Maintaining Psychological Fail-Safe Systems of Performance: A Proposed Theoretical Model for Explaining Resistance in Psychotherapy

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MAINTAINING PSYCHOLOGICAL FAIL-SAFE SYSTEMS OF PERFORMANCE: A PROPOSED THEORETICAL MODEL FOR EXPLAINING RESISTANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

by

Daniel Rosen

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Daniel Rosen
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To Karla and Jon, with love
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The phenomenon of resistance to behavior change is generally recognized by counselors and therapists. As viewed from a problematic perspective, resistance represents the fundamental obstruction in effecting behavior change in the client. Resistance in psychotherapy has been equated with "obstinacy" (Evans, 1973), "negativism" (Nikelly, 1971), and "masochism" (Horney, 1945). Adler (cited in Nikelly, 1971) interpreted client resistance as a depreciation tendency which usually diminishes as therapy progresses.

These interpretations do little to further the understanding of resistance to behavior change since they name rather than explain the phenomenon. Except for psychoanalytic theory, very little theoretical work directly and systematically addresses the nature of resistance to behavior change. However, other theoretical models exist which are concerned with the determinants of behavior and the process of behavior change. These models provide a basis for implicit assumptions regarding the phenomenon of resistance.

If resistance to behavior change is defined as any process which impedes a person's capacity or desire to alter established patterns of behavior, then any theoretical model which addresses the following two issues suggests a concept
of resistance: (1) The model has a set of theoretical constructs pertaining to the determinants of behavior, and these determinants become a person's primary "reference source" for establishing patterns of behavior; (2) the model also addresses the nature and extent that a person is constrained by this particular reference source. The first theoretical issue deals with the etiology of present behavior, and the second issue is concerned with the locus or source of resistance to the alteration of present patterns of behavior. The second issue indicates how and why the determinants of present behavior persist as the primary reference source for particular response sets, even when an individual seems to express a sincere desire to change these patterns.

The existing theoretical models which address these two issues can be classified by three general paradigms of resistance. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of these three paradigms. Although any given model may have characteristics of more than one of these general paradigms, the primary aspects of a theory of behavior change and resistance are represented more significantly in one of the paradigms as opposed to another. In Figure 1, note that the arrows indicate the proposed direction of determination of behavior, and the broken circles represent the proposed locus or source of resistance to altering the particular reference source or determinant of behavior.

For example, in Paradigm I, an arrow issues from the
Paradigm I:  (Past) ---→ Present
Paradigm II:  Past ---→ (Present)
Paradigm III:  Past  ⇔  Present

Key:  ---→ = Determines.
     ( ) = Primary locus of resistance.

Figure 1. Three existing paradigms of resistance to behavior change.

"past" and points toward the "present." This represents the theoretical proposition that one's past psychological experiences provide the primary reference source from which one's present behavior is established. The broken circle around the "past" refers to the theoretical view which posits that the primary locus or source of resistance to changing one's present behavior remains within one's past psychological experiences. The implication is that the process of behavior change requires interventions which alter the psychological significance of one's past. Psychoanalytic theory exemplifies the conceptual framework depicted in Paradigm I.

Paradigm II also reflects the view that one's past experiences provide the primary reference source for one's present behavior. However, it differs from the first paradigm because it emphasizes that the primary locus of resistance is within one's present circumstances, not within one's past. This paradigm implies that the process of behavior change
must alter one's present conditions. Learning theories reflect this paradigm.

Paradigm III is viewed as striking an interactional or combined effect between the first two. It proposes that the psychological significance of one's past determines one's present experience; in turn, one tends to structure one's present experience to reinforce or revivify the significance of one's past. This third theoretical paradigm emphasizes an interdependency between past and present experiences. As such, the locus of resistance to behavior change lies primarily within the dynamics of this interactional process. The implication for psychotherapy is that a therapist must intervene so as to redirect a person's present behavior away from validating the psychological significance of past experiences. Cognitive models and self-oriented (phenomenological) theories of personality tend to exemplify this third general paradigm.

This thesis presents an alternative paradigm of resistance and a theoretical model which is based upon it. The purpose for developing such an alternative is to focus on a theoretical source of resistance which has not been previously emphasized, but is viewed as being a very significant source of resistance to behavior change. That is, although the existing three paradigms account for some important potential aspects why an individual maintains certain patterns of behavior, the existing theories fail to emphasize
the primary potential source of resistance to behavior change. Since psychotherapy is a process geared toward altering certain existing patterns of behavior (i.e., attitudes, feelings, and/or actions), its efficacy is ultimately based upon how well it overcomes the sources of resistance to such behavior changes. Thus, one of the most important contributions of this alternative paradigm and model of resistance to behavior change is with regard to the implications for psychotherapy procedures generated by such a concept.

Existing Theoretical Views on Resistance to Behavior Change

The framework for classifying existing theoretical views of resistance into three general paradigms is introduced in the previous remarks. In the present section, each of these three paradigms is discussed further. Subsequently, the discussion focuses on critically evaluating the concepts of resistance which are represented by each of the paradigms. Such discussion will involve comparing and contrasting the various theoretical propositions held by each of the paradigms. The implications derived from this evaluation will provide the theoretical backdrop for presenting an alternative paradigm, Paradigm IV.

Paradigm I: (Past) → Present

In general, the view of personality exhibited in Paradigm I is that the etiology of a person's present behavior can be understood in terms of significant past psychological
experiences. It emphasizes that the primary sources of resistance to altering present patterns of behavior are within the contents of past experiences. It presumes that a person is constrained or psychologically fixated to certain past patterns of behavior and that these past patterns continue to be the reference source for establishing and maintaining present patterns of behavior. Paradigm I assumes "critical periods" of personality development exist in which certain behavior patterns are formulated as strategies for coping with the demands associated with these development periods. These early, formative experiences provide the basis or reference source for one's attempt to cope with the perceived demands within one's present life conditions.

Classical psychoanalytic theorists appear to exemplify Paradigm I. That is, they reflect the concept of resistance which assumes that the effects of experiences during certain critical stages of development become the basis of resistance to behavior change. Specifically, these effects result from an individual's earliest attempts to maximize instinctual gratification while minimizing anxiety (S. Freud, 1924). According to Freud, this process of maximizing gratification while minimizing anxiety involves unconscious operations. The primary function of these unconscious processes is to reduce the anxiety associated with achieving instinctual gratification. Instinctual urges, which have become associated with societal-parental or reality-based punishment,
tend to evoke anxiety within a person when the urges become conscious. Freud suggested that each mental process is first harbored within the unconscious psychical system. Only under certain conditions can a mental process proceed further into the conscious system. When certain unconscious trends of thought are turned back from entering the preconscious, these trends are then viewed as incapable of being conscious and are termed "repressed" (S. Freud, 1924).

Certain trends of thought remain repressed because of the anxiety attached to them. The individual, during psychosexual development, forms ego defense mechanisms which serve to repress unacceptable thoughts or urges. This does not mean that the gratification associated with such trends cannot be attained, but that the ego permits the process of gratification to occur in a manner which minimizes anxiety and involves unconscious processes. The process underlying resistance is repression, and this process is served by the ego (A. Freud, 1966; S. Freud, 1924).

According to psychoanalytic theory, resistance to behavior change is manifested when such change becomes a disruptive force against the maintenance of established ego defense mechanisms. That is, the ego is antagonistic to the process of change when it diminishes its capacity to remain a vigilant guard against the anxiety associated with unacceptable thought trends. This source of resistance comprises a person's system of "ego resistances" against unacceptable,
unconscious thought trends.

S. Freud (1924) also identified other forms or manifestations of resistance as the "transference resistances" and, relatedly, those resistances which have their source in the "repetition compulsion." The locus or source of these factors of resistance is also bound to past experience.

The repetition compulsion is the theoretical construct for the process by which the very earliest object relations are revived in one's present object relations. The repetition compulsion underlies both the transference of libidinal (id) impulses and the transference of ego defenses against these impulses (A. Freud, 1966). Since this remains an unconscious process, the individual dissociates the original situation from which the earliest defenses were developed from their present operations. As Reich (1949) proposed, these defenses often assume fixed character traits such as arrogance, a rigid body posture, or a fixed smile. The original function of these defenses was to reduce the anxiety associated with infantile id impulses. However, due to their unconscious fixation, these defenses remain as personality traits apart from their historic sources.

The process of the repetition compulsion is related to the phenomenon of transference. The transference of libidinal impulses occurs when the person begins to experience emotions such as love, hate, anxiety, or jealousy in relation to a person or object which are not warranted in the actual
situation. What is said to be occurring is that the individ­
ual is unconsciously revivifying infantile id impulses--
early affective states which have been experienced in rela-
tion to the individual's earliest objects. The person is
unconsciously imputing to the present object the properties
or attributes of the infantile object relationship. The
repetition compulsion not only exerts its force to transfer
infantile id impulses to one's present situation, but it also
revives the former defensive operations against these
instincts, which are the transference of defenses (A. Freud,
1966).

As suggested earlier, in psychoanalytic theory, resis­
tances to change are defenses designed to minimize anxiety
while maximizing one's instinctual gratification. Patterns
of behavior which are part of the ego's defense mechanisms
enlisted to minimize sources of anxiety tend to be resistant
to change when the particular change undermines the effec-
tiveness of the ego to maintain repression of these sources
of anxiety. In general, the greater the source of anxiety,
the greater the resistance is to relinquishing the behaviors
which are associated with the ego defensive operations used
to repress this source of anxiety.

Sources of anxiety are based in infantile experiences.
Young children regard their instinctual impulses according
to parental approval or disapproval. Disapproval of instinc-
tual gratification engenders anxiety associated with
restrictions, loss of support, rejection, or abandonment. Thus, the infantile ego fears the instincts because it is so dependent on the outside world but yet so fearful of it. Consequently, in young children, defense mechanisms are motivated by objective anxiety. As the individual develops toward more independent, autonomous modes of functioning, characteristic of maturation, these infantile defense mechanisms are often retained even though the historic sources (infantile fears) no longer have any basis in actuality. Thus, what were objective sources of anxiety during infancy become transformed into neurotic mechanisms of defense in adulthood via the unconscious process of the repetition compulsion and the related transference phenomenon (A. Freud, 1966; S. Freud, 1924).

In psychoanalysis, the phenomenon of resistance is not viewed merely as an obstacle in the psychotherapy process, but it becomes the object of the therapy process itself. An analyst attempts to determine the psychological significance of an analysand's present defensive operations which are manifested as resistance in terms of their unconscious link to historic sources of anxiety. The theoretical assumption is that while this link remains unconscious, the analysand's resistance to relinquishing the defensive operations remains.

Paradigm II presents some contrasting views regarding resistance to behavior change to those of Paradigm I. It is recalled that Paradigm II is represented as follows:
Paradigm II: Past $\rightarrow$ Present

Paradigm II, like Paradigm I, also views that the primary determinant of one's present behavior is one's past experience. Unlike Paradigm I, however, the locus or source of resistance to changing present patterns of behavior is within one's present conditions, according to this second theoretical paradigm of resistance. Learning theories and their applied models represent the propositions associated with Paradigm II.

Many learning theories are based on three broad assumptions. First, behavior is learned by the building up of associations. Second, persons are presumed to be hedonistic. Third, behavior is environmentally determined. The first assumption suggests that complex patterns of behavior can be understood in terms of the linkage or joining together of simple associative bonds. Watson (1925) termed the units of these associative bonds as stimulus-response units which he called reflexes. The second assumption, that of hedonism, is articulated in Thorndike's (1905) law of effect, which states that in a given situation a behavior producing satisfaction (pleasure) becomes associated with that situation. Thus, when that situation recurs, the behavior is more likely than before to also recur. Any act or behavior within a given situation producing discomfort becomes dissociated from that situation so that when the situation recurs, the particular behavior is less likely than before to recur. In essence,
Thorndike's law of effect seems to be a restatement of the psychoanalytic assumption that one seeks gratification associated with pleasure and strives to avoid punishment or pain. The third assumption, dealing with the view that one's behavior is primarily determined by environment, suggests that all persons are controlled by certain variables in their environment. This last assumption profoundly influences Paradigm II's view of the locus or source of resistance to behavior change.

Learning theories do not seem to adopt the reductionistic view of resistance that is maintained in psychoanalytic theory. Learning models do accept the psychoanalytic notion that there is a kind of repetition compulsion, but learning theories posit a different view to explain the process of the phenomenon. According to most learning models, an individual does repeat patterns of behavior which are based in past experiences. However, one's past experiences do not retain the status of a primary reference source for one's present behavior. That is, there is nothing "magical" about one's past experiences since one's present experiences serve to either maintain a person's established patterns or they serve as a basis for changing these patterns. Analogous to the repetition compulsion in many learning theories is the concept of the "behavioral repertoire." According to this concept, those behavior patterns which are most strongly reinforced tend to persist; those which are not as strongly
reinforced do not acquire as significant a position, in hier-
archal terms, as do other more strongly reinforced patterns. 
Behavior change thus involves a restructuring of one's behav-
ioral repertoire, and this change process occurs within one's 
present conditions apart from one's past experiences.

Three major types of conditioning models exist for 
establishing behavior patterns: (1) classical conditioning, 
(2) instrumental conditioning, and (3) operant conditioning. 
The basic characteristic of classical conditioning is that a 
previously neutral stimulus acquires the capacity to elicit 
a response because of its association with another stimulus 
that automatically produces the same or similar response. 
Thus, in classical conditioning, a particular pattern of 
behavior becomes established as a result of pairing a previ-
ously neutral stimulus with an unconditioned stimulus, one 
that automatically produces the response, enough times so 
that the results are that the conditioned stimulus acquires 
the power to produce the unconditioned response when intro-
duced by itself. This Pavlovian model (Pavlov, 1927), clas-
sical conditioning, clearly defines stimuli and response sets 
and therefore provides an influential role in the development 
of further learning models. In terms of resistance, the 
classical conditioning model points to one's environmental 
conditions as providing the primary source of resistance to 
behavior change. By systematically controlling which stimuli 
are associated with a particular response set, not only can
certain behavior patterns be initiated, but, in addition, by manipulating the variables which initiated the patterns, one can alter the behavior patterns which already have been established.

The Hullian model (Hull, 1943) of instrumental conditioning emphasizes behavior as motivational or goal-directed activity. In the Hullian model, behavior patterns become associated with their effectiveness at drive reduction. For example, an organism which has built up a substantial hunger drive due to deprivation of food is more likely to perform behaviors associated with obtaining reinforcing stimuli which reduce the hunger drive than is an organism for which the hunger drive is not so strong. The theory attempts to derive lawful relationships among environmental influences which affect an individual's internal drive states, and the consequences of certain response sets which reduce the individual's internal drive states. The Hullian model suggests two factors or aspects of resistance to behavior change. First, consequences associated with a particular pattern of behavior cannot be viewed independently, because the relative strengths of drive states associated with those consequences also play an important role in determining the significance of that pattern of behavior. Second, Hull's emphasis on drive states suggests that resistance to behavior change relates to an individual's reluctance to relinquish a particular pattern of behavior which has been strongly associated with acquiring
drive reduction. The implication is that in order to attenuate this source of resistance, the individual must perceive an alternative pattern of behavior for acquiring similar drive reduction.

The third major model of learning theories is operant conditioning, developed by Skinner (1953). In this model, responses are emitted by the individual and are called oper- ants. Skinner, however, did not emphasize an internal motivation like Hull's drive state. In a sense, Skinner adopted the view that the individual tends to emit various behaviors in a random fashion, and significance is subsequently endowed to these behaviors as a result of the consequences associated with these responses. In operant conditioning, the sources of resistance to altering one's established behavioral repertoire is ultimately bound to one's present conditions of reinforcement in terms of its magnitude, and its schedule of occurrence in relation to the behavioral responses. Accordingly, these sources of resistance can be counteracted to the extent that control over these reinforcement factors can be achieved. Given this assumption, the sources of resistance against behavior change persist as a function of the relative inability to control the variables associated with the conditions of reinforcement.

More recently developed learning models diverge from the Skinnerian system, most notably those of social learning theorists such as Bandura (1969). Such social learning
theorists suggest that the Skinnerian view fails to address adequately the occurrence of learning of specific responses in the absence of direct reinforcement. For Bandura and some others, most social learning occurs as a function of observing behavior and modeling the behavior of others. Moreover, the concept of "self-reinforcement" has been adopted by Bandura and others. In essence, an individual is viewed as having the capacity to internalize (make covert associations) and maintain associations in the absence of direct, external reinforcing stimuli. However, this concept does not present a contradiction to the locus of resistance associated with Paradigm II. That is, although one can internalize previous associations between patterns of behavior and the acquisition of rewards, the resistance to relinquishing these patterns of behavior is still contingent upon the reinforcement conditions in one's present circumstances.

Thus, the primary locus or source of resistance to behavior change reflected in learning models remains within the individual's present conditions. From the psychotherapist's view, resistance becomes a problem of logistics. One major logistical problem involves initiating certain intended behavior patterns so that the reinforcement of these can occur. That is, operant conditioning requires that a given behavior be generated in the first place in order that it be paired with the reinforcing stimulus. The technique of modeling, as prescribed by Bandura and other social learning
theorists, may be used to facilitate vicarious conditioning as a way of mitigating against this aspect of resistance.

A second problem occurs when an individual's present conditions of reinforcement are not readily amenable or accessible to external interventions. A child's classroom behavior may be modified through a teacher's regulation of reinforcement conditions in the classroom, but the teacher may have little ability or desire to enforce matching conditions beyond the classroom setting. A prison inmate may exhibit significant behavior change as a result of stimulus controls within a correctional institution, but the conditions out in the "streets" may fail to provide an adequate reinforcement schedule to maintain these changes. Thus, the ability to control the process of generalization represents another significant factor of resistance within the learning models.

A third major factor of resistance within the learning theory paradigm is associated with the problems of conditioning inhibition of firmly established behavior patterns through aversive control. Behavior such as cigarette smoking, overeating, and certain drug addictions has intrinsic reinforcing value associated with the behavior itself. Because of the intrinsic reinforcing stimuli associated with such patterns of behavior, the source of resistance is within the behavior itself. This situation, within behavior therapy modalities, is frequently associated with an attempt to
introduce an aversive stimulus as a means of counteracting the positive reinforcing stimuli intrinsic in the behavior itself. However, it is a moot point as to whether a client would continue in such a program beyond the controls of the modification setting itself. That is, many individuals would probably have difficulty applying aversive stimuli to themselves over a period of time.

In summation, Paradigm II, as represented by learning theory models, posits that the primary locus or source of resistance to behavior change is within one's present conditions. Within this theoretical paradigm, the repetition of past behavior patterns is not viewed as an automatic process; rather, past behavior patterns are repeated because the individual anticipates the consequences to be similar to those incurred in past experience. Behavior change is resisted to the extent that one persists in this anticipation. Modification of behavior or behavior change does occur, theoretically, when the individual "learns" that by inhibiting the occurrence of a past response pattern to a particular stimulus, or by engaging in another given response set to a particular stimulus event, the consequences provide greater rewards than experienced in the past. In this sense, Paradigm II views resistance primarily as a logistical problem. This problem is one of control. To the extent that the consequences of behavior can be regulated as per desire within ongoing, present conditions, resistance to behavior change
can be counteracted effectively.

The third existing paradigm of resistance, Paradigm III, subsumes the phenomenological or self-oriented theories of personality. It reflects cognitive models of behavior as well. In this paradigm, the primary locus of resistance is within the interactional process between past and present experiences and is represented as follows:

Paradigm III: Past \rightarrow Present

It appears that the theoretical construct of the "self" relates to this interactional process. From past experiences persons derive precepts of what their relationship to the world should be, and these provide the cognitive frame of reference for their perception of their present experiential field. In turn, their immediate experiences either reflect a consistency with their preconceived relationship to the world, or they conflict with this expectation. One of the major assumptions held by theorists who are identified with Paradigm III is that individuals strive to maintain an optimal level of consistency between what they perceive should occur, and the events which are actually experienced by individuals. The motivational aspect underlying this presumed tendency has been articulated by Adler (1963), Horney (1945), Rogers (1961), and Sullivan (1953), among others. Persons strive to maintain their adopted position in relation to particular objects because it ensures the persons' psychological significance to these objects.
Adler (1963) termed this tendency as one's striving for "self-esteem." A person develops a system of "plans" concerning how he/she must impact on others in order to elicit outcomes which generate feelings of power or potency. It is an attempt to establish a position of significance or importance in relation to certain objects so as to increase one's ability to control the outcomes resulting from interactions with these objects (persons or otherwise). Thus, achieving such positional status provides psychological security against feelings of helplessness and ineffectuality. According to Adler, one's "life style" reflects one's plans for attaining such a position, leading to self-esteem.

Horney's (1945) theoretical position with regard to the nature of such a striving is very similar to Adler's. Horney suggested that persons develop an "idealized image of self" which represents their cognitive image of how they must relate to others in order to minimize feelings of "basic anxiety." Basic anxiety has its roots in infantile feelings of helplessness, of being overwhelmed by the "big world." Like Adler, Horney proposed that one strives to secure a relationship to objects which mitigates against feeling helpless and insignificant, reminiscent of infantile feelings.

Rogers (1961) termed this motivational aspect as one's striving for "self-worth." According to Rogers, an individual begins to experience anxiety or a feeling of vulnerability when he/she perceives incongruence between the
concept of self (one's preconceived relationship to the world) and what one experiences in ongoing interactions with the environment. Such a situation signals a threat to self-worth, because what the person believes he/she must be in relation to others deviates from what one is in relation to others.

Sullivan's (1953) theoretical construct of the "self-dynamism" also refers to the individual's system of interacting with objects, based on previous experiences in which such interactions produced psychological security. Again, it is a theoretical proposition which suggests that persons tend to develop a cognitive system of precepts as to how they should relate to certain objects in order to achieve a position of significance in relation to these objects.

