Regional Bargaining: Its Impact on Local Control of School Districts in Macomb County

Genevieve Eleanor Gangler
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REGIONAL BARGAINING: ITS IMPACT ON LOCAL CONTROL
OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN MACOMB COUNTY

by

Genevieve Eleanor Gangler

A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Education
Department of Educational Leadership

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 1980

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DEDICATION

To my late husband, Jim, because he shared his life with me. He always believed in me and thought me capable of all endeavors. Because he gave me the desire and opportunity to pursue an education, and, for his love, understanding and patience, this research effort is dedicated in his memory.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is the culmination of many months of planning and effort; that is the product of many people's time and assistance. The author is particularly grateful to Dr. Munsterman, my advisor, for his creative advise and critical assistance in developing the direction of this research. He was a constant source of motivation and support.

The Committee members, Dr. Smidchens and Dr. Grove, offered helpful advise, valuable additions, and critical reading skills. In particular, Dr. Grove provided continuous assistance throughout the months of planning this study. To him and the other advisors, I am most grateful.

Gratitude is extended to Joe Oliverio and Walt Benton for listening skills, inspiration, and expertise of Local I during the planning and development of the study. Information and materials along with encouragement and full support from my superintendent, Dr. DePillo, is appreciated. Special appreciation and gratitude are extended to Mrs. Sue Stroup for her continuous support, encouragement, friendship, and for the professional skills needed for typing this manuscript.

I am especially grateful to my late husband, Jim, and to my son, Mike, and my daughter, Cherie, for their confidence and encouragement. They were a constant source of love and motivation for me. Over the years their efforts and sacrifices enabled me to pursue these graduate studies.
Most sincere appreciation is extended to the many people associated with the Chippewa Valley School District and for the delightful children with whom I have been privileged to work and for providing the inspiration for translating this plan into reality.

Genevieve Eleanor Gangler
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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The status of local district education associations are in a continued state of flux. Most teachers still belong to local associations with affiliation to the state and national associations. In some regions, local district associations have combined with others to bargain collectively. Some of these regional units are loosely organized and are verbal communication channels between units, while others are tightly formed to require sophisticated modes of behavior.

Regional bargaining is a collective effort by the Michigan Education Association (MEA) to cluster local unions under one large representative unit in a given geographical area. The purpose of organizing in this matter is to gain strength for collective bargaining. Regional bargaining attempts to develop alliances between school districts patterned after examples of industry, such as the international unions negotiating with AFL-CIO.

Teachers' desire for control of their destiny, versus local control of education in the collective negotiations movement in education, has created some interesting problems and raised a variety of perplexing questions. These questions concern the rights of boards of education and superintendents to manage or control public education.
Questions such as the following arose from the review of literature and will be addressed in this study:

Will regional bargaining limit the rights of boards of education to manage or control public education?

Will regional bargaining contribute to uniformity of contracts across district boundary lines?

Will the regional unit effectively control layoffs, recalls, and hiring of personnel in the local districts?

Will just cause provisions related to disciplinary action of personnel be attributed to regionalized bargaining and have an impact on the control of schools by local boards of education?

Other factors contributing to the interest in regional bargaining have been declining enrollment and teacher layoffs. Job protection in schools with declining enrollment is nonexistent at the present time. Teachers with an excess of 10 years seniority have lost their jobs with no promise of returning to the classroom in the near future. It is generally agreed upon by those in the field of education that superintendents are reluctant to hire teachers with experience and additional education beyond the required 4 years of college education because of the tight budgets and structure of the teachers' salary schedule.

The Michigan Education Association Teacher Union has responded to the needs of its membership by devising a plan of coordinated or regional bargaining which will offer job protection through sheer size and number. As a result, teachers in school districts in Macomb County and many districts across the state have requested
decertification of existing local education associations as their bargaining agent and recertification of a unit which would represent all teachers employed in a geographical area. This approach seems to be viewed by many school boards as a more militant approach to collective bargaining (Tonks, 1979).

Purpose of the Study

The MEA/NEA Local I is a regional or unified organization composed of public school teachers in 16 local districts who have certified this unit as their bargaining unit in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan. Shortly after Local I was organized, it established minimum goals to be uniformly practiced by all of its members. These goals included minimum salary packages, minimum fringe benefits, common calendar, common expiration dates of contracts, just cause and due process clauses. In addition to the preceding goals, a new concept surfaced, which is called preferential hiring. Preferential hiring is defined as a negotiated clause, under the master agreement of the individual school districts, requiring local boards to hire teachers laid off from other districts before hiring from outside the bargaining unit.

The purpose of this study is to determine the perceptions of board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers toward regional bargaining as it relates to local control of schools. Local control is defined as the right of local boards of education to determine policy and make decisions regarding the operations and government of their individual public school district. The
aforementioned negotiating goals of MEA/NEA Local I is also examined in relationship to local control of schools in Macomb County, Michigan.

Significance of the Study

Currently there is considerable concern among members of the profession in relation to regional bargaining. Most agree that some change in control is inevitable. The big question is what changes will be made and how much change will be made? Opinions are readily available, an in depth opinion search is not.

Several writers have written about the impact of regional bargaining on local control of schools, however, no empirical data were gathered to demonstrate the effects on local control due to regionalized bargaining. Further investigation relating to regional bargaining in education may help clarify issues and provide the basis for future research. Thus, new communication channels for negotiations techniques might be developed to enhance interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships between the unions and the educational organization.

Regional bargaining is a relatively new concept and at the present time there is no compilation of current practices concerning regional bargaining under Local I. This study will attempt to provide this compilation in the review of literature.
Overview of the Study

This first chapter has presented the background, need, purpose, and significance of the problem confronting school districts regarding local control. Objectives of the study and the statement of the problem have been developed and formulated. As the title indicated, the thrust of the study was to examine the perceptions of superintendents, board members, principals, union presidents, and teachers, related to regional bargaining in Macomb County, Michigan.

The first chapter briefly introduced the study and research questions upon which the study was based. Pertinent terms were defined in the body of the study.

Chapter II focuses attention on relevant literature and research; included is a discussion related to recognition of the problem, historical analysis of local school control and collective bargaining in Michigan, unique characteristics of MEA/NEA Local I, explanation of the five negotiating goals, and published articles relating to control on the local level.

Chapter III presents the research design from which the study proceeded. The general design of the study is discussed and the population and sample defined. The proposed instrumentation and data analysis are described.

Chapter IV consists of an analysis of collected data. The information relevant to the testing of the research hypotheses is discussed, as are the study's findings.

Chapter V includes a summary of major findings and conclusions as well as recommendations for possible future research.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Investigation of the professional literature revealed numerous writings regarding local control of education, professional negotiations, and regional bargaining. These multi-dimensional articles covered the power structure of boards of education since the relatively new phenomenon of teacher unionization first occurred. A study of dissertation abstracts and an examination of research in the areas of professional negotiations failed to produce a single piece of empirical data specifically related to regional bargaining and local control of schools. Thus, it should be pointed out that the existing literature, which is examined in this section, is basically opinion rather than empirically based.

For convenience, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly presents the legal structure and background of local school boards and collective bargaining in the state of Michigan. The second section provides a background and an overview of the unique characteristics of MEA/NEA Local I. The third section describes the five negotiation goals outlined by Local I for the 1979-80 school year and the research hypotheses, based on the literature which has been written concerning these goals and how they relate to local control of schools.
Legal Structure and Background of Local Boards of Education

Essential to this study is an understanding of the background and legal structure of local boards of education. Thus, a very brief review of their development, duties, and rights is presented. The following is an abstract from Drury and Ray's (1967) book, entitled Essentials of School Law. The power to control education was given to the states by default under the reserved powers clause of the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in 1791. Such Amendment states "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the states respectively or to the people" (p. 27).

Thus, governance or control of state school systems rests with the state legislators. It is a state institution and the states created local boards of education to assist in carrying out state educational policies. Local rights and limitations are provided under federal and state constitutions. Bruce (1977) wrote:

As an elected body, a school board performs a variety of functions. It sets the policies and approves the curriculum of a system, approves an annual budget, recommends appropriate millage, employs and evaluates the superintendent, sets guidelines and gives general direction to the negotiating team. As overseers of the local educational process, and as the legally constituted body responsible for the management of the school system, the board directs the team to negotiate a contract that would provide it with the maximum opportunity to carry out the legal responsibilities and to compensate the staff fairly and equitably. (p. 19)

Some of these rights related to teachers, as detailed in the Michigan Public School Code, are the rights to: fix the
qualifications of teachers, select and employ teachers and administrators, enter into contracts and fix the terms of their employment and compensation, along with the right to dismiss teachers if statutory due process and just cause are followed. However, both the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, along with state constitutions, as applied to the public schools, imposed some limitations on the local boards of education.

Historically, for more than 150 years, local boards of education exercised the right to govern schools in Michigan with only limited interference. Teachers during this time met and conferred with the local boards of education regarding working conditions and compensations. The consensus of literature surveyed suggested that many board of education members felt that it was important not to spend any more money on education than was necessary in order to get a reasonable amount of quality education.

Teachers, on the other hand, often felt that they deserved to be paid more. In order to obtain a more equal position for bargaining the teachers were no longer willing to rely solely upon boards of education and legislation. Consequently, they chose to enter into arrangements with the American Federation of Teachers, or the National Education Association. These affiliations were not challenged until teachers vigorously sought economic justice through the collective bargaining process (Tonks, 1979).
Overview of Collective Bargaining

In 1962, President Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 10933, granting federal employees the right to bargain collectively. Teacher collective bargaining began in Michigan following the passage of Public Act 379 in 1965. Sections 9 and 11 of the act gave public employees the right to organize for purposes of collective bargaining, in respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. That same year, Governor George Romney signed into law a revision of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act, giving public employees, primarily at the local level, the right of organization and of collective bargaining (Packer, 1967, p. 123).

Motivated by the passage of this type of enabling legislation, along with a scarcity of qualified teachers, increased student enrollment, national economic growth, low wages and benefits given educators, teacher militancy grew quickly (Tonks, 1979). Thus, the MEA reported that they gained strength and power resulting in significant improvements for Michigan teachers. The balance of power between the local union and local boards of education weighed heavily in teachers' favor for several years with a balance between the two occurring in the middle 1970's (MEA, 1978). Since that time, gains previously made in contract negotiations began to erode with the balance of power shifting back to local boards of education. This shift was due primarily to the hiring of sophisticated negotiators by local school districts, declining enrollment with a resultant overabundance of teachers on the job market, an inflationary trend occurring, and the
taxpayers' revolt against high property taxes (Tonks, 1979). It was then emphasized in MEA's published paper that,

If we now have a one sided situation where the school boards have all the power, we must develop a new strategy to bring about some balance to the power, to provide an equalizer . . . to multiply our power, locally, with unified bargaining. (1978, p. 1)

At the Fall Representative Assembly of MEA in 1976, approval was given for a long-range bargaining strategy as recommended by the MEA Board of Directors. The following are the 5-year, long-range bargaining strategies and priorities taken from the Michigan Negotiators Association Position Paper of 1977. They are:

1. By February, 1977, every unit will be part of coordinated multi-unit bargaining.

2. By May 1, 1979, every contract shall include basic predetermined contract provisions.

3. By May 1, 1979, the bargaining agent shall be a coordinated bargaining unit.

4. By May 1, 1979, the coordinated bargaining agent shall approve the contract before the ratification vote.

5. By May 1, 1979, legislation action with provision for impasse resolution and multi-unit contracts.

6. The MEA will attempt to become the state wide bargaining agent by May 1981 and local issues will be bargained by the coordinated bargaining unit. (p. iii)

In 1978 it was reported that there were 20,000 members in 183 local associations that had already changed to new unified bargaining agents. Another 45,000 members in 330 locals were in some stage of reorganizing for unified bargaining (MEA, 1978).

As a result of this review of the literature and research regarding the evolutionary trend of teachers' collective bargaining, it was...
found that regional bargaining "is now perceived by teachers as a means to gain more control of their destiny, thus more control of schools from local boards of education" (Oliverio, 1980)

**Organization, Structure, and Unique Characteristics of Local I**

An in-depth taped interview with Joe Oliverio, President of the Chippewa Valley Education Association and a member of Local I's bargaining council, along with Walt Benton, the Executive Director of MEA/NEA Local I, provided the following information regarding some of the unique characteristics of the MEA/NEA Local I's organizational structure.

Local I, a labor organization in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan, comprised of teachers employed in 16 school districts, is the multi-bargaining unit most successful in using the strategies and meeting the priorities of the 1975 MEA Fall Representative Assembly.

After the Fall Representative Assembly in 1976, the Region VI MEA staff in Macomb County and southern St. Clair County met with local school district union presidents. At that meeting a general Local I outline was presented and the local presidents were asked to meet with their executive committees and ask for authorization to discuss unified or regional bargaining with the general membership and draft a constitution and by-laws for this regional group.

The presidents and chief negotiators drew up the Local I constitution and by-laws and submitted them within each district for review in the winter of 1978. Hearings were held enabling individual local
members to have input into the drafting of the by-laws and the constitution of Local I. Revisions were made as a result of the input from local members and the revised document was submitted and voted on before June 1978.

Oliverio, in the recent interview, noted that Local I's staffing arrangement, stipulated by the constitution and by-laws of Local I, is unique to the Macomb County teacher group. The five members of Local I's professional staff are responsible for specific areas of specialization in servicing the 16 school districts. No longer does one individual take responsibility for all matters related to servicing school systems in a given area. The Local I's staffing arrangement offers greater specialization in specific areas such as public relations, grievances, arbitration, political actions, union organizing, and negotiations. The five professional staff members have a good opportunity to meet the members in all the districts, as well as be responsible to the membership in their area of specialization.

Local I's constitution and by-laws, cited in the May 1978 issue of Scuttlebutt, provided for the establishment of several committees or councils. The coordinating council, made up of all the presidents and representative assembly delegates of the local districts, is the official governing body for Local I. This council is the legislative body, having power over all staff members in Local I (pp. 2-4). The Unified Bargaining Committee (UBC), on the other hand, consists of one representative from each school district. The UBC was given the power to grant approval for strikes within the individual school districts. However, this group does not make decisions for an
area-wide strike or area-wide withholding of services. Area wide
strikes or job actions are recommended to the coordinating council
by the bargaining council.

An additional group, the bargaining council, consists of one
delegate from every 25 members. Each building has at least one dele­
gate in addition to each district's president and the MEA's Local I
Board of Directors, which represents the various districts in Local I.
The bargaining council consists of approximately 150 members who have
the power and responsibility for the "establishment, modification,
and enforcement of Local I's minimum acceptable standards and district
minimum acceptable standards of control settlements." The duties
also include making recommendations to the coordinating council rela­
tive to Local I area wide "job actions or strikes." "The bargaining
council is also empowered to authorize tentative agreements." This
group is considered to be the "grass roots" of the MEA/NEA Local I
(Oliverio, 1980).

