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The Idea of Good Government: The Evolution of Administrative Thought and Practice in the American Republic

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THE IDEA OF GOOD GOVERNMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

by

James Robert Wieber

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THE IDEA OF GOOD GOVERNMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT AND PRACTICE IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

James Robert Wieber, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 1987

This study analyzes the evolution of the proper role of public administration in American government. American public administration traces its roots to the founding of American constitutional government in 1789, but divergent opinions continue regarding the discipline's proper role in a democracy. This question has never been settled in the American experiment. Considering the size, scope, and complexity of today's administrative state, it may well never be. Recent efforts have sought to define public administration's role as proactive on behalf of clients for reasons of social equity and human dignity. Further attempts have been made to define administration as a mediating social partner with affected social groups.

This study agrees with the need for government to become more than a mechanistic deliverer of public services. However, argument questions the legitimacy of an administrative elite with broad powers and discretion. Can public administration, as an elite, withstand the realities of the political world? If public administration maintains an anti-intellectual bias and resists the
application of ethical theory and moral reasoning in bureaucratic contexts, can it profess to know the public good?

Analysis is made concerning evolution of administrative thought and practice in the American republic, with emphasis given to (a) the value of efficiency, which, beginning in the early 1900s, became the discipline's ultimate value; and (b) an unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane bureaucracy. The New Public Administration is analyzed. This concept emphasized vital and legitimate roles for administration, but the effort failed due to anti-governmental sentiment and lack of internal support. Trusteeship Public Administration followed, and defined the role of public administration as a mediating social partner with citizens. Although Trusteeship continues to promote the idea of administration as an elite, this study sympathizes with Trusteeship as an approach to accomplish responsible and humane government. However, Trusteeship needs a better-promoted plan of action, agenda, and formal program to be considered in a scholarly way. Further exploration of the concept is worthwhile.
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Wieber, James Robert, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 1987

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Lynn:
Thank you for encouraging my dream.

To our children, Jim, Jeremy, and Kelly:
May your dreams be as satisfying and rewarding.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The process of writing a dissertation necessarily includes the advice, encouragement, challenge, support, and patience of a great many people. It has been a most humbling process. I am indebted to several friends. Their involvement on the project has elevated the effort from my perspective and has, indeed, enriched the whole experience.

Good teachers are embedded in our minds forever, and I have been rewarded with much to remember. Foremost, I owe considerable appreciation to Dr. Ralph C. Chandler, who long ago sparked my interest in the study of public administration. Dr. Chandler fueled that spark three years ago in his exploratory class on the "public good." I treasure the whole new world that unfolded before me at Dr. Chandler's encouragement. He has been an inspiration throughout the entire project.

I am no less grateful to my esteemed dissertation committee, composed of Dr. Michael S. Pritchard of the Department of Philosophy, Dr. William A. Ritchie of the Department of Political Science, and Dr. Chandler, who served as chair. Collectively, the committee challenged me to new levels of intellectual pursuit, and without their support and critique, the project would have carried far less importance to me than it does. I am extremely satisfied
with the "product," and I trust that the academic disciplines of the committees are treated with respect and understanding.

Several scholars whetted my appetite for learning, but I wish to thank especially six of them. They are Dr. Peter Kobrak, Dr. Frederick Mortimore, Dr. Susan Hannah, and Dr. Myron Ross, all of Western Michigan University; Dr. Vishwa M. Mishra, of Michigan State University; and Dr. Dwight Waldo, formerly of Syracuse University. Dr. Kobrak, Director of the Center for Public Administration Programs, has strongly guided a most successful program, and I thank him for his encouragement through two degree programs. Dr. Mortimore has been a faithful counselor, and someone who always found time to listen to students' concerns and ideas. Dr. Hannah taught a foundations in public administration course at the start of my study in this area, and I was deeply moved by her lectures. Dr. Ross helped make the quantitative aspects of the DPA program most worthwhile and enjoyable. Dr. Mishra, whom I met in the journalism program at MSU, was another friend of the student. He demonstrated the meaning of courage and determination. And Dr. Waldo, the esteemed public administrationist, was kind to politely and thoroughly answer my then-naive questions about the meaning of "moral reasoning" during a visit to one of Dr. Chandler's classes. His grasp of the "public good" left me eager for further inquiry. I think his writings on American public administration far exceed those of any other scholar.
I would also like to thank former Michigan Governor William G. Milliken, who so willingly offered interview time for this dissertation, and guidance to me and others in the public service through his own example of trusteeship as a most able and compassionate man. He meets Frederickson's description of "the finest public servants."

No graduate student can underestimate the importance of helpful librarians and a good library. I wish to thank Ilene R. Schechter of the Library of Michigan for paying special attention to my research. And I would like to thank several librarians at MSU--too many to name, but all appreciated.

On a personal level, I wish to express my gratitude to my family, which has exercised utmost patience and understanding over the last several months while I spent evenings "with my books." My wife, Lynn, has been very supportive for a number of years; more recently, this support has come from Jim, Jeremy, and Kelly.

Last, I wish to acknowledge Reverend Al Deutsch, my pastor, whose own interpretation of the "public good" has had phenomenal influence on my life; and Susan Cooley, my typist and editor, who brought beauty to the final product.

James Robert Wieber
TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................... iii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1
   An Historical Perspective ......................................... 4
   Purpose and Organization of the Study ....................... 8

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE .... 11
   Roots of American Ideal ......................................... 12
   Constitutional Basis of Administration .................... 16
   Organization of the Government ............................... 23
   Distribution of Powers ........................................... 28
   Concluding Comments ............................................. 36
   Footnotes--Chapter II ............................................ 41

III. DEVELOPMENT OF "GOOD GOVERNMENT" ....................... 46
   New Directions for Administration ........................... 47
   Need for "Good Government" ................................... 53
   "High Noon of Orthodoxy" .................................... 66
      Enormous Practical Problems ............................... 69
      The Executive Art ............................................ 74
      Less Efficient, More Effective ............................. 76
      Overhauling the Executive Branch ......................... 80
      Plan for Centralization ..................................... 80
Table of Contents--Continued

Toward Recovery ................................. 88
Concluding Comments ............................. 91
Footnotes--Chapter III ......................... 96

IV. CRITIQUE OF THE "UNIFIED DISCIPLINE" .......... 103
   True Democracy, True Efficiency ............... 106
   Heart of Orthodoxy ............................. 106
   The Moral Imperative ......................... 110
   Decision, Execution, and "Science" .......... 115
   Idealism and Policy ......................... 115
   Politics Controls ............................. 120
   Administration Executes ..................... 122
   Validity of Principles ..................... 126
   Seeking Definitions ......................... 126
   Getting the Job Done ....................... 129
   Technique and Success ...................... 133
   Social Science Perspective ................. 136
   Application of Business Values ............ 144
   Concluding Comments ....................... 149
   Footnotes--Chapter IV ....................... 154

V. CLIENT-CENTERED ACTIVISM: THE NEW PUBLIC
   ADMINISTRATION .............................. 160
   Time of "Contemporary Revolutions" .......... 162
   Human-Centered Organizations ............... 168

vii

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Table of Contents--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defining a New Movement</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitism and the Public Good</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further Criticism: Absurdity or Significance?</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considering Administrative Compassion</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Comments</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes--Chapter V</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. ADMINISTRATORS AS SOCIAL PARTNERS</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments Against Dispassionate Government</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Administration With a Soul&quot;</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Comments</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes--Chapter VI</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I--Introduction</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II--Development of the American Administrative State</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III--Development of Good Government</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV--Critique of the &quot;Unified Discipline&quot;.</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V--Client-Centered Activism: The New Public Administration</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI--Administrators as Social Partners</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations for Further Study</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionalism</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

viii
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the evolution of administrative thought and practice in the American republic. Even though American public administration can trace its roots to the founding of American constitutional government in 1789, divergent opinions exist to this day regarding the discipline's proper role in a democracy. This question has never been settled in the American republic, and when considering the size, scope, and complexity of today's administrative state, it may well never be. There have been recent efforts, however, in which prominent scholars have sought to appropriate the function of public administration as one of proaction on behalf of clients in the name of social equity and related values. Even more recently, attempts have been made to define American public administration in terms of a mediating social partner with the citizenry, again, in an effort to serve the public good in more than a minimal way.

While this study agrees with the need for government to become more than a mechanistic deliverer of public services, argument is made to question the legitimacy of an "administrative class" and, further, the impracticality of equating career public administration on a level comparable with elected officials, public interest
groups, and other policy definers with broad powers and discretion. Can public administrationists be elevated to an elitist status in which they alone are capable of successful integration of self-interest with the public interest? Can public administration, as a discipline, be able to withstand the reality of the political world, which considers it wholly subservient to political expediency? Can public administration, with its anti-intellectual bias toward and resistance of the application of ethical theory and moral reasoning in bureaucratic contexts, profess to know the public good?

These questions are approached systematically, in that various interpretations of the proper role of public administration are explored from the time of the establishment of the constitution. Special consideration is given to the value of efficiency, which, beginning in the early 1900s, became the ultimate value of American public administration. At this same time, administrators were expected to remain value-neutral on policy matters. Despite wide acceptance of the idea that the "gospel of efficiency" constituted good government, scholars began to question seriously the adequacy of efficiency in this context, a situation that tied in closely with perceptions of the unresponsiveness of government to modern problems of Americans. Advocates of a New Public Administration, beginning in the 1960s, hoped to address problems of an unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane bureaucracy by becoming proactive participants on behalf of disadvantaged "clients" in the public
policy arena, using the value of social equity as their chief administrative concern.

The New Public Administration emphasized that public administrators have vital and legitimate roles in administering and implementing policy, but the effort failed largely as a result of strong anti-governmental emphasis by national elected leaders, and from lack of internal support. A subsequent movement, Trusteeship Public Administration, began to evolve in the mid-1980s, as a hopefully more realistic approach to the New Public Administration, by professing the role of public administration as a mediating social partner with citizens and groups rather than an elitist policy maker with broad powers and discretion. This study sympathizes with the Trusteeship approach as an effort to accomplish responsible and humane government. However, Trusteeship needs a better-promoted plan of action, agenda, and formal program to be considered in a scholarly way.

Thus, the proper role of government becomes the one most adaptable to change in a vastly changing America. The role is not something definable in a statement, but one rather which molds to the needs of the time--that is, which meets the criterion of the guiding political philosophy of the time. The best that public administrators can hope for is to be satisfied that their needs are met by individual involvement with society on a small scale or, at least, as participants in a pluralist setting. One thing is for sure: Whatever action a public administrator takes, it must be
consistent with the guiding political philosophy, whether it be one of public purpose or private interest. It has been that way in America for 200 years.

An Historical Perspective

While American public administration developed as a serious area of academic inquiry only 100 years ago, the field itself was established with the founding of the American administrative state in 1789 (Van Riper, 1983). But the proper role of American public administration has never been settled. Early historical emphasis in the New Nation focused on a governing philosophy of private interest, as an effort for the country to encounter the problems of nation-building in a wild and untamed land. The new constitution set up a strong national government, as the best means to protect individualism. Rapid "progress," however, opened the doors of self-interest toward widespread corruption—a situation that lasted most of the 1800s.

But beginning near the end of the 1800s, a movement among progressives sought reform of American public administration, and with reform came a new role for public administration. The guiding public philosophy focused on the idea of public purpose, and reformers sought to bring ethical norms into the public service through various administrative techniques, such as the merit system in the federal government, and through establishment of an executive budget to strengthen control of the "good management" of the
government. These reformers also advocated the practice of scientific management within the sphere of public administration, borrowing upon the assumed success of American business to seek achievements of a more efficient and effective administrative machinery. Proponents of this new "science of administration" contended that politics and administration were distinctly separate, and that the role of administration was essentially based on a primary value of efficiency, which could only be achieved through economy, good management, and accountability of government to public opinion based on the concept of public purpose. Emphasis on management systems thus became the primary focus of reformers' efforts.

In turn, scientific management became the foundation of proper administration, a fact that stood the test of time through the 1930s when what had become known as traditional or orthodox public administration reached its zenith period, or as Sayre (1958) described it, its "high noon." It was at this period in American history, during the midst of the Great Depression, when the federal government called upon prominent public administrationists to help the federal bureaucracy find a means to efficiently service the critical needs of the nation's people. The problems of how to win World War II further emphasized this reliance on the discipline for practical answers to solve the major events of the time.

As a field, public administration came out of the Depression and World War II as a unified discipline. The Great Depression was
overcome, and World War II was won, but among scholars within the field of public administration, the discipline's contributions upon analysis indicated that more than efficiency and the fact-value distinction of the politics/administration dichotomy were responsible for realization of the achievements of the "high noon" period. Scholars began to raise serious questions about theory and practice which had become fundamental to the field. Public administration came to admit that politics and administration did not exist separately, as had been believed and advocated since the turn of the century. Indeed, public administration was seen by leading scholars as a political process of its own. Public administration could no longer justify the premise that moral judgments and consequences were unimportant in the course of implementing public policy.

Therefore, although public administration had become a unified discipline, scholars looked at the field as a troubled one on a theoretical level (Simon, 1976; Waldo, 1948). Arguments were made that the politics/administration dichotomy never existed, even in the "high noon" period. Further, it was argued that politics and administration were really extrinsically connected, and always had been. The consequence of these new approaches was that if public administrationists are involved in politics--in the political world --it is their right to advocate political views. Hence, during the turbulent years of the 1960s, a new movement known as the New Public Administration was begun. Its values were based on client-centered
activism—that is, administrationists working as viable activists outside the system of government on behalf of the public, in general, and on behalf of disadvantaged groups, minorities and the poor, in particular. A bold new role for public administration had been advanced. While it is significant that the New Public Administration emerged under the leadership of some of the discipline’s foremost academicians, the new movement attracted numerous critics, as well. Certainly, the New Public Administration set the tone and direction for much of the practice of American public administration beginning in the 1960s. A strong argument with respect to the New Public Administration is that practitioners ought to be able to advocate their interpretation of the public good. Critics challenged their assumed status as elitists.

In the face of all of this, proponents of orthodoxy continued to reject the premises of the new movement, arguing that the primary role of administration remained as efficiency. They argued that administrators did not have legitimate roles as advocates of policy, which was reserved for officials of the government elected by the people to implement public policy. Largely as a result of the attacks by orthodoxists, a further, somewhat related, movement emerged which affirmed the advocacy role based on the idea that public administrationists were trustees of the people as a matter of constitutional duty. These arguments have been presented as those of a New New Public Administration, or Trusteeship Public
Administration (Chandler, 1984a). Advocates view their role as that of constitutional officers of the government and as legitimate citizens with rights guaranteed to all Americans, as "representative citizens." They see their heritage as stemming from ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. However, Trusteeship, like the New Public Administration, has been sharply criticized by both academics and practitioners of American government for being presumptuous in assuming to know the public good, that is, in having an assumed self-appointed status as knowing what is best for the people.

Purpose and Organization of the Study

The task of this study is two-fold: (a) to analyze the major concepts, principles, and proposals that have determined appropriate roles for American public administration; and (b) to examine the development of the New Public Administration, its evolution into the new concept of Trusteeship Public Administration, and its potential in the future of the discipline.

The basic premise of this study is that the development of Trusteeship Public Administration contains constitutional and moral overtones that deem it worthy of serious attention, and that as an outgrowth of the New Public Administration, it continues to envision the proper role of the discipline as prime participant in social, economic, and political problems that confront the American polity. However, I see this approach as one needing to better promote an effective plan of action.
The problems to be analyzed in this study are designed to conclude as a critical study of the New Public Administration and of Trusteeship Public Administration. Consideration is made with respect to how its proponents argue (a) why administrators, by assumed right, might become advocates in the setting of public policy development and implementation; (b) to what extent they attempt to resolve questions of society which they purport to advocate; and (c) what effects the general philosophies of American government--public purpose versus private interest--have had on these movements. These questions are explored sequentially in Chapters II through VI.

In Chapter II, discussion (a) focuses on the early development of the American administrative state, (b) traces philosophical influences upon the Founders, and (c) analyzes the framers' views about the role of government and its administration. This chapter is important in that, contrary to some current thinking, administration was developed along very narrow definitions, and as demonstrated, the proper-role question was never settled.

Chapter III examines the growth of public administration as a serious area of inquiry in the United States, concentrating on the development of the concepts of good government in orthodox theory and a science of administration, and culminating with examination of the "high noon of orthodoxy" period. This period is important as an
example of how political philosophy shapes the role of administration.

Chapter IV re-examines the American administrative state, focusing on analysis of Waldo's classical "political theory of public administration," which not only cast doubt on the validity of the politics/administration dichotomy, but opened the discipline up for further critical self-analysis. Significant here is the challenge to efficiency as the ultimate value of public administration.

Chapter V critiques the client-centered activism of the New Public Administration while focusing on its contributions to evolution of the discipline as an area of scholarly concern.

Chapter VI considers the idea of Trusteeship Public Administration, but challenges this new concept for not promoting an effective plan of action that satisfies the realities of the political world.

The dissertation concludes with Chapter VII, in which conclusions and recommendations for further study are presented.
CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

This chapter highlights early development of American public administration, with particular emphasis given to the framers' ideas with respect to the proper role of administration during constitutional debates of the late 1780s. Although the proper-role question has never been settled, it was the focus of strong opinions from several philosophical spectra. Many of these arguments continue to this day.

Thus, the purposes of the chapter are to demonstrate that (a) the framers operated with both a keen intellectual and moral awareness when considering the designs and intent of the new American government; (b) that the constitutional debates generally evolved into two distinct guiding political philosophies, that of public purpose and that of private interest; and (c) that, unfortunately for public administration, the matter of administration was considered with very narrow definitions, confusing the discipline even today on its proper role in the arena of government. The proper-role question during the debates focused on the possibilities of virtue as a value of good government, and upon the fear of human frailties, but in the end on the matters of power and greed (McDonald, 1985).
Despite the philosophy and theory, humans make the apparatus of government operate. Indeed, they determine the effectiveness of public policy so implemented to meet the needs of citizens. Unfortunately for nineteenth century American public administration, too much of its moral "upbringing" would be put aside as the nation's eagerness for expansion and development began to occur in earnest during Jackson's administration. The tone and direction were set, and would last, until the end of the century when reforms were sought.

Roots of American Ideal

The period from 1763 to 1789 had obvious revolutionary ramifications for a young America--fighting and winning independence from the rule of King George III of England. In addition to the Colonials' war with the British Empire, and in argument among men both philosophically and with arms about the future of a new nation of free people that was beginning to evolve, the period also brought with it "the stirring of a political problem older than recorded history: the balancing of liberty with authority" (Morison, Commager, & Leuchtenburg, 1980, Vol. 1, p. 121).

That problem was seen as resolvable in either of only two possibilities: (a) that government be organized around either a horizontal or federal distribution of power between one main central or national government and many smaller local or regional governments; and (b) from an opposite perspective, in which power
would be positioned in the smaller governments in a vertical or
democratic system of rule in which the trust of control could be
placed more directly with the "masses of mankind" (Morison et al.,
1980, Vol. 1, p. 122). The discussion continues to this day (Waldo,
1980) and the substance of argument over 200 years ago is as
philosophically pertinent in 1987 as it was when signatures were
affixed to the Declaration of Independence in 1776. What was
decided then was imperfect, as on the question of slavery, for
example, but it has guided for decades. Arguments that formulate
the focus of concern on twentieth-century administrative
responsibility seemingly differ little philosophically or theo­
retically from when Madison noted in Federalist No. 51 that: "If
men were angels, no government would be necessary" (cited in

Americans in the late eighteenth century asserted their
"rights" against English rule because they believed that their
"inalienable rights" or freedoms were suppressed, ignored, or
abused.1 But repudiating the English connection was one thing, and
determining a direction to proceed toward beyond repudiation quite
another. Memories were fresh, and troubled, over results of years
of authoritarian regimes in England. America's colonial experience
with respect to that rule had already encompassed generations of
settlers (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 1).
The new America found answers to its concerns on how to proceed with a new government in establishment of a constitution, which would serve as a foundational agreement among the nation's peoples to seek the opportunities of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" so envisioned and promised. The document, further, would designate Americans as unique members of a "covenanting community" in which members would commonly commit themselves to freedom under law, and presumably of having "transcended the 'natural' bonds of race, religion, and class" (Kristol, 1987, p. 4). This was the core of the Puritan influence, and it should come as no surprise to students of the Constitution that it is more than a legal document; "It is covenant as well as contract" (Rohr, 1986, p. x). For, although they were clearly influenced by Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu, among others (McDonald, 1979; Oppenheim, 1968; Plamenatz, 1978), those signing the new Constitution sought to philosophically incorporate the Protestant ethic of hard work equating to one's success and fortune into the document. The greatest influence came from the Puritans. As Kristol pointed out, the Constitution of the United States, while having many "intellectual fathers," has but "one spiritual mother . . . the Protestant religion--perhaps one should say the Protestant impulse--in its various American forms" (pp. 5-6). It is from this Protestant, mostly Puritan, idea that the "covenanting community" evolved as a foundational value of the new government. Stated Kristol:
The idea of this community being governed by elected representatives comes not from memories of a feudal parliament (as in Europe), but from [the Protestant ideal] that all men have equal access to God, that freedom of conscience has divine sanction, that a large measure of individual liberty is consonant with a moral life. ... What we call the "Protestant ethic" or "work ethic" ... comes from Puritanism [but] became a moral code for all honest, God-fearing men and women, a code that infused the new "bourgeois" society with a religious aspect. (pp. 6-7)

The ethic was uniquely American, a belief that the purpose of government revolved around individual freedom so that people may pursue their guaranteed right to seek ways to better their condition in life. Clearly, individual rights were at the forefront of constitutional concern. They, more specifically, influenced both Federalist and Anti-Federalist concepts relating to individual rights, value of property in terms of a measure of freedom, and for establishing a system of local government in which democratic decisions were made by those closest to and, therefore, most affected by their "towns." Puritans laid a unique cornerstone for American democracy. These distinctions later become significant from the standpoint of private interest political philosophy.

But the "ethical keystone of Puritanism was the conviction that all men were totally responsible for their own behavior" (Bailyn, 1955, p. 20). This aspect of the Puritan ethic is explained through an examination of their theory of state and society. The seeds to a new American philosophy were deeply embedded in a concern for habits and values that would sustain the new American nation in the late eighteenth century toward independence. In effect, the
Puritans "planted" an inheritance of tremendous argument for
generations to consider. Among this legacy were: (a) respect for
the individual and for the dignity of man, (b) recognition of the
ultimate authority of reason, (c) allegiance to principles rather
than to persons, (d) the doctrine of government by compact and by
consent, (e) spiritual and moral democracy, and (f) pursuit of
property (Commager, 1970). Puritanism was fueled by moral purpose,
and with a passion for justice and righteousness. Parallels are
seen in the constitutional debates and, even today, in the
philosophy of the Reagan Administration.

Constitutional Basis of Administration

Debate and disagreement among the Federalists and Anti-
Federalists about the concept and content of the new American
Constitution are well-documented (Cullop, 1983; Ketcham, 1986; J. D.
Lewis, 1967; McMaster & Stone, 1888; Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 1;
Rossiter, 1961; Schlesinger, 1964; Storing, 1981, Vol. 1). Important here is an understanding of the framers' views toward
establishment and administration of the new government--the
foundation to the American administrative state.

Essentially, and generally speaking, the Federalists advocated
a strong central government, and the Anti-Federalists opposed this
position, favoring instead a concept of decentralization which
placed emphasis on power and authority among the states. Central to
the arguments is consideration of two basic philosophies of American
government that have historically surfaced in cycles as primary
directions of administrations from Washington to Reagan
(Schlesinger, 1986). That is, whether the emphasis ought to be on
government's role toward public purpose (i.e., Federalists) or
toward private interest (i.e., Anti-Federalists). Since these early
debates, Americans have struggled over the philosophical question of
whether the conscious argument about government's role toward
collective needs and social concerns was really secondary to their
subconscious temptations with pursuits of personal aggrandizement
(Chandler, 1986b). Addressing these philosophies--at least
recognizing them--is critical to understanding of administrators' roles. That is, are rules determined in large part by the dominant
executive branch philosophy at any given point in time? Were
administrative roles clear-cut? That is, were (a) administrators
intended to be constitutional officers of the government and (b)
distinctions made between the executive branch of government and
administrators in general? Was "administration" in any way set up
as guardians of good government?

Proponents of Trusteeship Public Administration, explored later
in Chapter VI, most certainly think that they are. In fact,
Chandler (1984a) argued that public servants have legitimate claim
to a strong democratic-elitist orientation, indeed, a right to be
considered as "part of a (tutelary) ruling elite" (p. 141). It is
my opinion that Chandler stands in the minority on this point and

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would have a difficult time in attempting to convince the elite of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of either federal or state governments of this claim. At the time of the Constitution-drafting, the Anti-Federalists feared that the presidency would become a form of "elective king," so clearly, those arguing at Philadelphia were at least aware of the dangers of providing too much power to an administrative class. Rohr (1986) makes a case that ties the legitimacy of the administrative state, not class, to the framers' intent to make the Senate a part of the executive establishment, "not simply a second house of a national legislature" (p. 28). A more in-depth discussion on these points is made later. For now, the significance is that the framers left the word "administration" out of the language of the Constitution. I think they did so because administration was simply not part of the bigger picture of what the framers had gathered in Philadelphia to accomplish.

This is not to say that the framers did not care about administration and its proper role in government. It just was not as important at the time of the drafting as were matters of a strong central government and protection of individualism. Theory came first. The closest the Constitution comes to acknowledging the need for administration, however, comes in Article 2, which assumes that Congress will create executive departments (Rohr, 1986). The framers' fear of executive power was apparent here. Initially,
delegates to the constitutional debates sought to diffuse executive power among several persons, rather than in a single executive (McDonald, 1985). Compromise was reached on the latter after arguments were made that an executive would not be strong enough. The compromise agreed that a single, "vigorous" executive would be elected by the people.

Nonetheless, Madison, a Federalist, analyzed the proposed new Constitution as being neither a "federal" nor a "national" one, but "a composition of both" (Morison et al., Vol. 1, p. 253; cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 246 [from Federalist No. 39]). His perspective was deliberate as an apparent noble effort to show that both "sides"--the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists--had "won" the argument about how the United States would be set forth on its untested journey toward democratic government. Madison attempted to demonstrate that federalism and nationalism were not mutually exclusive, and that they offered the best hope in modern history toward reconciliation between liberty and empire.

Madison may have been correct in assessing the Constitution as a unified document--that is, a compromise--but that did not prevent debate among framers of any political persuasion to continue in an effort to influence the "ratification contest" of the states (Ketcham, 1986, p. 12). The ongoing argument focused not on the extent to which states yielded powers to the central government--substantial agreement had been reached on that issue--but, rather, on political technique: that is, (a) the organization of the
government and (b) the distribution of power. They were generally assured that men were capable of self-government, although experiences among states with respect to the Articles of Confederation left much to be proven. But could there be agreement on what constituted the "true republican principles"?

There were many philosophical questions yet unresolved in 1787. The Federalists took the initiative to ensure ratification of the Constitution when Hamilton conceived the idea of publishing essays in the popular press to explain their position to the people. It began as "a propaganda tract, aimed only at winning the election for delegates to New York's ratifying convention" (McDonald, 1979, p. 107), but the essays--now known as The Federalist Papers--evolved into "the classic commentary upon the American federal system" (p. 107). They became "a debater's handbook," especially in the key ratification states of New York and Virginia (Rossiter, 1961, p. xi), and over a seven-month period from October 1787 to March 1788, totaled 85 essays. As the theoretical positions were placed before the public, the ratification votes were simultaneously taking place in the states.

It is here, in the Federalist essays, where the proper role of administration became a focus of concern among the framers, at least those authoring the Federalist essays. While not mentioned in the Constitution, the word "administration" now appears in these essays more times than the words "Congress," "President," or "Supreme
Court," the three highest stations of the three branches of government. Further, administration had become the focus of the argument brought by the Federalists about why the states should ratify the Constitution. In Rohr's (1986) words, "it would bring better public administration" (p. 1). Federalist essays 68 through 77 are especially descriptive of the value of administration. For example, in Federalist No. 72, Hamilton defined administration "in its largest sense" as all aspects of the "body politic" (Rossiter, 1961, p. 435) and further stated, in Federalist No. 77, that sound public administration requires the selection of individuals for high offices from "men who are best qualified for them" (Rossiter, 1961, p. 462).

Rohr (1986) considered Federalist essays 68 through 77 as "the first and perhaps the best treatise ever written on Public Administration" (p. 1), but I think the important statement is made much earlier in Federalist No. 27. Here Hamilton stated: "I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, the [people's] confidence in and obedience to a government, will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 174). In this sense, the administration is the one elected by the people--as for the executive branch of the government, the presidency--and it follows that an unpopular presidency cannot maintain the support of the populace for any extended length of time. The recent presidencies of Johnson, Nixon, and Carter are cases in point. What effects did
Vietnam, Watergate, and the handling of the hostages in Iran have on the goodness or badness of these presidencies? "In the largest sense," what value did the federal bureaucracy have to play in each of these very generalized instances? I do not believe it had as much to do with the public perception of these presidencies as the personalities and the political philosophies of these respective presidents did. What middle-aged American can forget Nixon's "I am not a crook" speech?

Administration was important in Hamilton's essays, but in contexts different from merely administration for administration's sake. That is, in Federalist Nos. 72 and 77, the concern centered not simply on administration, but on the larger matter of what effect incoming presidents would have on the consistency within the governmental apparatus. Hamilton questioned the good that might come with a staff house-cleaning by an incoming president and condemned any executive who brought in his own team of subordinates primarily to elicit their unqualified "devotion to his will" (Rossiter, 1961, p. 462). Today, selection of loyal appointees is commonplace among chief executives. But at the time of ratification, the experiment at a new American government had not yet begun. This was a nation of about three million, as opposed to over 240 million today. It was a newly formed federal government whose first permanent employees could be listed on handwritten pay ledgers. Today, there are more people on the federal payroll than there were citizens in 1789.
Certainly, in Federalist No. 72, Hamilton advocated "the permanancy in a wise system of administration" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 436). But did he justify, as the intent of the framers, the creation of an "administrative class" by these statements? Anyone can read into the comments whatever interpretation they wish, but it is my viewpoint that Hamilton's intention encompassed more than the concern of keeping bureaucrats employed from one administration to another. The "wise system" was extended, in Hamilton's words, when "the people . . . see reason to approve [the president's] conduct, to continue him in the station in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 436). Upon a president's re-election, therefore, the national government would retain "the advantage of permanancy" in theoretically staying in administrative place for another four years. The idea of consistency makes sense for the concern, in 1789, of having the moving parts of the fledgling government machine work as smoothly as possible for as long as possible. No one knew what a dramatic change in executive direction and philosophy would bring. This is somewhat different from accepting Hamilton's words as justification for an "administrative class."

Organization of the Government

Both those who favored or opposed the Constitution--awaiting ratification of the states--saw that it did not provide consensus to
the essential questions of extent and direction of the new government. What would be the people's role of government?


[The Constitution] did not settle everything; it did not finish the task of making the American polity. The political life of the community continues to be a dialogue, in which the Anti-Federalist concerns and principles still play an important part. (p. 3)

Thus, what were the theoretical differences? One view is as follows:

Opponents of the Constitution appealed to the popular sentiment, announced by Thomas Paine, "That government is best which governs least." They viewed with alarm the fact that two popular principles, annual elections and rotation in office, were not embodied in the Constitution. [They believed] that states were the true guardians of "Republican Virtue," predicted that the new Constitution would encourage speculation and vice, and that America would soon go the way of imperial Rome.

The Federalists, however, were convinced that the natural rights philosophy, taken straight, would go to the nation's head and make it totter and fall; believed that the slogans of 1776 were outmoded; that America needed integration, not state's rights; that the immediate peril was not tyranny but disorder or dissolution; that certain political processes such as war, foreign affairs, and commerce, were national by nature; that the right to tax was essential to any government; and that powers wrested from king and parliament should not be divided among thirteen states, if the American government were to have any influence in the world. (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 1, p. 258)

Federalists foresaw the United States as a nation set to undergo rapid growth and expansion, and thus as a nation that potentially could become a world leader. That possibility could not become a reality, however, unless Americans became less provincial in their thinking and direction. The experience under the Articles of Confederation had been one of "weak, ill-organized, quarreling"
state governments, a situation quickly realized as the doom of a nation "assuming a leading role in the world" (Ketcham, 1974, p. 123). In Federalist No. 1, Hamilton made note of the frustration and asked "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident or force" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 33). He expounded on the fundamental Federalist belief that "the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty" (p. 35), and that the real danger in a democracy is not found under the "forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government," but rather under the guise of "the zeal for the rights of people" (p. 35). It was a position emphasizing that a nation's strength and stability could only be realized from a unified, steady, and effective government.

Anti-Federalists took issue with the "provincial" position from the standpoint that it represented one of the very reasons that the Revolution was fought. They thought the war attempted to end the "arrogant, oppressive, and depraved" rule that eroded their "self-respect, capabilities, and virtues" (Ketcham, 1986, p. 19). Surely, they argued, the Federalists were not merely exchanging one form of tyranny for another? And, certainly, strong government could serve the people when they were in control, just as much as it could provide them with harm if they were not in control. They questioned
Federalist motives for commercial growth and world prestige, seeing those objectives as only the "lust of ambitious men" whose efforts, in the end, would handicap the nation with more taxes, campaigns, and conscriptions (Ketcham, 1986, p. 16). They also questioned—as do many Americans today—whether a nation as vast as the United States could be controlled by the people at all, and such being the case, viewed centralized government as a threat to individual rights and liberties. The nation they envisioned, contrary to that of the Federalists, was one "of the small, pastoral republic where virtuous, self-reliant citizens managed their own affairs and shunned the power and glory of empire" (p. 17). Winning the revolution was not an opportunity for the United States to become a leader in the world, for that philosophy embraced the corruption, greed, and tyranny that Machiavelli and Hobbes said characterized human existence. They wanted a society that encouraged virtue and happiness. Stated Storing (1981):

The Anti-federalists' defense of federalism and of the primacy of the states rested on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the states and the preservation of individual liberty, which is the end of any legitimate government. (Vol. 1, p. 15)

The argument was carried a step further, in the Anti-Federalist belief that the Declaration of Independence instituted specific rights to the states—"that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do" (Commager, 1973, p. 102).
Storing (1981) described the principle as one that places the "general government . . . subordinate to the state governments" (Vol. 1, p. 15). Thus, the Anti-Federalists contended that the essential business of government rightly belongs as a duty of the states—not a central or "general government"—because, consistent with Montesquieu's argument, true republican government could best govern over a small territory geographically.14 Good government required homogeneity in the population, the Anti-Federalists argued, where the "vitality of government [meant] that rulers and ruled could see, know, and understand each other" (Ketcham, 1986, p. 17). Even Hamilton acknowledged that the Anti-Federalists had a point, when he confessed that "the extent of the Country to be governed [was] discouraging" (Storing, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 83).

More important to the Anti-Federalists was the chance—made possible by the victory over England in the Revolutionary War—of achieving a genuinely republican polity. Their central questions, stated Ketcham (1986), were removed from aggrandizement characterized throughout human history. He said:

Was it possible, [the Anti-Federalists] asked themselves, to found society on other bases and with other aspirations that would nourish the virtue and happiness of all the people? Could they break the self-fulfilling cycle where selfish people needed to be controlled by checks and balances which in turn required and encouraged more and more self-seeking by the people? (p. 17)

But the Federalists saw threats of foreign intrigue, the possibilities of domestic insurrection, bankruptcy, and disunion,
all of which they believed could be avoided by a combination of a strong central and efficient government. Observed Ketcham (1986):

The federalists still thought of themselves as heirs to the American Revolution and sincere friends of government by consent. To them the ideals of human rights and rule by the people required not suspicion of government but use of it. They were confident that human ingenuity could devise mechanisms that would at once protect liberty, allow efficient government, and rest on the consent of the people. (p. 15)

Was there just a matter of disagreement with philosophy expounded by the Anti-Federalists? How could a nation guard against evil and corruption in government when it might be possible to trust and use government to the benefit of the common good? Anti-Federalists based their argument on (a) the possibility that human nature had a basic decency to it; (b) that trust might result in a society where hard-working citizens could enjoy the "fruits of their labors"; (c) where institutions would function according to virtue, rather than greed; (d) where public administrators could be seen as servants of the people, and not their oppressors; and (e) where "peace and prosperity came from vigilant self-confidence rather than from conquest and dominion" (Ketcham, 1986, p. 18).

Distribution of Powers

Such was the case for operation of the government. Interestingly, Hamilton and Madison agreed that the cardinal element in democratic government was that powers needed to be derived from the people (McDonald, 1979), which is essentially the same perspective taken by the Anti-Federalists (Storing, 1981). The disagreement was
seen in interpretation and application of the principle. Parallels are noted in Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments concerning distribution of powers, although wider disagreements are noted here, as well.

Hamilton and Madison had different attitudes about power (Benson, 1961). While Hamilton argued that power was primarily vested in the executive, Madison, in Federalist No. 51, argued that it was possible to provide both the executive and legislative branches of government certain powers and still be able to protect against abuse of those same powers. Madison stated in Federalist No. 51:

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 322)

Those auxiliary precautions, Madison noted, were these:

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impractical. (pp. 323-324)

Thus, Madison argued that "usurpations are guarded against" in the Constitution according to the distribution of power vertically within the governmental hierarchy, and among the separate branches of the government.

There were significant areas on which Hamilton and Madison were able to reach consensus. They were: (a) both held pessimistic views of human nature, which they considered as the basis of a need for a "science of politics"; (b) both agreed that men were not motivated by reason, but rather by passion; and (c) both believed that the "unchecked power in the people" presented more of a threat to liberty and good government than any other factor (p. 111). An example of Madison’s pessimistic thinking is found in Federalist No. 55, in which he cited the need to distrust men having power because "a degree of depravity in mankind . . . requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 346). But he added, perhaps to the appreciation of the Federalist cause, that "a certain portion of esteem and confidence" exists as a quality of
human nature, a possibility that provides "sufficient virtue among men for self-government" (p. 346).

One further consideration is necessary to grasp the Federalist position on the distribution of powers. While advocating the governing process based on the separation of powers among the three presumably equal branches of government, Federalists recognized the possibility that policy could become "bogged down in inertia and toward stalemate" (Schlesinger, 1986, p. 285). If this was so, then responsibility needed to be placed in one branch of the government in order to make the system move. Hamilton thought that absolute veto power should be vested in the executive. He explained in Federalist No. 70 that the executive branch of government was both the logical and most structurally capable branch of government to address the problem. "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government," he stated (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 423). In effect, both Hamilton and Madison conceded the importance of executive administration, although Hamilton's viewpoint was more strongly defined. He said:

It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 423)

While explanatory of the executive, the statement falls short of a description for a quasi-independent administration. Madison's comment that elected representatives "ought to mix with the people"
formed the basis of an argument by Rohr (1986) that a "representative assembly should be a microcosm of the society as a whole" (pp. 40-41). He saw this possibility of mixing with the citizenry to "think as they think, feel as they feel," as a major shortcoming--his word, "defect"--in the Constitution. The argument simply contends that no representative could possibly mix with his constituents as Mason envisioned, clearly due to the size of any legislator's constituency. The solution was presented by Rohr and Chandler (1984) as one in which "representative citizens" might serve the public good with both an obligation to all citizens ("representative"), as well as to themselves ("citizens"). The "representative citizen" role was one, both argued, that belonged to public administration.

This is a bold assertion on Rohr's (1986) part. Even though the framers were committed to representative government, McDonald (1985) agrees that such representation was not adequately spelled out in the Constitution. Is Rohr correct in noting that no single executive, nor elected representative, could possibly engage in dialogue or execution of public policy with millions of citizens? I think he is. These minority (in numbers) officials need to rely on others to execute or mediate their will. Stated Rohr:

[The] emphasis on numbers of representatives in the founding debate was instrumental to the deeper question of the character of the representatives and the character of representation itself. If one follows the lead of the "representative bureaucracy" literature and allows that nonelected officials can be "representatives," the administrative state, with its
massive public service, surely responds to the numerical concerns [espoused by the framers]. (p. 47)

The question of character is a further matter. Arguments about civic virtue, although held in sympathy by the framers, proved to be unrealistic in that the framers did not agree that ordinary citizens could be counted on to hold it as a primary value. Human experience dictated otherwise. Rohr (1986) contended that the best of both worlds is found in the modern administrative state. He assumed that Madison's virtuous citizen, and the framers' more hopeful intention of holding single executives virtuous, come together as possible among "representative citizens."

All of this is speculation, and somewhat presumptuous, on the part of Rohr or any others who might share his viewpoint. Reasons are the same as those posed at the outset to Chapter I, and which are examined further in Chapter VI. Important here is recognition—not necessarily acceptance—of yet highly controversial interpretations of framers' intent. There is merit in Rohr's (1986) contention, but his viewpoint is strongly hypothetical and theoretical. Can his thesis withstand the rigors of the political world? I argue in Chapters V and VI that it is unlikely.

