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INTRODUCTION:
GLOBALIZATION,
SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND
SOCIAL WELFARE

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Although the literature on globalization has increased exponentially over the last decade, the term is still poorly defined and its many facets and complexities are under-appreciated. A major problem is the way the effects of globalization on social welfare have been reduced to simplistic, rhetorical statements that either condemn all aspects of globalization or uncritically extol its benefits. In reality, however, globalization has complex and paradoxical consequences for human well-being. For example, international trade is widely viewed by many progressive observers as being exploitative and unequal and many are appropriately critical of the way neo-liberal writers wax lyrical about its purportedly positive impact. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that some countries have benefited from export led development, and that incomes and standards
of living for many of their citizens have improved as a result of
the increased rate of employment generated through trade.

However, arguments about the social consequences of glo-
balization cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy in which
globalization is viewed either as having disastrous conse-
quences of otherwise as bringing untold benefits. Thee issues
are far more complex. While employment opportunities and
incomes have indeed increased for many people in low income
countries that have adopted export led industrialization strate-
gies, improvements in incomes and standards of living have
come at a cost for many of these countries. Rapid urbanization,
congestion, heightened inequalities, the decline of traditional
values, emotional stress and other negative manifestations of
prosperity now characterize many newly industrializing de-
veloping countries. Globalization has also fostered the diffu-
sion of Western cultural beliefs and practices to other parts of
the world which many traditionalists abhor. This has result-
ed in the resurgence of fundamentalist religious and cultural
movements that have in some cases used violence to resist the
spread of secularism, individualism and consumerism. On the
other hand, rapid advances in communication technologies
and more the frequent exchanges between people of different
cultures through these technologies and travel have produced
results that cosmopolitans view as highly desirable. As these
examples suggest, a proper analysis of the impact of globaliza-
tion requires a nuanced understanding of the complexities and
paradoxes of the globalization process.

An analysis of this kind not only challenges social work
and social welfare scholars to understand the complexities of
globalization but to advocate for the adoption of principles,
policies and practices that may lead to a socially just system
of global exchange that explicitly incorporates social welfare
and social justice ideals. Efforts to promote fair trade, equitable
economic exchanges and the regulation of the global economy
have gained more support in recent years as activists, aca-
demics and progressive policy makers have challenged the
market fundamentalism that has characterized economic glo-
balization. The goal of creating a socially just global system
is now more frequently discussed in both the media and the
academic literature. Since social work and social policy have
long been committed to social justice ideals, there is a need for more scholarly debate on these issues in social work and social welfare circles. The tendency in the social work and social policy literature to totally dismiss globalization needs to be re-assessed in the light of international efforts to promote these social justice ideals. After all, few informed observers today believe that nation states can ignore global realities and retreat into economic nationalism and isolationism. The issue today is not whether globalization should be welcomed or rejected but how globalization can be regulated in terms of principles that promote social justice.

This special issue of the *Journal Sociology and Social Welfare* presents a number of articles that address aspects of the way the issues of globalization, social justice and social welfare have been addressed in social work, social policy and social welfare. Although much of the existing literature has focused on the social problems that may be attributed to globalization, an attempt has been made here to focus on issues of mainstream social welfare concern in the context of globalization.

The special issue begins with an article by James Midgley, one of the special editors. Midgley asserts that although the literature on globalization has proliferated, social policy and social work scholars have not adequately debated the consequences of globalization for social welfare and social justice. Recognizing that different social science interpretations of globalization reach very different conclusions on this issue, four major perspectives which offer different analytical and normative insights into globalization are identified and their implications for social welfare and social justice are briefly examined. Midgley concludes that cultures and societies define, interpret and promote social justice and social welfare in a variety of ways. Social work and social policy must embrace an international perspective that views the phenomena of globalization from more than a western view in order to permit the formulations of interventions to promote social justice and social welfare that are culturally congruent and socially compatible.

Pamela Anne Quiroz examines the prevailing ideology of color-blindness and transracial adoption. *Color-blind individualism*, the adoption arena’s version of color-blind discourse, argues that race should not matter in adoption; racism can
be eradicated through transracial adoption; and individual rights should be exercised without interference of the state. She argues that as privatization has increasingly dominated our world and disparities between countries have grown, so too has intercountry adoption. This article examines the colonial aspects of intercountry adoption and implications for conceptualizing global human rights from the current emphasis on individual rights. Quiroz concludes that the real issue continues to be which children are desired by which parents. By recognizing the colonial aspects of intercountry adoption and challenging the practices that reproduce racial, gendered, and economic hierarchies children’s rights can be protected.

Karen Smith Rotabi, Denise Gammonley, Dorothy N. Gamble and Marie O. Weil define social work as a global profession. The authors encourage a broadening of social work education, moving beyond the traditional conception of “internationalized” to a “globalized” social work curriculum which embraces a world systems perspective. Practical teaching strategies for a globalized perspective are presented with selected key concepts specifically applied to social policy, community practice, human behavior in the social environment, and sustainable development. Discussion also includes macro-scale ethical considerations in a neoliberal economic system.

Charles Fiki presents an exploratory study of alcohol and drug use in two rural communities in Plateau State, Nigeria with the aim of raising awareness to the rural alcohol and drug problem. This article examines the patterns of alcohol consumption and drug use, and their perceived functions for substance use among rural farmers in Nigeria. He discusses the common use of marijuana and alcohol in addition to prescription drugs as well as multiple or combinational drug use. Pleasure and relaxation emerged as the major reason for drug and alcohol use. Fiki concludes that the factors influencing alcohol and drug use are the relative neglect of rural communities, and the activities of hawkers, quacks, and other untrained individuals pervading the rural health sectors. He calls for further research to adequately capture the reality of alcohol and drug use in rural communities in Nigeria.

Gregg M. Olsen analyzes the highly contentious accounts of the welfare state and the dynamics governing its
development in the social policy literature over the past few decades. He argues that research has suggested that as a result of domestic pressures and strains and/or the impact of globalization, welfare states were declining in tandem. However, most of these studies were quantitative, focusing upon 18 or more advanced capitalist nations and emphasized variables that were readily amenable to statistical manipulation in search of broad, cross-national trends. His study investigates the extent to which the social democratic welfare state in Sweden, the "social liberal" welfare state in Canada, and the liberal welfare state in the United States have converged. Olsen applies a qualitative approach, examining the character of the income security and social service programs in two broad policy domains, family policy and health care and concludes that the welfare states in the three nations remain distinct.

Marina Findlay and John McCormack's article investigates the educational preparedness and practice views on globalization from a sample of Australian social work practitioners. Sixty-six social workers completed a questionnaire which explored the relationship between local and international issues. Practitioner responses indicated a strong interest in the topic and widespread agreement that there is a link between local and global issues on clients in their daily practice. While there was a diversity of opinion on educational preparedness for global practice, practitioner responses again indicated general agreement that ongoing education would be useful. Findlay and McCormack conclude with some suggestions to further enhance the knowledge and education of social workers for global practice.

Loring Jones, David W. Engstrom, Tricia Hilliard and Mariel Diaz argue that globalization demands that social workers embrace more than just local and national perspectives; they must adopt an international viewpoint as well. A negative aspect of globalization that deserves more attention is the international movement of labor. This article presents a description and analysis of trafficking, the more deleterious part of this movement of people, in a global context. Decision makers seeking to make global migration more humane need to know about the dynamics and process of trafficking, as well as ways to combat it. Definitional controversies, contextual issues
cluding the dynamics and processes of trafficking), and consequences of this movement for individuals and societies are discussed. Implications for social work are also presented with a particular emphasis on advocacy for human rights.

Vanna Gonzales argues that our understanding of the relationship between globalization and contemporary social welfare systems is heavily influenced by three conventional approaches to studying welfare reform: the political economy, moral economy, and mixed economy approaches. In addition to analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, she introduces the social economy approach as an emergent alternative. Drawing from a growing body of work on institutional innovation within the European third sector, Gonzales argues that the social economy approach makes a valuable contribution to understanding the role of welfare networks in reconfiguring globalization's impact on the character and quality of social welfare so as to better reconcile social efficacy with social justice.

Qingweh Xu examines the issue of globalization and immigration. The relationship between globalization and immigration has been intensely examined in the last decade with a focus not only on whether and how much globalization has caused international immigration but also how to promote and sustain a just global system for the growing number of immigrants. His article selects three developed countries with different welfare state philosophies and traditions—Australia, Sweden and the United States—and compares how they cope with the growing number of immigrants and their various needs. This article reflects thinking about states' ability to redistribute resources, about the ability to agree upon a unified theory of welfare rights in a diverse society, and the feasibility of opening nations' welfare systems to all immigrants in the globalization context and from a rights-based social work perspective calling for policy makers, scholars and social workers to underscore and reinforce the value of immigrant.

Howard Karger, Christian Iyiani and Pat Shannon examine how and why five major stakeholders—international financial organizations; NGOs; governmental entities; multinational corporations; and community development projects—have failed to significantly and uniformly reduce aggregate global
poverty. This article uses the results of a case study of HIV/AIDS prevention in a low-income Nigerian city to argue that effective action must involve local and global stakeholders in collaborative partnerships. It concludes by discussing the critical role of facilitators in such partnerships.

Ernie Lightman, Andrew Mitchell and Dean Herd explore whether people are better off working in the precarious employment associated with a neoliberal globalized economy. Their research shows the impacts of globalization on the composition of food bank users in Toronto, Canada. They then compare two groups of food bank users, one with at least one household member working, the other without. The findings demonstrate that the life experiences of the two groups remain depressingly similar: those employed remained mired in poverty and continued to lead marginalized, precarious lives.

The lack of investment in education or training characteristic of ‘work-first’ welfare reforms leads to unstable, low-paid work for the vast majority of those leaving welfare. The authors call for a rejection of the narrow work-first models and the continued development of broader mixed models offering pre- and post-employment services and financial supports necessary to make work both realistic and sustainable, challenging the assumption that any work is the route out of poverty for all groups within society.

These articles demonstrate the wide range of areas and content that can help provide a better understanding of globalization and the issues facing policy makers, educators, social workers, and the diverse groups of people impacted by the changing international context. It is the editors’ hope that the selected articles will stimulate further understanding, discussion and plans for action to address the social and economic realities in a rapidly changing world.
Perspectives on Globalization, Social Justice and Welfare

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Although the social science literature on globalization has proliferated, social policy and social work scholars have not adequately debated the consequences of globalization for social welfare and social justice. Drawing on different social science interpretations of globalization, four major perspectives that offer different analytical and normative insights into globalization are identified and their implications for social welfare and social justice are briefly examined. The implications of these perspectives for social policy and social work scholarship are also considered.

Keywords: globalization, social welfare, social justice, social work scholarship

The concept of globalization is widely used today not only in the social sciences but in journalism and popular discourse. However, it is still poorly defined. Although loosely employed to connote the processes of social change that are affecting social relations between people living in the world's different nation states, the nature of these processes and their effects are widely debated and contested in the social sciences today. Nevertheless, these processes are said to be qualitatively different from earlier forms of international exchange in that they are more complex, intense and volatile. They are also believed
to be fostering a historically unique interdependence between the people and nations of the world that will ultimately result in the integration of economies and societies. Of course, this interpretation has been disputed and an alternative view that defines globalization as no more than the acceleration of historic patterns of international exchange has also been formulated.

Different interpretations of the nature of global change reflect different disciplinary social science perspectives. While economists view globalization as the creation of a world economic market, sociologists place more emphasis on the role of international social relations, communications and population movements in fostering space-time compression, post-modernity and cultural diffusion. In turn, political scientists stress the way power relations operate internationally to foster new systems of global regulation and governance.

These diverse disciplinary perspectives have different normative implications that not only evaluate globalization differently but inspire different policy perspectives on how the process of globalization might and should be molded. These normative dimensions are of obvious interest to scholars in the fields of social policy and social work. However, as will be shown, different social science interpretations reach very different conclusions about globalization's consequences for welfare and justice. This article outlines four major perspectives which offer different analytical and normative insights into this issue and then considers the social welfare and social justice implications of these different perspectives. But first, it provides a brief discussion of the emergence of the concept of globalization and its social science usage.

The Idea of Globalization

Although the term globalization was popularized in the 1990s, some commentators believe that its roots are far older. Jan Scholte (2000) finds evidence that it was first employed in the social sciences during the Second World War, but notes that it was increasingly used in 1960s and 1970s and became pervasive by the 1990s not only in the social sciences but in everyday discourse. The concept's social science formulation owes much to the Neo-Marxist dependency scholars of the
1960s and 1970s (Cardoso and Faleto, 1979; Frank, 1967, 1975; Rodney, 1972) who examined the way international economic and power relations impeded domestic development effort. Although they did not actually use the term, their focus on global economic exchanges paved the way for the adoption of a wider perspective which was subsequently augmented by Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory (1975, 1980). By conceptualizing contemporary international economic exchange as the result of a historic process that began with European mercantile expansion in the 15th century and which had, by the 20th century, a produced a unitary, integrated world capitalist system, Wallerstein paved the way for the adoption of a global perspective in social science analysis.

Sociologists and scholars in communications and media studies also recognized that technological innovations had exponentially increased the flow of information around the world with profound consequences for economic, political and cultural exchanges. Innovations in communications media were, as Marshall McLuhan (1962) put it, creating a "global village." It was likely that people living in the global village would eventually share a common, global world-view that would reshape identity. It was also likely that a new, cosmopolitan, global citizen, with a global consciousness of the unity of all humankind would ultimately emerge (Robertson, 1992).

These formative accounts influenced international economic analyses which stressed the increasing interdependence of national economies and the emergence of a global market. Business writers such as Keniche Ohmae (1991, 1996) popularized these ideas by claiming that nation states were of declining importance in global affairs and that the emergent "borderless world" would being unprecedented prosperity. By the 1990's, journalists were writing about globalization with increasing frequency and a number of popular, best-selling books on the subject had been published (Friedman, 1999; Barber, 1995).

These developments reflected real changes taking place in the world economy, in communications, in international migration and in governance and political arrangements. Although it is difficult if not impossible to summarize these changes, there is widespread agreement that the last three decades of the 20th century were marked by greater economic integration,
the acceleration of information flows, increases in population movements, restructured international power relations, the emergence of a global civil society, greater cultural diffusion and enhanced multilateral cooperation through the agency of international organizations. All have facilitated more frequent interactions between nation states, growing interdependence between nation states and the likely future integration of national economies and even political systems.

However, it is important to restate the obvious fact that the term globalization is a linguistic form of shorthand which connotes an extremely complex and volatile set of international events. The widespread tendency to reify the concept and even to endow it with anthropomorphic characteristics has unfortunately parodied these events. This is particularly evident in the way that blame for a great variety of social problems, including unemployment, the spread of contagious diseases, environmental pollution and many other human ills are attributed to globalization when they are not in fact the result of some objective "thing" exerting its own, malevolent volition but the result of a complex set of human activities with intended and unintended consequences. This point is not only of methodological but normative relevance. Controlling the processes of globalization does not involve the domestication of some abstract construct but will require that the myriad actions of individuals, organizations, corporations and governments that directly affect human well-being at the international level be shaped through purposeful policy intervention. This point has obvious relevance for any analysis of the relationship between globalization, social welfare and social justice.

Perspectives on Globalization

Recognizing the complex and multifaceted nature of the globalization process, social scientists with different disciplinary perspectives have attempted to differentiate between its different dimensions. Perhaps the most obvious is the separation of its economic and non-economic dimensions. As has been shown earlier, globalization is closely associated with the analysis of international economic exchanges. However, others have emphasized the multidimensional features of
globalization, arguing that the processes of international change not only involve the economy but also affect communications, culture, migration, politics and many other aspects of contemporary life. This more broadly focused, multidimensional approach supports a cosmopolitan view which not only recognizes the multifaceted features of globalization but regards them as providing a sound basis for enhancing international cooperation, strengthening international institutions and effectively exercising international law. However, this interpretation has been criticized for failing to address international power relations that shape the international economy and affect social and cultural conditions around the world. Critics have drawn attention to the hegemonic features of global capitalism and the way the proponents of unipolarism insist that the diffusion of their values, institutions and world-view through the exercise of political power will benefit humankind.

These different perspectives are summarized in the following fourfold typology that addresses both the analytical and normative aspects globalization. It offers an overview of the way social science commentaries have sought to interpret and explain the complex phenomena that are encapsulated in the concept of globalization and it hopes to excavate the normative preferences that are inherent in these accounts. These preferences lead naturally to the formulation of policy interventions that address the welfare and justice consequences of the globalization process.

The Economistic Perspective

The economistic perspective emphasizes the way international economic exchanges are increasing in frequency, creating greater interdependence between national economies and facilitating their integration. These accounts situate current economic activities within a historic context that stresses the demise of Keynesianism and centralized economic planning and the gradual replacement of the previously ubiquitous endogenous economic policy approach with an outward looking growth model that is highly dependent on international investments, the flow of finance capital and trade (Gray, 1998; Hoogvelt, 1997: Scholte, 2000). These accounts usually begin
with the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. By reaffirming the gold standard, adopting policies to stabilize the world economy, undertaking to assist member states during times of fiscal and economic difficulty, and addressing the need for reconstruction and development, the signatories to the agreement hoped to avoid catastrophes such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and foster the smooth functioning of the international capitalist economic system.

However, it was not intended that the prevailing preference for endogenous economic development would be abandoned. Indeed, efforts to establish an International Trade Organization at Bretton Woods were postponed and despite the GATT agreement of 1947, which provided an interim set of regulatory trade arrangements, it was only in 1995 that the World Trade Organization came into being. By this time, endogenous economic development had been undermined by a number of important events that fostered increased economic exchanges and interdependence.

The decision by the Nixon administration in 1971 to abrogate the gold standard is usually cited as a major event of this kind. It allowed the free exchange of currency and facilitated the international flow of financial capital. It also facilitated increased trade in the form of accelerated manufacturing imports from regions of the world with low labor costs which popularized the successful export-led development policies of the East Asian tiger economies. The replacement of Keynesian with neoliberal economic policies by radical right Western governments in the 1980s built on these developments. The United States consolidated its hold over the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and used these organizations to promote the interests of powerful commercial financial institutions. These developments were accompanied by the further deregulation of international economic exchanges, increases in the volume of global trade, new opportunities for multinational corporations to maximize profits and the more frequent outsourcing and relocation of production. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the adoption of market liberalism in the former communist countries and China further expanded the global economic market. With the creation of the World Trade Organization, the neo-liberal principles governing the
These developments are seen in a positive light by many commentators, particularly mainstream economists and their supporters in the business world (Bhagwati, 2004; Lal, 2000; Ohmae, 1991, 1996; Wolf, 2004). Drawing on Ricardian and neoclassical analyses, they stress the positive benefits that derive from international exchanges. They point out that the global economy functions much like the domestic economy in that it benevolently satisfies the demands of consumers and appropriately rewards producers who seek to meet these demands. As with the domestic economy, when prices are the optimized and the market is in equilibrium, everybody benefits. The global market has also created mass employment in many low-income, developing economies where the production of goods for export to the high income countries has brought about increases in standards of living for millions of previously impoverished people. It has also created new opportunities for entrepreneurs and stimulated employment in the Western countries with positive consequences for incomes and standards of living. The overall result is a win-win situation in which standards of living for those who participate in the global economy rise dramatically.

As is well-known, these assertions have been widely challenged not only by critical academics but by policymakers, street protesters, union leaders and those whose jobs have been displaced through outsourcing and the relocation of industrial production. Indeed, it is hard on the basis of the evidence to accept the neoclassical view that globalization is a benign force that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. Although there are obvious examples of the positive consequences of international economic exchange, the literature is replete with examples of the negative impact of international predatory capitalism on the lives of millions of people around the world (Gray, 1998; Harvey, 1995; Lutwack, 1999; Soros, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002). In addition to this criticism, many believe that the economic perspective is too narrow and that its exclusionary focus on economic phenomena fails to encapsulate the complex multidimensional features of the globalization process.
The Multidimensional Perspective

It was noted earlier that sociologists, political scientists, scholars in media and communications studies and other fields are critical of the practice of defining globalization narrowly in economic terms. As the political scientist David Held (2004, p. 161) insists, "...the story of globalization is far from simply economic." The sociologist Anthony Giddens (1999) agrees, pointing out that globalization "... is political, technological and cultural as well as economic." (p. 10). However, critics of the economistic perspective do not deny the importance of international economic exchanges in fostering global integration. They recognize that the process of globalization is driven primarily by economic forces even though developments in communications technology, population movements, political cooperation and civil society activities also play a critical role in fostering international exchanges, interdependence and integration.

Technological innovations in communications are singled out by many as making a major contribution to globalization (Cairncross, 1997; Castells, 1996, 2001; Giddens, 1999). These innovations have not only facilitated rapid increases in economic exchanges but, through the mass media, have exposed many millions of people around the world to events in other countries. This has been accompanied by a greater awareness of diverse cultures and lifestyles and has also increased interpersonal contacts between peoples in many different parts of the world. Mass travel and ready access to internet communications have allowed ordinary people to interact promptly with others in many distant countries and regions. Places that were previously regarded as remote are now more readily accessed and communications that were previously time-consuming are now instantaneous.

Enhanced communications has also increased awareness of cultural diversity in the modern world and facilitated the consumption of cultural artifacts on an international scale. People who were previously relatively culturally isolated now consume cuisine, appreciate art and music, wear apparel and purchase crafts and other commodities from many different countries. The diffusion of culture is a matter of much debate among globalization scholars who speculate on whether
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a single, global culture of internationally shared attitudes, preferences and tastes is emerging (Lechner and Boli, 2005). However, the resurgence of traditionalism suggests that the diffusion of culture and pressures of cultural homogenization are being resisted.

The increase in migration is identified as yet another dimension of the globalization process. Although migration is hardly new, there is a good deal of evidence to show that population movements have accelerated over the last few decades particularly from low to high income economies (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). The Western countries are a magnet for millions of people from the Global South in search of employment and opportunities to improve their living standards. The new migrants include unskilled workers as well as well-educated members of the middle class with sought after, technical skills. Of course, push factors such as civil conflict and economic stagnation in the developing world are also a major cause of world migration. The result is that previously homogenous cultures have now become increasingly complex and diverse.

The role of political cooperation through the agency of multilateral organizations and the growth of civil society activities at the international level are also identified as a facet of globalization that, many believe, will contribute to greater international cooperation and reciprocity. International efforts to address humanitarian, health, education and other social concerns have increased significantly since the Second World War and now make a major contribution to promoting people’s well-being in different parts of the world (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs, 1997; Midgley, 1997). Cooperation between nongovernmental organizations has also increased and some scholars (Ireye, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003) believe that globalization is being accompanied by the emergence of a global civil society in which ordinary people increasingly participate and exercise influence.

The multidimensional globalization process is transcending economic exchanges to create greater interdependence among the world’s nation states and their peoples. However, contrary to the claim that nation states are becoming less important, they continue to shape identity, structure economic activities and exert political control over the lives of their citizens. They
are likely to serve as fundamental social and political forma-
tions for many decades to come. Nevertheless, in its multifac-
eted form, globalization has brought about significant changes
in way people in the world’s nation states relate to each other.
This is often expressed as a time-space compression which, as
Giddens (1999) put it, has fostered a shared consciousness of
the world as a single place. Although Giddens and other mul-
tidimensionalists are not oblivious to the tensions and conflicts
which characterize contemporary globalization, their writings
optimistically imply that the international changes taking place
auger well for the future. With a shared global consciousness
of their common humanity, people may be more tolerant of
cultural and religious difference, amenable to cooperate with
each other, avoid conflict and support international institu-
tional arrangements that enhance reciprocity.

It is in this sense that the multidimensional view of glo-
balization is readily transformed into a cosmopolitan view
that more overtly and confidently asserts the principle that all
human beings are members of the same, global community.
Cosmopolitans believe that purposeful efforts should be made
to promote the integration of disparate societies and remove
the strictures of cultural, religious and national difference that
blinker people’s awareness of their common humanity. By
serving as an agent of universality, globalization facilitates the
realization of these ideals.

The Cosmopolitan Perspective

Derived from the Greek word meaning “world or universal
city”, the term cosmopolitan is loosely used to refer to a
form of political organization which transcends the nation
state. It is also used to characterize a disposition that rejects
narrow national loyalties and prejudices and recognizes the
unity and shared commonalities of the world’s peoples. In the
Western tradition, cosmopolitan ideas are often traced back to
the Cynics and Stoics who rejected the authority of the Greek
city state, and argued that human being are subject to a uni-
versal, natural law that transcends the actions of earthly legis-
latures. These ideas laid the foundations for many subsequent
reformulations of the cosmopolitan vision. For example,
it inspired attempts to establish multilateral, institutional
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arrangements that facilitate cooperation between the world’s nation states. It also found expression in the toleration of diversity on the grounds that difference was no more than an epiphenomenon of shared human characteristics.

Cosmopolitanism is today widely linked to the idea that the world’s nation states can cooperate through multilateral institutions, international law and human rights conventions to promote human well-being and social justice. The origins of this type of cosmopolitanism is usually attributed to the Kantian idea that the social contract can be applied internationally to create a federation of sovereign, nation states committed to the perpetuation of peace. Although the surge of nationalists fervor during the 19th century was hardly conducive to the adoption of this proposal, the carnage of the First World War persuaded many that greater efforts to secure peace through international cooperation were required. Despite the failure of the League of Nations, its resurrection in the guise of the United Nations in 1945 revitalized liberal cosmopolitanism (Kennedy, 2006). This event was subsequently reinforced through the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the more frequent recourse by national judiciaries to the principles of international law, and the creation of international juridical institutions such as the World Court and the International Criminal Court. The formation of the European Economic Community and its subsequent reconstitution as a quasi-political union has further reinvigorated cosmopolitan ideals.

Proponents of liberal cosmopolitanism draw on the multidimensional approach to optimistically and confidently assert that the growing interdependence of the peoples of the world’s nation states and will foster greater international cooperation, tolerance and the furtherance of peace. They also view globalization as vehicle for achieving these goals. As people and their governments increasingly recognize that they are members of the same human community, and that they have much to gain from cooperation, they will work together to regulate the forces of globalization to promote social well-being and social justice for all.

The belief that the forces of globalization can be domesticated to serve human interests is a key element of the
cosmopolitan perspective. It finds expression in a plethora of proposals for strengthening existing multilateral arrangements or establishing new arrangements that can effectively manage global economic as well as political processes for social ends. Advocates of this approach believe that the United Nations and other representative multilateral organizations created at the end of the Second World War have made a major contribution to promoting international cooperation. Although enfeebled in recent times, they contend that these organizations can be revitalized to address the challenges of globalization. The Bretton Woods institutions also need to be reformed so that they do not function as the agents of international capitalism but fulfill their original purpose of promoting the economic welfare of the world's nation states and their citizens. New international organizations that democratically represent these states and are able to exercise control over international economic activities should, they believe, also be created.

Held (2004) has neatly summarized these proposals and packaged them within a social democratic framework that reflects liberal cosmopolitan ideals. However, others are skeptical of the ability of the world's governments to cooperate in this way and place more faith in the role of emerging civil society institutions in fostering global cooperation. Resurrecting older cosmopolitan beliefs, others believe that nation states should be bypassed and that opportunities for direct democratic representation in new and reformed multilateral institutions should be created. Electronic democracy and other forms of direct participation in new global assemblies of the world citizens have been suggested as ways of achieving this goal (Schotle, 2000). The burning question, of course, is whether these and many other proposals for creating a democratic, just global order can ever materialize in the face of entrenched inequalities in global power, the relentless pursuit of commercial interests and the hegemonic exercise of unipolarist beliefs.

The Unipolar Perspective

Some scholars have argued that contemporary forms of international exchange are, in reality, imperialistic. Although critics of the economistic perspective, such as Noam Chomsky (1994, 1998), David Harvey (1995, 2003) Edward Luttwack
Globalization, Social Justice and Welfare

(1999) and Susan Strange (1986) have emphasized the links between globalization, capitalism and the exercise of global power, James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2001) are perhaps the most assertive proponents of the view that globalization is little more than a contemporary expression of age-old imperial practices. The very use of the term globalization, they contend, is designed to obscure this fact. Since imperialism is hardly acceptable in the modern world, globalization serves as a convenient cover for the exercise of economic and political power by the United States and its allies. Worse, by suggesting that current globalization processes are inevitable, the term legitimates the continued imperial subjugation of the world’s peoples. Petras and Veltmeyer urge that the term be abandoned and that globalization be recognized for what it is.

While many advocates of the economistic perspective would reject the claim that globalization amounts to the exercise of imperial power, this view has been formalized as a clearly articulated, normative perspective on contemporary global relationships known as unipolarism. The term was popularized by the neoconservative journalist and scholar Charles Krauthammer in the 1990s and drew on earlier neoconservative ideas which extolled the role of the United States in world affairs. It reflects the realist position of neoconservative scholars of the 1980s such as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz who criticized the accommodationist policies on the Cold War and applauded the Reagan administration for its resolute opposition to the Soviet Union which, they believe, brought about its collapse (Dorrien, 2004). Unipolarist ideas found further expression in Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) neo-Hegelian thesis that the capitalist and liberal democratic values of the United States and its allies had not only triumphed over Soviet communism but diffused over the globe to herald the end of ideological struggle and ultimately of history.

Unipolarist ideas were first translated into policy in the 1992 Defense Department document authored by Paul Wolfowitz that urged the government of the United States to adopt a new strategy of “benevolent domination” by which it would exercise economic, diplomatic and military power to protect American interests and diffuse American values (Dorrien, 2004). Subsequently, this view was vigorously
promoted by a variety of neoconservative groups and think tanks such as the Project for a New American Century which called on the government to emulate the imperial achievements of the Romans and British. These imperial powers brought peace and prosperity through the benevolent exercise of power and the diffusion of values. As is well-known, these ideas were used to legitimate the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and have been restated by President George W. Bush who frequently declares the intention of his administration to spread American liberal democracy and free-market capitalism throughout the world.

Unipolarists deny that their position is imperialistic. They point out that the government of the United States has not assumed direct rule over other nations or promoted colonial settlement or, with a few legitimate exceptions, exercised military power to replace sovereign governments. Rather, unipolarism involves a consensual set of international arrangements by which the world’s peoples and nations accept the benevolent involvement of the United States in world affairs and welcomes its role as the guarantor of peace and facilitator of prosperity. Offering a neo-Hobbesian interpretation, neo-conservative scholars such as Robert Kagen and William Kristttof (2000) and Michael Mandelbaum (2005) point out that the United States functions as a Leviathan that uses its diplomatic and military power to challenge the uncertain and dangerous contingencies of the modern world. Its purpose is not only to protect its national interests and promote the welfare of its citizens but to ensure the security and well-being of all the world’s peoples. However, it can only play this role if its benevolent supremacy is unchallenged and it is able to end rivalry and conflict between the world’s nation states, uphold international law, and ensure the passage of commerce and the legitimate pursuit of commercial interests. It is for this reason that unipolarists urge the government of the United States to use its military might to secure peace and maintain global stability. Proponents of this view contend that globalization as unipolarism offers the best prospect of promoting human well-being and social justice in the world today.
The four perspectives outlined here not only provide analytical interpretations of current international events but offer normative insights into the social consequences of these events. In some cases, these normative implications are clearly articulated. The economistic perspective provides a clear statement of how economic globalization is said to create employment and raises the standards of living of the world’s peoples. The normative implications of the multidimensional perspective are less obvious but nevertheless suggest that enhanced international exchanges in various domains of contemporary life have positive consequences for social welfare.

The normative implications of these different perspectives are also contested but here again, some are more vigorously disputed than others. The economistic perspective has evoked intense debate and the contention that global capitalism brings positive benefits to humankind has been hotly contested. Somewhat surprisingly, the unipolarist perspective has not attracted as much attention from social policy scholars as might be expected. Responses to the cosmopolitan and multidimensional perspectives have also been relatively muted. Nevertheless, these perspectives offer very different normative interpretations and policy prescriptions about how social welfare and social justice ideals may be realized.

Although social policy and social work scholars have not written extensively on the subject of globalization, the issue of how globalization effects human welfare has been addressed by some of them (Dominelli, 1999; Fergsuon, Lavalette and Wilson, 2005; George and Wilding, 2002; Ife, 1998; Midgley, 2004; Mishra, 1999; Prigoff, 2000; Reisch, 1998; Wagner, 1997; Yeates, 2001). Not surprisingly, their attention has focused on the economistic perspective. Most have emphasized the negative effects of economic globalization and most agree with (and tend to restate) the argument that globalization has had disastrous consequences for human welfare and social justice. Many have highlighted the negative effects of globalization on employment and wages in the Western countries, the heightening of inequalities, increased gender and ethnic oppression and discrimination against immigrants, retrenchments in social
expenditures and programs, the enfeebling of governments and their inability to protect the domestic economy, the spread of managerialism and a new workfare ethic in social policy that abrogates the universalism of earlier collectivist social welfare ideals.

Generally, these accounts focus on the Western countries and do not address the effects of globalization on social welfare and social justice in the Global South to any great extent. This is perhaps understandable because much of the Western social policy and social work literature is preoccupied with domestic events, infused with a Eurocentric bias and neglectful of international issues.

Social policy and social work scholars interested in international affairs have tended to favor the multidimensional or cosmopolitan view. Indeed, cosmopolitanism has a long and venerable history in the field, particularly in social work where formative social work innovations were diffused from Europe to North America and other parts of the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Kendall, 2000; Midgley, 1981). In addition, some of the founders of social work such as Jane Addams were strongly committed to liberal cosmopolitanism particularly through the advocacy of pacifism. However, the cosmopolitan elements in international social work are seldom recognized by its practitioners and few have commented on the ideological implications of cosmopolitan values. Indeed, few have overtly asserted a commitment to cosmopolitanism which insists on mutuality and reciprocity in international relations.

On the other hand, cosmopolitanism has featured prominently in the few accounts that have been published on what is called global social policy. The work of Bob Deacon and his colleagues (1997) is a particularly good example of this approach. They contend that globalization's negative effects on social welfare can best be addressed through supranational institutions and discuss the work of a variety of multinational agencies that currently contribute to this goal. They argue that these organizations should be strengthened to implement what they describe as a "global government reform agenda". A commitment to strengthening cooperative efforts to promote social welfare at the international level should also be given
high priority.

Unipolarist claims about the allegedly positive benefits of imperialism have not been debated in the social policy and social work literature but recently, James Midgley (2006) has drawn attention to these claims and their implications for social work and social welfare. On the other hand, the idea that Western social policy and social work offers a universalistic set of prescriptions for promoting social welfare has been widely discussed and challenged (Gray and Fook, 2004; Midgley, 1981; Yip, 2004). Of course, the idea that Western models apply internationally is not an explicit statement of unipolarist ideology but rather an unconscious tendency to assert the applicability and superiority of these approaches. Nevertheless, Edwards Said’s (1978) admonition that Western social scientists should exercise caution when making pronouncements about other cultures is apposite to any discussion about the transferability of Western social welfare approaches to other societies.

The different interpretations of the consequences of globalization for social welfare and social justice outlined in this article need to be more thoroughly scrutinized by social policy and social work scholars. Indeed, it may generally be claimed that those working in these fields need more vigorously to embrace an international perspective that not only addresses the complex phenomena of globalization but seizes the opportunity to revise their methodological proclivity to view the world from a Western perspective. The adoption of a global perspective will broaden the scope of social policy and social work scholarship to encompass many more cultures and societies and obtain meaningful insights into the way that diverse cultures and societies define, interpret and promote social welfare and social justice. Social policy and social work will be enriched by a perspective of this kind and hopefully assert its latent commitment to cosmopolitan ideals. More frequent and meaningful exchanges between social policy and social work scholars and practitioners in many different parts of the world will also permit the formulation of interventions that effectively address social welfare and social justice concerns at the international level.


Globalization and Drug and Alcohol Use in Rural Communities in Nigeria: A Case Study

CHARLES FIKI

This paper presents an exploratory study of alcohol and drug use in two rural communities in Plateau State, Nigeria. The aim is to raise awareness of the rural alcohol and drug problem. The paper examines the patterns of alcohol consumption and drug use, and their perceived functions for substance use among rural farmers in Nigeria. The study shows the common use of marijuana and alcohol in addition to prescription drugs. There is also evidence of multiple or combinational drug use. Pleasure and relaxation emerged as the major reasons for drug and alcohol use. Factors influencing alcohol and drug use are the relative neglect of rural communities, and the activities of hawkers, quacks, and other untrained individuals pervading the rural health sectors. The paper calls for further research to adequately capture the reality of alcohol and drug use in rural communities in Nigeria.

Keywords: Nigeria, globalization, drug use, alcohol use, rural communities

Introduction

Drug and alcohol problems in Nigeria have assumed epidemiological dimensions. A visit to most hospitals reveals the preponderance of drug-related psychotic disorders. In a study of five selected psychiatric hospitals, Obot and Olaniyi (1991) show that drug related cases have increased since 1985. In a related study, Ikwuagwu et al. (1993) found that about
60 percent of substance abusers are young persons. Other studies also raise an alert on the dimensions and epidemiology of drugs and alcohol consumption and abuse in Nigeria (Nevadomsky, 1982; Ebie and Pela, 1981; Ifamayi and Ahmed, 1987; Odejide, 1997; Adelekan, 2002; Obot, 2003). Judged by reports in the popular media, accumulating research evidence in scientific journals, and the increasing tempo of anti-drug activities by Federal and state Ministries of Health, Private Non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals, Nigeria today has a growing drug problem (Obot, 1993: iv).

This awareness has identified the 'drug and alcohol problem' as exclusively an urban problem. Consequently, research initiatives, educational interventions, and interdiction measures are determined by urban values and trends, which have not sufficiently improved the situation in the rural communities. The rural drug and alcohol scene is affected by this paucity of information, because rural drug problems are more likely to be seen as primarily isolated problems of little national interest. There is the need for studies to explore, assess, and monitor the rural alcohol and drug use in Nigeria, because the solutions to the problem lie in the community itself.

This paper presents a recent exploratory study of alcohol and drug use in two rural communities in Nigeria. It aims at generating knowledge and enhancing the understanding of precipitating factors of alcohol and drug use in rural areas.

