Editors' Introduction: Revisiting William J. Wilson's The Declining Significance of Race
Richard K. Caputo and Luisa S. Deprez 7

Moving Beyond Dichotomies: How the Intersection of Race, Class and Place Impact High School Graduation Rates for African American Students
Heather L. Storer, Joseph A. Mienko, Yu-Ling Chang, Ji Young Kang, Christina Miyawaki, and Katie Schultz 17

Young, Jobless, and Black: Young Black Women and Economic Downturns
Raine Dozier 45

Racial Attitudes in the New Millennium: Cool Feelings in Hot Times
Sarah E. Cribbs 69

The Significance of Race for Neighborhood Social Cohesion: Perceived Difficulty of Collective Action in Majority Black Neighborhoods
Tara Hobson-Prater and Tamara G.J. Leech 89

"Waiting for the White Man to Fix Things": Rebuilding Black Poverty in New Orleans
Robert L. Hawkins and Katherine Maurer 111

This ends the special issue contents.
TOWARDS A PRACTICE-BASED MODEL FOR COMMUNITY PRACTICE: LINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Amnon Boehm and Ram A. Cnaan

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION: VALUE CONFLICTS FOR THE SOCIAL WORK PROFESSION
Rich Furman, Alissa R. Ackerman, Melody Loya, Susanna Jones, and Nalini Negi

BOOK REVIEWS

Family, Kinship and State in Contemporary Europe (3 Vols.)
The Century of Welfare: Eight Countries (Vol. 1).
Hannes Grandits, Editor.
The View from Below: Nineteen Localities (Vol. 2).
Patrick Heady and Peter Schweitzer, Editors.
Perspectives on Theory and Policy (Vol. 3).
Patrick Heady and Martin Kohli, Editors.
Reviewed by Natalia Sarkisian.

Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy. James Midgley and David Piachaud (Eds.).
Reviewed by Melinda Williams Moore.


Reviewed by Paul Saba.

New Deal, New Landscape: The Civilian Conservation Corps & South Carolina’s State Parks. Tara Mitchel Mielnik.
Reviewed by Marguerite G. Rosenthal.

Reviewed by Edward J. Gumz.
Editors' Introduction:
Revisiting William J. Wilson’s
*The Declining Significance of Race*

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The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States in November of 2008 prompted the co-editors of this special issue to organize a panel discussion revisiting William Julius Wilson’s thesis about race and class in America at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP) in 2009. Later that same day at the *Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare* (JSSW) editorial board meeting, we recommended that JSSW consider a special issue entitled “*The Declining Significance or Race—Revisited*” devoted to the thesis Wilson advanced in his now-classic *The Declining Significance of Race*.

Getting a green light to do so, we invited the panelists from the thematic session to submit their papers and put out a Call for Papers that in turn yielded the articles that make up this special issue. As the co-editors of the present special issue favorably viewed the presidential election of Obama in 2008 as a
 historic moment in U.S. history, we sought to tap contemporary scholarship that specifically addressed Wilson’s earlier thesis about the effects of race and class on blacks over time in the United States. We were also reminded by Robert Leighninger, editor of the *Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare*, that twenty years ago *JSSW* published a special issue on Wilson’s (1987) book *The Truly Disadvantaged*. That December 1989 issue benefitted from the temporal proximity to the book’s publication, its subsequent national attention, and the opportunity for the special issue editor Robert G. Newby (1989) to assemble “the right scholars” as a counterbalance to the “retrogression” that had come to characterize the underclass debate “in the parlance of conservative scholars” (p. 3). This special issue also comes a timely moment, one in which black Americans experience stagnating and decreasing wages, significant reductions in net worth, elevated rates of unemployment, and housing depreciations and losses. We are hopeful that this *JSSW* edition brings attention back to important discussions that we must have about race and class in America. As David Remnick said in 2010 in an interview on the NBC Nightly News, “race is the longest and the most painful drama the country has ever known.”

William Julius Wilson’s legacy is a notable one. He began his academic career teaching sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. In 1972 he joined the faculty of the University of Chicago faculty where, in 1990, he was appointed the Lucy Flower University Professor and director of the University’s Center for the Study of Urban Inequality. He joined the faculty at Harvard University in July of 1996 where he is now the Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor and Director of the Joblessness and Urban Poverty Research Program. He has authored or co-authored seven books and written a countless number of articles. Recent publications include *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (1996), which received the Sidney Hillman Foundation Award; *The Bridge over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality and Coalition Politics* (1999); *There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning for America* (with Richard P. Taub, 2007); and *More Than Just Race: Being Black and Poor in the Inner City* (2009). He is, without
Introduction to the Special Issue

doubt, well published.

In *The Declining Significance of Race*, winner of the American Sociological Association’s Sidney Spivack Award and the focus of this special issue, Wilson (1978a) argued that when comparing the contemporary situation of African Americans to their situation of the past, the diverging experiences along class lines revealed that race was no longer the primary determinant of life chances for blacks in the U.S. that it had historically been. The effect of economic and political changes on the relative importance of race and class in black occupational ability and job placement, Wilson contended, had shifted from race to class. He also noted an increasing economic and cultural divide between more and less affluent blacks, due in part to affirmative action initiatives that had benefitted middle income blacks, leading him to recommend a shift in focus to more class-based, race-neutral programs.

In 1993, Neil McLaughlin noted that Wilson had been taken to task for painting an overly optimistic portrait of middle class blacks, particularly given the discriminatory practices that thwarted upward mobility (Wilkinson, 1995; Willie, 1978) as well as the effects of housing segregation that suppressed the accumulation of wealth (Harris, 1999; Massey & Denton, 1985). Wilson stood steadfastly by his work (1978b) but was also moving beyond his original thesis to embrace race-specific policies such as affirmative action, broad-based employment policies, and an expanded welfare state that would capture more popular programmatic support. In later works, Wilson (2009) also placed more emphasis on culture as a factor contributing to racial inequality (Clark, 2011). In a recent retrospective essay, Wilson (2011) amended his original thesis, withdrawing his support for solely class-based, race-neutral programs and advocating instead for both race-specific and race-neutral programs, such as affirmation action and employment programs in areas of the highest rates of joblessness to combat racial inequality.

This pull-back, as well as the articles in this special issue, are in line with a recent report by the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, Fry, & Taylor, 2011) which underscores the continuing economic vulnerability of blacks, especially vis-à-vis whites. This vulnerability, the Pew Report finds, has been
prevalent since the mid-1980s when the U.S. Census Bureau began the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), gathering household level data that included measures of wealth and race/ethnicity (Tavernise, 2011). Although all major racial and ethnic groups lost ground between 2005 and 2009 with the U.S. in recession, the distribution of those losses varied widely. Whites, for example, lost 16 percent of their net worth compared to a 53 percent loss for Blacks. The situation for Hispanics was even worse—their net worth declined by 66 percent. In addition, the ratio of white-to-Black household median net worth deteriorated (that is, increased) from 11:1 in 2004 to 19:1 in 2009; whereas the white-to-Hispanic household median net worth increased from 7:1 to 15:1. For all groups, the largest single contributor to net worth is home ownership. Home equity, however, is more vital to Blacks and Hispanics than it is to whites. In 2005, for instance, Black households derived 59 percent of their net worth from home ownership: only one other asset type exceeded 10 percent of net worth, namely 401(k) and thrift accounts (12%). By 2009, however, black households derived 53 percent of their net worth from home ownership and 14 percent from 401(k) and thrift accounts. In contrast, white households derived 44 percent of their net worth from home ownership and 11 percent from 401(k) and thrift accounts in 2005, but by 2009 derived 38 percent of their net worth from home ownership, 16 percent from stocks, and 12 percent from 401(k) and thrift accounts. A recent study by Rugh and Massey (2010) shows that black residential segregation has a causal adverse effect on foreclosure rates in the top 100 metropolitan areas in the U.S. This is, in 2011, discouraging news.

The articles in this special issue highlight the more nuanced, but nonetheless significant, effects of race on the socio-economic well-being of Blacks in the U.S. Relying on data from the National Council of Education Statistics (NCES), Heather Storer, Joseph Mienko, Yu-Ling Chang, Ji Young Kang, Christina Miyawaki, and Katie Schultz examine the interaction effects of class, race, and place on educational outcomes, operationalized as graduation rates of those enrolled in the twelfth grade at accredited high schools, throughout the U.S. In their article, “Moving Beyond Dichotomies: How the Intersection
of Race, Class and Place Impact High School Graduation Rates for African American Students” they reveal a positive relationship between the socioeconomic status of a school district and the aggregate level of educational attainment in that school district. In school districts with higher levels of African American school-age children, they found lower rates of educational attainment, although both social class and race appeared to have independent effects on educational outcomes. Interaction effects of race and class were also found among their sample. For primarily white and wealthy school districts, race was found to be the greater determinant of students’ educational attainment while, in predominantly African American school districts, factors associated with socioeconomic status (SES) played a more predictive role. Spatial stratification was also found to account for variability in the rates of high school graduation. They conclude that educational attainment is influenced by a combination of factors including the socioeconomic status of one’s school district, the race of one’s peers in the school district, and perhaps most profoundly one’s zip code.

In challenging Wilson’s claims about social class superseding race, Raine Dozier turns our attention to young Black women who are degree holders. In “Young, Jobless, and Black: Young Black Women and Economic Downturns,” she highlights the wage erosion that occurred among young black women during the 1980s in contrast to the wage increases among white degree holders. Important attention is given as well to the significant unemployment spells encountered by young Black women in contrast to white degree holders. What she aptly points out is the volatility experienced by young Black women, especially those with college degrees, as a result of changing economic and business conditions: African Americans, she writes “are poised to receive the worst of bad economic news regardless of socioeconomic class.” The declines in the position of young Black college graduates that Dozier reveals are not in concert with Wilson’s claims of class over race. They are, in fact, just the opposite, bringing about challenging consequences, including wage inequality, based on race. While she admits that race may not be “the initial sorting mechanism” it once was in the economic queue, its place in that queue is, and remains,
quite constant and persistent, impacting Black women and men in their immediate lives as well as over the trajectory of their economic life courses.

Sara Cribbs offers a unique and interesting exploration into Wilson’s thesis of “class over race” by focusing attention on the racial attitudes of whites after 9/11. “Racial Attitudes in the New Millennium: Cool Feelings in Hot Times” pans over the period from 2002 to 2004, a time closely following the New York City disaster, to explore how, or if, racial attitudes of whites were affected by the occurrence of this “racialized national crisis.” As Cribbs rightly asserts, the events of September 11, 2001 provided a bell-weather on issues of race in this country. Mounting tensions exacerbated by heightened concerns about immigration increases, contests over civil liberties, terrorist acts towards and against Americans abroad aggravated, Cribbs says with concern, a “revitalization” of race-based prejudices among whites. While the data can provide some indications of how these attitudes fared, she urges that we continue to engage in ongoing, serious dialogues about these very important issues and adopt “a more intersectional approach for examining social relations,” one which can provide a richer social analysis which incorporates social class, race, gender, and other social locations.

Using data from a survey of 603 residents living in 92 census block groups in a largely middle class urban area, Tara Hobson-Prater and Tamara Leech assess the effects of neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., percent Black, median income, percent homeowners, percent of households with a senior resident, and percent of households with children) and perceived levels of difficulty associated with instrumental collective action and with pessimism on social cohesion. In “The Significance of Race for Neighborhood Social Cohesion: Perceived Difficulty of Collective Action in Majority Black Neighborhoods” they have constructed a 5-point Likert scale of participants’ responses to five statements: “people around here are willing to help their neighbors,” “this is a close-knit block,” “people on this block can be trusted,” “people on this block help each other when they can,” and “people on this block generally don’t get along with each other” (reverse coded). Results indicate that majority Black middle class
neighborhoods have lower levels of social cohesion than other socioeconomically similar neighborhoods. Race and perceived difficulty of instrumental efforts were the only measures that were significantly related to cohesion. The racial disparity was largely explained by the perceived effort required to engage in group instrumental action. Black respondents, despite living in a middle class area, not only live in neighborhoods with lower median incomes and lower rates of homeownership, but the majority Black neighborhoods were also found to have lower levels of social cohesion.

In a post-Hurricane Katrina qualitative study of 40 low-income residents of New Orleans, Robert Hawkins and Katherine Maurer show how race is “concentrically connected to poverty in mezzo level interactions.” In their article, “‘Waiting for the white Man to Fix Things’: Rebuilding Black Poverty in New Orleans,” study participants cast their post-Katrina experiences in terms of how race and class mattered as they sought to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of Katrina. Hawkins and Maurer’s study supports Wilson’s contention that for the poorest African Americans, race and class are inextricably linked and function as a structural barrier to accessing wealth, resources, and opportunities. All of the African American participants stated that race played a major role in their experiences with Hurricane Katrina and many whites also saw race as a major element. Reading many of the interview excerpts in this article, one gets the impression that there was no getting away from disadvantaging effects of race immediately after the devastation, during the rebuilding process, and during the relocation process.

On the basis of the contributions to this special issue and in light of the disparate impact of the financial crisis and recent recession on household wealth, race still matters—significantly. The economic mobility and general plight of Blacks in the U.S. remains precarious as commentators and scholars have noted with an upcoming presidential campaign about to swing into high gear (King & Smith, 2011; Pollack, 2011). As such, it would be an injustice to allow market forces to be the final arbiter of the economic fate of Black Americans. We clearly realize that the effects of race go beyond economic well-being and veer into cultural aspects of interracial
interactions. And we would agree with Wilson’s reformulation of his original thesis, namely that affirmative action programs remain warranted and that sustained attention to employment opportunities is crucial to address racial inequality. The contributions of this special issue continue discussions about how race matters in the U.S. It is our genuine hope that continued dialogue about the significance of race in this country will be undertaken and will ultimately result in more effective and humane policy responses, as well as a greater awareness of the issues that confront us. We are hopeful that this special issue contributes to the conversations before us.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge and thank each of the following for their thoughtful and thorough blind reviews of manuscripts submitted to us for consideration: Mimi Abramovitz, Randy Albeda, Kate Anderson, Saul Andron, Chuck Gazzetta, Elizabeth Higginbotham, Manoj Pardasani, Walter Pierce, Steve Pimpare, Dolly Sacristan, Sharron Singleton, Charles Trent, Edgar H. Tyson, and Diane R. Wood.

References


Introduction to the Special Issue

Moving Beyond Dichotomies:
How the Intersection of Race, Class and Place
Impacts High School Graduation Rates
for African American Students

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Over thirty years ago, William Julius Wilson declared that class trumped race as the more significant determinant of social mobility and economic opportunity. Despite the acclaim and scrutiny for Wilson’s work, the United States has grown increasingly divided by intersecting factors of race, class and other demographic factors such as place (Massey, 2007). These divisions are especially evident in the public education system. We analyze how race, class and place interact to predict high school graduation rates in a national sample of schools and students. Results confirm that a singular focus on race, class, or locale is insufficient to explain high school graduation rates. However, a more contextualized focus on the interactions between multiple determinants of inequality (e.g., race, class and place) can yield a more nuanced understanding of the indicators driving educational inequalities. Scholars and practitioners need to focus on the manner in which multiple positionalities influence the academic achievement of African American children and young adults.
Key words: educational attainment, achievement gap, spatial stratification, intersectionality, geographically weighted regression, race, class

I have four girls right now in my senior home room who are pregnant or have just had babies. When I ask them why this happens, I am told, ‘Well, there’s no reason not to have a baby. There’s not much for me in public school.’ The truth is, that’s a pretty honest answer. A diploma from a ghetto high school doesn’t count for much in the United States today. (Kozol, 1992, p. 26)

Over 30 years ago, William Julius Wilson (1978) argued that social class was replacing race as the primary status for social and economic opportunity and mobility in the United States. Despite Wilson’s vision of an increasingly race neutral society, the colorline has remained a persistent reality well into the 21st century. From 1972 to 2009, for example, income inequality between whites and African Americans has remained constant; African Americans have continued to earn between 57 and 60 percent of the white median income (Kerbo, 2011). While some African Americans have achieved educational and economic success, in the aggregate, African American youth still experience significantly greater high school dropout rates (Orfield, Losen, Wald, & Swanson, 2004) lower scores on standardized tests (Jencks & Phillips, 1998; National Center for Education Statistics, 2009) and higher rates of suspension and expulsion from schools (Mendez & Knoff, 2003; Mendez, Knoff, & Ferron, 2002).

While race continues to play an important role in educational inequalities in the United States, socioeconomic status (SES) and other demographic variables are also critical factors in explaining disparities in educational achievement among African American students. Rather than class replacing race, as Wilson contends, in this paper we are interested in exploring how SES, race and place factors comingle to produce inequalities in high school graduation rates; Kozol (1992) termed these multiple determinants “savage inequalities.” This paper asserts that class, race and place are intricately bound to one another and a singular focus on any of these factors is an
The purpose of this study is to investigate how race, class, and place interact to explain high school graduation rates. It is innovative in that it moves beyond the traditional focus on race or socioeconomic status as drivers of educational inequalities. As a point of clarification, we focus on the experiences of African American students, because no other racial group has been subjected to the same degree of racial segregation (Massey & Denton, 1993).

Background: The Interaction Between Race, Class and Place in the Public Education System

New York City schools are deficient in instrumentalities of learning ... There are certainly city schools where the inadequacy is not 'gross and glaring.' Some of these schools may even be excellent. But tens of thousands of students are placed in overcrowded classrooms, taught by unqualified teachers, and provided with inadequate facilities and equipment. The number of children in these straits is large enough to represent a systemic failure. (Judge Judith Kaye, as cited in Fine, Roberts, & Torre, 2004, p. 79)

Schools have often been considered the great equalizer and the pathway for social mobility. Empirical data show quite the opposite. Schools tend to perpetuate systemic inequalities, as well as being mechanisms for maintaining stringent racial hierarchies (Glenn, 2002). This has been the case since 1896 when the Supreme Court ruled in the historic case *Plessy v. Ferguson* that “separate but equal” facilities for people of color and whites were constitutionally sanctioned. Although this legal precedent was reversed, de jure segregation implemented in later Supreme Court Cases like *Sweatt v. Painter* in 1950 and *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* in 1955 allowed for the U.S. education system to continue as a “separate and unequal” system (Glenn, 2002) and has continued to remain persistently segregated (Orfield, Frankenberg, & Siegel-Hawley, 2010; Orfield & Eaton, 1996; Price & Wohlford, 2005). In fact, two thirds of urban African Americans live in areas of
extreme residential segregation (Massey, 2006). The current demographic and geographic trends lead Massey (2007) to conclude that “America’s current ecological structure concentrates the best-prepared students in areas of resource abundance while gathering the least prepared in areas of resource scarcity” (p. 197). Students in lower performing schools are more often than white students in suburban districts to be exposed to high rates of violence and crime, and experience greater rates of personal stress that adversely affect their academic performance (Massey, 2006), have less access to resources to prepare them for college, and have less experienced teachers (Fram, Miller-Cribbs, & Van Horn, 2007). The following section presents background literature on how educational inequalities among African Americans can be explained by class, race, place and the intersection among the three concepts.

Class, Race, and the Public School System

Although race is a socially constructed category that has been assigned based on skin color, physical characteristics, common descent and ethnic background (Yetman, 1985), there can be no doubt that race has played and continues to play a significant role in social stratification and inequality. This is certainly evident in the U.S. education system. The discrepancy between the academic performance between white and African American students, often termed the “achievement” or “opportunity gap” has persisted since rigorous standardized tests were widely implemented in 1965 (Hedges & Nowell, 1998). Despite considerable attention to the achievement gap, the average African American student still scores significantly lower than white students on most standardized tests (Jencks & Phillips, 1998). It should be noted that standardized tests have been criticized for being racially and culturally biased and, therefore, privilege white middle-class students (Jencks, 1998). Ferguson (2007) found in a secondary data analysis of a comprehensive survey of 7,120 students in 95 schools in 15 school districts in middle and high income districts that 44% of African American children and teens self report that they generally receive C and D grades (compared to 14% of whites), 55% understand less than half of the material read in school (compared to 29% of whites), and 48% completely
understand their teacher’s lessons less than half of the time (compared to 28% of whites). Finally, Caldas and Bankston (1998), through an examination of performance on the Graduation Exit Examination, found that African Americans in segregated schools still perform substantially worse than their white peers even when controlling for class indicators like family educational level, parental occupational status, and family educational level, indicating that there may be a segregation effect.

Beyond just academic achievement, the graduation rates of African American males lag behind their white peers. For example, the 2010 Schott Foundation 50 State Report on Black Males in Public Education found that only 47% graduate from high school nationally, compared to 78% of white males. In urban settings like New York City, a staggering 28% manage to graduate (Schott Foundation for Public Education, 2010). In a non-randomized study of 10,000 youth in urban, suburban, and rural communities, Fine, Roberts, and Torre (2004) found that 56% of whites are tracked into more “rigorous curriculums” compared to 33% of African American and 27% of Latino students. Furthermore, in Massey’s exploratory study of youth of color at elite public universities, he found that students of color experience twice as much stress due to family challenges, come to college with greater exposure to violence and social disorder, and are less prepared academically (as evidenced by taking fewer advanced placement classes and having lower standardized test scores) (Massey, 2006).

Of course, race is not the only factor associated with educational outcomes in the United States. Indeed, there is a substantial amount of literature to support the proposition that associations between race and education are moderated by class. However, rather than employing the Weberian definition of class adopted by Wilson, we acknowledge that class is a complex construct which, in addition to an individual’s position in economic markets, includes features such as occupational class, rates of home ownership and employment status.

One clear example of the association between class and academic achievement can be seen in reports of standardized test scores. In an examination of high school performance on standardized tests, Belluck (1999) found that middle class
African Americans receive significantly lower SAT scores than their white peers and are more likely to fail a class (as cited in Hallinan, 2001). Furthermore, 47% of African American high school seniors have taken a PSAT/SAT prep course, compared to 66% of white American seniors, indicating that African American students may not be receiving or cannot afford to acquire the same resources as their white peers to prepare for college admissions requirements (Fine, Roberts, & Torre, 2004).

The influence of class privilege is perhaps most apparent at the college level. With the soaring cost of higher education, people of color are facing the “affordability crisis” where even if they are admitted to college, they do not have the financial resources to attend (Price & Wohlford, 2005). The Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA (2008) found that the parental income of “entering college freshmen [in 2005] is outpacing the national income by a 2-to-1 margin and it accelerated during the mid-1980s, suggesting not only that students are from more economically advantaged homes than their predecessors but that the gap is widening” (p. 2). In Categorically Unequal, Massey (2007) documented that admissions committees give preferential treatment to children of alumni, which equates to “an admissions bonus of around 160 SAT points, tipping the odds of admission very strongly in their favor; a clear example of social capital influencing academic achievement” (p. 198).

Effects of class are not limited to the later portions of an individual’s education. Starting in early childhood, class and poverty issues are an ever-present reality in the public school system. For instance, Locasale-Crouch (2007) documented that while children from low-income communities have less access to high-quality early education, some upper-income families are spending tremendous resources enrolling their children into high-priced “baby-ivy” preschools to give them an early academic advantage (Kozol, 2005). Thus, in terms of educational inequality, the literature would appear to support the proposition that race and class have a role to play. Furthermore, it would appear that these constructs do not necessarily act independently of one another. That is, the extent to which race is associated with educational outcomes would appear to depend on class and vice versa.
Poverty, like educational opportunities, can be seen as place specific. Both between states and regions and within counties and cities there is significant variation in rates of poverty (Partridge & Rickman, 2006). For example, Partridge and Rickman (2006) found that the South has the highest poverty rate at 13.9%, compared to the national average of 12.4%; however, within the South, Louisiana has a 19% poverty rate compared to only 8.5% in Maryland. Similar variations were found within counties as well. These findings led Partridge and Rickman to conclude that there is a need to acknowledge the importance of "place specific policies" (Partridge & Rickman, 2006). Given that school districts are funded by local property taxes, the rates of regional poverty are directly tied to the provision of resources to these schools. Thus the spatial dimensions of poverty directly correlate to the spatial stratification of educational opportunities and graduation rates.

Beyond spatial differences in poverty, a limited amount of research has been conducted to explore the role of spatial stratification in educational attainment. For example, Roscigno, Tomaskovic-Devey and Crowley's (2006) study "Educational Inequalities and Place" documents a measurable rural and urban disadvantage in educational outcomes, which they term "the spatial patterning of opportunity." The authors found that this disadvantage is beyond just a shortage of school resources, but also includes class indicators like parents' educational achievement and families' median income. While they were looking at areas of overlap, due to the authors' decision to control for race, it is impossible to get a full picture of all of the interactions between race, class and place that can predict children's educational achievement.

Additionally, Fram, Miller-Cribs and Van Horn (2007) found that factors representing social disadvantage beyond race and poverty, such as locale, play a critical role in providing context for academic achievement in the South. They found that children from high-ethnic minority neighborhoods and in high-poverty schools have a greater percentage of peers reading below grade level (Fram, Mille-Cribs, & Van Horn, 2007).
The Intersection of Class, Race and Place in Educational Outcomes

While we contend that class, race and place play a predictive role in educational stratification, we now advance the argument that the interaction between these factors—or what some scholars have coined intersectionality—may be a more meaningful way to explain the persistence of social and economic inequality as opposed to a singular reification of either race, place or class. As Yeskel (2008) stated: “We need to have conversations about both race and class independently and about the intersections” (p. 9). Intersectionality has been defined in related research as the coalescing of the positionalities of gender, race, and class in “unique constellations of disadvantage and privilege” throughout society (Browne & Misra, 2005). For the purpose of this study we are using McCall’s (2005) conceptualization of intersectionality which states that “no single dimension of overall inequality can adequately describe the full structure of multiple, intersecting, and conflicting dimensions of inequality” (p. 1791). We are interested in moving beyond a singular focus on race or class or locale—but rather focusing on how these multiple positionalities, or what McCall terms “intercategorical complexity” comingle to influence the academic achievement of African American children and young adults. Although intersectionality has been applied in a number of sociological domains, rarely has it been used to explain the existence of educational inequalities.

Descriptive data from The National Center for Education Statistics (2009) provide support for our proposition of intersectionality with respect to race and class. For example, there is considerable academic variation among eighth grade white and African American students who are receiving free lunch, reduced lunch and those that are not eligible for lunch programs. In 2007 the average standardized math scores for free lunch-eligible eighth grade African American students was 253 compared to a free lunch-eligible white students who averaged a score of 274. The gap remains even for African American and white students not eligible for lunch subsidies. These and similar data have led some education scholars to contend that the “black-white achievement difference remains a defining mark of racial inequality in public education today” (Hallinan, 2001, p. 51). Overall, these data lend further support to our proposition of an interaction between SES and race. As stated
by Hallinan (2001), “social class [alone] is not an adequate explanation for the achievement gap” (p. 60).

Considerable academic literature has focused attention on the systemic inequality associated with the construction and funding of school districts by local property taxes (Roscigno et al., 2006; Wenglinsky, 1997; Wise & Gendler, 1989). In The Shame of the Nation, Kozol (2005) presents data that correlates race and class indicators (i.e., percentage of students on free or reduced lunch) with the percentage of per pupil spending to reveal that districts with the lowest per pupil spending are also comprised of the largest percentages of low income students and students of color. In the city of Philadelphia for example, the Lower Merion District, where 4% of students are low income and 91% are white or other, spends $17,261 per pupil annually. However, the Philadelphia School District, where 79% of students are African American or Latino/a, spends an average of $9,299 per pupil. There are similar disparities in per pupil spending in all of the large urban cities that Kozol evaluated including Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, Boston, and New York City (Kozol, 2005).

Although there are many scholars that look at the singular predictive relationship of race and class and some who are examining place, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to the intersectionality of race, class and place for all races, especially at the national level. In particular, Yeskel’s (2008) study points out that both the independent and convergent effects of race and class must be considered. Based on the above review of the literature, we pose four primary research questions: (1) What relationship is there between race and educational outcomes in the United States? (2) What relationship is there between class and educational outcomes in the United States? (3) Do class and race interact to influence educational outcomes in the United States? (4) How does geographic stratification (i.e., place) help to explain the above relationships?

Methods

Study Design

This study involves the secondary analysis of data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). This study is cross-sectional
with the goal of describing the manner in which race, class and place stratification coalesce to impact educational outcomes in the United States. Due to the cross-sectional study design, it is challenging to establish temporal precedence, therefore, we are only able to demonstrate with a high degree of certainty the correlational relationship between race, class and spatial stratification. This study should be viewed as principally exploratory, with the overall goal of informing the design of future studies that can more adequately address questions of causation and the nuanced interaction between race, class and place.

The majority of data used for this study was obtained through the NCES web-based datatools portal (http://nces.ed.gov/datatools/) which provides comprehensive information on a variety of educational measures in the United States. Various measures are available from this source and data are aggregated (with some variation across the country) at the school, district, and county levels. These data are reported directly from school districts across the country and been aggregated to the school-district level, thus making direct comparisons of Census data to school district reports possible. One limitation of this data is that comparable Census demographic data is only available for the year 2000, thus rendering it cross-sectional.

School District Level Examination

The current study involves the use of aggregated data on reports of graduation rates throughout the country. While county-level data were available for this analysis and may have facilitated a more longitudinal examination, the aggregation of trends at this high of a level could distort the more minute within-county variations. Additionally, due to our study’s focus on spatial stratification, it was deemed important to utilize the smallest geographic area possible. This would allow, for instance, examination of possible variation in outcomes by racially and socioeconomically diverse districts within the same county. However, this also creates a limitation for large cities such as New York City or Seattle that comprise one school district.

School district boundaries were specifically identified by
Moving Beyond Dichotomies

combining the individual boundary file of every school district in the country. These boundary files are available from the U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/sn2000.html). The files were combined using ArcGIS 9.3, available from the Environmental Systems Research Institute.

Variable Descriptions

Educational attainment. The construct of educational attainment was measured by calculating the ratio of diploma recipients to all twelfth-grade students in a given school district. A total of 10,335 school districts nationwide were included in this analysis. This data was obtained exclusively from the NCES database described above and calculated based on the 1999-2000 graduating school year. As the goal of this study was to determine rates of high school graduation, this denominator counts only students who are currently enrolled in the twelfth grade at accredited high schools. Students who are enrolled in non-traditional or adult education programs where traditional grades are not reported may not be included in the denominator. It is acknowledged that this measurement leads to larger proportions of high school graduates relative to commonly cited U.S. graduation rates (see descriptive statistics in Table 1 below). For instance, the NCES typically calculates graduation rates based on the proportion of students starting as ninth-graders in a given year and graduating four years later. This strategy is problematic because it fails to take into account that students change schools, attend alternative educational environments and simply may not graduate from the same school that they started in the ninth grade. While our constructed variable may be more of a raw measure, it is proposed that the proportion as calculated in this study is a better measure of the total diploma output of a given school district and also recognizes the varied paths through which students gain a diploma in the United States. Our method, however, makes it impossible to take into account those that drop out of high school.

