losing 3-5-1 causing attendance and income to fall dramatically. Elmer Layden replaced Anderson. Layden was asked to get football back into the winning tradition but without the glitter and flamboyance of the past. Notre Dame football fortunes did improve and football income rose to a $576,614.81 profit by 1939 (Annual Financial Report, 1939). Following the depression Frank Leahy would take Irish football to a new plateau of excellence in the 1940s.

Investment and endowment income had been placed totally in the hands of the lay board of trustees. Their membership consisted of 15 individuals from prestigious corporation and banking firms. They began the depression with $1,422,231 endowment, the majority of which was in mortgages, real estate bonds, and preferred stock. The minutes of their November meeting in 1929 display no panic but some
concern about the stock market crash. They thought the Notre Dame preferred stock was "absolutely safe" while at the same time acknowledging they had lost $45,440 in the market (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1929).

By 1930, 7% of the total assets of the Notre Dame endowment had been lost. Some stocks cost Notre Dame dearly, like the South Bend run Oliver Company whose stock fell from $94 a share to $25. Other stocks, like Pierce-Arrow, were sold off, losses taken, and money reinvested in public utilities (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1930, 1931).

Over the next several years the board reacted to the depression. The overall value of investments continued to fall and by 1934 investments and endowments stood at a total value of $1,164,497, a loss of around $258,000, or approximately a 17% decline (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1934). In 1935 the lay board switched to a much more conservative philosophy, liquidating many holdings in real estate mortgages for safer, more reliable government bonds (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1935). Many companies and individuals during this period of history had great difficulty meeting mortgage payments. The board had previously mentioned a desire to avoid foreclosing on people. Such behavior could make Notre Dame look like a cruel landlord. On the other hand, if mortgages were not paid the university lost the income. Government investments did not produce high interest rates but did produce a secure flow of income and the promise of higher value as the depression ended. Through such careful management the lay board of trustees kept investment income.
flowing. Even at the worst of the depression the lay board earned $35,223 for Notre Dame in 1935 (Annual Financial Report, 1935). By the end of the period the investment assets of the university increased to $1,931,000, which was approximately a half million dollar gain over 1929 (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1939).

It is important to remember that even with investment income, tuition income, and football income all down in 1934, Notre Dame still produced a profit of $488,045 (Annual Financial Report, 1935). This remarkable fact is even more impressive when noting that fund raising was not productive or well organized. The Congregation of the Holy Cross simply ran most everything effectively. Records show all departments right down to the candy store, laundry, and tailor shops turned a profit (Annual Financial Report, 1929). Notre Dame was managed like a city or monastery. It had its own farms, power plant, water, police, fire department, and a sense of community and purpose to make everything run well (Hesburgh, 1989).

Fund raising at Notre Dame was a rather unorganized entity until Father O'Hara became president. There had been a successful beginning at modern fund solicitation under Burns in 1920-1922. After his death his efforts were not continued because Rockne's athletic teams produced the capital needed for expansion. Some wealthy individuals gave large gifts to construct buildings named after them and the alumni association attempted to raise some money, but they were not successful. Perhaps their hearts were not in fund raising. They had a difficult time even raising dues and early in the depression the university had to give them $15,000 to keep the association
functioning. In one issue of the Notre Dame Alumnus (1935) they wrote, "The Alumni Office is sending out reminders of the one phase of the association's activity that has always embarrassed the administration--dues" (p. 71). This attitude hardly facilitated the solicitation of funds.

President O'Hara did try to increase alumni giving through the frequent listing of university needs in the alumni magazine from simple $15 dollar gifts, to scholarship contributions, to requests for major gifts for buildings. Alumni and patron giving did increase allowing O'Hara to build a number of residence halls, the Rockne Memorial Building, and other structures. It was a fine time for construction because labor and supplies were inexpensive. Notre Dame took advantage of the depression and 16 buildings or additions, many in beautiful Gothic style, resulted (Hesburgh, 1989). The Notre Dame Alumni Association did make a successful start in keeping in touch with alumni through their 30-page monthly magazine. It resulted in Notre Dame alumni clubs and activities all over the nation. Later in the next decade, a centralized Office of Public Relations would undertake a more organized fund raising role under J. Arthur Haley, who had previously been the business manager of athletics. His modern, centralized fund raising efforts would make good use of the organization initiated by the alumni association (Department of Public Relations, 1940).

Following the decline in enrollment in 1931 through 1933, more emphasis was placed on admissions activities similar to today. Alumni association staff members began visiting over 139 high schools.
to talk to students (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1934). Impressive recruitment literature was produced. The golden dome was usually featured on the front and by 1937 a blue and gold cover was in use. Black and white pictures were on nearly all the 40 pages of the recruitment magazine (Notre Dame Men, 1937). Enrollment went up immediately with the 1934 school year and by the end of the depression enrollment stood at 3,088, slightly higher than in 1929.

President O'Hara also succeeded in his venture to increase graduate programs and academic prestige at Notre Dame. An attempt at a graduate division had failed to develop sufficient students in 1923. O'Hara started slowly to add master's and doctorate degrees. By the end of his presidency in 1939 there were doctoral programs in philosophy, physics, mathematics, political science, and metallurgy, as well as master's degrees in 13 different departments. O'Hara also increased the number of teaching faculty from 177 full-time professors in 1935 to 222 in 1938 (Notre Dame Lay Board of Trustees, 1935, 1938). He was able to improve quality in teaching ranks by taking advantage of the flight from Hitler's Europe of some outstanding intellectuals and academicians. Notre Dame also received an unexpected boost in prestige when the popular President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, requested the opportunity to attend a program Notre Dame was organizing to celebrate Philippine independence. Father O'Hara used the occasion to award Roosevelt an honorary doctorate. Later in 1939 the new Notre Dame president, Charles O'Donnell, would use good relations with President Roosevelt (a former Secretary of the Navy) to win an important Naval ROTC program for
the campus which would help Notre Dame get through World War II (Hope, 1978).