**Drug and Alcohol Use in Nigeria: A Review**

Venturing into a relatively new terrain must necessarily begin with an exhaustive review of the trends in literature as a bridge between the past and the future. Alcohol and drug issues emerged in the literature in the 1960s (Asuni, 1978). However, rigorous academic interest did not surface until in the 1970s. The first trend of literature prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s attempts to capture the nature of drug use among youths and students (e.g., Asuni, 1978; Akindele, 1974; Olatawura and Odejide, 1975; Anumonye, 1980; Novadomsky, 1981). Some research in this trend focuses on specific regions (Odejide 1987; Novadomsky, 1981), and other research focuses on the incidence of mental health in Nigeria (Akindele, 1974; Asuni,
In a major review of this research, Pela and Ebie (1982) note that there was no age limit to drug use because there is a decline in the age of exposure to drugs and alcohol. The initial contacts have increased to include clandestine agents, home medicine chests, open markets, chemists’ shops and cannabis farms. As a result, there was no relationship between religion, culture, social class, and drug and alcohol use (Pela and Ebie, 1982; Odejide, 1982). Nevertheless, alcohol consumption was confined to private spaces (home and immediate neighborhood) in the past, and generally indulged in during traditional religious rituals and social occasions such as naming, wedding and burial ceremonies (Olatawura and Odejide, 1975). Many other communities in the southern part of the country also offer alcohol as a gesture of hospitality. It was argued that consumption of locally brewed alcohol may not be considered an abuse because of the symbolism that goes with it.

The second trend prevalent in the 1990s attempted to replicate the previous studies within time and space, and to examine the contours of drug use, trends and impacts. A major factor accounting for this resurgence in scholarly interest is the direct interventionist policy of the Nigerian state in the 1980s. The drug law and decree of 1984 introduced a punitive death penalty clause, which attracted the attention of domestic and international human right activists. In addition, the United Nations Drug Control Program that emerged in the early 1990s provided a launching pad for increased academic and political interests.

Scholars began to evaluate and reexamine the trends and impacts of drug and alcohol use in the 1990s. These scholars examine how drug and alcohol use reflects gender, regional, demographic and occupational categories, and in some cases, the impact of these drugs. Obot (1993) notes that while alcohol consumption is not age-, gender- or class-specific, it is consumed for recreational and instrumental purposes. In rural-urban contexts, he observes that most rural communities engage in agriculture, producing grains, root crops and fruits, which form local in-puts in both local and industrial breweries. This makes it easier for a burgeoning production of, and accessibility to, alcohol. As a result, Burukutu and Pito are locally produced and consumed in the middle belt/northern
part of the country, while *palm wine*\(^2\) and *ogogoro* (gin/whiskey) are produced in the south (Obot, 1998). Other studies such as Ikwuagwu et al. (1993) observe the worrisome preponderance of young persons in hospitals for alcohol and drug problems. The fact that most of them come from rural communities is very disturbing.

Concomitant with these trends is a public health approach of harm reduction that emerged in Nigeria in the late 1990s. The emergence of this approach is influenced by the prevalence of HIV and other diseases associated with substance abuse. A major outcome of the research provoked by this approach is that there is a steady closure and possibly a final disappearance of the gender differences in drug use in Nigeria (Adelekan, et al, 1996). In addition, this research notes the emergence of drug use by injection, such as heroin and cocaine. Adelekan and Stimson (1996) remark that, while a local market of heroin developed from the beginning of the 1980s, reports of injection use among drug treatment populations and other groups emerged in the 1990s. This trend is seen to be part of the diffusion of new drug-use patterns in countries with no preexisting history of such use, due to the existence of drug trafficking routes (Adelekan, 1998; Adelekan and Stimson, 1996; Fitch and Stimson, 2003).

Drawing on clinical and epidemiological data, this diffusion approach helps to further understand the variability of drug use in Nigeria and its precipitating effect on risky health behaviors. Reflecting the variability of substance use in Nigeria, alcohol and cannabis are the main substances of abuse by clients admitted in Enugu (south East), Calabar (south-south), Minna (central), and Kaduna (north central). Clients who were dependent on heroin and cocaine were found in Enugu (south east), Minna and Kaduna (north central), Kano (north), and Maiduguri (north east). Abuse of amphetamine, hypnosedatives (diazepam or valium), rubber/glue and petrol was reported more from the northern facilities. While the use of injectible substances are increasing in Lagos (south west), dapsone, tramil, pentazone, pawpaw leaves and phenerga are also used in Maiduguri area. The studies also note the use of combinations of these substances such as cannabis, alcohol, heroin and cocaine (Stimson, et al, 2003; UNDCP, 1997;
Adelekan and Stimson, 1996). The fruitfulness of these studies in creating awareness of the menace of drug and alcohol use in Nigeria is incontrovertible; however, these studies contribute to the understanding of how substance use is related to health problems such as HIV and Hepatitis, as well as the methodology of rapid assessment in developing countries and variability of drug use. In line with this study, the process of diffusion in drug use is also captured by the globalization trend. The reality of rural drug and alcohol use remains a challenge for research.

The third trend in the literature is the tendency to see the drug problem within the political and economic framework (e.g. Alubo, 1987, 1994; Alubo and Ogbe, 1987; Alemika, 1990, 1993, 1998; Ahire, 1990). While some scholars examine the drug problems as essentially a fake-drug syndrome (Alubo and Ogbe, 1987; Alubo, 1994; Erhun, 2001), others emphasize the historical and prevailing socioeconomic order and the failure of state policies on drug and alcohol production and use (Alemika, 1990, 1993, 1998; Ahire 1990). In the rural context, the challenge of the first group is to examine the interface between living conditions on the one hand, and drug and alcohol use on the other, and how they impinge on individuals to produce a milieu for drug and alcohol use. The challenge of the second group is to examine the fundamental failures in the structure and governance of society that promote drug and alcohol use, rendering their control problematic (Alemika, 1998). Considering the context of this research, the suggestiveness of these scholars is more important than the legitimacy of their derivatives because their framework provides a broader picture of governance of the alcohol and drug problem, as it reflects the type and nature of the community for this study.

However, this repertoire does not cover two rural factors: namely the reality of consumption of the rural people, and the conditions that instill drug and alcohol use. These factors must be considered because the rural community is both a site of production and consumption of drugs and alcohol. Such a balance invigorates the understanding of the prevailing contours of socioeconomic order in the rural areas and the associated drug use. In this way, one gains an understanding of the rural milieu as an entity influenced by a variety of 'outside'
actors and factors in addition to the rural dwellers themselves of which the state is an important part.

Analytically, the challenge in this paper is to account for the factors that reinforce and constitute the population as consumers in the alcohol and drug scene in the first case (O'Malley and Mugford, 1992; O'Malley, 1998). What is also called to account is how specific demands develop for particular drugs and alcohol in particular settings, and the images of pleasure or excitement in the commodities that promote them. The next section examines the research setting as a background to the methodology and discussion of findings.

Methodology

Research setting

In Nigeria, rural communities share several characteristics, which include small size, low population density, relative absence of social amenities (such as communication and health facilities), agrarian economy and low technological application. According to the population census of 1991, 'rural' is used to describe a community with a population of less than five thousand (5,000). Similarly, the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), a federal agency responsible for national and international rural development programs established in 1988, defined a rural area, for operational and policy purposes, as a community with inadequate basic social amenities/infrastructure and engagement in agricultural production. Social amenities encompass elements of modernity such as good roads, pipe-borne water and electricity. This de-emphasizes the population index for a rural community and raises the rural-urban development differentials as they affect the living conditions. In other words, rural communities are generally behind in national development efforts and parameters.

Two rural communities were selected for this study due to accessibility and their location within the locus of interest of the sponsoring institution. The two rural communities are Foron (CS1) and Miango (CS2), which are found within the 140 km radius of Jos metropolis, the administrative capital of Plateau state, Nigeria, defined as Upper Plateau. According
to the population census of 1991, they have a population of 4,000 and 4,200 respectively. Upper Plateau is one of the naturally endowed areas of tropical Africa, where the exploitation of its resources (tin-based economy) has, historically, created environmental problems that have adversely affected agriculture, making fertility and land cultivation relatively difficult. However, agriculture in these communities is labor intensive and remains the most viable economic activity supplemented with mining. Given the low technological application, manual implements are used for production. Due to the abundance of grains produced here, *burukutu* and *pito* are thriving local alcohol beverages. Other alcoholic products such as beer, spirits and gin are also found in local liquor stores. Besides these facilities, two patent-medicine stores were found in CS1 and CS2, which implies that social amenities are inadequate.

**Method**

A mixed methodological design was used for this study, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This method was adopted in order to capture an overall picture of drug and alcohol use of the people in this exploratory study, because rural communities are relatively too complex to be captured by the use of one variable, or measure, or one method of data collection. This is due to the absence of reliable clinical data on mortality and morbidity in most rural areas in Nigeria. Consequently, focused group discussion (FGD), document search, and inventory of amenities were used in addition to questionnaire administration and a structured personal interview schedule. These methods are relevant to the nature of the community as seen in other studies (see Bryman, 1994; Cresswell, 1994:13; Laluff, 1999: 316; Schwandt, 1997: 78).

The targets of the study were farmers, who were active during the research period. Participants in the FGD were farmers not covered by the questionnaire administration. Key informants and insider assistance play an important role in mediating the relationship between the ‘researcher’ and the ‘researched’ by providing access and answers to emerging questions (Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997). The analysis of the transcripts followed thematic references and connections in the interview. This task was made easier by the proficiency of
the researchers in the local languages. Structured questions in the FGD include history of drug use in the community, community approval of drug and alcohol use and solutions to the problem of drug and alcohol use.

Sample Description

A random sample of 200 was chosen from the two communities for the questionnaire survey, out of which 196 responded (effective sample), representing a ninety-eight percent (98%) response rate. Each of these communities was allocated a proportional sample of 100 with a mean age of 29.71 years and average annual income of ten thousand naira. Two criteria defined the selection of the participants in this sample: 1) farmers were actively engaged in farming during this study; 2) farmers were willing (volunteered) to be interviewed. In each of the communities we surveyed ten farms, two of which engaged paid laborers, over a period of two months. Group size (cluster) of farmers varies from 1 to 10 on each farm, while the maximum number of paid laborers found on one farm was five. This sampling method ensured that farmers involved in both practices (group farming, and paid labor) were represented.

The sample is composed of 153 male farmers (78.1%) and 43 female farmers (22.9%). This disproportional gender representation is due to cohort effects on the sample, which reflect the number of women on the farm or directly involved in farm activities during the period of the study. In part, this disproportion should not be surprising because farming in most communities is a male dominated activity. The FGD also consisted of male farmers over 40 and female farmers aged from 20-35.

Findings

Except for the marked absence of hard drugs, there is evidence that respondents have used other types of drugs and alcohol. Prescription drugs are commonly used among the respondents for nonmedical purposes. Seventy-eight percent of the users reported recent usage, while only twelve percent reported usage over their lifetime. Of the recent users, eighty-four recent users (55.1%) have used a combination of soneryl
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or valium (hypnosedatives) and kpaya (amphetamine), while thirty four recent users (22%) have actually used diverse forms of analgesics. The remaining thirty five recent users (22.9%) did not indicate the specific drugs often used. Similarly, forty-six (30%) recent users of prescription drugs have also used alcohol and some herbs (daukartayaro) at the same time or sequentially. Among the lifetime users, only 8 respondents (35%) indicated having used analgesics while the rest did not indicate the specific drugs, which they used.

Marijuana belongs to the realm of the personal in the communities under study due to its prohibition by the law and the disapproval of its use by the people. Private marijuana use is tolerated, but toleration does not equal approval. Drug use and expected behaviors are culturally conditioned and controlled by well-established tradition in local communities (Comitas, 1975). By keeping their marijuana use hidden, parents avoided exposing their children prematurely to an influence they considered potentially harmful (Hathaway, 1997:115). Fifty seven respondents (29.1%) admitted to being recent users of marijuana while fifty nine (30.1%) respondents fall into the lifetime use category. Fifty six (28.6%) have never used marijuana while twenty four (12.2%) respondents abstained from answering the question. About seventy two percent (41) of recent marijuana users have used some forms of prescription drugs and alcohol at the same time or sequentially.

The community appears to be flexible and tolerant about alcohol. There are ‘beer parlours’ (bars) and ‘burukutu/pito joints’ where the purchase and drinking of alcoholic beverages are routine activities, as is ‘take home’ use. In these joints and bars, use of alcohol with some drugs was reported. According to a respondent in the FGD, people use many prescription drugs together at times for various reasons. When asked to indicate the types of drugs used, he said “just go to the store and ask for mix”.

This phenomenon introduces the ‘mix concept’ in rural drug and alcohol use. The ‘mix’ sample obtained from the store has a variety of drugs containing vitamins, analgesics and stimulants, among others. What is interesting about this form of polydrug use, which is unique, is that it is a prescription given by people the local community have judged
to be knowledgeable about drugs. This raises an important issue for discussion in subsequent sections.

Table 1: Nature and Frequency of Drug and Alcohol Use $n=196$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Substance</th>
<th>Lifetime User %</th>
<th>Recent User %</th>
<th>Never Used %</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marijuana</td>
<td>30.1 (n=59)</td>
<td>29.1 (n=57)</td>
<td>28.6 (n=56)</td>
<td>12.2 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol e.g., (Beer, spirits)</td>
<td>51.5 (101)</td>
<td>45.4 (89)</td>
<td>3(6)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Alcohol (e.g. Burukutu and Pito)</td>
<td>41.8 (82)</td>
<td>53.5 (105)</td>
<td>4.7(9)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychotropic Substance (e.g., Cocaine, Heroine)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67.8 (133)</td>
<td>32.1 (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescription Drugs (e.g., Soneryl, ICD, kpaya (amphetamine), analgesics etc)</td>
<td>12 (23)</td>
<td>78 (153)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbs (e.g., Daukartayaro, Dan Cameroon etc)</td>
<td>34 (67)</td>
<td>41 (80)</td>
<td>16 (31)</td>
<td>9 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further interviews indicate that operators of the stores do not think there is anything wrong with the idea of mixing drugs for ingestion. A typical combination of ‘mix’ includes vitamins (folic acid is a constant), analgesics (pain relievers) such as panadol, and a sleeping pill (for evening use). The combinations vary according to the intended user and time of day (i.e., young or old, morning or evening). A young person
would require an active combination (including some form of stimulant) while older persons would require a combination to induce rest and relaxation.

The specific roles that drugs and alcohol are perceived to perform in the life of the users serve as the mobilizing theme for drug and alcohol use. There was no predominant reason among the respondents for drug and alcohol use. The survey reveals the reasons for taking drugs and alcohol vary by individual. Fifty six respondents (28.6%) have used some form of drugs and alcohol for purposes of relaxation, which is slightly higher than ‘health/illness’ (23.5%), ‘to remain strong’ (20.4%) and work purposes (15.3%). Six respondents (3.1%) take drugs and alcohol ‘just because people take it,’ while eight respondents (4.1%) take drugs and alcohol to ‘escape from problems’. Discussing the leisurely use of drugs and alcohol, a participant in FGD observed that “some people take alcohol in the evening after a normal day’s job, while some take medicine to have a rest. It is rare to see people sit at the ‘joint’ all day taking alcohol without finding something to do.”

While the responses are uniformly distributed, it is clear that alcohol and drugs are used predominantly for pleasure and relaxation. This is supported by Ericson’s (1989:179) finding that the most commonly mentioned response was ‘relaxation, followed by euphoria, recreation, creativity, provide insights, pleasure and escapism’. Twenty four percent (13) of respondents in the pleasure/relaxation category have recently used marijuana while twenty percent (11) of them currently use some form of alcohol. In the same vein, current users of prescription drugs constitute thirty percent (14) of ‘health/illness’ category, twenty percent (8) of ‘strength’ and twenty-one percent (6) ‘work more’ category.

Responding to the issue of perceived functions of drug use, a young female participant in the FGD observes that:

People, particularly young men, use some medicines that are meant to make people sleep with the belief that they intoxicate and make them feel good. Some of these drugs are soneryl, kwaya, and Chinese capsules. In the case of alcohol, I think people who drink beer take it just for enjoyment, while those who drink burukutu take it because it also helps the body.
When asked about how burukutu/pito helps the body, the respondent drew a link between the raw material (grains) and its nutritional value as a form of food that may be helpful to the body. The facilitator of the FGD then drew her attention to the fact that beer is also made from barley; in return, the participant observes that beer has chemicals unlike the naturalness of burukutu/pito. While people might have used alcohol and drugs for health purposes, people also use these substances for recreation.

The sources of drugs among respondents corroborated the findings of past studies (e.g., Erhun et al., 2001; Alubo, 1994; Pela and Ebie, 1982) that the rural drug scene is an open market exploited by everyone. Eighty-two respondents (42%) obtain their drugs through the patent medicine stores while forty-five respondents (22.8%) identify hawkers as their source of obtaining drugs. Five percent (10) of the respondents identified government clinics and hospitals as their source; ten percent (20) obtain their drugs through private clinics or hospitals; and 11.2 (22) percent of the respondents identify ‘friends as a source.’ The fact that government hospitals are usually in short supply of drugs makes drug sales outlets a burgeoning enterprise in the rural areas.

Discussion

The pattern of alcohol and drug use in rural areas is not much different from that reported in urban centers (see inter alia, Obot, 1993; Adelekan, 1998; UNDCP, 1997) except for the marked absence of hard drugs and injection use. Even in urban centers, while hard drugs have been noted for some years because Nigeria is a transit point, injection use is a recent development (Adelekan and Stimson, 1996; UNODC, 1997). Thus, the data above support the view that alcohol and drugs are used for different purposes.

Rural alcohol and drug use is influenced by three factors, the first of which is the relative neglect of rural communities in the provision of facilities needed to enhance the quality of life of the people. This neglect renders the rural population vulnerable to the vagaries of substance use and sales outlets. At the time of this research, there was only one patent medicine store
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in each of the communities studied. A government hospital is available within a 100-kilometer radius, and there is a dispensary in each of these communities. Drug availability in these dispensaries and government hospitals is pathetically low.

Secondly, untrained individuals are prevalent in the rural health sector in the distribution, sales, and prescription of drugs. As a result, all sorts of drugs and alcohol brands are sold by petty-traders, who sell items from cigarettes to oranges, on roadsides and corners. They hawk drugs that range from over-the-counter items to antidepressants, stimulants, and antibiotics as part of their normal business activities. The activities of these clandestine agents, home medicine clients, open markets, chemist shops, and Cannabis farms dominate the drug scene. Specifically, the poor state of the public health care delivery system has led people to seek help from other sources to the extent that people who least possess the credentials to dispense drugs now perform the role of medical experts in rural communities. The prevalence of diverse forms of 'For-profit' drug stores and their activities in the rural sector has brought to the fore the issue of commodity culture.

Drugs and alcohol are commodities that must be consumed, and the rural communities are markets to make them available. Understood in this context, diverse means are invented to make people use drugs and alcohol brands that are made available, for which the 'mix culture' is one. This situation provides the background to the prevalence of counterfeit drugs in rural communities in Nigeria, which has been used as the basis for rural drug and alcohol problems. There are no generally reliable data on mortality and morbidity arising from the consumption of alcohol and drugs in Nigeria. However in 1987, 14 children died after being administered fake chloroquine phosphate injections while in 1990, 109 children died after being injected with fake paracetamol (Alubo, 1994; Erhun, et al, 2001). Based on media accounts, several deaths have also been reported in many hospitals for misuse of drugs and wrong prescriptions from sales outlets. These scenarios clearly signify the reign of the markets over public health and social welfare.

Third, there is an absence of an effective enforcement and monitoring system for alcohol and drug sales and use as practiced in urban centers. Currently, National Agency for Foods,
Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) are increasing their activities in rural areas. They are still relatively obscure, and their impact has not been felt (Alemika, 2001; Obot, 2004). Moreover, while NAFDAC focuses on fake drugs, NDLEA targets hard drugs. There is therefore an absence of surveillance on general substance use in rural areas. This failure is partly due to the emphasis on liberalization and deregulation of the markets in Nigeria in order to create enabling environments for private investment. Because rural communities are the least policed in every aspect, hawkers and untrained individuals concentrate on the rural markets.

In this way, the risk environment constrains the freedom and ability of alcohol and drug users to make rational choices. This risk environment is characterized by the activities of salespersons, hawkers and patent medicine dealers, the marked absence of facilities and the absence of an effective monitoring system. Only what is made available is consumed. Both professionals and quacks often legitimize this form of consumption since there is hardly any consultation with doctors, nurses, pharmacists or quacks without a prescription. It is in this way that the preponderance of respondents in those four functions can be situated. People use drugs for different purposes, but these functions are influenced by the images that hawkers and sales agents conjure for the consumers, and the nature of the risk environment. In the case of prescription drugs, the mix culture amounts to ‘drugging the people’ as the rural people are confined to their fate according to the dictates of hawkers and sales agents. This is made possible by creating a perceived need for commodities, including alcohol and drugs, as evident in the ‘mix’ concept. Ogoh Alubo aptly captures the situation thus:

there is a pill for every ill. Much like food or water, pills have come to dominate human lives as basic survival needs. Through the unsolicited advice of drug manufacturers and sales people, we are told there is a pill, not just for all ills but also for all occasions: to enable us work, sleep, aid digestion and to soothe aches and pains (Alubo, 1985:98).
In so doing, meanings attached to particular alcohol and drugs are valorized as aspirations and achievement, particularly in marginal communities.

The case of “Aromatic Schnapps” illustrates this point concisely. ‘Aromatic Schnapps’ is a brand of gin produced by Seaman Brothers, a German company that operates in most African countries. Aromatic Schnapps is instilled in the appetite of the local communities so much that it has become part of the tradition of urban and rural communities. How this is achieved is compelling to know! The advertisement on billboards, radio and TV ads reads: “Aromatic Schnapps, the drink of the Elders. It is part of our tradition.” Like the Viagra advertisement where the elderly of all persuasion celebrate their return to a rejuvenated sex life, the clips that accompany this Aromatic Schnapps statement present the elders as jubilant when a successful young man and a potential suitor presents Aromatic Schnapps to the elders as a first step to meeting the bride’s family. This iconic representation of Aromatic Schnapps as the magic for bridging the cultural gap between the two families is clearly appealing and fashionable to a particular population. Schnapps is, today, an important component of tradition in most African countries despite its German origin. It is a major requirement for marriage engagements, complementing all items traditionally required by the bride’s family from a potential suitor. Schnapps is a major ‘drink’ used to celebrate achievement (i.e., purchase of a car, naming ceremonies, etc), a ‘drink’ dedicated to the gods for blessing.

As this research makes clear, rural communities are no longer immune to urban and global influences. These influences include “drugging the people” for profit, and cultivating a robust consumer base for drug and alcohol use. While multiple drug use and use of prescription drugs are not entirely new, the rural dimension of this problem raises some public health and social welfare concerns, and brings the efficacy of the regulatory system into question.

Conclusion

While this exploratory study may not be sufficient to make general conclusions on the prevalence of substance use, it
does point to the emerging reality of the rural communities. Because of the increasing penetration of rural communities by the forces of globalization, particularly the commodity culture in tandem with other change agents, rural communities are no longer insulated from social problems. Commodity culture forms the people as consumers by mobilizing functional cultural properties of the community, and by playing on the socioeconomic condition of the people for profit motives. It uses diverse imagery to ensure the patronage of consumers. Such is the prevailing situation of consumption of alcohol and drugs in rural communities in Nigeria. As evident in this study, global, market and urban influences render the rural communities vulnerable to the activities of entrepreneurs (hawkers, patent medicine dealers, professionals and quacks) of various drugs, ranging from illegal to the fake drugs, where they have found market niches.

Rural communities are particularly exposed to the social and health consequences associated with the practice of drugging the people, of which the “mix culture” in drug and alcohol use is emblematic. As the call for responsive regulation progresses, such global and urban processes and influences require effective monitoring and regulatory programming to reconcile their implications with community context and effects. This paper calls for further research to adequately comprehend substance use in the rural communities in Nigeria, and in Africa overall. This is important if one is to understand how the pervading commodity culture is undermining agency by constraining the ability and freedom of users to make rational choices within the context of the communities of fate. It is also needed to understand the convergence of rural trends and the pattern of the urban drug scene, which has obvious implications for social welfare of the people. The need to focus on substance use in such marginal populations beyond occasional descriptive glimpses is important.

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Endnotes

1 These are local alcohol fermented from grains such as corn, barley, maize, and/or cassava.

2 Palm wine is a popular Nigerian wine tapped from palm kernel trees while Ogogoro is the locally made gin existing in different tastes.

3 This study was conducted when the exchange rate of Nigerian Naira to U.S. Dollar was 82. One dollar currently exchanges for 132 naira.

4 While beer parlors are licensed outlets of leisure for beer, burukutu/pito joints are also outlets of leisure that require no licensing for sales and production.

5 Also known as polydrug use, is defined as “the use of more than one drug or type of drugs by an individual consumed at the same time or sequentially (World Health Organization).
The common term used at the patent medicine store is a code mix of English and Hausa, the local language: *Ka bani mix*. When translated directly, it means 'give me mix'.
Color-blind Individualism,
Intercountry Adoption
and Public Policy

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A prevailing ideology of color-blindness has resulted in privatizing the discourse on adoption. Color-blind individualism, the adoption arena’s version of color-blind discourse, argues that race should not matter in adoption; racism can be eradicated through transracial adoption; and individual rights should be exercised without interference of the state. As privatization has increasingly dominated our world and disparities between countries have grown, so too has intercountry adoption. This paper examines the colonial aspects of intercountry adoption and implications for conceptualizing global human rights from our current emphasis on individual rights, as the real issue continues to be which children are desired by which parents.

Keywords: Color-blind, adoption, racism, transracial, intercountry

The prevailing ideology of color-blindness has resulted in privatizing the discourse on social issues even as neoliberal policies have exacerbated inequalities. Support for public education has been discouraged in favor of school choice. Social welfare programs have been dismantled in favor of workfare, and preservation of the ecology has been undermined in favor of corporate entrepreneurship. The institution of adoption is
no exception as changing discourses and definitions of race in America are reflected in adoption. Color-blind individualism (Perry 1994), the adoption arena’s version of color-blind discourse, argues that race should not matter in adoption; racism can be eradicated through transracial adoption; and individual rights should be exercised without the interference of the state (Bartholet 1991; Kennedy 2003; Mahoney 1991). The logic of color-blind individualism has even greater currency in private adoption. Individual agency, a component of color-blind ideology, is critical to participants in private and independent adoption, and in the 1990s Congress passed laws to support color-blind adoption practice. Reflecting the desires of the dominant culture and certainly adoptive parents (also dominantly white), the Multi-Ethnic and Inter-Ethnic Placement acts of 1994 and 1996 denied consideration of race in adoption placement and shifted adoption from a utilitarian function to familial entitlement.

At the same time web site presentations of private agencies mirror a color-consciousness that continues to pervade our society. Web sites also show how racial categories are shifting since not all persons of color are located similarly (Quiroz forthcoming). The tripartite system of racial categories described by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2003) is found in private adoption where the majority of sites show how the term Biracial is used almost exclusively for children of any ethnic group mixed with African American heritage. At the same time, other racial/ethnic children, particularly those who are mixed with white ethnic parents, are given honorary white status as they are removed from Minority and Biracial programs and placed either into a middle category between the Traditional and the Biracial/Minority program or into Traditional programs. Adopting children of color (or not adopting them) is seen as a matter of individual taste and lifestyle as color-blind individualists look to transracial, intercountry and minority adoption as partial solutions to poverty and family disruption. As privatization has increasingly dominated our world and disparities between (and within) countries have grown International adoptions have increased substantially, particularly in certain countries. British demographer and intercountry adoption expert Peter Selman points to “the picture
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Emerging in the United States—with numbers doubling in the last five years—suggests that there is a growing demand for young light-skinned healthy babies, which has led to a trade in children from and to countries” (p. 23, 2001). Thus, new meaning for human rights is generated because issues are no longer national but global.

Color-Blind Individualism in the Global Market

One of the many ironies of globalization is how societies have been brought closer together through technology and transportation, yet inequalities within and between societies have been exacerbated as national, political, and cultural statuses are disrupted, identities redefined, and measures for exclusion redrawn (Sklair 2004; Weiss 2006). There are those who argue that racism goes hand in hand with globalization to delimit participants in the market. Sociologist and activist Andrew Barlow (2003) explains a nation’s racial response to globalization as the result of a number of factors. These include a nation’s position within the international order, history of racism, extent of migration, and oppressed groups’ ability to resist racism. It is within Barlow’s framework that I situate intercountry adoption.

Focusing attention on individual and family welfare, intercountry adoption presents a mechanism for middle-class family-building in the U.S., and favors those with adequate funds or ability to secure $20,000–$40,000 in adoption loans. Though not explicit, intercountry adoption serves as a vehicle of privilege masked by benevolent rhetoric. Not only is adoption an ancient practice, but it also has the benefit of being regarded an altruistic one, at least since the 20th century. Most adoption institutions maintain a not-for-profit status such as orphanages in sending countries and private agencies in receiving countries. Informal practices such as bribes or expedite fees that occur in intercountry adoption are ignored. Even though intercountry adoption serves a relatively small fraction of the world’s needy children, the formal and informal practices of private/intercountry adoption contribute millions to the global economy as asymmetric economic and power relations situate children within the international order of
countries sending and receiving them (Lieberthal 2001).1

In 2005, the U.S. State Department reported that intercountry adoptions by Americans had more than doubled (in the past decade) matched by an increase in private agencies (and individuals) facilitating these adoptions.2 Because many of these agencies also maintain domestic and minority adoption programs, private domestic and intercountry adoption are not completely separate entities (http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/notices/notices_473.html). Agencies that facilitate both types of adoption are basically self-policing and the amount of money expended on domestic and intercountry adoption is often comparable, at least for adoptive parents. Though regulations have been drawn for implementation by the U.S. State Department, since the treaty was drawn in 1993, intercountry adoptions by U.S. citizens, like private domestic adoptions, have not been monitored: 26 states currently recognize adoptions processed in other countries; 17 states require re-adoption (via petitions); and 18 states have no provisions for intercountry adoptions (National Information Adoption Clearinghouse (2003).

The only developed country to prefer private adoption over adoption through public agencies the U.S. has been slow to adopt the Hague Convention Treaty (Katz as cited in Masson 2001).3 Written in 1993 and signed by over 40 countries the treaty represents an international effort to reduce abuses of children and provides a framework within which participating nations can work. Although the United States signed the Convention in 1994, and President Clinton signed the Intercountry Adoption Act to implement the Convention in 2000, the treaty has yet to be ratified. Anticipated ratification is 2007 or 2008 when the State Department will become the Central Authority on intercountry adoptions, issue standards, accredit agencies, and maintain records for Congress. As the largest receiving country of children through intercountry adoption, the U.S.' procrastination in implementing the treaty may have promoted similar behavior among other countries and has called into question our commitment to children. Our country has also engaged in pressuring sending countries that place moratoriums on intercountry adoption (Romania, Guatemala, Liberia). Indeed, it is the contexts of private and intercountry adoption where
abuses are most likely to occur prompting UNICEF to assess them as "high risk." Compounding issues of implementation is the fact that adoption contributes to the political economies of nations with estimated income ranging from $200-$400 million annually. Although such contributions are more significant for sending countries than for receiving ones, Kim Park Nelson (cited in Trenka 2005) estimates that when ancillary adoption businesses are included (clothing, dolls, magazines, books) adoption becomes a billion dollar industry for the U.S.

Emphasis by some U.S. scholars, social workers, and adopters has been given to the lack of a legal framework to facilitate intercountry adoption and to streamlining the process for adoptive parents rather than to protecting the rights of families in sending countries. This focus has been coupled with the rationalization that eliminating or curtailing intercountry adoption would only worsen poverty and deprivation for individual children. The focus on rights and dilemmas of adoptive parents has often led to accusations of exaggeration of child laundering (marketing or children for work, sex or adoption) as isolated incidents rather than a system that exploits poor birthmothers and adoptees. Instead of a global and highly interconnected picture of the impact of post-industrial countries on developing ones, Americans often get a picture of the internal failures of nations to secure their children's futures.

Law professor David M. Smolin (2005) explains how hard evidence of corruption in the adoption process demanded by advocates of intercountry adoption is difficult to acquire due to the nature of the activity.

Those who traffic, buy or steal children for processing through the adoption system do not advertise their illicit activities. Moreover, most within the adoption system, including adoption agencies, adoptive parents, and sometimes even adoptees, have motivations for minimizing or ignoring evidence of such conduct... Logically, the vast majority of such cases would never come into public view, for the illicit aspects of the case would remain hidden under the legitimating veil of legal adoption. These abuses of the adoption system could not last long if they were not usually hidden; these crimes would not exist if they were not usually successful in achieving the aims of their perpetrators.
Smolin cites a variety of inducements used to get families to part with children such as being told they will be able to stay in touch with their children or that they will receive continuing financial support from adoptive parents. In other cases, children are simply taken and turned into "paper orphans" with new identities provided. Though several countries have good reputations in intercountry adoption (China, Ukraine and Russia) there are also several with bad reputations such as Cambodia, Guatemala, India, and Vietnam. In the past 15 years, 17 of 40 sending countries to the U.S. placed either a temporary or permanent moratorium on private adoption due to suspected or known abuses of children and families (though not necessarily by U.S. citizens or private agencies). This is combined with the position of organizations like UNICEF that caution against poor control of intercountry adoption and cite this activity as one cause of the child trade (www.unicef.org/media/media_15011.html).

One of the most important criticisms surrounding debates on intercountry adoption is the bias of who gets to talk. Critics maintain that construction and presentation of adoption reality reflects the social location of adoption participants. Whereas scholars and intercountry adopters are often given a forum for their views to influence public policy, literary activist Jane Jeong Trenka (2005) observed, "adoptees are viewed as perpetual children, with views easily dismissed as 'angry', 'ungrateful', or 'bitter,' especially if our views are politicized, raced, or consider the women who gave birth to us." Assumptions (by adoption advocates) that children are better off than with their birthparents are often coupled with the argument that if poorer nations were truly concerned with the real needs of children they would support international adoption. Trenka (2005) has countered that if individual and national advocates of intercountry adoption were truly concerned with the status of poor children they would work on ways to secure the maintenance of families in these countries rather than taking their children.

The pattern that emerges is a collective cultural trauma on a global scale, manifested through the bodies of children and the mothers they have been taken from. It is an accepted, admired, praised, seemingly
benevolent programme of forced assimilation and amnesia, of relatively rich women entitling themselves to the children of severely impoverished and desperate women. It is a program of complicity in the so-called sending countries and unbridled greed for the natural resource of children in receiving countries. It is a program of ignorance enforced by the adoption industry itself” (http://www.languageofblood.com/whywrite.html). (07/09/2006)

Implications of Intercountry Adoption for U.S. Domestic Adoption

Implementing standards for intercountry adoption may have positive effects for domestic private adoption often accused of being one of the few remaining unregulated industries; however, this remains to be seen. Federal and state subsidies and medical assistance to adoptive families have promoted adoption of children with special needs and have resulted in increased rates of adoption of these children. Nevertheless, a substantial number of children remain in the system and recent cuts in state subsidies could result in stagnation of adoptions.

At the same time that special needs and intercountry adoptions have increased, the number of Black children placed with families from other countries (Canada, France, Germany, and Netherlands) has also increased. Private adoption and American demand has, in Patricia Williams words, turned "being black into an actual birth defect" (2003 p 165). Clearly black birthmothers who work with private agencies and select couples from abroad are an important part of this process. A number of newspaper and magazine articles suggest that at least one of the motivations for placement is an assumption that racism is less virulent in European countries and Canada.

Conclusion

In our new global reality, there ought to be a focus on improving the living conditions of all children both here and abroad. Measures should be in place to assure money gained through private and intercountry adoption be used to improve
conditions for families in developing countries with a focus on sustaining families rather than adopting their children. In an ideal world, adoption would not be needed, and certainly in a color-blind world 7 of 10 adopters would not be white.

In addition to ratification and implementation of standards for Intercountry adoptions, a Central Authority comparable to the State Department is also needed to accredit, monitor and report on adoption of U.S. children through private agencies. This Authority should publish regular reports on private agency practice for the protection of children and adoptive parents.

The relationship between Judeo-Christian beliefs and attitudes toward gay and lesbian persons (Crawford and Solliday 1996) coupled with the current conservative backlash in America resists expansion of adoption boundaries. A broader definition of who can adopt (gays, singles, older couples) needs to be standardized and not just for special needs cases. However, expansion is subject to states, agencies, and even individual social workers’ interpretations as adoption practices vary widely. For example, Arizona has been working on legislation to ban adoptions by gays and to give preference to married couples, thereby making adoption by single persons difficult if not impossible. Single persons are also directed toward adoption of special needs children. Certainly children with special needs require loving homes and persons should be encouraged to adopt these children. However, just as program requirements are often more lax for adoption of minority children, older persons/couples and gay/lesbian families are often regarded as second or even third-rate which is why certain adoptions are allowed and even encouraged. Why are single adoptive parents frequently directed toward programs with children who would require greater time, attention, and resources due to their physical or emotional needs? Why are these children more likely to be placed in homes of gay families, single persons, older couples, and couples with several children already in the home? Despite the ongoing claim of fewer available children in the U.S. the real issue seems to be which children are desired by which parents.

Finally, how do we address adoptions of U.S. children by persons/couples from other countries? Just as limits are placed
on who gets in (it is much more difficult to adopt infants and children from Mexico than from China) we should also have limits on placing U.S. children out of country. Of course it is important to provide children opportunities in life and to honor the decisions of birthparents. However, these practices beg the questions which children are promoted for adoption by persons from other countries and why?

During her adoption journey Patricia Williams was asked a common private agency question, ‘What races would you accept?’ Williams questioned, ‘Would they truly consider placing ‘any’ child with me if this agency happened to have a ‘surplus’ of white babies? Would I get a Korean baby if I asked? And for all the advertised difficulties, what does it mean that it is so relatively easy for white American families not just to adopt black children but to choose from a range of colors, nationalities, and configurations from around the world?’ As Williams pointed out, the argument that blacks are materially advantaged by living in white families should direct attention, not to transracial or minority adoption but rather the redistribution of resources so that African Americans and all parents can afford to raise their children.