The essential line of reasoning among these aforementioned theorists is that the person's behavior is strongly moderated by a wish to maintain an integrity of the self. In more operational terms, this is a desire to maintain congruence between one's precepts as to how one should relate to certain objects to maintain a position of psychological significance (i.e., esteem or worth), and what one perceives is one's relationship to these objects. Resistance to behavior change can be understood in terms of the person's wish to retain self-esteem or self-worth in the context of present life conditions and demands. Such resistance can be conceptualized as represented by Paradigm III. It is a person's
past experiences which provide him/her with what the cognitively defined relationship to the world should be in order to establish psychological significance and impact. It is the person's present, ongoing experiences which permit the person to appraise to what extent the relationship with others is as it should be, as defined by past experiences. The interactional process encourages the development of psychological defenses in order to perceive things as expected and dictated by past experiences. In turn, the perception of one's present experiences strengthens or reinforces these expectations. Thus, persons resist changes which undermine their ability to generate present experiences to conform with the expectations of what should be experienced in order to maintain self-worth or self-esteem. Such changes threaten their ability to perceive congruence between what they should be and what they actually are.

This interdependency between past and present experiences also underlies cognitive models of behavior. In general, these models presume that significant past experiences provide a cognitive or perceptual frame of reference from which one experiences ongoing stimuli. From a preestablished cognitive system, one is able to derive significance or meaning from the occurrence of events. An event by itself does not evoke a particular emotional response, but the meaning attributed to that event does. This assumption underlies the theoretical approaches taken by the cognitive models of
behavior presented by Ellis (1973), Festinger (1958), Kelly (1955), and McClelland (1951). From the previous discussion, it also appears to be an implicit assumption held by Adler (1963), Horney (1945), Rogers (1961), and Sullivan (1953). Self-esteem and self-worth are personal appraisals based on a preconceived system for deriving the meaning or significance of events.

Festinger (1958), Kelly (1955), and McClelland (1951) addressed interactional process between past and present experiences as a cognitive operation of "matching" the outcomes which one expects with those which actually occur. These theorists also assume one's tendency to strive for optimal consistency between what should happen (anticipation) and what does happen (realization). The nature of the outcomes which one expects is derived from past experience, and the outcomes which one experiences are derived from the perception of one's present circumstances.

While Festinger (1958) and Kelly (1955) suggested that the optimal level of consistency one strives for is maximum consistency or perfect matching, McClelland (1951) spoke of a bi-phasic tendency. According to McClelland, one strives toward minimizing large discrepancies perceived between expectation and actual occurrence, while maximizing small discrepancies perceived between expectation and actual occurrence (Maddi, 1968). That is, McClelland (1951) suggested that the individual desires a certain degree of predictability.

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and control, but not so much as to preclude novelty and spontaneity. The former situation in excess would lead to boredom, while the latter in excess would bring about psychological chaos.

Resistance to changes in behavior is viewed in terms of an individual's desire to maintain optimal consistency between expectations and realizations. Accordingly, anxiety signals the individual's fear that the perceived ability to maintain cognitive control over events is being diminished. By applying cognitive balance procedures as suggested by Festinger (1958), Heider (1958), and other "balance" theorists, such anxiety is reduced. In essence, persons must restructure their system of expectations to accommodate discrepant outcomes, and/or they must deny or distort the perception of actual events which are discrepant from those expected, to retain the accuracy or validity of such expectations.

Thus, an individual tends to persist or resist change in those behaviors and modes of perceiving events which serve to maintain optimal cognitive balance. This locus or source of resistance seems to be similar to that suggested by Adler (1963), Horney (1945), Rogers (1961), and Sullivan (1953). Past experiences provide the system of cognitive precepts from which one defines his/her relationship to certain objects, and one's present experiences occur within this pre-established system. This provides one with a frame of
reference for appraising one's psychological significance or power (i.e., self-esteem or self-worth). Thus, resistance according to Paradigm III represents the individual's attempt to retain the basis for certain cognitive precepts which lead to such feelings of significance and esteem within actual, ongoing interactions.

Critical Evaluation of the Three Existing Paradigms of Resistance

All three existing paradigms indicate that there is a process whereby an individual tends to repeat behavior. Paradigm I denotes the "repetition compulsion," Paradigm II speaks of one's "behavioral repertoire," and the concepts of "life style" and "self-concept" are the analogous constructs in Paradigm III. However, the process which underlies the tendency to maintain certain patterns of behavior is explained differently by each of these paradigms, and it relates to the nature of the theoretical relationship between past and present experiences which is promulgated by each of these paradigms of resistance to behavior change.

Paradigm I places the locus of resistance to behavior change within one's past experiences. The relationship between past and present life experiences is one in which the individual's early object relationships are revivified in his/her present life circumstances. Present patterns of behavior are understood primarily in terms of these past, early life experiences, and not so much in terms of present
or future concerns. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory assumes that this process of repeating behavior is an unconscious one, and, thus, by definition the person has no capacity to alter the operations of resistance as long as the process remains unconscious.

This view suggests that the person is a "victim" of circumstances. Persons are viewed as not having the capacity to generate their present circumstances. On the other hand, an alternative view suggests that persons have the capacity to be selective in applying the transference phenomenon and that transference does not occur automatically, only by passive volition. If one adopts this alternative view, the persistence of patterns of behavior can be understood as a function of a person's choice to repeat such patterns. Many of the theorists who began diverging from Freud could not maintain the view that one's present behavior can be sufficiently understood in terms of historic artifact. For example, Jung (cited in Jacobi, 1951; Munroe, 1955) perceived that the symbols and dream work are reflections of one's present and future concerns. According to Jung, even if the symbols refer to the past and the archaic, their appearance signals a functional relationship between this past and the present-life circumstances. Similarly, Adler (cited in Mosak & Dreikurs, 1973) viewed that an individual's defense mechanisms reflect a wish to maintain self-esteem within the present demands of living.
S. Freud (1924) assumed that psychological defenses are established in response to an initial source of anxiety and are maintained because one unconsciously revivifies this initial source within present object relations. For example, a man who exhibits hostility towards his wife is unconsciously acting out his hostility towards his mother via the transference phenomenon. One important phenomenon not emphasized by Freud, however, is the experience of negative outcomes in object relations which produce anxiety. This experience not only signals a fear concerned with the immediate situation, but, in addition, the anxiety is associated with an individual's future concerns as to the ability to achieve the desired outcomes in future object relations. For example, a child is not only threatened by the immediate loss of a primary dependency object, but is also threatened by the implication that he/she does not have the ability to impact on such objects in such a way as to ensure fulfillment of dependency needs in the future. That is, the child fails to acquire sufficient reassurance that he/she has the capacity to be lovable and special enough to be mothered.

Therefore, one of the major deficiencies with the concept of resistance in Paradigm I is the absence of the notion that certain reassurance or confidence not received in early object relations in the past affects one's present interactions with other objects. Even though an individual's historic or initial sources of infantile anxieties no longer
operate in the present circumstances, the prospective implications derived from these initial sources may remain. The man who grew up feeling insecure about his ability to elicit approval and nurturing from his mother may develop a hostile, defensive posture toward his wife. This posture results not because he is merely revivifying unconsciously his relationship with his mother, but because he lacks the reassurance that he has the ability to meet adequately the expectations of a woman.

Paradigm I denotes that the locus of resistance is within past experiences. In this recent example, it would be presumed that by revealing to this man his unconscious desire to defend against his mother's rejection and to punish her, the transference of these feelings toward his wife may be altered. However, the proposal here is that the content transferred from his relation with his mother to his wife is his lack of confidence or reassurance in his ability to impact sufficiently upon a woman. Moreover, his resistance to relinquishing the hostile patterns of behavior centers around his desire to have such confidence reinstated by his wife but, at the same time, a desire to avoid outcomes which would reinforce his lack of confidence. Thus, Paradigm I fails to recognize that persons are often attempting to seek certain reassurances in their present object relations to compensate for a lack of such reassurances from past object relations. An individual often accounts for a particular
pattern of behavior or trait by specifying the historic source or genesis of the behavior but still resists relinquishing or altering such behavior. Persons frequently exploit their past to rationalize or justify a given behavior when, in actuality, such persistence serves present and future concerns, apart from the past.

Both Paradigms I and II tend to view individuals as passive reactants to internal and external stimuli, having little or no control over the circumstances to which they must be responsive. In Paradigm I the individual is presented as an unwitting "victim" of unconscious trends of behavior which issue from early, past experiences. In Paradigm II, the assumption is that individuals are respondents to environmental conditions and that their behavior is "shaped" by its consequences within these conditions. This paradigm emphasizes a locus of resistance which is primarily oriented toward adapting to present conditions.

Several major theoretical factors suggest that the primary locus of resistance is not confined within one's actual, present circumstances of living. First, learning theorists seem to neglect the proposition that one often tends to seek out the conditions or stimuli which will reinforce a particular pattern of behavior. Generally, theorists identified with Paradigm II presume that one is responsive to a given set of stimuli, and the effects of that response tend to either reinforce the strength of the response or weaken it.
However, the contention here is that persons have the capacity and desire to generate their own consequences and have the ability to seek out consequences which will maintain a particular desired response set. For example, a person who wishes to maintain his/her dependence on alcohol may generate the occurrence of stimuli which reinforce alcohol consumption, even when such stimuli are currently absent. Such persons may instigate an argument, for instance, with their spouses in order to generate anger and anxiety, and subsequently proceed to drink as a means of reducing the impact of these feelings. An obese individual who is resistant to losing weight may consciously or unconsciously generate the circumstances in which the temptation to eat is present (e.g., driving by the ice cream parlor or generating a "crisis" to precipitate anxious worrying, etc.).

The implication is that there often exists a motivational aspect underlying a particular pattern of behavior in which persons generate their own condition of reinforcement. Altering the consequences of such a pattern does not necessarily remove the motivational factor, and persons are likely again to generate their own contingencies of reinforcement. A child who wishes to be disruptive in school in order to avoid his/her frustration with academic performance may do so not because the consequences of disruption are reinforcing, but because the child would rather be a "behavior problem" than a "stupid child."
A second major factor overlooked in Paradigm II is that one can generate contingencies of reinforcement in fantasy behavior. Through fantasy behavior, an individual has the capacity to reinforce a particular thought or behavior trend by generating fantasy outcomes rather than experiencing actual ones. In its more extreme forms, this capacity is manifested in psychotic disorders. Thus, fantasy is an important channel for experiencing outcomes, but one which is overlooked by most learning theorists.

If individuals can choose and generate the sources of reinforcement for a particular trend of behavior which they desire to maintain, then persons will tend to discount stimuli which do not serve to reinforce the behavior. In effect, the concept of using stimulus control as a means of countering resistance fails to consider the notion that persons already have the capacity for maintaining stimulus control. Therefore, one must presume that there exists another source of resistance beyond the immediate consequences associated with particular behavior patterns.

It could be stipulated that maintaining stimulus control is effective in altering behavior, but only to the extent that such control is imposed and regulated over a "captive" individual. For example, it is interesting to note that residents within institutional environments, such as prisons and other detention facilities, often demonstrate marked changes in behavior within the stimulus controls of the
institution but revert to previous trends outside of the institution. The implication is that because persons have the capacity or freedom to select the conditions to which they must be responsive, they can selectively generate their own sources of reinforcement for a particular behavior pattern.

Paradigms I and II tend to complement each other due to their contrasting views on the sources of resistance to behavior change. Paradigm I presumes that the impact of one's past experiences must be altered in order for one to relinquish certain modes of behavior. Paradigm II suggests that while past experiences determine how one will respond to one's present circumstances, it is the outcomes derived from present experience which are related to resistance. Proponents of the former view tend to be critical of the latter because of the assumption that, unless one's past experiences are redefined, one will continue to transfer past, infantile trends to present behavior. Proponents of the latter, on the other hand, point to the idea that the former approach fails to recognize that persons are responding to their present life demands and that behavior must have utility in relation to their present circumstances, apart from historic determinants.

An alternative perspective is that each of these views is partially valid, and, by combining both approaches, a more accurate concept of resistance is achieved. Such a

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perspective is reflected in Paradigm III. Paradigm III designates the locus of resistance to behavior change within the interactional process between past and present experiences. As such, this paradigm emphasizes the theoretical viewpoint expressed by Lewin's (1935) field theory. Lewin stated that an individual's behavior in a particular situation is determined both by the characteristics of that situation, as he/she views them, and by the particular dispositions of the person at that time.

The implication of Lewin's statement is expressed by other theorists identified with Paradigm III. That is, there exists an interdependent relationship between past and present experiences. According to this view, the locus of resistance is not confined to the revivification of past experiences, as contended in Paradigm I, but it extends to the implications that such experiences have in relation to present life demands. At the same time, this view also implies that the locus of resistance is not confined to the nature of the outcomes in one's present conditions, as suggested in Paradigm II, but it extends to the nature of how one's past experiences delimit one's mode of perceiving present conditions. Thus, resistance to behavior change is not always an expression of the absence of certain reinforcing conditions, but it frequently reflects a person's unwillingness to permit the experience of such conditions.

The view of this paper is that Paradigm III represents
the most accurate or valid concept of resistance among the existing three paradigms. It emphasizes the point that an individual derives a system of interacting with certain objects from past experiences as does Paradigm I. However, Paradigm III also notes that behavior is not merely perpetuated by the unconscious existence of its historic determinants, that is, infantile sources of anxiety, but is perpetuated by the implications that such experiences have in regard to the nature of immediate outcomes. Consequently, the locus of resistance is not confined to the psychological significance of historic, past experience, but it extends to the psychological significance of one's present conditions of life.

Paradigm III indicates that past experiences tend to generate the system of precepts of what one's relationship to the world should be, and that from present experiences one derives the precept of how one is relating to the world. Persons tend to resist changes in patterned behavior which would alter their precept of what they are in relation to certain objects when such a precept generates incongruence between what they are and what they should be. For example, as Adler (cited in Mosak & Dreikurs, 1973) indicated, a man might develop certain traits of a "masculine" life style because he thinks, "I should be masculine." Much of his self-esteem relies upon maintaining congruence between his cognitive precepts: "I should be masculine," and "I am
Adler might suggest that this individual has derived this precept from past experiences in which the traits of masculinity may have been denoted as being physically strong, intrepid, and indifferent to attaining emotional nurturing. By exhibiting such traits in relation to certain objects, the individual presumes that he will achieve approval and acceptance from certain others. "I should be masculine" develops into an expectation that a masculine life style will lead to acquiring and maintaining self-esteem, and this individual attempts to structure his behavior toward fulfilling such life-style goals. If he begins to experience such feelings as fear or dependency anxiety in relation to certain objects, then his self-esteem tends to be threatened.

Resistance to relinquishing or altering this individual's "masculine" behavior is a function of the interactional process between his past and present experiences. It is his past experience which has provided the structure for developing his masculine life-style goals, representing what his relationship should be to certain objects, in a given situation. It is his present experiences which serve as the frame of reference for appraising whether he is as masculine as he should be. The interaction is such that he tends to persist in attempting to exhibit masculine traits as long as he maintains the cognitive precept that this is what he should be in order to achieve psychological significance (i.e.,
self-esteem or self-worth). Thus, according to Paradigm III, it is difficult for one to change what one is doing unless one can change what one believes he/she should be doing. Again, the former is related to what one is presently experiencing in interactions with objects, and the latter is derived from one's past experiences.

In essence, Paradigm III theorists assume that in order to counteract the resistance which is a product of the interdependent relationship between past and present experiences, a process of "reeducation" must occur. The focus of this process seems to be on the person's cognitive system of expectations which have been derived from formative, past experiences. That is, it involves an attempt to restructure life-style goals or the preconceived relation to objects which the individual has adopted as an injunction based on past experience. However, the process tends to occur in relation to the individual's ongoing interactions, in contrast to the psychoanalytic focus on the person's early, past relations with objects. Thus, resistance to behavior change is viewed as the persistence of certain cognitive precepts, and psychotherapy is viewed as a process which is undertaken as a means of attempting to provide the client with alternative cognitive precepts. By altering the client's concept of what he/she should be in relation to the world, the client is more "free" to pursue alternative life-style goals and still retain self-esteem.
An alternative theoretical paradigm is presented in the next section. In theory, it more closely resembles Paradigm III than either of the other paradigms of resistance to behavior change. However, this alternative paradigm, Paradigm IV, diverges from III by adopting the following proposition. While Paradigm III assumes that persons strive toward maintaining congruence between what they are and what they should be, Paradigm IV proposes that persons strive to maintain congruence between what persons perceive they are, and what they can be. Thus, the emphasis is on competence of behavioral performance rather than on the issues of ethical-moral or value-based obligations to perform behavior in a particular way.

This theoretical distinction alters the locus of resistance to behavior change from that suggested by Paradigm III. What one "should be" is derived from past experiences, but what one "can be" is derived from one's precepts of future or potential experience. Consequently, Paradigm IV designates the primary locus of resistance as the interactional process between present and future experience rather than between past and present experience. The basis for this theoretical distinction is explained in the following section.

**Paradigm IV: An Alternative Concept of Resistance**

An alternative paradigm of resistance is represented as follows:
Paradigm IV: Past → Future ——— Present

Like Paradigm III, this alternative paradigm assumes that one strives toward establishing and maintaining a position of psychological significance in relation to certain objects. Such a position permits individuals to feel that they have sufficient impact upon such objects in order to derive the desired outcomes from interactions with them. As indicated previously, Adler (1963), Horney (1945), Rogers (1961), and Sullivan (1953) suggested that having a preconceived position of regard, esteem, or worth in relation to the world provides one with a feeling of security and control which mitigates against the feelings of vulnerability and helplessness.

Paradigm IV also concurs with the notion that a person attempts to construct a "cognitive map" of the world. The individual attempts to develop a system of cognitive plans or expectations for relating to various objects in particular situations. Such expectations are derived from past experiences. However, Paradigm IV begins to diverge from III at this point. Paradigm IV proposes that while a person seeks to establish a system of cognitive plans or expectations relating to establishing a position of psychological significance, the focus of concern becomes centered around the extent to which the person remains confident that he/she has the ability to execute these cognitive plans. That is, while persons may know what kinds of positions they wish to
establish and maintain to achieve security, the issue that
remains is whether they can achieve those positions.

Using this line of reasoning, anxiety represents a
threat to persons' precepts of their capacity to achieve
desired relationships to certain objects. Resistance to
behavior change represents their unwillingness to risk
encountering a threat to their perceived capacity. That is,
as long as persons perceive that they have the ability to
execute particular cognitive plans or expectations to estab­
lish positions of significance, they can maintain a feeling
of psychological security. Thus, according to Paradigm IV,
behavior patterns do not reflect a person's attempt to exe­
cute a particular life style, but an attempt to maintain the
precept of his/her capacity to execute a particular life
style.

In Paradigm IV, the primary locus of resistance is
between future and present experiences. The precept "I will
be able to execute my plan or expectation for achieving a
position of psychological significance" is an expression of
a hope, a future wish. As such, the perceived ability to
execute a cognitive plan remains an expectation which is
expressed in fantasy. The expectation remains viable or
valid in fantasy to the extent that its validity is not
threatened by actual experiences. For example, the expecta­
tion expressed in fantasy that "I have the ability to be
sexually attractive to the opposite sex" remains viable to
the extent that when this ability is "tested out" in actual interactions (not in fantasy behavior), the resultant outcomes verify or validate the fantasied ability. Consequently, the interaction between persons' future experiences as expressed in fantasy and their present experiences as expressed in ongoing actual behavior provides them with the frame of reference for appraising their sense of security or self-esteem according to Paradigm IV.

Individuals adopt a kind of scientific approach to rendering meaning and implications to the outcomes which they experience. According to this alternative paradigm of resistance, the experience of particular outcomes, in and of themselves, does not affect the perception of self. What does affect individuals' perceptions of their ability to achieve psychological significance is the degree of external validity they assign to particular outcomes. For example, a student who receives failing results on an examination may become extremely anxious because this outcome invalidates the student's perceived ability to be academically successful. However, if the student minimizes the significance of this particular outcome, he/she decreases its negative implications so that it does not invalidate the perceived ability to be academically successful. For instance, "I failed this examination because I did not study enough for it" discounts the significance that this negative outcome has on the student's fantasies of having the capacity to be academically
successful. That is, the following belief, "If I had really tried to achieve good results on that examination, I would have been able to do so," is a precept whose adoption permits this individual to retain the perceived ability to be academically successful in spite of the discrepant outcome just experienced.

Thus, individuals adopt a pseudoscientific posture in regard to the implications of outcomes which are experienced. Like a law of physics, an outcome which appears to invalidate a particular law of nature can be dismissed to the extent that it is viewed as being produced from faulty or nonideal conditions. In an analogous fashion, an individual can discount a "negative" or invalidating outcome by determining the existence of a flaw within the circumstances in which the outcome occurred. Applying this line of reasoning, Paradigm IV assumes that the primary locus of resistance to behavior change is within the interaction of future experiences and present ones. The expectation to fulfill one's abilities and achieve certain outcomes remains viable even in the light of the experience of actual discrepant outcomes to the extent that the external validity of these discrepant outcomes can be discounted.

Dismissing or discounting the significance of the implications of actual outcomes is central to the concept of resistance represented by Paradigm IV. Persons protect their expectations of their capacity to attain certain outcomes.
that lead to a perceived position of psychological significance by structuring present conditions in such a way as to make it feasible to discount discrepant outcomes, to provide them with a kind of psychological "slack." The less assured one is of achieving non-discrepant (invalidating) outcomes, the more psychological slack one tends to require.

A related approach to understanding this concept of discounting the external validity of an actual outcome is the notion that one tends to introduce a "fail-safe system" into one's interactions with objects. A fail-safe system is a perceived set of flaws in the conditions in which behavior occurs so that the failure to achieve certain desired outcomes can be attributed to the existence of these flaws, rather than invalidating a person's perceived abilities themselves. Such fail-safe factors provide one with the degree of psychological slack needed when one is putting a fantasied ability to the "test" of reality. The particular kinds of flaws utilized as fail-safe factors can be applied to the person within a given situation, and/or applied to the conditions or objects in that situation. Examples of the former are physical ailments, fatigue, apathy, and antisocial or characterological traits. These permit individuals to experience outcomes which would undermine their fantasied abilities to produce the desired outcomes if it were not for the existence of these fail-safe factors. For instance, a person who fears an impending rejection by another might behave in
such a way as to justify such rejection. The person might begin to interact in ways which typically elicit disapproval and rejection so that if and when it occurs, it can be viewed as a result of the person not really "trying" to be accepted or loved, rather than an absence of the capacity to be lovable and held in esteem by another.

