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BOOK REVIEWS

Due to the level of response to the special issue topic, the Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare does not contain any book reviews this issue. This section will return in our September 2011 issue.
Thinking about Peace, Conflict, and War:
An Introduction to the Special Issue

Special Editors

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This special issue had humble beginnings. As a matter of fact, odds were stacked against it, especially given that the original plan for this topic was for a panel discussion based on submitted work to the 2009 Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP) Conference. However, not one abstract was received for this topic. I found this quite curious and alarming since at that time this country was engaged in two wars, there was continuous media coverage around “terrorist” activities, and we were experiencing frequent changes to our daily routines based on new security measures. Anti-war protestors were growing silent. It has been said that “sometimes no action is an action.” The lack of peace talk, or discussion of ending conflict and war was shocking—at least to me.

I am old enough to remember Vietnam. I remember the protests and hearing plans from older “boys” to cross to Canada. I remember the activism on college campuses across the county from students organizing and shouting their views. I remember the news reports showing the destruction and disruption.
of everyday lives. I remember the picture of the young girl running naked down the barren street of her town after being burned by the explosion of a bomb. I remember all of this vividly ... and this was at a time when there was no internet or instant access to images from cell phones or web-cameras.

Given these experiences and adding many more that have occurred over the last 30 or so years, I still think about peace. What would it look like? Can we ever achieve it? Why is there so much conflict and war? What stops us from peace? When I shared the news with my colleagues at the SSSP that I did not receive any abstracts for the proposed session on Peace, Conflict and War, I was heartened to hear encouragement from my colleagues and Robert Leighninger, the Editor of this journal. He offered to print a note to readers requesting that they write about this topic. From this note, Dan Liechty emerged as a fellow thinker on this topic. Together we proposed a special issue on the topic of peace, conflict and war that was accepted by JSSW.

Our call for papers went out last year. The responses were slow to trickle in, making us wonder even more about the silence surrounding this topic. Another email blast went out to various academic disciplines, including peace studies departments. Manuscripts came pouring in towards the end of the submission period. Through a peer-review process, Dan and I selected diverse, and perhaps unconventional, scholarship for this special issue.

The contributions included in this collection cover a broad range of material, which we present in thematic pairs. The first essay introduces the topic and invites readers into a reflective and philosophical consideration of the subject. Michael Allen Fox notes that too often our reflexive understanding of peace actually presupposes the priority of war and conflict as constants, with peace as an absence of war, or at least in contrast to war. Fox challenges us to be more creative in our concept of peace, approaching peace as an imaginative concept in its own right, quite apart from our customary pairing of peace with war. As we do this, many of the commonplaces about human nature and social institutions are called into question, which in turn yields a clearer picture of the hidden trade-offs we make by supporting war and war preparations.
The pair of essays following Fox's article draws attention to concrete experiences in global peace work. These essays serendipitously prove to be very timely in the context of world affairs. First, Joseph G. Bock highlights some of the unanticipated partnerships, alliances and programs that have emerged as human service focused NGOs have gradually contoured their guiding philosophies toward peace and justice concerns in the wake of the passing Cold War era. Then Shaazka Beyerle examines the connections between political and economic corruption that occur in areas of armed conflict and military government. This corruption is felt at the popular level as a basic denial of human rights and freedom. This type of oppression has been successfully ameliorated through movements of civil resistance and grassroots efforts to combat corruption.

The next pair of essays focuses on peace education and activism within academic institutions. One of the byproducts of recent U.S. political history has been a pervasive identification with patriotism and militarism among the populace. One result of this is that military recruiters have been given a degree of access to adolescents not seen for an entire generation. Scott Harding and Seth Kershner report on efforts to challenge such access through organized counter-recruitment programs in secondary schools. Following this, Eric Swank and Breanne Fahs describe their studies to better understand and articulate the complexity of factors involved in decisions of undergraduate-level social work students to become politically engaged in antiwar activism.

The next two contributions focus generally on the issue of religion and conflict. As these essays are written from the perspective of advocate-believers, it might surprise some that they were chosen for inclusion in a journal of social sciences. Therefore, a bit of explanation is in order. Each is worthy in its own right. However, pairing the two yields, we believe, even more than the sum of the parts. Whereas many in our society, and even in the academy, may associate the Islamic faith with coerced religious conformity and Buddhism with high levels of social tolerance, these essays drive home the point that in concrete historical situations, both of these religions have served to justify coercion and violence, as well as peace and social tolerance. In both of the articles, the authors, Liyakat
Takim, who looks at Islam, and Masumi Hayashi-Smith, who addresses Buddhism, suggest that the deepest and original "core values" of the religion grow out of and support attitudes of peace, pluralism and social tolerance. However, through sudden or gradual co-optation of the religion by the governing powers, both religions lent themselves to interpretations supporting warfare, coercion and social intolerance. In each of these essays, the author makes the case for concerted disentanglement of the religion from the legal and political assumptions of state and government, and to once again allow believers' attitudes and ethics to be contoured by the original core values of the religion. Social observers will notice in these essays the emergence of concepts and ideas that directly echo the experiences of other great religions, especially of western Christianity, which became the religion of state and subsequently transitioned into institutions within democratic societies in which religion and state are formally, legally and constitutionally separated. Most specifically, we see the employment of an historicist hermeneutic for reading sacred texts which retains the communal authority of the text itself while simultaneously criticizing the ossification of particular interpretive traditions around the text.

The contribution of S. Elizabeth Snyder was chosen to end this collection because this essay brings together many of the themes present throughout the collection. The summary vision of this collection is that we must transition from being cultures of war into becoming cultures of peace. Elizabeth Snyder contends that German society, in conscious reaction to its significant role as a perpetrator of war during the 19th and 20th centuries, developed a deep vein of antimilitarism among its people and a sincerely held desire to create a culture of peace. At the same time, Germany also endeavored to maintain itself as a full and active member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This entailed significant commitment to maintaining a military force and relatively high levels of military spending. While these competing social trends of becoming a culture of peace and maintaining NATO involvement coexisted successfully, if at times uneasily, during the time when NATO focus was primarily within the European Theater, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain as NATO, at the prodding primarily
of the U.S., is expected to supply troops and treasure for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. There is clear evidence of open dispute between those in German society who seek to continue movement in the direction of a culture of peace and those who want to see more dutiful support for NATO and its U.S.-led policies. Snyder’s essay ends, in effect, posing to German society the ancient perennial question. "Quo vadis?" Where are we heading? Will we move forward in creating world cultures of social peace and tolerance, or will we lose ground and continue to be defined by forces of fear, militarism and war?

Although social scientists are rightfully hesitant in much of their work to step out of their roles as objective observers and into the roles of advocates, in terms of the question Snyder’s essay poses—of whether or not we move forward toward building a culture of peace—we are all actively engaged and the role of (disinterested) objective observer seems mightily out of place.

Thus, we end this collection with a commentary by Michael D. Knox. Knox’s credibility and reputation as a social science researcher has been firmly established over a long career, yet Knox has now clearly and unapologetically moved into the role of peace advocate. Employing his wealth of knowledge about human social processes, Knox outlines the very concrete steps being taken by a peace advocacy organization he leads to raise the profile of peace education in the U.S. Whether or not readers feel animated by Knox’s particular project, his work reminds us that as social scientists we do not live in a vacuum. Our accumulated professional knowledge places an even greater burden of responsibility on our shoulders than would otherwise be the case.

This special issue of The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare is conceived and offered in the expectation that we can move forward toward greater social peace and tolerance, as citizens of our respective nations, as world citizens, and as a collective species.
Thinking about Peace Today

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Discussing peace—and how to get to and maintain situations, practices, and socio-political structures that build peace—is of the greatest urgency. But the first step, both psychologically and epistemologically, is overcoming preoccupation with war and resistance to thinking about peace. This article takes on these problems and lays essential groundwork for substantive discussion of peace. Attractions of war and myths of war are deconstructed, and negative views of humans' capacity for peaceful behavior are examined and rejected. Wide-ranging costs of war and war-preparedness are also exposed. The value of peace is then discussed. A concluding section offers a list of "home truths" (beliefs that invite universal assent), from which constructive reflection on peace might begin.

Keywords: peace, peace-building, war, resistance, peaceful behavior

The Obstacle of War

Some of the best thinking about humans as social and political beings has been devoted to peace. But a far greater amount has undoubtedly been devoted to war. Indeed, war hovers, like some abstract entity, just beneath the surface of daily life and, tragically often enough, occupies the surface itself. Even
when war is not "hot" in some geographical area near you, it consumes many resources while biding its time and exercising its metaphorical presence—as in the sentence just phrased. War appears in everyday discourse not just as a metaphor but even as a model for conscientious action. Campaigns to improve the human lot, for example, are often characterized as: "war on poverty," "war against climate change," "war on hunger," "war against HIV/AIDS," "war on child abuse," and so on. Over the past few years, the "war on terror" has been on the front page and the evening news more or less daily, and this ill-considered concept has licensed a spectrum of illegal and immoral behaviors, from systematic lying by elected leaders to the dark excesses of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, which are comparable to wartime crimes of the past (Cortright, 2008). Think you’ve heard it all? You haven’t. Surfing the crest of the war on terror wave, the Civil Aviation Authority of Australia now declares "war on error" (Marchbank, 2009), an educational "roadshow" aimed at reducing pilot mistakes.

War is free for the taking in lots of ways. Some say that in contrast, peace has to be "sold," that there is a problem of "marketing peace" to those who know little and maybe think less about it, or else are just downright skeptical of the idea. Why should there be a problem of this kind? It seems absurd. But let’s accept the premise and see where we can go from there. Peace scholar David Cortright remarked that: "Throughout history the cause of peace has been on trial, standing like a forlorn defendant before the court of established opinion, misunderstood and maligned on all sides" (Cortright, 2008, p. 1). Cortright’s reflection suggests that the answer to the "why" question posed earlier can be framed as follows: Peace is an unfamiliar and poorly understood concept and reality. Perhaps it has been too seldom experienced—or in the case of some people, hardly tasted at all. Learned observers note that there have been fewer inter-state wars in recent times; that democracies do not go to war with one another; and that war as a useful extension of national policy and means of pursuing political objectives is a thing of the past. Perhaps so, but this does not prevent wars from occurring in abundance, and increasingly they are intra-state civil wars, guerrilla-led insurgencies, explosions of ethnic violence, criminal power-struggles, and
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proxy wars. However, as war historian Jeremy Black cautioned,

It is possible that low-intensity warfare will be that which is most common in the future, but, equally, across much of the world there is no effective restraint on the ambitions and activities of states, and the continued combination of issues over which to dispute, and bellicose leaderships, may lead to serious levels of warfare between regular forces. (Black, 1998, p. 235)

Since war is such a familiar part of human life, past and present, and peace, by contrast, occupies the shadows, it follows that in order to think about peace, we first have to get past thinking about war. This requires us to move beyond some pretty formidable and influential ideas. These are, for example: that war brings out the best qualities in men; that it is a "manly art"; that it makes men out of boys; that a nation comes of age through armed conflict, its defining moment being some famous battle or a particular war; that the most honorable way in which one can serve one's country (or group) is by shedding blood for it. Such ideas have not served humanity well—rather, just the opposite. They have led us blindly into more and more wars, genocides, arms races, and ultimately, to the constant state of war-readiness we find ourselves in today—a kind of unending war, as some observers have called the situation. Wars have cost our species and the planet hugely both in terms of their casualties and other consequences and the resources consumed by war-preparedness. What is it all for? Are we stuck forever within cultures of violence? Do we lack the intelligence, will, moral fiber, and sense of world community to find better ways of conducting our affairs? Is it in our genes to be warriors? Is there something specifically wrong with how males are constituted or socialized that leads to war? Are there forces in history with their own irresistible momentum that bring about periodic clashes? Or, on the other hand, are there perhaps many valuable templates already in existence for building relationships, negotiation strategies, trust, and modes of behaving that can provide alternatives to war and even terrorism? As Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pondered in 2008, on the ninetieth anniversary of Armistice Day, "...is war our permanent condition? Must every generation go through
war to be reminded why there should be no war? Or can we
dare to do something different, can we dare to think something
different?” (Rudd, 2008). The questions pile up like the dead
and maimed that humans continue to produce in warfare.

Many have raised these questions and more, wondering
whether humans are fatefully warlike and locked into perenni-
al cycles of mortal combat. To be sure, no one can claim to have
complete answers to the deep questions about war because
abundant areas of uncertainty still persist in our knowledge
about our own species. Even if we could gather together all of
the world’s psychologists and psychiatrists, it is unlikely they
could explain everything we need to know in order to create
a world free from war and violent conflict. But we can try to
move forward with the insights we’ve achieved and the tools
we have for understanding and promoting the factors that
make peace possible, with the aim of stimulating new and dif-
f erent thought and feeling processes that may promise better
choices than those made in the past.

War Myths

In keeping with the commitment to examine and move
beyond barriers that block thinking about peace, it will be
useful to expose some myths. Of course myths alone do not
explain war. A monocausal account could never do justice to
the complexities of war, and no attempt will be made here to
provide a comprehensive explanation of why wars occur. This
would be an entirely different and far more ambitious project.
But, whatever else might be said about war, it lives in the
domain of myth, and this applies both to the factors that help
bring it about and to those that create and sustain ideas such
as that of the “demonic enemy.” As psychologist Lawrence
LeShan pointed out, war brings about a shift from the normal
or “sensory mode” of perceiving reality to a “mythic mode”
(LeShan, 1992) with a logic of its own. Journalist Chris Hedges,
who has reported on-the-scene from numerous wars, explained
this “logic”:

The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its
destruction and carnage, it can give us what we long
for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for
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living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. ... And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble. And those who have the least meaning in their lives ... are all susceptible to war’s appeal. (Hedges, 2003, pp. 3-4)

Looking back at his own experience of war’s addictive allure, Hedges added: “The chance to exist for an intense and overpowering moment, even if it meant certain oblivion, seemed worth it in the midst of war—and very stupid once the war ended” (Hedges, 2003, p. 5).

War also thrives on symbolism and imaginative associations, and it has been remarked, in this vein, that: “Wars commence in our culture first of all, and we kill each other in euphemisms and abstractions long before the first ... missiles have been launched. ... The deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon ...” (Thompson, as cited in Zwicker, 1983, p. 7).

It is partly these myths and subconscious connections to which Black referred when he observed that in studying wars, past or present, “Rather than focusing on individual conflicts, it is more important to understand the values that made compromise unacceptable, force appear necessary and even desirable, and war seem crucial to identity and self-respect” (Black, 1998, p. 242).

According to the first and most prominent myth about war the history of humankind is equivalent to the story of great deeds done by famous rulers and leaders (mostly men) and the wars they have prepared for and fought. Peace, viewed from this standpoint, consists of the dull, uneventful periods in between wars that are unworthy of investigation. Aside from begging questions about the nature of peace, peace as a desirable goal, and avenues by which to reach a peaceful world, this outlook neglects the positive phenomenon of peaceful everyday interactions that predominate among humans (Fry, 2007; Tomasello, 2009), as well as the perspective that history cannot be written without reference to the actions and ways of life of average people throughout the ages.

Second, there is the myth that wars solve human problems and advance interests more effectively than other kinds of
engagements. The fact that wars are recurrent should by itself show that (with a very few, debatable exceptions) they do not solve problems, or at best, do so only temporarily and partially, while sowing the seeds for nationalism, inter-group hatred, revenge-seeking, defective political arrangements and boundaries, and therefore, for future conflict. At the end of the day communication, respectful coexistence, and sometimes even forgiveness and reconciliation, are the only ways to bury hostilities with finality. As one social scientist observed, “What all wars have in common is the unmistakable moral lesson that homicide is an acceptable, even praiseworthy, means to certain ends” (MacNair, 2003, p. 51). But following this go-nowhere teaching can only yield negative feedback: aggression begets more aggression, violence, more violence, and war, more war, if they remain unchecked by negotiation and nonviolent resolution. Surely bitter experience has taught us that there is no “war to end war”—or has it?

A third, associated myth is that wars—or “military actions” that perpetrators seek not to have thought of as wars, invasions, or acts of aggression—are undertaken (always) in defense of shared ideals and a cherished way of life. On the contrary, historical examples show that in warfare, economic, class, and other factors are often front-and-center, and that private political aspirations, the jingoism of particular interest groups, and various ideological factors are rife. While it is simplistic and one-dimensional to argue that in all wars the poor and disadvantaged serve the interests of the rich and powerful, a stark slogan from the First World War—“A bayonet is a weapon with a worker on both ends”—makes us wonder whether this perspective embodies a significant grain of truth. Widespread opposition to, and public demonstrations against, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, both in America and abroad, also bring into focus the question of whose values, interests, and political judgments were driving these conflicts.

The preceding paragraph may put one in mind of a fourth myth, expressed in the belief that traditional notions of a just war can still be defended today. While just war theory has a long and distinguished career, to be sure, in the age of aerial bombardment, and nuclear and other contemporary weapons, killing has become actually and potentially more
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indiscriminate, making the concept of “just war” highly tenuous. And because, as mentioned previously, warfare not only promotes actions that would be considered clearly immoral in any other context, and frequently serves vested interests of one kind or another, it may turn out that just war theory will itself become either a casualty of philosophical critiques (Francis, 2004) or at least an extremely restricted category for rationalizing armed conflict (Lucas, 2007).

Fifth, there is the myth that human nature is inherently aggressive and warlike. A widely-held theory claims that war “has played an integral role in our evolution.” Specifically, “[t]he theory ... suggests the cooperative skills we’ve had to develop to be effective warriors have turned into the modern ability to work towards a common goal” (Holmes, 2008, p. 8). Some might infer that such a view is perhaps merely another vaguely disguised glorification of war, a coopting of our peaceful instincts by a view about our inborn (biologically determined) aggressiveness. However, it would be facile to draw these conclusions, given that the theory stems from research findings in a number of fields that tend toward a consensus. More importantly, the outlook under consideration tells us that although cooperative tendencies evolved from warlike ones, they have taken on a life of their own and thus play a real, independent role in human affairs. Looking at the theory in this way helps us avoid endorsing the fallacious belief that how things once were tells us how they will be, ought to be, or even must be. What has occurred or might have occurred during the ancient (and not so ancient) past life of our species is a very unreliable and not necessarily desirable guide to how things might or should be, either now or in the future. The premise for the statement just made is that humans are capable of choice, rational reflection and analysis, and hence also of change. Unless one accepts some form of rigid determinism, no biological or anthropological account can provide everything we require in order to understand the past or plan for the future. Not only this, but humans are showing every sign of being able to control their own future evolution. ("Being able" does not, of course, entail that we are yet willing to take on the task in a responsible manner, and to use this potential wisely.) While some aspects of human nature may be relatively
constant, our species is noteworthy for having reinvented itself many times over. As recent brain research on "neuroplasticity" keeps demonstrating, humans are not so "hard-wired" into stereotypical patterns of thinking and response as many suppose (Doidge, 2007; Eliot, 2009).

A century ago, William James, psychologist, philosopher, confirmed pacifist, and proponent of the idea that humanity exists in a state of unending war, confidently proclaimed—as if it were a truism needing no argumentative or empirical support: "Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us" (James, 1987/1910, p. 1283). But as we've seen, this view is now being challenged on both historical and scientific grounds. And if recently proposed revisions to Darwinian theory prevail, the previously scorned idea that "environment can alter heredity" may eventually take hold (Burkeman, 2010), opening up new possibilities for changing human behavior for the better—if we so choose.

We can now begin to see more clearly that evolutionary traits revealed in the human past do not license inferences about the inevitability of war and other forms of violent conflict in the future. The claim that "war is in our genes," therefore, should be rejected. Leaving aside possible supplements to the theory of natural selection, a growing body of empirical research tends toward the conclusion that, even if humans' evolution into peaceful beings is not guaranteed, it's equally evident that war cannot simply be rationalized as a kind of "biological compulsion" (Horgan, 2009). Furthermore, inasmuch as belief in the inevitability of something tends to make that thing inevitable (a self-fulfilling prophecy), we need to be on guard against any such belief, for it negates humans' decision-making capacity and consequently the ability to change the course of events in which they are involved. Immanuel Kant, the brilliant Enlightenment philosopher, entertained the theory that:

war itself requires no particular motivation, but appears to be ingrained in human nature and is even valued as something noble; indeed, the desire for glory inspires men to it, even independently of selfish motives.
Consequently, courage in war (among American Indians as well as during Europe's chivalric period) is judged to be of immediate and great worth not only during war (as is reasonable), but also in order that war might be, and often war is begun only as a means to display courage. As a result, an intrinsic worth is bestowed on war, even to the extent that philosophers, unmindful of that Greek saying, 'War is a bad bet because it produces more evil people than it eliminates,' have praised it as having a certain ennobling influence on mankind. (Kant, 1983/1795, p. 123; emphasis original)

This is a very perceptive and interesting blend of two views: the belief that humans are innately warlike and the idea that war has the magic transformative power to actualize the finest aspects of human nature. Kant concedes a certain amount of truth to both views, but it is of much greater importance to notice that the context in which he discusses them—his famous essay on "perpetual peace"—builds a strong argument on behalf of a rational arrangement of mutual interest by which nations can abolish war.

We needn't be frightened, then, of the theory that war has developed cooperative skills in our own (and closely related) species. Let us assume that war has done so, rather than struggle resignedly against admitting the possibility. Many other activities have also undoubtedly co-developed these same skills. And the conclusion we ought, therefore, to reach is that maybe the route we have followed to this end is in some ways unfortunate, but the cooperative skills now exist and can be used and developed further in new settings. In this respect, as in many others, the future doesn't have to resemble the past, with ourselves as mere passive and despairing onlookers. It can, on the contrary, be consciously, conscientiously fashioned by us, and this gives grounds for hope that we will do so.

Looking again at Kant's comments, we can see that they confirm the claim (also found in the observations by Hedges cited in the previous section) that war produces a strong sense of common purpose and solidarity. This assertion should not be dismissed lightly. It was acknowledgment of this fact that motivated James to introduce the important idea of a
“moral equivalent of war” (James, 1987/1910), that is, some participatory activity or activities that are capable of yielding the same beneficial outcomes for humanity as war does. While James’ and Kant’s accounts expressed the masculinist bias of their times, they nevertheless made an important point, and ongoing research is providing evidence about alternative activities that produce the rewards and emotional outlets often attributed to war (MacNair, 2003). But in the end, the question remains whether, for the vast majority of humans of both sexes (the dead, injured, maimed, and all noncombatants), this is the most relevant issue. Furthermore, given the fragile state of the world today and the costs of war, one group of psychologists remarked that “peace cannot wait until all the data are in” (Winter, Christie, Wagner, & Boston, 2001).

Another perspective that tends to foster pessimism about our species’ warlike nature is Freud’s theory of the “death instinct.” With an intellectual lineage deriving from Empedocles in ancient Greece, this formulation first appeared in Freud’s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle and was developed in several subsequent works. Most of Freud’s early students and followers rejected the theory, with the notable exception of Melanie Klein, but renewed interest in it has been stimulated by French psychoanalysts Jacques Lacan and Jean Laplanche. Philosopher Richard Boothby, an expert on Lacan, argued that the death instinct is “the darkest and most stubborn riddle posed by the legacy of psychoanalysis” (Boothby, 1991, p. 1).

In “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” Freud (1964/1937) argued that there are “unmistakable indications of the presence of a power in mental life which we call the instinct of aggression or of destruction according to its aims, and which we trace back to the original death instinct of living matter” (p. 243). The death instinct entered the scene primarily to explain neurosis, masochism, certain kinds of dreams, and other phenomena as surrogate forms of self-punishment or self-eradication, and human psychic life came to be understood as the site of a struggle between “Eros” (the life instinct) and “Thanatos” (the death instinct). Eros includes impulses that “seek to preserve and unite,” and the death instinct those that are motivated by hatred and “seek to destroy and kill.” Yet Freud insisted that each is equally “essential” to our makeup (Freud, 1964/1933, p. 209).
Which tendency will triumph? Freud eventually postulated that the death drive threatens to overwhelm the life drive in each of us (rather than the reverse, or some state of equilibrium being reached). Against this background, he saw civilization as the somewhat precarious process whereby humans learn to sacrifice raw expression of instinctual drives in favor of stability, sociability, and the rule of law. Instinctual energies are channelled into other avenues of endeavor, and although social disintegration and war are constant disruptive tendencies within the human condition, Freud paradoxically envisioned the possibility that we all may even become pacifists one day (Freud, 1964/1933).

Freud’s death instinct has not gained much traction in psychoanalysis and the social sciences, but it certainly appears to have passed into the everyday and literary imaginations as a way of capturing our predicament, and references to a “collective death wish” are not uncommon in popular culture. This is entirely understandable in view of the persistence of warfare and violence as means of settling disputes and conflicts of various kinds, dealing with offences and exacting revenge, nefarious strategies for advancing interests, and the like; the manufacture and proliferation of high-tech weapons and weapons of mass destruction; and the burgeoning of cultural products concerned with death, destruction, torture, the symbolism of death and aggression, and so on. One might likewise be forgiven for pondering a collective death wish given the neglectful behavior of human beings toward their own kind, and our abuse of other species, the environment, and the planet as a whole.

Whether the idea of a universal death instinct in humans belongs within the realm of fact or fantasy, I shall not judge here. However, as even Freud himself realized, we must resist entrapment by its deterministic tone; we can only act meaningfully when we choose our own destiny as a species, and this entails addressing and taking charge of both the best and the worst in us. Once again, this insight beckons us toward the study of peace as an alternative pathway.

The Costs of War

The devastating effects of war in the modern world need little elaboration, nor does the non-productivity of aggressive
violence on the individual and group levels. But it may help to place the present investigation of peace in perspective if we confront a few facts and figures. To start with, as Cortright (2008) correctly argued, "the permanent mobilization for war that emerged in the wake of World War II reinforced the predisposition of political leaders to use military force and created greater institutional capacities to intervene in the affairs of other countries" (p. 155). Superpowers and other major powers among nations have followed this route numerous times in the postwar decades, because adherence to militarized policy has "devalued diplomatic approaches" (Cortright, 2008, p. 123).

War-preparedness is very costly and it inspires the mindset that: "we've paid for all this stuff, so we'd better use it" (to justify the cost to taxpayers and legislators); or: "we might as well use it" (because it can be used, needs to be tried out, and so on). During the Cold War, there was also the motivation to "use it or lose it," exacerbated by fears of a nuclear first strike. This arguably caused much of the stress and social anxiety of that era, for leaders and citizenry alike, although fortunately the ultimate weapons were never deployed.

Annual global military expenditures in 2009 were reliably estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at 1.53 trillion U.S. dollars. This represents a six percent increase in real terms over the previous year and a forty-nine percent increase since 2000. Nearly half of the world total is accounted for by the American defense budget. In contrast, the entire budget of the United Nations is a pitiful 1.8 percent of the world military expense total (Shah, 2010b). This is the "big picture" cost of war-preparedness. Meanwhile, the gross disparity between the world's rich and poor continues, and is appalling by any measure. Peace and development activist and author Vijay Mehta observed that: "This emphasis on militarism stands in sharp contrast to the social deficit of humanity. Almost half the world's people live in abject poverty" (Mehta, 2006, p. 1). It is easily concluded that diversion of a substantial portion of the massive military costs borne by nations today into solving global problems of living by means other than the use of deadly force and threats is money better spent on finding solutions to our common security issues. With specific reference to the United States, the National Priorities
Project, an Internet resource, invites viewers to see how tax dollars spent on defense (including weapons development) could alternatively be allocated to socially beneficial programs, nationally, by state, by congressional district, and by city, town, or county (National Priorities Project, n.d.).

There is also the "big picture" cost of actual warfare. As can readily be seen, this cost is wholly disproportionate to the investment in human well-being that good sense would prescribe, and opens up a seemingly all-consuming, bottomless pit of financial burden. The U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had 1.26 trillion dollars allocated to them in the period up to March 4, 2011 by the U.S. federal government (National Priorities Project, n.d.). This unfathomable sum does not include: costs to other countries participating in the Coalition; costs borne by individual taxpayers, servicemen and women and their families; loss of government services traded off against military expenditures; and future costs such as medical care for veterans and interest on the national debt incurred by deficit financing (National Priorities Project, n.d.). Nor, of course, does it include all the many costs to the Iraqi and Afghan peoples; to neighboring countries that have had to deal with refugees and other spillover effects; and the collateral damage that is intangible, difficult to verify or quantify, and far-reaching, such as increased hatred and anger toward the U.S. and its allies, the use of Iraq as a terrorist training arena, assaults on civil liberties and international law, fanning the flames of other conflicts, aggravation of personal risk in international travel, and so on. It is typical of warfare to have a large range of costs (including unintended ones) and "invisible," intangible effects that unroll for decades afterwards (Tyner, 2010).

One of these "invisible" or little reported, little considered effects is that on women and children, who traditionally bear many of the costs of war. An example comes from the civil war that has torn apart the Democratic Republic of Congo since August 1998. Although "the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II," as one observer put it (Shah, 2010a, p. 1), this horrible war is "forgotten" by most of us, notwithstanding the involvement of seven countries, and a toll to date of 5.4 million dead and 1.5 million people internally displaced or made
refugees. While children comprise nineteen percent of the population, they represent forty-seven percent of the fatalities (Beaumont, 2010; Shah, 2010a). In addition, "thousands upon thousands of women, girls and children ... suffer brutal sexual violence, which is the worst in the world, the UN says" (Rice, 2008, p. 19). Rape is one of the most universal and egregious forms of human rights violation during periods of armed conflict, women and children having always been regarded as among the spoils of war and as instruments for humiliating the enemy (Jones, 2010).

A second example concerns Israel's invasion of Gaza that began in late December 2008. In this operation over 1,400 people were killed, a large majority of whom were noncombatants, and more than 5,300 were injured. In excess of 5,000 homes were destroyed or severely damaged, another 16,000 "moderately damaged," and subsequent importation of essentials "has been insufficient to meet the needs of the 1.5 million people trapped inside the Gaza Strip" (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 2009, p. 13). Estimates of total damage range up to two billion U.S. dollars and above. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has recently stated:

In particular, the Committee is deeply disturbed by the psychological effects on children in Gaza resulting from [Israel's 2008-09] Operation 'Cast Lead' and the lack of assistance for these children. The Committee is furthermore concerned over the lack of adequate programmes for rehabilitation of children who have been victims of anti-personnel mines. (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2010, point 37)

A more general finding is that: "Among the consequences of war, the impact on the mental health of the civilian population is one of the most significant" (Murthy & Lakshminarayana, 2005, p. 25) with children, not surprisingly, standing out as especially vulnerable.

Another background effect of war—collateral damage to victor and vanquished alike—is the lingering impact upon veterans. Up to twenty percent of service personnel returning from present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but even more alarming
is the fact that nearly sixty percent of those treated at veterans' hospitals are veterans of a war that ended over four decades ago. "Even as Vietnam veterans now enter their 60s and begin to die off," it is reported, "the number seeking P.T.S.D. treatment is growing" (Winerip, 2009, p. 2). Leaving aside the monetary cost of veterans' payouts of all kinds (around 44.7 billion dollars in 2009), one can easily see that a terrible price is being paid by those who fought and still fight these wars.

A final example of the easily ignored or overlooked effects of war is its environmental impact. According to geographer Joni Seager, "Militaries are the world's biggest environmental vandals, whether at war or in peace. ... [T]he environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war" (Seager, 1995, p. xi). But beyond generalities, consider briefly the Gulf War (1990-91). Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces deliberately "dumped approximately one million tons of crude oil [from Kuwait] into the Persian Gulf"; and "Crude oil was also spilled into the desert, forming oil lakes covering 50 square kilometers. In due time the oil percolated into underground aquifers" (Enzler, 2006, p. 1). The effects on wildlife, sea-dwelling food sources, and human health were predictably vast. Meanwhile, Coalition air attacks on Iraqi installations released quantities of nerve gas into the Tigris River, and "Soon after the ceasefire was signed, U.N. observers declared this salient river dead" (Thomas, 1995, p. 123). At the time, it was reported that bombing campaigns in Iraq "consume 12 million gallons of fuel a day," and that the amount of bombs dropped on Iraq and Kuwait "is generally believed to exceed what was used in all of World War II" (Kifner, 1991, p. 1). In addition to obvious military targets, "Croplands, barns and grain silos were ... attacked, along with irrigation floodgates that caused vast incursions of seawater into southern Iraq, killing crops and permanently salting farmland" (Thomas, 1995, p. 124). A group of scientific researchers, in the conclusion of their article, noted simply that "The Iraqi occupation and the subsequent armed conflict devastated the terrestrial environment of Kuwait" (Omar, Briskey, Misak, & Asem, 2000, p. 336).

The preceding account provides only a minute slice of the actual or suspected environmental damage resulting from this war. Recovery and rehabilitation of regional ecosystems have
been long-term processes and some good outcomes have been claimed (Omar, et al., 2000; Brauer, 2009). In the larger context, there are ongoing discussions in the literature aimed at defining accountability for ecological damage in wartime and developing guidelines that will help limit negative environmental consequences in military operations (Austin & Bruch, 2000; Brauer, 2009). It is important to observe here that the issue is not whom we should blame for starting a particular conflict; who did the most damage; whether recovery and rehabilitation are viable after technologically advanced warfare; or whether national policies to restrict environmental destruction in wartime can be framed (in the spirit of just-war doctrine). The point is that war and a healthy planet are incompatible states of affairs.

Ron Paul, a Texas Republican congressman, physician, and U.S. Air Force veteran, has written that: “The cost of war is always more than anticipated. If all the costs were known prior to the beginning of a war, fewer wars would be fought” (Paul, 2005, p. 1). This assessment may be too optimistic, as it assumes a level of rationality tragically often bracketed out of the equation that leads to war-making. Nevertheless, Paul’s conclusion that: “Most wars could be avoided with better diplomacy, a mutual understanding of minding one’s own business, and respect for the right of self-determination” (p. 1) shines forth as a truth we would all do well to memorize and implement.

Why We Need Peace

Given the level of violence in the world today, as well as the waste of resources and human potential that war and preparations for war represent, there is an acute need for peace everywhere. War and preparations for war are bad for all living things—socially, economically, environmentally, and in terms of survival and basic well-being. To say that war is bad for us is one thing; to say that peace is good for us is another. Some, but not all, will regard the latter, as much as the former, as obviously true. I hope this essay will have shown it to be so. Nothing can be lost, however, and much is to be gained, by briefly reviewing why we need peace.
One way to pursue this goal is to invoke the perspectives of "negative peace" and "positive peace," as they are commonly called. My argument is that we can readily discern the benefits of peace under both of these headings. Negative peace refers to the absence of war and violent hostilities. This includes or may include the cessation of armed conflict, the ending of territorial occupation, the withdrawal and decommissioning of armaments and armed forces, arms limitation treaties, amnesties, and the like. Negative peace offers relief or freedom from war, which is an essential prerequisite for the resumption and continuation of everyday life. Clearly, negative peace, if maintained, offers the benefits of security, repatriation, rebuilding, and reconciliation. It doesn't take peace scholars, though, to make people realize that this is only part of the story, and this is where positive peace comes into the picture.