Unfortunately, the Hague Treaty continues to allow intercountry adoption facilitated by both not-for-profit and for-profit agencies. And although countries have been modifying their practices, the continuing dominant philosophy (and one no doubt influenced by receiving countries) is that market mechanisms work effectively to assure that only reputable agencies and good practices prevail (Masson 2001). We need to reconsider the argument that various forms of adoption (transracial, minority, intercountry) promote transnational identities and endorse a multicultural paradigm. Assumptions and promises to the contrary, intercountry adoption not only fails to address the needs of the majority of children in sending nations but also creates honorary members of the dominant group in receiving countries. To borrow from Toni Morrison’s analogy of Clarence Thomas and the character Friday in Robinson Crusoe, many adoptees feel the pressure of owing allegiance to the “master.”

Voluntary entrance into another culture, voluntary sharing of more than one culture, has certain satisfaction
to mitigate the problems that might ensue. But being rescued into an adversarial culture can carry a huge debt. This debt one feels one owes to the rescuer can be paid, simply, honorably, in lifetime service...Under such circumstances it is not just easy to speak the master's language, it is necessary (Introduction 1992).

By recognizing the colonial aspects of intercountry adoption we can also begin to challenge practices that reproduce racial, gendered, and economic hierarchies. Unless substantial efforts are made to alter who participates in discussions of children's rights, the prospects for conceptualizing "global" human rights from the exercising of individual rights, are not very good.

References


Endnotes

1. In its report Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation, the United Nations estimated that 1.2 million children are trafficked each year.

2. In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Cindy Friedmutter, Executive Director of the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, estimated that U.S. adoptive parents spent close to $200 million in 2001 for international adoption services. Peter Selman (2001) suggests that the number of intercountry adoptions is higher than many estimates and that it is now at its highest level world-wide, with these numbers projected to increase in the near future. This projection contradicts a prior claim by Altstein and Simon (1991) who argued that the
phenomenon of non-white children from poor nations being “transferred” to wealthy white nations was on the decline and would continue to decline.

3. In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the Intercountry Adoption Act that would eventually ratify the Hague Convention Treaty by the U.S. As of June 2006, the treaty had yet to be ratified.
The Challenge of Community Work in a Global Economy

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This article examines how and why five major stakeholders—international financial organizations; NGOs; governmental entities; multinational corporations; and community development projects—have failed to significantly and uniformly reduce aggregate global poverty. The article uses the results of a case study of HIV/AIDS prevention in a low-income Nigerian city to argue that effective action must involve local and global stakeholders in collaborative partnerships. It concludes by discussing the critical role of facilitators in such partnerships.

Keywords: global economy, community development, NGO, INGO, World Bank, IMF, WTO.

Globalization is best understood in relative terms since all countries are not impacted equally. For the world’s desperately poor, sweatshops and other exploitive workplaces can seem more like opportunity than exploitation. For others in the
developed (and developing) world, globalization has meant untold prosperity. While the edifices of capitalist development—megacities, posh hotels and skyscrapers—are growing, poverty rates in developed countries are either frozen or rising, housing costs are becoming unmanageable, and the prices of goods and services are rising faster than wages which is leading to unsustainable levels of personal debt (Karger, 2005). Like Russian dolls, industrial societies are resembling a nation within a nation within a nation. This article will investigate how these forces are shaping policies in the developing world. It will also examine how effective development requires collaborative partnerships by which local people can regain control of development.

Major International Financial Organizations

Numerous international financial organizations, United Nations funds, and private donors are trying to address global poverty and development. However, an economy of space dictates that this section only focuses only on the largest financial organizations.

In 1944 delegates from 45 nations gathered at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to discuss Europe’s shattered economy. Delegates reached a consensus that established a postwar economy around currency exchange rates and free trade. The Conference created the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO) which the U.S. Congress refused to ratify. Instead, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947; in 1995 GATT became the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Mason & Asher, 1973).

Organizations Emerging from the Bretton Woods Conference

The IMF

The IMF provides financial assistance to countries experiencing severe financial difficulties. In turn, it requires members' currencies to be exchanged freely for foreign currencies, to inform the IMF of planned changes in financial and monetary
policies, and to modify their economic policies based on the IMF advice. Although the IMF administers an emergency lending pool, they are not primarily a lending institution like the World Bank (WB). The IMF perspective is based on the view that international prosperity is rooted in an orderly monetary system that encourages free trade, creates jobs, expands economic activity and raises global living standards (Driscoll, 1996).

Member nations requesting loans and/or organizational consultation are often required to conform to the "Washington Consensus," a set of fiscal reforms developed by neoliberal economists. The name was chosen because it represents the shared themes of Washington-based institutions like the IMF, the WB and U.S. Treasury Department. Consensus principles include:

- Pressuring least developed countries (LDCs) to enact fiscal discipline; tax reforms; market-driven interest rates; currency exchange rates based on market conditions; and strict oversight of financial institutions.
- Coercing borrower nations to adopt aggressive free trade policies by removing import restrictions and tariffs, except for those justified on safety, environmental or consumer protection grounds. Institute legal guarantees of property rights.
- Pressuring borrowers to privatize state-owned or controlled enterprises (Palast, 2003; World Bank, 2002).

The World Bank

Owned by 184 member countries, the World Bank Group is composed of two principal institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD focuses on middle income and creditworthy poor countries, while the IDA focuses on the poorest countries. Together, these two organizations provide low-interest loans and interest-free credit and grants to poor countries for education, health, infrastructure, communications, etc. WB affiliates include the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; and the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The WB is responsible for providing financial advice to LDCs for economic development and poverty reduction. Headquartered in Washington it has local offices in 100 member nations (World Bank, 2006a & 2006b; Driscoll, 1996).

Since 1996 the WB has focused on combating corruption in developing nations—it views reduced corruption and improved governance as crucial prerequisites for sustainable development and poverty reduction (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005). Over the last few years, the WB steadily moved its focus from economic growth to poverty reduction, supporting small scale local enterprises. Despite this new emphasis, WB projects are frequently criticized for social damage and for not meeting the goal of poverty reduction (Palast, 2003). As a lender of foreign currency, the WB demands to be repaid in the same currency. To repay loans, borrowers must become net exporters, a goal also shared by rich countries. In turn, this generates a “transfer problem” — the only way to repay loans is to engage in other loans and to accumulate even more debt. During the 1990s this cycle of indebtedness resulted in a net yearly transfer of $1.7 billion from poor to rich nations (Caulfield, 1996).

The Proponents of International Finance Organizations

Supporters of international financial organizations argue that their central purpose is to promote economic and social progress by raising productivity. They maintain that the WB and IMF are two of the most highly regarded financial institutions in developmental economics, and that while economic stability is a precursor to democracy, the WB and IMF have little power to democratize sovereign states. That view may be widely shared. A Pew Research Center study found that more than 60% of Asians and 70% of Africans felt the IMF and the WB had a positive effect on their countries (Pew Research Center, 2002; World Bank, 2005). Proponents also argue that no nation is forced to borrow their money, and that loans are given at below market interest rates to countries with little or no access to international capital markets (Mallaby, 2004).
The Critics

Critics charge that IMF and WB policymakers support military dictatorships friendly to U.S. and European corporations. The organizations are accused of being a U.S. tool for imposing economic policies that primarily benefit Western interests. Critics claim that the IMF is apathetic towards democracy, human rights, and labor rights. In Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, John Perkins (2004) casts the WB as an instrument of American imperial policy, providing loans to developing countries for projects that benefit a bribed ruling elite and American companies. While the WB insists that fighting poverty is their first priority, many critics, including Joseph Stiglitz, former Senior VP and Chief Economist of the WB, believe it is responsible for the rising poverty rate globally (Stiglitz, 2000).

Other critics charge that financial aid is bound to conditionalities, including neoliberal-based Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) modeled on the Washington Consensus (Dreher, 2004). For more than two decades, the WB imposed stringent SAPs on recipient countries, forcing them to adopt reforms such as deregulating capital markets; downsizing public social welfare programs; massive privatization of state companies, water supplies and public pensions; and levying cost-sharing user fees for public schools and hospitals (Palast, 2003). Even some conservatives believe the economic reform policies of the WB and IMF is harmful to economic development if implemented too quickly, as in “shock therapy.” (Public Broadcasting System, 2005).

The Failure of Other Actors to Reduce Poverty

Myriad agencies glut the field of international poverty and development. The lines between Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), governmental organizations, private donors, and others are often vague and artificial. A caveat is necessary before beginning this section: Any typology, including this one, is necessarily incomplete.

NGOs

The term NGO encompasses a wide variety of groups and organizations. The World Bank defines NGOs as “private
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development” (Galena, 1995). (INGOs refers to international NGOs.) NGOs depend in large part on charitable donations and voluntary service. They also encompass organizations including corporate-funded think tanks, community grassroots activists, development organizations, and emergency humanitarian relief.

The NGO sector in developing countries has experienced phenomenal growth and it is estimated that more than 15% of total overseas aid ($8 billion) is channeled through them. The WB estimates that there are 6,000 to 30,000 national NGOs in developing countries alone; community-based organizations number in the hundreds of thousands (Galena, 1995).

Some government officials established their own NGOs to access resources and develop new opportunities. Other NGOs are “briefcase companies” for the purpose of tax evasion and private gain. There is little consistency in the mission of individual NGOs.

Although NGOs have made the lives of millions appreciably better, they have also been criticized on many levels. Criticisms range from pointing out that only a small percentage of aid actually goes to those in need partly due to high executive salaries and other costs. In some cases, NGOs do more harm than good. For example, many food aid groups that bring in free food into non-emergency situations from rich countries undercut local producers and hurt local farmers. Other organizations working on population-related issues have misconceptions about over-population, or misunderstand the family and community structures in societies where they work. A significant amount of aid raised and distributed by NGOs is based on foreign policy or religious objectives. In other words, the decisions are made based on the interests of the lenders rather than the recipients. Aid can often lead to dependency and runs counter to promoting self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

Regions with high aid levels—sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South America, and some Central European republics—have not experienced a significant drop in poverty despite years of economic aid. The economic growth that some Asian nations—China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea—are experiencing is related more to market forces than NGO-inhabited areas is clearly not convincing. While the reasons for intractable poverty are complex and cannot be blamed solely on NGOs, it is also true that their impact on aggregate poverty is minimal.

National, State and Local Governments

Market liberals often blame development failures on political corruption. However, the reality of domination and imposition in the development field has led to a widespread resistance to global capitalism. It is not surprising that when autonomy is reasserted it results in the election of leftist leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Brazil’s Luis Lula da Silva, and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.

The impact of contemporary leftist governments on poverty is unclear. In 1997 (the year before Chavez’s election), 61% of Venezuelans lived beneath the poverty line; by 2005 that number dropped to 43.7% percent, still unacceptably high for an oil-rich nation (Weisbrot, 2005). The Bolivian economy grew at 4% or better for most of the 1990s, per-capita income grew steadily from 1996, and poverty rates hit near-record lows. By 2005 the economic situation worsened and now about 64% of Bolivians live in poverty. It is too early to judge Evo Morale’s effect on the Bolivian economy. Under Luis Lula da Silva the poverty rate in Brazil was about 22% in 2005, lower than when he took office in 2002. Although some poor nations have experienced improvement in recent years—sometimes dramatic—it is hard to unequivocally tie that to governmental policies.

Multinational Corporations

In A Corporate Solution to Global Poverty, George Lodge and Craig Wilson (2006) argue for the creation of a World Development Corporation (WDC), a partnership of multinational corporations (MNCs), international development agencies, and NGOs. For Lodge and Wilson, MNCs can have important benefits for developing countries, including the capacity to build investment, the propensity for creating a sound economic structure (including job creation), and the promise of subsequently reducing poverty levels. Lodge and
Wilson optimistically believe MNCs can do this profitably and sustainably.

Despite Lodge and Craig's optimism, the track record for MNCs is bleak insofar as developing a positive economic change in developing nations. In contrast, Milton Friedman's (1970) assessment is more realistic:

He [the CEO] has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to... make as much money as possible.... Insofar as his actions in accord with his 'social responsibility reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers' money. (p. 1)

Although the economic data on how multinationals affect developing economies is unclear—e.g., supporters claim they pay higher wages in developing countries than indigenous businesses—it is clear that they cannot be counted on as a steadfast development partner. Friedman is correct about the primary concern of corporations for profit.

Community Development

While there are many attempts at bottom-up development, perhaps the most celebrated innovation has been the much touted success of microcredit. Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for founding the Grameen Bank, whose main purpose is to offer microcredit to the poor in rural Bangladesh. With 47.5% of its 138 million people living in poverty, Bangladesh has the highest poverty rate in South Asia.

At least on the surface, Grameen's microcredit project is successful. The fact that 97% of Grameen's loan recipients are women in a country where few women can secure commercial loans is a major accomplishment. This is especially impressive given the 98% payback rate. Supporters claim that half of Grameen borrowers (close to 50 million) have risen out of acute poverty because of their loans.

The Wall Street Journal's Daniel Pearl (murdered in Pakistan in 2002) and Michael Phillips (2001) revealed in 2001 that Grameen loan repayments were less than what the bank
claimed, that at least one quarter of loans were used for consumption, that the bank delays defaults and hides problem loans, and that Grameen is not subject to serious public or private supervision. Critics claim the Grameen strategy has created a debt trap for borrowers who are charged high rates of interest relative to conventional banks. Opponents further claim that instead of being self-sufficient, Yunus's first money came from the United Nations, then the Bangladesh government, and finally U.S. foundations. From the 1980s to the 1990s the bank received nearly $150 million in grants. At the same time, Yunus was accused of borrowing at low interest rates from governments, and then lending it out at higher rates (Tucker, 2006). Critics charge that Grameen's tactics suffer from four flawed assumptions: (1) the poor should be self-employed rather than wage earners; (2) loans are the main financial service needed by the poor rather than savings and insurance; (3) credit builds entrepreneurship and management; and (4) microcredit institutions can be self-sustaining despite evidence that new enterprises in poor areas built on credit alone rarely emerge from dependency (Tucker, 2006).

Regardless of the criticism, economic data points to Grameen's modest effect on lowering aggregate poverty rates. While Bangladesh's economic growth rate is a healthy 5%—due largely to fish and clothing exports—little mention is made of Grameen's contribution. According to one study (see Table 1), Bangladesh remains persistently and acutely poor.

Poverty levels in most poor countries have not significantly declined in sixty years of tinkering by international financial institutions, NGOs, governmental entities, MNCs, and microfinance projects like the Grameen Bank. Despite the WB's conservative poverty threshold of $1 a day, poverty has increased in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Central and South America. There is little to suggest that another 60 years will make a difference in most persistently poor nations.

There are numerous reasons for the failure of anti-poverty and development strategies, including the lack of coordination among actors and the inability of NGOs to effectively communicate with the people they serve. The dynamics of these issues will be examined through the lens of a case-study of HIV/AIDS prevention in a low-income Nigerian community.
Table 1. Social Indicators for South Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IMR</th>
<th>MMR</th>
<th>LIFE years</th>
<th>Poverty %</th>
<th>Literacy %</th>
<th>GDP $</th>
<th>HDI</th>
<th>RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>5003</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>3778</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'desh</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IMR/MMR=Infant/Maternal Mortality Rate per thousand live births.
Life=Life Expectancy at birth.
Poverty=Measured at below U.S. $1 a day.
Literacy=As a percentage of the total population.
GDP=Gross Domestic Per Capita income in U.S. Dollars.
HDI=United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index.
Rank=In HDI.

Lessons from AIDS in Nigeria

One issue that reflects the failure of current development strategies is the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa, an effort that consumed billions of dollars in ineffective solutions. The influence of the multinational agencies is illustrated in the way the Nigerian government became aware of AIDS and HIV at the beginning of the 1980s but was reluctant to admit the problem for fear of turning away investors and tourists. For example, in 1983 and in 1985, the military governments of Buhari and Babangida were prohibited from forming AIDS councils for fear of classifying Nigeria as an HIV/AIDS infected venue. Successive Nigerian military regimes from 1983 to 1999 sidestepped the threat by not addressing it. Based on similar influences, many African governments responded to HIV/AIDS with denial, ministerial wrangling and the misallocation of resources. The government of Nigeria was eventually forced to reassess this issue despite its resistance. This was partly due to the potential destruction of an emerging middle class, the erosion of hard-won economic gains, and the potential restiveness in military high commands. The major administrative response to HIV/AIDS in Nigeria began in
Facing a troubled politico-religious environment around Muslim/Christian differences, Nigeria has a number of aid organizations working on development issues. A broad range of INGOs—APIN, Pathfinder International, Ford Foundation, BASIC, Society for Family Health (SFH) USAID, the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, Family Health International, the World Bank, Caritas International, and others—are active in Nigerian HIV prevention. The presence of international partners, especially from the United States, is evident in many Nigerian communities. These organizations seek to collaborate with other international partners and the Nigerian government in forming a national response to HIV/AIDS.

Iyiani’s (2005) case study examined HIV/AIDS activities by Western aid organizations and compared it to the lived realities of people most at risk (sex workers, unemployed street youth, and married low income families) in a poor migrant community of Ajegunle in Nigeria’s Lagos state. Iyiani found that INGOs and their client NGOs emphasized Western medical models of HIV/AIDS for both intervention (e.g., testing and ARV drugs for management) and prevention through education and behavior change. In effect, the AIDS problem was viewed through the lens of a narrow medical model whereby infection was primarily caused by the failure to practice safe sex, and reinforced by traditional cultural beliefs and/or ignorance (seen as largely the same thing in Western minds). Education to promote safe sex was a major strategy involving a wide range of school programs, radio soap operas, and the provision of condoms. Failures abounded, especially in profiteering around condom use and fundamentalist Christian international donors who stressed sexual abstinence. Since INGOs provided needed resources, this “preference” amounted to coercion by donor nations, especially the United States.

Investigating the lived reality of people at risk illustrated how this community viewed their situation and how they dealt with the epidemic. In contrast to the Western medical assumptions, Iyiani’s study (2006) found a high degree of knowledge about the transmission of HIV/AIDS, but also strong feelings of powerlessness in being able to address it. The reaction of low-income people was marked by fatalism, poverty, and a general
sense of powerlessness. Sex workers felt powerless to insist on safe sex in the face of client demand and were burdened by the costs of condoms given their crushing poverty. Overwhelmed by mistrust and fatalism, street youth lived for the moment and were not receptive to safe sex messages. Even respectable married couples lived with mistrust between partners where condom use had an unwelcome and hidden message for both partners. Under INGO patronage, medical professionals operated through relatively expensive Western medicine facilities that went largely unused by local people who resorted more to traditional cultural healers.

INGOs and their client organizations were operating at the levels of tertiary (curative) and secondary (behavior change) prevention, whereas the views of the local at risk people indicated acting at the primary prevention level (social structural conditions). The failure to address conditions such as poverty and deprivation helps explain the pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS in Africa compared to the more affluent West.

Iyiani’s (2005) findings identified a process of “talking past each other” by official aid agencies and those most at risk, thereby inhibiting effective prevention. The study suggested that new thinking about multi-sectoral responses with full community participation is necessary to engage in more effective preventive action. This approach requires the appropriate policy response, capacity building, and above all, an empowerment-based response. Tembo (2003) came to a similar conclusion when studying the interaction and miscommunication between World Vision and villagers in Malawi. Both studies contrast the Western patronizing “development” discourse versus the reality and self-interest of poor aid recipients.

In the Ajegunle study, the first step was to identify the power resources and strengths of the differing groups. For the INGOs and NGOs it was fairly straightforward since the gross inequality in the world distribution of resources gave them financial resources Nigeria lacked. In turn, they used that position to dictate their own agendas, omitting primary intervention and instead concentrating on secondary and tertiary prevention.

A second part of Iyiani’s study sought out power resources in the local Ajegunle community. As a poor community, they
lacked financial resources and human capital, such as skilled workers, but they had considerable knowledge capital about their own circumstances and the realities people faced. The community also had considerable capital in terms of the cultures and lifestyles of the various ethnic groups in the population, the churches, and resources like traditional healers. Similarly, local organizations ranged from grassroots groups with considerable relational capital around community links, to expert groups with INGO links and organizational resources but few networks of local community accountability (Iyiani, 2006).

These case studies suggest the need to pay attention to how power operates, to identifying and working through the power differentials, and especially to empowering local communities if effective development is to take place. Such participation has, of course, been a favorite invocation of global financial organizations which are long on rhetoric but short on delivery. As Tembo (2003) notes, participation is used in a simplistic populist sense with no consideration of the "politics" of situations—ranging from international to national and local politics.

A key issue is to analyze and identify the "power" and locate its sources and bases. In terms of the four major groups of stakeholders identified, each has specific power resources.

- International financial organizations have enormous financial power (capital).
- Aid INGO's have considerable financial and political capital, and access to human capital that is useful for development.
- National and regional governance bodies have the political capital (authority).
- Local communities have social and cultural capital—the knowledge needed for effective development and for meeting the felt needs of people.

To undertake an empowerment process in capacity building, effective action needs to replace "power over" by "power with." This approach stresses not "giving development" as in Malawi, nor asking groups to "lift themselves up by their bootstraps" as in many participatory approaches to poverty.
Nor does it entail the "talking past" phenomenon of Ajegunle; instead, it reflects the negotiated interaction of various stakeholders whose resources are the basis for the negotiated development of a shared vision and action plan.

Tembo presents a figure of how under the concept of empowerment, the agendas of the external agents and the people's "internal agents" are brought together for sustainable development (Tembo, 2003).

Participation is the mechanism by which people are brought into the empowerment process. This process needs definition as relationships realized in action and built through process and interaction are ongoing and negotiated in an open-ended process. Outcomes of this process are uncertain and are constructed through power relationships rather than a top-down set plan. The outputs of such an approach at any point in time are contingent and shift with no final solution—"talking to each other" is an ongoing dialogue which must change with changing relationships and challenges.

This type of power does not operate solely on a local level, but on a range of levels (Lukes, 1974). Specifically, from the actual community level decision making and delivery to that of setting the agenda for decisions (interaction of INGO's and governments) and, ultimately, to the structural conditions surrounding global financial structures. In this way, successes at the micro level are felt at the global level. Globalization is a two way process—global forces shape the local and the local shapes the global. In effect, power is "glocal."

While the agendas of groups like NGOs are inevitable, they are also changeable. Shannon and Walker (2006) argue that the process of interaction at the decision level has the potential to develop the leverage to change differing agendas, and in the long term, to make a contribution to changing unequal development in higher level organizations. The key to such
transformative partnerships must be "talking to each other" and building relationships through communication in agreed action at all levels where all the relevant stakeholders are involved (Shannon & Walker 2006; Forschner, Brandsdettter & Byrne, 2006). Development problems can only be resolved by acknowledging and working with power differentials. Therein lies the potential contribution of social work and community development in the global environment. This form of community work has the potential to move beyond the failed activities of the WB, the IMF and other bodies.

Conclusion

After sixty years of effort and planning, international financial organizations, NGOs, national governments, MNCs, and community development projects have failed to lift large numbers of people out of poverty. The economic and social strategies employed by these groups have not resulted in significant poverty reduction despite throwing billions of dollars at the problem. There is little evidence that the top-down approach of aid, loans and other forms of assistance has made a major dent in ending the devastating poverty in the developing world.

Local community initiatives, like microcredit, have also not significantly lowered aggregate poverty levels. An alternative strategy would require a multi-tiered approach that gives significant decision-making to people at the lowest level. But this strategy alone will still not significantly decrease the overall number of people in poverty. What is necessary are multiple strategies that involve a high level of collaboration and coordination with all organizations involved in the development process. Grounded in the active participation of those in poverty, this kind of coordinated approach will maximize resources, end duplication of services, and carefully target areas of need. Will it work? There is no magic bullet to end poverty.
References


Globalization, Immigration and the Welfare State: A Cross-National Comparison

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Over the past decades, the forces of globalization have helped create a huge wave of immigration. The relationship between globalization and immigration has been intensely examined in the last decade with a focus not only on whether and how much globalization has caused international immigration but also how to promote and sustain a just global system for the growing number of immigrants. This study selects three developed countries with different welfare state philosophies and traditions—Australia, Sweden and the United States—and compares how they cope with the growing number of immigrants and their various needs. This paper reflects thinking about states’ ability to redistribute resources, about the ability to agree upon a unified theory of welfare rights in a diverse society, and the feasibility of opening nations’ welfare systems to all immigrants in the globalization context and from a rights-based social work perspective.

Keywords: Welfare State, Immigration, Australia, Sweden, the United States

Over the past decades, the forces of globalization have helped created a huge wave of immigration. The United
Nations estimates that 3% of the world's population—about 191 million people—lived in a country other than the one in which they were born in 2005, with 33% having moved from a developing to a developed country, 33% moving between developing nations, and another 33% having moved from a developed country to another developed nation (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). In the last decade, the ratio of the Western world's foreign-born population has been increasing. According to UN migration statistics from 228 countries and regions, the United States leads the world as a host country, with 38 million immigrants in 2005, constituting almost 13% of its population. But the share of the immigrant population is larger still in Australia at 19.6% in 2005, and Canada at 18.9%. In regional terms, however, Europe's migrant population of 64 million in 2005 was almost 50% greater than the 45 million in North America (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). The relationship between globalization and immigration has been intensely examined in the last decade with a focus not only on whether and how much globalization has caused international immigration but also how to promote and sustain a just global system for the growing number of immigrants.

It is important to emphasize that a just global system must consider the interplay between immigration and the welfare state primarily because the welfare state has been conceptualized to structurally address issues like economic and social well-being, equality, human rights and justice. While scholars in the fields of law, political science, sociology, economics, and social work have identified several challenges that immigration poses to the welfare state, there is a general lack of discussion about a reconstruction of the welfare state to accommodate immigration in the context of globalization. In addition, while addressing relations between immigration and the welfare state, there is a sense of powerlessness and/or reservation about certain principles of the welfare state. Concerns have been raised about states' ability to redistribute resources, about the ability to agree upon a unified theory of welfare rights in a diverse society, and the feasibility of opening nations' welfare systems to all immigrants (e.g., Vasta, 2004; Clarke, 2005). Reflections on these issues pose particular
challenges to different types of the welfare state. This study selects three developed countries with different welfare state philosophies and traditions—Australia, Sweden and the United States—and compares how they cope with the growing number of immigrants and their various needs. This paper also explores the relationship between globalization, immigration and the welfare state from a rights-based social work perspective.

Literature Review

The Welfare State and Globalization

The term welfare state refers to a state or political entity whereby the state assumes primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Welfare states, both politically and economically, address institutionalized relationships between welfare programs, a government and/or a nation, and are to enhance the quality of people’s life, to support equality, justice and human rights, and to help develop and maintain the development of a country’s economy. Variations exist across countries in terms of the meaning, desirability, distribution and scope of welfare—ranging from social democratic, liberal and corporatist welfarism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) to the expansive welfare politics of social movements (Piven & Cloward 1993). Nevertheless, the welfare state had been generally accepted as a nation-state doctrine during the post-war period, whereby the nation provided the territorial unity of welfare (Jessop, 2002; Clarke, 2005). In the last three decades welfare states have been subjected to diverse pressures of which globalization is the most powerful (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Yeates, 2001).

While modern globalization has led to increased trade, capital mobility and labor market flexibility, it has also drastically changed social conditions and cultural values in countries and communities. The incompatibility between the welfare state (a nation-state doctrine) and globalization (economic and social activities across national borders) has led to a claim that globalization heralds the “end of the welfare state”. This claim has been largely discredited as evidence of the survival of welfare states has mounted (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1996;
Kuhnle, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). This is primarily because, as Taylor-Gooby (2001) indicated, “[w]elfare is being recalibrated, recast, is in transition, adapting, restructuring, evolving or being modified” (p. 2-3). Efforts to restructure welfare states include discussions about welfare policy and its governance at the regional level, such as the European Union (EU), and in multi-level systems, such as local governments. Despite different approaches, the general trend in Western welfare states has been towards a reduction in welfare programs, and a shift to an ideology of individualism. As such, it is not done yet to access the extent to which welfare states are surviving globalization.

Globalization and Immigration

The academic literature has explored the relationship between globalization and immigration in detail. To the extent that scholars considered the possible links between globalization and international immigration in the past, the application of economic theorems has led to the inference that globalization and international immigration have been interdependent (e.g., Rodrik, 1997; Swank & Betz, 2003). That is, while globalization has forced many countries to reform their immigration policies to become competitive in an integrated global market, to the extent that immigration is primarily driven by economic incentives, differences in real wages or more broadly, in returns to human capital, has generated incentives to migrate. On the other hand, to the extent that immigration is primarily driven by non-economic considerations such as a desire to reunite with family members, a need to escape wars or political persecution, and/or an aspiration to live in a country with better welfare benefits, there is no clear systematic relationship between globalization and immigration.

Observations indicate that the recent increased influx of culturally diverse immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers into West European nations accounts for a substantial component of these societies (OECD, 2006). As such, the real threat from globalization and immigration is that together—capital mobility, immigration of skilled workers, and incoming refugees and asylum seekers (who usually take low-paid jobs)—are contributing to employment and income insecurities for
Globalization, Immigration & the Welfare State

many native wage earners (Swank & Betz, 2003). In addition, immigrants in general are more likely to stay on welfare and to receive public benefits and most refugees and asylum seekers display a greater degree of "structural" welfare dependence than natives, and their dependency may last for years (Hanson & Lofstrom, 2003; Chung & Bemak, 1996). Therefore, it is no surprise that the mass public tends to weigh the costs of globalization and immigration more heavily than its benefits.

Immigration and the Welfare State

Debates about immigration have mainly focused on welfare and welfare eligibility, or social rights as defined by Marshall (1950). Immigrants' rights to welfare benefits differentiate migration that is considered as "wanted" (such as skilled labor migration) and "unwanted" (such as asylum seekers). By providing access to, or exclusion from welfare support, welfare states have sought to welcome some forms of migration while rejecting others (Geddes, 2003). Doing so reveals the territorial character of welfare states. While globalization has promoted economic and social integration, welfare states remain decidedly national and are "powerful institutional forces embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership, belonging, entitlement and identity" (Geddes, 2003, p. 152). The intended discriminatory immigration-welfare policies however cannot counteract trends towards openness and inclusion of the "unwanted" immigrants due to humanitarian concerns and the imperative of refugee protection. Scholars have highlighted the contradictions in nations' rationale to actively recruit skilled workers to sustain the labor market on one hand, and the concurrent concerns of unemployment, underemployment and welfare dependency on the other (e.g., Man, 2002; Nannestad, 2004). Moreover, with a growing number of immigrants and increased diversity among populations, it is becoming difficult for people to see a universal welfare solution that is based on an earlier collective value system. Without a certain degree of solidarity, it is easy for some members of dominate ethnic groups who feel threatened by the influx of immigrants to adopt an anti-welfare attitude that values self-sufficiency and blames immigrants for needing support (Brett, 1997; Byrne, 1999; Castles, 1997; Vaste, 2004). Debates about the
extent of the burden placed on national social welfare systems by immigrants have been ongoing for at least a century and the immigrants' welfare dependency (e.g., Razin & Sadka, 2004) has become the foundation for modern immigration law and welfare reforms. For example, as the number of migrants entering Britain rose throughout the 1990s, politicians legislated increasingly restrictive immigration policies; simultaneously, successive governments have sought to limit welfare entitlements for migrants (Dwyer & Brown, 2005). As Hjerm (2005) indicates, welfare states that were built and expanded on grounds of homogeneity, such as Scandinavian social democratic welfare states, have been struggling to address the changing circumstances in an increasingly racially and ethically diverse society as a result of globalization and immigration. Welfare states of the 21st century have been unable to achieve their primary societal goals and secure equality for all people (Hjerm, 2005).

Nations with strong social welfare systems have been attempting to articulate concepts of how all differences can fit together, and socially responsible groups such as "modern" British people (Clarke & Newman, 2004) and Modern Finnish People (Castells & Himanen, 2002), have been articulated focusing on work and welfare, conditions and character of citizenship, and the multicultural community. These efforts nonetheless have tended toward reducing welfare benefits for immigrants, encouraging their participation in both the labor market and society, and enforcing the value of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility. Therefore, in the context of globalization and immigration, will modern developed nations continue their welfare states? And how will they do this? Will welfare programs address the needs of immigrants and survive the public's outcry over spending tax dollars on (useless) immigrants? This paper describes immigration policies, in particular policies concerning immigrant welfare eligibility, in Australia, Sweden and the United States. Then it discusses the use of welfare benefits among immigrants and refugees and their unmet needs, as well as societal concerns.

Three Countries in Prospect

I chose Australia, Sweden, and the United States for
comparison and analysis primarily due to their different types of welfare states. According to Esping-Anderson's definition (1990), Sweden has been a flagship for social democratic welfare states; it applies universal and redistributive benefits, combines higher levels of welfare support with a social democratic principle of equality, and promotes universal solidarity in support of the welfare state. The United States has modeled a liberal welfare state for the past century, which emphasizes individual self-reliance and the primacy of the market; lower levels of state welfare support are accompanied by patterns of social stratification. The Australian welfare regime incorporates elements from both social democratic and liberal welfare states, such as the role of large, centralized unions in securing a relatively high minimum wage, which social democratic welfare states frequently adopt, and the means-tested income support system that liberal welfare states prefer (Beer & Forster, 2002).

The different welfare state philosophies and scope of welfare benefits can be illustrated best by the indicator of "public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP," which is, according to the definition of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006), a measure of the extent to which governments assume responsibility for supporting the standard of living of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups (see Figure 1). Public social expenditures include cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks for social purposes. While in the last decade, the United States and Australia have maintained similar levels of public social expenditures (around 15% of their GDP), Sweden

![Figure 1: Social Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP](image-url)
earmarks at least 30% of its GDP for its comprehensive and universal public welfare system.

**Transparent or Opaque Immigration**

The three countries vary greatly in their history of immigration. While Australia and the United States have historically been considered "settlement countries," where immigrants have traditionally flocked, immigration to Australia has increased dramatically in last 50 years, more than immigration to the United States. When Australia embarked on its post-WWII program to encourage greater immigration to supplement its 1947 population, of which only 2.7% were foreign-born, today above 40% of Australians are either foreign born (23%) or have a foreign-born parent (19%) (Price, 1998). Unlike Australia and the United States, Sweden has been, until the past few decades, a very homogenous country that maintained its cultural uniformity by refraining from attracting "foreign elements" until the 1950s (Runblom, 1994). In the last decade, the percentage of the foreign-born population has increased from 9.6% to 12%, and from 8.3% to 12.2% in Sweden and the United States respectively, while Australia has maintained the same level over the past 10 years (roughly 22-23%) (see Figure 2). Currently, the United States leads the world as a host country for immigrants while Australia’s population has the highest percentage of immigrants worldwide.

![Figure 2: Percentage of Foreign-born Population](image-url)
Immigration policies in the three countries share numerous similarities and differences. All three countries classify immigrants as labor-market-needed immigrants, family-reunification-based immigrants, and humanitarian-based refugees including asylum seekers (though the name of each category varies across countries). In Sweden, labor-market-needed immigrants had traditionally been reserved for Finnish, Danish and Norwegian workers. Not until 1965, when a huge flow of Yugoslavian temporary workers arrived unexpectedly, did Sweden start to regulate work-related immigration. However, due to Sweden’s central location, its strong ties with other Nordic and European countries, and the growing power of the EU, the dominant migration in Sweden has been refugees and asylum seekers from Southeastern Europe, followed by their family members (reunification), and EU citizens (Westin, 1996 & 2006; Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003). A significant number of foreign-born Swedes today are from the former Yugoslavia and Finland (Westin, 2006).

In the United States, the 1965 Immigration Act, aimed to facilitate family reunification and admit workers with special job skills, has produced two groups of immigrants. Since 1965, most immigration visas have been allocated to relatives of U.S. residents (Donato, 1992). The U.S. Immigration Act of 1990 further sets limits for certain categories of immigrants. In 2004, the limit for family-sponsored immigrants was 226,000 to 480,000, and 140,000 for employment-based immigrants (USCIS, 2006). The top two regions from which new U.S. immigrants come are Mexico and Asia. In contrast, in Australia, skill-based immigration comprised 68.1% of total immigration in 2005-06 (Australia Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2006), resulting from Australia’s immigration reform in 1995-96, which created a new category for skilled workers, superseding the previous family category. Consequently, since 1997 the number of skilled workers migrating to Australia has exceeded the family-member category, reflecting a continuing trend (Soon, 2001-02). Many migrants today enter Australia through an independent stream based on a point system that assesses immigrants’ potential for employment and self-sufficiency. Points are allocated for various criteria including professional skills, command of English, age
and other adaptation/self-sufficiency factors and applicants receive extra points if their occupation is in demand (e.g., medicine), and/or if an employment offer has been made (Reitz, 1998). The top countries and regions from which new immigrants come are United Kingdom, New Zealand and Asia. Comparatively, while Australia and the United States are more open than Sweden, Australia’s immigration policy is more attractive for skilled workers.

**Welfare Eligibility**

Australia, Sweden and the United States vary greatly in the welfare benefits offered to immigrants. My comparison is largely based on income support programs, which is a means of resource redistribution and represents the societal goals to achieve social equality. Sweden historically restricted immigration and provided no aid to immigrants until the mid-1970s when it established an immigration policy that took equality as one of the country’s top priorities and aimed to provide civil rights and equal opportunities to immigrants (Vollmer, 2002). Today, Sweden provides the most generous welfare package for immigrants who need monetary support. As soon as immigrants enter Sweden, they can access all the welfare benefits available to native Swedes. However, due to a 1980s economic recession, in the 1990s Sweden added restrictions to its welfare programs despite its ideal of welfare universality. For example, the welfare benefit is now based on an individual’s work experience, such that low-wage, unskilled immigrants receive less support. Typically, to obtain unemployment benefits, the claimant must have been employed for a minimum time during a 12-month period immediately before becoming unemployed. In addition, the applicant must have contributed to an unemployment insurance fund for one year and must register with a public employment service. While this restriction is applied to both immigrants and natives, the implementation negatively impacts immigrants more than native Swedes.