Race. The construct of race was measured by calculating the proportion of African American school-aged children (i.e., ages 5 to 17) in a given school district. This data was obtained exclusively from the school-district tabulation of Census 2000 data described above. Although the NCES databases do
provide information sufficient to calculate the proportion of African American twelfth graders in a given school district, over a third of the school districts did not report this information for the 1999-2000 school year. Therefore, due to the high percentage of missing NCES data, it was necessary to use the constructed proportion of African American school-aged children in a given school district.

**Class.** Although there are a number of potential measures with which class could be effectively operationalized at the school-district level, the current study utilized the socio-economic position index (SEPI) developed by the Harvard Public Health Disparities Geocoding Project (Krieger et al., 2003). The index was developed based on factor analysis and consisted of the following components: (1) The proportion of individuals in working-class occupations in the school district; (2) the proportion of unemployed individuals in the school district; (3) the proportion of individuals meeting the federal poverty definition on the school district; (4) the proportion of individuals (over the age of 25) with less than a high school education; (5) the proportion of expensive homes in the school district (i.e. those homes greater than or equal to 400 percent of the median housing price in 1999); and (6) the median income of the school district. We chose this measure because of its breadth and ability to capture multiple indicators of class attainment, rather than singular indicators such as median family income or percentage receiving free or reduced lunch. It is acknowledged that the SEPI has been shown to be no better than simple measures of poverty at predicting potentially related constructs (e.g., low birth weight as in Krieger et al., 2003). However, the current study seeks to examine the association between socio-economic status and educational outcomes, not simply predict educational outcomes.

**Place.** As implied from the discussion above, in examining the construct of place in this study we have focused on the geographic boundaries of U.S. school districts as our unit of analysis. While it is acknowledged that there is an ongoing debate over the proper definition of neighborhoods in the literature (see for example, Chaskin, 1995), it is proposed that using school districts as our level of analysis is the most appropriate geographic unit for the current study. We are
Moving Beyond Dichotomies

simply seeking to determine geographic variation in educational outcomes. Since any potentially relevant policies or programs designed to increase graduation rates will likely be tied to a given school district, it is arguable that the school district is the smallest geographic unit available to effectively address the questions in this study. Furthermore, school districts are a microcosm of the demographics of the cities within them and, therefore, there is heterogeneity across districts just as there is across cities or counties.

In order to create the SEPI index, the values for each school district measurement of the SEPI variables were standardized. These standardized values were then averaged to create a composite SEPI index for the school district. In order to facilitate comparison amongst the various variables, race and educational attainment were similarly standardized prior to any subsequent analysis. It should be noted that, while the Harvard Public Health Disparities Geocoding Project envisions a summation of the SEPI variables in order to create the index, the average was taken here to maintain a constant scale among all of the variables in the analysis. For clarity, it should be noted that the standardized values of income and expensive homes were reverse coded to reflect poverty and not wealth. While standardization amongst all of the variables can potentially lead to misinterpretation of the ultimate effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable, it also allows for better comparison amongst multiple independent measures, which is the principal goal of this analysis (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986).

The dataset prepared for this analysis had several missing values. Of the 13,867 school districts for which the CCD has data, only 10,335 had data available for all three of the variables created for the study (74.5 percent). Rather than dropping these records from the analysis, several different imputation techniques are available to estimate the missing data values. Indeed, as the current study will be employing GIS in the analysis, near-neighbor imputation is a potential option for this analysis. However, as King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001) argued, such imputation techniques can lead to biased estimates. Thus, the current study will make use of multiple imputations using predictive mean matching (Little, 1998). A
total of 10 multiple imputations were run after which average values for each school district were taken as representative of missing values based on the overall statistical patterns in the available data.

**Analytic Technique**

The research questions in this study were assessed using both ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and geographically weighted regression (GWR). While OLS or variations thereof remain a standard analytic tool across many disciplines, the analysis of geographic units adds an additional level of complexity to the problems usually assessed through OLS. Specifically, the OLS assumptions of the independence of observations and constant variance across school districts may be violated. The use of GWR can account for such violations. Additionally, GWR can be used to examine the spatial variability of regression parameters (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002). All analysis was undertaken through a combination of ‘R’, GWR 3 from the National Centre for Geocomputation in Ireland, and ArcGIS 9.3.

**Results**

**Descriptive Statistics**

Descriptive statistics from the non-standardized variables identified above are outlined in Table 1. As noted above, the proportion of diplomas to twelfth graders is higher than what might typically be expected in the United States. Other variables appear to be in general congruence with other reports from Census 2000 data.

The authors utilized color-coded country-wide maps of the variables to get a better sense of the pattern of the variables throughout the United States. In terms of the diploma ratio measure, a great deal of variation was observed throughout the country. This tends to be true even within states (aside from Arizona). In terms of school district class (as measured by the SEPI), there is a noticeable trend with northern school districts appearing to experience less deprivation than southern school districts. Race appears to have the most noteworthy trend with the vast majority of school districts in the southeast
of the country having above average proportions of African American students.

Table 1. For identified constructs. (n=13,867)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Operational Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>SEPI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Working Class</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Unemployed</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in Poverty</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% with &lt; High School Education</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Median Income ($)</td>
<td>41,040</td>
<td>15,783</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>192,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>% School-Aged African American Children</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>Number of Diplomas: Number of Seniors</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>19.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Global OLS regression model predicting the diploma ratios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPI</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.0427</td>
<td>-0.0309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.0136</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race By SEPI</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Squared</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Model (Only SEPI) AIC</td>
<td>-1432.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>-1612.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
**OLS/Global Model Results**

The results of OLS regression outlined in Table 2 (i.e., the global model) indicate that both school district class indicators and the proportion of African American school-aged children are significant predictors of the ratio of diplomas issued in a given school district. Specifically, on average, a one standard deviation increase in the disadvantage of a school district is associated with a 0.037 standard deviation decrease in the diploma ratio in a given school district ($p < 0.001$). For race, the results indicate that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of African American students in a school district is associated with a 0.008 standard deviation decrease in the diploma ratio for that school district ($p < 0.01$).

Figure 1. Interaction between deprivation and race

There is also a significant interaction between race and class. Figure 1 displays the pattern of this interaction by comparing three different values of race as it relates to class (x-axis) and diploma ratios (y-axis). The dashed line in the figure
represents the trend of school districts with a relatively low proportion of African Americans (i.e., three standard deviations below the mean), the dotted line represents school districts with a relatively high proportion of African Americans (i.e., three standard deviations above the mean), and the solid line represents the trend for school districts with a mean proportion of African Americans. From this data, race appears to have a differential effect on the diploma ratio depending on the level of school district deprivation. Specifically, race appears to have less of an effect in extremely low class school districts and a comparatively large impact in high SES school districts. Put simply, the extent to which SES is associated with the diploma ratio appears to depend on the level of school district deprivation.

As indicated in Table 1, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated in the global model to assess multicollinearity. The VIF is a measurement used in OLS regression to assess the extent to which standard errors are increased in a given model due to correlations amongst independent variables. As can be seen, the VIF is well below the typical cutoff value of 10 suggesting a lack of multicollinearity at the global level (see Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004 for more on this recommended level). Furthermore, although the adjusted R-squared value indicates that the model explains a very small amount of variance, the AIC indicates that this model is an improvement to the null model which only included class as a predictor of the diploma ratio. Based on the geographic analysis indicating the possible presence of clustering among the race and poverty independent variables, it is necessary to investigate possible violations to the assumptions of OLS through the use of local modeling by way of GWR.

GWR/Local Model Results

Initial attempts to build the local model of these variables resulted in models that failed to converge due to multicollinearity problems. As collinearity has already been assessed at the global level, these results suggest local multicollinearity in the model. This is consistent with the results of the interaction analysis in the global model which suggests that, at least around values within one standard deviation of the mean,
the interaction variable may possess some level of local multicollinearity. Therefore, for school districts in which there is a moderate level of deprivation (i.e., middle to lower middle class districts) and moderate proportions of African American school-age children, the interaction variable is highly correlated with the other two measures. Thus, the interaction variable was dropped from estimates of the local model, which allowed the GWR model to successfully converge.

The results of the local model are displayed in Table 3. This table presents the quintile summary of the two parameters included in the global model. The results of Monte Carlo significance tests indicate significant spatial variability in these parameters across the United States. In other words, the associations modeled using OLS cannot be generalized to the United States as a whole. As measured by the $R^2$ value, the local model is indicated to account for over 23% of the variance in these data compared to just over one percent using the global model. Furthermore, the model is indicated to be a better fit as measured by the AIC value of -4376.63 compared to -1612.38 in the global model.

Table 3. Geographically weighted regression 5-number parameter summary results and Monte Carlo significance test for spatial variability of parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Minimum/Maximum</th>
<th>Lower/Upper Quartiles</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Monte Carlo Testing Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.85 0.13</td>
<td>0.00 0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Non-Stationary***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPI</td>
<td>-0.50 0.23</td>
<td>-0.04 0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>Non-Stationary**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-1.71 0.67</td>
<td>-0.03 0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>Non-Stationary**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>-4376.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; *** $p<0.001$
Further geographic analysis was conducted to assess the spatial variability of the parameter estimates. The results of this analysis indicate that the parameter estimates vary substantially across the United States. These results, taken in conjunction with the descriptive geographic analysis mentioned above, are informative in examining how the global model without the interaction effect compares to the OLS model with the interaction effect. Take, for example, the southeast United States. Our descriptive geographic analysis of race and poverty indicated that this area of the country has relatively high levels of African American children and relatively high levels of poverty and other indicators of class differentials. In our geographic analysis of GWR coefficients in this same region, it appears that the racial coefficients are relatively low. This is consistent with the interaction effect, which was interpreted as showing that race had less of an effect on the receipt of one's diploma ratios when SES was low. Similarly, returning to our geographic analysis of parameter estimates, it can be seen that areas with high socioeconomic statuses and high proportions of African American children appear to have higher racial coefficients (e.g., eastern Michigan/Detroit,) indicating that race may play a more significant role in educational attainment. Thus, the results of our geographic analysis in conjunction with the increased R-Squared value and decreased AIC, suggest that the variability captured in the interaction variable of the global OLS model is better accounted for by the local GWR model.

Discussion

In the nearly thirty years since William Julius Wilson declared class as the more significant determinant of social mobility, we have seen a country grow increasingly divided by intersecting factors of race, class and other residual demographic factors, such as place (Massey, 2007). In this paper we chose the public education system as the site to examine how the interaction of race, class and spatial stratification impacts the high school graduation rates of African American high school-aged students. Through the use of regression techniques that allow for the examination of both the global and geographically varying aspects of these constructs, we acquired a more
in-depth understanding of how race, class and place interact to predict high school graduation rates nationwide. The results of these analyses provide support for the proposition that a singular focus on race, class, or locale represents an oversimplification of this problem. These results instead lend support to the need to focus on the manner in which multiple position- alities, or what McCall (2005) terms “intercategorical complexity,” influence the academic achievement of African American children and young adults.

The Interaction Between Race, Class & Place on Educational Attainment

Consistent with the reviewed literature on educational attainment (Belluck, 1999; Kozol, 2005) the results of our analyses indicate a positive relationship between the socioeconomic status of a school district (as measured by SEPI or school district class indicators) and the aggregate level of educational attainment in that school district. As was seen in Jencks and Phillips (1998) and Ferguson (2007), a similar trend was observed with respect to race. In school districts with higher levels of African American school-age children there are lower rates of educational attainment. Thus, with respect to our first two research questions, as has been previously documented in the literature, we can say that both social class and race appear to have independent effects on educational outcomes.

With respect to our third research question, pertaining to the presence of race and class interactions on educational outcomes, our analyses indeed show evidence of such interactions. Similar to the findings uncovered in the 2009 NCES educational statistics, our findings suggest that there are increasing levels of educational attainment for white students in privileged school districts. Interestingly, the data presented in this study augments and contextualizes these findings in the literature by revealing that in affluent school districts that possess relatively high numbers of African American school-age children, there is an increase in the levels of educational attainment compared to privileged districts with a lower percentage of African American students. In other words, for primarily white and wealthy school districts, race is the greater
Moving Beyond Dichotomies

determinant of students' educational attainment, however in predominantly African American school districts factors associated with SES can play a more predictive role. These findings reinforce the claims made by Hallinan (2001) and Yeskel (2008) that a more sophisticated appreciation of the intersections between race and class can reveal a complex picture of the factors that predispose educational inequality.

From our analysis in the local GWR model, we learned that there is a noticeable spatial variability across the United States, seeming to give credence to the idea that "intercategorical factors" like place can be important in determining rates of educational attainment. These findings move beyond the regional discussions presented in Roscigno et al. (2006) or a binary urban/rural distinction sometimes mentioned in the sociological literature. This finding starts to address our fourth research question regarding the moderating role spatial stratification can play in explaining the variability in the rates of high school graduation. For instance, the geographic analysis of our local model indicates that in some portions of the country, such as the Detroit or Miami areas, where there are greater concentrations of African Americans, SES factors may be a more significant predictor of high school graduation rates.

Differential patterns of the effects of race were also observed in our geographic analysis of the model coefficients, the association between educational outcomes and numbers of African American school-age children matches the trend of the global model in much of the northern portion of the country while a neutral or even positive association with race is observed in most of the South. Such inconsistent patterns across the country could support the conjectures of Kozol (2005) and Fine, Roberts & Torre (2004) that disparate levels of achievement are the product of an uneven distribution of resources to poor and minority school districts throughout the country or perhaps varying levels of racial segregation in educational settings, as Caldas and Bankston (1998) posited.

As previously stated, these findings start to address the question about the moderating role place can play in understanding educational inequalities. When we initially developed our fourth research question about the role of place, we expected to see more robust regional or urban/rural
differences emerge in our geographic analysis. Based on the dominant literature on the academic achievement gap, it was anticipated that in locales with large percentages of urban poverty and racial segregation that we would see significant clusters of low graduation rates. Overall, these variable patterns are interpreted as an indication that it is inappropriate to tell a single story for the association between race and class across the whole country. In response to the question of whether race or class is the dominant predictor of educational inequality, the answer is: it depends. Rather, the extent to which either one of these factors is associated with educational attainment can depend on the location of a school district. More than just a simple interaction effect as identified in the global model, the results of our analyses indicate that place can provide important context for the explanation of how a student’s educational attainment is constructed and the many competing factors that influence that trajectory. Rather than there being a singular indictment of race, class or place as explanatory variables, it is more apt to say the relationships between these variables represent a complex problem, and educational outcomes depend on an individual’s amalgamation of racial and class positional-ity, as well as place.

Implications of this Study

The results from this study reconfirm the necessity of scholars and practitioners to focus on the manner in which multiple positionalities influence the academic achievement of African American children and young adults. Clearly, resources should be allocated to students with the greatest need; therefore, we urge the importance of considering the multiple determinants of social and educational inequality (e.g., race, class, gender, place, etc.). This has a practical implication for after-school enrichment programs and funders that target services for “at-risk” students using school-wide indicators like percentages of students receiving free and reduced lunch. In light of these findings, we also want to stress that racial minorities, even in affluent areas, are still in need of services and support to reach their educational goals.

Furthermore, the themes underscored in this study can
Moving Beyond Dichotomies

resonate well beyond the educational system. For social welfare scholars interested in the predictors of social inequality, the findings in this study emphasize the need for a more nuanced discussion on how individual attributes like race and class interact with social contexts like place. This research also has implications for social work practice. Since issues of social inequality are central to the core tenets of social work practice, it is important that we do not fall prey to unidimensional explanations of inequality. Knee-jerk responses of “it’s race” or “it’s class” fail to take into account the context of multidimensional issues. The findings in this study reinforce the critical importance of including conversations about multidimensionality and intersectionality within social work education.

Limitations of this Study and Directions for Future Research

The current study has several limitations. As stated previously, the study is cross-sectional, therefore causation cannot be inferred with any degree of certainty. The cross-sectional nature of the study also prevents the analysis of cohort effects, which are of potential importance and represent the typical means by which graduation rates are measured in the United States. While our approach to measuring graduation rates takes into account the many different pathways young adults make to graduation, we do miss those that drop-out before reaching the twelfth grade. This approach also limits the ability to assess the extent to which the significance of race is changing over time, as Wilson has suggested. The school district focus of the study makes it impossible to include individual-level covariates such as gender, sexual orientation, immigration status, and other family demographics, as well as community-level factors such as the presence of violence, which are potentially of value in discussions of educational outcomes. Also the focus on school districts obscures the variation in graduation rates for large cities, such as New York City, that also comprise single school districts. Finally, since we relied on those that self-reported as African American on the 2000 U.S. Census, it is impossible for us to ascertain possible within-group differences among African Americans. This approach also precludes the
inclusion of those that perhaps do not self-identify as African American on the Census or those who opt to not participate in it.

Future research in this area is needed to better understand how the contextual factors analyzed in this study relate to the propensity of individual students to graduate from high school. Ideally, such research should focus on graduation cohorts with students as the unit of analysis. Although the analyses presented in this manuscript provide more information than analyses conducted at the state or country level, they are limited by the lack of information on individual students which the literature suggests are important determinants of educational outcomes in the United States. Nonetheless, such future research should also be informed by the results of this study, which suggests that the macro-level context in which a student is educated also plays an important role in educational attainment.

Conclusion

In *The Declining Significance of Race* Wilson (1978) described a country that he hoped to see, a country where the historical legacies of racism could be transcended. One of the limitations of his approach was an attempt to explain social inequality with a singular focus on class. Such an approach fails to acknowledge that people's lives are multidimensional. Simple bivariate approaches to problems of social inequality tend to flatten the fine-grained details or context that informs the lived experiences of children as members of families, communities, school districts, counties and states (compounded by their own individual biological makeup). However, Wilson deserves credit for advancing a provocative thesis about the declining significance of race that inspired generations of scholars to interrogate more critically the relative roles of race and class in the prospects for individual and group advancement in American society.

Although we chose to focus on the public education system, there are many other social domains, such as the prison industrial complex, where we hypothesize a similar coalescing of predictive factors occurs. As we have seen in this paper, with regard to the public education system, the classic engines of
social inequality (racism and class) are still alive. The race, class and place dialectic is, in a sense, a synthesis of these various iterations of social marginalization and stratification. Consistent with intersectionality theorists like McCall, the results of this study indicate that rather than race, class or place being singular drivers of educational disparities, a convergence of factors is responsible. This does not lend itself to simple prescriptive indictments of race or class as causes of inequality. Rather than the education system being “the great equalizer,” we have seen that educational attainment is influenced by a combination of factors, including the socioeconomic status of one’s school district, the race of one’s peers in that school district and perhaps, most profoundly, one’s zip code.

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to acknowledge Dr. Gunnar Almgren, Dr. David Takeuchi, Kari Gloppen, Dylan Smith and the anonymous reviewers for their support with this article.

References


Endnotes:
1) Although this study made use of GIS technology for both descriptive and inferential analyses, the fact that this study included school districts from across the country required the authors to produce high-resolution maps that cannot be meaningfully included in a grayscale publication. These maps can be accessed freely over the internet with additional information at http://staff.washington.edu/mienkoja/pweb/StorerEtAl2012FullColorFigures.pdf. References such as “geographic analysis” included in the remainder of the document refer to the authors’ interpretation of these maps.
This research challenges William Julius Wilson’s (1980) postulation that social class has superseded race in predicting economic outcomes among African Americans. Among the evidence Wilson used to support his claim was the strong position of black degree holders, particularly women. Shortly after the publication of The Declining Significance of Race, however, the United States experienced a severe recession and slow recovery, contributing to a marked growth in the black-white wage gap among women. Young black women were particularly hard hit. Over the 1980s, their cumulative work experience became increasingly correlated with educational attainment, leading to an absolute loss in experience among less educated black women. Although black degree holders were able to keep pace in cumulative work experience, their wage trajectories flattened over their twenties, relative to both a previous cohort and young white degree holders. The declining relative work experience and wage erosion of young black women during the 1980s does not bode well for young black women weathering the 2007-2009 recession. Initial indicators find an increase in the black-white wage gap and disproportionate growth in the length of unemployment spells among young black women, particularly degree holders. The losses sustained by young black degree holders during two severe recessions and their inability to regain ground during subsequent recoveries challenge Wilson’s thesis that educational attainment and social class can insulate African Americans from racial inequality.

Key words: racial inequality, wage inequality, African Americans, recession, work experience
William Julius Wilson's influential book, *The Declining Significance of Race* traces the historical relationship between race, class, and economic inequality in the United States, concluding that race has waned as a predictor of economic outcomes among African Americans. At the time the book was published, African Americans had made remarkable economic and occupational gains in recent decades. Wilson noted the shrinking wage gap between black male and white male degree holders and the strong position of black female degree holders (Wilson, 1980, pp. 178-179). By the late 1970s, black female workers had a higher median wage relative to white females as professionals, managers, and with a college degree creating an optimism concerning the future of African Americans (Dozier, 2010; Wilson, 1980). History supports Wilson's prediction that gains made by African Americans in aggregate occupational mobility would continue and that within-race inequality, i.e., class inequality, would become increasingly significant. Over the 1980s, within-race wage inequality grew significantly and socioeconomic class, indeed, appeared to eclipse race in determining economic well-being (Mishel, Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2007).

Related Literature about Social Conditions

Just a few years after publication of *The Declining Significance of Race*, the United States experienced a severe recession and African Americans suffered disproportionately. Young black female workers were hard hit (see Table 1), posting absolute losses in median hourly wage and work experience over the 1980s (Bound & Dresser, 1999; Corcoran, 1999). During the same time period, young white women increased their labor force participation and made some wage gains, significantly increasing black-white inequality among young women. By 1990, the wage gap had tripled and young white women had, on average, nine months more work experience relative to young black women (Bound & Dresser, 1999; Kilbourne, England, & Beron, 1994; McCrate & Leete, 1994; Pettit & Ewert, 2009). The losses sustained by young, black women during the 1980s have persisted, even during subsequent economic expansions (Browne & Askew, 2005).
The relative wage erosion of young black women during the 1980s was due to a confluence of factors reflecting their unique social and economic position. In some respects, their misfortune during an economic downturn is not surprising. At the aggregate level, young black women lag in degree attainment and work experience, suffer from residential segregation, are occupationally concentrated in low-wage service jobs, and experience racial discrimination in hiring and wages (Alon & Haberfeld, 2007; Bound & Dresser, 1999; Iceland & Wilkes, 2006; Massey & Denton, 1992; McCrate & Leete, 1994; Neal, 2004). In addition to their weaker position in the labor market, young black women faced greater competition for jobs as young white women strengthened their labor force attachment. Thus young black women in the 1980s faced a labor market with both fewer jobs available due to the recession, and increased competition for available jobs. These factors affected young black female workers regardless of socioeconomic class, illustrating a persistent racial vulnerability to structural shifts.

**Joblessness and Outcomes**

In his book, Wilson addresses the influence of joblessness, asserting that the ability to get work (as evidenced by the employment rate) is the most significant indicator of relative disadvantage (Wilson, 1980, p. 89). Joblessness has long-term consequences because it lowers cumulative work experience and may signal a lack of motivation to future employers (Alon & Haberfeld, 2007). Among African Americans, employment is more strongly tied to the business cycle, resulting in disproportionate joblessness during recessions (Couch & Fairlie, 2010). As African Americans improved their labor force status as degree holders, managers, and professionals, Wilson asserted that a greater proportion of black workers would be insulated from fluctuations in the business cycle. He pointed to the relative equality among black and white degree holders in the late 1970s, claiming that any observed racial wage inequality among degree holders comprised a cohort effect due to historic discrimination that affected cumulative work experience and seniority among older workers. Yet over the 1980s and 1990s, as the effects of historical discrimination on work experience subsided, racial wage inequality among female degree holders grew (Dozier, 2010).
Changes in the labor market position of black female workers can be understood within the framework of queuing theory. Queuing theory describes a labor queue in which workers are sorted by employer preference. Workers who are highest in the labor queue (due to skills, race, sex, and other characteristics) have the most bargaining power and greatest access to "good jobs" while workers lowest in the queue have the least bargaining power, and are "last hired and first fired" (Reskin & Roos, 1990). During the 1980s and 1990s, labor market queues fundamentally changed. First, the labor queue was reordered as, judging from women's wage growth, women became more valued workers (Dozier, 2010; Mishel, Bernstein, & Boushey, 2003; Padavic & Reskin, 2002). Second, the shape of the labor queue changed as an increasing proportion of workers had college degrees (Carnevale & Rose, 1998; Farber, 1997; Morris & Western, 1999). Wilson's thesis resides within this framework—degree attainment among black workers will strengthen their position in the labor queue, insulating them from joblessness and inequality. Although skilled black female workers were outperforming skilled white female workers in the late 1970s, Wilson did not predict the influx of white women into the labor queue. Increased competition from young white women displaced black women because white women's higher educational attainment, increased labor force attachment, and race privilege advantaged them, pushing young black women further down the queue. The erosion of young, black women's standing in the labor queue increased their likelihood of joblessness relative to white women, regardless of education level.

Effect of Economic Recessions on the Employment of Women

The United States has experienced several economic recessions during the last three decades, peaking in 1981-1982, 1991, 2001 and 2007-2009 (Knotek & Terry, 2009). As noted by Wilson, the primary effect of recessions on workers is joblessness, rather than wage erosion. Unemployment rates during the last two severe recessions were comparable, with unemployment peaking at 10.8 percent in 1982 and 10.1 percent in
Young Black Women and Economic Downturns

2009 (Allegretto & Lynch, 2009). However, in the last three decades recessions have had differential effects on women and men. During the severe recessions of 1981-1982 and 2007-2009, men faced greater joblessness due to the fields in which they work (e.g., construction and manufacturing) while women remained relatively sheltered due to their predominance in fields less vulnerable to business cycles (e.g., teaching and health care) (Shank & Haugen, 1987; Wall, 2009). Job creation during recent economic recoveries has also disproportionately benefited women (Joint Economic Committee Majority Staff, 2010; Shank & Haugen, 1987). Women, then, are in a unique position having lost less in the past two severe recessions and gained a greater share of new jobs during subsequent recoveries (Dozier, 2010; Hoynes, 2000; Shank & Haugen, 1987). While Wilson focuses on the position of black workers generally, black women and black men have been differentially affected by fluctuations in the business cycle. Although black women did not experience the joblessness suffered by men, they experienced greater losses and smaller gains relative to white women in both severe recessions (Hoynes, 2000; Shank & Haugen, 1987; Wall, 2009).

While growth in and persistence of class inequality remain central in explaining the economic position of African Americans, my analysis indicates that racial inequality still contributes significantly to the economic position of African American women. Increasingly, the lower wages of African American women relative to white women are not explained by differential educational attainment and, among degree holders, wage inequality has grown (Dozier, 2010). Additionally, Wilson states that the insulating effects of education should protect young black degree holders from economic downturns, yet it is unclear to what extent employment and cumulative work experience is mediated by educational attainment. In this analysis, I examine the effect of educational attainment on changes in cumulative work experience and wage trajectories over the 1980s. I also look at initial effects of the most recent recession, examining joblessness and wage inequality among young black women and white women.
Method

Data

This analysis uses two secondary datasets: The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). Both are nationally representative samples administered by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. I use the NLS to examine outcomes for young female workers during the 1980s and the CPS to examine effects of the 2007-2009 recession.

National Longitudinal Surveys

Sample. The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) are a set of longitudinal surveys that gather detailed information about family, education, and work experience from a nationally representative sample. In this analysis, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (referred to as the 1980 cohort in this analysis) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) (referred to as the 1991 cohort in this analysis). Interviews for the NLS began in 1968 with young women who were 14 to 25 years old with an average age of 18.75 years. The NLSY began in 1979 with young women 14 to 21 years old with an average age of 17.75 years. For this analysis, I eliminate women in the earlier cohort that were over 21 at the initial interview in order to make the cohorts more similar in age distribution. The sample is limited to black and white non-Hispanic women working in the public or private sector who were interviewed in the 13th year of the survey, 1980 and 1991 respectively. The sample includes 1448 white women and 650 black women in the 1980 cohort and 1687 white women and 978 black women in the 1991 cohort.

The National Longitudinal Surveys are optimal for this analysis because they contain information regarding actual work experience. The surveys also provide some unique challenges, especially when attempting to compare two surveys, because they do not always have identical or even comparable questions. Additionally, they have differential rates of attrition and relatively small sample sizes. However, these weaknesses are overshadowed by the detailed work history and longitudinal data offered by the NLS and NLSY datasets.
Variable descriptions. Since the NLS surveys have a relatively small sample size, the regional variable has been condensed and coded as living in the South or not living in the South. Other variables used in this analysis include age, family status, educational attainment, rural or metropolitan residence, and part-time or full-time employment. In the recent cohort it is not possible to distinguish city center from metropolitan residence for a large portion of respondents, thus the measure has been condensed to “rural” and “non-rural.” Educational attainment is derived from reports of the highest grade completed and coded into “less than high school,” “high school,” “some college,” and “college degree.” Although this results in some overestimation of diplomas and degrees (Frazis, Ports, & Stewart, 1995), the magnitude of error should remain similar between cohorts.

In order to gauge changing labor force participation, I used two measures. At the aggregate level, I used the percent of women working in the last observation year (1980 and 1991, respectively). At the individual level, I measured cumulative work experience as the percent of observation weeks worked by the respondent. This strategy overcomes the challenges of missing data due to missed interviews. In addition to cumulative weeks worked, I also used tenure (in years) in the last or current job as a job-specific measure of work experience.

Analysis. Most of the analysis in this paper is straightforward, using summary statistics and percentage distributions. I also incorporate ordinary least squared regression in order to examine the effects of human capital and labor market variables on hourly wage outcomes. In addition, I use synthetic wage trajectories in order to examine the average change in hourly wage over the respondents’ twenties.

Synthetic wage trajectories are derived using the mean hourly wage observation at each age available in a particular cohort. One weakness of this is the age span of respondents. For instance, in the first cohort, individuals were age 22 between the years 1969 and 1976 while in the second cohort, individuals were 22 between the years 1980 and 1986. Thus the two surveys have a small proportion of observations of 22 year olds that were only 4 years apart—1976 and 1980. However, this would serve to attenuate, rather than overstate, differences
between the two cohorts. On average, observations between cohorts are eleven years apart and there are fewer respondents at the tails of the age distribution, helping diminish the effect of the relatively close observations. Another challenge in using person years is that some respondents overly influence the results because they have numerous wage observations, due to both a steady work history and a complete interview history. This means workers with the most stable jobs and the highly educated might overly influence wage trajectories, creating an upward bias. Although trajectories may be upwardly biased, this bias should not differ between cohorts. Since the focus of this analysis is on change between cohorts, the potential upward bias will not markedly influence the findings.