Fail-safe factors can also be applied to other objects or conditions whereby undesirable outcomes are reconciled by the perceived existence of inadequate or nonideal conditions. For example, a tennis player may use a poorly constructed racket as a potential fail-safe factor to account for occasions of poor performance on the tennis court. A woman might seek out a hostile, rejecting kind of man as a husband in order to provide a potential fail-safe factor for certain outcomes which would otherwise threaten her fantasied abilities to be an "adequate" wife.

According to Paradigm IV, resistance is not so much an expression of one's desire to avoid conflicting life-style goals, as suggested by Paradigm III, as it is an expression of one's need to protect the perception of the ability to achieve such life-style goals. Thus, it is suggested that the persistence of certain behavior patterns does not reflect an attempt to achieve an expectation, as it is to protect one's perception of the capacity to achieve it.

Paradigm IV is the theoretical base for a model of resistance to behavior change which has the following
implications with regard to the existing concepts of resistance. First, past object relations not only provide individuals with information as to what kinds of positions they must achieve in relation to certain objects, but, in addition, these relationships convey to the individual how successful they are at achieving such positions. Parental figures directly or indirectly set up expectations and demands for individuals but frequently fail to provide adequate reassurance to individuals that they have the ability to meet them. For instance, a child tends to experience anxiety when a parental figure is rejecting him/her. However, the anxiety not only relates to the child's immediate concern of being unable to maintain an adequate position to be lovable and acceptable, but there is the anxiety generated from the perceived threat that the child does not have the capacity to be lovable and acceptable in the future. This latter threat can only be defused by experiencing present or future outcomes which reinstate the individual's confidence and assurance in this ability.

Many theorists neglect the proposition that early sources of anxiety are not just perpetuated by historic artifacts, but continue to be real, ongoing fears in relation to present and future interactions with certain objects. Certain reassurances not received in the past can only be instilled as a function of experiencing present or future outcomes which serve to reinstate confidence in spite of the
past. In line with such reasoning, resistance to relinquishing psychological defenses relates to present and future concerns, and not to those of the past. The experience of hurt and pain in the past has great significance only to the extent to which one is not reassured of one's ability to avoid it in the future.

Furthermore, behavior patterns, or one's apparent life style, do not necessarily reflect one's expectations, values, or goals. The contention here is that individuals' expressed values and actions frequently are a means of justifying their avoidance trend from attempting to seek validation of a fantasied ability. For example, persons who adopt the value that material wealth is not important to them may, in fact, maintain this value as a means of justifying an avoidance of an attempt to demonstrate the ability to achieve financial security. In a sense, this is a kind of reaction formation defense, but it is not a defense against unacceptable urges or impulses. Instead, it is a defense against risking a threat to one's fantasied abilities.

Thus, the expression of certain personal values, attitudes, and preferences often serves an individuals' desire to justify what actually is an avoidance trend. The individual who does not "believe" in violence is often an individual who is fearful that he/she may not have the ability to be physically dominant over another. Another person who expresses no "interest" in active participation in athletics is often a
person who is fearful of destroying the fantasy that if the person really wanted to demonstrate athletic prowess, he/she could. The proposition maintained in Paradigm IV disputes the maxim which suggests that "one is good at the things one likes." Instead, it is the contention here that "one likes what one is good at." The implication is that one's cognitive system of expressed values and precepts is not maintained merely as a function of parental influence, but that the person also chooses to persist in these to rationalize a particular mode of behavior or emotional reaction which underwrites fail-safe features in actual interactions. Thus, the persistence of feelings and actions based upon an adopted belief system may not be a function of maintaining the belief system, but rather that the belief system justifies the feelings and actions which the person wishes to maintain for self-serving purposes.

The theoretical model based upon Paradigm IV also suggests that such terms as masochism, self-punishment, self-defeating behavior, and maladaptive behavior are misnomers for describing certain behavior patterns. The alternative model presents the view that behavior which appears to be self-destructive or self-defeating is in actuality self-serving behavior with regard to the individual's self-esteem. Such behavior patterns serve to protect the validity of one's fantasies of certain abilities and powers in the face of actual threats to their validity. Many existing theoretical
approaches are based upon elucidating for clients how they are behaving in self-defeating or self-destructive manners and, consequently, how they are generating anxiety and depression within themselves. This pattern is instead established by clients as a means of providing fail-safe features to dismiss or defuse the threat of certain recent or anticipated outcomes. Therefore, for the client, awareness that certain behaviors are self-defeating or self-destructive does not undermine the desire to persist in them since, for the client, they are self-serving. The concept of masochistic behavior is rejected by Paradigm IV. Behavior trends observed by others are only self-destructive because others project their own feelings of self or relate to them as such.
CHAPTER II

The Fail-Safe Theoretical Model of Resistance to Behavior Change

The proposed theoretical model developed in this chapter reflects the features represented by Paradigm IV. Like the existing three general paradigms, Paradigm IV imparts significance to past experiences as determinants of behavior. However, according to the concept reflected in this alternative paradigm, the process of resistance itself occurs in relation to an interdependency between present and future (as depicted in fantasy) experience. That is, certain modes of behavior may be initiated as a function of past experiences, but their persistence, according to Paradigm IV, indicates an attempt to negotiate psychologically between present experiences and fantasied, future experiences. The presumed nature of this interdependent relationship provides the central issues which comprise the proposed theoretical model.

In initiating the presentation, the following section introduces what is considered to be a core tendency or a primary striving underlying personality development and functioning.

Psychological Security: Ability to Be Significant in One's World

The abilities to be special, unique, and lovable are very much associated with a person's capacity to achieve
positions of significance in relation to others. In order to establish and maintain a position of significance or regard in relation to another, an individual must compete with other persons as well as other things. A child who wishes to occupy a strong position of significance in relation to the mothering one must compete with siblings, perhaps with another parental figure, and other potential sources of interest and gratification which the mothering one could pursue. Somehow the child must be able to assert its presence, to have a special sense of significance or impact, in such a way as to compete effectively with these alternative objects and events. In other situations, a spouse competes, directly or indirectly, with other potential, alternative sources of gratification for the special position of significance in relation to the other spouse. Generalizing this concept, individuals compete for such a position among peers and within other social constellations.

To maintain a strong position of significance to certain objects is to ensure that these objects remain reliable and accessible sources for gratifying certain biological and psychological needs. Adler's (1964) concept that one strives for esteem within one's social constellations (i.e., family, peer groups) at least implicitly underwrites this theoretical proposition.

As suggested in the previous section, those figures for which a person desires to establish such a position tend to
generate, implicitly or otherwise, expectations and standards of performance which become prerequisite conditions for acquiring certain degrees of significance in relation to them. Perhaps contrary to Rogers' (1961) presumption, a position of being loved and special to another is conditional, even though the conditions often remain unspoken. An individual must realize that there exist particular attributes such as intelligence, athletic prowess, physical attractiveness, poise and charm, socioeconomic status, appropriate gender-role performance, and so on, which factor in the process of acquiring significance and impact. Depending upon the relative importance rendered to certain attributes by a particular figure, one's ability to achieve such a position in relation to that figure rests on one's ability to demonstrate these attributes adequately.

Integrating this notion into the theoretical frame of the proposed model, the perceived ability to establish and maintain a desired position of significance to certain objects corresponds to one's degree of "psychological security." This concept of psychological security as a core striving underlying personality development, as suggested earlier, is similar to Adler's concept of striving for "self-esteem." However, Adler and other theorists with similar theoretical views presumed that self-esteem or self-worth is defined by adopting and identifying with a particular life style or concept of self. However, the proposed theoretical model begins
to diverge at this point. The proposed model is based on the idea that a person's self-appraisal is defined by that person's perceived ability to execute certain life-style patterns or kinds of interactions with the world. That is, it is not sufficient (but necessary) that persons have a cognitive "map" or system for attaining esteem and regard in relation to others, but, in addition, their sense of psychological worth rests in their confidence to execute or implement such a system. Thus, Adler viewed behavior as reflecting persons' concepts of how they should relate to certain others to achieve a position of significance. However, the proposed model views ongoing patterns of behavior as representing individuals' attempts to preserve the precept that they can relate to certain others to achieve a position of significance.

"Should I be . . . " involves a decision of selecting among alternative ways of dealing with particular situations.

"Should" delimits the issue of concern to selecting the most effective mode of interaction perceived by the individual, in a given situation. "Can I be . . . " extends the issue of concern beyond which mode of interaction would be the most propitious in a given situation to whether the individual perceives the ability to implement or execute effectively a particular mode of interaction, apart from the issue of whether that particular mode is desired by the individual.

Consequently, the proposed model conceptualizes the persistence of certain behavior patterns as underlying an attempt...
on the part of individuals to preserve certain self-assurances that they can be significant in relation to others, even if this desired level of significance has not been or is not being demonstrated in interactions with certain objects. It is assumed that one's psychological security rests on maintaining such a precept.

The following section introduces the concept that maintaining psychological security involves a process of acquiring ongoing reassurance of one's ability to achieve significance to certain objects by experiencing outcomes which demonstrate such ability. Outcomes which enhance an individual's psychological security shall be termed positive outcomes. Those which undermine or threaten one's psychological security shall be referred to as negative outcomes. It is proposed that persons have two dimensions in which to experience outcomes and that there is an interdependent relationship between these two dimensions.

**Actual and Fantasy Interactions: Two Interdependent Dimensions of Experience**

In general, the existing three paradigms as presented in Chapter II reflect the view that behavior represents the result of persons attempting to negotiate, psychologically, past experiences with ongoing experiences. The proposed model, based on the concept related in Paradigm IV, suggests that the locus of such negotiation is between future experiences (as generated in fantasy) and actual, ongoing
circumstances of living. Upon this theoretical distinction rests the concept that a primary direction or focus of behavior is toward maintaining the capacity to generate psychological security from fantasied, future outcomes, when threats incurred as a function of negative outcomes are experienced within actual, ongoing conditions.

What is being proposed within this theoretical model is that a person maintains psychological security through two interdependent dimensions of experience: actual, ongoing interactions and fantasied, future interactions. That is, individuals maintain two dimensions in which to test out and acquire assurances of their abilities to be significant and to have impact in relation to certain objects.

The model assumes that there is a fluid, ongoing system of dynamics between these two dimensions of experience which maximizes psychological security. The concept of resistance rendered by the model involves explanations of how and why persons "shift" from one dimension to the other. The shifting phenomenon which shall be examined in further discussion is apparent when one speaks of altered states of consciousness. It is as if there were an ongoing process of selectively attending to sources of stimulation provided by actual events and objects and, under certain conditions, a shift occurring in the focus of experience toward stimulation provided by fantasied events and objects.

A person's capacity to maintain an adequate level of
psychological security corresponds to the person's ability to generate ongoing assurances of having sufficient impact and significance to certain others. In the relative absence of such assurances (i.e., positive outcomes) arising within an individual's actual, ongoing conditions, the individual shifts from these conditions to the dimension of fantasied experiences which compensate or substitute for the absence of such assurances within the present, actual circumstances. A compensatory function is intended when one attempts to shift from where one "really" is to where one will be or could be as depicted in daydreaming. At times, the shifting from one dimension to the other is partial rather than complete. For instance, an individual might elaborate or superimpose fantasied aspects upon actual experiences so that the outcomes experienced by the individual are enhanced as being more positive. In this manner, persons utilize partial shifts to transpose what would otherwise be experienced as mundane and uneventful interactions into experiences which bespeak their impact and significance to certain objects. Beyond such partial shifting, persons generate shifts from one dimension to the other so that they can perceive actual, ongoing experiences as relatively inconsequential and rely primarily upon outcomes generated from fantasy experiences. The process involved in shifting between the two dimensions of experience to maximize psychological security, at a given point in time, is explicated in the following discussion.

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Dynamics Underlying Shifting: Maintaining Cognitive Control Over the Validity of Outcomes

The model denotes a system of dynamics that are involved in the process of shifting between the two dimensions of experience which is necessary if the process is to serve its compensatory function. A shift from actual ongoing conditions to the future fantasied dimension does not automatically, in and of itself, enhance psychological security. Fantasies must retain sufficient plausibility or validity for them to enhance one's level of psychological security. Sufficient validity is maintained to the extent that individuals are capable of reconciling large discrepancies between fantasied performance abilities and the level of performance reflected by the outcomes within their actual, ongoing interactions with objects. This prerequisite condition is particularly relevant in cases where a person has been experiencing negative outcomes in certain actual experiences but wishes to maintain the validity of fantasies which depict the capacity to achieve positive outcomes relative to this particular domain of interaction.

In order to reconcile the discrepancies between the two dimensions of outcomes experienced by an individual, the individual tends to discount the validity of actual outcomes which are discrepant from those generated in fantasied future experiences. The "degree of validity" assigned to a particular outcome is defined as the extent to which one perceives
that outcome as reflecting one's true performance ability. Like the laws of nature, only under certain adequate or ideal conditions, the laws will hold true. However, even in the case when a particular outcome is discrepant from that predicted by certain laws of nature, if it is perceived as resulting from inappropriate or inadequate conditions, then the law retains its validity in spite of the discrepant outcome. In an analogous fashion, outcomes resulting from interactions with objects need not always be valid or accurate indicators of the degree of significance one can have in relation to such objects, if the conditions or circumstances in which these interactions occurred were flawed or inadequate. For example, it is generally accepted that when an individual is temporarily debilitated or incapacitated by illness, the individual's level of performance during such a period is not a true reflection of the individual's performance capabilities.

In order to facilitate the compensatory function of the shifting process to maximize psychological security, one strives to maintain cognitive control over assigning the varying degrees of validity to outcomes. As long as a person is able to perceive flaws or inadequacies in actual, ongoing conditions, then the person remains prepared to shift toward a fantasied future dimension of experiencing positive outcomes when such outcomes do not occur in actual conditions. The student who maintains faulty study habits may utilize
this condition cognitively to account for poor academic performances. When such poor performances are demonstrated, the student can counteract the potential threat to psychological security by shifting to fantasied future experiences. These depict that in the future, the person can prove that under the proper conditions (i.e., sufficient studying), academic success can be achieved.

Thus, not only does the nature of a particular outcome (positive or negative) affect psychological security, but, in addition, it is affected by the degree of validity that one assigns to the outcome. This concept may be expressed as follows:

\[
\text{Psychological Security} = \sum (\text{Outcome} \times \text{Assigned Validity}).
\]

In the recent example, in order for the student to counteract the threat of negative outcomes in actual interactions by shifting to fantasied, future outcomes, the student must be able to discount the perceived validity of the actual ones while assigning validity to those generated in fantasy.

Thus, the capacity to exert sufficient cognitive control in assigning validity to outcomes is central to one's ability to shift from one dimension to the other dimension of experiencing outcomes and maximizing psychological security. When persons do not derive sufficient assurances of their interpersonal impact and significance within their actual, ongoing conditions, and they are able to discount the validity of this occurrence, then they can shift toward generating

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fantasied, future experiences. On the other hand, when actual, ongoing conditions do provide an adequate source of positive outcomes, persons can assign validity to these outcomes, and withdraw their reliance on the fantasy dimension during such periods.

Therefore, being able to assign or discount selectively the validity of outcomes is a crucial factor in permitting the person to maintain enough psychological flexibility to shift effectively from one dimension of experience to the other. Within the framework of the model, this flexibility is termed psychological slack. While individuals seek reassurances in their actual life conditions to enhance psychological security, persons, at the same time, also wish to defend against the risk of being vulnerable to threats to psychological security that might occur in the process. One is more apt to undertake this risk factor when one or both of the following conditions are perceived: (1) the person's past experiences have generated enough confidence in a given area of performance to minimize the perceived level of risk of incurring negative outcomes during an anticipated performance in actual, ongoing interactions; and/or (2) the person is able to maintain enough psychological slack to reconcile cognitively the occurrence of negative outcomes, even if these are encountered.

The proposed model reflects the view that the persistence of behavior patterns (i.e., beliefs, moods, and
actions) signals their use in providing the levels of psychological slack desired by the person to maintain cognitive control in assigning validity to outcomes. In a sense, psychological slack permits one to build a fail-safe system into one's actual conditions of performance.

The concept of resistance presented by this model is based upon the notion that individuals tend to be resistant to relinquishing those behaviors or predispositions which provide them with psychological slack and a fail-safe system for interacting with actual objects. There is often a paradoxical situation involved in one's attempt to maximize one's level of psychological security. That is, reassurance is needed most when self-doubt exists. At the same time, the more self-doubt there is, the less one has confidence in the ability to acquire such reassurance. Thus, the less assured persons are about their ability to attain positive outcomes in actual, ongoing interactions with objects, the more psychological slack they desire. The problem of psychological dysfunction tends to occur when the person has provided so much psychological slack, to defend effectively against negative actual outcomes, that it also precludes or reduces the opportunity for acquiring positive actual outcomes.

Before elaborating on how behavior functions to secure a desired measure of psychological slack, the following remarks about evaluating the process in terms of its relationship to "normal" and "abnormal" psychological functioning
are necessary. Like most defensive operations (biological as well as psychological), providing psychological slack is associated with both functional and dysfunctional characteristics. It is viewed as functional in the sense that it affords individuals with the means of asserting themselves toward maximizing gratification and security while providing a buffer against the potential threat of deprivation and rejection. If one were not able to "soften" the implications of negative outcomes, one would probably remain in a constant state of panic, reservation, and helplessness. Psychological slack facilitates the ability to assume the potential risk of failure in an attempt to meet effectively the demands of psychological development. In a related fashion, it allows an individual to utilize effectively the compensatory functions of the shifting process from one dimension of experience to the other to maximize psychological security during periods of felt rejection and deprivation. It is viewed here as the process which allows one to feel potent and significant in spite of actual conditions which reveal impotence and insignificance, and permits one to feel hopeful in the midst of despair.

On the other hand, psychological slack tends to become dysfunctional when exaggerated to the degree that it undermines the opportunity to acquire the very reassurances for which the person initiated the defensive measure. In such degrees, it is analogous to the paradox of the person who

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avoids eating because of the fear that the food is poisoned and, in the process, starves to death.

From this viewpoint, "normal" personality development proceeds when the person introduces sufficient psychological slack to facilitate risk-taking in attempts to acquire needed assurances, but delimits its use sufficiently so that it does not preclude the opportunity for acquiring such assurances from actual objects.

Clinical Manifestations of Psychological Slack: Maintaining a Fail-Safe System Between Actual and Fantasy Dimensions of Experience

Individuals adopt certain patterns of activity, mood dispositions, as well as expressed personal attitudes and preferences which permit them to either avoid certain "arenas" of interactions within actual conditions, and/or provide persons with a means of providing the necessary cognitive flexibility to discount the significance of negative outcomes which might arise from certain actual interactions. When such patterns provide such a function, they are classified as modes of psychological slack.

For discussion purposes, patterns of behavior will be addressed under three separate domains: (1) personal beliefs and preferences, (2) affective or mood dispositions, and (3) characterological traits. However, beyond facilitating the organization of presentation, these domains of personality functioning are viewed as being interdependent.
The traditional concept of personal attitudes, values, and preferences indicates that they result from a process of internalizing familial-cultural norms and values. Through the process of role-modeling and identification, certain expressed beliefs and preferences are inculcated within one's referent social group and, subsequently, are internalized. However, the proposed model suggests that while such patterns may be initially derived from a social learning context, their persistence underlies their function of providing psychological slack. The cliché "I was brought up that way" is viewed from this perspective as being an accurate statement of etiology but a rationalization for its persistence over time. What is being suggested is that one is selective in one's persistence of attitudes and preferences on the basis of their utility in providing psychological slack, apart from their existence in response to their historic source.

Persons utilize their expressed attitudes and preferences frequently as a means of justifying why they delimit attempts to interact with certain objects in certain situations. The model reflects the notion that when persons perceive little confidence in their ability to demonstrate effective performance in a particular mode of interaction, they can generate a fail-safe system by providing psychological slack in adopting a dislike, a religious injunction or prohibition, and/or an ideological stance which can serve to account for the lack of positive outcomes related to that
mode of interaction. For example, an individual who expresses a dislike for cocktail parties may account for this negative preference by suggesting a contempt for "idle conversation" or "social-climbing." However, in actuality, this individual perceives little confidence in the ability to perform well enough in the context of a cocktail party to secure a desired position of significance in relation to others there. By adopting and justifying a negative preference for cocktail parties, this individual is able to avoid pursuing performance in a particular arena which exists in the person's actual, ongoing conditions but, at the same time, provides for the validity of the following fantasy theme: "If I cared to attend cocktail parties, I would be able to demonstrate my ability to impress these other persons."

This negative preference provides psychological slack even when that person is at a cocktail party. Persons do not expect themselves to pursue a performance to the best of their "true" ability when they express no commitment to do so. An individual's expressed attitudes and preferences justify why there is no interest in pursuing a particular interaction to the fullest ability. Consequently, it is not necessary for a person to test performance capabilities in an area which one avoids by means of cognitive sanctions or injunctions. Thus, "I do not have any desire to pursue a particular outcome" provides psychological slack against "I do not have the ability to achieve a particular set of
positive outcomes in this area." Related to the function of underwriting the person's capacity to discount cognitively the validity of outcomes resulting in certain actual conditions, it maintains the validity of fantasy outcomes related to this area of interaction. Thus, such psychological slack permits persons to shift towards the fantasy dimension of experience and allows them to assign validity to the fantasied outcomes for maintaining psychological security in spite of actual performances.

A person's resistance to altering expressed beliefs and preferences underlies the individual's desire to retain these as factors which provide psychological slack in the manner described. In fact, clinically, a potentially less threatening and less obtrusive manner of determining an individual's level of self-assurance and security with regard to particular domains of functioning is to inquire as to the individual's expressed preferences and attitudes in relation to such areas. It is theorized that the degree of resistance to altering or relinquishing particular beliefs, attitudes, and preferences is abated when individuals become more confident in their ability to achieve positive outcomes.

Within this proposed theoretical system, the aspect which remains as an unconscious operation is that related to a person's dissociation between the process of generating psychological slack and the products, the patterns of behavior which serve as psychological slack. That is, the
fail-safe factors or flaws utilized in providing psychological slack are always accessible to consciousness, but the fact that these are actively maintained for the purpose of providing psychological slack tends to remain unconscious. In this respect, the psychoanalytic concept that the origin and function of a particular defensive operation tend to remain unconsciously dissociated from the manifestation of the defense is also maintained in regard to the present model.