It is noteworthy that both “settlement societies,” Australia and the United States, tend to impose tighter restrictions on welfare eligibility for immigrants. Both countries require residency for immigrants to apply for income support benefits, and in the past decade, both nations have reformed their welfare
programs for immigrants. Australia adopts a national welfare system while benefits are primarily paid by the central government. In general, Australian residency is required to qualify for income support benefits. Australia's immigration reforms of 1995-96 not only changed the focus of immigration away from family reunification to a skills-based needs test, but restricted newly arrived immigrants' access to welfare benefit. Most new arrivals must now wait for two years to apply for almost all social security benefits. Meanwhile, concluding that the welfare programs had not effectively promoted personal responsibility on the part of welfare recipients, the government in the 1990s further cut more specialized services for migrants including language programs, income support, and ethno-specific health care services (Vasta, 2004).

In the United States, the federal, state and county governments share welfare responsibilities. The 1996 U.S. welfare and immigration policy reforms changed the eligibility for immigrants applying for federal benefits. Immigrants who entered the United States after August 22, 1996 cannot apply for federal income support benefits until they reside in the United States for five years. In addition, the reforms restrict most immigrants and refugees from receiving welfare benefits to five years total (Lim & Resko, 2002). In reality state and local governments have gradually provided various income support programs to immigrants, such as California's Cash Assistant Program for Immigrants that financially supports aged and disabled legal immigrants.

Assess Immigrants' Needs

The success of immigrants depends mainly on the extent of their economic and social integration into society (Valtonen, 2001). While immigrants of "family reunification" and "refugee" status normally face more challenges and barriers than "skill-based" immigrants in integrating into the labor market, the use of welfare benefits, particularly during the early stage of immigration is critical. The use of welfare benefits and other government supports has been described as an important tool to assist immigrants acculturate and achieve economic self-sufficiency. Studies show that immigrants' use of welfare benefits decreased with the number of years spent in resettled
societies (Hirschl, Gurak & Tran, 1995; Chung & Bemak, 1996; Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003). Nonetheless, immigrants' use of welfare benefits has been conceptualized as "welfare dependency" and this has been a hotly debated public issue in all three countries examined here. Available research and evaluations suggest that the governments of Australia, Sweden and the United States have had different perceptions on this issue and have legislated different policies to address immigrants' needs.

In Sweden rather than viewing welfare dependency as a problem, much research has been devoted to examining social conditions of immigrants and the welfare programs that assist them; this perhaps reflects its strong universal redistributive welfare state. Despite Sweden's comprehensive welfare system, its commitment to social and economic equality, and its extensive efforts to support multiculturalism and anti-discriminatory political principles, studies have found that immigrants in Sweden have fewer economic resources, lower salaries than native Swedes (i.e., from 1993-2000, immigrants earned 88% of the average native Swede's income), do not have equal access to employment (in particular immigrants from non-Western Europe such as former Yugoslavia, Iran and Iraq), and consequently have a lower standard of living compared with native Swedes (Anderson, 1996; Martens, 1997; Hjerm, 2005). Research indicates that Sweden's social welfare system and labor market have not worked reciprocally to minimize immigrants' marginalization. Recent reforms in welfare policy that limits eligibility, and in particular, unemployment benefits, have posed tremendous challenges to immigrants: not only have they faced discrimination in the labor market, but most have not qualified for employment benefits (Bergmark & Palm, 2003; Bergmark & Backman, 2005). While Sweden has a strong reputation for caring for its populace, it seems to have neglected special needs of its newest members, its immigrants.

Stemming from the pressures of the growing number of "unwanted" immigrants and their use of welfare benefits, Australia reformed its immigration policies in the 1990s, favoring the English-speaking immigrants with valuable job skills and consequently incurred the net fiscal impact on the central
government's budget in terms government outlays and receipts of migrations. These reforms effectively silenced the welfare dependency discussions (Betts, 2003; Khoo, 1994; Vasta, 2004) yet resulted in several positive outcomes including halving the unemployment among recently arrived immigrants, increasing the salaries of new arrivals by two-thirds, and reducing the number of immigrants on welfare programs to a historic low level (Hawthorne, 2005). Discussions on Australia's immigration policy during the last 20 years have turned away from welfare dependency and have focused on assimilation, integration and multiculturalism, and how to incorporate these principles in welfare programs and service delivery (Kelaher & Manderson, 2000).

The United States' immigration and welfare reforms in 1996 have achieved their stated goal of decreasing welfare dependency, but have also raised concerns about immigrants' well-being. Studies examining the post-1996 U.S. welfare reform trends show that welfare use by immigrant households declined sharply—relative to the decline experienced by native households—immigrant families have had a disproportionately higher percentage of unemployment, lower earnings and public assistance benefits (Borjas, 2002; Fix & Passel, 1999; U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 & 2003). Based on studies that have shown the negative impact of immigration and welfare reform on low-income immigrants, refugees, immigrant women and children (Van Hook, 2003; Legomsky, 2002; Lofstrom & Bean, 2002; Fremstad, 2004), since the implementation of the laws in the late 1990s, the federal government has restored several important programs for immigrants such as nutrition programs (food stamp program) and income support programs for the elderly and disabled. But today, immigrant eligibility rules for family income support and health care programs have remained at the (low) levels of 1996. Concerns raised during discussions on the welfare reform reauthorization in 2006, have led to increased government investments from local levels in developing programs that improve the language ability of low-income, limited English-proficient immigrants.
While one might assume that countries with a long history of immigration such as the United States and Australia would be more willing to support immigrants and incorporate them into society, this is not the case, based on this study's comparisons of the three nations. Among the three countries studied, Sweden is the most generous country in terms of welfare benefits provided to all immigrants, both the "wanted" and the "unwanted". It is argued that Sweden's welfare system is based upon its immigration history and ethnic homogeneity. Given that Swedish social democratic welfare system is likely facing a greater threat to its stability than the United States or Australia as the forces of globalization have brought in diverse immigrant groups (predominantly refugees and relatives of immigrants), it is more likely that Sweden would change its commitment to equality and fundamental principles of welfare universality. However, as immigrant welfare dependency has been widely discussed in all three countries, it seems that it only poses a threat to social cohesion and welfare system stability in individualistic, non-collective cultures such as the United States and Australia. Several explanations can address this paradox. One, the number of the immigrant population in Sweden is relatively small, compared to Australia and the United States. As such, a universal welfare system is more manageable and immigrant welfare dependency could be more tolerable. Two, as a member of the European Union and within a unified and regulated labor market, the Swedish market seems more secured and an overflow of labor market-based immigration would not be expected in Sweden. In addition, the Swedish welfare system has been working to assimilate immigrants and reinforce its value system. As such, the survival or continuance of Sweden's universal welfare state depends on how the welfare state can extend the same rights to immigrants as are enjoyed by citizens while creating a new solidarity across all groups of people.

Global Market and Welfare System Reforms

While recent immigration policies in Australia, Sweden
and the United States have been aimed to control the flow of immigrants, they nonetheless reflect each government's desire to obtain valuable human capital—the "wanted" immigrants with desirable job skills—from the global labor market and to keep out unskilled workers who could strain their social welfare systems. However, the reforms in both Australia and the United States in the 1990s had less consideration of the increased mobility of people in the global market. Rather, their reforms focused on the populace's growing resentment of the immigrants and their added stress on the welfare system to address immigration concerns, and vice versa. Policy makers assumed that by attracting more skilled immigrant workers, welfare dependency among immigrants would diminish. This was clearly the case in Australia. Policy makers also assumed that restricting immigrants' access public welfare benefits would indirectly discourage new immigrants who lack language proficiency, formal education, and the ability to quickly become self-sufficient, from immigrating. This was a driver of the U.S. welfare reforms of the 1990s. While Australia and the United States adopted different strategies to address both spiraling welfare costs and the growing number of immigrants, the desired results—decreased welfare expenditures and a shift in the responsibility to immigrants themselves—were identical. While it could be argued that the different strategies stem from the nature of each country's industries, need for human capital, and ease in border control, to name a few, a comparison of the 1990s immigration-welfare reforms distinguish America as a liberal welfare state, and suggest Australia has a practical orientation of its welfare system. Unfortunately, these reforms failed to note the role that each nation's welfare system plays in the global labor market. In fact, welfare systems were developed to provide a safety net for citizens who work and live in a country and presumably pay taxes to support the system, not as welfare benefits for selected guests. A feasible welfare structure for immigrants and a form of securing their chances of participation in the labor market and integrating into society are critical in this era of globalization. This holds true for both the "wanted" and "unwanted" immigrants.
Equality and Redistribution in the Globalization Context

Overall, from the previous cross-national comparison, the relationship between globalization, immigration and welfare programs are not closely tied together as often is assumed. Increased globalization does not necessarily link to increased immigration; immigration flow is still highly controlled by categorizing people into the “wanted” and the “unwanted” and it is influenced by economic and political conditions in various countries. Immigration does challenge and has changed the boundary of welfare states and led to governments’ withdrawal from responsibility to immigrants to some extent, but the organizational structure of each welfare state remains the same. This reflects a transitional situation while welfare states are adjusting their positions in the era of globalization. This also represents the paradox of immigration with economic benefits on one hand, and welfare expenditures on the other. In addition, this reveals a tension about how we as nations and citizens set up boundaries between “us” and “them”.

The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) asserts that all human beings have the right to leave their country (Article 13), the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, death of a spouse, and old age (Article 25). Following the UDHR principles, categorizing immigrants into “wanted” and the “unwanted” categories is a discriminatory policy; refusing access to public welfare benefits violates human rights; and a government’s failure to help its residents secure an adequate standard of living is morally questionable. However, immigration control for most nations is a long-term goal; most countries, both developed and developing, will not likely adopt a liberal immigration policy and fully open their labor markets, particularly given the specter of global terrorism. The very nature of politics and public policy, which responds to pressures from economic interests, makes it unlikely that the welfare of outsiders—immigrants—will be given much consideration.

Comparisons in this study suggest that different types of welfare states are rooted in history, culture, political ideology, and geographic and demographic factors. Indeed, social democratic welfare states like Sweden exemplify the UDHR
ideal. As for other types of welfare states, including liberal (the United States), conservative (German which is not included in this study), and third-way practical (Australia) welfare states, globalization and immigration could possibly coexist with individual states to intervene in the economy (i.e., resource redistribution) to ensure welfare goals such as equality and justice. To achieve welfare goals, international organizations and inter-government collaborations must play a critical role. Various international organizations and inter-governmental collaborations aim to promote structured global immigration, establish broadly recognized humane policies to move groups of people across borders, to support and assist immigrant health programs, and counter criminal activities across borders. Without market regulations from a multi-national organization such as the EU, social democratic welfare states such as Sweden will have to work hard to survive. Without collaborations between Mexico and the United States to control the border and regulate economic activities, American welfare policies will continue to discriminate against Mexican immigrants. As Western countries need immigrants to fill jobs that require special skills, to work at low-paid positions that natives are often unwilling to take, or simply to fill jobs that an aging society can no longer supply, policy makers, scholars, and social workers, etc. need to underscore and reinforce the value of immigrant, to their new society and to the global economy. A reconstructed welfare state needs to be built based on this consensus.

References


Globalization, Immigration & the Welfare State


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Globalization demands that social workers embrace more than just local and national perspectives; they must adopt an international viewpoint as well. A negative aspect of globalization that deserves more attention is the international movement of labor. This paper presents a description and analysis of trafficking, the more deleterious part of this movement of people, in a global context. Decision makers seeking to make global migration more humane need to know about the dynamics and process of trafficking, as well as ways to combat it. Definitional controversies, contextual issues (including the dynamics and processes of trafficking), and consequences of this movement for individuals and societies are discussed. Implications for social work are also presented.

Keywords: human trafficking, global migration, labor exploitation, international labor movement

Introduction

Globalization has resulted in an unprecedented flow of capital, goods and services, and labor into every continent and...
nearly every country in the world. Although much has been written on capital flows and emerging markets (Friedman, 2000), not as much attention has been given to the tremendous flow of people seeking work outside of their home countries. Indeed, in 2006 the International Organization for Migration estimated that there were more than 191 million immigrants worldwide (IOM, 2006). Immigrants are frequently treated as outsiders in their host countries and not afforded the same protection and rights as citizens (Engstrom, 2006; Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2002). In part because of their outsider status, immigrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and other harms, and nowhere is this more apparent than in human trafficking, a violation of basic human rights that is aptly viewed as a modern form of slavery. Human trafficking represents perhaps the worst form of labor exploitation and can be regarded as one of the dark sides of globalization.

Trafficking supplies human beings for prostitution, sweatshop labor, street begging, domestic work, marriage, adoption, agricultural work, construction, armed conflicts (child soldiers), and other forms of exploitive labor or services. Estimating with any accuracy the number of victims of human trafficking is a daunting task, so much so that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime stated that such a "statistical goal may prove to be unachievable" (UNODC, 2006, p. 45). Methodological problems have not, however, prevented organizations and scholars from offering widely ranging estimates. For example, a 2005 report by the International Labor Organization said that there were approximately 12,300,000 victims in forced labor in the world (ILO, 2005), while Bales (2005) offered an estimate of 27 million. There is general agreement that the majority of persons trafficked are female, perhaps nearly 80 percent (UNODC, 2006).

Labor exploitation of trafficked persons is hugely profitable. One estimate places the global profits at approximately $32 billion annually (Feingold, 2005). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS) described trafficking as the fastest growing criminal industry in the world (2004). Among illegal enterprises, trafficking is second only to drug dealing, and tied with the illegal arms industry, in its ability to generate dollars.

Human trafficking is both a global problem and a
domestic problem. The United States is a major receiver of trafficked persons: It is estimated that 15,000 to 50,000 of internationally trafficked victims arrive in the United States each year (United States Department of State [US DOS], 2005; US DHHS, 2004; UNODC, 2006). Trafficked victims can be found in various sectors of the U.S. economy, including prostitution, sweatshops, factories, and service industry work (US DHHS, 2004). These data demonstrate the scope of the problem. Human trafficking is a highly underreported crime and victims can be extremely difficult to identify (Hopper, 2004). Due to the criminal, secretive nature of human trafficking, victims are often hidden in brothels, homes, and businesses. Moreover, law enforcement, social workers, health care professionals, and other authorities rarely encounter victims of human trafficking, both because they are frequently unaware of how to identify potential victims and because victims are intentionally kept out of sight (Diaz, 2006). Even if victims do come into contact with law enforcement or social services, they are usually reluctant to ask for help, partly as a result of psychological coercion but also because they fear retribution from the trafficker (United States Department of Justice [US DOJ], 2006). Many victims come from countries with oppressive governments and are therefore fearful of any type of government official or authority figure (Human Rights Center, 2004).

Those who are trafficked are among the most vulnerable and exploited individuals in the new global economy that spawned this phenomenon. Now more than ever, social workers need a global perspective (Healy, 2001) to understand the issues that are contributing to international migration, including the problem and dynamics of human trafficking. Social workers need to recognize that some of the thousands of trafficked people in the United States will end up as our clients in emergency rooms, domestic violence shelters, mental health facilities, and child welfare systems. To intervene effectively, social workers must become aware of the realities of trafficking. Decision makers seeking to make global migration more humane also need to know about the dynamics and process of trafficking, as well as ways to combat it. It is within this framework—of trafficking in a global context—that this paper is presented.
Defining trafficking can be difficult. There is no single, universally accepted definition of trafficking (Arnold & Bertone, 2002; IMO, 2000). Trafficking is often confused with smuggling or illegal immigration; it is not synonymous with either, but may involve both. Smuggling can be defined as "the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation, or illegal entry of a person or persons across an international border in violation of American immigration laws" (US DOJ, 2006, pp. 9-10). Sometimes smuggling can turn into trafficking: for example, when people pay to be smuggled into a country, but once there, find that they owe a large debt and are not free to leave. Human traffickers and human smugglers often work together to supply the U.S. labor market with workers (Cole, 2005).

Definitions of trafficking found in international and national law emphasize the elements of deception, fraud, and coercion for the purpose of exploitation. The UN defines human trafficking as:

the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, ... the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (UN, 2000, art. 3).

The protocol further specifies that consent of the person being trafficked is irrelevant. The protocol affords trafficked persons the status of victims even if they are involved in illegal activities. The UN Trafficking Protocol has received widespread international support, with 117 signatories (The Future Group, 2006).

The debate within the field reflects honest definitional disagreements: for example, over the extent to which coercion and exploitation are necessary elements and whether a
national border need be crossed for an activity to be labeled trafficking (Mekong Region Law Center, 1999). The lack of a common, accepted definition has resulted in much confusion on how governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) ought to respond, confusion about these entities' roles, and difficulty in getting accurate counts of the numbers of trafficked persons.

Definitional issues over human trafficking are further compounded when one examines specific areas of labor exploitation. Prostitution provides perhaps the best and most studied example of the tension over an operational definition of the term. Prostitution arouses major concern because it is usually an illegal activity and carries stigmas that make it more difficult for the trafficked to escape than other types of work. Prostitution is also likely to involve the most vulnerable segments of the population: women and children (Derks, 2000; Hollingsworth, 2003); however, it is important to note that significant numbers of males are also trafficked as sex workers (Leuchtag, 2003).

Most anti-trafficking advocates, service providers, and policy makers believe that all those involved in the sex trade are coerced in some way. They argue that prostitution cannot be regarded as a rational choice, because too often it is a forced choice by those who have no alternatives for economic survival (Leidholdt, 2003). Advocates for trafficked women also stress the issue of exploitation, because traffickers know how to take advantage of a victim's vulnerability. For example, foreign women may agree to enter another as entertainers, but then find themselves functionally helpless in a country with a culture far different from their own, where they are subject to economic pressures and race and gender oppression that may drive them without overt coercion into the sex trade. Women may even agree to be trafficked for prostitution, but when they arrive at their destination they find the conditions to be much worse than they had agreed to or been promised—but they have no way to get out of the deal gone bad or return home.

In contrast, some advocates for women perceive that the issue of trafficking has been used to focus unwanted, unneeded attention on women who have voluntarily chosen to become sex workers, and claim that some trafficked prostitutes might not agree with the victim label (Biemann, 2005).
In the opinion of these commentators, many women who are classified as trafficked have made rational decisions to do sex work, and do not require "rescue." These advocates emphasize the need to educate sex workers about safe sex practices and to monitor the working conditions in brothels and massage parlors (Engstrom, Minas, Espinoza, & Jones, 2004).

Most advocates fall somewhere between these two viewpoints, and seek to intervene on behalf of women who are forced in some way into the sex trade and find themselves unable to leave it because of debt bondage, physical threats, or other coercion. There is, however, uniform consensus among advocates and observers alike that there should be zero tolerance of the trafficking of children for the sex trade (Engstrom et al., 2004).

**Context of Trafficking**

Discussions of trafficking make a distinction between sending, transit, and receiving countries. Although trafficking can refer to internal movement of people within a country, the main concern appears to be movement across national borders. Some countries, such as Ukraine, are primarily sending countries, whereas other countries, such as the United States, are almost exclusively receiving countries. A few countries, such as Thailand, function as both receivers and senders, as well as facilitators of the transit of trafficked persons.

An effective strategy to defeat trafficking must begin with a better understanding of the global "push" and "pull" factors that promote emigration, including the factors that lure individuals and population groups to wealthier foreign countries and those countries' restrictions on legal immigration. Such constraints and considerations promote alternate migration practices that lead toward exploitation and trafficking.

People are "pushed" out of poor countries where economic opportunity is lacking and "pulled" into countries that have a higher level of economic prosperity with a corresponding demand for cheap labor (Bales, 2005). Many migrate to take advantage of economic opportunity, so that they can send money back home to support their families. Often migrants receive higher wages than they would in their home countries,
even though they are paid less than the prevailing rates in the receiving countries. For example, Thais working in con-
struction in Japan are paid only about 40% of what Japanese
workers would get, but this wage can be as much as ten times
what these workers would earn in Thailand (Phongpaichait,
Piriyarangsan, & Treerat, 1998).

Traffickers play off this push/pull dynamic. They use as
recruitment tools the promise of a better life and increased
opportunity. Victims of trafficking, who are usually poor and
often uneducated, are not in a position to discern beforehand
that the promises of economic opportunity are, in fact, lies or
gross exaggerations. Ignorance and naiveté, along with dire
economic circumstances, make these people vulnerable to traf-
fickers. Indeed, human trafficking represents an acute intersec-
tion of vulnerability and exploitation.

Countries that are prone to political unrest, or have weak or
corrupt infrastructures combined with widespread poverty, are
breeding grounds for international criminal networks (Shelley,
2005). Traffickers dealing arms or involved in the drug trade
are quickly learning the increased value of trafficked humans,
one of the only commodities on the global market that can be
resold and used again. In this regard, Feingold (2005) argues
that one must distinguish between ordinary criminal activi-
ties and organized crime. Criminal activities can be carried out
through good organization, and may last for a certain period
of time, but once the work has been completed the group dis-
solves. Organized crime, in contrast, is undertaken by a stable
organization that is involved in various criminal activities; the
organization remains viable and functional even if it changes
its focus or type of criminal activity. Criminal elements are ob-
viously behind much human trafficking. However, it is organ-
ized crime, combined with corrupt officials and governments,
that has contributed to the significant growth of this problem
on a global scale.

Corruption enables human traffickers to operate success-
fully, whether through bribes to public officials or collabora-
tion of officials with criminal networks. Officials holding key
positions have used their authority to provide protection to
those engaged in criminal activities; their complicity can range
from simply ignoring illegal activity to blocking legislation
that would counter trafficking (Van Impe, 2000). The success of human trafficking depends on frequent transportation of victims to the many different service sites used every day. Successful trafficking thus requires easy and frequent crossing of borders and utilization of corrupt local officials, both in border crossing and conduct of the often illegal services for which victims are used (Schloenhardt, 2001).

The process of gaining entry to a country is often done under the auspices of criminal networks. Global trafficking involves smuggling persons across national borders, having them enter with fraudulent immigration documents, or (more rarely) having their valid travel documents confiscated after entry. Traffickers then use the “illegal” immigration status of their victims as a tool of exploitation: Subservience of trafficked persons is often achieved through psychological coercion, threats, and physical violence. The perpetrators operate with the knowledge that these migrants have little or no access to social or legal protection (Gushulak & MacPherson, 2000), even when the traffickers have not bribed officials to look the other way. The covert nature of migrants’ movement makes trafficked victims dependent on the traffickers. Trafficking victims face many risks, including physical and psychological stress, struggle with an unknown environment, and fear of arrest and imprisonment. All these factors add to the traffickers’ power and control.

The intersection of push/pull migratory dynamics with criminal syndicates and corruption is best understood by examining trafficking for prostitution. The demand for these victims is created by the sex industries in the receiving countries. Transnational crime networks, such as the Yakuza in Japan and those that developed after the fall of the Soviet Union, are meeting this need simply because it is a lucrative enterprise. Michael Platzer, of the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention, said, “Trafficking in women has arguably the highest profit margin and lowest risk of almost any type of illegal activity” (quoted in Hughes, 2000, p. 7).

Coercion occurs when victims are forced into the sex trade as part of a debt-bondage scheme or are held against their will in brothels or other venues of sex work (Skolnik & Boontinand, 1999). Another form of coercion is “bait and switch,” a form
of deception in which traffickers trick their victims into cooperating by promising them legitimate jobs (in entertainment or domestic work, for example); when it is too late to change course, these initially willing victims find that the promised jobs were a fiction, and end up, against their will, in sex-work venues (Engstrom et al., 2004). For example, Hughes (2000) reports an Interpol study which estimated that 75% of trafficked Ukrainian women working as prostitutes did not realize that they would be forced into sex work.

Sex trafficking is also fueled by a secondary ruse, in which trafficked women who have managed to return home recruit other women. Women who have been trafficked and trapped into the sex industry have very few, if any, options for escape from enslavement. To escape the horror of being forced to have sex with multiple men every day, some victims make a deal with the traffickers: in exchange for release and a return home, they agree to recruit new victims—thus moving from victim to perpetrator status, even though they often still remain under the control of the traffickers (Hughes, 2000).

Consequences of Trafficking

First and foremost, human trafficking is a violation of human rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies that every person has “inherent dignity” and “freedom.” More specifically, Article 4 states that “no one shall be held in slavery or servitude,” and Article 23 states that “everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work” (United Nations, 1948). Although the 1948 Declaration is not a legally binding document, it provides the moral basis for other human rights conventions that are legally enforceable. From a human rights standpoint, human trafficking violates the principles and articles of the Declaration even if no physical or psychological harm occurs (which is seldom the case).

The consequences of trafficking for victims are huge and far-reaching. Trafficking most often involves the movement of people from their own communities to situations in which they are isolated and dependent on those who are exploiting them. Trafficked persons are subject to being held in debt bondage
and involuntary servitude, often being forced to work for low or no wages in unsafe and unregulated working conditions. Victims of trafficking also often face ill treatment by public authorities that may associate them with criminal activity, such as prostitution or illegal immigration. (Traffickers use this unfortunate fact to consolidate their power over victims, threatening them with arrest, imprisonment, and other official/legal actions if they do not remain subservient.) Those who do return to their place of residence or country of origin may face ostracism for engaging in what is seen as shameful behavior; this is especially true with sex trafficking.

Human trafficking contributes to the weakening of social structures in sending countries by denying individuals access to their immediate and extended families. Moreover, trafficked persons are denied opportunities to further their acquisition of human capital in the form of education and occupational skills; this in turn leads to diminished workforce productivity. At the individual level, Farley (2003) argues that this increases such persons' vulnerability to being retrafficked in the future. At the societal level, the loss of human potential can inhibit national development (US DOS, 2006).

Studies on the state of trafficked women in East Africa, Nepal, and the European Union reflected many victims' reports of widespread rape, forced substance abuse, physical abuse, sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. Health impacts included extreme violence resulting in broken bones, complications related to forced abortions, gastrointestinal problems, lice, suicidal depression, unhealthy weight loss, alcoholism, and drug addiction (US DOS, 2006). Others have noted additional harmful effects of trafficking, such as somatized symptoms (e.g., headaches, back and body aches, dizziness, nausea, vision disturbances) and inability to recuperate and integrate into society (Stewart & Gajic-Veljanoski, 2005).

Ninety-five percent of trafficked victims in the European Union had been violently assaulted or coerced into a sexual act, and more than 60% reported experiencing fatigue, neurological symptoms, back pain, vaginal discharges, and gynecological infections (Hughes, 2000). Consequences of trafficking can include cervical cancer, which is common among women who have frequent sexual encounters with many men (Landesman, 2004).
Landesman (2004) went on to describe yet another layer of coercion, based on the victim’s belief (often well-founded) that the traffickers will harm her family if she does not comply with their demands. Victims who are psychologically broken by their traffickers may become loyal to them (a variety of Stockholm syndrome) and may not even identify themselves as victims. Frequently perpetrators employ a combination of abusive methods, including torture, to assert and maintain control over their victims (Perilla, 1999). Experts in the domestic violence field use the concepts of power and control and the cycle of violence to understand the phenomenon. Like perpetrators of domestic violence, traffickers use violence and deception to gain complete control over their victims. These tactics often result in self-blame and learned helplessness on the part of the victim, making it even less likely that victims will seek help or accept it if it should become available (Hopper, 2004). Exposure to chronic trauma can cause depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which also affect a victim’s ability to seek help. “A trafficking victim who is experiencing symptoms such as decision-making problems, lack of energy, hopelessness, and feelings of guilt is unlikely to mobilize the resources needed to escape a trafficking situation” (Hopper, 2004, p. 130).

Macro consequences of trafficking for receiving countries include strengthening the hand of organized crime, which can put the overall security of the society at risk. The enormous profit from human trafficking ends up fueling other criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and document forgery (US DOS, 2006). In areas around the globe where organized crime continues to operate successfully, governments are weakened and the rule of law undermined, affecting the social order in those nations in particular and the global society as well.

Orderly and legal immigration may be threatened, and trafficking can feed popular anxieties about immigration and foreigners. It also may deprive sending nations of vital human capital that could be used to spur economic development. In many countries, such as Thailand, trafficking has resulted in a large illegal economy that is well integrated into the country’s power structure. This integration fuels corruption and results
in the government having little interest in controlling trafficking (Phongpchai, Piriyarangsant, & Treerat, 1999). With large pools of illegal workers willing to take low-end jobs in an economy, trafficking may block efforts to improve wages and working conditions.

Global Response to Human Trafficking

Although human trafficking is not a new problem, the dynamics of globalization are fueling its growth. Preventing the occurrence of human trafficking and remedying its many harms requires a global and regional coalition of countries and nongovernmental organizations. Such a coalition has only recently taken shape, but it is in the process of developing roles and responsibilities and creating organizational infrastructures so that its members may work both collaboratively and unilaterally. The global effort to combat human trafficking is organized around prevention, prosecution, and protection (UNODC, 2006).

Sending countries are the focal point of prevention strategies. Economic development, with a special emphasis on women and girls, constitutes perhaps the best long-term approach to combating human trafficking. At the same time, there is a great need for educational outreach programs to alert individuals and communities to the ploys traffickers use and the dangers of being trafficked. Like AIDS education, anti-human trafficking education must be offered repeatedly if it is to have lasting effect.

Prosecution of traffickers also has a strong prevention aspect. Breaking up trafficking networks and imprisoning traffickers stops the recruitment and movement of trafficked persons. Unfortunately, it has been the most difficult of the three strategies to develop and implement (UNODC, 2006). In countries with weak legal systems and corrupt police and courts, investigation of human traffickers is a rare occurrence, and conviction even rarer. Even in countries where the environment for investigation, prosecution, and conviction is favorable, the results have been disappointing. Between 2001 and 2005, the United States successfully convicted only 138 human traffickers (US DOJ, 2006).
Protection first requires identification of victims. As noted previously, police, immigration officers, social workers, and health care workers require training on how to identify victims of trafficking. Because trafficked victims often find themselves residing illegally in a foreign country, efforts have been undertaken to avoid treating them as illegal immigrants. In the past, it was not uncommon for trafficked victims to be placed in immigration detention centers and then deported. Currently, efforts are being made to place trafficked victims in nondetention facilities. The harms of trafficking further require that the mental health and health care needs of trafficked victims be attended to, and that psycho-educational programs be constructed to offer them occupational skills to rebuild their lives.

Implications for Social Work

Social workers are required by globalization to widen their focus from local and national perspectives, to a worldview that includes global issues such as human trafficking. Trafficking in humans is such an egregious violation of human rights that our professional code of ethics compels us to confront the problem, not only by tending to the victims of trafficking in our communities, but also by working to stop trafficking from occurring in the first place. Social workers must advocate for use of this country's resources and policies in ways that can complement and expand the capacity of countries around the world to counter human trafficking. Moreover, social workers can advocate for women and children by tapping the resources and strengths of the international social work community; by doing so, they help address the problem of human trafficking on multiple fronts. This advocacy requires, at a minimum, establishing and strengthening international collaboration among victim advocates working in the field. Ideally, it entails coordination of policies and services among sending and receiving countries to better aid victims of human trafficking.
References


Globalization and Social Work Education and Practice: Exploring Australian Practitioners’ Views

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The process of globalization is a controversial movement supported by some due to the potential cross-national benefits, but criticized by others because of the fragmented or uneven distribution of those benefits. As many social workers interact with clients who may be affected by globalization processes, we were interested to investigate their educational preparedness and practice views on this topic. Sixty-six social workers completed a questionnaire which explored the relationship between local and international issues. Practitioner responses indicated a strong interest in the topic and widespread agreement that there is a link between local and global issues on clients in their daily practice. Also, while there was a diversity of opinion on educational preparedness for global practice, practitioner responses again indicated general agreement that ongoing education would be useful. The paper concludes with some suggestions to further enhance the knowledge and education of social workers for global practice.

Keywords: Globalization, Global Social Work Practice, Global Social Work Education

Introduction

Interest in the global dimensions of social work practice
has been renewed in the literature recently, with discussions regarding both the positive benefits of cross-national collaboration between social workers as well as the often negative effect globalization processes can have on people’s health and welfare. (Phillips 2004; Healy, 2001; Hokenstad & Midgley, 1997; Kondrat & Ramanathan, 1996). Some of the recent significant global welfare issues which social work might be involved in include the globalization of children’s rights, especially in relation to child abuse and pornography. Similarly, the social impact of global viruses such as HIV/AIDS and the respiratory syndrome SARS, the job impact of multi-country Free Trade Agreements, and the precarious welfare of international refugees and asylum seekers, are other important areas where social workers might be involved in dealing with the local consequences of global changes.

The underlying process affecting these pervasive changes is typically referred to as ‘globalization’ and in simple terms means the increasing interaction and interdependence of world society (Giddens 1993). That is, there is a more rapid flow of money, ideas, technology, and practices between nations. A major driver of this advance is the development of sophisticated global technology, such as the computer based internet, and users ranging from large trans-national corporations through to individuals are utilising this technology to participate in global activities. The changes brought about by this rapid flow of technology, ideas and practices can have a direct effect on the well-being of local citizens in those countries, and in this respect is of direct interest to social workers.

Some argue that if social workers are to practice effectively in the twenty-first century then social work practice itself needs to be conceptualised beyond the confines of the nation-state, as influences located outside this realm are increasingly being acknowledged as having some influence on local issues (Healy 2001; Ife 2000; Midgley 2001; Hare (2004); Abram, Slosar & Walls 2005). Thus, practitioners operating in local, national or international contexts should be fully trained to understand these interactive effects to be able to practice effectively and make a difference (Asamoah, Healy & Mayadas, 1997; Midgley, 2000). Since research indicates that educational content on the global dimensions of social work is limited in social work
curricula (Johnson 1996; Boulet, 2001; Healy, 2001), and since this globalization topic is growing rapidly in public awareness, it is timely to investigate the degree to which social workers in Australia are aware of global influences on their practice, and whether they believe they are appropriately trained to deal with this global phenomenon. This paper reports on a survey of social workers in Australia regarding their self-reported awareness of globalization and their educational preparedness for global social work, and what further global practice educational needs they may have.

Globalization and Social Work Practice and Education

While 'globalization' generally is a burgeoning topic, only three studies specifically on social workers' practice perceptions of globalization were found, and only one of these specifically addressed education for practice in a comprehensive manner. One study surveyed social workers (n=25) affiliated with the International Federation of Social Work (IFSW) (Rowe, Hanley, Moreno & Mould, 2000). This qualitative study primarily explored what globalization meant to social workers and how they saw it affecting their practice. The sample however was derived from an international social work organisation database, and therefore respondents were likely to be more familiar with international issues. The results were predominantly substantive descriptions of day-to-day practice with high-risk groups such as asylum seekers and dislocated low income and HIV clients, often from developing economies, and the practitioners were effusive in their analysis of the link between global changes and their clients’ problems (Rowe et al., 2000). The respondents were adamant that the globalized experiences for their clients were mostly negative, and that globalization failed to address the consequences of the resultant imbalance in power and resources. They suggested social work needs to look beyond the traditional micro/macro dichotomy and work to address the negative impacts of globalization.

Compared to this study where the social workers were already well informed on international issues, the other two studies found that the social workers interviewed had a limited understanding of the implications of the relationship between
local and global issues. Dominelli's (2001) study of 179 social
workers in Britain via a postal questionnaire, found that social
workers had limited insight regarding the broader structural
influences of globalization processes on social work practice
at the local level. While she found social workers were pes-
simistic about the shifts in practice toward commercialisation
and contracting out, she argues there can also be some posi-
tives to globalization as well, such as the greater cross-cultural
exposure of British social workers, and their enhanced under-
standing and skills to deal with international social problems.
Kondrat & Ramanathan's (1996) study of 130 American social
workers also found a strong interest in global matters among
social workers and a desire to learn more about it. However,
they say more research on the topic is needed because their
study was the first in the literature to empirically investigate
social workers' practice perceptions and educational needs in
relation to globalization.

Despite the high interest in the topic, Kondrat & Ramanathan
(1996) found social workers' awareness of the perceived global
dimension of their practice was only low to moderate. The
social worker's understanding of the impact of globalization
on their practice was related to a range of variables such as
the frequency of working with people from culturally and lin-
guistically diverse backgrounds, especially immigrants and
refugees. Their study also included qualitative data which
indicated that practice setting and beliefs about the focus of
social work affected their perceptions of the relevance of glo-
balization to social work. For example, practitioners indicated
that their work settings constrained their macro-level under-
standings as they were often too busy dealing with the day-to-
day issues of clients to worry about global policies. This point
has also been made in relation to practice in Australia (Hil,
2001). The authors concluded that overall the majority of re-
pondents in this exploratory study reported little awareness
of how global issues impact domestic practice, and they sug-
gested more training needs to be offered to workers in all fields
of practice to increase their sensitivity to the link between local
and global issues.
The Research Question

Australia currently has no empirical data on the state of this practitioner knowledge and thus the aim of this research follows on directly from the above studies by investigating Australian social workers’ perceptions of globalization, with a particular focus on how that perception has been affected by social work education. That is, are Australian social work practitioners able to see the links between local and global issues in their day-to-day practice, and how this ability is influenced by previous education? Thus the key research questions were: (1) What are social workers’ perceptions of their awareness of globalization, (2) Has social work education assisted that global understanding, and (3) what future learning needs might be identified in relation to this topic. Similar to Kondrat & Ramanathan’s study, this is the first known empirical study of this topic with social workers in Australia. The study has considerable limitations, as outlined below, and so these findings cannot be generalised to the Australian social work population, however the results are significant in that they contribute to a beginning Australian knowledge in this area.

Sample Selection and Data

A convenience sampling method was used for this exploratory study whereby, despite targeting a few agencies such as migration centres, where international clients might be, overall distribution was to a general range of local welfare agencies. A questionnaire, pilot-tested and developed from the previous studies using the same type of Likert-response format, was distributed via two methods. First, senior social workers from varying fields of practice in Victoria kindly distributed questionnaires to fellow social workers within their organisation. Second, questionnaires were also distributed at the Australian Association of Social Work’s (AASW) 2003 national conference in order to gather views of practitioners who worked in other localities. A total of 205 questionnaires were distributed and 66 completed and usable questionnaires were returned. Considering the moderate response rate (32%), and that most respondents (80-90%) indicated they had a personal interest in international and global issues, it is possible that people with
such interests are over represented in this exploratory study.