Current Population Survey Annual Demographic Survey

Sample. For the analysis of the 2007-2009 recession, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data from the first six months of 2006 and 2009. The CPS is a monthly household survey of approximately 57,000 households conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to measure labor force and demographic characteristics of the U.S. population. The CPS is a probability sample of the civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States. The Current Population Survey is optimal for investigating black-white inequality among women because of its large sample size, representative sample, reliable earnings data, and consistency in questioning. The sample for this analysis is restricted to non-Hispanic women identifying as black or white, ages 27 to 33, with an average age of 30, in order to correspond with the average age of women in the NLS and NLSY datasets. The sample includes 6642 white women and 1201 black women in 2006 and 6865 white women and 1240 black women in 2009.

Variable descriptions. Hourly wage observations are derived from respondent reports of usual weekly income divided by reports of usual hours worked per week. Other variables are used directly from the dataset, including employment status (employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force) and duration of unemployment spell (weeks). Educational attainment is derived from the highest grade completed and coded into “less than high school,” “high school,” “some college,”
and "college degree" in order to resemble the variable in the National Longitudinal Surveys.

Results

Trends in Work Experience over the 1980s

During the 1980s, the influx of white women into the labor market coupled with an economic downturn resulted in a weakening of young black women's position in the labor queue. Young black women experienced relative wage loss when compared to young white women, and among the less educated, absolute wage loss (see Table 1). In addition to the erosion of wages, black women had greater difficulty in finding work at all. The changing labor force participation of young women is evident at both the individual and group level. At the respondent level, cumulative work experience is derived from the percent of observation weeks worked. At the aggregate level, labor force participation is expressed as the proportion of black or white women working, unemployed, or out of the labor force when respondents are, on average, thirty years old (1980 and 1991).

The change in the proportions of young women working and working full-time illustrates the growth in the labor force participation of white women over the 1980s. While the proportion of white and black women working was similar in 1980, by 1991, white women were more likely to be in the labor force and equally likely to be working full time (see Figure 1a; Table 1). By 1991, 75 percent of young white women were working relative to 64 percent of black women.

At the respondent level, white women's increased labor force participation over the 1980s culminated in increased work experience. In the 1980 cohort, white women had worked 56 percent of the observation weeks, on average, while the 1991 cohort had worked 68 percent of the observation weeks. As white women gained work experience, black women's cumulative experience stagnated at just over half of the observation weeks (see Figure 1b). Although work experience among young black and white women was comparable in 1980, by 1991, white women's work experience was approximately thirty percent higher.
Tenure on current or most recent job improved slightly for white women between cohorts while black women’s tenure remained similar, at just over 3 ½ years. White women increased their job tenure by approximately a half year to 3.9 years; thus in the first cohort, white women had slightly less tenure than black women and in the second cohort, they had slightly more. Because respondents are in their prime childbearing years, the growth in job tenure and weeks worked implies that, over the 1980s, white women became increasingly likely to remain in the labor force after having children.

Unemployment rates across cohorts were similar among both black women and white women, although the unemployment rate among black women was more than twice as high for both cohorts (10 percent vs. 4 percent in 1991). At the individual level, white women had a similar number of weeks unemployed in both cohorts while the time unemployed grew by over fifty percent between cohorts among young black women. Thus although the unemployment rate remained relatively stable between cohorts, the length of unemployment spells grew significantly for young black female workers during the 1980s.

The time spent out of the labor force declined dramatically for white women from 40 percent to 27 percent, and slightly among black women, from 41 percent to 37 percent. At the aggregate level, the proportion of white women not working, either due to unemployment or non-participation in the labor market, declined from 35 percent to 27 percent, while for black
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Young Women

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<td>Mean age</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Mean hourly wage</td>
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<td>$12.30</td>
<td>$9.42</td>
<td>$10.11</td>
<td>$1.74</td>
<td>$0.69</td>
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<td>Median hourly wage</td>
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<td>$10.29</td>
<td>$8.58</td>
<td>$8.54</td>
<td>$0.86</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (years on job)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of observation weeks

- Working: 0.56, 0.68, 0.53, 0.53, 0.12, --
- Not in labor force: 0.40, 0.27, 0.41, 0.37, -0.13, -0.04
- Unemployed: 0.03, 0.04, 0.07, 0.11, 0.01, 0.04

Percent of sample

- < High school: 0.10, 0.09, 0.27, 0.16, -0.01, -0.11
- High school: 0.42, 0.44, 0.42, 0.42, 0.02, --
- Some college: 0.23, 0.23, 0.19, 0.30, -0.01, 0.11
- BA or greater: 0.25, 0.24, 0.13, 0.13, --, --
- Married, children: 0.62, 0.52, 0.38, 0.26, -0.10, -0.12
- Married, no children: 0.13, 0.15, 0.05, 0.06, 0.02, --
- Single parent: 0.10, 0.13, 0.43, 0.48, 0.02, 0.05
- Single, no children: 0.15, 0.21, 0.14, 0.20, 0.05, 0.06
- Rural residence: 0.30, 0.23, 0.20, 0.15, -0.07, -0.06
- South: 0.28, 0.33, 0.59, 0.58, 0.04, -0.02
- Full-time work: 0.48, 0.56, 0.57, 0.55, 0.08, -0.02
- Part-time work: 0.17, 0.18, 0.10, 0.09, 0.01, -0.01
- Not in the labor force: 0.32, 0.23, 0.24, 0.26, -0.09, 0.02
- Unemployed: 0.03, 0.04, 0.09, 0.10, 0.01, 0.01

Notes: NLS & NLSY data, weighted; hourly wages are PCE deflated to 2000 dollars.

women the proportion grew slightly, from 33 percent to 36 percent (see Figure 1b). Taken together, this means that, by 1991, a smaller proportion of young black women were participating in the labor force at any given time and their cumulative work experience had declined relative to that of young white women. Black women's relative loss of work experience was primarily due to white women's growth in work experience rather than declines among black women. However, even though black women's cumulative work experience remained similar between cohorts, at the aggregate level, they were less likely to be employed in 1991. White women, on the
other hand, were more likely to be working, more likely to be working full-time, and were accruing experience at a rapid pace relative to the previous cohort.

**Trend in Returns to Work Experience**

Over the 1980s, young white women dramatically increased their labor force participation, leading to greater cumulative work experience and a higher employment rate relative to black women. As white women’s work experience increased, returns to experience also changed (see Table 2). In the 1980 cohort, when black and white women were more similar in experience, white women’s return to experience was approximately fifty percent higher than black women’s; for each ten percent increase in weeks worked, white women’s hourly wage increased by 4.3 percent. Between cohorts, white women gained in weeks worked, while their return to experience remained similar, increasing their wages. Conversely, black women’s work experience remained similar, but their return to experience grew markedly; the return to each ten percent increase in weeks worked grew from three to five percentage points between cohorts. By 1991, then, work experience became particularly influential to black women’s wages.

For both black and white women, work experience was most important among high school dropouts. In the 1991 cohort, controlling for work experience reduces the wage penalty for less than twelve years of education by almost two thirds, meaning that the chief obstacle for less-educated women is in getting and keeping a job. Work experience had little effect on the return to a college degree (except among black women in 1991); instead returns to work experience were in addition to the premium already garnered by degree holders. Interestingly, by 1991, the influence of education was attenuated by work experience at all education levels among young black women, meaning that work experience more strongly mediated the effect of education. In addition, although regression models show that work experience was important in explaining wage variation in both cohorts, it was particularly important to black women’s wages in 1991, improving the model fit by over fifty percent.
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models for Young Women Workers

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
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<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.88</td>
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<td>.01**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.08***</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>Single parent</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<td>.04</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>Less than high school</td>
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<td>-13***</td>
<td>-11**</td>
<td>-05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
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<td>.08***</td>
<td>.12***</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
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<td>.28***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.09***</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>-.10***</td>
<td>-.15***</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure on job</td>
<td>.02***</td>
<td>.02***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work experience</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>889</td>
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1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White 1991</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married, no kids</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single parent</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unmarried, no kids</td>
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<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>-23***</td>
<td>-09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
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<td>.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-.22***</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure on job</td>
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<td>.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work experience</td>
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<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2295</td>
<td>1349</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Omitted categories: married with children, high school, not South, non-rural; **.01, *.05, *.10; weighted NLS and NLSY data; dependent variable is log hourly wage, PCE deflated to 2000 dollars
In a sense then, young black women and white women experienced differential trends over the 1980s. In 1980, cumulative work experience and job tenure were particularly important to white women’s wages, becoming less influential by 1991. By 1991, young black women had longer spells of unemployment and lower levels of work experience relative to white women, yet work experience became far more predictive of their wages.

The Effect of Educational Attainment on Work Experience

While cumulative work experience significantly affected the wages of young women, returns to experience were mediated by education. In 1980, young black and white women had similar levels of work experience, except among degree holders, where young black women worked almost 10 percent more weeks; both black and white high school dropouts worked only one third of observation weeks (see Table 3). By 1991, white women made gains in work experience at all educational levels, while black women’s work experience became increasingly dependent on education. Table 3 shows that black women lost ground in work experience with a diploma or less and only made gains as degree holders. Both black and white degree holders gained in work experience, working approximately three quarters of the observation weeks by 1991.

Over the 1980s, then, as economic necessity sent more women into the labor force, black women had a more difficult time getting work relative to white women. Black women had longer spells of unemployment, and work experience was increasingly contingent upon educational attainment. Although black women did not experience absolute losses in work experience, relative to white women, they lost ground. With increasing competition from white female workers and fewer jobs available during the economic downturn, black female workers fell behind and young black female workers especially suffered (Bound & Dresser, 1999; Dozier, 2010). A tighter job market meant that the least desirable workers (young, black, uneducated women) fell in the labor queue, leading to lower employment, less cumulative work experience, and wage stagnation.
Young Black Women and Economic Downturns

Table 3. Proportion of Observation Weeks Worked by Level of Education

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<td>&lt; High school</td>
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<td>.33</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.10</td>
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<td>High school</td>
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<td>.56</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
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<td>.65</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: NLS & NLSY data, weighted

Educational Attainment and Within-Cohort Wage Trajectories

Women workers were in a unique position in the 1980s. While generally workers in the United States suffered losses due to industry shifts and an economic recession, women did not suffer to the same extent as men (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, & Scott, 2001; Browne, 1999; Dozier, 2010; Shank & Haugen, 1987). Young white women increased their labor force participation, improved their cumulative work experience, and made wage gains across educational levels during the 1980s (Bound & Dresser, 1999; Browne, 1999; McCrate & Leete, 1994). The plight of young black women was mixed, as they followed the broader trend of wage erosion among the less educated, yet, like white women, made some gains as degree holders and with some college. Relative to white female workers however, they lost ground in both cumulative work experience and mean hourly wage across educational groups (see Table 4).

Table 4. Mean Hourly Wage By Level of Education

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; High school</td>
<td>$7.06</td>
<td>$7.37</td>
<td>$8.19</td>
<td>$6.31</td>
<td>$1.12</td>
<td>-$1.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>$9.68</td>
<td>$8.64</td>
<td>$9.79</td>
<td>$8.40</td>
<td>$0.11</td>
<td>-$0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>$10.76</td>
<td>$9.99</td>
<td>$12.81</td>
<td>$11.29</td>
<td>$2.05</td>
<td>$1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>$12.88</td>
<td>$13.11</td>
<td>$16.75</td>
<td>$14.28</td>
<td>$3.87</td>
<td>$1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: NLS & NLSY data, weighted; hourly wages are PCE deflated to 2000 dollars

The marked growth in the degree premium (i.e., return to a college degree) significantly increased wage
inequality over the 1980s. Among the highly educated, wage trajectories became steeper, leading to greater wage dispersion as workers aged and gained experience (Bernhardt et al., 2001). As the college premium led to steeper wage trajectories for degree holders, wages of the less educated stagnated or, in the case of white men over the 1980s, declined (Bernhardt et al., 2001; Morris & Western, 1999). One would expect that white women’s strengthened position in the labor force would lead to steeper wage trajectories over their twenties, especially as degree holders. In keeping with Wilson’s thesis, black women would have greater dispersion in wages based on educational attainment, culminating in steeper trajectories for degree holders and flatter trajectories among diploma holders and high school dropouts.

Figure 2 displays the synthetic wage trajectories of black and white women from ages 22 to 30. Figure 2a indicates that white women in the 1980 cohort experienced relatively little growth in wages or wage dispersion over their twenties (during the 1970s). After age 24, the wage gap between high school dropouts and degree holders remained steady and the high school/college gap increased only slightly, due to the relatively flat wage trajectory for degree holders. In the early cohort, black women had a more typical pattern of wage dispersion over time. Although the black and white wage gaps were similar at age 24, the black dropout-degree wage gap widened, due to the steady growth in wages for degree holders and the stagnation of wages among high school dropouts. Diploma holders fared a little better, but, still, the diploma-degree wage dispersion was larger for black women over their twenties than for white women. Over the 1970s, then, black degree holders were able to make impressive gains, distancing themselves from the less educated and supporting Wilson’s claim that class superseded race in determining the economic outcomes of African Americans.

In the 1991 cohort, however, the trend in wage trajectories was reversed, with white women experiencing a more typical pattern of dispersion, including increasing advantage to degree holders over time. Black women had a more compressed wage structure across their twenties relative to both the previous cohort and white women. As expected, black high
school dropouts experienced little wage growth over time in both cohorts. White dropouts in the 1980 cohort experienced some wage growth over their twenties, while the 1991 cohort did not appear to make gains over time, illustrating the difficulties that all low-education workers faced during the 1980s.

Figure 2. Wage Trajectories of Black and white Women by Educational Attainment

- **NLS, 1980**
- **NLSY, 1980**

![Graphs showing wage trajectories for Black and white women by educational attainment.](image-url)
Additionally, young black women in the later cohort had a lower starting wage, particularly as degree holders. Figure 2d shows that, in the 1991 cohort, black respondents with some college education made close to the same mean wage as degree holders throughout their twenties. This similarity is due to the suppressed wage growth among degree holders rather than an improvement in the wages of black women with some college education.

Overall, then, the steeper wage trajectories of young white female workers over the 1980s are as predicted by their increased labor force participation, greater cumulative work experience, and growth in the college premium. The wage trajectories of black women without a degree are also as expected, illustrating little change as they age and wage stagnation among the least educated. The trajectory of black degree holders, however, is unexpected. While black degree holders were able to keep pace with white women’s growth in work experience, their wage trajectory was flatter than the previous cohort, featuring lower starting wages and suppressed wage growth over their twenties. As a result, black degree holders’ wage trajectory failed to keep pace with white degree holders, creating greater black-white wage inequality among degree holders as women aged.

The Great Recession: Initial Effects on Young Black Women

Economic circumstances during the 1980s were difficult for many workers, but particularly for more vulnerable workers, including the less educated, people of color, and young workers (Bernhardt et al., 2001; Levy & Murnane, 1992). Over the 1980s, young black women spent almost half of their observation weeks not working while young white women spent less than a third. As predicted by Wilson, less educated young black women had particular difficulty in finding work, resulting in wage loss between cohorts. At the same time that young black women were struggling, white women experienced a dramatic increase in work experience both absolutely and relative to young black women. White women’s growing labor force participation and movement into managerial and professional jobs (Dozier, 2010) led to modest wage gains, even during difficult economic times.
Young Black Women and Economic Downturns

Table 5. Labor Force Indicators for Young Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Hourly Wage</td>
<td>$14.71</td>
<td>$16.14</td>
<td>$12.13</td>
<td>$13.13</td>
<td>$1.44</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Hourly Wage</td>
<td>$12.59</td>
<td>$13.53</td>
<td>$10.48</td>
<td>$10.91</td>
<td>$0.94</td>
<td>$0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Employed</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Degree Holders Employed</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Unemployment (Weeks)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Current Population Survey data; weighted; hourly wage PCE deflated to 2000 dollars.

As Americans grapple with the 2007-2009 recession, one would expect a similar outcome—individuals with the least structural power will suffer most. Evidence suggests that young black women have experienced more severe losses during the most recent recession relative to young white women. While both young black women and young white women had median wage gains, the proportionate wage gap grew 2 percentage points (about 15%) between 2006 and 2009. In addition, young black women had steeper declines in percent employed and greater growth in unemployment spells. During the first half of 2009, the median unemployment duration was 12 weeks for young white women and 22 weeks for young black women (see Table 5). This sustained joblessness could have long term effects by reducing cumulative work experience and flattening wage trajectories, as observed in the 1980s. The effects of the recession on degree holders are particularly concerning. One would expect degree holders to be the most insulated from economic downturns, especially women degree holders. However, while white degree holders saw employment declines of 1 percent (from 84 percent to 83 percent), the employment of young black degree holders
declined 6 percentage points, from 86 percent to 80 percent. If the 1980s are predictive, young black women will have a difficult time recovering these losses, even in future economic expansions.

Discussion

This analysis shows the effect of business cycles on the most vulnerable—in this case, young black women with few skills. Yet in contrast to Wilson’s thesis, the negative effect stretched beyond the less educated; young black degree holders also lost ground, indicating a racial component to the effects of economic conditions and business cycles. Although one might expect that low-skill individuals would suffer during economic downturns, other individuals with less social power also bear the brunt of economic losses (Couch & Fairlie, 2010; Hoynes, 2000). With persistent residential segregation, both on a neighborhood and regional level, and a long history of discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1992), African Americans are poised to receive the worst of bad economic news, regardless of socioeconomic class.

Both the absolute losses of less educated black women and the growth in the correlation of educational attainment with joblessness among all young women support Wilson’s thesis that class has superseded race in predicting inequality and employment. Yet the declining position of young black college graduates, particularly the suppression of their wage trajectories even as cumulative work experience grew, challenges the claim that socioeconomic class can protect young black workers from the influence of race in the labor market. However, it is important to note that vulnerability to the business cycle does not explain all of black women’s losses over the 1980s, nor their failure to recover during later economic expansions. Wilson did not predict the influx of white female workers into the labor force, resulting in increased competition for jobs and a fundamental reordering of the labor queue.

Although young black women are facing disproportionate losses in the most recent recession, the long-term effects should not be as pronounced as those experienced during the 1980s. Conditions during the 1980s were unique—not only
did American workers face an economic downturn, but the degree premium grew markedly and women, especially white women, increased their labor force participation. These factors created a “perfect storm,” leading to marked growth in racial wage inequality among young women. In the most recent recession, young black women faced challenges due to their disadvantages in education, work experience, and social power, yet these challenges are not coupled with increased competition from white female workers.

The labor queue is ordered not only by educational attainment, but also by sex and race. As a result, during economic downturns, young black women, like other vulnerable populations, can expect to be disproportionately harmed. Although race may no longer be the initial sorting mechanism, it remains a persistent predictor of the ability to find work, which, as this analysis suggests, influences wage trajectories across the employment life course.

References


Young Black Women and Economic Downturns


Racial Attitudes in the New Millennium: Cool Feelings in Hot Times

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Department of Sociology

In *The Declining Significance of Race*, William Julius Wilson (1980) stated social class was more influential than race in determining social outcomes for Blacks. This thesis remains a controversial centerpiece among race scholars. This paper examines one part of the overall puzzle of American race relations: white racial attitudes since September 11, 2001. Using Wilson's declining significance of race thesis, I question if white racial attitudes toward Blacks declined significantly from 2002 to 2004. If social class exerts greater influence on social indicators than race in the coming years, will racial prejudice, particularly toward Blacks, also decline in significance? What happens to white racial prejudice toward Blacks when a highly racialized national crisis occurs? Does racial prejudice heighten and become more significant or, as Wilson suggested, does it decline?

Key words: September 11, 2001, William Julius Wilson, racial attitudes, prejudice

In 1978, William Julius Wilson daringly proposed that race in the United States was declining in significance. According to Wilson, economic and political changes in the post-Civil Rights era resulted in a bifurcated Black class structure. Wilson (1980) suggested class, rather than race, will have a greater influence on life chances for Blacks, particularly as the Black middle class continues to integrate in economic and social spheres (p. 23, p. 150). Wilson’s thesis supplicated additional research on the evolution of race relations, and some thirty years later debates on the importance of race in social relations continue.
For example, if social class exerts greater influence on social indicators than race in the coming years, will racial prejudice, particularly toward Blacks, also decline in significance? Broadly, I question if race actually declined in significance in the post-Civil Rights era; specifically, after a highly racialized national crisis, what happens to white racial attitudes toward Blacks?

The events of September 11, 2001 quickly affected the nature of communities, politics, group interactions, and American laws. The United States was in a state of unequivocal fear as a result of the attack and the perceived potential threat of additional attacks. In the wake of these fears, the government swiftly enacted new legislation intended to broaden the scope of government power under the auspices of protecting Americans. As Wilson (1980) suggested, racial “conflicts shifted … to the sociopolitical order” (p. 23). In the weeks following September 11, 2001, racial tensions in the United States heightened, as American citizens committed numerous attacks on innocent Arab, Muslim, and South Asian individuals. Thus, as Omi and Winant (1994) suggested, “The [racial] dictatorship … drove racial divisions not only through institutions, but also through psyches” (p. 66). Thus, despite Wilson’s claim that race was declining in significance, the weeks following the terrorist attacks point to a revitalization of overt prejudice based on perceived race group membership.

**Background**

The United States experienced terrorism at an unprecedented level on September 11, 2001 with the hijacking of four U.S. airplanes and the use of those airplanes as weapons against the World Trade Center buildings, the Pentagon, and a failed attempt—possibly at the White House—that crashed in the fields of western Pennsylvania. Abdolian and Takooshian (2003) contended that September 11, 2001 was unprecedented by virtue of the attacks being “immense, unexpected, cunning, ferocious, and devastating” (p. 1429).

While the events of September 11, 2001 represented the largest terrorist attack experienced on American soil, the ramifications of these attacks on the civil liberties, national identity, immigration laws and patriotism confounded the effects of
While the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were unprecedented in many regards, the historic and systematic policies of exclusion and profiling following the aftermath of national threat were not isolated. Ahmad (2002) pointed to Butler who suggested that,

Decentering of September 11 ... is important to understand the meaning and import of the terrorist attacks. But decentering requires not only that we expand our frame of reference to include the world before September 11, we must envision a desired world after September 11 as well. (p. 101)

Along these lines, the academic community postulated about the effects of September 11, 2001 on race relations and the resulting socio-political “othering” as indicated through changes in racial attitudes, immigration laws, perceptions of terrorism, civil liberties, and other race-related changes (e.g., Abdolian & Takooshian, 2003; Ahmad, 2002; Akram & Johnson, 2002; Coryn, Beale, & Myers, 2004; Crotty, 2004; Engle, 2004; Gwartney, 2007; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2004; Volpp, 2002).

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 many Americans transferred their sorrow for the victims and anger toward the terrorists onto innocent individuals of Middle Eastern descent. The number of hate-crimes in the weeks immediately following September 11, 2001 rose to slightly over 1,000 (Ahmad, 2002). Akram and Johnson (2002) suggested that the complexity of these hate crimes was confounded by the failure of the perpetrator to differentiate among racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Despite the increased race-related hate crimes committed against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians, Volpp (2002) suggested that these crimes were understood as “crimes of passion, whereby the passion is love of nation” (p. 1590). American national identity formed around ideas of loyalty and patriotism and otherness formed synchronically around opposition to patriotism, American loyalty, and America. Thus, the repercussions of September 11, 2001 called on all individuals living within the borders of the United States to forge alliances and display images of patriotism. In particular, people of color needed to prove allegiance to the United States and display a
sense of national identity.

The creation of “otherness” at moments of heightened national security—from the slavery of Africans, forced removal of American Indians, exclusionary and quota immigration laws, Japanese internment camps, definitions of Germans, Italians, and Japanese as enemy aliens—was not a new phenomenon in the United States (Engle, 2004). Identity creation of otherness occurred in a symbiotic relationship with the heightening of nationalism or national identity. Part of increased patriotism encompassed the “You’re either with us or against us” attitude, whereby questioning the American government is perceived as anti-Americanism or as a request for additional terrorist attacks (Abdolian & Takooshian, 2003).

Existing research on race relations post-September 11, 2001 suggested that groups of color, rather than forging alliances with other groups of color based on their subordinated status within the racial hierarchy in the United States, tended to reorder racial hierarchies (Ahmad, 2002). Ahmad (2002) suggested that Black and Latina/o individuals, rather than opposing the very laws they were historically subjected to, supported increased racial profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians (p. 103). The compression of attitudes among whites, Blacks, and Latina/os pointed to the creation of the “other” or “alien enemy” whereby Blacks and Latina/os forged their alliances with Whites and staked claim to increased American identity (Ahmad, 2002). Accordingly, Blacks and Latina/os supported profiling laws, which constituted what Johnson (2002) referred to as displacement, as minority groups transferred hostility onto scapegoats (Arabs, Muslims, South Asians) rather than target the real threat, their historic oppressor. Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2004) suggested, “sometimes the fear, anger, and desperate need for understanding resulting from heightened accessibility of death thoughts are directed toward those with no obvious similarities to the perpetrators of the attacks” (p. 105). Thus, the threat posed to America in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 resulted in newly forged alliances between Blacks and Whites and intensified existing racial attitudes toward Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians. According to Kunovich (2004), “[g]roup-threat theorists suggest that increases in the collective threat posed to
dominant ethnic and racial groups increase average levels of prejudice and intensify the relationship between individual characteristics and prejudice” (p. 20). Thus, the perceived threat to the United States provided the grounds for heightened discrimination and prejudice toward Arabs, Muslims and South Asians.

Despite the increased participation of Blacks and Latina/os in allegiance toward subordinating a newly defined group of “others,” scholars questioned the causes of this participation. As Ahmad (2002) stated, “One has to wonder if we are witnessing an organic convergence of black and white interests, or a cynical manipulation of black opinion, the better to subordinate new communities of color” (p. 105). Through increased threat to the United States, groups of color distanced themselves from one another rather than fighting in solidarity, which resulted in the passage of laws that extended government control and that directly impacted their particular racial group in the past. Laws such as racial profiling exemplified this phenomenon and are perceived by many as antithetical to civil rights.

As previously noted, the history of race relations in the United States is characterized by its oppressive tendencies, mass violations of civil rights and liberties, and often brutality. Despite Wilson’s (1980) proposition that, “life chances of individual blacks have more to do with their economic class position than day-to-day encounters with whites” (p. 1), historical and contemporary social reality suggests race still matters. Wilson’s thesis suggested race relations were improving and as the economic conditions for some Blacks improved, class subordination emerged as the essential barrier. For Wilson, in order to understand current problems of Blacks, the focus must be on economic change. Wilson’s analysis, while calling for a more intersectional understanding of the economic conditions of Blacks, failed to address enduring white prejudice when societal conditions call for more cohesive race relations.

Through this distinct and highly divided “color line” within the history of the United States, skepticism surrounds the nature of alliances between Blacks and Whites in the newly reinterpreted “othering” of individuals from the Middle East or of Middle Eastern descent. According to Omi and Winant
(1994), historical race relations in the United States are characterized as “racial dictatorship” whereby the political arena and all citizenship matters remain in the hands of Whites and all persons of color are specifically excluded. Accordingly, this racial dictatorship took three distinctive forms: the definition of “American,” the organization of the “color line,” and finally the consolidation of “oppositional racial consciousness” (Omi & Winant, 1994, p. 66). For Omi and Winant (1994), the process is achieved through hegemony implemented with both coercion and consent, and this represents the new nature of race relations in the United States, as racial dictatorship shifts to racial democracy (thus from domination to hegemony). Therefore, are these newly forged relationships between Blacks and Whites (or the convergence of black and white attitudes toward people of Middle Eastern descent) a repercussion of the hegemonic rule of the power elite in the United States? If traditional racism is declining in the United States, does this convergence merely signify a shift toward the new or modern racism through hegemony rather than erosion of racist ideology and structure?

The bulk of the race-related work post-September 11, 2001 focused on immigration policy, civil rights laws, and racial attitudes about individuals primarily perceived to be Muslim or Arab (or more generally individuals from the Middle East or Middle Eastern descent), but no research exists studying the impact of September 11, 2001 on racial attitudes toward Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Thus, while numerous studies examined the impacts of September 11, 2001 on America and its policies, a dearth of research exists on racial attitudes directed toward people of color not targeted through September 11, 2001 racial projects and how September 11, 2001 impacted those attitudes.

Whereas research suggested a decline in traditional race-related prejudice among Americans, I seek to examine whether or not prejudice still persists to the same or different levels against Blacks, and to determine what types of individuals are more likely to admit prejudiced attitudes. If Wilson is correct, then racial attitudes should decline in significance in tandem with the importance of race. As mentioned previously, attitudinal beliefs remain a significant force in American society,
particularly when considering the legislative and policy implications related to racial and other minority groups. This paper provides a clearer understanding of prejudice, the pervasiveness of negative racial attitudes in American society, and suggests the traditional component of prejudice is not declining in significance since September 11, 2001.

Method

The data for this study come from the American National Election 2000, 2002, and 2004 Panel Studies from the Center for Political Studies Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York (D B 7532.R01) (American National Election Studies, 2004). Respondents were interviewed in 2000, 2002, and again in 2004 through computer assisted interviewing technology (CATI) telephone interviews. Eligible respondents were 18 years of age or older at the time of the first interview. This paper differs from existing studies, which examined Whites' attitudes toward Blacks by investigating the consequences of a major national tragedy on white racial prejudice.

Research into the influences of racial stereotyping provided contradictory results regarding the demographic characteristics of individuals who utilize racial stereotypes. Research indicated that age has a positive relationship with stereotyping (Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Kinder & Mendelberg, 1995). In their study on the trends in anti-Black prejudice, Firebaugh and Davis (1988) noted that one important factor in the decline in racial prejudice was "cohort replacement" as younger, less prejudiced cohorts replaced older, more prejudiced birth cohorts (p. 251). However, Sniderman and Piazza (1993) suggested this increased tolerance might no longer persist. Research by Plous and Williams (1995) found a curvilinear relationship between age and endorsement of racial stereotyping, although the relationship with educational level was not controlled in their study.

Measures

Gender. The impact of gender on acceptance of negative stereotypes was also inconsistent. Some research indicated that
women were more likely than men to support policies to aid Blacks and to hold fewer negative stereotypes while Plous and Williams (1995) reported that gender differences were relatively small.

**Religion.** The relationship between religion and prejudice is a complex issue in that prejudice can vary by religious group or belief structure. Allport (1958) suggested that religious groups usually held similar levels of prejudice but chose different groups to dislike. Additionally, Allport (1958) noted two forms of religiosity that influence prejudice: one that focuses on brotherhood and tolerance, and one that breeds prejudice. Later research found religiosity was not associated with prejudice but with how individuals held their beliefs (Hunsberger, 1995). Hunsberger’s (1995) research suggested individuals who rigidly adhere to their beliefs were more likely to be prejudiced than those who were more open in their beliefs. Hunsberger (1995) also cited conflicting research on the association between religious service attendance and prejudice. While some research suggested a curvilinear relationship between religious service attendance and prejudice, Hunsberger, citing Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992), stated that the current “empirical evidence has not consistently supported this ‘curvilinear’ conclusion, with some researchers arguing that the relationship is indeed a relatively strong linear one” (p. 116).