Local I, with these features built into its constitution and by­
laws, gives status to the bargaining council above that of the Local I
individual bargaining units. Section G2 of Local I's constitution
informs the local units of their right to strike. It also gives the
Local I bargaining committee the power to grant approval for a local
unit to strike (Scuttlebutt, May 1978, p. 2).

The establishment of the by-laws and constitution of Local I
set the stage for the decertification of the local unions in the
individual districts and the recognition of Local I as the representa­
tive union. Thus, by June 1978, 13 of the school districts in Macomb
County and Grosse Pointe sought voluntary recognition or successful determination by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission for MEA/NEA Local I representation. Herman Coleman (1978), Association Executive Director, said, "the consolidation is the first ever for the Michigan Organization and for its parent body . . . the NEA" (p. 1). Thus, the organization has fostered a new concept in collective bargaining which was called "unified bargaining" in the Michigan Negotiators Position Paper of 1977. As of today, 16 school districts in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, in Wayne County, are represented by MEA/NEA Local I.

Local I set up a communication network for the 1979-80 bargaining year. The first meeting of the Unified Bargaining Committee took place in the spring of 1979. The general membership was surveyed. Over 4,000 membership surveys were administered and a study of the proposed goals was done. The UBC used the information from the study to set minimum goals and standards for local I settlements for the 1979-80 school year.

A careful examination of the issues in each district revealed that the bargaining goals for the 1979-80 school year were the following:

1. Salary to be considered as a combination of a percent increase of schedule, a meaningful COLA, or cost of living allowance. The combination of these items was not to fall below 17% in any 2-year tentative agreement.

2. An improvement in fringe benefits such as additional life insurance, board paid tax sheltered annuities, vision care, long-term
disability, and MESSA (Michigan Education Special Services Association), a medical insurance which is offered to Michigan school employees.

3. Common calendar and expiration dates for those districts serviced by Local I.

4. Preferential hiring language which includes a defined procedure providing a published seniority list, a layoff and recall procedure based only on seniority as bargaining unit members and Michigan State certification. Required posting of all vacant or newly created positions, along with bidding rights based upon seniority and certification, where certification is applicable, was also part of the preferential hiring language to be included in this year's contract.

5. All discipline, including termination, to be subject to due process and just cause.

Walt Benton, the Executive Director of Local I, clarified the ratification and strike procedure during an interview. He indicated that area district teachers may reach a tentative, tentative agreement (TTA) with the board's negotiator. However, before ratification by the membership, the TTA must be given to the Unified Bargaining Committee (UBC) for authorization. The UBC then reviews the contract for inclusions of the minimal goals or standard set by Local I, as well as minimal goals set by the local districts. The UBC makes a recommendation for ratification of the contract and then the contract is voted on by the local membership. A two-thirds positive vote is needed for ratification. The ratification procedures are to guarantee
that settlements will achieve the minimum objectives or goals within participating districts. Thus, the most important element as seen by the union, is the Unified Bargaining Committee's veto power over all contracts.

The same procedures outlined for ratification are evident for area-wide strikes or for withholding services with broad base teacher support and endorsement: The Unified Bargaining Committee recommends an area-wide strike to the Coordinating Council. If the Coordinating Council approves a strike vote, that recommendation is made to the general membership. A two-thirds vote of this group is needed for a strike action. Sixty percent of the Local I units must have a positive vote for a determination of an area-wide strike. All of these procedures take place within a 92-hour period. Only one other regional bargaining unit closely resembles Local I and that is the Jackson County Education Association, MEA/NEA. It has all the characteristics of Local I but is minus veto power over all contract settlements before the ratification vote of their membership (Benton, 1980). Some of the characteristics that Local I has are: a constitution, by-laws, recognition clauses, a bargaining council, a bargaining committee, minimum goals, research, bargaining strategy, public relations, training of crisis association teams, communication networks, and the Michigan Unified Bargaining Organization Funding.

During the interview with Joe Oliverio, he indicated that "some of the same characteristics are found in regional units across the state but none are as far reaching as Local I" (Oliverio, 1980). Further, in the interviews with the union representatives, Joe Oliverio and
Walt Benton, it was concluded that even with the similar unique characteristics between the Jackson County and Local I organizations in the state of Michigan, Macomb County teachers, under the banner of MEA/NEA Local I, are the most advanced and far reaching regional group as far as their unity, structure, and size are concerned.

Along with the unique features of Local I listed, Local I's structure is different from Jackson County's. As noted earlier, Local I's bargaining committee recommends to the coordinating council any area wide "job action" or strike and they, in turn, recommend to the general membership, giving the bargaining committee veto power. The Jackson County organization, at the present time, is without veto power. They can make a recommendation only after the general membership has ratified the contract. The control then is given back to the negotiations committee for ratification.

Thus, there is no formal mechanism or internal control given to Jackson County's Council in relation to the local tentative agreement. Consequently, there is no mutual defense system formulated in the mechanism. In other words, in one district, if teachers are fired for a work stoppage, there is no formal mechanism set for sympathy strikes with the other participating districts in the same regional group.

All Jackson County locals except Jackson City, Jackson Community College and Western voted that the Jackson County Education Association be their bargaining agent in 1974. The Teacher's Voice, dated January 12, 1976, stated that "In the two years of bargaining of local contracts, through a county-wide bargaining agent, according to one comment, there is no comparison between now and previously." Poor early settlements and unknowing
acceptance of poor contract language are part of the past. (Michigan Negotiators Association, 1977, p. 2)

Charles Fine, a labor attorney, sent a memorandum to the Michigan Negotiators Association and Metropolitan Task Force in 1976 detailing legal opinions about multi-unit (regional) bargaining. He concluded, however, that Jackson County, after 2 years in existence, "tends to show that the advantages of regional bargaining have been, at best, only marginally successful." As of January 1980, the Jackson County Education Association was considering amending their constitution to include veto power.

Local I Goal Achievements

The Teacher's Voice, dated January 12, 1976, gave an update of multi-unit or regional bargaining in Michigan. Some of the success of this coordinated effort reported by the Teacher's Voice stated that "there have been big improvements in the contract language . . . ." (cited in Michigan Negotiators Association, 1977, p. 2). Regional bargaining was definitely credited with acquiring the best salary increase given in recent years in this area.

Macomb County's Local I regional unit has been in existence now for 2 years and has made dramatic strides (Benton, 1980). They recently sought meaningful COLA language and a minimum percentage increase in salary in their 1979-80 school contracts. The November 1979 Scuttlebutt, Local I's monthly newsletter, reported that "most Local I units have negotiated the largest salary improvements ever and their first cost of living provisions ever" (p. 1). Also, the
November 1979 *Scuttlebutt* reported that all of the contracts in 1979, with the exception of Armada School District in Macomb County, reached an agreement which met minimum settlements set by Local I (p. 1). The November 1979 *Scuttlebutt* listed the salaries of each district going back 6 years to clearly show that the salary increases could not be attributed solely to the rise in inflation. Instead, the article inferred that increases were related to unified bargaining under Local I. *Scuttlebutt* also reported that they succeeded in achieving a majority of their goals regarding improved fringe benefits and common expiration dates of contracts (November 1979, p. 1). However, it was noted by Oliverio (1980) that there was, at most, limited success in achieving the goals of preferential hiring and due process and just cause language pertaining to teacher discipline, including termination.

The length of the school day and the calendar year are basically left unchanged with Local I's recent settlements. It is apparent with the settlements, however, that there is uniformity of language in each of the Local I school district's contracts with reference to length of the school day and school calendar, as well as with the expiration dates of contracts.

Preferential hiring was one of the major demands in Local I's contract negotiations. Local I has negotiated clauses requiring all job postings be placed in the Local I office. However, some districts, in addition to postings, were able to negotiate first consideration for laid off teachers in the unit, while others gained guaranteed interviews along with the postings of job opportunities. This

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new contract language is considered by Local I leadership to be a movement toward preferential hiring (Benton, 1979). Along with this demand, all district contracts except Grosse Pointe have narrowed their language regarding qualifications for layoff and recall. Layoff and recall provisions in the majority of contracts are based solely on seniority and certification. This is seen by management to be restrictive language and one which takes away a management right (Tonks, 1979).

In 1976, Harry Bishop, a negotiator for the Michigan Association of School Boards, sent a paper to all key board members and superintendents. In this paper, "in response to the inherent dangers of regionalized bargaining" he used the phrase, "an opportunity to revisit 1965." The points Bishop (1976) made were:

1. School management made some serious bargaining mistakes out of unpreparedness for negotiations that started in 1965, in comparison to MEA and AFT preparedness.

2. It has been difficult, if not impossible to "rollback" the mistakes made.

3. With the formation of new bargaining units on a regional basis, school management now has an opportunity to correct any of the bargaining mistakes made. (p. 1)

Based on an examination of the recent negotiation agreements, the Michigan Education Association's (MEA) proposed contract clauses and the Michigan School Boards Association's (MSBA) proposed contract clauses, Local I representatives indicate that the bargained language more closely resembled that set forth by the MEA, rather than that set forth by the MSBA. Economic gains appeared to dominate the successes. Thus, a parallel between the fears of the public sector
achieving bargaining rights in 1965 and regionalized bargaining in 1979 is apparent (1978, pp. 1-5).

Local Control of Schools

A review of the available literature implies a relationship between loss of local control of schools by boards of education and the five separate bargaining goals of Local I. The five negotiation goals of Local I, as outlined on pages 14 and 15 of this report, include the minimum acceptable salary increases and fringe benefits, common calendar and expiration dates of contracts, preferential hiring language, along with due process and just cause provisions for all teacher discipline, up to and including termination. There are many indicators in the literature surveyed that regional bargaining will cause an erosion of local control of schools. Some writers consider teacher power, within the context of regional bargaining, as the source of erosion of local school control.

Less than 10 years ago, the message was quite clear at the NEA and AFT convention that "teacher power isn't new—there's just going to be more of it" (Shawver, 1979, p. 199). An associate professor of education at Washington State University related the same message, that teachers will have power in areas of decision making far beyond anything experienced up to now (Shawver, 1979, p. 199).

Again, at a "Conference of School Attorneys" held at the Holiday Inn in Southfield, Michigan, on May 4, 1978, Joe Mosier, an attorney representing school boards in regional bargaining cases, indicated the "true purpose behind MEA's attempt to regionalize bargaining was
to increase and improve their bargaining efforts by involving more than one employee group." He also indicated that, "it is a power thrust by the MEA to control or dominate the local associations and local boards of education." Further, he stated, "it is an attempt by the MEA to establish uniform scales of wages and working conditions within the scope of the regional concept as well as to include language which would control and restrict boards' rights, authority and prerogatives" (1978).

To further solidify this point, at one of the Oakland County Superintendents' meetings last year, a representative from MEA stated, "that regionalized bargaining is a power potential. In the public sector, the only source of power is people. That is why we are organizing under a single negotiation group concept" (Michigan Negotiators Association, 1977). "Currently there are 20,000 members in 183 local associations that have already changed to new unified bargaining agents. Forty-five thousand members in 330 locals are in some stage of reorganization for unified bargaining" (MEA, 1978).

In a position paper on regionalized bargaining, the Michigan Negotiators Association (1977) presented a firm stand and asked for resistance against MEA's attempt to control public education. It was emphatically stated that if they did not stand firm and resist regionalized bargaining, "the end of local autonomy and local control of education would be the end result" (p. 3).

John M. Bruce, Jr. (1978), Vice President of Grosse Pointe, Michigan's, Board of Education, also responded to regionalized bargaining, saying he felt that elected representatives of the board...
should not allow a third party such as Local I to dictate what is to be the best interest of the school district. Instead, he felt that board members have the legal designated responsibility and accountability to the voters to make decisions regarding the best interests of the public schools (p. 19).

Edward Duane (1978), Associate Professor of Michigan State University, showed concern for reviving local school power. However, he noted that regulations by federal and state courts, along with legislatures and executive agencies were the real culprits responsible for the decline in local school power and control. James O'Connell (1978), Superintendent of Schools, advised elementary and secondary teachers to study the example set in New York where community college and state universities have administrators, department heads, and faculty members that are able to work together in relative harmony, even during negotiation breakdowns, because salaries are set regionally. He cited conflict to be less personalized and concluded that "local bargaining neither saves money nor guarantees local control." Further, he suggested that "regional bargaining will, if nothing else, reduce dangerous tensions in local school systems" (pp. 43-44).

To solidify his point, Mr. O'Connell responded to those who argued that regionalizing the process of negotiations would destroy one of the last traces of local control of education. He felt that the real indicator of political control is in the power of the purse. Therefore, he indicated that it does not necessarily follow that negotiating contracts within individual school systems gives local school boards control over the process. Also concluded was that the major
issue in contract negotiations is usually money and that is not controlled locally (O'Connell, 1978, p. 43). One writer, who advocated regional bargaining, cited the power of the purse as the real indicator of local control. The basis of finance is generally through local taxation. At the same time state allocation is based on various tax formulas in the determination of the budget as well as the number of teachers hired and how they must be paid.

The foregoing discussion of regional bargaining as it relates to local control of schools reveals that most of the writers differed in their perceptions regarding a loss of local control of schools with regionalized bargaining.

Based upon the review of literature, the following research hypothesis was generated: There will be a difference between the perceptions of boards of education, superintendents, union presidents, principals, and teachers regarding regional bargaining in Macomb County as it relates to local control of schools.

**Salary and Fringe Benefits**

The relationship of salary and fringe benefits to regionalized bargaining and local control of schools is pertinent to one of the major premises of this research. Advocates, as well as opponents of regionalized bargaining have contended that 70-80% of the budget goes for personnel costs, which is primarily determined at the bargaining table. At the same time, it is recognized that local boards must deal with state implied limitations upon unilateral taxing powers which places financial constraints at the local level.
Long before regionalized bargaining was formalized under Local I, the practice of area wide bargaining had been going on for several years. Burton Ramer (1972), the editor of *Clearing House*, presented arguments that "it is almost essential for salary schedules of school districts to be very similar as no school district can afford to tarry too far behind the pace-setter in that region." The small school district and the poor school district in a region must compete for teachers. Therefore, he concluded, "competition dictates closeness in salary schedules and fringe benefits" (pp. 22-23).

An advocate of regionalized bargaining is James O'Connell (1978), Superintendent of Schools in Ulser County, New York. He believes that it has been established in the past, that within a given region, percentage salary increases and benefits in one district dictates that of every school district in a given area. "The highest settlement in the region sets a target, and each subsequent agreement adds a new standard of acceptability in the minds of teachers" (p. 43). O'Connell (1978) also felt that it is somewhat naive to argue that school systems salaries and benefits are too diverse to allow rational bargaining, because of the similarities of salaries and fringes in a given area (p. 43).