However, there are three major theoretical differences in perspective with regard to the unconscious dissociation between the process and products of psychological defensive operations in comparing the traditional analytic concept and the one rendered by the present theoretical system. The first theoretical point of difference is that traditional psychoanalytic theory posits that the motive underlying this unconscious dissociation between the source and process of the defensive operation and the manifestation of the defense is an attempt to reduce the anxiety associated with the urge to gratify certain instinctual impulses and trends. The present model attributes the motive for this unconscious dissociation to a person's desire to generate fail-safe factors and flaws into certain actual conditions of performance while maintaining the cognitive precept that these flaws exist as inherent characteristics of that particular set of actual conditions. That is, it is an attempt to externalize the responsibility for the existence of fail-safe factors.
utilized in providing psychological slack. Secondly, it appears that the traditional psychoanalytic view suggests that an effective transformation within the individual of the unconscious nature of the dissociation to a conscious state of awareness is a necessary condition for reducing or eliminating the individual's unconscious drive to persist in generating the particular defensive process. However, the present theoretical system proposes that such a transformation is not a necessary condition in order for the individual to relinquish or reduce the drive underlying the persistence of the particular defensive operation involved. Finally, the third major theoretical distinction is that the present model reflects the view that not only is the effective interpretation of the unconscious dissociation not a necessary condition, but, in addition, it proposes that it is not a sufficient condition as well for counteracting resistance.

These points of theoretical difference between the two theoretical systems rest on the different sources of resistance promulgated by each of these models. The emphasis placed upon interpreting the nature of the unconscious dissociation is reflective of the traditional psychoanalytic view that in order to alter personality functioning, the psychological significance of past, formative experiences must be effectively altered. In contrast, the present theoretical system proposes that the only implications the past has are relative to the present and future capacity to acquire
positions of significance in relation to certain objects. Anxiety issues from concerns about maintaining the precept of such a capacity in ongoing and future situations, despite the past, not only in light of it. According to the view reflected by the proposed model, one cannot "relive" the past to acquire the assurances of this capacity; one can only achieve them in the present and future.

Thus, resistance is not maintained by unconsciously based defenses developed in one's formative past, but rather by unconsciously based defenses developed in the interdependent process between one's present and future experiences. Moreover, awareness of the nature of the threats to a person's capacity to be significant to certain objects in the past is not a salient process if the person is seeking assurances from such objects in present and future situations. In short, the proposed model subscribes to the concept that in the context of psychotherapy or other setting, if a person can achieve the desired reassurances for which the unconscious defensive process has been developed, the impetus for the defense can be removed without the person ever being aware or needing to be aware of its existence.

From this perspective, awareness of the nature of the unconscious dissociation between certain patterns of personality functioning and their use as modes of psychological slack tends to be useful to the therapist (change agent) in understanding an individual's needs. However, these needs
can be filled without attempting to make the individual aware of their origin and existence. Within the framework of the present model, a person's resistance is not to becoming aware of the sources of unconsciously felt threats issuing from the past, but to assuming the risks associated with counteracting unconsciously felt threats to the fantasied future.

In line with the view, one's behavior patterns frequently represent a pro-active adjustment to anticipated, future interactions rather than merely representing the effects of a reactive response to past experiences. Accordingly, there is an important theoretical distinction assumed within the model between an emotional "response" and an emotional "adjustment" to an event. This distinction is very important for discussing how affective states are used to provide psychological slack which then facilitates cognitive control over the perceived validity of outcomes. According to the model, only one dimension of emotional "response" is recognized within the model: anxiety. It is assumed, within the theoretical rubric of the model, that a positive outcome relieves one's anxiety about one's capacity to achieve a desired position in relation to certain objects, and a negative outcome tends to increase one's level of anxiety. However, a person's emotional "adjustment" to outcomes relates to how he/she attempts to adjust either to the decreased or increased level of anxiety which corresponds to the nature of an outcome which has occurred or is anticipated.

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Emotional adjustment to a positive outcome corresponds to a person's desire to assign validity to the conditions in which the outcome occurred and a desire to maintain a pursuit towards acquiring such outcomes within these conditions. As such, this kind of emotional adjustment is usually manifested as moods which are expressive of receptivity, warmth, and acceptance in relation to certain objects. On the other hand, emotional adjustment to a negative outcome corresponds to a person's desire to withdraw from risking further threats to psychological security within those conditions. Thus, while the emotional response to the occurrence or anticipation of a negative outcome is increased anxiety, the manifestation or emotional adjustment may range from apathy to rage, "flightiness," sadness, grief, or sullenness.

As in the case in which expressed preferences and attitudes tend to persist, unconsciously dissociated from their function of providing psychological slack, emotional adjustments frequently tend to be dissociated from the emotional responses (anxiety) which evoked such adjustments. The emotional adjustments which are exhibited in relation to increased anxiety serve as psychological slack to diffuse the threat of negative outcomes. For example, such emotions as anger and apathy underwrite an attempt at perceiving the immediate, ongoing conditions as inadequate to demonstrate the abilities depicted in the fantasy dimension of experience. When one reacts in anger to an outcome, it signals an attempt

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to generate the precept that there exist certain flaws in the conditions in which the outcome occurred, and the anger reflects the frustration in light of these perceived flaws. Also, by maintaining a hostile disposition toward certain objects, persons justify their tendency to withhold attempts at evoking positive outcomes from interactions with such objects. In this sense, anger permits one to control the locus of power with regard to who is rejecting whom, or what.

The expression of apathy or indifference is an emotional adjustment to anxiety which provides psychological slack for individuals in a very similar manner to that of anger. Indifference justifies a person's relative failure at attempting to achieve positive outcomes in interactions with certain objects. It provides psychological slack since one can maintain a precept that a poor performance is due to a lack of motivation rather than a lack of ability. As it shall be explicated in the next chapter, passive-aggressive patterns are viewed as attempts to undermine or devalue the significance of objects and/or events in terms of their impact on a person's psychological security. Like anger, apathy is an emotional adjustment which permits one to discredit the validity of outcomes by reacting to the perceived flaws in the conditions in which these outcomes occur. Again, these emotional adjustments correspond to one's attempt to reject others before one is rejected by others. In this manner, such emotional adjustments underwrite the ability to shift
from actual, ongoing conditions as a means of acquiring assurances of interpersonal significance and power to a fantasied, future dimension of experience.

Moods which reflect apathy or anger function as psychological slack because these underwrite an attempt to project inadequacy onto external objects and conditions to account for negative outcomes and, consequently, preserve an individual's fantasies which depict self-adequacy. Certain negative outcomes associated with emotional adjustments feature introjective rather than projective tendencies. Grief and depression appear to reflect such introjective emotional adjustments to negative outcomes. Although on the surface it would appear that grief and depression are associated with self-effacement and self-punishment, they also serve to provide psychological slack. Such introjective emotional adjustments are provoked in situations in which a person has previously assigned much validity to outcomes resulting from interactions with a particular object, but who has recently experienced a profound negative outcome associated with a loss of an established position of significance in relation to that object. Whereas anger and apathy are emotional adjustments which serve to discount or devalue certain actual objects and conditions, grief and depression serve to render psychological slack without devaluing or depreciating the particular actual object associated with the threat to psychological security. Instead, these emotions underwrite an attempt to accomplish
a twofold operation. First, they are designed to increase the significance that the object has in relation to the person, and secondly, to flaw one's own performance in relation to that object.

The functions of this twofold operation are as follows. Since the individual had previously established a strong position of significance in relation to the object, there is a tendency to hope for reinstatement to that position. That is, there is a desire to hope for the return of a lost or separated relationship. By increasing the significance of that object, the person is attempting to convey this desire for reinstatement. By engaging in a self-effacing, self-punishing pattern, the person is attempting to generate the existence of fail-safe factors which were not perceived before but which now can serve to account for the loss of position recently incurred. It represents an attempt to generate psychological slack. The reason individuals wish to perceive fail-safe factors within their own performance and avoid discounting the negative outcome through flawing the object is to encourage the return of the object through what, in fact, is flattery.

"I was such a fool" and "if only I had been more understanding" are fail-safe factors which not only serve to preserve the viability of fantasies which depict that outcomes will be positive because these factors will be reconciled in the future, but, in addition, they underlie an attempt to
generate positive outcomes for the object. That is, when the other person perceives that he/she has such power to establish such a strong position of significance in relation to the bereaved person, it may motivate him/her to "return." Thus, one effective way for an individual to encourage other persons to invest (or reinvest) in a relationship with that individual is to give them positive outcomes in interactions so that the individual becomes a reliable source for validating fantasied abilities which depict importance and stature in relation to others.

When an individual can no longer maintain a plausible hope for reinstatement to the previous position of significance with the object, grief and depression tend to be converted to anger and apathy. That is, the person begins to generate psychological slack by devaluing the significance of the object and flawing the conditions of the relationship. This conversion in process also tends to be facilitated when the lost object has been replaced, both in one's fantasies of future interactions and within one's ongoing, actual interactions. (A more elaborate presentation of the theoretical dynamics involved in depression is found in Chapter III.)

In general, mood dispositions are conceptualized here as corresponding to attempts to generate emotional adjustments to defuse the recent occurrence and/or the anticipation of negative outcomes or, in the case of good moods, to encourage the reception of positive outcomes. When one is in a "bad"
mood, one is cognitively preparing to discount one's actual performance. It provides the psychological slack needed to justify a person's desire to withdraw from further attempts at risking the encounter of negative outcomes resulting when one tries to produce positive outcomes. In addition, bad moods, in effect, remove the individual from the "arena" of demonstrating adequate performance in relation to others but, at the same time, also elicit positive outcomes from others in terms of their need for succor. Frequently, persons will attempt to generate the basis for a bad mood by consciously and/or unconsciously setting up conditions which cause frustration, and the mood is then extended to the "real" situation which is associated with anxiety about incurring negative outcomes. For example, if one is feeling very anxious about an upcoming event in the afternoon on a particular day, the person may generate conditions during the morning which generate frustration and anger. Although the individual in the example might account for the resultant bad mood as the reaction to frustrating events in the morning, in actuality, the bad mood is a fail-safe factor which will serve to provide psychological slack for the afternoon performance.

As it shall be explained more fully in Chapter III, the model reflects the proposition that when an individual is experiencing a period of mood swings, it underlies the following kind of situation. A person has maintained a fantasy
that certain positive outcomes will occur in the future. From the fantasied outcomes, the person has derived a great deal of psychological security. However, as the time approaches such that these fantasied outcomes are going to be put to the test of reality within actual conditions, there is a tendency for the person to want to prepare for the occurrence of negative outcomes. Thus, the ambivalence centers around a desire to express satisfaction and elation in anticipation of positive outcomes, but, at the same time, a desire to build in some potential fail-safe factors which would permit the person to withdraw validity in the event that the outcomes are negative rather than positive. This kind of situation appears to be reflected in some interpersonal relationships in which an individual relates on a very intimate and warm manner towards another on certain occasions and becomes distant and unaffected in relation to the other person on other occasions. This apparent inconsistency underlies the person's desire to maintain psychological slack "close at hand" so that the validity assigned to the outcomes from interactions with the other person can be depreciated in the event of negative outcomes.

Certain patterns of behavior are not readily classified as beliefs or mood dispositions, but are viewed as personal habits or traits by others. These "characterological traits" are also often maintained as potential fail-safe factors which provide a person with psychological slack. Selfishness,
rigidity, obnoxiousness, shyness, stuttering, obesity, substance abuse, and antisocial behavior are among a myriad number of negative traits which become associated with individual personalities. These are generally perceived by individuals as personal flaws or weaknesses which are part of their "nature," yet, at the same time, they are not perceived by them as intractible. For example, a person with a "bad temper" may describe it as a part of a self-identity, but then may express a desire to learn how to control this temper, implying a recognition that it is not a permanent or fixed trait.

In terms of the model, the aspect of the precept that one is predisposed toward exhibiting a particular feature serves to justify its existence in present interactions. The other aspect of the precept, that while the trait is an inherent feature of the past and present, it can be relinquished in the future, serves to preserve the plausibility of fantasied future interactions which depict that without the negative trait one has the capacity to achieve positive outcomes rather than negative ones. Thus, the former aspect, associated with a trait being well engrained, permits one to justify the existence of the traits in past and present conditions of performance while the latter aspect, associated with its malleability, allows one to shift effectively from the actual dimension of experience to that of futuristic fantasies which depict the ability to achieve more positive
outcomes in the absence of the negative traits.

For instance, shyness tends to provide psychological slack in interpersonal interactions because the person mini­mizes the risk of initiating attempts at establishing signif­icance in relation to others. Instead, this trait allows a person to reduce the risk of a negative outcome since it dictates that others must initiate a demonstration of inter­est in the person. The shy, timid individual can cognitively discount the lack of actual, ongoing outcomes regarding an ability to impact on certain others on the basis of being "too shy." In the meantime, the person generates a fantasy dimension of experience which depicts the individual really trying to assert his/her presence and having a significant impact on others. Thus, the shy person tends to persist in exhibiting the trait to avoid risking the fantasied future experiences to the test of reality which depict that, in the future, when the shyness is overcome, positive outcomes are realized.

It frequently becomes difficult to relinquish a negative trait (i.e., one which a person views as interfering with performance effectiveness) when an individual has relied upon it extensively as a fail-safe factor which has provided psy­chological slack during certain past and present interactions. This is especially so when profound threats arising from negative outcomes in the past were defused on the basis of perceiving the existence of this trait as accounting for the
occurrence of negative outcomes and/or the absence of positive ones.

Certain negative traits, such as obnoxiousness, are acquired by persons even though it would appear that they are clearly sabotaging their own efforts at evoking positive outcomes. However, the model suggests that rather than being self-destructive, such behavior is self-serving. By sabotaging a chance to elicit positive outcomes from certain others, the person builds in a very blatant fail-safe factor. Obnoxiousness or offensive behaviors not only provide attention-getting devices for an individual, but they serve as a means of accounting for negative outcomes. In a sense, obnoxiousness is a way of demonstrating that certain objects and events have little significance to persons. Thus, it underwrites an attempt to depreciate or devalue certain actual conditions and, consequently, reflects a demonstration of not trying to be at one's best. When persons acknowledge certain conditions as being valid in terms of testing out their true performance abilities, then they tend to be on their "best behavior." Such patterns of offensive behavior are viewed here as being a passive-aggressive attempt at undermining the extent of impact that others will be permitted to have in relation to persons' self-appraisal.

When a person exhibits antisocial interactions in relation to certain others and events, it indicates that the person lacks confidence in performance ability towards
achieving positive outcomes within such interactions. For example, one who appears to reject, blatantly, current clothing styles and tends to be offensive in terms of personal appearance may utilize these traits as fail-safe factors in the context of outcomes related to sexual attractiveness or individual popularity. Again, such deviance provides one with psychological slack to facilitate an attempt to discount the validity of the actual conditions in which negative outcomes might occur and, subsequently, to facilitate the effectiveness of a shift to the fantasied, future dimension of experience. This process allows one to preserve the validity of such fantasy experiences which depict that if it were not for the negative trait, outcomes as reflected to occur in those fantasy experiences would have resulted and can result in the future in the absence of that trait.

This concept is extended to explain how antisocial patterns of personality tend to reflect a fail-safe system which has been developed as a means of counteracting threats to psychological security stemming from frequent experiences of rejection. In a sense, the antisocial individual is one who removes him/herself from certain "arenas" of performance by rejecting those and subscribing to areas of performance and categories of objects to which the individual can interact and achieve positive outcomes. For instance, adolescents who feel that they may experience negative outcomes while attempting to achieve a position of significance in the context of
parental demands and expectations may attempt to develop attitudes and preferences which serve to reject this arena of performance. Instead, they tend to underwrite an attempt to seek such a position in the context of other adolescents to whom such a position of significance is perceived as attainable. This establishes a fail-safe system because these adolescents are then able to promote shifts toward the fantasied, future dimensions of experience which depict that when they care to establish a strong position of significance in relation to the parents, they will have the capacity to do so. (A more elaborate discussion of sociopathic and antisocial personality patterns is presented in the next chapter.)

This view of resistance should be understood to suggest that a person may initially develop certain modes and patterns of relating to objects as a function of historic determinants. However, the issue of their persistence is associated with the person's utilization of these patterns in the service of providing psychological slack needed to underwrite an effective fail-safe system of performance in the context of actual, ongoing interactions. The major theoretical inference derived from this view of resistance is that in order for interventions to be effective in reducing resistance to altering established patterns of behavior, the locus of emphasis must go beyond the issue of their historic determinants.
The theoretical construct and concepts of the model are now to be integrated and applied toward a conceptualization of resistance to behavior change. To begin this endeavor, the theoretical dynamics of the model are briefly summarized as follows.

Persons strive to maximize their psychological security. That is, individuals have a very strong psychological need to achieve adequate assurances that they have the ability to acquire and maintain a position of significance and have impact in relation to certain objects. By having such an ability, these objects remain responsive and reliable sources of fulfillment of individual needs. A person's level of psychological security depends on the extent to which the outcomes he/she experiences in interactions with objects provide affirmation of the capacity to be significant and have impact on them.

The model is based further on the proposition that one utilizes two dimensions of experience to generate interactions with objects and resultant outcomes. One dimension corresponds to actual ongoing interactions, and the other to fantasied interactions with objects. Thus, an individual has two sources of ongoing experiences in which to attempt to acquire assurances needed to maximize psychological security.
During periods in which sufficient assurances (positive outcomes) are not derived from actual, ongoing conditions of experience, there is a tendency to shift to the fantasy dimension in which positive outcomes are then generated. These fantasied positive outcomes serve to compensate for the lack of actual ones during that period. The tendency for such a shift is intensified when there is not only a relative absence of positive actual outcomes due to a lack of certain interactions with certain objects, but when negative outcomes result from actual interactions.

In order to utilize the process of shifting as a means of maximizing psychological security, persons strive to maintain cognitive control over the perceived validity of outcomes. By discounting the perceived validity of negative actual outcomes, then fantasied positive outcomes can retain their validity in spite of the actual occurrence of negative ones. By developing this kind of fail-safe system in which potential fail-safe factors are introduced into actual performance conditions, one has a way of underwriting cognitive operations of discounting or discrediting the validity of actual negative outcomes occurring in these conditions. This provides psychological slack in persons' interactions such that conditions which produce positive outcomes are assigned validity, while those conditions resulting in negative outcomes can be perceived as faulty and not having produced a valid indication of true performance capacity. This
fail-safe system permits an individual to rely on the outcomes generated in the fantasied future dimension of experience when sufficient assurances are not being acquired in the actual ongoing dimension of interaction. In order to facilitate or generate the perception of inadequate or flawed conditions, the person adopts modes of relating to actual objects such as personal attitudes and beliefs, emotional adjustments, and characterological patterns which provide the psychological slack required to underwrite the features of a fail-safe system.

Given this theoretical framework for the model, resistance to behavior change is conceived as being related to a desire to maintain an established fail-safe system in response to adjusting to current performance conditions. Persons tend to resist changing modes and patterns of interactions when the persistance of these patterns is in the service of providing psychological slack. Thus, persons tend to complain, remain critical, withdraw, and become hostile in response to obstacles which impede their effective performance in relation to certain objects, but frequently they also maintain resistance to interventions which would remove such obstacles or flaws from their conditions of performance.

The degree of psychological slack maintained by persons tends to reflect the extent to which persons have underlying doubts about their ability to achieve actual positive outcomes. As such, the crucial factor involved in dealing with
resistance to relinquishing modes and patterns of behavior which provide psychological slack is the acquisition of increased self-assurance in that area of doubt. Moreover, a paradoxical situation arises because the modes of interactions in the service of providing psychological slack to discount the validity of negative outcomes also tend to reduce and, in some cases, preclude the probability of achieving positive outcomes. This paradoxical tendency frequently leads to psychological dysfunctions by virtue of a self-perpetuating cycle which tends to escalate in intensity. That is, the more self-doubt that exists about a particular area of performance, the more psychological slack is needed to underwrite a fail-safe system of actual performance to ensure an effective shifting operation between actual and fantasied, future dimensions of experience. In turn, the more psychological slack persons introduce into that area of actual interaction, the less likely it is that they will achieve the assurances needed to raise the level of confidence in the performance capacity. Over time, the cumulative effect of a lack of positive actual outcomes is such that in order to maintain the perceived validity of fantasied future outcomes, in light of their protracted absence in actual conditions, the degree of psychological slack needed to underwrite the fail-safe system becomes exacerbated. This cycle of escalation in its severe forms often corresponds to clinical indications of psychological decompensation and/or
severe personality disorders.

In psychotherapy, attempts to counteract this proposed source of resistance tends to involve a catch-22 syndrome. On one hand, both the client and therapist are striving for certain assurances which have been precluded because of the persistence of certain fail-safe factors. On the other hand, each is fearful of relinquishing these important components of their fail-safe systems. In regard to the client, this is viewed as client resistance to psychotherapy, and in relation to the therapist, this process is viewed as counter-resistance in psychotherapy.

This kind of interactional effect is such that in psychotherapy, the client's resistance to relinquishing certain modes of psychological slack tends to engender a counter-resistance on the part of the therapist, who remains unwilling to yield positive outcomes in light of the client's resistance to elicit for such outcomes. For example, the client who brings into the psychotherapy relationship a great deal of self-doubt about the capacity to be lovable and special to another might also bring into the relationship such strong modes of psychological slack that they inhibit the therapist's willingness to take the risk of interacting with the client in a warm and nurturing manner.

In effect, clients tend to bring into the psychotherapy relationship a "magical wish" whereby they demand positive outcomes but, at the same time, demand that they be permitted
to retain the fail-safe features related to achieving such outcomes in actual conditions of performance. A client's magical wish reflects a desire to retain a system of psychological defenses while still having the capacity to experience outcomes which have traditionally not occurred because of these defenses. To the extent a therapist can accept and service a client's magical wish, resistance to behavior change can be counteracted effectively.
CHAPTER III

Application of the Model to Clinical Theory and Practice

The present chapter is concerned with applying the theoretical concepts of the model to clinical theory and practice. The emphasis is on delineating the theoretical dynamics of resistance to the process of behavior change as these occur in psychotherapy by applying these concepts of the model.