**Education.** Researchers consistently found education to be one of the strongest determinants of attitudes concerning race (Hesselbart & Schuman, 1976; Kunovich, 2004; Plous & Williams, 1995; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Taylor, 1998). Some researchers contended that education was the most important factor in delineating the amount of stereotypes an individual embraces (Plous & Williams, 1995; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993), which reinforces Lippmann’s (1922) earlier research.

**Income.** In addition to education, researchers suggested that income, as a part of an individual’s socioeconomic status, was associated with negative racial stereotyping. Researchers contended that individuals with lower socioeconomic status were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward minority groups due to the belief that minority group members posed a threat to their status (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Kunovich, 2004; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000). Individuals with lower
income and lower socioeconomic status sought to denigrate members of minority groups as a reaction to perceived inter-racial competition for resources.

*Political Affiliation.* Sniderman and Carmines (1997) found that “conservatives who like Blacks are as likely to be opposed (to government policies to aid African-Americans) as those who dislike Blacks” (p. 94). Wood and Chesser (1994) found Republicans more likely to stereotype than Democrats and Independents. In sum, research indicates that an increase in conservatism leads to an increase in racial stereotyping while an increase in liberalism leads to a decrease in racial stereotyping.

**Predictions**

This study examines how the feelings of whites toward Blacks changed from 2000 to 2004, during which time a racial project against individuals of Middle Eastern descent was forged. I hypothesize the following among white respondents:

1. As age increases, feelings of coolness for Blacks increase.
2. Males feel cooler toward Blacks than females.
3. As years of college attendance increase, feelings of coolness toward Blacks decrease.
4. As income increases, feelings of coolness toward Blacks decrease.
5. Self-identified Republicans feel cooler toward Blacks than self-identified Democrats.

**Results**

This paper examines white respondents' attitudes toward Blacks, therefore the population of the NES Panel Study was limited to white respondents. The 2000 NES Panel Study included 1,393 white respondents, 932 in the 2002 study, and 700 in the 2004 study. In order to maximize respondents, separate regressions for each year of available data were run and coefficients compared across models.

Compared to the white population in the 2000 Census, the white subset of the NES Panel Study had fewer respondents
with a household income of less than $50,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000d), slightly more females (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000a), slightly older respondents, (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000b), and similarly educated respondents (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000c). A comparison table is shown below:

### Table 1. Comparison of Panel Study Demographic Variables to US Census Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NES Panel Study</th>
<th>2000 US Census</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% with Some College or More</td>
<td>43.2% 46.9% 68.7%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>37 53 55</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Female</td>
<td>55.3% 55.2% 56.7%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income of &lt;$50,000</td>
<td>44.2% 44.7% 44.1%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study examines the relationship between gender, education level, income, political orientation, religiosity, age, and their influences on warmth or coolness toward Blacks in 2000, 2002, and 2004, which include pre- and post-September 11, 2001 responses. Attitudes toward Blacks were gauged by asking respondents to rate their feelings toward Blacks on a continuous thermometer gauge from 0 to 100, with 0 representing coolness, 50 neither unfavorable nor favorable opinions about Blacks, and 100 representing warmth or favorable opinions of Blacks.

Most of the dependent variable information was obtained through close-ended questions, except age and gender (1 = male). Age was analyzed in the models as a continuous variable. Education, income, political ideology, and religious importance were all measured through dummy variables: some college and above and no college and below; household income of $50,000 and above and household income below $49,999; self-identified Republican and not self-identified Republican; and religion as important and religion as not important.
I use two separate measurements of the strength of religiosity in people’s lives for the models: importance of religion in the respondent’s life (mentioned above) and frequency of religious service attendance. For religious service attendance, a score of 5 indicates the respondent attended religious services every week, a score of 4 indicates they attend almost every week, a score of 3 indicates they attend once or twice a month, a score of 2 indicates they attend a few times a year and a score of 1 indicated they never attend religious services.

As previously mentioned, this paper examines if attitudes toward Blacks changed significantly post-September 11, 2001. In order to ascertain whether a statistically significant change in Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks occurred between sample years, I generated a Paired Samples T-Test, resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the mean scores for Whites’ gauging of favorability toward Blacks is zero. In other words, the difference between the mean values for Whites’ “thermometer” ratings of Blacks is statistically different between 2000, 2002 and 2004. Regression results from the 2000 NES panel study are presented below in Table 2.

Table 2. 2000 Black Thermometer Regression

<table>
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<td>Gender -2.163*</td>
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<td>-1.642</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.980)</td>
<td>(.985)</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age -.017</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
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<td>Education 2.997**</td>
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<td>Income -.109</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 67.378***</td>
<td>65.378***</td>
<td>60.985***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.556)</td>
<td>(1.725)</td>
<td>(2.401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r² .004</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Standard Errors in parentheses)
Some hypotheses were supported through the 2000 NES data. Education is consistent and significant across all models, with an increased educational attainment raising thermometer scores. Gender is consistent in the first two models, but then it loses significance in the final model. Gender is consistently negative across models, indicating that males are "cooler" toward Blacks than females. Both measures of religiosity—religious attendance and importance—are positive and significant, suggesting higher levels of religiosity increase thermometer scores. Age, income, and Republicanism are not statistically significant. Regression results from the 2002 NES panel study are presented below in Table 3.

Table 3. 2002 Black Thermometer Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-3.411**</td>
<td>-3.537**</td>
<td>-3.048*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.172)</td>
<td>(1.184)</td>
<td>(1.204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>1.133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.213)</td>
<td>(1.215)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.169</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.264)</td>
<td>(1.273)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Importance</td>
<td>2.504*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.413)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.624)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.219)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>69.177***</td>
<td>68.240***</td>
<td>62.743***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.064)</td>
<td>(2.359)</td>
<td>(3.195)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r²</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (Standard Errors in parentheses)

In the 2002 model, gender and religious importance are the only significant predictors of Black thermometer scores. Again, men's scores are lower than women's scores and increased religious importance raises thermometer scores. Age, education, income, religious attendance, and Republicanism do not have a significant effect on thermometer scores. Regression results
from the 2004 NES panel study are presented in Table 4.

For the 2004 model, gender is consistently significant and negative across the three models, indicating males tend to have lower Black thermometer scores. Religious importance is again positive and significant, with people who identified religion as important in their lives having higher thermometer scores. Age, education, income, religious attendance, and Republicanism are not significant across all models.

Table 4. 2004 Black Thermometer Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-4.268**</td>
<td>-4.463***</td>
<td>-3.945*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.390)</td>
<td>(1.398)</td>
<td>(1.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.294</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.594)</td>
<td>(1.586)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.287</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
<td>(1.533)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>5.227**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.686)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>.561</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.715)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.458)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>69.556***</td>
<td>66.973***</td>
<td>61.124***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.627)</td>
<td>(3.227)</td>
<td>(3.949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (Standard Errors in parentheses)

Gender and religious importance were the only independent variables significant across the three points. Since each model is for a specific year, we can compare coefficients across models with the knowledge that time is controlled for in the comparisons.

Gender is consistent in the first model of each year, and it remains significant throughout the nested models in 2002 and 2004 and has the largest coefficients in the 2002 models.
Age is consistently small and insignificant across models, with directionality being inconsistent across the three years. Education has the largest coefficients in the 2000 models, and all coefficients are positive and significant. The coefficients are much smaller in the 2002 and 2004 models, and none are significant for these years either.

The income variable did not appear to be very large across any of the models, but it was the largest for the 2004 models, with respondents with higher incomes having a predicted thermometer score 1.3 points higher than respondents with family incomes lower than $50,000. Thus, Wilson’s prediction that class difference would ameliorate racial prejudice does not hold true.

The importance of religion indicator is significant in all models. Religion importance appears to have the largest coefficients in the 2004 model and the smallest coefficients in the 2000 model. Frequency of attendance of religious services is only significant for the 2000 model. The importance of religion in a respondent’s life is a stronger predictor of Black thermometer scores than religious service attendance.

The self-identified Republican variable was relatively large but insignificant in the 2000 model, with self-identified Republicans having a predicted thermometer score 1.6 points lower than non-Republicans. The coefficient was smaller and insignificant in subsequent models.

Gender is the most consistent predictor, with gender being a significant predictor of Black thermometer scores in the first nested model for each year. In 2002 and 2004, gender is significant across all three nested models. Religious importance is also significant across all years. This specific set of independent variables does the best job of explaining variation in the Black thermometer score for the 2004 model when comparing the r-squared statistic across models.

The inconsistency in the literature on predictors of prejudice is replicated in this study, with few independent variables consistently remaining statistically significant throughout the models. Interestingly, income did not mitigate Whites’ feelings of relative coolness toward Blacks. As Wilson (1980) noted, during slavery, “the economy provided the basis for the development of the racial caste system, and the polity
reinforced and perpetuated the system” (p.61). The prejudice and feelings of coolness among Whites remains stuck in a racial caste system where Whites are unfavorable to Blacks, even as household income increases.

Discussion and Conclusion

Data from the 2000 to 2004 National Election Survey Panel Studies provide rather inconclusive results regarding the change in white racial prejudice and the characteristics of those who hold prejudice beliefs. While the main goal of this paper was to determine if Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks changed significantly as a result of September 11, 2001, this paper also sought to examine the prevalence of traditional prejudice the United States. Results suggest the difference between Whites’ rankings on the feeling thermometer is statistically significant, although predictive demographic characteristics are inconsistent. From 2000 to 2004, Whites’ feelings toward Blacks consistently warmed. However Whites, without fail, felt warmer to other Whites while feeling cooler toward all other racial and ethnic groups, including Blacks. In other words, while the mean score for Whites’ rankings of Blacks increased (became more positive), predictors for how Whites rank did not parallel previous research on prejudice.

While the results of this study suggest that the shift in prejudice attitudes might signify a change in prejudice, from traditional to modern prejudice, further research into the patterns of modern prejudice needs to be assessed before drawing strong conclusions on this change. Further research is needed to assess the support or lack of support for public policy, however the validity of separate constructions of prejudice is questioned through the work of Essed (2002), whereby racism is less of a dichotomized phenomena and more of a problem relating both the structure (public policy) and compendious practices. For Essed (2002), racism can also be examined as “everyday racism,” characterized by the repetition of racist practices involving “socialized attitudes and behavior” and including “cumulative instantiation” (p. 178). Therefore, racism is embedded in ideology, structure and process (Essed, 2002).

Additional research also needs to examine the relationship
between Whites' prejudice attitudes toward Blacks, and their prejudice attitudes toward individuals of Hispanics, Asians, and Middle Eastern descent. Examination of comparative minority groups might solidify understandings of the patterns of prejudice beliefs or pose additional questions as to the nature of prejudice. Finally, further examination of the consistency of racial attitudes across time is needed. Panel studies, which follow respondents' racial attitudes across time, would provide insight into the stability of racial attitudes.

Finally, through the completion of additional research into the attitudes of Whites toward public policy, deep questioning and debate needs to occur around the "decentering" of September 11, 2001. While the goal of this paper is not to provide a vision for the world after the terrorist attacks, dialogue should begin surrounding the passage of future anti-civil rights laws and the ramifications of those laws on all persons. As Butler (as cited in Ahmad, 2002) suggested, this dialogue should include envisioning the future of our world moving beyond September 11, 2001. The data do not suggest a complete warming of racial attitudes or that Whites feel as warm toward people of color as they do to other Whites. Thus, the data question Wilson's overall premise of the declining significance of race. Wilson's call to examine the importance of social class is certainly needed. Overall, a more intersectional approach for examining social relations, whereby social class, race and gender (among other social locations), lends to a richer analysis. The data from this study suggest White racial attitudes toward Blacks nominally improved post-September 11, 2001 but remain lower than Whites' feelings toward other Whites. Thus, the data question if race has truly declined in significance, particularly among white racial attitudes.

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References


The Significance of Race for Neighborhood Social Cohesion: Perceived Difficulty of Collective Action in Majority Black Neighborhoods

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Department of Sociology

This article explores William Julius Wilson's contentions about community cultural traits by examining racial differences in middle class neighborhoods' levels of social cohesion. Specifically, we explore the perceived difficulty of these actions—as opposed to general pessimism about their outcomes—as a potential explanation for low levels of instrumental collective action in Black middle class neighborhoods. Our results indicate that, regardless of other neighborhood factors, majority Black neighborhoods have low levels of social cohesion. We also find that this racial disparity is statistically explained by shared perceptions about the amount of effort required to engage in group action in different neighborhoods. These findings emphasize that residence in a majority Black area—and the well-informed perceptions accompanying it—affect the lived experience of neighbors, even when they are middle class.

Key words: race, collective action, social cohesion, collective efficacy

Racial differentials in urban neighborhood environments represent a historically well-studied phenomenon. The sociological literature began to provide a clear statistical picture of Black urbanites' daily environments with the seminal works of Drake and Cayton (1993) and DuBois (1996). These studies invariably included a section on the Black middle class. However,
with the 1987 publication of Wilson’s *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, quantitative sociological literature on the well-being of Black neighborhoods began to focus more exclusively on the circumstances of the Black urban poor. We now know a great deal about racial differentials in neighborhood quality and social cohesion within poor urban environments (Sampson & Sharkey, 2008), and we also know that these factors are associated with racial differences in various health and public safety outcomes (Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Williams & Collins, 2001). Yet, our knowledge of the statistical dynamics of these relationships in nonpoor neighborhoods is more limited.

Understanding these relationships in nonpoor contexts is important because the most common neighborhood environment for contemporary Black Americans is majority Black and majority nonpoor (Pattillo, 2005). This is largely in-line with predictions in Wilson’s (1978) earlier and equally influential work, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Although some scholars cite the fact that most Blacks live in nonpoor contexts to support contentions that the significance of race is declining in America, most agree that the typical neighborhood environment of Black Americans at this time—majority Black—highlights the significance of race through the perpetuation of class-specific, racial residential segregation in the U.S.

The continued racial residential segregation in the U.S. currently contributes to vastly different neighborhood contexts for middle class Blacks compared to middle class Whites (Massey & Fischer, 2003). Among other outcomes, there is reason to believe that these differential contexts lead to lower levels of cohesion and lower rates of collective action in Black neighborhoods (Lacy, 2007; Pattillo-McCoy, 2000). Although there is myriad literature on the consequences of racial differences in this type of cohesion (Buka, Brennan, Rich-Edwards, Raudenbush, & Earls, 2003; Cagney, Browning, & Wen, 2005; Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999; Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005), there is a paucity of quantitative research on the sociocultural explanations for these differentials.

In this paper, we explore differences in residents’ perceptions of the amount of effort required to engage in collective
action as an example of Wilson’s emphasis on the cultural
effects of macrosociological forces. We expect that residents of
majority Black, nonpoor neighborhoods will report that engag-
ing in these types of behaviors is more difficult, and distinguish
this perception from one common example of “cultural traits”:
pessimism. Using data from a survey of 603 residents living in
a largely middle class urban area, we test the hypothesis that
differences in the perceived amount of effort required—not in-
dividuals’ pessimism or cynicism about outcomes (Sampson &
Bartusch, 1998)—explains racial differences in levels of cohe-
sion. We expect the perceptions accompanying residence in a
Black middle class neighborhood to be distinct from those in
White middle class neighborhoods, and to be potentially infor-
mative about the continued significance of race on residents’
responses to neighborhood contexts.

Literature Review

Racial Segregation and Neighborhood Quality

Scholars have consistently documented that living in
an urban, Black neighborhood is qualitatively different than
living in an urban, White neighborhood. Based on the concen-
tration of poverty and single parent families, Wilson, himself,
writes that “the ‘worst’ urban contexts in which Whites reside
are considerably better than the average context of Black com-
munities (Sampson & Wilson, 1995, p. 42).” Yet, discussions
of single parent families and poverty can conflate race and
class issues. Wilson, in his most influential studies, argues that
these economic and social characteristics of Black neighbor-
hoods are largely due to macrosociological forces (e.g., dein-
dustralization of cities) and their subsequent cultural effects.
His detractors contend that concentrated disadvantage among
urban Black populations is not new; it existed long before the
deindustrialization of the Rust Belt (Massey & Denton, 1993).
Instead, scholars like Massey and Denton (1993) contend that
segregation is the primary source of racial differentials in
urban residential contexts and that this segregation remains a
problem for Blacks of all social classes.

Subsequent studies have confirmed that residential segre-
gation persists in the U.S. Most notably, recent studies provide
evidence that Blacks continue to be the most racially segregated racial minority group (Iceland & Wilkes, 2006) and—as Wilson predicted—the segregation of poor Blacks from affluent Blacks has increased over past decades (Massey & Fischer, 2003). Some of the persistence of neighborhood segregation is due to the intergenerational continuity of neighborhood environments (Sharkey, 2008) in addition to a threshold effect such that it is nearly impossible for a 40 percent Black neighborhood to decrease their Black residential representation (Sampson, 2009).

The recent documentation of increasing, class-based segregation within the Black community corresponds to Wilson’s predictions about the increased significance of class for Black Americans. Yet, the sustained residential segregation between races means that even middle class Black Americans continue to live in inferior neighborhood surroundings when compared to their White counterparts (Sampson et al., 2002). For example, middle class Blacks live in neighborhoods with a lower median household income (Logan, 2002), a higher concentration of abandoned housing, more single parent families, and fewer college graduates (Adelman, 2004) than middle class Whites. Furthermore, middle class Whites live in areas where over a third of their neighbors are also affluent, a characteristic of only a quarter of middle class Blacks’ neighbors (Massey & Fischer, 2003). Therefore, it remains unclear whether class matters more than race or vice versa. The whole of the literature suggests that residential segregation is becoming even more complex, with Black middle class neighborhoods segregated from the Black underclass as well as from the White middle class. In this way, it seems that race is distinct from (even if not more important than) class.

Beyond Neighborhood Quality: Neighborhood Cultural Traits and Group Behavior

Extant literature provides a good understanding of the racial differentials in the physical and socioeconomic conditions of middle class neighborhoods, but we have an incomplete statistical understanding of social and political behavior within these areas. Most existing information on the topic comes from qualitative literature. For example, Haynes (2001)
and Patillo-McCoy (2000) document the effects of physical proximity to low-income communities on political cohesion and action in Black middle-class neighborhoods. Other scholars provide evidence that class-based disputes impede Black nonpoor neighborhoods from wielding control over political and social resources, despite their racial, numerical majority (Ginwright, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Lacy, 2007).

To our knowledge, these qualitative findings have not permeated into the quantitative literature on differences in positive, group-based action in nonpoor neighborhoods. Applying the concept of collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997)—a dominant topic in research on impoverished areas (Browning & Cagney, 2002; Browning, Leventhal, & Brooks-Gunn, 2005; Cohen, Finch, Bower, & Sastry, 2006; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Morenoff, 2003; Wikström & Sampson, 2003)—to dynamics in middle class neighborhoods might help to address this current limitation in the literature.

The notion of collective efficacy centers on the belief in a group's ability to accomplish goals (Bandura, 2000), and incorporates ideas about the group's propensity to collectively act toward achieving those goals (Sampson et al., 1997). As a concept, it extends beyond the aggregate effect of individual self-efficacy, as it allows members of a community to have expectations and understandings of their group's (or neighborhood's) actions that are distinct from expectations for their own, individual behavior (Bandura, 1997). The concept also extends beyond social ties, focusing on mutual trust and cohesion among neighborhood residents in order to act for the well-being of the common good (Browning & Cagney, 2002).

Perhaps due to many social scientists' fear of advancing ideas associated with "cultural" explanations of racial differentials (Patterson, 1995; Wilson, 1991b), collective efficacy has not been acknowledged as a group-level example of a cultural trait and behavior (Wilson, 1991a). These fears may be warranted, given that the majority of Americans—Black and White—believe that "Blacks who have not gotten ahead in life are mainly responsible for their own situation" (Kohut, 2010). Yet, in his most recent work, Wilson (2009b) reminds us that, although cultural explanations are probably not as important as structural explanations, both dimensions need to be taken
Collective efficacy as a cultural explanation need not be seen as completely devoid of a structural component. If we accept that culture represents “the way that individuals in particular groups, communities or societies develop an understanding of how the world works and make decisions based on that understanding” (Wilson, 2009a, p. 1), then perceptions of obstacles to collective behavior represent a specific example of culture. Furthermore, these perceptions about difficulty or obstacles are likely to reflect both Wilson’s (1987) and Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls’ (1997) focus on macrosociological factors better than the stereotypical cultural trait concepts of hopelessness and/or pessimism.

Partially reflecting the dual structural and cultural nature of the concept, scholars often parcel collective efficacy into two components: expressive connections and instrumental actions (Sampson et al., 1997). Expressive collective efficacy represents the social cohesion and trust among neighbors that we have previously discussed. Instrumental collective efficacy is best described as members of a neighborhood coming together to deal with social problems and to improve the conditions of their neighborhood—e.g., taking action to get a stoplight built in the neighborhood (Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006). Similar to Wilson’s contentions about macrosociological effects on underclass cultural traits, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) posit that instrumental collective efficacy originates within the structural and political contexts, often distinguishing neighborhoods through social characteristics. Distinct from expressive collective efficacy, instrumental collective efficacy is especially susceptible to structural barriers because it is typically channeled through formal institutions—police departments, public works, school systems—in addition to the structural contexts that affect expressive collective efficacy. Therefore, it is important to recognize that being “socially situated” determines different types of instrumental, group-level behavior (Bandura, 2000).

Race plays a central role in being socially situated in neighborhoods. Due to structural barriers, and regardless of their median income, urban Black neighborhoods are often distanced from government decision making processes (Coaffee &
Healey, 2003; Mesch & Schurin, 1996; Portney & Berry, 1997) and, therefore, institutional services (Carr & Kolluri, 2001; Gee, 2008; Holzer, 1991; Orfield & Lee, 2005; Zenk et al., 2005). In turn, instrumental behaviors may be more difficult and require more effort for these neighborhoods' residents than for those living in other neighborhoods. Even if these barriers are not “real,” the perception of difficulty itself can impede instrumental actions that would otherwise lead to social cohesion in these neighborhoods (Thomas, 1928). Figure 1 graphically depicts this conceptual framework of the connection between racial composition and levels of collective efficacy. It illustrates our contention that, regardless of whether obstacles are empirically unobservable or unquantifiable, when people living in predominantly Black neighborhoods believe that collective behavior is more difficult in their neighborhoods; this perception itself would impede collective action.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework explaining racial differences in middle class neighborhoods’ levels of collective efficacy (Wilson’s equivalent concepts are included in gray)

The Current Study

Existing literature on urban neighborhoods indicates that people who believe that their neighbors are willing to intercede when a problem arises benefit in many ways from this high level of collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Indicators of neighborhood quality (e.g. concentrated poverty, percent homeownership, etc.) are at the base of
collective efficacy theory, and therefore many previous studies have contended that poverty is associated with greater differences in levels of collective efficacy than is race (Browning & Cagney, 2002). To evaluate this contention, we investigate differences in levels of expressive collective efficacy (i.e., social cohesion) within a sample of largely middle class, urban neighborhoods, based on racial composition of the neighborhood as well as several different indicators of neighborhood quality. We expect to find a significant difference in levels of social cohesion between predominantly Black neighborhoods and other neighborhoods, even when other socioeconomic indicators are taken into account. Furthermore, we hypothesize that these racial differences between neighborhoods can be explained by a perception (or recognition) in majority Black neighborhoods that instrumental action toward collective benefit requires a great deal of effort. We also statistically distinguish this perception from overall levels of pessimism in Black neighborhoods.

Method

Data

The data used to test the hypotheses of this study come from information collected for a larger, separate study during October and November of 2009. The larger project was concerned with public safety and collective efficacy in a mid-sized, Midwestern city. This project focused on life stage specific collective efficacy, so the data set represents a sample of block groups that were stratified by both the percentage of residents age 65 and older and the racial concentration (Black/White) of residents. The fact that the sample was stratified by race ensures the racial diversity of block groups needed to assess our research questions.

In total, 603 residents (a 65% response rate) from 92 census block groups participated in our study. Each block group is represented by two to nine respondents. The Survey Research Center at Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis used random digit dialing to contact residents and solicit participation. Those agreeing to participate spent between 10 and 15 minutes answering 50 questions. They were compensated with a $5.00 gift card for their time. Individual's responses
were combined with 2000 census information on census block groups to constitute our final database.

Measures

Social cohesion: For our dependent variable, we replicated the portion of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods' (PHDCN) measure of collective efficacy that pertains to community cohesion and trust, which has been validated and replicated in a variety of other studies (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Participants used a 5-point Likert scale to respond to five statements: "people around here are willing to help their neighbors," "this is a close-knit block," "people on this block can be trusted," "people on this block help each other when they can," and "people on this block generally don't get along with each other." Responses to the last statement were reverse-coded.

We used these answers to construct a neighborhood-level measure of collective efficacy in accordance with Raudenbush and Sampson's (1999) procedure for constructing neighborhood-level scales from individual-level responses. Thus, we treated responses as embedded within individuals who are embedded within neighborhoods. The final measure represents empirical Bayes residuals (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) that are adjusted for measurement error at each of the three embedded levels. The neighborhood-level scale reliability is 0.80.

Neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics: Racial composition—more specifically, whether a neighborhood is majority Black—is the neighborhood characteristic of primary concern. Thus, we created an indicator coded as 1 to indicate that a block group has 51 percent or more Black residents and 0 to indicate all other racial compositions. We also control for other socioeconomic neighborhood characteristics: median income, percent homeowners, percent of households with a senior resident, and percent of households with children. Each of these was dichotomized such that 1 indicates that the block group falls into the lower quartile of our sample and 0 includes all other block groups. These binary variables were created: (1) to be comparable to the indicator of majority Black neighborhood; and (2) because there is no standard cutoff point for "lower income" neighborhoods within nonpoor areas.
Difficulty of instrumental collective action and pessimism: The level of perceived effort associated with instrumental behavior was determined by one statement posed to participants: “getting neighbors together to deal with a problem is a lot of work.” Levels of pessimism were determined by responses to: “If something can go wrong for me, it will.” Respondents answered each of these questions using a five-point Likert scale. Using the method described for our measure of collective efficacy, we calculated empirical Bayes residuals based on a two-level model for each of these statements.

The two measures—perceived effort and pessimism—were created using glamm commands in Stata 11 (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). After we obtained the Bayes residuals, we recoded them into binary variables so they are comparable to our indicators of neighborhood quality. Our final measures are of high perceived effort (i.e. block groups at or above the 75th percentile are coded as 1) and high pessimism (again, block groups at or above the 75th percentile are coded as 1).

Procedures

First, we performed analyses to address concerns about multicollinearity between the indicators of neighborhood quality. According to established standards (Lewis-Beck, 1980), there is no cause for concern in our dataset. Correlations between the indicators of neighborhood quality range from -.03 (between low income and low concentration of elderly) to .74 (between low income and majority Black). The largest Pseudo $R^2$ (regressing low income on all others) is .55, and therefore does not approach 1.0. The correlation between average perceived difficulty of instrumental action and average overall pessimism is .10, so there is no colinearity between these indicators, either.

Next, we performed four stepwise OLS regressions. The models proceed from including only majority Black as an independent measure to ultimately including all controls. The intent is to establish a baseline association between majority Black neighborhoods and levels of social cohesion, and then determine if the association is “explained” by: (a) neighborhood characteristics; (b) perceived effort; and (c) levels of pessimism.
Results

Descriptive Results

Table 1 displays descriptive statistics pertaining to the neighborhood environment of Black and White respondents accordingly. Our respondents largely reside in racially segregated neighborhoods, where 65 percent of Black respondents live in a predominately Black census block group, and 73 percent of White respondents live in a predominantly White census block group. [It should be remembered, however, that our sample was stratified by race of block group.] In agreement with existing research, our Black respondents are exposed to different neighborhood environments than White respondents. Their block groups have a significantly lower median household income, lower concentration of homeowners, and higher concentration of households with children.

Table 1. Respondents’ Neighborhood Characteristics, Separated by Black and White Respondents (n = 603)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Black Respondents</th>
<th>White Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Black neighborhood</td>
<td>40.93%</td>
<td>65.10%*</td>
<td>22.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority White neighborhood</td>
<td>54.91%</td>
<td>30.71%*</td>
<td>73.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood median household income</td>
<td>$48,029</td>
<td>$36,170*</td>
<td>$56,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean concentration age 60 and older</td>
<td>18.42%</td>
<td>17.17%</td>
<td>19.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean concentration households w/ kids</td>
<td>31.32%</td>
<td>36.04%*</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean homeownership</td>
<td>63.87%</td>
<td>55.12%*</td>
<td>70.44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ANOVA indicates that p < .05

Table 2 indicates that our sample area represents a diverse, largely middle class area, despite its racial
segregation. According to census information, the median household income for blocks in our sample is nearly $50,000 and 65 percent of residents own their homes. The average neighborhood in our sample is 39 percent Black, with percent Black ranging from .01 percent to 99 percent. Many families have children (30%) while nearly a third of neighborhood residents in the typical block group are classified as seniors. As the table indicates, all of these measures show significant variation.

Table 2: Description of Block Groups in the Sample (n = 92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>39.33</td>
<td>0.1 - 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent homes w/elderly</td>
<td>28.74</td>
<td>1 - 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent families w/kids</td>
<td>30.48</td>
<td>11 - 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent homeowner</td>
<td>65.30</td>
<td>5 - 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income</td>
<td>$49,655</td>
<td>$9,595-$140,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analytic Results

The analytic results (presented in Table 3) prove to be very interesting. Model I indicates that levels of social cohesion are significantly lower in majority Black block groups. This one neighborhood characteristic explains 7 percent of the variation in levels of social cohesion (R-squared = .07). Even when we add socioeconomic indicators such as low concentration of elderly, low concentration of children, low home ownership, and low income in Model II, the association between majority Black and collective efficacy remains significant. Perhaps more importantly, the R-squared value remains the same (.07), providing no further explanation of variance.

Model III introduces the indicator of perceived difficulty of instrumental action, and once this is taken into consideration, the association between social cohesion and majority Black neighborhoods is no longer significant. Neighborhoods reporting high perceived difficulty of instrumental action have much lower levels of cohesion than other neighborhoods. The size of the effect (-.213) is similar to the initial size of the effect of
living in a majority Black neighborhood (-.212). Furthermore, introducing perceptions about the difficulty of collective action nearly doubles the explanatory ability of the model (R-squared = .13). To distinguish this effect from the influence of pessimism, we introduced the pessimism variable in Model IV. High neighborhood levels of pessimism are not significantly related to levels of cohesion, and its introduction does not affect the relationship between perceived difficulty and social cohesion.