Father John O'Hara was a successful president; however, it is interesting to note his attitude toward the new student personnel services movement. He did not appreciate selective admissions because he thought students with potential would never get an opportunity to attend. Freshmen orientation prior to regular enrollment also drew his displeasure. He preferred to keep freshmen so busy as to be overwhelmed during their first few weeks to keep them out of trouble and to prevent homesickness. He viewed psychological and placement testing as strictly experimental and recommended ignoring them. He disliked specialized advising and counseling because he thought those services were already being performed by priests and professors. To employ student personnel specialists would take away from the informal family character of Notre Dame. In conclusion Father O'Hara (1930) noted, "Personnel service impresses the writer as an attempt of educators who have lost contact with their students to bridge the gap and give the student a substitute for personal relations between themselves and the student" (p. 24). He went on to write that to employ personnel services would be "to ignore the human soul" (p. 24). Father O'Hara wrote his opinions while serving as Prefect of Religion, a post he saw as providing most of the same services the student personnel profession claimed. It seems likely, he thought the student personnel movement was a threat to the traditional family relationship between the clergy and clientele at Notre Dame.
The University of Notre Dame du Lac went into the depression in a strong position and left it in an even more enviably way. Enrollment was up. The physical plant had expanded to one of the finest in the Midwest. Academic prestige had increased through more graduate degrees and a larger well-paid staff augmented by well-known scholars from Europe. Football was again producing income without the previous circus-like atmosphere, and student satisfaction seemed high.

Notre Dame had passed other Catholic universities in prestige, not just by winning football games but through academic excellence and foresight. The chief purpose of education at Notre Dame had never been to train men for the priesthood. Theological dogma did not restrict the progressive development of the liberal arts, law, engineering, architecture, and business (Lenoue, 1933).

Notre Dame was also fortunate to have a plenitude of land on which to expand its programs. Other fine Catholic universities like Fordham, Georgetown, and St. Louis built in the city and were eventually locked into relatively small campuses (Hesburgh, 1989). Notre Dame also seemed to have a larger national and international vision than some Catholic colleges and universities. Perhaps a Notre Dame graduate, Francis Wallace (1949) summed it up when he wrote, "Notre Dame stands, in its second century and to its own people, as a Midwest fort and cathedral, dedicated and devoted to God and the melting pot, to country and individual rights" (p. 275).
Interpretation

Valparaiso University, Goshen College, and the University of Notre Dame did survive the Great Depression through some similar actions and methodologies, while also displaying unique tools in their arsenal of survival. The most important trait they shared was a deep sense of purpose. The administrators and professors who worked at each institution believed they could develop higher education for their particular constituents in a fashion that would provide a better atmosphere than elsewhere. All three examples focused on their religious affiliation as an integral part of that "better" atmosphere. They also believed higher education and the liberal arts were worthwhile endeavors, and no soul searching about the value of higher education was indicated. Belief in their own religious interpretation also produced a strong group identity in the leadership during the 1930s. There is a sense of wanting to work hard for the German Lutherans, the Swiss Mennonites, or the Irish Catholics. Self-sacrifice went along with hard work on all three campuses.

Effective, strong leadership was another important factor in the survival of the three case study institutions. At Goshen College the leadership of Sanford C. Yoder was critical as Goshen faced the double-barreled difficulties of hard economic times and cultural clashes within the Mennonite church. O. C. Kreinheder at Valparaiso was an able academician who could also win the support of businessmen to his university’s cause. Notre Dame had had a long tradition of able leaders from the inspiring Sorin to Father John O’Hara, who was a
businessman, clergymen, university president, and later deemed worthy of the College of Cardinals. It might be that hard times allow people the opportunity to display leadership characteristics unnecessary at more stable periods of history; however, men like Yoder and O'Hara were exceptional individuals no matter the time in which they might have lived.

All three schools went to a great deal of effort to build above average to excellent academic programs and standards. Valparaiso and Goshen went through distinct changes in administration during the 1920s. Thus, both had to work very hard to acquire North Central Association accreditation. Neither complained about the necessity for such accreditation standards and organized to meet them, in Goshen's case on very limited resources. Notre Dame with its longer history and superior financial situation was able to actually work for national prominence and high recognition in academia. They all put a great deal of effort into acquiring the best professors with the finest credentials each of their resources allowed.

The campus atmosphere for students at Valparaiso, Goshen, and Notre Dame was a positive one. Valparaiso's Lutheran administrators had purchased the school from a group who had prided itself on a rather free environment for students, especially one lacking fraternities and sororities and some of the pseudo-social sophistication that sometimes goes with them. Students at Valparaiso enjoyed a well rounded student activity program and a university that did attempt to organize a fairly modern student personnel service for its day. Goshen College actually allowed their students a much freer
environment than most of the young students could have hoped for in the rural homes. At Goshen College the students could choose to wear modern clothes as opposed to "plain" clothes and enjoyed automobiles and music of the day which was often seen as worldly and sinful in some home communities. The excitement of intellectual challenge was also available at the college while topics like modern biology and genetics were disclaimed elsewhere in the Mennonite world. Furthermore, Goshen used professors in all student services positions, even sending a few to graduate school for education in the new discipline. This allowed for maximum interaction with faculty. Notre Dame stressed campus life at the all-male university. Priests lived in the halls and performed most student services functions. Further emphasis was placed on increased religious activities by Father O'Hara that led to a deeper sense of community during the 1930s. Athletics at the intramural and intercollegiate level also played an important role in campus life at Notre Dame.

Based on their particular situations all three institutions changed or adjusted academic programs during the Great Depression. Valparaiso carefully studied its programs during the economic downturn and bravely eliminated or modified those that did not pay for themselves. They were careful to support other academic departments integral to the liberal arts tradition. Among others they canceled pharmacy, several foreign languages, and engineering and down scaled offerings in art and physical education. Goshen College cut a program by finally eliminating their academy when enrollment fell beyond financial reason. Goshen also innovated by starting night courses,
attempting a branch campus in the next town, offering successful religious education in summer school, and promoting adult religious education in a variety of ways. Notre Dame was able to start a successful graduate school during the depression years. All three institutions displayed a willingness to carefully study their academic offerings and did not remain stagnant. Instead they cut, innovated, and added rather than allowing inertia and indecision to overcome them.