The Federalists seemed more cognizant of the realities and dangers of the political world. The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, dissented to Federalist arguments relating to distribution of powers because, chiefly, they generally accepted Montesquieu's observation that republicanism was possible only with
public-spirited or virtuous citizens. As such, republicanism required what today may seem to some as Pollyana. They sought a true sense of community--where citizens could experience a oneness with their fellow citizens--"a society in which there are no extremes of wealth, influence, education, or anything else [but] the homogeneity of a moderate, simple, sturdy, and virtuous people" (Storing, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 20). The homogeneity of the republican society was seen as crucial to a citizenry of free and independent-minded people, so in a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests of the people had to be similar. Storing stated:

If this not be the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other. This will retard the operations of government, and prevent such conclusions as will promote the public good. . . . Republican government depends on civic virtue, on a devotion to fellow citizens and to country so deeply instilled as to be almost as automatic and powerful as the natural devotion to self-interest. (pp. 19-20)

Interestingly, Rohr (1986) very specifically tied his observations about "representative citizens" into the idea of public spiritedness advanced by the Anti-Federalists. It is here that he argued that full value of service in the administrative state pays off within a democracy--that is, "to fulfill the aspirations of citizenship--to rule and be ruled" (p. 53). The millions of governmental employees, unlike anyone else connected to the public service, has the unique opportunity to instruct millions of other citizens "in the ways of citizenship." He stated:
Thus the administrative state has the capacity to increase and multiply public spiritedness and thereby infuse the regime with active citizens. This could bring government close to the people and thereby heal a defect in the Constitution that has been with us from the beginning. If this does not happen at present, one reason may be because we have such a negative attitude toward the administrative state, and this attitude may be grounded in a distorted interpretation of our constitutional heritage. (p. 53)

Is the question in 1987 similar to that of nearly 200 years ago? Is it flowery language and fiction? Can it wash in the real world? The argument brought forth by the Anti-Federalists shifted abruptly to one of responsibility and of checks and balances. The civic virtue argument failed to draw more than sympathy—from both Federalists and Anti-Federalists. More urgent to them, before ratification of the Constitution was completed in 1789, was more practical matters relating to fear of the Federalists' call for a "great, splendid, . . . consolidated government" and "Universal Empire" that the Anti-Federalists thought the American Revolution had been fought to overcome (Ketcham, 1986, p. 20). The fear did not diminish, and, as Americans in 1987 know, for good reason.

Yet, the Constitution of the United States did include vague and narrow recognition of administrators as constitutional officers, whose appointments "shall be established by law" but be made under authority of the President as the nation's chief executive (cited in Rohr, 1986, p. 200). A question of interpretation remains relevant for American public administration in today's contexts.
Concluding Comments

Proponents of an administrative class can look to at least two primary reasons for interpreting the intent of the framers for quasi-independent administration, namely that (a) the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in modern public organizational settings is consistent with the understanding of the separation of powers agreements reached during the constitutional debates; and (b) that the idea of citizenship is especially keen among public administrationists because they are afforded a unique place in American democratic government of being both "representatives" and "citizens" in combination.

Rohr (1986) thinks the first possibility exists because the framers thought of prudence and accommodation when defining administrative power in terms of "partial" and never "whole" applications. He views the "whole" power problem as one of doctrine, and one left to direction from a particular branch of government, that is, its current guiding philosophy. Administrative agencies are far removed from questions of "tyranny," or exercise of too much power, because they function only over "partial" or narrowly defined government activities. Administrative agencies were never intended to "rule" over the big picture, only pieces of it. With this, I concur. Where I disagree is on the second point, that public administration ought likely to be more public spirited, and thus more in a position to satisfy the "aspirations of
citizenship" than anyone else whose individualism is protected by the same Constitution. Public administrators are subjected to the same problems of size, scope, and complexity of American government as regular citizens. All supposedly are provided the same promises for the good life, which includes the function to reason and think and act virtuously. So, how can public administration claim a corner on the citizenship market? I sympathize with the interpretation by Rohr (1986) and his supporters, but what of the prudence and accommodation of the idea? Is it possible, as Rohr observed, one that day "the energies of high civic purpose latent in the Public Administration" will be released (p. 53)? But how and when? The first thing that comes to my mind when the discipline is positioned for leadership in pursuit of "high civic purpose" is Waldo’s concern that there is an anti-intellectual bias among public administration practitioners concerning moral philosophy, and a resistance to the application of ethical theory and moral reasoning in important bureaucratic contexts (Chandler, 1981). How can public administrators, as mere human beings, function as our intellectual and moral teachers about the challenges and opportunities of citizenship? Certainly, there are some who could fill this role--Rohr and Chandler are two good examples--but what of the masses of civil servants? Would you want them to guide your aspirations of citizenship? The idea seems contrary to the overall achievement of the Constitution: to establish a strong central government to best protect individual liberties.
I have sought in Chapter II to provide the foundation for the discussion that follows in subsequent chapters, leading up to public administration's bold assertion in the New Public Administration to fulfill Rohr's (1986) challenge. The Constitution was implemented on what scholars have termed the high ground of government activity, that of the pursuit of public purpose. But through much of the last two-thirds of the 1800s, corruption in government and the exploitation of the intent of private interest public philosophy sent administration into moral chaos, and eventually, toward a call for reform. An in-depth review of administration in the 1800s is not important to this study, which now continues with examination of making government more businesslike. The answer to moral chaos was seen in the value of efficiency.

Last, in summary of Chapter II, I attempted to make the following points as significant to the discussion regarding public administration's proper role in American democratic government. These observations are as follows:

1. The framers were strongly influenced by the Puritan work ethic and concepts of individual freedom, community government, covenant, and rights to property.

2. The framers generally agreed that there is a common interest in liberty which brings civilized people together to draft constitutions and to form governments.
3. One of the major arguments favoring the new Constitution was that a strong central government was needed to protect individual rights.

4. Although the separation of powers was never seriously debated in Philadelphia, the framers found great difficulty in finding the proper mechanism for implementing the concept. Representation became the primary issue of debate.

5. On the matter of administration, the framers provided very narrow definitions. An administrative state was created, but an administrative class was not.

6. The constitutional debates generally identified two distinct guiding philosophies for the new nation: that of the pursuit of public purpose or that of private interest.

7. Upon establishment of the new government, the prevailing guiding philosophy was one of public purpose. A guiding philosophy, more than anything else, would set the course for the proper role of public administration at any point in time.

The fascinating thing about the U.S. Constitution is that it is an unfinished work and should always be. It endures because it continues to be the focus of argument, refinement, and change—all elements that make democracy interesting. The constitutional debates, too, are fascinating because much of what was sought, intended, or feared 200 years ago from a philosophical sense remains at the forefront of today’s discussions about related human concerns and aspirations. But the proper role of public administration in
this country has never been settled, and perhaps cannot be, for many of the same reasons the Constitution endures. If public administration is the public service, then it correctly encompasses all three branches of American government. If the administrative state supports the technology of the public service--that is, the institutional arrangements that make a working system out of government's need for hierarchical organization, rational decision making, rule of law, written procedures and records, and sufficient public funds--then it represents the government. There is not likely to be a simple resolution concerning administration's proper role as representatives of citizens, the people for whom government exists. Americans are fortunate that democracy is interesting.
Footnotes--Chapter II

1Although their cause in this context related to whether or not the proposed Constitution ought to be ratified, the separate points of view of these two coalitions evolved as platforms for America's first political parties (Cullop, 1983). However, for purposes of my discussion, Federalists should be taken to mean the authors of the Federalist papers, and Anti-Federalists should be taken to mean the authors of what are known as the Anti-Federalist papers. Thus, Federalists are Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, all lawyers. Hamilton and Jay came from New York, and Madison from Virginia. Anti-Federalists cited in this chapter are Robert Yates and John Lansing, both of New York; Luther Martin of Maryland; George Mason of Virginia; Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts; Richard Henry Lee of Virginia; and George Clinton of New York. (Interestingly, Thomas Jefferson supported the Constitution, but when elected President in 1800 he was a member of the Democratic-Republican Party, which was rooted into Anti-Federalist thought. When elected President in 1808, Madison was also a member of the Democratic-Republican Party.)

2The Puritans, settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Company, might seem as unlikely contributors of such magnitude, as shallow thinking portrays them in the context of things "puritanical" in nature, or for their experience in matters of witchcraft, rigid orthodoxy, or fanatical theology. Historians, avoiding shallow judgments, have spoken of the Puritans in laudatory terms (Miller & Johnson, 1968). Tocqueville (1945) noted in his 1835 essay, Democracy in America, that there were special qualities about the Puritans. They had discovered a way of life, Tocqueville observed, where they could live "according to their own opinions and worship God in freedom" (p. 33). Puritanism's importance transcended religious doctrine, serving as communal enterprises whose basic doctrines corresponded with the most absolute democratic and republican theories. Commager (1970) viewed Puritanism along with rationalism and idealism as "the three major sources of American philosophy . . . [it] could permeate secular rather than merely theological thought, freed from the burden of nonconformity, it could serve as a philosophical instrument rather than a sectarian challenge" (p. 26). Others have concluded that Puritanism as both a religious and social force has been "so pervasive and permanent an influence in the United States [that it extended] far beyond New England and the colonial period" (Morison, Commager, & Leuchtenburg, 1980, Vol. 1, p. 51).
3See Bailyn (1955, pp. 39-44) for discussion of Puritanism's emphasis on business. The author charged that the Puritans had "a grammar for the translation of economics into morality, and in the machinery of the Puritan church and state a means of effecting these ideas" (p. 43).

4The theory of state and society is examined in detail by Miller and Johnson (1963, Vol. 1, pp. 181-280). The guiding theory unifies religion and politics in such a manner as encouraging the idea that church and state could be separate. The theory was advanced, as Winthrop noted, because religious reasons included "a due forme of Government both civill and ecclesiastical" (p. 181), and both were important.

5Ketcham (1974) provided examples of Puritan influence on certain of the "patriots" who advocated a split from England rule in the mid-to-late 1700s. Included is an analysis of the effect of the Puritan ethic on Franklin, John Adams, and Jefferson (pp. 8, 159-167).

6Bailyn (1955) summarized the situation succinctly, as follows: To [the Puritans] land meant not so much wealth as security and stability, tradition and status. Shaken out of their familiar ways of economic and political disturbances, caught up in varying degrees by the cause of religious reform, most of the 20,000 Englishmen who migrated to America in the 1630's sought to recreate the village and farm life they had known. They accepted and probably welcomed the medieval social teaching of orthodox Puritanism if only for its inspiring support of the idea of the close-knit community that existed for the good of all its members and in which each man was his brother's keeper. (p. 39)

7A most difficult task here is to broadly conclude what was thought or intended by individuals noted as the framers, Founders, Federalists, or Anti-Federalists. As human beings, their positions were varied and diverse. Some had specific ideals, which they strongly advocated. Others had vague ideas about the evolving constitutional document. Compromise was possible in some areas, not so in others. I refer to "framers" as those at the Philadelphia debates, and Federalists or Anti-Federalists as being representative of majority opinions of those "groups."

8Perhaps Madison sought to soothe the egos of all who debated the philosophy of the Constitution, but as Storing (cited in Rohr, 1986) stated, the Anti-Federalists lost the debate over the Constitution because they had the weaker argument.
Ten states had ratified the Constitution by July 2, 1788. Although adopted, the new Constitution did not go into effect until March 4, 1789. In 1790, all 13 states of the "original" states had adopted the Constitution as the supreme law of the United States (Cullop, 1983, p. 18; Morison & Commager, 1980, pp. 289-294).

See Ketcham (1986) for further discussion, p. 5.

The reference here is to the political philosophy in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist points of view. For example, Dietz (1965) described the Federalist essays as follows: "[They] are a treatise on free government in peace and security. [They are] the outstanding American contribution to the literature on constitutional democracy and federalism, a classic of Western political thought" (p. 3). The Anti-Federalist essays are not remembered with such high praise, as is explained elsewhere in Chapter I. Ironically, from the standpoint of American history, little has been written about the Federalists and Anti-Federalists until recent years (Dietz, 1965). Wright (1961) is recognized for his full-length edition of the essays. Important recent works include Allen and Lloyd (1985), Borden (1965), and Kenyon (1966).


Hamilton wrote 51 of the Federalist essays, mostly on the subjects of the need for a more energetic government, powers of Congress, and the executive and judicial departments. Madison wrote 29 essays on the nature of the federal system, checks and balances, and the Congress. Jay fell ill after agreeing to be a Federalist author, and only penned five essays, primarily on national defense. Morris was an original member of the project, but declined to write anything. See McDonald (1979, pp. 107-115) for further discussion.

Madison and Hamilton liked to read Montesquieu in their own language and liked to cite, especially, the great English thinkers, Hobbes and Locke. Stated Burns (1982): "Out of the writings of such men, out of his own and his comrades' political experiences, Madison had forged his theories of government" (pp. 28-29).

The Federalists considered "public good" as both an object of government and as a standard of political decision. Rossiter (1961) listed no less than 36 references to "public good" in his book. As Hamilton forthrightly stated in his essay Number 71, "It is a just observation that the people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD," even if they err about the means to attain it (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 430). There was considerable discussion in the Federalist essays about the need for public officials to be virtuous, in fact, stating:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next place to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous. (See Madison's essay Number 57; cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 350.)

Placing a definition on "public good" from the essays is difficult, however. Generally, "public good" is identified with "happiness." Some examples follow. From Hamilton's essay Number 30, he stated: "The ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 191). From Madison's essay Number 43, he stated: "The transcendent law of nature and of nature's God . . . declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions must be sacrificed" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 279). From Madison's essay Number 45, he stated: "The public good, the real welfare of the great body of people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 289). But Madison made a broad definition of "happiness." So, what was meant by the "public good"? The definition remained elusive and is the focus of discovery in this and subsequent chapters.

There would later be greater tension between Hamilton and Jefferson (Cunningham, 1957; McDonald, 1979; Padover, 1952; L. D. White, 1951). Generally, Jefferson opposed Hamilton's proposal for a national bank, greater centralization of policy making at the national level, and aggrandizement of the executive branch of government (Vocino & Rabin, 1981). Initially, Jefferson's arguments were "overtaken and rejected" by the growth of the national economy and the strong acceptance of Federalist implementation of the centralized government. When Jefferson had the opportunity to shape policy as President, he would recognize the strength of the national government, and its executive branch, and accepted their role in the future development of American government.

The Federalist position on executive leadership was established early. Stated Jay in Federalist No. 3:

When once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government--especially as it will have the widest field for
choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of the States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us. (Rossiter, 1961, p. 43)

18 See Cullop (1983, pp. 114-115) for full text of the United States Constitution. Amendment 9 reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" (p. 114). Amendment 10 reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people" (p. 115). Miller's (1960) discussion appears, pp. 20-26.
CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF "GOOD GOVERNMENT"

The first century of the practice of public administration in the United States might be described as a period of trial and error (Mosher, 1981). The trial related to implementation of intent of the framers, and the blending of that theory with the practical problems of nation-building. Any errors might be reflected in experimentation with the new government. So much error was evident by the end of the 1800s that the tone and direction of national politics pivoted around efforts to reform the federal government.

The cycle of history had turned full circle as the nation demonstrated preference toward a "new" guiding philosophy of public purpose--similar to that envisioned by the Federalists (Schlesinger, 1986). Emphasis on a philosophy of laissez-faire involvement of government in the affairs of national expansion had led to disenchantment about the course of such events. American public administration would be changed dramatically as a result of the progressive movement. The discipline stood at the cutting edge of the coming change; in fact, it represented the main focus of this change. That is, reformers sought to make government efficient. The purpose of this chapter is analysis of this new emphasis, with particular attention being paid to how efficiency became the
ultimate value of good government. Was the proper role of public administration one of cutting costs to be more businesslike? Or would efficiency come to mean a demand for effective delivery of promised services? Obviously, I intend to make the point that, at points in time, both questions could be answered in the affirmative. However, the second question relates to how efficiency most applies to the proper-role matter. Although American public administration had existed for nearly a century, the field was about to embark on a new direction that would elevate it as an area worthy of serious inquiry.

New Directions for Administration

Van Riper (1983) posited the basic question confronting American public administration at the end of the nineteenth century when he asked: "Could we simultaneously renovate a run-down administrative system and regain the idealism which had fueled the first version of our administrative state?" (p. 481). He argued in the affirmative on both counts, but Van Riper found his answer mainly in the new scientific-management literature and its emphasis on the doctrine of classical management. He was correct to observe that the momentum of the new reform movement was initiated "by men like the Federalists, men of affairs and practical experience, many of whom had played important military roles in the Civil War" (p. 481). He noted that there were "few works that might have in any
way assisted, say, Theodore Roosevelt in managing the construction of the Panama Canal" (p. 481).

The development of one of the strongest statements on behalf of centralization in the American government that came about since arguments by the Federalists was also evident. Although the administrative state "lay at rest for three generations," Theodore Roosevelt revived it in 1901, Wilson enhanced it, and Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) put it into action (Chandler, 1986b).

There was no American of his time who was "more national in his interests" than Theodore Roosevelt,¹ and few ever attempted to define the responsibility of the presidency as simply and as dramatically as this Roosevelt. A President, he said, had but two important functions: (a) to serve as moral leader of the American people and (b) to enforce the national interest against special interests (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2). The "new" centralizers saw strong central government as the answer to resolution of "modern" democratic government. Their political philosophy aimed at redistributing state power for humane ends in the name of society as a whole.² They were convinced that the capitalism enhanced over most of nineteenth-century America wrongly equated individual freedom through encouragement of unimpeded ambition and gratification of self.

Wilson complemented these themes in his "New Freedom" argument culminated in the 1912 campaign for the presidency--Roosevelt was one of his chief opponents--and served as the foundation of a
political philosophy encouraging the use of federal powers to eliminate economic maladjustments. It was a philosophy recognized by Franklin Roosevelt two decades later, when he won the presidency and sought to lead the nation out of the Great Depression through the politics of the New Deal (Blum, 1956; Chessman, 1969; Davidson, 1956; Mowry, 1958).

The influence of both Roosevelts and Wilson is profound with respect to the determination of government purpose in the United States (Horwitz, 1979; Mosher, 1976). Reform was at the heart of Theodore Roosevelt's and Wilson's purpose, and national survival and recovery, at the heart of Franklin Roosevelt's idea of government purpose. It became apparent in each situation that laissez-faire economic policies that evolved from the Anti-Federalists, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians were not ends in themselves. When a nation's purpose equates to society as existing apart from its government, the resulting pursuits of personal aggrandizement overtake the conscious rhetoric and reality of its fundamental social contract of collective needs.

FDR was certainly a Wilsonian Democrat (Burns, 1978), who implemented perhaps the greatest centralization of the American government ever effected. "The only sure bulwark of continuing liberty," FDR stated, "is a government strong enough to protect the interests of the people" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 525). But he would add a caution that that nation's people also needed to
be "strong enough and well enough informed to maintain its sovereign control over its government" (p. 525)

FDR used that philosophy in revitalizing a depressed nation, leading it through a second war with world-wide implications, and posited a legacy for America as "the hope of the human race" (p. 525). But in the 1930s, when FDR was elected to his first term as President, Americans doubted whether liberty or democracy could actually survive in the modern world. Ironically, as well, FDR entered office in 1932 with no systematic program or ideology, and with only a generalized belief in what liberty and equality meant (Burns, 1978).

He knew that the government at the national level had to effect Wilsonian philosophy in order to survive. That meant, FDR realized, that the federal government needed to be led by the strongest "energetic executive" that the nation had ever experienced, or that Hamilton could have envisioned (Blum, 1980). FDR called the nation together over the course of his administration under the banner of "the older [American] tradition of doing good by example rather than by interference," and that any hardships being endured by the people would be considered hardships being endured by all--and that it was the nation's business to correct them (Schlesinger, 1986, p. 94).

Wilsonian Democracy gave FDR the agenda he needed to attempt to resolve the great economic crisis before the United States in 1932. He understood the needed direction in terms of "national self-determination," and further meshed the philosophy with not only his
"New Deal" policies aimed at recovery, relief, and reform, but also in terms of individual rights--FDR's "Four Freedoms" (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear) (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, pp. 454-545; Schlesinger, 1986, pp. 94-95). His idea was to return to a basic understanding of America's founding principles--an emphasis on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights--to refocus the nation toward tradition, culture, and purpose (Commager, 1970).

But FDR cautioned Americans, even then, about the moral of European history, that given a choice between freedom and satisfaction of one's hunger, people's basic instincts would lead them toward bread over liberty. It was an important point, from FDR's standpoint, because it was a realistic alternative to the time and a sure course to loss of that liberty. Thus, he warned America in a 1938 radio message that people in other nations were starving because of "government weakness through lack of leadership," a situation not to be repeated here. He said:

> We in America know that our own democratic institutions can be preserved and made to work. But in order to preserve them we need . . . to prove that the practical operation of democratic government is equal to the task of protecting the security of the people. (Commager, 1970, p. 350)

Like Presidents before him since Jackson, presidential power was basically what the man in office made of it (Koenig, 1968; Neustadt, 1980), and FDR's approach boldly asserted the executive branch of government in domestic and, later, in world affairs. While Wilson...
targeted the need to control business and industry for the common
good of the nation, FDR took the philosophy a step further and
argued that "private economic power . . . is a public trust as well"
(Schlesinger, 1960, p. 631), although it remained "as the backbone
of economic well-being in the United States" (p. 631). However, FDR
added, "The struggle against private monopoly is a struggle for, and
not against, American business. It is a struggle to preserve
individual enterprise and economic freedom" (pp. 631-632).

It is my viewpoint that FDR was thinking beyond the issues at
hand. He was setting the stage for a bold new approach for the role
of government. This would culminate in the first comprehensive
reconsideration of the presidency and the president’s control of the
executive branch since the original constitutional debates (Rohr,
1986). This situation is examined later with respect to the
Brownlow Committee report.

But first, FDR had to refocus the government on a stronger
course toward public purpose, begun by Theodore Roosevelt and
Wilson. Subsequent discussion will demonstrate the parallels
between FDR’s political philosophy and that of Theodore Roosevelt
and Wilson. Importantly, and collectively, these three
"progressive" Presidents turned the course of American government
away from the demise that transpired from the Jacksonian-Radical
Republican Era, and incorporated key elements of Federalist and
Anti-Federalist thought. It is significant that the framers debated
aloud and in print about their beliefs about the basis and shape of
their political institutions. This indicated that there also had to be definite thinking about the goals and content—that is, proper role—of public administration (Gladden, 1972, Vol. 2). The same can be said of the Roosevelts and Wilson.

Need for "Good Government"

"Do Americans really want good government? Do we know it when we see it?" The questions were asked by journalist-muckraker Steffens in 1903 (Kaplan, 1974, p. 113), a year before he published the classic expose of governmental corruption in America, *The Shame of the Cities*. The questions posed a realistic inquiry into the meaning of public good at a time when reformers had had enough of spoils, patronage, graft, and of federal, state, and municipal governments that failed to provide services either economically or efficiently. One sage of Tammany Hall made the following observation for newspaper reporters upon publication of Steffens's then-new book:

Steffens means well but, like all reformers, he don't know how to make distinctions. He can't see no difference between honest graft and dishonest graft and, consequent, he gets things all mixed up. The difference between a looter and a practical politician is the difference between the Philadelphia Republican gang and Tammany Hall. Steffens seems to think they're both about the same; but he's wrong. The Philadelphia crowd runs up against the penal code. Tammany don't. (Kaplan, 1974, p. 120)

This picture of American politics could have been snapped in 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, or at several points between or after. For
the many events there were going on continuously and simultaneously in the rapidly "transforming" America had dramatic effects on the system of government at all levels. Steffens, as one of the leading reformers, believed that privilege controlled politics and "neither morals nor laws had anything to do with the matter" (cited in Morison & Commager, 1980, p. 456). Something had to be done. One way of addressing the matter was in the manner of Steffens and other muckrakers--write newspaper and magazine articles, and books, to expose the shame of cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and New York, or practically anywhere else. A second way of addressing the matter was to bring about "good management" in government. As L. D. White (1958) observed, the period was ripe for the rise of businesslike administration in government, and for technologicalizing that same government (pp. 387-392). After all, what worked for business ought to work for the public service as well.

It was in this setting of reform and clamors of the need for "good management" that Americans renewed their search for the "happiness" prescribed by the Federalists. Up until and shortly after World War II, the ramifications of that sought-after "good management" would underscore the efforts and the moral responsibility of the public service in dramatic manner. The period in the history of American public administration where this concept of "good management" was paramount has come to be known as "orthodox" or "classical" public administration. The main elements
of orthodox public administration were pulled together by Sayre (1958) in his essay, "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging." Those elements are as follows:

1. [A] politics-administration dichotomy was assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal; administration was perceived as a self-contained world of its own, with its own separate values, rules, and methods.

2. Organization theory was stated in "scientific management" terms; that is, it was seen largely as a problem in organizational technology—the necessities of hierarchy, the uses of staff agencies, a limited span of control, subdivision of work by such "scientific" principles as purpose, process, place, or clientele.

3. The executive budget was emphasized as an instrument of rationality, of coordination, planning, and control.

4. Personnel management was stressed as an additional element of rationality [jobs were to be described "scientifically," employees were to be selected, paid, advanced by "scientific" methods].

5. A "neutral" or "impartial" career service was required to insure competence, expertise, rationality.

6. A body of administrative laws was needed to prescribe standards of due process in administrative conduct. (pp. 102-103)

Sayre (1958) could easily have added a seventh "element," which he used in summary of the points above. This additional "element," however, provides not only the "bottom line" of the orthodox public administration, but also the scope for necessary elaboration. He stated:

... The responsibility of administrative agencies to popular control was a value taken-for-granted; the responsiveness of administrators and bureaucrats was not seen as a problem because everybody then understood that politics and policy were
separate from administration, which was concerned exclusively with the execution of assignments handed down from the realm of politics. (p. 103)

The message from the progressives to public administrators about their moral responsibility in government was unmistakable. If they assisted in the administration of "good government," they were morally responsible. If they went about their jobs "scientifically," and followed orders of the policy-makers, they were morally responsible. And as long as they accomplished their tasks along the businesslike lines of economy and efficiency, they, again, were morally responsible. I am convinced that in the strictest sense of orthodox public administration, there was little room for moral choice, only "scientific" management and "good administration." I agree with Chandler and Plano (1982), who stated: "Morality in the sense of ethical choice was simply not a function of the functionaries" (p. 15). At least, not until the orthodox model and the politics-administration dichotomy were abandoned.

Two key dates are important to remember at this point: 1887 and 1946. It was in 1887 that Wilson published classic essay, "The Study of Administration." It marked the beginning of academic interest in American public administration. It also set forth the logic of the politics-administration dichotomy. By 1948, when Waldo's classic, The Administrative State, was published, the tenets of orthodox public administration were largely discredited, if not the politics-administration dichotomy. Between Wilson and Waldo,
however, America experienced 59 years of orthodox public administration.

But Wilson's (1887) essay clearly was influenced by the political reforms of the late 1880s, especially to include reform of the civil service which led to the adoption of the Pendleton Act (1883). Wilson proposed a "science of administration" as a necessary solution to improve not only the personnel aspect of the national government, "but also the organization and methods of our government offices" (p. 197). The reason for this need was simply stated: the time had come to find out, first, what government could "properly and successfully" do, and, second, how government could do its tasks "with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy" (p. 197). Wilson argued that the Prussians and the French had developed the world's most advanced administrative systems, so he asked why those models could not be copied in the United States.

Wilson (1887) said America did offer special problems to consider in the running of its government, but the European models—the "simplicity and efficiency" of the Prussians, and the "symmetrical divisions of territory and [the] orderly gradations of office" of the French—could easily be adaptable to the American system (p. 204). They were businesslike, and they stressed economy, efficiency, and accountability. Wilson interpreted those attributes as "good management." What could have been more desirable? But he
I find it difficult to believe that Wilson (1887) was the only scholar who had recognized that a "transforming" America had become extremely complex to administer. His essay, however, was the first to tie the problems together with a call for a science of administration. Where once the American government had "single" duties of government, the duties were now becoming unwieldy due to the proliferation of special interests. Observed Wilson, "Government once had but a few masters; it now has scores of masters" (p. 200).

The need for a "science of administration" could not have been more obvious. Certainly, it was to Wilson (1887), and to the many individuals who would nurture and enhance orthodox public administration in the years to come.

The essence of Wilson's (1887) new "science of administration" can be summarized in four points: (a) the "science of administration" should be applicable to all administrative organizations; (b) "administrative questions are not political
questions" (p. 210), and thus administration "is not therefore" politics (p. 211); (c) the guiding value of "good management" is efficiency; and (d) an efficient public organization requires administration by "the executive," as "a single dominant center" of power (pp. 198-199).

Wilson's (1887) lead would be followed by several other proponents of orthodox theory, to include Goodnow (1900), Taylor (1947), Willoughby (1937), and Gulick and Urwick (1937), whose contributions to orthodox public administration will be highlighted below. Mention will also be given to Weber (1975), the German sociologist whose work on the bureaucracy is a relatively recent discovery of American public administration.

Goodnow's (1900) Politics and Administration told in the title the exact message of the book, that there are two "primary functions" of government, namely politics and administration. They are totally separate, with nothing in common except the "will of the state." Politics expresses that will, and administration executes that will (pp. 18, 22). While Goodnow's definition is simplistic, his rationale is not as clear. From one standpoint, he professed that the "control of administration" is by politics, but he stressed that it takes a certain "harmony" between those expressing the state's will and those executing that will, or the "orderly and progressive" possibilities of government are "impossible" (pp. 23-24, 37). Thus, the key to control is harmony. Goodnow stated:
Whether this control be found in or outside of the governmental system, its existence is necessitated by the fact, that without it orderly and progressive government is impossible. It should, therefore, extend so far as necessary to produce that harmony between the expression and the execution of the state will which has been shown to be so necessary. If, however, it is extended beyond this limit, it at once loses its raison d'être. (p. 37)

How much control is enough, or too little, or too much? These are important questions, but for Goodnow (1900), like Wilson (1887) 13 years previous, the motivation for authorship was that of reform, and the issue that of "developing a proper administrative apparatus" (Waldo, 1980, p. 68). By today's standards, the candid explanation of the politics-administration dichotomy—that is, expression as opposed to execution—seems overly simplistic. Perhaps they were, although scholars today well recognize the fact that Goodnow, considered by some as the "Father of Public Administration," understood the distinction between the logic of analysis and the realities associated with administering a complex government, especially in an era of "transformation" (Waldo, 1980, p. 68). Importantly, Wilson and Goodnow were in basic agreement on the issue of deciding and executing. Who was in a position to challenge them? Those who order, and those who do, made perfect sense in the business world. Why would it not in government?

Taylor's (1947) principles of "scientific management" are probably as well known by those who study management as he is by those who study public administration. As early as 1880, he was instrumental in developing a "scientific management" approach to
industry (Mosher, 1976), emphasizing that there was "one best way" to design and execute tasks. The method stressed the possibilities of efficiency: (a) using division of work to take maximum advantage of workers' specialized skills and (b) unifying direction to group common activities under a single plan, single supervisor, and single work unit to accomplish the task. For those reformers who reacted against inefficiency in government, waste of resources, and corruption, Taylor's ideas were revolutionary. By proposing that management was a true science, productivity could then be increased by systematic application of certain scientific principles. American public administration took a keen interest in what Taylor had to say, but not until 1906 (Chandler & Plano, 1982). In his Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor noted in the Introduction that "President [Theodore] Roosevelt ... remarked that 'the conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to the larger question of national efficiency'" (p. 5). Of course, "scientific management" was one way--the "one best way"--to insure realization of the political expression. Taylor defined "scientific management" as follows:

Science, not rule of thumb.
Harmony, not discord.
Cooperation, not individualism.
Maximum output, in place of restricted output.
The development of each man to his greatest efficiency and prosperity. (p. 140)

But that was not all. As important to public administration was Taylor's (1947) elaboration of these principles in terms of what
he called his "underlying philosophies." Using the word "mechanism" in place of "procedure," Taylor underscored his belief that administration was merely mechanistic. He said:

The mechanism of management must not be mistaken for its essence, or underlying philosophy. . . . The same mechanism which will produce the finest results when made to serve the underlying principles of scientific management, will lead to failure and disaster if accompanied by the wrong spirit. (p. 128)

It is my opinion that Taylor's (1947) mechanisms went hand in hand with the politics-administration dichotomy as his "scientific management" provided an accepted means for the experts (through expression of policy) to control the workers (who executed it). Although Taylor professed that "scientific management" developed workers to their greatest "prosperity," as well as their greatest "efficiency," the system clearly was autocratic--with authority flowing only one way, from the top of the hierarchy down. But, again, with respect to the politics-administration dichotomy, what did it matter? Experts expressed, and workers executed. What sense was there to unnecessarily worry about the human element? It was not important. The issue focused on "national efficiency," a much greater practical concern than feelings and opinions of members of the administrative state. Moral responsibility is not even an afterthought.

Nonetheless, Taylor's (1947) work significantly influenced management and public administration for several decades. Even in the 1930s, Taylor's "scientific management" was used as the
springboard for L. D. White (1965) and others (Gulick & Urwick, 1937) to launch new theories of their own: the "principles of administration." But, at the time of "national efficiency," Taylor's approach was extremely meaningful—not only was it widely acclaimed and developed, public administrationists were eager to jump on the bandwagon because they thought that by joining the private sector in the movement it meant that public management might also be "elevated to the status of a legitimate science" (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 29).

L. D. White (1926, 1965) argued for consolidation of political science and management thought—an idea credited to him for "creating" public administration (cited in Mosher, 1976, p. 183). This is laudable, and White certainly was a pioneer in the sphere of public administration literature. However, he did not envision public administration beyond "an instrumentalist role [by] which it denied itself philosophy" (p. 183). As such, public administration was therefore unable to adapt a "theory of politics," as problems of public policy, ethics, discretionary power, and self-image were concerned. However, he was unmistakably a pioneer in early public administrative thinking. One of his more notable achievements was in having the foresight to include ethics as a matter of concern in public administration's first text. His premise for public administration was based on management, but as he implied, even management needs to be concerned with ethics. After all, the underlying thesis to L. D. White's (1926) early work was the idea that
public administration had universal applicability and principles that pertained to public and private organizations.

Gulick and Urwick (1937), American administrative reformers whose influence peaked in the late 1930s, argued that efficiency was the single value administrators needed to concern themselves with.\textsuperscript{4} Gulick (1937a) provided American public administration with an expansion of L. D. White's (1926) management approach and suggested—emphasizing pragmatism, or the idea of solving problems according to practical analysis—that good administration requires good organization. To accomplish tasks in a practical way, administrators, he stressed, needed to be guided by certain principles or laws. In this way, he contended, administrative science could take place and efficient results would become realistic objectives.

Gulick's (1937a, 1937b) plan of action became known as his "gospel of efficiency" or his "principles of administration" (Nigro & Nigro, 1984, pp. 150-151). In it, Gulick proposed that operations of government and industry would be rationalized by institutionalizing these operations into large subunits, or bureaus. Duties of administrative scientists were compressed into principles represented by the acronym POSDCORB—for each of the critical functions that administrators performed, namely, planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (Gulick, 1937a, p. 13).
But Gulick (1937a) saw organization as the cornerstone of administration. For him, every administrator was responsible for "division of work" within the organization, characterized by purpose, process, persons or things, and place (p. 15). It was all very logical to him, and to his followers: work division is necessary for organization to be operative; indeed, it is the reason for organization. It follows that the ultimate purpose of administration was to coordinate these specialized functions. Without organization, Gulick contended, administration has no purpose.

Of all the orthodox theorists, Gulick (1937a, 1937b) has probably been attacked in recent years by theorists who argue that his principles lacked the human element in their application. Waldo (1948) and Simon (1976) were leading critics of Gulick. Was he easy pickings for this criticism? How much different from all the other efficiency proponents was he? I find it important to note that Gulick, indeed, advocated efficiency into orthodox public administration's climatic heyday, just as the world entered its second global war. It was a time when top-down expression of policy was executed by "workers" in various situations, some "good" and some "bad," but all in administration of someone's act of command. As for Gulick, a concluding comment seems appropriate. It is:

Luther Gulick has been one of the most influential figures in American public administration. Although POSDCORB became symbolic of all the early errors critics believed were produced by those who first ventured into the science of administration, it represented pioneering insights as well.
Gulick's ideas are still widely used in government, primarily because his critics did not have better ones to suggest. (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 20)

"High Noon of Orthodoxy"

American public administration through the first 37 years of the twentieth century has been described as "government by the efficient" (Mosher, 1981, p. 70). It marked the period when implementation of scientific management was commonplace (Nigro & Nigro, 1984). The year 1937 is significant, as well, as the time when Gulick and Urwick's edited "bible" of orthodoxy, Papers on the Science of Administration, was published, and when a presidential committee recommended to F. D. Roosevelt (FDR) that the foundation of good government was management. The committee, commonly known as the Brownlow Committee after its chair, Louis Brownlow, was formally known as the President's Committee on Administrative Management. Gulick was a committee member. Management, the Brownlow Committee envisioned, was consistent with science and efficiency. But in underscoring the importance of control in government administration, they felt it also epitomized the essence of democracy. Thus, the Brownlow Committee reported: "By democracy we mean getting things done that we, the American people, want done in the general interest" (Brownlow, Merriam, & Gulick, 1937, p. 1).

There was a great deal that the American federal government was getting done by the late 1930s on behalf of the "general interest." New Deal politics were promoted by FDR's Administration: not a new...
game with new rules, but "a reshuffle of cards that had too long been stacked against" middle- and lower-income America (Leuchtenburg, 1963, p. x). Mammoth public programs were being administered by a commanding federal government seen by the majority of Americans in the context of leadership and democratic resurgence, as opposed to minority concern that a revolution was underway and that FDR's presidency amounted to no less than a dictatorship (p. x).

Americans, seemingly preoccupied as always with progress, were in the midst of progressive government feared by the Anti-Federalists, and yet untested by the continuing "experiment." In The Making of the New Deal, Freidel stated:

The decade of the 1930s, despite the privations of the Great Depression and the threats of global war, was a time of national reaffirmation and the laying of the foundations of modern America. This was the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. . . . The young New Dealers, trained in law, economics, public administration, or new technical fields, brilliant and dedicated, brought their energy and creativity to the federal government. Nurtured on progressive ideals, schooled in the improved universities of the 1920s, they possessed both the knowledge and the vision to engage in the restructuring of government and society. (cited in Louchheim, 1983, p. xi)

American public administration was set to transcend "government by the efficient," toward "government by administrators" (Mosher, 1981, p. 79). More important, the discipline was on the threshold of a major evolutionary change that sought to establish rationality in government in contexts never before attempted in the United States. It was a period of history, and an expansion of American
political philosophy, described as the "high noon of orthodoxy" (Sayre, 1958, p. 103). Focusing on the executive branch of the federal government, "significant and impressive" managerial changes were to be made which "strengthened the prestige of public administration as a body of precepts" (p. 103). These "significant and impressive" managerial changes profoundly affected American public administration.

I find it extraordinary that public administration's role at this point in the American experience would become as significant as it did. Both Mosher (1976) and Rohr (1986) contended that the report is probably the most important constitutional document of our time. The report itself concluded that the constitutional principle of separation of powers placed "the whole executive power of the Government of the United States" in only the President, as head of the executive branch of government (Rohr, 1986, p. 137). As Rohr observed, and I agree, it was after Brownlow was implemented that Americans came to believe that ultimate administrative responsibility--that is, where the proverbial buck stopped--rested in the chief executive. This provides obvious and clear insight into the proper role of public administration. The discipline, while apparent in all branches of government from a literal standpoint, is most closely associated with the executive branch. And the president's policies are those that dictate the guiding direction and philosophy of the particular administration in office.
If the proper-role question had not been settled, the one of power had.

**Enormous Practical Problems**

When FDR took office as President of the United States in 1933, few people—perhaps FDR himself—could have guessed that the "New Deal" would ever amount to anything really serious in the history of American public administration. After all, the term "New Deal" was coined by a campaign aide in search of a speech topic (cited in Louchheim, 1983). The term later caught on as a "happy phrase" during the campaign against the incumbent President, Hoover. It was intended to be a psychological slogan to make people, who were experiencing the hard times of the Great Depression, "feel better" (Perkins, 1947, p. 135). It was not, then, a plan with form and content. That plan, and the place of the "New Deal" in history, would evolve later.5

But, in 1933, FDR's concern as the nation's new President, winning the election against Hoover with a commanding 60% of the popular vote, focused on enormous practical problems. The country struggled in the midst of severe financial crises: nearly one in four Americans was unemployed, banks closed and mortgages were defaulted to record levels, farm prices undercut production costs, and trade and investments were stagnant (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2; Mosher, 1976). Worse yet, the morale of Americans was at a frighteningly low ebb. Government to them was perhaps symbolized in
Hoover's attack on the "Bonus Army"—the World War I veterans and their families who marched on Washington in 1932 to seek out unpaid federal payments for overseas service. Hoover had the veterans driven out of Washington by National Guard cavalrymen who, with sword in hand, rode down on the marchers and burned their shanty camps. The action confirmed a nation's perception of Hoover's administration as being "hostile to the dispossessed" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 480).