Table 3: Regressions of Social Cohesion (measured as empirical Bayes residuals) on Indicators of Neighborhood Quality and Neighborhood Attitudes (n = 92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Black</td>
<td>-.212**</td>
<td>-.258*</td>
<td>-.173</td>
<td>-.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low concentration elderly</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low concentration kids</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low homeownership</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High perceived difficulty</td>
<td>-.213*</td>
<td>-.227*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High pessimism</td>
<td></td>
<td>.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.21***</td>
<td>2.26***</td>
<td>2.29***</td>
<td>2.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Discussion

Our results indicate that majority Black middle class neighborhoods have lower levels of social cohesion than other socio-economically similar neighborhoods. In our analyses, race and perceived difficulty of instrumental efforts were the only variables that were significantly related to cohesion. The racial disparity was largely explained by the perceived effort required to engage in group instrumental action. Furthermore, the analyses indicate that perceived effort is distinct from general pessimism about the results of such action.
According to our analyses, scholars can add social cohesion to the list of documented differences in the quality of Black and White middle class neighborhoods. Our descriptive analyses are consistent with existing literature (Adelman, 2004; Logan, 2002): Black respondents, despite living in a middle class area, live in neighborhoods with lower median incomes and lower rates of homeownership. Our analytic results expand on these pre-existing studies and indicate that the majority Black neighborhoods also have lower levels of social cohesion.

In our sample, this statistical difference is explained by residents’ perceptions about the amount of effort required to change undesirable aspects of the neighborhood. To be clear, our models indicate that these perceptions are distinct from residents’ feelings about whether or not general change is possible (i.e., pessimism). The lower levels of social cohesion in majority Black neighborhoods are not associated with levels of pessimism. Furthermore, in our sample the connection between perceived effort required to affect change and social cohesion among neighbors is not due to general pessimism in the neighborhood.

The distinction between perceived difficulty and pessimism is theoretically significant. Wilson (2004) reminds us that stereotypes regarding Black communities are not necessarily blatant in their delivery; instead they are hidden in the structure of our society and in the institutions that support society. This institutional racism is especially important, given that instrumental action requires a connection to social networks as well as social institutions (Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006). Recognition of these barriers in institutional structures may be thought of as a cultural trait, representing pragmatism or realism about collective action rather than pessimism about outcomes.

It may be helpful to consider a common example of collective efficacy—obtaining a stoplight—to illustrate this process. You may imagine that a group that expects to expend 40 hours of work toward getting a stoplight will be less inclined to do so than a group that expects to expend 20 hours. The additional, expected 20 hours might be due to recognition of: slower responses from government agencies, the time required to form personal relationships that the other group already has, make-up hours at work or school due to limited numbers of
community members available during government hours of business, etc. When these types of difficulties are perceived, it may make action less likely, but this does not mean that the actors believe change is impossible.

In this way, our results add to the extant literature, but all of these findings must be understood and interpreted within certain limitations. Our data rely upon information from a diverse, middle class urban area, but they only represent the experience of individuals in one area of one Midwestern city. The results are, therefore, not generalizable nationally. Given that our results were limited to a specific geographic area, it seems well worth the effort to conduct a comparative study.

The characteristics of the city also limited our ability to explore different racial/ethnic residential concentrations. We can only comment on racial segregation in the Black context, and not in the context of any other racial/ethnic group. We recognize there are cultural differences among populations, and future studies will need to explore cultural characteristics that are important to understanding group level interactions and organizing between neighbors.

Despite these limitations, our findings provide valuable, if preliminary, information about the dynamic, group-level cultural traits of middle class Black neighborhoods. Previous studies have established the importance of perceptions about neighborhoods with high concentrations of Blacks. For example, neighborhood racial composition has been shown to affect the identification or definition of neighborhood disorder: even when objective levels are similar, people tend to perceive more disorder in majority Black neighborhoods (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006). Our perception-based inquiry came to a similar conclusion, but suggests that perceptions emanating from within the neighborhood may also be important.

People in our sample who live in majority Black, middle class neighborhoods perceive unique difficulties associated with group action, and this race-specific perception has consequences for social cohesion. Our results reinforce the possibility that perceptions associated with racial concentration are a significant factor in determining neighborhood outcomes, even when comparisons are limited to middle class contexts.
Although the previous research on perceptions of areas with high concentrations of Black residents have concentrated on stereotypes emerging from outside of the neighborhood (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004), our data suggest that racial concentration may also influence residents’ perceptions about their own neighborhood. Racial concentration is not simply a substitute for communities’ socioeconomic characteristics. Although neighborhood racial composition is related to economic characteristics, it goes beyond these and also has cultural influence. Racial composition influences people’s interpretations of social contexts and seems to shape group behavior and ultimately guides neighborhood residents’ experiences.

Conclusions

In future studies, scholars should turn their focus towards both the perception of barriers and the existence of structural barriers to uncover whether or not these perceptions of difficulty are in fact realities. We believe that perceptions of difficulty stem from the social distance between Black communities—even middle class Black communities—and government agencies. Frank Wilson (2004, p. 194) writes that, “problems of race and class, that involve power conflicts and structural inequalities, are generally minimized and made invisible.” The qualitative literature has begun to make these issues visible (Lacy, 2007; Pattillo-McCoy, 2000). In future quantitative studies on the neighborhood environment and social cohesion, scholars should make these conflicts more readily evident by identifying the specific difficulties that account for higher perceived effort of action in Black neighborhoods. Essentially there is a new era of maintaining social distance from Black communities and scholars cannot be afraid to approach the cultural traits that may result from this distance. Resistance or hesitance from researchers when approaching such a topic seems understandable, especially when the context of one’s work is up to reader interpretation, but studies on cultural traits in Black communities are important to inform intuitional and policy changes. This new research should also carefully consider the proper analytic treatment and formulation of community-level cultural traits. For example, it is important to distinguish between
pessimism and perceived difficulty as neighborhood-level cultural traits, especially when the analysis concerns neighborhood levels of cohesion (or expressive aspects of collective efficacy). Bandura’s (1997) definition of collective efficacy focuses on the group’s ability to affect change and work towards a common goal. The group is at the core, not the individual. In contrast to perceptions about group action, pessimism is typically treated as an individual trait (or an aggregate of individual traits)—pointing to hopelessness and loss of motivation to take action—rather than a group-level cultural trait. In contrast to the typical emphasis on pessimism or fatalism when scholars implement the “cultural trait” aspect of Wilson’s work, our framework emphasizes the recognition of social and structural barriers. Future studies will need to explore what these perceived social and structural barriers are (which may be more important than determining whether communities’ perceptions reflect reality).

Since William Julius Wilson published the *Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*, scholars have been challenging, critiquing, and building upon this research. It has been a powerful force in the field of sociology, guiding the way in which we study and understand Black neighborhoods and the daily environment of poor, Black urbanites. We find, as other scholars have, that race continues to be significant even within nonpoor contexts, but we do not see the continued significance of race as eclipsing the significance of class. In our study, race is a better measure of social cohesion than indicators of class. Specifically, when concerning perceptions about actions that require overcoming institutional and structural barriers, our findings suggest that race continues to be a factor in groups’ inclination towards behaviors intended to bring about social change and equality.

References


Social Cohesion in Black Middle Class Neighborhoods


“Waiting for the White Man to Fix Things:”
Rebuilding Black Poverty in New Orleans

ROBERT L. HAWKINS
KATHERINE MAURER

New York University
Silver School of Social Work

This paper revisits William Julius Wilson’s thesis that class has surpassed race in significance of impact on African Americans. Our study uses qualitative data from a three-year ethnographic study of 40 largely low-income families in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. We also include a review of the recent U.S. Census study assessing New Orleans’s current economic state. Participants in our study viewed race and class as major factors in four areas: (1) immediately following the devastation; (2) during relocation to other communities; (3) during the rebuilding process; and (4) historically and structurally throughout New Orleans. Our analysis concludes that racism is still a major factor in the lives of people of color. Further, for the poorest African Americans, race and class are inextricably linked and function as a structural barrier to accessing wealth, resources, and opportunities. The results have been a reproduction of the economic disparities that have historically plagued New Orleans.

Key words: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, race, class, African Americans, low income, poverty

Images of the great physical devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 were less powerful for many than the overwhelming visual evidence that a specific group of individuals were bearing the brunt of the devastation: poor Black Americans. It was clear from the images presented in the media that African Americans were disproportionately affected by the hurricane. Merely on a visual level, the media
images projected a vision of concentrated poverty that suggested a developing country and racial segregation that harkened back to the pre-Civil Rights Era. Hurricane Katrina thrust to the forefront the undeniable reminder of the most entrenched, structural, and complicated racial stratification that this country very reluctantly owns.

In this paper, we revisit William Julius Wilson’s (1978) thesis that class has superseded race in significance of impact on African Americans. We do this by examining highly concentrated low-income racial urban segregation based on our research in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Our previous research focused on the role that accumulated trauma and negative life events played in the rebuilding process and future prospects for low-income New Orleans residents (Hawkins, 2009). We also examined social capital (Hawkins & Maurer, 2009) and the reconstruction of ontological security as factors in relocation (Hawkins & Maurer, 2011). One other analysis focused on racial and gender dynamics as barriers to data collection (Hawkins, 2010). In this current analysis we examine the possibility of race as a significant factor in the lives of New Orleans residents, but one that is concentrically connected to poverty in mezzo level interactions. This analysis adds to the literature by continuing to unravel the complexity and relationship of race and class, especially among those who are low-income. We give voice to that complexity by showing how those most affected by the connection of race and poverty makes sense of their experiences.

The essence of Wilson’s (1978) argument in The Declining Significance of Race is that with shifting economic and post-civil rights socio-political structures, that which had previously deprived African Americans as a group access to resources and opportunities, now oppresses a subset: the economic “under-class,” rather than an entire race. Thus, according to Wilson (1978), class structure has a greater impact on individual African Americans’ life chances than race. Wilson (1978) posits that the structural barriers that have developed in the modern industrial era “have racial significance in their consequences, not in their origins” (p. 142). The origins, in his view, are class oppression, which disproportionately affects poor African Americans, but does not target them as a population, as did
We posit that our qualitative data, as well as recent census data analyses, support Wilson’s (1978) contention that for the poorest African Americans, race and class are inextricably linked and function as a structural barrier to accessing wealth, resources, and opportunities (Lin, 2001). Though the outright racial agenda targeting African Americans as a group may have dissipated, the consequences of being Black today remain similar to what they were prior to the end of legal segregation in the U.S. for poor African Americans as a group. One serious consequence of this structural racism means more than simply having little money. Rather, structural racism has manifested itself as poverty, producing a significant lack of resources that hampers opportunities and self-determination that affect life chances, choices, and even health (Hawkins, 2009).

Literature Review

Structural Barriers: The Intersectionality of Race and Class

Wilson (1996) and others (Rank, Yoon, & Hirschl, 2003) assert that post-Civil Rights Era chronic concentrated poverty developed largely as a result of the movement of industries that historically provided sustainable living wage jobs from the inner city to the suburbs. This out-migration had a devastating and long-term effect on cities and their residents. The middle class followed industry to the suburbs, taking resources and social and cultural capital with them. In the wake of the depletion of resources, together with a steady decline in real wages, the inner city could not sustain its economy. As a result of unemployment, poor schools, high levels of crime and an underground economy developed. Governments, banks, and businesses no longer invested in these highly racially segregated communities. These patterns prompted Wilson (1996) and others to describe the resulting inner city communities as a permanent “underclass.”

The structural perspective maintains that poverty is the result of larger shortcomings found in the structure of society that generate adverse effects on multiple dimensions biopsychosocially. Institutional racism is a structural shortcoming that has had a long lasting effect on individuals and
communities. Thus, urban areas with high levels of economic and racial segregation are representative of negative consequences of the structural intersectionality of race and class (Conley, 1999; Crenshaw, 1994; Wilson, 1996).

Wealth and asset development, for example, is almost entirely absent from poverty reduction policies. Yet research findings suggest that wealth accumulation is related to sustaining economic security in low-income minority populations, just as it has done historically for middle and upper income families (Lui, Robles, Leondar-Wright, Brewer, & Adamson, 2006; Rank et al., 2003). Conley (1999) explores the interaction of race and wealth, concluding that lack of wealth is a more significant impediment to accessing resources and opportunities for African Americans than Whites. Further, even when wealth and access to resources and opportunities are accumulated by African Americans, it is at a rate that is significantly less than for Whites. Whiteness garners a higher salary above and beyond education in the U.S. (Adelman, 2004; Pattillo, 2005; Pattillo-McCoy 1999).

Hardaway and McLoyd (2009) studied the transition out of poverty and the intersection with race in this process. Their data show stark differences on multiple measures between African Americans and their white counter-parts as they transition from poverty to middle-class status. They attempt to identify “linkages between individual, family, community, and structural factors related to social mobility for African Americans” (p. 243) that have shown disadvantage for the poorest African Americans, as well as a compromised middle class. The authors found that more members per African American family contribute to household income totals than white family members; African Americans work on average an additional 12 weeks to gain the equivalent income of a white family. Further, as a result of the disproportionate number of African Americans growing up poor, even when they reach the middle class, they are more likely than Whites to have siblings still living in poverty with whom they share their income (Chiteji & Hamilton, 2002; Heflin & Pattillo, 2006). This reality limits financial accumulation for African Americans and may inhibit the ability to transition to or maintain middle class income levels (Avery & Rendall, 2002).
McLoyd (2009) also found that African Americans born into poverty are three times as likely to remain poor in adulthood as their non-poor peers.

**Pre-Hurricane Katrina Structural Inequality**

Much has been written since Hurricane Katrina depicting New Orleans as a “weak city” (Liu & Plyer, 2010b) prior to 2005 and its status as such having contributed to the magnitude of the disaster. In addition to high economic and racial segregation, New Orleans had a tenuous and underserved infrastructure, a poor public transportation system, especially to the poorest neighborhoods, high spatial mismatch (distance between industry and residential sectors), ineffective government, and other structural issues (Barnshaw & Trainor, 2007; Berube & Katz, 2005; Bullard & Wright, 2007; Dyson, 2006; Rodríguez, Trainor, & Quarantelli, 2006). Income and race were inextricably enmeshed and bound African Americans to an economic destiny beyond which few were able to move.

Despite prosperous tourist districts, prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had a poverty rate of 27 percent, almost twice the national average of 12 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). The poverty rate among Black families is far higher, with 35 percent living in poverty compared to 11 percent for white families. Education attainment, which can reflect a community’s socio-economic status, showed disparities as well. The adult population that held less than a 9th grade education was greater than the population that had completed graduate school (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). New Orleans also had one of the highest levels of concentrated poverty in the country, falling only behind Fresno, California.

Concentrated poverty is defined by geographic areas in which the poverty rate is more than 40 percent. Thirty-eight percent of the city neighborhoods experienced concentrated poverty, the highest of any city in the South. Orleans Parish, inner-city New Orleans, was defined by high concentrated racial segregation (68% African American) and high unemployment (50% for African Americans compared to 24% for Whites) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). Spatial mismatch was high pre-Katrina as well and has been increasing nationally for African Americans (Stoll & Raphael, 2001). In 1980, 56 percent
of industry employment was in Orleans Parish; today this is down to 34 percent (Liu & Plyer, 2010b). Further, housing was substandard in the parish with a high rate of rental units, 56 percent of which flooded (Berube & Katz, 2005).

Urban Racially Segregated Poverty Post-Hurricane Katrina

Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, approximately 1.3 million people were evacuated to shelters, homes, and private residences in all 50 U.S. states (Nasser & Overberg, 2005). Media outlets and researchers alike suggested that the near destruction and diaspora of New Orleans presented an opportunity for the city to “do better” (Liu & Plyer, 2010a). What doing better means in practical terms has come to signify, for many, reducing the racial economic disparity so evident in media images and in the data.

A recent analysis of socio-economic and political recovery of New Orleans five years after Hurricane Katrina produced by the Brookings Institute and the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center (GNOCDC) (Liu & Plyer, 2010a, b) states “new evidence shows that greater New Orleans is emerging as a healthier, more resilient region.” The data that show improvements are largely aggregated across the New Orleans metropolitan area, which includes wealthier, predominantly White parishes that suffered less damage as a result of Hurricane Katrina. As the report notes (Liu & Plyer, 2010a), New Orleans and the Gulf coast have also been battered by the 2007 financial crisis and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thus, while current data do not reflect purely the long-term impact of Hurricane Katrina, they do reflect the reproduction of structural barriers such as Wilson (1978; 2010; Wilson & Taub, 2006) posits would constrain the Black urban poor from recovering on par with Whites. An example of this can be found in the data that highlight areas most affected by the storm and most reflective of pre-Katrina high economic and racial segregation, such as Orleans Parish. These data show that Blacks/African Americans trail all other ethnic groups in recovery in virtually all categories (Liu & Plyer, 2010b).

The Brookings/GNOCDC data analysis, primarily collected in 2008 (see Liu & Plyer, 2010b for detailed data sources), shows Blacks/African Americans in New Orleans behind in all
significant areas of positive life outcomes. The median income for White New Orleans metro area is higher than the national average, $58,234 to $56,826 respectively. For Blacks/African Americans in New Orleans, median income is not only below local and national averages for Whites and Latinos/Hispanics, it is also below the national average for Blacks/African Americans, $32,179 to $35,425 respectively. Blacks/African Americans fare poorly in higher education as well, with only 13 percent having completed college compared to the more than double figure of 29 percent for Whites. Aggregated proportions of income measured by low, lower middle, middle, upper middle and high held steady across greater New Orleans from 1979-2008. Whites and Latino/Hispanic populations showed slight decreases in the lower incomes and slight increases in the middle and upper incomes. For Blacks/African Americans, the opposite was true: while there was no change in the proportion of middle income households, the proportion of poor households increased and the proportion of wealthier households decreased. The poverty rate of Orleans Parish, home to a high concentration (62%) of Blacks/African Americans, has fluctuated slightly over the past three decades and is at its lowest since 1979 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). However, the percentage of the population in the parish who are poor (23%) is double that of the larger New Orleans metropolitan area (11%) and almost double the national average (13%) (Liu & Plyer, 2010b).

An unexplored aspect of these statistics is the economic status of the more than 100,000 individuals who have not returned to New Orleans post-Katrina. The population of Orleans Parish in 2008 was only slightly more than half of what it was in 1999 (Liu & Plyer, 2010b). Have those who have not returned found an escape from the high levels of racial and economic segregation of the parish or have they perhaps been too poor to return and rebuild? Nearly 64,000 unoccupied addresses remained in the parish as of March 2010. In addition, Orleans Parish outstrips other parishes and the New Orleans metro area in both property and violent crime (Liu & Plyer, 2010b).

The intersectionality of race and poverty is not only seen in the latest U.S. Census Bureau literature, but it is heard in the
voices of the New Orleans population as well. The literature suggests that racial disparities are historical and structural in New Orleans, existing prior to the storm and continuing thereafter. In this study, we give voice to some residents' perceptions of their lives prior to and following Hurricane Katrina. In their own words, they explain to what extent race and its intersectionality with income level/class was significant.

Method

This study uses a longitudinal methodology with a qualitative, grounded study design (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 1994). The data collection included responses to semi-structured questions, combining a grounded study approach and directed interviews (Padgett, 1998) to better understand specific experiences and place them in context.

Sampling and Recruitment

The sample for this study consisted of 40 (N = 40) heads of households or individuals with primary childcare responsibilities. These families had school-age children and had been affected by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. The demographic makeup of the sample was 78 percent African American, 18 percent White, 2 percent other (Asian and American Indian), and 2 percent who did not identify their race, but appeared to be either Black or African American. The age range was 18 to 63 years (mean age 41). Thirty four of the participants were female, and six male. The number of children ranged from 1 to 5, with an average of 2. Nineteen participants identified as low-income, ten as working class or lower middle class, eight as middle class, and one as upper middle class. Thirty of the families received some kind of public assistance for themselves or their children.

Procedures

Participants for this study were drawn primarily through a "snowball" sample approach but also from Federal Management Emergency Administration (FEMA) and American Red Cross databases and telephone records of evacuees. Participants included the heads of households in
families with school-age children. Data collection consisted of two life history interviews, which included experiences leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina, and current life situations. The interviews were approximately six months apart and each lasted an average of two hours. Some participants received additional follow-up visits or telephone calls when necessary to clarify statements or to fill in information about their experiences. Each interview was conducted at a setting chosen by the participant, which may have been their own residence, their workplace, a FEMA-provided mobile home, or a suitable public space.

In addition to using traditional grounded theory methodology for qualitative data collection (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 1994; Padgett, 1998), we also used ethnographic techniques that included serving as participant observers between interviews, volunteering with the clean-up efforts in New Orleans, and spending time with some participants at community events, their workplaces or places of worship (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). The process of data collection also included building relationships with key informants and community leaders, in addition to study participants.

All participants gave informed consent and received $40 per family for the original interview and $30 for the follow-up. Interviews were conducted by the study PI and four graduate-level qualitative interviewers. During the first interview, participants were asked about their lives prior to and following Hurricane Katrina. Demographic data were collected and participants were asked to discuss their life situations before, during, and following the hurricane. Participants were specifically asked about their experiences relocating and settling into their new environment, and their readjustment process returning to New Orleans, when that was applicable.

Following the model suggested by Padgett (2007), the second interview was individually tailored for each respondent. It was designed to learn about changes in the participants' lives since the last interview, fill in gaps, verify events, clarify uncertainties, and to follow-up on certain details. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim and field notes were also compared and analyzed. Researchers participated in written and oral debriefings following each
interview. Multiple coders read several transcripts and developed a systematic coding scheme for the data. Each transcript was analyzed for preliminary themes using open coding, with researchers developing a list of categories and concepts, developing primary and secondary coding through axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Later, several themes and patterns were identified through selective coding.

Results

The intersectionality of race and class was a major issue for the study participants, with heads of households directly or indirectly stating that it was a significant factor for them. In some cases race and racism were a blatant element, while in other examples race itself and the interaction between race and class appeared more subtle. While all of the African American participants stated that race played a major role in their experiences with Hurricane Katrina, many Whites also saw race as a major element. While at times participants placed race as a key factor, the analysis of these data show that both race and class were extremely relevant for participants from both historical and current perspectives. Most participants, however, strongly placed great emphasis on race and racial dynamics, with class either existing as a subtext or sharing center stage. Study participants did not always distinguish race from poverty. Four consistent themes emerged that suggest that for many of the families affected by Hurricane Katrina, race and class significantly impacted their experiences. These factors included experiences: (1) immediately following the devastation; (2) during relocation to other communities; (3) during the rebuilding process; and (4) historically and currently in the structure of New Orleans.

Experiences Immediately Following the Devastation

Shortly following Hurricane Katrina, stories began to appear in the media regarding murders, shootings, and looting within the Morial Convention Center, in the New Orleans Superdome, and within communities where some people still resided (Vergano, 2010). Some of these were true, including stories of dead bodies left for days (Brinkley, 2006), while others were false, such as babies being raped, but nearly all
had overtones that suggested race and poverty were factors (Dyson, 2006; Thompson, 2008). Whether true or false, study participants discussed their own perceptions and experiences that involved race and its intersection with class (whether implicit or explicit) to a strong degree. At the request of study participants, some of their names have been changed in our presentation, but no other facts were altered. Linda, an African American grandmother raising her two grandchildren, said that race played a major role for her and her family members when they were in the Convention Center before being bused to Houston.

Everybody was in there and it seemed like the Black people were treated the worse ... that hurt. It really hurts. And then they treated us like we were animals and not human beings ... the police and the national armed guards ... I mean they would talk to you like you was a dog. If you had to go to the restroom, and the, ah, in the Convention Center, they would put guns on you and ask you where you going and I don’t think that was right. I mean we didn’t have any weapons.

Linda’s perception is similar to that of DaShawn, an African American man who was in the Superdome with his sister while the rest of their family evacuated to Memphis. DaShawn sees more of a racial element, making no distinction with class. He does, however, observe that there was a lack of resources that were controlled by Whites available to African Americans:

I think it was a racial thing, definitely ... You gonna let all those Black people wait. See what if they would have been all White people? How many damn White people would have been down here with those buses, greyhound, helicopters you name it? Won’t no White people waiting.

Even study participants who had left the city, but watched the events unfold in the media, said that they responded to the impact of race on the poor individuals displayed on television. David, a White father of two, said that when he was watching the events of Hurricane Katrina his mind went to racism.
I am not the first person to bring up racism and such, but I do think that there was a reason some people couldn’t leave. People in the Lower Nine are poor, outside the Lower Nine too … some folks may have been neglectful, but what they did to people weren’t right … (The Government) knew it weren’t right … You just don’t do that to people.

What happened to those in the Superdome and Convention Center seemed to set a tone for how study participants viewed their experiences, with many saying their personal experiences sent a clear message. They also felt that other experiences sent similar messages. African American study participants recalled an incident in Jefferson Parish, a predominately White and middle income community adjacent to Orleans Parish. Jefferson Parish became familiar in the media when, a few days following the Hurricane Katrina, local law enforcement officers set up armed roadblocks to halt the passage of hundreds of New Orleans residents attempting to cross the Crescent City Connection Bridge from Orleans Parish (Harris, 2005; Witt, 2008). Others recalled the widely reported shooting of unarmed Black men by local police officers a few days following the storm. While some White residents in Jefferson Parish praised the actions of the Sheriff Department and the importance of protecting property (see Hawkins, 2010), African American residents saw it another way: “I get mad just thinking about that,” said one study participant. This father had not attempted to cross into Jefferson Parish, but stayed and slept on the bridge for several days with his family. “Here we are just trying to survive. Trying to live … and they shooting at us, making everything worser than it was.”

For some, the interaction of race and poverty within the experience of Katrina offered a lens by which to understand what happened to them following the storm, for better or for worse. For others, it seemed to confirm what they already knew about life as minorities in New Orleans and the rest of the United States.

Racism in the Rebuilding Process

In other studies, we have identified racism and the lack of privilege as consistent themes in people’s early experiences
Rebuilding Black Poverty in New Orleans

following Hurricane Katrina (Hawkins, 2009). Shortly after the storms and into the rebuilding process, stories about racial violence spread throughout the city (Vergano, 2010). Several participants had specific ideas about how race and class played a role in these stories. There were real experiences to go along with the media stories and community rumors.

Some spoke of specific stories that they had heard. One African American community leader in his late twenties spoke about rumors he had heard about racial killings in Algiers, a racially mixed, largely middle class community in the area.

It is open season on Black folks ... Shot one brother point blank. Young man. They killed him, dead ... In Algiers. ... Right across the River. ... You know white folks will start shooting when they think they losing something ... They will do anything to protect what’s theirs. They will start shootin’ niggas. (Hawkins, 2010, p. 251)

Other study participants spoke about their lived experiences during their attempts at rebuilding. Carla, an African American woman whose family received welfare benefits, but described herself as “middle class” because she owned her home, said that she had experiences being kept out of her home because she did not look like she lived in a middle class community, issues that she feels directly are related to her race and class. She described returning to her neighborhood, a mixed-income community, but the police would not let her beyond the street barrier because she did not have the right identification.

They were letting everybody else through, whether they had the right ID or not. Who had the right ID? I had nothing, but a few things. I had just moved (before Hurricane Katrina) and my ID had an address in East New Orleans ... I keep telling them I just moved and they still won’t let me in ... The next day I came back and this time the National Guard or something was out there, not New Orleans police and he let me right through. I told him I had just moved and my address was different, and he was like ‘You have a nice day, Ma’am.’
Carla said that some streets had barriers and others did not, but she was not sure why hers did. She suspected because the neighborhood was considered “middle class” and not poor. Carla’s neighborhood is known as Gentilly. Gentilly is a mixed-race and mixed-income community that proved to be extremely resourceful in mobilizing residents in the rebuilding process following the storms. Residents from other areas, however, did not always feel so empowered. One participant, a hairdresser in the lower Uptown area, one of the poorest neighborhoods in the city and a predominately African American area, spoke to the common theme that the government was not interested in rebuilding the city beyond the white prosperous areas.

They are not going to rebuild. They do not care. Listen, it has been two years since Katrina. Look at the French Quarter, look at the Garden District. They look fine, and those that don’t got construction going on. I’m still fighting with the insurance company ... but look up the street, look at the Lower Nine. Who lives where we live? Who lives in the Garden District?

Even when interviewed two years later, study participants continued to feel that their race played a role in what was happening in financing the rebuilding process in the city. Ernestine, an African American mother of three children and a grandmother, stood with a small group of worshipers at a Black church located in East New Orleans. They echoed a sentiment that had already been articulated by the church’s pastor during an earlier interview.

We have to rebuild for ourselves, because they will not rebuild for us. They do not want us to come back ... and by us, you know who I am talking about, people who look like you and me (pointing to the interviewer, who is African American). Look at what they are trying to do to our people ... It is no mistake that they look just like you and me.

Like the women in this group, Ernestine expressed the sense that not only did race matter, but her skin color specifically excluded her and people who looked like her from
resources and opportunities for rebuilding. Participants in this study also experienced this exclusion outside of New Orleans, in locations where they relocated following the storm.

Experiences Related to Race and Class in Communities Where Residents Relocated

All participants at least temporarily left the city either prior to or immediately following the storm. As we have reported elsewhere (Hawkins & Maurer, 2011), for many of them, leaving the city was a first time experience. For some participants even ending up in a particular city was a shock, as participants described being placed on buses and in some cases planes, traveling for several hours and hundreds, if not thousands, of miles from home. Said one participant about entering a rural Texas town, “I was like, Sweet Jesus, where am I now?” Participants expressed multiple and mixed feelings about their experiences while outside of New Orleans. Some spoke fondly of the places they had temporarily lived, while others reflected on their struggles, especially at first, when race was a factor. Most of the comments centered on White people in other communities expressing their stereotypes about African Americans, people in poverty, and those from New Orleans.

Nickeema described as an adventure how she and her extended family left the city the day before the storm and for several weeks pooled their money until they received space and resources from FEMA and the American Red Cross. The family encountered racial microaggressions in their attempt to find a hotel room:

This motel was remodeling or something ... nobody was there. And once we got in there, everybody on the highway started following up in. It was empty when we got there ... Some doors looked like they didn’t even have locks on them. You didn’t care. We was tired of being on the highway all that time ... And then after they say they got no room. So we bout to go off! Come on. You think about it. You have to remember we weren’t neat and debonair as we are now. We didn’t look like this. Hair all stickin’ up, kinda pushin’ it down. Men all ... they just tired so they lookin’ rough. That man was going to tell us they didn’t have no room. You got thirty
angry Black folks and you think they going to tell them they didn’t have no rooms and I don’t see anybody in this hotel. Oh you got a room and if you don’t you gonna make one real quick. So we kinda bogarted our way into the hotel. We stayed there for two days. And then the managers watched us the whole time ... And then they turned the water off!

Lucy, an African American woman who had been relocated to Alexandria, Virginia following the floods, said that she lived in a church for a month, until she was kicked out over what she feels was a racial incident involving a White evacuee.

Alexandria was Hell! I lived in a church ... but they told me I had to leave because this white woman accused me of stealing her purse. Which was a lie! This woman was a gambler, gambled the whole time we was there ... She wanted more money from FEMA so she had to say her things were stolen ... the Pastor believed her! I left after that and lived in a storage unit for two weeks.