Business management of the schools was also important during the 1930s. Valparaiso and Notre Dame were fortunate to have experienced business executives they could count on for advice and management decisions. The lay board at Notre Dame led the university through the depression. They constantly adjusted Notre Dame's investments to counter the new and challenging economic situation that no one had previously faced. Their success was noted previously in the decidedly increased value of the Notre Dame portfolio by the depression's end. Valparaiso was also able to utilize experienced businessmen who helped with fund raising, investments, and good banking services. Goshen College did not have access to the type of experienced business community enjoyed by Notre Dame and Valparaiso. Most Mennonites were farmers with little investment experience. What Goshen lacked in investment expertise, it made up with determination. Goshen basically decided, given its past unfortunate experiences with debt, that unpaid bills would simply not be allowed to accumulate. All essential bills were paid at the expense of employee salaries. An emergency pool of money was set aside each year and professors who felt
an extra need could apply to the business manager for funds. Student notes of debt were also given to some professors and they were expected to collect part of their salary directly from the individual. Valparaiso also cut professor's salaries to survive the Great Depression, while Notre Dame found it unnecessary.

All three schools tried to help students by making more scholarship money available. They also increased the number of campus jobs for students and took advantage of expanded government financial aid. Goshen College even started a shirt factory on campus to provide students with work and provided off-campus job placement.

Goshen College also saved a great deal of money by increasing the academic staff teaching load. Many professors found themselves teaching 18 hours a semester and filling in part time with a student service function. Administrators also taught and often had extra administrative duties outside their immediate offices. Notre Dame was fortunate that its dedicated clerics who worked for the university in every capacity imaginable, including instructional, received no pay other than room, board, and clothing for their efforts.

Notre Dame was also successful because it was really administered as a town unto itself. It had its own farms producing food at wholesale cost, tailor shop, barber shop, candy store, and other enterprises, all producing income. It had its own power plant, water, police force, fire department, post office, and took full advantage of its extensive land holdings and rental properties.

Valparaiso and Goshen found it necessary to make across the board cuts in spending, especially on maintenance activities.
Library acquisitions suffered the least at both schools. They also curtailed major building projects until the end of the depression. Although Notre Dame practiced frugality they used their extra income to do a tremendous amount of building to take advantage of the low construction costs of the time.

All three schools monitored student fees closely. Valparaiso and Notre Dame cut their student charges and Notre Dame's cuts were dramatic. Goshen's fees were already low and the administration elected not to lower them further. Instead small increases occurred as the enrollment during the period was actually increasing.

Alumni and constituent relationships were a priority for the case study institutions. Valparaiso performed a thorough job of church relations organizing Lutheran groups for men, women, and youth. They constantly lobbied the church for financial and moral support. Alumni were pursued vigorously. Goshen College spent an amazing amount of time on church concerns. As already noted President Yoder thought one of their main goals had to be improved constituent relationships. He and others at Goshen spent much time traveling by car and rail to raise the level of support for the place of higher education in the Mennonite world, and Goshen College's place as the provider of that education. They also began embryonic outreach programs to alumni. Notre Dame had developed a more sophisticated alumni association by the 1930s with all the earmarks of success alumni organizations most private colleges consider critical today.
Valparaiso University put great stress on fund raising activities just prior to and during the depression. They were very successful at raising money during the economic downturn and used a well organized, multi-faceted approach more typical of modern times. The minutes of their board meetings are filled with fund raising discussions; and while it is too simple to say that fund raising alone saved Valparaiso, it certainly played a critical role in the university's health. Goshen College had attempted to raise money but without great success. However, when they finally made a commitment to a full-time position in fund solicitation the results were telling. Notre Dame had enjoyed great success in an organized fund raising effort during the 1920s. However, later leaders did not follow up on the fund raising success probably because it was not deemed necessary. President John O'Hara reversed that trend in the mid-1930s and began working with the alumni association to raise money. Notre Dame also did well in attracting large gifts by rewarding the donors with major buildings named for them, a common practice in higher education today. Early in the 1940s administrators at Notre Dame would follow O'Hara's lead and centralize fund raising efforts.

Valparaiso University fostered a fine working relationship with the town of Valparaiso. City fathers helped the university acquire land and easements. The university invited townspeople to participate in the cultural life at the school, provided speakers for town programs, and scholarships for local youth. The town reciprocated with occasional funds for special projects, cooperation with university visitation programs, and absolute positive publicity in the
local newspaper. Notre Dame also enjoyed good relations with South Bend. The local newspaper gave the university front page coverage of major events, university personalities, and athletics. Notre Dame officials invited South Bend personages to campus for appreciation dinners, special events, and to meet important persons who might be speaking on campus. Goshen College's relations with the town were not so fortunate during the Great Depression. Local newspaper coverage of the college was limited during the period. It should be remembered that Mennonites were clannish and did not normally join the activities of the large society. Mennonites who attended Goshen were from small communities that tended to be predominantly Mennonite and Amish. Thus, they were used to their own particular society and did not typically develop in-depth interaction with non-Mennonites in the Goshen area. Also some non-Mennonite townspeople did not care for the pacifist stance of the Mennonites which had become apparent during the patriotism of World War I. Other community people were leery of Goshen financial position following the troubles in the early 1920s.

Student recruitment was not a highly organized priority at any of the institutions studied. Valparaiso and Notre Dame suffered initial enrollment losses, while Goshen College actually increased enrollment during the Great Depression. Valparaiso and Notre Dame involved the registrar and alumni offices in some student recruitment activities. They did not see fit, even in great need in Valparaiso's case, to invest money in full-time professionals in recruitment. Notre Dame eventually began producing accomplished recruitment
literature and developed 139 high schools for alumni officers to visit for recruitment purposes. Their enrollment did increase following their efforts; however, since the high school visits were begun late in the depression, better economic times may have explained enrollment gains. Goshen utilized President S. C. Yoder and other administrators and professors to actively seek students. Yoder continually wrote letters, followed tips from college friends, and traveled extensively visiting potential students in their homes over the summer. Later in the depression a professor was given part-time responsibilities for recruitment.

One institution used intercollegiate athletics successfully. Notre Dame's football teams made so much money that the university did not have to be concerned with survival as Valparaiso and Goshen did. The income built a beautiful campus and allowed Notre Dame to employ and retain a large, outstanding faculty. It also brought Notre Dame prestige, school spirit, students, donations, and the support of Catholics all over the United States. It seems doubtful that the university planned for such success. No one plans for a Knute Rockne. However, when Rockne appeared officials at Notre Dame recognized the opportunity and took full advantage of the option. Later in the 1930s President O'Hara modified the approach to football so that victories still occurred but without the over emphasis and bad publicity that had earned Notre Dame the football factory appellation of the previous decade. Valparaiso considered intercollegiate athletics to be important for student, alumni, and local morale. They never discussed canceling the athletic program during the Great
Depression and while they did not achieve Notre Dame's fame they did believe athletic success to be important in university life. Goshen College, because of its more conservative culture, did not compete in intercollegiate athletics and, therefore, did not acquire the potential positive results of intercollegiate sports. On the other hand, it did not have to spend time and money on them during the threatening economic era. At any rate, intercollegiate athletics would not have been tolerated by critical conservatives in the Mennonite culture.