Hypothesis two was generated on the basis that there will be a difference in perceptions by the various respondents. Thus, hypothesis two indicates that there will be a difference in perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding regionalized bargaining and local school control of salaries and fringe benefits.
School Calendar

Along with Local 1's goal of establishing a minimum acceptable standard with regard to salary and fringe benefits, a unified school calendar and common expiration date of the master agreement for the Macomb County region were sought during the 1979-80 contract negotiations. However, literature on the length of the school day and year as well as common expiration dates of the master agreement has been very limited.

McDonnell and Pascal (1979) gathered data for inclusion in the Rand Report. From the data gathered from various school districts they concluded that teachers show a growing influence on the length and composition of the school day, as well as upon teacher evaluations and the manner in which supplementary personnel are used in schools. The authors of the Rand Report stressed that the areas cited are intrusions into school policy and are not items traded away by school boards in lieu of money. Instead, the authors have stated that such gains are obtained along with advances in compensation (p. 43).

On the other hand, Wendell Colliver (1973), a uniserve director in Hillsdale, Michigan, believes that the practice behind area-wide bargaining has been going on for several years. He used as an example instances where local boards and teacher units, in an intermediate district, often had sought mutual agreement on such items as school calendar, leave days, in-service, and evaluation procedures (cited in Michigan Negotiators Association, 1977, p. 1).
Although the literature has not been extensive enough to draw a conclusion regarding the relationship of regional bargaining and local control of schools as it relates to the school calendar and common expiration dates of contracts, the lack of literature asserts a need for its examination. Thus, the following research hypothesis was generated: There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding regionalized bargaining and local school control in determining the calendar and expiration dates of the master agreement.

**Layoff, Recall, Transfer Procedures, and Preferential Hiring**

Similarities of contracts in a given region normally contain multiple references to how teachers are employed, where they are assigned, their number of preparations, their hours of work, and their access to voluntary transfer procedures. Once an advocate of collective bargaining, Lieberman (1973), has radically changed his teacher advocacy position and warned administrators and school boards to carefully consider any layoff clauses proposed by unions which would severely limit managements rights. He advised board negotiators that they should not propose any contract language regarding layoffs, but rather adopt board policy on the reduction of personnel (p. 16).

Harry Bishop (1976), negotiator for the Michigan Association of School Boards, and an opponent of regionalized bargaining, feels that
school boards could gain an advantage with regionalized bargaining by negotiating needed changes in the contract that preserves "local autonomy." He cited many of the pertinent clauses in the contract and made language changes needed to insure local autonomy. Many of these clauses limited hiring, layoffs, recalls, vacancies, and promotions to the specific local district's teachers, rather than to the regionalized unit (p. 1).

In the past, it has been the right of the boards and/or the administration to place teachers within their area of certification and where they felt the best interests of the students would be served. The question seems to be, will the negotiated goals of Local I restrict and in fact control these decisions? Pat Laughlin (see Nickerson, 1979), Local I MEA/NEA Executive Director, said that "preferential hiring means the board should hire teachers laid off within Local I, which includes 16 school districts, before employing teachers from outside the unit." Due to declining enrollment and the power potential of regionalized bargaining, contracts and union involvement mandates various aspects of assignment, transfer, and the reduction of the teaching staff. Although educational research data on regional bargaining and its effect is not presently available, this author feels that sufficient literature exists to warrant an investigation regarding the effect of regional bargaining on layoff and recall procedures.

Thus hypothesis four was generated. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County

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regarding local school control in relation to layoff, recalls, transfers, and hiring of personnel with regionalized bargaining.

**Due Process and Just Cause Provisions**

Just cause language covering disciplinary action or termination of teachers contracts was another of Local I's minimum goals for the 1979-80 bargaining year. Chester Nolte (1974), a well-known authority on school law, justified the right of courts to interfere with the local districts' actions regarding the discipline of teachers. He felt that courts will continue to get involved if school boards continue to violate teachers' legal rights of due process and just cause. He felt that by insisting on dress codes or censoring books or expressions, the courts would take over as the policy makers in a school system (pp. 28-30).

Nolte (1974) cited the dismissal of teachers without just cause as a misuse of power by boards of education. Some unjust causes which were noted include union activity, growing a beard, speaking out against school policy, or any violation of the First Amendment guaranteed rights. Courts under the Constitution will come to a teacher's aid for any conflict of law. Nolte (1974) concluded that school boards are not powerless to act in matters of teacher accountability or in meeting minimal standards (p. 28).

Lieberman (1977), citing the advantages of teachers' bargaining rights over the private sector emphasized that teachers have had the right of due process even in absence of statutory provision or collective agreements because they have been and still are protected.
under the Federal Constitution. Basically, the collective bargaining agreement merely states that management does have the right to discipline for "just cause" or to establish reasonable rules of behavior (p. 36). Further, the grievance procedure and/or arbitration provisions negotiated create the "judicial system of the employment relationship" (p. 36).

Regional bargaining as it relates to due process and just cause language in the contract is not seen by the majority of authors surveyed, as threatening to school boards right to control their local schools. They noted that state statutes and constitutional law provided due process and just cause for teachers. However, due to the diverse views of the authors cited, the following hypothesis was generated. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding local school control in relation to due process and just cause language with regionalized bargaining.

Conclusion and Review of Research Hypotheses

The majority of the literature reviewed indicates that regional bargaining would have an effect on local control of schools. However, this study and the hypotheses concerns itself with the difference in the degree of change in local control as perceived by members of boards of education, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County.
Literature written on the five negotiating goals reveals that most educational writers perceive regional bargaining as not affecting salary, fringe benefits, the school calendar and common expiration dates of contracts, language related to the hiring, layoff, recall, and transfer of teachers, along with due process and just cause provisions of the master agreements. However, the MEA leadership, and more specifically, Local I's leadership have reported in the November 1979 Scuttlebutt newsletter that gains in salary are attributed to regional bargaining and not to other factors reported to be significant by other writers. A Teacher's Voice article was referred to in the Michigan Negotiators Association (1977) position paper which reported that "acceptance of poor contract language is part of the past" (p. 2). Also, in the past school year, Scuttlebutt (November 1979) reports for Local I, that a majority of goals set by the MEA/NEA Local I were achieved due to regional bargaining. However, diverse views and inconclusive literature relating to regional bargaining and its impact on local control as it relates to the five negotiating goals is the basis for this study. Thus, hypotheses one through five are generated on the basis that there will be a difference in perceptions by the various respondents concerning the aforementioned goals as they relate to local control of schools. The five research hypotheses are as follows:

1. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers regarding regionalized bargaining in Macomb County as it relates to local control of schools.
2. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding regionalized bargaining and local control of salaries and fringe benefits.

3. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding regionalized bargaining and local control in determining the calendar and expiration dates of the master agreement.

4. There will be a difference between the perceptions of board of education members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding local school control in relation to layoff, recalls, transfers, and hiring of personnel with regionalized bargaining.

5. There will be a difference between the perceptions of the sampled population in Macomb County regarding local control as it relates to just cause and due process with regionalized bargaining.
CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter focuses on the design of the study and gives a description of the methodology used to conduct it. Specifically, the discussion is concerned with a review of the problem, description of the population, development of an appropriate survey instrument, the population sample, and design of the study combined with the procedures adopted for data collection and analysis.

Review of Problem

This study will examine the effect of regional bargaining on local control of education, which was developed in Macomb County, Michigan, under the banner of MEA/NEA Local I, as perceived by boards of education, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers. Its objective will be to analyze the five negotiating goals for the MEA/NEA Local I within the context of the cited major hypotheses in order to determine if the negotiating goals play an important part of effecting changes in local control of school districts.

In order that data relevant to the problem could be obtained for analysis and discussion, a set of hypotheses were developed around local control and the five negotiation goals: minimum salary packages, minimum fringe benefits, common calendar and expiration dates of contract, preferential hiring, and just cause language for
discipline and/or dismissal.

Sample Design

A table found in a Survey Starter Kit, compiled by the Macomb Regional Dissemination Center, outlines the steps to determine the sample size within a specific confidence level. A confidence level of .95 was chosen with a .05 sampling error (1978, p. 4).

A total population of 154 was used for board members, 22 for superintendents, and 22 for union leaders. Based upon the aforementioned table, 155 of the 265 principals, along with 400 of the 7,800 teachers in Macomb County were selected. Thus, there was a total of 753 participants for this study. One hundred and fifty-five principals were selected by a random process using a random number table.

Teachers' names were derived from school directories. A systematic sampling technique was used from 22 school directories. To arrive at the selection interval, the total population of teachers (7,800) was divided by the sample size (400), giving a quotient of 19.5. Thus, every 20th teacher was selected from the mailing list of teachers. The sample consisted of 400 teachers.

To identify the individuals used for this study the Michigan Education Directory and Buyers Guide, January 1980, was used to provide names and addresses of superintendents and principals, along with demographic data from the school districts. A list of board members was provided by the Macomb Intermediate School District. The list of teachers was provided by friends in the various school districts. Union presidents' names and addresses were provided by
the MEA/NEA Local I office.

Population and Sample

The purpose of this study was to ascertain the opinions of the total population of board members, superintendents, union presidents, principals, and teachers concerning the impact of regional bargaining on local control of schools in which the study participants were involved.

This study was conducted in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan. Macomb County consists of 21 school districts located in the northeast metropolitan geographical section of Detroit, Michigan. Grosse Pointe, Michigan, consisting of one school district, is directly to the southeast of Macomb County and is part of Wayne County, Michigan. Six of the school districts in this population are not affiliated with Local I. Those include Warren Consolidated, Utica, Van Dyke, Lakeshore, East Detroit, and Centerline.

Each of the 22 districts in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe is headed by seven citizen board members. Some of these board members are paid a nominal fee for serving the school district with the majority serving without monetary compensation.

These 22 school districts are reasonably diversified, in terms of school and community size, complexity of operation, and suburban and rural components (see Appendix A). The comparative differences of these schools is not dissimilar to those found in the remainder of the state. The 22 superintendents were classified as white males with a graduate level of education who have been involved in the
contract bargaining process.

The union presidents consisted of 22 participants. Each of the individuals teach or live within the individual school districts. Sixteen of these individuals represent their school district with affiliation with the Michigan Education Association and five were affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and one, namely, Van Dyke School District representative, is not affiliated with any organized group.

Principals from the elementary and secondary schools in the 22 school districts were combined to make up 265 participants. One hundred and fifty-five principals were randomly sampled for this study. The majority of the study group were in districts affiliated with Local I. Others were selected from districts with only MEA, AFT, or no affiliation units.

In the 22 school districts there were 7,800 teachers. Less than 100 teachers were not affiliated with MEA, AFT, and/or MEA/NEA Local I. Four hundred of the 7,800 teachers in 22 school districts were selected in a systematic sampling from this study.

A detailed list of the individuals from each group was made. The individual's name, address, telephone number when appropriate, school name, and district was noted. Each individual from the various groups was given a code number. The various groups were coded as follows: Boards of Education 1-1 to 1-154, Superintendents 2-1 to 2-22, Principals 3-1 to 3-155, Union Presidents 4-1 to 4-22, and Teachers 5-1 to 5-400. The code number was placed in the upper right hand corner of the first page of each questionnaire and was used for
follow-up purposes only.

Instrument Development

The survey instrument was developed to correspond to the research questions or hypotheses generated for this study. This survey was constructed to obtain relevant data regarding regional bargaining and local control of education.

It was necessary to develop a survey instrument because no existing instrument covered the questions to be answered. The designed questionnaire had 24 questions placed on a two-sided, four page, standard size sheet of paper in booklet form. It was comprehensible and uncomplicated, with emphasis given to attractiveness of form and ease of response. See Appendix B. The first page consisted of the cover letter. Page two consisted of 10 demographic questions. Pages three and four consisted of 24 questions requiring a scaled response on a Likert-type scale.

Demographic data was used to generate descriptive statistics about the various respondents. The comment section was placed on the questionnaire to solicit responses from the surveyed group. This information was classified under the independent variables and added in the appendix section of this study.

Validation of Instrument

A pilot study was conducted with a selected group consisting of two board members, one superintendent, two principals, two union presidents, and three teachers. Content validity was tested with
this group. All of the questions were placed on index cards in six categories consisting of the five negotiating goals of MEA/NEA Local I and local control of schools. The categories were as follows: local control, wages, fringe benefits, preferential hiring, common calendar and expiration dates of contracts, along with due process and just cause language as each relates to decision making by the board of education.

Each individual's categorization was analyzed and charted in November and again in December of 1979. Any question which was categorized differently by three different individuals piloting the survey was eliminated. The second time this categorization took place with the pilot group, questions were deleted if there was a deviation of one in categorizing the various questionnaire items under the variables.

The questions were analyzed in relationship to the variables defined. The item analysis (see Appendix C) reported the pilot groups attempt to classify each item on the questionnaire. The items were then selected by using this analysis as the basis for the final draft of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was written after some editorial changes and other minor changes were made in wording and format. Another sample of the five representative groups were used to recheck wording, format, and clarity.

Scoring and Reliability Methodology

The check for reliability of the survey instrument was accomplished by administering the questionnaire to the pilot group during
November and then again in December 1979. Each response was assigned a numerical value of 5 for greatly increased effect, down to 1 for the least effect on a Likert-type scale. For those individuals who omitted an item, a score of 3 was used. The point system utilized allowed a maximum of 40 points for local control of schools (LCS), 30 points for salary (S) and for fringe benefits (FB), 15 points for calendar (C), 15 points for preferential hiring (PH), and 20 points for due process (DP). Questions 1 through 8 revolved around local control, 9 through 14 salary and fringe benefits, 18 through 20 calendar, 16, 17, and 21 for preferential hiring, and 15, 22, 23, and 24 for due process.

Each respondent's scores were calculated by assigning the aforementioned points for the items under the categories and total responses were summed up. For each administration summarized and analyzed to determine if differences were apparent between the two administrations of the survey instrument. The pilot groups consisted of two board of education members (BE), one superintendent (S), two union presidents (UP), two principals (P), and three teachers (T). No intermediate feedback was given between the two administrations. For each of the five content areas, the correlation of rating scale responses were: .98, .84, .82, .88, and .79.

Research Procedure

The Michigan Education Directory and Buyers Guide, January 1980, was used to provide names of superintendents and principals along with demographic data of the school districts. A list of board
members was provided by the Macomb Intermediate School District and the list of teachers was obtained from various school directories. Administrators and/or Union Presidents' names and addresses were provided by the MEA/NEA Local I office.

To insure a greater response, the writer met with elementary principals at their Region VI meeting and indicated that a questionnaire would be forthcoming on Regional Bargaining and asked for their cooperation. A meeting with Walt Benton, one of the regional directors of MEA/NEA Local I, was arranged and he co-signed all letters to teachers to insure a greater number of responses from the teacher's group. See Appendix D.