Positive peace signifies the domain of options afforded by negative peace and what can be accomplished therein. We may call this "real peace" because it embraces all the processes and projects out of which a better world can emerge. Perhaps it will be objected that to speak of a peaceful world as a better world begs the question whether peace is a preferable state of affairs. Against this, however, it must be observed that peace offers many benefits that war and preparation for war grossly stunt or eliminate, and that rational choice would clearly seem to favor. Examples are: replacement of tension-driven rhetoric by less alienating and more constructive forms of discourse; greater scope for developing healthy, cooperative relations among nations and peoples; the chance to improve national infrastructures, education and other human resources; the prospect of dismantling forms of structural violence (such as poverty, hunger and political repression) with greater energy and the redirection of effort to matters of equality and equal opportunity; the chance to focus more carefully on environmental issues and even to exploit the potential for evolving international environmental cooperation as a means to build sustainable global peace; the opening up of space for personal transformation (so-called "inner peace"); and in general, the encouragement to think about alternative ways of coexisting that have not been thought of or tried out before. Peace is not an easy path, for very entrenched psychological traits and habits stand in the way, but the rewards are worth the effort.
The Appeal of Peace

Historian Michael Howard wrote: "Peace may or may not be 'a modern invention' but it is certainly a far more complex affair than war" (Howard, 2000, pp. 1-2). If so, then it may be that peace needs to be "sold" after all, if only in the sense that informing ourselves concerning what peace is and might be all about is the first step toward achieving a peaceful world. In keeping with this objective, I close with a series of observations labelled "home truths," which I hope will reinforce the reflections on why we need peace offered in the previous section. Specifically, these statements are intended to be expressions of common sense that invite a more detailed consideration of peace by each of us.

Home Truths

• All members of our species (not to mention other species) have a common interest in survival.
• Humans have survived evolution thus far because of their social skills (including caring and nurturing behavior) as well as communication skills, rather than because of their aggressive and violent tendencies.
• Security (a sense of safety and a positive quality of life) is a common interest of all human beings. Nationally, security signifies territorial integrity, the preservation and flourishing of certain values and ways of life, as well as self-sufficiency in defensive strategies and economic, energy, and resource matters. At the personal level, security embraces a safe and healthy natural and social environment, well-being, a decent standard of living, meaningful employment, adequate housing, freedom of expression, participation in decision-making processes that affect one's life, and for children, being loved, looked after, and educated.
• In a rapidly changing, "globalized" world, the vulnerability of every individual, group, and nation is increasingly apparent. Given that security (on various levels) is desirable, reducing levels of vulnerability becomes a paramount goal.
• If we (no matter whom the word "we" designates) have basic security needs, then it is fair to assume that this is also true of everyone else (every other "we," whether a loose collection of individuals, an identifiable
group, or a nation). In a global community, such as the one that exists today, security cannot be unilaterally or militarily assured; it must be a project of reciprocity.

- It is better (easier in practice, and more effective, economical, and conducive to mutual security and well-being) to realize one’s interests and achieve one’s goals by nonviolent rather than by violent means. It is better to avoid or prevent violent conflict than to manage or resolve it after the fact, just as it is better to prevent any kind of damage than to repair it.
- True security entails attempting to remove or reduce the causes of war and violent conflict, many of which are well-known or obvious, even if not equally well understood. For example: poverty; historical inequalities and injustices; colonialism; lack of access to resources; abuse of power; unfair trade practices; unsustainable development; unethical exploitation of markets and foreign economies; violation and undermining of international law; lack of trust; aggressive foreign relations; proliferation of weaponry; inability to see beyond narrow self-interest or national interest; and lack of cooperation in defining and solving common problems.
- Armed conflict cannot continue indefinitely without destroying that for which we are fighting. In the end, it must give way to communication and learning how to coexist. Focusing on the latter processes instead of the former is less painful all around and offers greater positive benefits to all concerned.
- Notwithstanding what we constantly imbibe from the media, everyday human life is largely based on peaceful transactions, which, in normal circumstances, we build upon, either instinctively or deliberately.

Pondering the above statements and others like them might just help clear a space within which a constructive conversation about peace can occur—one that invites all interested persons to become involved therein. Either we will end war and preparations for war or they will end us. Ending them, therefore, is not just a choice, it is also an imperative. Discussion of what peace is, or could be, and of how we can obtain it must therefore be kept at the forefront of public dialogue and discussions of social welfare.
References


Thinking About Peace Today


Humanitarian Aid and the Struggle for Peace and Justice: Organizational Innovation after a Blind Date

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Humanitarian organizations working in developing countries have gone through a transformation since the thaw of the Cold War. Their increased programming to promote justice and peace has resulted in disparate partnership configurations. Illustrative examples of these configurations show how organizational deficiencies and challenges have spawned innovation. These innovations provide insight about how similar organizations might usefully be engaged in the struggle to promote greater justice and peace in areas of the world suffering from violent conflict.

Key words: violent conflict, identity-based conflict, humanitarian organizations, justice, peace, partnership, innovation

Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and those that struggle for justice and peace have been developing various forms of partnerships at an accelerating rate. Two developments have fostered this partnering. The first is the greater awareness that humanitarian aid can have both positive and negative impact on tensions of the host country population. The second development is the increased funding by donor governments and multilateral organizations for conflict-related programming. For example, U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID) created the Office of Transition Initiatives (though this office has focused mainly
on providing in-kind support to indigenous NGOs). More recently, USAID created the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation as a part of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. These branches of USAID provide funding for conflict-related programming.

In this article, I describe some of the reasons behind the collaboration of disparate types of organizations and some of the challenges they face. I then present five examples of organizational innovation that, together, provide insights about how configurations might be developed for effective programming that combines humanitarian aid with the promotion of justice and peace in developing countries.

Evolving Organizational Imperatives

For years, the objectives of humanitarian aid (such as providing food, potable water, and plastic sheeting after a flood) and conflict transformation (such as training moderate religious leaders in anti-incitement or political leaders in negotiation skills) were distinct and separate from each other. Many humanitarian NGOs were created in the wake of World War II, and the Cold War between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States followed shortly thereafter. In a Cold War context, conflict transformation was viewed as too "political" for humanitarian organizations which prided themselves on that impartiality. Conflict transformation NGOs, on the other hand, tended to utilize a relatively narrow repertoire of methodologies, namely mediation techniques. Humanitarian NGOs with an explicit conflict transformation agenda (focusing substantially on promoting justice and peace in addition to relief and development), such as Mennonite Central Committee, were both atypical and modestly funded. The larger humanitarian NGOs such as CARE, Save the Children, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), generally speaking, sought to maintain their neutrality with a rationale that it was their role to help the victims of conflict and the purview of diplomats and politicians to prevent or stop wars from happening.

This division of humanitarian from justice and peace programming changed gradually over the years following the thaw of the Cold War. Skirmishes between groups within
nation-states allied with the respective superpowers became an anachronism while conflict between those of different identities (related to ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, tribe, or a combination of these), including instances without external encouragement and support, grew in frequency. No longer were humanitarian NGOs kept at a distance from conflict-related programming by the "high politics" of the Cold War. Rather than encountering rebels or paramilitary factions fighting in "proxy wars," humanitarian NGOs were faced with internal and regional conflicts. These consisted of one identity group pitted against one or more others in a bloody contest for control, or of regional "warlords" with powerful armies pursuing enormous financial gain, skillfully pitting one group against another, often by enkindling or inventing ancient enmities related to past injustices (Rudolf & Rudolf, 1993). Local, national, and regional disputes erupted without the influence of bi-polar superpower politics. It became clear that aid itself was often political and partisan, or perceived as such, when victims of conflict and other disasters of one identity group received support when others did not, or arrangements were made with groups perpetrating violence as a way of securing safe passage for relief supplies (otherwise known as "corridors of tranquility"). Humanitarian NGOs found themselves in the middle of disputes between people of different identities that were fueled by "grievance," "greed," and "failure of the social contract" (Korf, 2005; Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). A position of standing in the background was no longer morally tenable.

In addition, humanitarian NGOs experienced an urging from donors to become involved in conflict transformation, sometimes with diplomatic support in the corridors of political power providing some leeway for programmatic inventiveness and assertiveness.

At the same time, humanitarian NGOs began looking critically at how their aid impacted inter-group tensions. For instance, some had distributed food aid for decades. They began an introspective process of asking why people did not have enough food and what could be done to change agricultural and trade policies that would bring about greater food security. Many supported the "Do No Harm" initiative (Anderson, 1999), which sought to distill lessons learned about how to
not inadvertently exacerbate tensions with humanitarian assistance. Some humanitarian NGOs took this evolution a step further and developed free-standing conflict transformation projects aimed at addressing such contentious matters as land disputes.

Organizations and Challenges

There are five main types of entities that have engaged in various organizational configurations to promote justice and peace internationally. These are international humanitarian NGOs, advocacy-oriented peace and justice NGOs, service-oriented peace and justice NGOs, for-profit contractors, and academic entities (such as peace institutes or programs at universities). Each type of organization, on its own, faces challenges that can conceivably be addressed by some form of partnership with one or more of the other types of entities.

*International Humanitarian NGOs*

Large international humanitarian NGOs have budgets in the hundreds of millions of dollars, programs in as many as 110 countries, and thousands of expatriate and national staff members. They typically encounter high staff turnover and frequent reassignment, which makes being "learning organizations" difficult. Some of the larger ones develop their own technical support units. CRS, for instance, has a Program Quality and Support Department. But even when such a unit is created, staff turnover and transfers are disruptive to institutional memory, especially when major disasters pull people into emergency responses.

Peacebuilding technical support staff members are often under pressure to do monitoring, evaluation and proposal writing, the projects of which are often funded by government donors like the USAID or by multilateral institutions like the United Nations' Development Program, or a combination of the two. This constrains the membership of their learning communities, because of their specialized terminology and acronyms. Engaging outsiders, including academics, is awkward due in part to this specific vocabulary.
Advocacy-Oriented Justice and Peace NGOs

Those NGOs that focus on justice and peace advocacy typically have offices in Washington, DC, New York, or Brussels, Belgium, or all three, to cultivate policy changes with the U.S. Government, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations (UN), or the European Union. These organizations face daunting challenges in raising money from individuals. At a meeting of the Peace and Security Initiative, a collaborative effort of foundations and NGOs focusing on foreign policy issues, it was acknowledged that NGOs involved exclusively in research and advocacy on foreign policy issues are overly reliant on foundations, and foundation grants tend to be fickle. They typically last between one and three years. Foundations often expect unrealistically that these NGOs will have sustainable funding after the grant funding discontinues. What this means in practice is that advocacy-oriented justice and peace NGOs will typically survive only if they develop multiple foundations to support them, along with other major donors (usually private individuals).

It is important to keep in mind that it is much easier to raise money for humanitarian relief and development than it is for advocating for policy change. As a result, advocacy organizations do not typically have the funding for programming that can lay an educational foundation upon which to build a critical mass of involved citizens.

Service-Oriented Justice and Peace NGOs

In contrast to advocacy-oriented justice and peace NGOs, those that provide conflict transformation services, primarily in mediation, are more apt to develop sustainable funding by charging fees. An example is Collaborative Decision Resources Associates, based in Boulder, Colorado. It provides negotiation support to foreign governments, federal government departments, state governments, and Native American tribes.

The challenge service-oriented justice and peace NGOs face is in getting an adequate amount of steady business to remain financially solvent. Financial survival sometimes requires that a few core staff members are on the payroll while others are pulled into projects on an as-needed basis. The non-core staff members are typically on temporary contracts, and
the revenue they generate is often a subsidy to their more reliable income in an academic setting.

Contractors

Contractors are for-profit entities (though some barely stay solvent) and, supposedly, take on a higher degree of liability for program performance than those that receive grants under cooperative agreements (which NGOs typically receive). Examples of contractors are Chemonics, Development Alternatives Incorporated (now simply called DAI), Research Triangle International (RTI), and Associates in Rural Development (which is now simply called ARD since becoming a subsidiary of Tetra Tech).

The volume of governmental funding going to contractors has increased in recent years. USAID, among others, has awarded contracts to reach specific program objectives. According to Rachel McCleary (2010) "United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2005, the share of funds awarded to for-profit contractors rose from 33 percent to 58 percent" (p. 1).

Contractors are by nature project-oriented. They hire a Chief of Party to oversee project activities. They typically do not establish country programs but, instead, set up an operation for the specific purpose of project execution. Unlike NGOs, contractors do not contribute matching funds, and they tend to be willing to accept money from entities like the Department of Defense in addition to the USAID.

Staff members of international NGOs sometimes generalize about contractors, calling them "beltway bandits" (referring to the location of many of the contractors' headquarters, near the Beltway surrounding Washington, DC). One reason is due to competition and the increasing amount of U.S. Government funding going to contractors which NGO staff members feel they could more effectively utilize. There is also a common perception that contractors do not engage the local population, and do not work with national NGOs and civic groups.
Organizational Innovation

Academic Institutions

Universities and colleges have supported NGOs and contractors engaged in justice and peace. Individuals and groups of faculty members serve as consultants, usually by assisting in conceptualizing a problem. The understanding that develops is then used in project design or in staff training programs. While academic institutions do not have the in-depth knowledge from on-the-ground work as do staff members of NGOs and contractors, they do bring theoretical and comparative perspectives that can be useful for some justice and peace efforts. Academic institutions, especially those that engage tenured faculty, can also provide added institutional memory to NGOs and contractors that suffer from high staff turnover and transfer rates. Faculty members, however, usually need to be engaged over a period of years to develop an accurate understanding of the donor and political environment in which NGOs and contractors work.

Organizational Innovation

In this section, I provide examples of some of the organizational configurations which have developed in justice and peace programming. This is by no means an exhaustive list but is meant to be illustrative of the kind of innovation that has been taking place. It is hoped that these examples will shed light on which combinations work well in achieving greater justice and peace.

Producing Toolkits

CRS went through an organizational transformation in the late 1990s, during which it developed what is commonly called its “justice lens” (Fast & Lindsteadt, 1998). Rather than simply trying to help pull people out of poverty, CRS leadership insisted that they ask why people were impoverished in the first place.

As CRS leaders sought to imbue each of their country programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with an orientation aimed at addressing underlying causes of poverty and violence, they sought the help of the Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. The two organizations exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding that stated, in part, that a regular "peacebuilding institute" would be conducted in which CRS staff from all over the world would get trained by Kroc Institute faculty. Over the years, a more substantial "learning alliance" was created with the CRS' South East Asia Region. Insights from the annual workshops in South East Asia were documented by a CRS regional staff member focused on justice and peace. Over three years, enough common terminology and material had been produced to create *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring, and Learning Toolkit* (Lederach, Neufeldt, & Culbertson, 2007). The toolkit is in its second printing, has been translated from English into French and Spanish, and has been downloaded from the internet on a scale much beyond what either CRS or the Kroc Institute anticipated.

Another example of developing a toolkit is a collaborative initiative of Church World Service (CWS), the relief and development arm of a number of Christian Protestant denominations, and Eastern Mennonite University’s Center for Justice and Peacebuilding. CWS is a smaller organization than CRS. In some respects, its size precludes achieving economies of scale in technical support related to justice and peace. As a result, CWS leadership explored a working relationship with the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding’s STAR Program (Seminars in Trauma Awareness and Recovery). The Program had been launched in the United States following the devastation of September 11, 2001. Church World Service leaders were impressed by the project and asked Center for Justice and Peace faculty and staff if they would be interested in doing the same kind of work in war-torn countries. The two entities exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding and implemented a week-long training program in Monrovia, Liberia, in 2004, involving 45 civil society and church leaders (Church World Service, 2004). As was the case of collaboration between CRS and the Kroc Institute, STAR produced a toolkit that has been disseminated widely (Eastern Mennonite University, 2010; Yoder, 2005).
Mercy Corps decided that its approach to building its capacity to engage in justice and peace programming would be to merge with Conflict Management Group (CMG), a service-oriented justice and peace NGO (Mercy Corps, 2004). CMG was facing financial challenges, despite its stellar reputation and credibility from being founded by one of the authors of the classic conflict resolution book *Getting to Yes* (Fisher & Ury, 1981) and being affiliated with the Harvard Negotiation Project. Fees for services proved to be feast or famine, with rather too much famine.2

Mercy Corps, on the other hand, raised private, governmental, and multilateral support with relative ease. The merger, in 2004, was seen as mutually advantageous in that Mercy Corps increased its conflict transformation capacity while CMG staff members kept their jobs—even continuing to reside in Cambridge, Massachusetts even though Mercy Corps’ headquarters is in Portland, Oregon (Mercy Corps, 2004).

But the merger had a rocky start, due mainly to the type of services that CMG staff members provided. They were experts at mediation. And in war-torn countries, mediation is typically undertaken by diplomats, not NGO staff members. But by 2009, Mercy Corps’ conflict transformation activities included not only training Iraqi leaders in consensus building and negotiation, but also: resolving land disputes in Guatemala; supporting regional initiatives to reduce clan violence in northern Somalia related to competition for firewood and water, youth unemployment, environmental degradation and drug abuse; working with over 400 tribal elders, government officials, youth, women, and religious leaders in Kenya’s Rift Valley to reduce election-related violence; and supporting the creation of 820 youth clubs in Nepal to minimize inter-ethnic conflict following a decade-long civil war. Mercy Corps has been pleased with the results of the merger. According to the organization’s website, ‘Mercy Corps’ 2004 merger with the Conflict Management Group strengthened our ability to implement conflict programs worldwide. Over its 20-year history, the Conflict Management Group developed a widely acclaimed reputation built on interest-based negotiation methodology. By blending their vast experience in negotiations theory and
practice with Mercy Corps' global experience in conflict and post-conflict settings, the merger created possibilities that were not possible as separate organizations" (Mercy Corps, 2009).

Making Handoffs and Building a Foundation

American Refugee Committee (ARC) works in war-torn countries around the globe. ARC's staff members often see gross violations of human rights. In one instance, one of ARC's country directors communicated passionately with ARC headquarters in Minneapolis about the need to advocate with the U.S. government and the United Nations about abductions of children by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. The conundrum facing ARC leadership in its headquarters was that if ARC was visible in such advocacy, there could be repercussions for its staff members working in those countries. This was especially so because ARC's logo was prominently depicted on vehicles, in part to make sure that government troops and LRA rebels knew of its humanitarian identity.

ARC leadership overcame this challenge by communicating information gleaned from the Uganda/southern Sudan program staff to one of the ARC board members. The board member was an executive at Refugees International, a prominent advocacy-oriented NGO in Washington. As such, Refugees International benefited from the on-the-ground information while ARC did not compromise the safety of its staff in Uganda and southern Sudan.3

Another example of a handoff relationship exists between CRS and the Justice, Peace and Development Department of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). CRS was contacted by one of its country representatives about a law in South Asia that resulted in the capricious prosecution of religious minorities. For CRS to have been visibly involved in advocacy with the U.S. Congress and the diplomatic community to address this injustice would have put CRS staff members in South Asia in a compromising position relative to extremist groups. So CRS contacted the Justice, Peace and Human Development Department in Washington about the problem. The Department's advocacy did not implicate CRS' staff overseas.
But a more interesting organizational development occurred with CRS relative to the USCCB, whereby a more robust foundation for advocacy is being laid. CRS and USCCB leadership recognized that advocacy on justice and peace issues would be limited without educating the public. In this case, the U.S. Catholic community comprises the largest single denomination in the United States—roughly 70 million people in a population of 310 million. The Church has considerable infrastructure—parishes, schools, colleges and universities.

CRS' budget dwarfs that of the Justice, Peace and Human Development Department of the USCCB. People donate to CRS primarily because of its humanitarian work. But some of the donations are unrestricted as to their use. So CRS channeled some of its unrestricted funds to an entirely new department called U.S. Operations, opening regional offices in major cities across the United States with the mandate to engage the U.S. Catholic community in education and advocacy. This organizational innovation builds a foundation of educated supporters who can engage in public policy advocacy on behalf of those suffering from injustice, violence, and poverty to address root causes as well as immediate needs.

CRS' U.S. Operations efforts have also engaged academic institutions. Rather than collaborating for technical support and the creation of toolkits, a partnership with universities has spawned an education and advocacy initiative on campuses throughout the country (Catholic Relief Services, 2010).

Securing Community Involvement and Technical Support

In 2004, DAI was awarded a contract from the USAID for its Sri Lanka Transition Initiatives Program. DAI established offices in Colombo, Trincomalee, Ampara, Matara, and Batticalo and provided grants totaling approximately $30 million to "local government entities, nongovernmental organizations, community-based organizations and, to a lesser extent, international nongovernmental organizations, chambers of commerce, trader and farmer associations, student groups, and the media" (DAI, 2009).

Because of the technical challenges of meeting contract specifications for an early warning system that would incorporate events data development, digital mapping, and mathematical
pattern recognition, DAI engaged Virtual Research Associates, another consulting firm, to provide technical support (Virtual Research Associates, 2008). This specialized technical knowledge was unavailable in Sri Lanka.

In 2008, DAI received additional funding for its Sri Lanka Transition Initiatives Program from the U.S. Department of Defense to assist people displaced by conflict in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province. DAI worked with local contractors to rehabilitate health facilities, schools, and other public infrastructure using “an inclusive participatory community consultation process” (DAI, 2009).

This example illustrates how for-profit contractors sometimes work closely with national NGOs, government officials and other entities. It also shows how the use of other for-profit entities is typically related to areas where substantial technical expertise is needed. And, finally, it shows how contractors are willing, unlike most NGOs, to accept funding from the Department of Defense for humanitarian projects.

**Conclusion**

Supporting justice and peace while also engaging in humanitarian relief and development is perhaps analogous to an emergency assistance social service agency developing an advocacy arm and the capacity to do group therapy. The skill sets are different. The networks are different. The terminologies are different.

Organizations have adapted, however, and aligned themselves in creative combinations that take advantage of their respective strengths. No single organizational configuration will work all the time. Instead, it is helpful to ponder the experiences of those who have had the imagination and inventiveness to build creative partnerships.

What might we learn from these examples? First, international humanitarian NGOs that have staff members operating in developing countries can benefit from having a close partnership with advocacy-oriented NGOs. Handing off information that could compromise the security of staff members or the mission of the aid itself to an entity that specializes in advocacy can enhance staff security in the field and provide
needed on-the-ground information that can enhance the accuracy and authenticity of advocacy efforts.

Second, service-oriented NGOs that are skilled in mediation will probably find it challenging to merge with humanitarian NGOs. Those skilled in mediation, however, are likely to enjoy greater job security and, over time, will learn how to adapt their services to a wider range of humanitarian interventions.

Third, academic institutions can play a vital role in supporting the justice and peace initiatives of humanitarian NGOs by assisting with workshops and producing “toolkits.” Furthermore, the research and instruction of faculty members involved is improved by interacting with practitioners with on-the-ground experience. Academic institutions can also help NGOs promote greater engagement of the U.S. public in advocacy related to justice, peace, and poverty.

Fourth, on some projects, contractors work with national and local NGOs, but also reach out to other for-profit firms for technical support. While most NGOs neither pursue nor accept funding from the Department of Defense for fear that staff security in conflict zones will be compromised, contractors are more apt to pursue and accept such funding in conflict zones. This reflects how NGOs usually operate in a specific country or region for long periods, ideally getting to know the culture and leadership of a given place, while the contractors discontinue project operations when a contract expires. In addition, NGOs’ security is usually based on “acceptance” by the local population rather than “protection” from harm. Contractors, in contrast, are usually more apt to hire armed guards, being more inclined to use “protection.”

And, finally, if one looks at these evolving partnerships over time, from a social work perspective, it is evident that systemic reasons for poverty, for violence, and for injustice are increasingly being addressed. It is easy to understand and to raise money for charity. It is difficult, relatively, to understand and raise money to do systemic change. But with a “systems theory” perspective, the tide is turning. More specifically, NGOs are embracing a “strategic peacebuilding” version of that theory, which holds that structures that lead to violent conflict must be addressed systematically. Specifically, it involves
...the creation and nurturing of constructive relationships—at every level of society—across ethnic, religious, class, and racial boundaries. ...[Practitioners] seek the nonviolent and collaborative resolution of social inequities and the transformation of structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. The range of relationship-building activities encompasses the entire conflict cycle and includes conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation. (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2010, para. 1)

Those NGOs that pursue this approach are venturing forward into relatively new territory, less focused on symptoms and more focused on causes. What more could one ask for after a blind date?

References


(Endnotes)

1. Comments about the difficulty of raising money were made during Peace and Security Initiative meetings in Washington, DC in 2003 and 2004 which I attended.

2. At the time of the merger, I spoke with a number of CMG staff members.

3. I know of this example personally because I was Vice President at ARC at the time.

4. I am familiar with the involvement of Virtual Research Associates through communication with its President, Doug Bond. I spoke with him about my experiences with the Foundation for Co-Existence, most of which was as a consultant with The Asia Foundation.
Civil Resistance and the Corruption–Violence Nexus

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There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to violent conflict, some direct and some indirect. For ordinary citizens, the experience of this nexus is the denial of basic freedoms and rights. In spite of such bleak circumstances, people can move from being victims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming their societies. Citizens are engaging in civil resistance to curb corruption and win accountability and justice. This article explores the linkages between corruption and violence; identifies the conceptual and practical limitations of top-down, technical approaches to combating corruption; articulates a bottom-up approach in which the civic realm is included in the anti-corruption equation; and presents case studies of civic action campaigns and movements under conditions of violence, post-conflict transformation or state capture by violent crime syndicates. From these, general lessons learned are distilled.

Key words: corruption, civil resistance, civic action, nonviolent, people power, accountability, citizen, post-conflict transformation, violent conflict

Corruption is intimately linked to violent conflict, human insecurity, and oppression. In a checklist of the “root causes of conflict and early warning indicators,” the European Commission (2008) includes the corruption troika of bribery in bureaucracies, collusion between the private sector and civil servants, and organized crime. At an aggregate level, corruption has been found to be positively correlated with higher risks of political instability (Le Billon, 2003). Human Rights
Watch (2007) cites a direct relationship between corruption and political violence, in which state officials use stolen public revenues to pay for violence in support of their political ambitions. A 2004 report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that “corruption, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to State weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democracy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for civil conflict” (United Nations, 2004, p. 20). Finally, corruption also creates an overall climate of impunity (Kaufmann, 2006). Human rights organizations link corruption to repression, as it impedes government accountability, and can motivate officials and security forces to commit abuses for financial or other forms of gain (Ganesan, 2007).

There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to violent conflict, some direct and some indirect. War economies by their nature function through malfeasance; the parties in the conflict depend on fraud, bribery, and criminal groups to expedite the smooth functioning of the system (Scharbatke-Church & Reiling, 2009). Arms traffickers and trans-national organized crime add to the deadly mix by readily providing weapons. The global illicit arms trade is estimated at $200-$300 million annually and Africa is the largest so-called market. As a result, the continent tragically suffers the most casualties from it (United Nations News Centre, 2010).

Moreover, corruption can draw out or perpetuate bloody confrontations. Violent groups themselves engage in illicit activities to acquire weapons and supplies. According to a confidential source, Al Qaeda has access to emeralds mined in the Northern Frontier province of Pakistan, from which it has been deriving approximately $150 million income per year. Nowhere is this process more wrenchingly evident than in DR Congo, where approximately 3.5 million lives have been lost since the onset of war in 1998 and hundreds of thousands of girls and women have been systematically raped (Global Witness, 2004; UNICEF, 2008). The military, rebel groups, and various foreign allies have plundered the country’s diamonds, gold, timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt, not only to finance their atrocities but ultimately to enrich themselves, which has become an end unto itself (Global Witness, 2004). Over the past decade,
violent confrontations over the Casamance region have broken out among Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal, and between Cameroon and Nigeria in the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula for an equal length of time. A USAID report concluded that corruption, more often than not, played a key role in fomenting and protracting these conflicts (USAID, 2007).

When corruption is endemic, whereby a complex system of graft permeates the political system, economic spheres, and basic provision of services in a country, it can stimulate social unrest and foment violent conflict. For example, in the Niger Delta, insurgent groups are amassing weapons and recruiting young men from an impoverished, angry and frustrated population that experiences little benefit from oil wealth while living amidst horrendous environmental degradation from its extraction and processing (United Nations Development Program, 2006).

In the post-conflict context, corruption can function as an inhibitor of sustainable peace, the latter needing human security and stability to take root and flourish (Ahtisaari, 2009). First, graft can allow the entrenchment of the political status quo that operated during the conflict (Le Billon, 2007). Second, it undermines the new government’s legitimacy, rule of law, and capacity for reconstruction, economic development and the provision of basic public services. For ordinary citizens, the horrors of war are replaced with grueling hardship, to which pervasive malfeasance adds another layer of tangible injustice, such as in Afghanistan. In a 2010 poll, 83 percent of Afghans said corruption affects their daily lives (United States Embassy Kabul, 2010). As a result, the Taliban is recruiting new members from among the marginalized population oppressed by unremitting graft and poverty.

Corruption can be an enabler of state-capture in post-conflict or fragile democracies. Tragically on the rise in Central America, “narco-corruption” refers to the interrelationship between transnational drug cartels and state security forces, as well as the infiltration of organized crime interests into politics, governance and the actual functioning of institutions, leading to countries such as Mexico and Guatemala being called narco-states. In the first 2.5 years of Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s administration, drug violence took 12,000
lives (Camp, 2009). The United Nation’s Office of Drugs and Crime chief has asserted, “Corruption, poverty and poor criminal justice capacity make Guatemala extremely vulnerable to organized crime” (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime, 2010). Not coincidentally, the country is experiencing the worst violence since the cessation of the 36-year civil war in 1996. Approximately 5,000 people are murdered each year due to organized crime and gangs, now compounded by Mexican drug-cartels expanding south across the border (Dudley, 2010; Sanchez, 2007). Narco-corruption, of course, is not limited to the Americas. The drug trade in Afghanistan also serves as the main source of financing for the private armies of local warlords, which are connected to parts of the post-conflict government (Confidential communication, 2009). The Taliban is in on the game as well, exchanging drugs for weapons (Starkey, 2008).

A vicious cycle can develop, whereby authoritarian and/or ineffectual governance paired with endemic corruption results in the further de-legitimization of authority and rule of law, leading to fragmented tyrannies, which in turn reinforces authoritarian and/or ineffectual governance, impunity, poverty, and so on. In contrast, civil resistance has the potential to activate an anti-corruption cycle. Nonviolent social movements and grass-roots civic campaigns can challenge the corruption–violence nexus, which in turn create alternative loci of power, thereby empowering the civic realm to continue to wage strategic civic campaigns and movements (Zunes, 2008). The civic realm refers to the collective non-state, bottom-up initiatives and relationships in a society. This includes: nonviolent civic campaigns and movements; civil society organizations (CSOs); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); community-based organizations (CBOs); civic coalitions and alliances; unions; professional organizations; grass-roots networks, committees, and collectives; local citizen groups; activists, community organizers, and last but not least, citizens.

Echoing this dynamic, a Kenyan civic leader explained: “If people are able to be encouraged to go out, today it’s CDF [Constituency Development Funds], tomorrow it’s something else, and another day it’s another thing. So CDF is an entry point to the realization of so many rights that people are not getting” (International Budget Partnership, 2010). To target
corruption is to simultaneously touch the myriad of injustices to which it is linked, from violence and poverty, to impunity, human rights abuses, authoritarianism, unaccountability, substandard social services, and environmental destruction. Thus, fighting graft is not a superficial solution that avoids the underlying problem; it can be a direct attack on oppression.

Civil Resistance

Civil resistance expresses people power through the use of nonviolent strategies and tactics. It is also called nonviolent struggle and nonviolent conflict. "People power" refers to political, social and economic pressure that is exerted by significant numbers of people organized together around shared grievances and goals.

The efficacy of civil resistance is not a matter of theory (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Nonviolent social movements and civic campaigns have a rich history of ending oppression and injustice and the apparatus of state and other forms of corruption. A 2008 study found that in the last century, violent campaigns succeeded historically in only 26 percent of all cases, compared to 53 percent in the case of nonviolent, civilian-based campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). A quantitative analysis of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy over the past three decades found that civil resistance was a key factor in driving 75% of political transitions, and such transformations were far more likely to result in democratic reform and civil liberties than violent or elite-led, top-down changes. Of the 35 countries subsequently rated "Free" according to a Freedom House index, 32 had a significant "bottom up" civil resistance component (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).

Over the past twenty years, from the 1986 "People Power" uprising in the Philippines to the "Color Revolutions" in the former Soviet Union, corruption has been a source of deep public discontent and a key mobilizing issue of nonviolent social movements. This shows that people themselves, who increasingly experience the nexus of violent conflict, crime and corruption as another form of tyranny, can move from being victims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming their societies.
Reconceptualizing Corruption

The global anti-corruption arena is relatively new, having emerged over the past two decades. While there certainly has been progress, change has been modest (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009). Wide-scale, national anti-corruption programs, favored by donor countries and multilateral institutions, have had less than consistent results (Hussmann & Hechler, 2008). Transparency International’s 2010 Global Corruption Barometer found that 60 percent of those surveyed in 86 countries and territories said that corruption has increased over the past three years. Eighty percent stated that political parties are corrupt or extremely corrupt and half asserted that their government’s efforts to stop corruption were ineffective. Since 2006, pay-offs to police are said to have doubled, while more respondents reported paying bribes to the judiciary, and for registry and permit services than in 2005. Poorer interviewees were twice as likely as more well-off individuals to pay bribes for basic services.

Through the framework civil resistance and people power, it’s not surprising that a predominantly top-down approach has limitations. One must start with the definition of corruption, commonly characterized as “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain,” or the “abuse of public office for private gain” (Transparency International, 2010). While concise and accurate, conceptually they do not convey the systemic nature of corruption, which involves a complex set of relationships, some obvious and others hidden, with established vested interests, that can cut across political, economic and social forces. Moreover, how a problem is defined will affect how it is addressed. Thus, up until this decade, there was an over-emphasis on the state. Less attention was paid to other groups, such as agricultural landowners, private sector, multinational corporations, oligarchies, crime syndicates, gangs, and paramilitaries, as well as their inter-relationships.