Notre Dame was unique in its cultivation of relations with the military and the federal government. During World War I Notre Dame had allowed the military to utilize the campus as a training center. The income proved to be very beneficial. Shortly after the Great Depression, World War II would break out and Notre Dame was again able to benefit as a training center for the war effort. Former presidents of Notre Dame like Burns during the early 1920s had made it plain that the university supported the United States government and opposed communism. President Franklin Roosevelt believed Notre Dame was a positive place for him to visit during the 1930s. Valparaiso was operated by the German Lutherans. While their community's loyalty during the war years was never in doubt the fact that the foe was Germany may have kept more extensive relationships with the government at a low priority. Goshen College was pacifistic and believed noncooperation with the federal government's war efforts to be necessary.
Finally, location and competition played a role in each institution's history. Valparaiso enjoyed the enviable advantage of being the only Missouri Synod Lutheran undergraduate program in the Midwest. It was located close to Chicago where a large market for potential students and donations existed. It also had open areas and friendly city fathers to allow for relatively easy physical expansion. Notre Dame also enjoyed the close connection to Chicago for students and donations. South Bend also proved to be a strong economic base with a growing population. The university possessed large land holdings on which it could expand at will, rather than being locked into the central cities like its strongest Catholic competitors. Goshen College was not located in an especially strong town economically like South Bend, nor was it as close to Chicago. However, this did not matter because the college's clientele were mostly rural Midwesterners. The parents of the Mennonite young people who became Goshen students were more comfortable with a smaller town in an agricultural setting and Goshen fit this description. Goshen was centrally located in the Midwest so that travel from Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa was not overly burdensome. The college itself was built on farm land south of the town and never lacked acreage when it chose to build. It did have some competition from Bluffton College in Ohio and later from Eastern Mennonite College in Virginia.

Valparaiso, Goshen, and Notre Dame survived the economic threat of the Great Depression. Valparaiso had the added handicap of the acquisition of a campus just before the depression, while Goshen had to rebound from an actual closing in the 1920s and cultural clashes.
within its own church. Today, all three institutions continue to provide service to their clientele through the will and energy of the administrators and professors who went before them.
CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING IN PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

As previously discussed, many authors believe that private higher education appears to be in retreat as the end of the current century approaches. Astin and Lee's (1972) so-called invisible colleges of small size and little renown seem especially vulnerable. With competition from strong state controlled universities and community funded two year colleges the viability of many small private institutions is in doubt. Some observers of the American social fabric may think that private higher education is no longer needed and, therefore, concern for them may be misplaced. However, given the nature of the founding principles of the United States and the variety in human nature, it should seem logical that private higher education is worth saving.

It would be antithetical to allow something as important as education to be strictly state-run in a democracy. Private options for higher education by the very nature of our society must exist and should be nurtured as examples of our free system of government. Citizens in the United States should have choices in considering higher education as part of their inherent life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. It seems logical too that smaller environments should provide a more appropriate place for a certain percentage of students seeking higher education. A more peaceful atmosphere and smaller
numbers provide those students who want it with greater attention from their college community and a place in which to grow that is calmer than major state universities. A smaller, privately-run collegiate setting also provides college administrators with the chance to experiment and innovate in ways unavailable to massive universities. Finally, private higher education allows certain groups to foster their own particular religious and philosophical values, thus establishing a kind of atmosphere denied to the public universities by the doctrine of separation of church and state.

Three historical case studies followed three private institutions through the challenge of the Great Depression. Their actions during that period of intense economic decline suggest a number of implications current private higher education needs to consider as low high school enrollments, rising cost, and competition threaten their existence. However, before a discussion of a game plan based on history commences, what of the colleges that failed? Do the lessons they teach the educator support our current study?

Many authors have focused on private college failures but probably none as thoroughly as Andrew and Friedman, who in 1976 were commissioned by the federal government to study the reasons for private college collapses. They reported on 59 different closures or mergers during the 1960s and 1970s. Basically they found that the failed institutions had serious problems with a vision of their own mission, their weak financial bases could not stand competition, and they lacked expertise in marketing, financial planning, business practice, and faculty commitment to goals. They also found that the larger and
older an institution the less chance it seemed to have of intense problems which might threaten its existence. For example, 39 out of 59 colleges which failed had an enrollment of 500 students or less. Forty-nine out of 59 failed colleges were less than 100 years old. Demised colleges did not appear to have a sound grasp of efficient operation and business practices. They were spending $4,059 per full-time student while existing colleges were only spending $2,407 per full-time student to operate their campuses. All 59 colleges were eventually threatened by a lack of sufficient students and some by a lack of effective fund raising (Andrew & Friedman, 1976).

Other studies found that quick action and strong leadership might have saved colleges which failed. An example is Wilson College, which was allowed to run dangerous deficits for 7 consecutive years before the leadership decided to take action. Unfortunately, their efforts were too late (Beeman, 1979). Healy (1977) studied three defunct colleges and found old-fashioned curriculums, naive business practices, soft mission statements, and poor student recruitment efforts contributing to failure. Leadership and management difficulties were found to be culprits in private college closings by Millett (1976), while O'Neill and Barnett (1980) noted debt accumulation and overestimation of income precipitated college failure. All of these research discoveries interface very well with the findings of the enclosed case studies of success at Valparaiso, Goshen, and Notre Dame.

As noted in Chapter IV, much can be learned and applied to successful private college management from the lessons delineated from
the three previous historical case studies. Most importantly the
three institutions displayed a deep sense of purpose and admirable
leadership. All three schools were founded by religious groups which
felt a deep commitment to their constituents and to learning. They
were willing to employ the liberal arts for their best purposes while
not apologizing for preparing their young people for professions.
The University of Notre Dame educated Catholics in business, archi-
tecture, engineering, and law as well as the liberal arts. Valparai-
so did much the same for Lutherans in business, engineering, law,
teaching, and with attempts at pharmacy and dentistry. Goshen Col-
lege promoted service related occupations like education, and later,
social work and nursing for Mennonite students. All encouraged their
youth to consider the ministry or priesthood. The three also felt a
great desire to provide values and an appreciation for learning and
culture through the liberal arts.