The idea of the evacuees as criminals, undesirables or increasing crime rates in cities, was a consistent theme among study participants. These perceptions were also expressed in the national media, especially in Houston (Moreno, 2006), but were then reported to have never occurred (Pinkerton, 2010). In an earlier study, we described African American New Orleans residents who felt harassed or mistreated by residents in other communities (Hawkins & Maurer, 2009). For example, Larry, a 27-year-old African American father of two, said about his experience in Memphis, Tennessee:

Red Cross said I won’t from New Orleans ... Where I’m from then? ... I was harassed by the police, called a pimp, a drug dealer. I was arrested and I never done anything bad in my life ... I’m still tryin’ to clear that up ... I wish I’d never walked in that room ... (pp. 1787-1788).

Robin described how in a community near Denver, African Americans and “poor white folks” were fenced in what she called “a prison,” with armed guards. They took daily shopping bus trips to points in town, such as Target.
I ain’t lying, there was armed guards. Like you in prison or some movie or some concentration camp. They even call it Camp Katrina ... We even had lock down. Grown people; responsible adults treated like they ain’t nothing but common criminals. They all nice and everything at first and then they give you the rules. I’m like ‘Sweet Lord, where I’m at? What I did?’

While most participants spoke of blatant racial incidents as they intersected with class, Jenna, an African American mother who evacuated with her husband and daughter to Houston, described several racially microaggressive experiences. She said that while people were initially nice, her family soon experienced subtle comments that she felt were geared toward her race and status as a Katrina evacuee from New Orleans. Jenna suggested that many people made assumptions about her family, their race, and socio-economic levels. One such assumption came from her daughter’s teacher.

When we first came, people were like “welcome!” But, now, it’s not really real. We have a lot of negativity coming from people, you know, soon as I open my mouth. ‘You from New Orleans, I can tell.’ You know, it’s our accent. And, believe it or not, it matters. They treat you different once they find out you’re from New Orleans. You see a lot of negative things. Like my girl’s teacher told her that she needs to be glad that she’s here because she was living in poverty in New Orleans. She don’t know how she was living. We don’t have everything, but we weren’t living in poverty.

Michelle is a White mother of one child who also made note of the differences in treatment of African Americans, including pointing out what she believed were the racist and biased messages in what was being said on the news.

So once we get the rabbit ears, I’m watching the news. I had to stop watching the local news. Cause basically the lead story on every news cast in Baton Rouge every night was, ‘look what other trash from New Orleans the storm has brought in.’ They didn’t have to come out and say what they were really saying ... They don’t have to say anything because, well, you know, they say
to you, and they don’t say it. You know, it’s that kind of thing, but it’s racism. Every white person knows the cues that other white people use.

While most of the study participants discussed their experiences and those of others, many tried to make sense of what happened after Katrina from a historical and structural perspective. What they saw was that the current trauma fit into a pattern that they or those close to them had experienced before the storm came through.

**Historical, Current, and Structural Nature of Racism and Classism in New Orleans**

During various stages of the interviews, African American study participants shared that Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent floods fit into a larger context of the negative intersection of race and class. It was consistent among African Americans that their experience ran deeper than Hurricane Katrina. One African American man noted: “Katrina ain’t nothing new ... This is what they do. They would never have left white folks like that. No food, no water, nowhere to go” (Hawkins, 2010, p. 252).

Opal, a mother with three children, felt that Katrina was a larger issue that came from the White House and George W. Bush, who was U.S. President at the time, which had racial overtones.

I thought it was a racial thing. But Bush you wrong for that. He wrong for that. Got us going through here, just like that little rapper that was talking about the Hurricane Katrina victims, Kanye West. He said Bush do not like Black people. Yeah, that. It’s true to me ... Bush, he ain’t playin’ with our nigga lives.

One recurring conversation among African American participants particularly was the nature of the destruction of the levees surrounding New Orleans. While not all participants believed that the levees were blown up, many participants either discussed it as at least a possibility or were certain that local, state, or federal government officials were responsible.
Some of this discussion is analyzed by Hawkins (2010) in an article that focuses on residents' beliefs about racial politics, but a common theme remains in the belief that: (1) the government destroyed the levees, especially those surrounding the Ninth Ward to save the French Quarter; and (2) this reflects a consistent pattern of racism and classism inherent in the power structure of New Orleans.

One study participant gave this analysis of the situation:

You know what my idea is? That they wanted that land. And my idea is that they broke the levees. They did it in Betsy, they did it in '27 and I believe they did it again. Because I had people that were there when the storm passed through, the city wasn’t flooded. It didn’t flood till afterwards. They broke the levees ... they know where the Black people live ... I truly believe they broke the levees. I know for sure that they do it. I know some people who live near the 17th Street Canal and they heard an explosion and then the water came.

Others’ sentiments followed similar patterns, some based on what they heard and others believed that this is simply part of the historical racist pattern of New Orleans and the larger society. As documented in Hawkins (2009, 2010), New Orleans residents had already experienced a series of negative life events, many of them related to racial and economic health disparities and traumatic events. An understanding of this reality was expressed by Donna, who was an advocate for local housing projects, several of which were closed after the Hurricane.

First of all, they should not have shut down all the housing projects. That would have afforded a lot of people to go back home. Number two, those of us who did not live in housing projects, like myself and my family and thousands of others, they should have had hotels, remember when we first got here, a lot of people lived in hotels? Why didn’t they make hotels available for us to immediately come back home? Funny how, White people got in shelters and hotels and I don’t mean no Superdome!
Claire, a White private school teacher in her mid-40s suggests, too, that the events of Hurricane Katrina were bigger than they seem and, for her, the race-class interaction inherent in the storm and floods, centered on the schools.

Naomi Klein, in that book, *Shock Doctrine* explains it. The conservatives have been trying to get rid of New Orleans public schools for I do not know how many years ... She said that Katrina provided a laboratory for charter schools ... they got what they wanted. It's the same way with the housing projects ... They have been trying to get rid of the housing projects for years. So Katrina gave them that chance too. You will not see them messing with anything in the Garden District, in Lakeview, or anywhere where White people are ... where there is power.

Finally, Jim, an African American father and grandfather who lost family members in the floods, insisted that White people had a historical plan to undermine and pit African Americans against each other, describing in detail a historical plan of domination (Hawkins, 2010, p. 252). He insisted that racism played a key role in what was happening to African Americans, especially those who are low-income and lacked resources. Jim stressed that if African Americans and other minorities wait for White people to provide the resources and opportunities to rebuild, the structural disadvantage will be reproduced.

Man, that what we been doing waiting on the White man to change things, fighting with each other and waiting ... They (Whites) ain't giving up nothing not if they can help it.

Discussion

An early debate among media pundits included the question of whether the outcomes of Hurricane Katrina were due to poverty or race (Dyson, 2006). In this study, the perception of the structural nature of racism and income disparity is apparent in our findings. The residents of New Orleans experienced this intersectionality at multiple stages of Hurricane
Katrina and see it in the historical and contemporary fiber of the city. They also see race as intertwined within their lives, hardly ever separating it from their daily struggles, let alone their experiences related to Hurricane Katrina. The residents’ words, together with data from the U.S. Census analysis (Liu & Plyer, 2010a, 2010b; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006), strongly suggest that race and racism are important factors in the lives of New Orleans residents. But it is especially the intermixing of race and poverty in New Orleans that had a negative impact in 2005 and this is a pattern that continues to reproduce itself. One lesson we learn from this and previous studies (Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Hawkins & Maurer, 2009) is that in New Orleans, both prior to and following Hurricane Katrina, the structural issues of race mixed with poverty, a history of trauma, psychological problems, and limited resources serve as barriers to economic, social, and educational opportunities.

The simple understanding of Wilson’s (1978) thesis that income has surpassed race among African Americans has not been shown to be the case in the literature, nor specifically in the reality of New Orleans for these study participants. The more nuanced component of Wilson’s early work does play out in New Orleans, however, in which an “underclass” has developed due to structural failings, neighborhood economic and racial segregation, and lack of access to jobs, education, and opportunities. The findings in this current study should be examined alongside Sampson and Sharkey (2008), who studied the reproduction of racially and economically segregated neighborhoods. Their data show consistent patterns of reproduction of socio-economic structure at the neighborhood level, including recycling of barriers that limit access to resources, wealth and opportunities that wealth provides. While society can point to many advances among African Americans since the publication of Wilson’s (1978) classic work, economic, health, and mental health outcomes continue to display major disparities (Aber, Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, & Maritato, 1997; Farah et al., 2006; Shonkoff, 2003). Research tells us that even when controlling for income, racism emerges as a major source of stress for minority populations. African Americans, for example, are more likely to have one of the top three fatal medical conditions, and die at an earlier age than
Whites. These differences have been directly linked to racism and discrimination (Din-Dzietham, Nembhard, Collins, & Davis, 2004; Lantz, House, Mero, & Williams, 2005; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003). Adding poverty to the mix only makes matters worse, as racism and discrimination are accompanied by life- and health-threatening stressors (Lantz et al., 2005; Williams, 2005).

As Wilson (2010) has clarified his earlier analysis over the years, he argues for a holistic approach that incorporates both structural and cultural factors. García Coll et al. (1996) propose a similar approach in “considering social position and social stratification as distal contributors to developmental processes” (p. 243). Hardaway and McLoyd (2009) combine the materialist conceptualization of socioeconomic status, which emphasizes “income as a source of inequality,” focusing on outcomes related to family and individual financial resources, with a social class model that emphasizes “cultural, structural, and institutional factors’ and non-economic resources that contribute to inequality” (p. 243).

Given the findings of this study, a similar approach is suggested here, in which the interventions at both the policy and practice levels are holistic in nature, but perhaps pay even greater attention to race and cultural factors than others suggest. Current policy approaches disaster relief and the rebuilding of New Orleans from a perspective that ignores the impact of structural racial and economic segregation. In fact, structural factors are ignored over individual behavioral issues, using a bootstrap mentality even when there is compelling information that race and class are key factors, such as in studies focusing on health disparities (Williams, 2005). Social capital is a good rubric for understanding the complexity of the interaction between individual-level and structural-level issues, which we see in mezzo-level interactions where the individual and institutional meet. Looking at mezzo-level interactions can be helpful in understanding the interaction of race and economic status (Hawkins & Maurer, 2011).

Implications

What practitioners and policymakers failed to explore following Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was the substantial
role that structural racism and classism played in what millions of television viewers saw on their screens and in the aftermath that included relocation and rebuilding. Despite being slow to respond following Hurricane Katrina, the federal government eventually paid billions of dollars for relief efforts (Comfort, Birkland, Cigler, & Nance, 2010). Agencies were supported, homes were restored, and even college funds were established to help victims. All of this and more was necessary to help the communities, but little was done to address directly or indirectly the structural racism that study participants and many experts have blamed for the floods and their aftermath (Dyson, 2006; Jones-Deweever & Hartmann, 2006).

Affirmative action policies that existed in greater numbers when Wilson (1978) first wrote the Declining Significance of Race are no longer part of standard employment. Few economic empowerment or educational policies consider correcting racism in any form in their development or implementation. It is Wilson (2010) himself who decades later notes:

Despite the obvious fact that structural changes have adversely affected inner-city neighborhoods, there is a widespread notion in America that the problems plaguing people in the inner city have little to do with racial discrimination or the effects of segregated poverty. (p. 203)

Further still, the public sentiment has moved away from race as a focus to broader identity issues, such as gay and lesbian marriage, breaking the glass ceiling for women in the professional world, and poverty in developing countries. Wise (2009) suggests that race has become a dirty word in politics, with even an African American President choosing to talk around racial tensions or hold photo-ops characterized as a “beer summit” following a conflict between an African American professor and White police officer, rather than hold a real discussion about structural race issues and racism.

The lack of a conversation about race exacerbates the disenfranchisement of those who are people of color and low-income. As David, the White father of two in this study described, it is difficult to believe that the government did not know what was happening to a specific set of people. But what
is perhaps more relevant is that if policymakers believe that race does not matter, or that income alone is a major factor, then only one aspect of the issues that reproduce minority poverty is addressed, thus perpetuating disenfranchisement.

From a practice perspective, for reasons of mission clarity, organizational effectiveness, funding, and often pragmatism, agencies rarely engage a critical race perspective in their work. Instead, agencies focus on issues that have race as a major theme without addressing race itself. One exception to this was, in fact, in New Orleans. In an earlier study, many study participants mentioned the organization Common Ground as playing a role in helping them (Hawkins & Maurer, 2009). This group is closely linked to the People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond, which incorporates a critical race analysis in its work through their national program, “Undoing Racism.” Agencies are beginning to adopt these efforts, including private agencies, universities and school systems. This focus on eliminating racism also has a place in the practice world, where anti-racism is a growing movement (Smith, Constantin, Graham, & Dize, 2008).

Conclusion

The perception of the structural nature of the intersectionality of race and class/income is apparent in the findings of this study. It is also apparent in data from the general literature and the U.S. Census. The residents of New Orleans experienced this interaction at multiple stages of Hurricane Katrina. They also saw it in the historical and contemporary fiber of the city. In fact, race and income as concomitant factors among these study participants run deeply, with few separating their lived experienced of race from that of poverty. In many cases, neither current policy nor practice acknowledge race as a factor in developing and planning interventions. Approaches that recognize and address the significance and intersectionality of race and poverty would be a step towards preventing the disproportionate results of disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.

Limitations

This study is limited by our non-probability sampling method and small sample size. The experiences that
participants shared with the interviewers for this study only represent some of the experiences of New Orleans residents and evacuees, thus generalization is not possible. The intention of this and other qualitative studies, however, is not to produce a reproductive sample of the New Orleans population affected by Hurricane Katrina. Rather, an in-depth and longitudinal analysis using grounded theory methodology allows us to generate theory (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). It is also important to note that when these experiences occurred, participants may have been under heavy stress, thus affecting their memories and perceptions. While a concern, the data collection and analysis used are designed to capture the reality of participants’ experiences. Finally, the importance of these findings is how participants understand their experiences, rather than the actual facts of particular events.

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This ends the special issue contents.
Towards a Practice-based Model for Community Practice: Linking Theory and Practice

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Careful examination of the literature of community practice shows that existing community practice models do not adequately respond to the unique and changing needs of various communities. This article provides an alternative model that challenges the existing models. Based on extensive content analysis of the literature and practice knowledge, this alternative model offers sufficient flexibility to adapt to any particular community. The model is also participatory, process-oriented, and reflective. Herein we first review existing models, provide criteria for assessing their applicability, then introduce the new model, and subsequently discuss its applicability and merit.

Key words: community practice models, participatory, process-oriented, reflective, community practice

Throughout the past century many scholars and practitioners aimed at developing models designed to both explain the nature of community practice and help practitioners do their jobs well. Intermittently over one hundred years—and continuously over the past four decades—authors from various parts of the world tried their hands at developing models and sets of models for community practice (Weil, 1996). While literature
about community practice goes back to the 1920s, undoubtedly, the three models identified by Rothman (1968), that is, locality development, social planning, and social action, contributed a great deal to changing the thinking regarding community practice (Checkoway, 1995; Hardina, 2000; Jeffrie, 1996; Staples, 2004; Twelvetrees, 1991; Weil, 1996; York, 1984). Yet, these three models portray three areas of community practice intervention only and did not fully meet the needs of the community practice field. More alternative models were developed, such as: a feminist model (Hyde, 1989; Sanders, Weaver, & Schnabel, 2007), policy practice (Droppa, 2007; Hong, 2007), economic development (Hoyman, Franklin, & Faricy, 2009), community building (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Mulroy & Lauber, 2002; Naparestek & Dooley, 1997), community capacity (Fawcett, 2007; Saunders & Marchik, 2008), community advocacy (Crampton & Coulton, 2009; Otis, 2006), and community engagement (Butler & Eckart, 2007; James, Green, Rodriguez, & Fong, 2009), along with frameworks offering a varied set of models (Checkoway, 1995; Popple, 1996; Rothman, Erlich, & Tropman, 2009; Wandersman, 2004; Weil & Gamble, 1995).

All these models are synthesized from major categories of community practice, for example, goals, area of intervention, strategies, tactics, and the roles of the practitioner. Each model includes a unique combination of these categories. The rationale for each particular synthesis is based on the unique effect achieved by joining these categories into a coherent framework or a quasi-theory for potentially better understanding the domain of community practice. Usually, each model is based on a central concept related to a particular theory that implies a socio-political and moral approach, and which reflects a particular functional trend in practice.

These different models have much to contribute. They serve to generate knowledge and research, make the field better understood, and guide students and practitioners toward the formulation of strategies in practice. Some models focus exclusively on describing the field and less at guiding practice. These models are extremely important, as they lay the intellectual foundation of community practice. An intervention-based model, however, tends to utilize more accumulated practice knowledge and serves to determine goals, targets, and strategies for community change.
The ability of any of these models to reflect the enormous diversity that exists in practice has been questioned (Cnaan & Rothman, 1986; Hyde, 1996; York, 1984). Moreover, the source of this doubt is the many necessary adjustments that need to be made to any model during the intervention process. Thus, most models were revised and modified to reflect changing and diverse environments and yet they are insufficient to serve as practice frameworks (Checkoway, 1995; Rothman, 1996; Weil, 1996). As such, community practice models are often removed from the reality of the practitioners.

The art of choosing a model is still associated with selecting certain elements that are formulated a priori, outside the relevant community in which the change occurs, without the participation of local residents, and with limited flexibility to adapt the model to the unique conditions of each community. Moreover, the existing community practice models usually call for active participation of citizens and practitioners, but are pre-determined and hence minimize residents' possible contributions. While these models are based on rich practice or research experience, they stem from different communities and hence may be foreign to the community in which they are implemented.

This consistent pattern in the evolution of community practice models stands in contradiction to other approaches in social work, such as empowerment (Abel & Greco, 2008; Boehm & Staples, 2004; Everett, Homstead, & Drisko, 2007; Itzhaky & Gerber, 1999; Jordan & Jordan, 2000), the strengths approach (Cohen, 2000; Saleebey, 1997; Schatz & Flagler, 2004), and the reflective perspective (Farone, 2004; Gould, 1996; Leung, 2007; Ruch, 2007), which all call for the involvement and control of both community members and practitioners in formulating models that influence their own conditions and practice. Indeed, community practice models are often less community-oriented and conceptually more top-down. Furthermore, a general model for action based on the commonly accepted paradigms may not work well because today an increasing number of communities insist on being involved in decision making. They do not passively allow officials and professionals to represent them; but rather wish to get involved (Leighninger, 2006).
Following our critique of the accepted approaches to developing models in community practice, we propose an alternative model, a community practice model that is akin to a road map. In our proposed model, each set of users can choose the roads to take based on the vehicle they drive (resources), the specific terrain they will be traveling (obstacles and problems), and their desired destination (end goal). Intended as a working tool rather than a set of pre-determined directives, ours is not just one more pre-designed model, but rather a specific localized framework that can be applied to each specific community context. Our proposed community practice model is not limited to community practitioners, but can also be used by administrators and social work practitioners in the field, particularly in circumstances of critical community change, insertion of new communities, initiation of new projects and services, integration of fields of intervention, and introduction of processes of comprehensive and strategic planning. Perhaps most importantly, it can be employed by members of the community without the presence of a professional.

Common Approaches to Model Development

Community practice began at the same time that direct practice started. While Mary Richmond set into motion the tradition known as direct practice, Jane Addams innovated the settlement house movement that evolved into community practice of today. For many decades community practice was taught as a method without a conceptual framework. Classes and books offered some principles as well as many case examples. While direct practice was refined and further conceptualized, community practice remained a diverse set of practices waiting for guiding conceptualization. The first recognized attempt at building models in community practice came from Rothman (1968). Rothman proposed that community practice can be categorized into three distinct realms of intervention: locality development, social planning, and social action. From that time on, community practitioners were able to define their work conceptually. However comprehensive and refined this was, it left a wide range of practice activities undefined and outside the model.
A common way of dealing with the diversity of practice is simply to increase the number of models offered (Checkoway, 1995; Popple, 1996; Taylor & Roberts, 1985; Weil & Gamble, 1995). Among those that apply this approach are different authors suggesting different sets of models. For example, based on her historical review of the development of models and an adjustment of the models to reflect the times, Weil (1996) identified and outlined the following eight distinct models: neighborhood and community organization; organizing functional communities; community, social, and economic development; social planning; program development and community liaison; political social action; coalitions; and social movements.

Others authors have focused on one model. York (1984), for example, focused on doing for or with local residents. These single models were usually adopted later as part of a comprehensive set of models. For example, Popple (1996) incorporated both a feminist community work model and an education model into his set of models. Similarly, Weil (1996) included an economic development model in her set of models.

Recently there has been increasing support for the development of a comprehensive community model, based on the approaches of strengths and community empowerment. Such comprehensive models, which guide action in different aspects of community life, constitute an alternative to separate models that focus on specific, single aspects (Delgado, 2000; Saleebey, 1997). For example, the community-building model prescribes several guiding principles: (a) intervention in a given geographic community; (b) an integrative, holistic approach that assumes a relationship between the different needs of citizens (education, health, housing, and employment) and the need to link the different services; (c) a need to develop local leadership that is capable of leading the change; (d) delegation of authority from central to local government; (e) reliance on community assets and strengths, and (f) mobilization of external resources (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007; Mulroy & Lauber, 2002; Naparestek & Dooley, 1997; Saleebey, 1997).

In a different manner, based on the overlap among the various models and the mixtures and hybrids used in practice, Rothman (1996) suggested that his three original models provide take-off points for creating other combinations or
submodels, referred to as *modes*, which combine all three of the original models and nine interactional combinations.

Currently, the field of community practice is becoming saturated with practice models. Yet, as we will demonstrate, many of these models fail to accomplish the central theme that they strongly advocate for; they are not locally-based and they are not grassroots-determined.

Criteria for Development of Community Practice Models

Developing a model to be practice-relevant requires concerted effort in recruiting the participation of citizens and cooperation among the stakeholders in the community. While most models allow for minor modifications as local adaptations, the model proposed here is predicated on processes of active planning in and by the community. For a model to be relevant to real life practice, it must meet certain criteria summarized below in Table 1.

**Critical Dialectical Process**

Critical-dialectic thought includes the presentation of reasons, conclusions, claims, and assumptions that are consistent, comprehensible, and relevant (Clark, 2002). Critical thinking consists of a clearly expressed thesis or question, a search for reasons, updating, use of reliable sources, a description of the situation in its entirety, and a search for options that are relevant (Gambrill & Gibbs, 2009; Yanchar, Slife, & Warne, 2008). Critical-dialectical thinking is a fundamental social activity (Johnson, 1992; Mumm & Kersting, 1997), and reveals itself through some defined activity or issue (Kersting & Mumm, 2001; McPeck, 1981).

The job of the community practitioner is based in the Socratic model (Brickhouse & Smith, 2000; Constable, 2008). Instead of suggesting a precise formulation of policy and action guidelines, as accepted by many models, the practitioner leaves this formulation to the community and experts. In a more flexible model, the practitioner encourages, challenges, and questions community members into discussing each relevant issue, where relevance is determined by the community.
### Table 1: Comparison of Paradigms for Model Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics: Who and What Makes a Model</th>
<th>Accepted paradigm for model development</th>
<th>Proposed approach to model development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical–dialectical process</td>
<td>The members of the community are presented with a prepared formula for action. Knowledge of the models develops without linkage to local critical thought.</td>
<td>In a process of dialectical critical thought, the practitioner, following the Socratic model, challenges the participants to debate their local reality and elicit their own suggestions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of community involvement</td>
<td>Models are designed outside the community, with a possibility of choice from structured modules. Community members have a low level of influence.</td>
<td>Models are designed within the community; the process reveals strengths of community members; they participate actively and have influence and control over the model design. The model serves the community members as a contract for joint activity towards change in the conditions of their lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deduction/Induction</td>
<td>Model development is based on theoretical and professional knowledge and experience, and a deductive process of model design. The practitioner serves as an expert.</td>
<td>The model is developed in a reflective process, encompassing professional and experimental knowledge. The process is integrative – inductive and deductive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive communication and deliberative democracy</td>
<td>Formal communication is used in model development, with emphasis on description of goals and means. Usually, the community is expected to select one existing model.</td>
<td>Discursive communication and deliberative democracy are employed to develop a model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model flexibility</td>
<td>The categories of all models are interrelated. Separation impairs the rationality.</td>
<td>The categories of the model are related to the place and time in which the model develops, allowing flexibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of policy and implementation</td>
<td>The model focuses on description of policy guidelines, with little relationship to implementation.</td>
<td>The model describes guidelines for policy and implementation, including the link between them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>Social networks are limited.</td>
<td>Social networks are active; all three types of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking are developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

His or her role is to pose questions and to draw out clarifications and illustrations of the implications of their ideas. The practitioner lays open opposing views, or dialectics, to the discussants, encouraging new perspectives and building of methods of action accordingly.
Level of Community Involvement

The common paradigm for model development in community practice concentrates on conceptualizations from across communities to provide an overarching knowledge. When such a model is formulated, it is usually refined and becomes quite rigid. For example, when a community practitioner is contemplating the use of any given model, the options are using it “as is,” using it alongside other model(s), or creating a hybrid of existing models. This type of pre-determined structure leaves little for local stakeholders to influence. On the other hand, a more practice-based model can be worked out organically while still incorporating systematic knowledge. Such a model allows all stakeholders to engage in discussions which will reflect their social and political realities as well as assess the community’s strengths. Moreover, overt discussion of major issues may serve to create a social contract among the participants that reflects their agreement and mutual commitment to work together to implement the model that they have formulated and designed.

Deduction and Induction

Borkman (1976) suggested a distinction between the professional knowledge and professional expertise that professionals possess versus experiential knowledge that is acquired by members of the community in the course of their direct personal experience. Leighninger (2006) stressed that citizens should express their experiences, insights and recommendations. They bring unique knowledge and information. However, most community practice models are based on professional knowledge and expertise. Similarly, the common paradigm for model development has been based on a deductive approach. The deductive process allows for testing, examining, and comparing of successes in different places and assessing their suitability for other communities. Then, what could we do with a model that combines the two, that is, based on deductive knowledge, yet incorporates an inductive, or experiential, base?

Developing a model like this does not rely solely upon a priori practice and a fixed set of rules based on theory. Conceptualizing and applying such a model evolves, step
by step, in the course of collecting, studying, and analyzing bits of information that come out of a dynamic process that is guided by the model yet is grounded in the field, that is, in the community. In this circumstance, the practitioner encourages community members to express their experiential knowledge, which can help resolve local problems by capitalizing on their personal experience. The practitioner does not disregard the theoretical professional knowledge that he or she acquired through academic study: alongside it, they also activate a process that Schon (1983) calls reflection in action and reflection on action. Such reflective activity calls upon higher levels of practice wisdom or artistry (Gould, 1996; Leung, 2007; Moffat, 1996; Ruch, 2007).

Discursive Communication and Deliberative Democracy

In the spirit of Habermas (1984, 1998), a concept of deliberative democracy has evolved over the years, which calls attention to the need to encourage citizens and other groups to engage in public discourse. According to Habermas, the opposite of discursive communication is instrumental or strategic communication. Deliberative democracy assumes that in many cases the preferences of different groups vary and contradict one another, and a free, open, and rational discourse is necessary, in which each group expresses its view (Borgida, Worth, Lippmann, Ergun, & Farr, 2008; De Greiff, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 2002). Another central aspect of deliberative democracy is the process of acquiring knowledge intrinsic to it. The participants must research the policy issues in question and consider their implications for different resolution options. The meanings of “participation” and “public opinion” are measured not only according to the ability to influence, but in the nature of the public opinion as informed and well founded (Elster, 1998; Gastil, Black, Deess, & Leighter, 2008; Kelly, 2004; Weeks, 2000).

Most community practice models do not contradict deliberative democracy, but they do not explicitly encourage such discourse. These models assume a priori what is appropriate and limit the boundaries of the discourse. A more effective model could be consistent with the message of deliberative democracy and provide a suitable framework for encouraging it. The new model could conceivably evolve in the course of...
discussion by citizens and different stakeholders who make decisions that will determine the ultimate pattern of their activities and their lives. Such a discussion could draw on reasoning and judgment based in the best that community practice literature has to offer.

Model Flexibility

Most community practice models are composed of interrelated categories: when they are separated, the model they comprise is impaired. Thus, instead of being bound to the model’s categories, a “bottom-up” model, specific to each community or movement, offers greater flexibility without compromising integrity. To implement a process of change, each community and movement would build its own unique and different model matching its particular needs and conditions.

Such a model provides increased flexibility in creating various combinations for intervention, that is, end-models may vary according to the conditions required in each community. The process itself is flexible, because in developing the model, the choices associated with one issue are not predetermined: rather, the source and rationale for each individual choice is associated with the community’s specific situation.

In addition, in the course of the intervention, discrete changes to the model can be customized to the specific issues that require change, without necessitating comprehensive change that would affect other stable issues. Thus, the model’s overall integrity is not undermined, whatever the conditions in the community at the various phases of its development.

Integration of Policy and Implementation

Finally, when a general model for action based on the commonly accepted paradigm is adopted, it is not possible to preserve the continuum between policy and implementation, as the designers of the model are rarely, if ever, located in the same time and place where the process occurs. A more open model locates its development in the precise place where the process of change occurs, enabling consistency between the policy guidelines and the implementation plan. This relationship between policy and implementation is essential as community practice seeks not only to describe and explain
A Practice-based Model for Community Practice

A general model for action based on commonly accepted paradigms is often not a result of discourse that takes place in social networks and therefore does not generate social capital. The proposed model, on the other hand, is based on active participation from varied formal and informal networks and encourages the building of social capital. As such it includes components such as connections with friends and neighbors, active participation in one’s community, and tolerance and feelings of trust (Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Warren, Thompson, & Saegert, 2001). Social capital is a resource that contributes to social and economic community development and helps individuals and communities better cope with situations of crisis (Mathbor, 2007; Warren, Thompson, & Saegert, 2001). Three types of social capital have been recognized: bonding social capital, which is typically found in tight and homogenous communities; bridging social capital, which is found in heterogeneous societies with loose social connections; and linking social capital, which refers to mutual connections outside of the local social network (Mathbor, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Warren et al., 2001). The proposed model stresses all three types of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking. The model presents an opportunity for, and encourages that, everyone’s voice be heard. As people who work together to solve public problems come from diverse backgrounds, using all types of social capital increases the probability that elected officials will hear from, work with, and respond to community residents and their requests.

In sum, according to most existing models, participants are expected to take part in applying a preexisting model they have had no part in designing, which runs contrary to empowerment (Abel & Greco, 2008; Boehm & Staples, 2004; Everett et al., 2007; Itzhaky & Gerber, 1999; Jordan & Jordan, 2000), the strengths-based approach (Cohen, 2000; Farone, 2004; Saleebey, 1997), and reflective practice (Gould, 1996; Leung, 2007; Ruch, 2007; Schatz & Flagler, 2004). The use of existing models may preclude critical thinking since such thinking
may pose a challenge to the basic principles of these models (Kersting & Mumm, 2001; McPeck, 1981).