FDR's approach was far different. His strategy was to demonstrate personal concern with the nation and its problems. Contrary to Hoover, FDR wanted the "dispossessed" to know they had a champion in the federal government. He consciously strived to let the people know how much their President empathized with their misery. The rallying cry of FDR's First Inaugural Address—"This nation asks for action, and action now" (Lott, 1969, p. 232)—underscored his message to the masses. If FDR wanted people to understand that he held a genuine concern for their welfare, he was most successful. Roseman, an early advocate of the "New Deal," recalled the mood of the time as one filled with FDR's "magic." He clearly was the one in charge of the administration. She stated:

The President had a tremendous feeling for people, individuals and people as a whole. Those who gathered around him imbibed that spirit and acquired some of it within themselves. So it was a period when people were searching for a solution to those terrible times and were giving whatever they could to contribute to it . . . . It was a personal thing [with the common people, as well]. When [FDR] talked on the radio, his sentences were short. He never used big words because he was
talking to the average man. He had an affinity for that average man. He always talked simply, and this I think was the magic of Roosevelt, that he had an empathy for everyone, or people on the whole. (cited in Louchheim, 1983, p. 11)

FDR's "empathy for everyone" became readily apparent in the scores of "New Deal" programs that were created between 1933 and 1945. Reading like an alphabet soup of acronyms, these programs represented "government in action" at high extremes, so much so that prominent critics like Lippmann accused the Roosevelt Administration of executing "dictatorial powers" (cited in Steel, 1980, p. 307). Despite the eagerness of the "New Deal" advocates and a nation identifying with FDR's "magic," warnings abounded from the skeptics. For example, journalist Lippmann considered FDR's "experiments in central control" as an immediate danger to democracy as Americans likely understood it. Stated Lippman:

These experiments have their roots in the desire for recovery rather than in a popular enthusiasm for the ideal of an authoritarian state and a planned economy. They are, therefore, practical expediens rather than revolutionary processes. (cited in Steel, 1980, p. 307)

Clearly, Lippmann's argument with the Administration centered on the haste, as well as the methods used in what could be described as rapid implementation—that is, "action now"—of bold new policies (cited in Steel, 1980). Thus, Lippmann defined the danger to democracy as the possibility that the "expedients" might give way to more drastic ones and thus "deepen the dislocation" by weakening the very free-enterprise system on which recovery depended (p. 307). Later, Lippmann (1955) would use FDR as an example of "the enfeebled
executive" in his book, *The Public Philosophy*. Contending that executive power of leaders of democratic governments had been weakened by the "pressures of the representative assembly and of mass opinion," Lippmann cited FDR as the prime example of the leader who feared those pressures and who "governed" under the "great temptation to outwit [or] bypass [those pressures]" (pp. 48-49).

Yet, despite the critics and the criticism, FDR pushed his programs full speed ahead. The nation was overwhelmed with practical problems, and there was just too much work to be done. It remained a time of "intense activity" in the federal government, and the times dictated the scope of administration. As one historian observed, "It was pragmatic, it was experimental, it was reformist, and there was little time for theoretical abstraction concerning either its ends or means" (Mosher, 1976, p. 54).

FDR saw his decisive election victory over Hoover as a mandate of the people "for discipline and direction under leadership" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 485). His re-elections only reinforced his concept of mandate. FDR reminded the Congress and the people, constantly, of the "unprecedented task before us," and warned both that the nation needed to move swiftly to deal with the financial crises that plagued the country. Thus, the "emergency" justified the need for "emergency measures," and FDR and the "New Dealers" provided what they determined to be the responsible action the people sought.
There was another important obstacle that the President felt in need of overcoming during the early "New Deal" years and later. That obstacle was the established bureaucracy--public administration, per se--and FDR let the nation know full well of his mistrust and lack of confidence in it. He got things done in the administration through his "Brain Trust," established during the early months of his first term. This represented a major departure from routine public administration, which for years had relied on obedient clerks carrying out the orders of officials under accepted "scientific management" principles. Although I point out later in the chapter that FDR relied heavily on many prominent public administrators to accomplish the deeds Rohr (1978) has credited him with, FDR handled policy by way of his cadre of behind-the-scenes actors who guided--and played key administrative roles in--implementation of the "New Deal" policies. Was it his way of making government more interesting? The wife of then-Congressman L. B. Johnson recalled the period as "a yeasty, exciting time" (cited in Louchheim, 1983, p. xviii). She explained:

... People really felt that they could roll up their sleeves and make America great. Lyndon had an expression about that: "You feel like charging Hell with a bucket of water." There were very few times in our country's life when so many good minds gathered together in [Washington] intent on raising the level of living and the safety of the American people. (p. xviii)

I tend to think FDR used the "Brain Trust" as his most expedient way of getting democracy done. He was the administration.
The Executive Art

The "New Deal" period between 1933 and 1936 clearly developed in "an opportunistic and haphazard way" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 521). It was not noted for administrative perfection, as the new ideas being promoted by FDR were so novel, so unorthodox, and so innovative that the established federal bureaucracy had great difficulty in coping with the rapid and dynamic change taking place. As noted, this "government by the efficient" was still being staffed by federal "clerks" whose efforts were far more routinized than "New Deal" activity could tolerate. FDR, however, understood that most of government's activities during the "New Deal," being responsive to the needs of a people undergoing hard times as a community, concerned the allocation of "pretty well established services" (Mosher, 1981, p. 79). Thus, stated Mosher:

With the New Deal, government ceased to be merely a routine servant or a passive and reactive agent. It became itself an initiator of programs and change—for a while, almost the only one. This role strengthened during World War II when government, military and civil, dominated much of American life. In this context, more important than efficiency in carrying out given tasks were initiative, imagination, and energy in pursuit of public purposes. These purposes were political, and the administrators charged with responsibility for them, as well as many of their subordinates, had to be politically sensitive and knowledgeable. Herein lay a new dimension in thinking about the public service which neither the early reformers nor the disciplines of scientific management had contemplated. (pp. 79-80)

As a leader, FDR's performance closely paralleled the theory originally posited by Barnard (1938) in his acclaimed book, The Functions of the Executive. Barnard called the ability of an
administrator to use his/her authority by "taking pertinent action" as being "the executive art" (p. 283). This skill is tested when administrators direct or "channel" conflicting argument and opinion into constructive uses that contributed to organization goals (cited in McKinney & Howard, 1979, p. 261). Undoubtedly, FDR was skilled in "the executive art," which Barnard considered the measure of not only the individual leader's responsibleness, but also that of the organization—in this case the government. Barnard argued that organizations "endure" totally in proportion to "the breadth of the morality" according to which they are governed. He defined breadth, in this context, as in "foresight, long purposes, [and] high ideals," and contended that only under circumstances related to "high morality" can either an executive or an organization "sustain leadership long" and heighten their influence (1938, pp. 282-283).

The "New Deal" period clearly provided a historic setting of unique challenge to American public administration and provided, as well, FDR with an opportunity to exhibit executive responsibility according to the finest of textbook criteria. Barnard's (1938) is an excellent example. He stated:

Executive responsibility . . . is that capacity of leaders by which, reflecting attitudes, ideals, hopes, derived largely from without themselves, they are compelled to bind the wills of men to the accomplishment of purposes beyond their immediate ends, beyond their times. . . . [And] when these purposes are high and the wills of many men of many generations are bound together they live boundlessly. For the morality that underlies enduring cooperation is multi-dimensional. It comes from and may expand to all the world, it is rooted deeply in the past, it faces toward the endless future. (pp. 283-284)
As a leader of the nation, FDR got done what he wanted to get done. And, from an administrative standpoint, he enjoyed the luxury--albeit the hard times of the Great Depression and World War II--of being able to create much of his own bureaucracy. His successors as President of the United States, on the other hand, were forced to work with "an inherited bureaucracy" (Koenig, 1981, p. 196). He did all of this while considering the machinery of his own government as being both "inefficient and extravagant" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 521), and by earning the personal reputation of being a "poor administrator" (p. 521).

Less Efficient, More Effective

In discussing leadership in the public management environment, McKinney and Howard (1979) cited FDR as one of only four American Presidents worthy of being considered historically as "effective executives" (p. 260). (Others considered as excellent executives were T. Roosevelt, Wilson, and L. B. Johnson.) "Effective executives" are skilled in "applying power imaginatively," that is, in knowing "how to apply power to accomplish the things they wanted to happen" (p. 260).

Descriptions of FDR by Burns (1979) and Koenig (1981) add further verification to this contention. Burns, in his prized book, Leadership, labeled FDR as the "Grand Improviser," a man impatient with limitations on his executive power, who found it necessary to
disdain "set programs and ideology" to bring about the fundamental changes that the "New Deal" stood for (p. 394). Koenig, in The Chief Executive, a study of declining power of the contemporary American presidency, fondly described FDR as the "Unconventional Administrator," a leader whose influence flourished under the great power he retained "in his own hands" (p. 194). Everything the management textbooks said about good management—"organization blueprints were often [just] scraps of paper"—were questioned by FDR. Stated Koenig:

In the pursuit of [the] supreme good [FDR] resorted to means that time and again violated the most scared canons of efficient administration as taught with unflagging zeal in schools of business and public administration. (p. 194)

Fueled by idealism and primed for action, FDR avoided the "old line" bureaucracy as much as possible while President because he feared its less idealistic and generally more inactive machinery "might stunt [the] development" of the programs he needed to implement on behalf of democracy (Seidman, 1980, p. 101). Additionally, FDR demanded choices, or a set of alternatives to consider, when deciding upon policy matters. Few agencies, he found, could provide choices that were not administratively self-serving by promotion of narrow interests of the individual federal department. FDR sought to promote programs on behalf of the Administration, if not himself (Neustadt, 1980). He intended to determine what course of action to consider, which to articulate, or which to defend. It was not a role for the "fragmented fiefdoms" (Seidman, 1980,
Those who failed to understand FDR's practice to deal "selectively with choices" simply were not perceptive enough to ever be in a position to make an impact with him. They lost his interest. Reminded Neustadt, management for FDR "was found in the finesse of shaping, airing or delaying just such choices, while evading others that he did not have to make" (p. 199).

FDR's approach with administration can best be described as unconventional, as already noted. The term needs further definition, and historians have provided ample explanation. Some examples follow:

Few executive leaders have better exemplified the strengths and weaknesses of personal management than Franklin Roosevelt. He had a discerning--some said intuitive--grasp of the needs and motivations of the cabinet members and agency chiefs he dealt with. One of his many techniques--difficult for a man who loved to talk and dominate the scene--was simply to listen sympathetically to those who poured out their woes and frustrations [often caused in large part by the President himself]. He knew how to persuade one person by argument, another by charm, another by display of self-confidence, another by flattery, another by an encyclopedic knowledge. While Roosevelt doubtless paid a price for his supple management, since it encouraged him to follow short-run expedient goals rather than long-run political strategy, he demonstrated the extent to which executive leaders can exploit their own personal as well as institutional resources. (Burns, 1978, pp. 374-375)

[FDR] had little regard for the administrative niceties that are observed in most organizations. He was given, for example, to end-running his department heads and dealing directly with their subordinates. He applied a competitive theory of administration, which kept his administrators unsure, off balance, confused, and even exasperated. With ambition pitted against ambition, the power of decision remained more securely in his own hands. (Koenig, 1981, p. 194)

By orthodox standards Roosevelt was a poor administrator. He did not work through channels, or a chain of command, but
through any persons or methods that caught his fancy; his intellectual processes were not orderly but intuitive, and he liked to match his "hunches" against the logic of his advisers. He allowed a thicket of overlapping and even conflicting bureaus and agencies to grow up almost in the White House grounds; he found it difficult to fire anyone, and those who outlived their usefulness were often kicked upstairs to make further trouble. (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 521)

Roosevelt played with federal agencies as if they were pawns in a chess game, moving them wherever it would best strengthen his strategic position. He delighted in violating the organizational commandments laid down by the orthodox theorists. Organization to him was "fun," something which could not be said for any of his successors. (Seidman, 1980, p. 101)

Not only did [FDR] keep his organizations overlapping and divide authority among them, but he also tended to put men of clashing temperaments, outlooks, ideas, in charge of them. Competitive personalities mixed with competing jurisdictions was Roosevelt's formula for putting pressure on himself, for making his subordinates push up to him the choices they could not take for themselves. (Neustadt, 1980, p. 116)

Where Roosevelt let his channels and advisers become orderly he acted out of character. (Neustadt, 1980, p. 119)

The record must confuse students of administration because of the tremendous success that FDR effected. No American President had as clearly been the master of the White House as FDR, and no President had been established to that time which offered the nation's chief executive guidance on how to administer "for the dark time" when he took office (Neustadt, 1980, p. 77). He retained a strong inner strength of personal self-confidence and "a love affair with power" that only the presidency could bring. He relished the assignment, and enjoyed it, like no one had before or since (Neustadt, 1980, p. 119).
Overhauling the Executive Branch

Plan for Centralization

Although he was "wonderfully effective [because] he got things done" (Morison et al., 1980, Vol. 2, p. 521), FDR decided on a need to reorganize the Executive Branch of the federal government to insure himself "more effective managerial control," rather than having the bureaucracy continue to focus on its traditional goals of economy and efficiency (Seidman, 1980, p. 102). In 1936, he appointed the Brownlow Committee--officially the Committee on Administrative Management--to formulate plans necessary for reform. On the surface, the Committee's task seemed straightforward enough in that FDR's charge was to sort through the government's deficiencies, of which the President was "acutely aware," and to prescribe remedies (Mosher, 1976, p. 70). FDR instructed the Committee--comprised of Brownlow, Gulick, and Merriam, all esteemed men of the highest rankings in their fields of political science and public administration--to "not get lost in detail" by wasting time on constructing a "neat and orderly" organization chart (Seidman, 1980, p. 102). They were to take a close look at one of FDR's "most obsessive preoccupations . . . as President," to find a way to centralize power and responsibility in the President (Seidman, 1980). Or, as FDR stated to Congress:

Now that we are out of the trough of the depression, the time has come to set our house in order. The administrative management of the Government needs overhauling. We are
confronted not alone by new activities, some of them temporary in character, but also by the growth of the work of the Government matching the growth of the Nation over more than a generation. (cited in Brownlow et al., 1937, p. iii)

Less obvious, the Committee was embarking on the first comprehensive reconsideration of the Presidency, and of the President's control of the Executive Branch, since first considered by the Founding Fathers in 1787. Public administration historian Mosher (1976) described the Committee's report, completed in 1937, as probably "the most important constitutional document of our time" (p. 71). Nigro and Nigro (1984) stated that the Committee's efforts were positive ones, which laid the groundwork for government to achieve "work results under strong executive leadership" (p. 291). Others viewed the importance of the Committee's findings in having had "spin-off influences unprecedented in American administrative history" (Chandler & Plano, 1982, pp. 153-154). McKinney and Howard (1976) boldly considered the effort the "high point of success" in the field of public administration because FDR "followed the suggestions of administrative theorists on how to restructure the federal government" (p. 100). I noted earlier that Gulick and Urwick's (1937) Papers on the Science of Administration were touted as the "essential papers" on what was considered then as "the phenomena of administration." This edited "bible" of orthodoxy was published on the occasion of the Committee's report to FDR (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 154). Thus, FDR, the "New Deal," and the
Committee's work come together as criteria for Sayre's (1958) comment about public administration's "high noon of orthodoxy."

But what about Sayre's (1958) contention relative to "significant and impressive" managerial changes? Or how these changes "strengthened the prestige of public administration as a body of precepts"? FDR's contributions have already been discussed. The answers lie in findings of the Committee, and how they were implemented and interpreted later. FDR's pitch with the Congress on the Committee's efforts focused on the need to relieve an "overworked" President whose job was "humanly impossible under the system which we have" (Brownlow et al., 1937, p. iv). Too many "minor details" and "needless contacts" prevent the President from accomplishing the constitutional intent of the head of the Executive Branch of government to "coordinate and manage," the President argued. Unless changes were forthcoming, he predicted that no government could be "thoroughly effective in working . . . for the common good" (p. iv). He alluded to the Committee's findings as "a great document of permanent importance" (p. iii) and concurred with the "adequate, reasonable, and practical" guidance that the Report provided as the basis "for immediate action." FDR highlighted the Committee's recommendations as a five-point program, described as follows:

1. Expand the White House staff so that the President may have a sufficient group of able assistants in his own office to keep him in closer and easier touch with the widespread affairs of administration, and to make the speedier clearance of the knowledge needed for Executive decision.
2. Strengthen and develop the managerial agencies of the Government, particularly those dealing with the budget and efficiency research, with personnel and with planning, as management-arms of the Chief Executive.

3. Extend the merit system upward, outward, and downward to cover practically all non-policy-determining posts; reorganize the civil-service system as a part of management under a single, responsible administrator, and create a citizen board to serve as the watch dog of the merit system; and increase the salaries of key posts throughout the service so that the Government may attract and hold in a career service men and women of ability and character.

4. Overhaul the 100 independent agencies, administrations, authorities, boards, and commissions, and place them by Executive order within one or the other of the following 12 major executive departments: State, Treasury, War, Justice, Post Office, Navy, Conservation, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Social Welfare, and Public Works; and place upon the Executive continuing responsibility for the maintenance of effective organization.

5. Establish accountability of the Executive to the Congress by providing a genuine independent postaudit of all fiscal transactions by an auditor general, and restore to the Executive complete responsibility for accounts and current transactions. (cited in Brownlow et al., 1937, p. iv)

The Committee, itself, covered these points in far greater detail, of course, but stressed as their bottom line the need for the President to be "the one and only" national officer of the government, and as representative of the whole nation (Brownlow et al., 1937, p. 1). Together with FDR, the Committee attempted to make it clear--the message seems to be intended more for Congress than toward American citizens--that the need for improved administrative management of the federal government was not designed as a request for more power for the President, but rather for "the tools of management and the authority to distribute the work" so
that he could more "effectively discharge" those powers vested in him by the U.S. Constitution (p. v). Several in Congress would disagree with that assertion before it passed into law as the Reorganization Act of 1939. They recognized FDR's strategy to have his executive power read as administrative power, and that administrative power was to be read as including both the execution of policies that had been established and initiative toward development of those yet to be established (Mosher, 1976).

Nonetheless, the Committee's concentration on precepts of administrative management is important. Defined as the means by which the President becomes organized in order to perform his duties of office (Brownlow et al., 1937), the concept also illustrated how the Committee envisioned improvement of the "machinery of government," understood as the foundations of government efficiency, determined what it took to modernize management of the federal government, and defended the need—as one of FDR's "most obsessive preoccupations"—for reorganization of the Executive Branch. Distinctions were made as follows:

**Improving the Machinery of Government**

... In part because of the very growth of the Nation, and in part because of the vexing social problems of our times [there] is room for vast increase in our national productivity and there is much bitter wrong to set right in neglected ways of human life. There is a need for improvement of our government machinery to meet new conditions and to make us ready for the problems ahead. (p. 2)

**The Foundations of Governmental Efficiency**

The efficiency of government rests upon two factors: the consent of the governed and good management. ... The
foundations of effective management . . . have emerged universally wherever men have worked together for some common purpose. . . . [This canon] of efficiency [requires] the establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction, and administrative management . . . [which] concerns itself in a democracy with the executive and his duties, with managerial and staff aides, with organization, with personnel, and with the fiscal system because these are the indispensable means of making good the popular will in a people's government. (p. 3)

Modernizing Our Governmental Management

. . . We find in the American Government at the present time that the effectiveness of the Chief executive is limited and restricted, in spite of the clear intent of the Constitution to the contrary; that the work of the Executive Branch is badly organized; that the managerial agencies are weak and out of date; that the public service does not include its share of men and women of outstanding capacity and character; and that the fiscal and auditing systems are inadequate. . . . [The] President's administrative equipment is far less developed than his responsibilities, and that a major task before the American Government is to remedy this dangerous situation. What we need is not a new principle, but a modernizing of our managerial equipment. (p. 3)

The Purpose of Reorganization

There is but one grand purpose, namely, to make democracy work today in our National Government; that is, to make Government an up-to-date, efficient, and effective instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation. It is for this purpose that the Government needs thoroughly modern tools of management. (p. 4)

The Committee on Administrative Management concluded that the need for immediate change in the mechanics of the government organization would result in savings of money, time, and effort, and consequently would permit government, for once, to provide "better service to society" (Brownlow et al., 1937, p. 51). The "forward march" of democracy in the U.S. depended—in 1937—more upon effective administrative management than upon "any other single factor" (p. 53).
The Committee's report, a 382-page document, is generally viewed today in public administration circles in mostly positive terms. But the strongest praise has come from outside the normal context of public administration (Rohr, 1986). Historically, public administration has treated the Committee's efforts from a distance. Thus, it is interesting to note that Waldo (1948) gave it very casual and superficial examination. Morstein Marx (1959) analyzed it in conjunction with earlier federal experience of an agency known as the Bureau of Efficiency. Nigro and Nigro (1984) limited their discussion on the Committee's influence on management approaches to budgeting. One of the most outspoken challenges to the Committee findings, from the field of public administration, is found in Mosher (1976), in which the report is criticized for having an "essentially theological approach," without really having "any clear criteria of the role of public administration in social change" (p. 50).

There is little doubt that the Reorganization Act of 1939 represented a rite of passage from legislative control to executive control of the management of the federal government. Nor is there much argument about Seidman's (1980) contention that the Committee's work--putting aside consideration of all other pros and cons of the document, before, during, and after--provided FDR with precisely the conceptual framework he desired for his own personal organizational strategy (p. 103). It was about management in the end, however, and "significant and impressive" managerial changes did evolve from the
"New Deal" and FDR's preoccupation with the bureaucracy. In order for FDR or anyone else to reorganize for whatever purpose or strategy, it became necessary to develop principles to grease the skids of change. Gulick (1937a), especially, must have been most eager to provide his talents in this regard, for the principles became none other than reiteration of orthodox theory. As Mosher (1981) noted, these principles read today almost as commandments of both public and private administration. They include these:

1. There should be clean, uninterrupted lines of direction from top to bottom [of organizations], and of responsibility from bottom to top;

2. The President's span of control should be reduced to a manageable number by the consolidation of all administrative agencies into a limited number of departments;

3. Independent agencies [principally the regulatory commissions] should be brought within the framework of appropriate departments for all purposes except those purely judicial in nature; and

4. The President's competence with respect to his administrative responsibilities should be greatly strengthened ["The President needs help."] by providing him an immediate White House Staff with a "passion for anonymity"; and by giving him complete authority over the key staff functions of fiscal management, personnel, and planning. (p. 80)

Interestingly, as noted above, FDR's critics--and in 1937 there were many--vigorously opposed the proposed changes and seriously considered them wholly dictatorial. Today, these concepts are accepted as fact by students and practitioners of government alike, and are found as common practice in the federal and most state governments. Indeed, leadership coming from the Roosevelt
Administration is far-reaching. Morally, the "high noon of orthodoxy" arrived and passed, leaving behind public administrationists assuming new tasks. For now, the public administrator was to concern himself or herself with the ambiguity and uncertainty of human condition, not merely the efficiency and economy of organizational apparatus. Human values evolved as the center of their attention, compounded with the government responsibility, after FDR left his mark on America, of total social, economic, and even spiritual needs of people. As Waldo (1948) stated, the public administrator had become someone now tasked with both function and virtues. He stated, "He will be more and more regarded not as the agent of a particular government entity, but as the center of social cooperation. He will be less legal and more technical and professional" (p. 94).

Toward Recovery

The events of the "New Deal" period, particularly as Big Government was created and called upon as a lead actor to help send the nation on its way out of the Great Depression toward recovery, provided American public administration with unparalleled opportunity. To a significant degree, public administration responded with considerable relevance by providing the "unconventional" FDR with the "urgent tools of rationality" that were so desperately needed to administer the new and expanded federal government (Sayre, 1958, p. 103). Since orthodoxy demanded
total separation of "politics" from "administration," the course was set early on with the main actors in full agreement. Public administrationists left universities as teachers and as students to become practitioners in America's new administrative state. They rallied to FDR's call for help to make democracy work. The nation, and the President, needed help. Honored to be asked, and eager to be recognized as more than bastard cousins to business and industry's "elite" managers, public administrationists were ably prepared to provide FDR with his needed "tools," which represented the essence of orthodox theory—an administrative class skilled in procedures, technique, rule-making, and obedient execution of the expressed will of the policy-makers. What was FDR to argue? He would decide, and our government agencies—the "instrument of our united purpose," our "useful servant"—would administer. There would be room for FDR to manipulate, to improvise, and to be unconventional. Importantly, the democratic purpose was to "get things done [that] the American people want done" (Brownlow et al., 1937, p. 1). What could be a more challenging calling? How could an administrative class be more morally responsive? As Waldo, although an outspoken critic of orthodox theory, would say later in praise of the responsiveness of this administrative class: Work was done in a way that "served the time and purpose well" (cited in Charlesworth, 1968, p. 15).
FDR had been the primary author in a "new book on self-government," as he noted in his first inaugural, but he could not have accomplished the feat without modernizing the managerial machinery of the federal government. As such, public administration improved just as significantly as Sayre (1958) opined, and perhaps even more so. While FDR stated his dislike of the bureaucracy, he went beyond the tenets of mere orthodox theory and championed the case for better public officials of "ability and character," and instilled "joy of achievement" and "thrill of creative effort" in the process. He also reminded both public administration and the nation of the "sacred obligation" to work toward the "larger good" as a national community. They did that, and more, in tune with FDR's favorite adjectives of the time: "truth," "frankness," "vigor," "vision," and above all, with "action."

The "New Deal," in Gulick's (1933) mind, was "politics" and "policy," the success of which "rests on administration" (p. 65). The period was reminiscent of the Federalist argument that a strong central and popular government was best for the new America, and of their advocation for a "vigorous executive." The Anti-Federalists would counter with a reminder of their fear of monarchy run by an "elective king"—perhaps a better description of FDR by his opponents than "dictator"—and of the focus on central government at the expense of state government, which they found so important for individual liberty.
However, fundamental to appreciating Sayre's (1958) comment that the "New Deal" era "strengthened the prestige of public administration as a body of precepts" is an awareness that the comment very likely represents an understatement. That is, the political philosophy of the "New Deal" promoted characteristics of centralization and egalitarianism in the strongest possible sense ever experienced to that point in American history. Public administration ventured willingly into the midst of the action, and was welcomed for it.

Concluding Comments

The main objective of Chapter III has been to examine the growth of public administration as a serious area of inquiry in the United States, concentrating on the development of the concept of good government in orthodox theory and the science of administration. Certainly, orthodoxists associated good government with the idea of efficiency, and the means to achieve good government was centered in the achievement of scientific management. It seems easy to criticize orthodoxy, but one needs to be reminded that, for the time, it worked. At no time in the history of American public administration has orthodox theory been as openly welcomed by an executive administration as it was by FDR during the "high noon" period of orthodoxy. One needs to approach a review of the Brownlow Committee with great care and respect. It was no ordinary study; it was one that resulted in "significant and
impressive" managerial changes with extraordinary impact on the "New Deal" period and constitutional democracy.

These overviews are exceedingly important and clearly illustrate how political philosophy shapes the role of administration. The "high noon" period is most aptly labeled. The leading American public administration orthodox theorists of the period were responsible, in part, for FDR to effect reform of the executive branch of the federal government. It was the first overhaul of the executive branch since established in 1787, and the reform that came about in the late 1930s was accomplished along purist classical lines--a feat that gave public administration never-before-achieved status. Contributions by orthodox theorists to the literature of American public administration were also at their zenith.

The second point is just as clear about how FDR envisioned the proper role of public administration. Centralization of power in the chief executive, and from him down through rationally organized hierarchies, set the stage for change in management of the federal apparatus and, more important, identified where the power and direction lay. The "style" of FDR as a leader has been recorded and emulated by perhaps thousands of public administrationists since that most "unconventional" of American Presidents did his thing in totally his own way. Although FDR looked at the bureaucracy in not too pleasant ways, he helped redefine the words "practical" and
"action" in the government setting. He strengthened the merit system and sought civil servants of good ability and strong character—a point encouraged by the Committee on Administration Management, and one adopted by FDR as a highlight of his five-point program stemming from the Committee's recommendations.

Government was to become, as well, the helpful parent to desperate, insecure, and dispossessed people in time of great need. It became concerned, not just with economy and efficiency of effort, but with the human condition. Thus, public administrators found their roles evolving beyond function, and in embracing virtues.

In summary, I have attempted in Chapter III to argue on behalf of these points, all of which are important in consideration of the possibilities of defining the proper role of American public administration. They are:

1. American public administration was at the forefront of the Progressive Movement at the turn of the century to rid the government of corruption and to restore a moral sense to administration.


3. Orthodox public administration was widely accepted as an effective and efficient approach to democratic government. Orthodoxy stressed organizational efficiency as the primary value of good government. Administrators were seen as value-neutral on matters of public policy. Politics (expression by policy makers of
the will of the state) and administration (execution of political decisions) were seen as entirely separate aspects of government. Organizations were considered effective when operated as well-oiled machines based on the principles of scientific management. Efficient government was also seen as one which functioned in a businesslike manner. There was little room in orthodox public administration for moral choice by administrators. They were merely expected to be effective in their jobs of accomplishing the decisions of policy makers.

4. Gulick's "gospel of efficiency" became the focus of what constituted good government.

5. Reliance of the American federal government on good government during the Great Depression and World War II resulted in the heyday of orthodox public administration. It was welcomed as part of the solution to resolution of America's major practical problems. The work of the Brownlow Committee was seen in terms of the most important constitutional document of our time.

6. Public-purpose political philosophy of government continued during this period of administrative need.

7. American public administration developed as a "unified discipline." Efficiency remained as the ultimate value of public administration, not in the context of cutting costs alone, but rather in the demand of citizens for administration to effectively deliver promised or necessary services.
A final note on Chapter III. From what occurred during the period I have described as the "Development of Good Government," four observations stand out. With the active help of American public administration, (a) the nation was rehabilitated, despite the Depression and World War II; (b) the principle that government is responsible for the health, welfare, and security of its citizens was established; (c) it became apparent that an assertive President's power is basically what he makes of it; and (d) government continues to change along both procedural and moral contexts, emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between function and virtues. American public administration had arrived at the point where the possibilities of this symbiotic relationship appeared realistic.
Footnotes--Chapter III

1Like other Progressives of his time, FDR thought that "a superior station in life entailed superior responsibilities," both to what he considered to be the "more unfortunate individual" and to the state (Mowry, 1958, p. 142). The concept seems consistent with the "love of fame" perspective of the Founders (see Chapter V), with an added degree of modesty. Interestingly, Wilson also carried a sense of noblesse oblige, as well, as noted in his original speech outlining the "New Freedom" (October 3, 1912). He said of himself:

I tell you frankly, I am not interested even in the person who is the Democratic candidate for President. I am sorry for him. I am sorry for him because I believe he is going to be elected, and I believe that there will rest upon him the carrying out of these fundamental tasks. And there will be no greater burden in our generation than to organize the forces of liberty in our time, in order to make conquest of a new freedom for America. (cited in Davidson, 1956, p. 325)

2Blum (1965) described FDR's passion for power in several chapters of his book, The Republican Roosevelt (Chapter VI, "President, Congress, and Control," pp. 73-105; Chapter VII, "Uses of Power," pp. 106-124; and Chapter VIII, "Concerts of Power," pp. 125-141). In sum, FDR was direct in his approach to power. Unabashedly, he said:

There inheres in the Presidency more power than in any other office in any great republic or constitutional monarchy of modern times. I believe in a strong executive; I believe in power. (cited in Blum, 1965, p. 107)

3This distinction is made in Mosher (1976), based on Goodnow's early writings on public administration. For example, Mosher noted that Goodnow's (1893) Comparative Administrative Law, published in two volumes, was the "first American treatise" on public administration (p. 27). Although he judged Wilson's (1887) essay to be "the most important document in the development of self-aware" public administration, Waldo (1948) also gave Goodnow his place in history by recognizing him, with Wilson, as the "progenitors" of what would become a doctrine, and later a dichotomy (i.e., politics and administration). Ironically, Goodnow was not mentioned in Nigro and Nigro (1984), which is considered one of the best introductory texts for the study of American public administration.

4The "gospel of efficiency" concept actually is attributed not only to Gulick, but also to Urwick and Fayol, two European organizational theorists (cited in Mosher, 1976). The phrase applies
broadly to their contributions to classical or orthodox American public administration. The "gospel of efficiency" relates in large part to Sayre's (1958) comment that collectively the works of Gulick, Urwick, and Fayol represent the "high noon of orthodoxy" in American public administration (p. 103).

5 The term "New Deal" is used in Chapter III to represent the period of time that encompasses FDR's four terms, from 1933 to 1945. Actually, there are two "New Deals," but that distinction is not important to my argument. For the sake of accuracy, the First New Deal ended with a series of adverse U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 1935 and 1936. The First New Deal is remembered for the politics of hard times, and the rapid implementation of new federal programs intended to help the nation recover from the Great Depression. It was the period when government's emphasis was on rebuilding the country. Historians differ on the start of the Second New Deal, but most agree that it represented reform in the structure of government, and when social security, utility regulation, and progressive taxation programs (begun in the First New Deal) were implemented (Leuchtenburg, 1963, pp. 162-163). Others have categorized the First New Deal as the time when government told business what it must do, as contrasted to the Second New Deal, when government told business what it must not do (p. 163).

6 FDR delivered his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1933. The speech clearly set the tone of what was to come in the early days of the "New Deal." Additionally, FDR laid out his philosophy of how courage, leadership, moral stimulation, and management all tied together. Key excerpts of this address are as follows:

This is preeminently the time to speak the truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need we shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today. This great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself--nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. In every dark hour of our national life a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory. I am convinced that you will again give the support to leadership in these critical days. . . . Compared with the perils which our forefathers conquered because they believed and were not afraid, we have still much to be thankful for. Nature still offers her bounty and human efforts have multiplied it. Plenty is at our doorstep, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply. Primarily this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed, through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure, and abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous
money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men. . . . They know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers. They have no vision, and where there is no vision the people perish. The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit. Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money; it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy and moral stimulation of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits. These dark days will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men. Recognition of the falsity of material wealth as the standard of success goes hand in hand with the abandonment of the false belief that public office and high political position are to be valued only by the standards of pride of place and personal profit; and there must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business which too often has given to a sacred trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing. Small wonder that confidence languishes, for it thrives only on honesty, on honor, on the sacredness of obligations, on faithful protection, on unselfish performance; without them it can not live. Restoration calls, however, not for changes in ethics alone. This Nation asks for action, and action now. Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem. . . . I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first. . . . If I read the temper of our people correctly, we now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we can not merely take but we must give as well; that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline, because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger good. This I propose to offer, pledging that the larger purposes will bind upon us all as a sacred obligation with a unit of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife. With this pledge taken, I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack on our common problems. Action in this image and to this end is feasible under the form of government which we have inherited from our ancestors. Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That
is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations. It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure." (cited in Lott, 1969, pp. 231-234)

There is no question that FDR set forth in his First Inaugural Address both his philosophy and his intent with respect to how to lead the nation out of the darkness of the Great Depression. This philosophy and this intent included the call for effective leadership of a government in ways, as he stated, that were "unprecedented." In his Second Inaugural Address, delivered on January 20, 1937, prior to publication of the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, FDR set a different tone. Changes were needed in the structure of government, he argued, which the Constitution could and should allow. The following excerpts help explain the situation:

[Four years ago] we dedicated ourselves to the fulfillment of a vision--to speed the time when there would be for all the people that security and peace essential to the pursuit of happiness. . . . Instinctively we recognized a deeper need--the need to find through government the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individual the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization. Repeated attempts at their solution without the aid of government had left us baffled and bewildered. For, without that aid, we have been unable to create those moral controls over the services of science which are necessary to make science a useful servant instead of a ruthless master of mankind. To do this we knew that we must find practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish men. We of the Republic sensed the truth that democratic government has innate capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable, to solve problems once considered unsolvable. . . . In this we Americans were discovering no wholly new truth; we were writing a new chapter in our book of self-government. . . . The Constitution of 1787 did not make our democracy impotent. In fact, in these last four years, we have made the exercise of all power more democratic; for we have begun to bring private autocratic powers into their proper subordination to the public's government. The legend that they were invincible--above and beyond the processes of a democracy--has been shattered. They have been challenged and beaten. Our progress out of the depression is obvious. But that is not all that you and I mean by a new order of things. Our pledge was not merely to do the patchwork job
with secondhand materials. By using the new materials of social justice we have undertaken to erect on the old foundations a more enduring structure for the better use of future generations. . . . Among men of good will, science and democracy together offer an ever-richer life and ever-larger satisfaction to the individual. With this change in our moral climate and our rediscovered ability to improve an economic order, we have set our feet upon the road of enduring progress. (cited in Lott, 1969, pp. 237-239)

For progress already realized to continue, democratic government--the science, the machinery, and the control--needed to be strengthened, and FDR's agenda was ready to be set in motion to effect the changes the President wanted to happen. He would use public administration, primarily through the Committee on Administrative Management, as one of the means to reach his end. One might argue that both FDR and public administration were experiencing a revolution of sorts toward the start of the President's second term. In this sense, both the discipline and the man were winners and losers. Stated Mosher (1976):

... Public Administration's revolution was both more and less than Roosevelt's revolution. It was more than Roosevelt's because it began to incorporate and make operative what may be called secular trends in the value-free philosophy of management science quite alien to the essentially theological approach of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. It was less than Roosevelt's because it never developed any clear criteria of the role of public administration in social change, and left the discipline without very many clear and viable standards of conduct for weathering the social and political conflicts through which a democratic policy charts its course. (p. 50)

Nonetheless, with the premier scholars of public administration being welcomed into the White House in time of the President's call "for help" on the difficult question of administrative management of the bureaucracy--which FDR described as a possible "ruthless master of mankind"--orthodox public administration was in its heyday. Only time would determine the veracity of Mosher's conclusion.

The period has been called the "heyday of alphabetical organizations" (Mosher, 1976, p. 62). Included among these programs are the well-known TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), WPA (Works Projects Administration), REA (Rural Electrification Administration), AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration), FHA (Federal Housing Administration), NYA (National Youth Administration), PWA (Public Works Administration), RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation), and SEC (Securities Exchange Commission), just to name 10. Morison and Commager (1982, Vol. 2) provided an excellent discussion of "New Deal" programs, especially
as relates to farm relief, industry, labor, conservation, and welfare concerns (pp. 471-525). From the perspectives of a young Congressman, excellent insight into "New Deal" politics and programs is found in Caro's (1983) biography of L. B. Johnson, The Path to Power.

8Lippmann, journalist and adviser to Presidents from Wilson through Johnson, attempted to support FDR's "New Deal" policies and programs, but grew skeptical about what he considered the excesses of the President's use of discretion (cited in Blum, 1984). In the late 1930s when many of the "New Deal" programs were declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, Lippmann suggested to FDR that he should take advantage of the "great opportunity" before him "to consolidate his achievements, defend himself against charges of excessive experimentation, and bask in the adulation that would come with an improving economy" (p. 112). FDR did not follow Lippmann's recommendation. From that time on, Lippmann openly criticized FDR's character, questioning whether he would be "sufficiently sensible" to continue in office, and once accused FDR of a "fit of mid-summer madness" (p. 113). Lippmann concluded that FDR was "restless" and insatiated with a need to always have "something big underway." Stated Lippmann: "The idea merely of administering what [FDR] has achieved doesn't appeal to him" (p. 113).

Recollections of 50 of FDR's "New Dealers" forms the basis for Louchheim's (1983) book, The Making of the New Deal. Many of the contributors to the book were members of FDR's "Brain Trust." Louchheim provides biographical information on all 50 of the individuals who wrote or who were interviewed for the book. Biographical information is also provided on 107 other individuals noted or quoted in the book. All 157 individuals were involved in some way with FDR's "New Deal."

Brownlow and Gulick discussed the Committee's findings ahead of time with Roosevelt--in the form of a draft report--and found that their recommendations matched the President's own thinking on the matter (Seidman, 1980). However, in the final report, the Committee members pointed out that "statements and recommendations" that are contained in the research studies are those of the individual authors (Brownlow, 1941, p. viii).

Selznick's (1949) TVA and the Grass Roots is an excellent example. The book contains an analysis of the process, results, and implications of the phenomenon he called the "cooptative mechanism." He provided public administration with an understanding of "cooptation," which is the effort of an organization to "bring about and subsume" new elements into the decision-making and policy-making processes in an attempt to prevent those elements from creating or
causing threats to the organization or its mission. Selznick’s observations are classic in the literature of American public administration.
Discussion in Chapter III demonstrated the development of American public administration as a "unified discipline." Major tests arose as government sought to address the monumental problems associated with administration during the Great Depression and World War II. Both events were resolved, in large part by administrative help, but within the field of public administration, scholars began to raise serious questions about theory and practice which had become fundamental to public administration.

Public administration came to admit that politics and administration did not exist separately, as had been believed and advocated since the "gospel of efficiency" came to describe the essence of "good government" at the turn of the twentieth century.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the main arguments presented by Waldo (1948) in his classic, The Administrative State. Waldo's arguments began to focus attention in American public administration on the consequences of administrators as participants in the political process. The state demanded effective delivery of promised or necessary services.

These arguments set the stage for the debates to follow in the 1960s and 1970s about the possibility of administrators actually
being advocates of—rather than merely participants in—the sphere of public policy development and implementation. Chapters V and VI are devoted to furtherance of this discussion.

Nonetheless, Waldo (1948) presented a model, "the political theory of American public administration," which he developed at the zenith of classical pragmatism. Much attention is devoted to the model even today, and it appears to have withstood the tests of time (Brown & Stillman, 1986), despite the majority assumptions of public administrationists that some tenets of orthodoxy have long been outdated.

Discussion, then, in Chapter IV encompasses this four-part model, which is outlined as follows:

1. True democracy and true efficiency are synonymous, "or at least reconcilable" (Waldo, 1948, p. 206).

2. The doctrine of the politics-administration dichotomy holds that government is divided into two parts, decision and execution, and further, that execution (administration) "is or can be made a science" (p. 206).

3. The science of administration contains "principles" which through scientific study can be upheld as both scientifically and ethically valid (p. 207).