The discussion will deal first with how the concept of psychological dysfunction or pathology is discerned within the theoretical context of the model. From this context, the dynamics of resistance in psychotherapy shall be presented, extending the concept of the "magical wish." Next, the discussion will turn to some general theoretical propositions associated with counteracting the sources of resistance in psychotherapy. Finally, a number of clinical categories of psychological dysfunction will be conceptualized within the theoretical frame of the model and then discussed in terms of their sources of resistance to change, and how these sources can be counteracted in the process of psychotherapy.

Functional Versus Dysfunctional Fail-Safe Systems

Within the theoretical frame of the model, psychopathology or psychological dysfunction is both the result of a dysfunctional fail-safe system for interacting with certain
objects, as well as the continued manifestation of a dysfunctional fail-safe system. In distinguishing between functional and dysfunctional fail-safe systems, it is understood that these categories are continuous and not discrete entities. With this point in mind, the following two interrelated characteristics are utilized in making a theoretical distinction between fail-safe systems which are functional and those which are dysfunctional.

First, for a particular fail-safe system to remain functional, the persistence of modes of behavior providing psychological slack must preserve psychological security in the face of actual negative outcomes without precluding chances for the achievement of actual positive outcomes. Thus, while a person desires sufficient modes of psychological slack as a contingency factor in the event that positive outcomes are not achieved, these modes should not sabotage the person's level of performance to the degree that it virtually eliminates the probability of incurring positive outcomes. In cases in which the opportunity to generate positive actual outcomes is reduced significantly, the intensified self-perpetuating process alluded to in the previous chapter tends to be set in motion over a period of time. That is, persons' protracted inability to achieve actual assurances requires that they generate an increasing level of psychological slack to buttress the tenuous validity of fantasied, future assurances, and this increase in psychological slack tends even
further to reduce the opportunity for acquiring actual assurances, and so the cycle continues to intensify. In this situation, persons' fail-safe systems are viewed as dysfunctional. They not only restrict the levels of interpersonal intimacy since little validity is assigned to actual objects and ongoing conditions, but, in addition, they perpetuate and increase the level of self-doubt for which the systems were initially designed to counteract.

Secondly, an interrelated characteristic of a functional fail-safe system is that it permits a person to retain a fluid shifting process between the two dimensions of experience. A dysfunctional fail-safe system imposes a more rigid and less flexible shifting operation. A flexible and fluid shifting operation permits one to periodically withdraw psychologically from actual conditions of performance and let psychological security rest on the fantasied, future dimension of experience. Such flexibility in shifting is manifested in one's capacity to relax, to let go of pragmatic and mundane issues, to imagine and process things creatively, and to render perspective to actual circumstances by being able to perceive them in the context of their implications to future, anticipated experiences. At the same time, the fluid capacity for shifting facilitates an individual's responsiveness to the actual dimension of experience, that is, grasping opportunities to acquire assurances by assigning validity to certain actual objects and events occurring from moment to
A dysfunctional fail-safe system of performance is associated with an individual who tends to become "locked" into a dimension of experience following a shifting operation, and who is either unable to withdraw from actual conditions of performance or has difficulty withdrawing from the fantasied set of interactions with objects and events.

**Concept of the "Magical Wish" in Psychotherapy**

A dilemma may be defined as a situation which requires that one assume the risk of unfavorable consequences resulting from a choice between equally undesirable alternatives. When a person is confronted with such a dilemma, there is a tendency to operate initially from a wish to have the power to assume only the favorable consequences of a choice and resist or deny those which are unfavorable—the power to "have one's cake and eat it too." This notion is termed here as a person's **magical wish**. Resistance in psychotherapy exists as a function of the persistence of such magical wishes. For a client, the magical wish reflects a desire to achieve assurances in areas of actual performance which have been precluded by the persistence of certain modes of psychological slack but still retain the effects of a fail-safe system engendered by such psychological slack. The terms of clients' magical wishes stem from the dilemma which they face. That is, clients are confronted with a choice between
assuming the risk of losing their capacity to discount the validity of actual negative outcomes which permit an effective shift to occur to the fantasied, future dimension of experience, or not risking this capacity to discount the validity of actual negative outcomes while continuing to experience an absence of positive outcomes in actual, ongoing interactions with objects. Both alternatives are undesirable for clients since each one requires that they assume further risk to an already tenuous level of psychological security. If clients choose to relinquish the current modes of psychological slack which underwrite the ability to assign validity to the fantasied, future dimension of experience in attempting to achieve positive actual outcomes, they risk losing their fantasies to reality if negative actual outcomes occur instead. The other alternative is associated with the source of risk that while clients may continue to preserve the viability of fantasied, future outcomes by continuing to discount the validity of the absence of positive actual outcomes, these fantasied outcomes begin to lose their plausibility over time if there continues to be insufficient support of their plausibility rendered by actual performance. Thus, clients' magical wishes are to achieve certain products (actual positive outcomes) without assuming the risk associated with the process required to achieve such products.

A therapist's magical wish would be that the client relinquish these modes of psychological slack as a
prerequisite condition for acquiring such assurances within actual, ongoing conditions. This magical wish associated with therapists stems from their desire to protect their own psychological security by maintaining their capacity to be significant and effectual. Frequently, a client's modes of psychological slack are viewed by a therapist as the obstacles to the therapist's ability to be successful in having sufficient impact on, and effectiveness with, the client. Often, therapists tend to generate their own fail-safe systems to protect their psychological security by adopting the precept that the client is not amenable or responsive to psychotherapy because the client is unable to relinquish defenses which are too well engrained. Thus, it is proposed that frequently therapists tend to operate from a magical wish which involves their insistence that the client relinquish his/her defensive operation in order to achieve certain assurances from the therapist and others.

As such, the respective magical wishes of the client and therapist represent antagonistic trends. From the point of view reflected by the model, a client's resistance in psychotherapy tends to persist as a function of the counter-resistance stemming from a therapist's insistence of his/her magical wish. The major theoretical proposition in applying the model to the practice of psychotherapy is that to the extent that a therapist is unsuccessful in accepting and responding to the terms of a client's magical wish,
resistance to behavior change remains. That is, resistance to the process of behavior change is counteracted when the client is able to retain certain modes of psychological slack and still achieve actual positive outcomes in areas of performance for which such a fail-safe system of defenses is desired. These are the terms of the client's magical wish, although usually a client does not express the conditional terms of the wish, but only the statement concerned with the desire to achieve certain actual assurances.

For example, "I wish I could be more assertive," "I wish I could stop feeling depressed," and "I wish I could find a friend" are statements derived from magical wishes which do not express the conditional terms. Each of these statements expresses a desire for an outcome or a state of being which is, in fact, accessible to an individual, but the individual seems to operate implicitly on the premise that it is not. For instance, persons who wish that they could be more "assertive" know which modes of behavior are expressive of this attribute but seem to convey a source of resistance to enlisting these modes. Therapists who begin to operate without understanding and responding to the conditional terms which clients generally leave unstated tend to become frustrated by the client's "resistance" and begin to insert their own fail-safe systems to counteract their feelings of ineffectuality in relation to the client, which further intensifies the client's resistance to the process.
Within the theoretical frame of the model, the primary thrust of the psychotherapy process should be twofold. First, a therapist must determine the terms of a client's magical wishes, both the stated objectives (e.g., "I do not want to feel lonely") and the unstated, conditional term related to achieving that objective (e.g., "... but I do not want to permit my psychological security to become vulnerable to unsuccessful attempts at not being lonely"). Secondly, a therapist must endeavor to intervene in such a way as to accept and to respond to these terms of a client's magical wish. The next section is a presentation of some theoretical principles in accomplishing this twofold process in psychotherapy.

General Principles in Accepting and Responding to Clients' Magical Wishes

In order to establish a clear ground for these principles, the following remarks are made in reiterating, in some cases, and elaborating in other cases, on some of the concepts presented thus far in this chapter. Within the framework of the present model, client resistance in psychotherapy issues from a client's persistence of one or more magical wishes. These involve a desire to secure certain assurances in particular areas of performance without having to relinquish the modes of interacting which provide psychological slack for the client in relation to those areas of performance. Counter-resistance in psychotherapy issues from a
therapist's persistent nonacceptance and non-responsiveness to the terms of a client's magical wishes. Such counter-resistance reflects the actual conditions external to those in psychotherapy in which the client's modes of psychological slack precluded or, at least, reduced the probability that others will provide the assurances which the client seeks.

What is being suggested here is that clients typically extend the conditional terms of their magical wishes in interactions with actual objects external to the psychotherapy setting, and generally these terms are not accepted nor are they responded to by these objects. The concept of counter-resistance in psychotherapy can be understood in terms of a therapist's failure to alter such a course of events. This notion of counter-resistance is associated with the tendency to elicit complementary responses when interacting with objects. For example, when an individual maintains a distant, hostile posture towards another, there is a tendency for the other person to respond in a complementary fashion, that is, the other person becomes distant and hostile in relation to the individual. The person's hostility is a mode of psychological slack which underwrites his/her capacity to discount the validity of outcomes resulting from interactions with the other person. Thus, an inability to establish a desired position of significance in relation to that other person (i.e., to feel rejected or rebuffed) is not assigned validity. The hostility provides a fail-safe factor in that
it underwrites the individual's desire not to try to secure such a position of significance to that other person. This facilitates a shift toward the fantasy dimension of experience which depicts that if it were not for the fact that the other person is "unacceptable," the individual would pursue and be successful in acquiring a strong position of significance to the other person, and, in the future, this can be demonstrated in relation to "acceptable" persons.

To the extent that this individual generalizes and persists in the hostile attitude toward others, the individual's fail-safe system becomes dysfunctional. It discounts the validity of actual occurrences of rejection by others, but as long as only complementary responses are elicited, it precludes the occurrence of actual outcomes which assure the individual of the capacity to be liked and well regarded by others.

Others tend to react in such a complementary fashion to preserve their own sense of psychological security since the hostility signals an anticipation of negative outcomes occurring in the interactions with the hostile individual. Thus, the counter-resistance on the part of others to accept the terms of the individual's magical wish, "I want to be loved and regarded by you, but I also want to act in a way which devalues your significance to me so I can continue to underwrite a shift towards fantasy experiences," tends to occur as a function of others' persistence in preserving their own
psychological security.

As a client, this individual brings into the psychotherapy relationship the distress related to not being loved and cared about, but, at the same time, a fail-safe system which sabotages the actual conditions for securing assurances of the client's capacity to be loved and cared about. Any astute therapist or clinician could note the client's hostile modes of interaction but would frequently respond in a complementary way, implicitly demanding that the client assign validity and significance to the therapist as the prerequisite condition for reciprocating with nurture and care. If the client does not fulfill the therapist's magical wish, then the therapist tends to view the client as hostile and resistant to psychotherapy. The client's resistance in psychotherapy persists as a function of counter-resistance on the part of the therapist to accepting and responding to the terms of the client's magical wish. In most cases, the client enters into the psychotherapy relationship with an already tenuous level of psychological security. To a large extent, the client is clutching to the assurances or positive outcomes generated from the capacity to shift towards the fantasied, future dimension of experience, relying on the modes of psychological slack to discount the validity of actual, ongoing experiences. However, the fail-safe system has become dysfunctional because it has eliminated or significantly reduced the probability of acquiring actual, positive
outcomes. Consequently, a more intense reliance upon the ability to maintain the shift away from interacting within actual, ongoing conditions in favor of fantasied, future experiences as the primary source of psychological security occurs. A client's magical wish is to be able to buttress or strengthen the sagging hope derived from the shifting operation without having to risk losing what little reassurance or hope is made available through the operation. The idea of relinquishing the modes of psychological slack needed to underwrite the effectiveness of the shift towards the fantasied, future dimension to secure actual sources of reassurance may persist as an untenable alternative for the client.

The remainder of this section of discussion offers some principles for accepting and responding to the terms of a client's magical wishes, that is, ways to counteract client resistance to behavior change. These are presented as follows.

Principle #1. Identify the terms of a client's magical wish, both the statement of desire for achieving particular outcomes and the conditional terms which tend to remain unspoken.

The primary objective of this first principle is to determine what kinds of assurances clients are seeking, to counteract existing or potential threats to their psychological security, and the modes of psychological slack which these clients tend to use in underwriting a fail-safe system for pursuing such assurances. This objective can be accomplished in numerous ways.
Traditional clinical approaches and techniques, although not expressly designed to determine these kinds of information in the context of the model, can provide sources for obtaining such information. Projective test instruments and some other formal or informal psychometrics can be administered and their results interpreted in a way which reveals the terms of magical wishes.

Any clinical approach or style which addresses the following lines of inquiry could provide an effective means of identifying the terms of a client's magical wish: (a) How is the client's present life different than when it was experienced 2, 5, 10, 15 . . . years ago through the fantasied, future dimension? From the perception of the client, what circumstances prevailed in the actual conditions of living which account for the discrepancy? (b) How does the client imagine his/her life 2, 5, 10, 15 . . . years from now? What kinds of conditions does the client perceive as necessary for achieving such life experiences in this future period?

Therapists who are oriented towards exploring a client's past formative object relations can attempt to form clinical impressions in terms of what kinds of assurances (positive outcomes) a client failed to receive. Then, they can attempt to identify the nature of the fail-safe features the client has developed in relation to preserving psychological security to cope in further interactions with certain objects, in light of the past.
Again, there exist numerous ways or vehicles for ascertaining the terms of a client's magical wish. This first principle corresponds to a diagnostic phase which is a prerequisite to treatment intervention. That is, a therapist must identify the magical wish before it can be responded to in an effective manner.

The view reflected in the model proposes that desired assurances not acquired in past actual interactions with objects cannot be achieved in the past; they can only be acquired in present and future actual interactions. Thus, while exploration of past experiences may provide useful information with regard to identifying the nature of clients' magical wishes, such wishes must be serviced in the context of ongoing and future object relations apart from historic interactions.

The point of this first principle is that the therapist should determine what kinds of positive outcomes were not achieved developmentally, so that the conditions required to institute adequate opportunities to experience such assurances can be established in the client's present and future actual interactions. However, in this regard, a therapist must remain sensitive to the conditional terms of a client's magical wish since these terms suggest the modes of psychological slack which the client has developed to retain the validity of future, fantasied experiences in light of past experiences. It is this term of the magical wish which
presents the client's potential source of resistance to a therapist's interventions. After a therapist identifies the terms of a client's magical wish, the psychotherapy process should deal with the client's fail-safe system of performance. This consideration brings to the fore the next theoretical principle.

Principle #2. Attempt to make a dysfunctional fail-safe system more functional.

If a therapist is to be effective in responding to a client's magical wish, there must be an attempt to facilitate situations in which the client is permitted to achieve the desired products of a process without having to assume the risk of engaging in the process itself. If clients perceive that they must test out fantasied performance abilities in actual conditions to achieve the assurances needed to bolster psychological security, the terms of the magical wish are not being carried out. In such a situation, the client will tend to persist in maintaining the dysfunctional fail-safe features in order to ensure the effectiveness of a shift toward the fantasied, future dimension of experience for such assurances. If the resistance to relinquishing the dysfunctional features is to be counteracted, then the psychotherapy process must permit the client to ensure the validity of the client's fantasies against the threat of actual negative outcomes.

This second principle suggests that a therapist can accept and respond to the terms of a magical wish by restructuring a client's dysfunctional fail-safe system so that it
becomes functional. That is, it is an attempt to permit a client to ensure the ability to reinstate psychological security by means of a shift towards fantasy experiences against the potential occurrence of negative, actual outcomes, without precluding the opportunity to achieve positive outcomes.

Certain therapy techniques in current practice by some clinicians produce the conditions suggested by this principle. Many of these techniques could be broadly subsumed within the framework of "paradoxical intent" interventions. Generally, such an intervention involves a situation in which a client is instructed to act ostensibly in a way intended to produce one effect, but the result is that this activity produces another effect (often the obverse effect) rather than the one intended. In regard to the present model, paradoxical intent serves to permit an individual to retain certain modes of psychological slack (i.e., symptoms), but allows the client to remain in a position to experience positive outcomes for which the modes function to underwrite a fail-safe system.

As suggested, certain clinical techniques in practice seem to reflect the theoretical aspects of this principle, although their functional effects may be interpreted differently by those who practice them. For example, certain sex therapy techniques, such as "sensate focus," seem to provide clients with a functional fail-safe system for achieving certain actual assurances or positive outcomes. As Kaplan
(1974) suggested, a therapist's instructions for the sensate focus exercise obviate the necessity for sexual performance ability per se, but they still place the client(s) in an actual situation in which positive outcomes from having sexual impact and significance on another can be experienced. Since the client(s) is instructed that the exercise is not geared to be a prelude to coitus or the achievement of orgasm, it provides an inherent mode of psychological slack which underwrites a fail-safe feature and minimizes the risk associated with attempting to demonstrate prowess in sexual performance. For clients who suffer situational or secondary sexual impotence, techniques similar to sensate focus permit them to retain the symptom, but, at the same time, they provide opportunities for achieving positive outcomes which tend to relieve the underlying anxiety associated with the symptom. Such techniques tend to be responsive to a client's magical wish, and, consequently, resistance to the process of therapy tends to abate significantly.

The theoretical proposition underlying Principle #2 is that by replacing certain features (i.e., modes of psychological slack) of a dysfunctional fail-safe system so that it becomes functional, opportunities are made available for clients to experience actual positive outcomes and, in the process, still retain insurance to protect the validity of fantasied, future outcomes. This permits clients to perceive that they can retain the capacity to discount the validity of
actual negative experiences and shift back to the fantasied, future dimension in case actual positive outcomes fail to occur. The assumption is that as a client experiences positive outcomes from a functional fail-safe system of performance, the perceived need to generate psychological slack (i.e., symptoms) is reduced accordingly.

This theoretical principle appears to be further reflected in the ideas and clinical practices of Erickson (cited in Haley, 1973) and Kelly (1955). They operate from a process of psychotherapy which engenders situations in which their clients are permitted to retain modes of psychological slack but in which such fail-safe features become functional, so as to permit the client to experience certain desired positive outcomes.

This seems to be illustrated in Erickson's work with clients, for example, in the reported case of an adolescent female who was experiencing psychological distress relating to her perceived "unattractiveness," in particular, her breasts (Haley, 1973). Her entry into therapy with Erickson coincided with her upcoming intentions to begin college. Erickson noted that her anxiety regarding her attractiveness to men appeared to underlie her tendency to withdraw from and avoid interpersonal interactions with them. From the point of view of the present model, her withdrawal and avoidance pertaining to such interactions represented a fail-safe system because she was able to avoid having to confirm the worst...
of her fears and could rely on a fantasied, future dimension of experience instead. Referring back to Erickson's transactions with this client, Erickson seemed to emphasize that his interventions with her did not explicitly require the client to relinquish her patterns of withdrawing from such interactions. Instead, it appears that he permitted her to retain these "symptoms," but he shifted the emphasis of concern by virtue of hypnotic suggestion to a more "neutral" zone. Quoting from Erickson's reported account of his hypnotherapy interventions:

This series of suggestions have the multiple purpose of meeting her ambivalence, puzzling and intriguing her, stimulating her sense of humor, meeting her need for self-aggression and self-derogation, and yet doing all this without adding to her distress. It was done so indirectly that there was little for her to do but accept and respond to the suggestions.

The final set of hypnotic instructions was that she have a thoroughly good time in college. Making the suggestions in this way effectively by-passed all discussions of her withdrawn behavior and college attendance. (p. 113)

In addition, in his further account of this case, Erickson tended to utilize the client's symptoms (i.e., modes of psychological slack) in a manner which could be fashioned as a paradoxical intent technique. That is, he permitted the client to retain the feelings of her embarrassment with regard to her breasts, often intensifying this feeling through his suggestions, but his suggestions still afforded her the opportunity of interacting with the young men at
It is interesting to note that it appears characteristic of Erickson's work with clients that little analysis or interpretation is offered to the client, and that although it is clear that Erickson conceptualizes many attributes of personality functioning as resulting from unconscious trends, making the client aware of the nature of such trends is not an integral thrust of the process.

Furthermore, as implied by Haley (1973), it could be interpreted that Erickson also tended to view the psychotherapy process as "re-setting a stage" for a client to develop a functional fail-safe system of interactions to achieve certain desired assurances in the present and future conditions of actual performance, that is, those which the client failed to receive in past actual conditions. In a sense, it is as if, from a developmental point of view, the client is permitted to achieve assurances associated with a particular, past developmental era within ongoing, actual experiences.

Another treatment approach, which appears to accomplish the process suggested by this principle, is Kelly's (1955) fixed-role therapy. Essentially, the approach involves asking a client to perform certain role behaviors as if the client were role-playing rather than being the person performing those behaviors in "real life." The treatment approach is introduced to a client as representing a brief
experimentation rather than a permanent attempt to adopt these patterns of behavior. This allows the client to dissociate these particular patterns in a way which provides psychological slack since a client does not have to acknowledge commitment to a sustained performance towards acquiring certain outcomes, but, at the same time, the client is placed in a position in which such outcomes can be achieved anyway. Such an approach tends to attenuate the intensity of a client's resistance reflected in the conditional terms of the magical wish since the client is provided with fail-safe features but still can pursue certain actual interactions.

Principle #2 also has implications for certain clinical and behavioral management practices as being antithetical to the terms of a client's magical wishes. Consequently, such practices are deemed here as being ineffective at counteracting resistance and, in some cases, intensifying it. In general, it is presumed that those practices or interventions which require a client to relinquish certain symptoms (i.e., modes of psychological slack) without replacing these with modes of performance which can serve in their place tend to be ineffective in psychotherapy. It is suggested that in such cases, a client persists in resisting the process geared toward behavior change, and therapists begin to generate their own fail-safe features (i.e., counter-resistance) which are designed to dismiss the client as being "too resistant" or "not amenable" to therapy.
Principle #3. Avoid attempts to alter "functional" fail-safe features of performance in the course of psychotherapy.

This third principle may be viewed as a corollary to Principle #2. Frequently, in psychotherapy, clients exhibit certain characteristics which a therapist may view as being indicative of psychopathology. Yet, many of the "symptoms" which clients reveal are modes of psychological slack underwriting a functional fail-safe system of interaction. Sometimes therapists, because of their own personal needs and desires, have difficulty tolerating certain modes of psychological slack which may be functional for a client during that particular point in time.