As stated above, respondents selected a number from a five-point Likert-style level of agreement with a number of statements concerning globalization where the number 1 indicated low level of agreement and 5 was a very high level of agreement. Some respondents had pointed out in pilot testing that, for example, the response category ‘Agree’ conveyed the sense that they agreed all the time whereas this was the case most of the time but not all the time. This category was then changed to ‘Partly Agree’ and other category names were also changed in a similar manner to reflect this difference in respondents’ meanings. The resultant ordinal level data were analysed using SPSS V10 to produce mainly descriptive statistics as shown below. Some variables were cross tabulated to draw out differences in respondents and Spearman’s non-parametric correlation analysis was undertaken when looking for associations, and overlap, between variables.

Profile of Respondents

A range of socio-demographic characteristics of respondents were collected as well as a number of practice-related indicators. As shown in Table 1, eighty-six percent of the sample was female, with nearly three quarters born in Australia. The median age was 44 years (Mean: 43 years, SD: 10.6 years), and the number of years these respondents had been practising ranged between 1 and 40 years (Mean: 15, SD: 10.5).

Table 1: Social Worker sample characteristics (n = 66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Variable</th>
<th>Respondents (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Birth: Australia</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group (Years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 and over</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years as Social Worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 years and over</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These basic demographic characteristics are somewhat similar to the Australian Social Work population as reported by McCormack (2001), although this sample is a little older, with more years or experience. The social workers came from a variety of fields of practice, although as part of the small component of purposive sampling, there were slightly more social workers working in income support and migration. However, only one in five of the social workers had a client base where the clear majority of their service users were from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds. Two thirds worked in the urban / metropolitan region and the remainder in rural or other areas, and half were employed by government with another quarter employed in the Health sector. Again, just over a half worked in direct individualised practice, and a quarter were in management or policy. In terms of international exposure, a large ninety two percent of the social workers had travelled overseas, and half of those had lived abroad for six months or more. Generally speaking then this sample of social workers is a mature and experienced group of workers.

Results

Social Work Awareness of Globalization, and its practice impact

Three questions measured social workers' perceptions of their awareness of 'globalization', as detailed in Table 2. The first asked respondents with what ease they were able to identify a relationship between global issues and local practice, and the second asked the same in respect to global policies and Australia's national policies. The third question aimed to find out with what ease respondents were able to see the impact of Australia's national policies on some people from other countries. Results of the first question indicated that about 86% partly or totally agreed with the statement, indicating a high level of awareness. However, only about four in ten (37.9%) could state definitively that this relationship was always clearly observable. That is, about six in ten of the respondents (62.1%) believed they experienced some difficulty making this link in all situations.

This proportional response pattern of high levels of awareness but not at all times was fairly consistent across the three
questions, although on questions two and three, the percent that were unsure was slightly higher.

The next important practice-related question asked whether globalization had an impact on the people the social workers work with, and again the answers resulted in a very high positive response of part or total agreement. However, as in the previous questions, only about four in ten of the social workers (39.7%) totally agreed with the statement. Nil respondents indicated that globalization processes had no impact on the clients and community they work with, and five percent of respondents were unsure of the impact globalization has on their clients and community.

Table 2: Respondent's level of agreement with statements about their own perceptions of the link between local and global issues %
(n = 66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Totally Disagree</th>
<th>Partly Disagree</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Partly Agree</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easy to see impact global issues have on local practice and local issues</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy to identify relationship between global policies and Australia's national policies</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy to see how Australia's national policies influence the lives of some people in other countries</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were able to add some qualitative comments to the above practice-related questions but unfortunately only a small number of the respondents provided examples of globalization. The most common example given in relation to the whether respondents' were able to identify how Australia's national policies affect some people in other countries were Australia's immigration policies. Some also mentioned Australia's trade related policies, in particular international trade policies, as having an effect on people living in
Exploring Australian Practitioners' Views

Australia. A couple of social workers also referred to the globalization of culture in relation to the negative influence they saw it having on some people's mental health, however no other details were provided. Some of the respondents also saw and commented on the positive side of globalization. They commented on improved international collaboration between colleagues as being facilitated by globalization, and also transnational sharing of knowledge and information. Overall, from the questions above, social workers self-reported awareness of globalization appears fairly high at a general level, however that awareness is much lower in terms of articulated and easily observable specific policy impacts.

Three further questions elicited social work practitioners' opinions regarding how relevant they believed a global perspective is to social work practice. These questions were as follows: 'How relevant do you think global issues are to your field of practice?'; 'Do you think that social work, as a profession, has a role to play in dealing with global issues?'; and; 'How often do you use global policies to inform your practice?' Eighty-six percent of respondents indicated that global issues were either fairly relevant or extremely relevant with 45% in the latter category. The remaining 14% were either unsure (7.6%), did not think global issues were very relevant (4.5%), or felt that global issues were not at all relevant to their field of practice (1.5%).

This response pattern, as in the previous questions, shows that while a large proportion agree generally, less than half (45.5%) of the respondents agreed on the relevance of globalization unequivocally.

Responses to the next question on the social work profession's involvement showed that one hundred percent of all respondents believe the social work profession has a role to play in dealing with global issues. Two-thirds (67%) agreed strongly, and one third partly agreed. However, although some respondents cited activities such as advocacy, activism, lobbying governments, and community development, specific details as to how this meshed with a global perspective or what the specific role of the social work profession might actually be was not explicit. A further 'relevance' question asked social workers how often they used global policies to
inform their practice. Examples of global policies provided to the respondents included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The results on this question had a greater spread than previous questions. Approximately ninety percent agreed that they used these policies at some time to inform their practice, however about half of these respondents (43.9%) used the policies only 'occasionally', and the other half (46.9%) used them 'regularly' or 'always'. Only nine percent stated they never used such policies.

One would expect however that all social workers would 'innately' use these types of policies all the time, as they accord with basic core practice values, and the fact that some respondents said they did not use them might just be a methodological naming issue. That is, the social workers do use this type of policy but identify its source as a local rather than international or global policy. Nevertheless, the fact that less than half of the social workers regularly use these global policies contrasts somewhat with the high levels of general awareness and relevance stated in sections one and two above.

Individual Factors and Globalization

The survey asked some other questions aimed at drawing out individual's interest and commitment to globalization and global practice. One question asked respondents whether they had a personal interest in international and global issues. The majority of respondents (87.7%) indicated that this was the case, although only 35.4% stated they had a high personal interest in the topic. Just over half (52.3%) of the respondents reported they had 'some' personal interest. As a further measure of interest and commitment to the issue of globalization the survey also asked respondents whether they considered themselves to be 'global citizens'. The majority of respondents (82.8%) indicated quite clearly that they would identify themselves as global citizens.

These personal identification responses, which are very positive about globalization, are similar to the overall positive pattern shown above on the awareness and relevance
questions. In fact, Spearman’s correlation coefficients for all
the above variables shows reasonably high and positive asso-
ciations between all these questions, indicating some overlap
in that they are all tapping into the same positive view of glo-
balization which most of the social workers in this sample
espouse. In an effort to see whether there were any differences
in this somewhat homogenous group of respondents we also
briefly analysed the responses of the nine social workers who
said they disagreed that it was easy to see the impact of global
policies on local issues.

This group of nine were not social workers that had no in-
terest in globalization. They all agreed, for example that the
social work profession has a role to play in global matters, that
Australia’s policies could affect people in other countries, and
the majority considered themselves ‘global citizens’. However,
compared to the aggregated percentage responses, they were
consistently less likely to respond in the positive response cat-
egories. For example, they thought globalization was less rel-
levant to their clients or field of practice than the remainder
of the respondents. Socio-demographically, this ‘less global’
group was more likely to be male, either younger (under 35
years) or older (over 53 years), working with individuals and
families, and had travelled abroad but not lived abroad. These
differences were not tested for statistical significance due to
the large disparity in numbers between the two groups, and
are presented from this exploratory study merely as examples
where some further research may occur.

Educational Content and Preparedness for Global Social Work
Practice

In line with the other major focus of this paper, we were in-
terested in whether the basic social work training in Australia,
i.e., the Bachelor of Social Work (BSW) degree, educated social
workers so that they were prepared and able to understand
this globalization phenomenon. One fifth of the sample rated
other degrees they had completed so only those who rated
the BSW are reported here. Table 3 illustrates the spread of re-
sponses, with sixty percent agreeing that the BSW had a posi-
tive impact on their globalization preparedness. Conversely,
approximately thirty seven percent did not think the BSW had
prepared them to understand globalization. A small number of respondents provided some narrative comments, predominantly from those who positively rated the BSW, and these comments indicated that some BSW subjects (not named) specifically raised global and international social work issues, and that sociology subjects contributed to the respondents understanding of global interdependence as well.

Table 3: Level of agreement that BSW Educational preparation assisted globalization understanding, and importance of Global content %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSW degree prepared me to understand local - global links in my practice</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Content important in undergrad BSW</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global content important in post-grad Education</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In relation to global content in the under-graduate BSW and at the post-graduate level as well, the responses in Table 3 are fairly positive that it is important and should be included. There were however small numbers who disagreed and slightly more who were unsure. Slightly more emphasis was placed on its importance for undergraduate education. Teasing out what the content of that global education should be is a task for further work, however theoretical perspectives are currently taught in all BSW courses and respondents were asked which perspective they preferred and was more relevant to global social work practice. Respondents could nominate up to three preferences, and Table 4 reports the findings.

Sixty-one respondents indicated at least one theory or perspective, and it is clear that Systems theory was by far the most preferred. This Systems preference result holds when all preferences were accumulated. Other theories, particularly feminist and structural, were also well represented, and, like Systems
Table 4: Preferred Practice Theory or Perspective for Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Interdependence Theories</th>
<th>First Preference</th>
<th>Total of top 3 Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems theory</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist theories</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural social work theory</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological systems theory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical theory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27 (n=61)</td>
<td>58 (n=155)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

theory, these two are easily applied to a macro perspective. There was no prompting in this question and those theories listed above were the only ones identified.

Other Educational Sources for Globalization

Social workers were also asked whether they had participated in other educational activities which assisted understanding of globalization, and if so, were asked to rate these out of ten, with one being equal to the educational activity making a negligible contribution to their global understanding, and 10 being equal to a great contribution. The findings are detailed in Table 5. Overall, ninety-four percent of respondents indicated that they had participated in one or more other educational activities that had prepared them to understand the relationship between local and global issues.

The single categories that were rated by the largest number of respondents were journals, conferences, and workshops. However, the educational mediums that were rated as making the highest contribution to the respondent’s globalization understanding were ‘other’ and ‘media’. Unfortunately only a couple of respondents commented on the category ‘other’, saying for example, that working with refugees had made a strong contribution to their understandings of the local-global nexus. One person stated that certain international
Table 5: Level of contribution various other educational mediums made to respondents' understandings of the effects of globalization on social work practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Medium</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
<th>Low to Moderate Contribution (1-5)</th>
<th>Moderate to High Contribution (6-10)</th>
<th>Minimum rating</th>
<th>Maximum rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journals (n=55)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences (n=52)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops (n=46)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media (n=15)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (n=24)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

organisations such as the Red Cross, or Amnesty International or Greenpeace did this, and another respondent referred to travelling and private reading. Some people chose to identify specific types of media in this section with references to various internet sites, documentaries, and certain radio programs.

Practitioners' Interest in Learning More about Global Issues Relevant to their Field of Practice

Looking to the future, respondents were asked whether they were interested in learning more about global issues for their field of practice. Respondents were indeed interested in learning more about how global issues are relevant to their field of practice as Table 6 shows. A total of near 80% are interested in further learning, with half (51%) indicating that they were very interested, and a quarter (27%) extremely interested.

Table 6: Practitioners' interest in learning more about global issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Not at all interested</th>
<th>Not very interested</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Very interested</th>
<th>Extremely interested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Want to learn more about global issues</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, fifteen percent were unsure and the remaining 6% were not at all interested. A small number of respondents indicated in the comments section that they would only be interested if such education was relevant to their practice, and should count for CPE (Continuing Professional Education) points.

Discussion

This preliminary study, which is the first empirical investigation of globalization and social work in Australia, shows a small selected group of Australian social workers to be highly aware of the process of globalization and its impact on their clients. These practitioners also think globalization is relevant to their particular fields of practice, and that the profession of social work has a role to play in dealing with global issues. However, the social workers were much less likely to say they use specific global policies to consistently inform their practice. Also, when one looks at the sample in more detail, it appears that there is a group of about one third of the total sample who are unequivocal about their interest, concern and commitment to being involved in this globalization process. This group scored at the high end on all the Likert-type questions.

At the other end of the globalization continuum, this sample also included a much smaller group, just over 10%, who are not quite so enthusiastic or convinced about the relevance and impact of globalization. They are not against the idea of globalization but are less inclined to say the relationships between local and global issues are easily observable. The remainder of the sample is a fairly big group in the middle, i.e. about 50% of the total group, who certainly are interested in the topic and want to be involved with it because they can see it affects their clients. They are however, more equivocal as to the ease with which local and global issues can be observed and worked on.

These findings are both similar to and somewhat different from the study by Kondrat & Ramanathan (1996), from which this study drew considerable insight and replicated some of the questions. Their study of American field educators found only low to moderate awareness and knowledge of globalization
compared to the generally high levels found here. However, when we disaggregate our results to the three groups identified above, we also see a much lower level of awareness and relevance in social workers’ perceptions of globalization, similar to Kondrat & Ramanathan’s low to moderate knowledge group. As stated above, there is a much larger group in Australia, around 50% of this sample who want or need enhanced information to appreciate the finer, less obvious specific relationships and impact of globalization on social work practice. It should be noted that the study by Kondrat & Ramanathan (1996) was carried out at least ten years ago and this temporal difference would account for some of the difference in sample responses, especially as the concept of globalization has grown so much recently.

Despite our attempt to gain more qualitative information from respondents, our study did not provide the expansive explanations behind the self-reported globalization ratings that we see in the Rowe et al (2000) study. That study illustrated many situations where social workers are exposed to globally-linked problems and the resultant inequities, such as the excess of tobacco products, the lack of life-saving pharmaceuticals, and so on. This is an important limitation of this study because those responses are needed to expand on important issues such as what the role of the social work profession might be in working on global issues. This qualitative data would also provide more explanation and examples that might not only deepen our understanding of the issue, but also provide information that could be used for further education of that fairly large group of social workers who have difficulty consistently identifying the local to global links.

In terms of social work education, practitioners expressed a wide range of preparedness from their BSW in terms of assisting them to understand and work with global issues. This is consistent with previous research findings that social work curricular has a limited focus on how global issues affect local issues and what the social work response to such issues should be (Boulet, 2001; Healy, 2001). This investigation revealed that these social workers gathered information on the effect of globalization processes on local practice from a range of other sources, especially the media. If understanding the local-global
nexus is necessary for effective social work practice, these results suggest that additional education in this area may need to be reviewed in formal social work courses, and as part of ongoing professional development.

In terms of educational content relevant to global social work, other research points out that macro social work theory facilitates conceptualisation of the link between local and global issues (Ramanthan & Link, 1999). Almost half of the respondents in the sample here (40%) indicated that their preferred approaches to practice included one or more of the more macro oriented theories. The theories identified by the social workers in this sample included: systems theory, feminist theories, and structural social work. While many respondents preferred one or more of these theories, the results indicated that many practitioners still experienced some difficulty identifying the link between local and global issues. Further education using for example Gidden’s (1993) World Systems Theory, as well as reviewing how existing social work theory applies in a global context, might be appropriate. Similarly, social policy subjects may be an ideal student forum where ‘global social policy’ could be highlighted through a focus on for example international poverty reduction programs that have a common goal but recognise cultural differences. That is, curriculum would be aimed at enhancing ethno-relativism as distinct from assuming the dominant culture and its values are the ethnocentric single standard against which the merits of other groups or countries are made.

Despite current social work curricula being somewhat deficient in global practice, this does not appear to equate with lack of interest in the topic. Nearly 80% of the respondents indicated that they were interested in further participating in globally oriented CPE. These results were similar to Kondrat & Ramanathan (1996) in that 85.4% of respondents, who were social work field educators, indicated that they would attend CPE on global issues. Current students’ interest in these aspects of social work is relevant to global curriculum development but unfortunately is unknown at this stage of research and could be an area for further investigation. Similarly, as this study cannot be generalized to the broader social work population, it is unknown whether the views of other social workers are
similar to those surveyed in this research. This study also did not investigate what educational content these social workers might consider relevant to their field of practice. Such issues would be worth researching if education is to be designed in response to such interest.

If institutions that provide social work education wish to cater to future social worker students' interests, perhaps social work programs could supply education in accordance with student demand. If it is not possible to include international content in every social work program, perhaps one or a group of institutions could create a distance education course, delivered via the Internet. This could avoid some of the barriers to including such education in the already crowded curriculum. Students could gain access to such knowledge without having to attend the institution physically, and even cross-institutional enrolment could be an educational partnership model worth considering.

If globalization processes do affect social work practice in domestic contexts, it is reasonable to suggest that some integration of content on the local-global nexus be included in social work curricula. Furthermore, if education for the global dimensions of social work is considered necessary for effective practice locally perhaps the AASW could consider such content when reviewing course accreditation policies as Asamoah et al, 1997, and Cox, 2000 suggest. Also, perhaps the global standards for social work education (IASSW, 2002) devised by the International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) and IFSW could inform the AASW's approach to this. As Ife said, 'No longer can we think globally and act locally, but rather it has become necessary to think and act at both local and global levels, and to link the two (Ife, 2000:62). This study has established an exploratory baseline to assess whether Australian social workers are able to link local with global issues and, if educational opportunities as outlined above are developed, this study will also enable us to see the progress Australian social work as a profession is making in this important area.
References


Toward Global Welfare State Convergence?: Family Policy and Health Care in Sweden, Canada and the United States

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Accounts of the welfare state and the dynamics governing its development have been pivotal and highly contentious in the social policy literature over the past few decades. Since the 1980s, research has suggested that, as a result of domestic pressures and strains and/or the impact of globalization, welfare states were declining in tandem. However, most of these studies were quantitative, focusing upon 18 or more advanced capitalist nations and, in their search to uncover broad cross-national trends, utilized narrow welfare state indicators. This study investigates the extent to which the social democratic welfare state in Sweden, the social liberal welfare state in Canada, and the liberal welfare state in the United States have converged. It takes a qualitative approach, examining the character of the income security and social service programs in two broad policy domains—family policy and health care—and concludes that the welfare states in the three nations remain distinct, while acknowledging some broadly similar trends and new developments.

Keywords: convergence, globalization, policy domains, programmatic and structural change, crisis, family policy, health care policy, income security/maintenance, social services

Introduction

Accounts of the welfare state and the dynamics governing its development have been pivotal and highly

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contentious in the social policy literature over the past few decades. In the 1980s numerous studies from across the political spectrum declared that they were everywhere in crisis, beset by new unrelenting pressures and constraints which would ultimately lead to their demise. Subsequent research, however, disputed these bleak accounts of inevitable cross-national convergence, highlighting significant variation in the face of widespread and broadly similar cutbacks and reforms (cf. e.g., Alber, 1988; Mishra 1984; O'Connor, 1973).

Since the 1990s the focus has shifted toward the impact of global integration, but the debate has been very similar. Studies describing or predicting a cross-national race-to-the-bottom suggested that increasingly permeable borders in the spheres of commerce, production and finance have set increasingly stringent limits on state autonomy and national policy options, whatever the nature of domestic public opinion or political stripe of incumbent governments (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Fulcher, 1994; Gilbert, 2002; Goodman and Pauly, 1993; Mishra, 1999). But the conclusions of these studies have also been challenged. Some researchers were skeptical of the globalization thesis itself, noting that most developed welfare states have often been found in nations, such as the Nordic lands, with the most open borders because comprehensive networks of social policies can greatly minimize economic uncertainty and socio-political instability (Cameron, 1978; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Rodrik, 1998). Others largely accepted the idea of a downward pressure exerted by economic integration but argued that the forces of globalization are refracted through very different conditions, institutions, and historical traditions across nations, rendering welfare states more or less vulnerable to these forces and preventing any form of meaningful convergence (cf. Bradley et al., 2005; Castles, 2004; Huber and Stephens, 2001: Navarro et al., 2004; Olsen, 2002; Swank, 2002).

Despite their varying conclusions, most studies addressing the fate of welfare states to date have been quantitative, utilizing large aggregate data sets and narrow welfare-state indicators amenable to statistical analysis, such as levels of social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, replacement rate levels for major transfer programs, or public employment as a
percentage of total employment. Although they have proven invaluable, these studies are limited by their restricted range of indicators. As often pointed out, a higher level of social welfare spending in a nation does not necessarily indicate greater welfare commitment; rather, it might simply reflect greater need spurred by higher levels of unemployment, population aging, or increases in the costs of program delivery. Moreover, the inclusion of 18 or more nations in most of these studies precludes a close examination of the general character of welfare states, including their commitment to social equality and social justice, and some their key social policy components, such as social services. In response, this study provides a close, qualitative account of two central social policy domains in each of three nations with different policy approaches—Sweden, Canada and the United States.

The U.S. welfare state has often been characterized as rudimentary. It is the quintessential liberal “social safety net,” providing a relatively restricted range of social protections and services, meagre income benefits, and few programs as a right of citizenship or residence. The restricted nature of the U.S. welfare state reflects a commitment to a narrow conception of equal opportunity, a negative expression of liberty—freedom from the state—and limited government, helping to explain its higher levels of poverty and smaller middle class (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Olsen, 2002).

Sweden’s welfare state, in contrast, has often been heralded (or condemned) as archetypal, the apex of social policy evolution to date. Categorized as institutional, social democratic and encompassing, it covers a wider range of social contingencies than most nations and provides generous social transfers and a dense network of high quality social services. And many of the benefits it furnishes are provided as a right (or a proto-right) to all permanent residents. Its relatively large middle class, longstanding concern with full employment and the elimination of poverty, and broad range of “family-friendly” and “women-friendly” social programs reflect a greater commitment to equality of condition and freedom for the state.

Although often classified with its U.S. counterpart, the Canadian welfare state has been characterized as “social liberal,” reflecting a greater commitment to state intervention
and lower levels of inequality. Canada’s welfare state also provides more universal social program entitlements, and more comprehensive risk coverage. And while Canadian transfer programs have been less generous than those in most of Europe, they have typically been more supportive than those in the U.S. (Olsen, 2002, 1994; Olsen and Brym, 1996).

Welfare states are comprised of a comprehensive network of protective legislation, income transfers and social services across a wide range of policy domains. It would be virtually impossible to determine if there has been a convergence across welfare states, even if the focus is upon only these three nations. Therefore, this study focuses on the central income transfer programs and social services in two central policy areas—family policy and health care policy. It is argued that, despite some notable changes and trends in all three nations, the character of their welfare states has remained distinct in these policy domains.

Family Policy

Family policy is a broad, encompassing area that is not as clearly demarcated as other policy domains, especially in Sweden where it has been very closely linked to labor market and gender equality policy. Family policy typologies have tended to place Sweden in a “pro-egalitarian” category. Swedish policies have sought to create greater opportunities for women to enter and remain in the labor force and to reconstruct traditional gender roles by, for example, encouraging men to play a larger role in childcare. While the family policy approaches in the U.S. and Canada are more noted for their “gender neutral” approach and for targeting poor families, there are also important differences between these two North American nations (Gauthier 1996; Ergas, 1990). Although Sweden provides a much wider range of supports for families than Canada and the U.S., the discussion here will be largely limited to the two central family policy transfers—family allowances and maternity/parental leaves—and one key social service, childcare.

Income Security I: Family Allowances

Family allowances are among the most important income
transfers provided to households with children. They provide a basic income supplement to all families with children (typically under 16 years of age). Sweden's universal, flat-rate, tax-exempt allowance provides benefits which have been among the most generous in the advanced capitalist world since it was introduced in 1948. The per-child monthly benefit level was lowered in 1996 from 750 SEK ($US 109) to 640 SEK (US $93), but was raised again to 950 SEK ($US 138) in 2001. Families are also entitled to an extended allowance for children who turn 16, provided that they are still in school (until they complete their secondary education) as well as several other allowances for children who require special care.

Canada implemented its universal family allowance system in 1944, but benefit levels were comparatively low, encouraging a reliance upon supplementary means-tested transfer programs and other fiscal measures. Moreover, Canada's family allowance benefits were de-indexed in the 1980s, abolished in 1992 and replaced by a refundable tax credit, the Child Tax Benefit (CTB) the following year. This development marked the end of universal income benefits and an increasing reliance upon fiscal measures in Canada (Myles 1998).

Virtually alone in the advanced capitalist world, the U.S. has never provided a universal family allowance program, relying instead upon targeted, means-tested programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a central and long-standing measure that was replaced with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program (TANF) in 1996. However, unlike AFDC, TANF is not an entitlement available to all who meet eligibility requirements, and it has a maximum five-year, lifetime limit. The most central means of assistance in the U.S. today is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), but it only assists the working poor and requires a tax form to determine eligibility (Goldberg, 2001; Karger, 2003). Thus, unlike Sweden, where family allowances actually have been improved, the programs in Canada and U.S. have become less inclusive and support levels have deteriorated for many recipients.

Income Security II: Maternity/Parental Leave Programs

Programs which enable parents to stay at home to care for young children are another central income security
component of family policy. Sweden, a pioneer and leader in this policy area, has provided support for mothers via state subsidies to voluntary sickness societies since 1891. In 1900 a new *Workers Protection Act* ensured that women did not have to return to factory work for four weeks (extended to six in 1912) after giving birth and the nation's first *paid* maternity insurance scheme was introduced in 1931. Although it provided modest economic support for new working mothers at first, it became increasingly generous over the ensuing years. By 1974 it was converted from a maternity leave program into a parental leave program, and both the benefit period and the income replacement levels were incrementally raised over the next two decades.

Today Sweden's parental leave program is extremely generous by international standards, providing income support for 16 months. Each parent must take at least two months of leave and the remaining months can be shared between both parents as they see fit. Parents receive an income replacement rate of 80% for the first thirteen months of leave and a flat-rate for the last three months. Parents without any income receive the flat-rate for the entire 16-month period. All parents are also entitled to an additional three months of unpaid leave. Moreover, they are free to take the benefit at any time before the child's eighth birthday. Universal paternity leaves are also provided in Sweden, entitling fathers to ten days of paid leave (at 80%) after the birth or adoption of each child to allow them to share in the care of new family members.

While space limitations prevent an examination of several related Swedish programs, three other entitlements should be acknowledged here: (1) a "pregnancy benefit" paid to expectant mothers with physically demanding jobs so they do not have to work; (2) ten paid "contact days" per child, per year, allowing parental involvement in their child's daycare or elementary school activities, and (3) up to 60 days per child, per year of "sickness benefits" to enable parents to stay home to care for sick children under the age of 12 (or 16 years under special circumstances). Like parental and paternity leaves and other insurance programs in Sweden, all three of these entitlements replace 80% of the recipient's income.

Programs for parents in Canada have not been nearly as
supportive or had as long a history as those in Sweden but they provide considerably more support than those in the U.S. Canada unconventionally introduced its maternity leave program within the framework of its unemployment insurance (UI) scheme in 1971 (1984 for adoptive parents) providing only fifteen weeks of benefits and leaving parents to rely upon other forms of support in the private sector. Because maternity leave has been part of the UI scheme (styled EI, employment insurance, since 1996), income replacement rates have fallen with cuts to this program (currently at 55%, up to a ceiling). However, in 1990 the length of the leave was extended by ten weeks to be shared between mothers and fathers (biological or adoptive) at the same income replacement rate. In 2001 the parental leave period was increased to 35 weeks, a significant program expansion during the period of globalization. And, in Quebec, arguably the nation’s most European and social democratic province, parental leave became somewhat more generous and inclusive in 2006, providing higher earnings replacements, allowing recipients the option to claim higher benefit levels for shorter periods, and extending coverage to the self-employed.

Exceptional again, the U.S. is one of the few developed capitalist nations which does not provide statutory, paid maternity, parental or paternity leave. Twelve weeks of family leave have been available to mothers of newborns or newly adopted children through the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, but this is an unpaid scheme that only applies to employees who meet certain employment conditions and work in firms with 50 or more employees—roughly 46% of the employed population of the United States (OECD, 2001:151). Although the U.S. remains a notable laggard in this policy area, all three nations experienced some program expansion over the past 15 years, but the differences in the character and levels of support remained firm across them.

Family Services: Childcare

The major social service provided in the family policy domain is childcare. Sweden has been actively committed to developing its existing childcare system since 1974. By 1995 all parents who were working or studying were legally
entitled to spaces for their children. Almost 75% of children aged 15 months to 6 years of age receive some form of childcare through the public sector. Most of these children (53%) are enrolled in municipal daycare centers, but some (12%) are cared for in family daycares by municipal childminders or in publicly-subsidized private daycare centers (7%). Although parents pay income-related fees to access Sweden’s public childcare system, it is largely financed through municipal tax revenue and grants from the central government.

Like most public services in Sweden, childcare is administered at the local level by municipal authorities but closely regulated by the central government to ensure that the provision of care is consistent across the nation’s 289 municipalities. Childcare in Sweden is of a uniformly high quality, serviced by highly-educated and well-trained workers. Childcare group sizes are relatively low and have relatively low child-to-staff ratios. And most childcare centers have adequate space, meet high health and safety standards, and have well-developed activities and programs. They also foster close links with parents and have flexible hours to accommodate the need and demands of parents’ work and school schedules.

Again contradicting the suggestions of many globalization/convergence theorists, Sweden’s public childcare system has grown dramatically over the past few decades—a remarkable development given the substantial increase in the number of children born in the early 1990s. Waiting lists have virtually disappeared and the number of spaces provided largely conforms to current needs. Moreover, childcare has become increasingly formal, collectivized, and public, reflecting declines in unpaid and unregulated care, private-sector daycare, and public and private residential/family care. And, while the number of publicly-subsidized private childcare spaces has increased in recent years, most of these have been in parents’ cooperatives, worker cooperatives and other non-profit organizations, a development that does not reflect a marked trend toward privatization or marketization.

Despite this expansion, there were some jarring cutbacks to the Swedish childcare system in the 1990s. For example, some municipal childcare centers moved to smaller, less expensive quarters and/or offered reduced flexibility in their hours of
operation. Larger groups of children enrolled in public daycare and a reduction of personnel increased the average child-to-staff ratio in some childcare centers from 4:1 to 6:1, increasing stress levels among childcare workers. Parental user fees also increased, comprising over 17% of the gross costs of public childcare in Sweden by the end of the 1990s. And, amidst record-high levels of unemployment in the early 1990s, many municipalities (40%) adopted new rules denying childcare spaces to families with an unemployed parent. As in other parts of the Swedish welfare state, central government control over childcare was weakened. Although the national government continued to set goals for the municipalities, decentralization and the abolition of state regulations gave local authorities somewhat greater freedom to decide how to meet those goals, resulting in less uniform provision and costs across the nation (Bergmark, 1997; Palme et al., 2002; Szebehely, 1998). However, the government instituted a maximum fees reform in 1993 to contain the cost of childcare and limit variation across municipalities while respecting their autonomy. It also strengthened the right of the unemployed and those on parental leave to access childcare.

If Sweden's network of universally accessible childcare services best approximates a "maximum public responsibility" childcare model, the approach taken in Canada and the U.S. more closely approximates the "maximum private responsibility" model according to one OECD study (Ergas, 1990). Governments in both of these nations have been reluctant to assume full responsibility for the provision of services; neither of them has introduced national childcare legislation or universal childcare programs. Informal unlicensed, unregulated childcare in its various forms is more widespread in Canada and the U.S. than in most other developed nations. Indeed, private (non-profit and for-profit) fee-for-service childcare programs accessed through the market constitute the major component of formal care in both nations. Parental fees cover most of the childcare costs in these nations. And, various fiscal measures—tax deductions, credits, allowances, exemptions and other forms of relief—are typically utilized to help parents purchase childcare services in the market and to encourage the provision of employer-sponsored care to a significantly greater
degree than they are in Sweden and most other nations.

Childcare in Canada, like the majority of other social ser-

vices, is a provincial/territorial responsibility. But, unlike

healthcare or education, it is not a mandatory service, so the

provinces and territories rarely operate childcare programs or

ensure that they are in place. Coverage rates in formal child-
care settings across age groups are relatively low in Canada,

and there are wide variations in accessibility as well as in the

affordability and quality of childcare centers across the nation.

One prominent counter development in Canada in this area,

however was the creation of a $5-a-day CDN (now $7-a-day)

public childcare program in the province of Quebec which has

been steadily increasing its number of spaces since its intro-
duction in 1997. Outside of Quebec, however, there has been

little evidence of improvement on the Canadian scene. Indeed,

the minority Conservative government that assumed power

in the 2006 federal election scrapped the previous Liberal gov-

erment's plans to establish a universal, accessible child-care

program and instituted a monthly 'Child Care Allowance' of

$100.00 CDN that covers only a small fraction of childcare costs

and does not address the urgent need for more spaces.

Childcare provision in the U.S. is uneven across the states,

but the proportion of children in formal care is greater there

than in Canada. Childcare quality is generally inadequate, in

part due to the low pay provided to child care workers and the

consequent difficulty in recruiting or retaining qualified per-

sonnel. High quality childcare is very costly in the U.S., where

parental fees cover 76% of childcare costs. As in Canada, the

use of the tax system to offset childcare costs to parents has

disproportionately benefitted higher-income earners. Because

fiscal measures do not fund childcare services directly, they do

little to increase access or significantly reduce costs for most

families. Affordable, accessible, regulated childcare that meets

even minimum standards remains in severe shortage in both

Canada and the U.S. (Boushey, et al., 2001; Kamerman, 2000;

OECD, 2001; Prentice, 1999). The situation in these two nations

contrasts markedly with the general expansion that occurred

in Sweden during the same period.
Health Care

Health care is another central social policy pillar and one of the most costly. The health care policy domain includes two broad kinds of measures—sickness insurance, the income security component, and health care, the social services component. The three nations examined here have taken unmistakably different health care approaches. Canada and the U.S. have lagged behind Sweden and most of Europe in this policy area. However, while comparatively late, Canada, unlike the U.S., did mount a national health insurance plan in the 1970s, and many of its provinces had begun to introduce hospitalization and medical care insurance programs much earlier.

**Income Security: Sickness Insurance**

Although much less familiar in the North American context, sickness insurance is a central social insurance program with a long history in many European nations. Sickness insurance provides benefits to ensure financial security for people whose ability to work is reduced due to illness for relatively short periods (after which work injury or disability insurance may apply). Sweden’s universal sickness insurance scheme was established in 1955, replacing the existing state-subsidized, but voluntary sickness fund scheme. It is among the most generous schemes in existence today, providing 80% income replacement levels for those who must take time off from work when they become ill. Moreover, employees do not have to endure the long uncompensated waiting periods common in many other nations. Sickness insurance regulations were repeatedly adjusted in the 1990s, largely at the request of employers who believed the benefits were too easy to access. Since 1998, employees have not received public benefits during the first 14 days of illness but their employers are legally required to provide sickness compensation during this period, except for the first day which, since 1993, is unpaid. Perhaps most remarkably, there has been no formal limit on the duration of the sickness compensation period. However, claimants who are incapacitated for over a year may be considered for a temporary or permanent disability pension. Occupational rehabilitation programs, including assessments, work testing,
and work training and other cash benefits have also been available to those on sick leave. The only significant change to the Swedish sickness insurance scheme was a decrease in income replacement levels from 90% to 80% (in 1993) and then to 75% (in 1996). But, as with UI and parental insurance, benefit levels were returned to 80% in 1998.

Unlike Sweden, Canada has not established a separate sickness insurance program. However, time-limited sickness benefits have been available in Canada since 1971 through its UI program. Of course, this has meant that income replacement rates, the duration of the benefit period, the number of waiting days before compensation begins, and other rules and conditions of Canada's sickness insurance scheme, as with its leave programs, have moved in lockstep with changes to UI. Moreover, unlike UI, sickness benefits have been means-tested in Canada, taking into account certain other income that beneficiaries might be receiving (such as sickness benefits from an occupational plan, for example). Despite these limitations, and a decline in benefit levels, Canadians remain much better off than their counterparts in the U.S., where there has been no national public sickness insurance program. A few states, such as California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, have introduced programs to protect loss of income during illness. But most Americans wishing to have such protection must turn to the private sector, and many simply cannot afford adequate or even any coverage (Kangas 1991; RFV 1999).

Health Care Services

The provision of health care services in Canada, Sweden and the U.S. is even more strikingly different than that of sickness insurance. Of course, at a highly abstract level, the health care services in these three nations look somewhat similar; they all emphasize curative intervention over health promotion. However, the three models differ in the range and quality of the primary and specialty services they furnish, the extent to which they challenge or defer to market forces, their emphasis on prevention, and extent of population coverage. Here we will focus primarily upon the general character of health care services and the way they are financed and delivered in order to contrast the three national models and track recent
Global Convergence in Social Welfare

Sweden has developed what is sometimes referred to as a “national health service” model of care. In many ways it is quite similar to Britain’s more familiar public health care model because both the financing and delivery of health care services are carried out through the public sector. Most Swedish hospitals, local primary care health centers, child and maternity clinics and so on, are publicly-owned and administered. And the great majority of physicians, nurses, midwives, and other health care professionals, and about half of all dentists, are salaried, public sector workers. Comprehensive and high quality primary and specialty health care services are available to all as a right of residence (Holt and Cohn, 1995).

Unlike in Britain, however, the provision of health care in Sweden is highly decentralized, a hallmark of the Swedish welfare state generally. Health care is largely organized on a county basis and is clearly dominated by the county councils. Most hospitals, clinics and centers are owned by the county authorities and most health care providers are county employees. Moreover, health care is largely financed through income taxes levied by the county councils (about 61% of total costs). However, while the county councils clearly play the central role in the planning, provision and financing of health care in Sweden, the national government has also been a significant player, laying down key principles through the creation of directives, regulations, legislation, and ordinances. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs draws up guidelines and sets national policy goals for the counties while several other national agencies monitor and evaluate developments and advise the government. The central government has also attempted to coordinate county health care systems by, for example, instituting a national pay scale for all hospital employees and restricting hospital doctors to salary only remuneration. Sweden’s pharmacies were also brought under public ownership and control by the central government and combined into one agency, the National Pharmacy Company (Apoteksbolaget), which is responsible for the purchase and distribution of drugs. Finally, the national government also helps to finance the delivery of health care by the counties through health insurance and various forms of grants and payments (about 35% of total developments.