Second, the strategies have been top-down and elite-driven, with a focus on developing norms, rules and structures that mainly target administrative graft. According to a former World Bank specialist, there is the fallacy that one “fights corruption by fighting corruption” (Kaufmann, 2005, p. 41). This
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has translated into a preponderance of international agreements, policy diagnoses, legislation, and institution-building, such as anti-corruption commissions, improvement of national and local government capacity, and public finance management. The underlying assumption is that once anti-corruption frameworks are put in place, illicit practices will change. But how can institutional mechanisms bring forth change, when they must be implemented by the very institutions that are corrupt? Those who are benefitting from corruption are expected to be the ones to curb it. It’s not surprising then, that even when political will exists, it can be thwarted, because too many people have a stake in the crooked status quo.

Lastly, traditional strategies have not appreciably factored people into the equation—although they are the ones who bear the brunt of corruption, have direct experience of it, suffer its ill-effects, and can contribute to curbing it. For those on the receiving end, the experience of corruption can be oppression and a loss of freedom. Aruna Roy, one of the founders of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) “Right to Information” movement in India, characterizes corruption as “the external manifestation of the denial of a right, an entitlement, a wage, a medicine...” (Roy, n.d.). Viewed from this perspective, the priorities shift to controlling those forms of graft and abuse that are most harmful or common to citizens, particularly the poor. The goals are accountability, participatory democracy, and social and economic justice.

The Dynamics of a Bottom-Up Approach to Curbing Corruption

To its credit, there has been a growing recognition in the international anti-corruption community and among donors and development institutions, especially over the past six years, that corruption cannot be challenged unless the civic realm is involved, including an active citizenry. This paradigm shift was encapsulated in the final statement of the 14th International Anti-Corruption Conference (2010), which stated: “Empowered people create change ... This expanded element of our conference points the way for the future of the anti-corruption movement, one incorporating citizen mobilization and empowerment, as well as the inclusion of youth” (p. 7).
Well-organized, strategic civic movements and campaigns may be particularly suited to a systemic approach to curbing corruption. First, mobilized people, engaged in organized collective nonviolent action, constitute a social force that can exert pressure on the state, as well as on other sectors in society. Second, civil resistance can disrupt both vertical (up and down within an institution) and horizontal (across institutions, groups, sectors) corruption. Third, civil resistance has a strategic advantage, as it consists of extra-institutional methods of action to push for change, when power holders are corrupt and/or unaccountable, and institutional channels are blocked or ineffective. This involves generating political will, demanding specific measures, and reinforcing new patterns of administration and governance centered on accountability to citizens. Hence, top-down and bottom-up approaches are not mutually exclusive. Civic campaigns and movements can complement and reinforce legal and administrative mechanisms, which constitute the anti-corruption infrastructure needed for long-term transformation of systems of graft and abuse. Finally, civil resistance can also support honest individuals, within state institutions and other entities, who are attempting reforms and change. All too often, lone figures cannot challenge or dismantle entrenched, multi-faceted systems of graft and unaccountability. Such attempts have been compared to the actions of political dissidents, who stand in singular defiance before an entire undemocratic system and are easily suppressed (Martin, Callaghan, & Fox, 1997). This was the fate of John Githongo, a former Kenyan anti-corruption chief, who fled the country in 2004 after threats to his life.

Civic campaigns and movements, by their nature, emerge from the civic realm and include the participation of ordinary people united around common grievances, goals and demands. People power is generated through the sustained, strategic application of a variety of nonviolent tactics that are designed to:

- Strengthen citizen participation and campaign capacity;
- Disrupt systems of corruption, including dishonest relationships, illicit practices and the status quo;
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- Weaken the sources of support and control for unaccountable and corrupt power holders; entities, systems, and their enablers; and/or
- Win support of sectors, groups, institutions, and people over to the civic campaign or movement, the latter including from the public and from within corrupt systems, for example, political leaders and honest officials.

Nonviolent tactics constitute the methods of civil resistance. Scholars such as Gene Sharp have identified over 200 tactics, and most campaigns and movements create new ones. Civic anti-corruption initiatives engage in varieties of:

- noncooperation, civil disobedience
- low-risk mass actions, displays of symbols
- street theatre, visual dramatizations and stunts
- songs, poetry, cultural expressions, humor
- civic “report cards” for political candidates
- citizen “report cards” for public services
- monitoring of officials, members of parliament, institutions, budgets, spending and public services
- social audits and “face the people” forums
- social networking technologies (e.g., Facebook organizing and petitioning, blogging, SMS communication)
- education and training, youth recreation
- social and economic empowerment initiatives, creation of parallel institutions
- anti-corruption pledges; citizen-sponsored anti-corruption awards
- protests, petitions, vigils, marches, sit-ins, leafleting
- strikes, boycotts, and reverse boycotts (e.g., patronizing businesses that refuse to pay protection money or bribes)
- nonviolent blockades, nonviolent accompaniment
Civic Campaigns and Movements to Fight Corruption

Though not widely known, there has been a grass-roots, bottom-up “eruption against corruption,” to borrow a popular slogan of the Fifth Pillar movement in India. The author has been conducting a research project to document and distill general lessons learned from civic campaigns and movements to fight graft and abuse, demand accountability and win rights. It is examining the skills, strategies, objectives and demands of such civic initiatives, rather than the phenomenon of corruption itself. The focus is on what civic actors and citizens—organized together, exerting their collective power—are doing to curb corruption as they themselves define and experience it.

Over 30 cases have been identified, of which 15 are being documented and analyzed in depth. A number of common attributes of civic campaigns and movements to fight corruption are emerging from the case studies. Bottom-up initiatives can be found around the world, among democracies, semi-democracies and authoritarian regimes. Contrary to common misconceptions that civic mobilization is only possible when there is political space, a relatively educated populace and a non-violent legacy, they are prevalent in societies enduring poor governance, poverty, illiteracy, repression, and violence, the latter two perpetrated by the state, organized crime, paramilitary groups and gangs. Rather than spontaneous outbursts, organization and planning precede action, even when a scandalous event first arouses public indignation. Taken together, they confirm what some civil resistance scholars assert; skills and strategy generally matter more than pre-existing conditions (Ackerman, 2007).

Women and youth are also playing galvanizing roles in many campaigns, notably in Muslim settings. “Defining methods,” around which a host of nonviolent tactics revolve, are common (Schock, 2010). Success in one struggle or context inspires new applications, knowledge-sharing and campaigns—locally and even across borders and continents. Finally, the struggles are quite often multidimensional in focus, reflecting the reality that corruption does not occur in a vacuum; it is linked to other forms of oppression and injustice.

The following four cases have been chosen for their
relevance to peace building and conflict transformation contexts and strategies.

**Guatemala: Grass-Roots Resistance to Violence and Impunity**

In Guatemala, innovative grass-roots civil resistance movements have been undermining the corruption-violence nexus at the community level, maintaining resilience in the face of brutal repression, and fostering social and economic development. One particularly poignant case is in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, a mid-size town populated largely by indigenous people, which suffered great losses during the civil war (1960-96). It was the cradle of the organized peasant movement, and the site of persecution and mass murder of peasants, church members and unions by state forces, which was sponsored by sugar plantation (Finca) owners. Every guerilla faction had a presence as well. Dozens of the organized paramilitary groups have since been transformed into hit-men operations, and it is now unfortunately situated in a geographical spot convenient to cross-border narco-trafficking, from Columbia up to Mexico for the North American market (C. Samayoa, personal communications, various dates, 2008-2010).

Reflecting a collective “outcry of despair,” a local citizen’s movement emerged in the aftermath of the civil war. Its objectives were to recover the community and local government from the hands of drug lords and organized crime, promote economic and social development, create a collective sense of worth and empowerment, challenge the climate of impunity, prevent electoral fraud, and defend hard-won gains along the way. Organizers put together a strong coalition that included women, youth, and community groups. In spite of the legacy of repression, they initially built alliances with Finca owners (which later broke down) to support an honest candidate in the local elections and kick out a drug lord from the local government.

Over the years, they conducted a wide range of nonviolent actions, such as: civil disobedience; solidarity demonstrations; literacy, education and development programs; radio call-in programs; theater; art festivals; and recreation projects aimed at youth, who are often the targets of organized crime recruitment. Their successes wrought severe counter-attacks.
By 2007, 11 community leaders had been murdered, four attempts were made on an honest mayor’s life, slandering and defamation cases were lodged, electoral fraud was orchestrated, and the police, prosecutors and judges favored the drug cartels, an odious confirmation of the extent of corruption and state capture.

In spite of this extreme intimidation, citizens refused to be subdued. Solidarity demonstrations and civil disobedience persisted. People engaged in new methods to disrupt the corrupt status quo, such as monitoring the actions and spending of the new authorities in power, as well as criminal activities, reporting the latter to the newly instituted International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, though it appears the case will not be pursued. However, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has accepted the case of the first assassination that struck the town, which will proceed in 2011.

A significant dimension was added to the struggle—the international community. Guatemalan human rights defenders drew world attention to the movement. They garnered support for civic initiatives from the United Nations Development Program and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A security plan was devised, bolstered by human rights organizations that networked to bring international observers and non-violent accompaniment to protect people at risk. Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa became the host of national and international meetings, thereby sending a message to the corrupt power holders that the country and the world were watching and stood together with the townspeople. Finally, home-grown, grass-roots solidarity and coordination networks have been established with other indigenous communities engaged in civil resistance both in Guatemala and across borders. They share information, experiences, and strategies, send out alerts, and even have come to one another’s aid, for example, by blocking a road.

In extending the arena of resistance from the local to the regional and international, the community is increasing its capacity of people power, the source being strength in numbers. From unity within, they are building a broader front involving allies at all levels. In confronting a system of violence, graft and impunity involving the state and transnational organized
crime, in essence, the citizens' movement is now creating an alternative system of civil resistance, involving national and transnational networking, solidarity and action. In seeking to overcome marginalization and poverty through education and development initiatives, for women and youth as well as the town at large, the movement calls to mind Mohandas Gandhi's "constructive programme in the nonviolent effort," (Gandhi, 1945) in which equality, education, and economic self-reliance were core elements. Finally, the people of Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa embody what Gandhi observed decades ago, "Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will" (Gandhi, n.d.).

Indonesia: People Power Provides Protection

After 32 years of authoritarian rule and state violence under General Suharto, the multi-ethnic Indonesia began a new chapter of governance in 1999. Nonviolent civic coalitions played a significant role in his demise (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005). The fledgling democracy inherited a multitude of ills not unlike those of post-war contexts, from widespread poverty to a 30-year armed conflict in Aceh that resulted in close to 15,000 deaths (World Bank, 2005), dysfunctional state institutions, security force impunity, and corruption, the latter embedded into the power structures and social fabric of the country. Into this mix was born the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2003. When both the institution and leading figures in it were assailed, a nationwide civic campaign came to its rescue, providing a rich example of how civil resistance can protect government structures and honest officials in fragile states.

While some anti-corruption commissions are dismissed as "window-dressing" to satisfy donors and multilateral institutions, others are at the forefront of fighting corruption and gaining transparency. The KPK has earned the public's respect and admiration since it was created in 2003. It was seen as the "hope to fix a broken country" (confidential source, 2010). KPK did not hesitate to confront the powers that be, and expose corrupt behavior and relationships among the local and national governments, Parliament, Administration, private sector, and police, the latter having a particularly
negative reputation with the public. It convicted politicians, governors, judicial figures, and in 2008, the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, who is also the father-in-law of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s son (Lindsey, 2009).

By threatening the entire tangled system of influence and graft benefitting the ruling elites, KPK soon became a target. Since early 2009, efforts to weaken, if not destroy, it have intensified, including police criminalization of some of its activities, the arrest of its Chairman for murder, investigations of deputy commissioners, and parliamentary attempts to cut its budget and authority. The situation came to a head mid-year, in the wake of ongoing investigations of embezzlement in the infamous Bank Century bailout, in which a wiretapped conversation documented the senior police officer handling the Century case and a politically connected tycoon, Boedi Sampoerna, discussing an arrangement to safely withdraw Rp 2 trillion deposited at the bank in return for a Rp 10 billion payoff.

By July 2009, a core group of civil society leaders—veterans from the Reformasi civic movement against the former Suharto regime—“saw the signs” (non-attributable activists, 2010). They decided it was necessary to proactively develop a strategy to protect KPK—the institution, its mandate and authority. One activist said, “We realized that what we faced was so big and so strong and has so much authority, we needed to come together.” (non-attributable personal communication, April, 2010). They launched the CICAK campaign, which had a dual meaning. It’s an acronym for “Love Indonesia, Love Anti-Corruption,” but it also refers to the gecko lizard. During the Bank Century investigations, the Chief of the Police’s criminal department said that the KPK was like the gecko fighting the crocodile. One hundred civic organizations joined, and a graduate student on his own accord created a CICAK Facebook group, which soon played a role bigger than anyone imagined. CICAK groups formed in 20 of the country’s 33 provinces and well-known public figures came on board.

On October 29, the police arrested two KPK deputy Chairmen, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto, on charges of abuse of power. The arrests came a day after President Yudhoyono ordered an investigation into wiretapped telephone conversations involving a senior Attorney General’s
Office official, in which the president was said to support efforts to quell KPK. On October 30, the President gave a televised address stating he would let the police continue with the case. People were furious with the police and embittered with their leader, who had recently been re-elected on an anti-corruption platform. This repression backfired; CICAK was ready to channel popular anger into civic mobilization. The Facebook group grew so quickly that television news ran hourly updates of the numbers, which reached 1.3 million and became a key tool through which to communicate with and rally citizens. CICAK organized actions in Jakarta, while local chapters and high school and university students spontaneously initiated events throughout the country.

Campaign tactics included demonstrations, marches to the Presidential palace, petitions, wearing a black ribbon symbolizing the death of justice, gecko T-shirts, pins, stickers, leaflets, banners reading “Say no to crocodiles,” street murals, sit-ins, gatherings in front of police stations, a hunger strike, street theater, concerts, and “happening art” that often involved humor and garnered national media coverage, for example, jumping off the KPK building with parachutes. Popular singers added their support and composed an anti-corruption song, which people used for ringtones, with the refrains “gecko eats crocodile,” and “KPK in my chest.” Citizens of all ages, socio-economic groups, and religions participated. CICAK leaders report that the upper middle and middle classes joined in streets actions; professionals could be seen standing together with students and poor people. Senior clerics of Indonesia’s five faiths paid solidarity visits to KPK.

CICAK demanded an immediate independent investigation and called on the President to save the KPK. As people power escalated, he agreed to it, and the investigation began soon after. Millions around the country heard a wire-tape in which senior officials from the police and attorney general’s office and a big businessman planned to frame the KPK officials, including killing Chandra. The independent commission recommended the charges against the KPK officials be dropped. Bibit and Chandra were released and went back to work. Senior figures in the police and attorney general’s office resigned and other investigations have been launched. The
CICAK campaign was the single largest social mobilization in Indonesia since the Suharto dictatorship. Civic leaders remain vigilant against new attacks on the KPK, but also exert pressure on the KPK itself, in order to keep it clean and accountable.

*Kenya: Overcoming Marginalization, Winning Accountability*

Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) based in Mombasa that operates among impoverished communities in the area, which was a site of political and ethnic violence in 1997 and after the 2008 elections. It is catalyzing grass-roots civic campaigns to access information about budgets, curb corruption, win accountability, and ultimately, fight poverty. It empowers poor communities in making their voices heard to their elected representatives and local officials, thereby channeling frustration, hopelessness and anger away from hostilities to changing unjust conditions. The immediate focus is on the use, or rather, misuse of constituency development funds (CDFs), which are annual allocations of approximately one million dollars to each Member of Parliament for his/her district. MUHURI's long-term vision is to cultivate a sense of agency among Kenyans (International Budget Partnership, 2010; Ramkumar & Kidambi, 2010).

CDF is the result of a popular idea in the development world; devolve power and give local communities resources for their own development schemes. However, when there is no meaningful independent oversight and corruption is endemic, the end result is often mismanagement and graft. For MUHURI, it's up to the people to provide the oversight. Since 2007, the NGO has worked to animate and train citizens in civic mobilization. Through a pioneering collaboration with the International Budget Partnership and veteran activists from the MKSS movement in India, it has developed a defining nonviolent method—the five-step social audit. The first step is information gathering—records from the local CDF office. MUHURI representatives are initially sent, because it's daunting for ordinary citizens to approach officials and obtain information. The second step is training local men and women to become community activists. They learn how to decipher documents and budgets, monitor expenditures and scrutinize public works.
The third step is inspecting the CDF project site. Newly trained activists conduct systematic, meticulous documentation, comparing records to the reality on the ground. They also use site visits to speak with local people, in order to generate interest in the social audit, get them to attend the public hearing, and gather additional information about corruption and abuse. The fourth step is educating and motivating fellow citizens about the CDF and their right to information and accountability. Community activists and MUHURI attract attention, directly engage people, and encourage them to attend a “public hearing” through nonviolent tactics such as street theater, puppet plays, trumpet and drum processions, and leafleting by volunteers. Information about CDF misuse and graft is shared and people’s reactions and input are gathered.

The final step is the public hearing with CDF officials, the media, and in some cases, the Member of Parliament. MUHURI first leads a procession through the community, complete with slogans, chanting and a youth band. It gathers dancing children and adults as it goes along. Once the forum begins, local activists present the results of their investigations, CDF officials are questioned, and citizens demand accountability of them. At MUHURI’s first ever public hearing in August 2007, approximately 1500-2000 residents in the Changamwe slum attended, many standing for over four hours. The MP finally agreed to register their complaints and charges against the concerned contractors. MUHURI then rolled out a cloth banner petition demanding that accountability and transparency measures be added to the CDF Act and the RTI law be passed. The MP initially refused to sign it, but after all the people and opposition candidates signed it, he acquiesced to civic pressure and added his name.

In 2009, whilst conducting the Likoni constituency social audit, MUHURI’s office was ransacked and their guard was stabbed. The intimidation backfired. The next day a popular radio station interviewed the Executive Director and a local activist, which gave them another platform to communicate with people and increase attendance at the public hearing. That same year, activists from eight constituencies that conducted social audits joined a national campaign, transcending ethnic and social divisions, to change the CDF law. By June, the
Kenyan government set up a task force to review it. MUHURI is increasing its efforts to develop new campaigns (H. Khalid, personal communication, November 12, 2010). For instance, during the final week of October 2010, a social audit was conducted in the Mwatate constituency. Earlier that month the local public Chair and Secretary had been arrested and charged in court for misappropriation of funds. The audit is investigating whether or not other project funds had been embezzled in addition to those under scrutiny in the court case.

**Turkey: Low-Risk Mass Actions Surmount Fear and Apathy**

Public apathy and fear of reprisals from either the state or vicious non-state actors are common among countries engulfed in violent conflict or emerging from it. Nonviolent street actions, such as protests, marches and sit-ins may, at least initially, be too risky. As was the case in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, this did not mean that people were powerless. To the contrary, the brilliance and creativity of ordinary citizens to disrupt systems of malfeasance and impact the corruption–violence nexus is staggering. The following case illustrates the force of civic pressure from low-risk, mass actions.

In 1996, Turkey was plagued by a nationwide crime syndicate that involved paramilitary entities, drug traffickers, the mafia, businesses, government officials, members of parliament, and parts of the judiciary and media. Extra-judicial killings were common, some linked to the mafia and some political in nature. That November a speeding car crashed on a highway late at night near the town of Susurluk. Among the passengers were a police chief and police academy director, a member of parliament, and an escaped criminal and paramilitary member (wanted by the Turkish courts, Swiss police and Interpol) who possessed a fake ID signed by the minister of internal affairs. The car contained cash, cocaine, and weapons. The following day students held unplanned protests throughout the country, but were harshly repressed by police, while other youth already on trial for previously breaking the “demonstration law” were sentenced to 15 months in prison (Akay & Mahoney, 2003; E. Salman, personal communication, June 24, 2010).

A small group of professionals, lawyers and civil society
advocates decided that this scandal provided an opportunity to tap public disgust, mobilize people to action, and push for definable measures. Their demands were to remove parliamentary immunity, prosecute the founders of the criminal groups; protect judges trying such cases; and reveal the crime syndicate relationships. They formed the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light. From the outset, they made strategic choices—citizens should feel a sense of ownership in the effort and the campaign would be apolitical—in order to build a broad alliance, protect against smear attacks, and attract the widest possible base of people. Prior to taking action they defined goals, analyzed the media’s views on corruption, and developed a publicity strategy. Because the mafia had recently been taking control of a major broadcasting corporation through manipulating legislation and business links, the press and National Broadcasters Association were looking for ways to improve the media’s image, and prior to the Susurluk crash, had hired a PR expert to help them. Following the scandal, he personally became involved in Citizen Initiative for Constant Light.

The civic group systematically built a coalition by reaching out to non-political entities, including the Istanbul Coordination of Chambers of Professions, the Bar Association, unions, nongovernmental organizations, and the professional associations of pharmacists, dentists, civil engineers and electrical engineers. The organizers sought to create an innovative nonviolent action that would overcome real obstacles, such as violent crackdowns, imprisonment, and public fear and feelings of powerlessness. The teenage daughter of a lawyer involved in the campaign came up with the idea of turning off lights. A chain of mass faxes and press releases signed by “an anonymous aunt,” who became the image of the campaign, got the word out.

On February 1, 1997, citizens began to turn off their lights at 9:00 p.m. for one minute. After two weeks, approximately 30 million people participated throughout the country, adding their own embellishments such as banging pots and pans and staging street actions. Neighborhood squares took on a festive character as people overcame their fear and gathered together. The campaign lasted six weeks. In the short-term, it broke the
strong taboo over confronting corruption. It empowered citizens to fight corruption and forced the government to launch judicial investigations. What was not anticipated was that the military would remove its support for the government, which was forced to resign. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan remained in power until a new government was approved by the parliament six months later.

The next prime minister continued the court cases, handed out verdicts, and set up an investigative committee, which prepared a report listing the names of all people murdered by the crime syndicate. A parliamentary committee was also created to document the syndicate's activities. In 2001, the interior minister launched a series of investigations. In cooperation with the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, widespread embezzlement was exposed, and well-known business executives were arrested. What was not achieved, one of the original objectives, was the removal of parliamentary immunity, which would have allowed an investigation of the Susurluk parliamentarian. However, by 2003 most of old guard was voted out. Analysts believe that voters punished both the political establishment and the military by electing the AK (White) Party, the moderate Islamic party.

Lessons Learned

The case studies provide general lessons learned about the application of civil resistance to curb corruption and win accountability, rights and equity. Whether within one community or on a larger front, unity is essential. This includes unity around goals, and among people and groups wanting change. This goes hand-in-hand with shared ownership, the sense that everyone is part of the struggle and can play a role in it. Both unity and ownership can be strategically cultivated. Civic campaigns and movements link corruption to widely-held concerns, such as state capture to grievances and tangible injustices that impact people's daily lives, including basic human security, poverty, lack of medical care, access to water, etc. Information itself, in the form of budgets, spending, and power holders' assets, is a source of power when accompanied by civil resistance to demand accountability and change,
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as was the case in Kenya.

Creativity is a hallmark of effective mobilization, tactical development, and communication. Effective tactics can derive from local circumstances and reflect local culture. Consequently, while a particular tactic may not necessarily be transferable across situations, the strategic considerations and impact can be emulated. For example, low-risk mass actions can activate people power even under conditions of intimidation and public resignation, and once enacted, can embolden citizens to further action. In Turkey, it began with coordinated switching off of lights, soon augmented by unanticipated outpourings on the street. In the digital age, joining a Facebook group and uploading SMS ringtones in Indonesia had a similar function, and led to further dissent.

Communications are strategically important to build awareness, win support and actively involve citizens. Depending on the audiences and objectives of the messaging, the medium of communicating can be the media itself, from songs to street theater. Though not often considered part of the nonviolent tactical repertoire, education, training and youth recreation can be vital to build campaign capacity, confidence and resilience. Tactical innovation, such as turning everyday actions into acts of resistance, can thus be crucial to build support, overcome repression, human rights abuses, and maintain campaign resilience. An honest image is critical for winning support. The association of groups and individuals who are seen as incorruptible can have a galvanizing effect.

As in other nonviolent struggles, in disrupting systems of graft and the corruption-violence link, power comes from numbers—locally, nationally, and even internationally, in the case of Guatemala, when citizens confront endemic corruption involving national and cross-border relationships and actors. Power is indeed not monolithic; allies and support can be won from within corrupt systems and individual institutions, which can yield information, access and strategic negotiations, especially when backed by citizen mobilization.

Conclusion

An examination of the corruption–violence nexus presents
a bleak picture of human anguish. In spite of difficult circumstances, or perhaps because of them, citizens are mobilizing, engaging in civil resistance and wielding people power to curb corruption and injustice, in some cases weakening linkages with violence. They exemplify the capacity of civil resistance to potentially prevent some forms of violent conflict, foster conflict transformation, and strengthen post-conflict peace building. As importantly, the achievements of citizen campaigns and movements fighting graft and abuse plant seeds of hope—hope that those living under oppression have options beyond quietly suffering or resorting to violence.

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Civil Resistance and the Corruption–Violence Nexus


In an effort to counteract the growing militarization of schools, military counter-recruitment (CR) has emerged as an effective grassroots movement across the United States. Led by a small number of local activists, CR utilizes community organizing methods to confront the structures supporting military enlistment as a viable career option. Despite operating with limited resources, counter-recruitment has secured key legal and policy victories that challenge the dominant social narrative about military service. Three examples of counter-recruitment are profiled to illustrate the different tactics and strategies used for successful organizing within a culture of militarism.

Key words: militarization of schools, counter-recruitment, community organizing, tactics, strategies, militarism

At a time of heightened militarism and involvement in long-term wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are few overt signs of an active and successful "peace movement" in the United States. Despite significant opposition to the invasion of Iraq and public apprehension over expanding the war in
Afghanistan, two successive administrations have maintained a notable consistency in the use of U.S. military force, ostensibly to “protect” American security. Presidents Bush and Obama have also sustained record levels of military spending since 2002, while other forms of the U.S. national security state have grown apace. Fear of additional terrorist attacks in the wake of September 11 have led to an open-ended “War on Terror,” including an expansion of domestic and international intelligence gathering—spying—on U.S. citizens and “foreigners” alike (Murray, 2010). Popular culture, most notably film and television, has largely avoided critical scrutiny of this “new American militarism” (Bacevich, 2005), while public displays of nationalism and support for the military have suppressed political dissent.

In spite of this apparent hegemony of beliefs, a growing movement of community organizers and activists opposed to U.S. foreign policy and the growing militarization of schools are engaged in a battle for the hearts and minds of young Americans. Military counter-recruitment (CR), an effort to neutralize recruitment into the armed forces, has emerged as a key method among those disillusioned with the more traditional tactics and approach of the mainstream U.S. peace movement. With an estimated 150 local CR groups operating in different venues and utilizing various organizing tactics (Castro, 2008; Friesen, 2010), counter-recruitment is focused on the increasing presence of military recruitment within public education. While CR organizing exists across the United States, it is largely a grassroots effort to resist war and a broader culture of militarism by emphasizing clearly defined—and what organizers see as achievable—goals linked to the “symbolic violence” represented by military recruiters in schools and local communities.

In this article, we analyze three examples of counter-recruitment in the United States. We examine the respective strategies and use of community organizing tactics by organizers, evaluate the similarities and differences in approach among these examples, and assess the efficacy of CR efforts. After noting the growing presence of military recruiters in educational settings, we locate the work of local CR groups within Friesen’s (2010) model of five symbolic struggles between CR activists
and military recruiters. While CR organizing typically operates with limited resources and staffing, in contrast to the massive advertising and recruiting budget of the U.S. military, the counter-recruitment movement has achieved notable victories in local communities. We find that to be successful, CR groups must utilize strategic framing of their activities to broaden public support. In addition, choosing discreet targets of organizing efforts, careful recruitment of allies, and long-term coalition-building appear critical to positive outcomes. We frame our analysis within a broader context of public support for and acquiescence to a culture of militarism in the United States.

The Culture of Militarism in America

While mainstream accounts of American history have typically glorified the U.S. military, representations within popular culture have intensified in the post-September 11 era. A recent issue of Fortune magazine (March 22, 2010), for example, featured four different covers of uniformed soldiers, all but one holding a rifle, under the heading, “Meet the new face of business leadership.” The article noted that major U.S. corporations are actively recruiting “the military’s elite.” The March 2010 cover of Vogue, tagged as the “Military issue,” featured female models in military-inspired clothing. “Heavy-duty utility pieces in khaki and olive,” it noted, “make up a distinguished urban uniform that commands the season’s attention.”

In a September 2010 profile, Men’s Journal lauded the “gutsy” and “ballsy pilots” who fly the Kiowa attack helicopter in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the article included a photo of a bare-chested, smiling pilot, it had no pictures or little mention of the civilian casualties that often result from the use of these weapons. Such examples depict soldiers as modern day “heroes” and “warriors” representing an ideal of American society, and have become deeply embedded within popular culture. These and similar representations are thus so normalized and ubiquitous that they may seem “invisible,” as the military is portrayed as vital and desirable, especially in an increasingly “dangerous” world.

Like the growing use of the American flag—on bumper stickers, advertisements, lapel pins—American soldiers are
everywhere imaginable in mainstream culture. As important, the common portrayals of soldiers emphasize themes of bravery and honor, avoiding critical scrutiny of the role played by the military in foreign interventions (like the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), or the clear dangers that soldiers face. The rise of the phrase “support our troops,” is used ostensibly to offer thanks “to those who do so much to protect us,” as a recent advertisement from Goodyear noted. But such references also imply only one acceptable way of thinking about the military, while implicitly providing support for U.S. foreign wars. Sports and other public events routinely utilize the military and those in uniform to promote a distinct form of nationalism and patriotism. Thus militarization takes place not only at a military base, “in the classroom, or on the battlefield (wherever that may be), but instead increasingly occurs in less institutionalized settings such as state fairs, air shows, and car races” (Allen, 2009, p. 10).

Ironically, at a time when the military draft is a distant memory Lutz (2010) suggested that “war readiness is a way of life” in the United States, a phenomenon that permeates public life and social identity, yet is largely devoid of critical scrutiny. She found that a “permanent and massive mobilization for war” has distorted the American Dream by increasing corporate power in the public sector, promoting a culture of government secrecy, and shifting critical resources away from the struggle for social and economic equality (p. 45). The depth of this cultural militarization, she found, is crucial to the lack of public introspection about its implications.

Veneration of the military represents a recent cultural shift: until the mid-20th century “military power and institutions” were viewed with “skepticism, if not outright hostility. In the wake of World War II, that changed. An affinity for military might emerged as central to the American identity” as a global power promoting freedom and democracy (Bacevich, 2010, p. 13). As a result, critical debate over the size of the U.S. military budget remains a taboo topic for most U.S. politicians, helping fuel a “permanent war economy.” As Lutz observed, “there is no institution that is more revered than the military and whose financial and moral support is thought more unquestionable in the halls of Congress ...” (2010, p. 55).
Organizing Against Militarism in Public Schools

Normalizing Military Recruitment

Of significance for counter-recruitment efforts, the culture of militarism permeates key social institutions in U.S. society, with public schools a prominent example. The use of primary schools for presentations has become an ideal site of socialization by veterans and current soldiers, who use these opportunities to discuss their experiences “defending freedom.” That such events often attract local media coverage further normalizes the role of the military and serves as a potent and free recruiting tool by the armed forces. Another common practice is for primary schoolchildren to assemble care packages or write letters which they send to soldiers serving overseas. Such activities constitute a form of “symbolic recruitment” which educates children “to take the war effort for granted and to view it as desirable, to consider it a privileged form of social participation, rather than question its necessity” (Givol, Rotem, & Sandler, 2004, p. 19).

More pervasive is the growing presence of military recruiters in thousands of secondary schools across the United States. Changes to federal law have gradually increased students’ exposure to the military in various ways. The 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, for example, requires all U.S. high schools to provide the Pentagon with contact information for high school students or face the loss of federal education funding (Tannock, 2005). As a result, recruiters now have access to nearly all students, both directly on high school campuses and via telephone and other communication tools. As a U.S. Marine Corps strategist acknowledged, “the future of the all-volunteer armed forces are seventeen-year-old male high school seniors … but it is crucial that a recruiter contacts them during their junior year of high school, which is why the provision of student directory information is so critical” (Long, 2006, p. 8). The Pentagon also pays handsomely for information obtained by private data brokers, sometimes illegally obtained by the third party (Goodman, 2009).

Anderson (2009) criticized the growing presence of recruiters in schools for targeting the most vulnerable segment of American youth: low-income students with limited academic and employment prospects. Noting the lack of research about military recruiters in high schools, he finds that this “pipeline
to the military” has largely avoided critical scrutiny while schools have come under more pressure from recruiters: the Pentagon’s need for troops has increased since the invasion and occupation of Iraq and, more recently, the escalating war in Afghanistan. In the context of a call for a permanent war against terrorism, troop levels are expected to remain high into the foreseeable future (pp. 267-268).

The need to meet recruitment goals, especially among minority youth, has increased demands on the military and forced recruiters to increase their exposure to school-aged youth. A 2009 study prepared for the Secretary of Defense notes the recent difficulties of the Army in meeting annual recruiting goals, resulting in lowered recruitment standards, recruitment of “more lower-quality enlistees,” and “several experimental programs to allow applicants who failed to meet standards to quality for enlistment” (Asch, Buck, Klerman, Kleykamp, & Loughran, 2009, p. xxii). Future efforts to develop “recruiting incentives” for less qualified Hispanic and African-American youth, such as increased marketing of educational benefits, were encouraged.

The military also obtains a wealth of student information from the results of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The three-hour test is provided free to school districts as a “vocational aptitude” exam, and many cash-strapped districts require their students to take it. Test results are made available to recruiters, who can then use the data to customize their recruitment “discussion” with students. Still, the Pentagon publicly plays down the recruitment potential, claiming that the ASVAB is just a way of “giving back” to communities by providing a public service to schools and often referring to the test as the innocuous-sounding “ASVAB Career Exploration Program” (Castro, 2010).

The growing popularity of computer and video games, many of which trace to Pentagon-funded research to create training simulation for the armed forces, represent a related means that supports a culture of militarism. Ottosen (2009) linked military research and development and the creation of new video games “as instruments for recruitment to the armed forces and as a tool in the global battle for hearts and minds in the so called Global War on Terror” (p. 123). Indeed, the most
popular video games offer players fictional depictions that mimic current U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and surreptitiously build support for the American military (Suellentrop, 2010). One such game, “America’s Army,” requires users to “register” by providing personal data to military recruiters.