For example, clients who are very depressed over a recent loss of a previously established position of significance in relation to a particular object or event tend to operate from a fail-safe system which is functional in buttressing psychological security at that present period in time. (The fail-safe features associated with depressive reactions are discussed further in the chapter.) However, a therapist who feels obligated to not permit the client to be depressed may unwittingly impede that client's ability to resolve the threat to psychological security incurred as a result of the recent loss. Moreover, the client will tend to resist the therapist who demands that the client not operate from feelings of grief, sadness, or self-pity.

In other instances, some therapists may not be able to
resist the temptation to impress clients (and themselves) with their clinical astuteness, analyzing and interpreting the motives and bases for their clients' every aspect of defense being used to preserve psychological security in light of their current conditions. Although such practices may be in the service of boosting a therapist's own psychological security, these often occur at the expense of undermining the effectiveness of the fail-safe features clients have developed to protect theirs. For example, an individual who exhibits a mode of psychological slack involving an attempt to counteract a recent negative outcome by projecting blame on certain external circumstances does not need a therapist to point out that, in fact, the individual failed on his/her own account rather than being a victim of such circumstances. What the client does need is some reassurances in the present and future conditions of living, and then such fail-safe features will abate accordingly.

The notion involved in this third principle may be reflected developmentally. That is, it is generally recognized that many developmental tasks are associated with acquiring certain perceived mastery and competence in various modes of interaction with objects. In attempting to acquire such assurances of self-adequacy, individuals tend to give themselves certain modes of psychological slack which are utilized until such assurances are achieved, and then these modes tend to be relinquished. From this point of view, the
primary thrust of psychotherapy should not be directed at undermining the effectiveness and utilization of clients' fail-safe systems, but, instead, it should be directed at helping clients achieve those assurances in their actual, ongoing conditions which would permit them then to relinquish some of these fail-safe features. This means that therapists may need to permit themselves to tolerate a client who may be too introverted, too hostile, too detached, too compulsive, or too immature in respect to the therapists' own expectations, needs, and desires relative to maintaining their own psychological security. Perhaps, the essence of Principles #2 and #3 is that resistance to behavior change tends to occur when therapists resist accepting and responding to clients' resistances because of therapists' concern for the safety of their own psychological security.

Theoretical Application of the Model to Selected Clinical Patterns of Psychological Dysfunction

Psychological dysfunction, as discussed previously, is viewed as both the product of a dysfunctional fail-safe system and the intensified persistence of one. In this final section of discussion, some selected clinical categories of psychological dysfunction are presented. The thrust of this presentation is to address each of these clinical categories within the following context. First, the clinical attributes associated with each category are discussed within the theoretical frame of the model. In this endeavor, there is
little emphasis on attempting to delineate etiological factors. Instead, the focus is directed at the ongoing dynamics and effects of the fail-safe features presumed.

Secondly, after considering the nature of the fail-safe features associated with each of these clinical patterns, the general terms of the magical wish corresponding to the source of resistance to each is addressed. Some suggestions are offered in terms of applying the theoretical principles enumerated in the previous section of discussion.

Each of the following clinical patterns is discussed: anxiety reactions, obsessive-compulsive patterns, grief and depression reactions, passive-aggressive patterns, antisocial (sociopathic) patterns, passive-dependence patterns, paranoid patterns, and schizophrenic patterns.

**Anxiety reaction patterns.** This neurotic pattern is characterized by a relatively constant state of tension, apprehension, and uneasiness. Often, the individuals experience acute panic anxiety attacks which punctuate their more general and diffuse tension and uneasiness. In this clinical category, the individual tends to ruminate obsessively over impending decisions as well as those already made by the individual. Characteristically, the anxiety reactions do not appear to stem from specific threats, but seem to issue from more vague and generalized stimuli.

Within the context of the present model, as with the other clinical patterns to be discussed, anxiety reaction
patterns are modes of psychological slack used to underwrite fail-safe systems for actual performance. Moreover, it may be recalled from the discussion in Chapter II that the model reflects the view that affective states are emotional, pro-active adjustments to counteract threats to psychological security and not just responses or reactions to such threats. Thus, anxiety reactions constitute a kind of emotional adjustment pattern to threats which is incorporated as a mode of psychological slack used to discount the validity of certain actual, ongoing experiences.

It is theorized here that the individual manifesting this clinical pattern derives fail-safe features in a way analogous to a person who operates from a laudable and ambitious set of intentions or goals and derives a sense of worth or esteem from the "possession" of these goals, apart from accomplishing them. The anxiety reaction pattern serves as a fail-safe system such that the individual accomplishes successfully these goals and intentions in the fantasied, future dimension of experience but is unable to demonstrate this proficiency in actual conditions because there is always a crisis situation which must be dealt with first. Consequently, commitment to performance is rarely sustained since the person's energies must be diverted towards resolving other issues which intrude upon the scene.

The anxiety reaction is viewed here as underwriting the level of crisis and urgency the person must perceive in order
to divert a commitment process in one direction by assuming a commitment in another direction. These individuals find themselves in an almost constant state of ambivalence, not wanting to give up the pursuit of certain directions of performance but also not wishing to commit their performance to the extent that they must test out their capacity of effectiveness in those areas of performance. Frequently, more intense and acute states of anxiety reaction are felt by such persons when they experience situations which require that the ambivalent posture be replaced by assuming commitment.

For example, a man who has maintained a relatively noncommittal relationship with a woman may begin to experience panic anxiety when he perceives that his position of significance in relation to her is being threatened by the intrusion of other men onto the scene. On one hand, he desires to make a commitment toward a pursuit of interaction designed to compete effectively with the other men for maintaining his position of being the "one." However, if he does so, he risks losing the validity of his fantasied performance outcomes which demonstrate that when he tries to be the special one in relation to a woman, he indeed has the capacity to do so. Thus, he does not want to lose her by not trying, but even more so, he does not want to lose her despite his trying.

The ensuing anxiety reaction serves to immobilize him so that he makes himself feel helpless and, consequently, unable to assert himself in resolving the situation. If he
loses her, it is because he is involved with so many problems that he is unable to compete effectively for maintaining his position of significance in relation to her. Thus, the anxiety reaction underwrites a fail-safe system which ensures that in the event of actual negative outcomes, the shift toward the fantasied, future dimension remains an effective source for experiencing positive outcomes to counteract the actual negative ones.

It is speculated that, in most cases, a client entering psychotherapy due to acute or panic anxiety attacks has reached the stage in which certain events and/or objects require a commitment to performance in order to counteract an impending loss of position of significance in relation to them. Frequently, such clients have begun to transform the emotional adjustment concerning their high level of anxiety response to the situation by manifesting phobic-like or panic anxiety reaction patterns which serve to immobilize them.

The general terms of the client's magical wish are: "I want to overcome these anxiety [or phobic] reactions so I no longer feel helpless in my attempt to exert control over my life." The conditional terms associated with this aspect of the wish are: "But I also want to be assured that if I am in a position to sustain a performance, it will not destroy the validity of my future, fantasied capacities."

Applying Principle #2, the direction of psychotherapy with such clients should be an attempt to induce them to
"act out" the performance in question without them having to acknowledge commitment towards attempting to achieve positive outcomes from such performance. Since the anxiety reactions serve as modes of psychological slack by underwriting an individual's felt inability to sustain a commitment to demonstrating the capacity to achieve actual positive outcomes, a therapist must attempt to find a means to allow the client to sustain a performance attempt without the client having to acknowledge the attempt itself. The anxiety reaction pattern becomes dysfunctional when it permits individuals to abort completion of attempts to demonstrate the actual capacity to achieve positive outcomes in certain kinds of interactions and, therefore, precludes their achievement. In order to respond to the client's magical wish, to counteract this source of resistance, a therapist must allow the client to retain a fail-safe system, but one which is functional in that it affords the client opportunities for acquiring these positive actual outcomes (Principle #2).

Thus, in order to deal effectively with the resistance corresponding to the conditional terms of a client's magical wish associated with the anxiety reaction pattern, a therapist must induce the client to complete the performance in question without the client acknowledging the intention to do so. Consequently, a client does not have to abort the attempt since the client does not acknowledge commitment towards accomplishing the particular goal associated with
the anxiety.

Such techniques as desensitization are effective in this regard because a client is permitted to punctuate increasing phases of commitment with the achievement of positive outcomes along the way. In a sense, the process may be viewed as a "weaning" away gradually from the more intense modes of psychological slack that were used by the client. The emphasis here is that a therapist must remain sensitive to the conditional terms of a client's magical wish in order to counteract the source of resistance to the process of attempting to respond to the expressed aspect of the magical wish.

**Obsessive-compulsive patterns.** Within the theoretical frame of the model, the fail-safe features associated with this pattern are very similar to those encountered with anxiety reaction patterns. The primary distinction is that, with regard to the obsessive-compulsive pattern, the person makes very strong commitments to certain areas of performance which are relatively "safe" in order to avoid such commitments in more risky domains of actual interactions. In the case of anxiety reactions, individuals tend to remain too immobilized and too scattered to sustain even more circumscribed, ritualistic forms of behavior.

Obsessive-compulsive individuals underwrite their fail-safe system to discount the validity of the relative absence of more intimate, personalized actual performance in relation to others by intensifying the importance of more impersonal...
issues and events. Like the individual associated with anxiety reaction patterns, the obsessive-compulsive person intensifies the perception of urgency and crisis as related to such events. All of the ramifications must be considered and not left in the hands of chance. These individuals attempt to enhance their self-importance in relation to accomplishing these compulsive-oriented tasks.

Relaxation and diminished intensity of performance tend to be anathema since the individual wishes to retain the fail-safe features which underwrite an avoidance of sustained commitment in certain other areas of interaction, in particular, intimate levels of interpersonal involvement. Leisure time allows persons to relate to others, and these individuals tend to feel impotent without the compulsive "tools" used to delimit and circumscribe spontaneity. Consequently, without the compulsive modes, levels of intimacy are much more difficult to avert.

There appears to be a serious irony associated with the more pronounced obsessive-compulsive pattern. While the modes of psychological slack underwrite an effective fail-safe system for interactions in which the individual lacks sufficient performance confidence, it leaves the person with little psychological slack in those areas for which commitment is made in lieu of these other, more threatening areas of interaction. Thus, although the person is able to discount the validity associated with the relative absence of
positive outcomes in the more interpersonally oriented spheres of performance, in the trade-off there is little psychological slack available for underwriting a fail-safe system to discount the validity of actual negative outcomes arising within the areas of achievement at which the compulsive pattern is directed.

Therefore, in lieu of sufficient psychological slack in these areas of compulsive performance, the person is unable to mitigate or attenuate the high level of stress associated with ensuring positive outcomes in such areas. Unable to let go and escape psychologically from maintaining a vigilant, stellar capacity of performance in these compulsive areas, the stress tends to become reflected in psychosomatic disorders. Frequently, physical debility and illness become the only means by which the person is able to escape temporarily. Having little psychological slack in these areas of performance, the person's psychological security remains extremely vulnerable to actual negative outcomes. Consequently, there is little capacity to generate effective shifts towards counteracting actual negative outcomes by compensating with fantasied, future positive outcomes in these compulsive spheres of performance. The depression and suicide potential tends to become elevated in such individuals when they experience negative outcomes in these achievement-oriented areas of performance, because they are unable to generate effective shifts to counteract these threats.
While moderate obsessive-compulsive patterns may continue to exist as functional fail-safe systems, the more extreme patterns tend to become associated with dysfunctional fail-safe features. This is especially the case when a person for reasons of illness, forced retirement, or otherwise is unable to continue effectively within the compulsive domains of performance and is left with little psychological slack to underwrite fail-safe features pertaining to interpersonal intimacy and dependency relationships. In such cases, agitated depression and symptoms of regression often appear clinically.

In psychotherapy, the general terms of the magical wish associated with the obsessive-compulsive pattern are as follows. The client tends to express a desire to feel less tense, to be able to relax and worry less about ongoing and future concerns. The conditional terms are that the client also desires to maintain sufficient fail-safe features in relation to performances associated with more intimate interpersonal interactions. A corollary conditional term is that the client be assured of the ability to remain significant to certain others in lieu of continuing to derive this capacity from such achievement-oriented performance.

In psychotherapy, interventions which require the client to "learn" how to relax and relinquish the obsessive, ruminative component tend to encounter much resistance unless the conditional terms of the client's magical wish are serviced.

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first. That is, clients must first acquire reassurance that they have sufficient interpersonal potency apart from extra-personal endeavors; that they can achieve "success" and status in relation to others and are held in positive regard or in a position of being lovable not just for what they can accomplish, but also because of what they can be in relation to others.

To service the client's magical wish, there should be an attempt to restructure a fail-safe system which has become increasingly dysfunctional so that it becomes more functional for the client. In this regard, one suggestion is to structure opportunities for clients to achieve assurances of their interpersonal potency and impact within the context of their more compulsive, achievement-oriented environment. For example, a therapist could be instrumental in helping the client arrange for the client's spouse and/or other significant others to become more involved in the client's extra-personal affairs and perhaps to attempt to structure in occasions when interpersonal interactions with these others could occur within the context of the compulsive modes (e.g., helping the client with a project related to the job). If implemented effectively, this tact would be responsive to the conditional terms of the client's magical wish involving a desire to retain the aura of self-adequacy and self-significance provided by the compulsive-oriented environment and, at the same time, provide opportunities for the client
to achieve interpersonal assurances. In addition, it may be helpful for such clients to inculcate the cognitive precept which involves the notion that since they have worked so hard and effectively for so long, they have a right to "cash in" by beginning to permit themselves to rest on their laurels. That is, a therapist might attempt to help the client--in particular, the retiring individual--focus on the accomplishments of the past dimension of experience for buttressing psychological security and rely less upon future-oriented experiences.

Reactive depression and grief reaction patterns. From the viewpoint of the model, reactive depression and grief reactions are emotional adjustments that tend to occur when persons experience a serious threat to psychological security within their actual conditions and are unable to counteract this threat effectively by means of a shift towards the fantasied, future dimension of experience. Precipitous changes, such as those associated with the death or separation of an object to which much of an individual's psychological security is based, evoke this kind of emotional adjustment. The loss or unavailability of such an important object leaves a kind of vacuum for the individual because an important source for achieving positive outcomes is removed. The loss or unavailability not only affects a person's reliance on the positive outcomes resulting from actual, ongoing interactions with that object, but it also impairs the capacity to generate
the future experiences related to fantasied interactions with that object.

There are only two ways in which a person can attempt to counteract this threat to psychological security, but both ways depend on the person's ability to maintain the effectiveness of a shift to fantasied, future experiences for achieving positive outcomes in lieu of the present, actual loss of the object. The person attempts to preserve the validity of future, fantasied experiences with that object by denying that the loss is permanent, and, consequently, the object's expected return salvages the validity of these fantasy experiences. Otherwise, the person attempts to restructure the future, fantasy dimension of experience so that its validity no longer depends upon the return of the lost object, but instead depends upon the replacement of the lost object with another, or others.

The attributes associated with grief and depression correspond to an individual's development of a fail-safe system which is designed to facilitate the effectiveness of maintaining a shift toward the fantasied, future dimension of experience to counteract the threat to psychological security occurring as a function of the actual loss of the object. Furthermore, there generally occur four stages or phases in a grief or depressive reaction, and, as a person moves through these four stages, there is a gradual transformation in the type of fail-safe features used by the person to
preserve psychological security in light of the loss or separation associated with an important object. Applying the notion extended by Principle #3, grief and depression remain as a functional set of fail-safe features to the degree that it permits the individual to move through the four stages of the emotional adjustment. These four stages are enumerated below.

The first phase, the **immobilization stage**, involves the precipitous loss or separation of a very significant object. This tends to represent a serious threat to psychological security since the individual has lost an established source for acquiring positive outcomes which had demonstrated the capacity to maintain a strong position of significance to that object. Not only has the individual lost such a primary source within actual conditions of interactions, but the loss extends to the future, fantasied dimension of experience which relies a great deal on the perception of the availability of the lost object in the future. It is during this stage that the individual feels helpless, confused, and without direction. In a very real sense, the person has lost a previously effective channel of acquiring positive outcomes leading to psychological security. There may be much emoting, but the most predominant clinical feature associated with this stage of the grief or depression reaction is regression. The individual becomes immobilized and confused, not being able to plan or organize from moment to moment, nor from day
It is the implications of the precipitous loss of the object which become the source of profound threat to persons' psychological security. Persons strive to secure the precept that they are capable of maintaining a desired position of significance in relation to certain others because it means that they have a responsive and reliable set of sources for acquiring the fulfillment of biological and psychological needs. In effect, the loss or separation represents a severe threat to psychological security because it suggests to persons that they in fact have very little control in maintaining such a position of significance.

During the immobilization stage, the individual requires much structure and support. The extreme feelings of helplessness and confusion tend to remain until the person is able to restructure an effective shift towards the future, fantasied dimension of experience.

The reinstatement stage is the second phase and is marked by an attempt to secure a tenable shift to the fantasied, future dimension by underwriting a hope or belief that the loss of position will be reinstated by the return of the object or previous relationship to the event in question. In this regard, the felt immobilization is gradually replaced by the following modes of psychological slack used to secure the effectiveness of such a shift.

There tends to be much obsessive behavior as the
individual becomes preoccupied with regaining the lost object's presence and impact. The hope for restoration of the previous position of significance leads to an attempt to institute a fail-safe system of performance, which becomes retroactive, to account for why the position of significance was lost. This corresponds to a tendency to become very self-critical and self-effacing and a tendency to perceive that the loss occurred as a reprisal for not having been fully committed to maintaining a strong position of significance to the lost object.

This stage of the depressive reaction becomes similar to the pattern of the passive-dependent individual (considered in later discussion). The self-deprecation and self-punishment serve two objectives with regard to countering the threat to psychological security associated with the loss of position of significance. First of all, these underwrite the individual's attempt to demonstrate that the loss of this position in relation to the object occurred because of the failure on the part of the individual to sustain sufficient commitment. "I was such a fool," "if I had only shown more love," "if I had only been there more when he/she needed me," and other self-effacing thought trends permit the person to shift to the fantasied, future dimension which allows the restoration of a strong position of significance to the lost object to exist since greater commitment will be demonstrated in the future, upon the object's return.
Secondly, this tendency to introject blame and engage in self-denial and self-sacrifice, an anhedonic posture, is also an attempt to demonstrate just how much impact and significance the object has in relation to the person, as if to answer the object's reprisal associated with not having shown this before the loss or separation occurred. Ultimately, the individual hopes that this demonstration will reaffirm to the lost object that, indeed, much significance is assigned to it and that it is very special and unique.

It is suspected that most individuals who enter into psychotherapy due to a depressive reaction tend to be within this stage of the pattern. As clients, these individuals tend to focus a great deal of attention and emphasis on seeking reinstatement of the previous positions held in relation to the lost objects. Initially, therapists will encounter much resistance on the part of their clients if the therapists attempt to intervene in such a way as to "demand" that their clients relinquish the beliefs or hopes for reinstatement. Instead, the most effective approach is to accept clients' desires to engage in the self-effacing patterns. The reasoning behind this is explained in considering the third stage of the depressive reaction pattern.

In the third phase, the depreciation stage, the features associated with the reinstatement stage continue until the individual has developed enough of a basis to restructure this fail-safe system. This conversion is characterized by
changing a fail-safe system which relies on an introjective mode (i.e., self-effacement, self-sacrifice, and self-punishment) to a fail-safe system which is underwritten by a projective mode (i.e., externalization of blame and devaluation of the lost object). This transformation occurs as the individual's implicit demands for reinstatement to the previous position to the lost object continue to go unanswered. After all, if the lost object is in fact so special and important, would it allow the individual to suffer so much and be so much in need of the object's presence, and still desert the person?

Thus, the characteristics associated with the reinstatement phase set the stage for the individual to establish implicit demands relating to the object's return, and when these demands are not met, it permits the individual to be in a position of being able to discredit the lost object. This is why it was suggested that in psychotherapy the client who appears to manifest the features associated with the reinstatement phase of the reaction should be permitted to continue and, if possible, to intensify the felt loss and despondency in the absence of the object's presence. It is suggested that a therapist should hold in abeyance any attempts directed at reversing the self-effacing trend of the client until the client is "ready" to acknowledge the anger and frustration related to the object's apparent indifference to the client's suffering.
The depreciation stage corresponds to instituting a shift to the fantasied, future dimension of experience which is no longer dependent upon the reinstatement to the previous position in relation to the lost object, but involves the replacement of that object with another, or others. In order to underwrite this fail-safe system in light of the recent loss of a position of significance, the individual begins to devalue the significance of that previous relationship. Apparently, since the lost object was not responsive to the extreme suffering and need for reinstatement, the individual begins to institute a kind of "sour grapes" approach in reevaluating just how important that relationship had been. The person begins to adopt the notion that perhaps he/she really had imputed much more value to the lost object than justified, in particular, in light of the failure of the object to appear in the person's hour of need. This, in turn, leads to the person formulating the conclusion that the significance of the relationship with the lost object was, in retrospect, not justified, and the depreciation of that significance begins to gradually intensify. It is at this point that the individual tends to engage in the expression of anger and resentment towards that object for deceiving and betraying the individual, and the "pedestal" upon which the person had previously placed the object is removed.

The transformed fail-safe system corresponding to the depreciation stage is that the individual assumes that the
capacity to sustain a strong position of significance in relation to objects was not invalidated by the loss of the object. Instead, the person assumes that the relationship had been flawed by the nature of the object itself, that is, the object and/or the circumstances of the relationship are discredited.

As the transformation to the fail-safe features associated with the depreciation stage becomes more crystallized, the individual is able to rely on a shift towards the fantasied, future dimension of experience. This corresponds to the final phase, the restructuring stage, which depicts that strong positions of significance in relation to other objects can occur since the loss encountered previously was based on external deficiencies, apart from the person's capacity to sustain a relationship itself. The restructuring stage corresponds to the recovery aspects of a depressive reaction as the individual begins to replace the lost object in the fantasied, future dimension of experience with another, or others.