4. The values and practices of American business can be applied to the administration of American government "with only slight reservations" (p. 207).
Waldo's (1948) model is specifically important for three significant reasons for purposes of this discussion: (a) the model was used as the basis for Waldo's arguments challenging the validity of orthodox thinking, especially that efficiency was the ultimate value of American public administration; (b) although orthodoxy is believed to have been "destroyed and abandoned" almost 40 years ago, no "well-argued and generally accepted" theory has really taken its place (cited in Charlesworth, 1968, p. 15); and (c) as noted, the model set the discipline up for intensive self-criticism that eventually led to the idea of the New Public Administration. It is no coincidence that in 1968 Waldo became one of the founders of this new movement toward client-centered activism. Further, it is a reason why Waldo (1980) likely surprised few public administrationists with his valedictory comment that the major problem in public administration ethics was that nobody yet had a handle on "what we are talking about" (p. 107). It was a major void in American public administration scholarship that Waldo (1948) described as public administration's "thirst for philosophy" (p. 205). But he proposed the concept only as an afterthought, in a footnote, and left the discussion with a mere challenge to his colleagues to assist in the development of such a theory.

Waldo's (1948) model retains high standing in the field of American public administration. It was generally unchallenged, and remains--nearly 40 years later--as the last clearly "articulated [and] distinct political theory" having wide acceptance in the study
of American public administration (cited in Charlesworth, 1968, p. 15). This says little for public administration's appetite for theory. But that defect has already been stated.

True Democracy, True Efficiency

Heart of Orthodoxy

When Waldo (1948) wrote his classic, "explicit doubt and skepticism" existed about orthodox ideology except the postulate defined by Waldo as "true democracy and true efficiency" being comparable. What public administrationist could deny this definition, Waldo asked? He concluded that this tenet was "so fundamental" that its challenge seemed unrealistic, except perhaps in understanding of the "original definitions" of the two key terms, "democracy" and "efficiency." Nonetheless, to say that "true democracy and true efficiency are synonymous" is to place one's finger on "the heart" of orthodox thought in American public administration (Waldo, 1948, pp. 206-207).

Yet, in both cases, that is, with respect to the terms "democracy" and "efficiency," Waldo (1948) had difficulty in arriving at precise definitions,2 and used "end or means?" arguments to determine their application to the "good" of public administration.3 For purposes of this discussion, a similar approach will be used.
Waldo's (1948) idea of democracy paralleled the thinking of the Federalists in that the concept represents much more than a form of government for the United States, but rather "a faith and an ideal, a romantic vision" (p. 12). This definition equated, in Waldo's view, to "the mission of America," that is, the vision that "has been peculiarly our form of patriotism, our form of spiritual imperialism" (p. 12). The definition was not new to the literature of public administration and, in fact, underscores the answer to the problem, as Waldo stated, "Our students of administration have accepted the American faith and have made an heroic effort to realize this faith by improving our institutions" (p. 13).

This "love" of democracy by "students of administration" extends throughout American history, Waldo (1948) argued, demonstrated by the devotion of those within or advocating "efficient" public services through expansion of those services or through insistence on the nation being "worthy of its mission abroad by being noble at home" (p. 13). In the end, it becomes clear to these "students of administration" that "democracy cannot compete with ethically inferior ideals without efficiency" (p. 13). This is not to say that democracy imposes few limitations on the efficiency of the administrative process, for the opposite is true. Wilson (1887) recognized this probability when describing efficiency as being realistic as long as it did not become "meddlesome" to good government (p. 215). Seldom, however, could "students of administration" foresee that happening because over the course of
America's first century of government, reconciliation of democracy and efficiency evolved as an obligation of good government, and reaching a point at the start of the second century where it became a virtue of the obligation (Waldo, 1948, p. 14). That conclusion was drawn by Waldo, who made a special point of the distinction. He stated:

The dilemma of democracy versus efficiency was avoided by the formula that true democracy and true efficiency are not necessarily--perhaps not possibly--incompatible. The assumptions and syllogisms of this line of thought are familiar: Democracy means an intelligent and informed citizenry organized into groups, preferably as few as possible, on the basis of issues. To realize this condition the proper institutions, such as the short ballot, a merit system, a budget system and a reporting system must function. (p. 14)

Thus, Waldo (1948) argued, two forces come to address the running of government: informed citizens whose duty it becomes "to learn, to judge, and to vote," and another group, whose specialty is actually to run the "business of government." This point of view leads "students of administration" clearly into the second of Waldo's four-part model of public administration theory, politics and administration, and the need to accept--he said--the latter element as a "science." But according to Waldo, politics-administration fit into the democracy-efficiency discussion only when "properly separated and institutionalized." At that point, orthodox ideology postulates that the resulting system is both democratic and efficient. Waldo ultimately did not agree with this conclusion,6 but others, as proponents of orthodoxy, obviously did.
As noted earlier, Goodnow (1900) advocated that any form of politics and administration in combination would produce inefficiency. Laswell (cited in L. D. White, 1942) radically argued from an orthodox standpoint on behalf of a "science of democracy," which he described as "a special science . . . concerned with the fulfillment and preservation of specific forms of state and society" (pp. 32-33). This "special science" made possible efficient democracy, or stated another way, in the "effective control" of all decisions affecting the livelihood of citizens "whether or not they vote on any given occasion" (p. 33). The President's Committee on Administrative Management concurred. Brownlow et al. (1937) contended that the "strength of democracy" rested in the political sphere of government—that is, in the presidency with respect to the federal government of the United States—because only in this arena could the American people truly "see made one their purpose, their plans and their aspirations" (p. 19). Even as a symbol, this arena alone could satisfy the New Deal's "need for action in realizing democracy" (p. 13). The complex and cumbersome machinery of government, on the other hand, was neither effective, nor in any rational way, representative of the entire nation, as was the President (p. 14).

This contention was certainly nothing new to orthodoxists, as the course was charted by Wilson (1887) nearly a century ago. It was Wilson who first identified efficiency as the guiding value of the science of administration, and who proclaimed that a single dominant
center of government power was necessary for efficient public administration. "Public administration," he said, "is detailed and systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of general law is an act of administration" (p. 212). The application of efficient administration made good government. Thus, it is my viewpoint that democracy and efficiency were synonymous "or at least reconcilable" in orthodox thinking, if only from the standpoint of control of government. As to how this thinking applies to the moral responsibilities of men and women caught up in the logic of orthodoxy, one can assume that control may be the primary concern, but not the only one.

The Moral Imperative

An analysis of efficiency, in the orthodox sense, casts further emphasis to the democracy-efficiency relationship. Mosher (1981) considered efficiency as the moral imperative of twentieth-century American public administration up to and including 1937, the year normally associated with orthodoxy's most influential period, as already noted. But Mosher explained further. He stated:

The development of the field [or the science, or the discipline] of public administration during the first third of this century may be regarded either as an offshoot of scientific management in the public sphere or as an essentially parallel and similar movement. In much of their philosophy, approach, and content, the two were very nearly identical. Both were grounded in a society thoroughly dedicated to growth and progress; in a philosophy of rationality; and in a faith in science and scientific method and its applicability to the practical lives of men and women, a reawakening of August
Comte's positivism. Both proclaimed a new gospel to a new deity: efficiency. The precise meaning of the term was--and remains today--arguable, but its moral significance could hardly be questioned. Efficient administration was "good"; inefficient administration was "bad." ... The public service, to be good, must be politically neutral and efficient, and there was more than a little doubt that it could be efficient unless it was also politically neutral. (p. 71)8

Mosher (1981) observed that scientific management had begun in the late nineteenth century as an effort--both practically and philosophically--to make industry more efficient. While a connection between public and private administration cannot be made on the basis of efficiency alone, parts of government began similar "movements" shortly after 1900; it only became logical to attempt to make government, "literally, more like business" (p. 72). Both private and public sectors used the "tools" of scientific management, Mosher believed, namely:

1. Rationality--the applicability of the rule of reason, based upon research, to the organization, management, and activities of men;

2. Planning--the forward projection of needs and objectives as a basis for work programs;

3. Specialization--of materials, tools and machines, products, workers, and organizations;

4. Quantitative measurement--applied as far as possible to all elements of operations, including the qualifications of individuals to do specific jobs;

5. "One best way"--there is one single best method of doing a job, and also one best tool, one best material, one best type of worker;

6. Standards and standardization--the "one best," once discovered through systematic research, must be made the standard and thereafter systematically followed. (pp. 72-73)
Importantly, I concur that these six points added up to define what efficiency in government came to mean. Much like business, efficiency in public administration was understood to represent "maximization of output for a given input." Morrow (1980) equated the significance of efficiency as one of the enduring traditions of American public administration, saying that aside from hierarchies and chains of command in the bureaucratic contexts, "probably no term seems so much within the province of administration as efficiency" (p. 27). Wilson's (1887) tenet that any good science of administration must be totally separate from the field of politics not only dominated orthodox thinking for 50 years, it also propelled efficiency as the logical sequence to the neutrality argument. Stated Morrow:

If administration could be depoliticized, then it could also be subjected to scientific analysis--devoid of values--and the one best way for administering policies could be determined. . . . Rationality, efficiency, and strong leadership were hallmarks of capitalism, as they were for public and private administration. Such an attitude meant that public administration was reemerging as a positive force with a challenge to administer public policy in the most rational and objective fashion. (p. 35)

I can appreciate Dimock's (1951) observation that efficiency had become a kind of "religion" in American culture, and in fact, "according to American standards and values the highest compliment that a government can be paid is to be called 'efficient'" (p. 124). Likewise, the worst judgment--or one of the worst--is to consider a government agency as being inefficient. Why? As stated Morrow
Americans still consider [efficiency] the major mission of public administration" (p. 61).

A minority opinion was offered by Redford (1975), who acknowledged that efficiency was an inevitable goal of twentieth-century American public administration due to its assumed role in improving organizational and managerial processes (p. 7). He hastened to add—and I strongly disagree because people believed it to be the ultimate value—that as a goal of public administration, efficiency proved to be grossly exaggerated, especially in the input-output test noted above by Mosher (1981). Redford saw government, especially the making of public policy, as representative of perhaps the most complex of all human undertakings. This is no profound observation. Nonetheless, Redford argued that the greatest deficiency of the efficiency goal is not that efficiency is nonmeasurable but that the goal itself is inadequate. This is understandable. Redford stated:

However defined, whether as a means-end relationship or merely as effectiveness in producing results, [the efficiency goal] gives the administrator no guide for choice among values. The administrator is no automaton with all guides for action laid out. Statute and other overhead directives often provide general and vague, perhaps even conflicting guides, either or both on means and ends. They may even leave him with no guide at all. He may have to find his lead for action in the general nature of his program. Or he may find that program objectives must be balanced with community ideals. . . . We have reached this position: efficiency is measurable only in terms of the attainment of all community ideals which the administrator is obligated by his official and moral nature to consider, yet the efficiency test provides no guide for measuring these ideals. This has important implications for training for the public service. It means that the public administrator should know more than the techniques necessary for efficiency. Quite
obviously he must know also the definition of purpose prescribed for his function in law and regulation. . . . Beyond this he should know the ideals of society toward which efficiency techniques are to be directed. He should have deep appreciation and feeling for the cultural traditions of his society. (pp. 17-19)

Waldo (1952), in his essay, "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," stated that a "new philosophy of democracy" evolved with orthodox American public administration. It was one that he contended reversed the belief common in the nineteenth century that "democracy is achieved by parcelling out the power and functions of government among the people" (p. 86). Central to this thinking was both the politics-administration dichotomy and the idea that the "means and measurements" of efficiency were determined universally for all administration. To insure its survival, proponents of orthodoxy insisted, democracy "could not afford to ignore the lessons of centralization, hierarchy, and discipline" (p. 87). Waldo offered this concluding thought: that in the early twentieth century, both public and private administration became entrenched in a misguided application of efficient democracy, indeed, "in an important and far-reaching sense false to the ideal of democracy." How could democracy be "peripheral" to administration? How could efficiency, as a moral imperative of orthodoxy, be so clear and unequivocal? How could efficiency be so "scientific" and valueless? Waldo offered the following as one explanation. He said:

The comparative lack of moral elan in the western democratic tradition in the crises of our own day is due to many factors.
But surely some of the inertness, doubt, and confusion in this country is the inevitable result of our having long held the point of view that the ideal we professed had no relevance during half of man’s waking hours. (p. 87)

In *The Administrative State*, Waldo (1948) identified equality and liberty as the two most common goals of "the good life" (pp. 72-73), both of which underscore human rather than mechanistic ideals. Therein lies, Waldo (1952) would later clarify, the essence of democracy: "in the development of common, shared purposes in organizations in which all participate" (p. 95). However, the central problem of democratic administrative theory, "as of all democratic political theory," is in reconciliation of a people's "desire for democracy" with that of the "demands of authority" (p. 102). Is this possible?

**Decision, Execution, and "Science"**

**Idealism and Policy**

American public administration recognizes Wilson's (1887) essay, "The Study of Administration," as the starting point "for the self-conscious development of the field" (Vocino & Rabin, 1981, p. 24). It was in this often-discussed essay that Wilson set the course for perhaps the most-debated postulate of the discipline when he stated that politics and administration ought to be separate enterprises. Wilson stated the situation as follows:

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; it at most points stands apart even from the debatable ground of
constitutional study. It is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. . . . The object of administration study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle. . . . Most import to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. (pp. 209-210)

The argument became widely accepted as a fact of public administration—without much disagreement anywhere—for almost 50 years. Even more, it became the keystone in the orthodox construct and provided the impetus for late-nineteenth-century reformers to focus not upon personal problems within the civil service, but on organization and management. Next to efficiency, standing fast to separation of politics from administration meant that a public administrationist of the time was most knowledgeable of his profession, if not at the cutting edge of orthodoxy. Reasons were understandable: reformers campaigned for appointment of leaders of the administrative apparatus of government based not on partisan politics, but on fitness and merit. Wilson's (1887) essay did inspire a new theme for public administration to be based on principles of scientific management, and that, too, is an important point underlying the significance of the neutral politics-administration position.

Waldo (1948) presented sharp criticism of the politics-administration dichotomy, and in identifying it as the second of the
four-part political theory of public administration, considered other critics of the period as being too "subtle" (p. 207). But, as discussed earlier, among orthodoxists the importance of the dichotomy is most intensely found in the true democracy/true efficiency argument, or as Waldo stated, "the key to the customary view of democracy" is found in the distinction (p. 74). What constitutes a democracy becomes the logical question to ask. This is because democracies are supposed to be controlled by a "vote of the people," not by the will of a powerful administration, as might be the case with an autocracy. Even so, the prospects are not easy considering Wilson’s (1887) comment that it is more difficult to "run" a constitution than to "frame" one (p. 200), or with Waldo’s own admission that despite their theoretical thoughts, administrationists like Wilson and Goodnow (1900), indeed scholars, had the right motivation behind their beliefs. Waldo stated, "[They were] genuinely interested in democracy: they were ardently seeking a scheme to save it" (p. 75).

Idealism aside, Waldo (1948) nonetheless rigidly drew the line with respect to Gulick, perhaps the most prominent of all orthodox public administration theorists (Chandler & Plano, 1982).9 Focusing on Gulick’s (1933) essay, "Politics, Administration, and the 'New Deal,’” Waldo (1948) challenged Gulick’s analysis of the use of discretion, which was understood as the "essential element" in the determination of policy (p. 123). Waldo correctly countered that
Gulick's assertion was unrealistic because of its simplistic view that it allowed that "anyone" could determine policy, "even the most minor employee" (p. 123). Gulick recognized that "the scope and importance" of discretion increased in importance with the hierarchical ranking of employees within organizations. The higher the rank, the more discretion--in "scope" and "importance"--the individual had available to exercise (p. 61). But where Gulick expanded his argument to the disagreement of Waldo was in his contention that the value of discretion to students of administration came in the form of a discussion of the mere theoretical aspects of public administration. "In practice," Gulick stated, a whole new situation occurs. He explained:

In the first place, as a practical matter, officials on permanent tenure exercise a greater amount of discretion than their associates who are not on tenure, though they may be of the same rank in the organization. Cases are not uncommon in which a subordinate official on tenure will exercise greater policy determining functions than his superior who is not on tenure. In the second place, in any large enterprise it becomes humanly impossible for the man at the top of a hierarchical organization to have all the even relatively important matters of policy referred to him. If he attempted to, the entire machine would stop operating [emphasis added]. It is therefore not possible to accumulate more than "one manful" of discretionary work at the top. The remainder must be distributed down the line. In the third place, much of the actual discretion used in administration is used at the very bottom of the hierarchy, where public servants touch the public. (p. 62)

At first glance, Gulick's (1933) perspective might seem as being inconsequential to the political administration argument. However, I contend that his illustration of the third point--"where
public servants touch the public"--digs much deeper than might be expected. His examples included the assessor who evaluates a citizen's property, the policeman who stops to ticket a motorist, the health inspector who "visits the dairy," and the income tax auditor who questions a citizen's tax statement. It is in these kinds of cases where discretion is tolerated among the "machinery" of government. Further, application of discretion constitutes the most "badly organized and poorly administered units," in which Gulick added, "it cannot be completely eliminated even in the best" (p. 62). It should come as no surprise that Waldo (1948) challenged Gulick's simple division of government into politics and administration as wholly "inadequate" (p. 128). He saw the "scheme" outlined by Gulick as carrying with it "the idea of division, of dissimilarity, of antagonism" (p. 128). On the politics side of the dichotomy, the opposite roles were required, expected, and practiced. For the reason for separating politics from administration, in really important matters, rests on the fact that their combination, Gulick reasoned, represented a "violation" of the most important principle of government. He elaborated as follows:

The reason for insisting that the elected legislature and executive officials shall not interfere with the details of administration, and that the rank and file of the permanent administration shall be permanent and skilled and shall not meddle with politics, is simply that this division of work makes use of specialization and appears to give better results than a system where such a differentiation does not exist. (pp. 62-63)
Willoughby's (1937) essay, "The Science of Public Administration," considers a further theoretical separation of politics and administration. One of the most prominent of orthodox theorists, he envisioned the separation as being essential to an acceptance of public administration as "science." The reasons for the dichotomy were quite "evident," according to Willoughby, because he viewed the "fundamental principles of general application" as being as "analogous" to public administration as to those characterizing any science. That is, if the "end of administration, efficiency in operation" is to be achieved, "the rigid application of scientific methods" was required (p. 39; for discussion, see pp. 39-51). Or, in other words, if politics controls the apparatus of government, efficiency results. The position was classic orthodoxy.

While Willoughby (1937) strongly advocated the need for the politics-administration dichotomy, he was unique in being perhaps the first orthodoxist to support the position that the chief players at the higher levels of government did not consist only of a president, governor, or the head of a government agency. Administrators within agencies had some part to play, although obviously not the major role. Where Willoughby's logic seems overly extended is his contention that students of administration were "misled by a loose use of terms" if they had a notion that all administrative powers were lodged in the executive branch, because
he stated, "In point of fact real administrative authority, and primary responsibility for the conduct of the administrative affairs of the government, reside, under our political system, in the so-called legislative, rather than in the executive, branch of government" (p. 41).

The difficulty in respecting Willoughby's (1937) viewpoint is not that he said it, but when he said it--during the "high noon" period. He certainly was unaware of the changes in government that FDR was embarking on at the same time. For example, Willoughby explained that the executive branch of government was guided by principles too vague for good government. Such general administration could only provide "effective means" only for the general direction of the enterprise, as opposed to legislators whose interests and direction was specific and precise. Acting as government's boards of directors, legislatures were in a position to act "purely" with their own special "administrative character" free of the ambiguous desires of the "general public" (pp. 41-42). It is only the "executive powers" of presidents, governors, and administrators, Willoughby believed, that fall within the category of "administrative powers" (p. 42). Unfortunately for him, Willoughby considered "administrative powers" as the least effective because they were not free of the ambiguous desires of the "general public." The Brownlow Committee would prove him wrong.

Willoughby's (1937) arguments closely paralleled those of Goodnow (1900), made nearly four decades previously. This seemed to
be the pattern among orthodoxists up to the "high noon" period--that is, that there was little improvement or flexibility in a generally rigid set of principles. Thus, when Goodnow advocated the need for separation of powers between decision and execution of the will of the state as being one of "practical political necessity" (p. 23). It is required to insure "harmony" between that separation of powers. In fact, Goodnow cautioned, if the "harmony" becomes absent for any reason, "it at once loses its raison d'être" (p. 37). Goodnow's point was further explained as follows:

Lack of harmony between the law and its execution results in political paralysis. A rule of conduct, i.e., an expression of will, practically amounts to nothing if it is not executed. . . . Now in order that this harmony between the expression and the execution of the state will may be obtained, the independence either of the body which expresses the state will or of the body which executes it must be sacrificed. . . . In other words, practical political necessity makes impossible the consideration of the function of politics apart from that of administration. Politics must have a certain control over administration. (pp. 23-24)

It was the prevailing orthodox position.

Administration Executes

The politics-administration dichotomy was widely accepted until just before World War II, when scholars began to rediscover Wilson's (1887) essay and apply it to new progressive thinking that started to sweep the country (Mosher, 1976). Interestingly, when compared to Willoughby's perspective, the dichotomy dissolved when legislatures delegated responsibility "in the public interest" to
public administrators—the "machines" of government—to carry out "the practical demands of loosely phrased laws" (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 90). In his Policy and Administration, Appleby (1949) provided a strong argument against proponents of the dichotomy. He observed that only when administrators exceed their discretion do legislatures seek to become involved in evoking their reserve powers. Opposite of the position posited by Willoughby (1937), Appleby contended that legislatures make "very general policy," which necessitated the application of that vague direction by administrators into execution of policy at "less abstract levels" (p. 8). Thus, the question of dichotomy, he said, represented basically a normative position. That is, so far as possible, administrative discretion ought to be limited. Appleby described the policy nature of administrators as follows:

Congress and legislatures make policy for the future, but have no monopoly on that function, as the courts have no monopoly on the determination of what the law is. Administrators are continually laying down the rules for the future, and administrators are continually determining what the law is, what it means in terms of action, what the rights of parties are with respect both to transactions in process and transactions in prospect. Administrators make thousands of such decisions to one made by the courts. They act in regard for what the courts have decided and would be likely to decide, of course, but in considerable degree the power of the courts over administration is a reserve power [emphasis added]. The power of legislative bodies is in a considerable degree, also, a reserve power over administration. (pp. 6-7)

Appleby (1949) added that administrators affect policy decisions and use of discretion by formulation of recommendations for legislation, by control of information being disseminated to
legislators and executives, and in working in tandem with special-interest groups to set policy and to establish law which satisfies mutual need. In short, Appleby concluded that orthodoxy is naive in its assertion that policy falls within the realm of a single category of actors in the operation of democratic government. Thus, without administration, Appleby stated that nothing would happen with respect to policy. Therefore, wherever action in government occurs that has an effect on the public, policy-making is taking place, no matter what level of government or hierarchical aspect of that government is involved. He stated: "Policy is made by means of all the political processes by which government is carried on" (p. 20).

Whatever conclusion one might draw today about the obsession among orthodox theorists about the politics-administration dichotomy, or how convincingly scholars like Appleby (1949) managed to counter the viewpoints of these theorists, the debate continues. Waldo (1980) stated that "no problem is more central to public administration . . . than the relationship of politics and administration" (p. 65). He believed that nearly all public problems of a contemporary nature still reflect one sort of political or administrative relationship or another. The distinction, too, relies on public administration's reexamination of itself as a discipline--Waldo chose to characterize the situation as public administration's current "identity crisis" (p. 69)--that falls along the pathway of four observations. They are:
First . . . the belief that everyone in Public Administration before World War II had a simple-minded notion that the governmental realm can be clearly divided between the political and the administrative is uninformed, untrue.

Second, the development of the doctrine that a basic working distinction can be made between politics and administration must be viewed in historical context; and so viewed it can be understood and more or less forgiven its simplifications and excesses. Even commended: we are, I judge, the beneficiaries of reforms in politics and improvements in administration that the doctrine helped to advance. The notion that an American Eden created by the Founding Fathers was subverted by Wilson and his successors I regard as both unhistorical and unfair.

Third, the doctrine was not all wrong. The logical and psychological distinctions on which it rested have a recognized, workable reality in human affairs, no matter the difficulties in attempting to separate or combine them. The doctrine still serves some useful purposes both in academia and in government, in the same way that ordinary instruments of measurement continue to serve useful purposes after the invention of much more sensitive instruments.

Fourth, to extend the metaphor just used, we have not yet invented political-administrative instruments to replace those that are recently judged to be too crude for our needs and purposes; or if they have been invented, as some would hold, we cannot agree on their accuracy and mode of employment. (p. 69)

The rigid doctrine of the orthodox theorists forgot or neglected to incorporate the need for "an interlocking set of values," which Waldo (1980) professed as being characteristic of any profession (p. 77). This observation was enhanced by Simon's (1976) Administrative Behavior. Waldo may have been the leading scholar who attempted to dispel orthodoxy, but Appleby (1949) and Simon were close behind. The "immediate problems" that became the focus of public administration up to and including World War II--at the expense of having the time or energy for theorizing--began to
disappear when it became necessary to rationalize a whole new postwar government that began to concentrate on the needs of individuals, as people, rather than on the needs of the public, as people.

Validity of Principles

Seeking Definitions

Waldo's (1948) third part of his four-part model of "the political theory of American public administration" is perhaps the most important for formulating an analysis of the moral responsibilities of the administrative class in American public administration. This point, that the science of administration contains "principles" which through scientific study can be upheld as both scientifically and ethically valid, focuses its discussion on the backbone of orthodoxy--the POSDCORB (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting) activities of the administrative apparatus.

Therefore, three points need to be addressed, namely: (a) what constitutes the "principles," (b) how they were considered scientifically and ethically valid, and (c) how challenges to these "principles" came about. The following discussion considers the questions in sequence.

Waldo (1948) was quick to point out that the concept of "principles" in American public administration had many varied
definitions (p. 159). From a general perspective, Waldo contended that most early orthodox thought considered the basic POSDCORB model as the foundation of the "principles," followed by recognition of two broader aspects: that in a democracy, every administrative officer needed to be held accountable to public control; and that an organizational hierarchy existed in which line and staff activities functioned under a single "chief administrative officer of the government" (p. 164). Further, the "principles" connoted wide acceptance that not only is there "one best way to organize or conduct an administrative activity," there is "one best man" to do it as well (p. 59).

Gulick's (1937a) "Notes on the Theory of Organization" contain the most specific discussion of the "principles" of administration advanced by the orthodox period. Gulick reasoned that in every large-scale organization, "men" were required to make it function and that the "best results" were achieved only when the work was properly divided. Or as he stated, the division of work is both the "foundation of organization" and the "reason" for the being of the organization (p. 3). But why divide work? Gulick explained:

Because men differ in nature, capacity and skill, and gain greatly in dexterity by specialization;

Because the same man cannot be at two places at the same time;

Because the range of knowledge and skill is so great that a man cannot within his life-span know more than a fraction of it. In other words, it is a question of human nature, time, and space. (p. 3)

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Gulick (1937a) forwarded, as "principles" of public administration, the concepts of specialization, span of control, and unity of command. These "principles" support his argument for the coordination of work within organizations, whether public or private in scope. The need for specialists—individuals "each working in his own field at a particular time and place"—was seen as the means to increase administrative efficiency by placing specific tasks before men within the group determined best qualified by the "single directing authority" (p. 7). It becomes obvious, according to Gulick, that due to the "inexorable limits of human nature" (p. 7), organizations must limit the control of workers to the smallest hierarchical number possible. Unity of command follows the assumption that "a man cannot serve two masters" (p. 9). If he does, the worker will be "confused, inefficient, and irresponsible"; but if he receives instructions from "but one superior," the individual's efforts—that is, his results—will be completed in a fashion that is "methodical, efficient, and responsible" (p. 9). Gulick's unity-of-command principle, then, refers to workers within the organization who are being directed, and not to those doing the directing. The distinction is important because orthodoxists believed that the "one master" concept applied beyond the workplace and, indeed, was a principle accepted as a way of life generally. Last, Gulick's principles were founded on the premise that efficiency within organizations is increased if workers with the
organization are grouped for purposes of control according to four common characteristics. He explained the terms as follows:

The major **purpose** he is serving, such as furnishing water, controlling crime, or conducting education;

The **process** he is using, such as engineering, medicine, carpentry, stenography, statistics, accounting;

The **persons or things** dealt with or served, such as immigrants, veterans, Indians, forests, mines, parks, orphans, farmers, automobiles, or the poor;

The **place** where he renders his service, such as Hawaii, Boston, Washington, the Dust Bowl, Alabama, or Central High School. (p. 15)

**Getting the Job Done**

Waldo's (1948) critique of the "principles" attacked the question of why the "principles" were universally considered as valid. How can they be considered as "true and valid," especially in the sense that orthodoxy considered them **scientifically true** and **ethically valid**? That is, why did orthodoxists seem to accept them on face value as being both "true and valid"? The possible answer is twofold.

First, there were critics--chiefly Follett (1920, 1937) and Barnard (1938)--who attempted in the 1930s to tell administrators in both the public and private sectors to move cautiously into accepting the then-popular idea that people could be managed by a set of "principles" that stressed "manipulation in order to achieve more productive results," rather than considering a less-popular but more plausible human relations approach with these same workers.
Not everyone did accept the "principles" on face value, even during the heyday of orthodoxy. But their arguments came as less convincing to a nation desperate to overcome the depths of the Great Depression and the horror of World War II. The need to get the job done, as Van Riper (1958) noted earlier, took precedence over any and all human relations considerations. All Americans were committed to the cause of democracy, and that included what was expected of everyone—sweat, sacrifice, and self-discipline.

Second, science in administration seemed to work. It facilitated the achievement of enough "administrative efficiency" to get the job done. As far as ethical validity, with efficiency being the "good" of effective administration, the matter could be easily dismissed as being resolved for reasons that seemed obvious.

Nonetheless, the work of Follett (1920, 1937) and Barnard (1938) is significant to both orthodoxists and to nonorthodoxists like Simon (1976) who would later build "massive case[s]" against both the "principles" and the application of scientific management to American public administration (Shafritz & Hyde, 1978, p. 79; Simmons & Dvorin, 1977, pp. 485, 488). Follett (1937) strongly supported the "principles" of public administration in stressing the importance of control in organizations as being essential to authority and leadership. She stated:

In our best managed industries, we notice two points about control: (1) control is coming more and more to mean fact-control
rather than man-control; (2) central control is coming more and more to mean the correlation of many controls rather than a superimposed control. (p. 161)

In addition, Follett (1937) was a leading advocate of planning and research in administrative settings and staunchly positioned herself with the orthodoxists who accepted the politics/administration dichotomy. On this latter point, in organizational settings, "within any undertaking," she stated: "playing politics is a deplorable form of coercion" (p. 39). Barnard (1938) presented a far more comprehensive theory, but he closely followed Follett's theme and underscored the importance of what others labeled as the "principles" of public administration (Shafritz & Hyde, 1978).

However, both Follett (1920, 1937) and Barnard (1938) are recognized for expressing their viewpoints from an employee's standpoint, especially to argue that the success of an organization is realized less from bosses barking orders than from employees willing to accept and implement them. Thus, both rejected the legal, rational approach to organizational theory and planted seeds for further challenges to hierarchy as the key to administration. Simmons and Dvorin (1977) have noted Follett's "fascination with the dynamics of interpersonal psychological processes" (p. 485). This viewpoint supported her belief--based on her training in economics and political science and her work with community service organizations--that people constitute the major challenge to modern management (Chandler & Plano, 1982). She stated:
To demand an unquestioning obedience to orders not approved, not perhaps even understood, is bad business policy. [But] how can you expect people merely to obey orders and at the same time to take responsibility which they should take? Indeed, in my experience, the people who enjoy following orders blindly, without any thought on their own part, are those who like thus to get rid of responsibility. But the taking of responsibility . . . is usually the most vital matter in the life of every human being, just as the allotting of responsibility is the most important part of business administration. (cited in Shafritz & Hyde, 1978, pp. 29, 35)

In short, Follett (1920, 1937) argued that people detest being "bossed around" and that administrators needed to focus on the psychological characteristics involved with motivating workers (cited in Simmons & Dvorin, 1977, p. 486). Barnard (1938), on the other hand, conceived of administration as being the "consciously coordinated, cooperative system for the accomplishment of a particular task" (p. 487) and became the first major theorist of administration study to develop the decision-making process as a concept (Chandler & Plano, 1982). Importantly, Barnard found both the need to maintain an equilibrium between organizational needs and needs of workers, and the need to approach decision making objectively (that is, to weigh decisions to insure they are effectively carried out). Barnard's main difficulty with his thesis came about in its clash with the scientific management approach, which he strongly advocated. Thus, he made an attempt to bridge the gap between scientific management and human relations theory, totally abandoning neither. He left a legacy, with Follett (1920, 1937), that organizations are comprised of people who must maintain an identity and have the ability to make choices if the organization is...
really to function within a cooperative system. Simmons and Dvorin (1977) observed:

Both Barnard and Follett observed that authority within an organization rested on "acceptance" by the employees concerned. Whether or not a decision carries "authority" with it is not a function of the person's position in the hierarchy that issues that particular order or reaches a particular decision. . . . Follett and Barnard drove a spike into the comfortable illusions that men and women could be managed by "principles" that merely were to be correctly applied. (p. 488)

The trouble, however, from the standpoint of administrative theory, was that during the heyday of orthodoxy, the human-relations aspects of Follett's (1920, 1937) and Barnard's (1938) writings were all but ignored by public administrationists--perhaps in part for the reasons of practicality already noted. Even Waldo (1948), in his criticism of orthodox theory, presented only a single insignificant footnote reference to Barnard's then-10-year-old book (p. 170). As for Follett, Waldo cited her chiefly as a bibliographical note (p. 154), although he did recognize her prominence in the scientific management movement (p. 209).14

Technique and Success

Writings not ignored by public administrationists were those reflecting the essence of orthodox theory. These have already been cited. When orthodoxy was enjoying its heyday, its advocates apparently took advantage of every opportunity to enhance their philosophies, from involvement in FDR's Administration, to the drafting of the Report of the President's Committee on
Administrative Management, and everything in between, in all levels of American government from coast to coast and then some. Thus, while orthodoxists argued that people could not be properly "managed" according to the orthodox "principles," bureaucracies continued to operate on the assumption that they could, influenced little by the efforts of academics.

More important were studies by Mooney (1937), which looked not at scholarly theory but rather at the practicality of the management practices of great leaders throughout world history. He concluded that in all lasting organizations success was based on a system of superior-subordinate relationships established in strict line fashion. He argued for the necessity of command in "every form of concerted effort" (p. 91). He did identify responsibility as an important element of organizational hierarchy, but in terms of delegation authority from top to bottom within these organizational structures, and it follows, who is responsible for getting the job done (p. 94). Even stronger was Mooney's message that organizations rely on efficiency of procedure, without which "all human group effort becomes relatively futile" (p. 98).

Urwick (1943) continued to profess the importance of "technique" and "technical skill" as being paramount to successful--that is, efficient--management of organizations. He argued that "a remarkable consensus of agreement" permeated American government at the time--at least among those concerned with effective management.
of administration (p. 117). More important, perhaps, is his assertion that the application of "technical skills" for insuring the effective conduct of the public's business was consistent with "the principle of democratic government" (p. 7)—although he never explained the statement. Findings of the First and Second Hoover Commissions in 1949 and 1955 evaluated efficiency in the federal government and emphasized administrative efficiency as a fundamental aspect of American government. These findings shed an additional perspective on the "principles" and the place of "technique" and "technical skill" within the public service.

Based on commission reports, questions evolved over the types of public servants and how each contributed to administrative efficiency. Not just careerists—more normally associated as the "machinery" government—were considered. Some, as political appointees, or even others, recruited on the basis of their particular competence to work for a short period of time in a specific area, were judged to have special effects on the scientific nature of the public service. The concept was whether or not their tenure would be consistent with the "principles of democracy."

The two Hoover Commissions' preoccupation with "orderliness and efficiency" in the public service illustrates the point. Some saw their charge as being actually translated into a concern for how far the merit system—long under the political control of the Democratic Party's leadership—had gone. Could the technicians comprising the public service be trusted? Would they "sabotage" the carrying out
of new policies? Were they really politically neutral public servants who had the technical skills needed to execute the will of the state? As the new Republican Party leadership came together in the Eisenhower Administration after decades of FDR-influenced policy, worries abounded about all of these possibilities and actually fear for the worst was paramount. This fear was extended to a belief that the senior civil service would become a "built-in, protected governing elite--an administrative class [as in Great Britain] camouflaged in the garb of political innocence and political neutrality" (Mosher, 1968, p. 88). Further, this fear was felt to be contrary and a threat to the underlying principles of American democracy (p. 88). Urwick and other orthodox theorists seemed to have touched only the shell of the problem in their arguments about whether science and ethics were compatible. 

**Social Science Perspective**

Waldo (1948) also viewed administration in terms of "social science" and, in fact, presented this argument to explain how his trouble with accepting the underlying problem of the "principles" being "scientifically true" and "ethically valid." He stated:

A physical science problem is a problem of "What is the case?" An administrative problem is characteristically a problem of "What should be done?" Administrative study, as any "social science," is concerned primarily with human beings, a type of being characterized by thinking and valuing. Thinking implies creativeness, free will. Valuing implies morality, conceptions of right and wrong. It is submitted that the established
techniques of science are inapplicable to thinking and valuing human beings. (p. 181)

Waldo's (1948) observation about "social science" parallels those of other leading critics of orthodox theory who--for the most part--considered human values and human behavior as the focus of their studies. A review of three such perspectives is important in this regard.

Other public administration scholars refuted the "principles" of public administration as being "inconsistent, conflicting, and inapplicable" to administrative settings (Shafritz & Whitbeck, 1978, p. 69). Still others challenged the "principles" for not resolving basic problems of values, individual personality, and social framework (Hawley & Weintraub, 1966).

For every one of the "principles" of public administration, Simon (1976) contended he could find "an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory principle" (p. 69). Thus, he labeled his criticism by the title of "proverbs," in place of "principles." A synopsis of his argument follows:

1. Specialization. Orthodox public administration assumed that administrative efficiency increased with a similar increase in specialization. But Simon asked, "Is this intended that any increase in specialization will increase efficiency?" (p. 70). Using hypothetical examples of situations that clarify the application of specialization to place or function, Simon contended that the
"principle" of specialization "is of no help at all in choosing between the two alternatives" (p. 70). He concluded:

It appears that the simplicity of the principle of specialization is a deceptive simplicity—a simplicity which conceals fundamental ambiguities. For "specialization" is not a condition of efficient administration; it is an inevitable characteristic of all group effort, however efficient or inefficient that effort may be. Specialization merely means that different persons are doing different things—and since it is physically impossible for two persons to be doing the same thing in the same place at the same time, two persons are always doing two different things. (p. 70)

2. Unity of command. Simon's (1976) argument focused on Gulick's (1937a) explanation of the term and its conflict with his definition of specialization. In short, Simon observed that even in typical administrative settings where line and staff activities of an organization intermingle—that is, how can accounting or personnel employees issue direct orders to a line employee?—unity of command is almost certain to cause "irresponsibility and confusion" (p. 71). The contradictions and inconsistencies of Gulick's rationale, Simon stated, not only dispel the significance of unity of command as a "principle" of administration but also present the likelihood that "unity of command, in Gulick's sense, never has existed in any administrative organization" (p. 72).

3. Span of control. Conflicts with this "principle" exist with both those of specialization and unity of command, Simon (1976) stated, because in large organizations the span of control increases or decreases depending on circumstances that may have either desirable or undesirable results. He saw problems of
increased red tape for contacts made between members of the organization when the communication travels upward in its hierarchy. On the other hand, when communication travels downward, the danger increases the necessity in the form of orders and instructions, "a cumbersome and time-consuming process" (p. 73). Thus, he asked, "What is the optimal point" of the span of control? (p. 73). Is there any? If the number of employees supervised is increased to address the problem one way or another, further difficulties arise, as a supervisor ends up with more employees to control, and his control subsequently weakens. Simon stated:

Proponents of a restricted span of control have suggested three, five, even eleven [employees], as suitable numbers [to supervise], but nowhere have they explained the reasoning which led them to the particular number they selected. The principle as stated casts no light on this very crucial question. One is reminded of current arguments about the proper size of the national debt. (pp. 73-74)

4. Organization by purpose, process, clientele, place. Simon (1976) purported that each of these four elements of organization, as "principles," is in competition with the others. Therefore, the element selected as the basis of organization--according to orthodox theory--consequently comes into conflict with the others. Using an example of public health administration, which might be organized on the basis of purpose, certain clientele served, or place located, Simon asked which of the elements would be most effective. He concluded that the answer is not explained by the "principle."