...
While health care in Sweden is socialized—overwhelmingly financed and provided by the public sector—it is not always free. Certain services, such as birth control counseling, maternity care, and life-saving drugs, are provided without charge. But patients pay user fees for many other services, including hospitalization, a visit to a family practitioner or clinic, lab tests, and other forms of treatment from physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists and nurses. Set by county councils, user fees vary across the counties, but residents in Sweden generally pay about $30 (US) for a visit to the hospital and approximately $15 (US) to see the family doctor or use a primary care facility or clinic. These charges reflect incremental increases over the past few decades and an attempt to limit unnecessary overuse of the Swedish health care system. However, the fees are still relatively low, and those under 20 years of age do not pay for medical or dental care. Moreover, the relatively low annual ceiling or upper limit on the maximum amount a family pays for medical care, dental care, and pharmaceuticals remains in place (approximately $170.00 US).

Much more significant than the increase in user fees has been the notably greater role of markets in the provision of health care in Sweden since the 1980s. Increased patient choice of healthcare providers and the adoption of purchaser-provider models that allow county councils to simply purchase services from other public or private providers that run and manage them, were among the first market reforms introduced. In some cases, county councils have even encouraged the public health care providers in their jurisdictions to foster a corporate management approach and compete with one another. In other cases, they have restructured their hospitals as joint stock companies in an attempt to transform them into managerially independent operations with responsibility for raising and spending their own budgets. The county councils have typically maintained control over all of the company shares, but three acute care hospitals were recently privatized. While this might be a symbolically important change, the vast majority of Sweden's hospitals are still owned and run by county authorities. The number of private, for-profit primary care centers, however, has expanded dramatically. Virtually
non-existent in the early 1980s, they now comprise almost 12% of the total number in the nation, but most of them are publicly financed via contracts with the county councils. Other legislative reforms have enabled doctors to work in private practices on a fee-for-service basis and fostered the introduction of private health care insurance schemes, although neither of these developments has been very widespread. While it may not represent the seismic or revolutionary shift claimed by proponents of market reform in Sweden and abroad, these developments are not insignificant. However, Sweden’s health care system still maintains its definitive characteristics, including a considerably greater emphasis upon the public financing and delivery of health care than is found in most other advanced capitalist nations.

Canada’s national health insurance model is similar to Sweden’s in many ways. It too is based upon the idea of collective responsibility for shared vulnerabilities and ensures comprehensive coverage for all of its long-term residents. As in Sweden, health care is the responsibility of sub-central governments. Indeed, the Canadian model, better known as “medicare”, is best described as an interlocking set of ten provincial and three territorial health insurance schemes which collectively comprise a national health care insurance system. And, health care is largely publicly financed by various levels of government through taxation and grants. The Canadian health care approach is based upon a single-payer system in which the government is the main purchaser of most of the primary and speciality health care services provided. However, the delivery of health care in the two nations is quite distinct. Unlike in Sweden, most health care services in Canada are not provided by the state. Rather, they are typically furnished by non-profit organizations and hospitals and physicians working from private offices (Olsen, 2002, 1994).

Constitutionally, Canadian health care falls under the jurisdiction of the provincial and territorial governments but the federal government sets national standards to ensure uniformity in quality and access across the nation. In order to qualify for federal funding, provincial and territorial health plans have had to comply with five familiar central principles: universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, portability, and
public administration. However, the national government’s presence has diminished over the years as federal funding has generally declined and taken the form of unconditional block grants rather than cost-sharing. Concomitant with this development has been a number of other significant trends, including a reduction in the number of hospital beds, the de-listing of drugs covered, the privatization of some services, the introduction or expansion of user fees for some services in some provinces, longer waiting lists, and lengthier waiting periods to access certain services (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1996; Fuller, 1998).

The U.S. has an entrepreneurial health care system. The private market is dominant in both the financing and the provision of health care, and state involvement is much less extensive than in the other two nations. Only about 20% of the U.S. population is covered by two major publicly-financed programs, Medicare (12%) for the elderly, and Medicaid (7%), for the poor. However, over 30% of the poor in the U.S. do not have health care insurance according to the U.S. Census Bureau. And 15% of the U.S. population—close to 45 million people—did not have any health care insurance in 2002, an increase of 1.5 million since 2001. The numbers with health care coverage have been declining in the U.S. in part because of reduced levels of employment-based coverage with the recent proliferation of low-wage, insecure jobs. Many families were also pushed off Medicaid with the elimination of AFCD. Although they were still eligible for Medicaid (with the exception of those who refused work), many families did not know they were eligible. According to the Urban Institute there were 500,000 fewer people participating in Medicaid in 1996, one year after AFDC was eliminated. However, since then, many states undertook to increase awareness of the program and the numbers of people using Medicaid increased significantly.

The health care approaches in all three nations are based upon a mainstream biomedical model which defines health as the absence of disease and views illness as primarily determined by genetics, external pathogens, degeneration associated with aging, and poor choices made by individuals rather than by poverty and socio-economic inequality. Consequently, their health care systems are all
physician and hospital intensive, emphasizing curative medical intervention over prevention. Of course, health care systems play a very important role relieving suffering, restoring functioning and prolonging life. In nations such as Canada, where health care is provided universally, life expectancy does not vary with income as much as it does in the U.S., where millions of people cannot afford any or adequate health care. But the socio-economic determinants of the symptoms which health care systems identify and suppress often go largely unaddressed. Not surprisingly, this is somewhat less true of Sweden than of Canada and, especially, the U.S. (Robbins, 1989; Wilkinson, 2005).

Most nations have increased their concern with prevention in recent years, passing laws, introducing educational campaigns to modify behavior, and encouraging medical testing for several increasingly common chronic diseases. Sweden has passed (and enforced) more protective environmental and workplace legislation, removed more barriers to affordable housing, and provided a wider range of other preventive programs—such as universal maternity care, child health care, school health services and other health insurance programs which make it easier for children and others to stay home when they are sick—than most other nations. In the U.S., in contrast, environmental programs and regulatory activities and agencies have been pared back markedly since the 1980s and a renewed emphasis has been placed upon changing narrowly-defined, individual “lifestyle choices”, such as tobacco use, drug use, and inactivity, while ignoring their class context. Convergence is least detectable in this policy area; while cutbacks to the Canadian health care system have been neither minor nor inconsequential, the approaches taken in the three nations remain distinct.

Conclusion

Globalization theorists and resilience theorists have reached very different conclusions about the development of welfare states over the past two decades. While the former maintain that the economic logic of global integration has resulted in the erosion of national autonomy and strict social policy austerity
across the affluent capitalist world, the latter suggest that, for a variety of reasons, some nations have been much better placed to resist it. Sweden's still very powerful labor movement—reflected in virtually unparalleled unionization rates and the relatively steady incumbency of its Social Democratic Labor Party (SAP)—unitary parliamentary state structures with relatively few veto points, and more collectivist and state-friendly cultural traditions rooted in its feudal past have provided a good measure of insulation from the forces of globalization. The extraordinarily weak labor movement, highly fragmented presidential and federal state structures, and long-standing cultural traditions emphasizing individualism and antipathy toward the state in the U.S. have led it to embrace neo-liberalism and provided little resistance to economic integration. Canada's position between these two nations along these socio-political and socio-cultural dimensions no doubt helps to account for its continuing social policy position between Swedish social democracy and American exceptionalism (for an overview, see Olsen, 2002).

This examination of the major income programs and social services in two central social policy domains in Sweden, Canada and the United States here suggests that, despite some erosion and restructuring, there has not been a convergence. The character of the welfare state in each nation has generally remained intact, although the social policy patterns are considerably more complicated and subtle when Canada and the U.S. are closely contrasted. These two liberal nations have become more similar in certain policy areas while diverging markedly or remaining unchanged in others.

In the family policy domain, it is notable that all three nations actually expanded their provision of maternity/parental leave in the 1990s. However, Sweden has clearly maintained its position as a leader in this domain; it continues to provide an extensive and generous range of income support measures as well as high-quality, universal childcare. Both Canada and the U.S. eliminated their central family income entitlements and introduced new fiscal measures (CTB and EITC, respectively) in the mid-1990s. But Canada greatly extended the length of its parental leave program and now provides nearly a year of combined maternity/parental leave. While the U.S. may have
taken an unexpected policy step with the introduction of its family leave program in 1993, it remains out of step with most of the advanced capitalist world; the program covers only a minority of workers and provides no financial compensation, so many of those who need it most cannot take advantage of it.

It is in the health policy domain that there clearly has been the least convergence and the varied approaches in the three nations remain quite distinct. Nevertheless, several recent developments have pushed Canada somewhat closer toward the U.S. While Canada, unlike the U.S., still maintains a sickness insurance program, the benefit has become harder to access and income replacement levels have declined significantly. Even in area of health care services, where the differences between the two nations remain most stark, there have been some notable developments. In addition to the cutbacks and retrenchment in the Canadian health care system, some convergence has been set in motion by a failure to adjust the Canadian health care system to current needs and trends, as indicated by the recent Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada (2002). In its early days, the Commission notes, medicare in Canada largely revolved around the provision of hospital care and the services of doctors. But the centrality of these healthcare components has been steadily declining over the past 25 years. Better drugs and improved day-surgery procedures have allowed hospitals to discharge patients much sooner and home care has increasingly become a substitute for longer periods of convalescence in hospital. But pharmaceuticals—once only a relatively small portion of total health care costs but now the second biggest expense—are not covered in Canada. And home care is only adequately covered. These developments and higher expenses mean that, as in the U.S., health care costs are more likely to bankrupt lower-income families today.

The trends observed across the nations in these two policy domains will not necessarily be the same across and within other social policy domains. In the area of old age policy, for example, more substantial restructuring appears to have take place in Sweden and other social democratic nations (Olsen, 1999; Szebehely, 1998). Such variation across nations and
policy areas demonstrates that quantitative studies of numerous nations using a narrow range of indicators do not capture the complexity of policy shifts and provide an incomplete picture of the social policy landscape. Their breadth must be balanced by the depth afforded by qualitative research that can examine fewer policies in fewer nations, as the present study has shown.

References


Integrating Globalization into the Social Work Curriculum

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The reality that social work is a global profession is explored. Authors encourage a broadening of social work education, moving beyond the traditional conception of “internationalized” to a “globalized” social work curriculum. Practical teaching strategies for a globalized perspective are presented with selected key concepts specifically applied to social policy, community practice, human behavior in the social environment, and sustainable development. Discussion includes macro-scale ethical considerations in a neoliberal economic system.

Keywords: social work education, globalization, cultural competence, interdependence, reciprocity

While there has been discussion about the true relevance of globalization to social work (Powell & Geoghegan, 2005; Webb, 2003), the evidence of practice world-wide and the burgeoning literature indicate that social work is now truly a global profession (Asamoah, et al., 1997; Caragata & Sanchez, 2002; Cox & Pawar, 2006; Healy, 2001, 2002; Johnson, 2004; Midgley Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2007, Volume XXXIV, Number 2
& Hokenstad, 1997; Midgley, 1997; 2001, 2004; Nagy & Falk, 2000; Ramanathan & Link, 1999). Clearly, we are now entering a period in which our profession embraces both international practice and also a more complex global understanding of social problems and solutions (Asamoah, et al, 1997; Cox & Pawar, 2006; Healy, 2001; Midgley, 2001; Ramanathan & Link, 1999).

In this paper we expand upon the idea of an internationalized curriculum (Estes, 1992; Healy, 2002; Johnson, 2004) employing a global and holistic conception that fully embraces the complexities of the transactional nature of social work and its ecological perspective (Hutchinson, 1999). An integrated curriculum addresses demographic, cultural, social, political, economic, environmental and psychological causes and consequences of globalization (Midgley, 2001, 2004) attends to the consequent ethical responsibilities (Rotabi, Gammonley, & Gamble, 2006; Link, 1999; Singer, 2004) and the necessity of inter-cultural competence (Rotabi, et al., 2006) to promote social justice and human rights (Cox & Pawar, 2006; Finn & Jacobson, 2003; Reichert, 2003).

From International to Global

There are different definitions of international social work and some usages of the term have been restrictive to practice (Midgley, 2001), or used to “denote the exchanges that take place between social workers” (Midgley, 1990, p. 295). Also, social work scholars have used the term in a comparative model and policy approach (Healy, 1995; Kahn & Kamerman, 1978; Mayadas, Watts, & Elliot, 1997) or international profile presentation focusing on the roles of social workers in other countries (Hokenstad, Khinduka & Midgley, 1992). However, more broadly, Healy defines the outcomes of “internationalization” as being “(1) improved social work practice; (2) more humane and socially oriented public policies at the national and global levels; and (3) enhanced status for the profession of social work through its increased visibility” (Healy, 2002, p. 4).

While Healy consistently integrates a broad global perspective in her international social work discussion, we suggest adding a fourth more explicit outcome: an increased
understanding of the complexities and human costs and benefits of a globalized and interdependent world with rapidly changing social, technological, and economic systems. We present this fourth outcome as a way of moving beyond more traditional conceptions of international social work towards a globalized social work perspective (Asamoah, et al., 1997; Polack, 2004; Ramanathan & Link, 1999) which captures the nuances of multiple and interacting world systems. This approach is consistent with Singer's view that "the term "globalization" rather than the older "internationalization" moves us past the era of growing ties between nations towards something beyond the existing conception of the nation-state" (Singer, 2002, p.8). It moves us to a fuller understanding of the effects of social, economic and environmental policies in one part of the world have on people in many other places (Gammonley, Rotabi, & Gamble, in press).

Asamoah, Healy, and Mayadas (1997) point out that the term global is also often used interchangeably with international, however global is broader as it "refers to a mode of thinking about the planet as a whole and the interactive effects of social phenomena, linking domestic and international concerns in a seamless web" (Asamoah, et al., 1997, p. 389).

There are multiple usages of the term globalization (Lyons, 2006; Midgley, 2001, 2004), many of which explore the positive and more frequently the negative aspects of the phenomena (Midgley, 1997, 2004; Wormer, 2005). Our discussion relies upon the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) definition that honors a "seamless web" of world systems. Incorporating culture and shared place, the IFSW summarized globalization holistically with a strong connection to people and cultures and highlighted the intersection of the profession and globalization (2004):

Globalization is the process by which all peoples and communities come to experience an increasingly common economic, social and cultural environment. By definition, the process affects everybody throughout the world. A more integrated world community brings both benefits and problem for all; it affects the balance of economic, political and cultural power between nations, communities and individuals and it can both enhance and limit freedoms and human rights. Social workers, by the nature of their work, tend to meet those who are more
likely to have suffered the damaging consequences of some aspects of globalization (IFSW, 2004).

Key Globalization Concepts for the Curriculum

For this discussion, it is impossible to explore all the concepts of globalization offered by economists, international development scholars, sociologists, social workers, and others. We present a set of core concepts relevant to the social work curriculum. These concepts and their brief definitions are found in Table I.

Our following curriculum discussion builds upon these concepts and presents recommended content and practical teaching strategies to integrate globalization issues into courses in social policy, community practice, human behavior in the social environment, and sustainable development. Ethical issues related to globalization are also explored, incorporating the concepts of human rights and social justice into considerations of human oppression and freedom (Gil, 1999).

Social Policy

Kahn and Kamerman (2000) remind us that social policy has never been purely national in nature. Comparative international social policy has a well-established history (Kahn & Kamerman, 1978, 2000; Midgley, 1997) in the field of social work with multiple methodologies (Chatterjee & Sinclair, 2000; Estes, 2004). In advanced social policy courses, students can be assigned comparative social policy activities using indicators such as the Human Development Index (Chatterjee & Sinclair, 2000; Estes, 2004; UNDP, 2005), to encourage global thinking and critical analysis (Rotabi, Weil, & Gamble, 2004).

Rotabi, Weil, & Gamble (2004) present a course assignment in which students focus on a social problem, such as child labor and trafficking or fair housing, and identify policies in the United States and two other countries, one of those countries being a developing nation. Students present the different policies, relevant social indicators, the Human Development Index of each country, and they also answer a series of comparative questions including a discussion of the underlying values of equality and liberty (Drake, 2001). Also, students are asked to identify relevant United Nations human rights declarations or codes, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and their application in each country presented. When students identify that one particular country has far superior social indicator data, they also present relevant social interventions (i.e. State provided health care in Europe and Canada). This assignment provides students with an opportunity to apply a Human Rights
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>&quot;An economic and political theory that places primary importance on individual ownership of property and stresses the role of capital investments in the creation of wealth&quot; (Hall &amp; Midgley, 2004, p. ix).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural Competence</td>
<td>&quot;A measurable professional standard that evaluates the incorporation of the differential historical, political, socio-economic, psychophysical, spiritual, and ecological realities, their interaction, in its impact on individuals and groups&quot; (Lum, 2003, p. 8).</td>
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<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>&quot;The acquisition of power to control or influence the course of events&quot; (Hall &amp; Midgley, 2004, p. x).</td>
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<td>Human Development Index (HDI)</td>
<td>Developed by the United Nations, the HDI &quot;represents three equally weighted indicators of quality of human life: longevity, as shown by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as shown by adult literacy and mean years of schooling; and income, as purchasing power parity dollars per capita&quot; (Chatterjee &amp; Sinclair, 2000, p. 68).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Human rights are quality of life standards for individuals and groups. When discussed, most typically they are in reference to United Nations documents, especially the Universal Declarations of Human Rights, and more specific documents, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Donnelly, 1993; Reichert, 2006). Human rights provide a framework to evaluate social justice issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>&quot;The unequal and inequitable distribution of income, wealth and political power in society&quot; (Hall &amp; Midgley, 2004, p. xi).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdependence</td>
<td>An outcome of global linkages produced by the movement of natural resources, capital, and populations across geographic and political environments that creates shared responsibility for the definition and development of social problems and requires mutual cooperation to resolve them to promote &quot;...social and economic well-being and the overall health of the planet&quot; (Healy, 2001, p. 3).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>&quot;The withdrawal of government interference (regulation) in financial markets, capital markets and trade&quot; (Hall &amp; Midgley, 2004, p. xi). Often it is called neoliberalism in terms of politics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
<td>A large corporation with operations in multiple countries.</td>
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<td>Migration</td>
<td>The demographic movements of peoples. In the context of globalization it is often discussed as shift of populations from the Global South to the North.</td>
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<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Often applied in the context of global economic issues as the concept corporate social responsibility encompasses accountability for global poverty reduction, environmental protection and the promotion of human rights (Jenkins, 2005).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Mutual exchange across global populations, economic and political systems characterized by respect for independence, dignity and worth of the person and acknowledgement of shared responsibility to promote resolution of social problems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>The redistribution of wealth, political, and social power from those that have it to those that do not (Jansson, 2000).</td>
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<tr>
<td>South/North</td>
<td>&quot;The 'South' refers to those countries once labeled 'Third World', which is now considered a pejorative term. Correspondingly, the 'North' denotes the industrialized nations&quot; (Hall &amp; Midgley, p. xv).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>&quot;Transnationalism creates networks that both facilitate exchanges of people, communication, and goods and services between nation states and incorporate cultural conditions at both ends of the network&quot; (Aveda, 2005, p. 137).</td>
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Framework to social problems. Students also have the opportunity to explore the social interventions that result from a variety of social policies, including underlying concepts such as capitalism, liberalization, socialized community care, social justice, human rights, inequality, and interdependence.

Community Practice

Community Practice courses offer a wealth of opportunities to engage students in active learning experiences connecting practice methods and skills with global practice issues and with the effects of globalization on human migration and populations at home (Reisch, 2005; Estes, 2005). Community practice involves discrete and complementary methods: organizing (such as the life work of Mohandas Ghandi and Martin Luther King, Jr.), development (i.e. micro-enterprises and women’s cooperatives in Bangladesh, India, Kenya, and Columbia, planning (the Dudley Street, Boston Project, Streets of Hope—Medoff & Sklar, 1994; Weil, 2005), and local to global change strategies (UNICEF, 2006; Weil, 1994; Gamble & Weil, in press; Brueggemann, 2006). These methods have become central means of working with vulnerable populations responding to the multiple impacts of globalization in their home countries (Yunas, 2003; Shiva 2005; Fisher & Karger, 1997). Likewise community practice is evolving as an important approach in countries that have received refugees from war torn areas, those who have had to relocate because of natural disasters, and those who have become internally displaced or cross-boarder migrants as a result of civil warfare (UNDP 2005; United Nations High Commission on Refugees, 2006; Brueggemann, 2006; Cox & Prawar, 2006; Healy, 2001; Weil, 1981). The increased movement of populations and the effects of changing economies indicate that social workers throughout the Global South and those working in North America and Europe as well, need to give serious attention to these methods of developing immediate and long term mutual support, assisting community groups in organizing for their own welfare, strengthening social capital, building infrastructure and social structure through community development and in longer term social and community planning and social reform focused on increasing the abilities of peoples to exercise human rights.
Globalization in the Social Work Curriculum

and build more socially just communities and governments (Friedmann, 1992; Reichart, 2003; Finn & Jacobsen, 2003). The social development and empowerment perspectives on human, community and economic capacity building provide an overarching framework for practice designed to strengthen vulnerable, low-wealth communities (Friedmann, 1992; Midgley & Livermore, 2005; Prigoff, 2000; Sherraden & Ninacs, 1998).

Advanced macro courses in community practice can draw on a wealth of literature that: (a) documents practice methods and theory for community development (Rubin & Sherraden, 2005; Shiva, 2005; Hall & Midgley, 2004; Midgley & Livermore, 2005); (b) presents asset development interventions (Padilla & Sherraden, 2005; Sherraden, 1991; Rubin & Rubin, 2007); (c) reports on civic engagement worldwide (McBride & Sherraden, 2007); (d) presents models of social planning with communities (Weil, 2005; Lauffer, 1978) and (e) describes means for empowering and organizing vulnerable or displaced groups (Gutierrez, et al. 2003; Rubin & Rubin, 2007; Cox & Pawar, 2006). Abundant literature also focuses on relevant theory and policy approaches that form significant aspects of the knowledge base for such interventions (Brueggemann, 2006; Estes 1993; Friedman, 1996; Midgley 1997; and all volumes of the following journals: International Social Work; International Development; Journal of Community Practice; and Social Development Issues).

In a course at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill on “Community Practice and Planning” students investigate and role play similarities and differences in engagement with and facilitation of community development processes founded in mutuality and interdependence with diverse populations in local and international settings (Weil, 2007). Assignments include having each student study an organization/agency involved in community practice in the U.S. and investigate examples of the same model in other nations based on web and literature searches. Commonalities and differences are critically analyzed for issues of intercultural competence, indigenous leadership approaches, facilitation issues (lack of gender equity, strong traditional hierarchies, etc.) building or re-building reciprocity in community engagement and methods of community-led needs assessment, planning and
implementation of projects (Noponen, 2002; Pennell, Noponen & Weil, 2005; Fetterman & Wandersman 2004). Following adult learning principles, students also take responsibility for class projects teaching each other culturally appropriate skills for working with diverse groups and relevant strategies for working with groups in other nations and with immigrant and refugee groups to organize communities (Nkesibia, 2005, Developing the North Carolina Pan-African Association), create development, educational and economic projects (Southeast Asian Women’s Association and others), and devise appropriate means for evaluating local projects (Pennell, Noponen & Weil, 2005; Noponen, 2001).

These assignments engage students in active learning, facilitation, and coaching/teaching strategies to assist them in working with community groups in ways that are focused on mutual learning, reciprocity, North/South and East/West dialogues, and transnational practice responses to globalization abroad and at home. They are able to investigate the transferability of programs from South to North and to consider professional responsibility in working with migrant and disenfranchised groups in a developmentalist and empowerment focused model (Midgeley & Livermore, 2005; Gutierrez, et al, 2003 ) that emphasizes strengthening human rights particularly equal rights for women and girls) (Gamble & Weil, in press) and righting historically unjust practices (Finn & Jacobsen, 2003; Reichart, 2003). Students are expected to explore and compare a range of community practice models and interventions from local programs in different nations to global NGO development activities (e.g. Oxfam; UNICEF; Soros Foundation). In community practice courses that focus on issues of globalization, students are able to sharpen their basic practice skills in facilitation, coaching, community development, program development and evaluation, and to hone skills and interests in specialized areas from work with photo-voice projects and revitalizing community culture among refugees, to inner-city and rural economic, social and sustainable development projects. In their international comparisons, students consider the following learning strategies: (a) analyzing the effects of different political/economic structures and related policy directions (gender equity; expanding rights for
previously disenfranchised groups, etc.); (b) investigating cross-national and cross-faith issues related to cultural competency; (c) learning and applying empowerment theory and practice and supporting broader participation where strict patriarchy and class hierarchies have promoted policies of exclusion, and (d) documenting practice projects that support participatory planning and evaluation, and inclusive community-led change to support positive human and economic development. Concepts critical to mastering skills and methods of community practice include: mutuality, community and indigenous leadership, intercultural competency, human and community capacity building, and basic ethical principles of the worth and dignity of the individual and the realities of human interdependence (Weil & Dromi, 1984) within communities and across the globe.

Human Behavior in the Social Environment

Theories of human behavior presently emphasized in micro-level human behavior in the social environment (HBSE) are selected for their empirically based foundations (Council on Social Work Education, 2003). This approach may privilege Western positivistic values over more constructivist or indigenous approaches to understanding human development that have stature in many cultures. A global perspective in teaching HBSE will encourage students to integrate disparate practice implications arising from theories of human development linked with these contrasting paradigms.

Transactions between the person and environment within and across micro, mezzo, and macro systems occurring across the life span are at the core of the HBSE curriculum. To capture adequately these dynamic processes, along with the changing nature of world economic, social, and technological systems, concepts of interdependence, responsibility, and reciprocity should be emphasized. These terms provide the impetus for a critical analysis of the consequences for individual, family, and community development of macro economic policies which promote globalized interdependent but inequitable economies that allow multinational corporations to abrogate civic responsibility.
The role of work and employment for individuals and families across the life span can be linked with core concepts of globalization such as capitalism, multi-national corporations, and empowerment and students can be engaged in critical and comparative analysis of opportunities and outcomes. The social cognitive theory of human development, which characterizes self-efficacy beliefs as a motivating force for human action, links individual development with human agency and collective action (Bandura, 2006). Each individual's life work is reflective of our common human identity, creativity and human agency but is also significantly impacted for many across the globe by neoliberal economic policies which constrain opportunities for education, advancement, and employment. Developmental consequences of foreign outsourcing of major US industries like textile manufacturing can be contrasted with those promoting corporate social responsibility such as the standards for business practices promoted by the fair trade movement (International Fair Trade Association, 2006). As a link to HBSE content on individual development the role of older women in women's collectives both in the US and abroad can be examined in parallel as a strategy to teach the biopsychosocial benefits of intergenerational social engagement and productive engagement in later life (Fried, et al., 2004). Older women in the US engaged in volunteerism create fair trade artisan markets in churches, or business enterprises such as Ten Thousand Villages (Ten Thousand Villages, 2006). Women in developing countries who use their expertise as artists, craftsmen and lay health advisors are promoting sustainable livelihoods for their families and communities. Both groups of women are engaged in activities known to promote their health and successful aging (Carlson, Seeman & Fried, 2000).

Case examples can also illustrate the links between natural resource extraction in developing nations, environmental and social consequences of extracting and manufacturing raw materials into globally traded commodities, and their subsequent use and/or abuse in developed nations. Three examples are the global trade in sugar, coffee, and cocaine. Instructional activities should address educational opportunities for children, employment prospects for working age adults, and health and well-being of individuals and families in both the nations
where the resource is extracted and manufactured and in those where it is primarily consumed.

Exploration of transnational family relationships brought on by migration in response to poverty, oppression, or disaster adds another layer to an HBSE focused analysis of globalization. The exchange of economic remittances is one expression of interdependence and responsibility in transnational families. Exchange of bi-lateral aid across borders has been thought of as an expression of economic interdependence and a tool to promote responsible development across nations, or, alternatively, as a reflection of capitalistic exploitation and imperialism (Pankaj, 2005).

Other global events that lead to migration provide a fruitful resource for the HBSE curriculum. Topics include, unfortunately,—the short and long-term impacts of war, disasters, terrorism and human rights violations which often result in the movement of large numbers of refugees across borders. Other global events include educational innovations, changing health care practices, and cultural norms related to gender and age, and spirituality. A more difficult task for the HBSE instructor is to link globalization in a coherent format across the course. HBSE is frequently organized along developmental trajectories (childhood, young adulthood, old age, etc.). By comparing and contrasting developmental trajectories across the life span in collectivist and individualist oriented cultures numerous opportunities to integrate aspects of globalization emerge. Child rearing and family care giving practices can be compared along with family rituals and spiritual practices associated with pregnancy and birth and developmental milestones such as menarche, menopause, and death and dying.

An individualistic vs. collectivist comparative approach leaves room for both the positivistic, empirically grounded theories of human development and more constructivist understandings. Educators employing this teaching strategy with US students are also exposing people who tend to be more individualistic in nature (Oyserman, Koom & Kemmelmeier, 2002) to the collectivistic orientation experienced by many peoples across the globe. Teaching that encourages students to reconcile the 'good' with the 'bad' of globalization in the HBSE curriculum can promote cultural competence.
Sustainable Development

Sustainable Development is a process as well as an outcome. The World Commission on Environment and Development defined it as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (1987, 3). Estes introduced social workers to the theories that inform sustainable development and its usefulness as a concept in understanding human development and social work practice (1993). Understanding the meaning of sustainable development enlarges social workers concept of person-in-environment by incorporating human relationships with other species and with natural ecosystems as well as relations with social and institutional systems (Gamble & Hoff, 2005; Hoff & McNutt, 1994).

When social workers help people as individuals, families, or community groups to develop livelihoods that can be economically, culturally, and socially satisfying without contaminating or permanently eliminating the earth’s resources they are working in sustainable development. A social worker who understands that we are all mutually dependent upon the earth’s forests, fisheries, arable land, clean air, and potable water, practices from a global perspective. Mutuality, the idea that all people in the world have common needs for the earth’s resources, helps students move directly to discussions of social justice, and how we decide what is fair in terms of consumption, production, growth, and development (Finn & Jacobson, 2003; IFSW/IASSW, 2004; Polack, 2004).

One way to help students connect personally with the local to global development relationships is to ask them to do a test that calculates their ecological footprint (Redefining Progress, 2006). The ecological footprint is a calculation of the number of acres a person needs to maintain their current lifestyle. The result helps students see that residing in an industrial country makes them contributors to the greatest proportion of environmental pollution, no matter how many vegetables they grow or how often they ride their bicycle to school. A deeper exploration of how other cultural traditions have embraced the earth’s resources helps students to gain perspective on the perceived superiority of the western positivist knowledge base.
and quickly disabuses the simplistic idea that “all we have to do to save the earth is decrease the fertility rate in the Global South”. Vandana Shiva, renowned for her work in India and throughout the world to expose cultural theft, violence against women, and natural resource privatization, describes in *Earth Democracy* how cultural diversity, a reverence for all life, and interconnection and interdependence of cultures is the only way to ecological sustainability (2005). Wangari Maathai, winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2004, has worked in Kenya for more than thirty years “to mobilize communities for self-determination, justice, equity, poverty reduction and environmental conservation, using trees as the entry point” (Greenbelt Movement, 2006, p. 1). Winona LaDuke, provides American Indian perspectives on sacred lands, water, rice, horses and medicine in her collection of stories from indigenous North American communities (2005).

Student assignments with lots of freedom for incorporating the concept of sustainable development in their personal and professional development and in the ethical practice of social work, expand social work knowledge in the areas of human behavior, policy, practice, and research. A student doing field practice in a local school, for example, could help the school do an audit of toxic cleaning materials, help develop student groups to celebrate and appreciate cultural diversity (especially for schools with significant immigrant populations), help to grow vegetables in the schoolyard for school snacks or lunch, help teachers develop resources for recycled school supplies, and help the school administration plan for ways to reduce energy consumption. Such projects, drawn from real student experiences, can be evaluated using Maureen Hart’s Sustainable Development Indicators, helping students further understand the difference between traditional social and economic indicators (e.g. “the unemployment rate”) and sustainability indicators (e.g. “diversity and vitality of the local job base”) (2002, p. 9).

Gaining experience in the understanding and practice of sustainable development helps students internalize concepts of social justice, responsibility, mutuality, and cultural competence.
A Globalized Curriculum: Exploring Social Work Values and Ethical Principles

An important component of the concept of globalization is the idea of nation state decline in an emerging world-wide, neo-liberal economic system (Lyons, 2006; Midgley, 2004; Singer, 2002). Multinational corporations are the power brokers in this emerging world system creating a dynamic that has been called "turbo capitalism" (Luttwak, 2000, p. 1) and "predatory capitalism" (Midgley, 2004, p. 13). As Singer (2002) points out, this shift from a nation-state orientation to that of a global system "needs to be reflected in all levels of our thought, and especially in our thinking about ethics" (p. 8). Consideration of world-systems ethics provides students with an opportunity to explore the philosophy of ethics in a broader context than the traditional social work conceptions provide.

Ethical discourse within a human rights framework is an important classroom activity and encourages students to consider universality and cultural relativism (Reichert, 2003, 2006) as they grapple with examples of oppression related to globalization (Gil, 1998). An integrated curriculum encourages students to actively apply the UN Declaration of Human Rights and associated conventions (i.e. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination) across courses as they consider societal ethics at home and abroad (Blackburn, 2001). Explicit human rights codes help students have concrete discussions about social justice (Reichert, 2006) and challenge students to apply their own conceptions of equality and liberty on a global scale (Drake, 2001).

Specific discussion as it relates to professional social work standards would draw upon Section 6 of the US National Association of Social Work (NASW) Code of Ethics: "The standards [in this section] explicitly highlight social workers' obligation to engage in activities that promote social justice and the general welfare of society from 'local to global levels'" (Reamer, 1999, p. 61). Local responsibilities in a global system are an important concept for American social work students and often, when learning within a globalized social work curriculum, they experience consciousness raising about the inevitable conflicts between our capitalistic system and global
Exploration of ethical principles and standards on a global level provides US students with an opportunity to become familiar with the International Federation of Social Worker’s (IFSW) and the International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW) Ethics in Social Work, Statement of Principles (IFSW& IASSW 2004; Link, 1999). The IFSW/IASSW statement provides guidelines for professional conduct but leaves the primary responsibility for specifics of professional conduct to national organizations. The statement, however, makes very clear that all social workers everywhere must use the principles of human rights, human dignity and social justice as the guiding principles for their work, and must have knowledge of the seven United Nations conventions that outline basic human rights.

Conclusion

By its very nature, globalization moves us from a nationalistic and localized conception of reality to a world-systems perspective (Singer, 2002). This represents a paradigm shift requiring new and holistic education strategies. The globalized social work perspective builds upon the more established international social work conceptions and moves beyond what has been simply called “broadening the mind” (Askeland & Payne, 2001, p. 263) to a more transactional way of thinking which has been called “global mindedness” (Asamoah, et al., 1997, p. 389). A globalized perspective also more fully incorporates conceptions of interdependence, responsibility and reciprocity, and cultural competence (Asamoah, et al., 1997; Rotabi, et al., 2006).

References


Globalization in the Social Work Curriculum


Globalization in the Social Work Curriculum


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Our understanding of the relationship between globalization and contemporary social welfare systems is heavily influenced by three conventional approaches to studying welfare reform: the political economy, moral economy, and mixed economy approaches. In addition to analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, a central aim of this article is to introduce the social economy approach as an emergent alternative. Drawing from a growing body of work on institutional innovation within the European third sector, I argue that the social economy approach makes a valuable contribution to understanding the role of welfare networks in reconfiguring globalizations' impact on the character and quality of social provision so as to better reconcile social efficacy with social justice.

Keywords: Globalization, Welfare Reform, Welfare Networks, the Third Sector, Social Enterprises, Social Inclusion, Social Justice

Increasing market integration, changing demographics, and shrinking public budgets have fueled a pervasive redefinition of the state's role in providing for the social welfare of citizens. In addition to challenging public administration's dominance over the production and distribution of social services, policy makers and politicians from across the political
spectrum have called into question the once pervasive belief that the state is exclusively entitled to guarantee the collective well being of its citizenry. Together, these developments have produced a climate favorable to the expanding role of the third sector, not only in the delivery of social services, but in the formulation and stipulation of social welfare policy as well.¹

Despite third sector organizations' increasing centrality in the development of contemporary social welfare systems, the two dominant approaches to studying welfare reform have downplayed, if not ignored, their importance as an interface between globalization and social wellbeing. Locked into a dichotomous state-society framework, the political economy and moral economy approaches have had a polarizing effect on the way we understand globalization and its consequences for welfare. Whereas the former adopts the 'welfare state' as its central analytic unit and focuses on the degree to which globalization is undermining states' capacity to protect their citizens social rights, the latter concentrates on the societal dynamics of the 'welfare society', underscoring the key role of societal actors in responding to societal need and the extent to which the state has become the chief impediment to achieving social justice. As a result of this dualism, the salience of the third sector for transforming the structural and cultural foundation of social welfare systems, and thus its capacity to mediate the effects of globalization, has not been fully appreciated.

The so-called mixed economy approach emerged more recently to underscore the inherent pluralism of social welfare systems and the role of the third sector as a vital intermediary between state, society and economy (Anheier and Seibel, 1990; Gidron, Kramer, Salamon, 1992; Salamon & Anheier, 1996; Salamon, 2002). Stemming primarily from professionals and practitioners involved in the implementation and delivery of social and human services, this approach illuminates the black box that separates policy formation from societal outcomes by underscoring the productivist underpinnings of the social welfare systems. Although it has made significant advances in connecting the micro-level institutional dynamics involved in service provision to broader economic and socio-political processes underlying contemporary welfare reform, in focusing somewhat narrowly on the organization
and management of welfare production, it fails to explore the broader structural implications of welfare reform and does not take sufficient account of the social consequences that emerging welfare mixes have on both users and citizens more broadly defined.