Another cover letter was used for members of the board of education, superintendents, and principals. See Appendix B. Dr. George DePillo, the Superintendent of Chippewa Valley Schools, wrote a personal note which was printed on a card to each individual in the aforementioned three categories. The personal note card was inserted in each letter to promote a greater response from board members, superintendents, and principals in the Macomb County area. See Appendix E.

The cover letter contained an assurance of confidentiality in the handling of all information contained in the questionnaire. An identifying code number was placed in the upper right hand corner of the first page of each questionnaire. The identification number was used strictly for follow-up purposes and the identification numbers destroyed, along with the removal of respondents' names from the master mailing list upon receipt of the questionnaire. Confidentiality
procedures were explained in the cover letter sent with the questionnaire. Certification of these measures adopted to protect respondents was done through the Department of Educational Leadership at Western Michigan University as required by the department's Human Subject Committee.

**Questionnaire Mailing**

The survey instrument was forwarded to 154 board members, 22 superintendents, 155 principals, 22 union leaders, and 400 teachers who constituted the samples. Each person was sent the following materials: a cover letter, a copy of the questionnaire, and a return addressed stamped envelope for return of the survey. The cover letter was designed to emphasize the importance of the study and to guarantee the confidentiality. The inclusion of a stamped, return addressed envelope was meant to enhance the factors of convenience and commitment.

**Follow-Up Procedures**

Ten school days after the mailing of the questionnaire, a U.S. post card (see Appendix F), was sent to each nonrespondent. The content of the card briefly thanked the subject for responding (in the event of a crossing of letter in the mail) and reiterated the importance of the study and the responses of participants. For those who had not yet responded, there was a reminder that a stamped return envelope had been included with the questionnaire and that an early response would be appreciated.
A second follow-up, sent to nonrespondents 1 week after the follow-up card, consisted of an introductory letter (see Appendix C), another copy of the original questionnaire, and another stamped, self-addressed envelope. The idea was to send a second questionnaire and envelope in case the original materials were lost or misplaced.

A third follow-up, sent to nonrespondents, consisted of an introductory letter (see Appendix H) and a self-addressed post card asking simply if the respondents agreed or disagreed with the concept of regional bargaining as instituted by MEA/NEA Local I in Macomb County and if they were represented by Local I (see Appendix I).

Data Analysis

As each completed questionnaire was returned, it was scrutinized for missing data, and for any solicited comments by the respondents. Responses were coded, tabulated, and fed into Western Michigan University's computer system for further analysis.

The five research hypotheses were tested inferentially. The statistical procedure used was the One-Way Analysis of Variance Test (ANOVA). The .05 level of significance was used to test the null hypotheses.

If a difference is found between the means of the five groups and their perceptions toward regional bargaining using the One-Way Analysis of Variance Test (ANOVA), a post hoc analysis will be performed to check for pair wise differences. The Least Squared Method, which is a multiple comparison procedure, was the method used to uncover the groups contributing to a significant result.
For testing each specific null hypothesis the following formula was used:

\[ H_0: \mu_a = \mu_b = \mu_c = \mu_d = \mu_e \]

where:
- \( \mu_a \) = the mean for the school boards
- \( \mu_b \) = the mean for the superintendents
- \( \mu_c \) = the mean for the principals
- \( \mu_d \) = the mean for the union presidents
- \( \mu_e \) = the mean for the teachers

The alternate hypothesis is stated as follows:

\[ H_1: \mu_a \neq \mu_b \neq \mu_c \neq \mu_d \neq \mu_e \]

This section dealt with design and methodology of the study. The population and sample were defined as well as the data analyses used for the study. Chapter IV will consist of the findings and analyses of the collected data.
CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Chapter I described the purpose of the study and the research questions upon which the study was based. Chapter II reviewed the literature pertinent to the subject and outlined the unique characteristics of Local I. Chapter III dealt with methodology, procedures, and methods of data collection. The present chapter will summarize the survey responses, techniques used for analyzation, and the findings from the investigation.

Survey Responses

On March 21, 1980, questionnaires were mailed to 154 school board members, 22 superintendents, 22 union presidents, 155 principals, and 400 teachers in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan.

Table 1 provides a summary of the regional bargaining survey by subgroups. The total number of questionnaires returned was 61% of the total population. In addition, there were 12 returned questionnaires which were nonusable. This represented an additional 3% of the total surveys sent.

Boards of education in each district responded with a minimum of three responses except for one school district. No board member for this one school district responded to the questionnaire. This school district had a lengthy strike in the fall of 1979, which could be the contributing factor for the total nonresponse from their board of
education. Although all school districts except one had a minimum of three responses which give an indication of representation, one must be careful of any of the findings with this group. No additional study was done to access the nonrespondents. Thus, there might be a potential bias.

Table 1  
Characteristics of Returned Questionnaires by Subgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Total Number of Questionnaires Sent</th>
<th>Total Number of Questionnaires Returned</th>
<th>Percent of Variable Returned Per Total Number Sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School Board Members</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Presidents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ninety-five percent of the superintendents, 81% of the principals, and 95% of the union presidents responded to the survey. Due to the high response of these three groups, it is concluded that they are representative of the study groups. When the nonrespondents were contacted and were asked if they had any bias, they responded that they did not. The only reason given for nonresponse was time constraints and work loads in their jobs. Therefore, it was concluded
that there was no obvious difference between the respondents and non-
respondents.

Two follow-up procedures failed to increase the rate of response
from the teachers' group. A total of 52% of the teachers responded
to the questionnaire. Thus a third follow-up was done to access the
reason for the nonresponse from this group. A letter was sent, along
with a self-addressed post card (see Appendix H and Appendix I), re-
questing the teacher to check "yes" or "no" to a question simply
asking if they are in agreement with regional bargaining as instituted
by MEA/NEA Local I. A space was also allowed to write other comments.
Eighteen cards out of 50 were returned. The returned cards indicated
no uniform bias. The responses on the returned rationale cards were
nondirectional. The respondents indicated they were neither for nor
against the process of regional bargaining. However, due to the low
return rate of the third follow-up, no data could be gathered to
determine if the other 48% of the teacher nonrespondents were biased
or not. Therefore, any interpretation of these findings with teachers,
must be viewed with the limitations that the 48% might be biased toward
the process of regional bargaining.

Characteristics of the Population

Some of the characteristics of the respondents are included to
help the researcher interpret the results with a better understanding
of the population surveyed.

Respondents to the survey included 303 males and 152 females.
Four respondents did not identify themselves as male or female. The
ages of the respondents ranged from 24 to 70. The mean age of the respondents was 43.2 years old. The average number of years that the respondents had held their positions was 9.93 years. The majority of the 459 respondents had a master's degree (222), with 84 indicating a bachelor's degree, 77 an educational specialist degree, 27 a doctorate degree, and 43 noted the category of "other." Six did not indicate their educational status.

For those interested readers, charts have been developed outlining some of the demographic variables for each group and they are provided in Appendices J, K, and L.

The majority of the respondents indicated that they were inactive in the negotiations process: 50% of the board members, 42% of the principals, 4.8% of the union presidents, and 75.8% of the teachers. Table 2 indicates the level of activity in negotiations by the respondents in the five subgroups. It was interesting to note that a union president was inactive in the negotiations process. Also of interest is that 6.8% of the teachers are very active and together with the 17.4% of the teachers who are actively involved with negotiations are making the decisions for the majority of the teachers. Forty-two percent of the principals showed an indication of non-involvement.

Sixteen of the school districts are affiliated with MEA/NEA Local I, five with the American Federation of Teachers, and one unionized school district without a national or state affiliation with a union. Of the 459 responses received from the total population, 294 indicated an affiliation with the MEA/NEA Local I, 134
Table 2
Negotiations Involvement by Subgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Board Members</th>
<th>Supt.</th>
<th>Principals</th>
<th>Union Pres.</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inactive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Freq.</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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indicated they were not, and 26 responded that they did not know.
(See Appendix A.)

To help the researcher better assess the respondents knowledge of Local I, the survey instrument listed the following two questions:
Does Local I have to approve the contract before your district teachers ratify? Does Local I set the minimum standards for which your district teachers can settle?

The majority of the total respondents indicated an affiliation with Local I. One union president responded he didn't know if he was affiliated or not. Perhaps his notation in the "do not know" category could be due to lack of interest in his office, lack of interest in the survey instrument, or lack of understanding of the union affiliation. Board members and superintendents seemed to indicate by their responses that they were well aware of their affiliation with MEA/NEA Local I. Even though principals responded in the "yes" or "no" categories rather than the "do not know" category, only 19 of the 56 in the "no" category really were not affiliated with Local I. Thus, it is apparent that principals are really unaware of their district's affiliation. The responses to the aforementioned question by the individuals are noted in Tables 3 and 4.

It is interesting to note that a large percentage of the respondents were unaware of their affiliation with Local I or another unit and did not know some of the details of Local I's structure. Evidence of this lack of knowledge is apparent by the responses noted on the survey to Local I's minimum standards. A large percentage of principals and teachers (47.5% and 33.0%, respectively) responded that no
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Board</td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Not Know</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Freq.</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Board Members</th>
<th>Supt.</th>
<th>Principals</th>
<th>Union Pres.</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do Not Know</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Freq.</strong></td>
<td>83</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing Data</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
minimum standards were set or they did not know that standards were set by Local I. (See Table 4.)

Definite minimum standards are set for contract settlement for all districts in MEA/NEA Local I. Thus, it appears that the union leadership and the educational leaders must improve their communication about Local I and educate the teachers and principals groups regarding the structure of Local I. Knowledge about minimum standards is important to unions, particularly, if they don't wish to see a split between the union and the teachers' group when contracts are not settled due to their not meeting goals set by the union leadership.

Reliability

As a measure of internal consistency, the Cronbach Coefficient of Reliability was calculated. The reliability of the regional bargaining inventory ranged from an alpha level of .49 for preferential hiring, .51 for calendar, .61 for due process, .86 for salary and fringe benefits, and .75 for local control for various subtests on the questionnaire. Three questions each were asked and were under the categories of preferential hiring and calendar on the survey instrument. Due process and just cause category had four questions related to it. The local control category had eight questions listed and salary and fringe benefits category had six questions listed on the survey instrument. The overall alpha level for the instrument was .70.

A reliability measure of .70 is sufficient for this survey instrument. Gay (1976), in his book on educational research, notes
that "reliability is a function of test length. The reliability of a given subtest is typically lower than the total test reliability" (p. 96). He also noted that one would not expect high reliability for new tests in a given area.

Presentation and Analysis of Data

The presentation of the findings of the study follows a format where by each hypothesis is informally stated. The technique of analysis of variances was used to compare groups and/or subgroups. Where significant F ratios were obtained, a post hoc analysis was conducted, using the least squares test method, as presented in the statistical package for social science (SPSS, 1975, pp. 398-434).

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 stated that there will be a difference between the perceptions of board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers regarding regional bargaining and its effect on local control of schools. Hypothesis 1 was analyzed using a one-way analysis of variance to differentiate between the mean differences the five groups regarding local control of schools with regionalized bargaining. A level of significance of .05 was previously established for the study.

Table 5 provides the results of the ANOVA. A review of this table reveals that an F ratio of 31.70 was obtained. This was of a magnitude such that the researcher was able to reject the null hypothesis using an alpha level of .05. Based upon this finding, it can be
concluded that there are significant differences in terms of the mean perceptions of the five groups with regard to regional bargaining and local control of schools.

Table 5
Analysis of Variance—Regional Bargaining—Control of Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sums of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>F Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Group</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,975.58</td>
<td>493.90</td>
<td>31.70</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Group</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>7,073.64</td>
<td>15.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Frequency Scores</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sums of each participant's responses for instrument items one through eight were calculated for local control and are presented in Table 5. A total of 5 points for each response could be obtained. The summary score for the eight questions on local control could range from a high of 40, down to a low mean score of 8. A mean summary score of 40 for the instrument scale would indicate that regional bargaining's effect on local control would be greatly increased.
A score of 8 on the instrument scale would indicate that the effect of regional bargaining on local control of schools would be greatly decreased. A score of 24 which is the midpoint of the scale, indicates no effect on the instrument scale.

As noted in Table 5, the group means range from a low of 14.7 for superintendents, to 21.5 for union presidents. Union presidents' and teachers' scores were slightly below the no effect range on the scale whereas members of the boards of education, superintendents, and principals indicated from their scores that they felt the impact of regional bargaining would have no effect or might moderately decrease local control of schools. Their scores were between the no effect range (24) and slightly decrease range (16). The magnitude of all of the aforementioned differences are not practically meaningful. All of the groups together show a difference of approximately 5 points.

The writer predicted that there would be differences in mean perceptions with regional bargaining as it related to local control of schools by the five groups surveyed. When the least square post hoc analysis was calculated, the results in Table 6 indicated statistically significant differences between the boards of education with the principals, the boards of education with the union presidents, the boards of education with the teachers, the superintendents with the union presidents, the superintendents with the teachers, the superintendents with the principals, the principals with the teachers, and the principals with the union presidents.
Least Square Post Hoc Analysis—
Local Control of Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise Comparison</th>
<th>Decision Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with superintendents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with union presidents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with union presidents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with union presidents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents with teachers</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The post hoc analysis inferred a separation of the higher administration from the teachers and their union presidents. This finding indicated that the local control factor was intensely important in the isolation of the higher administration from the teachers. Additionally, differences in mean perceptions of principals with higher administration as well as teachers and union presidents was apparent. Principals are apparently in the middle.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 states that there will be a difference between the mean perceptions of board of education members, superintendents,
principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding regional bargaining, related to salary and fringe benefits, and its effect on local control of schools.

Table 7 provides a statistical treatment of the resultant data, using a one-way analysis of variance. This test reveals an F ratio of 3.50 which is significant at the .05 level. Based upon this result, it can be concluded that there are some statistically significant differences in terms of the mean perceptions of the five groups with regard to salary and fringe benefits as it relates to local control of schools.

Table 7
Analysis of Variance—Regional Bargaining—Salary and Fringe Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sums of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>F Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>176.59</td>
<td>44.15</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>5,733.41</td>
<td>12.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>5,910.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Frequency Scores</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>24.75</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24.81</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>23.52</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Questions 9-14 on the survey instrument referred to salary and/or fringe benefits and relates to Hypothesis 2. A total of 30 points indicates a greatly increased impact on salary and fringe benefits. A total mean score of 6 indicates that the effect would be greatly decreased. A summary score of 18, which is the midpoint of the scale, indicates that the respondents perceived regional bargaining as having no effect on salary and fringe benefits (see Table 7).

The means on Table 7 represent a two point difference, ranging from the high of 25.76 for superintendents, down to a low of 23.52 for teachers. The midpoint for this subtest instrument score is 18 which shows that regional bargaining will have little effect on determining salary and fringe benefits. The obtained mean scores indicate a feeling on the part of all groups that the impact of regional bargaining will moderately increase salary and fringe benefits.