Typically, the four stages correspond to the development of functional fail-safe systems utilized by individuals to counteract the threats to psychological security associated with the precipitous loss or separation of significant objects and/or events. With regard to psychotherapy, it is proposed that therapists should attempt to identify the stage or phase of the depressive reaction and, rather than attempt to help the client forestall or avoid the features associated
with the particular stage, therapists should instead accommodate the client's desire to experience the particular set of feelings and attitudes of that particular phase. Moreover, it is suspected that the time needed by a particular individual to achieve psychological recovery from a grief or depressive reaction tends to be protracted when either the individual or others are not willing to permit the individual to be depressed.

**Passive-aggressive patterns.** From the theoretical framework of the model, the fail-safe features associated with the passive-aggressive pattern and the antisocial pattern, which is the next clinical pattern presented, are very similar. Both employ modes of psychological slack which are utilized to underwrite feelings and attitudes of indifference to trying to develop a strong position of significance in relation to certain objects and/or events.

The more pronounced antisocial pattern is viewed as an adjustment to experiencing outright rejection from others and a well-engrained self-doubt as to the capacity to maintain a strong position of significance to certain classes of objects. In relative contrast to this situation, the passive-aggressive pattern is a fail-safe system developed as a means of adjusting to the "incompleteness" or the tenuous nature of positions of significance to objects. Historically, the individual has "almost" acquired strong positions of significance to certain objects but has frequently fallen just a
bit short of meeting the demands and expectations required for sustaining the desired positions of significance. The individual had to try a little bit harder in future attempts to achieve the completeness of being loved and well regarded but then, again, seemed to fall just a bit short.

Consequently, the fail-safe system associated with the passive-aggressive pattern reflects a person's dilemma resulting from such a situation. The individual is led to hope that the capacity to sustain a strong position of significance exists but seldom is led to know that such a capacity exists in relation to certain objects. Thus, there is sufficient hope to underwrite some degree of commitment to attempt to gain acceptance and approval toward strengthening positions of significance to certain objects. However, not having sufficient confidence in the capacity initiates enough desire to retain some modes of psychological slack close at hand which can be utilized to underwrite reductions in the degree of commitment towards such attempts at establishing and/or maintaining a strong position of significance in relation to these objects.

The fail-safe features associated with the passive-aggressive pattern tend to be a pervasive clinical syndrome in the sense that it epitomizes the concept of the magical wish. That is, it is a desire, on one hand, to achieve certain assurances, but, on the other hand, a wish to avoid the degree of commitment required to achieve them for fear of
losing the effectiveness of relying on the shift to the fantasied future for such assurances. As such, the fail-safe characteristics of the passive-aggressive pattern tend to also be attending features of individuals who utilize the characteristics associated with the other clinical patterns being considered.

In psychotherapy, a client who exhibits passive-aggressiveness tends to evoke much counter-resistance on the part of therapists. The complementary response to passive-aggressive behavior tends to be passive-aggressive behavior in return. That is, since the passive-aggressive pattern reflects an attempt to withhold commitment, the response tends to represent an attempt to build in some fail-safe features to discount the outcomes related to being rebuffed by the individual. A passive-aggressive client attempts to withhold commitment to the psychotherapy relationship by avoiding any sustained performance towards achieving levels of intimate interactions. Since anger is one of the most potent ways to demonstrate interpersonal commitment, the passive-aggressive individual attempts to avoid demonstrating anger. For example, it is not uncommon for someone to desire to elicit jealousy or anger from another individual as a way of reaffirming the degree of commitment and the degree of significance the individual has in relation to the other person. The client tends to restrict the level of interactions by externalizing the focus to issues such as wishing
to know why certain events (as if the client was dissociated from their occurrence) have occurred in the past and present conditions. There is a related tendency for the client to stipulate many times in the interactions that he/she is unable to "understand," and when the therapist attempts to provide such understanding for the client, the client invariably rejects or withholds a degree of acceptance of the explanation. In this way, the client is able to devalue the impact and significance of the therapist in relation to the client's needs. In response to being made to feel ineffectual and inept, the therapist tends to adopt an emotional adjustment of indifference or, in short, a passive-aggressive posture towards the client. That is, after a while, a therapist withholds making a sustained commitment to performance so as to build in some fail-safe features to counteract against the threat of feeling ineffectual and unable to achieve a strong position of significance in relation to the client. Again, in order to underwrite this indifference, the therapist tends to suppress and/or repress the anger felt towards the client since this would betray the fact that in actuality the client is having an impact on the therapist. From the point of view of the model, it is this unwillingness to permit the client to "know" that he/she is that significant to the therapist which perpetuates the resistance associated with the passive-aggressive pattern of the client.

The general terms of the passive-aggressive client's
magical wish tend to be: "I want to have impact and significance in relation to others by gaining acceptance and approval from them, but I do not wish to acknowledge my attempt to do so. It would destroy the validity of my fantasies which suggest that when I try to achieve acceptance and approval, I am capable of having impact on others."

Given the presumed terms of such a magical wish, one of the most effective responses to this magical wish is for therapists to express their anger and frustration at the client with regard to feeling ineffectual and impotent in their attempt to be significant to, and have impact upon, the client. Such expressed anger reveals to the client that he/she is capable of generating hurt and anger in others because they want to care for and respond to him/her. What has historically occurred, in contrast, is that others have reacted by not showing their vulnerability in relation to the client's significance to them, but instead have conveyed an indifference to acquiring a position of significance in relation to the client.

Antisocial (sociopathic) patterns. Individuals exhibiting pronounced antisocial patterns operate from fail-safe systems which account for actual experiences of felt rejection by intentionally provoking these rejections through disregard for others, selfishness, and deceit. They adopt attitudes and behaviors which bespeak their outright indifference to wanting to attain a desired position of
significance in relation to certain others (most often, parental figures).

As suggested earlier, the features of this fail-safe system are similar to those associated with the passive-aggressive pattern. However, the intensity of the ambivalence or dilemma experienced by the more passive-aggressive individual is much less so for the antisocial. Whereas the passive-aggressive individual is constantly involved in a conflict between wanting to sustain commitment towards acquiring a strong position of significance in relation to others and a desire, at the same time, to withhold such commitment, the more pronounced antisocial (sociopathic) individual attempts to underwrite a fail-safe system which denies the former aspect of the conflict.

The modes of psychological slack corresponding to the antisocial personality pattern are developed, and tend to become engrained developmentally, when a child and/or adolescent experiences longstanding periods of rejection by parental figures. In contrast to the situation depicted in the discussion of the passive-aggressive pattern, in which the person "almost" achieves a strong position of significance in relation to such figures, the antisocial pattern corresponds to a situation in which individuals experienced a more outright sense of rejection by such figures. In order to provide a means of discounting the validity of these negative outcomes, the young individuals begin to act out in a
manner which characteristically provokes rejection from parental figures. This fail-safe system permits persons to shift to the fantasied, future dimension of experiences which depicts that when these individuals try to behave in ways which foster acceptance and approval, their capacity to be special and lovable can be demonstrated.

For these individuals, the resistance to relinquishing these modes of psychological slack, which underlie the anti-social pattern, is attached to the fear that rejection will remain as an omnipresent feature despite commitment towards acceptance and approval.

Given the need to develop a strong fail-safe system to compensate for these rather strong self-doubts, these persons tend to underwrite their fail-safe systems by striving to establish attitudes and preferences designed to give impetus to the rejection of conventional modes and norms for interacting. This striving underlies the projective-blame mechanism and externalization of shortcomings to perceived inequities and inadequacies of environmental conditions. It allows the individual to feel disenfranchised by the mainstream of society, to justify behavior accordingly. Because the person has been unable to establish a strong position of significance in relation to parental figures and within the normative peer population, the person seeks out affiliation within more marginal segments of the population where it is easier to compete for such a position. Rather than risk
further threats to their fantasied capacity to be held in regard by certain others, such persons attempt to underwrite feelings and attitudes of indifference towards desiring acceptance from these objects. One of the most effective ways of underwriting an attitude of indifference to establishing and maintaining a position of significance in relation to a particular object is to exploit it. That is, generally, the prohibition against exploiting others is that the reprisal from others involves a loss of a position of significance in relation to them. Thus, the antisocial person who exploits and abuses objects is attempting to demonstrate his/her indifference to the outcomes associated with such reprisals. Again, this is done to underwrite effectively a fail-safe system which allows such individuals to affirm in their fantasied dimension of experience that they can be special and significant to others, but they really do not care to.

Generally, the antisocial or sociopathic individual is not prone to seek psychotherapy and tends to encounter psychotherapy as related to substance abuse programs and/or treatment programs associated with incarceration. The general terms associated with the magical wish in relation to the client who features sociopathic trends are as follows: "I want to be lovable and special to someone, but I do not want to make myself vulnerable to the threat of rejection by acknowledging and committing myself towards acquiring such
a position of significance."

Given these general terms of a client's magical wish, there is a tendency for much counter-resistance to develop in psychotherapy since the client will tend to exhibit hostility and/or indifference to the process. It is often difficult for therapists not to institute their own fail-safe features in response to the client and, unwittingly or otherwise, exacerbate the source of resistance associated with the conditional terms of the magical wish. In short, to attenuate this source of resistance, a therapist must be able and willing to invest emotionally (i.e., approach levels of intimacy on a gradual basis), without demanding the client to reciprocate during the initial periods involved.

**Passive-dependent patterns.** Passive-dependent patterns tend to remain quite resistant to behavior change because of the nature of the modes of psychological slack the individual utilizes to underwrite the fail-safe system. The individual develops the characterological traits of self-effacement, submissiveness, self-sacrifice, and humility and invests much energy in demonstrating these attributes to others. Appearing ineffectual and helpless are part of a self-deprecating process which, on the surface, might appear to contradict the theoretical proposition that persons attempt to discount the validity of actual interactions which indicate inadequate performance capacity.

In the case of passive-dependent individuals, the
self-deprecation permits them to account for why others eventually reject them, ensuring the effectiveness of shifts toward the fantasied, future dimension of experience. Upon initial contact, the passive-dependent tends to evoke nurture and recognition from another person by making the other person feel so valuable and potent, by virtue of the power of the person's presence in relation to the passive-dependent individual. This aspect is very similar to the stage of a grief or depression reaction in which the person attempts to achieve reinstatement of a lost object or established source of positive outcomes by flattering the object, by indicating how much significance and impact the loss has had on the person. The conciliatory, gracious posture along with the self-devaluing comments invariably elicit support and affection from the other person--initially. In time, however, the selfless, utilitarian sacrifices the individual has made, the vesting of trust in this other person, are repaid not with kindness but with rejection and abandonment. In a sense, the individual implicitly expects and demands so much back because the individual has "given" so much that invariably the other person will fall short. At this juncture, the other person, who begins to feel overwhelmed and smothered by these implicit demands which have begun to surface in the relationship, wants to renege or withdraw.

There is a tendency for the other person to become rejecting, to withhold affection and recognition in a
desperate attempt to be removed from the "pedestal" upon which the person initially permitted the individual to place him/her.

At this point, the individual begins to exert the fail-safe effects provided by the passive-dependency. What kind of person would betray, exploit, and abuse another person after that other person had sacrificed so much, and dedicated so much energy to fulfilling present and future aspirations with the person? Only one kind of person would do that—an exploitive or abusive person. To even further underwrite the inequity and inadequacy of these conditions, the passive-dependent tends to become suicidally depressed and withdrawn, as if to demonstrate how cruel and uncaring some persons can be.

Despite the felt psychological pain and discomfort associated with the outright rejection and loss of position of significance to another person, the passive-dependent applies the fail-safe system in the following manner. The reason the person was unable to demonstrate the capacity to sustain a strong position of significance was because the person never had such a position, but was duped into believing otherwise. The individual begins to recognize that he/she is the victim of a pathological and predatory person and may confide that although this was suspected to have been the case, the other person deserved a chance to reveal otherwise.

This facilitates the ability to discount cognitively the
validity of those negative outcomes on the basis that these occurred in relation to a person who, by nature, is exploitative and deceitful. Then, the effectiveness of a shift to the fantasied, future dimension is ensured as a means of reinstating the loss of psychological security as a result of the negative outcomes associated with the actual rejection.

As the individual is attempting to "rebound" from the most recent experience of rejection, it is usually not too long before the person finds another "rescuer," and the cycle continues: The individual relates how badly the other person hurt him/her despite the affection and loyalty bestowed upon that person, and what an ineffectual, inept fool the individual must really be. Responding in a complementary fashion, the rescuer assures the individual with statements which contradict the passive-dependent's self-deprecations. Almost immediately, the passive-dependent assigns a great deal of significance and validity to the sympathetic person. This self-perpetuating pattern of going from one rescuer to another is similar to the concept related by the "rescue triangle," which is a concept used in transactional analysis (Steiner, 1974).

It is suggested that in psychotherapy the therapist is often viewed as a potential "rescuer" by the passive-dependent client who, in most cases, is at the depths of despair and self-pity. The therapist, initially, has a tendency to invest a great deal in this client, in response to
attempting to fulfill the demand and expectation of being omnipotent and extremely significant in relation to the client.

There is a tendency for a therapist to operate in the direction of responding to the expressed terms of the client's magical wish, which is to acquire greater self-esteem, self-respect, and autonomy. However, unless a therapist is able to recognize and respond to the unspoken conditional terms of this magical wish, a therapist tends to soon become frustrated by the client's resistance and setbacks in relation to the interventions intended to meet the expressed terms of this magical wish.

The general conditional terms of the magical wish are that the passive-dependent does not wish to relinquish the fail-safe features, that is, being extremely conciliatory, self-sacrificing, and overly deferential to conforming to behavior which meets the wishes of others, underwriting the ability to be "victimized" by the predatory individuals of the world. Without these modes of psychological slack, how could the client discount the validity of actual outcomes associated with being rejected and abandoned by those whom the client served so well?

Thus, the passive-dependent client tends to exhibit much resistance to attempts to induce more autonomous, assertive, and aggressive patterns of interpersonal interactions until another fail-safe system can be developed to ensure the
effectiveness of shifts toward the fantasied, future dimension of experience to compensate for actual rebuffs and rejections. Instead of attempting to contradict or redirect the client's expressed self-deprecation and statements pertaining to inadequacy, a therapist should concur and respond to the client as if the client were a helpless, inept child. Then, the therapist should begin to discuss with the client arrangements such as institutionalization and other extreme care-taking devices until the client resists these intended interventions.

Paranoid patterns. In order for fail-safe systems to remain effective at insuring the validity of certain future, fantasied experiences against the threat of negative actual outcomes, persons must be able to underwrite these systems with sufficient modes of psychological slack. Within this theoretical framework, paranoid patterns represent individuals' desperate attempts to structure into their actual conditions of performance certain circumstances which are not, in fact, operating, but ones which then provide modes of psychological slack required to underwrite effective fail-safe systems.

"Normal" fail-safe systems are generated by structuring into actual conditions of performance consensually validated bases upon which the validity of certain outcomes can be discounted. Delusional trends of thought provide persons with fail-safe features which are not consensually validated to
exist, but are nevertheless perceived by such individuals.

Thus, when individuals are unable to underwrite effectively their fail-safe systems within the context of actual conditions of performance, they tend to engender these conditions with attributes which can serve such a purpose. Furthermore, it is assumed as a corollary proposition that when persons are not able to discount the validity of the absence of positive actual outcomes by utilizing a mild degree of delusional perception of their actual conditions of performance, greater degrees of delusion are required, corresponding to the observed variability in the degree of clinical manifestations of this pattern.

In order for individuals to maintain the basis underlying a particular delusional trend, they tend to direct much of their behavior toward validating this basis. Consequently, the paranoid person not only becomes concerned with defending against the perceived threats existing in actual conditions of interactions, but, in addition, becomes preoccupied with ensuring that the presence of such threats remains.

This rather paradoxical approach underlies the basis for the general terms of the magical wish associated with the paranoid pattern. The expressed term usually involves a desire to eliminate or remove the sources of the perceived circumstances which are held to be the obstacles or threats to achieving certain positions of significance in actual, ongoing experiences. However, the conditional term of the
magical wish is concerned with acquiring sufficient assurances that if these threats or obstacles are removed, the individual will retain enough psychological slack to pursue actual interactions in lieu of relinquishing the delusional trends.

Therefore, the objectives of psychotherapy relative to treating this clinical pattern are twofold. First of all, the client's delusional system should not be undermined until the client is able to integrate another, more functional system for providing psychological slack. It is assumed here that the delusional aspects provide the fail-safe features needed to justify why certain actual outcomes are occurring and/or why certain interactions are being avoided by the client. Given this assumption, if a therapist can provide another justification which permits the client to forestall attempts directed toward certain actual performances, the client tends to be less resistant to relinquishing these delusional aspects, at least temporarily.

The next step would be to establish with the client a functional fail-safe system which would permit the client to be in a position to experience some positive outcomes in the area of actual performance which the delusional trends had previously precluded. This step is not directed at revealing to the client that the perceived threats are in fact not present, but, instead, to reveal to the client that there is no longer a need to perceive such threats. It is suggested
that therapists frequently tend to direct their efforts toward demonstrating to the paranoid individual that there is no basis for the particular delusional thinking before assuring the client that he/she no longer needs to generate such a basis.

Schizophrenic patterns. According to the model, functional (nonorganically based) schizophrenic process occurs in situations where persons have been subjected to profound threats to their psychological security and are unable to counteract such threats with the "available" fail-safe features inherent in their actual conditions of performance. The psychosis aspect represents an attempt to generate the dimension of actual experiences from the fantasy dimension, independent of the actual conditions which are consensually validated to exist for the individual.

The primary objective of the person is to render the potential impact of actual objects and events as insignificant, and therefore to withhold assigning validity to the outcomes which might result from interactions within such actual conditions. By breaking down the process of consensually validated communication with actual objects, such individuals have removed themselves from any commitments to performance designed to establish positions of significance in relation to these objects. Instead, psychological security is derived from experiences generated in fantasied dimensions of experience which no longer require a basis
within actual conditions since these are relegated to having virtually no validity.

There tends to be much resistance against relinquishing the psychotic behavior serving as modes of psychological slack since this underwrites the capacity to undermine the perception that there exists a set of consensually validated conditions from which to appraise self-adequacy and interpersonal potency. This notion is reflected in the general terms of the magical wish, which is, "I wish others could understand me and then be available for interacting with me." The conditional terms of this magical wish tend to be, "but I want to be assured of my capacity to be significant and potent in relation to others before I allow their presence to be acknowledged and permit them to understand me."

Traditional modalities (i.e., verbal interchange, attempts at cognitive restructuring, and insight and awareness techniques) tend to remain ineffectual since they are antithetical responses to the conditional terms of this magical wish. Rehabilitative psychotherapy, as opposed to maintenance procedures, cannot counteract the source of resistance associated with the conditional terms unless the process permits the client to achieve interpersonal status without having to relinquish the psychosis. Perhaps the most effective way of complying with this injunction is for the therapist (and/or others) to give the client importance and status by "learning" the language of the client rather than insisting
that the client let go of the fail-safe features by having to accept and acknowledge the significance of others on their terms.
CHAPTER IV

The Hypothetical Case of Ms. C

Although Chapter III discusses application of the model, a clearer understanding of its application may be provided by presenting the following hypothetical case, influenced by Erickson's work (cited in Haley, 1973).

The client in this hypothetical case is a 21-year-old college student who is self-referred. Upon initial contact, Ms. C is visibly agitated (i.e., digging her fingernails into her hands, glancing about the room, heavily perspiring hands, etc.). Ms. C's speech pattern is somewhat flat in affect. However, the intensity of her feelings is revealed in her facial expression. As she describes it, for the past several months she has been extremely depressed and confused, and she lately has been contemplating suicide. She states that she has "reached the end of her rope" and does not know what to do. Upon further inquiry, it is learned that this young woman grew up with only one sibling, a brother 2 years older than Ms. C. Although her parents have never been physically separated in terms of the marital relationship, there nevertheless has been much turmoil between them. Ms. C describes her mother as a chronic alcoholic and her father as a very hard-working man. She goes on to state that in recent years her mother has required a great deal of support and attention
and has experienced some extreme mood swings, exhibiting behavior which is very regressed in nature. Ms. C's father has nearly "gone crazy" trying to maintain the household intact, according to the client. She states that much of her problem involves a conflict between meeting parental demands within the home—in particular, indulging her mother—and her desire on the other hand to pursue her own goals socially and academically at college. She has been given to extreme feelings of guilt, she says, if she attempts to direct her energy away from the parental home, but feels extremely lonely and "out of it" at college (where she has a dorm room) because she has so little time to pursue activities there. Over the past several months her academic performance has been slipping, and she finds her attempts to study almost futile since she is no longer able to concentrate and tends to become extremely agitated. She has had almost no contact in recent times with any of her acquaintances at college and has found herself withdrawing, becoming reclusive.

In a second session with Ms. C, the content begins to focus upon her feelings about her position in relation to her parents and older brother. She relates an incident that she believes to have occurred when she was approximately 7 years old and apparently having some serious trouble adjusting to school. She remembers overhearing her mother and father discussing how her older brother is so much brighter and more capable than his sister. She also recalls her mother saying
on that occasion something to the effect that she wished that "your daughter had never been born," and her father replying, "But she was." As she continues to reminisce about her childhood, she concludes that she believes her parents really love her, but, because of marital problems, they have been unable to express their love to her. Ms. C looks at the floor and begins to cry. A few moments later, she states that she was hoping that going away to college would have permitted her to escape the pain she felt at home and that she could start her life over again at that point. However, she states that she did not anticipate that, between her having to work on a part-time job as well as attend to her felt obligations at home, she would be unable to fulfill this hope.

The therapist in this hypothetical case, Mr. T, attempts to discern the terms of Ms. C's magical wish. This procedure corresponds to Principle #1 in the application of the model, that is, identifying the terms of a client's magical wish. He assumes that Ms. C's agitated depression is an emotional adjustment which serves to underwrite her withdrawal from interpersonal interactions at college. The persistence of the depression and withdrawal are not viewed as sustained reactions or unresolved feelings. Instead, these symptoms are perceived as part of a proactive adjustment which provides fail-safe features to maintain the validity of future, fantasied outcomes in light of the absence of certain actual
positive outcomes.