In nine pages of discussion, Simon (1976) attempted to destroy theory that has existed for decades. His analyses were
straightforward, logical, and understandable. He challenged the "principle" of efficiency as one that should never have been considered more than a "definition." The concept has failed to tell how accomplishments ought to be maximized in organizational settings, but merely states that efficiency is an aim of administrative activity and theory (p. 80). But of the "principles" themselves, and of orthodox theory in general, Simon was even more critical in his contention that in reality no one can determine which, if any, may apply. He stated:

Administrative description suffers currently from superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism. It has confined itself too closely to the mechanism of authority and has failed to bring within its orbit the other, equally important, modes of influence or organizational behavior. It has refused to undertake the tiresome task of studying the actual allocation of decision-making functions. It has been satisfied to speak of "authority," "centralization," "span of control," "function," without seeking operational definitions of these terms. Until administrative description reaches a higher level of sophistication, there is little reason to hope that rapid progress will be made toward the identification and verification of valid administrative principles. (p. 79)

Simon (1976) concluded that public administration cannot aspire to be a "science," that orthodox theory is founded on "proverbs" instead of "principles," and that, in fact, it cannot even be considered an "art" (p. 83). He was to argue later that organizations are primarily processes of decision making. He set the stage for further argument against orthodox public administration, but the gun was sounded. After all, decisions are made in the mind, and mental choices had become factors of organizational dynamics. 16
In Hawley and Weintraub (1966), questions of normative values with respect to the "principles" are raised. That is, in an effort to develop a science of public administration as one would for one of the natural sciences, would all normative values be stripped away? Would the implication of orthodox theory that the "principles" of public administration are independent of moral and political ends subsequently result in confirmation of this assumption? And, further, cannot science "demonstrate moral values" because it cannot bridge the gap between "is" and "ought" (p. 23)? Thus, where is there for public administrationists to go for resolution of their continuing theoretical problem?

Some answers are provided by Hawley and Weintraub (1966). First, the academics who write the literature of public administration recognize that they cannot assume that they are "snugly insulated from the storms of clashing values" (p. 24). Second, they need to recognize that the study of public administration has to be developed "on some clarification of ends" (p. 25). When that is done, perhaps then these writers could stop attempting "to perpetuate the gobbledygook of science in the area of moral purposes" (p. 25). In the first instance, public administrationists might be seen as being hypocritical about their concern with ends arguments at times when they proclaimed to be least concerned with them. It is noted: "The doctrine of efficiency is a case in point; it runs like a half-visible thread through the fabric of public administration" (p. 24). On the second point, it is
argued that administrators need to be honest with themselves and "make explicit" the ends or values that comprise the foundation of their doctrine. Therefore, is public administration a "long way" from being an accepted science? Consider this statement:

No science of public administration is possible [until]: (1) the place of normative values is made clear; (2) the nature of man in the area of public administration is better understood and his conduct is more predictable; and (3) there is a body of comparative studies from which it may be possible to discover principles and generalities that transcend national boundaries and peculiar historical experiences. (p. 33)

Simon (1976) expanded on his argument that analyzed the rationality of decision making by individuals within organizations. Simon believed, however, that few people really have what he called the "wits" to capitalize on their decisions to the maximum extent possible (p. xxviii). Instead, they seek the route of most convenient and acceptable compromise, which he called "satisficing" (pp. xxviii-xxx1). If people's decisions are based on choices that relate to their personal "satisficing," Simon assumed that those decisions are most heavily influenced by the individual's psychological environment within his/her organizational setting. Then, Simon stated, these decision makers affect and actually create organizations by becoming collections of people who are at least partially directed at pursuing common goals (Chandler & Plano, 1982; Vocino & Rabin, 1981).

The decision aspect of the argument is important because Simon (1976) found that they are usually "something more than factual
propositions" (p. 46). These decisions have effects on "a future state of affairs," a situation that can be true or false, and which can be selective in determining a preference for some future course of action that directs the behavior of an organization toward that selected alternative. "In short," Simon stated, "they have an ethical as well as a factual content" (p. 46). He continued:

The question of whether decisions can be correct and incorrect resolves itself, then, into the questions of whether ethical terms like "ought," "good," and "preferable" have a purely empirical meaning. It is a fundamental premise of this study that ethical terms are not completely reducible to factual terms. (p. 46)

Simon (1976) made a distinction between science, which he considered the "observable world" and how it operates, and ethical propositions, which are expressions of preferences (p. 248). He asked, "Do principles of administration qualify, under this definition, as scientific propositions, or do they contain an ethical element?" (p. 248). He summarized his answer as follows:

An administrative science, like any science, is concerned purely with factual statements. There is no place for ethical assertions in the body of a science. Whenever ethical statements do occur, they can be separated into two parts, one factual and one ethical; and only the former has any relevance to science. (p. 253)

Simon (1976) presented convincing arguments against orthodox administrative theory and the scientific and ethical validity of scientific study in public administration. He is generally considered, with Waldo (1948), as being responsible for placing the final nail in the coffin of orthodoxy (Vocino & Rabin, 1981). Nigro and Nigro (1984) described Simon's (1976) contributions to the
discipline, through his attacks on the "principles," as being "scathing" to any claim that they may have had to scientific validity (p. 152). By the end of the first half of the twentieth century, American public administration began to recognize that the social and psychological aspects of organizational life were likely to be as important to the dimensions of the moral responsibility of the administrative class, as was the emphasis on efficiency in the pre-World War II years by Gulick and other orthodoxists. Thus, the human-relations approach evolved in such a manner as to "effectively challenge the principles school for the dominant position in administrative thought" (p. 153). Ironically, although many considered the "principles" approach to have met its match at the turn of the half-century mark, American public administration can directly trace its way of dealing even today with problems of administration to the prescriptions offered by the orthodoxists (p. 152).

Application of Business Values

Waldo (1948) completed his four-part model of orthodoxy by stating that students of public administration generally accepted the opinion that the values and practices of business could be applied to the administration of American government "with only slight reservations" (p. 207). If business was good enough for America, it ought to be good enough for the administration of
government and for democracy. After all, business people were in the leadership ranks of the research movement of the late 1800s. They did not concern themselves as much with conflicts with business and government, but rather considered their efforts directed at extension of business successes to government. Stated Waldo: "They thought, as most of their successors have thought, that the 'tuning up' of government machinery and its more vigorous operation will not be inconsistent with the maximum operation of all legitimate business enterprise" (pp. 70-71).

Some saw government like virtue, "the hardest of hard things is to make progress" (Wilson, 1887, pp. 207-208). But, unlike any business enterprise of the pre-World War II orthodox period, American government extended in broad and complex dimensions that affected the entire economic and social structure of the United States. As such, Waldo (1948) observed that government was growing in importance in ways necessitating the creation of a massive administrative machine. He saw this as paradoxical to the thought of Jeffersonian Democrats in that for a liberal democratic state to flourish and prosper, it needed to support a gigantic bureaucracy. However, application of business practices, such as achieving the most results at the least cost, seemed to provide the most acceptable course of action to insure manageability of the public enterprise. Similarities seemed obvious: directing the work of men in the most effective and efficient manner possible to achieve predetermined goals and objectives. Differences also seemed
obvious: business is in business to make a profit, and governments serve public needs without need of a profit motive. So could the values and practices of business be applied as the orthodoxists believed?

Wilson (1887) placed the matter in its earliest perspective when calling for government to "straighten" its paths "to make its business less unbusinesslike" (p. 201), stating that "the field of administration is a field of business" (p. 10). Gulick (1937a) applied his principles to "every large-scale or complicated enterprise" (p. 3). And it did not matter to them whether an organization was public or private in nature because in both cases "the basic 'good' is efficiency" (p. 192). It is here that Waldo's (1948) central question about efficiency must be resurfaced again: "Efficiency for what? Is not efficiency for efficiency's sake meaningless? Is efficiency not necessarily measured in terms of other values?" (p. 202). It is not a simple statement, for his argument contended that the "notion of efficiency" might be acceptable--even "valid and useful"--in some contexts, "but only within a framework of consciously held values" (p. 203). He further explained:

We hold that efficiency cannot itself be a "value." Rather, it operates in the interstices of a value system; it prescribes relationships [ratios or proportions] among parts of the value system; it receives its "moral content" by syntax, by absorption. Things are not simply "efficient" or "inefficient." They are efficient or inefficient for given purposes, and efficiency for one purpose may mean inefficiency for another. . . . [To] paraphrase Robbins' statement about the data of
economics, "There is no quality in administrative organizations and procedures taken out of their relation to men's purposes that can make them efficient." (p. 202)

Dimock (1956) viewed the primary difference between public and private organizations as solely the motivation of business toward profits as the basis of all economic activity (pp. 79-81). Government, on the other hand, addresses the concerns of a people and their democracy. To explain, he classified the work of government according to five basic criteria. They are (a) the "ends of the state," in which case the concepts of "justice and the good life might predominate"; (b) the "structure of economy," to demonstrate a commitment to efficient use of the public's tax dollar; (c) "social problems," to provide protection, assistance, regulation, and direct service for the good of society or to benefit publics unable to meet their own basic needs; and both (d) "administrative methods" and (e) "political economy," to insure that the will of the state is properly executed (pp. 24-25). Perhaps implied in the criteria is the matter of law and the observation that private administrators have far more latitude in interpreting the relationship between their organizations and the general welfare than would a public administrator (Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950; Vocino & Rabin, 1981).

Appleby (1945) seemed to put the matter to rest with his oft-recalled proclamation that "government is different." He stated:

Statecraft--government--is different from all other professions because it is broader than anything else in the field of action. Purely speculative thought and emotion may range a
wider field, yet even this may be doubted, for government must be concerned with intellectual and emotional out-reachings too. Government is different because it must take account of all the desires, needs, actions, thoughts, and sentiments of 140,000,000 people. Government is different because government is politics. (p. 107)

How different is different? Everything done in the way of the public's business, unlike the private sector, is presumably done 
publicly. In business, good work well done is lauded within the corporation, for example, but in the public sector, doing a good job is seldom enough. The public must be convinced that it was well done. Nigro and Nigro (1984) observed that the distinction is the chief reason why successful businesspersons oftentimes fail in government assignments. They stated:

Impatient with the need to justify their decisions to the public and accustomed to giving orders in their companies that quickly produce action, they complain that in government they are thwarted by red tape. Civil service, conflict of interest, and numerous laws and regulations must be observed. Some of the red tape may safely be eliminated, but a sizeable residue will always be necessary to protect the public interest [emphasis added]. (p. 9)

Almost as ironic as the fact that orthodoxists thought business values and practices ought to be applied to government was Waldo's (1948) concluding comment on this matter that perhaps business itself was due for an overhaul of its organization and procedures much in line with that being done by government (p. 207; Brown & Stillman, 1986, pp. 86-87; Thayer, 1973).

The idea of a "democratic administrative culture" in organizations raises a number of eyebrows, both public and private (Brown & Stillman, 1986, p. 86). This tenet of orthodoxy, that business
values and practices would help public administration to be more businesslike, may have been mistakably disclaimed by Waldo. For, whether right or wrong, proved or unproved, the philosophy behind it still persists. Reagan's signal that "Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem" (Congressional Quarterly, 1982) illustrates that the tenet retains a breath of life. His comment that he wants people in his Administration "who don't want a job in Government" (Reagan, 1980, p. 36) shows a seriousness to the situation. Reagan elaborated:

I want people who are already so successful that they would regard a Government job as a step down, not a step up. I don't want empire builders; I want people who will be the first to tell me if their jobs are unnecessary. Out there in the private sector, there's an awful lot of brains and talent in people who haven't learned all the things you can't do. (p. 36)

Appleby (1945) may have professed that "government is different" and continued to draw a sizable following. But "different" can be defined in many unrelated ways. Reagan and his followers may view government as being "different," yet in ways that degrade the discipline. Orthodox beliefs may have changed, but they have not evaporated from either the literature or the practice of American public administration.

Concluding Comments

At the outset to Chapter IV, I noted that Waldo's (1948) criticism of orthodoxy was important for two chief reasons: (a) for discrediting orthodoxy, and especially the idea that efficiency was
held as the ultimate value of American public administration; and
(b) that his "political theory of American public administration"
provided the discipline with enough challenge to become self-
critical. The first point was realized, but for a short period of
time, as efficiency even today is discussed in some circles as the
ultimate value of good government. But Waldo did help stimulate
rational thinkers to look at efficiency beyond time clocks and
purely cost-cutting measures to at least think of efficiency in
terms of the demand on the administrative state to provide effective
delivery of promised services. The performance of administration in
response to FDR's leadership is a classic illustration of the point,
as noted in Chapter III. I think efficiency will always be a factor
in demonstrating good government because orthodoxy has not died, and
neither has, or will, the guiding political philosophy of private
interest. As long as power centers with those--even those as
elected officials only--with "business" motivation, who is to be
surprised if their philosophy permeates their actions in government?
There is no reason for them to function in any other way.
Unfortunately for public administrators who would strive to change
such thinking, their big surprise will be in the realization they
are wholly in the minority. Waldo's efforts at discrediting
orthodoxy made sense to some academics, but outside of that realm is
likely another story.
On the other hand, Waldo's (1948) criticism unquestionably opened up the field of public administration for painful scrutiny by administrators themselves. For reasons to be explored in later chapters, the discipline did not like what it saw, where it was headed, and where the country was headed. Among some academics, there was (a) no connection between democracy and efficiency, (b) no validity in the politics-administration dichotomy, (c) no ethically valid science of administration, or (d) no application of business values and practices to public administration. From the standpoint of American public administration, these academics are still accurate in their viewpoints. But there remain critics from within academia, and among citizen nonpublic administrationists, in each of these areas. Political reality sometimes casts the shadow of a more convincing argument on these concerns than theory. Even Waldo acknowledges today that Americans--including public administrationists--have little time for theory and almost no patience with ambiguity. The key here is examination of what orthodoxy's role has been in relation to good government. It has provided, at minimum, (a) a respectable foundation for "modern" public administration, (b) a means to overcome the problems of self-interestedness of the late 1800s and 1900s, (c) a means for American government to survive two world wars and a Great Depression, and (d) a means that guided implementation of an executive philosophy (FDR) of centralization and egalitarianism that resulted in establishment of a national sense of community never before or since seen in America.
Public administration owes a great deal to orthodox theory. Would administrators, or even politicians, have thought seriously about the goals of public administration without at least approaching the idea that good government means more than just efficiency? Would public administration--without being encouraged by orthodoxy to break tasks and responsibilities down into their component parts--have been able to think as rationally about organizational or policy objectives? The idealism of classicists like Gulick, Taylor, Wilson, and even Weber have been applied to development and application of descriptive research.

The idea of efficiency is still equated by the public with good government, and that is a significant point, not to be taken lightly. It may not be fundamentally relevant to actual administrative situations, but picture a candidate for elective office who, if the situation fits, would not hesitate for a moment to campaign on the premise that the public bureaucracy needs to be reformed to make it more efficient.

Waldo's (1948) model, analyzed in this chapter, is a classic. But like most else in the public arena, it cannot be taken wholly at face value. Everything in the public administration is subject to change, and with that, interpretation.

A final comment is necessary to conclude Chapter IV. That is the following summary of key arguments. They are:
1. American public administration began to question the value of orthodoxy, in total, to modern organizational theory and practice.

2. Leading public administration scholars began to seriously question the validity of the "gospel of efficiency." An ultimate value of efficiency was seen as inadequate.

3. American public administration came to admit that politics and administration did not exist separately, and, in fact, they never had. Attention began to focus on administrators as participants in the political process.

4. Doubt was cast on the principles of the science of administration as being both scientifically and ethically valid.

5. Public administrationists began to question how and why the business values and practices were applied to government.

6. American public administration was judged to be absent of an administrative theory.

7. The decline of orthodoxy and the idea of efficiency are myths. Nonpublic administrationists view both as still important to the mission of public administration.

8. Waldo's model of a "political theory of public administration" has been invaluable to the discipline because it forced public administration to be self-critical and to rethink its purpose and role in American government.
Footnotes—Chapter IV

1Vocino and Rabin (1981) clearly concluded that Waldo and Simon were the leading academics of the period whose writing tremendously influenced the decline in acceptance of orthodox thinking. Stated Vocino and Rabin: "From that time forward, there was scarcely a defender of orthodox public administration to be found, and it became a standard part of the discipline's scholarship and teaching to decry the simplicity and naivete of past public administration" (p. 31). Nonetheless, my point about using caution in "discarding tradition" retains validity, as further discussion indicates with respect to "current" or "modern" thinking about efficiency, the politics/administration dichotomy, the practiced principles of administration, and Ronald Reagan's crusade in the federal government to make government work as well as business. It is easy to say that orthodoxy is dead, and among some academics it may well be. But it is alive and well in many quarters, even today. One question worth pondering by students of the moral responsibility of the administrative class is whether or not evolutionary gains since the end of orthodoxy as described by Vocino and Rabin are being reversed in practice toward philosophy understood before orthodoxy reached its heyday.

2One chief concern was the almost triteness of both words. On the one hand, democracy had so many definitions accorded it over the early history of the United States, that it indeed came to be understood just as the President's Committee on Administrative Management described it (p. 1). Efficiency, on the other hand, seemed to pop up as a result of late-nineteenth-century interest in having government function more "businesslike." Stated Waldo (1984): "The rise and diffusion of the concept is, I judge, associated with the modern phenomena [of] the power-driven machine, with economic rationality, with the business ethos..." Waldo's difficulty in defining the terms is further elaborated in his 1980 valedictory, The Enterprise of Public Administration (see Chapter 6, pp. 81-98, for discussion).

3That is, the ends of the state is definitely a central problem of political theory, and a key consideration of rectifying the arguments about what constitutes the "good life" in any administrative state. "What form of government," asked Waldo (1948), "will exercise the control and seek to realize the Good Life?" (p. 74). The answer appears to be democracy, he explained, for students of administration "profess" to identify democracy as the ideal for which they strive and eagerly seek. This quest, for students of administration at least, comes in the form of applying
administrative principles to the machinery of government. Orthodoxy demands results from those administrators, for as the President's Committee on Administrative Management proclaimed, "without results Democracy means nothing" (see discussion, pp. 74-75).

4 Like some Federalists, Waldo (1980) contended that the United States was created as a republic, not a democracy; in fact, he questioned the connotation of the term "democracy," which he described the Founders as considering "something little removed from mob rule" (p. 36). However, over time, changes in political beliefs and institutions of the United States caused a transformation of the nation from a republic to a representative democracy. The point is significant because the "democratized" American government became less "nationalized" and its "ownership" became less symbolic and less of a corporate matter. This government, argued Waldo, became an entity that each citizen owned a chunk of. And, as he stated: "And owners are entitled, if they can make their will effective, to have what they own serve their interests" (p. 37). What evolved is more consistent with Federalist thought than Anti-Federalist thought (J. D. Lewis, 1967, see pp. 49-53). (For further elaboration of Waldo's argument, see Brown & Stillman, 1986, pp. 60-61.)

5 In L. D. White (1948), the concept is explained as something "next to a Miracle" (p. 4). The idea was that perhaps a majority of citizens of the new United States, while recognizing that no government is perfect, had accepted the premise that their government was "one of the best in the world" (p. 4). Underscoring this belief, however widespread, was what White described as strong public confidence in the "ideas of progress" that were characteristic of the time. He stated:

The concept of the indefinite perfectibility of man and his institutions, the belief that man could determine the main lines of his progress, and the opinions that institutions existed to further progress, and that education was one of the principal means. (p. 6)

Even so, Waldo (1977) contended that the word "democracy" had negative meaning to the Federalists, although its evolution—as he saw its development over time—became a "natural development" consistent with the thinking of the Founding Fathers (p. 8). Waldo finally came to conclude that democracy was certainly more than a descriptor of a form of government, or of a simply defined concept that connotes "rule of the people." He saw democracy beyond the political-public realm. He saw democracy in America as the nation striving toward "equality and freedom," but warned that those terms in themselves open "a difficult and dangerous terrain" (p. 5). How are "equality" and "freedom" defined, understood, and applied within any democracy?
See Brown and Stillman, 1986, pp. 157-158. Waldo judged efficiency as having emerged as a political concept. The "success" of American government noted earlier by Van Riper plays directly into Waldo's implication that efficiency had as much to do with political expediency of those individuals in power as it did with the results achieved by the administrative class that functioned as the machines of government. (See Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950, pp. 488-512, for general discussion.)

Goodnow's (1900) point was that administration, without question, served as the "function of executing the will of the state" (p. 72). Thus, the function must be subjected to the control of politics, if it is hoped that the expressed will of the state shall be executed, and thus become an actual rule of conduct. This control should not, however, extend further than is necessary to insure the execution of the state will. If it does, the spontaneous expression of the real state will tends to become difficult and the execution of that will becomes inefficient. (p. 72)

Gulick's (1937b) famous "axiom" about efficiency and administration comes quickly to mind while contemplating this discussion. He stated:

In the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic "good" is efficiency. The fundamental objective of the science of administration is the accomplishment of the work in hand with the least expenditure of man-power and materials. Efficiency is thus axiom number one in the value scale of administration. (p. 192)

In a twist of irony, Gulick was presented in 1979 with the Dwight Waldo Award by the American Society for Public Administration, presented to a distinguished contributor to the literature of the discipline. Waldo found the situation "embarrassing," but now considers Gulick as "the outstanding citizen of our realm of public administration" (Brown & Stillman, 1986, p. 132).

An excellent analysis of Willoughby's (1937) thinking is found in Waldo's (1980) valedictory. He stated:

Willoughby, certainly a major figure of the time, argued at three levels: (1) Yes, a distinction between politics and administration is important; but (2) the threefold separation of powers deserves respect and must and can be accommodated in building administration into the governmental system; but also (3) there really are five distinct and important functions in modern government--the Constitutional triad of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, plus the administrative and the electoral. Willoughby wrote in the teens and twenties; and
certainly through the thirties there were those arguing that the governmental realm could not be divided into two separate worlds, that the participation of administrators in the political is inevitable, even desirable. (p. 68)

The term was well-defined by Simon (1976). He stated:
Decisions are sometimes more than factual propositions. To be sure, they are descriptive of a future state of affairs, and this description can be true or false in a strictly empirical sense; but they possess, in addition, an imperative quality—they select one future state of affairs in preference to another and direct behavior toward the chosen alternative. In short, they have an ethical as well as a factual content" (p. 46)

As discussed in Chapter I, the impetus behind the "principles" was the scientific management movement. This is illustrated especially in the general similarity between scientific management and public administration over beliefs in the value of "efficiency, which evolved not only with tremendous praise among scholars, but also with a definite moral content. This moral content, however, was overshadowed by the "scientific attitude" of orthodoxists (see Waldo, 1948, pp. 59-60).

Gulick's (1937a) argument is illustrative of orthodox ideology. He explained "span of control" as follows:
Just as the hand of man can span only a limited number of notes on the piano, so the mind and will of man can span but a limited number of immediate managerial contacts. . . . The limit of control is partly a matter of the limits of knowledge, but even more is it a matter of the limits of time and energy. As a result the executive of any enterprise can personally direct only a few persons. He must depend upon these to direct others, and upon them to direct still others, until the last man in the organization is reached. This condition placed upon all human organization by the limits of span of control obviously differs in different kinds of work and in organizations of different sizes. Where the work is routine, repetitive, measurable and homogeneous [in] character, one man can perhaps direct several score workers. This is particularly true when the workers are all in a single room. Where the work is diversified, qualitative, and particularly when the workers are scattered, one man can supervise only a few. This diversification, dispersion, and non-measurability is of course most evident at the very top of any organization. It follows that the limitations imposed by the span of control are most evident at the top of the organization, directly under the executive himself. (pp. 7-8)
Those who would later challenge the "principles" of public administration had difficulty with the "simplicity" and the "naivete" of the orthodox argument, and ultimately viewed this argument as little more than "contradictory proverbs and homilies" (Vocino & Rabin, 1981, pp. 30-31).

These omissions, and recognition of Follett's (1920, 1937) and Barnard's (1938) "importance in the development of administration-organizational thought," were corrected--or at least acknowledged--by Waldo in his "Introduction--retrospect and Prospect" that updated his thoughts for the Second Edition of The Administrative State (1984, pp. xxvii-xxviii; see also Brown & Stillman, 1986, pp. 61-62). Waldo clearly lauded both authors and their contributions to the study of organizations. However, Waldo stood firm in his assertion that neither Follett nor Barnard was "judged important" in the rise of public administration (p. xxvii). He conceded that Follett's work later had an indirect effect upon public administration and that Barnard's book "has not yet been fully mined" (p. xxviii). Others have disagreed about the influence of Follett and Barnard, as already cited. Simon (1976) acknowledged Barnard as a "major influence" in his own studies of administration (pp. xlix-l) and quoted him extensively through the pages of Administrative Behavior. Barnard even provided the Foreword (pp. xlix-xlvi). One concluding thought about the treatment by Waldo and Simon of the two authors in question is significant to any understanding of American public administration. That is, the literature, from the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, to Wilson (1887), to current work, is really multi-disciplinary in nature. In fact, until the publication of Gulick and Urwick's (1937) Papers on the Science of Administration, the discipline of public administration could claim little in the literature as solely its own. And questions from business administration scholars likely challenge the full nature of Papers are applying only to public administration!

The two Commissions (1949 and 1955, respectively) were charged with conducting an evaluation of the federal government as part of an effort that considered reorganization of the bureaucracy. Both Commissions were chaired by former President Herbert Hoover. Unlike the Brownlow Committee in 1937, comprised of three political scientists, the Hoover Commissions represented a cross-section of major special interests, plus members of Congress. Like the Brownlow Committee, however, the First Hoover Commission upheld the necessity of the President-centered executive branch and stressed internal management reforms. The Second Hoover Commission concentrated mostly on unnecessary services and agencies of government and recommended that many be abolished for increased efficiency. However, the primary importance of both Commissions to the current discussion is that they continued the efficiency-economy discussion with authority at the highest visible levels of American

Waldo (1984) recognized Simon’s (1976) "impressive" work as cited, but continued to wonder why the "enterprise of self-aware public administration did not reconstitute itself" as a result of his efforts (p. xviii). Others have questioned the "limited practical effect" of Simon's attacks on the "principles" of orthodox public administration (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 141). For example, POSDCORB may have been proverbial but it was useful to administrators in a way that Simon’s emphasis on administrative decision-making was not. Ironically enough, since about 1960 Simon has moved more and more toward the position that a science of management may be possible after all. His position from the beginning was that it was impossible for managers to achieve a high degree of rationality in making decisions because the amount of information they needed to evaluate was too great. That position was modified by the computer revolution [which may now] give them the ability to make entirely rational decisions. (pp. 141-142)

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CHAPTER V

CLIENT-CENTERED ACTIVISM: THE NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Classical or orthodox public administration traditionally asked two questions of public policy: (a) Can public services be offered to citizens with available resources? and (b) Can these services be provided while cutting costs? A third question was added by a new "movement" that began in the 1960s: Does the effective delivery of services by the state enhance social equity? The first two questions were explored in preceding chapters. The purpose of Chapter V is to consider the third one in terms of an analysis of the New Public Administration, an effort to refocus the discipline away from orthodoxy's emphasis on efficiency and good management to a concern for social equity. Because it was represented by no formal organization or program, the New Public Administration was identified at the outset as "a movement of sorts" (Waldo, 1984, p. xvi). Discussion here, however, will address the New Public Administration as a movement because it was supported in the literature, and in practice by administrators well into the 1980s.

Orthodoxy maintained efficiency as its ultimate value, while the New Public Administration held human dignity as its chief criterion for judging the value of administrative policy and the delivery of public services. The new movement was activist in
nature and considered advocates as members of an administrative elite. It attempted to bring American public administration from focusing on good management techniques and the concept of efficiency toward a sense of self-awareness with values, ethics, and administrative compassion as its primary focuses of attention. For example, on the matter of social equity, advocates of the New Public Administration sought a standard that required the fair and equitable distribution of public services, with special emphasis on minorities and the disadvantaged. The New Public Administration encouraged individual administrators to become proactive in the public policy arena on behalf of clients—that is, minorities and the disadvantaged—in order to effect good government.

Nonetheless, the New Public Administration was not a popular movement, either inside or outside the discipline. It claimed to know the public good in ambiguous contexts, although the New Public Administration claimed legitimacy as a matter of constitutional design. Critics attacked the movement by contending that proactive administration was not a realistic or practical application of democratic government.

The scope of Chapter V is discussion of major positions of both advocates and opponents of the New Public Administration. The chapter begins with brief discussion of the setting in which the New Public Administration was conceived. Two overall factors that affected the movement before and during its development, perceived threats of bureaucracies and human theory, are noted. Then I
proceed directly into an analysis of the movement, followed up with critiques of both the New Public Administration's values and the matter of elitism. The overall argument of the chapter posits that the role in government envisioned for the New Public Administration had its merits and ultimate successes but, more important, that the role was not consistent with the needs of American government.

Time of "Contemporary Revolutions"

Discussion in the preceding chapters pointed out that orthodox public administration provides scant opportunity for administrators to use discretion in the best interests of the public's "business." The latter term is not coincidental for it derives from theory that emphasizes the need for economy and efficiency in operations of the government.

However, this is from the standpoint of public administration. There may have been reasons other than merely the concentration on efficiency as the discipline's ultimate value which were concerns of others outside the sphere of public administration. For example, bureaucracy has often been viewed as a threat to democratic systems, likely one reason why political attacks on the size and scope of government--"get government off our backs"--meet with such wide appeal. Bureaucracies are perceived as being inflexible, cumbersome, and indecisive, so why should citizens place their trust in a system from which decision making demands adaptability,
accountability, and courage? Is efficiency a correct measure of administrative effectiveness? Are there other factors to be considered?

Few would disagree that when orthodox theory is considered by public administrationists, good government is generally thought of in contexts that connotate a structured organization that runs smoothly, with mechanistic speed and precision, like a fine-tuned motor. Similarly, good government in the orthodox sense came to mean policy decided by the political leadership of the moment, which was executed or carried out obediently by the administration--as servants of the public. To ensure maximum economy and efficiency, it was assumed that administrators operated as pragmatists, being neutral about values and goals. This theory reached the zenith of its influence in the American experience before World War II and was recognized for greatly assisting the American effort when near-autocratic government became most needed during the global turmoil of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Such theory would change over time. Numerous behavioral scientists (Argyris, 1957, 1973a, 1973b; Bennis, 1966a, 1969; Herzberg, 1964; Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959; Likert, 1961; Maslow, 1943, 1970; McGregor, 1960) argued that there were underlying motivating factors involved within organizational settings that needed to be considered (McKinney & Howard, 1979). That is, in addition to the recognition by the earlier theorists
that there were independent sources of power within organizations separate from the direction of the politics side of the orthodoxist's politics/administration dichotomy maxim, "new" thinking beginning primarily in the 1950s sought answers to how this "power" could best be applied to the achievement of organizational goals.

Coupled with this new sense of theorizing came America's social collision on such matters as race, poverty, the environment, and later, with the trauma of Vietnam. Waldo (1968) described the historic setting as a time of "contemporary revolutions" (p. 362). While the behavioral/motivation movement did not directly involve public administration, the role of American government in the "contemporary revolutions" most emphatically did. Several scholars suggested that administrative efficiency needed to be replaced by social equity as the number one concern of the public bureaucracy (Frederickson, 1980; Rice, 1976). "It was felt," said Rice, "that the present public administration medium for coping with contemporary problems and issues was failing to respond properly to the demands of the public" (p. 10). Which "demands" of what "public" were only generically argued and may not be supportable by what the greater public saw as demands. How do the masses relate and agree on what constitutes social equity in any context? If Rice means that the masses were displeased with government service, that is one thing. But to say that agreement was evident in the early
1960s on race relations, that is quite another matter. Public administration literature generalizes a great deal, which helps to flame the confusion over the discipline's purpose, let alone its proper role in government. So, it is with such a caveat that I say that critics of orthodoxy believed that while the public bureaucracy may have been efficient, some leading scholars concluded that it was not effective in addressing citizen needs in a changing society. Was the public bureaucracy unconcerned with the personal worth and dignity of man, as some argued (Rice, 1976)? Was it out of tune, therefore, for being "out of tune with reality" by "not properly managing society" (pp. 32-33)?

It is difficult to believe that the masses, and most elected leaders of government, have disagreed or would ever disagree with either question. I stated only a few paragraphs earlier that scholarship indicates that bureaucracy is historically perceived in negative, if not skeptical, contexts (Crozier, 1964; Downs, 1967; Jacoby, 1973; McCurdy, 1977; Nigro & Nigro, 1984; Plamenatz, 1978). More to the point, there has been much evidence in behavioral research that emphasized goal displacement and bureaucratic dysfunctions that reinforce prevailing doubts about bureaucratic rationality (Merton, Gray, Hockey, & Selvin, 1952; Ostrom, 1973). To illustrate these doubts, for example, Ostrom described a "rule of thumb" to define the "strategy of bureaucratic personality." It was: "When in doubt, don't" (p. 10). This viewpoint, of course, was wholly contrary to theoretical presumptions attributed to
bureaucratic organizations, that is, "efficiency, speed, and dispatch" (Merton et al., 1952, p. 378).

The comments noted above by Rice (1976), however, are appropriate and relevant, but he makes serious presumptions in assuming that bureaucracy manages society. If he means that administrative agencies manage government programs, he is correct. But to assume that public administration manages society is to commit a grievous error in interpretation of political environments. Rice's argument is noted primarily to explain the mood and the thinking that lead up to the focus of this chapter.

I agree that many individuals concerned with the criticism being leveled at government for being unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane wanted to make change in public administration's proper role. This has been argued quite convincingly by Waldo (1971, 1980, 1984) for many years. It was in this setting that the New Public Administration evolved.

The effort of New Public Administration focused on an attempt to create a new administrative theory that placed advocates' interpretations of client-centered activity, humanism, and social equity at the forefront of administrative concern. Instead of public administrators being solely servants of the system, they ought now to become proactive participants of government policy and action. I do not believe that the New Public Administration necessarily evolved in any sort of popular effort, inside or outside
of the discipline. It became, however, a movement of significant historical importance to public administration, furthering Waldo's (1980) challenge for critical self-analysis. I think that one of New Public Administration's problems from the outset was that it assumed that majority opinion concluded that government had not done enough in pursuing the values of humanism and social equity. In fact, the opposite may have been true.

The New Public Administration certainly would have its outstanding advocates, as well as its outspoken critics. Despite the problems and argument it fostered, "questions of values and ethics have remained major items in public administration" (Nigro & Nigro, 1984, p. 15) since the emergence of the New Public Administration. If the movement achieved nothing more, it achieved a great deal in its contributions to the public dialogue. Despite the severe criticism it encountered, the New Public Administration must not be taken lightly. It, for example, promoted a public-purpose philosophy, as opposed to one of private interest oftentimes associated with orthodoxy.

But answers to significant criticisms of the New Public Administration remain unsettled. For example, critics asked, what gives administrators the right to advocate their interpretation of the public good? Also, what of democratic responsibility? That is, are the New Public Administrationists responsible to anything? These are fundamental questions about which the New Public Administration needed to provide convincing argument.
Organizational humanist theory erupted into a social science reform movement in the United States during and shortly after World War II. Although the movement was not directly related to public administration, results of studies by leading humanists had profound effects on raising the levels of self-consciousness years later among proponents of the New Public Administration (McKinney & Howard, 1979; Simmons & Dvorin, 1977). If nothing else, the humanists presented convincing arguments that correlate achievement of organizational goals by workers who feel they are actually involved in the organization from a participative standpoint. Workers who feel they are contributing are better motivated, and organizations are seen "healthier" for it. But public administrationists need to exert caution when approaching the humanist bandwagon. While much was gained from this reform effort, part of the impetus behind the "new political science movement" which paralleled the New Public Administration movement was to rid political science of its emphasis on behavioralism (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 21). For political science, the pendulum had swung too far in one direction. For public administration, the pendulum was just beginning to swing.

Nonetheless, the roots of the organizational humanist movement were clearly embedded in the Hawthorne Studies conducted in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1972). The major
foundation of the movement is generally traced to Maslow (1943), who first proposed that a needs hierarchy existed in organizations, within which workers move up or down as levels of needs are either satisfied or threatened. According to Maslow, "man is a perpetually wanting animal" (p. 370), whose needs range from those relating to basic physical survival (at the lowest level) to those of self-actualization (at the highest level), which comprise one's maximum use of his/her creative abilities. Thus, the significance of Maslow's needs hierarchy lies in realization of what motivates individuals and, importantly, what types of motivators are required to achieve organizational goals.

Maslow's (1943) theory, from the standpoint of public administration, directly challenged the politics/administration dichotomy principle of the orthodoxists because it implied and it encouraged disassociation with value-free arguments that established the role of administrators in public organizations. Like other citizens, public administrators were human, and therefore they were not machines without feelings, personal beliefs, or desires. They may have been "perpetually wanting animals" in the Maslow sense, but even that description defies the docile-workers approach professed by the orthodoxists. Additionally, Maslow's hierarchy of needs emphasized the importance of worker satisfaction in organizations and contended that "any thwarting or possibility of thwarting" of these needs represented "a psychological threat" to the individual.
and similarly affected his/her performance within the organizational setting (pp. 395-396).

The substance of efforts by the behavioral theorists in pointing out that orthodox theory blatantly disregarded the human elements of individuals within organizations is undisputed (Nigro & Nigro, 1984). Opposite the orthodox viewpoint, the humanists believed that it was humanly impossible for individuals to be value-neutral, a matter that profoundly influenced achievement of organizational goals. For example, Nigro and Nigro contended that "values are the generators of rational action," and until administrators realize this they cannot make "morally rational" decisions and be aware of the choices they are making (p. 52).

Human relations theorists focused their attention on having the organization adjust to individuals, an approach considered necessary for both organizational health and individual growth. Related to this movement was the behavioral science approach known as organizational development, which assumed a process of self-renewal within organizations. Bennis (1969) described organizational development as a top-directed, planned, organization-wide method of involving employees in an effort to change "beliefs, attitudes, values, and structure of the organization to facilitate adaptation to fast-changing and highly complex environments with which we must contend" (p. 2). A premise of organizational development was involvement of employees in an atmosphere of openness and trust in both problem analysis and problem solving. It follows that an
underlying philosophy of organizational development was that employees were not only capable of diagnosing problems within organizations, but they were also capable of suggesting viable solutions to those problems (Bennis, 1969; Chandler & Plano, 1982). Like the efforts of the other human relations theorists noted earlier, organizational development had its critics (Kaplan & Tausky, 1977), especially with respect to its fundamental ideals that (a) people required personal fulfillment from their jobs and (b) goals of the individual and the organization could become compatible (McKinney & Howard, 1979). However, organizational development theory supported and enhanced the efforts of Maslow (1943), McGregor (1960), and others noted, if only from the standpoint of injecting the human element in organizations.

The humanists built the foundation for further study in the form of concern for worker satisfaction and organizational "health." Proponents of the New Public Administration built upon this foundation in the form of "a call for action to meet human problems in a new way" (p. 141). Not only would public administration be refocused away from traditional concerns of economy and efficiency, advocates of the New Public Administration sought active involvement in ways to improve society. Rice (1976) found the humanist contribution to the New Public Administration as important. He evaluated the importance as follows:

The new Public Administration reaffirms the rejection of the fact-value distinction. One of its main propositions is that
values must be reflected in the everyday decisions of the administrators. This proposition was viewed as one criterion for a humane bureaucracy. The concern for humanism saw the rise of phenomenology and existentialism as the basis of decision-making. Human dignity is to be recognized as the top concern of the administrator. . . . [The] administrator must know man in order to better serve him. The implicit suggestion was to have the administrator philosophically analyze himself and change those values which are contrary to humanism. (pp. 145-146)

Thus, the stage was set for development of the New Public Administration as a new administrative theory.

Defining a New Movement

What attracted people to the New Public Administration? What philosophy kept them interested and perhaps involved in the movement? Answers to both questions are difficult to pinpoint because of the generality and ambiguity of the literature on this area of interest. Waldo (1984) admitted that no formal program was developed in keeping with "the spirit of the time [which was] contrary to organization and programs" (p. xvi). Frederickson (cited in Chandler & Plano, 1982) thought the movement might possibly be "in alignment with good, or possibly God" (p. 24). Thompson (1975) argued that the movement amounted to little more than "academic proposals . . . [that were] somewhat subversive" (pp. 6, 66). Whether uncharted, lofty, or controversial, those who became advocates of the New Public Administration were those who said they were, or acted as if they were.
But a formalness of program was absent. At first, there were just the Minnowbrook papers, an assemblage of essays prepared by attendees in late 1968 at a New York convention center by that name where Waldo and 35 other university public administrators gathered to discuss strategies to become more actively involved in "the grave happenings and urgent problems of the times" (Marini, 1971, p. xiii; this book is the source of the Minnowbrook papers). Later, there would be Frederickson's (1980) book, *New Public Administration*, which appeared nine years later, more than half way through the period normally associated with the viability of the movement (1969 to 1984; dates arrived at from Frederickson & Chandler, 1984; Marini, 1971). Most often, the movement was advocated from an academic sense in occasional journal articles. Marini and Frederickson remain the primary book-length analyses of the movement from the standpoint of advocates. Thompson's (1975) is by far the most prominent critique, although Ostom (1973) disagreed with the movement by advancing one of his own, public choice economics.