The successful private college must know its mission, just as
Goshen, Valparaiso, and Notre Dame understood their own in the 1930s.
If the modern institution does not clearly understand itself then
staff and constituents will not appreciate its reason for existence
either. In considering purpose some collegiate educators seem to
flounder on the rocks of the liberal arts. One of the most respected
defenders of the liberal arts, Cardinal John H. Newman (1959), wrote
"a liberal education is one that forms a habit of mind which lasts
throughout life which values freedom, equitableness, calmness, moder-
ation and wisdom" (p. 129). J. H. Newman believed the liberal arts
would prepare students to be studiously healthy and, thus, productive
in the practical world. Educators down through the years have generally agreed with him. However, some have gone to the unnecessary extreme of postulating that a major in a liberal field is the ideal for all students, while other information is deemed unnecessary or even an academic sacrilege. This type of breast beating about protecting the liberal arts does serve the purpose of unwise dilution of the liberal arts base in higher education, but it is overly defensive. Students and society have already voted with their feet moving swiftly to business, education, health, computer science, and technology. Education for the professions is here to stay. Rather than bemoan the fact educators should be pleased to note the continued importance of the liberal arts which pervades and is so necessary to the educated professions. Society, technology, and international competition are too pervasive for educators to expect all students to feel well prepared for their place in the world by a strict liberal arts curriculum. The liberal arts and professional education can and should coexist to give the student the best preparation for life.

As private college and university educators review their statement of mission they need to consider the times and whether their institution's purpose is in touch with those times (Giamatti, 1988). Mission statements or statements of purpose should periodically be read, considered, discussed, and if necessary, thoughtfully changed. When a mission statement is under review representatives from the faculty, students, alumni, and trustees should be consulted for input. One of a private college's strengths should be a strong sense of community and family identity. A well done statement of purpose
will review the history and past mission of the school because history is a necessary prologue for the future (Martin, 1982). The statement should clearly and succinctly enumerate the particular institution's philosophy and goals to be utilized for stated results. In other words, state clearly what the college or university wants for students, how it will go about providing an education to achieve the purposes, and how it will know it has succeeded. In considering purposes and goals private colleges would be remiss to ignore values including religious/philosophical orientations (Giamatti, 1988). This is where the private college should be able to outperform the state universities with their handicaps of larger size and government imposed separation from religious orientations.

A clear mission statement developed by the entire college community provides the greatest number of people with a sense of ownership and a sense of purpose (J. S. Green et al, 1985). This will allow the college community to see the institution's direction and plan strategies and resources to achieve it (Lahti, 1975).

Leadership in any enterprise is critical and exceptional leadership was a blessing for the institutions in this study. People like Yoder of Goshen, Kreinheder of Valparaiso, and O'Hara of Notre Dame were hard working leaders who set positive examples for others. Modern day writers generally agree that leadership is critically important. What type of leader is appropriate for the collegiate setting? What characteristics do they display? Astin and Scherre (1980) studied leadership at 44 private colleges and universities. They found humanistic presidents were most appreciated by faculty and

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students. Humanistic leaders were defined as egalitarian administrators. They interacted readily with a wide range of people and were nonauthoritarian in style. Presidents who were hierarchical administrators favoring bureaucratic structures were less popular with private college communities as were those leaders deemed too entrepreneurial. The humanistic president as leader faces a demanding environment and a variety of roles. He or she must be careful to interact with all constituents including faculty, staff, students, alumni, and also people of importance outside the college community. Beside the constant human interaction necessary to bind the collegiate family, the successful president "must be the master of two ends of the spectrum: ideas at the highest level of abstraction and actions at the most mundane level of detail" (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 287). The collegiate president must be a visionary who can temper the visions of what could be with pragmatism (J. S. Green et al., 1985). The ultimate leader at a private college in other words must provide some creativity and thought for the future within the stated mission so that others are inspired to work toward future improvement and excellence. At the same time he or she must be pragmatic and willing to compromise, delay gratification, or accept other ideas if resources or timing negate dreams. The leader becomes a symbol for the college and for those who work there. The presidential leader must build coalitions and teams to be successful and respected as a knowledgeable executive and future agent (M. F. Green, 1988). At the same time the president should be willing to recognize and utilize the financial resources, ceremonial power, access to inside and
outside information, and reward/punishment power for the good of the institution (Wise, 1975). He or she must be clearly willing to take charge against an array of potential hindrances including relations with the trustees, faculty inertia, tenure, inefficient administrators, and a challenging environment outside the campus.

Where exactly a private college may find a humanistic, confident, almost charismatic, educational leader is a perplexing question. Many fine professors and high level administrators may not be willing to pay the price in time, effort, and frustration that are a daily part of the president's role. Thus, trustees and search committees face a difficult task in locating the right individual. As the private college seeks a leader for difficult times it should look for men and women who have educational experience, vision, management skills, public relations ability, opportunistic consciousness, a people orientation, a sense of when to delegate responsibility, and compassion for faculty and students (Gilley, Fulmer, & Reithling-shoefeer, 1986).

Once a private college has a well done mission statement and an effective leader, planning becomes the next critical issue. During the depression years at Goshen, Valparaiso, and Notre Dame extensive planning was not a priority except for the acquisition of accreditation. Recent researchers of failed colleges also note a lack of long-term planning. Given the vicissitudes of present times planning is a necessity. Planning is:

a conscious process by which an institution assesses its current state and the likely future condition of its environment, identifies possible future states for itself, and
then develops organizational strategies, policies, and procedures for selecting and getting to one or more of them. (Jedamus, Peterson, & Associates, 1980, p. 114)

When conducting planning the effort must be led by the chief administrator who should make its importance clear to all. Time and adequate resources must be provided to a planning group who are required to seek input from all constituents of the college including students. Planning should consist of a three-part process encompassing master planning, strategic planning, and tactical planning.

Master planning focuses on the large overview of the particular college's situation. The committee should consider the mission statement, the environment outside the college, institutional environment, and values so that a clear overview of the college's current conditions and future orientation is plainly delineated. In effect the master plan shows the institution who it is, what it has, and where it wants to go.