Alternatives to Militarism:
Counter-recruitment as One Model

It is within this context of deeply embedded militarism that the practice of counter-recruitment exists. Despite the growth of CR activities, counter-recruiters face significant odds in their efforts to dissuade American youth from joining the military. As suggested, they confront a society that encourages youth—especially males—to demonstrate masculinity (and patriotism) by becoming modern-day “warriors” and joining the military.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, CR activists must also grapple with an environment where political dissent is increasingly suspect and subject to being labeled “un-American.” This is especially pronounced for those challenging cultural norms about the military and its use. Those involved in counter-recruitment, like other forms of peace activism, therefore face claims of being unpatriotic, undermining the morale of U.S. troops involved in war, and of jeopardizing U.S. security by (unwittingly) supporting “enemies” of the United States (Coy, Woehrle, & Maney, 2008).

Nonetheless, there are successful precedents of efforts to challenge war and militarization; resistance to the Vietnam War is the best known example in the United States. On the home front, draft counseling and conscientious objection (CO) to military service in Vietnam received broad support, fueled by recognition that racial minorities, and poor and working class youth were disproportionately drafted to fight an unpopular war (Cortright, 1975). Draft counseling efforts assisted soldiers and potential recruits by identifying options available to those opposed to serving in the military or who felt that fighting in a war contradicted their personal values. Much like counter-recruitment employs community organizing, draft
counseling utilized similar tactics as a way to deal proactively with the Vietnam war. These activities were an integral part of a broader anti-war activism that reshaped the American political landscape. Despite its disparate nature, “the Vietnam antiwar movement was the largest, most sustained, and most powerful peace campaign in human history” (Cortright, 2008, p. 157).

Lainer-Vos (2006) noted that “more than fifteen million men received legal exemptions and deferments (60% of the cohort)” during the Vietnam War, while about 170,000 “obtained the legal status of CO. As many as 570,000 men evaded conscription illegally” (p. 363). According to Cortright (2008), by the last year of the draft “conscientious objectors outnumbered military conscripts” (p. 167). In 1973 with the draft ended, some activists viewed counter-recruitment as a more practical option of opposing the military than claiming conscientious objector status.

The first national counter recruitment conference was held in Baltimore in 1974, and in 1976 the Task Force on Recruitment and Militarism (TFORM) was formed by those involved in draft counseling campaigns. The group, which later included several national peace organizations, including the American Friends Service Committee and the War Resisters League, served as a network among activists and mobilized in the early 1980s to address the revival of the Selective Service Registration System (Castro, 2008; Friesen, 2010). TFORM represented a precursor to the current environment of local CR organizations focused on challenging military recruitment. As described in our examples, these groups have been active since the 1980s, though up until the current Iraq war organizing efforts were uneven. Despite a lack of media coverage and scholarship about counter-recruitment, CR activists have scored important legal victories, forced changes to local school policies, and broadened their base of support to include parents, teachers, unions, and other key community actors.

Goals of the Counter-Recruitment Movement

In the first empirical study focused on the counter-recruitment movement (CRM), sociologist Matthew Friesen (2010) argued that CRs are involved in five symbolic struggles with
military recruiters (MRs). Friesen’s research, based upon interviews with movement activists, owes its theoretical underpinnings to the field of social movement studies and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “symbolic violence.” His analysis revealed that “a series of contests is occurring between CRs and MRs in public schools” over the following:

- **Rendition of Information**: Counter-recruiters resist the efforts of military recruiters to collect and use student information to promote military recruitment.
- **Educational Space**: Counter-recruiters work to restrict the physical presence of military recruiters on the school campus.
- **Heroic Military Narrative**: Counter-recruiters present narratives of military service contrary to those related by military recruiters.
- **Educational Mission**: Counter-recruiters resist efforts to introduce military values into public education.
- **Vocational Visions**: Counter-recruiters challenge military recruiters’ descriptions of vocational opportunities provided by military service, and provide alternative career options. (Friesen, 2010, p. 41)

We expand upon Friesen’s (2010) model by construing these symbolic struggles as common goals for the CR movement. As Friesen provided the first analysis of counter-recruiters’ own perceptions of their work, and in the absence of anything resembling a counter-recruitment movement manifesto, we are confident in re-branding Friesen’s five struggles as movement goals. Our analysis illustrates how three high-profile organizers reflect a commitment to achieving the same goals while drawing upon community organizing tactics to advance their agenda. Effective military recruiters essentially practice good community organizing: they talk to the influential people in a neighborhood—a local minister, a high school football coach—and build support for the military as a viable option for young men. The fact that military recruitment relies on organizing principles suggests a need for counter recruiters to do the same.

The first goal of CR, following Friesen (2010), aims at combating MRs’ easy access to private student information. Nearly
half of Friesen's interviewees cited "resistance to these data collection efforts as a central activity" of their local CR organizing activities (p. 20). Recruiting for an all-volunteer military depends on generating reliable leads and contacting young people as early as possible in their high school careers. As a result, military recruiters depend heavily on lists of student data to generate solid leads and gain enlistments. Such data comes from the variety of sources discussed above. Pat Elder, profiled below, is one organizer who has successfully used the tactic of lobbying for legislative changes to restrict military recruiter access to student information at the school district, county, and state levels. CRs who organize around this particular goal often report having an easier time gaining support for their advocacy efforts from parents.

The second goal of CR aims at combating MRs' control over educational space. In many school districts military recruiters currently enjoy almost unlimited access to students: they often represent a grossly disproportionate number of occupational representatives at school career fairs, walk about unsupervised on school property, and at times even intervene to ensure that potential recruits get passing grades so they can qualify for special service after graduation (Geurin, 2009). Since the Pentagon can afford to inundate schools with recruiting resources, the result is that other post-graduation career options are not as well represented in guidance offices, at school career fairs, and in students' post-graduation plans.

Counter-recruiters rely on community organizing tactics in their struggle over MRs' access to educational space. They often stake out their own space within schools to undertake public education efforts (e.g. tabling and distributing literature). They may also engage in advocacy by lobbying local school boards to restrict MRs' access to schools (Hardy, 2005). A remarkable amount of effort goes into both tactics. Organizers must be persistent in trying to reach school administrators in order to secure permission to set up a literature display or "peace table." Furthermore, the legislative achievements that offer CR activists the rare opportunity to see concrete results only come after significant time spent networking and recruiting allies: parents, students, teachers, and school board members.

The third goal of CR organizing aims at challenging what
Friesen (2010) called the "heroic military narrative" endorsed by MRs and reinforced by military recruiting advertisements in the mass media (p. 22). A large share of the Pentagon's $1 billion annual public relations budget goes into promoting the notion that serving in the military can be an exciting adventure—witness current Air Force Reserve television advertisements which play on young men's fascination with extreme sports. MRs' more personal pitches aim at stimulating pride and nationalism—that only the toughest join the Marines, or that heroism is the exclusive domain of the military. As a counterpoint to this dominant narrative, counter-recruiters seek to introduce young people to information that MRs are likely to leave out of their marketing. In another instance of organizing for public education, many of the brochures and fliers distributed by CRs in schools and at career fairs relate statistics on the number of veterans who end up homeless or on the alarming percentage of women soldiers who experience sexual violence in the military.

In a key tactic used to achieve the goal of challenging the dominant military narrative, CRs organize with veterans' groups to deliver public education modules. Most of these public presentations take on the topic of "what the military is really like." Extensive outreach to classroom teachers and students is important here to recruit allies and ensure that counter-recruitment presentations will continue to be welcomed in the future.

The fourth goal of CR seeks the demilitarization of schools. Counter-recruiters are concerned with the way recruiters' presence in schools contradict "traditional educational values" like creativity and non-violent problem-solving. Indeed, the school-based Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program shows how "military values that emphasize discipline, hierarchy, conformity, rigidity, uniformity, obedience, and training in violence" can take hold in schools (Friesen, 2010, p. 26).

There are more than 3,000 JROTC programs in all branches of service across the United States and its territories. Although schools pay for most JROTC programming, the Pentagon successfully sells the programs to often poorer and under-resourced communities with the promise that youth involvement in JROTC promotes "discipline" and even reduces the
likelihood that at-risk youth may get involved in gangs. Some public schools and charter schools have gone as far as to revamp the entire curriculum along the lines of a military school (Aguirre & Johnson, 2005). Therefore, in order to resist the rising tide of militarized education, counter-recruitment affirms the educational values of critical thinking and free thought—principles antithetical to the military model of education. To advance their goal of resisting militarized education, counter-recruiters rely on school-specific community organizing tactics such as curriculum development. CRs may also lend their support to student-initiated extracurricular activities like “peace clubs” or social justice magnet schools. As Friesen stated (2010), the “promotion of anti-militarization curriculum and teacher training, radical thought classes, and support of peace clubs” will together “enable CRs to reaffirm traditional educational values” (p. 27).

The fifth goal of counter-recruitment aims at contesting what Friesen (2010) called the “vocational visions” offered by military recruiters. Since the end of conscription in 1973, military recruiting advertisements have heavily promoted the opportunities for career-advancement found in the armed forces (Bailey, 2009; Moore, 2009). Such sustained publicity has been effective in attracting recruits interested above all in the prospects of family insurance coverage or generous sign-on bonuses. With the armed forces now dependent on finding more than 200,000 volunteer recruits annually (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009), young men facing economic pressures and those with few educational opportunities are especially vulnerable to recruitment, resulting in what some label a “poverty draft.” Not surprisingly, military recruitment continues to emphasize vocational and educational opportunities, along with financial incentives to potential recruits. Anecdotal reports of increased recruitment during economic recessions underscore how many enlistees view the armed forces through a pragmatic, rather than a patriotic, lens (Massing, 2008). As Friesen (2010) relates:

Fashioning a future for a potential enlistee through the lens of military experience is one of the most powerful tools at the MR’s disposal. MRs describe military
service as an opportunity to receive technical training that will further a civilian career, provide money for college, offer a way out of difficult life circumstances, infuse a vocation with patriotic service, and secure a sizable retirement pension (p. 27).

Counter-recruiters contest the military's perceived monopoly on viable vocational opportunities by pointing out that many military occupations have no civilian counterpart, making employment upon discharge problematic; that military recruiters cannot guarantee an enlistee will receive the occupation or training of their choice; and that there is a much higher unemployment rate for military veterans than non-veterans. At career fairs or at the growing number of CR-sponsored "social justice fairs," counter-recruiters engage in public education by distributing literature and giving public presentations on non-military routes to learning a trade.

Counter-recruiters also recognize the abundance of research which shows how many young people choose to enlist out of a desire to serve one's country. They may be motivated by such intangible vocational aims as "dignity" and "fidelity," two of the leading themes identified by young recruits in Department of Defense Youth Polls (Eighmey, 2006). Therefore, CRs must "contest the collapse of serving one's country into a strictly military narrative by sharing information about volunteer programs such as AmeriCorps, National Civilian Community Corps, City Year, and other not-for-profit service opportunities" (Friesen, 2010, p. 29). By offering information on non-military alternatives to national service, CRs are making a major contribution to their goal of contesting the vocational visions promoted by military recruiters.

**Counter-Recruitment in Action**

In the following we analyze how three counter-recruiters (and their respective organizations) engage in community organizing to achieve the goals outlined above. We chose these "cases" due to the visibility of each organizer in peace and counter-recruitment publications, and based on the prominent roles they play nationally, for example in terms of organizing, public speaking and leading workshops at the 2009 national
conference of the National Network Opposing Militarization of Youth (NNOMY). Our analysis is based on multiple interviews with each of the organizers conducted by telephone during the spring and summer of 2010. Follow-up interviews were conducted via email and telephone. Informants were asked to describe how they became involved with counter-recruitment, what tactics have proven to be the most successful in their organizing, and to identify their larger organizational strategies. In addition, through an analysis of primary and secondary documents related to the work of each organizer and his or her organization, we sought to further assess their different organizing tactics, key barriers they confront in schools and local communities, and the relative success of their efforts. In our second example, in particular, use of these documents helped provide a critical historical assessment of the counter-recruitment movement by exploring the contest over “equal access” in public schools. We note that although all three of the “cases” analyzed here make reference to the goals described by Friesen (2010), this is coincidental; we selected our examples of counter-recruitment prior to learning of Friesen’s framework.

Pat Elder: Plucky Pragmatist. Maryland-based organizer Pat Elder is a practical organizer concerned above all with getting results. He advocates a legislative approach to counter-recruitment and presents workshops to activists interested in learning about the subject. In his pragmatism he shows the influence of his organizing “guru,” Rick Jahnkow, a San Diego-based organizer who has been a consistent critic of the U.S. peace movement’s focus on traditional activities—like picketing and marching—that produce little in the way of concrete results (Jahnkow, 1989; Jahnkow, 2006a). According to Elder, the traditional peace movement views “countering recruitment and militarization in the schools as just another tactic to use to fight the wars du jour. On the other hand, many of my colleagues and I with NNOMY feel countering recruitment is the strategy to employ to resist war” (personal communication, June 26, 2010).

Elder was not always opposed to the traditional means of protesting wars and militarism in the United States. Having founded a non-hierarchical activist group, DC
Anti-war Network or DAWN, he helped organize one of the first anti-war demonstrations in Washington, D.C. after the attacks of September 11. However, in 2004 he made what he calls a "pragmatic shift" and decided that his efforts would be better spent by focusing more narrowly on the issue of military recruitment. As a parent, a school teacher by profession and a self-described "Bethesda type," the decision to focus on lobbying school boards to restrict military recruiter access to student information was a natural fit. His efforts, falling under Friesen's first goal of preventing the rendition of student information, quickly bore fruit (personal communication, May 12, 2010).

As noted, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 mandates that public high schools hand over their students' contact information to the Pentagon as a condition of continued federal funding. However, an obscure legal loophole allows parents or students to "opt-out" of what critics see as an invasive procedure. Elder's first victory was in persuading his own local school district of Montgomery County, Maryland, to require the "opt-out" form to appear on the emergency information card that all parents or guardians must complete at the beginning of the school year. He and other organizers experienced subsequent successes getting the same provision passed in neighboring counties. But when they targeted school districts far from liberal Montgomery County and ran into opposition, "we decided it was time for some legislation." Elder gives all the credit for what came to be known as the Maryland "opt-out" legislation to State Senator Paul Pinsky (personal communication, May 12, 2010).

Elder has shifted his attention in the last few years to the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). His efforts to get legislation passed preventing the automatic transfer of student test results to the military is a useful example of community organizing. Elder started by recognizing a pair of organizing challenges that would make this campaign a tougher fight than the opt-out efforts. First, the military would put all its organizing efforts into blocking passage of any ASVAB bill. As Elder noted:

The military didn't fight the "opt-out" (legislation).
... It didn't matter to the military, because the military
can get names and phone numbers from a bunch of other sources. The ASVAB is different. The military really counts on the ASVAB because they get career information, demographics—they get four hours of getting into a kid's head! (personal communication, May 12, 2010)

Elder also faced a second organizing challenge: he would not be able to count on a sturdy advocate in government, having recognized before starting the campaign that his old ally Sen. Paul Pinsky would be perceived as too liberal to shepherd this bill through the Maryland Senate. To head off the two challenges, he had to secure stronger support in the community by recruiting new allies and coalition building. Elder was instrumental in founding Maryland Coalition to Protect Student Privacy, and gained support for the bill from the ACLU, the NACCP, and the Maryland PTA. Along with recruiting allies and coalition-building, the group was also careful to properly frame the public messages they were broadcasting. "We never allowed anybody to suggest that we were anti-war people" (personal communication, May 12, 2010). He credits this public relations tactic with helping to get the bill passed. As he told attendees of a workshop on legislative approaches to CR at the NNOMY National Conference in 2009: "You can't build a movement out of just the radicals in this country. There just aren't enough of them." Hence, given the realities of the American political scene, networking with groups like the decidedly un-radical local parent-teacher association becomes a fundamental component of counter-recruitment.

Rick Jahnkow: Doyen of the CRM. Described above as Pat Elder's organizing "guru," Rick Jahnkow represents the counter-recruitment movement's historian, philosopher, and chief strategist. With thirty years' experience in the San Diego, California area, Jahnkow and the grassroots organization he co-founded, Project for Youth and Non-Military Alternatives (Project YANO) have achieved a number of successes. Among them, probably the most significant was the successful 1986 suit in San Diego CARD v. Governing Board of Grossmont Union High School. The decision in Grossmont, handed down by the
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U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, came at a time when many in the CRM were resorting to litigation as an organizing tactic. Grossmont effectively gave counter-recruiters a legal basis for organizing in schools.

Jahnkow has always made tactical use of the alternative press. He writes frequently for journals such as Draft NOTices on topics pertaining to peace education and counter-recruitment. His careful framing of the public message means that his opinions have remained remarkably consistent over the years. Two points are worth noting. First, he believes that the peace movement, used to thinking primarily in terms of visible, public protest, must shift its emphasis to addressing the "dangerous spread of military ideals and values in society," which constitutes the "root cause" of unending war and militarism (Jahnkow, 1989, p. 1). Counter-recruitment is the means by which activists can address the "root cause" of war in the places where military values are disseminated—the public schools. The second element of his message targets those who are doing counter-recruitment. Jahnkow urges activists to start thinking strategically and adopt a "long-term vision" aimed at combating the spread of militarism in schools (2006b, p. 19). A long-term strategy would be effective at not only opposing current U.S. wars, he argues, but possibly preventing the outbreak of future wars (2006a). Jahnkow’s emphasis on long-term strategy stems from his experiences organizing in conservative and highly militarized San Diego County. “That long-term perspective is very important. But I feel it’s that way everywhere. Movements in other countries have learned that, but that goes against the grain of our culture—we want immediate gratification” (personal communication, May 27, 2010).

The “Case History” of Project YANO, written by Jahnkow (2006b) to educate other activists in the field, highlights specific community organizing tactics the counter-recruitment movement draws on to achieve its goals. Jahnkow’s primary affiliation, Project YANO, was formed in 1984 at a time when “only a few organizations were engaged in similar efforts” (p. i). At that time, the principle of equal access for counter-recruiters had not yet been addressed in the courts. As a result, Project YANO organizers had to think strategically about how best to use their limited resources to gain access to schools given
that their right to that access was often challenged by school stakeholders. The first year of organizing was therefore spent recruiting allies: targeting classroom teachers, sending out large mailings about the Project YANO classroom presentations and soliciting invitations from teachers. By the second year their effort to recruit allies had extended to guidance counselors, a group targeted with a special mailing “since they are frequently the primary source of information for high school students looking for career and college opportunities” (p. 5). During those first two years, when Project YANO activists were delivering classroom presentations and reaching out to guidance counselors, the group was both countering the “heroic military narrative” and providing information on non-military career options (Friesen’s [2010] third and fifth goals, respectively).

In 1988, Project YANO shifted its focus to Friesen’s (2010) first goal when they launched a campaign to raise awareness of equal access and privacy issues around ASVAB testing in the San Diego Unified School District. Jahnkow and his fellow Project YANO organizers relied heavily on three community organizing tactics during this campaign: letter-writing, advocacy, and recruiting allies. A letter-writing campaign led by parents and religious groups, including the San Diego County Ecumenical Society, lobbied the school district to change its policies regarding the automatic release of test results to military recruiters. Organizers had early on recruited allies among the clergy at the Unitarian church attended by the district Superintendent, and this association paid off. As Jahnkow relates, “even at his own church, Superintendent Payzant was approached by people asking him to do something to stop ASVAB testing” (2006b, p. 12). Ultimately, the district and Project YANO reached a compromise on a policy which held that the district “would no longer allow students to take the ASVAB unless they got a parent’s signature on an acknowledgment form that explicitly asked if they wanted recruiters to receive their child’s scores” (p. 12). According to some accounts, the new policy had the effect of halving the number of military recruitment leads generated by ASVAB testing in the district.

It is worth summarizing Jahnkow’s own conclusions drawn from the campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. Three in particular best illustrate the use of community organizing. First, it was
essential to embrace a long-term, incremental approach to building support. The first- and second-year mail campaigns to teachers and guidance counselors exemplify this approach. Project YANO sought to build "community" support first, rather than to risk closing doors in the future by getting turned away at the school board and superintendent level. Second, the group sought to strengthen "organizational credibility" by working "in coalition with community groups" and soliciting "key community endorsements." Project YANO’s practice of recruiting allies and coalition building with area clergy serve as a good example of this approach. Finally, a letter-writing campaign and lobbying from parents and clergy aided the success of the anti-ASVAB campaign cited above. Jahnkow notes that “complaints about the military from parents, students, community groups and school personnel are effective” (2006b, pp. 19-20).

For contemporary campaigns, Jahnkow holds that there are at least two important tactics to keep in mind while engaged in counter-recruitment work in a highly militarized environment like San Diego. First, it is necessary to control and tailor one’s message to suit different audiences. “You have to speak a language that is understandable to the people you’re addressing and not speak the language of other places, like Berkeley, when you’re in Phoenix,” he noted. Second, considering the difficulty of securing funding and adequate staffing for counter-recruitment work, Jahnkow suggested that “you have to think strategically about what you do choose to do, about the approaches you do adopt and whether they’re going to have strategic value” (personal communication, May 27, 2010).

Arlene Inouye: Outreach Artist. In the months following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, a speech and language therapist in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) was troubled by a question. Arlene Inouye knew that the youth and militarism work done in her area by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was useful. But she wondered if there wasn’t something more that she and her colleagues could do on a local level. Inouye describes herself a union person, thus she approached the Human Rights Committee of her teachers’ union with her question. At that time she did not yet have
a clear idea about specific goals, only an interest in recruiting teachers who would want to develop “some kind of a response.” To her delight, the union was receptive and “doors opened right away” (personal communication, September 20, 2010). One of those doors led to a union-organized teach-in on the Iraq war in June 2003, an event which attracted more than one hundred area teachers. Inouye came away from the teach-in with a list of names that would serve as the foundation for the soon-to-be-formed Coalition for Alternatives to Militarism in Schools (CAMS).

Inouye has been the chief coordinator of CAMS since its founding. Lobbying and advocacy victories by the group include a district-wide policy restricting the disclosure of student ASVAB test results to the military. A public education campaign, Operation Opt Out, has resisted the rendition of student information (Friesen’s [2010] first goal) by more than doubling the number of students who return signed opt-out forms each fall. Another form of public education, classroom presentations, is organized by volunteers working with CAMS’ outreach arm, Project Great Futures. Similar to Project YANO, these classroom presentations seek to achieve the third, fourth and fifth goals identified by Friesen (2010). Inouye’s innovative Adopt-a-School program shows more clearly how community organizing tactics facilitate counter-recruitment work.

Employing a tool-kit approach to Friesen’s (2010) second goal of counter-recruitment (resisting the “physical presence of MRs on the school campus”), the Adopt-a-School program empowers stakeholders in the school community—teachers, parents, or concerned citizens—to take concrete steps toward demilitarizing their local schools. Preliminary work involves strategic targeting of individual schools. In her capacity as mentor to novice teachers, Inouye makes regular visits to many of the schools in her district. This enables her to be a listening post, getting a feel for any special issues that a school may have with regard to military recruiters. Such regular contact with schools also enables Inouye to recruit allies for CAMS from among the staff she encounters. Once target schools have been identified, Point Persons (supportive school stakeholders) work together with a CAMS representative to identify and discuss the chief characteristics of their particular school, determine whether there have been complaints from parents or
students about military recruiters, and to develop a strategy based around that data.

What also makes the Adopt-a-School program unique is its online trove of documents. These materials constitute a program of public education in community organizing. "Strategies for Operation Opt Out," "Working With Union Reps at the School," and "People Skills: How to Frame the Issues" are among the resources available online. As the title of the last document demonstrates, the group places great stress on properly framing the public message in counter-recruitment work. Inouye also cautions counter-recruiters against using anti-military rhetoric in their organizing: "It's not a black or white thing. You have to be really flexible and you have to adjust your message, your approach" (personal communication, September 20, 2010).

The Tides Foundation, which funds other peace and social justice organizing efforts, originally provided CAMS seed money for its Adopt-a-School program which the foundation felt had shown "great promise as a national model" (personal communication, September 24, 2010). The grant allowed CAMS to identify and organize 35 schools. Five years later, 50 schools in the LAUSD have a designated Point Person, and elements of the Adopt-a-School program have been implemented by CRs in other parts of the country, most notably in New York and San Francisco.

As noted, aside from success in lobbying for legislative changes at the school district level, CAMS monitors compliance with the new policies at both the school district and the local school level. Past experience observing school administrators' lax approach to upholding new policies has taught Inouye that "once something passes you really have to have a mechanism in place where you can monitor compliance." To better advocate for demilitarized schools at the school district level, the group initiated a process of creating a military advisory committee on the school board. "We went to the board and they actually formed a committee around us," Inouye noted, "where I drive the agenda and we're able to keep a watch over policies, practices and everything having to do with military recruiting." Aside from Inouye, the committee includes the school district official in charge of secondary schools, as well
as the district supervisor for JROTC (personal communication, September 20, 2010).

Within the Adopt-a-School program, school stakeholders in the form of Point Persons (usually teachers) function as "force multipliers." Thus the Point Persons often work as CAMS informants in the schools, monitoring compliance with relevant district policy at the school, or alerting CAMS in the event of non-compliance. For instance, a Point Person on the teaching staff at one district school informed Inouye that a military recruiting van was planning to visit the school without gaining prior approval. The point person's early alert allowed Inouye time to contact the school principal to discuss her concerns. Shortly thereafter, Inouye dispatched volunteers to the school who distributed CAMS literature. Those volunteers were later joined by representatives from the student peace club, also sent to the scene by Inouye. In the end, the principal arranged to have the recruiting command cancel the visit. "That to me was a really exciting example of how when you work things at multiple levels you can actually stop something from happening," Inouye said (personal communication, September 20, 2010).

Discussion

Counter-recruitment demands that its activists perform the same sorts of functions normally associated with community organizing. Our analysis illustrates the following implications for CRM strategy: (1) CRs must avoid taking an overtly anti-war position, stressing instead the anti-militarism of the movement. To do otherwise and frame CR as a form of opposition to particular wars runs the risk of alienating key community leaders whose support may be needed to build future coalitions; (2) While the CRM is explicitly inclusive, in that it is multi-generational and multiracial, CR organizing paradoxically needs at the same time to be somewhat exclusive in recruiting activists. Not everyone can be a community organizer, and those who lack good interpersonal skills and a feel for the political will fail to advance the movement's goals; and (3) Given the long-term dimension of this work, CRs would do well to focus their efforts on achieving some of the goals
identified by Friesen (2010). With the possible exception of Arlene Inouye, none of these examples of counter-recruitment sought to organize around all five of the goals at once. Indeed, one of the counter-recruiters in this study compared his role in fighting the Goliath of American militarism to the plucky determination of the American bull terrier highlighted in James Thurber’s short story, “Snapshot of a Dog.” “You pick a bit, you become an expert in it, and you don’t let go” (Pat Elder, personal communication, May 12, 2010).

Counter-recruitment organizing starts with recruiting allies to build effective local coalitions. The examples of CR analyzed in this study demonstrate that the best allies are typically school stakeholders: parents and teachers. With a coalition firmly in place, these groups seek to clarify goals and objectives. Counter-recruiters do this by framing their coalition’s public message in non-threatening, inclusive language. The activists we interviewed all agree that an anti-war or anti-military message will end up alienating the coalition from the community whose support it needs to survive. If these groups cannot transmit their finely-honed message to enough people, or to those they want to target, counter-recruiters then try to utilize alternative media outlets.

The counter-recruiters profiled here lobby policy-makers and relevant public officials when they want to see concrete (policy) change. They get on the phone, write letters, and reach out to local places of worship to influence decisions. As another means of advocacy, counter-recruiters may get themselves seated on committees. If none exist they may start the process to create one so that there will be some forum to address the concerns of their coalition. And finally, if their coalition isn’t getting a chance to be heard, and if those in power won’t let them be heard because they are ignoring a law, counter-recruiters first try and cajole them or convince them to come to their senses. And, if all else fails, they litigate.

Current counter-recruitment strategy can be summarized in three key phrases: anti-militarist, long term, and inclusive. CR strategy is anti-militarist, not simply anti-war. It is aimed at countering that part of U.S. culture which promotes violence and war as the optimal response to conflict. Anti-militarism is seen by movement organizers as a way to keep the
movement viable for the long-term. One lesson CRs must learn from the Vietnam war is that to focus on individual issues (a specific war) and tactics (like draft resistance) may result in sacrificing long-term relevance for short-term goals (Jahnkow, 2006a). Counter-recruitment is thus a means of resisting not just one war, but the larger culture of militarism whose survival depends in part on young people’s passive acceptance of military values and ideals.

CR strategy is also focused on a long-term vision of incremental gains. If the CRM had a symbol, it would surely be the tortoise. As the anti-ASVAB campaigns in Maryland and San Diego attest, when activists win, it may be only be one local school district. Thus, as the movement goes forward, activist victories will be measured by the “summation of a series of small, incremental struggles” (Theberge, 2005, p. 16). For CR strategist Rick Jahnkow, “people have to be operating from a very long-term perspective and be willing to accept that you might not achieve real measurable and visible victories quickly, that it requires time, it requires dedication” (personal communication, May 27, 2010).

Finally, CR strategy is inclusive in that it is a multi-generational, multiracial movement and needs to be to remain a credible force for change in the communities most heavily targeted by military recruiters. However, there are obstacles to keeping the movement inclusive. Older CRs often have trouble working with the co-leadership of younger, high-school-age CRs. This reluctance reflects an authoritarian thread of movement culture and must be addressed for a truly multigenerational movement to flourish (Jahnkow, personal communication, May 27, 2010). Further, despite its success, CR has trouble attracting attention and respect from the broader peace movement, a problem which will ensure that the counter-recruitment movement remains under-resourced in terms of volunteer recruitment and fundraising. Interestingly, Rick Jahnkow (2009) identified class divisions as a barrier to greater (movement) solidarity: peace activists “generally come from a more affluent part of society than those who are targeted by recruiters.” As a result,

Those of us who have been doing this work have sometimes felt that the struggle to educate the peace
movement about the social injustice dimensions of this problem has been just as frustrating at times as trying to break through the pro-military biases of school officials. (p. 2)

As important, CR activists recognize the ways that public policy serves to reinforce a culture of militarism. At over six-hundred pages, the mammoth No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 is the best-known example of such legislation. Section 9528 of the bill requires all U.S. high schools to provide the Pentagon with contact information for their students or face the loss of federal education funding. That directive was added in the final hour "by a Louisiana congressman who was offended that some high schools chose to protect their students' privacy by not giving out student information to military recruiters" (Anderson, 2009, p. 275). Parents and students can still "opt out" of having their private information rendered to military recruiters. Indeed, as shown, counter-recruitment organizers have increased the number of students who opt out every year by, for example, lobbying school districts to send opt-out forms home for parents to sign. While such efforts surely make a difference, the lack of an opt-out provision on the national level means that CR successes will retain the limited impact of local campaigns. But even if CRs and their allies were to gain repeal of Section 9528 of NCLB, it would probably fail to have the desired effect. When it comes to collecting the kind of student information most helpful to military recruiters, the Pentagon is hardly dependent on NCLB; it can and does get private student information from elsewhere. Other, lesser-known pieces of legislation (e.g., the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002) give military recruiters practically the same level of access as NCLB (Anderson, 2009).

Although the legislative outlook may be bleak—Congress remains staunchly pro-military and the repeal of NCLB is unlikely—the counter-recruitment movement has to exploit what little advantage it has within the existing legal framework. For example, Section 9528 of NCLB not only includes the mandate noted above, it also requires that military recruiters be given the same level of student access enjoyed by other types of recruiters. An example of what the CRM could do
with this "equal access" provision is provided by the students of Watervliet High School in New York State. Fed up with the military recruiters who stalked the school cafeterias almost on a daily basis, Watervliet students and their adult allies successfully lobbied their local school board to pass a policy limiting visits by all types of recruiters to one per month (Geurin, 2009). As their example shows, there is a growing recognition that effective counter-recruitment can be done even when schools are forced to open their doors to military recruiters.

Regardless of tensions with the broader peace movement, and despite legislative obstacles that make it difficult to eliminate militarism in schools, since the 1980s counter-recruiters have scored significant victories. Project YANO's successful use of litigation as a tactic won the equal access rights critical to counter-recruitment in schools. And as the military devised new methods of securing the private information of students, CRs joined outraged parents and teachers in launching a counter-attack. Organizers like Pat Elder and Arlene Inouye have also successfully used legislative tactics at the state and school district levels. Charting the ways in which the CRM achieves its victories represents an important contribution to the social sciences literature, which until now has all but ignored the counter-recruitment movement.

Conclusion

Counter-recruitment has been criticized for its narrow focus and lack of engagement with the larger aims of U.S. militarism abroad and structural inequality at home (Tannock, 2005). Nonetheless, though it only has limited support from some national peace organizations, properly understood, CR remains a viable method of addressing U.S. foreign policy and a culture of militarism. In what amounts to a division of labor among antiwar activists, Travieso (2008) identified counter-recruitment as one of three strategic interests to develop out of the U.S. peace movement following the invasion of Iraq (along with targeting multi-national corporations like Halliburton, and lobbying members of Congress to cut off war funding.) Ultimately, he suggested, this "professionalization" of strategy represents a marked improvement over the non-hierarchical and largely ineffective peace movement represented in the
run-up to the war in Iraq. Where does this leave the future of counter-recruitment?

In terms of scholarship, academics and others concerned with the impacts of increased militarism should consider work on this and related topics. Ironically, colleges are being pushed to roll out the welcome mat to the armed forces and increase the university presence of ROTC nationwide (Lewin & Hartocollis, 2010; Nelson, 2010). Instead of uncritically accepting a military presence on campus, colleges and those who teach in them could more effectively confront American militarism through focused research and vigorous public debate. In spite of stereotypes about American universities as bastions of radicalism, these institutions and those working inside their ivy-covered walls have failed to adequately grapple with the reality of U.S. militarism.

The time to turn the tide is now. With Pentagon spending at record levels, the occupation of Afghanistan in its tenth year, a long-term American military presence in Iraq likely, and military operations expanding in places like Yemen and Pakistan, the stakes could not be higher. If colleges are to be more than mere incubators of military values, scholars—social scientists in particular—must critically examine America’s culture of militarism and its domestic and global impacts. Research on counter-recruitment as one aspect of peace activism offers such an opportunity.