The post hoc test was performed and the results are noted in Table 8. Statistically significant differences were found between teachers and superintendents, principals with superintendents. It is interesting to note that superintendents differed in mean perceptions with teachers and principals. Their thinking is closely aligned to the board of education and union presidents. The principals group seems to agree with the majority of the groups. Perhaps, they have difficulty knowing which group they should relate to and therefore try to relate to all groups and not take a definite stand.
Table 8
Least Square Post Hoc Analysis—Salary and Fringe Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise Comparison</th>
<th>Decision Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers with principals</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers with boards of education</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers with superintendents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with boards of education</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with superintendents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with superintendents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 was generated to test the difference between the perceptions of board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding local school district's control in determining the school calendar and the expiration dates of the master agreement.

A one-way analysis of variance was used to differentiate between the five groups regarding their mean perceptions of regionalized bargaining's affect on local control of schools with regard to school calendar and expiration dates of the master agreements.
Table 9 provides the results of the ANOVA. A review of this table reveals that an F ratio of 1.54 was obtained. This ratio was not of a magnitude where the researcher was able to reject the null hypothesis using an alpha level of .05. Based upon this, it can be concluded that there are no significant differences among the five groups with regard to their mean perceptions of the school calendar and the expiration dates of contracts as it effects local control of schools. No differences were found between the five groups, thus no post hoc analysis was performed.

Table 9

Analysis of Variance—Regional Bargaining—School Calendar and Expiration Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sums of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>F Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1,236.39</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,253.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Frequency Scores</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questions 18-20 on the instrument survey referred to the school calendar and related to the aforementioned hypothesis. A maximum of 15 points could be attained for the calendar score, down to a low of 3 points. The midpoint score is 9 (see Table 9).

The five groups' scores centered around 11, indicating that all of the respondents felt there would be a greater impact on school calendar determination and expiration dates of contracts due to regional bargaining. The opinions expressed by the total study population disclosed that they were almost even in their mean perceptions regarding the increased impact of regional bargaining on school calendar and common expiration dates of contracts. It appears that the past practices of trying to provide common calendar dates has enabled the groups to be closer in opinion on this variable.

**Hypothesis 4**

Hypothesis 4 suggests that there will be a difference between the perceptions of members of boards of education, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb County regarding local school district's control in relation to preferential hiring of personnel with regional bargaining.

A one-way analysis of variances, of the mean scores, was used to differentiate between the five groups regarding their perceptions of regional bargaining's effect on local control of schools as it relates to preferential hiring (see Table 10).

Table 10 provides the results of the ANOVA. A review of this table's findings reveals that an F ratio of 9.35 was obtained. This

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F ratio is of a magnitude that the researcher is able to reject the null hypothesis at an alpha level of .05. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are differences in terms of the groups on this measure.

Table 10
Analysis of Variance—Regional Bargaining-- Preferential Hiring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sums of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>F Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>107.53</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1,305.88</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1,413.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Frequency Scores</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions 16, 17, and 21 on the instrument survey referred to preferential hiring and related to Hypothesis 4. A maximum of 15 points was possible which would indicate greatly increased impact on local control with preferential hiring, down to a low of 3 for greatly decreased. The midpoint score was 9 for this instrument (see

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As was the case in Hypotheses 1 and 3, the means of the groups' perceptions were very close. The midpoint score of the survey instrument was 9 and the mean scores of the groups ranged from a high of 8.06 to a low of 6.48. Thus, although differences existed, they were not of a magnitude to be considered practically different. It is interesting to note that a majority of all groups were below the midpoint of the scale and superintendents and board members scores were moving closest to the point on the scale indicating a moderate decrease in local control due to preferential hiring with regionalized bargaining. A possible interpretation of this finding is that all groups feel that by the administration losing the ability to hire from outside Local I, it will diminish the local control now enjoyed by the local districts.

However, the findings of the post hoc analysis reveals disagreement between union presidents and teachers (see Table 11). Principals were in disagreement with the boards of education and the superintendents. It is interesting to note that principals' mean perceptions differed with the higher administration. It is also interesting to note that union president's perceptions are not in agreement with teachers but are in agreement with the mean perceptions of all three levels of administration. Further, teachers' mean perceptions differed from all of the groups.

Possibly teacher's different mean perceptions from all of the groups indicates an alienation from administration and the union presidents because it has a direct effect on their seniority and job status.
Table 11
Least Squares Post Hoc Test—Preferential Hiring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise Comparison</th>
<th>Decision Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with superintendents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 which was generated for this study asserted that there will be a difference between the perceptions of the sampled population in Macomb County regarding local control of schools, as it relates to due process and just cause language, with the regional bargaining process.

The one-way analysis of variance was used to test if the differences between the mean perceptions of the five groups in relation to due process language was statistically significant (see Table 12).

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Table 12
Analysis of Variance—Regional Bargaining--
Due Process and Just Cause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variability</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Sums of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>F Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>241.38</td>
<td>60.35</td>
<td>13.57</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2,019.34</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>2,260.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.86</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>11.14</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 provides the results of the ANOVA. A review of this table reveals that an F ratio of 13.57 was obtained. The ratio was of a magnitude where the researcher was able to reject the null hypothesis using an alpha level of .05. Based upon these results, it can be concluded that there were statistically significant differences among the five groups with regard to their perceptions of regionalized bargaining and due process and just cause language and its effect on local control of schools.

Questions 15, 22, 23, and 24 of the survey instrument referred to just cause and due process language as related to Hypothesis 5.
The sums of each participant's responses for items 15, 22, 23, and 24 was calculated for a maximum of 20 points, down to a low of 4, with a midpoint at 12.

As noted on Table 12, the mean scores of the five groups ranged from 11.14 to a low of 9.10. There is a two point deviation. All of the groups' responses, when related to the survey instrument, indicated that they perceived regional bargaining as having no effect on due process or just cause clauses in the contracts. However, the post hoc analysis as presented in Table 13, revealed that statistically significant differences in mean perceptions were found between all of the other groups noted in Table 13. Again, the principals seem to place themselves in closer agreement with union presidents. Perhaps, both groups could be in the best position to look to the best interest of teachers and, thereby, have less disagreement than with the other administration and teacher group. Union presidents' disagreement with all groups other than principals and teachers could be due to the lack of good communication with the higher administrative groups. Thus higher administration, teachers' and union presidents' perceptions differ with respect to this variable.

Supplemental Qualitative Analysis

As a part of the survey, a section was provided for the respondents to include comments regarding the topic. These comments are listed in Appendix J. Approximately 30% of the total study group wrote comments. This percentage of respondents held the viewpoint that regional bargaining would negatively impact local control of
schools. These comments indicate a great deal of discord between the groups regarding regional bargaining. However, the results for the study indicate a great deal more harmony than discord between the groups. Thus, specific caution should be taken regarding the use of the comments as the basis for interpreting the results of the study.

Table 13
Least Squares Post Hoc Test--Due Process and Just Cause

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairwise Comparison</th>
<th>Decision Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with superintendents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with union presidents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boards of education with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with principals</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with union presidents</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with union presidents</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals with teachers</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union presidents with teachers</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

This chapter encompasses the data concerned with the study. The statistical data describe the perceptions of school board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers in Macomb
County, Michigan, regarding the dependent variables of local control of schools, salary and fringe benefits, calendar, due process, and preferential hiring clauses.

Based upon the results of the analysis of variances, and the least squares post hoc tests, significant differences were found between the groups in four of the hypotheses. Analysis of the results of the findings for Hypothesis 3 showed that when the total responses of the five groups were compared, this null hypothesis could not be rejected. Thus, no post hoc analysis was done for Hypothesis 3.

The response rate of the questionnaire, along with demographic data describing the population was included to help the researcher interpret the results with a better understanding of the population surveyed. The lack of congruence between the comments and the individual responses is artificial due to the small percentage of the total study group who responded. Further, the responses represent single individuals' responses and are not the responses of the entire group.

Chapter V will include a presentation of the conclusions based upon the findings as well as implications derived from the findings and recommendations for further study.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is presented in the following order: first, a general statement of the purpose and the design of the investigation; second, a description of the procedures used; third, a presentation of the findings and conclusions relating to the questions raised; fourth, the important implications beyond the findings of this study; and finally, recommendations for further study.

Review of Purpose and Design of the Investigation

In the 1960's, teachers obtained the right to bargain collectively with local boards of education. During the succeeding 20 years, some teachers' collective bargaining groups evolved from a single local union into a regional unit. Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan, teachers evolved in the manner now represented by the MEA/NEA Local I regionalized group.

Regionalizing the process for negotiations has been one of the most debated topics of retaining policy determination and local control of schools by members of local boards of education. Teachers feel that they should have the right to control their work environment and gain control of the educational process. Board members and administrators perceive that such decisions are solely within their respective realm. This difference of opinion is the basis of this study.
The purpose of this study was to investigate regional bargaining and its impact on local control of schools as perceived by school board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers. The negotiating goals of MEA/NEA Local I were also investigated in relationship to local control of schools in Macomb County, Michigan.

A review of the literature revealed no empirical data in this area. Journal articles were also limited in number and reflected a wide variance of opinion as to whether or not regional bargaining actually impacts the control of local school districts. This lack of concurrence among many significant groups led the writer to construct an instrument to determine whether significant differences of opinions exist between board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers.

Review Description of Procedures Used

To investigate the problem, the total population of school board members, superintendents, and union presidents was used from the 22 school districts in Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan. A random sample of 155 principals was used, as well as a systematic sampling of 400 teachers from the aforementioned school districts. A total sample population of 753 was used for this study.

To obtain data from the sample population, the technique of survey by questionnaire was employed. The questionnaire was developed largely from information gathered in the review of literature and contained 24 items. These items were designed to obtain data on
regional bargaining under MEA/NEA Local I. Items were presented in five major categories on the instrument. The categories include local control of schools, salary and fringe benefits, calendar with common expiration dates, preferential hiring, and due process and just cause clauses. A one-way analysis of variance was used to test the differences between the groups' mean perceptions regarding regional bargaining on local control of schools. Where significant differences were found, a least squares post hoc test was applied. In total, the survey sought information on regional bargaining and its impact on local control of schools as well as the aforementioned categories.

In March of 1980, the questionnaire was mailed. Eighty-four board members, 22 superintendents, 125 principals, 21 union presidents, and 208 teachers returned the questionnaires. A total of 459 questionnaires were returned and provided the data for the study. Data were compiled and analyzed by subgroups. Fifty-two percent of the teachers responded and no data could be gathered to determine if there was bias present in 48% of the nonrespondents. Fifty-five percent of the board members responded to the survey. No additional study was done to access the nonrespondents. Thus, there might be a potential bias with this group as well. The response rate for all of the other groups is considered representative of the population.

Chapter IV presented data revealing the respondents' knowledge of Local I and their affiliation with that regionalized unit. It was interesting to note that many individuals in the groups did not know they were affiliated with Local I and that Local I had to approve the tentative agreement before ratification by the teachers. Additional
data presented in Chapter IV of the study indicates that the five groups in general have very definite but varying degrees of perceptions concerning regional bargaining and local control of schools which is the basis for this chapter.

Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications

This study sought to answer questions, stated in a hypothesis form, relative to regional bargaining as it relates to local control of school districts in Macomb County, Michigan. The paragraphs which follow summarize the discussions and implications of this study.

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 states that a difference in perceptions exists among the five groups regarding regional bargaining's effect on local control of schools. This hypothesis was supported. The scores of the five groups indicated that all believed regional bargaining would either have little effect on the local control of schools or moderately decrease local control of schools.

From the post hoc analysis principals are seen as not relating to either the higher administration or teacher groups. Perhaps the fact that principals have the most one-to-one contact with the public causes the principals to reflect the opinions of that public rather than that of higher administration or teachers.

A reason for the groups to state that they feel regional bargaining will have a slight to moderate impact might be related to the
fact that prior to the inception of Local I's organization and first bargaining year, it was generally believed that regional bargaining would greatly impact local control of schools. Since the impact of regional bargaining on local control of schools has not been as significant as anticipated by some, the responses might suggest, that individuals had been overestimating the power of MEA/NEA Local I. Further, boards of education might be projecting their success in resisting any effort of Local I to gain local control. Perhaps the whole concept of local control is thought to be so weakened by the federal and state regulations that the whole idea of local school control is not as significant as the higher administration or the teacher group had thought.

The review of literature was generally as variable as the responses from this study. Some writers indicated that factors unrelated to regional bargaining contributed to loss of control by local boards of education. One writer cited the power of the purse as the real indicator of local control. Other writers indicated that regional bargaining would be responsible for the end of local autonomy and/or local control of education. However, the review of literature did not clearly distinguish between the perceptions of each of the various groups used for this study.

Based upon the review of literature and the results of this study, it is concluded that differences of perceptions are apparent between board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers with regard to regional bargaining's impact on local control of schools.
Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 was designed to test the relationship of salary and fringe benefits on local control of schools with regional bargaining in Macomb County, Michigan, as perceived by the five groups of respondents. Based upon the results of the study and the least squares post hoc test statistically significant differences were found which supports the research hypothesis that stated that there would be a difference in perceptions between the five groups. Even though differences between the groups' perceptions were found, all groups indicated that the impact of regional bargaining would moderately increase salary and fringe benefits.

Perhaps, all of the evidence from the past years' negotiations with Local I and the local publicity surrounding the settlements, has made each group believe that the settlements were due to regional bargaining rather than inflation factors. To the extent that salaries and fringe benefits have improved for educators, these union organizations have a right to claim some measure of success and credit. The degree to which credit can be ascribed to regional bargaining is disputable.

The lack of differences between the perceptions of principals and all of the groups except superintendents might possibly be a reflection of the total involvement of principals with all of the groups. Further, salary and fringe benefit packages for principals are generally related to the teachers' settlements. Thus it might be assumed that principals are estimating the impact of regional
bargaining in their behalf. The thinking of principals may also be due to the fact that most school boards assign principals the task of acting as a member of the board's negotiating team and that they also must maintain a close working relationship with the teachers.

Possible implications are that with regional bargaining, teachers will try to exercise much more control over their living standard through the negotiating process. Further, that in the foreseeable future, teachers' unions will continue to bargain aggressively for better wages and fringe benefit packages. If teachers are successful, imbalances with other employee groups could be evident due to smaller amounts of money available for other groups. Based upon the review of literature and the results of this study, it was concluded that there are differences in perceptions between members of the boards of education, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers regarding regionalized bargaining and local control of salaries and fringe benefits.