Strategic planning goes beyond the master plan to discuss external opportunities and threats, determine internal strengths and weaknesses, consider constituents to be served or those that are not being served, and study geographic questions and concerns all within the institutional mission (Steeples, 1988). Tactical planning advances to the final level and should include department heads or division leaders. Individual program planning, priority setting, and actual resource allocation are the goals of tactical planning (Jedamus et al., 1980).

This type of three stage planning is necessary for the year to year and decade to decade success of a private institution. However,
this is a threatening age for private colleges and the prudent administrators will go beyond the usual procedures and include crisis adaption planning to the repertoire. Crisis adaption planning envisions the worst scenarios so that immediate action can be taken if a crisis such as a sudden drop in enrollment or income occurs. Administrators and trustees should work out strategies that can be placed in immediate effect with different actions for drops in revenue or cost overruns of 1% to 5% to more critical shortfalls in revenue of 25% or more. The administration should carefully prioritize academic programs, instructors within the programs (in their minds if not on paper), student services programs, auxiliary services, and enterprises that might be cut given each scenario. To assist in accomplishing such planning a college might follow Vanderbilt University's example. Vanderbilt asked professors to rate academic programs by the essentiality to the school, quality of the program, need for the program, demand, location or geographical advantage, cost-revenue relationship, and cost implications of maintaining the program (Mingle & Associates, 1981). Such perceptions on the part of faculty would be very helpful in making adaptive decisions to environment stressors. Similar surveys should be made of student and auxiliary services.

Crisis adaption planning must also study selected cuts in physical expansion and plant maintenance which proved to be successful short-term adaptive devises for schools like Goshen and Valparaiso during the Great Depression. Thirdly, the college can explore the use of discretionary funds, emergency fund raising, and short-term
loans for appropriateness of utilization in a crisis (McCorkle & Archibald, 1982).

As private college presidents, trustees, and select committees plan they must constantly monitor the environment for change, while at the same time considering possible internal signs of distress. Outside the campus itself, alumni, collegiate competitors, students who elected to attend some other college, and local citizens should be routinely polled to detect changes, positive or negative, in the college's image. Internally the institution should carefully watch student flow from high schools, pressure to lower admissions standards, salary levels compared to competitors, percentage of faculty teaching outside their area, number of adjunct instructors, and other signs that might display initial financial or organizational stress (Mingle & Associates, 1981).

Income production through student recruitment, alumni services/fund raising, and sound business and endowment practices are critical for private colleges and universities because they do not enjoy state tax dollars. During the depression years Valparaiso was greatly assisted by vigorous fund raising, alumni support, and sound business knowledge. Goshen actually increased enrollment consistently during the depression by utilizing its outstanding president in student recruitment and while staying out of debt by determined financial exigency. Notre Dame had tremendous gift support and began modern alumni and student recruitment efforts toward the end of the depression. Notre Dame also enjoyed a lay board that managed their endowment admirably. Among more modern case studies of colleges that
failed, an inadequate student body, a lack of fund raising, or slipshod business practices consistently contributed to decline and fall.

While marketing a college has had negative connotations in the past it has swiftly become a necessary part of the private colleges' survival arsenal. Keeping in mind a particular college's mission and constituents, marketing a college should be much like marketing any service-related product with one major exception: Admissions personnel must be very conscious of the school's dignity and reputation. Truth must temper enthusiasm. It does no good to make a college sound like perfection itself only to have new freshmen disappointed and disillusioned after a few weeks on campus. They will be unhappy or drop out telling friends and relatives of their displeasure, thus causing great harm to the institution.

Recruitment of students at a private college must be a campus-wide endeavor. Pretty or handsome young graduates with a shoeshine and a smile are no longer enough to run a sophisticated recruitment function. Presidents must give the recruitment office a proper budget and encourage faculty to help, especially when it comes to on-campus visitation programs. Meanwhile the recruitment office must run a multi-method and multi-media approach to attract students. Direct mail, high school visits, in some cases national college fairs, and the use of high quality recruitment literature, with well researched themes and images must be produced. Each college will want to consider the use of videos, television, radio, and newspapers depending on the geographical distribution of their market. Every office of recruitment must initiate rapid personalized
correspondence, have state-of-the-art technical equipment, and make carefully researched decisions on market segmentation, market shares, market penetration, and protective marketing.

Potential students are much more sophisticated today than in the past because of our modern media and technological society. Therefore, colleges must tailor their messages to a consumer-oriented clientele. For example, it is no longer enough to tell potential students that "ABC College is a good college" and let it go at that. The perceived value of a particular college's education is the most important single item in recruiting (Hossler, 1986). Recruiters need to focus on the outcomes of college, such as intellectual, social, personal, and career development and reinforce what they say with pertinent statistics and information from significant others like professors, alumni, students, and outside experts. As private colleges face a declining pool of high school seniors they will have to do more to show young people and their parents why private higher education is worth the climbing cost.

Because there will be fewer high school seniors, private institutions must look for solutions to enrollment decline. One method is to increase the number of older students returning to college. This will mean more night courses, child care, and possible tuition adjustments. Institutions need to consider how older students will affect the environment on campus for the traditional aged clientele. Colleges can also seek a great share of international students especially Asians and domestic minority students. Acculturation services and remedial services usually result from such increased populations.
Finally, private colleges should work with local schools and state governments to encourage a greater proportion of young people to enroll in college, especially in states like Indiana where college attendance rates are low.

Alumni and fund raising activities are crucial to the private colleges. Alumni offices should have the resources to keep in careful touch with alumni and develop a sophisticated data base. Not only do alumni activities help maintain the family feel of private colleges, but graduates also provide almost a quarter of most colleges' gifts and endowment funds, more at some schools (Heemann, 1979). The alumni magazine has become a critical part of an effective alumni program. To get reader interest alumni magazines now include a variety of informative articles rather than only college news (Williams, 1979). Furthermore, questionnaires, telephone interviews, and face to face meetings are becoming more popular to assist in researching questions of changing image and gift behavior (J. B. Frances, 1979).

Fund raising per se has gone beyond alumni giving. Other fertile markets for gifts are non-alumni individuals, private philanthropic foundations, business and corporate foundations, non-alumni groups, religious groups, and other sources (Heemann, 1979). College fund raisers like their counterparts in student recruitment can no longer depend on one or two methods to raise money. Typical fund raising tools include annual giving campaigns, cultivation of selected target individuals, extensive use of volunteers, direct mail campaigns, phonathons, reunion programs, corporate and foundation
campaigns, donor recognition programs, leadership training, and more (Welch, 1980). Most presidents are highly involved in successful fund raising projects and their leadership and attention to detail appears to be a critical factor in success ("Give and Take," 1989).