The following exchange between Mr. T and Ms. C underlies the therapist’s attempt to determine both the expressed terms of the client’s magical wish and the conditional terms. The expressed terms correspond to the kinds of actual assurances (positive outcomes) Ms. C is seeking to counteract the threat to her psychological security. This threat occurs because of the increasing ineffectiveness of shifts to her future, fantasied dimension of experience for bolstering psychological security since the validity of these fantasied outcomes is becoming less tenable. The conditional terms correspond to Ms. C’s desire to retain modes of psychological slack needed to underwrite a fail-safe system to account for why she is not yet in a position to achieve the actual assurances she desires. The source of resistance which Ms. C brings into psychotherapy is associated with the conditional terms.

Ms. C’s responses in the exchange relate primarily to the expressed terms of her magical wish. It is only after Mr. T pursues a certain line of inquiry that the nature of the conditional terms becomes evident.

Mr. T: You seem to be so caught up in your obligations--work, school, and attending to your parents' needs--there is little time left to participate in the activities you enjoy.

Ms. C: I just don't have any more energy to keep going this way, but what can I do?

Mr. T: Somehow, you did not expect life to be so cumbersome at age 21; that a young woman
in college would not be able to go to parties, meet people, and perhaps find a few exciting men.

Ms. C: If life for me is like it has been, I might as well crawl into a hole and die.

Mr. T: Well, even though you feel that way, it seems that something has prevented you from resigning to that, so far.

Ms. C: I guess I've been holding out for things to change. I keep hoping. I keep praying.

Mr. T: Tell me. What do you pray for? What do you hope will happen to prevent you from crawling further into that hole and dying?

Ms. C: First of all, I would like to see my parents happy. Then I want to graduate and work; maybe not work for the rest of my life. Maybe I will get married and have some kids.

Mr. T: What is going to make your future marriage happy?

Ms. C: Being a good wife and mother.

Mr. T: Being someone special to your future husband and children?

Ms. C: Yes. (She laughs nervously and then appears somber as she looks down at the floor.)

Mr. T: It's kind of frightening to sometimes think that no matter what happens between your parents you still might feel alone and sad.

Ms. C: I guess I'm not sure that any guy would really be interested in me. I mean as far as a deep relationship.

Mr. T: I think what you are saying is that you hope you won't continue to feel alone and not special and lovable to others who might become special to you, but you really don't know what will happen. Since you have been away at college, you still haven't had the opportunity to assure yourself that this will happen.

Ms. C: I don't know anything now. All I know is that I'm going crazy.
Mr. T: If it were not for your obligations to your parents, especially your mother, what could be different for you now?

Ms. C: Well, I'd be able to concentrate on my schoolwork and get good grades.

Mr. T: I'm sure that would be nice, but would that counteract your feelings of loneliness?

Ms. C: I'd also have more time to make friends at school. Mark [her brother] goes to Michigan State University, and he hardly ever comes home or takes any responsibility at home.

Mr. T: Your parents must be extremely upset with Mark's selfish preoccupation with his own life.

Ms. C: That's the funny thing! No matter what Mark does or doesn't do, he is the greatest thing on earth as far as my mother and father are concerned.

Mr. T: Isn't it frustrating to you that Mark is enjoying college at the expense of leaving your parents to fend for themselves, and here you are trying to rescue your parents from a miserable life, and they still don't appreciate you?

Ms. C: The way you say that makes me sound like a martyr.

Mr. T: There is nothing wrong with being a martyr if it makes you happy.

Ms. C: (She becomes visibly angry at the therapist.) But I am not happy! I feel like I want to kill myself!

Mr. T: Then it seems to me that your parents better get their lives in order before you end up killing yourself.

Ms. C: (Appearing frustrated, she begins to cry.) It is my life that I want to straighten out. I get so mad at times, I just want to scream!

Mr. T: Why are you wanting to scream at me now?
Ms. C: Because I want you to help me. I hate myself. I'm ugly. I'm fat. I'm dumb. Nobody will ever want me.

Mr. T: I feel sorry for you.

Ms. C: I don't want you to feel sorry for me. I want you to care about me.

Ms. C initially focused on a theme concerned with an expressed need to resolve her feelings in relation to her position in the parental home. She felt rejected and unwanted, and needed to seek approval and significance from her parents. It became apparent to Mr. T that this theme had become incorporated into Ms. C's fail-safe system. The "real" threat to her psychological security was associated with her fear of risking a shift from her reliance on fantasied, future outcomes toward seeking actual outcomes to maintain the perceived capacity to elicit love and recognition. In the exchange with Mr. T, she alluded to her fantasy that such interpersonal significance would be demonstrated when she went off to college. Because she was so terrified that this fantasy would be destroyed, she developed modes of psychological slack which kept her isolated and unable to sustain any commitment toward interacting at college.

As it became apparent in the latter portion of this interview, Ms. C was finding it difficult to continue to externalize the basis of her distress to her discordant familial situation. Instead, the client began to focus on how terrified she was that she might not have the capacity to be significant as an adult, away from the parental home,
as her future fantasy experiences had once assured her. Consequently, the following fail-safe system was placed into operation.

Ms. C perceived a high level of risk that if she assigned validity to the actual, ongoing conditions at college and sought verification of her fantasied capacity to be significant among peers, she would have destroyed any residual hope for the future. Therefore, Ms. C desired an effective fail-safe system to avoid risking her fantasies to reality while still preserving the validity of these future fantasies. She wished to ensure that this dimension of experience remained a viable source for psychological security in the absence of actual assurances. The client was able to underwrite such a fail-safe system by unconsciously developing a set of emotional adjustments to the perceived turmoil within the parental home. These emotions corresponded to the symptoms of her agitated depression and interpersonal withdrawal and were initially effective at permitting the client to isolate herself at college. She could not sustain a commitment to interpersonal and academic performance because of the derisive nature of the family problems.

This is not to suggest that Ms. C's concerns are not real in a phenomenological sense, nor is it contended that such concerns are unwarranted. However, these felt concerns also persist because of their utility as modes of psychological slack to underwrite the fail-safe features in the
manner previously described.

Thus, Mr. T interprets the expressed terms of the client's magical wish as a desire to achieve interpersonal recognition and significance at college. He conjectures that the conditional terms involve Ms. C's desire to retain an effective fail-safe system to ensure that the absence of such achievement can be discounted. The fail-safe system which operates presently is dysfunctional since her isolation from others at college precludes opportunities for achieving the assurances which she so desperately seeks.

In accordance with Principle #2 in applying the model, Mr. T prepares to restructure Ms. C's present dysfunctional fail-safe system to make it more functional. He remains cognizant of the client's fear expressed in the conditional terms of her magical wish. Mr. T presumes that the essential aspect of these terms is Ms. C's desire to be able to discount the validity of the absence of positive outcomes in her ongoing conditions at college. Mr. T considers two criteria in attempting to restructure the client's present fail-safe features. One criterion is that the modified fail-safe features must allow for Ms. C to be in positions to interact with others at college so chances for acquiring the needed actual assurances are not precluded. The other criterion is that the modified fail-safe system must remain effective enough to insure the validity of her future, fantasied dimension against the event that negative outcomes occur in
interactions with others at college. Otherwise, the client will resist interventions in therapy designed to fulfill the expressed terms of her magical wish.

Some traditional therapy approaches would focus on helping Ms. C "work through" her feelings concerning the parental rejection. Mr. T, however, views the persistence of these feelings as psychological defenses to underwrite her fail-safe system, permitting Ms. C to isolate herself from others. Mr. T virtually ignores the issue of the parental situation, as it will become evident, as he pursues in further sessions with Ms. C. He assumes that Ms. C will permit resolution of this issue only after it is no longer required to underwrite her fail-safe system of performance within her actual, ongoing conditions.

Using hypnotherapy as an adjunct (Ms. C is found to be an excellent subject), Mr. T proceeds as follows. First, Mr. T, as a posthypnotic suggestion, advises Ms. C that as she remains depressed and isolated in her dorm room at college, her appetite will decrease accordingly. While she will be able to eat enough to remain healthy, she will find that she is losing about 1 pound between each of the biweekly therapy sessions. Second, the client is instructed that when she begins to feel "bad for herself" that she should experiment with facial make-up (Ms. C seldom uses cosmetics). In addition, she is to apply make-up before each session, so Mr. T can offer comments and suggestions as to "how it looks" on her. No other instructions are given at this point.

During each of the following 10 biweekly sessions, Ms. C is told that, despite her depression and anxiety over her concerns, she is becoming more attractive with each pound she loses. Suggestions and comments are made regarding her facial make-up, e.g., to reduce the amount of rouge; how striking her eyes appear.
By the tenth such session, Ms. C remarks to Mr. T that her clothes no longer fit very well, and she plans to shop for some new clothes. Mr. T concurs and suggests that she purchase a pair of earrings and wear them to the next session.

At the next session, Mr. T observes a marked change in the client's demeanor. In contrast to her previous tendency to slouch in the chair, she sits straight up. Her once badly bitten fingers and nails are in much better shape, with the nails carefully polished. She smiles more frequently and sustains eye contact with Mr. T much more often. Nevertheless, Ms. C reports that she still ruminates about her familial situation and still tends to be reclusive. However, the intensity of concern or emotion appears to have been reduced as she describes these feelings.

Mr. T induces a trance state and conveys the following instructions to the client:

"When you begin to think about how terrible things are as you are alone in your room, you also begin to feel the urge to go out. The more depressed you feel, the stronger the urge becomes to go out of your room. You may wish to take a nice, warm, leisurely bath as if you were getting ready to go out somewhere. While bathing, your biggest concern involves selecting what to wear. You dress, put on your make-up, and fix your hair, as if you were planning to go out. Finally, you look in the mirror, and when everything looks just right, put on those nice earrings that you bought."

A week later, at the next session, Ms. C arrives in a somewhat silly, puckish mood. She remarks that she has a date this evening with a young man she met in the library the previous afternoon. Later during this session, the same instructions as before are given to the client.

Several weeks later, it is noted that Ms. C's expressed concerns have shifted from feeling depressed and withdrawn to apprehension regarding sexual activity in relationships. It is also of interest to note that she has inquired of Mr. T about arranging a referral for professional counseling for her parents. Shortly thereafter, therapy is terminated upon mutual agreement between Mr. T and Ms. C.
This hypothetical case illustrated several important aspects of the model. First, there were virtually no attempts to interpret underlying motives to the client. Although Mr. T, for his own benefit, engaged in analyzing the unconscious dynamics of Ms. C's fail-safe features and the terms of her magical wish, it was not necessary for him to share the process with the client.

Second, Mr. T attempted to respond to the conditional terms of the client's magical wish by not requiring Ms. C to relinquish the fail-safe features provided by her state of depression and withdrawal. The suggestions and instructions to the client never "demanded" of the client to acknowledge a commitment to seek assurances of her interpersonal significance at college. She was permitted to retain her depression to account for why she was not yet in a position to fully test out her impact on others. However, by "pairing" the depression with an urge to leave her dorm room, the opportunity for achieving interpersonal recognition and significance was acquired, without requiring Ms. C to acknowledge a commitment to seeking such recognition.

Third, Mr. T attempted to instill confidence in the client by preparing her for the opportunity to feel physically attractive. However, it was left for the client to decide when to acknowledge attempts to test out the impact of these attributes. The instructions never required Ms. C to acknowledge intentions to interact with others, but only
established the conditions in which such interactions could occur. In short, Ms. C was permitted to retain sufficient fail-safe features to ensure the validity of her fantasied dimension. She was prepared to "save face" in the event of disappointment.

Finally, this hypothetical case reflected one of the major theoretical propositions of the model. That is, Ms. C's resistance was not a function of revivifying past experiences; rather, it corresponded to her attempt to secure and maintain the validity of fantasied, future experiences. Ms. C's felt rejection in relation to her parents corresponded to the fact that she did not receive adequate assurance from them that she was capable of being special and significant. This threat to her psychological security was counteracted by generating a future, fantasied dimension of experiences which demonstrated her capacity to be significant to others, despite her actual circumstances. Mr. T's interventions were not directed at helping Ms. C to overcome her anxiety attached to those painful past experiences, because she had already done that through her fantasy dimension of experience. However, the therapist did direct his efforts at helping Ms. C overcome her anxiety and resistance by bolstering the sagging validity of her future fantasies and restructuring her dysfunctional fail-safe system.
CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose for presenting this alternative theoretical model for conceptualizing resistance to behavior change is to propose what is considered to be a primary source of resistance not emphasized by existing theoretical models. This alternative model suggests important implications for clinicians in both the theory and practice of psychotherapy.

To provide a contextual framework in which to present the model, Chapter I categorizes the existing views of resistance into three general theoretical paradigms. These paradigms are distinguished by how each views a person's past and present dimensions of experience in determining behavior patterns or personality characteristics, and how these dimensions interrelate to provide sources of resistance to altering such patterns.

The view which suggests that one's past, formative experiences not only determine one's present modes of relating to the environment, but also serve to fixate one unconsciously to persist in these modes, is represented by Paradigm I. Psychoanalytic theory reflects this concept, and offers the most explicit statement about the phenomenon of resistance. Beyond psychoanalytic theory, the phenomenon only receives implicit attention within other existing theories of
personality functioning.

Although Paradigm I represents a well-articulated understanding of resistance, its reductionistic view fails to render sufficient import to a more teleological approach, which considers that persons are oriented towards generating conditions to meet present and futuristic goals. In failing to emphasize this aspect, Paradigm I ignores an important attribute of resistance. Several related issues are also described in what are suggested as theoretical deficiencies within the concept of resistance represented in Paradigm I.

A concept of resistance which proposes that while past experiences function to establish behavior patterns, the persistence of these patterns occurs in response to present, ongoing conditions of experience is represented in Paradigm II. Many learning theories and their applied models reflect this proposition. Persons tend to be viewed as respondents to environmental conditions. Those ongoing conditions which serve to reinforce certain behavior patterns must be altered in order to counteract the resistance to changing such patterns. Paradigm II fails to consider individuals as active participants in the selection of the environmental conditions to which they wish to respond. That is, it is assumed implicitly that resistance can be overcome to the extent that stimulus control can be achieved (i.e., regulation of intensity of reinforcing stimuli and their schedule of occurrence). It is proposed here, however, that through selective
attention and the use of fantasy behavior, persons automatically exert stimulus control. Accordingly, it can be presumed that persons tend to seek out those conditions which reinforce or support certain behavior patterns, rather than the reverse process of selecting behaviors which are reinforced by existing environmental conditions. Since this presumption is held, the concept of resistance reflected in Paradigm II fails to remain tenable. The discussion in Chapter I elaborates on this issue.

Paradigm III represents the third existing general concept of resistance and emphasizes the individual as assuming an active role in generating experiences which are integrated within the phenomenological self. Resistance is viewed implicitly as involving the "private logic" or phenomenological world of a person. It is not only a function of past experiences, nor is it dictated by present circumstances alone. Instead, resistance represents an interdependent relationship between past and present experiences. The present is perceived within the context of past injunctions and beliefs about the self, and this significance of the past is validated in the perception of the present. From this theoretical perspective, past experiences define for persons what they should be, and their present experiences define what they are in relation to what they should be. Resistance is implicitly a function of a person's desire to maintain integrity of his/her self-concept, to minimize the perceived
disparity between what one should be and what one is.

In light of the three existing general paradigms of resistance, Paradigm IV represents an alternative concept of resistance. Like Paradigm III, IV presumes that individuals strive to maintain precepts concerned with their capacity to be significant and held in regard by others. This striving is termed psychological security within the proposed model and is similar to the constructs noted as self-esteem and self-worth within Paradigm III. However, Paradigm IV diverges from III with regard to the process involved in maintaining psychological security. In Paradigm IV, the locus of resistance is not between past and present experiences, but between future (as depicted in fantasy) and present experiences. That is, within Paradigm III, resistance is viewed in terms of persons' desires to delimit their awareness and life-style patterns within present, ongoing conditions to ensure perceived congruence between present experience (i.e., "who I am") and past experience (i.e., "who I should be"). In contrast, Paradigm IV assumes that resistance occurs because individuals strive to minimize the perceived discrepancy between "who I am" and "who I can be."

This theoretical distinction is significant since Paradigm IV presumes that the psychological significance of past and present experiences affects the perception of psychological security primarily to the extent that these affect the capacity of individuals to view their future, fantasied
experiences as being plausible. From this perspective, "what significance to others I did demonstrate, and am demonstrating" is important to the extent that it supports or discredits "what significance I can demonstrate."

In order for individuals to maintain the plausibility or validity of their future, fantasied abilities to be significant to others in the face of past and ongoing interactions, they strive to maintain enough cognitive flexibility to discount the occurrence of actual outcomes when these threaten the validity of these fantasies. Persons strive to ensure the validity of their future, fantasied dimension of experience so that it remains as a viable and effective source for acquiring psychological security. This process is especially important during periods when individuals are not experiencing sufficient actual outcomes to sustain desired levels of psychological security. During such occasions, persons tend to "shift" towards their future, fantasied dimension of experience and to rely on this to compensate for the present lack of actual outcomes to sustain their psychological security.

The theoretical model presented in Chapter II explains resistance in terms of the dynamics involved in preserving the validity of futuristic fantasies against the potential threats posed by actual, ongoing experiences. The cognitive flexibility necessary to accomplish this is termed psychological slack and serves as a means of underwriting fail-safe systems for interacting within actual conditions of living.
Much of one's behavior is directed toward developing modes of interaction (i.e., psychological slack) which provide potential fail-safe features to preserve the validity of future, fantasied abilities by allowing persons to discount the perceived validity of those actual outcomes which fail to support the fantasies.

The modes of psychological slack required by individuals to underwrite such fail-safe systems for actual, ongoing performance are acquired by consciously and/or unconsciously persisting in certain beliefs and preferences, adopting particular emotional dispositions toward certain objects and events, and/or exhibiting particular characterological traits in certain actual interactions. How such patterns serve as modes of psychological slack is discussed further in Chapter II. However, the essential concept is that such patterns serve to establish for individuals the ability to perceive that the absence of certain actual outcomes is because the actual conditions are too inadequate or flawed, in and of themselves. This precept permits persons to preserve the validity of future, fantasied outcomes since these are depicted to represent their "true" performance capacity to achieve these desired outcomes when the conditions are adequate in the future. As such, modes of psychological slack ensure the validity of the future, fantasied dimension of experience.

It is assumed that persons tend to seek modes of
psychological slack when they feel insecure about their capacity to demonstrate significance in relation to certain objects. By effectively discounting their actual performance, individuals can shift to their future, fantasied dimension, and rely on those experiences to maintain psychological security despite their actual conditions of living. As one begins to acquire actual assurances (positive outcomes) within particular performance situations, the degree of psychological slack one seeks to maintain is reduced accordingly. When this occurs, it is manifested as changes in the behavior patterns which persisted previously as modes of psychological slack.

Resistance to changing certain behavior patterns (i.e., beliefs, feelings, and actions) underlies a desire to retain these as fail-safe features. Relinquishing the ability to underwrite fail-safe systems threatens a person's capacity to insure the validity of certain future, fantasied experiences against negative actual experiences. Such resistance is counteracted only to the extent that one acquires sufficient assurances within actual, ongoing conditions that demonstrations of significance and impact will be achieved within these conditions. In many cases, the resistance tends to perpetuate and intensify over time when the modes of psychological slack ensure the validity of certain future, fantasied abilities to be significant but, unwittingly, preclude or minimize the opportunities for achieving actual assurances.
of these abilities. These cases tend to occur when the fail-
safe features reduce or preclude persons from sustaining the
commitment or level of actual performance necessary for
achieving such assurances.

Fail-safe systems which are so extreme as to preclude
one from acquiring certain desired actual assurances are
viewed as "dysfunctional." Extended over time, the lack of
actual positive outcomes further intensifies the use of modes
of psychological slack, eventually leading to the symptoms
observed in many individuals seeking and/or in need of
psychotherapy.

Chapter III discusses the application of the model in
psychotherapy. Client resistance as well as counter-
resistance revolve around the "magical wishes" which abound
in psychotherapy. A magical wish is an expression of a cli-
ent's dilemma when confronted with a desire to seek out cer-
tain actual assurances without acknowledging a commitment to
the performance required. Fail-safe systems permit individ-
uals to disavow such commitment so that the absence of cer-
tain desired outcomes is not perceived as indicative of their
"true" performance capacity. This helps to maintain the
effectiveness of shifts to future, fantasied experiences for
bolstering psychological security.

Magical wishes are comprised of expressed terms which
correspond to the kinds of changes clients say they wish to
experience in the context of their actual conditions of
living. In addition, a magical wish is associated with conditional terms which relate to clients' desires to retain enough psychological slack to underwrite effective fail-safe features of performance. Client resistance stems from the persistence of the conditional terms and frequently establishes counter-resistance on the part of a therapist. These sources of resistance occur because a client's conditional terms are manifested as the client's rejection of the therapist's intervention to secure for the client the kinds of changes indicated in the expressed terms of the client's magical wish. In response to such "rejection," a therapist tends to feel ineffectual and applies his/her own fail-safe features to defend against this threat to his/her psychological security. The interactional effect is that a self-perpetuating system of resistance occurs.

Three principles for dealing effectively with resistance in therapy are as follows: (1) identify the conditional terms as well as the expressed terms of a client's magical wish; (2) accept and respond to these terms by restructuring the dysfunctional characteristics of a client's fail-safe system, to make it functional enough to yield the changes indicated in the expressed terms of the magical wish; and (3) avoid undermining a client's fail-safe features which are functional for the client.

Chapter III also presents a number of traditional categories of clinical dysfunction to illustrate how the concepts...
of the model are applied. A hypothetical therapy case is discussed in Chapter IV to further describe the model's implications for therapy.

It is hoped that the model contributes another useful dimension for understanding and dealing with the perplexity individuals experience in their strivings to cope with the demands of living. The model also underscores the notion that the art and science of psychotherapy require the ability and desire to be innovative and always sensitive to the needs of clients. These attributes are especially important when the needs of therapists are such that clients are expected to assume the risks of commitment before therapists are willing to take such risks. The excuses often used to provide fail-safe features for clinicians are the declarations that particular individuals are "resistant to therapy" and/or have "nontreatable character disorders." The model suggests, however, that many clinicians are resistant to individuals who desire assurances of their significance before they are willing to assign such significance to others. Although the validity of the theoretical model is subject to further empirical and clinical evaluations, it is presented in the hope that it will be a useful contribution.
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