**Hypothesis 3**

Hypothesis 3 stated that a difference existed among the perceptions of the five sampled groups with regard to the school calendar and its effect on the local control of schools. This research hypothesis was not supported. The literature indicated that the practice of setting common school calendars and expiration dates of contracts in a given area has been going on long before area wide bargaining began.
Further, the state requires a minimum of 180 days and tradition has set school starting times directly after Labor Day. Holidays are set either by legislative action or tradition. Thus, the school calendar allows for little flexibility and possibly the administration and teachers perceive the setting of school calendars as insignificant with regard to a change in local control.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 stated that there would be differences in perceptions of the five groups in relation to local control and preferential hiring with regional bargaining. This research hypothesis was supported.

Boards of education, superintendents, and union presidents perceived regional bargaining to have little effect on preferential hiring and local control of schools. Boards of education, superintendents, and union presidents are perceived as being in power positions. Due to these power positions, they may be more aware of the effect of preferential hiring and agree to its direction. Principals and teachers might be less aware of the effect of preferential hiring. Thus, they perceive a greater impact in preferential hiring than the other three groups. This circumstance might account for their lack of disagreement with one another.

It is interesting to note that teachers and union presidents are not in agreement on preferential hiring. Teachers perceive preferential hiring as having a greater impact on local control than union presidents do regarding this question. However, the teachers' and
principals' perceptions were still in the range that they believed regional bargaining would also have little effect on preferential hiring.

Teacher assignments, involuntary transfer, and "bumping" language probably has as broad an implication for the future of education as any of the variables selected for the study. It might be strongly opposed because the boards of education feel it to be harmful to the total educational program. In an area plagued by enrollment loss, this has major implications for Macomb County schools and the right of the board and/or the administration to place teachers where they feel the best interests of the local district will be served. Contract language pertaining to preferential hiring may restrict and in fact control these decisions. Teachers of low seniority could be in new buildings or assignments each year. This could not only cause morale problems, but also have a major effect on building program continuity and staff cohesiveness.

Based upon the results of this study, it is concluded that there are differences among the five groups with regard to their perceptions of regionalized bargaining and preferential hiring and its effect on local control of schools. Further, the majority of the groups indicated a moderate decrease in local control due to preferential hiring.

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 states that a difference in perceptions exists among the five groups with regard to regional bargaining and due process and just cause language as it relates to local control of schools.
This research hypothesis was supported.

The findings from the one-way analysis of variance indicates that there are statistically significant differences on how the five groups perceived due process and just cause language to affect local control of schools. The differences in perceptions between higher administration and the teachers and their union presidents suggest a reluctance on the part of administration to recognize the workability of due process and just cause. Administration may see these contract clauses as weakening their exclusive right to evaluate and discipline teachers when, in fact, these clauses may act as safeguards for administration requiring them to be more correct in any decision and/or action to discipline and terminate a teacher. Administrators generally do not display the intensity of teachers toward employee rights. They commonly feel that employee rights are an internal concern to be resolved through unstructured and informal arrangements rather than tightly worded contractual clauses.

It is also possible that the population studied believes that the constitutional law and the courts have and will continue to solve the problems related to this topic as was noted in the review of literature. Thus, based on the results of the study and review of literature, it is concluded that there is a difference in perceptions between board members, superintendents, principals, union presidents, and teachers regarding regional bargaining and its impact on local control of schools as it relates to due process and just cause clauses in the contracts. However, while differences of perceptions were indicated, all of the groups felt that they perceived regional
bargaining as having no effect on local control of schools and due process and just cause clauses in the contract.

Summary

Of the five variables tested which were seen as areas impacted by regional bargaining, three variables; local control of schools, preferential hiring, as well as due process and just cause clauses were perceived as being negatively impacted by regional bargaining, whereas the salary and fringe benefit variable was viewed as positively being impacted by regional bargaining. Even though there were some differences between the groups on four of the hypotheses studied, the magnitude of the differences between the groups were very small.

Comments were listed in Appendix J in a verbatim fashion under group headings. Specific caution should be taken regarding the use of comments as the basis for interpreting the results. The comments indicated a great deal of discord between the groups regarding regional bargaining. However, the review of literature and the statistical findings of this study do not support these views. Generally speaking, the comments agree with the emotionalism associated with regional bargaining, as noted in the local Macomb County newspapers, Regional VI administration meetings, and discussion with individuals associated with Local I. However, these surface opinions do not correlate with the specific opinions of regional bargaining when individuals were asked specifically for this study if and how regional bargaining would impact local control of schools. On the basis of the comments, it can be concluded that the people involved with Local I
really do not understand how others feel about the issues.

Further Implications

As the literature has indicated, there is diversity of opinion concerning school district governance. Regional bargaining is perceived as making an impact in all areas. It also implied that local bargaining might be necessary for other areas of negotiations. Thus, ultimately a single agency, region, county, or state, might be responsible for negotiations of salary, fringe benefits, calendar, due process and just cause clauses while local districts will negotiate such issues as areas under local control (management rights) and preferential hiring. The implications on both sides are that bargaining goals should be carefully outlined, and reasonableness from both parties should prevail.

Recommendations for Further Study

Based upon the conclusions and implications of the present study, the following recommendations for research are provided:

1. Since Macomb County and Grosse Pointe, Michigan, have operated 2 years under MEA/NEA Local I, it is recommended that a repetition of this study in Macomb County and Wayne County be conducted in 5 to 10 years. A replication of this study will provide the opportunity to see if regional bargaining has caused any major changes in local control.

2. A study such as the one described in this research should be undertaken over a larger geographic area. This will allow for sorting
out any effects of bias due to the restricted sampling incorporated in this study.

3. The impact of regional bargaining should be investigated using objective data rather than solely subjective perceptive data as was utilized in this study.

4. An identification of a comparable region should be conducted which has not yet experienced regional bargaining to compare with Local I, with both subjective and objective data, such as salary and fringe benefits obtained in comparison with districts serviced by Local I.

5. One concern has been the low response rate of board members and teachers and to identify any bias with these groups. Thus, it would be helpful to design a method of data collection for the aforementioned groups enabling one to gather data which would be more accurate and complete.
# School District Demographics

Local I school districts by name, union affiliation, county, student enrollment, number of teachers, and operating millage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>Union Affiliation</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Student Enrollment</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Operating Millage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Anchor Bay</td>
<td>MEA/NEA Local I</td>
<td>Macomb</td>
<td>1,323</td>
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<td>Centerline</td>
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<td>30.24</td>
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<td>Macomb</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>Union Affiliation</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Student Enrollment</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Operating Millage</th>
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<td>Utica</td>
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<td>Macomb</td>
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<td>Van Dyke</td>
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<td>Macomb</td>
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<td>250</td>
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<td>Warren Con.</td>
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<td>Macomb</td>
<td>27,689</td>
<td>1,343</td>
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<td>Warren Woods</td>
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<td>282</td>
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Appendix B

Cover Letter and Questionnaire for
Board Members and Administration
Dear Colleague:

Your assistance is needed to obtain pertinent data for my dissertation at Western Michigan University.

The study examines Regional Bargaining's impact on the local control of schools as perceived by School Board Members, Superintendents, Principals, Union Presidents and Teachers. The results of this study should be most informative and of general value to public education.

In token repayment for your assistance, I pledge that I have made certain that your response and identity cannot be associated with you and that the results of my research will be made available in the form of a dissertation at Western Michigan University. An identification number will be used strictly for follow-up purposes. You and your responses will remain anonymous throughout the study.

Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and return in the self-addressed, stamped envelope. Your prompt response is requested to permit meeting a program deadline of April 1, 1980.

Thank you so much for your cooperation.

Respectfully,

Genevieve E. Gangler
Doctoral Candidate

Dr. Richard Munsterman
Department of Educational Leadership

Note. This is a typed copy of the original letter.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

(Please enter all information in the column to the right.)

1. What is your age? .............................................

2. What is your sex?
   Male ........................................... ........
   Female ........................................... ........

3. Please indicate your highest degree achieved:
   Bachelor's Degree .............................................
   Master's Degree .............................................
   Specialist's Degree .............................................
   Doctorate Degree .............................................
   Other ........................................... ........

4. What is your position?
   Board Member .............................................
   Superintendent .............................................
   Principal .............................................
   Union President .............................................
   Teacher .............................................

5. Number of years you have held your present position.
   Years .............................................

6. Total experience in this type of position.
   Years .............................................

7. How active have you been in negotiations?
   Very active .............................................
   Active .............................................
   Inactive .............................................

8. Has your local bargaining unit affiliated with MEA/NEA Local I?
   Yes .............................................
   No .............................................
   Do not know .............................................

9. Does Local I have to ratify the contract before your district's teachers ratify?
   Yes .............................................
   No .............................................
   Do not know .............................................
10. Does Local I dictate minimum standards for which your district teachers can settle?

   Yes .................................................. 
   No .................................................. 
   Do not know ...................................... 

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Please encircle the number which best reflects your opinion of the impact that regional bargaining will have on the following subjects:

I believe that regional bargaining will:

1. Greatly decrease
2. Moderately decrease
3. Have little effect on
4. Moderately increase
5. Greatly increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the local control of schools.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the relationships or allegiance of teachers to local school boards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the resolution of local teacher concerns by central office administrators.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. the power of local boards to control the schools.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. the cooperative effort on the part of the entire school district's staff on the development of school policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. the power balance of boards of education in the bargaining process.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. the number of offices or seats held by teachers on the local boards of education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. the prospect of state-wide bargaining.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. the amount of economic settlements given to teachers.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. the fringe benefits attained by teachers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. the equalization of teacher salaries in affiliated districts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. the ability of local teachers to obtain minimum salary packages as determined by the regionalized group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
I believe that regional bargaining will:

1. Greatly decrease
2. Moderately decrease
3. Have little effect on
4. Moderately increase
5. Greatly increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatly decrease</th>
<th>Moderately decrease</th>
<th>Have little effect on</th>
<th>Moderately increase</th>
<th>Greatly increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>the amount of teacher salary increases.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>the amount of priority given to teacher salaries in negotiations.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>the ability of administrators to evaluate teachers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>the ability of boards of education to hire teachers of their choice.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>the preferential hiring of teachers from districts in the regionalized unit.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>the establishment of common expiration dates of contracts in the districts affiliated with MEA/NEA Local I.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>the established common calendar among units in Local I.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>the length of the school calendar year.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>the ability of boards of education to determine assignments and transfers of teachers.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>the retention of teachers who show unsatisfactory work performance.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>the concept of seniority as a major criteria for job retention.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>the disciplinary action taken toward teachers, including termination.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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Appendix C

Panel of Experts Categorization of Variables
Pilot Questionnaire
Panel of Experts Categorization of Variables

Pilot Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Group</th>
<th>Key</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 Board Members</td>
<td>LCS = Local Control of Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Superintendent</td>
<td>S = Salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Principals</td>
<td>FB = Fringe Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Union Presidents</td>
<td>PH = Preferential Hiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Teachers</td>
<td>C = Calendar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DP = Due Process
0 = Other
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Question</th>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Pilot Question</th>
<th>Panel of Experts Categorization of Variables</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1</td>
<td>LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>DP DP DP DP DP DP DP DP DP DP DP</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>PH PH PH PH LCS PH PH PH PH PH PH</td>
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<td>Research Question</td>
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Appendix D

Cover Letter and Questionnaire for Union Presidents and Teachers
Fellow Educator:

Your assistance is needed to obtain pertinent data for my dissertation at Western Michigan University.

The study examines Regional Bargaining's impact on the local control of schools as perceived by School Board Members, Superintendents, Principals, Union Presidents and Teachers. The results of this study should be most informative and of general value to public education.

In token repayment for your assistance, I pledge that I have made certain that your response and identity cannot be associated with you and that the results of my research will be made available in the form of a dissertation at Western Michigan University. An identification number will be used strictly for follow-up purposes. You and your responses will remain anonymous throughout the study.

Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and return in the self-addressed, stamped envelope. Your prompt response is requested to permit meeting a program deadline of April 1, 1980.

Thank you so much for your cooperation.

Respectfully,

Genevieve E. Gangler
Doctoral Candidate

Mr. Walt Benton
Local I Uniserve Director

Dr. Richard Munsterman
Department of Educational Leadership

Note. This is a typed copy of the original letter.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

(Please enter all information in the column to the right.)

1. What is your age? .............................................
2. What is your sex?
   Male ............................................................
   Female ...........................................................
3. Please indicate your highest degree achieved:
   Bachelor's Degree .............................................
   Master's Degree ............................................... 
   Specialist's Degree ...........................................
   Doctorate Degree ..............................................
   Other ............................................................
4. What is your position?
   Board Member ..................................................
   Superintendent .................................................
   Principal ....................................................... 
   Union President ............................................... 
   Teacher ........................................................
5. Number of years you have held your present position.
   Years ............................................................
6. Total experience in this type of position.
   Years ............................................................
7. How active have you been in negotiations?
   Very active .....................................................
   Active ...........................................................
   Inactive ........................................................
8. Has your local bargaining unit affiliated with MEA/NEA Local I?
   Yes ..............................................................
   No ............................................................... 
   Do not know ..................................................
9. Does Local I have to ratify the contract before your district's teachers ratify?
   Yes .............................................................
   No ..............................................................
   Do not know ..................................................
10. Does Local I dictate minimum standards for which your district teachers can settle?

Yes ..............................................
No ..............................................
Do not know .....................................
Please encircle the number which best reflects your opinion of the impact that regional bargaining will have on the following subjects:

I believe that regional bargaining will:

1. Greatly decrease
2. Moderately decrease
3. Have little effect on
4. Moderately increase
5. Greatly increase

1. the local control of schools.

2. the relationships or allegiance of teachers to local school boards.

3. the resolution of local teacher concerns by central office administrators.

4. the power of local boards to control the schools.

5. the cooperative effort on the part of the entire school district’s staff on the development of school policy.

6. the power balance of boards of education in the bargaining process.

7. the number of offices or seats held by teachers on the local boards of education.

8. the prospect of state-wide bargaining.

9. the amount of economic settlements given to teachers.

10. the fringe benefits attained by teachers.

11. the equalization of teacher salaries in affiliated districts.

12. the ability of local teachers to obtain minimum salary packages as determined by the regionalized group.

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I believe that regional bargaining will:

1. Greatly decrease
2. Moderately decrease
3. Have little effect on
4. Moderately increase
5. Greatly increase

13. the amount of teacher salary increases.
14. the amount of priority given to teacher salaries in negotiations.
15. the ability of administrators to evaluate teachers.
16. the ability of boards of education to hire teachers of their choice.
17. the preferential hiring of teachers from districts in the regionalized unit.
18. the establishment of common expiration dates of contracts in the districts affiliated with MEA/NEA Local I.
19. the established common calendar among units in Local I.
20. the length of the school calendar year.
21. the ability of boards of education to determine assignments and transfers of teachers.
22. the retention of teachers who show unsatisfactory work performance.
23. the concept of seniority as a major criteria for job retention.
24. the disciplinary action taken toward teachers, including termination.
SURVEY—Continued

COMMENTS:

_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________

If additional space for comments is needed, please enclose an extra sheet in the return.
Dear Colleague,

May I extend to you my personal request to assist Mrs. Gangler in her graduate survey. The results of her study on Regional Bargaining will be of significance to the Chippewa Valley School District, as well as to her professional and personal benefit.