Despite the utility of Friesen’s (2010) study, for example, larger sample sizes are needed to better assess the similarities and differences among groups engaged in counter-recruitment organizing. Evaluation of the success of counter-recruitment is also needed. Field research and in-depth case studies could help explain the strengths and limitations of CR, along with its relationship to other forms of peace activism. NNOMY supports a directory of nearly 150 U.S.-based groups engaged in some type of counter-recruitment and demilitarization work. Absent a national magazine or information source devoted to counter-recruitment, this presents a vital opportunity for scholars and others to follow such activism.

The study of international counter-recruitment efforts offers another line of inquiry, given the lack of such research. In countries with a military situation similar to the United States (no draft, an all volunteer army), there is little evidence
of counter-recruitment organizing per se. Instead, we do see a growing interest in the issue of military recruitment and youth militarism in places like the United Kingdom, where Scottish parliamentarian Christine Grahame has criticized the Army for making visits (often uninvited) to elementary schools, high schools and even preschools (Johnson, 2010). In Spain, Canada, and Italy, activists have gone beyond an idle interest in this issue; they have spontaneously organized counter-recruitment events in their schools, colleges and communities.

From the limited information on international CR-related activities we draw two conclusions. First, the United States is the only country with a well-organized network of counter-recruitment groups. Outside U.S. borders the most obvious examples are demonstrations targeting military recruitment kiosks (in Spain and Canada) or against groups perceived to be promoting or profiting from youth militarism (Italy) (Alacant, 2010; Denomme, 2005; Micci, 2010). Second, we suggest that these limited international efforts underscore that the American model of recruiting for the military is uniquely dependent upon the schools. While these countries are similar to the United States by virtue of their reliance on all-volunteer forces, only two (Spain and Italy) ended conscription within the last ten years. More research is needed to determine the extent to which a military recruiter presence in schools grows in proportion to the length of time without conscription. It is interesting, in this regard, to note a possible correlation. Only the United Kingdom has had a longer period without conscription (since 1963) than the United States. Today the UK's school recruitment program is just as robust as the U.S. model. The armed forces seek recruits starting at age 16; army visits to schools are also an integral part of the program.

As opportunities for transnational peace organizing increase, counter-recruitment may emerge as an essential activity in other countries. Trends in key western states indicate a shift away from conscription, and toward all-volunteer, professional armies. At the same time, military forces from NATO countries are increasingly being called upon to support U.S. foreign policy goals—which often means sending troops into combat in Afghanistan or other neo-imperial outposts. This suggests an opportunity for counter-recruiters in the United
Organizing Against Militarism in Public Schools

States to collaborate with European peace movements with the aim of promoting CR as a viable anti-war organizing strategy. For U.S. activists, outreach efforts could be as simple as monitoring peace movements outside the United States. They could also involve leading workshops on counter-recruitment at international peace conferences or writing guest editorials on blogs and in magazines read by the European peace community. Regional networks of counter-recruitment activists organizing their own conferences will likely assume a greater role in the future; as an example, we note the contingent of Micronesian counter-recruiters that grew out of the 2009 International Network of Women Against Militarism conference in Guam (Kershner, 2010). Promoting dialogue on issues of mutual concern thus offers the potential to build a CR network in other countries and regions within established peace and anti-war organizations. If successful, such efforts will not only build bridges of understanding between U.S. activists and their international allies, they will also bolster global defenses against militarism at a time of increasingly global war.

References


Students for Peace: Contextual and Framing Motivations of Antiwar Activism

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This article traces the development of peace activism among undergraduate social work students. In doing so, it explores how social statuses, political contexts, and collective action frames affect the likelihood of joining the movement against the Afghanistan war (2001 to current). After analyzing data from a multi-campus sample of Bachelors in Social Work (BSW) students (n = 159), results show that peace activism was predicted by level of education as well as perceptions of proper foreign policy, the relative efficacy of social movement tactics, and identification with specific activist ideals. Finally, being situated in activist networks fostered greater peace activism while the ascribed statuses of race, class, and gender were poor predictors of peace activism.

Key words: peace activism, students, antiwar, BSW, social movement, collective action

In the last twenty years, the United States has initiated three major wars: twice in Iraq, and once in Afghanistan. In each war, most Americans initially supported the war policies, but a noticeable segment of the U.S. population also mobilized...
into new incarnations of U.S. peace movements (Meyer & Corrigall-Brown, 2005). While demonstrations against the Afghan and Iraq wars were large, little analysis exists about who joined these recent peace movements (Bogdan Vasi, 2006; Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007). To date, no studies have explored the extent to which employed social workers or social work students have contributed to the recent protests against the U.S. invasions of Middle Eastern countries.

In its most abstract terms, the social work profession has a commitment to achieving global and local peace through political and non-political means. The social work literature contains many essays on why and how social workers can work for peace making and human rights at international, national and local levels (e.g., Adams, 1991; Lundy & van Wormer, 2007; Moshe, 2001). The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) code of ethics reads: "Social Workers promote social justice and social change with and on the behalf of clients." Some of the ways to achieve social justice is through "direct practice, community organizing, social and political activism." Moreover, the NASW Peace and Social Justice Committee has urged social workers to work for an absence of war as well as reducing the size of the federal military budget, greater cooperation with the United Nations, total nuclear disarmament, stopping the poverty draft and a general de-escalation of violence.

While professional organizations have urged social workers to engage in peace activism, there is an absence of empirical studies on how often or why social workers join social movements against an ongoing war. When addressing political activism in general, many impressionistic essays suggest that the social work profession has become too "micro orientated" and has neglected its activist mission (Abramowitz, 1998; Davis, Cummings & MacMaster, 2007; Specht & Courtney, 1993). Coates (2003) warned that "many social workers consider the area of policy and actions to change policy to be the concerns of others—administrators, academics, government—but not themselves" (p. 138). Likewise, when discussing social work's role in international relations and peacemaking, James Midgley wrote (2001): "It cannot be claimed that social activism has
been popular in social work or that it has inspired many social workers" (p. 10).

College students have often been a central force in peace movements in the past (Van Dyke, 2003) but there is little knowledge of how social work students might fit into these dynamics. On the other hand, there is some research on the reformist tendencies of social work students. The empirical literature suggests that only a small percentage of social work students see social reform as a primary role for social workers. While one study contends that a "desire to create social change" is a major motive for students choosing social work (Hanson & McCullagh, 1995), other studies suggests that social work students are not enamored with political activism and prefer a career in micro practice (Aviram & Katan, 1991; Butler, 1990).

To address peace activism among social work students, this paper asks two related questions: (1) What proportion of undergraduate social work students have protested against the U.S. war in Afghanistan?; and (2) What are the factors that differentiate the students who have and have not joined this recent peace mobilization in the United States?

With a focus on factors that may inspire and hinder activism, this work integrates insights from many academic disciplines. The much cited "resource" model of political science guides our theoretical conceptualizations (Brady, Verba, & Scholzman, 1995), as do the sociological theories of "mobilization structures" (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Passy, 2001) and "collective action frames" (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Snow & Benford, 1992). This work also taps the nascent literature on peace activism among social work faculty (Davis et al., 2007; Van Soest, Johnston, & Sullivan, 1987) and political participation among social work students (Aviram & Katan, 1991; Butler, 1990; Rocha, 2000; Weiss, 2003) and employed social workers (Dudziak & Coates, 2004; Ezell, 1993; Hamilton & Fauri, 2001; Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Reeser, 1992; Ritter, 2008; Wolk, 1981).

Literature Review

Variable selection in this study is partially guided by the "resource-model" of political participation (Brady et al., 1995).
Offering a succinct answer as to why people refrain from politics, the resource-model asserts: "because they can't, because they don't want to, or because nobody asked" (p. 271). "They can't" suggests a dearth of necessary resources to be political. While crucial resources may come in many forms, these authors emphasize the importance of financial situations, free time, and civic skills in civic engagement. "They don't want to" deals with a lack of psychological engagement in politics. This indifference to politics is sometimes seen as political ignorance, but the resource model assumes that this is a reaction to a lower sense of political efficacy and greater levels of individualism. "Nobody asked" implies that people are isolated from the recruitment networks that move citizens into action.

They Can't: Class, Race, and Gender Cleavages

According to "resource-model" scholars (Brady et al., 1995), socioeconomic standing (SES) is a powerful variable that drives political participation for members of every social group in society (e.g., SES works across race, gender, and occupational boundaries). In the simplest of terms, a person's class location grants or impedes access to opportunities and financial resources that make political activism easier. Consequently, people in higher socio-economic levels amass and retain the structural elicitors of activism (be it more money, wider educational opportunities, or greater amounts of free time).

Numerous studies argue that affluence predicts political activism in samples of the general public (Barkan, Cohn, & Whitaker, 1995; Brady et al., 1995; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Oliver, 1984; Tate, 1991; Wallace & Jenkins, 1995) and collegiate undergraduates (Paulsen, 1994). When moving to social workers, the impact of income on activism is a bit less clear. A few studies argue that social workers are more political when they have higher incomes and more financial assets (Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Wolk, 1981). However, other studies find no such relationship (Andrews, 1998; Ezell, 1993; Hamilton & Fauri, 2001; Ritter, 2008).

The resource model also asserts that greater educational attainment leads to greater political engagement (Finkel & Muller, 1998; Hillygus, 2005; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999, Lim, 2008; Stake & Hoffman, 2001; Verhulst
& Walgrave, 2007; Wallace & Jenkins, 1995). Studies among social workers often highlight the effects of education. Higher levels of educational attainment seem to inspire greater levels of activism among practicing social workers (Andrews, 1998; Chui & Gray, 2004; Ezell, 1993; Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Wolk, 1981). Among social work students, it is possible that the completion of certain classes can make students more politically active (Rocha, 2000; Van Soest, 1996). However, Van Soest (1996) cautioned that finishing a class on oppression did not lead to higher advocacy intentions, while Weiss & Kaufman (2006) noted that BSW students were less willing to engage in social action after they did a field placement in organizations that emphasized political change. Finally, educational attainment measures were insignificant in the only multivariate study on social worker political participation (Ritter, 2008).

Previous studies sometimes found links between political participation and one's gender and racial background (Niemi & Hanmer, 2010). For example, African-American high school and college students protested more regularly than did Euro-American students in the 1970s (Paulsen, 1994) and the 1990s (Dolan, 1995). Social work studies have occasionally confirmed this pattern. Two studies found that African-American social workers and MSW students wrote more letters to Congress, attended more political meetings, and joined more community organizing efforts than white Euro-Americans with lesser academic degrees (Ezell, 1993; Rocha, 2000). Another study found that minority social work faculty were more likely to wear a peace button or attend an antiwar rally than their Euro-American counterparts (Van Soest et al., 1987). Nevertheless, four studies argued that the race of respondents was irrelevant when addressing the electoral activities of social workers in Michigan (Wolk, 1981), South Carolina (Andrews, 1998) and in national samples (Parker & Sherraden, 1992; Ritter, 2008).

The relationship between gender status and political participation is far from certain. Some studies suggest that until the 1970s women were slightly less likely to vote or join political protests (Barkan et al., 1995; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Wallace & Jenkins, 1995). Conversely, studies on contemporary populations suggest that this gender gap disappeared or has even been reversed (Eckberg, 1988; Hillygus, 2005; Hritzuk &
Park, 2000; Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010; Paulsen, 1994; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Tate, 1991). Studies on a political action "gender gap" among peace activists and social workers were more conclusive. A study on protests of the second Gulf War found that women outnumbered men (Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007) as did a study on peace activism among social work professors (Van Soest et al., 1987). Only one study of social workers in Hong Kong found that male respondents were more politically active (Chui & Gray, 2004), while gender failed to predict the political engagement of social workers in most other studies (Andrews, 1998; Ritter, 2008; Rocha, 2000; Wolk, 1981).

Some studies suggest that the transition into marriage or divorce can influence a person’s political activities (Fahs, 2007; Stoker & Jennings, 1995). The early stages of marriage can suppress political engagement for men and women (Cole, Zucker & Ostrove, 1998; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Opp, 1990; Stoker & Jennings, 1995) while other studies contend that long-term married people are more likely to vote (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). Ending marriages can also politicize women, since divorced women are more likely to engage in feminist activism (Cole et al., 1998). Conversely, another set of studies concluded that marital status was a poor predictor of political practices (Dolan, 1995; Hillygus, 2005; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Paulsen, 1994; Schussman & Soule, 2005).

They Don't Want To: Framing Grievances, Efficacy, and Collective Identities

Frames are generally conceived as cultural tools or schemas that provide "tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). While frames help with the classification and organization of incoming stimuli, they also serve a political function. Conventional frames acquire the consent by portraying the social order as proper, normal, and inevitable. By seeking widespread conformity, mainstream narratives get people to subscribe to values, ideals, and self-definitions that bind them to their social location. While conservative frames prioritize deference to conventional standards, collective action frames do the exact opposite. Collective action frames are the set of beliefs that motivate people into joining
collective efforts that publicly seek social change.

Movement theorists have identified several dimensions of collective action frames (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLuaglin-Volpe, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997). First, collective action frames initially render some societal norms as wrong, unacceptable, and unjust. By naming the injustice, Snow and Benford (1992) suggested these frames serve as "accenting devices that either underscore or embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine it as unjust (or/and?) immoral" (p. 137). These injustice frames can highlight many sorts of maltreatments but they often generate greater salience when they focus on violations of fairness or equity norms. Second, frames identify the causes of the injustice. By serving a diagnostic function, frames are etiologies that explain why problems exist and assign levels of blame or capability to different entities. By making these attributions, frames highlight the sorts of practices that should be modified, transformed, or eliminated. Third, frames also convince bystanders that they should use political tactics to stop these violations. This prognostic aspect of frames usually emphasizes the urgency of political action and a sense that challenges from less powerful constituencies can force concessions from a reluctant target (this confidence in movement tactics is sometimes called "agency" or a "sense of collective efficacy"). Finally, frames must foster a collective or shared identity among the aggrieved. In doing so, collective identities establish social boundaries of "us" and "them" by specifying who belongs to the righteous in-group of the mistreated and who represents the antagonist wrongdoers against whom the in-group must be mobilized. These collective identities often contest and refute societal claims that members of their group are inferior, worthless, sick, or maladjusted. Instead, collective action frames offer narratives about the virtues of similar people and claim that their group is illegitimately threatened, deprived, or treated badly. These collective identities enhance a sense of solidarity and loyalty for the people who share the same problems, while fostering some distrust or contempt for the people or institutions that maintain these problems.

Numerous studies concur that injustice frames are relevant to joining social movements (Finkel & Muller, 1998). Feminist
activism occurs more often when women notice power imbalances among men and women (Cole et al., 1998; Kelly & Breilinger, 1995; Stake & Hoffman, 2001) while civil rights activism is more common when African-Americans see systematic forms of racial discrimination (Beyerlein & Andrews, 2008; Tate, 1991). Antinuclear activists believe that atomic energy is dangerous (Opp, 1990) and antiwar activists see foreign policy as immoral or driven by corporate profit seeking (Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Swank, 1993; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007; Woehrle, Coy, & Maney, 2008; Wood & Ng, 1980).

Social work research on political participation has mostly ignored the role of injustice frames. Two of these rare studies noted that MSW Students who believed in a just world were less likely to advocate on the behalf of women, people of color, and homosexuals (Morrison Van Voorhis & Hoestetter, 2006; Van Soest, 1996). Moreover, a study from Israel found that BSW students endorsed political activism more freely when they saw poverty emanating from a lack of jobs and discrimination (Weiss, 2003). Finally, social work faculty were more likely to join a peace march when they thought there was excessive spending on military issues and that the U.S. should stop embarking upon military interventions in Central America (Van Soest et al., 1987).

While perceptions of social biases and discriminations offer an impetus for political activism, these thoughts by themselves do not guarantee political action will occur. People who see unfair practices may be resigned to endure or cooperate with oppressive institutions when they think the status quo is unable to be changed or altered by non-elites. Accordingly, some argue that sympathetic bystanders must feel that their contributions will add to a movement’s success before they join political movement.

To date, the role of power interpretations in political activism is far from settled. Some studies contend that perceptions of personal efficacy (Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Lim, 2008), and/or collective efficacy, are crucial to activism (Barkan et al., 1995; Beyerlein & Andrews, 2008; Stake & Hoffman, 2001; Verhulst & Walgrave, 2007). Accordingly, it has been found that college students are more likely to be politically active when they think that the government is responsive to
citizen demands (Dolan, 1995), while women were more likely join feminist mobilizations when they felt they understood political affairs and felt the women’s movement was powerful (Cole et al., 1998; Stake & Hoffman, 2001). Conversely, some studies insist that a sense of efficacy has little to do with participation in the women’s movement (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995), liberal activism (Schussman & Soule, 2005), antinuclear protests (Opp, 1990), youth movements (Paulsen, 1994) and antiwar protests (Swank, 1993).

The occasional social work activism studies have found credence in the efficacy hypothesis (Ritter, 2008). Hamilton and Fauri (2001) noted that politically engaged social workers expressed more political efficacy; Pawlack and Flynn (1990) noted that social work administrators refrained from political activism when they believed that their activism could lead to negative repercussions for themselves or their place of employment.

Issues of collective identities and self-concepts can change a person’s political behaviors in many ways. Advocacy on behalf of oneself and others is often interwoven with issues of self-conceptions, moral obligations, and the personal salience of political events (Hillygus, 2005). Accordingly, activist identities are often connected to narratives of how to display a desired or idealized self and how to live a principled life (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995; Oliver, 1984; Opp, 1990; Polletta & Jasper, 2001). To people who internalize activist identities, political engagement can be conceived as an opportunity to express key moral convictions and to act upon obligations of reciprocity, fairness, and concern for the common good.

Empirical studies have noted that the purposive incentives of adhering to moral codes and commitment to social justice were strong predictors of antinuclear activism in Germany (Opp, 1990), feminist activism in Britain (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995), and peace activism in the United States (Swank, 1993). In studies of social workers, ethical reasons for activism seem especially important. A study of Israeli social work students discovered a greater willingness to be politically involved when the students saw a congruency between social work and social action (Weiss & Kaufman, 2006). Similarly, two studies found higher political participation among professors who
thought social work was "inherently political" and that it was an ethical responsibility to engage in political activities (Mary, 2001; Van Soest et al., 1987); another found that social work agency directors were less politically active when they thought such actions were inappropriate for a person in their profession (Pawlak & Flynn, 1990). Finally, Ritter (2008) noted that interest in politics motivated activism among licensed social workers, while Reeser (1992) discovered that social workers whose primary loyalty was with clients were more committed to social action than employees who voiced a stronger loyalty to their agency's rules and regulations.

**Nobody Asked: Social Networks and Mobilizing Structures**

The proposition that social networks shape political behaviors has drawn considerable interest in movement and participation studies (Cole et al., 1998; Finkel & Muller, 1998; Lim, 2008; Passy, 2001; Tate, 1991). While the exact mechanism for this relationship is still up for debate, many movement scholars agree that personal networks often inspire and draw people into political mobilizations.

Many sorts of contextual and institutional settings can make people predisposed or receptive to political activism. The messages received in familial and peer groupings can have a major impact on political inclinations (Chorn-Dunham & Bengston, 1992; Dolan, 1995). Accordingly, studies of the general population suggest that citizens are more likely to be antinuclear, civil rights, and gay rights activists when they think that their friends and acquaintances approve of such actions (Beyerlein & Andrews, 2008; Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Opp, 1990; Simon, Lowry, Sturmer, Weber, & Freitag, 1998). Such associations may be linked to the emotional rewards of adhering to the directives of significant others who encourage political engagement.

While general population studies often discover a link between referent attitudes and political activism, this has not always been the case in studies on social work activism. Some studies confirm this socialization argument. Recently both Ritter (2008) and Chui and Gray (2004) concluded that social workers were more engaged in activism when they discussed politics with colleagues and family members. Nevertheless, other studies have yielded contradictory results. Ezell
(1993) and Hamilton and Fauri (2001) found no relationship between the frequency of political conversations among one's coworkers, one's family of origin, and the amount of political activism among employed social workers.

While social networks either encourage the acceptance or rejection of specific collection action frames, they also serve as conduits of important information about political events. Political parties, committed partisans, and movement activists often try to motivate activism through different persuasive techniques (e.g., face-to-face conversations, phone calls, email, direct mail, etc). While each of the recruitment pitches convert some sympathetic bystanders into activists, people engage more often in political actions when encouraged or asked to be active by someone whom they personally know (Finkel & Muller, 1998; Hritzuk & Park, 2000; Lim, 2008; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Nepstad & Smith, 1999; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010; Ritter, 2008; Schussman & Soule, 2005).

Method

Sample

This study drew on the responses of 159 BSW students from throughout the United States. To establish a stratified research design, this study selected participants through two means. By seeking a pool of fully engaged student activists, the lead researcher distributed surveys at several college-based protests throughout the Midwest and South (Indiana University, Ohio State University, University of Kentucky). Two of these protests focused on antiwar activism (protests occurred from Winter 2001 through Spring 2002). To maximize the likelihood of receiving completed surveys, we asked the protesters to complete the survey before they left the event. Eight of 37 BSW students from these protests said that they had done some form of peace activism.

To create a comparison group of non-activists, this study also distributed surveys to students who belonged to twelve colleges through the entire U.S. (Fall 2000). To create this comparison group, we initially separated all public campuses into research, doctoral, masters, or baccalaureate clusters using the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education.
This creation of four clusters enabled access to students from many sorts of colleges, including large research campuses and smaller, state-run commuter colleges. Next, three schools were randomly selected from each of the four strata.

After selecting these twelve colleges, we contacted faculty from each institution (via email). Professors in the natural sciences, humanities, social sciences, and business were asked to administer surveys in their classrooms, since student attitudes have previously differed by such majors (Astin, 1993). With participation being purely voluntary, 28 of the 338 contacted professors decided to distribute and collect the surveys during one of their class sessions (8.2%). Four of these professors taught in BSW programs and these four provided the comparison data for this study.

In total, 159 BSW students completed the survey. As expected, this sample had a higher proportion of women (89.3% female). The racial breakdown seemed to mirror that of many public institutions, since 85% of the sample was Euro-American, 7% was African-American, 5% was Latino/a and less than 1% were Native or Asian-American. Likewise, the age pyramid conforms to familiar trends, since the mean age was 26.4 years and 48% of the students were between 18 and 22 years of age. Finally, the social-class composition of the sample was slightly skewed toward lower-middle incomes. Twenty-seven percent of the students report a family income of less than $20,000 a year, another 28% had incomes between $21,000 and $40,000, 40% had incomes from $41,000 to $80,000, and 15% had incomes above $81,000.

Measures

Participation in the peace movement was based on a political activities approach. Respondents were given a checklist of 17 ways to be politically active. Eleven of the behaviors dealt with electoral means of influencing governmental policies (e.g., voting, making financial contributions to elected officials, writing a letter to a politician, signing a petition) while six items dealt with more unconventional and protesting tactics (going to a legal demonstration, doing civil disobedience, boycotting products, protesting another group). Students were also asked about the political causes that motivated such actions. If the
students indicated that they engaged in any of these political actions for antiwar or peace reasons, they were deemed peace activists. In the end, 10 of the 159 students were considered peace activists through this approach.

Most of the demographic variables were measured through dichotomous dummy variables. For sex, respondents were asked "What is your sex?" (Female = 1, Male = 0). Responses were recorded as being single or not since studies suggest that married and single are the crucial distinctions for predicting political activism (Single = 1, Other = 0). Race was determined by their response to the question: "How would you classify your race/ethnicity?" Although it is often methodologically more sound to identify variance by all races, the small number of Asian, Latino/a, and Native-American students lead to two binary variables for race (Euro-American = 1 and Others = 0; African-American = 1 and Others = 0).

Some of the other demographic factors were measured through closed-ended scales. Social class was determined through a family income scale (10 categories that started at under $10,000 and ended with above $151,000). For educational attainment, students were asked, "Please indicate your highest level of education." People who said they were first-year students were coded 1 while senior students were coded 4.

The concept of mobilizing structures has been operationalized several ways in earlier studies of political participation. Most often, studies have explored the value expressed by other people, the way a person was recruited to activism, and types of group affiliations. The "Activist Friends" measure dealt with the approval of activism among peer referents (see Opp, 1990). The prompt asked respondents if their friends generally condoned activism: "My friends think that activism is a positive thing" (Strongly agree = 5). The "Activist Networks" question dealt with the availability of "micro-mobilization moments" in which bystanders may meet political recruiters. To address explicit face-to-face requests for participation, we asked: "Have any friends ever asked you to go to a political event?" (similar to Eckberg, 1988).

All of the collective action frames were measured through Likert scales. The "Foreign Policy Injustice" item dealt with the debunking of the United States as the protector of freedom and
democratic processes: "American foreign policy supports democracies throughout the world" (Strongly disagree = 5). We also inquired if students recognized heterosexism by asking participants to respond to the statement: "Too often heterosexuals are unfairly accused of being homophobic" (Strongly disagree = 5).

The concept of collective efficacy was assessed through interpretation of the potential efficacy of protests and demonstrations (Finkel & Mueller, 1998). A single item declared that political demonstrations helped a social movement achieve its goals ("helped a lot" = 5, "hurt a lot" = 1).

The attributes of social identities have often been delineated as an individual's awareness that he or she belongs to a certain social group, together with the evaluative and emotional significance of that membership (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995). While closeness to one's social groups can inspire collective action, some studies suggest that the best predictor of activism is overtly defining oneself as an activist (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995). Accordingly, activist identities were traced through a four-item composite scale that dealt with several dimensions of politicized self-concepts (Cronbach alpha = .736). The first two questions addressed the internalization of protest norms or the extent that people felt obliged to protest: "I see myself as someone who is involved in promoting social justice" and "I feel guilty when I am politically active" (Kelly & Breilinger, 1995; Opp, 1990). Activist identities also compensated for the "free-rider" dilemma of people benefiting from activism even if they remained politically disengaged (Oliver, 1984). Accordingly, one item tapped the conviction that participants are personally active in order to atone for the political apathy of others: "I must be politically active since most people are politically inactive" (Strongly agree = 5). With activist identities concentrating on the need to generate new recruits and political sympathizers, participants responded to the statement: "I try to initiate political conversations" (Strongly agree = 5).

**Analytical Strategy**

Given the binary nature of our dependent variables, we deemed a discriminant analysis the most appropriate multivariate technique (Aldrich & Cnudde, 1975; Klecka, 1980; Sherry, 2006). Approaches like discriminant analysis
proficiently highlight crucial independent variables that maximize the likelihood of a participant belonging to a particular group (i.e., doing a political action or not). Discriminant analysis shares many qualities of more familiar general linear regression models. By exploring the squared canonical correlations, researchers can also uncover the amount of total variance explained by all of the independent variables found in the regression (this effect size is akin to $R^2$ in Ordinary Least Square Regressions). A Wilks' Lambda ($\lambda$) provides the chi-squares ($\chi^2$) that test the significance for the entire function.

When exploring the importance of specific variables, the calculated standardized discriminant functions are analogous to $\beta$ weights in Ordinary Least Squares regressions. As such, standardized discriminant functions convey the unique contribution of each independent variable after the contributions of other independent variables are controlled. Like $\beta$ weights, the relative strength of the predictors can be gleaned by comparing the size of the standardized discriminant functions (strength is determined by how far the coefficients move away from zero).

Results

Our primary objective was to determine, using a discriminant regression approach, the effects of resource, mobilizing, and collective action frames on participation in the current peace movement. To assess the relative strength of resource, mobilization and framing variables, Table 1 displays the effects of different variable types through a series of step-wise regressions.

Model 1 suggests that the resource variables were relatively inept predictors of peace activism among undergraduate students. The cumulative effects of the resource variables generated could only account for 9.7% of the variance in peace activism and the $\chi^2$ of 15.37 rejects the null hypothesis ($p < .05$). Among specific independent variables, the variables of educational attainment and being single were the only significant predictors of peace activism (.583 and .359, $p < .05$), while income, gender, and race variables did not significantly predict peace activism.
Table 1. Standardized Discriminant Coefficients of Involvement in the Peace Movement (n = 159)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
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<td>-.213</td>
<td>-.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
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<td>.389*</td>
<td>.430**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>.068</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>.359*</td>
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<td>.111</td>
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<td>-.094</td>
<td>-.088</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afro-American</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>-.060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilizing Structures</td>
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<td>Activist Friends</td>
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<td>Foreign Policy Unjust</td>
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<td>Activist Tactics Efficacious</td>
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<td>.299*</td>
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<td>Wilks' λ</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.858</td>
<td>.773</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ test of Wilks'</td>
<td>15.37*</td>
<td>22.82**</td>
<td>37.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Canonical Correlation</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall % correctly classified</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
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Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

The mobilization factors in model 2 offered better predictors of activist outcomes. When inserting the two contextual factors into the formula, the $\chi^2$ grew to 22.82 ($p < .01$) and the squared canonical correlation grew to 14.2. Both of the network factors showed significance, as activist networks were the most important predictor of peace activism (.442, $p < .01$), and having activist friends also inspired peace activism (.392, $p < .01$). Similar to the earlier regression, education levels still influenced political involvement but the importance
of being single lacked significance. This suggests that single people probably have greater access to the sort of mobilizing structures that generate more activism.

The framing variables in model 3 provided better predictors of activist outcomes. When adding the three framing variables, the $\chi^2$ increased to 37.70 ($p < .001$) and the amount explained increased to 21.8%. All four framing factors also attained significance. Net of other factors, seeing an unjust U.S. foreign policy had the strongest association with peace activism (.409, $p < .01$). Recognizing discrimination against gays and lesbians and having an activist identity were almost as strong as having grievances with U.S. foreign policy (.387 and .354, $p < .05$). Lastly, students who thought that protest tactics were relatively effective were more likely to join the peace movement than the students who considered movement tactics unproductive tools of social change (.299, $p < .05$). Finally, educational attainment, activist friends, and activist networks remained significant in the last regression as well.

Discussion

Strengths and Limitations

This study offered some theoretical and methodological rigor. Our list of predictor variables was theory-driven and the breadth of variables lessened the chance of having extraneous or spurious variables. Moreover, our use of a stratified design allowed for a sufficient comparison of students who did and did not join these peace protests. Also, our sample of students from different colleges throughout the nation lowered problems of representativeness because this study is less inclined to suffer from the idiosyncratic side effects of studying a single campus.

That said, research designs can also play havoc with the accuracy and generalizability of research findings. We caution that these findings may not perfectly apply to students from all majors, since social work students are often more politically engaged than business or natural science majors but less engaged than sociology, political science and women's studies majors (Astin, 1993; Hillygus, 2005; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010). Several research decisions could have undermined this study's
external validity for the social work student population. First, the small sample size can lead to Type II errors in hypothesis testing (e.g., there are few men and racial minorities in the sample of undergraduate social work students). Second, the sampling procedures were not identical for activist and comparison groups, so problems of selection bias can exist. Third, measurement errors regularly haunt survey data. Problems of over-demanding recall could hurt our mobilization measures, in that people may have difficulty remembering whether anyone asked them to join a political event. Questions of social desirability may be especially relevant to our activist identity measures, as participants may want to sound socially desirable to themselves by overstating the amount that they fight for social justice. Moreover, students may have difficulty identifying the actual amount of income that their families have, as other family members may not share such information or people may not similarly judge who “counts” as a member of their family.

Conclusions

When exploring peace activism among BSW students, this study offers a unique look into a retrospective sample of activists and non-activists. While peace activism was relatively rare among our sample, our analysis reveals the value of an integrated theoretical model. Variables from each of the resource, framing, and mobilization theories yielded significant results.

Only one of the resource factors consistently drove involvement in the peace movement. With greater educational attainment being significant in each regression, it is clear that activism was more prevalent among the students who have completed more course work. This finding might be the result of effective classroom interventions or issues of self-selection among social work majors, as students less inclined to protest wars may remove themselves from the social work major during their junior and senior years in college. While both options suggest that social work curricula inspire greater peace activism, future research should identify what classroom content and assignments are better at inspiring political participation and activist commitment.
Marital status was the only resource factor that was temporarily significant. Being single initially was important but this importance notably disappeared when mobilizing structures were entered into the mix of variables. This might suggest that single students were more active than married or divorced students because they were more likely to have activist friends. Perhaps married students embraced more traditional and conservative values compared to single students (especially given their age cohorts and young people generally delaying marriage more). Further, single students may have more free time to participate in activism due to fewer caretaking responsibilities or living situations that contain more like-minded activists of the same age cohort (e.g., dorms or student ghettos).

The rest of the resource variables were irrelevant to peace activism. Levels of family income never swayed involvement in this peace movement. This suggests that students from affluent, middle-class, and working-class backgrounds are equally drawn to antiwar activism. This result may have occurred since social work majors have less variance in family incomes than students in other majors (Caputo, 2004), or because framing factors were simply more important than resource variables for people who attend college (itself a relatively narrow demographic).

Matters of gender and racial status seemed equally inept at forecasting peace activism. While women and racial minorities were more likely to object to the Afghan and Iraqi wars (Kaufman, 2006), the demographic forces behind war opinions and political activism were not the same. That is, being a woman or person of color might make students slightly more suspicious of war rationales, but these differences in attitudes didn’t always translate into greater peace activism behavior. Instead, the true catalysts of peace activism were the collective action frames and mobilizing networks that motivated action against the American invasion of Afghanistan.

This study also highlighted the importance of mobilizing structures. Peer attitudes were crucial to peace activism. Predictably, students who socialized with activists were more likely to be peace activists themselves. However, there could be temporal ordering problems in this association, in that students who were already politically active may have
intentionally sought out people who supported such tendencies. Additionally, being embedded in pre-existing activist networks certainly predicted future peace activism. Accordingly, these findings suggest a couple of things: first, substantial political tutoring must occur before a social work student takes up the struggle against U.S. war policies; and second, students who attended colleges that lack thriving activist networks may never transform their political attitudes into political behaviors.

Our data also suggested that framing variables were especially important in predicting peace activism. Grievances with the federal government led to more peace activism among our sample. Students who disputed the nobility of U.S. foreign policy and challenged issues of heterosexual privilege were more likely to join the peace movement. Also, activism was more prevalent among students who characterized themselves as workers for social justice. That is, peace activism was partially contingent upon the internalization of a personal commitment to working for oppressed peoples. Some constructed this as desire to be an "honorable" citizen and some responded to the guilt of implicitly supporting injustice through political inactivity. Activists also had greater confidence in social movement tactics and clearly believed that these were an effective way to enact social change. This suggests that some students were opposed to U.S. war efforts but remained politically inactive because they felt that social movement tactics were unable to alter the George W. Bush administration's war plans.