Given the shortcomings of these conventional approaches to welfare reform, there is a particular need to identify and develop new approaches to understanding the capacity of contemporary social welfare systems to meet the formidable challenges posed by globalization. A central aim of this paper is to introduce such an approach. Based on a detailed analysis of the strengths and weakness of the three conventional approaches mentioned above, I establish the foundation for what I identify as a social economy approach to welfare. Drawing from a growing body of work on institutional innovation within the European third sector, I argue that this emergent alternative makes a valuable contribution to understanding the role of welfare networks in reconfiguring globalizations' impact on the character and quality of social provision so as to better reconcile social efficacy with social justice.

Conventional Approaches to Analyzing the Development of Contemporary Social Welfare Systems

Each of the three conventional approaches to studying the development of contemporary social welfare systems—the political economy approach, the moral economy approach and the mixed economic approach—is based on a distinctive analytical model, each with its own conceptual frameworks, theoretical preferences, and normative commitments (See Table 1 below). While each approach has contributed significantly to our understanding of how and why social welfare systems develop, disciplinary boundaries and distinctive research agendas have tended to thwart cross fertilization among them. Thus, looking more closely at how they compare to one another is important not only for identifying the social economy perspective as an emergent alternative, but also for generating a more integrated, informed understanding of the impact of globalization on social development in the twenty-first century.
Table 1: Contemporary Approaches to Analyzing the Development of Contemporary Social Welfare Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Political Economy</th>
<th>Moral Economy</th>
<th>Mixed Economy</th>
<th>Social Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Analytical Concept</td>
<td>Welfare State</td>
<td>Welfare Society</td>
<td>Welfare Mix</td>
<td>Welfare Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Theoretical Frameworks</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism, Neo-Marxism</td>
<td>Communitarianism, Pluralism</td>
<td>Institutional Economics, Non-Profit Management</td>
<td>Cultural Institutionalism, Constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Commitments</td>
<td>Economic Justice, Distributional Equity</td>
<td>Social Cohesion, Community Development</td>
<td>Economic Efficiency, Organizational Effectiveness</td>
<td>Social Justice, Social Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>Nation-state, Social Policy</td>
<td>Civil Society, Communities</td>
<td>Nation-state, Human Service Organizations</td>
<td>Social Service Systems, Social Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Political Economy Approach

Emerging during a period of profound faith in the state as the key to prosperity and progress, the political economy approach reflects the social ideals of the post-war era: universalism, equality, and the power of the state to provide an unprecedented quality of life for its citizens. The welfare state, its key unit of analysis, is conceptualized as a form of embedded liberalism—a reformist compromise capable of compensating for, if not correcting, the most deleterious affects of the capitalist economy.

Although initially focused on the political engineering of social protection vis-à-vis social rights and regulations, with the end of the so-called Golden Age of the welfare state, the political economy approach has focused on questions and issues pertaining to welfare retrenchment and the respective role of politics and economics in driving welfare reform. Although long a concern within liberal welfare states like the United States, more recent debates about an emerging global "third way" (Giddens, 2001) and the transformation of "vice into virtue" among conservative, christian democratic welfare states (Levy, 1999; Hemerijck and Visser, 2001) have drawn
attention to the ways in which welfare states are 'recalibrating' (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003; Handler, 2003; Gilbert, 2002) and the relevant degree of freedom they have in dealing effectively with the cultural and economic challenges of globalization.

Within the political economy framework, the key point of contention focuses on the extent to which there has been greater convergence or persistent divergence among historically distinctive models of welfare state development. The convergence thesis holds that welfare states, particularly those characterized by comprehensive, national social programs and public services, face growing external constraints to their ability to maintain generous, publicly financed social protections. According to this thesis, shifting patterns in international trade and finance increase competitive pressures within the global economy, thus restricting government's maneuverability in crafting policy to meet domestic social and economic objectives (Castells, 1996; Kurzer, 1993; Gilbert, 2002). As traditional macro-economic policy tools become harder to manage and labor and total production costs rise due to the diversification of demand and the increasing use of technology, governments must rely heavily on non-payroll taxes to finance welfare expenditures. Yet high rates of inflation combined with shrinking tax bases make substantial tax increases both economically and politically unpopular. Combined with significant pressures to reduce budget deficits, this situation places critical limits to the expansion of social spending and thus the ability and willingness of governments to provide wide-ranging, long term public benefits (Atkinson, 1992; Rhodes, 1995). In addition to scaling back cash-based subsidies and increasing eligibility requirements, devolving competencies to lower levels of government and off-loading services to private providers are seen as the logical product of welfare states' increasing vulnerability to the vagaries of market forces (Bennet, 1994; Mangen, 1996; Gilbert, 2002).

The divergence thesis, by contrast, is advanced by those who see the link between economic imperatives and policy choices as over determined. From this perspective, political preferences, policy legacies, and institutional arrangements are conditioned by historically driven, path-dependent processes which mitigate if not compel differential responses
to common challenges (Weir, Orloff, Skocpol, 1988; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Ferrera, 1996; Pierson, 1997; Stephens and Huber, 1998; Hacker, 2002; Swank, 2002). Because powerful structural, political and cultural forces are seen as mediating both policy makers perception of the challenges arising from globalization as well as their responses to them, different types of welfare states are seen as posing unique constraints and opportunities for reform. And because social reform reflects tensions generated by existing socio-political cleavages, cultural values, and strategic maneuvering by relevant political actors, the divergence thesis expects that reform will reflect the adoption of a wide range of policy tools. Thus, while decentralization and privatization may be standard policy proposals across a variety of welfare states, the specific policies formulated and implemented will vary. Thus, whereas the introduction of new technology systems aimed at maximizing choice and increasing economic efficiency is expected in Liberal welfare states like the United States and Great Britain, it is less likely in continental European countries where the legacies of familialism and paternalism are stronger and budget control is a higher priority.

While the political economy approach to welfare reform offers an important contribution to our understanding of the constraints and opportunities facing governments as they attempt to craft solutions to the challenges raised by globalization, one of its key drawbacks is that by emphasizing convergence vs. divergence, it is of limited utility in helping us to better understand the more nuanced dynamics of welfare reform. While the state is imbued with responsibility and control over welfare, society is seen primarily as the passive recipient of state-generated policies and prescriptions. Thus, arguments about the positive or negative effect of reforms on social welfare tend to be based almost exclusively on their implications for the state. Either they are increasing the state’s capacity to effectively and fairly respond to social needs (OECD 1996; Vandenbrouchke, 1998) or undermining its efforts to maintain its commitments to reasonable, equitable and/or just social benefits (Giamo, 1995; Gough, 1996; Fargion, 1998).

A second, yet related problem with the political economy approach is that in focusing on the nation-state as its primary,
and in most cases exclusive, level of analysis, the space between policy making and policy outcomes remains a black box. In confining the analysis of globalization and its subsequent affects on welfare reform to "high politics," understood as elite-level policy formation, the political economy approach underestimates or leaves out important dynamics that operate in the realm of "low politics," as well as a variety of cross cutting territorial and sector-based considerations that profoundly impact the inter-play between policy making and policy implementation and thus the substantive impact that welfare reform has on users and citizens.

**The Moral Economy Approach**

 Whereas the political economy approach is fueled by a profound skepticism about the ability of society to meet the collective social needs of citizens, the moral economy approach embraces community as the primary guardian of social well being. Grounded in a conception of welfare provision as the natural extension of voluntary, mutualistic forms of self-help, the moral economy approach offers an alternative framework for conceptualizing and analyzing social welfare systems as a product of the so-called welfare society, a model for organizing social welfare on the basis of interlocking individual sanctions and rewards emanating from local communities.

The moral economy approach can be further separated into a progressive and a conservative version based on distinctive interpretations of the social fabric of society. The conservative version of the welfare society is profoundly skeptical of the governments' ability to gauge social needs and harness capitalism to fulfill these needs. Emerging as a reaction to the state's perceived colonization of civil society, this version of the moral economy perspective underscores the dangers of publicly provided, state-regulated welfare. Conceptualized as a paternalistic bureaucracy, the state is seen as creating harmful 'welfare dependencies,' which erode personal responsibility and weaken the ability of people to help themselves by undermining community-based social and ethnical norms (Murray, 1989; Mead, 1991). By contrast, the welfare society, which is viewed as complementing, rather than competing with market-based exchange mechanisms, is seen as
strengthening the social fabric of society by reinforcing traditional values such as family loyalty and social obligation.

A more progressive version of the moral economy approach embraces the welfare society not as the locus of cultural preservation, but rather as part of a broader movement toward social solidarity and associative democracy. Emphasizing participation and connectedness to local community as a principle legitimating factor in empowering and assisting people in need, this perspective sees reciprocity as a necessary precursor to developing healthy and productive societies. Less a reaction to the state than a response to the commercialization and alienation that has accompanied the process of modernization, this version of the moral economy approach sees communities as critical to actively reconstituting society by reconstructing identities and extending affective bonds between groups of people that increasingly lack a shared moral culture (Ezioni, 1991; Donati, 1993; Walzer, 1995; Cohen and Rogers, 1995).

From this perspective, the welfare society embodies a realm of fluid, multi-faceted relationships which counteract individualism and narrow self interest by fostering trust, mutual respect, and collective participation.

Regardless of their distinctive understandings of the social fabric of the welfare society, both versions of the moral economy approach underscore the importance of social actors, emotive ideas, and the non-rationality of culture in the development of social welfare systems. Challenging the authority of the state as legitimate arbitrator of welfare reform, they expand the scope of inquiry beyond the political economy approach’s relatively narrow focus on poverty rates, social security, and income-transfers to encompass a broader array of social arrangements and processes, from more traditional conceptions of self-help to community care (Chambliss, 1996; White, 2000) and the creation of alternative consciousness (Havel, 1990; Cruikshank, 1999).

Despite this noteworthy advantage, the moral economy approach suffers from several shortcomings. First, by ignoring, by and large, the distributional aspects of social welfare systems, it obscures the important role that societal stratification and inequality play in welfare reform. Because the most marginalized segments of the population usually lack the
capacity to voice their concerns and press their needs effectively, they tend to be disadvantaged by a welfare society which relies predominately if not exclusively on self identification of need and voluntary responses to those needs. Second, the moral economy approach reproduces the state-society dualism of the political economy approach, thus obscuring rather than clarifying the relationship between the two realms. By viewing the welfare society as an autonomous locus of proactive community engagement, responsive to both individual want and collective need, the moral economy approach portrays the state as outside of, and thus largely irrelevant to, society. Where the state is considered, however, the focus of the moral economy approach is almost exclusively on its coercive power. As a result, it tends to underestimates the state’s role in establishing the foundation for effective responses to a variety of welfare dilemmas, including stimulating the welfare enhancing properties of community activism by, for example, outlawing discriminatory practices, redistributing scarce resources, and guaranteeing social rights. A third problem with the moral economy approach is that it does not pay adequate attention to the multiplicity of institutional configurations involved in the day-to-day operation of social welfare systems. Consequently, it fails to appreciate the extent to which the distinctive juridical and legal status of private and non-profit organizations is critical to the success of welfare reform.

The Mixed Economy Approach

The growing complexity of the inter-organizational linkages connecting social organizations to one another and to public institutions, and the recognition of this development as critical to determining the consequences of welfare reform, has led to the development of a third approach, frequently defined as the mixed economy of welfare. While those who employ this approach come from a wide array of disciplines, principally economics, but also social welfare, public administration, and non-profit management, they ground their analysis in a concept of the welfare mix which is distinctive from both that of the welfare society the welfare state (Kramer, 1981; Taylor-Gooby, 1987; Powell, 1987; James, 1989; Abrahamson, P., 1988; Anheier and Seibel, 1990; Gidron, Kramer, Salamon, 1992;
The concept of the welfare mix emphasizes institutional plurality and shared responsibility for welfare. Inevitably, social welfare systems draw on a variety of organizational resources, all of which are embedded within a broader set of exchange and production relationships. As the guarantor of citizen's legal entitlements and a key source of power, the state, understood more broadly as the public sector, is recognized as playing a vital role in the creation of social markets, understood as quasi-markets for social goods and services which separate purchasers, usually government agencies, from providers. The public sector is balanced, however, by two equally important sectors, the private and non-profit sectors, each of which operates according to a unique set of norms and principles. Thus, within the mixed economy approach, it is the relationship between the public, private and non-profit sectors that determines temporal and spatial variation in the output of social welfare systems.

Emphasizing institutional plurality, the mixed economy approach to welfare offers an analytic framework in which the output of welfare systems varies both temporally and spatially according to the relationship between the public, private and non-profit sectors. Thus, in addition to identifying a third sector, distinct from both the state and society, the mixed economy approach has contributed to our understanding of social welfare systems by paving the way for more sophisticated longitudinal and comparative empirical analysis of welfare systems across a variety of local and national contexts.

While paving the way for a more sophisticated comparative analysis of welfare systems and their capacity to mediate pressures for reform, the mixed economy approach has two significant limitations. First, by assuming a difference in kind between organizations according to the presence or absence of certain sector-based properties and functions, the welfare mix approach falls into the same dilemma of the previous two approaches. It fails to fully appreciate the breadth and depth of organizational variation within each sector, thus divorcing pertinent issues relating to social production (i.e. contracting, management, participation) from core issues of policy reform (i.e. cost effectiveness, marginalization, entitlement issues).
Second, in focusing on the technical and economic aspects of institutional performance, it obscures the social and political relevance of reform. By failing to link institutional outputs to the types of system-wide properties that give them meaning for those that they affect most directly, such as marginalized citizens and welfare users, the mixed economy approach does little to improve our understanding of the issues related to social justice.

An Emerging Paradigm: The Social Economy Approach to Welfare Reform^2

More recently, a growing body of work emerging from the social economy literature (6 and Vidal, 1994; Travaglini, 1997; Defourny et al, 1999; Borzaga, 2000; Van Til, 2000; Pestoff, 1998; Ranci, 1999; Defourney, Favreau, Laville, 1999; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Evers et al, 2004; Evers, 1995; De Leonards, 1998; Laville, J., & Gardin, 1999; Evers and Laville, 2004; Gonzales, 2006) has established the basis for a new approach to welfare reform. Motivated by a shared set of theoretical and empirical concerns about the role of the third sector in mediating the relationship between state, society, and economy, this social economy approach is distinct from conventional approaches in that it offers an alternative conceptual understanding of social welfare systems as dynamic, open systems, grounded in complex institutional networks. In addition, it seeks to accumulate knowledge about collective forms of entrepreneurship and the extent to which they act as catalysts of change within emerging welfare networks.

Like political economy and moral economy approaches, the social economy approach is concerned about macro-level developments in the economy and society. Yet, it links these changes to questions and concerns relating to the social and administrative underpinnings of social welfare. As such, it introduces greater dynamism by exploring the micro foundations of institutional change, thus avoiding the political and moral economy approaches’ over-emphasis on the degree to which macro-level structural and cultural forces favor continuity over change within social welfare systems. Although recognizing that third sector organizations may rarely
determine social and economic outcomes on their own, the social economy approach underscores their critical role in establishing the context and meaning that determine how every day people perceive of and experience social welfare.

While overlapping with the mixed economy approach in its attention to the third sector, the social economy approach encompasses a broader understanding of the third sector as a highly differentiated and interpenetrated institutional realm neither derivative of, nor inherently in competition with, the public and private sectors. In proposing a more fluid conceptualization of the third sector as an important nexus of interaction between different principles (i.e. exchange, redistribution, and reciprocity) otherwise seen as distinctive characteristics of either economy, state, or community, the social economy approach moves beyond conventional understandings of market values and interests and social values and interests as inherently conflicting. Embedded in both society and the economy, third sector organizations create, reconstruct and maintain social relationships as well as the universe of practices and forms of mobilizing economic resources, which, as Saucier and Thivierge (2003) observe, are key to combating poverty, generating social solidarity, and satisfying human needs (as cited in Van Kemenade, Paradis, and Jenkins, 2003).

The Rise of Welfare Networks

The social economy approach takes for granted that the processes of globalization and modernization have fundamentally altered the parameters of contemporary welfare systems, and thus its principle concern is in understanding the capacity of third sector organizations to serve as a socially efficacious response to these twin challenges.

Although identifying and explaining the causes of broader structural change is not a central component of the social economy approach, its analysis of the third sector's role in responding to change is informed by an understanding of globalization and modernization as symptomatic of a fundamental shift in the productive infrastructure of society from one which was industrial to one which is predominately informational and service based (Priori and Sabel, 1984; Jessop, 1994; Bakker and Miller, 1996; Castells, 1996). By impacting
employment opportunities and family dynamics, this structural shift in the economy significantly impacts the demographic composition of society, which in turn fuels greater pressures toward administrative, political and economic decentralization. While these processes significantly increase the complexity of welfare systems (Banting, 1995; Bennett, 1990; Kuhnle and Selle, 1992; Alber, 1995; Sipila 1997), the capacity of national public administrators to manage social welfare systems diminishes as greater policy responsibility is transferred to the subnational level, shifting the locus of public intervention away from the central government to lower levels of government.

In tandem with a pervasive post-materialist shift in values (Abramson and Inglehardt, 1987; Inglehardt, 1990) post-industrialism entails a transition away from both the state and society as dominant organizing infrastructures of the social welfare systems toward more amorphous welfare networks. This reconstitution of welfare systems into welfare networks motivates three key developments: 1) The potential for constructing more efficacious responses to new and old social and economic risks, and 2) The emergence of a more complex and differentiated third sector, and 3) A more fluid process of reform facilitated by the proliferation of new organizational forms and strategies utilized in social welfare provision.

Social Risk and Emerging Welfare Networks

The key characteristics defining the new post-industrial era—the blurring of boundaries between sectors, the increasing specialization and volatility of social and economic relations, and the institutionalization of continual change—both exacerbate pre-existing risks and create new ones. They restrict the relevant degree of freedom afforded to governments to adopt and implement social policies that can harness the benefits and compensate for the losses incurred by globalization and modernization, thus contributing to what Beck (1998) identifies as the 'democratization of vulnerability' as risk becomes more fluid. Greater instability and increasing differentiation in citizens' needs and preferences make it increasingly difficult for public officials to guarantee a fair and equitable allocation of social and economic resources and a high standard of living to all citizens while the combination of diminishing public
resources, increasing ethnic and cultural diversity (and with it the proliferation of social customs, norms, and practices) increase the threat of various forms of discrimination.

In tandem with these developments, welfare networks offer the potential for constructing more efficacious responses to risk, particularly those related to social exclusion and economic dependency. In much the same way that the creation of the market economy during the nineteenth century gave rise to what economic historian Karl Polanyi (1944) describes as a double movement, the social and economic processes set in motion by the current post-industrial shift has engendered a countermovement. This countermovement, stimulated by the impulse to re-embed the economy in social relations, creates a new role for third sector organizations as the source of alternative social constructions capable of generating a collective response to social need. Although not intrinsically a promoter of social justice, in a context in which globalization, combined with a maturation of government commitments increases citizens' vulnerability to social dislocation while simultaneously undermining the capacity and legitimacy of the state to provide social protection, the third sector represents a force within local communities that works to make them more livable, and in many ways, more socially just. By creating new forms of connectivity and solidarity, covering new forms of social need, and mobilizing citizen awareness of and reaction to factors which undermine the public good, third sector organizations alleviate social marginalization, negotiate greater fairness in the distribution of material and cultural resources, and reconstruct welfare networks to empower the least powerful in society.

Social Enterprises and Emerging Welfare Networks

A key factor in the rise of welfare networks is the increasing willingness on the part of politicians, policy-makers, and administrators to utilize the resources and skills of a myriad of organizational forms in their efforts to deal with new and old social risks associated with globalization and modernization. This in turn has made internal variation within the third sector much more critical to understanding the output that social welfare systems generate (Alber, 1995; Munday and Ely, 1996;
Within this context, the social economy perspective highlights *social enterprises* as playing a particularly innovative role within emerging welfare networks (EMES project, 1999; Borzaga, 2000; Pestoff, 1998; Borzaga and Defouney, 2001; Defourney, Favreseau, Laville, 1999; Van Til, 2000; Evers and Laville, 2004). While the specific definition of social enterprises varies, broadly speaking, they are understood as a new, hybrid form of third sector organization that incorporate into the production and delivery of socio-economic goods and services a new social enterprise spirit and greater citizen participation as co-producers. Although more "professionalized" than voluntary organizations, social enterprises are membership based. They merge economic entrepreneurship with civic entrepreneurship to foster patterns of trust and mutuality between groups of citizens that come from different cultural and economic backgrounds. While "doing with others" is critical, they combine internal solidarity with a dedication to the general interest. Their character as multi-stakeholding organizations and their express commitment to internal democracy allow them to pursue a variety of social, political, and economic functions simultaneously, such as greater citizen participation, more rewarding occupation for employees, and higher quality care giving (Pestoff, 1998; Borzaga, 2000; Borzaga and Defouney, 2001).

Although still not widely identified as social enterprises per se, these organizations have become increasingly salient in the development of welfare networks, particularly in continental Europe, where there is a clear and legitimate distinction between the market and social economy (Perri 6, 1994; Laville and Nyssens, 2001), mutual aid societies and corporatist organizations are pervasive, and there is a less resolute commitment to individualism and self-reliance. Rather than being looked upon as a product of incomplete welfare development, as has been the prevailing view of the third sector's role within the welfare system, politicians and policy makers from across the political spectrum have embraced social enterprises as catalysts for overcoming a myriad of existing dysfunctions embedded within traditional welfare arrangements (Borgia, 1983; De Leonardis, et. al., 1994; Marzocchi, 2001). Whereas
conservatives see them as a means of introducing greater flexibility and efficiency to remedy what they perceive as over-bloated, inefficient centralized welfare bureaucracy, they are particularly attractive for progressives as bottom-up, people-centered alternatives to the hierarchical, highly impersonal quality of many state-run welfare agencies.

**Linking Social Enterprises to Globalization and Welfare Reform**

By embracing the notion that market, society and state function as interpenetrated spheres, the social economy approach provides a more organic understanding of welfare reform as a fluid and continually evolving process of change. As a consequence, it is not enough to look at the scope and depth of social policies or the interests and preferences they represent in order to determine whether emerging welfare networks constitute welfare retrenchment or reconstruction. Instead, reform outcomes are more closely tied to how these policies are configured, interpreted and reconstituted by the myriad of institutional actors which cross-cut particular sectors and policy arenas.

Thus, rather than forcing scholars to locate the engine of reform within one sector or another, the social economy approach allows for the identification of multiple sources of change. At the same time, it draws attention to a greater focus on the dynamics of social production (as opposed to policy formation) in order to better understand how the pressures and constraints created by post-industrialism, and thus the processes of globalization and modernization, are being interpreted, processed and transformed into social realities on the ground. As globalization and modernization have spurred specific socio-demographic pressures such as aging populations, declining birthrates and increased migration, demand for more and better quality health and social care has increased, as have the proliferation of new models of management emphasizing personalization, flexibility and “client” centeredness. In turn, this has stimulated third sector organizations to take on a much more central, yet multifaceted role in the process of social production.

What makes social enterprises particularly interesting as a unique sub-sector of the third sector is their intrinsically
hybrid nature. Because they are engaged in the productive function of supplying services to fulfill a specific demand, they have an exchange function. Yet rather than choosing to maximize service efficiency, revenues or a return on capital, social enterprises, “combine the necessary economic goal with other important social goals that can also be achieved or satisfied at the same time” (Pestoff, 1998: 13). By incorporating new forms of user and citizen participation and creating a variety of “relational goods,” such as trust and solidarity, they are also reciprocity generating institutions (Evers, 2001). In addition, they are redistributive because they stem from a cooperative effort to create and provide public goods and services to beneficiaries that extend beyond their direct members. By blending a variety of social and economic functions typically seen as mutually exclusive, social enterprises represent a unique means of balancing individual and collective well being.

By harnessing policy strategies aimed at social investment (Giddens, 1998; Midgley, 2001) to social enterprises, understood as a unique set of institutions capable of fusing stakeholder democracy (Pestoff, 1994; Borzaga & Mittone, 1997), social capital, (Sabatini, 2006) and social inclusion (Gonzales, 2006), the social economy approach moves beyond a relatively narrow understanding of social welfare systems as exclusively about preserving and/or extending social protection to one which incorporates their relevance for social justice, more broadly conceived. In addition, it bolsters our understanding of how contemporary reforms impact both the most risk prone segments of the population as well as those that are less disadvantaged by globalization and modernization.

On the one hand, social enterprises extend democratic participation and social capital to socially excluded segments of the population, who, despite the prospective benefits of post-industrialism, have stayed trapped in the margins of society. They also have the capacity to expand service networks well beyond the poor and dispossessed in a way that strengthens the public sectors’ ability to overcome the inconsistencies and differentiation that have historically prevented the consolidation of a more organic system of social intervention. Embodying a unique constellation of managerial efficiency, professionalism, and volunteerism, social enterprises offer the potential for
generating a wide range of specialized and general services to a variety of populations, thus expanding well beyond the general pattern of service provision among traditional third sector organizations. Yet, unlike many public agencies, they are adept at linking civic priorities to public responsibilities. In the context of global contracting and “partnered subsidiarity,” (Fanelli, 2001), social enterprises provide the raw material for transforming welfare networks into networks of social responsibility by counteracting the erosion of cooperation and solidarity set in motion by competitive market mechanisms. In addition to providing immediate assistance to service beneficiaries, they serve as the building blocks of broader collective social goods. Relying heavily on human and social capital, as opposed to material and/or technical resources, social enterprises generate job creation for portions of the population that are often most in need of flexible employment opportunities, such as women and youth. They also strengthen the social fabric of communities by bridging local development objectives with traditional “welfare” concerns for the most disadvantaged members of society.

Conclusion

Combining a greater appreciation for the varied nature of organizational forms and inter-organizational relationships underpinning welfare reform with a central concern for the needs and concerns of welfare constituents, the emerging social economy approach identified in this article provides a useful alternative conceptual and analytical framework for understanding the capacity of social welfare systems to cope with the challenges and opportunities posed by globalization and modernization. By incorporating dynamic interactions that take place within the realm of institutional formation and reconfiguration, it allows for a better appreciation of change without losing sight of the structural constraints that are critical in defining the parameters of social welfare systems.

Building on this value added, the future analytic tasks in developing the social economy approach are three fold. Despite the widespread appeal of social enterprises, the breadth and scope of empirical research focused on the hybrid nature of
these organizations is limited. More in depth research into the extent to which social enterprises are able to balance what are often viewed as conflicting imperatives, both cross-nationally and over time is critical to better understanding their contribution to promoting social justice. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to the precise role that governance plays in harnessing large-scale structural reform to the micro-dynamics involved in the day-to-day practices of welfare institutions. Lastly, although the social economy approach offers expectations for service delivery within increasingly complex welfare networks, more theoretical work is needed to link welfare networks to the broader governance systems in which they are embedded.

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Social Welfare Systems in the Post-Industrial Era


(Endnotes)

1 Although it is often used interchangeably with the terms voluntary sector, independent sector and non-profit sector, here I use third sector to refer to the sum total of not-for-profit enterprises, cooperatives, and voluntary associations operating within the intermediary realm between the private business sector, the public sector, and the personal sector comprised of family and friends.

2 While the concept of the social economy has been articulated in a variety of ways, Renato Galliano (2003) best captures the meaning used here by identifying the term social economy as an expression used to define a complex world and a system of relationships which governs the life of the Third System and non-profit enterprises: the creation of flexible employment, active citizenship, services to people, decentered welfare, safeguarding of human rights, strong local development policies and social cooperation.

3 In the *Great Transformation,* Polanyi describes how the ravages of the enclosure movement, Industrialization and laissez-faire economics created a spontaneous, deep seated resistance, without which, he argues, modern, industrial society would not have been possible. For Polanyi, society’s impulse to protect itself against the pernicious effects of the market economy was, “the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age,” (p. 76). And thus, “… human society would have been annihilated but for protective countermoves which blunted the action of this self-destructive mechanism” (p. 76).
Dear Dr. Leighninger,

I have had a subscription to *Social Work* since 1975 when I first joined NASW. Since that time, I have to admit that I have probably read less than 1% of the editorials published within that journal. When I unsystematically poll other subscribers, I discover that most people do not read the editorials. So, if Midgley’s editorial appeared within Social Work with or without “naming the names,” I doubt that most people would have read it. I would not have read it. Perhaps telling social workers that they are not permitted to read something is the best way to get them to read. The decision of Elizabeth Clark and the NASW staff to censor Midgley’s editorial was the catalyst for an unprecedented number of people reading material that would normally go unread. Perhaps this was an unintentional benefit.

The editorial board of *Social Work* and the Executive Director of NASW has a fiduciary responsibility to protect NASW from law suits and other hazardous responses. This fiduciary responsibility includes self-censoring. Although it appears like micro management, Clark has every right and duty to censor material that could harm the organization. For example, I was invited to write a review of the CD version of *The Encyclopedia of Social Work* [see: *Social Work*, 1997. 42(2), 210-211]. Part of the review included experimenting with various social workers (3 or 4) and a librarian on this “new technology.” I went to the trouble to get signed release/consent forms. Nevertheless, *Social Work* required me to remove all names from my manuscript. I thought it was a mistake to fail to give credit. Because of my own experience, I suspect that eliminating names is a common practice. Thus, removing the names from Midgley’s editorial is, in fact, consistent with past editorial procedures.
Yet – like many others, I don’t like it.

My simple review was not a political statement, while Midgley’s editorial was. The censorship of Midgley’s editorial has generated considerable anger among a number of social work faculty. In fact, at least two of my most respected colleagues are planning to drop their membership to NASW as a direct result of the censoring of Midgley’s editorial. This action is a mistake! Like it or not and whether you’re a member or not, NASW represents all social workers in the U.S. In my mind’s eye, the censorship of Midgley’s editorial should become the catalyst for more people to join NASW. Thus, if you don’t like censorship and you want NASW to take greater political risks, you need to be a member of NASW and work to change its policies, and if necessary, its leadership.

Sincerely,
Stephen M. Marson, Ph.D. ACSW
Senior Editor, The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics

Dear Dr. Leighninger:

As someone in the perhaps unique position of serving as an editor for both The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare and Social Work, I greatly appreciate that you and this journal have exposed the issue of censorship at NASW by airing the linen pertaining to the unilateral altering of Jim Midgley’s guest editorial originally scheduled for publication in Social Work last year. The correspondence published about this occurrence, coupled with the thoughtful letters concerning censorship generally and the history of NASW’s actions in this regard more specifically, have served an important purpose: providing an opportunity to examine whither the profession of social work when it comes to openly discussing ideas with political (even only tangentially political) content.

My situation is unique in yet another way: I am currently on the Editorial Board of Social Work and attended my
first meeting in that capacity last May when Jorge Delva, Social Work's Editor-in-Chief, brought the controversy to our attention. Several members of the Board and I were deeply concerned when we learned about the decision made by Betsy Clark and NASW's publisher to strike the names of a few prominent public figures either in or close to the Bush administration. Indeed, the Board spent most of our annual meeting on this matter, including having an unscheduled meeting with NASW's attorney. My position during this discussion (and I was joined by several others) was emphatically to oppose all censorship; there were one or two who voiced concern that the association includes members who are politically conservative, and that efforts must be made not to drive them away.

What clearly emerged—in addition to the publisher's stance of obdurate caution—was that there were no procedures in place to resolve disagreements or disputes between the Editor and the organization or its publisher. We resolved to have procedures developed and suggested that a "special resolution committee" include members of the Editorial Board, the Editor-in-Chief, the author of the "controversial" submission as well as various members of NASW's leadership and press. The resolution, which circulated through email, was made to NASW's Publications Committee whose Chair, Barbara White, was present at the Social Work Board meeting in May.

Despite the seeming urgency to create a policy and the embarrassment to NASW resulting from this controversy, it was not until the its annual meeting in December that the Publications Committee voted to recommend a process to resolve future disagreements. Essentially, as Dr. Delva has informed the Board, the recommendation is to have a process in place that includes the author(s), the Editor-in-Chief, NASW's Executive Director, and the publisher to discuss any concerns. Through this process, it is hoped that the parties will reach agreement or compromise. Dr. Delva has also informed Board members that peer reviewed articles will not be subject to reviews by NASW's executive or publisher and that it is only editorials that are of concern. He has also stated that the process is similar to those of the APHA and the APA. I have asked that this matter be placed on the agenda for the Board's next meeting, in May. I remain concerned that the door is still
open for censorship by NASW's Executive Director and/or publisher should an amicable resolution not be reached in situations of controversy.

I have been consistently aware of the hypocrisy inherent in NASW's censorship of Dr. Midgley's editorial: an organization whose Code of Ethics specifically calls on social workers to advocate for political and social change in order to enhance social justice silences a reputable scholar when he points to some who thwart it. I am reminded of John Ehrenreich's cogent analysis of the profession's history\(^1\): when the political environment is open to social and economic change, social work follows and joins the chorus, but when the times are dominated by reactionary forces, social work retreats and focuses primarily on individuals' problems and methodologies to address them.

Needless to say, I have my own dilemma about whether to remain on Social Work's Board or to resign. Perhaps with the publication of this letter, others will make the decision for me.

Sincerely,
Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Ph.D
Professor, School of Social Work
Salem State College, MA

Book Reviews


Among the remarkable phenomena of the Twentieth Century were the changing roles of women in politics and the transformation of the Republican Party. This book provides an unusual history of women’s involvement in the Party from the time of women’s suffrage, guaranteed by the 19th Amendment, through the dominance of the Party by the New Right. That dominance was partly the result of the efforts of some Republican women.

Because the book is in large measure an explanation of how the New Right came to power in the Party with the support of conservative women, some of the most prominent Republican women are either not mentioned at all or are given minimal attention. For example, one of the Republican women best regarded by social workers is Jeanette Rankin, a social worker herself, and the first woman to be elected to Congress in 1916. She is not mentioned. She was a leading supporter of women’s suffrage and a pacifist. Margaret Chase Smith, one of the most important Republican Senators in the Twentieth Century and one of the few women ever elected to that body, is only referred to in passing. Current Senator Elizabeth Dole is not included.

The author suggests that there were and continue to be various dichotomies among the women in the Party. She describes the National Federation of Republican Women, and women Republican Party officials, whom she calls Party women. Party women, she notes, were “often unmarried, used politics as a career, and were in some cases paid for their work” (p. 3). Clubwomen, active in the Federation, were volunteers.

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However, there were great conflicts beginning in the 1960s about the principles that women’s efforts should support. So the other dichotomy was between Republican women feminists and liberals and Republican women who were antifeminists and conservatives. Perhaps the turning point, the author notes, came in 1967 when, for the first time, the presidency of the National Federation of Republican Women was contested. Usually, a nominating committee’s recommendations were ratified at the conventions of the Federation. However, in 1967, after the 1964 lopsided defeat of the Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater by Lyndon B. Johnson, “the Party regular” Republican women and a group of insurgents battled for the presidency of the Federation.

The leader of the insurgents was Phyllis Schlafly, then and now a strong supporter of conservative positions, who opposed the nominating committee candidate, Gladys O'Donnell. O'Donnell was elected with 56 percent of the convention delegates but Schlafly and her point of view largely prevailed over the future of the Party. Schlafly was the author, in 1964, of A Choice Not an Echo, a strongly conservative political book that voiced opposition to Democrats and their policies. Republicans, Schaflly argued, should not echo the more liberal positions that were espoused by Democrats and were the prevailing philosophy of the more liberal wing of the Republicans. Instead, the Party should pursue conservative policies. In some ways, the Goldwater candidacy and Schlafly's book set the agenda for the New Right. Schlafly and her supporters were opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment, which had initially been supported by many Republicans as well as Democrats but which ultimately failed to be ratified.

The nomination of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a victory for the Republican Right, including the conservative Republicans. For the future of the party, up to and including the present, the dominant position of the Republican Party, including its women leaders, has tended towards the conservative. Although not all Republican presidents and presidential candidates are as conservative as Goldwater and Schlafly, the liberal wing of the Party, which had once been dominant, now represents only a minority of Republicans.

The author notes that the battle continues. Although the
Democratic Party is more identified with feminism, feminist women continue to work within the Republican Party for their point of view. Schlafly continues to pursue her philosophy through her Eagle Forum, an independent organization. A new breed of active and high-ranking Republican women, such as Mary Matalin, an aide to Vice President Cheney, do not especially identify with feminist causes or movements or suggest that they speak for women. They identify themselves as individuals, the author notes.

In several ways, the book is a useful and objective analysis of some of the forces of recent American politics and the conflicts over feminism as well as liberal versus conservative political philosophies within the Republican Party. It will be a useful resource for anyone interested in these developments.

Leon Ginsberg
Appalachian State University


The conversion of scientific knowledge about juvenile delinquency to actual policy and practice has been dreadfully slow and even stalled at times. Criminological research consistently links such factors as delinquent peer affiliations, neglectful parental supervision, low school achievement, and adolescent substance abuse to juvenile delinquency, and juvenile delinquency itself is a risk factor for adult criminality. Despite this robust knowledge base, however, recent developments in crime-control policy often look strikingly like old developments. Tougher sentencing laws, expanding police departments, and construction of more prisons are promoted, supported and funded over proven evidence-based interventions.

The frequent evolution of chronic juvenile delinquents into serious adult offenders would seem enough to justify the need for sound, early preventative programming. Yet, as Peter Greenwood notes in his new book, Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention as Crime-Control Policy, delinquency prevention is
a difficult and complex undertaking. Key issues around how prevention is defined, what types of criminal behavior are to be prevented, and who is responsible must be addressed. Clear definitions of program success and a better understanding of what works are needed, as well as reliable mechanisms for the transmission of information and evidence from researchers to public policymakers and practitioners. These issues drive the book, and Greenwood does a remarkable job of highlighting, analyzing, and critiquing these most critical topics and considerations.

Following a foreword by noted legal scholar Franklin Zimring, the brief opening chapter introduces the purpose and focus of the book. Greenwood recognizes the disconnect between research and policy, the need for better prevention strategies, and the necessity of examining those issues described in the preceding paragraph. Chapter 2 then assumes an historical perspective when tracing the evolution of juvenile delinquency prevention from the emergence of colonial-era institutional placements to the establishment of the juvenile court to the Great Society programming of the 1960s and the policy shifts that marked the 1980s and 1990s. This is a fascinating chapter with relevance beyond simply summarizing interesting social welfare and criminological history. Instead, a better understanding of the historical developments and changes in delinquency prevention gives context to the political and social climate surrounding prevention today.