We trust that you will also benefit from these results as Regional Bargaining is a relatively new concept. At the present time there is no compilation of current practices concerning Regional Bargaining under MEA/NEA Local 1. This study will attempt to provide this compilation, as well as answer some of your questions or concerns.

Superintendent of Chippewa Valley Schools

Note. This is a typed copy of a personal request signed by Dr. Depillo.
Appendix F

Follow-Up Card
Dear Fellow Educator:

Recently you received a questionnaire asking for your confidential participation in an important survey on regional bargaining in Macomb County, Michigan. If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this card a "thank you" for your valuable help.

If you have not had a chance to do so, may I ask you to return the completed form? Your participation is vital to the success of the study.

Thank you

Genevieve Gangler
Doctoral Candidate

Note. This is a typed copy of the follow-up card.
Appendix G

Follow-Up Letter
Dear Fellow Educator:

I recently mailed the enclosed form to you as a member of a scientifically selected number of educators in Macomb County, Michigan. The majority of the educators have been kind enough to help with the study of regional bargaining by sending in their responses. If you were one of them, this is my way of saying "thank you."

Because of the limited number of carefully selected participants, I am trying to get as near to a "perfect survey response" as is possible. Therefore, if you have been unable to complete the questionnaire before this, I would appreciate your cooperation at this time.

Your answers will be treated confidentially and the enclosed, stamped, self-addressed envelope is provided to facilitate your earliest reply. The identification number will be used strictly for follow-up purposes.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Genevieve Gangler
Doctoral Candidate

Note. This is a typed copy of the original letter.
Dear Fellow Educator:

Recently you received a questionnaire asking for your confidential participation in an important survey on regional bargaining. If you have already returned the questionnaire, please consider this letter a "thank you" for your valuable help.

If you have not had a chance to do so, may I ask you to return the completed forms now or answer the questions noted on the enclosed self-addressed post card and mail.

Your participation is vital to the success of the study.

Sincerely,

Genevieve Gangler
Doctoral Candidate

Note. This is a typed copy of the original letter.
Appendix I

Follow-Up Card
Dear Fellow Educator:

I did not respond to the survey on regional bargaining for the following reason.

I am in agreement with regional bargaining as instituted by MEA/NEA Local I. _______ Yes _______ No

Other ____________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Note. This is a typed copy of the original card.
Appendix J

Age of Population by Subgroup
# Age of Population by Subgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Superintendents</td>
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<td>Principals</td>
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<td>Union Presidents</td>
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<td>38.62</td>
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<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>9.63</td>
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Appendix K

Experience of Population by Subgroup
## Experience of Population by Subgroup
(Experience in Position)

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<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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Appendix L

Degree Status by Subgroup in Percentage
## Degree Status by Subgroup in Percentage

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<th>Degree Status</th>
<th>Board Members</th>
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<th>Principals</th>
<th>Union Pres.</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
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<td>124</td>
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Appendix M

Comments on Regional Bargaining
by Respondents
Comments on Regional Bargaining by Respondents

Comments about regional bargaining by members of boards of education, principals, union presidents, and teachers. Superintendents did not respond in the comment section.

Of the 84 board members who responded to the survey instrument used in this study, 42% of the respondents wrote a comment in the space provided after question number 24. The verbatim responses, corrected for spelling, are listed here:

Response 1: I did not sit at the negotiation table but was very much informed of the situation. The board continually gave our negotiation team directions.

Response 2: As a board member I deplore the trend to place teachers' welfare before that of the students' welfare. Unfortunately, the bargaining trends are not only for higher salaries, but also for less work (smaller class sizes and shorter school years and more time off) and absolute security (layoff by seniority only, unbelievable protection of incompetent or lazy teachers). However, as a citizen who sees what the Teamsters, UAW, lawyers, and doctors can do for themselves by organizing powerful unions or associations, I can understand the teacher's desire to organize and get a bigger slice of the pie.

Response 3: I feel that regional bargaining is the beginning of loss of local control. The results will be state bargaining which will lead to federal control of schools. This process will be a contributing factor to the ruination of the basic independent principles on which our country was founded. We must emphasize the responsibility of our citizenry rather than rights.

Response 4: With our teachers in Local I they will have to give up some autonomy. It may well be that in the future any teachers laid off will have to be used by other districts before new teachers can be hired within Local I's boundaries. Teacher's wages should be left with the district's ability to pay, not ruled on by someone who gets a wage from an affluent area.

Response 5: The concepts of regional bargaining is the first step toward state wide "local unionism." In addition, it's predicated on the false assumption that all districts have the same financial ability to meet demands that are established through bargaining in the more affluent districts. The concept
can only lead to a complete take over by the state and loss of local control and input.

Response 6: Answers based on board tenure. However, I have a background of 20 years' experience as a personnel director and labor negotiator with a major corporation. My assessment of the relative impact of regional bargaining is based on my experience with local, regional, national, and international unions, many of which would be comprised of "professional" employees. I believe regional bargaining will have a modest effect on certain areas which are "key" for the union. These are primarily economic or job security related. Depending upon the outcome of current legislation, one of the principle motivations for regional organization may be diminished. I have indicated Local I doesn't ratify a contract, their Executive Board Committee will establish minimum contract standards. Local I representatives assigned to each district negotiation will then assure objectives are met.

Response 7: I have a very strong suspicion that regional bargaining is only concerned with getting what it can for teachers with little concern for what is good for kids.

Response 8: Without some solidification of school boards towards bargaining, Local I will soon consume most duties now performed by board members. It is impossible for a single small board to defend itself adequately against the power, money, and numbers of the Local I.

Response 9: There are other areas that should be taken into consideration that have either a primary or secondary influence on the effect of regional bargaining:

A. The inability of local school boards to understand the concepts and precepts of proper business management.
B. The inability of local school boards to operate within an established budget at the onset of the fiscal year.
C. The generalized lack of communication between administration and school boards.
D. The inability of schools in general to operate on a business-like operation.
E. The internal disgust of teachers to promote and exploit their own shortcomings.

Response 10. Regional bargaining is a tragedy for quality education. Only through strong school boards will its effect be mitigated, even to a small degree, and the vast majority of boards are not strong. Most board members are naive in the labor relations area.
Response 11: Regional bargaining tends to accentuate salary differences. A percentage raise in a high paying district is much more than the same percentage in a low paying district.

Response 12: The ultimate impact of regional bargaining is on students. Have we forgotten them? I predict that the future will see the increase of parent power groups to protect the interests of students.

Response 13: There is no question that regional bargaining will tend to diminish the concept of local control of school districts.

Response 14: I believe the regional bargaining team was a positive factor in reaching a contract agreement after being without one for 2 years.

Response 15: The last time this district fired a teacher for a reason was 5 years ago. We just finished with the appeals and settled with said teacher, we won our case and were upheld by all decisions. It cost us $165,000 in legal fees to defend our position. I see more of this in the future unless we even up our desperate position in negotiations.

Response 16: This move will undoubtedly increase the frustration, not only of the local school board members, but of the general public. They already feel so disenfranchised, so without a voice in government that regional bargaining with all it's implications could easily fire their unrest into action. The average citizen, while slow to organize sometimes, is more sophisticated in political procedures and will react accordingly.

Response 17: Regional bargaining for teachers will lead to regional bargaining for boards. Unless some other means (other than local) is found to finance schools increased benefits and salaries can't go much further. I can't see good faith upon the part of a faculty when they strike after they have settled just because some other faculty is striking. Schools must be administered by administrators with boards carrying out their functions. Poor teachers who do not improve must not be retained.

Response 18: Education has kept us free. Teamwork among the participants at a local level is highly essential with proper communications established. Any loss of local control endangers the above being dealt with effectively.

Response 19: Regionalized "anything" is best defined in my evaluation as "short term gain - long term loss."

Response 20: Regional bargaining will result in more frequent strikes and more settlements which are beyond the current financial means of the school district.
Response 21: I think the main problem for most school boards is the suffering experienced by the district who has settled a reasonable contract with their teachers, but another district wants to fire their teachers causing a region-wide walk-out.

Response 22: I believe that regional bargaining is another step in the process of turning teachers away from a "profession" and toward a "trade." There are many dedicated, sensitive, excellent teachers - a number of these are underpaid. On the other hand, there are many teachers who do not truly care about children and teaching them and are overpaid. I would like to see a system on merit pay. I believe it could be worked out fairly.

Response 23: Briefly, the problem that has developed with the intrusion of a consolidated group seeking recognition for its members, would not have materialized if the responsible organizations had lived up to their responsibilities, and realized the need for adequate pay and support for people who have the formative and educational mandates before them. We must recognize that the minds of our young is the future of our country, our philosophies, and of our families. We should support an effective, educative, and inspired group of intelligent people to educate and develop the minds, concepts, and needs of our communities. It is because of the lack of respect for the educational process and the people who are now charged with these responsibilities that we find ourselves seemingly hopelessly immersed in developing contractual agreements with groups that we have little confidence or respect with. Until we assume a realistic and candid attitude toward the teaching profession and treat it with the dignity that it desires and deserves we will for a long time be confronted with the philosophies and the actions that are a part of groups that take control of the teaching community.

Response 24: My deepest concern is what happens to kids; our district has not suffered a strike but kids have been uncertain about possible strikes and actual "chalkboard flu." They are uncertain how to regard their "sick" or striking teachers, and pick up the ambivalence or hostility of their parents; these factors intensify during more public regional bargaining. In general, faith and mutual respect have decreased among members of school community with regional bargaining. Teachers report to me intolerance of each others' opinions re strike; duties of their own bargaining team. I have both trusted/distrusted various union team members' ability and good faith in conveying board team's position accurately.

Response 25: In my opinion the most objective thing about regional bargaining is the fact that the head negotiator, who may not even be associated with education, can in a struggle for power and publicity close down the educational process in a whole area.
Response 26: Local boards in bargaining must keep in mind their own local consideration and management perogatives and maintain their positions in negotiations.

Response 27: This year capped COLA, next two years uncapped COLA.

Response 28: I feel that Local I like many unions start out with many high ideals that sound awful good, but after a while they go over board just to justify their existence. (Very Simplified)

Response 29: It won't be long before Local I will be joined by other sections and soon the whole state. After the whole state people will be as close and have as much influence as we do to the people who lead us in Washington. In other words, less local control, more waste and a poorer education system.

Response 30: We don't have regionalized bargaining and I would hate to see it. Each local district has their own set of problems unique to that district. Financial and contractual.

Response 31: While our board does not directly negotiate, we do set policy and are kept informed of the status of negotiations. Thus we indirectly participate. Overall I am very concerned that regional bargaining will greatly decrease local citizens' ability to control their schools.

Response 32: Your questions are too simple and do not allow enough latitude in answers. I could write a page on each question. I answered your questions from the point of viewing all the districts in Local I. If my answers reflected my views as President of a strong, enlightened, informed board with high integrity, with full community support and trust, which it is, my answers in most cases would be different. School boards will be divided, and divided and conquered, because of the lack of unity. If a teacher belonging to Local I is ever elected to my board, I will take legal steps charging conflict of interest. I am not anti teacher or anti union.

Response 33: It is difficult to determine the long range effect of regional bargaining because many boards are just becoming involved with it.

Response 34: Sympathy strikes by regional bargaining units will be a common occurrence in Michigan regardless of legislation passed in Lansing. This was a feeling expressed by MEA representatives in Lansing on February 9, 1980. This is where local control will be decreased among school districts.
Response 35: This movement in my opinion will deter the operation of school districts by local elected officials. Again, the student will be relegated to the position of hostage. The students, senior citizens, property owners, boards of education, administrators, classroom teachers will be the big losers in that order. The professional labor leader will be the big winner, and education will continue to decline at a much faster speed.

Response 36: My greatest concern with Region I is that we (our school district) were an announced "strike" even before negotiations started. Our negotiations were at a school within the region with more serious problems. I believe that regional officers "must" create unrest to justify their existence.

Comments About Regional Bargaining by Principals

Of the 125 principals who responded to the survey instrument used in the study, 20% of the respondents wrote a comment in the space provided after question number 24. The verbatim responses are listed here:

Response 1: The regional bargaining process will continue to strengthen the teacher's bargaining position, but the effect will continue to be moderated by the declining enrollment and teacher surplus.

Response 2: Boards of Education will lose control to a degree but individual teachers also will lose a voice on many issues.

Response 3: Since all districts have master contracts, I feel that Regional Bargaining will have little impact. The districts who will find it most difficult are those with boards who have not recognized professional staff as professionals. They had better recognize that the teachers unions are here and very real.

Response 4: Regional bargaining will pull up low districts and subvert lighthouse districts.

Response 5: As long as unions (MEA Local I) continue to develop a self-serving philosophy education will continue to wallow in despair. The education process should be a mutual process--however teachers (and unions) continue to get "too big for their britches" the resulting embarrassment to teachers may never be forgotten.
Response 6: Regional Bargaining is a bad idea. Solutions for problems and circumstances in a district should come from within. The students in one district should not be used as pawns to force settlements in other districts. Teacher unions have the political clout, lawyers and resources now. However, boards of education and teachers should meet the responsibility of settlement within a certain period or both should be penalized by the State in some way.

Response 7: Because we are not a part of Regional bargaining I find it difficult to answer most of these questions. I am only going on what I have read. I am sure that if I were involved my answers would be different.

Response 8: Have you ever thought of what effect regional bargaining will have on the consolidation of small school districts? (i.e., if "R.B." ever takes hold).

Response 9: Believe it is a bad concept and away from local autonomy to State control of schools.

Response 10: Local is a specter, newly arrived, whose full effect cannot be measured just yet. Boards of Education will counter with new strategies of their own and the process will evolve over a number of years. However, the seeds of creating another union super power have been sown.

Response 11: The first regional contract will set the pace for the future of education in the State of Michigan. Management should not give away its rights. Seniority with qualifications should be a big item. The calendar should be determined by the B.O.E. Evaluations should be a management right.

Response 12: Local I may well have an increase or influence in results of bargaining in many Macomb School Districts. This is not the case in my district since the teachers Local is affiliated with the AFT, AFL-CIO.

Response 13: Regional Bargaining is going to be a problem but it is here to stay. I guess we are going to have to learn to live with it.

Response 14: As you may surmise, I work in L'Anse Creuse District. I see L'Anse Creuse recognizing Local I in future (near) elections. I also see Local I as a benchmark for future activities in promoting more effective professional collective negotiations. Like it or not, that appears to be the way the ball is bouncing.