Implications for Social Work Education

This paper can inform social work education in several ways. With injustice frames being essential to protest activities, social work programs should try to reveal the discriminatory and exploitative nature of many U.S. institutions (e.g., unjust foreign policy or heteronormativity). Similarly, because activist identities mattered in predicting peace activism, professors must reveal the connections between client well-being and injustices in families, agencies, and political arenas. Moreover, instructors should find ways to move students beyond a narrow focus on the well-being only of U.S. citizens. That is, professors
must help students become committed to improving the lives of people who live outside of the U.S. by expanding notions of what an "us" actually looks like. Likewise, educators should convince students that politics is not a "spectator sport," that is, social work ethics requires involvement in political struggles. More concretely, educators should create assignments and exercises that offer opportunities to practice advocacy. The social work profession as a whole can also modify its curricula. Programs should provide a greater emphasis on foreign policy and the ways that the United States supports dictators throughout the world. Content can also explore the relationships between war and economic hardships, governmental debt, PTSD for soldiers and civilians, forced migrations, systematic rape, and spillover effects of greater familial violence in the U.S. and elsewhere. Departments can augment their policy classes by providing more social work classes on social action and by enrolling students in the sorts of sociology and women's studies classes than inspire the most progressive activism among their students (Hillygus, 2005; Niemi & Hanmer, 2010; Stake & Hoffman, 2001). Practice classes can also connect students to issue-based advocacy groups, and typically offer greater access to political field practicums (Rocha, 2000; Van Soest, 1996). Finally, programs can emphasize international travel or studying abroad, since these experiences can enhance students' cultural awareness and their commitments to social justice (Lindsey, 2005).

**Broader Implications for Education**

Ultimately, these findings also suggest that teaching about antiwar activism can enhance existing curricula in other departments, particularly sociology, psychology, ethnic studies, women's studies, and American studies. Such classes often focus on the relationship between individuals and social movements but too often fail to precisely examine the differences between those who are politically active and those who remain more politically disengaged. Further, the study of peace broadly defined allows students to imagine not only how peace functions in a conflict and military sense, but also how peace might inform other social relationships in their lives; for example, by engaging in peace activism, they might learn to value the
diverse lived experiences of their fellow activists, or they may gain exposure to new ways of seeing or embodying identity (e.g., heterosexual students confronting the lived experiences of homophobia in their peers' lives). Moreover, the study of peace from a social justice perspective can also work against the more intimate manifestations of violence (e.g., domestic violence, racism, sexism and homophobia). Because most classes in social work, sociology, and critical fields have as their goal the cultivation of critical thinking and enhanced political engagement in students' social environments, the examination of political socialization, political activism, social relationships, and peace studies plays an integral part in shaping the future of socially-engaged education.

References


(Endnotes)

1. Research schools: University of Delaware, University of Oregon, University of Texas; Doctoral: University of North Carolina-Greensboro, University of Mass-Lowell, Rutgers; Masters: Longwood College, University of Southern Maine, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay; Baccalaureate: Evergreen State College, Mesa State College, Southeast Arkansas College

2. Clearly this response rate was neither high nor random. Professors who never read email automatically removed themselves from the sample and the willingness to distribute the surveys was not constant throughout the different sorts of schools and disciplines. For the sample of all professors, around 2% of the Research professors distributed surveys, while 13% professors at masters granting universities did so. Likewise, less than 1% of Chemistry, Biology, and Physics professors assisted in this project while professors in Political Science, Sociology, and Social Work were most receptive to our requests (11%). Of the social work professors who actually distributed surveys, all of them either taught research or policy classes.
The Qur’anic period of Islamic history took place in a social context of significant diversity. A number of important verses in the Qur’an reflect this diversity and encourage Islamic believers to seek peaceful coexistence with those of other faiths, especially those designated as “people of the Book,” specifically Christians, Jews and Sabeans. In the later classical period of Islamic history, the exegesis of Islamic jurists markedly de-emphasized peaceful coexistence in favor of interpretations encouraging conquest and religious uniformity. Although the classical jurists have exercised enormous interpretive authority in subsequent Islamic history, their authority was never understood to be absolute or equal to the authority of the Qur’an itself. It is the challenge for Muslims in contemporary times to recover the authority of Qur’anic verses encouraging peaceful coexistence and respect for human diversity, not merely as a social strategy, but as an integral devotional aspect of better understanding the God who transcends all human understanding.

Key words: Islam, Qur’an, authority, peaceful coexistence

Until recently, nations lived in relative isolation. But with the advancement of communications technology and increased emigration, the many different religious and ethnic traditions must now share common space. More than ever it is imperative that they learn to understand, respect, and live with the “other.” More importantly, citizens of all nations must come to terms with the human diversity that characterizes our
existence on this planet. Dealing with human diversity requires a proper articulation of the means of peaceful coexistence.

While there has been plenty of public discussion concerning violence and Islam, Islam as a religion has all too often been singled out and targeted as violent and extremist. A reasoned discourse on the issue of peace within the Islamic tradition has been sorely neglected. In this paper, therefore, I will delineate the Qur’anic position on peaceful coexistence with the “other.” I will also examine the classical Sunni and Shi’i pronouncements on peace and war. In the final section, I will assess the possibility of an Islamic theology of peace in modern times.

Peace and Coexistence in the Qur’an

Historically, the Qur’anic view of engagement with the “other” was shaped by the socio-political milieu in which it originated. Islamic revelation found expression in a pluralistic world in which Muslims had to deal with Arab pagans and adherents of other monotheistic religions. To comprehend the Qur’an’s response to the Muslims’ interaction with the “other,” it is essential, at the outset, to examine the moral basis of such interaction and the Qur’an’s teachings on human diversity.

The Qur’anic view of peace and tolerance is interwoven with its view of a universal moral discourse uniting all human beings. According to the Qur’an, human beings are created with an innate disposition (fitra) that leads to knowledge of and belief in God. In fact, the Qur’an posits a universal morality for humankind that is conjoined to values ingrained in the conscience of all human beings (30:30). This suggests a universal, ethical language to which all human beings can connect and engage. As the Qur’an states, “He (God) has inspired in [human beings] the good or evil [nature] of an act, whosoever has purified it (the soul) has succeeded, one who corrupts it has surely failed” (91:8-10).

The Qur’anic concept of a universal moral order is thus grounded in the recognition of an innate disposition engraved in the human conscience. Through this notion, Islam embraced certain universal human values that could form the basis for interaction with a diverse “other.”

The basis of such a universal moral order can also be traced to verses like the following: “Humankind, be aware of your
duties to your Lord, who created you from a single soul, and from it created its mate, and from the pair of them scattered abroad many men and women” (4:1). The verse suggests a common genesis and unity of human beings based on God’s creation. It also implies that human beings must recognize and live with their differences. On the basis of universal guidance and a common human origin, the Qur’an posits the presence of an objective and universally binding moral standard that is accessible to all intelligent beings. A striking feature of the Qur’anic discourse is an emphasis on the capacity of human beings to use their innate intelligence to comprehend universal truths. It is on the basis of their innate capacity and shared moral values that human beings can deal with others based on principles of fairness and equity.

The ramification of the preceding passages is that, since guidance is the function of God, it is He alone who has the right to decide the “spiritual destiny” of human beings. The Qur’an categorically maintains that the ultimate fate of human beings is left to God, the true judge of human conduct. Not even the Prophet has the right to judge the ultimate fate of human beings. As it states, “Upon you [O Prophet] is the deliverance [of the message], upon us is the reckoning [of the deeds]” (13:40). In another verse, the Qur’an states, “Had God willed, they would not have been idolaters. We have not appointed you as a watcher over them, neither are you their guardian” (6:107). By elevating judgment to the divine realm, the Qur’an creates the necessary space for peaceful coexistence on the human plane.

The tolerant and universalistic tone of the Qur’an can be further discerned from the much-cited verse, “There is no compulsion in religion” (2:255). The famous twentieth-century Shi’i exegete Muhammad al-Husayn al-Tabataba’i contends that faith is a matter of individual conscience and as such it cannot be created by coercion and compulsion. “Belief,” al-Tabataba’i continues, “follows reason and understanding; and nothing but reason and understanding can create it” (Tabataba’i, n.d., Vol. 3, p. 342). According to Zamakhshari (d. 1144), not only the people of the book but all human beings have the right to exercise free volition in matters of faith. The “no compulsion” verse is not to be limited to the people of the book (Zamakhshari, 1987, Vol. 1, p. 387). The Qur’an clearly does not advocate the
use of force in matters of faith. Thus, verse 10:99 further states, "And if your Lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would have believed, all of them. Can you [O Muhammad] coerce the people to believe?" The overall emphasis in the Qur’an is on voluntary consent to the will of God, which is predicated on the universal guidance of reason and understanding engraved in all human beings.

Fundamental to the Qur’anic conception of peaceful coexistence, then, is the view that human beings are united under one God (2:213). They are to strive towards virtuous deeds (5:48), for the most noble person in the eyes of God is the one who is most pious (49:13). These and other verses command Muslims to build bridges of understanding and cooperation with fellow human beings so as to create a social order rooted in and reflecting the highest ideals of justice and equality.

The Qur’anic Vision of Religious Pluralism

The modern era has accelerated the intensity and pace of interaction among believers in different religious traditions. However, intense awareness of and interaction with other faiths has been present in the Islamic tradition from its inception and are not characteristics unique to the modern era (Eickelman, 2002). The Qur’an originated in the multicultural milieu of seventh century Arabia, and thus addressed topics such as freedom of conscience, rights of minorities, human rights, and religious pluralism—all issues with which a multi-faith community is bound to encounter and grapple with.

Among Muslim scholars, both those who favor and oppose religious pluralism have invoked Qur’anic verses to support their positions. The pluralistic outlook of the Qur’an is expressed by verse 2:62, which appears to provide salvation to, "whoso believes in God and the Last Day among the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabeans." This inclusive position is then apparently contradicted by verse 3:85, which states that, "whoso desires another religion than Islam, it shall not be accepted of him. In the next world he shall be amongst the losers." This verse is often quoted by those who claim it abrogated the promise of salvation offered to the people of the book in 2:62. Verse 3:85 provided a major impetus to those who see salvation restricted to Islam, and interpret the Qur’an according to a
Peace and War in the Qur'an and Juridical Literature

hermeneutic that later verses trump earlier ones. However, it is important to bear in mind that the verse that affords salvation to other monotheistic religions (2:62) is repeated almost verbatim in 5:69, which was apparently revealed after 3:85 (Hashmi, 2002a, p. 34).

Peaceful coexistence further necessitates that people abstain from abusing those who do not share their beliefs. Deriding and mocking others can often engender violence and hatred. Therefore, the Qur'an urges respect for the beliefs of others. The Qur'an further states, (this is a repeat of an earlier page)

Had God willed, they would not have been not idolaters; and we have not appointed you a watcher over them, neither are you their guardian. Abuse not those to whom they pray, apart from God, otherwise, they will abuse God in revenge without knowledge. So we have decked out fair to every community their deeds; then to their Lord they shall return, and He will tell them what they have been doing. (6:107-108)

Qur'anic tolerance extends protection not only to Muslims and the people of the book but even to strangers who openly declare idolatry. As it says, "If one of the idolaters seeks protection, then grant him protection so that he may hear the word of God, and after that, send him to a place of safety" (9:6). This verse instructs Muslims not only to protect but also to ensure that no harm comes to them when they leave Muslim territory, and to send them to a place of safety. The discussion above indicates that the Qur'an envisioned a diverse community that was united under common moral values. Human beings are to coexist in peace and harmony. Diversity and differences in faith are to be judged by God only since, "Isn't He (God) the best of judges?" (95:8)

Jihad in the Qur'an

The Qur'anic vision of tolerance and peaceful coexistence is mitigated by verses that encourage Muslims to wage war. It is important, therefore, that we properly understand the Qur'anic pronouncements on jihad. The Qur'anic world-view is to bring the world under the sway of God's guidance so as to establish a righteous order based on justice and equality. Thus,
jihad is envisioned as an important tool in the community’s attempt to build a world order in which peace, justice, and equality prevail according to God’s providence. According to Esposito (2002), the rationale of the wars was to “spread its (Islam’s) righteous order so that ignorance and unbelief could be replaced by just societies throughout the world” (p. 33).

The Qur’anic understanding of jihad as warfare is evident in verse 2:193, “Fight them until there is no persecution (fitna) and the religion be only for God.” In another verse, the Qur’an states, “Fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but do not transgress. God does not love those who transgress. And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places from where they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter” (2:190-191).

The Qur’an sanctions jihad to establish a moral order that will protect the welfare of the Muslim community against both internal and external enemies. Permission to engage in hostilities was evidently a response to the threat posed by the powerful Meccan tribes. A prescriptive measure was needed to redress the harm and the wrongs suffered by the Muslims in the face of Meccan aggression. These divinely sanctioned campaigns were a response to the hostility of the Meccan pagans. The Qur’an does not state that force was to be used against all unbelievers; only those who demonstrate their hostility to Islam by trying to undermine Islamic polity and by persecuting Muslims were to be targeted. It is Meccan hostility, rather than their disbelief, that is the target of the Qur’anic verses on jihad.

The Qur’an does not accept the idea of unlimited or aggressive warfare. By the assiduous usage of the term la ta’tadu (do not transgress) in the context of warfare, it can be argued that the Qur’an qualifies jihad with a moral condition of restraint. It also exhorts Muslims to seek avenues of peace. Thus it restricts rather than gives free license to recourse to war. The Qur’an also outlines rules of engagement, that is, who is to fight and who is exempted (48:17; 9:91), when hostilities should cease (2:192) and how prisoners should be treated (47:4). As there is no compulsion in religion (2:256), Muslims are not to use jihad as a means to impose their beliefs on others.

Other verses stipulate that Muhammad should accept peace
overtures (8:61) from the enemy. Verses 2:192-93 command the Prophet to cease hostilities if the enemy desists. In order not to transgress, Muslims are required to respond proportionally to the injury done to them. Even here, the Qur’an urges restraint by accepting blood money and forgiveness. The Qur’an suggests that jihad is a product of defense against aggression rather than initiation of hostilities against enemies (22:39-40).

The People of the Book in the Qur’an

The discussion on pluralism in the Qur’an is essential to our understanding of peace in Islam. Confinement of salvation to a particular religious tradition frequently leads to marginalization and demonization of those who espouse other religions. As I shall discuss, by characterizing the “other” as non-believers and therefore doomed, Muslim jurists justified the humiliation and even killing of non-Muslims.

In the sectarian milieu of seventh-century Arabia, Muslims encountered other monotheists like the Christians and Jews. These encounters generated inter-religious polemics, which are reflected in the Qur’anic verses, especially those revealed in Medina. In its discourses with the people of the book, the Qur’an invites them to the notion of a shared religious community based on the belief in one God. Thus, the Prophet is instructed to tell them, “Say! O people of the book! Come to a word common between us and you, that we serve none but God, and that we associate not aught with Him, and do not some of us take others as Lords, apart from God. And if they turn their backs, say, ‘bear witness that we are Muslims’” (3:64).

The ahl al-dhimma in the Qur’an and early history of Islam were the protected minorities, both Jewish and Christian, who had chosen not to convert to Islam. They were allowed to follow their own laws and modes of worship, provided this would not impinge on the Muslim community. The term dhimma refers to a pact drawn up with the people of the book which the believer agrees to respect, the violation of which makes him liable to blame (dhamm).

In return for security and protection, the people of the book were required to pay a poll tax (jizya), mentioned in verse 9:29. The poor and dependents were exempt from paying this
special tax. The *jizya* was also levied in compensation for exemption from military service in Muslim forces. If a *dhimmi* joined the service, then *jizya* was not levied (Safi, 1988, p. 39). But later on, this *jizya* became symbolic of Muslim ascendancy and subjugation of non-Muslims.

Initially, the issue of the collection of a poll tax and the circumstances under which it could be collected were not fixed. Umar, for example, is reported to have accepted the *zakat* rather than *jizya* from Banu Taghlib, when they argued that as Arabs, they should not be treated differently from their Muslim compatriots (Abu Yusuf, n.d. pp. 120-121). He also refused to accept the *jizya* from a group that he could not offer protection against Byzantine aggression (El Fadl, 2002, p. 21).

Early Sunni schools of law adopted different positions on the question of the collection of *jizya*. The Shafi'is and Hanbalis claimed that *jizya* is acceptable only from the people of the book and the Magians. It is not acceptable from any of the polytheists. The Hanafis and Malikis and several other jurists stated that *jizya* is acceptable from all non-Muslims except the Arab polytheists who had incited war against the Prophet (Sulayman, 2001, p. 67).

Al-Shafi'i (d. 820) also ruled that if a person was introduced to Islam when he was not one of the peoples of the book, and he made an offer to the imam to pay the tribute in return for permission to remain in his religion, then it was not permissible for the imam to accept that offer. Rather, the imam was obliged to fight him until he surrendered, just as he was required to fight idol worshippers until they surrendered. Al-Shafi'i further stated that if the Muslims fought those about whose religious affiliation they had no information, and who claimed to belong to the people of the book, Muslims had to ask them when they and their ancestors accepted that religion. If they said it was before the Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet, the Muslims could accept their statement and allow them to remain in their ancestral religion. But if Muslims suspected that what they were saying was not true and could establish proper evidence to that effect, then the Muslims had to spurn the tribute and challenge them to surrender or to fight (as cited in Sachedina, 2001, p. 49). The clear understanding is that if non-Muslims
refuse to accept Islam or pay the jizya, the male unbelievers may be killed. This implies that the guilt of refusing to adopt Islam deprives a non-Muslim of the right to life, and therefore, such a person deserves whatever harm may come to him. Clearly, such rulings contravened the Qur’anic vision of peaceful coexistence.

The Qur’anic discourse with the people of the book indicates that, despite the polemics and differences with the dhimmis, it encouraged the Muslim community to seek means of peaceful coexistence. Recipients of earlier traditions were acknowledged by the early Islamic state to be autonomous religious communities, to be governed in their communal affairs according to their own laws. As long as they did not threaten the Muslim community, and paid the jizya, the Islamic state was to assure their security and autonomy.

However, subsequent interactions between the Muslims and the people of the book did not reflect these principles of peaceful coexistence. Instead, Muslims often imposed discriminatory measures on the people of the book. Qur’anic verses urging tolerance towards them were often considered abrogated by verses requiring jihad against them.

The Historical Encounter with the People of the Book

The historical record of Muslim engagement with peoples of other faith lies in stark contrast to the tolerance and awareness of other religions set forth in the Qur’an and the practices of the early Muslim community. The distinction between the Qur’anic concept of coexistence with non-Muslims and the policies advocated by subsequent Muslims can be seen from the following comparison. The Qur’an allowed the evidence of non-Muslims when no Muslim was available to witness the will of a Muslim who died on a journey (5:106). Abu Hanifa (d. 767), however, rejected the evidence of non-Muslims in such a case, and Abu Yusuf (d. 798) declared the Qur’anic passage to have been abrogated by verse 65:2. The Medinese jurists went even further, rejecting the evidence of non-Muslims altogether, even against one another (Schact, 1950). Gradually, a series of restrictions were regulated so as to enforce Muslim supremacy and to reflect the inferior status and identity of non-Muslims.

Several discriminatory measures such as the prohibition
against building new churches or repairing old ones were enacted. Muhammad b. ‘Abdun (d. 1100), for example, stated in his treatise

that priests must be forcibly circumcised simply because they persist in following the example of Jesus Christ who was, states Ibn ‘Abdun, circumcised. A Jew or Christian should not be allowed to dress like an important person. A Muslim may not wash a Jewish or Christian toilet. (Williams, 1971, pp. 159-160)

Other jurists held that Muslim authorities may prohibit dhimmis from marrying Muslims. Dhimmis were to wear distinctive clothing, or more specifically, special emblems on their clothes as a token of their inferior or different status. They were to live in houses that were smaller than Muslim houses. They were not permitted to ride horses, which was public proof of one’s affluence. Most schools, apart from the Hanafis, paid a lower blood price for a dhimmi who was killed. Jizya, said Zamakhshari (1987), should be taken from them with belittlement and humiliation. “The dhimmi is to come walking, not riding. When he pays the jizya, he shall be slapped on the nape of his neck” (Lewis, 1984, p. 15). Others added symbolic acts of humiliation—for example that the dhimmi’s hand was to be lower than the tax collector’s hand when he pays the jizya. These regulations were incorporated into the jurisprudence as a divinely sanctioned system of discriminatory provisions (Khadduri, 1955). Not all jurists agreed with such acts of humiliation. Abu Yusuf, for example, stated that dhimmis should not be treated harshly or humiliated, rather, they should be treated with considerable leniency (Abu Yusuf, n.d., pp. 122-125).

Such discriminatory regulations contravene the spirit of peaceful coexistence and egalitarianism in the Qur’ān. The tendency among jurists of the eighth and ninth centuries was to seek justification for the discriminatory rulings by claiming that the unbelievers had chosen to refuse the offer to convert. Hence, their inferior status was the product of their own choice.

Overall, Muslims discriminated against but did not persecute the dhimmis. According to Bernard Lewis, “… in contrast
to Christian anti-Semitism, the Muslim attitude toward non-Muslims is one not of hate, or fear, or envy, but simply of contempt" (Lewis, 1984, p. 33). It is plausible to maintain that the policies of the state and political exigencies were incorporated in the body of the emerging Islamic law at the time. Rather than reflecting divine sanctification of the law, the various regulations regarding the dhimmis were enacted to justify the political and military realities of the time. Rulings on the dhimmis also demonstrated Muslim ascendancy over the people of the book.

Peace in the Juridical Literature

There has been limited discourse on peace in the exegetical and juridical literature. For the jurists, the discourse on peace was set in the context of a general theory, which presupposed that peaceful coexistence with a Muslim state was possible only when those areas where Muslims were in the minority or were persecuted (dar al-harb) were subdued. Anything less than that was construed as a compromise of Muslim ascendancy and an act of relinquishing power.

When jurists discussed peaceful coexistence, it was in the context of measures that would allow for a temporary cessation of hostilities. Shafi'i jurists interposed, between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, a third category, dar al-sulh, the abode of truce. Dar al-sulh refers to the territories where peace exists with an Islamic state based on treaties, alliances, and cooperation. During the period of the truce, dar al-sulh would have to pay the jizya or cede a portion of its territory (al-Shafi'i, 1990, p. 103-104).

According to al-Shafi'i, the imam could contract the truce if the welfare of the Muslims required it. However, al-Shafi'i's theory only suspended warfare, it did not eliminate it. Based on the precedent established by the Prophet's agreement with the Meccan tribes at al-Hudaybiyya in 630 C.E., the truce could not exceed ten years.

The jurists were divided on the question of the duration of the peace treaty. Malik b. Anas (d. 795) and Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855), two prominent jurists, supported the notion of an indefinite peace treaty as long as it served the interests of the Muslim community (Zaman, 2002). However, not all jurists
recognized the existence of *dar al-sulh*. The Hanafis did not accept it, whereas Ibn Taymiyya argued against putting a restriction on the length of the peace treaty (El Fadl, 2001).

The jurists conceived of another scenario for temporary peace. One of the most important aspects of the body of Islamic law regarding international relations (*siyar*) was the guarantee of free passage or security (*aman*) which any Muslim could grant to a visitor from *dar al-harb* (called *harbi*) (Khadduri, 1955). The *aman* is a pledge of security through which the *harbi* would be entitled to protection for up to a year while he is in *dar al-Islam*. The holder of the *aman* (called *musta'min*) is not considered to be a *dhimmi*, neither is he required to pay the *jizya*. The *aman* can be renewed at the end of the period if he agrees to pay the *jizya* and to become a *dhimmi*. The *aman* suspended, albeit temporarily, the state of hostilities.

Despite the juridical rulings on Muslim and non-Muslim relations, there have been many instances where Muslims coexisted peacefully with non-Muslims. Indeed, to portray Islam as intrinsically violent and incompatible with Western values is to ignore Muslim engagement with and contribution to Western civilization. The tendency to view Islam through a lens of violent militancy distorts the fact that Islam has a rich cultural heritage and precepts that strongly encourage coexistence with others. In Spain, for example, Muslims not only coexisted peacefully with Christians and Jews, but also protected them and shared scientific achievements with their counterparts. For much of Islamic history, Muslim societies have been remarkably open to the outside world (Eickelman, 2002).

The vast expanse of the Muslim world inevitably meant that it came to encompass a variety of civilizations and cultural forms. By the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Muslim-majority world showed a remarkable variety of institutional forms, from North Africa to South Asia, up to and including the hinterland of the Chinese empire, and soon emerged as a dominant force in Southeast Asia. Historically, Islam has exhibited remarkable tolerance toward people of other faith communities, as in Spain, India, the holy lands, Turkey, Africa, and Indonesia.

In the past, Muslims not only tolerated but even protected minority groups, especially Jews and Christians, the people
of the book. In ninth-century Baghdad, Hunayn ibn Ishaq, a Christian, directed the translation academy when the classical Greek works and Hindu and Persian scientific treatises were translated into Arabic. The Caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833) would send emissaries to Constantinople to bring back manuscripts written in Greek so that they could be translated. Greek works such as Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* and Plato’s *Dialogues* were preserved mainly through these translations. It was through the works of Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) that Aristotelianism and neo-Platonism came into Europe (Lopez-Baralt, 2003). Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle were indispensable to Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) (Bill & Williams, 2002).

As noted above, the era of Muslim rule in Spain (approximately the 9th through the 12th centuries) provides an excellent precedent where Muslims not only lived peacefully with Christians and Jews, but also shared their scientific accomplishments with them in the construction of a great civilization. Although treated as second-class citizens, the Jews of Spain were given religious liberty; they could run their own affairs based on their own laws. This was in stark contrast to how Jews were treated in any of the Christian lands during that time. Cordoba was the center of a brilliant Jewish culture epitomized by Hasday b. Shaprut, a scholar and physician serving the caliphs ‘Abd al-Rahman III and al-Hakam (Hillenbrand, 2003). He was a Jewish physician in the Caliph’s court, who, at various times, held important diplomatic and financial responsibilities. Like Hasday, Isma’il b. Naghrila (d. 1056), known in Hebrew as Samuel the Nagid, was also a central figure in the Jewish community (Scheindlin, 2003). Bearing the Hebrew title *Nagid* (prince) he not only supported Hebrew poetry and Talmudic scholarship, but was himself one of the most accomplished men of his time in both fields.

Christians and Jews were also involved in the Royal Court and in the intellectual life of Cordoba. Muslim-Christian interaction can be discerned from the following remark made by the Bishop of Cordoba, Alvaro. He stated regarding his Christian co-religionists, “... hardly one can write a passable Latin letter to a friend, but innumerable are those who can express themselves in Arabic and can compose poetry
in that language with greater art than the Arabs themselves" (Hillenbrand, 2003, p. 115). Other Christians served as administrators, financiers, physicians, artists, and craftsmen in the royal court (Hillenbrand, 2003).

The discoveries by Muslim scientists were transmitted to the west. Cordoba's mosque was famed as a center for higher learning on a par with Cairo and Baghdad and was the earliest medieval university in Europe. Major contributions were made in music, philology, geography, history, alchemy, chemistry, medicine, astronomy, philosophy, botany, mathematics, and agriculture (Hillenbrand, 2003). Hellenism was largely reintroduced into Europe by way of Spain and Sicily, thus facilitating the European Renaissance itself (Lopez-Baralt, 2003). Such accounts are important to mention as they remind us of how, by adopting a nonviolent posture, Muslims, Jews and Christians established a brilliant civilization for posterity.

Due to the status and protection the Qur'an accorded to the people of the book, violence and genocide against them became virtually impossible. Jews in Islamic lands did not face a tradition of anti-semitism, even though the dhimmis in general were regarded as second-class citizens. Jews had full religious liberty and were allowed to manage their own affairs. They were also able to participate in mainstream culture and commerce. It is generally acknowledged that Sephardic Jews were treated much better by Muslims than Ashkenazi Jews were treated by Christians. As Marc Gopin stated, "there is a qualitative, not just quantitative difference between the two" (Gopin, 2002, p. 107.)

Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam

Many Muslims have questioned the formulations of the classical jurists, claiming that their interpretations are no longer binding in contemporary times. In particular, the scholars of al-Azhar in Egypt, one of the oldest institutes of Islamic learning, have emphasized the social rather than militant dimension of jihad. According to them, jihad is a peaceful social struggle against illiteracy, poverty, and disease. They underline the peaceful nature of the Islamic message (Tibi, 1998).

Muhammad Shaltut (d. 1963), the rector of al-Azhar, asserted that Islam is open to pluralism. He claimed that the Qur'an
does not require Muslims to resort to warfare when they proselytize. Fighting cannot be a part of the Islamic mission, for the heart of Muhammad's mission is to bring good tidings and to warn humanity (Kelsay, 1993). Since war is an immoral situation, Muslims are required to live at peace with non-Muslims (Tibi, 2002).

In recent times, both the Research Council and the chief rector at dar al-ifta' in Egypt, Muhammad Said Tantawi, have spoken out against the militant fundamentalist movements and suicide bombers. More specifically, they have condemned the targeting of innocent civilians. These are indicative of a new trend among many Muslim leaders to accentuate the peaceful rather than militant dimension of Islam. It also shows the disparate views maintained within the various Muslim groups.

An important theme in the Qur'anic view of peaceful coexistence is forgiveness. Retaliation is a strictly defined legal principle that can perpetuate a culture of violence and a cycle of killing. The Qur'an evidently wants to replace this with a culture of peace. While permitting retaliation, the Qur'an urges the victim to forgive and eschew revenge (2:178). To inject peace in a series of retaliatory measures requires forgiveness as a healing and empowering process so as to restore human relationship (Sachedina, 2001).

Whereas a punitive response is often considered necessary when harm is inflicted, retribution should be linked to a restorative process. Thus, verse 2:179 states that, "In [the law of] retribution is a source of life, O people of understanding." The verse invites people to replace the cycle of violence by considering rettributive justice as a process of rehabilitation. In this way, the Qur'an replaces death caused by retaliation with life through forgiveness.

Retributive justice, according to the Qur'an, should aim at redressing the wrongs by making the offender acknowledge responsibility and by encouraging the victim to consider alternatives to the perpetuation of violence through retribution (Sachedina, 2001). The offender acknowledges the harm his acts have done so that a repaired relationship between the offender and victim can reinstate the dignity of both (Sachedina, 2001). Acknowledgement of injury inflicted is the first step in seeking forgiveness. Repentance and a genuine sense of remorse is another. The Qur'an also offers an alternative to
violence by recommending the acceptance of blood money as compensation.

There is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence and forgiveness over retribution. The Qur'an is also concerned about proportionality even in retribution. By stipulating appropriate levels of punitive response when attempting to restore violated rights or correcting injustices, it regulates acts of retribution, for these should not exceed the extent of the original injury (Gopin, 2002).

On the part of the victim, forgiveness is preferred over retribution, as he foregoes the moral right of demanding injury by inflicting more injury. As verse 42:40 states in this context, "... whoever forgives and thereby brings about a reestablishment of harmony, his reward is with God; and God loves not the wrongdoers." By his acceptance of compensation in the face of repentance and the acknowledgement of the harm that the offender has inflicted, the victim demonstrates willingness to rehabilitate the offender in society. The victim is, in turn, rewarded by God.

If forgiveness is merely a religious requirement but is not seen as some form of empowerment, then its effectiveness in resolving conflicts may be limited. The act must address a person's deeper wounds. It is vital that forgiveness be seen and felt as empowering, as this would affirm this inner process. The Qur'an describes this as an act of courageous will (42:43) (Gopin, 2002).

Approaches to conflict resolution in Islam reflect religious values and traditional rituals of reconciliation. Scholars also recognize the role that culture plays in conflict and peacemaking, and affirm the potential contributions of diverse institutions to conflict resolution. Cultural modes of reconciliation include acceptance of individual and collective responsibility of wrongdoing, attentiveness to face-related issues (public status, shame) and the achievement of restorative justice. (Said, Funk, & Kadayifci, 2001).

Conflicts are also resolved based on local customs, such as public acts of repentance, compensation for losses and acts of forgiveness. Frequently, communal leaders and village elders facilitate a process of reconciliation (Said et al., 2001). Muslims have delineated other processes for resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner. Although we cannot examine each more closely here, these include repentance, (Gopin, 2002, pp. 118-
Challenges for Muslims in Contemporary Times

Muslim discourse on war and peace has been defined primarily by the juridical literature. Especially after the events of September 11, 2001, we are witnessing a period of reinterpretation and redefinition of the notion of jihad in the Muslim community. It has been argued that the Qur'an offers a distinctly modern perspective on tolerance and respect in a multi-ethnic, multi-communal world (Eickelman, 2002). The challenge for Muslims in contemporary times is to recover the tolerance and means for peaceful coexistence through the Qur'an rather than the juridical and exegetical understanding which, as noted, were formulated to assert the subjugation of the "other" in a particular historical context. As they engage in a re-examination of traditional exegesis, the point of departure for Muslims has to be the Qur'an itself, rather than the multi-faceted and multi-layered scholarly discourse that has accumulated since the eighth century.

The moral tenor of the Qur'an shows that it wants to engage humanity in a moral discourse where all human beings can connect with the Qur'an and with each other based on universal values. As Sohail Hashmi argues, there are few ethical works that outline the Qur'anic vision of coexistence or warfare. Muslims need to disentangle Islamic ethics from medieval Islamic law and to re-examine the Qur'anic pronouncement on war and peace in light of its ethical axioms (Hashmi, 2002b). Thus, the challenge for Muslims is to draw on this Qur'anic vision so as to develop just interreligious and intercultural relationships in a world of cultural and religious diversity.

Muslims are also confronted with the challenge of contextual hermeneutics in dealing with the pronouncements of the Qur'an on specific legal issues like hostility and warfare. Verses on jihad must be understood as taking into account the particular conditions of persecution and oppression in which they originated. Returning to interpretation of the Qur'an and prophetic traditions in their proper historical context is often
circumvented by the juridical interpretations that promote the hegemonic interests of the Islamic state, thus ignoring, in the name of Islam, the ecumenical and universal message of the Qur’an. Muslim scholars and jurists have to engage in hermeneutic and interpretive exercises to provide a coherent re-evaluation of classical formulations and to reassert the Qur’anic inclusive and ecumenical vision of peace. In other words, modern Muslims need to go beyond the classical formulations on dhimmis, siyar, and non-believers. The delineation of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb no longer applies, and thus boundaries have to be re-imagined. Furthermore, Muslims must articulate a theory of international relations that incorporates notions of dignity, freedom of conscience, rights of minorities, and gender equality based on universal moral values.