Based on the previous analysis, the following standards are proposed for creating a new method of building a community practice model.

- The practitioner and community members should indeed have a model to guide the process of change, but it should be one into which they can integrate their own reality.

- The model should be enriched with key elements drawn from knowledge and research in the field of community practice, elements that are relevant for developing a distinct model in each particular community. Yet, it should be conceived and designed through a reflective process rather than chosen as a ready-made, “off-the-shelf” package.

- The model should be derived through a discursive process that engages all possible stakeholders.

- The model should be the result of a discursive and reflective process based on local knowledge and practice experience.

- The model should be flexible, allowing for the dynamic changes that are required during its application.

- The model should include all the issues essential for community change, thereby making the process feasible from its inception.

Methods

The approach proposed here was developed with the aim of supplying a framework actually based on the standards presented above. To facilitate this process, we performed a content analysis in order to identify key polarities in community practice. The content analysis consisted of two stages (Hodder, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the first stage, we collected and reviewed a comprehensive body of relevant literature in the field of community practice (37 key papers in all). This included (a) literature on models (Checkoway, 1995; Mulroy & Lauber, 2002; Popple, 1996; Rothman, 1995; Weil &
Gamble, 1995), and (b) using Social Work Abstracts, articles written between 1999 and 2008 identified for the key phrases “community practice,” “community organizing,” and “community work,” (Alvarez, Gutierrez, Johnson, & Moxley, 2003; Anderson, Zhan, & Scott, 2006; Babacan & Gopalkrishnan, 2001; Boehm, 2004; Carley, 2005; Cashwell et al., 2004; Coleman, 2004; Cox, 2001; Fisher & Shragge, 2000; Gray, Wolfer, & Maas, 2007; Gutierrez & Alvarez, 2000; Hardina, 2004; Hartnett & Harding, 2005; Ife & Fiske, 2006; Itzhaky & York, 2002; Knight, 2007; Korazim-Körösy, 2000; Martinez-Brawley & Gualda, 2006; Mizrahi, 2001; Moffatt, George, Lee, & McGrath, 2005; Mulroy, 2004; O’Donnell & Karanja, 2000; Ohmer & Korr, 2006; Pardasani, 2005; Pyles, 2007; Robinson, 2008; Sanfort, 2000; Share & Stacks, 2007; Shepard, 2005; Stern, Alaggia, Watson, & Morton, 2008; Weyers & van den Berg, 2006). This served as a general review of the issues of community practice.

In the second stage, we conducted a content analysis of these selected articles and sources. The content analysis yielded several central issues, each of which embodies dilemmas and positions of polarity which we also call “paradoxes.” These issues were then framed in terms of opposing forces, potentially indicating various directions of activity (for example, incremental vs. breakpoint change; comprehensive vs. focused practice). In defining and formulating these issues, an attempt was made to address six basic dimensions of the process of community practice: (a) goal definition; (b) identification of the clientele benefiting from the outcome of the model; (c) development of an operative system; (d) choice of the target system; (e) choice of alternatives for action; and (f) description of the roles of the practitioner.

The paradigm that describes different aspects of the practice in terms of polarity, as described in this paper, is not entirely new, and has been suggested in previous studies (Boehm & Litwin, 1999; Korazim-Körösy, 2000; Rothman, 1964; York, 1984). However, even those that do indicate polarities generally focus on a single, central issue, without being comprehensive. In addition, they neither describe how to reach decisions and construct the model from within the community nor address policy and implementation.
The Proposed Model

In their stead, we propose a model that meets the standards laid out above. Our model is based on existing knowledge, yet is not pre-determined and requires those involved in community practice to apply it anew in every community and to any change effort.

The essence of our proposal is a community model that develops through each community’s discussion regarding central community issues and conditions. Each issue in the model is represented by two opposing positions. That is, each issue is a paradox and the stakeholders must choose the position they wish to take. Instead of importation of pre-assembled directives, it presents sets of polarities that the community chooses from. All combined, these local choices become the practice model for that community.

A key step in formulating the model is the actual debate, managed at the community level, of issues that are relevant to the specific community in question. The outcome of the debate is an integrative and unique model that includes a “road map” of policy and action directions, tailored to the particular conditions and desires of that community. The results of this analysis are 12 paradoxes/polarities that are presented in Table 2 and are listed below.

*Geographical-based Community vs. Community of Interest*

Community practice is often directed toward a geographic community, such as a neighborhood, village, or city. The point of departure for such a program is the promotion of interests common to the people living in close proximity, and the development of a community identity that offers a sense of belonging. In contrast, the practice can also cut through geographic frameworks and act according to either a regional or a national basis, as in the activities of social movements, or even on an international level. Occasionally the practice can take place within a community that is geographically identifiable, but is nevertheless defined by non-place properties, as in the case of communities based on religion, women’s groups, or the elderly, that is, groups formed to promote the population’s identity or common interests, emphasizing affinity to the defined social group rather than to its geographic location.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice-based Model for Community Practice</th>
<th>Table 2. Model for Community Practice: Key Issues for Real Life Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic community:</strong> Defined by interests and identities of people based on their geographic location. Developing responsibility and spirit of a local community.</td>
<td>Community of Interest: Defined by interests and identities of groups and populations that cross geographic boundaries. Developing inter-local networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing community integration: Focus on mixing groups that are distinct in terms of culture, identity, and interests.</td>
<td>Maintaining group identity: Preserving and fostering the unique identity and character of each group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing primarily on activists: Informing and explaining tactics.</td>
<td>Appealing to indifferent community members: Persuasion tactics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integral/comprehensive change: Attempting to tackle a host of problems at the same time as a means to eradicate the root problem.</td>
<td>Targeted focused intervention: Attempting to tackle one, often most pressing, problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-community-focused change: Focusing on change within the community. Cultivating self-help, building strengths and assets within.</td>
<td>External change: Focusing on change outside the community, such as legislation, and importing outside resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration with government: Change and programs are based on government support.</td>
<td>Collaboration with nonprofit organizations: Including informal, non-profit, and private organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-rational approach: Change managed by means of systematic planning and activities. Each phase is based on the previous phase.</td>
<td>Organizational-political approach: Change is managed by negotiation with interest groups. Activities conducted to support social justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental process: Change involves a constant, continuous process. The process of change occurs in phases over a long period of time.</td>
<td>Breakpoint change: Process of change dramatic and immediate. Shift is fundamental in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass mobilization: Change achieved through mobilization of a mass of people who advocate a specific change, assuming that the mass creates power.</td>
<td>Small action system Change achieved through coordinated/joint activity of a relatively small, defined group, of professionals as well as community leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative strategy: Concern for all groups that may be of relevance. Change achieved through mutuality, understanding, and agreements.</td>
<td>Confrontational strategy: Concern only for the interests of the client and/or action system; aspires to win.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive approach of professionals: Professionals are the focus of the action and decision-making process.</td>
<td>Non-directive approach of professionals: The clients are the focus of the action and decision-making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Activity: Focus on central services; linear planning; solutions for varied needs; long term processes and treatments.</td>
<td>Activity in crisis: Focus on “reaching out”; immediacy; short-term thought and action; spontaneous and intuitive action; activity directed at meeting human basic needs; authoritative activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enhancing Community Integration vs. Maintaining Group Identity

An important theme in community practice is the choice of focusing on common themes and characteristics and thus aiming for a unified front or encouraging diversity and aiming for the formation of a coalition. This type of challenge is likely to arise in a practice that targets a geographic community, or in various non-localized communities. The former approach (integration) sees conflicts as a natural component of the development of human relationships and integration as the only way that can lead to coexistence in the community (for example, local bowling leagues). The opposite approach (maintaining group uniqueness) is based on valuing the preservation and fostering of social and cultural identification groups, such as orthodox religious groups.

Focusing Primarily on Activists vs. Appealing to Indifferent Community Members

The literature debates whether to focus on activists and people who are truly party to the problem as compared with attempting to reach each and every member of the community. The latter is clearly desired from a democracy perspective but is considerably more difficult and time-consuming. This paradox becomes irrelevant when there are sufficient resources to reach all segments of the community. However, more often than not, resources are limited. Focusing on supporters and the interested segment of the population is also predicated on the assumption that there is little chance of increasing the motivation of averse or indifferent groups. An example of this would be individual union rallies during contract negotiations as opposed to larger rallies in which other unions come to lend their support. Again, in every community, discussions of this paradox should occur and the final decision should be locally relevant.

Integral/comprehensive Change vs. Targeted Focused Intervention

Should community practice develop a comprehensive intervention that deals simultaneously with various areas and functions, or should it focus on only one issue? The primary justification for a comprehensive approach is that often groups
in distress face a variety of social problems simultaneously, such as unemployment, paucity of educational resources, low income, poor housing, and inadequate health care. Progress on one front that is not accompanied by an effort on other fronts may likely fail. A focused approach is based on the assumption that a population has an overriding need in a particular area, such as economic development or civil rights, and on a further assumption that a solution in one area can trigger a chain reaction, exerting a positive effect on other areas as well. Targeted focused intervention is characterized also in ad hoc processes. People may build a short-term coalition around a single issue or interest that will be dissolved as soon as the objective is achieved. On the other hand, a comprehensive intervention demands ongoing activities and more formal institutionalization for the long term.

Intra-community-focused Change vs. External Change

The community practice literature shifts from traditional locality development (building the community and its capacity) to pressuring the environment (as in policies and resources) to change. For example, according to the ‘community capacity enhancement’ perspective, the community has the will and strengths to help itself, it knows its priorities, and control of the strategy rests within the community. Intra-community-focused change emphasizes developing leadership, participation, empowerment, and building and improving local services. Alternatively, the critical goal is effecting a change outside the community that will help internally, such as lobbying the government to repair and improve local infrastructure. This is based on the open system theory which stresses that a community is effective if it imports the necessary resources effectively. Too much dependence on internal resources may block external opportunities. Here again, there is no ultimate right or wrong but rather a paradox to be debated and in each case decided locally.

Collaboration with Government vs. Collaboration with Nonprofit Organizations

In various countries and cultures, government is the most trusted partner, as it offers more financial resources than any
other possible partner and has the power to legislate. At the same time it is less flexible and often tied up with bureaucratic red tape. Nonprofit organizations are less powerful, but are flexible and can engage in various coalitions, especially when the goal is to modify a governmental policy. The local community has the responsibility to assess if they want to collaborate with governmental bodies, nonprofit organizations, or both, as well as the level of collaboration they are comfortable with, and may reassess this decision over time.

**Technical-rational Approach vs. Organizational-political Approach**

The rational (technical-rational) process is managed through systematic and linear planning and activities in which each stage follows and is based on the previous stage. Coming from the field of planning, it focuses on clear methods, research, instrumentation, data analysis, computer skills, and report-writing capability. The political (organizational-political) approach, on the other hand, is characterized by negotiation and mediating among individuals, groups, and organizations, and emphasizes the actors in the decision-making and operational processes. The objectives of each approach are also formulated differently. Rational objectives are oriented toward providing effective services to cope with the needs of consumers, and are described in terms of solutions to social problems or completion of specific tasks. In contrast, political objectives are driven by ideas, values, and beliefs of stakeholders and formulated in terms of human rights, responsibilities, and important moral issues. Each community at any given time is expected to debate and define its own preferences. Indeed, sometimes communities attempt to integrate both technical-rational and organizational-political processes, but some components are distinctive and require different focus.

**Incremental Process or Breakpoint Change**

A constant, continuous process, in which small steps are taken to achieve changes, is called *incremental* change. This is part of an ordinary flow in which each step brings small but meaningful progress upon which the next step is built. One example of this is communications and media regulations, which are constantly evolving. In contrast, in a breakpoint change, the shift is sudden, rapid, and fundamental in nature.
A breakpoint change interrupts the performance trends and shatters the rules of the previous game, making assessment of prior experiences irrelevant. An example of this is The Patriot Act, which changed many privacy rights that had previously existed. Here local preferences should be set in each community by local members according to their needs and, when necessary, re-debated and readjusted accordingly.

**Mass Mobilization vs. Small Action System**

The community practice literature suggests two possibilities for mobilization of actors. The first is mass mobilization of as many actors as possible, recognizing power in large numbers. A demonstration in which only 20 people take part is seen as not nearly as effective as one with thousands of participants. Alternatively, small groups of professionals and dedicated members can indeed effectively plan and execute a change process, often with limited interruptions. As before, the choice is locally based and open to debate as needed.

**Collaborative Strategy vs. Confrontational Strategy**

The dilemma of choosing between collaborative and confrontational strategies has been interwoven into a variety of studies of community practice. A collaborative strategy is characterized by a high degree of concern for both the action and the target (change) system. The change is achieved through mutuality, understanding, and agreements. Some examples of collaboration include revealing and sharing knowledge, active inter-organizational communication, and program collaboration. In contrast, a confrontational strategy is associated with a high degree of concern for only one major interest, the goals of the action system. Examples of this strategy are bargaining, severing contact, ultimatums and threats, demonstrations, disobedience, and class action lawsuits with emphasis on non-violent activities. Again, the model simply puts forth the opposing options and the community selects what it prefers.

**Directive Approach vs. Nondirective Approach for the Professional**

Here, on the one hand, the professional is the core of all activities and decision making, without whom no action is taken. Typical roles include planner, expert, implementer, activist, advocate, promoter, or partisan to support justice. Alternatively,
the professional is only a helper, if at all present, and the responsibility to make decisions and act lies solely with the involved members of the community. Professionals act as enablers, facilitators, brokers, coaches, or partners. Again, the decision to choose one approach or another or any combination is made through discourse and can be revised along the way as many times as needed.

Routine Activity vs. Activity in Crisis

An additional paradox is the appropriate intervention in routine times vs. activity in crisis times. Routine activities are those employed by the practitioner when the community is facing a challenge that is not an immediate crisis. In such cases time is less of an issue, while coalition building and consensus building are priorities. In times of crises resulting from natural disasters (such as flooding, or earthquakes) or societal disaster (such as war, increase in drug trafficking, or economic disaster), individual and community coping mechanisms are frequently ineffective and unable to deal with the rapidly changing conditions, dangers, and threats brought about by the disaster. Frequently tension heightens, and with it a sense of anxiety and hopelessness. Each circumstance calls for a different activity. Disaster often obliges professionals to leave their posts and to provide services through ‘reaching out’ with a sense of urgency. In a disaster, instead of linear planning in stages, intervention is based on combined short-term thought and spontaneous and intuitive action. Instead of providing citizens with alternative solutions for varied needs (the approach in routine times), professionals are expected to focus on activity directed at meeting basic human needs and assuring safety and security (in disasters). Disasters often require solving problems by more authoritative, single spectrum activity rather than complex long term processes and treatments.

Discussion and Applications

As noted above, community practice has developed models to aid the practitioner, but many of them present serious drawbacks, key among which is a top-down stance. Appropriately, these models are based on the best
A Practice-based Model for Community Practice

conceptual and empirical knowledge available at the time they were proposed. However, after these models were developed, they were espoused as truth and rigidified. At the same time almost all community practice models call for flexibility and adaptability to local conditions, resources, problems, and actors. As indicated in Table 1, the existing models have been found to be problematic when applied in practice.

Instead, our focus is on the development of a new, more flexible model for community change through public “discussion” that takes place within the community among grass-roots citizens and leaders as well as professionals, managers, and decision-makers. Practitioners are expected to mobilize and convene communities, rather than focus only on decision making. They have responsibility to build wide forums that enable citizens and other stakeholders to work together. As Leighninger (2006) noted, “Rather than lobbing the people they are expected to help people lobby for themselves” (p. 215). The model can easily be applied by members of the community alone in absence of any professional: an educated local resident with leadership skills can use this model to successfully guide a resident-based community change effort.

One of the gaps cited repeatedly in the literature is the lack of linkage between theory and practice (Wandersman, 2004; Weil, 1996). One key advantage of this proposed model is that it provides professionals with tools to implement theoretical ideas into daily practice. The conceptual knowledge is applied in a manner that is easy to follow and any professional can easily make the link between the two.

In each community at any given time in the development of the model, the practitioner involves the participants in discussion of the issues and the formulation of agreements. That discussion becomes a social contract for effecting change in the particular community. Members discuss and agree and in the process they take ownership of the process and become committed to the model they have composed and continue to construct locally.

Another advantage of this model is its flexibility. The suggested model is a suitable tool, particularly in cases when significant changes in communities are required. When the first indication of a problem becomes apparent, the professional or
activist brings stakeholders together and asks them to assess what their model should be, using the 12 paradoxes. When agreement is achieved, tasks and responsibilities are worked out. However, the model is not sacred; over time, any stakeholder can call for further discussion on one, a few, or all of the issues and a new or revised model will emerge. The proposed model is truly bottom-up and community-sourced, a tool that any community practitioner can adopt and apply to various communities and situations.

References


Endnote:
1) In our article here, the word ‘model’ is used rather than ‘strategy’, although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, the point of departure in this article is based on the literature on community-practice models (Popple, 1996; Rothman, 1968; Weil & Gamble, 1995), and it suggests the transfer of the arena of model building from academia to the community. In this context, the term ‘model’ serves to describe a guiding framework, tailored to the specific community where the change occurs, and not a design for the purpose of generalization.
The Criminalization of Immigration: Value Conflicts for the Social Work Profession

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This article examines the impact of the criminalization of immigration on non-documented immigrants and the profession of social work. To meet its aims, the article explores the new realities for undocumented immigrants within the context of globalization. It then assesses the criminal justice and homeland security responses to undocumented immigrants, also referred to as...
Social Work is the profession charged with guarding the rights and promoting the psychosocial health of at-risk populations (Lum, 1996). In particular, social work has long been concerned with the rights, well-being, and health of immigrant populations (Chang-Muy & Congress, 2008). While social workers continue to play a significant role in providing direct services to immigrants, they are perhaps less involved, or even aware, of the struggles that immigrants face given the changing realities in which immigrants finds themselves. Even when social workers are involved with immigrant clients, they often report feeling helpless and disengaged (Jones, forthcoming). The dynamics of post 9/11 politics, globalization, shifts in sentiments against immigrants, anti-immigration federal and state policies, and other factors have led to significant changes and challenges for many immigrants. More specifically, the movement toward the criminalization of immigration, most notably the undocumented population, has led to powerful dilemmas and barriers to which social workers must respond. In fact, the authors of this article claim that it is our imperative duty as social workers to get involved on both policy and practice levels when we serve immigrant clients. Given the complexities of immigrants’ lives and immigration policy, social workers need to address this issue from multiple perspectives using our training on all levels: micro, mezzo and macro analysis and practice. There is a sense of urgency as we write given the recent spate of anti-immigrant proposals and legislation being issued.

This article examines the intersection between criminalization, immigration policy, and the spread of economic, social and political violence perpetrated upon the lives of undocumented immigrants. We argue the convergence of these threats toward undocumented persons—and citizens alike—will have profoundly negative consequences for the everyday lives of undocumented immigrants and for social work policy and
practice. Further, the reproduction of xenophobic rhetoric and policies will keep us, as a profession and nation, immobilized in terms of enacting real immigration reform. First, in this article we explore the new realities for undocumented immigrants. Second, we assess the criminal justice and homeland security responses to undocumented immigrants, also referred to as the criminalization of immigration. Third, we explore the ethical dilemmas and value discrepancies that are implicated in some of these responses. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for social workers and the social work profession.

New Realities for Undocumented Immigrants

Post 9/11 Realities

While conflicted and negative feelings toward immigrants are certainly not new, the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have exacerbated nativist and ethnocentric sentiments in the United States (Nielsen, 2009). In October 2001, President Bush signed into law The Patriot Act (formally known as The USA Patriot Act). Among other things, this act sanctions law enforcement and immigration authorities with the right to detain and deport suspected terrorists. The very foundation of America’s relationship to immigrants has shifted in the wake of new calls for protecting our borders, broader national security, and a resurgence of an “us” versus “them” mentality (Sinnar, 2003). Suddenly, immigrants are not merely seen as economic or cultural beings, that is, having an impact, positive or negative, on these two domains, but as suspects through which the very safety and survival of our country is at risk. Tumlin (2004) wrote “The new terrorism policy sends the message that immigrants of certain nationalities should be viewed as potential terrorist suspects first and welcome newcomers second, if at all” (p. 177). This antipathy toward immigrants and discussions of national security have now extended to immigrant groups that have no history of engaging in terrorist acts. Calls to secure the United States/Mexico border have shifted from concern regarding the high numbers of undocumented immigrants to concern about national security and the infiltration of terrorists, vilifying the undocumented population even further. The House Committee on Homeland Security (2007)
In addition to the criminal activities and violence of the cartels on our Southwest border, there is an ever-present threat of terrorist infiltration over the Southwest border. Data indicates that there are hundreds of illegal aliens apprehended entering the United States each year who are from countries known to support and sponsor terrorism. (p. 4).

These discursive shifts have influenced the feelings of many citizens regarding undocumented immigrants and have also impacted immigrants’ experiences within the United States, leading to higher levels of marginalization and discrimination (Provine & Doty, 2011). Furthermore, egregious human rights violations—raids, deportations, detentions, to name a few—against immigrants in the name of homeland security have been rampant since 9/11 (Bacon, 2010). Making matters worse, the Obama administration deported approximately 400,000 people last year, which is the largest number of deportations in our nation’s history. According to a national survey of Latinos conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in 2007, we learn that two thirds of those surveyed say life is more difficult because immigration reform has yet to be enacted. Fewer surveyed also stated they experienced serious hardships with regard to housing, travel, and accessing services (Pew Hispanic Center, 2007).

Globalization

While there has been an increase in the sociopolitical pressures toward closing our borders, global realities have, in many ways, made nation-state borders more permeable. (Sassen, 2002). This phenomenon, known as globalization, on the most basic level refers to the increasingly closer integration of countries and people throughout the world (Stiglitz, 2003). The advent of easy and relatively low-cost telephonic and computer communication systems have contributed to increasing globalization. Although in some ways, a global focus has been present since the advent of sailing and trade, increases have been exponential in the last 50 years. While
goods are allowed to flow freely back and forth across borders with a lessening of regulations, the same does not hold true for people. Indeed, social, psychological and economic relationships and structures are now embedded in a globalizing world in which new forms of transnational organizations and social structures impact the human experience. Migration can no longer be simply regarded as a group of people coming to the United States and “assimilating” over time. Instead, new waves of immigrants should be viewed as a transnational phenomenon (Portes, 1997; Pries, 2004). Often, many immigrants live lives that transcend nation-state boundaries, moving back and forth between countries as they strive to meet various economic, familial and psychological obligations (Furman & Negi, 2007).

The social and economic forces that act upon transmigrants and their sending and receiving communities are so powerful that current strategies for closing the border are likely to fail. The common joke that building a ten foot wall would lead to a rash of sales for eleven foot ladders speaks to the difficulty of local and even federal policy in altering the powerful forces of globalization.

The Criminalization of Immigration

While it is the contention of the authors that the criminalization of immigrants has heightened and taken on new dynamics in the post-9/11, globalizing world, the incarceration of immigrants is not a new phenomenon. The history of American policy shows how the treatment of immigrants and subsequent immigration policy has reflected sociopolitical “crises” of the day. The history of incarcerating immigrants dates back to the War of 1812 (Daniels, 2006). During World War II the Alien Registration Act of 1940 aimed to make detention and deportation easier by legalizing the conviction of subversive acts, most notably those involved in communist activities. Approximately 110,000 Japanese Americans were held in internment camps during World War II; although not a phenomenon directly related to immigration, the policy decisions leading to the internment of these American citizens underscores the racism and xenophobia that shape many policies when looking at “others.”
United States immigration policy that utilized incarceration was, historically, two-pronged. First, criminal aliens, meaning those who committed criminal acts while on U.S. soil, or those who lied about a criminal record upon entry into the country, could be incarcerated. Only those convicted of certain felonies could be deported, but often deportation was waived by a state judge. Second, refugees, or those individuals with no criminal history, could be detained for further inquiry.

Through the first half of the twentieth century, imprisonment of immigrants was a part of immigration policy that remained relatively invisible to most Americans. In the 1940s and 50s, only a handful of cases dealing with immigrant imprisonment made it through the courts. Ellis Island closed in 1954 and little was heard about the imprisonment of immigrants until 1981 when the Immigration and Naturalization Service opened the Krome Avenue Detention Center near Miami. The purpose of this center was to monitor undocumented refugees from Cuba and Haiti and over the ensuing decade, thousands of refugees were detained in this and other INS facilities. In 1982, then President Ronald Reagan introduced a new policy mandating imprisonment for all refugees that the INS deemed unauthorized to enter. Around the same time, federal policy regarding the deportation of criminal aliens shifted. While under previous standards one could be deported for felonies, the policies of the early 1980s lowered the threshold to less serious crimes and made deportation mandatory. We see this same pattern—lowering deportation thresholds—repeated today (see discussion below).

In 1998, Jonathon Simon warned about the continued and expanding practice of locking up refugees, and while those targets for imprisonment have shifted, the basic premise of Simon’s article remains. In the late 1990s and especially after 9/11, focus shifted to human security, as fear about the criminality of undocumented immigrants and terrorism rose (Barry, 2005). Post 9/11 the number of immigrants detained has increased (Abramsky, 2004), and both detention and incarceration have become stalemates of immigration policy in the U.S. In the next two sections we discuss the past decade of changes to federal immigration policy and the new developments in state-level legislation.
U.S. Immigration Policy in a Post-9/11 World

Directly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed The Patriot Act into law. While the stated purpose of this law was to stop terrorism, it has had an impact on documented and undocumented immigrants, and native and naturalized citizens alike, in the United States. The law has had a particularly adverse effect on certain groups of immigrants, namely the Arab and South Asian populations (Sekhon, 2003). Sekhon argues that the Patriot Act specifically targets these individuals in an effort to intercept and obstruct terrorism. While some, like Sekhon (2003), argue that the Patriot Act has targeted a specific group of people, others suggest that immigration policy in the post-9/11 climate has had much farther reaching consequences. The fight against the “war on drugs,” for example, during the 1980s, criminalized and incarcerated many African-American men and men of color, sending them to prison, thereby, “browning” the U.S. prison population. Some argue that immigration policy today parallels the “war on drugs” in that Latino men and women are stripped of constitutional rights under U.S. deportation law and spend time in prison and/or are deported (Miller, 2006). As a result of federal policies like Operation Streamline, initiated again by the Bush administration in 2005, border crossers are being prosecuted in criminal, not civil, court and incarcerated as a result (Abdullah, 2010). Interestingly, the prison industry benefits handsomely from this increase in incarceration rates. “Since 2005, an estimated $1.2 billion in federal dollars—in Texas alone—have been funneled into warehousing the undocumented in predominantly for-profit private jails and detention centers, while they await trial or serve sentences prior to deportation” (Abdullah, 2010).

Amidst fear of terrorism and the hope for “safer communities,” U.S. immigration policy now focuses on national security, immigrant detention, and state and local level enforcement. At the federal level, bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform was stymied, but funding for programs linked to homeland security continued to grow (Mittelstadt, Speaker, Meissner & Chisti, 2011). The events of 9/11 placed enforcement of U.S. borders among the top priorities. With more intense border security—including the deployment of members of the National
Guard to the US-Mexico border—and broader use of investigations of individuals who have already entered the country, the number of people detained and deported has reached an all time high.

In 2007 alone, over 280,000 immigrants were deported, which was a significant increase from the previous year (Immigrant Justice Network, 2011). In 2008 and 2009, the Obama administration deported 359,795 and 395,165 immigrants, respectively. These years account for the largest numbers of immigrant removal in United States history (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) of Syracuse University states that criminal prosecutions of undocumented immigrants reached its zenith in early 2008 when immigration cases accounted for almost 60% of all new federal cases (www.trac.syr.edu). Currently, over 24,000 individuals, roughly 12% of the federal prison population, are incarcerated for immigration crimes or violations (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2011).

While one can see the effects of increased enforcement of federal immigration laws, the ability of the U.S. government to pass comprehensive immigration reform has failed. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which would have provided a path to legalization for the undocumented, failed in the U.S. Senate. Efforts to revive talks on immigration reform have also failed and this lack of progress has prompted states to champion their own immigration policies.

State-Level Immigration Policy
While criminalizing immigrant populations has historical precedent, the introduction of state level immigration policy is new (Mittelstadt et al., 2011). It is important to note that being in the U.S. illegally is not a criminal act (Kansas v. Martinez, 38 Kan. App. 2d 324, 2007). However, state legislators have attempted to change that. In 2010, the Arizona legislature passed the Support of Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070). The Act made it a misdemeanor offense for an immigrant to be without proper documents. In addition, the law directs law enforcement to attempt to determine one’s immigration/citizenship status at every lawful encounter where there is reasonable suspicion to believe the person is not in the state legally. There has been heated debate over the passage
of SB 1070 and the Obama administration even filed a lawsuit against Arizona in an effort to thwart the law [703 F.Supp.2d 980] (D. Ariz., 2010). The judge in the case issued a preliminary injunction which blocked the most controversial aspects of the Act, but the remainder of SB 1070 took effect in July, 2010. By early 2011 at least 10 states, including Georgia, Utah and Indiana, had drafted similar bills and passed legislation, yet much of the legislation is still being hammered out in the courts.

Social Work Ethical Dilemmas and Value Discrepancies

The criminalization of immigration compels social workers to contend with numerous ethical dilemmas. An ethical dilemma is a situation in which there is more than one clear ethically permissible response (Furman, 2003). In ethical dilemmas, by privileging one value over another through action, social workers violate another important value or ethical principle (Furman, Downey, & Jackson, 2004). Therefore, within each ethical dilemma exists both adherence to, as well as violation of, professional values. Social contexts in which the needs of society at large, as represented by government through the codification of laws and statutes, conflict with the needs of vulnerable populations, nearly always lead to ethical dilemmas.

Furman, Langer, Sanchez, and Negi (2007) qualitatively explored the implications of Proposition 200 (an Arizona ballot initiative passed by a wide margin in November 2004) on the potential ethical dilemmas that social workers might face should immigration be more fully criminalized. Proposition 200 requires public employees to check the legal status of individuals before the provision of any social services that may be regarded as public benefits. This proposition, enacted into law in Arizona yet never fully implemented, penalizes providers who serve undocumented people with a fine and/or jail time. Furman et al. (2007) studied the perceptions of social work students and future social work practitioners about choices they would make regarding practice decisions. The researchers found several key ethical principles and resolutions for ethical dilemmas, which are salient to the criminalization of immigration. There are three lessons we can glean from the Furman et al. (2007) study that apply to the ethical conflicts for social workers as related to the criminalization of immigration.
Obeying the Law Versus Adhering to Professional Values

With the passage of antiquated and punitive immigration legislation, social workers are in a quandary in which they either obey the law or violate professional values. Social workers are left to conceptualize how they provide services to undocumented clients differently than others. In other words, social workers will often come to view undocumented immigrants as a second class “other” for which certain laws and statutes prohibit services. This in and of itself may lead to small forms of discrimination, as social workers concerned with their own well-being and potential legal sanctions may not be free to prioritize and privilege the needs of individual clients. A social worker who is worried about violating the law may simply not fully follow up on a referral, or a supervisor may not prioritize finding a worker who is fluent in the language of the non-documented potential client. The move towards the criminalization of immigration pushes the profession toward the uncomfortable function of maintaining social control. This continues the deterioration of the social change agenda, which has been declining due to the conservatization of the profession, the medicalization of human problems, and the increased focus, via evidence-based practice, on that which is easily measurable (Furman, 2009).