Private colleges during the depression found they could not afford second rate business management and investment practices. Notre Dame and Valparaiso counted on the sage counsel of a variety of experienced business professionals on their lay boards. Since most trustee boards do play a part in raising money and in investment decisions it is important that competent business professionals be secured as board members (Wood, 1985). One investment and financial expert is not enough, rather there must be several included among the membership of the board of trustees. Typically colleges should invest conservatively in portfolios consisting of high grade stocks and bonds. However, recent changes in the economy make diversification into well selected real estate holdings a worthwhile opportunity (Anderson & Meyerson, 1987).

In day to day business management private colleges must professionalize or suffer the consequences. The business manager should hold a master's degree in business administration. He or she should be elevated to an equal relationship with the academic dean and dean for student services. The business manager should have at least one professional accountant on staff, preferably with a Certified Public Accounting license. It is probable that private colleges will have to pay high salaries to acquire such business professionals but given the threats to private college income, the changing nature of the
American economy, and the need for business innovation their high salaries will be justified.

The educational and social atmosphere on campus usually decides whether students will want to relate to a particular college and therefore dictates collegiate success or failure. The quality and energy of professors, the curriculum, and student services including athletics becomes the essence of college life and results in positive or negative experience. Goshen, Notre Dame, and Valparaiso all worked very hard given individual school resources to hire quality instructors and improve and modernize curriculum. How can smaller, private colleges acquire quality faculty when faced with competition from higher paying state universities? For example, the average pay for a full professor at many small private colleges in Indiana is $30,000 while their contemporaries at Purdue average $57,000. In Michigan a full professor at a small, private college earns $33,000 while full professors at the University of Michigan average $62,000 ("Fact File," 1989). In recruiting faculty the private college can remind young instructors that they will be of the utmost importance at the private college. They will teach in an environment where interacting with students is highly valued and small class size will make such interaction possible. Young faculty can be given the kind of freedom they may want to pursue their own particular choice of research projects. Many small colleges avoid the level of political infighting seen at major universities and tenure may be easier to acquire at the smaller, private college. Goshen College used an interesting tactic during the depression to acquire solid, young
faculty members. Outstanding young people were encouraged by the administration to earn their doctorate with the suggestion that Goshen could have an opening for them at a later time.

Since private colleges depend on good teaching and professors who want to interact with students, appropriate award patterns should be developed. Intrinsic rewards are helpful and finding methods to remind professors of the positive ways they affect students is meaningful. However, intrinsic rewards are not enough. Promotion, tenure, money, privileges, prizes, committee chairs, departmental chairs, improved equipment, research time, secretarial help, library support, an attractive environment, and family perks like free tuition can be used to keep esprit high among the deserving, while the lack of extra rewards can help cull the unimpressive (Baldwin, 1985). Private colleges should never lock themselves into tenuring an individual until the administration feels sure of the person’s value.

The curriculum should also be utilized to keep the college competitive. During the depression Notre Dame and Valparaiso were willing to try new programs in the professions, while Valparaiso and Goshen were also willing to cancel programs that did not have sufficient enrollment support. The liberal arts should remain the backbone of the private college program with an emphasis on utilizing it to stimulate the ability to think, write, communicate, become familiar with values, ethics, and the problems of society and the world. However, there has been a trend to a more practical bent to the liberal arts. More and more colleges while still providing the traditional programs have added curricula which allow students an
entrance to the job market. An example would be the addition of music therapy to the traditional performance major in music (Scott, 1983). Bradford College has pioneered a practical liberal arts education which emphasizes communication skills, a liberal arts core for all, a comprehensive major, practical minors, required internships, and a capstone project in the senior year (J. S. Green et al., 1985). This kind of fundamentally sound mix of the liberal arts and specific and experiential course work should serve students well in today's competitive world, just as curricula change did during the Great Depression.

Private colleges without strong business and computer science majors should institute them. The days of ignoring management, accounting, marketing, and data technology are over. Students and their parents are demanding solid programs in these fields and the job market is very good. Private colleges can no longer pretend business education is beneath them. Instead ways should be found to insure that the business and computer science majors have a sound liberal arts basis. Health programs including nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, medical technology, and respiratory therapy should also receive careful consideration.

Finally, with the advent of global communications and increasing economic competition and interdependence in the world economy, private colleges must allow students to become more familiar with international affairs. At least one required course in human geography will be necessary to provide students with fundamental facts about their world. Professors in other disciplines could incorporate
increased international connections in their courses while interna­
tional travel opportunities are developed.

During the Great Depression student personnel services was still
a young profession. Professors and religious leaders at Notre Dame,
Valparaiso, and Goshen performed much of the student personnel func­
tion. With the explosion of knowledge and demands on professors' time most private colleges must depend on student development spe­
cialists to provide a positive campus atmosphere. Astin (1985) and others have shown that "nearly all forms of student involvement are associated with greater than average changes in characteristics of entering freshmen" (p. 197). Student involvement is the key to stu­
dent learning outside the classroom. The goal of higher education is
one of positive student growth and change. Living in residence halls
and involvement in extracurricular activities increases persistence
and assists personal growth (Astin, 1975). Furthermore, campus life
can deeply affect alumni attitudes toward their alma mater which can interface with fund raising and student recruitment (Martin, 1982).

Many private colleges and universities are emphasizing retention
activities in which the student services unit plays an integral role.
To achieve increased retention, there must be presidential and fac­
culty support as well as an established plan. Positively affecting
student success in the classroom is the key element in retention
activities. Successful students stay in school. Therefore, student development professionals must obtain a faculty commitment to the underprepared student. Remediation and tutoring require dedicated faculty involvement to increase retention rates (Noel, Levitz,
Student services at small colleges face problems which are a reflection of the larger society. Drugs and alcohol continue to be health problems on campus and now herpes and AIDS also threaten the college population. Leaders in student services must initiate more information programs throughout the student's college career promoting health and values as part of the concept of education for the whole person.

Professionalization of student services will also need to be addressed. Because of low salaries many people in student services positions at small, private schools do not have graduate training and are unfamiliar with the concepts of student development. Individuals in leadership positions in student services on small campuses must attempt to provide education for current employees. To allow individuals to practice student development without a philosophical basis can be counterproductive and damaging in the eyes of the rest of the college community.