A major impediment to this approach is that many Muslims simply reject the idea that the classical juridical decisions are reflective of eighth century political, cultural, or historical circumstances in which they originated. They refuse to acknowledge that while the Qur’an is a fixed text, the interpretive applications of its teachings will vary with the changing realities of history. Traditionalists maintain that Islamic law, as it was formulated by the jurists in the first three centuries of Islamic history, was in strict conformity with the divine will expressed in the Qur’an. Thus normative textual sources are treated as timeless and sacred rather than anchored to a specific historical context. This traditionalist view is challenged by the fact that there was much disputation on what constituted the divine will among the classical jurists themselves, and by the fact that they proffered a wide range of views on the issues with which they were confronted.

As Muslims search for ways to chart out peaceful coexistence with others, they also need to reevaluate their normative texts. This exercise is contingent on recognizing that Muslims are not bound to erstwhile juridical or exegetical hermeneutics. Communities often construct a paradigmatic interpretation on the text and assert it on the readers. Once it is defined, the authoritative legacy of the text is transmitted to the next group of scholars and becomes entrenched as the normative and "authentic" position. Gradually, the texts construct an increasingly restrictive and specific well-defined position on an
issue. The contents of the sacred texts are frequently less important than the social and historical settings in which they are interpreted (Kurtz, 2002).

The reading of a text is interwoven with the closing of the interpretive process, thereby restricting the text to a specific determination. This determination is then submitted as the final and only possible interpretation of the text (El Fadl, 2001). In this sense, juridical hermeneutics are no different from the interpretive activities evident in other fields. The interpretive strategy can shape both future readings and the texts themselves, thus constructing the texts rather than arising from them. Hence, there is a need for Muslims to find reliable ways of separating the voice of God from the voice of human beings, and to differentiate between the Qur’anic vision and the socio-political context in which that vision was interpreted and articulated by classical and medieval exegetes.

Contemporary Muslims are confronted with hegemonic values of the past and an emerging political reality that often challenges the applicability of those values. The tension between the peaceful and militant strains of Islam can be resolved only as Muslims undertake the task of re-evaluating historically the classical and medieval juridical corpus.

Conclusion

Spiritually, the Qur’an accommodated and extended salvific space to other monotheistic faiths; subsequent Muslim jurists not only passed the verdict of non-belief to them but also treated adherents of these faith groups as second class citizens, a position that has no basis in the Qur’an.

For all people, peace requires changes in our world-views. The quest for peace challenges us to reevaluate how we have viewed the other. This requires a shift in paradigm, asking us to embrace those we have previously excluded or demonized. The challenge is to seek opportunities for interpretations that can make a community see the enemy in a new way (Gopin, 2002). Concurrently, we need to move beyond defining ourselves over and above an enemy “other.” The starting point is to re-examine traditions that draw boundaries of exclusion and marginalization. Peaceful coexistence is only possible
when we no longer see a group as the other but as a concrete human community with ancient values and norms. Ultimately, peaceful relations between human beings must be grounded in a community’s construction of order based on egalitarianism, justice, and a concern for the moral and social well-being of all its citizens.

References


Peace and War in the Qur’an and Juridical Literature


Contesting Buddhisms on Conflicted Land: Sarvodaya Shramadana and Buddhist Peacemaking

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Buddhism in its various incarnations has both aided and hindered the peace processes in Sri Lanka. Sarvodaya Shramadana, a Buddhist development organization, stands out in the way it uses religion to promote peace through a more humanist interpretation of Buddhist teachings. While Sarvodaya's alternative approach toward the religion provides an optimistic space for promoting peace, its connections to and dependence on populism can also complicate its politics. This article argues that the most effective means of peace work can be found through the same channel of collective mobilization that hindered it, Buddhism.

Key words: Buddhism, peace, Sarvodaya Shramadana, collective mobilization, populism

We believe in one undivided Sri Lanka; we believe that without any discrimination to any race or religion, we in Sri Lanka can live together in a righteous society. We can build such a society! Ariyaratne (1989, p. 244)

In July of 1983, when the mostly Hindu Tamil population of Colombo and other major Sri Lankan cities were persecuted, killed, and expelled from their homes, Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne, the founder of Sarvodaya, took the risk of housing seventeen Tamil people in his own home. When a Sinhalese gang came to his house for the Tamil inhabitants, they found Dr. Ariyaratne’s
daughter, who explained to them, "My parents' instructions are that if my father is here, he will have to be killed before any Tamil family member is touched. If my mother is here, she will die first. Now, as I am the oldest in the family and my parents are not home, I will have to die before you touch them" (Ingram, 1990, p. 128). The Sinhalese gang, recognizing the gravity of her words, apologized and left. A few days later, Ariyaratne published a statement chastising the nominative Buddhists who participated in and allowed the riots. He wrote:

For the ensuring of narrow political tribal, religious and economic gains should we be participants in the destroy[ing] of human qualities of kindness, truthfulness and justice—the patrimony of Sinhala Buddhists? To deviate from neutrality is against the Buddha's words 'Dammohave Rakkathi Dhammachari'. Should we deviate from the Dharma path and help to build a society that adulates violence, bribery, corruption? Should we reinforce a party system that ruptures the fabric of the Sinhala race? If we do not indulge in such a train of thought, nothing would be left of the Sinhala race and Buddhism. (2001, p. 834)

In his statement, he emphasized that the state of Buddhism in Sri Lanka was in crisis on account of the violence. If Sri Lanka had any hope for peace, its majority Sinhalese Buddhist population would have to return to its doctrinal and spiritual roots that recognized the sanctity of all life.

The story of Buddhism in Sri Lanka is both long and complex. In Sri Lanka, a country known today as the traditional home to Buddhism, the religion has transformed in many diverse ways. Since the introduction of Buddhism to the island in the third century BCE, the religion came under attack during the colonial period, was re-invigorated in the post-colonial era, and, subsequently, became politicized as a national project (Gombrich & Obeyesekere, 1998; Obeyesekere, 1991; Scott, 1999; Seneviratne, 1999; Tambiah, 1992). Buddhism in one of its current incarnations has been implicated in an exclusive nationalist project that abstracted it from its spiritual identity. Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism, in conjunction with Tamil nationalism, has polarized the population of Sri Lanka
and has often justified the use of violence under the pretext of identity preservation.

Operating within this context is Sarvodaya Shramadana—a Buddhist development organization earnestly trying to apply Buddhist ideals and principles to its work in order to differentiate itself from the politicized forms of Buddhism in the country. Sarvodaya has participated in supporting Buddhism as an anti-imperialist project, yet it has also promoted Buddhism as an open, non-exclusive religion—making it popular among its majority Sinhalese constituency, while pushing them towards a more progressive ethnic perspective. While Sarvodaya’s use of Buddhist principles in programs for general welfare can be extremely helpful, the Buddhist political agenda in Sri Lanka puts Sarvodaya in a delicate position. Sarvodaya’s effort to maintain a strictly spiritual, humanized, and non-political Buddhist approach to its peace work is difficult in the context of high Buddhist politicization and a political conflict.

The Sri Lankan war, which ended in 2009, is best known for the tactics of terror employed by the Tamil insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and counter-insurgency warfare conducted by the Sri Lankan government. However, the conflict has much deeper roots seated in the greater consciousness of the population where ethnic animosity and fear has been brooding for decades.

In Sri Lanka, one peace solution comes in the form of Engaged Buddhism. The term “Engaged Buddhism” is applied to the use of Buddhist practices and principles to combat situations of oppression, marginalization, and suffering. Activists within this field are largely informed by Buddhist principles of nonviolence, interdependence, and inward meditation and reflection (Jones, 1989; Queen & King, 1996). Currently, the scholarship on Engaged Buddhism within Sri Lanka has focused on grassroots connections and holistic peacemaking (Almeida, 2008; Ariyaratne, 1978; Bond, 2004; Macy, 1985). Engaged Buddhism, as operated by Sri Lankan grassroots-oriented Sarvodaya Shramadana, establishes itself in direct contrast to international interventionist approaches, making it more appealing to the Sri Lankan populace. Sarvodaya is a very large and encompassing organization whose work extends far beyond the scope of nominative peacemaking activities. Although Sarvodaya mostly focuses on development,
it adopted an identity as a peace organization when it directed its efforts towards addressing the escalating ethnic conflict in the 1970s. Since this shift in focus, it has won numerous peace awards. In the realm of peacemaking, Sarvodaya provides an intriguing vernacularized and popular model that incorporates the often-ignored aspects of spirituality into its work.

Sarvodaya has called itself, among other things, a social movement. This self-identification comes from their commitment to envisioning change through mobilizing the grassroots, marginal, and/or subaltern populations. Academic trends within the social movement field have placed a large emphasis on studying movements in terms of collective identity and alternative forms of resistance within new sites of conflict (Kelley, 1993; Melucci, Keane, & Mier, 1989). Within the discussion, theorists such as Alberto Melucci have argued that resistance within the realm of conventional political channels can limit the scope of social movements, and that new sites of resistance provide metapolitical challenges to modernity (Melucci et al., 1989). James Scott extended this concept to the "infrapolitical" level through his explanation of a "hidden transcript" of a subtle dissident political culture in which larger issues of hegemony can be challenged by small acts of everyday unorganized resistance (Scott, 1985, 1990). In this sense, social movement approaches towards peacemaking can both center on goals of institutional change, yet have also recently shifted to validate a more decentralized, identity-oriented approach towards change-making that widens the concept of socio-political citizenship (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). While large parts of the peace process will depend on political and governmental change, a change within the rest of the population is also necessary to reinforce an infrastructure conducive to maintaining peace. The conflict in Sri Lanka is not only an elite-centered case of insurgency and counter-insurgency, the conflict also has popular participation, and popular consent. For this reason, Sarvodaya’s work with the grassroots populations is extremely important to the equation of peace work in Sri Lanka.
Nationalist Buddhist Activism in Post-Colonial Sri Lanka

In the post-colonial years, Buddhist activism became mostly synonymous with pro-Sinhalese activism. A prominent instance of this can be traced to 1956-1958 when the Sri Lankan political elite drafted a new constitution for the country. In 1958, the government tried engaging in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, which would have instituted more linguistically equal options for its constituents. One of the first monastic political parties, the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna (EBP), or "United Front of Monks," led rallies at the state building with other monks and put up a strong resistance to the pact, claiming that it would denigrate the role of the Sinhalese. Some monks claimed that it would "lead to the total annihilation of the Sinhalese race" (Tambiah, 1992, p. 50). The monks organized marches from the capital to the most prominent temples, participated in sit down protests, and were known to have been involved in anti-Tamil riots. The activism was successful to the point that the pact was dissolved, and subsequently Tamil was excluded from future legislation establishing significant barriers between the Tamil constituency and the Sri Lankan government.

As tensions between Tamil and Sinhalese people were exacerbated and violence between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government intensified, political Buddhist monks also intensified their own activism. Often these monks based their arguments on Sinhalese protectionism and against making any concessions to the LTTE or Tamil people (Seneviratne, 1999; Tambiah, 1992). An interesting debate that grew during the increasing violence between the government and the LTTE was that of "just war." While Buddhism is considered to be a peaceful and non-violent religion, Sri Lankan monks during this time began to back the anti-LTTE violence using Buddhist principles to support their politics. Some monks, such as the Venerable Professor Bellanwila, explained that sometimes war is inevitable. Others, such as the Venerable Athurliye Rathana, crafted comparisons of the LTTE to Hitler, explaining that maitriya, or compassion alone, is not sufficient to eradicate evil (Frydenlund, 2005).
More recently, Buddhist monks have organized to create their own influential political party, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in 2004. Described by Iselin Frydenlund (2005) as a "protest party," (p. 14) the JHU advocated for Sinhalese rights and policies privileging Sinhalese Buddhists on the island. The monks, characterizing themselves as the protectors of Buddhism, ground their views in spiritually authoritative texts. During the 2006 Norway-facilitated peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, many monks, including the JHU, protested what they interpreted as a process ultimately aimed to disempower the Sinhalese. During these processes, monks staged demonstrations in front of the state building and at local religious sites, with actions ranging from sit-down protests to burning the Norwegian flag.

There have been no studies specifically gauging the politics of Sri Lankan monks. However, Frydenlund's (2005) survey of monks' views of the conflict showed that many monks theoretically supported notions of state decentralization, but felt threatened by a federal political solution that could offer more opportunities for Tamil self-representation. He also found that the majority of the activism performed by Buddhist monks was actually done against Tamil interests. Incidentally, those who fought for Tamil interests cited political, rather than religious, reasons. As Seneviratne (1999) reflected on the irony of the majority of monk political allegiances, "[W]hen the idea of a political solution is suggested to replace this slaughter [of the conflict], the chief monks who oppose it are more numerous than the bearers of arms" (p. 280).

While it is impossible to make general claims about all Buddhist political ideology in the country, a prominent theme is pro-Sinhalese activist work. This may more of a reflection of the political situation and the historical connections between Sinhalese nationalism and the religion than with religious doctrine in itself. Many monks, out of their responsibility to their constituents, felt the need to engage in issues of social justice. In Sri Lanka, where the ethnic conflict has colonized the domain of politics, monks seeking to be active have been funneled into Sinhalese nationalist causes. Monks responding to the needs of their constituents risk adopting populist politics, even when those politics may contradict certain aspects of their religion.
It could be seen that populism, which can be easily hijacked in multiple directions, may be the strongest factor motivating monks to campaign in the interest of Sinhalese nationalism. While this form of Buddhism has many adherents, there is another form of Buddhism that offers an alternative view. Following is the story of an organization that tries to inform its practices with Buddhist spiritual ideology rather than with the Buddhist political identity.

**Sarvodaya’s Buddhist Activism in Sri Lanka**

The story of Sarvodaya, while maintaining many Sinhala Buddhist traditionalist themes, has shown an interesting deviation from the mainstream Sinhala nationalist narrative. Sarvodaya tries to demonstrate that it is an organization built along Buddhist ethics, spirituality, and principals, not one that condones a harmful and exclusive Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Emerging from an anti-colonial Sinhalese nationalist tradition, Sarvodaya tried to differentiate itself by applying its traditionalist Buddhist rhetoric to projects encouraging inclusivity. From the moment of its inception in the 1950s, Sarvodaya demonstrated this inclusivity through its extension of projects to Tamil areas where it hired Tamil leadership, and later through its peace and dialogue projects.

George Bond (1996) wrote that Sarvodaya was able to reappropriate Sinhala nationalism as a more ecumenical cause given its ability to "cleans[e] it [Sinhalese nationalism] of racial claims for the superiority of the Sinhalese" (p. 133). They achieve this through emphasizing the strength and power of Sri Lankans, rather than of the Sinhalese alone. Carrying some elements of Sinhalese traditional nationalism, Sarvodaya leadership also tends to romanticize the pre-colonial past and strives for the aesthetics of the rural village unblemished by today’s materialism. This traditional nationalism helps explain why Sarvodaya has gained popularity among its Buddhist constituency, and also demonstrates the ways in which Sarvodaya has evolved as a product of its context.

Sarvodaya, starting purely as a development organization in the 1950s, located its first project in a village of low caste people who previously had been shunned by their local society. In an
effort to validate the agency of the villagers while helping the population develop, Sarvodaya engaged in a local participatory voluntary work program. This program later expanded nationwide to include Tamil and Muslim areas. Now, Sarvodaya is one of the largest development organizations in the country, with a network of over 15,000 villages (Ariyaratne, 2008). In every area where Sarvodaya has programs, the leadership is almost always local and representative of the people who are being helped. When the ethnic tensions of Sri Lanka escalated in the 1970s and 1980s, Sarvodaya quickly emerged as one of the leading peace-oriented organizations. Recognizing the Buddhist principle of interrelatedness, Sarvodaya leaders felt that the engagement in peace was crucial to its investment in development. Accordingly, Dr. Ariyaratne, the organization’s founder, initiated further programs of dialogue and exchange. In the months leading to the racial riots of 1983, Dr. Ariyaratne took special measure to encourage exchange programs between youth of the conflicting groups, and to participate directly in discussions of peace with the Tamil population.

It was the violent riots of 1983 that placed Sarvodaya in the public eye as one of the firmest advocates of peace. On July 23, 1983, Dr. Ariyaratne, once aware of the violence plaguing his immediate surroundings, mobilized areas of protection for the Tamil victims within twenty-four hours, sheltering some in his own home. Additionally, he published strong statements condemning the violence, and later organized large interfaith and interethnic meetings to brainstorm options for pursuing peace. Within the aftermath of the violence, Ariyaratne was the first Sinhalese leader to visit the Tamil refugee camps in the north of the country to offer condolences and donations for their recovery (personal communication, Devanesan Nesiah, Summer, 2009).

In the decades since the riots, Sarvodaya bolstered its existent peace programs. Its approaches towards peace range from dialogue and exchange to meditation and peace walks. Sarvodaya’s dialogue and exchange programs have been aimed at all sectors of the population from more powerful politicians to rural youth. Its youth program, “Shanthi Sena,” focuses both on dialogue and connecting people from areas in conflict through local four-day amity camps. The program has
been active since the 1970s and currently has a membership of over 86,000 youth. The Shanthi Sena program, like many of Sarvodaya’s initiatives, does not focus strictly on nominative peace projects. The youth also are trained in leadership, mediation, and first aid. Sarvodaya’s “5R” program, based largely in the North and East, approaches peace work as a multifaceted project based in “relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation, and reawakening.” The success of Sarvodaya’s multi-layered peace projects depends largely on its connections to its larger network of self-governance and development.

In order to tap into more spiritual sides of peace work, Sarvodaya organized mass peace marches around the country and large conferences including over 2000 people. Twice, it has organized mass peace meditations which have demonstrated its impressive ability to mobilize large groups of people. Its most recent mass meditation in 2002 brought together 650,000 people at Sri Lanka’s ancient capital, Anuradhapura, to meditate with spiritual leader Deepak Chopra.

As Ariyaratne noted, “people can write entire books about Buddhism and Sarvodaya” (personal communication, Summer, 2009) as almost every aspect of the organization has been built with Buddhist principles in mind. Ariyaratne explained that the organization is especially focused on the Four Brahma Viharas (“divine abidings” or positive conditions of being) as its “guiding principles” (2001, p. 467). In terms of peace, these principles interact with two prominent elements of Buddhism in their ability to inform Sarvodaya’s peace activism. The first relates to the Buddhist notion of self and interdependency. The second pertains to action and the concept of ahimsa, or non-violence. Both work together in the context of Sarvodaya to help pursue a sustainable peace in the country.

The Buddhist notion of self can first be informed by the concept of anattā, or selflessness. Selflessness can be interpreted in several different ways. In one way anattā can be seen as nonattachment, and the absence of selfishness. Another way addresses the myth of self and questions the hardened categories of an individual and collective identity. The way to conceptualize the idea of anattā is to examine the ways in which the individual is distinguished from others. Nhat Hanh and Kotler (1987) explained the interrelated quality of the self through the
term, "interbeing" which he took from the Avatamsaka Sutra. Through this notion of interbeing, the particularity of the self also reflects the universality of its connection to all beings and entities.

Someone, by using the concept of anatta to inform her own definition of self, is compelled to rethink the way she is distinguished from others. If the self is inherently interrelated and dependent on other people, then personal welfare is also dependent on the welfare of others. On the individual level, this means that a person's happiness is predicated on the happiness of her neighbor. On the collective level, it questions the distinction between one group and another (e.g. Tamil and Sinahlese groups). The removal of socially constructed divisions allows for the development of new concepts of self, self-protection, and inclusivity. If one group is separated from the other in terms of hardened categories, it is easy to see welfare as a zero-sum game wherein the power of one group depends on the disempowerment of another. The concept of anatta unsettles the notion of competition for prosperity. It both exposes humanity as a large interrelated group, and questions the notions of boundaries as they appear (Galtung, 1993). As Ariyaratne explained, an acceptance of the concept of anatta has a liberatory quality that can lend towards more peaceful thinking. Ariyaratne wrote, "in that highly evolved state of a living being called 'human,' there is a potential to free the mind from narrow barriers of family, race, color, religion, national borders and fragmented ideologies" (1980, p. 78). This is apparent in the case of Sri Lankan identity formation and mobilization where scholars, such as Valentine Daniel (1996), see the conflict in similar terms:

[O]ne way of understanding the current violence on the island is to see it as a check on the narcissistic expansiveness of infantile impulses, impulses that fail to recognize that the whole world is not one’s own and that all of being is not encompassed within the boundaries of an ever-expanding identity. (p. 68)

Sarvodaya's attempts to break away from exclusionist identities and to construct a more fluid sense of self delegitimizes the psychological foundations of war.
Obeysekere (1991) argued for a humanist Buddhism with a conscience that can communicate more effectively to the Sri Lankan heart, rather than the head. Through this conscience, the Sri Lankan populace can break down societally constructed barriers and develop compassion for others. Sarvodaya, in its engagement of anattā, discourages the fashioning of differences between the Sinhalese and Tamil participants in order to encourage Sarvodaya members to resist discriminating against each other and recognize their common identities and needs. When asked what his thoughts were about the Sri Lankan president declaring that minorities did not exist in Sri Lanka, a peace program leader expressed, “No minorities is a very good idea ... Now Sri Lanka only has Sri Lankan people. This is a very good philosophy” (personal communication, Summer, 2009). While the president’s attempt at a rhetorical erasure of minorities has many problematic political implications, the leader’s optimistic interpretation of the statement reflects a genuine effort to impart the belief of anattā onto the situation. This enthusiasm for supporting the “no minorities” stance of the president was reflected by the majority of the Sarvodaya staff in interviews conducted for this paper. To them, this idea of “no minorities,” rather than discounting the diversified experiences of people in the country, discouraged people from thinking of each other in terms of their racialized collective identities, but rather in terms of their common humanity and their shared investment in a peaceful future.

The overwhelming support of the president’s statement, however, also highlights tensions within the interpretation of anattā. It complicates the notion of one-ness in comparison to same-ness. Whereas a universalism reflected in policies of equal protection and access can demonstrate a support of unity, there is also the risk of unity becoming an oppressive project of appropriation, codification, and forced conformity to certain prescribed norms. This could easily allow people a way to avoid dealing with issues of past discrimination and issues of redistribution. In the case of Sri Lanka, ideas of unity and oneness have tended towards echoing majoritarian Sinhala-normative sentiments, in which a Sri Lankan identity is overtly or more subtly equated with the Sinhalese identity. Specifically in the case of the President’s speech, it was understood that while ethnic minorities no longer existed, those
who were not considered patriotic enough would be chastised as the new "minority." While Sarvodaya's higher leadership has been clearer in its cautious interpretations of majoritarian-dominated unity, it is not always reflected further down the leadership structure.

Another important aspect of Sarvodaya's peace activism is the concept ahimsa. Himsa translates to violence or harm and indicates its negation. Thus, ahimsa is most commonly translated to the term "nonviolence." Dr. Ariyaratne has many ways of interpreting violence, which then leads to a broad interpretation of ahimsa. Dr. Ariyaratne explained that violence can be enacted by citizens of the government as well as by organizations such as the LTTE. Additionally, violence can manifest in terms of the poverty in the country. Dr. Ariyaratne thus included notions of structural and cultural violence in his conception of violence and the process of fighting it. Structural violence can be interpreted as the mechanisms of institutional coercion that prevent people from aspiring towards their potential (Galtung, 1965). Poverty constitutes structural violence because it creates conditions where people's investment in their own survival forces them into situations of conflict. In trying to diminish violence, Dr. Ariyaratne has worked to combat the poverty of the country as well as the psychological factors encouraging people to become physically violent towards each other. He called this building a "psychological" and a "spiritual infrastructure." Other manifestations of structural violence can be interpreted as inequitable power structures. Engaged Buddhist theorist Ken Jones (1989) explained that addressing structural and cultural violence can be interpreted to be the core of Engaged Buddhism. He wrote, "To see only the violence of those who, in desperation, answer intolerable institutional coercion with overt violence is to become party to the hypocrisy of established power" (Jones, p. 146).

It is generally accepted amongst the Engaged Buddhist scholars that the genesis of ostensible outer peace is inner peace. The belief is that if one is inwardly peaceful, she or he will be able to interact non-violently with the outer world. In this sense, the inner cultivation of peace is also an essential part of practicing ahimsa (Bond, 2004). Conversely, violence in one's mind also can condone or lead to external violence.
Vietnamese non-violent Buddhist activist Nhat Hanh wrote, “We usually think that killing occurs in the domain of the body, but a fanatical mind can cause the killing of not just one, but millions of human beings” (cited in Sivaraksa, 2005, p. 15). Sarvodaya works to cultivate inward peace so as to prevent outside violence before it starts. This explains the emphasis it places on group meditation programs and small-scale amity camps. Thus while meditation programs might not overtly address issues of structural inequalities and injustice, they address a deeper part of humanity—hopefully preventing the very thought processes that lead to structural and physical violence.

This interpretation can inform the practice of ahimsa in terms of politics as well. The relationship of Sarvodaya’s politics to peace is significant because of the political nature of peace work in the country. Violence comes about through many different factors: some are merely psychological, yet others are related to institutional and structural coercion. The political structures and practices of the country, such as majoritarian governance, have led to both state and extra-state violence. Accordingly, while undertaking the project of individual transformation is an important factor of fighting violence, it is also essential to understand and address the structural issues. Sarvodaya’s relationship to politics becomes quite complicated in light of the way Sarvodaya vocally chooses not to align itself with specific political parties and policies. In his essay, “Weaving Peace from Bottom-up,” (2008) Dr. Vinya Ariyaratne explained that while implementing the principles of non-party political power and seeking participatory politics and democratic self-governance, Sarvodaya creates a constructive, non-violent and peaceful power influence at the national level, including moral power, meditation power, and people power (p. 5).

Here, we see that Sarvodaya tries to establish change while avoiding the institutions of party politics which have often been major sources of violence in the country. Within this excerpt, politics is framed in two ways. The first is in terms of “party politics”—often a corrupt and violence-perturbed arena that has not seen much progress in terms of the conflict. The second is “participatory politics”—a political model Sarvodaya
supports because of its connection to grassroots empowerment and its ability to allot agency to populations beyond the elite.

Sarvodaya's decision to step away from larger issues of politics can be interpreted in two opposing ways. In one way, its divorce from party politics contrasts it to the long history of Buddhist actors in the country that have associated themselves with politics, often to pursue and support projects of exclusive Sinhalese nationalism. As discussed before, the engagement of Buddhist monks in elections, campaigning against more inclusive policies towards the Tamil population, and recently in their establishment of their own political party, all are examples of ways in which the engagement of Buddhists in politics has even hurt the peace process. Sarvodaya, by not engaging in politics, also distances itself from this form of contaminated Buddhism. Sarvodaya stands as a quiet model of an ecumenical and inclusive Buddhism unhindered by the binds of politics.

Additionally, by not involving itself in politics, Sarvodaya protects itself from undue governmental attack. Acting primarily as a large development organization, Sarvodaya interacts with the Sri Lankan government through multiple organizational and financial channels. In many areas of its operation, the organization depends on governmental cooperation in order to fund its projects and gain access to certain areas. While Sarvodaya has a history of cooperation with the government, it also has a history in which it has been persecuted by the government. Its large share of non-political power with a network of over 15,000 villages has already made it seem quite menacing to the government, and it has been the victim of multiple governmental campaigns (Perera, Marasinghe, & Jayasekere, 1992).

Due to its large constituency and encouragement of non-governmental autonomy, Sarvodaya first came under government suspicion for unproven issues such as corruption and funding in the 1970s (Perera, Marasinghe, & Jayasekere, 1992). In 1980, the Volunteer Service Organization Registration and Supervision Act required Sarvodaya and all other NGO organizations to register with the government and share information about its funding and its activities. In 1990, Sarvodaya became one of the largest targets of the inquiry of a presidential NGO investigation in which leaders within the organization were
continually questioned by the government and taken into custody for up to six months. During this time, Sarvodaya lost government support of several of its programs, and was blacklisted by UNESCO. The government encouraged newspapers, especially through the government-run “Lake House” publishing company, to write stories slandering the organization. In 1992, when Sarvodaya won the Niwano peace prize, the Sri Lankan ambassador to Japan tried to discourage the organization from giving Ariyaratne the prize. It has been speculated that the government targeted Sarvodaya because it viewed Dr. Ariyaratne as a political threat. Nonetheless, this forever shaped the relationship between the government and Sarvodaya, making its leader more adamant that he would stay far away from politics, and the organization was strongly warned by the government of the repercussions that awaited it if it were to pose any challenges. Rather than playing within the dangerous realm of politics, it chooses to make the most change possible outside of it.

However, the lack of engagement in politics also has some unintended consequences. Sarvodaya’s lack of participation in overtly questioning the government’s role in both systems of violence and coercion could also be seen as indirectly legitimizing governmental violence. While Sarvodaya literature reflects the beliefs of its leaders that violence has been committed both by the state and by extra-governmental people and organizations, there still is a gesture in the direction of military legitimization. This can be seen further back in Sarvodaya literature, where Sarvodaya commanders have suggested that Sarvodaya youth volunteers be prepared to enter the army (Ariyaratne, 2001). This appeared more recently with Sarvodaya staff who, in interviews, unanimously heralded the 2009 military victory of the government over the LTTE as a great step forward without voicing much concern for the violence committed by the government or the current/past treatment of minorities, such as the conditions of the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps (Amnesty International, 2009), or allegations of war crimes (Permanent People’s Tribunal, 2010; United Teachers for Human Rights, 2009). While in principal the notion of ahimsa plays a large role in Sarvodaya ideology, many Sri Lankans still find difficulty with the concept of just war in understanding their own politics towards
minority rights or governmental minority concessions. This brings about questions of how “engagement” works within Engaged Buddhism. Does engagement require a certain disengagement from politics, or does it require further participation, even at the expense of endangering one’s own existence?

The multiple challenges within the politics of peace have placed Sarvodaya in a delicate position in terms of peace work. As seen through its work, it tries to build a “psychological” and “spiritual infrastructure” among the Sri Lankan population that reconceptualizes identity in ways that will make adherents more caring and invested in the well-being of others. To add to the difficulty of being associated with politicized Buddhism, the organization is placed under strict scrutiny by a paranoid government to which it is already indebted through their collaborative projects to help the Sri Lankan populace. Sarvodaya, recognizing that peace work is only one aspect of a largely intertwined project of social uplift, also has many other projects that do not relate directly to the ethnic conflict. Similar to the delicate position Sri Lankan monks have been placed in, Sarvodaya’s responsibility to its large network of predominantly Sinhalese people complicates its dedication to ahimsa in regards to the minorities in the country. Populism and progressive conflict politics clash and the way to navigate through the disagreement is not clear. As a result of the delicate political situation, Sarvodaya is able to vaguely allude to the specific changes needed to alter the inequitable social structure, but cannot make controversial claims without further quivering the tightrope strung up by the complicated politics of its situation.

The Benefits and Challenges of Populism

In a country where the majority of society identifies as Buddhist, the type of Buddhism followed becomes an important factor in the pursuit of peace. Both Sarvodaya Shramadana and the Sri Lankan monks will eventually have to come to terms with the way they navigate the populist elements of their religion. The monks’ investment in populism arrives from their commitment to care for the interests of their constituents. Sarvodaya’s investment in populism comes from its mission of prioritizing the agency of the grassroots
organizations. In the case of peace, Sarvodaya makes a large effort to demonstrate that the people, too, can be a part of the peace process. Ariyaratne (1989) explained that Sarvodaya is trying to "increase the space available for the people to participate in a lasting peace process without peacemaking remaining a monopoly of a few privileged groups circumscribed by their limited concept of peace" (p. 146). It is evident in Ariyaratne's statements regarding peace work that he closely links the process to his goals of smaller governance and to the de-monetization of the general governing apparatus. Working outside the contours of elitist politics provides larger opportunities for participatory state building, making the constituents more apt to locate their own role within peace work.

A difficulty, then, is for Sarvodaya to form a strong and consistent ideological front with control over its own projects that extends from its central leadership to its more distanced constituents in light of its efforts to prioritize grassroots empowerment. While its leaders may have very clear ideas about the problematic aspects of all violence, state legitimated and otherwise, the same politics may become diluted further down. This means that no matter what is written in Sarvodaya literature, its mostly Sinhalese employees, and majority Sinhalese Buddhist constituents may still look out for Sinhalese interests in political rather than spiritual ways. This is especially the case when Sarvodaya members must decide how to interact with a government that seems to prioritize mostly Sinhalese Buddhist interests. Sarvodaya emphatically discourages extra-governmental violence—which may serve to discourage another ethnic riot. However, the ambiguity of governmental morality in terms of the conflict continues. Through Sarvodaya's programs, members might learn to prevent themselves from being violent to other minorities on the island, but they still may condone violence when performed as a governmental maneuver of righteousness.

While Sarvodaya's multiple and intertwining projects encounter many questions, its peace work highlights some that are particularly relevant: How can it use its own Buddhist ideology to pursue peace without letting Buddhism's historical political identity make its religious identity reign imperial within its projects? Does its decision to not engage in politics separate it from the communalistic Buddhism in the
country, or does it allow Sarvodaya to quietly condone state actions while it tries to pursue greater change through outside channels? As Sarvodaya is such a large, popular, and populist organization, its actions have implications far beyond its headquarters. In fact, the uniqueness of its work can set the tone of possibility for most peace-oriented civil society in Sri Lanka and the world. Similarly, by not considering issues of power, privilege, and political urgency, it risks narrowing the field of possibility for others.

However, Sarvodaya’s connection to such a large portion of the Sri Lankan demographic places it in a prime position to change their mentality. In this sense, populism, which could be perceived as a challenge to Sarvodaya’s peace work, can also be its greatest strength. Identifying as a social movement, but in light of its persecution by the government, Sarvodaya has worked at the grassroots level—focusing on changing the ways society perceives the conflict, and accordingly their own actions within it. Through the far reaches of its programs, the diversity of its projects, its connections to Sri Lankans of almost every demographic, its reputation of caring for peace, and its ability to mobilize large masses of people, it provides one of the strongest spaces of potential to realize Obeysekere’s (1991) concept of a humanized, heart-centered Buddhism. How far they can take this humanized Buddhism within the space of the political Sri Lankan context is largely up to them.