Thus, one may surmise to any degree desired relating to the two questions posed above. The literature fails to provide definitive answers. I will attempt to provide satisfactory comment of my own based on a review of the available literature. One thing very clear is the setting, as noted earlier. Waldo (1968b) labeled the period as one of extreme "turbulence" on the American scene. A description of the "turbulence" is noted elsewhere, but what is important here
is that advocates of the new theory had become frustrated with a government--of which they were a part--they felt had grown apart from the needs of American citizens. Even in a time of national crisis, as the mid-1960s were, these advocates did not venture out with a popular position or, for that matter, one that was shrewd from the standpoint of considering political reality before assuming major political status. Rieselbach (1975) better describes, however, the frustration. He stated:

Something, it seemed, was profoundly wrong with America; her institutions--social, economic, [and] political--seemed unable to cope marginally with the crisis that threatened to overwhelm them. . . . The citizens of the nation seemed incapable of getting hold of their own affairs; their institutions seemed out of reach and out of touch. Societal structures seemed unresponsive and in need of reform. Governmental unresponsiveness seemed at the heart of the matter. The acts of policy-making institutions from the presidency on down appeared to have little or nothing to do with popular needs or desires. (p. 3)

The frustration was clear. But what to do about it? Rieselbach's (1975) analysis paralleled that of Waldo (1968), who originally characterized the period as "a time of revolutions" in an essay that challenged public administrationists to accept major responsibility for helping to cause the "revolutions" (p. 364). Waldo developed the term "revolutions" in the context of "rapid and significant changes in the governmental system" (p. 362) and argued that once public administration accepted its role in the matter, it could assume a leadership position in putting America back on course. The next question to be answered was how. Consider that in
a matter of about 20 years, public administration had evolved from a period of its "high noon of orthodoxy" beginning in the late 1930s, to a period when some of its internal critics would propose total abandonment of its role as executors of the will of the state and become proactive participants in that action.

This was the genesis of the New Public Administration movement, and its proponents were on the threshold of redefining their role in government and with respect to a neo-orthodox definition of administrative responsibility. What attracted people to the New Public Administration? Was the New Public Administration to become a mere effort by a self-stated administrative elite that, as Thompson (1975) contended, promoted a program of "political absurdity and immaturity" (p. 66)? Or was this a genuine neo-orthodox movement that would add a significant chapter to moral reasoning in American public administration? What was clear at the outset were three considerations: (a) leading public administration scholars believed that organizational effectiveness had for too long been epitomized through efficiency (Marini, 1971; Rice, 1976); (b) most traditional values of public administration--both political and social--no longer could remain relevant to the complexities of organization and issues of the time (that is, human relations and social science concerns); and (c) that there appeared to be a growing sense of uneasiness among public administrators who "no longer worship power or material success [who] are looking for ways to be of humane service to society" (Mosher, 1976, p. 252). The
first two points have been discussed earlier. The third point deserves further consideration here.

If the New Public Administration was not popular, and if I am correct that it was conceived on questionable theoretical grounds, why did many inside academia, and out, become so openly supportive of the movement? Dissent and rebellion were two key aspects of the anti-war and anti-government demonstrations during the Vietnam conflict. Did this attitude spread to public administration? Political scientists all but ignored public administrationists from an academic perspective through the 1960s, and the Minnowbrook conference was held shortly after the American Political Science Association removed public administration as an organizing category in the program for their annual meetings. Did this slight from academia have any basis for the conception of the New Public Administration? In both instances, the answer appears to be a resounding "yes" (Mosher, 1976; Waldo, 1968b, 1980). Some have suggested that the new movement represented "a declaration of independence from both political science and administrative science" (Chandler & Plano, 1982, p. 22).

However, I think the reasons are deeper than even these considerations. I think it attracted individuals because the New Public Administration held as its first principles moral propositions (Simmons & Dvorin, 1977), and ethics had certainly become a focal point of concern with anyone familiar with the Civil
Rights Movement, Vietnam, and, later, Watergate. Consequently, the New Public Administration was seen as both (a) a challenge of traditional administrative concern with techniques and (b) a search for inclusion of human values into public policy formulation and implementation. The New Public Administration was a radical and novel approach that sought to propose that administrative decision making would be based on "value choice" and that the effects of administrative decision making would have "value consequences" (p. 235). Thus, to enhance its own legitimacy, the movement encouraged the exercise of administrative power in a democratic society that would seek "morally compelling ends" (p. 236). The New Public Administration saw as these ultimate ends an individual's "human dignity" and "social justice" (p. 236; Frederickson, 1980; Marini, 1971).

This setting provided new opportunities for the frustrated and uneasy public administrators who genuinely cared about their profession's impact in the scheme of administrative life (Ostrom, 1973). Further, as Waldo observed in retrospect, "new ideas for the times were hardly abundant [and the New Public Administration offered] new thinking [and an] intellectually respectable presentation of a novel and promising approach" (cited in Brown & Stillman, 1986, pp. 105, 107).

The possibilities of a new theory provided a motivation that orthodoxy had not. Advocates were saying that the role of administrators in American government needed to change in dramatic
ways. Why debate the dichotomy issue any further? Now, administrators were openly being encouraged to be actively and aggressively involved in both politics and administration.

In fact, the guiding principles for the New Public Administration laid out a strategy that outraged established leaders of good government and led to charges that proponents of this activist phenomenon were "a misguided group of dissidents" (Devine, 1982, p. 19). Were they? What did the New Public Administration all mean? What effect does it have now, nearly 20 years after its inception, on the study of American public administration? Discussion throughout the remainder of Chapter V attempts to answer these questions. I will address these matters sequentially.

Before proceeding, however, it is important to know the guiding principles established for the New Public Administration. Depending on one's point of view, the content and even the language of the principles emit action, daring, and courage, or on the other hand, symbolic hot air from a bunch of people who allegedly misread the meaning of separation of powers under the United States Constitution (Devine, 1982; Harmon, 1982; Thompson, 1975).

The principles, prepared by Frederickson (1980), are as follows:

1. Social equity . . . includes activities designed to enhance the political power and economic well-being [of disadvantaged] minorities. A fundamental commitment to social equity means that new Public Administration attempts to come to grips with Dwight Waldo's contention that the field has never satisfactorily accommodated the theoretical
implications of involvement in "politics" and policy making. The policy-administration dichotomy lacks an empirical warrant, for it is abundantly clear that administrators both execute and make policy. . . . Administrators are not neutral. They should be committed to both good management and social equity as values, things to be achieved, or rationales. (p. 312)

2. A fundamental commitment to social equity means that new Public Administration is anxiously engaged in change. Simply put, new Public Administration seeks to change those policies and structures that systematically inhibit social equity. (p. 312)

3. A commitment to social equity not only involves the pursuit of change but attempts to find organizational and political forms which exhibit a capacity for continued flexibility or routinized change. . . . Change is basic to new Public Administration. (pp. 312, 314)

4. New Public Administration's commitment to social equity implies a strong administrative or executive government--what Hamilton called "energy in the executive." . . . New Public Administration seeks not only to carry out legislative mandates as efficiently and economically as possible, but to both influence and execute policies which more generally improve the quality of life for all. (p. 314)

5. Classic Public Administration emphasizes developing and strengthening institutions which have been designed to deal with social problems. . . . The Public Administration focus, however, has tended to drift from the problem to the institution. New Public Administration attempts to refocus on the problem and to consider alternative possible institutional approaches to confronting problems. [Thus, these alternatives] will seek to avoid becoming entrenched, nonresponsive bureaucracies that become greater public problems than the social situations they were originally designed to improve. (pp. 314-315)

6. New Public Administration advocates what could be best described as "second-generation behavioralism" . . . [in] emphasizing the public part of Public Administration. . . . [That is], the second-generation behavioralist is less "generic" and more "public" than his forebear, less "descriptive" and more "prescriptive," less "institution oriented" and more "client oriented," less "neutral" and more "normative."
Thus, the focus of the New Public Administration guided followers to act in a manner significantly contrary to traditional administrative practice. There were several factors involved in this change in role, including: (a) emphasis outward from the organization—not inward, which characterized orthodoxy; (b) clientele ought to participate, or be represented, in administrative decisions affecting them; (c) precedence must be placed on the broader "public interest," rather than on any conflicting interest; (d) agreement that traditional public administration "in thought and practice has tended toward repression"; (e) traditional public administration favors "dominant power-wielding groups" and disfavors other citizens, especially minorities and the disadvantaged; (f) traditional public administration is dehumanizing to administrators because it "divests [them] of conscience"; and (g) public organizations and public administrators, to insure their own survival, "execute the law" to meet those needs first, and by lacking a "bureaucratic ethic," disregard concern for "conflicts of conscience and moral dilemmas" (Simmons & Dvorin, 1977 p. 236).

It all fit together: the frustration, the quest for new ideas and purpose, and the challenge to find solutions to problems in a "time of turbulence." Few could argue, from an academic public administration perspective, with the observation of this group's leading scholar, Waldo (1984), who said that public administration had simply become "too closely bound to the instrumental values of
economy and efficiency, [and] too insensitive to the democratic ideas and humanitarian purposes that ought to guide public life" (p. xvi).

Neither Waldo (1968b) nor his supporters believed that public administration was "responding at a high level of consciousness and self-consciousness to the fact that we are in a time of revolutions" (p. 367). The overwhelming problem, as they saw it, was that public administration—in "quantity and quality [and] tone and character"—had been subjected to long and continued "pressures" from all aspects of American life on behalf of efficiency and economy in government. Waldo said, "We tend to retreat behind the shield of professional neutrality, and concentrate more and more on techniques" (p. 368). Public administration needed to consider the external environment, he argued, contending that most administrators were concerned only with internal aspects of the organization (Rice, 1976).

Waldo (1968b) called for "new organizational styles" to meet the revolutions head-on, because as he saw it, traditional organizations, procedures, and theories "can't and won't be changed" (p. 368). And, so, the groundwork was prepared for the New Public Administration. Its development and its acceptance created whole new problems with which to deal. Could public administration reach agreement, at least among its scholars, that a reexamination of the field was needed?
Waldo (1984) approached the question with expected bias. He said:

The movement and its literature represented a compromise between, on one side, what might be designated Establishment both in the larger societal sense and in the sense of self-aware public administration, and on the other side, the ferment of rejection, protest, and change then prominent. The traditional public administration, it was asserted, was too formalistic, too much oriented toward obsolescing philosophical-scientific bases, too closely bound to the instrumental values of economic [sic] and efficiency, too insensitive to the democratic ideas and humanitarian purposes that ought to guide public life. The New Public Administration proposed to move in a liberal and, in a general and non-Marxist sense, leftist direction. It emphasized what were taken to be genuine democratic values and changes. Its central value—or at least its favorite phrase—was "social equity" and its favorite means to achieve this value, "participation." (pp. xvi-xvii)

With the addition of new thinking brought forth by the human relations theorists noted earlier, some in public administration welcomed the advent of a new administrative theory. Waldo (1968b) continued his emphasis on the broad question of America's problems, and public administration's contributions or lack of them, with respect to these problems. "Did we help cause them," Waldo asked? "Of course we did--both by what we did do, and by what we did not do" (p. 364). How could a nation "so rich" as America permit poverty among its citizens? How could the nation stand behind the disgrace of its "hypocritical denial" of civil rights and equal opportunity among its citizens (p. 365)? These were examples of questions Waldo purposefully brought to the forefront of scholarly debate at the time, and all of which led to development of the principal themes of the movement: "relevance, antipositivism,
personal morality, innovation, concern for clients, [and] antibureaucratic philosophy" (Marini, 1971, p. 15). The themes emphasized the mood of the early advocates of the new theory, who expressed "dissatisfaction with the state of the disciplines; morals, ethics, and values; social equity; client-focus; and repression" (p. 15).

A further challenge was added to the discussion— that the field of public administration had been "flooded with literature that has no sense of direction" (Rice, 1976, p. 76). LaPorte (cited in Marini, 1971) argued:

Contemporary public administration is subject to great conceptual confusion. As an intellectual enterprise, it encompasses basic underlying ambiguity in many implicit models mixing various normative and substantive concerns, analytical assumptions, and preferred methodologies. (p. 75)

In combination, the temptation of advocating a new theory amounted to a popular cause inside public administration, not in toto, however, and certainly not outside the discipline. Of all the arguments, the strongest supported the idea of dropping the "facade of neutrality" and for administrators to be individually proactive in the use of their discretion when both advancing and protecting the interests of clientele in their roles as public administrators (Nigro & Nigro, 1984). The new role of public administrators in American government was being proposed consistent to the values traditionally accepted almost universally with change in the United States: (a) representativeness, (b) politically neutral competence,
executive leadership (Kaufman, 1969; Rourke, 1972). But would the role take hold?

The elements of the New Public Administration were envisioned by the advocates to address the identified problem areas noted earlier. Advocates were also able to reach agreement that the tone of the New Public Administration would be moral and that its primary focus of attention would be placed on normative theory, philosophy, activism, and social needs. In retrospect, Frederickson (1980) said the premises about which the New Public Administration was conceived were "exactly correct." He justified his observation by noting: (a) that the movement identified values and ethics as the critical issues for the 1970s (and 1980s); (b) that the movement identified the need for public administration to regroup and lead with development of strategies and approaches to organizational decline and cutback; (c) that public administration, particularly in America's "turbulent" 1960s, was "irrelevant, out of touch with current issues and problems," and that the movement forced rethinking about the discipline's role in American government; and (d) from a scholarly standpoint, the movement had a profoundly positive effect on the study of theories, techniques, and aspirations of public administration (pp. x-xiv).

The New Public Administration--both the movement and the subsequent literature--became "centrally" involved in political theory, according to Waldo, and most intently by being concerned with the definition of democracy and equality and the role of public
administration in the scheme of American government. At this point in time, Waldo could only wonder, "Who knows whether another turn of the wheel of history will bring [the New Public Administration] arguments into prominence?" (p. xvii).

There would be problems, however, and many questions to be answered.

Elitism and the Public Good

The position of policy advocate in which proponents of the New Public Administration envisioned themselves, in my estimation, placed them in the role of political elite, perhaps on the same plane as the President of the United States or the Governors of the 50 states, in the federal and state arenas, respectively. Is this a legitimate role? Is it a politically realistic one? The discussion that follows considers these points, and more--the essential question of how those associated with the new movement justify their interpretation of the public good.

Much of this relates to theory, which has always been a problem for American public administration. Waldo maintained that there is an "anti-intellectual bias" among public administrators concerning moral philosophy, and a strong resistance to the application of ethical theory and moral reasoning in bureaucratic contexts (cited in Chandler, 1981, p. 1). Still, the New Public
Administration set its course over perilous waters. Its tone was
moral. How well did it engage the obstacles?

When the New Public Administration was conceived in 1968,
America was ripe for moral relevancy. The country was in turmoil at
the time: (a) civil rights and equal employment concerns shook the
national conscience (Oates, 1982; Washington, 1986); (b) opposition
to the war in Vietnam reached massive proportions from campuses and
city streets to the highest levels of government (Halberstam, 1973);
and (c) Americans became concerned as never before about the effects
of pollution of their physical environment (Carson, 1962).

Although Americans had traditionally challenged the
administrative state as being inefficient and unresponsive, leading
scholars in public administration--assuming the role of interested
and affected citizens, and administrators--began to ask questions
aloud: (a) what was wrong with America?; (b) what solutions were
evident?; and (c) what role did public administration have before,
during, and after the "turbulence?" (Waldo, 1968b, p. 362). The
questions were straightforward but profound. Answers are not easy
to arrive at, but their consideration prompts recognition of
changing values in America that culminated in "an ideological
movement which for the most part was a reaction against the
insensitive and unresponsive nature of public bureaucracy" (Rice,
1976, p. 142). This was the New Public Administration "movement"
one which peaked in influence in the 1970s, but which has not
entirely diminished in importance as we near the 1990s. As advocates of moral reasoning, I would think that the New Public Administrationists would have a good idea to justify why they would be accurate interpreters of the public good. Such rationale, however, is difficult to determine upon review of pertinent literature (Frederickson, 1980; Marini, 1971). At best, explanations are wholly ambiguous. What is clear is that proponents of a New Public Administration considered themselves as men and women who legitimately occupied positions of influence in the body politic (Chandler, 1984a). They saw themselves in special roles that were supported by belief that the invalidity of the politics-administration dichotomy permitted them to exercise the "will of the state" as a matter of non-neutral policy participant in all arenas of government. They also claimed legitimacy from the standpoint of constitutional design, in that American public administration was grounded in constitutional theory and that by oath and allegiance the role of individual administrators was one of using their discretionary power "in order to maintain the constitutional balance of powers in support of individual rights" (Rohr, 1986, p. 181).

Frederickson (1980), a leading advocate, never specifically addressed the idea of public good interpretation. He did believe that the new theory was correct for the time, crediting his students at Syracuse University for helping to convince him of this. "My students were hostile and angry," he said. "They were a product of
the challenges and protests of the time—the turbulence" (p. x). Frederickson contended that his students claimed that American government, to include public administration, was "out of touch" with both current issues and national and international problems. "They were right," he said. The early critics of the New Public Administration--identified by Frederickson as "younger theorists, practitioners, and students" (p. xi)--did not attack the movement on legitimacy grounds, or that advocates were positioning themselves into an elitist position. They did question the advocates for what they thought were (a) too much trust in expertise and organizational capabilities and too little questioning of bureaucratic ways; (b) not enough concern for limits on growth, organizational cutback, and decline; (c) not enough concern for citizens' demands and needs and the issues of responsiveness excepted by elected officials; and (d) an overly optimistic view of what government and administration either can or should accomplish (p. xi).

None of this criticism put the new theory in check and, in fact, seemed to fuel the cause even more. To illustrate this point, I turn again to Frederickson (1980), who, in the literature, is the leading defender of the New Public Administration. In language I find to be the best example of what Chandler (1981) earlier advocated as one which supported a quasi-independent administration, Frederickson summarizes his understanding of the new theory. His justification is explained as follows:
One of the basic concerns of new public administration is the equitable treatment of citizens. Social equity works from these value premises. Pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favor of the established, stable bureaucracies and their specialized minority clientele [e.g., the Department of Agriculture and large farmers against farm laborers] who lack political and economic resources. The continuation of widespread unemployment, poverty, disease, ignorance, and hopelessness in an era of economic growth is the result. This condition is morally reprehensible and if left unchanged constitutes a fundamental, if long-range, threat to the viability of this or any political system. . . . A public administration that fails to work for changes to try to redress the deprivation of minorities will likely eventually be used to repress those minorities [italics added]. (p. 7)

There are many problems with these perspectives. The boldness of the New Public Administration is premised on the understanding by its proponents that they are members of a "ruling elite" (Chandler, 1984a, p. 141). As such, they need not be neutral on any matter of importance to the public interest, which includes the prospect of not being neutral on moral issues. Chandler said that the classic notion of citizenship is "participating in rule" (p. 140), and the question of whether public administrators participate or choose not to participate relates to whether or not they self-consciously "[embrace] civic virtue" (p. 140). To the framers, he argued, civic virtue meant "at the least good character and concern for the public interest," but at the most "a heroic devotion to justice, a willingness to sacrifice comfort and riches for the public weal, and a certain elevation of the soul" (p. 141). Rohr (1986) would clearly agree with Chandler's assessment. Rohr stated:

The constitutional approach to Public Administration is suitable for administrators who think we do too little for the
poor, as well as those who think we do too much; for those who support a nuclear freeze and for those who oppose it. . . . The Constitution is permissive on these issues. Administrators will not be without firm, perhaps passionate, convictions on matters of this sort. They should certainly use their discretion to favor those policies that they think are most likely to promote the public interest [italics added]; but they should assess the public interest against the broad background of constitutional principle. (p. 183)

Rohr (1986) argued that the Constitution "transcends" any given policy, program, or action of government. He follows by stating that "Constitutionally motivated administrators" need to function as policy advocates, similarly to lobbyists, with but one difference. That is, administrators are sworn to uphold the Constitution, whereas lobbyists are not. Rohr made a strong point of this distinction, but cautioned administrators to temper their actions according to the "imperatives of the constitutional order" (p. 183). This is necessary because he viewed the Constitution as the "cause above causes," which provides discretion among administrators to select which policies to advocate based on "the constitutional needs of the time" (p. 183).

As a final statement, Rohr (1986), though not an early advocate of the New Public Administration, summarized the essence of why he viewed public administrators as having the best position to know the good. He stated:

Administrators who are steeped in constitutional traditions . . . will have a profound sense of professional propriety. They will have a principled basis and, above all, a "sense" for when to bend and when to hold firm. They will know statesmanship when they see it. (p. 194)
The statement does not specifically say why this context applies more to public administrators than it would, say, to a President, or a Congressman, or a grocery store clerk. That argument has been discussed earlier; the importance here is the assumption that public administrators are professionals with an obligation to good government. But can the obligation be realized in light of the elitism criticism? Traditional public administration scholarship has pointedly cautioned administrators against elites as a problem in democratic theory (Mosher, 1976; Nigro & Nigro, 1984; Plano & Greenberg, 1979). Most students of government know that elites have existed through history and that they have been feared because of the unequal power they retain within the political arena--that is, through unequal distribution of talent, wealth, and influence in politics and in society. Now, public administration is advocating itself, openly within the argument framework of constitutional legitimacy, as an elite. This is difficult to accept. I agree with McKinney and Howard (1979), who questioned this new role by arguing that it upsets the balance of power and accountability in public policy formulation, similar to the fictional story of the fox guarding the chicken coop. "Administrative power relentless expands," they warned, a situation history has taught us consistently results in major abuses of power, such as failure of government to deliver the programs and services that have been authorized and funded through regular participative
channels of government (p. 410). Neither legislative bodies nor special interest groups appreciate this kind of elitism (Berry, 1984). And, contrary to the belief of proponents of New Public Administration, McKinney and Howard (1979) contended that the last thing government should be provided with is further discretion. They stated: "The power that permeates the public bureaucracy grows out of the discretion public servants exercise and the inadequacy of present controls. The central problem is how to legitimize this power and bring it under more democratic control" (p. 410). Unfortunately, neither of the primary New Public Administration "texts" (Frederickson, 1980; Marini, 1971) argues these problems of elitism with any depth.

I view this as a major shortcoming of the New Public Administration. At least, advocates might have better anticipated problems with established elites, which is the basis for my whole argument with respect to public-purpose and private-interest directions from these established elites. Some writers have divided political systems into two categories of "democratic" and "elitist" systems (Welch, 1979), but that is not my point here. My purpose is not to debate political science. My concern falls in the context of elitism as the ability of an established power structure in government to actually contravene democratic theory. I know that elitism pervades most institutions, and few if any public organizations of size and importance are not influenced by
special-interest groups (Plano & Greenberg, 1979). But, does not theory become somewhat permissive in looking the other way, so to speak, if a variety of elites can actively compete in the decision-making process? Is not that the assumption of democratic pluralism? If public administration functions as an elite, is this a fair or unfair advantage? Organized groups already have unusual access to the political processes. If public administrators, as part of their routine roles in government already make rules, determine what the law is, the rights of citizens with reference to the law, and interpret legislative intent when implementing vague (and maybe not so vague) legislative mandates (McCurdy, 1977), would not their elevation to accepted elite either (a) place them in an unfair advantage to other elites who compete or (b) in effect, greatly expand their already vast discretionary power? McCurdy contended that removal of public administration from what he views as its correct role in both politics and administration--that is, the essence of the dichotomy argument--jeopardizes democratic government. Indeed, he said that democracy and bureaucracy are compatible only when public administration is "treated as one of the basic political processes" (p. 108).

Elitism goes hand in hand with the concept of pluralism, which has been assessed as having displaced the classical principles of public administration as "the major operating norm" for American public administration (Morrow, 1987, p. 187). Thus, it is argued that public organizations cannot expect to be efficient, neutral,
and hierarchical and still meet the expectations of pluralist democracy. Why? To accommodate interest groups, the focus turns not to good management but, rather, to access to decision centers, and ultimately to a favorably negotiated position.

The New Public Administration confused the issue because these advocates already have access to decision centers as determiners of public policy. Now, do they also want to become recipients of the action? Yes, according to Morrow (1987), who considered institutions of government as arenas for self-interest, and Chandler (1987), to whom pluralist norms have resulted in a process of "bargaining bazaars for the negotiation of interest group conflicts" (p. 162). "The bureaucracy is the linchpin of the pluralist system," Chandler noted, "because it is the focal point of representation" (p. 162). Thus, pluralism became the means for those in the bargaining game to gain access to the decision centers of government. Neither Morrow nor Chandler agreed that pluralism is workable in American government beyond the requirements of representation--that is, they saw pluralism as actually an obstacle to public administration's ability to accomplish rational, comprehensive planning. This seems logical, and representation is the key point here--being able to influence by way of position. The question remains, however, about the presumption of New Public Administration advocates that their positions of normal responsibility, coupled with newly assumed responsibilities as new
members of the power elite, do not give them unfair advantage in the
compétition for representation.

Two additional points need to be made in opposition to the New
Public Administration's acceptance of elitism: (a) in reference to
my comment above, any elite has to be accepted, that is, elites do
not voluntarily invite nonelites to join their numbers (Welch,
1979); and (b) if an elite means power of a few, how many in public
administration would be rightful heirs to a badge of elitism—all
three million in the federal service, as starters?

The first point does not need much explanation. It is a
reality of human nature that those who have, want to keep. Welch
(1979) said that established elites relinquish power only if
required by "the situational circumstances in which they operate"
(p. 5). It is a competitive and selective game. Why would
established elites in Washington want to give up any of their power
to public administration? Because public administration believes it
is an elite? The more likely scenario would have established elites
influence government—that is, perhaps the President or Congress, or
any combination of elected political actors whose support depends on
these elites who are lobbying them for their support—to control the
subordinate public administrators. Public purpose versus private
interest: it depends on the time, feelings, and needs of the nation
at any given moment in history.

The second point is interesting in that neither the
Frederickson (1980) nor Marini (1971) dealt with the possibility in
any meaningful sense. Chandler (1987) is also subject to the vagueness that leads to confusion on this matter. But in The Public Administration Dictionary co-authored with Plano (1982), Chandler noted several elements of what constitute elites. Among them are these: (a) the elite hold their influence by virtue of their offices in critical bureaucracies; and (b) directly "under the elite" are a group of people with "middle range power" "who carry out the wishes of the elite" (p. 57). So, everyone in government with "middle range power" and above would meet Chandler's definition of the "ruling elite," noted earlier. Chandler and Plano placed "congressmen, state government officials, and lower ranking military officers" as specific examples of who are represented as "middle range power" elites. That still leaves tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of public administrators whom the New Public Administration attempted to "recruit" to the cause of social equity.

Further Criticism: Absurdity or Significance?

Considering Administrative Compassion

Criticism of the New Public Administration was both harsh and consistent. Thompson (1975) ridiculed the movement for its "political absurdity" and the program as one of "immaturity" (p. 66). Harmon (1982) was one of the original Minnowbrook advocates, who later changed his mind and described the New Public Administration as mere symbolism. Devine (1982) charged that the
movement amounted to an ambiguous exercise in theorizing by "a misguided group of dissidents" (p. 19). Each of these critics attempted to remind followers of the new movement that the purpose of public administration was to administer government programs, not to advocate policy. But, generally, their argument focused on the following areas: (a) its emphasis on "attempting to modify" the existing economic and political power structure; (b) the potential for greatly expanded "individual fulfillment," despite an increasingly administered society; and (c) the movement's demand for social justice, and not due process, as "the ultimate goal" of public policy (Simmons & Dvorin, 1977, pp. 639-640).

The literature (Frederickson, 1980; Simmons & Dvorin, 1977) described the most significant criticism of the New Public Administration as that being advanced by Thompson (1975), who said the movement's focal point on "administrative compassion" was wrong from the start. He said good government is "good service . . . professional, impersonal and equal--that is universalistic and non-compassionate" (p. 58). Thompson argued that administrative efficiency is the highest value to be sought in democratic government, and that the organization is simply a tool to accomplish this end. "In the final analysis," he said, "compassion is an individual gift, not an organizational one" (p. 13), and the role of administration is to be impersonal, abstract, and oblivious to "special treatment" or compassion (p. 9).
Clearly, Thompson's (1975) public administrator is properly--in his mind--a functionary who applies skills and performs practiced routines "regardless of what goal or whose goal is involved" (p. 21). On this point, Thompson errrs greatly; his understanding of administrative roles seems shallow. He noted: "A screwdriver does not choose among goals or among owners. It does what it is told" (p. 21). A public administrator being compared to a screwdriver? This is Thompson's weakest argument, for especially as Ostrom (1973) noted, "the public servant in a democratic society is not a neutral and obedient servant to his master's command" (p. 131). Ostrom acknowledged that public servants, as aware human beings in a constitutional democracy, would be expected to refuse to obey "unlawful efforts to exploit the common wealth [sic]," or infringe on the rights of individuals (p. 131). This could happen, but it is not the norm, and certainly not the insult to practitioners that Thompson advanced. As a scholar, Thompson erred in not showing respect for an opposing viewpoint.

In other areas, Thompson's (1975) criticism makes sense, especially when he adhered to his central theme relating to "administrative compassion." I agree with his point that bureaucracies cannot--from a practical standpoint--represent the masses. Instead, bureaucracies, by their very nature, are noncompassionate. He noted:

The client becomes part of a problem category, not a historical person: He becomes an applicant for welfare, a speeder, a cardiac case, etc. In this transaction, he is not a person.
The transaction is impersonal and this fact actually facilitates the expert solution of his problem. Interpersonal emotions do not interfere with the instrumental application of the specialist's expertise. His individuality, which is his identity, is ignored. (p. 9)

Thompson's (1975) points are well made and apply to those values which humans "hold dear and necessary" for their well-being and self-fulfillment (Simmons & Dvorin, 1977, p. 237). Under the New Public Administration, these values become operative, rather than ignored. Generally summarized, these values are those most conducive to "human dignity"--which advocates posited as the "highest operational value and the ultimate goal of bureaucratic decision making" (p. 237).

The idea is this: Human conscience becomes paramount, and through an administrator's actions, replaces the rules, regulations, and standard principles of orthodoxy. Justification is found, or placed, in the premise that the "moral relevance of administrative power" under a democratic system of government needs to be separated from operational needs. Thus, public administration can become the unified discipline envisioned by Waldo (1948), in theory and practice, only when it embraces morality as the principal end of power in public organizations.

Frederickson (1980) argued that this objective would be impossible in orthodox contexts, where the traditional values of (a) economy, (b) efficiency, (c) effectiveness, (d) responsiveness to elected officials, and (e) responsibility only serve operational needs. Human dignity necessitates a whole new set of values
"important to any public service ethic" (p. 47). He listed them as (a) citizen responsiveness, (b) worker and citizen participation in the decision process, (c) the equitable distribution of public services, (d) the provision of a range of citizen choices, and (e) administrative responsibility for program effectiveness (p. 47). These values, said Frederickson, "are values that suit our time. If there is, or even if there ought to be, a public service ethic, these values are as compelling as are the better understood commitments to managerial values" (p. 47). Further, even the best managed, most productive, most efficient, and most economizing governments can still be plagued with the perpetuation of poverty, injustice, and inequality of opportunity. But administrators with a public service ethic, such as that described here, can strive to achieve human dignity--for themselves and those they serve.

The only timetable for action was established by Waldo (1984), who interpreted social equity (that is, human dignity) as the goal of "self-aware" public administration. He said the concept means "genuine and prompt progress toward racial equality and economic benefit" (p. xxxvi).

Thompson (1975) did not accept the argument at all, and noted that the questions it raised were "almost endless" and not at all "trivial" (p. 79). But he stated but one query which underscored his concern: Whose equality is being assessed? He explained that the use of a principle such as equality in making political choices
is unrealistic because who becomes the "chosen group" varies according to circumstance. The result is one of discrimination. For example, he used the example of women, who hold a low percentage of corporate presidencies, but they average seven and a half more years of life than men. In one instance the discrimination is against women; in the other case, it is against men. In the realm of public administration, who makes the determination of the "chosen group" for the chosen purpose could have significant influence on the genuineness and the promptness of policy. Who is to hold the administrator responsible and accountable? Who advocates on behalf of the group not chosen? How do they achieve human dignity?

The questions are very much appropriate and renew the concerns of administrative elitism discussed earlier. As an idea, few, including Thompson (1975), would dispute the dream that every human being's dignity be fulfilled, and that each person have the opportunity to realize his/her highest potential. Realization of such dreams would certainly benefit the well-being of the total community. But Thompson reminded us that the human community presents difficult problems and dilemmas. There are no easy solutions, and there must always be trade-offs. Thus, there are problems and dilemmas with the New Public Administration's "ultimate value" of human dignity. It follows that the movement has encountered realistic and appropriate criticism. At any rate, Simmons and Dvorin (1977) identified problems inherent in administrative doctrines of human dignity. They are:
1. Their application to specific situations may be very difficult. How to weigh one man’s dignity over another’s?

2. If human dignity is applicable, as it apparently is, to both administrators and citizens, how are potential conflicts to be resolved?

3. Are there conditions under which the "public interest" may conflict with the doctrine of human dignity?

4. What is the role of administrators with a commitment to human dignity working within traditional hierarchical organizations?

5. How does moral concern relate to the systems approach? What is the meaning of human dignity in this context?

6. Can the value of a human being be measured or computed? If so, how? If not, how can it realistically be utilized as a criterion for organizational design or administrative decision-making? What are alternative guidelines? (pp. 651-652)

As a further matter, Thompson’s (1975) position was supported in part by Lowi (1979) and Ostrom (1973). Like Thompson, Lowi contended that the best governments are guided by the "rule of law" as opposed to a "rule of man," and expanded his argument by stating that "rule of law" implies government by principle and not government by compassion (pp. 124-126; Thompson, 1975, p. 68). "Government by principle," stated Thompson, "means decision by problem category rather than by the individual case" (p. 68). But while emphasizing the "rule of law" as incompatible with administrative compassion, Simmons and Dvorin (1977) reminded us—and Thompson—that there is much in the law that reflects compassion, to include provisions on right to counsel, executive powers of clemency, privilege against self-incrimination, and so
forth. The rule of law," said Simmons and Dvorin, "never meant the absence of compassion" (p. 646). Thus, Thompson's argument that implied that public administrators should reject compassion is in itself wrong.

Thompson (1975) also underestimated the professionalism of public administrators, a position emphasized by Karl (1976), who recognized administrative professionalism as a natural part of the evolutionary process in American government. Karl saw the "growing groups" of public service professionals as "no longer the Civil Service servants of power and democratic authority, looking for methods to fulfill responsibilities defined by the public through politics or the experts through science," but now as being scientists themselves of sorts who are "fulfilling the demands of interests defined by their own growing expertise" (p. 495). Even so, Thompson and Lowi (1979) strongly supported a "return" to the politics/administration dichotomy, arguing that too much discretion, without accountability or policy neutrality, would result in chaos (McCurdy, 1977).

Thompson (1975) challenged the New Public Administration's emphasis on service to disadvantaged minorities as "a kind of hoax" because their needs would be addressed by a professional bureaucracy who would likely be unfamiliar with their problems anyway. He stated, "Expert treatment is impersonal treatment: bureaucratic treatment of any kind is institutional, impersonal treatment--treatments through rules and roles" (pp. 65-67, 85).
Thompson's (1975) statement explained his moral argument. That is, administrators needed to be concerned with proceduralism and other principles of orthodoxy if the purpose of government was to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The problem magnifies when clients begin to have names and government cannot serve enough of them. Some individuals, in other words, might be served by government at the expense of the majority.

Ostrom (1973) approached his criticism of the New Public Administration in an indirect but scholarly way. He argued that public agencies acted as monopolies under the influence of elites—organized pressure groups. In order to effect what Ostrom labeled as "democratic administration" (p. 132), he said public administrators should not become elites themselves, but rather that they should assume leadership positions within public agencies to facilitate competition for goods and services with other public organizations, or even the private sector. His argument, drawn from public-choice economics (Chandler & Plano, 1982; see pp. 95-96 for discussion), assumed that public agencies are institutionally incapable of representing demands of individual citizens. The "choice" aspect of the theory holds that citizens, as "consumers" of government goods and services, should be given a choice between competing services. Supporters of free-enterprise economics welcomed what Ostrom (1973) had to say (Chandler & Plano, 1982).
His arguments were among the first, too, that led to present-day trends by government toward privatization, discussed in Chapter VI.

Critics aside, the biggest disappointment about the New Public Administration is the wholly ambiguous character of the movement itself. Waldo (1984) contends that the movement was the most visible response to self-aware public administration in two decades, but even the values of greater equity, fairness, and justice--by which advocates contended they could interpret as the good in government--are so arbitrary that they become muddled, if not meaningless. That was the focus of Thompson's (1975) argument.

But the New Public Administration correctly assessed that any unresponsiveness, any inhumaneness, or any inefficiency in American government was partly the responsibility of those in public administration. The new movement, in one sense, attempted to make things right, or to improve administrative performance as a matter of accountability.

Whatever outcome, one must credit the proponents of the New Public Administration who recognized a need for administrators to be better participants in public policy matters, and to be more understanding of clients they served. Emphasis in public administration on a need for efficiency in government action needed to change, and public administrationists who accepted social equity and good management as values, and participation as a means to achieve those values, were headed in the right direction. Critics unfairly attacked the movement as being only symbolic, and very
ineffective. The New Public Administration may not have "caught on" as the new theory of administration that its supporters had hoped. But it did bring questions of values and ethics to the forefront of discussion in American public administration. That discussion continues.

Further, there are several results of the New Public Administration that have contributed to the improvement of public administration as a discipline, and toward improving administrative responsibility within public sector organizations that it is hoped led to a more responsive bureaucracy. Thus, the New Public Administration, as a credit to its proponents, and in spite of its critics, "stimulated further thoughts on what public organizations should do to face a changing America" (Rice, 1976, p. 145). Among the contributions are these four which broadly encompass the movement:

[1.] The New Public Administration . . . reaffirms the belief that public administration is a political process. Any action on the part of the administrator represents political behavior. This is to say, public administration is intricately intertwined with politics. To separate one from the other provides a false look at the American governmental system. (p. 145)

[2.] The New Public Administration reaffirms the rejection of the fact-value distinction. One of its main propositions is that values must be reflected in the everyday decisions of the administrators. This proposition was viewed as one criterion for a humane bureaucracy. The concern for humanism saw the rise of . . . existentialism as the basis of decision-making. Human dignity is to be recognized as the top concern of the administrator [who] must know man in order to better serve him. [Administrators must] philosophically analyze
[themselves] and change those values which are contrary to humanism. (pp. 145-146)

[3.] A new direction in policy analysis [has become] one of the New Public Administration's major aims. Rather than focusing on institutions, processes, and behavior in government, the New Public Administration implicitly suggests that policy analysis focus more on the consequences of public policies, the outputs of the system. (p. 146)

[4.] Social equity was introduced as a concept for the means of ensuring organizational effectiveness. The organization should not only be evaluated in terms of efficiency but also how well the services provided by the organization are equitably distributed among its clientele. (p. 147)

The New Public Administration hoped to be both a viable theory and plan of action that would be developed and advocated by scholars in the field to seek ways to increase the possibility of a more responsible, representative, and relevant public bureaucracy. They succeeded in part, and that is more important than not trying at all.

Concluding Comments

Did the New Public Administration ever have a chance in advocating client-centered activism? In retrospect, it is my viewpoint that the movement was doomed to failure from the beginning because its conceivers misread the desires of the very individuals on whose behalf they sought to do good: citizens. It seems that most people are (a) threatened by bureaucracy, (b) mistrust government, (c) fear elites, (d) despise theory, and (e) do not understand compassion in the political world.
Further, proponents of the New Public Administration claimed to know the public good, but critics questioned how they could—due to their micro application of theory to the macro complexity of modern society. In other words, the New Public Administration could have done a much better job to explain and advocate their interpretation of the good. They could claim that value neutrality is neither possible nor desirable in public administration, but of what use is this without understandable argument?

Thompson (1975) presented strong arguments against the reliance of the New Public Administration to be "self-righteous." He charged that the movement only toyed with ideas from philosophy when, in fact, advocates were urging the frank adoption of an egalitarian value system. Discussion earlier noted Thompson's criticism of the New Public Administration, which he characterized as a mere power grab, a subversive one at that, which promoted its goals regardless of congressional or presidential mandates or even the wishes of organized interests. Reliance on a philosophical facade, to Thompson, represented an application of academic rhetoric in the most ambiguous of terms and real direction. A nation cannot expect to be governed on the basis of social equity because society, he argued, is too complex and multi-dimensional to regularly and consistently act in a governmental setting on behalf of individuals. Thompson makes considerable sense to me, but he underestimated the insistence of the New Public Administration to react in a time of
trouble as a matter of accountability. Further, he forgot that the movement was based on cause and moral sense. In the end, the New Public Administration only partly succeeded; but as noted in the previous discussion, the achievements were laudatory.

Can public administrators be proactive? In my viewpoint, not in the sense of the New Public Administration, but perhaps in some other way yet to be determined. Not all public administrators contend with policy on a large scale, so there are opportunities to help individuals, in spite of Thompson's (1975) argument. Public administrators also have a conscience, so there are opportunities to put it to good use. Administrators are not neutral robots carrying out the will of a superior, in the old sense of the concept, but they need to be political realists to survive in modern public organization settings. An example of this is consideration of a hypothetical situation Frederickson (1980) used to demonstrate the validity of being an advocate--in the spirit of the New Public Administration--of educational policy. Frederickson challenged that few school superintendents would be expected today to be less than neutral on modern society's questions of education. What are their values relating to sex education, creationism, drugs, handguns, teacher tenure, or even athletics? Communities likely would be interested in the values of superintendents on these and many other matters, but as Frederickson noted, they would also assume that he or she retained "strong and continuing" values and commitment to education.
Frederickson (1980) reasoned that communities expect that a school superintendent would be expert on such matters and that it would be his/her responsibility to argue on behalf of that expertise in both the making and implementation of related educational policy.

It becomes obvious, from Frederickson's (1980) standpoint, that the New Public Administration would insist that the superintendent be deeply involved at the very center of the "issue of education," for any other possibility would among to his or her inefficiency or ineffectiveness, and plainly would demonstrate the superintendent's irrationality about his or her purpose in administration. The social, political, economic, and distributive aspects of the question come into play here. Without this advocacy, the superintendent would not be able to provide leadership, nor would he or she be able to provide "both good education and good education for all" (p. 115).