Intercollegiate athletics are important to the collegiate milieu. Small private colleges cannot hope to strike the financial gold mine of a Notre Dame; however, athletics does increase excitement on campus, heightens the sense of family, and can positively affect enrollment ("After 94 Years," 1987). If a college is going to participate in intercollegiate sports it ought to try to operate a successful program just as the college would want to run anything else. Winning is important and it is absurd to look down on it (Giamatti, 1988). As long as intercollegiate athletics are not
allowed to impair the mission of the college then the community should be allowed to enjoy the activity, as they did at Valparaiso during the 1930s.

Innovation was another area of successful management for the three institutions studied in Chapter III. Goshen started a garment factory on campus, Valparaiso brought large youth conventions to the university during the summers, and Notre Dame slashed its tuition and de-emphasized football at the height of its power. All were innovations. None of the three case study institutions stayed static during hard times. They tried new ideas in curriculum, business practices, fund raising, recruitment, and alumni services and were often successful. As technology and communications move at a faster and faster pace so must the private college of today. Examples in present literature abound with curriculum and business innovations. Colleges are boldly stepping into real estate investment. Occidental College realized a 32% profit in one year from a real estate investment (McMillen, 1989b), while Mount Holyoke is developing the town in which it resides ("Mount Holyoke's Commercial Development," 1989). Some colleges are creating academic centers in retirement facilities (Watkins, 1989). Aquinas College has pioneered multiple nontraditional curricular ideas to appeal to older students including Saturday classes, workshops for police officers, evening business degrees, and many other ideas (Hruby, 1980). Small, private colleges have an advantage over the state universities when considering innovation. Smaller size usually leads to more rapid agreement on goals and a course of action. Private colleges also avoid much of the
bureaucracy and territoriality in establishing an innovative program. Innovation can help faculty and staff stay fresh and excited about their work place. The progressive private college will seek innovation but with a pragmatic attitude. The innovation must be good for people and the college. It must not risk the basic mission of the institution and it must pay or be dissolved.

Relations outside the college with non-alumni are also important. Valparaiso University had an exceptional relationship with the city of Valparaiso. University and city officials worked closely with each other in a model for successful college management. Cultivating good relationships with the local community makes imminent sense. Sooner or later misunderstandings and tensions can arise between town and youth. Students cause noise, traffic congestion, occasionally misbehave, and take some jobs away from town youth. Professors are sometimes resented as liberal intellectuals or impractical academics by some local people. Colleges may attract minority or foreign students to an area where few existed previously. Finally, in some small towns the college might be a major employer which can perpetuate a company town image (Rowland, 1980). To foster good relations colleges should encourage faculty and staff to be active in local churches, clubs, and civic affairs. The college would also be astute to open its facilities at certain times for community events, special children's programs, and sports activities. Colleges can encourage its own students to serve as playground assistants and good ambassadors in a variety of ways. The payoff for the institute comes in the form of a more pleasant environment for students, fund raising
opportunities, host families for international students, and zoning assistance.

Notre Dame used good relationships with the federal government on several occasions in its history to great advantage. As the difference in cost between private and public higher education continues to expand, private institutions can note Notre Dame's success and increase contacts with state and federal governments. Lobbying efforts in conjunction with other private colleges and universities will be necessary to keep and possibly increase hard won financial aid opportunities for students who would prefer a private education (Johnson, 1986). Private colleges must continually inform state and federal legislators of their institution's contributions to society and the cost reduction in higher education services each state enjoys because of the presence of private institutions.

The various implications for the future success of private colleges cannot be effectively viewed as separately functioning parts. Rather for a private college to be successful the whole enterprise must be understood and administered as a synergy. A synergistic entity is one whose parts are dependent on each other and without each other collapse can occur. Students must think they are properly challenged by stimulating professors who feel adequately rewarded and supported by appropriate equipment and library resources, which will not be available without adequate income augmented by fund raising and marketing, all overseen by a wise manager/president. Faculty and staff members on a small, private college campus need to be convinced that they are all dependent on the good performance of each other.
They must realize that what the professor does, what the student activities director does, what the fund raiser does, what the admissions director does, and what the president does will decide the student's outcome and future support or lack of it as an alumnus.

Stanford, Yale, Harvard, and other prestigious, powerful, and wealthy private institutions are not threatened by today's volatile higher education market. However, many of Astin and Lee's (1972) so-called invisible colleges are threatened. The small colleges without national fame or large endowments are in danger of passing out of existence. Most have done a workmanlike job of educating young people and have had a positive impact on American society. They must be aware of their situation, constantly court their constituents, monitor external and internal stimuli, change when necessary, strive for quality, and protect themselves or disappear from the education stage as so many before them.
APPENDICES
Appendix A

Initial Contact Letter
Initial Contact Letter

Historical research on private higher education can provide insights for individual faculty members and administrators in determining important courses of action for the future.

Under the direction of Dr. Beverly Belson, Professor, Department of Counselor Education and Counseling Psychology at Western Michigan University, I will undertake historical case studies of successful collegiate responses to the threat of the Great Depression. Your institution has been selected as a positive example of creative activity during this period of time.

I am requesting your assistance by providing me with suggestions or help in discerning sources of information that might be helpful, including significant persons who might have lived during the 1930s.

I hope you will share our enthusiasm for this study. We look forward to your cooperation.

Cordially,

Beverly A. Belson
Dissertation Chair
Western Michigan University

Mike Hostetler
Doctorate Candidate

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Appendix B

Oral History Release Form
Oral Release Form

I hereby give to J. M. Hostetler, for whatever utilization or educational purposes he may determine, the recordings, transcripts, and contents of this oral history interview.

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Appendix C

Oral History Interview Guide
Oral History Interview Guide

Interviewer: The date today is ________________.

What is your name?

What is your address?

What relationship did you have to ____________ University/College during the 1930s?

You were associated with the college/university in that capacity during what years?

Life for the college/university must have been difficult during the Great Depression. Tell me what it was like.

How did the institution manage to survive such a tough time?

What type of changes had to be made to survive?

Tell me about innovative activities undertaken by administrators and others in the academic community or board of trustees.

What role did leadership play and who showed leadership?

What do you think these innovative survival techniques led to after the Great Depression was over?

What do you think the experiences of ____________ University/College during the 1930s say to private higher education today?
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