As Escobar and Alvarez (1992) explained, struggles focusing on daily life rather than on changing governmental policies also deserve to be recognized for their transformative qualities. They wrote that these struggles show the “... intersection of processes of articulating meaning through practices, on the one hand, and macro processes of domination, on the other ...” and furthermore, “... struggles over meanings at the level of daily life ... are the basis of contemporary social movements” (p. 71). In this sense, Sarvodaya, by engaging itself in multifaceted and spiritually focused peace projects, has the ability to infuse its conceptions of peace into the minds of its constituents at the level of daily life. In this way, it is an actor in a larger project. Sarvodaya challenges the concept of violence as an acceptable norm and pushes for its participants to adopt more peaceful ways of interacting with each other. While this does not always directly address the political implications of
the conflict, it does locate an avenue of peace work within the political opportunity structure of the conflict (Tarrow, 1994). Considering the political opportunities and constraints in the political and historical context, Sarvodaya is able to mobilize around the resources and political opportunities opened to them.

It can be seen that when stuck in such a precarious position, Sarvodaya is doing remarkable work as a Buddhist organization. Operating with a predominantly Sinhalese Buddhist demographic, it has Sinhalese normative tendencies, but tries hard to perform through the good will of a spirituality that comes from Buddhism, but does not impose it. Because the question of peace inevitably includes politics, a non-political religious peace project is quite a challenging aspiration. However, by planting the seeds of peace in the minds of the Sri Lankan people, Sarvodaya strives towards cultivating a new Sri Lanka ready to move past the conflict.

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References


(Endnotes)

1. Though, as Anne Blackburn (2010) points out in Locations of Buddhism, the trajectory of Buddhism in the country is certainly not linear. Many elements of nationalism and ritual maintain continuous ties throughout its history of the island.

2. There have also been Buddhist monks that have worked for minority rights. An extraordinary example is a counter-rally partially organized by the All Lanka Bhiku Organization against a nationalist Buddhist rally in 1997. The counter-rally, which boasted of over twice the amount of attendance than the former rally, was conducted in three languages, and donated two truck-loads of coconuts to the mostly Tamil North-East of the country (Abeysekara, 2008). Unfortunately this type of activism is not typical and less documented.

3. In the 1800s, monks were more involved in anti-colonial movements as evidenced in the monk rebellions of 1818, 1834, and 1848. Later, in the early 1900s, monks were more active in leftist labor activism, seen in their participation in the general strike of
It was only later, that Sinhala nationalism became such a strong theme in monk political work (Tambiah, 1992).

4. The Sinhala Buddhist national consciousness has several main themes: a romanticization of the pre-colonial past of the island, where Sri Lankans were able to tend to their agricultural projects in an atmosphere of unadulterated Buddhist simplicity. In modern times, this is coupled with the frustration with the current situation influenced by the capitalist and industrialized influences of colonialism and globalization.


6. On May 9, 2009, the Sri Lankan government claimed victory in the protracted conflict through their massacre of LTTE leaders, including the infamous Velupillai Prabhaharan. In his widely quoted speech following the military victory, the Sri Lankan president, Mahinda Rajapaksa rhetorically attempted to inaugurate Sri Lanka into a post-identity era in a frequently quoted speech: We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary three years ago. No longer are the Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any others minorities. There are only two peoples in this country. One is the people that love this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the land of their birth. Those who do not love the country are now a lesser group. (Rajapaksa, 2009)

7. It is worth noting that Galtung is also affiliated with Sarvodaya. He has made several visits to the Sarvodaya headquarters and published a book on Buddhism and Peace through Sarvodaya’s publishing company. Sarvodaya’s 2003-2004 annual report states, “Addressing the gathering, Prof. Galtung stated that the foundation for universal peace as well as lasting peace in Sri Lanka can be found in the Sarvodaya philosophy and that everyone in the country should cooperate with Sarvodaya so as to translate this philosophic context into action to achieve permanent peace” (Sarvodaya Shramadana, 2004, p. 77).
Possibilities for Peace:  
Germany’s Transformation of a Culture of War

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In reaction to its militarist past, Germany has created a strong culture of peace, including solid educational and institutional supports for maintaining popular attitudes critical of war and military operations. Germany has been recognized for these efforts by a number of international organizations, including the United Nations. At the same time, Germany has sought to maintain a policy of active membership in NATO and active cooperation and participation in NATO operations. As the United States applies increased pressure on its NATO allies in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the inherent social and political tensions in German policy have surfaced. The German experience of continuing to build a culture of peace while simultaneously participating in unpopular military operations provides a significant case study for all who would seek to build and expand a culture of peace among nations.

Key words: Germany, culture of peace, NATO, military operations

On January 12, 2009 Germany’s then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier wrote an open letter to newly elected President Barack Obama, in which he offered the following reflections on the continued catalysts for global conflict and the necessity of seeking more peaceful alternatives.
The challenges before us are huge: a transparent and reliable architecture for the world financial system ... Establishing trust between East and West. Bridging different cultures and religions alienated from each other. Bringing peace and new perspectives where crises now prevail ... Seeking partners, dispelling hostile stereotypes—nothing is more important in a world where radical forces still misuse religious and cultural differences to stir hatred ... I am convinced that no one can defeat terrorism and hatred with the strongest military battalions alone. Peace becomes possible only once we convince people of a better alternative to animosity and violence. When we succeed in winning their minds and hearts. When we help to make economic development and possible prospects for life ... Only dialogue and cooperation, not suicide attacks and Qassam rockets will usher in enduring peace. ... Without the willingness to comply with internationally respected ground rules, cooperation becomes impossible ... We stand for a comprehensive approach to peace. (Steinmeier, 2009)

Steinmeier's (2009) remarks encapsulate in many respects Germany's postwar values. His letter highlights the importance of international economic development, intercultural understanding and tolerance, the power of diplomacy to resolve disputes, and the use of military force as a last resort. Perhaps more than any other nation, Germany has used its warring past to underscore current imperatives for peace. Germans are proud of their decades-long pacifism and conscious rejection of military heroes (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Germany is an active European sponsor of events that showcase, educate, and advocate on behalf of global peacebuilding. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany hosted a gathering of artists, scientists, writers, and musicians to develop a "counter-project" to the Cold War stand-off. It was the first nation to establish an International Society for a Culture of Peace, which mobilizes and globalizes cooperation to defuse violent conflict. In 2006, Germany won official recognition by the United Nations for its 30-year contribution to sustainable peace education and its staunch refusal to glorify war.
Gauging Success

Germany’s efforts to embrace non-violence as both a political and cultural ethos is borne out in the country’s continued positive ranking on the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI, launched in 2007, rates both developed and developing nations according to their relative states of peace. The index is composed of 24 indicators, ranging from a nation’s level of military spending to its relations with neighboring countries and the level of respect for human rights. The Global Peace Index seeks to determine what cultural attributes and institutions are associated with states of peace. Countries most at peace are ranked first; a lower score indicates a more peaceful society. Non-volatile nations have higher per capita income, greater freedom, elevated levels of sustainability, and equitable social expenditures. According to the 2010 GPI report, peace creates a society that promotes human potential and its many diverse forms (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010b). In 2007, Germany ranked 12th out of 121, compared to a ranking of 96th for the United States. In 2008, the number of included nations grew to 140. This time, Germany ranked 14th out of 140. The U.S. remained drastically lower, at 97th. The 2010 edition of the Global Peace Index (based on 144 countries) revealed similar findings. Germany stands at 16th, the United States at 85th (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010a).

Germany’s claim to becoming a culture of peace requires an ongoing assessment of its cultural values and an active pursuit of broad-based social justice initiatives. Peace practitioners agree that despite traditional notions that equate peace with the elimination of war, peace is an evolving concept that embraces multiple definitions and approaches. Johan Galtung of the International Peace Research Institute speaks of a negative peace or, simply put, the absence of violence (Galtung, 1996). Peace can also be discussed in terms of deterrence, avoiding war through a balance of power, or being equally armed for aggression. A further definition focuses on a positive peace, with high levels of equity and social justice within and between societies. The most aspirational of all concepts regarding peace is the model of a culture of peace, a societal framework that prioritizes the following elements: non-violent conflict resolution;
universal values of human rights; sustainable development; cultural diversity; and citizen participation. The year 2010 marked the final year of UNESCO’s International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence. The U.N. action, designed to build peaceful futures for the world’s children, prioritized attitudes and behaviors that reject violence, prevent conflicts by addressing their root causes, and solve problems through dialogue and negotiation. The U.N. launched its initiative by underscoring the centrality of global peacebuilding efforts not only for human rights advocacy, but for international democ-ratization and security (UNESCO, 2000).

Whither the Military?

Despite Germany’s long-standing commitment to a culture of peace, the nation’s aversion to war is not without detractors. Critics of a “post-pathos, post-heroic” Germany argue that the European power manifests a lack of passion for protecting its freedoms (Kurbjuweit, 2010). A poll conducted in 2007 revealed that over 60 percent of Germans believed that their army, the Bundeswehr, “bolsters Germany’s prestige in the Western world” and has a positive impact on people’s lives outside its borders. By contrast, over a third of those interviewed posited that military operations have a decidedly negative effect on security within Germany. In terms of an overall appreciation of the armed forces, there are stark differences among Germany, the U.S., and other European countries. When asked if they felt a sense of gratitude towards their own military, 87 percent of Americans said yes, as compared to 64 percent in Britain, 52 percent in France, and a meager 30 percent in Germany. The basic German attitude, say researchers, can best be described as a product of their history: “a benevolent reserve characterized by moderate emotional attachment” (Riecker, 2009, p. 1). This less than enthusiastic response is borne out by statistics produced by Germany’s own Ministry of Defense. In 2004, for example, 150,000 Germans were called up for compulsory military service. Seventy thousand served in the military. Eighty thousand served as conscientious objectors, working in non-military institutions (Weimberg & Ryan, 2007). The subject of the German military is so sensitive that September 2009 marked the first time soldiers were memorialized since World War II (Black, 2009).
The German peace movement, some contend, represents a dangerous dismissal of geo-political realities. This perceived naïveté is echoed by the director of Germany’s Institute for International Security Affairs in Berlin. “We tolerate the military, but we don’t want to know about it” (Peel, 2010b). Others go one step further. Pacifism implies a categorical refusal to defend one’s nation and therefore betrays democracy. Proponents of a more security-minded agenda do not deny the horrors of Germany’s militarist past. Nor do they devalue the nation’s success in building a peace-loving society. Support for a more robust defense apparatus is based on the premise that a culture of restraint is obsolete in an age of terrorism. While the German constitution limits the use of armed force to defensive operations or to emergency NATO assistance, some charge that the country is hampered by an imbalanced assessment of its military. The army’s restriction to peacekeeping missions has left the homefront vulnerable. It likewise has demoted the German soldier to a beneficent warrior “with a rose in his gun barrel” (Kurbjuweit, 2010). Critics of Germany’s anti-war policy claim that for decades the country has clung to lessons from the past and left the fighting to others. Such a position, they say, is no longer tenable. As one commentator posited, “If you want to stop people who are both trying to kill and unafraid of dying, chances are you won’t be untainted yourself. That might be hard to swallow, but it’s still the truth” (Neukirch & Supp, 2010).

When it comes to war and peace, Germany is between a rock and a hard place. German unification struck fear in the hearts of its European neighbors, who worried the nation could protect—and expand—its economic interests at gunpoint. A similar anxiety surfaced in 1994 when Germany was accused of “nationalistic impulses” for considering armed protection of its trade routes (Peel, 2010b). In the years following the Wende (turning point) from Cold War politics, Germany quickly allayed regional angst that it posed a threat to world peace. It entered the political stage as a team player in shaping foreign policy and attempted a delicate balance between
leadership and restraint. Yet, as many analysts observe, the continuation and exacerbation of global conflict confronts the German nation with a host of new challenges. Germany’s increased involvement in multilateral decision-making raises expectations that it will contribute not only politically and financially, but militarily if necessary. The days of “checkbook diplomacy” are over.

Observers of German politics, both domestic and foreign, frequently juxtapose Germany’s reconciliation with itself and its history with the nation’s confusion and anxiety about its role outside its own borders. Timothy Garton Ash, in his 2007 review of the Stasi-related film *Das Leben der Anderen* (The Lives of Others), argues that it is precisely, and paradoxically, the shadow of a violent past that has transformed Germany into a paragon of peace. Ash (2007) writes:

The Germany in which this film was produced, in the early years of the twenty-first century, is one of the most free and civilized countries on earth. In this Germany, human rights and civil liberties are today more jealously and effectively protected than ... in traditional homelands of liberty such as Britain and the United States. In this good land, the professionalism of its historians, the investigative skill of its journalists, the seriousness of its parliamentarians, the generosity of its funders, the idealism of its priests and moralists, the creative genius of its writers, and yes, the brilliance of its filmmakers have all combined to cement in the world’s imagination the most indelible association of Germany with evil. Yet without these efforts, Germany would never have become such a good land. In all the annals of human culture, has there ever been a more paradoxical achievement? (p. 3)

Ash’s (2007) assessment of German high-mindedness and virtue, born of its *Auseinandersetzung* (coming-to-terms) with a warmongering past, contrasts with that of journalists who accuse the nation of failed leadership on the international stage. According to these less laudatory spectators, Germany’s foreign policy continues in a state of transition, from a mid-sized power bolstered by the United States to a cautiously reunified country sensitive to European fears, to a team player
too timid to flex its political muscle. Critics assert that Germany has repeatedly sacrificed influence for non-aggression. The language of peace, international understanding, and multilateral approaches is, quite simply, shorthand for cowardice—or at the very least, a fear of commitment.

_Striking a Balance_

Germany's Catch 22—damned if they fight, damned if they don't—is nowhere more apparent than in the country's expected involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Political debates during the lead-up to the Iraq War expressed considerable ambivalence. The central question was whether the nation could reconcile its identity as a military power, its obligation to uphold global alliances, and its ongoing commitment to peace. In the end, Germany opposed the war in Iraq and refused to join the Coalition Forces. This general suspicion and critique of military intervention was coupled with persistent advocacy of those values enshrined in a culture of peace. Germany demanded the closure of the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A German legal team encouraged U.S. soldier André Shepherd, who went AWOL in 2007, to apply for asylum to escape further combat. Shepherd’s lawyers cited an EU mandate that protects deserters who refuse participation in crimes against peace or humanity (Meyer & Kaiser, 2008). In 2005, a German federal court challenged U.S. actions in Iraq, expressing concern that such military incursions failed to conform to the U.N. charter. As recently as March 2009, Germany admitted 2,500 refugees from Iraq, granting the displaced persons special resident status.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom nears completion and NATO increases its presence in Afghanistan, Germany's delicate balancing act between public opinion and political obligations has intensified. Germany, along with most of Europe, celebrated the election of Barack Obama, hoping the new President would transform transatlantic relations. But Washington expects a lot from Europe in return, most notably in regions key to U.S. interests, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Russia and China. Germany's Bundeswehr is actively engaged in anti-terrorism campaigns and supplies warships to safeguard shipping off the Horn of Africa. Germany has assured Israel that in the event of an Iraqi attack it would provide a
missile defense system as it did in 1991 during Desert Storm. German forces, as part of NATO, are stationed on the Turkish-Iraqi border as well as in Kuwait.

Germany likewise has assumed a commanding role in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. Thus far Germany has continued to couch its role in terms of humanitarian missions. Germany’s Parliament-approved presence in Afghanistan has three primary goals: to guarantee security; to facilitate reconstruction efforts; and to assist Afghan security forces in their response to rebel attacks. Former Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung characterized Germany’s contribution as a comprehensive strategy of “networked security” that prioritizes infrastructure development, including agriculture, health and education. He described Germany’s role as far-reaching, yet inextricably tied to the host nation’s own military and civilian commitment—to enhanced democracy, the prevention of terrorism, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and an end to extremism and intolerance. For Jung, Germany’s commitment as the third largest NATO force in the country is crucial to Afghanistan’s overall stability. He therefore expected the German public to honor the bravery of Germany’s troops. “Our soldiers are facing these dangers with courage and resoluteness,” Jung announced, “for which they deserve our utmost respect and gratitude” (Jung, 2009).

Calls to Action

Nine years into the Afghanistan conflict, the German government finds itself increasingly caught between two contending forces: pressure from Washington to supply more troops and growing public antipathy at home (Black, 2009). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed deep concern over what he describes as the “demilitarization of Europe” (Editorial, 2010). The growing lack of robust defense capabilities, Gates argued, creates real or perceived weakness that can precipitate aggression. Furthermore, it diminishes Europe’s ability to respond when necessary. The Defense Secretary concluded his critique with the following admonishment: Europe’s failure to step up militarily and face the threat of terrorism head-on is nothing short of “an impediment to real security and peace” (Schwennicke, 2010). Germany’s status as the third largest
contributor to ISAF did not spare the nation from further censure by its U.S. partner. Germany’s police training program for Afghan security forces was dismissed as too academic, too long, and ill-suited to the Afghan context (Dempsey, 2010). Former ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, as well as his successor David Petraeus, have told Germany to expect and assume more risks. The generals don’t just want more soldiers; they want them out on foot patrol. Counter-insurgency, the generals insist, requires direct contact with local Afghans. Large convoys of German soldiers do more to scare village residents than build their trust. And the Bundeswehr’s limited mandate creates too much distance from the populations NATO is there to serve (Gebauer, 2010). “Situational awareness can only be gained,” Petraeus reported, “by interacting face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass” (ISAF, 2010). While U.S. military officers praise Germany’s commitment to the alliance, they are frustrated by the country’s continued political debates at home.

*Awakening the Warrior*

Germany long avoided the term *war* to describe its range of operations in Afghanistan. Germany’s refusal to go on the offensive, combined with a clear NATO directive to assist with civil reconstruction, allowed the populace to speak of German operations solely in humanitarian terms. In the early days of the campaign, the majority of Germans supported a national military presence in Afghanistan—with the notable caveat that troop levels were not increased and that Bundeswehr soldiers did not participate in aggressive combat. The government-sanctioned escalation of deployments (expected to reach 5,350) as well as the rising number of civilian and military casualties, has changed all that. As one journalist reported in June 2010, Germans “get shot at. They shoot. And they get killed.” War is the only word that fits (Editorial, 2010).

Germany’s linguistic struggle over Afghanistan—from “humanitarian operation,” to “robust stabilization mission,” to “armed conflict,” to “war”—is more than mere semantics. The country’s postwar commitment to pacifism, the pillar of its politics and culture, has ignited a political debate unique in its intensity. Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has argued
consistently that the war in Afghanistan is necessary to prevent the spread of international terrorism and to keep the struggling nation from descending into chaos (Schwennicke, 2010). While Merkel acknowledges that a Western-style democracy is unattainable in the tribal nation, she insists that Germany must support its NATO partners in creating a more viable government and preventing a Taliban or Al-Qaeda stronghold in the region. German opposition to the Chancellor is wide-ranging. Merkel has been chastised for attempting to talk Germans back into war, for abandoning a culture of restraint in favor of one in which military aggression is “normal, manageable and appropriate” (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Merkel is likewise accused of failing to explain to the German public the reasons for a more martial approach and for not attending the ceremonies of fallen soldiers (Dempsey, 2010). Others disapprove of a missing timeline for shifting security tasks to Afghan forces, thereby allowing Bundeswehr troops to come home (Czuczka, 2009).

A leaked CIA memorandum from March 2010 exposed a belief among intelligence officials that Germans are largely apathetic towards the war. According to the memo, public indifference allows the German government to continue support for the mission. The report concedes that an upsurge in military or civilian casualties could rapidly turn apathy to hostility. The CIA suggested a counter-measure that plays to German fears of “terrorism, opium, and refugees” (Mellen, 2010). Such attitudes severely underestimate Germany’s postwar commitment to diplomacy over deployment. When one looks at the German homefront, it is clear that public opinion is decidedly against armed intervention. In terms of Afghanistan, Germany’s citizens are quick to point out this unpleasant yet unavoidable truth: the more soldiers ISAF sends in to fight, the more Taliban insurgents rise up to attack them. To date, 140,000 NATO soldiers from 43 countries have not been able to defeat 25,000 Taliban fighters (Neukirch & Supp, 2010).

Defending Peace

Popular opposition to the war is borne out in a series of recent opinion polls. Interviews conducted in April 2010 revealed that 62% of Germans are against the NATO
Germany's Transformation of a Culture of War

offensive. This number is up from 55% percent in 2009 and 34% in 2005 ("Immer," 2010). Despite Germany's troop presence in Afghanistan, and Angela Merkel's promises to remain, Germans are doubtful of ISAF's success. The results of a survey sponsored by the German Marshall Fund show that 75% of the country is pessimistic about the military campaign, compared with 62% in the European Union as a whole (Peel, 2010b). German opposition to the war in Afghanistan likewise is fueled by the financial cost. Official government figures price the war at $1.2 billion per year, although many set the figure at three times that amount (Schwennicke, 2010). An opinion poll conducted in spring 2010 disclosed that 76% of Germans are in favor of cutting defense spending. Germany's new Defense Minister, Karl zu Guttenberg, agrees and proposed terminating compulsory military service in favor of a smaller, professionalized force (Peel, 2010a). Guttenberg admitted that it is increasingly difficult to sell the Afghanistan mission to an electorate that has lost faith in its success (Dejevsky, 2010).

Concerns about the monetary burden of the ISAF mission are far outweighed by mounting fears that Germany is losing its moral compass. Although many citizens support the idea of a voluntary military, along with fewer men and women in uniform, the majority of Germans resist the notion that greater sacrifices in blood and treasure are required at present. One columnist aptly noted that war, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, "transforms not only soldiers, but the society they return to" (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). German concerns regarding the impact of current conflicts are wide-ranging. The German media released a series of reports exposing major deficits in the Bundeswehr's operations: lack of cooperation with civilian agencies on reconstruction efforts; lack of equipment (vehicles, weapons, aircraft) and training; lack of interpreters to interact with locals; and a lack of sufficiently encrypted computer networks to send mission-critical classified messages (Szandar, 2009).

As of July 2010, the number of Bundeswehr casualties stood at 47. Despite this relatively small number of German deaths compared to deaths of U.S. and British soldiers, the German tolerance for war dead remains low. Former Bundeswehr Chief of Staff Harald Kujat is convinced that substantive
discussions regarding Germany’s presence in Afghanistan will be triggered when the “pain threshold is crossed” (Schwennicke, 2010). In Kujat’s view, that threshold is quickly approaching, a view also held by former Defense Minister Peter Struck. Struck realized as early summer 2003 that Afghanistan was not a simple “hit and run” operation. In Der Spiegel magazine, he recounted his trip to Cologne’s airport, where he met with the families of troops killed and maimed in a suicide bomb attack. “It must have been clear even to the last holdouts that this was not just an aid mission in uniform.” Struck then added that the faces of the grief-stricken relatives continue to haunt him (Schwennicke, 2010).

Crisis of Conscience

In contrast to a slate of American films depicting soldiers’ experiences in Afghanistan, February 2009 marked the first attempt by German television to depict the story of Bundeswehr troops serving with ISAF. The movie, Willkommen zu Hause (Welcome Home), is a modern-day version of the 1947 post-WWII classic Draußen vor der Tür (The Man Outside), which begins with a young soldier’s attempted suicide. Willkommen zu Hause offers a similarly sober view of war and its effects. The film’s protagonist survives a suicide bombing that claimed the life of his best friend. His return home is a desperate attempt to reclaim his old life and reconnect to his girlfriend, family, and friends. As the plot progresses, the soldier’s war trauma gains the upper hand. He cannot sleep, panics at the sound of breaking glass, and vomits when he smells roasted meat. The final scenes show the soldier entering a veterans’ hospital, in hopes of finally getting relief. Statistics report that in 2008, 245 German soldiers suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, a significant increase from the 121 cases reported in 2005. Willkommen zu Hause created such public outcry that the German parliament engaged in a heated debate over the role of Germany’s Defense Ministry in helping soldiers cope with their emotional wounds. The Bundestag voted unanimously to assist soldiers in combat operations overseas. Efforts include the opening of a research institute on the effects of war trauma, a telephone hotline for soldiers in crisis, and an online network where troops can talk to one another about their experiences (Lichtenberger, 2009).
U.S. tolerance of combat losses in Afghanistan—1,095 as of mid-August 2010, according to iCasualites.org (Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan, 2010)—is anathema to the majority of Germans. High-risk battle strategies are considered too reckless, too dangerous, and too costly. Yet what most distinguishes the American homefront from its European counterpart is not their differing thresholds regarding soldiers killed or wounded; it is how many civilians are counted as collateral damage. Markus Kaim, in his assessment of the growing German opposition, made the following observation: Germany’s discomfort has much less to do with the death of their own troops. What worries Germans most is that German soldiers are killing Afghans (Black, 2009). The turning point in German public opinion came on September 4, 2009. A fuel tanker convoy traveling in the German-patrolled area of Kunduz province was captured by the Taliban. The insurgent forces then ordered local villagers to the site to collect the hijacked fuel. Learning of the attack, German colonel Georg Klein ordered two American fighter jets to strike. More than 140 Afghans died, many of whom were civilians. Before Kunduz, the war in Afghanistan was a hard sell. It was far away. The threat to Europe was obscure. And it violated Germans’ commitment to pacifism. After Kunduz, new questions arose about NATO’s apparent disregard for innocent Afghans. The Bundestag offered assurances that the army’s chief priority in Afghanistan is to protect the civilian population. It also approved the payment of reparations to the families of the Kunduz victims. For many Germans, however, the response of military officials revealed more concern about their reputations and careers than about the charred bodies of unfortunate bystanders (Gebauer, Goetz, & Medick, 2009). The tide of popular opinion took another major turn in April 2, 2010, when German troops mistakenly shot dead six Afghan soldiers following an ambush in which three Bundeswehr troops also died (Mellen, 2010).

Reconsidering Reconciliation

Germany’s involvement in ISAF continues to be a political and cultural minefield. In May 2010, Germany’s five leading research institutes added their voice to the nation’s growing rejection of the NATO mission and challenged the ability of current operations to bring stability to the war-torn country.
In their report, the respected think tanks argue that the cessation of conflict is contingent on a power-sharing deal with the Taliban—something U.S. forces have thus far dismissed. They insist that reconciliation must replace NATO’s reliance on counter-insurgency measures. German peace and security experts overwhelmingly favor Hamid Karzai’s strategy of talking to the Taliban, not bombing them (Hessler, 2010).

Germany’s growing abhorrence towards the violence in Afghanistan marks a significant return to its most cherished postwar values. The rejection of military engagement—whether by its own troops or those of its allies—signals an unwillingness to compromise long-term peace for short-term geopolitical gains. Despite persistent counter-arguments that the nation must show “patience and fortitude” to see the mission through, German citizens remain unconvinced (Kaim, 2007). The country may owe much to its NATO partners, but solidarity has its limits. It is amid this groundswell of support for peacebuilding over war fighting that, in August 2010, the army announced a major offensive in Afghanistan’s north. Weary of NATO criticism that German soldiers are too passive in the face of the insurgency, senior Bundeswehr officers opted to risk increased casualties—and political backlash at home—to improve their standing among their partners. The new German commander in Kunduz province confirmed that attacks to eliminate the Taliban would begin in October and underscored his resolve to “get this done” (Phillips, 2010). It is ironic that this military sweep would be achieved using Germany’s existing reconstruction teams, that is, soldiers serving in a protective capacity as first responders and development specialists.

The Way Forward

Germany’s embattled commitment to its postwar ethos offers a compelling case study regarding the possibilities for peace in a time of war. As the debate continues, scholars of German political and cultural history pose key questions regarding Germany’s future on the world stage. Will the nation continue to promote peacebuilding and diplomacy? Will it stand as a model for other nations, convincing them we can no longer afford, in Vandana Shiva’s words, the “luxury of violence”? (Shiva, 2002). It is worth noting that the recent 40th
anniversary of the Northeast Modern Language Association featured a panel on "Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Reading Resolution in German Literature and Culture." The call for papers reads:

With conflicts raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Sudan and elsewhere, war is a central global concern. But is there room in the age of terror for forgiveness and reconciliation? ... It has often been said that the history of Germany in the 20th century is the history of war and violence, but can cultural expressions ... provide valuable insights into processes of resolution and reconciliation? (Scott, 2009)

In attempting to respond to this question, I encourage all of us—sociologists, historians, literary critics and others—to consider once again the essential distinction between simply managing conflict and truly seeking peace. The German experience provides a constructive road map in this regard. Current political and cultural debates reveal a robust, public, and nuanced examination of what it means to be "secure," both as a single nation and as a community of nations. In July 2010, Germany’s Foreign Office presented a comprehensive plan devoted to balancing the country’s security concerns with sustained checks on military expenditures and engagements. In reference to Afghanistan, the strategic blueprint underscored Germany’s long diplomatic history with Afghanistan and highlighted the presence of 90,000 Afghans for whom Germany has become, more than any other European nation, “a second home” (Federal Foreign Office, 2010). The report reminds its international partners that Germany was the first to host U.N. talks on the future of Afghanistan. Afghan leaders traveled again to Germany to bolster the role of civil society and to discuss the de-escalation of armed force. Germany’s ongoing commitment to reconstruction, development, good governance and security is evidenced by heightened financial assistance to the region, which is scheduled to double between 2009-2013. Key projects are the construction of educational facilities to renew Afghanistan’s rich cultural heritage, as well as outreach centers to help demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. While the debate about ISAF continues, I am reminded of Timothy
Garton Ash's reference to that "good land" of journalists, scholars and artists indelibly marked by a history of conflict. Seen in this context, it is fitting that the Goethe Institute, Germany's premiere agency for culture, is sponsoring workshops in Kabul on music, theater, photography and film. It likewise pledged to restore historical monuments in Kabul, Bamiyan and Herat—many of which were laid waste by war.

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World Peace: A First Step
Commentary for the
Special Issue on Peace, Conflict and War

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The first step in achieving peace on earth must be the elimination of war and threats of war. Citizens of the United States are in a better position than others to make this happen. We spend significant portions of our tax dollars, and borrow money from foreign countries, to wage wars. We sell weapons and destabilize governments. We prioritize funding for war over spending on education, medical research, alternative energy sources, healthcare, housing and food for the needy, a balanced budget and almost everything else that can have a positive impact on this planet's quality of life.

The U.S. has a long history of waging war, from the Native American nations decimated by the U.S. Army to the recent bombing of tribal areas in Pakistan. During my lifetime, the U.S. has bombed more than 20 countries. Since the end of World War II, no other country has killed and injured more people living outside of its borders. We spend more on war, and have more soldiers in other countries, than any other nation.

War is glorified in our culture. The U.S. honors its military and reinforces warrior behaviors with monuments to war-time presidents, memorials to wars and to those who have served and died in wars, with medals, promotions, ceremonies, even vanity license plates and discounts at Kmart® and Home Depot®. Children are taught that soldiers are heroes and role models. These activities and symbols are all part of sustaining the culture of war. U.S. leaders continually reinforce this by
referring to those in the military as heroes.

One reason the U.S. wages so many wars is that few citizens speak out publicly against them. Most Americans remain silent while our military kills and wounds children, mothers, and other civilians. In a representative government such as ours, with members of the U.S. House of Representatives seeking election every two years, the government will be responsive to widespread antiwar sentiment, just as it eventually was to the civil rights movement. We have the power to take action. It's only a matter of changing our culture slightly so that more citizens feel comfortable speaking out.

If our goal is world peace, then we must oppose military solutions including invasion, occupation, production of weapons of mass destruction, use of weapons, and/or threats of war. Imagine the impact if one percent of the population marched in the next antiwar rally. What if one percent of voters contacted their representatives in Congress asking for an end to the Afghan war? Most people now recognize those who fought for civil rights as heroes. What if we could change our culture so that those who demand peace are also appreciated and not considered to be unpatriotic, anti-military, or un-American?

There are few indicators that American society values those who oppose war. As President John F. Kennedy wrote, "War will exist until that distant day when the conscientious objector enjoys the same reputation and prestige that the warrior does today" (Kennedy, n.d.). We can use simple behavioral principles to modify our culture and increase the number of people who speak out. We can encourage antiwar behavior, identify role models to emulate, reduce negative consequences, and provide positive reinforcement.

The mission of the US Peace Memorial Foundation is to demonstrate that advocating for an end to war, or for peaceful solutions to international problems, is an honorable and socially acceptable activity. We will accomplish this cultural change through three mechanisms:

1. Award an annual peace prize for antiwar work to recognize and honor U.S. peace leaders as a reminder that our culture values their work. Recent recipients have been Congressman Dennis Kucinich and Cindy
World Peace: A First Step

Sheehan.

2. **Build the US Peace Memorial** dedicated to those who have opposed war or proposed peaceful alternatives to national aggression (Knox & Waggoner, 2009a). A national monument in Washington, DC will recognize peace leadership by displaying antiwar statements of U.S. presidents and hundreds of other famous citizens from all walks of life (e.g., Margaret Mead, Helen Keller, Ben Franklin, Albert Einstein). The monument will also include electronic documentation of activities of thousands of other citizens who have taken public stands against one or more U.S. wars. The memorial will provide teaching moments for visitors that can help to change our culture by making Americans more aware of, and more comfortable with, our rich history of antiwar activity.

3. **Publish the US Peace Registry** to recognize and honor role models for peace and to document a broad spectrum of modern nonviolent antiwar behavior (Knox & Waggoner, 2009b). This ongoing scholarly work helps current and future generations understand how individuals and organizations have opposed war and promoted peace. It is hypothesized that the knowledge generated will reinforce antiwar actions, stimulate new discussions, reduce stigma, increase comfort levels, and perhaps lead to greater citizen involvement in interventions for peace.

If you are interested in world peace, your first obligation should be to demand that your own country stop invading, occupying, and bombing other countries. There are many peaceful alternatives to aggression and we must be willing to advocate for them. Please join us at www.uspeacememorial.org to recognize those who have had the courage to speak out. Significant contributions to peace on earth are within our power.


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*Disclaimer: The ideas expressed in this commentary are the views of the author and do not represent the views of any university or foundation.*
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Style
Overall style should conform to that found in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Fifth Edition, 2001. Use in-text citations (Reich, 1983). (Reich, 1983, p. 5). The use of footnotes in the text is discouraged. If footnotes are essential, include them on a separate sheet after the last page of the references. The use of italics or quotation marks for emphasis is discouraged. Words should be underlined only when it is intended that they be typeset in italics.

Gender and Disability Stereotypes
Please use gender-neutral phrasing. Use plural pronouns and truly generic nouns ("labor force" instead of "manpower"). When dealing with disabilities, avoid making people synonymous with the disability they have ("employees with visual impairments" rather than, "the blind"). Don’t magnify the disabling condition ("wheelchair user" rather than "confined to a wheelchair"). For further suggestions see the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association or Guide to Non-Sexist Language and Visuals, University of Wisconsin-Extension.

Book Reviews
Books for review should be sent to Jennifer Zelnick, Hunter College School of Social Work, City University of New York, 129 E. 79th Street, New York, NY 10075.

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