But Thompson's (1975) response would concern the political consequences of the superintendent, should he or she advocate policy, for example, contrary to the policy or intention of the school board. Assuming that school boards have hire/fire authority over superintendents, such an individual would be taking an extreme risk to publicly counter the board's policies. Dissent is permissible in most democratic settings, but how the dissent is accomplished becomes the more important concern. Simmons and Dvorin (1977) warned of the "self-destructive" features about the New
Public Administration, which not only rejects administrative survival as a "morally indefensible guideline for decision making," but considers it essential to achieve "maximum flexibility" in administrative organization (p. 239). Thus, rather than penalizing risk takers, as might have been expected in an orthodox setting, the New Public Administration encourages its advocates to do just that. As a consequence, just because one pattern of organizational response fails, it need not be "catastrophic," and it may be merely an occasion to test alternative strategies for action.

Does this mean that the New Public Administration substituted emotion and intuition over logic and rationalism as rules of professional administration? In a sense, it did, and to the movement's detriment. Proponents' effectiveness became subjected to a large number of "interacting environmental variables" (p. 239), and more logic and more rationality would have at least tempered the political consequences.

The New Public Administration, as noted, had difficulty gaining long-term serious acceptance as a viable approach to good government. But it did set the course away from strict adherence to orthodoxy and, today, toward consideration of a spinoff effort, Trusteeship Public Administration, discussed in the next chapter. In spite of all these attributes and possibilities, the role envisioned by the New Public Administration proved to be inconsistent with the needs of American government. It needed to be, as a movement and as a theory, both relevant and adaptable to
satisfy the requirements of "good" government at the time. It was ultimately neither. The New Public Administration lost support, but the long-term questions are: Did public administration as a discipline lose credibility? Does it matter in the real political world? Answers likely depend on how one views the proper role of public administration. They also depend on the discipline's own strength in adapting to relevance and change throughout the future.

Finally, several key points of importance to the study of American public administration were made throughout Chapter V. A summary follows:

1. The inadequacy of orthodoxy led American public administration to re-examine the discipline in terms of human relations theory.

2. The New Public Administration was advanced by several scholars in the 1960s who sought to make the public bureaucracy more responsible and responsive to contemporary issues and problems. Orthodox public administration was seen as out of tune with modern administrative needs. Government was seen by advocates of the new movement as being unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane.

3. The New Public Administration was seen as the means to overcome these shortcomings. This movement, advanced by public administrators, placed client-centered activism, humanism, and social equity at the forefront of administrative concerns. Human dignity was envisioned as the ultimate value of a public-service
Attention shifted from emphasis on good management techniques and efficiency toward concern for values, ethics, and administrative compassion.

4. Administrators were seen as being non-neutral on any matter of importance to the public interest, including the prospect of not being neutral on moral issues. New Public Administrators sought to embrace the ideal of civic virtue: a heroic devotion to justice, a willingness to sacrifice comfort and riches for the public weal, and a certain elevation of the soul.

5. The new role of administrators was seen as being justified by constitutional design. New Public Administrators considered themselves as members of an administrative elite. As such, administrators encountered a whole new set of problems in the world of political reality, especially that their perceived role in a power position of client advocate gave them an unfair advantage in the pluralistic setting of competing elites. Administrators did not consider this problem when the New Public Administration was begun.

6. The New Public Administration was based on a first principle of moral propositions. The exercise of administrative power in a democratic society was seen as an effort toward morally compelling ends. But how the New Public Administration comes to know the "good" has been treated with ambiguity in the literature. Answers to this question remain unsettled.

7. Criticism of the New Public Administration was harsh, but consistent. Critics questioned advocates' interpretation of the
"good," their status as administrative elites, and their actions as a matter of questionable accountability and administrative responsibility. The ultimate value of human dignity was challenged. The idea of administrative compassion was challenged.

8. New Public Administration countered the challenges by identifying a whole new set of values to justify human-dignity arguments. These included (a) citizen responsiveness, (b) worker and citizen participation in the decision process, (c) the equitable distribution of public services, (d) the provision of a range of citizen choices, and (e) administrative responsibility for program effectiveness.

9. Despite criticism, the New Public Administration stimulated further thoughts on what public administration's role in American government should be. The question has been unsettled throughout the American experience. However, questions of values and ethics have remained as major concerns of public administration.

10. The New Public Administration reaffirmed the belief that public administration is a political process. It also reaffirmed rejection of the fact-value distinction from orthodox theory. The movement helped public administration to begin focusing more on the consequences of public policies as outcomes, and their effects on both government and the governed. Also, as a result of the movement, social equity was introduced as a concept for the means of ensuring organizational effectiveness.
11. The New Public Administration helped increase awareness of and sensitivity to the possibilities of government being more responsible, representative, and relevant. However, the role envisioned by the movement proved to be inconsistent with the needs of American government.

12. Proponents of the New Public Administration generally advocated the public-purpose philosophy of American government. Opponents were largely supportive of the philosophy of private interest.
Footnotes--Chapter V

1Davis (1972) provided a thoughtful analysis of Maslow's need-priority model and Herzberg's motivation-maintenance model (pp. 59-60). Of special interest to the study of public administration calls into what Davis observed as a discrepancy in how Maslow and Herzberg interpreted motivational factors. There is a gradual upward emphasis in Maslow's model, while motivation was seen by Herzberg as a factor at the very highest levels. Thus, the difference relates to socioeconomic considerations. From this one might surmise that public administrators--because of their economic standing being lower than other professions (Nigro & Nigro, 1980, p. 267)--will not fit into the Herzberg model because they have not made the socioeconomic progress of others.

2Bennis (1969) defined organizational development as an "educational strategy" adopted to bring about a "planned organizational change" (p. 10). It is also designed to (a) improve interpersonal communications, (b) identify human factors and feelings as legitimate organizational values, (c) reduce tension between and within work groups, (d) develop "more effective team management," and (e) develop better methods of conflict resolution (p. 15). From an administrative standpoint, organizational development is seen as a research method to assist individuals within organizations to address three questions: (a) Where are we (the organization) right now? (b) Where do we want to be? and (c) How do we get from where we are to where we want to be? (McKinney & Howard, 1979, p. 137).

3Waldo (1980) described the New Public Administration in terms of a "movement," a term used "for lack of a more accurate designation" (p. 95). He explained that term was accurate from the standpoint that proponents of the New Public Administration felt that the discipline needed to respond to the "discontents and social ferment" being experienced in the United States, especially beginning in the 1960s. Thus, once conceived, the "movement" reflected critical reactions to both the "dominant practices . . . and the dominant doctrines." He stated:

The writings of those identified with the movement were critical of "establishment" practices and doctrines, and optimistic about what might be possible for a "new" public administration, one with proper values, high motivation, and proper administrative means. (p. 95)

Although the term "movement" has been criticized by opponents of the New Public Administration (Thompson, 1975), it is used throughout this chapter.
Waldo was concerned that discussions about the "future" of American public administration were dominated by "old men" (Marini, 1971, p. xiv). He attended, for example, the 1967 Conference on the Theory and Practice of Public Administration, sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and noted that most participants were in their fifties and sixties; "not one . . . was under thirty-five" (p. xiv). At the time, Waldo was editor-in-chief of Public Administration Review and was putting together a special issue on higher education and the public service. He was embarrassed by the issue when it was published. "Why?" he asked. "Because it presented old men talking to old men about irrelevancies, old men out of touch with the real problems of a chaotic and dangerous world and the youth who would have to deal with them" (p. xiv). He subsequently came upon the idea for a conference to examine a "new" public administration, but it would be a 'youth' conference, a conference organized and attended by younger persons in Public Administration to discuss whatever seemed important to them" (p. xiv; 1980, pp. 95-96). Of the 33 participants at the "youth" conference--also known as the Minnowbrook Conference--23 contributed essays to Marini's Toward a New Public Administration (1971), which set the movement on its course. Of these 23, only 3 held academic rank of professor, 6 were associate professors, 11 assistant professors, 1 was a nonacademic, and 2 were doctoral students. One of Waldo's colleagues in organizing the "youth" conference was Frederickson, then an assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University.

Waldo (1971) summarized the causes of the "turbulence" as follows:

1. A revolution in science and technology. . . . Ninety-five per cent of the scientists who ever lived are now living, and the time lag between basic scientific discovery and technological and industrial application is constantly narrowing. Changes in the condition of man at least equal to those caused by the Industrial revolution are implied. . . . There are seers and prophets, so to speak, who think that science and technology . . . are now uncontrolled, if not indeed uncontrollable. (pp. 362-363)

2. A growing reaction against science and technology. I refer to a mounting feeling that science and technology create a cold, artificial, impersonal, dehumanized, and even monstrous world. . . . [It] is a revolution against the machine and everything machine-like and machine-made [and] a revolution against a "system" that sustains and promotes a machine technology. [This revolution] is seen positively as a revolution on behalf of the individual and individualism, against the invasion of privacy and for individual rights. (p. 363)
3. A revolutionary increase in the means of violence and a counterrevolutionary revolution against the use of violence. . . . [We have] seen quantum jumps in the increase of man's ability to inflict violence and death on other human beings. (p. 363)

4. A reaction against gradualism and a growing commitment to violence. . . . [This revolution concerns especially] the civil rights struggle, and the effort on behalf of or by minority groups to get their fair share of what America is supposed to offer all its citizens. (p. 363)

5. A crisis in race relations. . . . Whatever resolution there may be of the forces that have been building up, the results will be revolutionary. (p. 363)

6. A severe generation gap, or revolt of the young. . . . The revolt of the young takes many forms, some corrosive as to established institutions, some deleterious as to personal well-being. (p. 363)

7. The urban revolution. . . . [Cities] grow where they should not and decay where they should not. . . . The larger ones increasingly are referred to as "ungovernable."

8. Upward, and still upward, rates of crime and violence. . . . [This revolution includes individual crimes, white-collar and organized crime] justified in the name of a "higher good." The appeal to a "higher good" as against the established order, whether from Left or Right, is one of the surest signs and accompaniments of a revolutionary period. (pp. 363-364)

9. Revolutions in morals and values. . . . [A revolution related to all of the points noted above.]

Conclusions reached at the Minnowbrook Conference have been summarized as follows: (a) administrative agencies are policy makers; (b) the policy-administration dichotomy is out of date; (c) it is difficult to define public administration and to mark its boundaries; (d) there is a big difference between public administration and business administration; (e) there is a sharp difference between public administration and the discipline of political science; (f) the theory of public administration, both normative and descriptive, was in the state of disarray; (g) the hierarchy was no longer an appropriate way to define or describe public organization; (h) managerial and administrative concerns in public administration were being replaced by policy and political issues; (i) there should emerge some professional schools of public administration; (j) public administration had not addressed itself in a significant way to pressing social problems such as the military-industrial complex, the labor movement, urban riots, and so on; and (k) the field had been too preoccupied with intellectual categories, semantics, definitions, and boundaries (Charlesworth, 1968, pp. 3-7; Frederickson, 1980, pp. x-xi).
Harmon (1971) succinctly explained the ethic of administrative neutrality and its shortcoming with respect to being a "dilemma" of administrative and political democracy (pp. 175-179). Recognizing administrative neutrality as being affirmed by traditional American views of democracy, Harmon contended that the root of the matter involved the "conventional distinction between freedom and responsibility" (p. 176). Because administrators are not chosen by an electorate, they therefore lack the freedom to be either advocates of policy or to permit their personal values to "influence significantly" the implementation of policy. The greater argument, Harmon believed, was to be found outside the realm of such conventional thinking. He thought that existentialist philosophy applied here in that individuals have responsibilities not only to others--as in the case of administrators in the public service--but to themselves as well. Freedom in this sense is not antithetical to responsibility. "Thus," said Harmon, "if the existentialists are correct in saying that freedom without responsibility is a meaningless kind of freedom, a definition of administrative responsibility based solely on the negative notion of accountability becomes untenable" (p. 176). There would be great difficulty, however, in convincing orthodoxists or elected politicians that Harmon's perspective retained validity.

Kaufman (cited in Rourke, 1972) argued that changes in emphasis over time with respect to these three values had the strongest effect on how much citizen participation in government would occur. He said that

Discontent on the part of various groups is . . . the dynamic force that motivates the quest for new forms. . . . Some groups feel resentful because they consider themselves inadequately represented; some feel frustrated because . . . the policy decisions seem to be dissipated by the political biases or the technical incompetence of the public bureaucracies; some feel thwarted by lack of leadership to weld the numerous parts of government into a coherent, unified team that can get things done. At different points in time, enough people . . . will be persuaded by one or another of these discontents to support remedial action--increased representativeness, better and politically neutral bureaucracies, or stronger chief executives. (p. 381)

Thus, representation is considered a powerful force in American government, stated Kaufman, and this time, "after a century of denigration of the government by the forces of politicians and special-interest groups, the bureaucracy had evolved as the new group interested in joining "a long-standing tradition in American politics" (p. 377), that of active participation.
Rohr (1978) complimented the proponents of the New Public Administration for their "serious academic work" and for expanding an evolving popular interest in ethics in the government arena. Rohr stated that the new movement provided the theoretical foundation that would support integration of the study of ethics into a public-service curriculum (p. 50). Chandler (1982) noted that analyses of the public good by reformers generally placed human values as their main interest of concern, and that the pattern of reform beginning with the New Public Administration has ensured that "ethics is a major concern in public policy formation in the 1980s" (p. 3). Henry (1975) said he hoped that today's public administrator will no longer be forced to make decisions solely "on the comfortable basis of efficiency, economy and administrative principles, but on the more agonizing criteria of morality as well" (p. 132).

Proponents of the New Public Administration lauded a similarity in their concern for social equity and human dignity in the public discourse with Rawls's (1971) definition of justice in his acclaimed A Theory of Justice (McKinney & Howard, 1979, p. 139). Rawls's First Principle and Second Principle of justice emphasized a "system of liberty for all" and advocated rearrangement of social and economic inequalities to benefit the least advantaged (p. 302). More specifically, Rawls contended that no organization had a right to subvert individual freedoms. He also said that individuals with the least social and economic standing should be granted the most in services and benefits from the government. He stated:

First principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (p. 302; discussion, pp. 60-65)

Hart (1974) analyzed Rawls's theory and correlated it with respect to American public administration. In fact, Hart offered a "Code of Conduct for the Equitable Administrator," based on Rawls's theory. Thus, according to Hart, a public administration could be created based on social equity as follows:

1. The theory of justice would provide equity with an ethical content. . . . Acceptance of the theory of justice would provide the equitable public administrator with clear, well-developed ethical guidelines, which would give social equity a force that it now lacks.
2. The theory of justice . . . provides an ethical framework that instructs all institutions. . . . there would be a consensus that the equitable public administrator has both the duty and the obligation to deploy his efforts on behalf of the less advantaged.

3. The theory of justice would impose constraint upon all complex organizations. [Thus], . . . most of the current civil rights problems would disappear.

4. The theory of justice would provide a means to resolve ethical impasses. . . . The parties would seek common ground by returning to the original position.

5. The theory of justice would provide a professional code for public administration that would require social equity. (pp. 9-10)

^Waldo (1980) took great exception to Thompson's charge. He stated:
Victor Thompson has told us forcefully--though with unnecessary peevishness--that we must recognize the limits of bureaucratic action, that the opposite side of its cool rationality is an inability to deliver the qualities of enthusiasm, sympathy, and compassion needed to do what it is now often attempting to do. The New Public Administration is his bete noire, not only because he sees it addressed problems with the wrong remedies but because he sees it urging that the "tool" of public administration be stolen from its "owners," the public. (p. 41)

^Harmon (1982) used the term in the context of having no practical meaning. It was not intended as political "quiescence," an administrative tactic used by regulatory agencies to lure the public into a false sense of security by thinking that things were being done when they, in fact, were not being accomplished (Edelman, 1960).

^Kaus (1986) presented a recent argument supporting Thompson's viewpoint.
Ask today's state-of-the-art Democratic politician why we should help the poor, and he'll likely tell you: "compassion." Compassion has become the all-purpose Democratic password, the thin layer of moral insulation that separates even the most market-oriented, standing-tall Democrat from a selfish Reaganite. (p. 17)
He argued that the aim of liberal government should not be to increase compassion in government, but to reduce it. "Self-pity is not our national emotion," he said. Compassion makes politics impractical because it diverts people's attention from correctly seeing "their own interest in solving the problems of others"
(p. 18). It becomes a facade because it provides a quick-fix on perceived problems in a micro-sense, when the health of the nation demands attention to "the broad common interest" in a macro-sense.
CHAPTER VI

TRUSTEESHIP: ADMINISTRATORS AS SOCIAL PARTNERS

Discussion in the preceding chapters has intended to demonstrate that despite public administration's foothold in American government, its proper role has remained unsettled and may be for the foreseeable future. This predicament exists not because those seeking to advance the study and practice of public administration in this country have avoided the pursuit of a suitable definition and direction. On numerous occasions in American history, the question about who the public is that public servants are supposed to serve has been raised by both those inside and outside of government. In a republic where relevance and change are valued attributes of "good" government, this continuing debate can, should, and must be encouraged and welcomed.

No one interested in public administration, however, should expect that the debate will be resolved once and for all. A collective administrative identity may be elusive in a system of government that necessitates flexibility and diversity of argument. Additionally, the size, scope, and complexity of the administrative state are extremely intimidating in their own right, especially when the problem is compounded with the realities of the political world. This was a lesson encountered firsthand by proponents of the New
Public Administration, who attempted to resolve the role question by viewing the public in terms of "one's neighbor" (Gawthrop, cited in Frederickson & Chandler, 1984, p. 103). That is, as noted in Chapter V, the New Public Administration made an effort to bring the public service delivery system directly to individuals in need—or assumed need—coupled with the purpose of bringing a sense of human dignity to these same individuals. Their idea of humane government sought to counter perceptions of government being a noncompassionate bureaucracy. Their attempt at compassion, however, failed largely because of bureaucracy.

In Chapter VI, I will broaden discussion of the role question with consideration of current political realities which have a bearing on the definition. The discussion will highlight areas that were neglected by the New Public Administration, and which must be taken into account by public administration in the future as it continues attempts toward resolution of a definition of its proper purpose in American government. Last, Trusteeship Public Administration is introduced as a possible new role of the discipline. While the literature on this effort is only beginning to emerge (Chandler, 1987; Frederickson & Chandler, 1984; Rohr, 1986; Weiner, 1987), further exploration of the concept seems worthwhile. However, no substantive criticism has yet been advanced with respect to this new approach to public administration, which posits the proper role of administrators as being advocates in a pluralistic setting. Even so, two versions of trusteeship have
been most strongly advanced. Trustee administrators, therefore, are seen as either (a) "representative citizens" (Chandler, 1987) or as (b) "mediating social partners" and "co-producers with affected social group" with the idea being one of consensus builders who seek to minimize conflict among competing interest groups (Weiner, 1987, pp. 15-16). Both interpretations importantly place administration in active, participative public policy roles. If the name of the game is politics, public administrators must develop "a procedurally shrewd political style" in order to survive in such an environment (Chandler, 1987, p. 163). This is the reality of the guiding political-purpose argument carried throughout this study.

The order of Chapter VI is to present analysis as follows:

1. Arguments are considered against dispassionate government, using the Reagan presidency as a focal point of interest. The intent is to demonstrate that public administrationists need to be cognizant of the possibility that government may not be viewed dispassionately if they presume to advocate the exertion of state power for humane ends. In fact, as in the Reagan example, the opposite effect may occur, that is, one in which government, rightly or wrongly, is considered a problem for the people, rather than as a solution to their problems. Further, this discussion indicates that interpretations of the public interest by administrators may very well conflict with that of the majority of Americans at any given time. Last, an expansion of the idea of the pursuit of private
interest as a guiding philosophy of American government is made. Problems associated with the advocacy role of public administrators in the context of the New Public Administration are reconsidered. Schlesinger (1986) noted that guiding philosophies of public purpose and private interest have occurred in cycles throughout American history. Private interest, being associated with the Reagan doctrine, encourages efforts toward privatization or the redistribution of government services to the private sector for purposes of efficiency. In this context, is efficiency used to describe difficulties with the public bureaucracy by those who do not like the outcome of either government or proactive administration?

2. Introduction of the concept of Trusteeship Public Administration, in which public administrationists consider themselves as constitutional officers who serve as both citizens and as representatives of citizens in the public policy arena.

Arguments Against Dispassionate Government

The energy of the "turbulent" years, the setting for the New Public Administration movement, fueled further mistrust, frustration, and alienation from anything governmental in the United States. This energy also refueled arguments against dispassionate government. In fact, after experiencing the effects of the Vietnam War and Watergate, researchers discovered that the loss of confidence of the American people in their government reached
"severe--even majority--proportions" (McKinney & Howard, 1979, p. 7). There remained a faint glimmer of hope in the American public that government at all levels had the ability to "work effectively and well," said the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations in late 1973. However, tension between power and accountability magnified by the tragedy of Vietnam and scandal of Watergate only convinced Americans even more that their apparatus of government had popped the stitches sewn by proponents of public participation--especially in the 1960s--to keep government and its policies healthy and in touch with the collective needs of its citizens. Despite efforts by those interested in the administration of government to draw government closer and more responsive to its citizens, the common perception was that the opposite effect had transpired. Thus, popular concerns unfolding in the aftermath of Watergate included these:

1. The people, to a far greater extent than their leaders, regard government secrecy as a prime obstacle to responsiveness. But both agree that official openness and honesty are prerequisites to successful contact between the leaders and the led.

2. The people, to a degree far greater than leaders understand, appear prepared to participate in the decisions that shape their society. Both officials and the public see in organized citizens' groups an increasingly successful and respected method of channeling individual energies into effective collective action.

3. Ninety percent of Americans--and a like percentage of state and local officials--are convinced that government can work effectively and well. Both share a faith in the ability of government, especially the unpopular federal establishment, to subordinate special influence to the general welfare and
to bring in first-rate people whose top priorities will be "helping the country" and "caring about people." (McKinney & Howard, 1979, pp. 7-8)

The irony of the New Public Administration argument is that these Senate findings paralleled its main concerns. That is, government remained unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane. Yet, as noted in Chapter V, the New Public Administration was not a popular movement, and one which failed to survive as a continuing aspect of American public administration. One of the reasons for failure: lack of a shrewd political style. It became an important practical lesson many in public administration neglected to consider. The Reagan lesson came after the main New Public Administration arguments were made, but it comes while public administration continues to debate its proper role in American government. Thus, the analogy has merit.

Reagan iterated an anti-government and anti-New Public Administration feeling in his First Inaugural when he said that the federal government had been in control for too long of an "elite group" of administrators who, explained the President, considered themselves "superior to government for, by and of the people" (Congressional Quarterly, 1982, p. 109). Thus, he proclaimed government as being the cause of, not the solution to, America's problems. "If no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else," challenged Reagan (p. 109).
The argument was not new to American politics. It was first made by the Founders in the constitutional debates. It is one which especially troubled a skeptical Madison (Barber, 1984; Berry, 1984). His distrust of human nature was reflected in Federalist No. 55, in which he noted that "a degree of depravity in mankind [required] a certain degree of circumspection and distrust" (cited in Rossiter, 1961, p. 346). But Madison thought that men in America offered some hope for self-government. "Republican government," he said, "presupposes the existence of [esteem and confidence] in a higher degree than any other form" (p. 346).

Madison, however, was further troubled by a dilemma that is central to the current argument. That is, if the government becomes too strong on behalf of a collective good, the people lose their political freedom because of constraints placed on their pursuit of self-interest. On the other hand, if pursuit of self-interest became predominant as one's goal, then societal concerns would be diminished. But he knew that authoritarian government resolved the problem by suppressing free expression of political views. He also saw the dangers of the alternative--of allowing people to advocate whatever they wished--for organized efforts by groups to pressure the government to enact policies tended to "benefit small constituencies at the expense of the general public" (Berry, 1984, p. 1). Madison wondered if the public interest was best served when each citizen pursued his private interests through politics
(Kirkpatrick, 1983). The question remains today as a highly debatable one.

This possibility is apparent in some aspects of the "welfare state" begun with FDR's "New Deal" and more recently experienced with Johnson's "Great Society." Some believe these programs have eroded the Federalist ideal of public purpose, contending that they offer examples of why Americans had for too long experienced "a period of great national self-doubt and self-denigration" (Kirkpatrick, 1983, p. 12). The effects of Vietnam and Watergate, especially, left social, emotional, and economic scars on the nation. Inflation was considered more of an economic problem than unemployment (Cannon, 1982; Congressional Quarterly, 1982; Palmer & Sawhill, 1982), and the military defeat in Vietnam (Summers, 1982), coupled with the embarrassment of the Carter administration for the botched Iran rescue mission in 1980 (Carter, 1982), left American influence in foreign affairs in chaos (Cannon, 1982). Could the nation be launched on a new course that "[reversed] attitudes of despair and hopelessness [that had] grown so pervasive" in the 1960s and 1970s (Valis, 1981, p. 30)? What America wanted, in part, was later explained by an Oxford University research and consulting firm, Oxford Analytica (1986). The firm stated in analysis:

Domestically, the country wants an end to what it perceives as "soft" Democratic policies--all that is implied in the Republicans' pledge to reduce the size and cost of government. In foreign affairs, the country wants more muscle, to stop what it sees as the "pushing-around" of America, while at the same time it wants to avoid any situation which can be labeled as "another Vietnam." (p. 180)
The comments are significant for at least two reasons: (a) they were made in 1986 in the midst of Reagan's second term, indicating that—if the research is correct—Americans at that time wanted more of what Reagan had been implementing as policy since 1981 (Ranney, 1985; Valis, 1981; Viguerie, 1983); and (b) that so long as services normally provided by the government are somehow continued (and no additional war is forthcoming), the trend toward cutbacks of the federal government remains a "welcomed" situation (Oxford Analytica, 1986, p. 180; Palmer & Sawhill, 1982). Reagan's strategy was described by the Oxford researchers as closely paralleling FDR's "anti-Depression" agenda in 1932. It was "a negative vote" that got FDR elected, comparable to Reagan's "anti-government" platform in 1980.3

It was on this last point that Carter warned Americans during the 1980 campaign that Reagan, if elected, would move swiftly to "emasculate, if not abolish, the major regulatory agencies" of the federal government (Valis, 1981, p. 95). Reagan, when elected, disputed the contention, stating in his First Inaugural:

Now so there will be no misunderstanding, it is not my intention to do away with the government. It is rather to make it work—work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it. (Congressional Quarterly, 1982, p. 110)

But Reagan did say that an inventory of government needed to be made to ensure that "our government has no special power except that granted it by the people" (p. 110). Two criteria were given as the

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agenda to guarantee the American people they would no longer be ruled by an "elite group" of administrators. Reagan's description was as follows:

[1.] It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed. (pp. 109-110.

[2.] It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal government and those reserved to the states or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal government did not create the states; the states created the Federal government. (p. 110)

Reagan's election in 1980 was in no sense a routine election. Just as FDR's victory in 1932, Reagan's win was "a realigning election [which reflected] trends that have been building for years, perhaps a decade, and finally expressed in a single dramatic election" (Kirkpatrick, 1983, p. 8). From a historical perspective, Reagan's presidency demonstrated the defeat of the "liberal coalition" in office generally since FDR, and further of the "ideas about economics and the relationships between government and economics" that had been dominated during the same period (p. 9).

Reagan summarized achievements of his first term in his characteristic, straightforward manner. In a State of the Union address shortly after being inaugurated a second time in 1984, he told Congress: "Four years ago we began to change, forever, I hope, our assumptions about government and its place in our lives" (Henry, 1985, p. 264). Democratic Party leaders published Reagan's campaign
promises, for the record, to demonstrate what those assumptions continued to be. They were concerned about Reagan’s intended new direction with the government. But "they" lost the election, and Reagan’s supporters obviously liked the direction. Campaign promises attributed to Reagan (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 1985) about the role of government included these:

[1.] . . . [Do] everything to get government out of the way to make sure that we have the best means of competing in a world market. (p. 24)

[2.] Expand the partnership between government, businesses, and private citizens [in order to protect and preserve natural resources]. (p. 24)

[3.] Reduce the "rate of increase in government spending" [and] curb "government's appetite." (pp. 24-25)

[4.] Give "permission for States or localities, if they so choose, to use their compensatory education funds to establish voucher programs to broaden family choice of effective schooling methods for educationally disadvantaged children." (p. 25)

[5.] Restore our nation's parents, State and local officials, teachers, school administrators, and principals to their rightful place in the educational process. (p. 25)

[6.] Put the money for general purpose in block grants and turn them over to the States and localities, and give them the ability to administer these. (p. 25)

[7.] Make decisions on every issue on the basis of "whether it is good or bad for the people--is it morally right?" (p. 25)

That was the record emphasized by Reagan's opponents, the Democratic Party. The message to American public administration was clear. Reagan's direction implied that America did not agree with activist New Public Administrators. Sharkansy's (1982) observation
that Reagan, speaking for either the privileged or the majority, seemed correct. At any rate, Reagan's "revolution" in the White House simply meant to some "a return to old-fashioned Republicanism" (Dallek, 1984, p. vii). That meant, stated Dallek:

Large tax cuts for the rich, less government help for the poor, weaker enforcement of civil rights, fewer controls on industry, less protection for the environment, and emotional rhetoric on the virtues of hard work, family, religion, individualism, and patriotism. (pp. vii-viii)

Reagan's message about reducing the role and size of government was nothing new to politics, or to politicians seeking to be President (Dallek, 1984; Neustadt, 1980). What was different about Reagan was that no one else was as successful in building his political career "so fully on this idea or had been so ready to make it the centerpiece of his administration" (Dallek, 1984, p. 63). Dallek contended that the emphasis on Reagan's anti-government rested in symbolism, as an effort to "help people strengthen their self-esteem" (p. 93). Ranney (1984) reported that Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 over Mondale came "without a mandate . . . [the] election has been about Ronald Reagan, a referendum on Reagan" (p. 164). If, indeed, it was, the President's anti-government policies are solid favorites with the people. Problem governments are surely unable to provide satisfactory solutions to perceived problems.

It was a lesson put forth to the New Public Administrationists, who thought, that those in government ought to be able to assume responsibility for government's woes, as advocates of the people as
a matter of social equity. However, was Reagan telling them that the people have to want them as their advocates? Institutions of government cannot expect that their administrative machinery will be viewed dispassionately if they presume to advocate the exertion of state power for humane ends. Such strategy tends to reward, deprive, distribute, and redistribute in the name of society as a whole (Chandler, 1986a). Further, such institutions logically retain the responsibility "of defining the public interest against legitimate private interests" (Chandler, 1986a, p. 1), which necessitates the employment of the processes of moral reasoning, judgment, and lawful coercion which "[renders] them a free-fire zone for the displacement of the fears, hopes, and anxieties of people they may have regulated" (p. 1).

Anti-Federalists, and the new republicans, would have great difficulty with this approach, as the question of administrative responsibility becomes the issue. "By what right, by whose authority, is policy made by nonelected public administrators?" asked Waldo (1984, p. 108). He did not question the fact that public administrators do make policy "over a wide and important area," but Waldo cautioned that the mood outside of public administration circles not only tended to disagree with the position, but strongly disfavored--and feared it--as well. They view public administration venturing on turf posted against their entry. Waldo (1980) stated:
In the United States we have special problems of a legal and symbolic nature in recognizing and legitimatizing what happens. At the Federal level, the present situation certainly is not foreseen or legitimated by the Constitutional interpretation and by usage. Nor is policymaking by public administrators easily and fully legitimated by the formulas that were developed to reconcile what takes place in fact with the democratic ideology that came to supplement the Constitution. (p. 180)

Waldo (1980) described "overhead democracy" as the most commonly understood formula. It holds that responsibility within public organizations rises hierarchically to the highest nonelected administrator, who, in turn, is responsible through chain of command to the highest elected official "and thence to the electorate" (p. 181). Authority was seen by Waldo as flowing along similar channels, but in an opposite direction. The whole idea of activist public administrators upsets the theory. Waldo said the problem is yet unresolved in American public administration and predicted that "the confusion and turbulence in this area" will increase in the period ahead (p. 181).

Chandler (1986a) argued that misinterpretation of public administration's role in defining the public interest against legitimate private interests has made "bureaucracy . . . an epithet in modern political discourse" (p. 1). He blamed capitalism for this situation, which he described as "singularly well-suited to provide for the gratification of the self" (p. 1). If there is a reflective relationship between an individual's emotional substructure or unconscious--which projects of personal aggrandizement--and with the conscious processes monitored by
government--concerned with collective needs and social concerns--obvious conflicts surface. But in the unconscious realm, where ambitions of economic, social, and psychological impulses can largely transpire unimpeded, the situation further becomes confused as capitalists begin to equate laissez-faire with individual freedom. Therefore, Chandler stated:

The marketplace can so facilitate the working out of the personal unconscious and emotional substructure that it sometimes overwhelms the conscious and collective side of society. As wants are expressed and satisfied with increasing speed and facility, a point is reached where new wants are created by the process itself. Society loses its bearings, its moral and practical points of references are obscured, and the public standards that are essential for the exercise of collective human discretion and judgment fail. (p. 2)

What, then, explains the current role of government? Chandler (1986a) argued a minority position, which holds that public administration represented "the collective consciousness of American society" (p. 2). But, if the framers envisioned government as the means of addressing current and unforeseen common problems, what if government, and those administering the government, became preoccupied with self-serving interests of their own? Do not elitists place their self above all else? The question is debatable, but administrative elites are on ground too soft already--with the current anti-government mood--to convince people they know their conscience.

Reagan's direction parallels motivation toward private interest--that is, he sees government as necessary to provide
opportunity, rather than to smother it--and American public administration needs to be flexible enough to recognize this interpretation of the public interest in order to understand their proper role in government.

Reagan and his policies view government as an obstacle to the pursuit of private interest6 (Chandler, 1986b). Like the Jacksonian Radical Republicans in the 1800s, the new republicans left no doubt that they desired to (a) control administrative discretion in the public policy arena and (b) demand freedom of the individual from government control "to the widest extent" (p. 458).

But beyond placement of government as an obstacle to private interest, it has been cast by the economization model (e.g., private interest) as "a source of enrichment" and as a "general utility-maximizing mechanism" for expanding the very pursuit of the private interest (Chandler, 1986a, p. 3).

Two recent efforts based on economic theory underscore this contention. First, has been the application of economics to the theory and operation of government, or public choice economics (Ostrom, 1973; discussed in Chapter V), which focused on the basic postulate that "man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer" (Mueller, 1979, p. 1). Second, has been the more recent effort toward privatization, or the actual transfer of government responsibilities to the private sector as a concerted effort "to reduce the scope of government" (Butler, 1985, p. 52).7 Both theories are based, in part, on a restatement of Madison's
dilemma—by contending that people participate in politics in order to enhance their own personal or private objectives (Laver, 1981).

Public choice economics requires public agencies to compete with the private sector to provide citizens with goods and services, rather than to continue acting like monopolies under the influence of organized special interest groups (Ostrom, 1973; Weschler, 1982). Citizens, as consumers of government goods and services, would be provided a choice—as in free-enterprise economics—between competing services. And, theoretically, administrative responsiveness to demands of individual citizens would be increased "by creating a market system for governmental activities based on microeconomic theory" (Chandler, 1986a, p. 4). Proponents of public choice economics contend that better goods and services are provided by profit-motivated enterprises, which stress efficiency as their primary motivational principle. In the private sector, financial compensation is based on a share of the business savings or profit generated by an increase in efficiency. In the public sector, financial compensation is "either unrelated or indirectly related to improved efficiency" (Mueller, 1979, p. 158). Thus:

The public bureau is characterized by weak external control on efficiency and weak internal incentives. If the bureaucrat has no financial incentive to pursue greater efficiency, what are his goals, and how are they related to efficiency? (Mueller, 1979, p. 158)

Chandler (1986a) argued that public administrationists would answer that efficiency is not a word from the public realm, but
rather a word from economics. Waldo (1948) contended that efficiency cannot be stated as a value. But in my view, the term is analogous to business, and economics supports the buzz words used by opponents of government who assume that the public organizations and business are operated similarly. Public administrationists who argue that efficiency had no place in the history of political theory (Waldo, 1948) would also agree that it rejects social contract theory because it asserts that people will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless they are forced or co-opted by affiliation with special interests to do so (Chandler, 1986a). In this context, social contract is defined as the reason why individuals join groups: to further their own common interests. Although scholars have argued that social contract theories are not always "collectivist" in nature (MacPherson, 1962, p. 255), I have in mind the idea of social contract generally associated with Locke (1963), who considered them as unspoken agreements that bring civilized people together to draft constitutions and to form governments (Chandler & Plano, 1982). In this way, those entering the agreement sought the benefit of organized social existence, and in the instance of American constitutional government, in the group pursuit of a means for preserving life, liberty, and property. Further, in the modern context of public organizations, Locke's assumption is crucial to the theory of democratic pluralism, which views the public interest as a product of the activity of organized interest groups (Appleby, 1952). Thus, Chandler's (1986a)
observation that people need to be forced to act toward a common purpose is one contrary to the theoretical basis of my understanding of social contracts. He argues that public choice economics, therefore, which refuses to view government as a voluntary association of citizens with similar needs, is wholly in conflict with Locke's theory, the intent of the framers who incorporated his assumptions in the Constitution, and of the idea of democratic pluralism.

Unfortunately, privatization only furthers the argument expressed by the public choice economists. Butler (1985) stated that most Americans agree that government is too large, wasteful, and thus inefficient, and that cutting down the size of the federal government is seen as a way of actually improving the levels of goods and services. While privatization efforts are targeted toward redistribution of government services to the private sector for purposes of efficiency, it also served as the focus of a definite political strategy by new republicans to subvert the aims of government from collective toward individual needs (Birkhead, 1985; Congressional Quarterly, 1982; Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 1985; Eads & Fix, 1984; Gartner, Greer, & Riessmann, 1982; Palmer & Sawhill, 1982; Valis, 1981; Viguerie, 1983). The privatization strategy provided advocates with an opportunity to "outflank the supporters of bigger government by turning the current political dynamics upside down" (Butler, 1985, p. 4). Doing so
weakens coalitions benefiting from government programs, and therefore "[plants] the seeds of a new coalition that would benefit from nongovernment delivery of the service" (p. 166). But that's not all. By reducing the scope of the federal government, privatization (a) can reduce the regulatory burden placed on the private sector by government and (b) bring the taxing and spending functions of government closer "to the people" by transfer of responsibilities to state and local governments where "taxpayer scrutiny and resistance to inefficient spending" is presumably greater (p. 167).9

Two factors worry proponents of privatization. First, the demand for government services, which powers the growth of government, continues to increase. Second, politics creates an imbalance between those who desire more or less government spending. Privatization attacks the "welfare state" left over from the policies of the centralizers. Reagan has encouraged privatization, as have other proponents of limited government.

Explained Butler (1985):

[Federal] spending [needs] to be brought under control in America, [to enable] the deficit to be cut without crippling increases in taxation. . . . Privatization holds out the prospect of finally breaking the federal spending ratchet and replacing it with a private-sector ratchet, so that the pressure to spend is reduced by diverting demand away from government programs. If the [Reagan] administration is willing to experiment with the device, and thereby turn the flank of the public spending coalitions, it could achieve historical reversal of the growth of government in America. (p. 172)
The economization model of government purpose has reached well beyond theoretical discussions about what may be good and evil, or merely argument about economic theory. The answer lies in part in the distrust of government and public institutions. Public choice economics and privatization can become tools to keep the public bureaucracy in check, which supporters of the economization model consider as both a generalized failure and a threat.

Additionally, considerable new emphasis has been placed on privatization in state and local governments (Butler, 1985), in which services normally expected or provided by government are contracted out or relinquished to the private sector for apparent reasons of cost effectiveness. Public choice economics serves as an extension of the orthodox model in which efficiency may be the ultimate value. As noted earlier, this poses a challenge to social contract theory because responsiveness to the demands of individual citizens might be seen as a less important role for administrators to pursue than one, for example, where their role is seen as that enhancing a climate favorable to free enterprise. The distinction is not clear-cut because citizen demands may or may not be met due to the nature of the economy. Governments realize fewer resource dollars in a recession. They realize more revenue when the economy is good. Good public administrators need to be prudent managers of scarce resources, as well.

My point is that efficiency in the sense of the private sector is not compatible with efficiency in the sense of the public sector.
Chandler (1986a) argued, and I agree, that efficiency does not apply to government in at least the following ways: (a) the private sector is profit oriented, while the public sector is not; (b) the private sector is competitive, while government in most instances operates as a monopoly; (c) the public sector is labor intensive, while the private sector is not; (d) society expects more of government workers than it does of private workers; (e) managers in the private sector typically have greater freedom in personnel matters than public managers; (f) authority is more structured in the private sector than in the public sector; (g) the executive branch of government is led by amateurs and politicians with short tenure, while the private sector tends to have more experienced executives at the top; and (h) personnel in the private sector tend to have a single purpose to serve, while public-sector employees typically serve multiple purposes (pp. 10-20).

It is my contention that efficiency exists as a matter of importance in public administration, not necessarily because those in the discipline consider it important, but that the political world does. It is an easy word to use in political contexts, too, because no rational person wants inefficient government, or inefficient anything. A bigger question is whether or not public purpose as opposed to private interest has become today's ethical battleground in American public administration. I use ethics in the context of the collective and moral identity that represents what
groups of people share as common values. As such, I posit that these two philosophies have been at the focal point of conflict in the American experience from the start, and will continue to be so. Public administration needs to fully recognize this if they expect to become politically shrewd participants in any respect in the public policy arena. By not becoming politically shrewd is to become irresponsible. That is, public administration needs to scrap its way to the forefront of the public purpose/private interest debate, for as Chandler (1986a) stated: "The first is about the role of government in modern society" (p. 5). Is not that the chief concern?