Response 15: Regional bargaining will alienate the public and the teacher union will be viewed by the least common denominator.
Districts who have settled in good faith will not honor their own agreement in sympathy for another district. Feel gains will be costly in terms of respect and prestige and eventually result in becoming an unattractive field to work in. Professionalism and unionism are at separate ends of the spectrum.

**Response 16:** Regional bargaining will give the teacher's association more power than ever before in its dealing with local boards of education.

**Response 17:** I am a first year principal of a Middle School. I have been a High School Assistant for 10 years but have NOT been involved in negotiations at all. Therefore my answers on this sheet are opinions strictly based on what I hear and NOT on experience at the bargaining table.

**Response 18:** At this point I do not see State Laws controlling the calendar or policies determined by the Tenure Committee being effected. I'm sure that some pressure will be exerted to such things as hiring teachers from districts with employees laid-off. I don't anticipate that this will be effective in our immediate future.

**Response 19:** Since my district is not involved in regional bargaining, my response is strictly speculative.

**Response 20:** I think Regional Bargaining will effect many things, some will be beneficial and some may be very threatening to the structure as we now know it. If, however, the units can police their own ranks for qualified people this will be beneficial. Also as a member of professional groups such as DACTM, MCTM, I find these teachers dedicated and knowledgeable in trying to bring about, maintain, and revise curriculum in keeping with the changes and research that is available. If the bargaining unit has total power over who a school district may hire, this is threatening. If the bargaining unit sets regional salaries and there are school districts that cannot meet these standards, this will also create problems and backlash not only on that group but teachers as a whole. I believe what needs to be in the minds of all is to elect good, well-informed leaders who are aware of both the teachers' needs and those of the community.

**Response 21:** As a concept in favor of teachers I believe that, regional bargaining can bring about strength in numbers. Conversely, I cannot see how a large group of teachers can be of much assistance in helping one of their units who happen to be in a particularly poor or unwilling community by sympathy striking or anything else. That particular community or district couldn't care less about other district's problems with a regional strike that may be caused in support of their teachers. What would it prove? Perhaps the whole thing would ultimately
lead to a regional district and regional board of education. Shades of Detroit, UCK!

Response 22: The balance of power will shift to Local I, but this could be a temporary condition. The influence of Local I will be moderate and the main impact for now will be to establish minimum standards for all contracts.

Response 23: Local control of education is gone! State bargaining (and strikes) will be next.

Response 24: Regionalized bargaining will have a devastating effect on Quality Education. We have already realized shorter work days, preparation time becoming less useful and many other setbacks. Education is in for some tough times ahead.

Response 25: I believe the primary purpose of forming MEA/NEA Local I was for security reasons. If the teachers in one given district should strike for an extended period of time they could be fired (as in Crestwood). By combining forces the teachers minimize their chances of being fired, it would be difficult to fire and replace several thousand teachers.

Response 26: Have very little experience in this area to make stronger opinion.

Comments About Regional Bargaining by Union Presidents

Of the 21 union presidents who responded to the survey instrument used in this study, 33% of the respondents wrote a comment in the space provided after question number 24. The verbatim responses are listed here:

Response 1: Whether regional or local in scope the gains and advances are directly proportionate to the resolve of the teachers of the district. Regional concept may, in fact, inhibit some efforts. The backlash and/or legal action against a teacher group which has had excellent relations with its Board of Education could result in a net loss for teachers as a whole. In my opinion Armada was more farce than force.

Response 2: Regional bargaining will solidify the power of boards of education in the face of the implied threat of regional bargaining. Teacher unionism rests with the power of the local to exert its own leverage in the power game that is C.B. Regional bargaining as practiced by MEA dilutes the power base.
Response 3: MEA/Local I is not really as effective as the general teacher perceives it to be. I am opposed to the centralized power of the MEA and the loss of local unit control it has caused directly and indirectly. The concept of coordinated bargaining is viable but the structure of the MFT's concept provides the unified bargaining power without so much loss of local control via staff hierarchy.

Response 4: There is very little local control now by Macomb County school districts. Regional bargaining will cause the legislature to take more notice of teachers and put pressure on those elected leaders to change the financial structure of education in the State of Michigan. This must occur first at the local level among teachers. Change occurs through "power" and "limited efforts" at the local level among teachers.

Response 5: Regional bargaining is the only way to stop future "Crestwoods" in this state.

Response 6: For the first time last year, the bargaining process was taken seriously by boards of education of the Local I area. The threat of 4,300 teachers organized in one unit helped us to overcome 5 or 6 years of 5% salary increase and the mass firing of teachers. Armada did not become another Crestwood—the rank and file teachers are feeling better about their jobs and their union.

Response 7: Regional bargaining has greatly helped the smaller districts because without the power of the larger entity—Local I—many important goals couldn't be attained.

Comments About Regional Bargaining by Teachers

Of the 208 teachers who responded to the survey instrument used in this study, 21% of the respondents wrote a comment in the space provided after question number 24. The verbatim responses are listed here:

Response 1: Regional bargaining can be very helpful to teachers.

Response 2: We have only just completed our first year of bargaining as part of MEA/NEA Local I. While we did see some overall growth in specific contract language and an adequate raise in salary, the kind of influences you appear to be looking for may or may not happen in the near future. At this time, it is difficult to judge many of your statements listed above. I feel...
as the concept of regional bargaining grows, and more and more units become involved, we may then see some of changes reflected in your statements #1-24 above.

Response 3: Local I's goals seem to be eventual statewide bargaining and parity between school districts. Because of this, I believe local control of schools will decrease as state funding of districts increase. Local I also makes the dismissal of incompetent teachers much more difficult. Teacher dismissal becomes a regional issue.

Response 4: Regional bargaining will increase benefits for teachers in poorer districts. I believe more pressure will be put on senior teachers to retire early. The legislature will make every effort to destroy regional bargaining. Contracts will become increasingly more difficult to settle and tax payers will be more aroused than ever (anti-teacher). Teacher stress will increase due to probable intervention by the judiciary.

Response 5: Glad we joined Local I!

Response 6: I am totally opposed to Local I--I voted against it. I'll vote against teachers strikes and I just happen to be the AR representative from our building this year because no one else was willing to do it. I feel the school should be represented and our staff knows my position.

Response 7: I oppose regional bargaining in that each community is unique in its school program and local input and support is important. I also think that union (agency?) shop has been negative in its effect on the educational programs--because it has divided teachers, administrators, and boards and been a poor example as to obeying the laws of the state. A professional person should not be forced to join or contribute dollars to any organization they oppose!

Response 8: I personally am not impressed with the Union organization from the MEA - on - down.

Response 9: It is my opinion that the heavy lay-offs being experienced at this time will bring about an older staff. However, with the natural attrition of the older staff and the replacement of these vacancies with younger teachers, there will bring about a change. The older teachers are more complacent, whereas the young tend to be more stronger position when negotiating because they will be backed-up by the younger militant teachers.

Response 10: Region I may work for larger schools but was practically responsible for destroying Armada. The town is resentful and teachers have lost any prestige and gains previously attained. The theory is correct, but in reality, with the economic situation yes - in school non-profit institution - never.
Response 11: At this point it is hard to determine what impact MEA/NEA Local I will have on school districts, but what I do see is a changed teacher attitude. I no longer feel that I'm in a powerless position. It is very difficult for me to work under a situation where I feel I have little to say when the board takes on a "take it or leave it" attitude. When I feel like a literal "public servant" I'll quit!

Response 12: I am against regional bargaining as represented by Local I.

Response 13: Should help do away with school boards "firing" entire teaching units when there is no teaching contract.

Response 14: I feel Local I is a step forward. Hopefully - we will be able to switch districts someday with losing seniority and §!.

Response 15: I've attempted to respond to effects on local control now and in the near future. However, I believe the impact will be greater beyond that time because of greater EA & FT solidarity and the obvious need forthcoming of local district boards to ban together. School administrators must subsequently align themselves with the teachers or with the boards of education for self preservation or become last in the power struggle. Unless boards realize their need for building administration functioning in a management capacity, the building administrator must look to the other power structure. In as much as central office and building administrators widen administrators who by necessity work with students, staff, and parents may by necessity need to consider joining forces with the teacher organization.

Response 16: I am opposed to regional bargaining. We have different district needs as teachers, ie people and as teachers of kids. To say we are equal is an American myth. Unionization - central bargaining units speak to needs not of individuals but rather to what the unit perceives as the majority, which I am finding out daily is NOT my need.

Response 17: Please base a teacher's salary on a job well done - not on the amount of education (or degrees) that a teacher has. In other words pay a teacher merit pay. Forget all those high degrees where a teacher spends all his or her time in a college classroom and not their own public school classroom.

Response 18: I feel a Local I (regional bargaining unit) removes the power of teacher unions, school boards, and administrators to look at local issues reasonably. Regional rule is next to a dictatorship and we still live in the United States of America!
Response 19: On the whole I see no good which can come from regional bargaining. All it will do is alienate parents/taxpayers from teachers. The arrogance and greed of the unions will become all too evident and the taxpayer will revolt; resulting in greater harm to teachers. A true professional doesn't work for money, but for the love of the work performed. When unions take more control, professionalism leaves, and the quality of services deteriorates. Just look at the cars we buy.

Response 20: I sincerely hope that regional bargaining will have no ill effect on teacher performance. I honestly believe that schools can benefit by regional bargaining, considering that the process should result in larger salaries with perhaps greater numbers of qualified people being initially attracted to teaching.

Response 21: I would like having the option of long term possibility or immediate possibility of regional bargaining upon local control.

Response 22: Regional bargaining, in my opinion is the only viable way for teachers to combat the firing of teachers for striking for equitable contracts. The archaic state law and backwards Boards of Education leave few alternatives here.

Response 23: I feel that regional bargaining is the most viable way teachers have of counterbalancing the inordinate power school administrators and their associations have. It also gives smaller districts a chance to get a better contract because of the support of a larger organization. Hopefully regional bargaining will better organize teachers so a Crestwood can never happen again.

Response 24: By improving teacher's economic position, Local I also provides the needed sense of security teachers must have to be effective in the classroom.

Response 25: I can't see where Local I has had much effect. Of course, it did unite districts in a common cause contract push when settlements did not appear favorable. Now that things have settled down, we are back teaching the same way we have for years.

Response 26: The way the state gives aid, the schools have done and will do more to standardize teacher bargaining than any other factor.

Response 27: I do not like regional bargaining. Local I covers too wide an area of labor/management concepts. Farm/rural areas think differently from suburban areas. Armada proves this! Local I was not clearly thought out. As with our Federal government we are just building a larger and larger bureaucracy within the MEA. In plain words, creating jobs for people who should be earning an "honest" living.
Response 28: I have answered taking an over-all view of the Local I. In theory, there should be no breakdown in administration and membership relations, however, each individual district will be different depending on individual personalities.

Response 29: I can see no way that regional bargaining will not strengthen the teachers position. I also feel we protect the jobs of teachers who have lost their ability to relate to their students; whose classroom practices and extracurricular relationships with students are highly questionable; whose behavior and attitudes reflect disfavorably on the profession. I feel that we haven't as many nit picking problems in our district as in other districts. I also wish we could negotiate the monies allocated to curriculum.

Response 30: My opinions are contingent on dealings with one district that has always had inferior contracts in comparison to the remainder of Local I - regional bargaining seems our only hope of equality, especially in monetary areas.

Response 31: The teachers of my district (Utica) voted against joining Region I. I feel this is a mistake and we who are the "fat cats" need to support reasonable requests of our smaller districts. The problem with this is what is "reasonable." I'm interested as to why you did not ask anything about the effects of declining enrollments on regional bargaining. I think that's the push behind regional bargaining.

Response 32: I believe local school boards will continue as unique units unless there is a financial crisis which would cause the State of Michigan to seize control due to the particular districts inability to operate thereby declaring bankruptcy.

Response 33: A majority of my colleagues and I feel very strongly in our support of Local I and the concept of unified bargaining. I also believe that the major motivating factor for this support is not money, but the determination that another Crestwood shall not occur.

Response 34: I feel legislation will be passing some laws which will effect why regional bargaining is now being done.

Response 35: If school boards treated teachers as professionals and equals at the "table," MEA/NEA Local I instead of NCA/MCA school district would not exist. When school boards want a contract and not "get back at the teachers" the need of power as represented by Local I would not be needed.

Response 36: Class size, wages, (COLA), fringe benefits will remain as they are now: of prime importance. Retirement benefits will become increasingly important as teachers' average age is
increasing. Disparities in monies available will make across-the-region fringes and wages very unlikely. The exodus to the far fringe suburbs will slowly depreciate with high interest rates and gasoline costs. This will help to stabilize districts. Older people will stay in their homes so homes won't be available to young people in Metro Detroit area, which means slow growth in child population.

Response 37: I feel the coordination of the calendar year, expiration of contracts, and removal of inferior teachers (teacher evaluation) are items a "united front" could bargain effectively. Money is an issue unique to each school board. I don't feel at odds with the school administrators who have limited funds. Working conditions are of vital importance to me. Having $20 a month (of which Uncle Sam takes $10 or more) doesn't equalize the loss of teaching materials, field trips, etc.

Response 38: In my opinion regional bargaining makes for a stronger union. More effective bargaining, and consistency within the participating districts as to contract language. Stronger is not always better. It is my fear that the community and inter district rapport of the "local" concept may be undermined. It is important for each particular school and its respective district to serve the particular needs of that area.

Response 39: I hope it doesn't increase teacher apathy and motivation to continue to improve skills - ie, like federal bureaucracy decreased state local desires to do a good job - bureaucracy and red tape slows accountability.

Response 40: In general I do not believe that regional bargaining will have any effect on teacher-administration relations!

Response 41: My greatest concern about regional bargaining is that it will become increasingly difficult to "weed out" incompetent staff. I would like to see the union focus more time in attempting to establish a mechanism whereby teachers could be brought before a "peer review" committee for complaint. Teachers must begin to police themselves re: standards etc, rather than defending inept associates.

Response 42: The overall reaction to regional bargaining will be negative for 10 years. The power regional bargaining affords Boards of Education is frightening. We will have education by mediocrity. Boards will "let George do it." Grievance will not be settled promptly; everything will be state arbitrated. We have not written enough safe guards for our profession.

Response 43: Regional bargaining is an "absolute necessity" if teachers are to survive the irresponsible repressive actions of school boards. I for one am fed up with being used as a
scapegoat by the media, parents, and administrators. Teachers
cannot take the place of parents who neglect their children.
THEIR children are THEIR responsibility! Administrators and
the media may bow to every whim of the gullible public, but
not teachers.

Response 44: Overall, I answered as a teacher feeling that
Local I is a necessity, but as a person, Local I could bring
major problems for education for the students. Two roles have
opposite effects - as a teacher needing a solid bargaining unit
and as a person-parent sending my children to private educa-
tional institutions.
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