The third chapter gives an overview of how prevention programs are evaluated and how program impact can (and should) be measured. Greenwood argues that cost-effectiveness is the most appropriate criteria for program comparison and evaluation, though he acknowledges that such analysis is uncommon and many delinquency prevention programs have not been evaluated at all. It is also recognized that variations in study design and methodology often hinder our understanding of a program's true effectiveness. Whereas this chapter argues strongly for the establishment of scientifically-rigorous and consistent criteria for evaluating program effectiveness, the next two chapters extend this to systematically review what works (chapter 4) and what doesn't work (chapter 5) in delinquency prevention. In chapter 4, programs are organized
by target age and the chapter concludes with a brief cost-benefit assessment of the most effective programs. Chapter 5 reviews ineffective programs organized by prevention level (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and it includes an interesting discussion of specific programs that continue despite evidence that they do not work (D.A.R.E., boot camps, and Scared Straight). The discussion of why such programs persist is especially compelling and speaks to the need for clearer definitions of program success as well as better dissemination of research evidence.

Part 2 of the book (Chapters 6-8) tackles important policy-related issues. Chapter 6, for example, discusses the strengths and limitations of cost effectiveness in resource allocation, while chapter 7 examines the role of government in prevention programming. This chapter debates critical questions about which level of government and which branch of government should be responsible for crime and delinquency prevention. Such choices will absolutely impact a program’s mission and goals, yet these questions do not receive enough scholarly, popular, or political discourse. The final chapter (chapter 8) focuses specifically on programming in the juvenile court. The juvenile court is in a unique position to provide and regulate a variety of services aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency. As this chapter recommends, juvenile courts should be knowledgeable about the current evidence base, divert youth to available services when appropriate, consider programming needs and sanctions in all cases, monitor the quality of local programs, and identify programming and service gaps.

Perhaps the real strength of this book is its usefulness to multiple disciplines and professions. As evidenced here, the contents have clear utility to politicians and policymakers as well as juvenile court judges and court administrators. Social work practitioners, social service providers, and agencies seeking to implement programs will also find the book useful, especially chapters 4-5 that review effective and ineffective programs. As noted in chapter 4, adjudicated juveniles, or those youth involved with law enforcement and the courts, pose a distinct risk for re-offending and chronic delinquency. In light of such risk, the brief discussion of effective programming for these youths in the book is disappointing.
However, this is more reflective of our limited understanding of what works with these juveniles than it is a criticism of this book. On the contrary, Changing Lives is an important book with broad appeal and equally broad application. It is wholeheartedly recommended for everyone working in the juvenile and criminal justice systems or for anyone with an interest in delinquency and crime prevention.

Matthew T. Theriot
The University of Tennessee


This book provides an historical and multicultural perspective of issues resulting from children in need of care outside the birth family. The editor and contributors have backgrounds in English, history, and law and they provide somewhat different perspectives than those found in traditional social work. Social work educators who are well versed on the history of child welfare may not find this book informative.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I includes seven essays describing various aspects of the history of child welfare, Part II addresses original documents and Part III, a variety of related resources. This reviewer found the first chapter, about the inclusion of children in need of care outside of their birth families during the Colonial and New Republic period (1605-1850), the most informative. The chapter describes how Native American tribes added non-relative children and adults to meet the needs of continuity and lineage as opposed to meeting the specific needs of children. The influence of the European family and care of U.S. children provided an alternate means of children's care outside the immediate family. Parents most often placed their children in others' homes through apprenticeship arrangements or through indentured servitude. The strength and adaptability of African Americans under the adversity of slavery is described as well. The importance of extended family and tribal communities encouraged taking in
and looking after other children through informal adoption, foster care and fictive kin relationships.

The second chapter describes a change in philosophy that recognized that children's needs are better met in families than in institutions. The orphan trains moved children from orphanages and inner city poverty to farm families, marking the recognized beginning of foster care and adoption in this country. Children's Aid Societies that ran orphan trains recognized early on that not every family was fit and developed a means of checking out perspective families via agents, arguably the first social workers. Because many of these children were not orphans and some were mistreated, the need for a legal arrangement was recognized with Massachusetts passing the first adoption law in 1851.

Chapter three covers a wide variety of child welfare topics during the period from 1930 to 1969. The author describes how sociology and social work developed into discrete disciplines that recognized the need for a workforce with proper education and training. As a result of the Great Depression, it became necessary to reimburse foster families for the care of others' children and Aid to Dependent Children was established to enable widowed and abandoned women to raise their children.

In chapter 4, the authors describe sealed adoption records and the controversies that followed. For example, adult adoptees needed access to health history of and information about birth parents, birth mothers wanted to know what happened to their children, and adoptive parents needed full information about the children they were adopting and health and mental health histories of the biological parents. The history and legal base of large-scale international adoption is thoroughly covered in chapter five. Chapter 6 provides an account the orphan's role in literature.

The chapters in Part II of the book are original documents, including letters from children placed by parents or farm parents who took in children of the orphan trains, the first adoption law, the Child Welfare League of America 1938 standards for adoptions, and the Hague Convention on Inter-country Adoptions of 1993. These are interesting writings and add some credibility through documentation to the
discussion in earlier chapters. However, they do not seem necessary since they were described in previous chapters. Chapters in Part III are bibliographies. The references are useful resource material on a wide variety of topics on orphanages, foster care, adoption, multicultural aspects and controversies in adoption practice.

The main value of this book is the synthesis of a great deal of information available in other sources into historical periods and topical categories. The book will probably be of most interest to child welfare practitioners, prospective foster and adoptive parents, and undergraduates who know little about the history of orphanages, foster care and adoption. Quite surprisingly, Lela Costin’s extensive work on the history of child welfare in the U.S. and Ruth McRoy’s longitudinal study on adoption were not cited in the text, although each author was listed in the bibliography. Research was not included on the outcomes of children in birth, foster and adoptive families. While the largest numbers of adoptions in the U.S. are by step-parents and relatives, these adoptions were only mentioned and should have been discussed in some detail. The odd organization and format of the book were somewhat distracting to this reviewer.

Alberta J. Ellett
University of Georgia


Social workers have discovered ethnography, to the benefit of neither so far. To some it seems an excuse not to worry about rigorous research. To others it seems a way to fancy up open-ended interviews or participant observations, perfectly legitimate methods not in need of cosmetics. Real ethnographers immerse themselves in a culture for months, sometimes years; they don’t just visit occasionally. Calling a two-hour interview an ethnography is like calling two notes a symphony or Twinkies® a balanced diet.
At the other end of the spectrum there is the problem of ethnographers becoming so immersed in the culture that they lose any outside perspective on it. It's called "going native." Jeff Ferrell is the real thing. He was a full time scrounger—someone who derives the material necessities of life from the waste and discards of others—for eight months, and a part-timer for years before and after. He is neither a cultural tourist nor a wannabe native, yet he presents an entirely different challenge to assessing his research. He has decided to recreate the culture in himself, making no structured attempt to describe and assess the lives of his fellow scroungers, in fact avoiding contact with them (except by accident). There are plenty of these happenstance encounters, but there are no rounded portraits, only snapshots on the run. This is more an exercise in autobiography than an ethnography.

As Ferrell readily admits, he may not be a remotely typical citizen of the "empire of scrounge." He has an employed partner who pays his mortgage and utility bills, covers his health care expenses, and feeds him. After a hot, gritty day of prospecting and mining, he has a hot shower, a sound roof, and a soft bed waiting for him. He may have fixed the plumbing, patched the roof, and built the bed from scrounged materials, but he has a home. He speculates that other scroungers may be like him, but he has no idea if this is true.

Ferrell pays little attention to food. He claims that, had he wanted to, he could have sustained himself on scrounged food. But this disinterest also must set him apart from the average scrounger. More important, we get hardly any idea about how the shadow economy actually works. We know that he collects scrap metal, for he discloses prices salvage yards pay for different categories of aluminum and later records the proceeds of a single haul; but, perhaps because his partner is covering most of his cash needs, he never tells us how much income he is able to realize this way on a regular basis.

We know he has occasional yard sales, however, these seem to be exercises in charity rather than income generation. He sometimes sells valuable finds to dealers, but about this he is annoyingly coy. He sells a cache of old doll clothes and, he says, "I walk out with, well, enough cash to keep me going for a while (p. 50)." Mostly, though, he gives things away or stores
them in his shed.

His shed seems to be bursting with things he can’t or hasn’t yet used, particularly tools. He finally admits, “I was a junky for tools, and the empire is an endless fix (p. 104).” This casts an interesting light on a quote buried in the footnote, perhaps waiting to be scrounged. Says another chronicler of the empire, “All the dumpster divers I have known come to the point of trying to acquire everything they touch (p. 211).” Have we moved from autobiography to psychopathology?

One goal of this book is to astound the reader with the quantity and quality of what our consumer civilization discards. In that Ferrell succeeds admirably. This is a book of lists. Hardly a paragraph passes, much less a whole page, without a list of treasures the latest trash pile has yielded. After the 25th list, the point has been made. By 50th, the excitement of a new discovery has long since faded.

Another goal is, or should be, to tell us how the citizens of the empire can survive. In the middle of the book Ferrell states, amazingly, that they can’t. Does this mean that they die rapidly and are replaced by an endless supply of impoverished citizens? Ferrell offers no vignettes of mortality, but since he doesn’t go looking, we don’t know. On the next to last page, Ferrell confesses that the book is “shambling scholarship,” not any kind of “thoroughgoing project.” It is a collection of stories, spun out with only the loosest connection to organizing themes. The closest we get to disciplined ethnography is the discovery that there are three mores in the empire: the first scrounger to the trash pile has first dibs, leave the trash neater than you found it, and take only what you need (a principle he regularly violates). Even at the practical level, we get little information on the techniques of successful scrouning. A few appear at the very end of the book. As a veteran scrounger myself, perhaps I was expecting too much.

Criminology is Ferrell’s academic speciality, and there are many passing observations of how simple attempts to cope with poverty are being progressively criminalized. He succeeds in igniting a simmering anger that a more careful analysis might have fanned into a proper rage, producing a genuine classic work that one quoted reviewer declared it. Instead, it is a self-indulgent ramble through what could be the twilight of
our civilization, undertaken by a very interesting and likeable person, who is hoping, as he puts it, to come upon a moment “of improvisational jazz when shared musical structure explodes into insight and emotion (p. 204).” However, such moments, in jazz or ethnography, don’t just happen by accident. Serious jazz musicians don’t just jam, they also “shed,” which means practice a lot in the woodshed.

Robert D. Leighninger, Jr.
Arizona State University


In her intelligent, creative and highly readable study, Laura Pulido demonstrates the value of a comparative analysis that respects the complex dynamics of organizing within and across race and class enough to convey not only the strengths and benefits, but also the limitations and pitfalls of such collective action. This work can be read on a number of levels—a study of racial identity mobilization, a history of the New Left, a narrative of indigenous leadership development, or a testimony to the dramatic potency of radical analyses of societal inequities. Through whatever lens it is read, Pulido has made an elegant and vital addition to our understanding of multicultural social change efforts.

The core theoretical framework for this study, as explicated in Part I, is collective racial identity formation, specifically how a racial/ethnic group comes to realize and then act on its common interests, how that group negotiates class differences and gender relations, and how that group chooses to work with other disenfranchised populations (if at all). In tracing the development of radical Third World organizing in greater Los Angeles, Pulido focuses on the Black Panther Party (BPP), El Centro de Accion Social y Autonomo (CASA), and East Wind (Japanese American collective). In the early chapters, Pulido provides the historical, economic and geographic contexts for the comparative case studies, noting that the different ways in
which Black, Asian and Latino/a were treated in the housing or labor markets not only shaped the collective racial identity, but also contributed to the politicization of that identity. This, she argues, is a critical phase in the distillation of a radical Third World analysis and she draws effectively from Freire’s work as well as that of Marxist-Leninist scholars and activists.

In Part II, she turns attention to the different trajectories of her specific case study organizations and attendant communities. Her narratives, built on interviews, original documents (such as manifestos, posters, event reports) and various first person accounts, are rich in detail. Those familiar with the social protests of the 1960s may well remember the excitement and danger of this time. Those not acquainted with the political organizing of this period perhaps will understand why the 1960s were viewed as a revolutionary era, even if at times misguided. This is not a romantic rendering of the time; rather Pulido’s account serves as a reminder of how graphic and brutal the context, and consequences, of radical politics could be. And yet, there is palpable excitement that practically leaps from the pages—an excitement largely absent from the comparably paler progressive politics of today.

Pulido traces the formation of the Third World Left, specifically the movement organizations, the emergence and coalescence of the ideology, the efforts at building solidarity across the various racial/ethnic groups, and the gendered relations within the movement. Throughout, she weaves in her own research with various theoretical works and historical accounts mostly from social movement literature. Pulido concludes with a somewhat cautionary chapter on the current state of activism, specifically radical activism with particular attention to race, class and gender.

Some may assume that Pulido’s work has limited applicability, since she is so focused on the dynamics of Los Angeles organizing. While the particulars might be of a regional nature, the lessons are not. First, Latino/a, Asian and Black identity-based movements can be found in the East, Midwest and South. These campaigns also struggled with internal dynamics of class, gender and nationality, as well as external, cross-race and class coalitions. Pulido makes an important contribution to the larger story of organizing through the U.S. Students
of collective action will learn much in terms of issue framing, strategic development, and movement building.

Second, regardless of the uniqueness of L.A. social activism, the way in which Pulido examines the complex intersections of race, class, nationality and gender is noteworthy. She is able to balance the narratives of each racial/ethnic group with an overarching account of the sometime fractitious interplay between the groups. Pulido clearly respects and admires the accomplishments of each group, and at the same time is able to critique their short-comings, especially those that result from too rigid an adherence to racial identity politics. This is most clearly seen in her chapter "Patriarchy and Revolution: Gender Relations in the Third World Left," in which she deftly notes the promises and problems of the feminist movement from a Third World perspective, as well as the ways in which many Third World women struggled to be taken seriously by their male comrades. This activist duality for Third World women simultaneously results from the new opportunities suggested by the women's movement and the racism of the women's movement juxtaposed with the immediacy of the struggle by their racial/ethnic movement and the sexism within that movement. As a minor complaint, I wish she had been clearer about her methodology and source acquisition.

I hope this book receives a wide reading. Pulido does an extraordinary job disentangling the conceptual and historical complexities. Those concerned with a radical vision of social justice can learn much, and be inspired by, the accounts set forth in this work. Given the present state of the world, Pulido reminds us how different the world could be and how some courageous communities fought for that vision of social justice against great odds. That they weren't completely successful does not diminish their efforts; instead, it places the burden on us to sustain that dream.

Cheryl A. Hyde
Temple University

Brian Donovan’s analysis of widespread crusades against so-called “white slavery” in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s builds on previous analyses of moralism in the Victorian era, particularly studies of the relationship between race, ethnicity, gender, and class in perceptions of morality. He argues that campaigns aiming to stamp out the vice of prostitution used gender, racial, and religious stereotypes to gather support for their cause. In fact, the assaults on white slavery helped construct a hierarchy of racial groups in the U.S., a hierarchy that included not only African Americans and Chinese immigrants, but also Jewish, Italian, Irish, Hungarian, and other newcomers from Europe.

Donovan’s work is based on the use of “narratives” or “stories” related to prostitution and the problems of “fallen women.” He uses “narrative” to cover a vast array of written and spoken material from the time, including pamphlets, letters, newspaper articles, novels, investigative reports, and pieces in popular magazines; as well as speeches on lynching, racial purity, and the phenomenon of white slavery. These narratives, he argues, were crucial “in the process of racial group-making and boundary maintenance during the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the U.S.,” (p. 3), just as stories about “black rapists” helped shape white dominance in the post-Reconstruction South. Donovan posits that white slavery stories provided a cultural resource that people could use to make arguments about gender and sex in the early 1900s.

Donovan examines the reactions of native-born whites to new European immigrant groups in Chicago, African Americans in New York City, and Chinese immigrants in San Francisco. In many cases, such as the Irish, immigrants worked hard to be seen as white, to distinguish themselves from free African American workers. In order to maintain “racial purity,” he explains, the non-immigrant white majority felt it imperative to regulate sexual intimacy within and between groups. Racial “outsiders”—Blacks and certain groups of immigrants—were seen as sexually dangerous.
Donovan discusses a number of social reformers, often women, who used the topic of white slavery to warn about the dangers of large cities and the exploitation of poor women, including immigrant women. While many women reformers tended to "blame the victim" (seeing immigrant prostitutes as weak and conscienceless), others, particularly Jane Addams, pointed out the economic forces that drove women to prostitution. However, Donovan notes that even Addams felt that women might exaggerate low wages as the reason for their "fall." Addams was indeed a complex person; a broader analysis of her writings on immigration might have yielded a more comprehensive picture of her views about the white slave trade.

The book ends with an account of the demise of white slavery, brought about primarily, as Donovan explains it, by the rise of the social hygiene movement. This movement developed during the early 1900s as a response to the rise of venereal disease. The approach of World War I brought awareness of the link between prostitution, disease, and the infection of American troops. As the author puts it, "a scientific discourse of social hygiene gradually replaced white slavery storytelling" (p. 135). I found this conclusion to the book rather abrupt and undeveloped—why did this phenomenon bring the fear of white slavery to an end? What other factors might have played a role?

In general, the book is interesting and provocative. The study covers an important topic in social and political history. Its major liability is the vagueness of the concepts of "narratives" and "stories." To group pamphlets, scholarly books, novels, government reports, newspaper articles, cartoons, speeches, and letters all under one umbrella seems a bit haphazard. Are some of these sources more important than others in shaping public opinion? Do they resonate with different groups in society? Could the book in fact been written without using the term "narrative?"

Leslie Leighninger
Arizona State University

Taxes are often portrayed as a burden rather than a means to meeting critical public needs, with much of the political debate focused on reducing taxes for individuals and families. In the midst of these discussions, little attention is paid to the value of the services our taxes fund, and the potential for tax policy to alleviate or exacerbate social inequality.

Mimi Abramovitz and Sandra Morgen's highly readable examination of the tax system in *Taxes are a Woman's Issue: Reframing the Debate* offers a much-needed feminist perspective. The authors state that a goal in writing the book is to provide an introduction to tax policy in the United States, highlighting the ways in which women are uniquely affected by our tax system. The text achieves this goal with its concise, straightforward writing style and combination of factual presentation with individual women's stories. These stories concretize otherwise abstract issues and underscore the importance of viewing tax policy through a feminist lens.

The first few chapters present the authors' arguments for a feminist understanding of tax policy. Chief among these is that women are disproportionately burdened by cuts in government services; for example, when Medicare is cut, women are doubly disadvantaged as they are more likely to need Medicare as they age, and they are often the primary caregivers for elderly relatives. Similarly, women fail to receive their fair share of tax benefits like Social Security, which hinge on earnings-based contributions, since they earn less than men, and are more likely to spend a portion of their prime working years caring for children. Women of color and poor women are even more affected by these kinds of biases in the tax system.
Subsequent chapters provide a brief history of the tax system in the United States, discuss the challenges for women resulting from specific tax policies introduced in recent years, and describe the continuing concentration of wealth. The final chapter presents a plan for tax reform, suggesting that women work towards a tax system that meets national goals and adheres to the principles of fairness, equity, adequacy, and responsibility. The book concludes with a selection of brief essays on tax reform by members of the National Council for Research on Women who were consulted in the writing of the book. For those interested in further information on tax reform and women, the book includes a helpful resource list.

The one weakness of the book is that it does not discuss non-tax-related solutions to some of the social problems presented; the call for a concise volume focused on the tax system may have made it impossible to address other types of policies that may achieve similar goals and benefit women more. Nevertheless, Abramovitz and Morgen breathe life into an issue that many of us dismiss as too dull or complex. They provide an excellent introduction to tax policy and make a compelling argument for a feminist analysis and reform of the tax system.

Sarah Taylor, University of California, Berkeley


There is a good deal of discussion today, both in academic and popular circles, about whether the United States has become a global imperial power similar to the great empires of the past. This debate has been facilitated by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the deployment of American forces to other countries as well. However, most scholars recognize that the contemporary global role of the United States differs significantly from the type of imperial power exercised by the ancient empires and by European countries in recent centuries. On the other hand, some believe that there are key similarities between the current practices of the American government
and past imperial ventures. In addition to these disagreements, the normative question of whether the United States should seek to exercise its military, economic and diplomatic power to direct international events is widely discussed.

Charles Maier tackles these complex issues by placing the question of American imperialism in a historic context which covers the earliest records of conquest in Mesopotamia to more recent global power struggles between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. The discussion is interwoven with many other historical examples of imperialism and its complex dimensions. Included are illustrative references to the Greek and Roman empires as well as those of the Arabs and Ottomans. Drawing on these examples, Maier seeks to elucidate some of the key issues in debates about contemporary imperialism.

An obvious starting point is whether the historic experience sheds light on the definition of imperialism and the question of what imperialism involves. Maier reviews numerous definitions and makes interesting points relating to the spatial and temporal dimensions of imperial ambitions as well as the extent to which imperial power is exerted both domestically and internationally. He applies these ideas to the current situation and examines the notion that the United States is a hegemon rather than imperium. He also offers an interesting discussion of the economistic theories that have sought to explain the dynamics of imperialism and shows the limitations of their appeal. Several chapters of the book focus specifically on the American experience since the Second World War. This discussion links issues of power politics to economic influence in an interesting and novel way. Contemporary imperialism, the author suggests, must be understood in the context of global economic forces.

Maier has a masterful historic grasp and his analysis is wide-ranging and comprehensive. However, this is by no means an introductory book, and students who wish to know more about the subject will be challenged by its discursive and reflective style. On the other hand, for those who have an understanding of the issues, Maier's virtuoso analysis and its broad historic sweep will be both informative and entertaining. The book makes a major contribution to current debates
and should be widely consulted by anyone interested in contemporary international events.


We are facing a global energy dilemma. Our primary source of energy—oil—is a finite and dwindling resource. The largest sources of oil are located in politically unstable regions where Western countries do not enjoy strong influence. Additionally, the negative consequences of the use of fossil fuels are apparent in global warming and negative health effects. Nevertheless, energy consumption continues to increase. Where do we look from here? In his book, *Global Energy Shifts: Fostering Sustainability in a Turbulent Age*, Bruce Podobnik suggests we look to the past.

The book consists of seven chapters examining the historical patterns of past energy shifts from one primary energy source to another. The author believes that these shifts can inform decisions in the future. The initial chapter explains the author’s world historical perspective and outlines his main premise that in order to truly understand energy shifts we have to account for actors at the state, corporate, and social levels. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the ascendancy of coal as the primary source of energy and the conflicts that arose in the coal sector. Chapter 4 examines the rapid movement toward an oil-based energy system brought about by the two World Wars. Chapter 5 describes the shift to an oil-based energy system along with the rise in natural gas and nuclear power. This chapter also offers an interesting analysis of the emergence of energy consumption inequalities. Chapter 6 describes the changes in the global energy system caused by the oil crises in the 1970s and the increase in global competition for oil resources. Finally, Chapter 7 offers a summary of the research and the author’s view of how the next transition toward a more sustainable energy system can be established.

Podobnik has gathered an impressive amount of data to
bolster his argument for the inclusion of an account of social conflict in the story of energy shifts. The use of data is very helpful in telling this story. The material is well laid out and is presented in a coherent manner which allows the reader to gain a greater understanding of the dynamics of global energy systems. The author has constructed a compelling argument for the need to examine social as well as political and economic factors when assessing energy shifts. Using this analysis, he offers an account of the factors necessary to move toward more sustainable sources of energy. The discussion, while intriguing, could have been enhanced by the inclusion of case studies detailing the interactions between political, economic and social factors. A more detailed discussion of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro power would also have been helpful. While a bit dry for the general reader, Global Energy Shifts will be of interest to educators as an example of the use of historical narratives and the integration of social factors into the discussion of global energy. Additionally, social activists will be interested in the discussion of the role social conflict can play in moving toward a more sustainable energy system.

Terry V. Shaw, University of California, Berkeley


The notion of "stakeholding" was frequently bandied about in political debates in Britain in the 1990s. As a part of its commitment to privatization, Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative government facilitated the purchase of public housing by residents and encouraged greater participation of ordinary people in shareholder capitalism. In this way, the Conservatives argued, citizens would acquire a meaningful stake in the nation's economy. Labour politicians echoed these ideas by arguing that stakeholding should be extended to the welfare domain as well. On a visit to Singapore, Tony Blair was much inspired by the savings accounts that had been created by the country's government to fund retirement pensions, education
and medical care. Before Labour won the 1997 general election, leading party thinkers began to propose the creation of similar programs. Of these, the idea of child savings accounts were particularly popular and, after much debate, these accounts were introduced in 2005. Known as child trust funds, the program provides a voucher which is used to open a bank account for each child born after September 2002. Interest earned is tax free and additional deposits may be made. Accumulations may not be withdrawn until the age of 18 when no restrictions on their use are imposed.

The child trust fund is used as a prime example of what the editors of this book described as a “citizen’s stake” or as “universal asset policies.” The purpose of the book is to examine stake holding programs such as child trust funds and to consider their viability as a new approach to social welfare. The book is divided into two parts: the first considers the mechanisms that may be used to fund universal asset programs of this kind while the second examines other forms of stake holding, including “caretaker accounts” for parents with young children, and “sabbatical” accounts for employees who wish to interrupt their working lives to pursue other interests. Various proposals for generating revenues through, for example, more effective inheritance taxes or taxes on commonly held assets are discussed. In addition, the book contains chapters reporting on public opinion studies about the desirability of Universal asset policies and the best ways of funding them.

The editors have assembled an interesting collection of papers that deal with many different aspects of the stake holding approach. They have grounded the book in a solid theoretical discussion of different perspectives on the issue of stakeholding and on interesting historical information about the origins on this idea. Some of the chapters on potential funding sources are fascinating. The notion of taxing the Commons to provide universal benefits to all citizens is discussed in a particularly interesting account. The chapter dealing with the idea of “sabbatical” accounts is equally intriguing. Although this book is written primarily for readers in the United Kingdom, it contains information that will be of interest to readers in other countries and particularly in the United States where assets now form a key component of social policy debates.
Psychiatry has often been referred to as a stepchild among medical specialties. Lower in status and financial reward than the others, it straddles the worlds of biomedicine and social science. Sigmund Freud, the presumptive grandfather of the field, revealed his training as a neurologist when he introduced his topographic model of the mind. Somehow, it has proven easier to localize the amygdala and hippocampus than the id, ego, or superego. The resultant confusion and illegitimate interchangeability of mind and brain have long outlived Freud, and form the core of ongoing controversy in the field of psychiatry. Add to this the interesting dilemmas that Eurocentric psychiatry presents in the developing world, and we have the background for Lakoff’s current effort.

Using an ethnographic methodology common to anthropological fieldwork, Lakoff interviews psychiatrists, patients, pharmaceutical representatives, and intellectuals in an attempt to delineate what he sees as the two major trends in Argentine psychiatry. Biomedical psychiatry is described as targeted, scientifically verifiable, and increasingly specific as DNA is collected for genomic databases. In opposition to this, Lakoff places the Argentine tradition of Lacanian psychoanalysis. This powerful institution found its way into the country in the early 1960s at a crucial moment in the formation of the Argentine psychiatric identity. Lakoff’s respondents represent this *Lacanismo* as progressive and reflective of human and individualistic values; utilizing language and the subjective as opposed to the presumed “animal” nature of biological markers. These respondents cite as evidence of their progressiveness the fact that they were repressed by the Argentine military junta during the “dirty war” of 1976-83, and were forced into clandestine meetings of their study groups. They see themselves as part of an advocacy, social, and therefore somewhat indigenous Argentine movement. Using a center-periphery paradigm, Lakoff focuses on the globalization of pharmaceutical markets and refers to the Argentine adoption of the DSM as a North American import. Indeed, there are ways in which
adoption of the DSM is a necessary precursor for expanding drug markets. Psychostimulants such as Adderall (dextroamphetamine), for example, once considered to involve too many risks to justify medical benefit, have enjoyed renewed medical legitimacy with the "discovery" of adult ADHD. While this is certainly of interest, the book does not, in any similar fashion, utilize the center-periphery paradigm for the psychoanalytic tradition imported from the capitals of Europe. This may be the book's major shortcoming.

Lakoff makes comparisons on many occasions with North American psychiatry, but fails to examine one of the more import contributions of the U.S. mental health system, namely, the consumer's movement. Such socio-political activity is dependent upon a high degree of congruence between the self-described identities of consumers and the description of them by mental health professionals. The absence of a comparable movement in Argentina may be due, in part, to the fact that a narrow Lacanian view does not afford such congruence, especially among the Indians and mestizos who live in large numbers outside of Buenos Aires. On balance, Lakoff's book is much more than another narrative about globalization and its discontents, and is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in psychiatry, Latino mental health, mental health policy, or the impact of globalization on national identities.

Peter Manoleas, University of California at Berkeley


Although welfare to work has been widely claimed as a highly successful social policy innovation, most former welfare recipients have joined the ranks of working poor and the belief that they are well on the way to self-sufficiency and success has been challenged. Many scholars believe that wider social policy interventions that address the problems of low-wage work are urgently needed. Although this interesting book is not primarily concerned with welfare to work, its comparative
account of the lives and experiences of low paid hotel workers in Seattle and Vancouver provides powerful insights into the way social policies and programs mitigate low wage work and improve the quality of life of low income families.

The book is based on a rigorous qualitative study of low paid workers in two hotels in each city. The hotels are owned by large international firms and the workers shared many demographic and other characteristics. The study paid particular attention to the way that government programs in each city subsidized low-wage work or otherwise provided a climate in which the quality of life of low paid workers was enhanced. It also focused on the extent of unionization and the way unionization contributed to the well-being of workers.

The study showed that there were clear differences in the way social policy and Canada and the United States affected the lives of low paid hotel workers. The workers in Canada clearly benefitted from unionization, the country's national health service and public transport facilities. In addition, urban planning and related services in Vancouver created a sense of security and community in the neighborhoods where the hotel workers resided. Although the author is careful not to caricature the situation in Seattle, the hotel workers clearly struggled with health care. Inadequate public transportation also posed a major challenge. Although wages were somewhat higher in the Seattle hotels, the differences were not great and the Seattle hotel workers generally reported higher health care and transportation costs. Generally, educational opportunities for the children of low income workers in Vancouver were superior to those in Seattle.

The author's central argument is that social policies play a major role in affecting the well-being of low income working people. While conventional means-tested programs made a negligible contribution, government policies and programs directed at health care, educational opportunities and neighborhood quality were critical in mitigating the negative circumstances in which many low paid workers found themselves. The fact that there were significant differences in the impact of social policies and programs on low-wage work in Canada and United States has major implications. The study challenges the widespread belief that government social policies are
ineffective or harmful and that government efforts to address the low wage problems associated with globalization will inevitably fail. Similarly, the idea that all industrial countries are gradually experiencing a neoliberal convergence based on American approaches is also questioned. The author is to be commended for producing a lively, interesting and ingenious comparative analysis which deserves to be widely read.
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A Call for Papers

Beyond the Numbers: How the Lived Experiences of Women Challenge the "Success" of Welfare Reform

Since President Clinton "ended welfare as we know it," JSSW's special issues—Evaluation of TANF in 2001, Coping with Poverty in 2006, Globalization, Social Justice & Social Welfare in 2007 and Recent or Contemporary History of Social Welfare projected for 2008—bring attention to areas of critical concern within the field. These special issues emphasize the importance of caring in a society that appears lacking in concern for those who are most vulnerable: the poor, immigrants, people of color, and single mothers on welfare. In addition, these special issues frame the concerns within the broader contexts of socially unjust systems, competitive global markets, and political and legislative processes that have led to policy changes.

This special issue aims to explore and critically evaluate the lived experiences of women on and post-welfare using historical knowledge and current qualitative and quantitative research data. We intend for it to complement and extend the discussion of the special issues that have come before it. Without doubt, the 1980s were a pivotal turning point in social welfare history. Neo-conservative theorists and policy analysts prevailed under the Reagan administration, paving the way for the fierce attacks on welfare in the 1990s and the eventual passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.

Specifically, we intend to focus this edition on how the actual experiences of low-income women challenge conventional ideas about the "success" of current welfare "reform" and how we can and must use this information to inform and impact public policy and address the systems of inequality that structure the lives of low-income women. We are concerned with the celebratory approach that many policy analysts have adopted in proclaiming the 1996 welfare initiative a "success." Too many women have disappeared from eligibility programs, a large majority is barely surviving on low-wage jobs without
opportunities for advancement to higher wage work, many more move in and out of the low-wage job market with distressing regularity, and over 40% remain poor. Women who had been attending college as a means to escape poverty have dropped out. Some are in prison, others have lost their children, and some have taken their own lives. Like many of our colleagues, we are struck and amazed and discouraged by how many researchers consider welfare a “success.” Too few raise concerns about the current dismal state of women on welfare and of those that have left and disappeared. Fewer bring attention to poor women raising families on their own and to the disconnect between their real lives and the statistics that report on their lives. While it is true that welfare numbers are down, many of those who have been forced off or left welfare are not doing well at all.

This special edition takes as its framework the work by Alice O’Connor in Poverty Knowledge wherein she brings attention to the ways in which poverty research has become an industry of sorts, more interested, it sometimes seems, in entrepreneurial gains and less interested in ameliorating poverty. O’Connor references welfare reform, calling it a “triumph of politics and ideology over knowledge.” We aim to bring forth the omitted knowledge that has been gathered by scholars and researchers since 1996. While the reams of data that had been collected over time proved to have little persuasive power over political decision-makers then, our concern is that the preponderance of evidence being produced that celebrates welfare “success” will have considerable influence in maintaining the harsh attitudes of current welfare policy as we know it now. It is to this concern that we would like this special issue to respond.

This special issue provides the opportunity to bring attention to the lived experiences of women who are poor, and those raising families on their own. It is our intent to not only insist that public policy consider their situations, but use the available data on women’s lives to propose a policy agenda that will raise them out of poverty.

We encourage submissions that demonstrate and challenge the proclaimed “success” of welfare reform and reflect the diversity of women’s lived experiences on and beyond welfare. We urge authors to suggest recommendations for crafting
welfare and workforce policy that can raise women and their families out of poverty and allow them dignity and respect.

Submission length: 10 – 14 pages

Submission deadline: October 1, 2007

Send submissions in Word doc format to:

jsswldmg@smr.rutgers.edu

About the editors:

Dr. Luisa S. Deprez is a Professor in the Department of Sociology, former Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, and Director of the Women’s Studies Program at the University of Southern Maine. She is also Visiting Scholar in the Center for Women in Politics and Public Policy and Center for Social Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. Her scholarly and teaching interests center on the broad arenas of social welfare policy including the politics of policy-making; the impact of ideology and public opinion in policy; citizenship; poverty; the Capability Approach and higher education; and women, welfare and higher education. She has published The Family Support Act of 1988: A Case Study of Welfare Policy in the 1980s (Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), co-edited Shut-Out: Low Income Mothers and Higher Education in Post-Welfare America (SUNY Press, 2004), and written numerous articles and book chapters about the restrictions of current welfare policy on low-income women seeking to access higher education.

Dr. Mary Gatta is the Director of Workforce Policy and Research at the Center for Women and Work at Rutgers University. Through this work, she currently directs the Sloan Center on Innovative Training and Workforce Development, a Alfred P. Sloan Foundation funded project that provides technical assistance and resources to states to scale up a New Jersey pilot project of online learning for low wage workers
throughout the country. Dr. Gatta’s book on this project, *Not Just Getting By: The New Era of Flexible Workforce Development* (Lexington Books, Press for Change, 2005) chronicles groundbreaking thinking and research on new and innovative workforce development initiatives that deliver skills training to single working poor mothers via the Internet. Her book, *Juggling Food and Feelings: Emotional Balance in the Workplace* (Lexington Books, 2002) investigates how individuals maintain and manage their emotions in an attempt to rebalance them as they are interacting in the workplace. Dr. Gatta has also published numerous scholarly articles and public policy papers on topics including gender equity in academia, workforce development policies for low wage workers, the gender based pay gap, and occupational sex segregation.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS
(Revised June, 2006)

JSSW welcomes a broad range of articles which analyze social welfare institutions, policies, or problems from a social scientific perspective or otherwise attempt to bridge the gap between social science theory and social work practice.

Submission Process
Submit manuscripts to: Robert Leighninger, School of Social Work, Arizona State University, 411 N. Central Ave. Suite 800, Phoenix, AZ, 85004-0699. Send these copies together with an abstract of approximately 100 words. Since manuscripts are not returned by reviewers to the editorial office, the editorial office cannot return them to the authors. Submission certifies that it is an original article and that it has not been published nor is being considered for publication elsewhere. Receipt of manuscripts will be acknowledged by email.

Progress reports can be obtained by emailing the editor at rleighn@asu.edu. Reviewing normally takes 120 days.

Preparation
Articles should be typed, double-spaced (including the abstract, indented material, footnotes, and references) on 8 1/2 x 11 inch white bond paper with one inch margins on all sides. Tables may be submitted single-spaced. Please provide a running head and keywords with manuscript.

Anonymous Review
To facilitate anonymous review, please keep identifying information out of the manuscript. Only the title should appear on the first page. Attach one cover page that contain the title, authors, affiliations, date of submission, mailing address, telephone number and any statements of credit or research support.

Style
Overall style should conform to that found in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Fifth Edition, 2001. Use in-text citations (Reich, 1983; Reich, 1983, p. 5). The use of footnotes in the text is discouraged. If footnotes are essential, include them on a separate sheet after the last page of the references. The use of italics or quotation marks for emphasis is discouraged. Words should be underlined only when it is intended that they be typeset in italics.

Gender and Disability Stereotypes
Please use gender neutral phrasing. Use plural pronouns and truly generic nouns ("labor force" instead of "man-power"). When dealing with disabilities, avoid making people synonymous with the disability they have ("employees with visual impairments" rather than, "the blind"). Don’t magnify the disabling condition ("wheelchair user" rather than "confined to a wheelchair"). For further suggestions see the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association or Guide to Non-Sexist Language and Visuals, University of Wisconsin-Extension.

Book Reviews
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