"Administration With a Soul"

The New Public Administration's answer to Thompson's (1975) arguments may have been best addressed by Campbell (1976), who observed that a central question of government concerning "who gets what out of the system" might be refocused toward a new normative question of "who ought to get what" (p. 556). Waldo (1980) acknowledged that the New Public Administration movement "has all but disappeared as the problems on which public attention focuses have shifted and the Zeitgeist has changed" (p. xvii). But its tone was moral and its proponents advocated a sense of public service in contrast to orthodoxy's model of economy and efficiency.

Levitan (1943) concluded an essay over 40 years ago on "Political Ends and Administrative Means" with a provocative
statement that challenged administrators to never lose sight of moral objectives. Levitan stated:

An outstanding government administrator once remarked that "administration must have a soul." That, in a way, magnificently summarizes the thesis I have been developing. It needs to be added, however, that administration should contribute to the fuller development of the soul of the state. I have tried to point out that administrative machinery and political and philosophical principles together determine the system of government; that a democratic state must be based not only on democratic philosophy permeating its administrative machinery and being manifested in its relations both with the citizen outside the government and the citizen inside the government, the public servant; that administrative procedures are even more important in effectuating the basic principles of government than is substantive law; and that these procedures must therefore constantly be reexamined in terms of the ends they serve and changed when the changing social and economic milieu requires different means to attain these ends. . . . The administrators of tomorrow must be men with a clear understanding and acceptance of the philosophy of the state and with the broad vision and imaginative power to gear the administrative machinery to that philosophy. (p. 359)

Chandler (1986a) asked how institutions of government today can expect to carry out a mandate such as "the fuller development of the soul of the state" (p. 27). The answer falls partly in the argument central to this study: determining the proper role of public administration in American government. Will an acceptable role be found?

Levitan's (1943) observations deserve serious consideration. His intention was to show that democratic government does not succeed alone on its machinery, or procedures, or even its philosophical principles, whatever they may be at some point in time. The system of government, he said, is determined by a
combination of all three points noted, with the addition of "being manifested in its relations with the citizen" (p. 359)--both inside and outside of the government. It is in this context that Trusteeship Public Administration builds upon the New Public Administration. (For reasons of brevity, I will refer to Trusteeship Public Administration from this point on as simply "Trusteeship.")

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, Trusteeship is now just emerging as a new effort toward role definition for administrators. Even though the literature to date is limited to a mere handful of sources, and unchallenged to date, the argument seems relevant and deserving of recognition. My reading of Trusteeship is that it is being conceived as an expansion of the New Public Administration, with corrections to be applied on matters of political reality based on the lessons hopefully learned from the previous activist experience. In this case, I intend political reality to mean recognition of politics, rather than the general citizenry, as primary centers of power and influence in the American public policy arena (Barber, 1984; Berry, 1984). Further, I intend the meaning to carry through on the idea that the proper role of administrators is not as elites, the hard lesson from the New Public Administration era. To accommodate this discussion, which concludes this study, I will (a) highlight major components of Trusteeship, (b) provide criticism, and (c) make conjectures for the future.
Two underlying questions need to be stated at the outset because they remain as crucial to the whole proper-role problem. These questions were not only left unanswered by the New Public Administration, they were reinforced by the muddled handling of the issue by proponents of that movement. Questions are (a) how can professionally trained public servants who claim to stand for the general will or public good be prevented from imposing themselves on the citizenry? and (b) how does one prevent these same citizens from directly imposing their "unstructured control" over the government (Weiner, 1987, p. 2)? Trusteeship argues that the American administrative state, up to the emergence of the New Public Administration, operated in a strongly functional manner, seeking to gradually enhance its own image and power through a technically oriented class of administrators, but failing to enhance the control and participation of the citizenry. These are important points, to proponents of Trusteeship, because they understand the proper role of administrators to be one of fiduciaries who help citizens toward the task of "renewing our communal values and taking the lead in making public institutions more reflective of the ideals of justice and equity" (Chandler, 1984, p. 202). These are administrators whose role is seen as one of "citizens in lieu of the rest of us" (Walzer, 1970, p. 216). As fiduciaries, Trustees believe that public administrators must be trained not only as managers to implement policies of government, but also "to be especially sensitive to a community's embedded norms and traditions [which
requires] a greater sociological awareness and sensitivity-training for civil servants" (Weiner, 1987, p. 7). Once trained in this regard, the fiduciary would be responsible, according to Weiner, for the preservation of freedom—freedom to and not merely freedom from—[and] obligated to keep the civil conversation going, "to enhance the knowledge base of public affairs to that citizens can understand how real public affairs operate, to keep the social contract vibrant and renew it." Only then can we follow Louis Gawthrop's precept that "making government interesting involves something more than mechanistic delivery by public managers." Only then can the civic conversation take us . . . to a higher stage in the development of the structures of rationality. (p. 7; first quote attributed to McGregor, 1984, p. 130)

The other Trusteeship advocates noted earlier tend to concur with Weiner in toto. Each has described ethics in the sense of a moral and collective identity that bonds citizens together through what Chandler (1984) described as "civic virtue" or a "heroic love for the public good . . . the elevation of the soul" which accompanies public service (p. 196). Public administrators, Trusteeship argues, have the task of not only maintaining their own "professional character and integrity," but to stimulate citizenship among others. "It is an ethics that tells us not what to do," stated Weiner (1987), "but whom to be" (p. 9).

Trusteeship is thus tempted, as was the New Public Administration, with the matter of administrative elitism, and with the temptation comes the concern again about administrators knowing the will. Here is where advocates of Trusteeship begin to disagree, however so slightly. Arguments made by Chandler (1984)
and Weiner (1987), respectively, reflect viewpoints of the two camps in question.

Chandler's (1984) trustee is seen by Weiner (1987) as having a broad scope of moral discretion, whose ultimate values are based on different levels of professional obligation. They are:

1. **allegiance**, i.e., confidentiality, avoidance of conflict of interest, and avoidance of personal involvement with clients, contractors, and interest group representatives.

2. **autonomy**, i.e., giving sound and independent advice, regardless of offense given or taken.

3. **knowledge and competence**, i.e., a command of a specialized body of knowledge and mastery of a set of utilizable techniques in a defined jurisdiction; and

4. **guild loyalty**, i.e., conducting oneself with integrity, honor, and fidelity with reference to one's fellow professionals and to the corporate body of the guild. (pp. 9-10)

Chandler's (1984) public administrator is described as both a **representative citizen** and as a representative **citizen**. This is a confusing part of his argument, but the emphasis on representative and citizen indicates that administrators actually have two roles, unlike most other people, as citizens. One is that of, for lack of better illustration, an employee of the government, and the other as an employer of those in government, a role theoretically shared by all Americans. Chandler argued that civil servants are sworn to uphold the same Constitution as other officers of government, and they may be competent enough to define the public interest on their own authority. Thus, as representative citizens they have an obligation to everyone, and as citizens, to themselves. Chandler
anticipated that Trusteeship would "bridge the chasm of self-interestedness which has characterized the American experiment from the beginning" by combining the essence of citizenship with "the moral unity of a society come of age" (p. 202). If this becomes possible, he argued, public administrators will be "elevated" by their fellow citizens into a role of occupying the "office of citizenship"--a term that settles the public administration task as one of "unapologetic leadership in making American public institutions more reflective of the communal values of justice and equity which are our goodly heritage" (p. 202).

Weiner (1987) had great difficulty with Chandler's (1984) perspective, as do I, in that the argument seems to be a rekindling of the elitism evident in the New Public Administration. Is this a mere lofty assessment of civil servants who are seen by scholars other than Chandler as hostile, indifferent, and manipulative? Weiner implied as much. Unfortunately for Chandler, as noted earlier, the literature disagrees with him. But Chandler's optimism and faith in humankind are noteworthy.

Especially significant here is that Chandler (1984) pins the hopes for citizenship mainly in an administrative class which is educated to know the good and to act on the public. They are to be educated by whom? What are their values? They are to be educated how? What is the curriculum? Presuming that the best possible curriculum is pursued, what is to prevent students from drifting philosophically away from what they were taught? Lawyers are
supposedly taught to pursue justice. But some of them have ended up in prison for taking advantage of the laws that they are sworn to uphold. Military officers are trained to uphold an honor code that says they should not lie. But America knows a Marine lieutenant colonel who recently did. Christian ministers are taught that adultery and stealing are wrong, but recent events indicate that both have occurred in dramatic fashion.

Education is an admirable goal of Trusteeship, but it cannot be considered as the means to a perfect value structure. Is there such a thing? Whose allegiance, autonomy, knowledge and competence, and guild loyalty are identical? Let us take the allegiance example, as described earlier. What is confidentiality? In what contexts does it apply as an ultimate value? How does one avoid conflicts of interest when, as an administrator, he or she is regularly involved in determination of the allocation of scarce goods and services? How does one avoid personal involvement with clients when Chandler (1984) argued that representative citizens are to be "front-line public administrators [who] can and ought to act as change and relevancy agents as they perform the unique service of transferring public programs to citizens bewildered by the complexity of modern government" (p. 197)?

Weiner (1987) asked, to what degree does Chandler’s (1984) sense of Trusteeship "[amount] to professional arrogance" (p. 12)? That is, has the implementation of predetermined goals been unfairly
utilized in the competition of the public policy arena by techniques of public management? It is my viewpoint that Weiner’s contention has merit, as I agree that too often public policy determination includes manipulative efforts by public managers over clientele groups. In fact, is not this the fear most recently expressed in the demise of the New Public Administration? I cannot agree, however, with the allegation of "arrogance" because Chandler is far from alone on this matter. Other prominent scholars (Barber, 1984; Frederickson, 1980; Waldo, 1980) share his viewpoint to a very large extent. The jury is still out on Trusteeship.

Nonetheless, elitism continues as a problem, for as Redford (1952) warned public administration over three decades ago, the danger of an administrative class is that the people will never accept it for the dangers it proposes. Is there middle ground? Weiner (1987) advanced a possibility in rejecting the idea of administrative elite, substituting instead the concept of Trusteeship as a mediating social partnership with "affected social groups" in a pluralistic setting (p. 15). I think Weiner's viewpoint needs serious consideration because it places public administration in an apparent nonthreatening role of negotiator in public policy matters very much similar to what Follett (1920) intended when she challenged public administration to seek power with the citizenry, rather than power over the citizenry. It also parallels Gawthrop's (1984) contention that the new proper role of public administration needs to be one that stimulates effective
communication with citizens in an "available, open, and interesting" manner (p.104). He agreed with Chandler in that the essential characteristics of citizenship should be "the primary responsibility" of public servants, and one of "ethical obligation" because it becomes the duty of these administrators to provide citizens "with an ethical sense of purpose in the system of democratic governance" (p.104).

There is a distinct difference in what Gawthrop (1984) and Chandler (1984) are saying on this matter. Chandler's whole argument comes from the premise that administration correctly functions as a "ruling elite" (p. 141). My difficulty on this has already been stated. Gawthrop, on the other hand, approached his explanation from the standpoint of communicative ethics, which is intended "to keep the civil conversation going" (p. 104). The term "communicative ethics" is intended here only as an expression of encouraging dialogue going in public policy settings as a means of compromise, understanding, and respect for different opinions. In the context of rationality, communicative ethics makes sense in that reasonable people ought to be able to arrive at reasonable conclusions. If they do not agree, then at least they have the opportunity to search for a point of commonality.

Additionally, communicativeness in this context attempts to resolve two other problems associated with administrative responsibility: (a) Weiner's (1987) belief that too much of the
literature on public administration and ethics is written in "an abstract philosophical vacuum" (p. 7); and (b) the possibility, expressed by Gawthrop (1984), that government is too complex for the average American citizen to comprehend and become "actively engaged in" (p.104). There is nothing new to Weiner's comment about the literature. Who could disagree? Waldo (1980) made the embarrassing point that not only is Weiner correct, but practitioners of public administration could likely not care less. But the literature has to be revamped if Gawthrop's observation is to occur. Dry academic journal articles are not interesting. I recall when American history was taught in terms of dates and memorization of events. That was dull, uninteresting material. History now is oftentimes recorded in interpretive detail, and even as historically oriented novels. It has become interesting. Public administration can do the same.

All of this is important if public administration is to become a part of the citizenry in Follett's (1920) terms. This is the basis for Weiner's (1987) argument on behalf of placing administrators in legitimate roles as coproducers of public policy with the affected social groups interested and involved in matters of specific policy. In this role, public administrators fulfill the requirements of the "shrewd political style" they ignored with the New Public Administration. They become actors where they can be effective and welcomed. They can contribute to the relevancy and
change necessary for good government, rather than becoming obstacles to good government because of their proaction.

Public administrators, according to Weiner's (1987) argument, become dependent on securing "a willingness to cooperate from what effectively must be their social partners" (pp. 15-16). They no longer function as power brokers or autonomous agents of the state, but rather as "consensus-builders [who] endeavor to minimize conflict among the competing interest groups whose assistance state managers are dependent upon in assuring capital growth and development" (p. 16). On a local level, Weiner said coproduction is more likely to succeed because the groups involved are small in number, and thus more easily accessible for negotiation. On a larger scale, for example, the federal government, Weiner viewed coproduction occurring between senior civil servants and leaders of the affected interest groups. "In each case, the trustee is understood as a mediating social partner rather than an elitist policy definer with broad discretion" (p. 16). I share Weiner's viewpoint that the continuing dialogue over public administration and ethics needs to focus on the bonds which hopefully will connect the civil servant and, as Weiner described them, the "values of a voluntarist civil society" (p. 17). Such an agenda will require professionalism by public administrators in every aspect of the term. I do not agree with Chandler (1984) that administrators will or need to be "elevated" by their fellow citizens into an "office of citizenship." Credibility is all important to Weiner's argument,
and it is earned, not given or presented. Public administration has much to do in the way of earning credibility, but as coproducers and as mediating social partners with citizens, they have the best chance yet of seeking a power with the citizenry, rather than a power over it. Public administration must learn from the mistakes of its history. The matter of citizenship is too important to think any other way.

American public administration has debated the notion of administrative responsibility since the birth of the republic. The profession has oftentimes been confused and bewildered by the idea of taking ethics seriously. Political expediency and self-interestedness seem to have taken precedence over collective need, especially at times--like now--when good government is most important. Waldo (1980) outlined future opportunities for public administration to consider and, hopefully, follow to ensure that the profession achieves its long-awaited status as the collective consciousness of American society. The opportunities include a shot at Trusteeship. But American public administration has been too modest in making note of its accomplishments, throughout the American experiment, and it certainly has been too passive in responding to the political abuse that it continues to receive. However, the role is one of public servant, not elitist. The criticism comes with the territory.
Public administration needs to fight its battles on the matter of legitimacy from the high ground. It needs to be consistent and politically shrewd. This has rarely been the case. Trusteeship merits further exploration and serious academic consideration. However, Trusteeship needs to better promote a plan of action, agenda, and formal program. These were matters the New Public Administration did not address. They need to be incorporated prominently in public administration curricula. If Trusteeship is to be further considered in a scholarly way, it is essential that these concerns be thoroughly addressed. Recent publication in this area is significant, but little noted outside of a small academic spectrum. To gain wider respect and acceptance, Trusteeship needs to be understood and not pose a threat to nonacademicians and public administration practitioners. This may not be possible. But nothing worthwhile comes without risks. Thus, to move forward, Trusteeship needs open, visible support from within and outside the profession to succeed. The writings of a handful of academics are only a beginning. A movement needs impetus, and the "we care" focus of Trusteeship epitomizes the essence of what constitutes good government. But it needs advocates, not detractors, to succeed. Whether this is possible within the context of the American experience needs to be seen.

Last, I wish to note that this study has "borrowed" from several other disciplines, to include political science, history, philosophy, and the social sciences. This is both a positive and a
negative reflection of public administration. It is positive because public administration becomes representative of all these disciplines. Although its claim as government's "collective consciousness" may be subject to their objections, it is negative from the standpoint that public administration lacks a systematic treatment of either its (a) history and substance in the American experience or (b) ethics, especially in providing meaning toward the "search for the good." This negative must become a positive through realization of these discrepancies in scholarship.

Public administration is an important and exciting part of the American experience. It is, however, to use Wilson's (1887) analogy, becoming more and more difficult to run a constitution than to frame one. Can public administration measure up to the challenge? Further, does it, indeed, have a soul? Chandler (1987) posited these questions most appropriately when he stated:

Democratic theory and administrative policies will converge at the point of professional ethics where the quality of human relationships is enhanced through the public service apparatus of government. The soul of the state will then be rediscovered. (p. 191)

Concluding Comments

The focus of Chapter VI has been to show that American public administration, at least in an academic sense, is well on its way to test Trusteeship as a viable new approach to the study and practice of the discipline. The New Public Administration is a tried and
failed approach. Trusteeship can be enhanced by being formulated upon the lessons encountered by proponents of the earlier movement. Distinct differences emerge on careful examination and merit restatement here.

The New Public Administration sought to become proactive primarily on behalf of disadvantaged clients, or "neighbors." The focus was individual in nature. Trustees seem to recognize the realities of the modern political world and have directed their attention toward proactive participation in government in a pluralist setting. This was impossible under the New Public Administration, as the idea of pluralism became confused in that no negotiation or consensus was sought. Advocates in the New Public Administration could not settle for any middle ground. Trustees have recognized that multiple and competing elites work within a pluralist setting and that public policy is determined most successfully through a process of bargaining and compromise. In a pluralist setting, the best decisions are those that emerge from clashes among interest groups in the political arena. Such clashes are theoretically determined in open discussions of issues so that an overall balance of power is maintained. Advocates of one's "neighbor" were feared for seeking the unfair and unequal positions that pluralism discourages.

New Public Administrators were self-appointed elitists whose status was well-noted in Reagan's First Inaugural. Consider the possibility advanced by Trustees who seek to be welcomed into the
public policy process in a nonthreatening way, and fully cognizant of the meaning of dispassionate government. As partners, not merely advocates, Trustees hope to rectify one of the New Public Administration's greatest failures: that of its neglect in not enhancing the control and participation of citizens in the public policy arena. Nonetheless, Trustees in the public administration sense will likely continue to be seen as threats to those in the private interest areas whom they regulate on behalf of the public good. But they have the unique opportunity not to dissuade, as did the New Public Administration; rather, they have the opportunity to build support as social partners. Their best image of service is one in which administrators are seen as being among the people, not above the people, as occurred with the New Public Administration.

Trusteeship needs to continue toward development of pertinent literature and toward construction of a formal program. It needs to welcome challenges and to build upon those challenges. In the interim, academic public administration needs to develop better foundational courses so that prospective guardians of the public good might best have a chance to demonstrate that the merits of Trusteeship are possible and, indeed, desirable. Practical and technical training of public administrators needs serious modification. Foundational training needs to begin with a survey of the legacy left by the ancient Greeks and Romans to good government everywhere.
Several key points were raised in Chapter VI, which are summarized as follows:

1. Trusteeship was an outgrowth of the New Public Administration, in which consideration was given to learn from the mistakes of the earlier effort, especially in matters relating to political reality. Trusteeship advocates thought that administrators needed to adapt to a shrewd political style. This especially includes recognition that public administration regulates private interests for the public good.

2. Trusteeship is difficult to analyze now because it is an emerging effort with a small body of literature to support it. No substantive criticism has yet been advanced.

3. Errors of the New Public Administration movement awakened public administration to better understand the political philosophies of public purpose and private interest, in addition to their application in government.

4. Current anti-government sentiment is traceable in part to the failure of the New Public Administration. Proactive administrators are seen as threats to advocates of private interest. They do not like the outcomes of government and, thus, oppose it. The economization model of government runs contrary to public purpose philosophy.

5. Efficiency in the sense of the private sector is not compatible with efficiency in the sense of the public sector. Efficiency does not apply to government as a value.
6. Trusteeship argues that the American administrative state, up to the emergence of the New Public Administration, operated in a strongly functional manner, seeking to gradually enhance its own image and power through a technically oriented class of administrators.

7. Trusteeship envisions the role of administrators as fiduciaries who feel morally obligated to help citizens understand and participate in citizenship. Advocates disagree on the status of administrators: Some view administrators as members of a "ruling elite," while others contend that they are coproducers of public policy with citizens. I argue that the more proper role is that of the trustee understood as a mediating social partner rather than as an elitist policy definer with broad discretion. Trusteeship cannot justify administrative elitism. It has yet to explain why public administrators should hold special status as trustees, when all citizens are trustees under the narrow guidelines outlined by the framers.

8. Trusteeship views the ultimate values of public administrators as those of allegiance, autonomy, knowledge and competence, and guild loyalty.

9. Trusteeship encourages communicative ethics in public administration to stimulate effective communication with citizens in an available, open, and interesting manner. Administrators' roles are seen as those which would seek power with the citizens, rather than power over the citizenry.
10. Too much of the literature of public administration and ethics is written in an abstract philosophical vacuum. Scholarship is needed to help make government interesting to citizens.

11. Trusteeship needs to better promote a plan of action, agenda, and formal program to be considered in a scholarly way. These were matters the New Public Administration did not address.
Footnotes--Chapter VI

1This is a situation not likely to improve, according to recent research about major trends in the United States through the 1990s (Oxford Analytica, 1986). This study indicated that the "often unappealingly mundane processes of politics"--that is, negotiation, deliberation, and compromise--"are downgraded, to be replaced by the high style of pose, gesture and drama" (p. 192). Oxford Analytica contended that the American public "has always distrusted" both government and those associated with it (p. 192).

2This is the foundation of the New Public Administration argument, as noted in Chapter V. See Frederickson (1980) and Marini (1971) for further explanation.

3Cannon (1982) said "The Reagan Revolution," the theme of the President's agenda for redirection of American government, was "an attempt to repeal the New Deal" (p. 321). But "The Reagan Revolution" was more than that. "[Reagan] had a vision of what America had been and what it should be again, and [it became his objective] to translate this vision into reality" (p. 416). Reagan viewed the role of President much like Theodore Roosevelt: to lead the nation in the direction he thinks it should go rather than to follow a direction that it appeared to be heading (p. 417). See also Henry (1985), p. 105.

4Palmer and Sawhill (1982), in the book they edited for the Urban Institute entitled The Reagan Experiment, acknowledged that the President's philosophy and direction, indeed, had raised fundamental questions about "the appropriate role of government in national life" (p. xv). In January 1981, when Reagan assumed office, the nation faced (a) high inflation, (b) sluggish economic growth, (c) rapidly rising federal expenditures, and (d) an inadequate defense budget. Thus, to counteract these trends, Reagan announced his experiment with economic and social policy--"perhaps as significant as the New Deal"--which included "a comprehensive plan designed to bolster the nation's economy, strengthen its defense, and reduce the role of government" (p. xv). On the last point, Reagan proposed to eliminate, reduce, or transfer "many of the domestic responsibilities that the federal government had assumed over the past several decades" (p. xv). Transfers were envisioned being made to state and local governments. This "counterrevolution" was designed to provide "a brighter future for [American] citizens" (p. 7). Emphasis was placed on the contention that "the federal government itself delivers very few services," and that "the federal presence had distorted local priorities, lessened
administrative accountability, and suffocated the growth of institutions which are closer to the citizenry than is Washington (p. 10).

The comment, as noted earlier, came from Reagan's First Inaugural address on January 20, 1981 (Congressional Quarterly, 1982; Evans & Novak, 1981; Palmer & Sawhill, 1982). Inherent in Reagan's strategy was his attempt to redirect government in such a way as to renew a laissez-faire economic doctrine in America.

But government in all modern political systems plays "the key role in setting economic arrangements" (Raskin, 1986, p. 142). Significant to the argument is the belief that the economy of a democracy is "grounded" on the proposition that people have definite collective responsibilities to one another (p. 142). This position was recently advanced, but it runs contrary to A. Smith's political philosophy, and likely that of proponents of the Reagan experiment. In fact, Palmer and Sawhill (1982) said that the Reagan administration had "implicitly rejected" the idea that the federal government had "a commitment to assist the poor regardless of the reasons for their poverty" (p. 25).

Butler (1985) provided an excellent description of mechanisms used to reduce the scope of the government. He said:

Privatization, in effect, requires the reexamination and reclassification of goods currently provided by the government, followed by the application of the most suitable method to transfer some or all of the government's responsibilities into the hands of the private sector. Three principal privatization mechanisms are available. They are load shedding, where the government transfers the tasks of funding and providing the service to the private sector; contracting out, where government directly finances the supply of the service, but uses private sector suppliers; and vouchers, where the government provides consumers with the funds they need to purchase the service in the open market. (p. 52)

None of the three techniques is new to government, especially that of contracting out. However, efforts toward privatization have increased since Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981. Butler's detailed descriptions of load shedding appear on pp. 52-53, contracting out on pp. 53-56, and vouchers on pp. 56-57.

This assumes that government has much to learn from business. American business, however, has fallen on hard times. See Hartle (1985), "Sisyphus Revisited: Running the Government Like a Business," for a current reexamination of the assumption that American business is to be admired for its superb management.
For detailed analysis of Reagan's economic program, see Cannon, 1982; Evans and Novak, 1981; and Stockman, 1987. Palmer and Sawhill provided excellent analysis from Reagan's perspective. Stockman provided an insider's viewpoint that generally criticized Reagan's policies.

Henry (1985) challenged Reagan's philosophy. While Reagan's personal vision of the proper role of government was "passive," the President firmly believed that the private sector could "heal all [of the nation's] wounds, solve all problems on their own" (p. 221). However, Reagan became so intent on determining what government ought not do, he neglected to indicate what government should do. "Naturally, [Reagan] scarcely talked about the problems his own government had created: the budget deficit, the booby-trapping of U.S. Marines enmeshed in a civil war in Lebanon, his own open-ended commitment to insurrectionist terrorism in Nicaragua" (p. 221)
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The objective of this study has been to analyze the evolution of American public administration in the context of the modern administrative state. To achieve this end, I have argued that divergent opinions have existed throughout the American experiment regarding the scope and intensity of the discipline's involvement in democratic government. This diversity continues, as the question of role has never been settled. When considering the size, scope, and complexity of today's administrative state, it may well never be resolved. My major objective has been to show that government is good if it appears to be benefiting people and looking to their general welfare. This definition is generalized and does raise two sets of problems, however: (a) whether "agreement" is possible among divergent peoples and interests on public-good determination; and (b) one of conflict, as good government so defined puts government, as a set of institutions, in direct conflict with private interests. Thus, public administration regulates private interests for the public good. This explains why private interests do not like public administration. They do not like the outcomes of government. This study has attempted to demonstrate that this situation has been institutionalized in the United States over time.
The study considered the breadth of concern for public administration, to include the following arguments by chapter:

In Chapter I, a concise introduction laid out the parameters of the study.

Chapter II considered framers' intent with administration in development of the Constitution. It is argued that the matter of administration was addressed with narrow definitions. But administration was intended to be "public spirited" and motivated by "high civic purpose." The role question may have been left unresolved purposely as the Constitution remains an unfinished work, and is always subject to modification based on relevancy and change.

In Chapter III, discussion considered a self-aware public administration which emerged out of the reform movements begun in the late 1800s. Through much of the early 1900s, public administration was affected by the science of management, and an effort toward making the concept of efficiency the ultimate value of public administration. The discipline experienced its "high noon" period when orthodox theory was adapted by the Brownlow Committee to reinvent the office of the presidency. This effort by then-prominent public administration scholars resulted in what some have described as the most important constitutional document of our time. But public administrators through mid-century were seen largely as an emerging new class of technically oriented administrators who...
enhanced their own power and image. Progressive reformers did not enhance the control and participation of citizens.

In Chapter IV, discussion analyzed the role of public administration as seen by orthodox theory. Administrators were to be value-neutral. They were expected to be efficient in the sense of being "businesslike" and in terms of seeking ways to provide government goods and services at the least expenditure of funds. These concepts were challenged beginning shortly after World War II. I use the model of good government as presented by Waldo (1948) to demonstrate that administrators are and need to be involved in both the politics and the administrative aspects of policy making, and that the value of efficiency in itself is not the proper one for public administration to address as its ultimate value. Efficiency came to mean more than cost effectiveness. It became a much broader focus in that the state demanded effective delivery of promised or necessary services. Public administration's role was evolving in a different direction.

In Chapter V, a new argument is presented: Does effective delivery of services by the state enhance social equity? Should it? What proper role for administrators does social equity entail? These were among the questions presented by advocates of the New Public Administration. They saw public administration's role as one of proactive participant in all arenas of public policy making as advocates of minorities or disadvantaged clients. The New Public Administration asserted itself in areas that raised significant
fears and criticism among those who saw the role of government differently. To whom are these administrators accountable? How do they know the public good? What gives them the right to act as members of a "ruling elite"? Is not this contrary to democratic government? The movement failed largely because of concern regarding these questions.

In Chapter VI, Trusteeship was introduced, as was future consideration of the political realities that the New Public Administration ignored or misunderstood. Trusteeship evolved as an expansion of the New Public Administration, but sought to incorporate lessons learned from the demise of the earlier movement. This is an emerging effort in public administration, and supporting literature is only now emerging. It remains untested. However, advocates have advanced the idea that public administrators need to be involved as mediating social partners with affected social groups as a means of enhancing the public policy process. Citizenship and involvement with citizens, rather than over citizens, is a central theme. Shrewd political style, communicative ethics, and involvement in a pluralistic setting are seen as reasonable, rational, and nonthreatening ways for public administration to effectively develop and enhance a new role in American government. But Trusteeship needs to better promote a plan of action, agenda, and formal program to be considered in a scholarly way. These were matters the New Public Administration did not address. Further, Trusteeship has yet to justify the viability of administrative
elitism. It has not satisfactorily explained why public administrators should hold special status as trustees, when all citizens are trustees under the narrow guidelines outlined by the framers.

I have also stated in summary form the key elements raised or considered in each of the preceding chapters. This was accomplished as an effort to assist readers in understanding and appreciating the study. This collective summary, by chapter, follows.

Chapter I--Introduction

1. American public administration was established with the founding of the United States in 1787.

2. American public administration developed as a serious area of academic inquiry nearly a century ago.

3. American public administration existed in a moral vacuum through much of the 1800s, but became the focal point of the reform movement beginning in the early 1900s.

4. American public administration has made significant contributions to the American form of democratic government.

Chapter II--Development of the American Administrative State

1. The framers were strongly influenced by the Puritan work ethic and concepts of individual freedom, community government, covenant, and rights to property.
2. The framers generally agreed that there is a common interest in liberty which brings civilized people together to draft constitutions and to form governments.

3. One of the major arguments favoring the new Constitution was that a strong central government was needed to protect individual rights.

4. Although the separation of powers was never seriously debated in Philadelphia, the framers found great difficulty in finding the proper mechanism for implementing the concept. Representation became the primary issue of debate.

5. On the matter of administration, the framers provided very narrow definitions. An administrative state was created, but an administrative class was not.

6. The constitutional debates generally identified two distinct guiding philosophies for the new nation: that of the pursuit of public purpose or that of private interest.

7. Upon establishment of the new government, the prevailing guiding philosophy was one of public purpose. A guiding philosophy, more than anything else, would set the course for the proper role of public administration at any point in time.

Chapter III--Development of Good Government

1. American public administration was at the forefront of the Progressive Movement at the turn of the century to rid the
government of corruption and to restore a moral sense to administration.


3. Orthodox public administration was widely accepted as an effective and efficient approach to democratic government. Orthodoxy stressed organizational efficiency as the primary value of good government. Administrators were seen as value-neutral on matters of public policy. Politics (expression by policy makers of the will of the state) and administration (execution of political decisions) were seen as entirely separate aspects of government. Organizations were considered effective when operated as well-oiled machines based on the principles of scientific management. Efficient government was also seen as one which functioned in a businesslike manner. There was little room in orthodox public administration for moral choice by administrators. They were merely expected to be effective in their jobs of accomplishing the decisions of policy makers.

4. Gulick's (1933) "gospel of efficiency" became the focus of what constituted good government.

5. Reliance of the American federal government on good government during the Great Depression and World War II resulted in the heyday of orthodox public administration. It was welcomed as part of the solution to America's major practical problems. The work of
the Brownlow Committee was seen in terms of the most important constitutional document of our time.

6. Public purpose political philosophy of government continued during this period of administrative need.

7. American public administration developed as a "unified discipline." Efficiency remained as the ultimate value of public administration, not in the context of cutting costs alone, but rather in the demand of citizens for administration to effectively deliver promised or necessary services.

Chapter IV--Critique of the "Unified Discipline"

1. American public administration began to question the value of orthodoxy, in total, to modern organizational theory and practice.

2. Leading public administration scholars began to seriously question the validity of the "gospel of efficiency."

3. American public administration came to admit that politics and administration did not exist separately, and, in fact, they never had. Attention began to focus on administrators as participants in the political process.

4. Doubt was cast on the principles of the science of administration as being both scientifically and ethically valid.

5. Public administrationists began to question how and why the business values and practices were applied to government.
6. American public administration was judged to be absent of an administrative theory.

7. The decline of orthodoxy and the idea of efficiency are myths. Nonpublic administrationists view both as still important to the mission of public administration.

8. Waldo's model of a "political theory of public administration" has been invaluable to the discipline because it forced public administration to be self-critical and to rethink its purpose and role in American government.

Chapter V--Client-Centered Activism: The New Public Administration

1. The inadequacy of orthodoxy led American public administration to re-examine the discipline in terms of human relations theory.

2. The New Public Administration was advanced by several scholars in the 1960s who sought to make the public bureaucracy more responsible and responsive to contemporary issues and problems. Orthodox public administration was seen as out of tune with modern administrative needs. Government was seen by advocates of the new movement as being unresponsive, inefficient, and inhumane.

3. The New Public Administration was seen as the means to overcome these shortcomings. This movement, advanced by public administrators, placed client-centered activism, humanism, and social equity at the forefront of administrative concerns. Human
dignity was envisioned as the ultimate value of a public service ethic. Attention shifted from emphasis on good management techniques and efficiency toward concern for values, ethics, and administrative compassion.

4. Administrators were seen as being non-neutral on any matter of importance to the public interest, including the prospect of not being neutral on moral issues. New Public Administrators sought to embrace the ideal of civic virtue: a heroic devotion to justice, a willingness to sacrifice comfort and riches for the public weal, and a certain elevation of the soul.

5. The new role of administrators was seen as being justified by constitutional design. New Public Administrators considered themselves as members of an administrative elite. As such, administrators encountered a whole new set of problems in the world of political reality, especially that their perceived role in a power position of client advocate gave them an unfair advantage in the pluralistic setting of competing elites. Administrators did not consider this problem when the New Public Administration was begun.

6. The New Public Administration was based on a first principle of moral propositions. The exercise of administrative power in a democratic society was seen as an effort toward morally compelling ends. But how the New Public Administration comes to know the "good" has been treated with ambiguity in the literature. Answers to this question remain unsettled.
7. Criticism of the New Public Administration was harsh, but consistent. Critics questioned advocates' interpretation of the "good," their status as administrative elites, and their actions as a matter of questionable accountability and administrative responsibility. The ultimate value of human dignity was challenged. The idea of administrative compassion was challenged.

8. New Public Administration countered the challenges by identifying a whole new set of values to justify human dignity arguments. These included (a) citizen responsiveness, (b) worker and citizen participation in the decision process, (c) the equitable distribution of public services, (d) the provision of a range of citizen choices, and (e) administrative responsibility for program effectiveness.

9. Despite criticism, the New Public Administration stimulated further thoughts on what public administration's role in American government should be. The question has been unsettled throughout the American experience. However, questions of values and ethics have remained as major concerns of public administration.

10. The New Public Administration reaffirmed the belief that public administration is a political process. It also reaffirmed rejection of the fact-value distinction from orthodox theory. The movement helped public administration to begin focusing more on the consequences of public policies as outcomes, and their effects on both government and the governed. Also, as a result of the
movement, social equity was introduced as a concept for the means of ensuring organizational effectiveness.

11. The New Public Administration helped increase awareness of and sensitivity to the possibilities of government being more responsible, representative, and relevant. However, the role envisioned by the movement proved to be inconsistent with the needs of American government.

12. Proponents of the New Public Administration generally advocated the public purpose philosophy of American government. Opponents were largely supportive of the philosophy of private interest.

Chapter VI--Trusteeship: Administrators as Social Partners

1. Trusteeship was an outgrowth of the New Public Administration, in which consideration was given to learn from the mistakes of the earlier effort, especially in matters relating to political reality. Trusteeship advocates thought that administrators needed to adapt to a shrewd political style. This especially includes recognition that public administration regulates private interests for the public good.

2. Trusteeship is difficult to analyze now because it is an emerging effort with a small body of literature to support it. No substantive criticism has yet been advanced.
3. Errors of the New Public Administration movement awakened public administration to better understand the political philosophies of public purpose and private interest, in addition to their application in government.

4. Current anti-government sentiment is traceable in part to the failure of the New Public Administration. Proactive administrators are seen as threats to advocates of private interest. They do not like the outcomes of government and, thus, oppose it. The economization model of government runs contrary to public purpose philosophy.

5. Efficiency in the sense of the private sector is not compatible with efficiency in the sense of the public sector. Efficiency does not apply to government as a value.

6. Trusteeship argues that the American administrative state, up to the emergence of the New Public Administration, operated in a strongly functional manner, seeking to gradually enhance its own image and power through a technically oriented class of administrators.

7. Trusteeship envisions the role of administrators as fiduciaries who feel morally obligated to help citizens understand and participate in citizenship. Advocates disagree on the status of administrators: Some view administrators as members of a "ruling elite," while others contend that they are coproducers of public policy with citizens. I argue that the more proper role is that of the trustee understood as a mediating social partner rather than as
an elitist policy definer with broad discretion. Trusteeship cannot justify administrative elitism. It has yet to explain why public administrators should hold special status as trustees, when all citizens are trustees under the narrow guidelines outlined by the framers.

8. Trusteeship views the ultimate values of public administrators as those of allegiance, autonomy, knowledge and competence, and guild loyalty.

9. Trusteeship encourages communicative ethics in public administration to stimulate effective communication with citizens in an available, open, and interesting manner. Administrators' roles are seen as those which would seek power with the citizens, rather than power over the citizenry.

10. Too much of the literature of public administration and ethics is written in an abstract philosophical vacuum. Scholarship is needed to help make government interesting to citizens.

11. Trusteeship needs to better promote a plan of action, agenda, and formal program to be considered in a scholarly way. These were matters the New Public Administration did not address.

Recommendations for Further Study

In relation to the existence of the government of the United States of America, the field of public administration is an old profession. But it is one that seems to be struggling for recognition as the unified discipline that it once was considered as
being. Part of the problem seems to be the very nature of the profession and of the American system of government. For example, some have stated that public administration is actually an interdisciplinary process comprised of, or borrowing from, other disciplines such as political science, sociology and anthropology, law, economics, business management, psychology, and management science (Barton & Chappell, 1985). Critics allege that public administration "lacks a paradigm or a commonly agreed upon body of knowledge" (p. 259). Rice (1976) contended that American public administration suffered from an identity crisis because "the field has been flooded with literature that has no sense of direction" (p. 76). Sayre (1958) believed that the field was "ultimately a problem in political theory" (p. 105), but that it needed to develop a sense of moral significance before consideration of the thesis could be competently made. And Waldo (1980) suggested that the discipline had a long way to go in this regard when he challenged that the matter of ethics was a "neglected" and a "rejected" interest among public administrationists (p. 108).

Clearly, the future of academic inquiry into American public administration has many ripe possibilities for further study. Based on research and observations with respect to this dissertation, suggestion for further study falls into two categories, ethics and constitutionalism. Specific suggestions are as follows:
Ethics

Waldo (1980) called ethics a "poorly 'mapped' terrain" (p. 184). The literature of American public administration lacks guidance about the kinds of ethical problems that arise within the arena of public policy development and implementation. "No systematic bringing together" of ethical codes in relation to large-scale organizations has occurred, said Waldo (p. 184), and no serious effort has yet been realized which explains the areas where ethical problems are posed or that explain applicable ethical principles. Waldo's concerns need to be addressed before the field of American public administration develops a sense of moral significance.

Further, training of public administrationists must be improved on the matter of ethics. Proactive administration requires it. The ancient Greeks believed, as do scholars interested in involving public administrationists on matters of social equity and responsible bureaucracy (Frederickson & Chandler, 1984), that training in ethics is possible and necessary. But too few American graduate schools offering public administration degree programs stress the importance of ethics (Stallings, 1986). Emphasis, for example, has been on "particular problems of day-to-day practical administration" (p. 239). Public administration cannot overcome the burden of being a "neglected" or "rejected" interest unless academic
efforts are initiated with the purpose of including ethics as a matter of practical education (Waldo, 1980, p. 108).

**Constitutionalism**

Further exploration of the concept of Trusteeship is worthwhile. If its main principles are based on the belief that practitioners of public administration are constitutional officers, convincing arguments need to be demonstrated to establish a paradigm so that a sense of direction can be made. The literature has only recently begun to emerge, which presents a serious problem for scholarly inquiry. It remains untested. It is not widely understood. Public-purpose/private-interest philosophies of government need to be explored and could significantly add to the understanding and awareness of trusteeship efforts. Few current public administration histories even go beyond cursory explanation of the roots of American political philosophy. Thus, meaning is lost and purpose remains undiscovered.
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