Reporting to Authorities Versus Confidentiality

Standards regarding confidentiality are upheld by state law and professional values. Confidentiality is one of the core values of the profession that has clear ethical and practical implications. Ethically, confidentiality places the clients at the center of the healing process, and demonstrates to them that their needs are of the highest value. It demonstrates to clients that with the exception of certain behaviors that place others and self in harm’s way, they are entitled to be forgiven for past transgressions, and that in spite of these transgressions, they are deserving of dignity, respect, and the opportunity to grow, heal and change. Practically, confidentiality allows for a safe space in which clients may present the totality of their lives. It serves as a protective social factor, in that it encourages people who may have harmed others to come forward and change their lives. Without confidentiality, both current and future
clients will not engage in social work services and treatment. Providing information to legal agencies to comply with one set of immigration laws may actually lead social workers to break laws governing confidentiality. Currently, social workers are not permitted to provide information to outside entities unless the client is a harm to oneself or others, or has perpetrated child or elder abuse. As such, many of these laws and potential laws have been called into question for this and other legal reasons.

One Versus Many

Social workers may be forced to decide between the welfare of one client versus the well-being of their whole client population, that is, when they are compelled to ignore or circumvent laws that place the integrity and potential well-being of their whole agency at risk. By being forced to worry about the survival of their agency in the face of anti-immigrant laws, social workers may place organizational needs over the needs of individual clients. This dynamic threatens to pit human service agencies against their most vulnerable clients, and the ones that are most in need of services. This perverse ethical dilemma actually compels social workers to violate one of two central values of the profession: social work’s history and championing of the social agency, verses the centrality of the needs of individuals from disadvantaged groups.

Implications for Social Work Practice

In this section, we explore several key implications of how the movement toward the criminalization of immigration impacts social work. Important implications can be found for micro and macro practice, the human service agency, research and education.

Social workers are required to practice with cultural sensitivity, but it is difficult to know how that sensitivity may be impacted by the political climate. As part of the larger society, social workers are inundated with mixed messages about immigration. The increasing laws and restrictions targeting non-documented immigrants from Mexico and South America, along with increasing criminal penalties for failure to report undocumented persons, may leave social workers feeling
stuck between the values of the profession, personal values, and current state and federal laws. Provine and Doty (2011) discussed how race continues to impact the current policies that have increased exclusionary immigration policies, noting how the focus of restrictive laws falls on immigrants from Mexico. One must wonder if the immigrants fit the stereotype of “American” (white, Christian, and northern European, according to Provine and Doty), if the response in terms of criminalizing illegal immigration would be the same. Even within the highest echelon of politics, the stereotype of what it is to be “American” has been challenged; debate over whether or not President Barack Obama is “American” continues to surface. Kong (2010) suggested that this debate may be due to the stereotypes of “American” as “white” and President Obama challenging this stereotype. Additionally, Americans tend to identify themselves by race, where in other countries persons are much more like to identify themselves by nationality (Kong, 2010). This seems to demonstrate the relevancy of race and ethnicity in American society, leaving those who do not fit the stereotype experiencing discrimination and racism.

When exploring the ability to provide culturally sensitive services, Loya (2011) found that white social work practitioners were subject to color-blind racial attitudes, which have been linked to prejudice in other studies (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000). Additionally, subscribing to color-blind racial attitudes suggests that multi-cultural counseling competencies may be decreased (Neville, Spanierman, & Doan, 2006). These findings call into question the ability of social workers to practice with true cultural sensitivity; how can a social worker be “culturally sensitive” to difference if they refuse to acknowledge the ramifications of those differences? Since exclusionary policies and immigration restrictions target undocumented workers from south of the border, the presence of color-blind racial attitudes are of concern. Add this lack of awareness to the mixed messages that social workers receive between their social work courses, the Code of Ethics, and the law, and it is easy to see how frustration over which way is the “right way” could develop. Furman et al. (2007) found that social work students were very conflicted regarding the provision of services to undocumented persons when
providing services violated reporting laws. Some of the participants stated that they would provide services and not report, while others stated that they would provide services and then report.

Social workers must discuss these important issues in their agencies and develop clear guidelines for responding to many of the dilemmas and challenges presented here. These conversations should occur within all levels of an agency, including members of the board of directors, executive leadership, and front-line workers. While some agencies may feel that airing these issues openly would bring attention to them, to not do so is to deny the very nature of the conflicts themselves and place workers and the agency in a vulnerable situation.

Such discussions could generate yet another implication of the criminalization, which is the need for social workers to be involved in social policy and legal advocacy. When advocacy occurs at the agency level, or even more powerfully as part of a consortium of like-minded agencies, the ability to assert collective power increases. Thus, such issues make it increasingly important for social workers to become involved in national social work organizations. The National Association of Social Workers has taken an official position opposing law SB1070 in Arizona, which allows law enforcement officers to stop people they “reasonably suspect” may be illegally in the country. The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) (2010) states that:

This law will undoubtedly increase discrimination and racial profiling as it permits police to apprehend someone based simply on his or her appearance. Not only will it erode the civil rights of residents of Arizona, but it will also erode public trust in the police and diminish public safety. Immigrants who are victims of a crime will be less likely to report crime, as victims may now be asked to prove their legal status and subsequently be arrested themselves. (para. 2)

In this policy statement, the organization further asserts its concern with the ethical and practical aspects of the law, and connects its position to the policy tool kit, in which suggested courses of action are provided.
Social workers may be placed in the situation of working with children whose parents have been incarcerated during the increasing raids around the country targeting undocumented workers. Bess (2011) suggests that social workers need to: engage in “social and political action” (p. 2); fight discrimination and exploitation; and “advocate, educate, and initiate” (p. 2). Social workers, according to Bess, need to explore the relevancy of the issues within their own practice settings and need to advocate for clients that have been impacted by immigration policies.

The need for research in this area is apparent. Past research demonstrates that at least one state proposed legislation greatly influenced social workers’ perceptions on how they believe they would act (Furman et al., 2007). The relationship, however, between one’s perceptions and intended behavior is not always clear. Research that measures the relationship between the criminalization of immigration and the actual behaviors of practitioners would help clarify social workers’ responses to the dilemmas presented.

Criminalizing immigration will have long term consequences on the public health, safety, and economic productivity of immigrants and therefore all of society. The reality is that as undocumented immigrants realize that human service organizations are no longer a safe haven, they will keep many of the most intractable problems hidden until they reach a crisis state. For instance, a depressed undocumented woman with a substance abuse disorder is not likely to seek treatment voluntarily and may wind up in an emergency room after a suicide attempt. The acuity of her condition may severely impact the educational attainment of her American-born children (who are citizens). These children may subsequently develop behavioral health disorders that will require intensive and costly intervention.

On an economic level, the incarceration of undocumented persons is estimated to have cost $1.7 billion in 2009. Private corporations compete for federal contracts to imprison those arrested, at a cost of around $122.00 per night (Bess, 2011). According to Bess (2011), “immigrants have become the fastest growing population in federally-funded detention facilities” (p. 1). Most of these immigrants do not have criminal
records, yet are incarcerated for entering the country without documentation.

As a profession that claims to fight for social justice and places advocacy at the top of the list of ethical obligations, it is imperative that social workers examine their personal beliefs and have knowledge of agency policies. This awareness and knowledge can help social workers effectively provide services and advocate for their clients where necessary. As political rhetoric heats up during the current election season, it greatly behooves social work practitioners, along with others in the helping professions, to remain cognizant of the ever-changing landscape of immigration laws and policies to assess their impact on day-to-day practice for those they purport to serve.

References


Book Reviews


Vol. 1: Hannes Grandits (Ed.), *Eight Countries*.
Vol. 2: Patrick Heady & Peter Schweitzer (Eds.), *The View from Below: Nineteen Localities*.
Vol. 3: Patrick Heady & Martin Kohli (Eds.), *Perspectives on Theory and Policy*.

Exploring variations in family and kinship in Europe, this three-volume set reports the findings of the Kinship and Social Security (KASS) project—an impressive undertaking that collected a wealth of ethnographic and quantitative data on 19 urban and rural localities in eight countries--Italy, Sweden, Germany, France, Austria, Croatia, Poland, and Russia. According to the editors, the project was mostly rooted in history and anthropology, but the resulting volumes have much broader interdisciplinary appeal. Volume one contains country case studies, highlighting variations in history and culture with a focus on how economic and policy changes affected families. Volume two provides ethnographic accounts of urban and rural life in each of the countries. Volume three presents analyses of quantitative data and synthesizes the findings. Despite the broad range of empirical analyses, the study is theoretically driven and integrates universalistic micro-level theories of altruism and exchange with macro-level structural and cultural theories while addressing a number of key debates. Perhaps the most central is the debate on the role of cultural, economic, and policy factors in shaping kinship, where the study concludes that all three are closely linked and frequently operate in tandem.

Addressing cultural patterns, Kohli and Heady (Ch. 17, Vol. 3) argue for a more parsimonious typology than either Laslett’s historical macro-regions (West, West-central, Mediterranean,
East) or Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes (liberal, corporatist-statist, social-democratic). (KASS study did not include any countries with liberal regimes, however.) They identify two clusters: Northwestern cluster, characterized by an emphasis on nuclear family, with kin ties downplayed; and southeastern cluster, that tends to emphasize kin ties more than marriages. This typology is based on patterns of marriage and kinship, but the authors argue that the role of the welfare state closely corresponds to these two types. Other chapters, however, make finer distinctions. Kohli, Albertini, and Künemund (Ch. 9, Vol. 3) theorize the North-South regime axis and identify Nordic, Continental, and Southern regimes; Schlee and Hardy (Ch. 15, Vol. 3) also mention three clusters (Northern, Central, and Southern). Augustins (Ch. 14, Vol. 3) highlights differences within the southeastern cluster and identifies three ideal types: “kinship-oriented” solidarity (southern cluster) characterized by strong kin ties and gendered division of labor; “institution-oriented solidarity” (northwestern cluster) characterized by individualism, isolation of nuclear family, gender egalitarianism, and reliance on broader social institutions for assistance; and “neighbor-oriented solidarity” (eastern cluster) emphasizing nuclear families embedded in local communities. All typologies, however, underscore the inverse link between marriage and kin ties as well as the relationship between strong kin ties and an emphasis on women’s domestic roles. The latter relationship is also tied to fertility patterns: Fertility used to be higher in countries with stronger kin ties, but by the end of the 20th century, this correlation reversed. Heady, Gruber, and Ou (Ch. 8, Vol. 3) examine this paradox and find that proximity to kin increases fertility in rural areas, as kin assistance compensates for the lack of men’s involvement in domestic tasks, but in urban areas it does not—there, egalitarian division of labor is the key to promoting fertility. In sum, this paradox results from an interaction of economic and cultural trends—urbanization combined with persistent cultural values.

Turning to economic factors more directly, the study focuses on the modernization theory which argues that as economies develop, kin ties are weakened. Cluster differences and historic trends offer some support: Kohli and Heady (Ch. 17, Vol. 3) suggest that the northwestern pattern is better adapted to
modern capitalism, while the southeastern type works better with agriculture. The full picture, however, is quite complicated, leading scholars to debate whether economic changes weaken kin ties or merely transform them. Another prediction of the modernization theory would be a cross-national convergence, yet the trajectories are more complex: Family patterns converged on high levels of marriage and fertility in post-war decades, but then diverged again, reflecting the pre-war differences—albeit in reverse for fertility. The most recent trends suggest a potential for another convergence—a “rediscovery” of kinship accompanying the welfare state retreat (Viazzo, Vol. 3, p. 285). Some also link this trend to the increased instability of marriages, arguing that it leads to increased reliance on kin. Segalen (Ch. 10, Vol. 3) argues, however, that current trends do not look like a return to kinship ties of earlier times. She highlights a shift towards emotion-based, rather than survival-based, kinship—one that parallels the earlier shift to companionate marriages and involves a move from status-based moral obligations to elective relations where both parties have a great deal of autonomy, and assistance depends on emotional closeness. Viazzo (Ch. 11, Vol. 3) agrees that modernization processes can promote elective kin ties, but emphasizes that the cultural differences across clusters will likely persist.

Finally, with regard to social policy, the study emphasizes the “crowding out” versus “crowding in” debate. The “crowding out” perspective assumes that familial assistance is driven primarily by recipients’ needs and suggests that social provisions displace such assistance. The “crowding in” perspective emphasizes the altruistic and reciprocal nature of kin help and argues that state support can actually increase the levels of informal support as it provides people with resources that they can use to assist others. Heady and Kohli (Ch. 1, Vol. 3) find support for both altruism and reciprocal exchanges as key mechanisms behind support transfers—with reciprocity operating both as a wish to reciprocate the help received (by increasing one’s own giving) and as a wish not to be a burden (by reducing what one asks for). As Viazzo (Ch. 11, Vol. 3) argues, however, there may be cultural differences in these mechanisms—in the northwestern cluster, assistance to adult children is often unidirectional and appears to be based more on altruism, while in the southeastern cluster, exchanges
and reciprocity dominate. Ultimately, Kohli and Heady (Ch. 17, Vol. 3) conclude that while some “crowding out” likely happens—financial support of the elderly is now primarily the responsibility of the state—other types of family solidarity and support are encouraged and enabled by the welfare state. The study also concludes that while social policies oftentimes emerge in response to economic changes and existing cultural patterns, they also promote specific goals such as increased fertility and women’s labor force participation, and, in recent years, an effort to shift assistance tasks to families. The latter trend, Kohli and Heady argue, may generate a “care crisis,” unless policies support flexible employment and provide financial support for caregiving, or, as Chevalier (Ch. 13, Vol. 3) shows, it can contribute to gender, class, and ethnic inequalities, as families with resources relegate caregiving to immigrant women, mostly undocumented and poorly paid.

This set of volumes is more integrated than many other edited collections, although numerous chapters with different authors do make it more difficult to identify the main arguments and pinpoint the evidence supporting them, and the quality of the writing is somewhat uneven. Nevertheless, the focus on kinship offers an important albeit underutilized lens for examining cross-national differences in family experiences, gender dynamics, and social policy regimes. The study provides a wealth of information, makes interesting theoretical arguments, and succeeds at preserving the micro-focus while considering macro-level cultural, economic, and social policy forces underlying kin ties. This blend of micro and macro approaches and the emphasis on theory-driven analyses make for an exciting set of volumes that will be of much interest to graduate students and scholars in the areas of family, gender, aging, and social policy.

Natalia Sarkisian, Department of Sociology, Boston College


This new book edited by Midgley and Piachaud addresses the limited attention paid by social policy analysts to the
impact of colonialism on the development of social welfare policies. By focusing solely on history of the British Empire on the development of social welfare policies in the former colonies, the book makes a strong argument for understanding the varied ways colonization affected the trajectory of welfare. This approach is informed by authors who are not only social work researchers, but also sociologists, historians, policy experts and development practitioners who hail from several countries, including former colonies. By weaving this interdisciplinary approach, the book focuses considerable expertise on social policy topics as diverse as social assistance, provident funds, social development, and identify formation.

Midgley and Piachaud argue persuasively that social policy analysis must include an historical analysis of the impact on former colonies of imperialism, both pre- and post-colonization, on current social welfare discussions. The book acknowledges that the complexity of imperialism and colonialism makes a global definition difficult. Given this complexity, the book does not assume the experiences among the countries highlighted in this book—which includes South Africa, India, Hong Kong, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Australia, and the Caribbean region—are generalizable. A few themes do emerge, however, and are cautiously applied to understanding the impact of British colonization.

The book’s 12 chapters are organized into three main parts. Part one consists of an overview of the British Empire, its impact on world history and the origins of social policy in the British colonies. This section of the book gives an historical context to British colonialism, as well as addressing theories and perspectives in social policy studies. Part two contains nine chapters designed as case studies that provide examples of social welfare policies originating out of the colonial experience. The authors skillfully describe colonization in the respective country, and then trace the development of welfare policies through the modern day. Subjects include racial differentiation and apartheid in social welfare in South Africa, compensatory discrimination policies based on the caste system in India, and the English Poor Laws in Zimbabwe. Part three brings these pieces together to address how the colonial legacy impacts current social policies, and identifies the implications for social policy today. Midgley and Piachaud state that it is inherently tricky to generalize findings from these case
studies to colonialism, but they do identify common strands. Colonization created an ideology that established the British Empire as arbiters of the betterment of the world’s people. Slavery and the mass forced migration of people, along with the insistence on English as the language of government and education, have also had lasting impacts on the former colonies. Finally, government provided unequal access to services among urban and rural dwellers.

There are limitations to the book, which are outlined by the editors. There is little focus on the social policy impact of forced mass migration and the resulting diaspora, as well as on the impact of the influx of British immigrants into the colonies. Additionally, while the social policies of the Dominions of Australia and South Africa were examined, those of Canada and New Zealand were not.

The book is cohesive and well articulated, a great feat for pulling together a number of authors from different disciplines. Each chapter illuminates the complexities and the contradictions inherent in the legacy of colonialism on social welfare policy. Indeed, one can only hope that this book becomes the first in a series of books examining the legacy of colonialism, not only of the British Empire, but also the French, Dutch, and American Empires. This volume forces the reader to look past the Eurocentric, Western model of welfare to focus on the histories of countries that are still wrestling with the visible and invisible structures left by colonialism. While this book will certainly appeal to social work researchers, practitioners and students engaged in international policy and practice, it holds value for those in other fields of social work. The development of the American social work profession grew, in part, from the English Poor Laws of this era, and therefore the book provides insight for social workers still operating under the legacies of these policies in countries across the globe.

*Melinda Williams Moore, School of Social Work, The University of Georgia*

Following Congressional reauthorization of the McKinney Homelessness Act in 1990, the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health funded six projects in five cities to address the needs of people who are homeless and mentally ill. This book describes in depth the Boston McKinney project, which was a randomized controlled trial that compared the impacts of independent living (IL or supported housing) and evolving consumer households (ECH or supportive group housing) on participants at six, 12, and 18 months, and at a longer-term follow-up.

Chapters 1-3 of the book provide background on the project, a review of sociological theories of community and how these theories relate to the ECH, and a brief historical review of mental health services and homelessness. Chapter 4 examines consumer preferences and clinician recommendations for housing for the participants. Chapters 5-8 and 10 focus on different outcome domains: social relations, substance abuse, mental illness, community functioning, and housing loss. Chapter 9 examines the process of empowerment in the ECH, and the final chapter (10) returns to the issue of community process as it relates to the project findings. There is also an appendix that provides a detailed description of the research methods used in the study.

The outcomes, costs, and many other facets of this project have been described previously in numerous journal articles (e.g., Goldfinger et al., 1999). Given this, readers will want to know what new information is provided in this book. First, extensive qualitative, ethnographic field notes are included in Chapters 5-8 and 10 to understand the ECH. Second, post-project archival data on housing loss were available for some participants up to 18 years later. Third, the project findings and the theoretical framework guiding the project are presented in more detail.

Currently, Housing First, an IL approach, has gained a great deal of currency in the field in the U.S. and elsewhere (Tsemberis & Eisenberg, 2000). The research reported in
this book challenges the Housing First model. First, African Americans in IL spent more days homeless than their counterparts in evolving consumer households. The research shows that 45% of those assigned to IL experienced some nights homeless, compared to 18% of those in ECH. Second, at baseline only 12% of participants clearly expressed preferences for ECH over IL. In contrast, two project clinicians indicated that less than 60% of consumers should live in ECH. Also, by the 18-month follow-up, 28% of those in ECH and 21% of those in IL indicated a preference for ECH. Third, consumer preferences for IL, coupled with clinician recommendations for ECH, predicted an increased risk of homelessness. These findings challenge the prevailing wisdom of Housing First.

Nevertheless, there are several limitations to the research reported in the book that should temper any conclusions about the superiority of ECH over IL. Over the 18 months of the project, both groups experienced high rates of housing stability, and there were few significant differences between the two types of housing on other outcomes. Moreover, Dickey, Latimer, Powers, Gonzalez, and Goldfinger (1997) reported that the costs of ECH were significantly higher than for IL. The small sample sizes and multiple statistical tests with no control for familywise error rate are problematic. Finally, the ethnographic description revealed considerable problems in the ECH, including escalating substance abuse, conflict among residents, conflict between residents and staff, and challenges in implementing an empowerment approach to working with residents.

In spite of these limitations, community mental health researchers will find this book valuable. It is well-written, well-researched, and offers a fresh perspective on the potential value of ECH for this populations. Hats off to Professor Schutt for putting this book together for the community of researchers, professionals, and consumers who are working to improve the lives and social conditions of this marginalized population.

Geoffrey Nelson, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, Canada

The scientific consensus is clear—our planet is facing an unprecedented environmental crisis, of which global climate change, the declining quality of our air, water and land, and the accelerated pace of extinction for many other species are only the most obvious features. The scientific consensus is equally clear that human activity on a world scale is the primary engine driving the crisis.

The consensus begins to break down, however, when it comes to the critical question of what long-term policies humanity needs to adopt to overcome this crisis. Are there solutions compatible with the existing international economic and political order, or does the environmental crisis require a fundamental transformation of our relationship to nature and of the way we organize human societies? Given the stakes involved, these are questions which should be of great concern to every social scientist.

Two scholars associated with the journal *Monthly Review*, Fred Magdoff and John Bellamy Foster, offer forthright and carefully-reasoned answers to these questions in their new book, *What Every Environmentalist Needs to Know About Capitalism*. Their conclusion, simply put, is that “environmental destruction is built into the inner nature and logic of our present system of production and distribution.” Capitalism is the problem, not the solution to the environmental crisis.

The authors point out that there are nine essential “planetary boundaries/thresholds” that ought not to be crossed if we are to maintain the earth’s climate and environment in a healthy condition: (1) climate change; (2) ocean acidification; (3) stratospheric ozone depletion; (4) the biogeochemical flow boundary (the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles); (5) global freshwater use; (6) change in land use; (7) biodiversity loss, (8) atmospheric aerosol loading; and (9) chemical pollution. They then proceed to systematically document the numerous ways that the capitalist system is incapable of operating within these boundaries, and, by its very nature, must and has crossed them.
Capitalism, they argue, is a system “based on a single motive—the perpetual accumulation of capital and hence economic growth without end.” For capitalism, the environment is not “a place with inherent boundaries within which human beings must live together with earth’s other species, but a realm to be exploited in a process of growing economic expansion.”

To those who argue that a “green capitalism” is possible, Magdoff and Foster respond: “A system that has only one goal, the maximization of profits … and which thus seeks to transform every single thing on earth into a commodity with a price, is a system that is soulless; it can never have a soul, never be green.” Capitalism, they go on to demonstrate, offers neither technological fixes nor market-based solutions adequate to preventing a future environmental catastrophe.

The authors do not deny that there are short-term policies that can be adopted now to lesson the capitalist system’s negative impacts on the environment. Indeed, they suggest a detailed array of such measures, including decreasing carbon emissions, reducing our dependence on fossil fuels, promoting sustainable agriculture and providing greater protections for threatened and endangered species.

But they insist, if we are to save the planet, we must ultimately replace capitalism with an alternative social system in which the aims of ecology (sustainability) and socialism (substantive equality) will be realized. This alternative will unquestionably require people in the developed countries to live at a significantly lower level of resource use than they do now. But, Magdoff and Foster suggest, although this would be a life poorer in material goods, it could be a socially and culturally richer one, through the re-establishment of vital connections between people and between people and nature.

One criticism that can be made of this book is that the authors fail to engage the politics of the current U.S. environmental movement. With existing environmental laws under determined attack in a hostile Congress and many state legislatures, and the Republican Party in total denial of the climate crisis, much of the environmental movement now finds itself on the defensive. Publicly taking an anti-capitalist position would seem to threaten to marginalize it even further.
Thinking through how environmentalists can effectively integrate anti-capitalism into their day-to-day theory and practice is an urgent necessity. While this book does not address that problem, it provides valuable tools for others to begin to do so.

Paul Saba, Center for Biological Diversity


At present, when our national government seems incapable of responding to the current economic crisis and when responsive, forward-thinking leadership is either absent or thwarted, it is instructive and inspiring to read accounts of New Deal programs that worked. This carefully researched book provides a detailed account of the workings of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in one state.

Mielnik investigates nearly every aspect of the CCC’s purposes, origins, organization, difficulties and accomplishments. Before the Depression, South Carolina had state forest land but no state parks. Between 1933 and 1942, the CCC built 16, all of which stand today. The Corps also established fire prevention and control stations and reclaimed land through reforestation. Famously, it provided work, education, healthcare and proper nutrition to a quarter million young men and a few women at a time when they were idle and hopeless. Meager as their earnings were, they were the greater part of enrollees’ families income during the worst of the Depression.

In the first chapter, the author provides compelling details about the impact of the Depression on South Carolina, a rural, segregated state where agriculture—primarily share cropping for African Americans—and textiles were the principal sources of economic activity. Both were clobbered by the Depression; many lost their jobs and those who kept them had their wages severely cut. With this as background, Mielnik discusses the various New Deal programs and their interfaces. She then provides detailed information about the administrative structure of the CCC that was positioned under the War Department but
where recruitment was the responsibility of the Department of Labor.

South Carolina had the highest percentage—40%—of African Americans of any state in the 1930s. The author discusses the federal government’s upholding racial segregation in the CCC camps; because of their greater presence in the South, there were higher percentages of African Americans in the CCC than elsewhere, but overall, only 9% of Corps members were Black, and they were confined in camps separate from whites. Similarly, when the parks opened, African Americans were either excluded (in the case of smaller parks) or confined to designated, less attractive and less appointed sections.

First person accounts of their experiences are difficult to locate and many written documents, such as camp newspapers, have disappeared, according to the author. She has made good use of whatever primary sources she’s been able to find, and they report hard work, good food, recreation and opportunities to learn some skills and basic literacy.

The book has a long middle section that provides details about the various parks built by the CCC. This section has many photographs, some showing how the buildings initially looked and how they look today. The final, brief chapter, “Learning from the Parks,” provides a succinct assessment of the achievements and failings of the CCC as well as the impact of other New Deal programs in South Carolina. About the former, she concludes (p. 138) that “The CCC met President Roosevelt’s dual goals of conservation of land and of men” despite having not confronted some of the State’s underlying socio-economic problems.

The CCC was conceived, developed and put into operation with amazing speed. A good companion to this book is Public Broadcasting Service’s American Experience documentary, *The CCC*. The book can also be paired with Robert Leighninger’s *Long-Range Public Investment: The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal* (2007). Both books demonstrate how much can be accomplished in the immediate and in the long term.

Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Prof. Emerita, School of Social Work, Salem State University

Much has been written in the social work literature about human needs and the role of social workers in responding to their clients’ needs. Much less has been written about looking at the “client” as “citizen” and how that shapes the social worker’s role. This compact book addresses seeing the older people with whom social workers work as citizens and what that means.

Malcolm Payne, professor emeritus of social work and management at Metropolitan University, London, currently policy and development advisor at St. Christopher’s Hospice, is the author of fourteen books on social work and related areas. He holds visiting professorships at universities in Poland and Finland. He writes from an international perspective, looking at aging and the response to it in Western Europe and the United States. For this book, he draws upon his work in Britain, Finland and Poland; throughout, he uses case examples based on his practice experience and information from colleagues and students. He is also familiar with U.S. policies toward the aged and introduces them often as a basis for comparison. American social workers can learn much from how other countries understand and deal with aging.

Payne’s idea of citizenship social work starts from the idea that older people are equal as citizens in any society, state, community, or family, and that citizenship confers rights of participation in and responsibilities for older people and everyone else in social relationships with them, based on the inherent worth of the individual regardless of age. In modern societies, the aged are often viewed as having limited roles—they no longer work, are often poor consumers, and cost society much in terms of the provision of medical care and Social Security.

The initial section of the book contains a general discussion of how aging affects people in terms of its psychological, social, economic, and political aspects. The author discusses main types of aging theories such as gerontological theories, critical analyses of social ideas of aging such as conflict theories, and biological and medical approaches to aging to assist in understanding the aging process. The importance of theory (and in fact, a range of theories, including feminist, life course
and social construction theories) is mentioned. While citizenship social work is not a theory, the author contends that it can be used as a model for social work practice with older people. This is plausible from the case examples presented. For example, the author discusses critical practice with older people and contends that it can be used effectively.

Theories that question the existing social order to guide practice actions can lead to the creation of social change that affirms the citizenship of older people in society. The author contends that social work practice with older adults that uses creativity can lead to a sense of empowerment in older adults. Examples are listening to music, art therapy, community art experiences, using pictures for life review and reminiscence.

Payne also asks, “What is the role of the older adult in the community?” and discusses how social workers need to deal with this in citizenship social work. Examples are the participation of older adults in mutual support groups, organizations, and groups. Participation in service planning is also mentioned. All of these suggestions are limited by health, interest and support from the community.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature on aging and, more specifically, to the little that has been written about the role of social work in social and political participation, particularly citizenship. The author brings a wealth of scholarship to this book, looking at aging and citizenship as they are encountered in Britain, Finland, Poland, and the United States. This gives the book a richness and range that a study dealing with aging in one country does not have. In one sense, this book is written in the best tradition of C. Wright Mills, who in The Sociological Tradition talked about “private troubles” and “public issues.” Using relevant examples, the author talks about these troubles of the aged but spends the majority of the book discussing the issues of aging, social and political participation, which are generated when a society’s population ages, and what the social work response needs to be to help achieve social and economic justice. While citizenship social work with older adults is not a well developed concept, it can serve as a useful model for social workers to use in their practice to enable older adults to live well with their aging and to help society to accept responsibility for the life that older people live.
This book would be edifying reading for anyone interested in aging and how to maintain the dignity and participation of the aged in society.

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Overall style should conform to that found in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Fifth Edition, 2001. Use in-text citations (Ritch, 1983), (Ritch, 1983, p. 5). The use of footnotes in the text is discouraged. If footnotes are essential, include them on a separate sheet after the last page of the references. The use of italics or quotation marks for emphasis is discouraged. Words should be underlined only when it is intended that they be typeset in italics.

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Please use gender neutral phrasing. Use plural pronouns and truly generic nouns ("labor force" instead of "manpower"). When dealing with disabilities, avoid making people synonymous with the disability they have ("employees with visual impairments" rather than, "the blind"). Don't magnify the disabling condition ("wheelchair user" rather than "confined to a wheelchair"). For further suggestions see the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association or Guide to Non-Sexist Language and Visuals, University of Wisconsin-Extension.

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