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Controversy, Regulation, and Innovation in the Secondary Financial Services Market

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University of Illinois–Springfield  
Department of Social Work

Stagnant income and persistent debt have induced low- and middle-income households to rely on alternative financial services (AFS): buy-here-pay-here auto loans, check-cashers, payday loans, auto title loans, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, and pawnshops. A secondary financial services market has evolved to serve the secondary labor market, replete with trade associations as well as state and federal regulators. Mainstream financial institutions have marketed innovations, such as reloadable debit cards, to appeal to low- and middle-income consumers. High fees and interest rates of AFS products have fueled a volatile debate about the future of the secondary financial services market, with options including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.

Key words: debt, alternative financial services, AFS, secondary financial services, secondary labor market

The Secondary Financial Services Market complements the economic circumstances of workers in the Secondary Labor Market, whose chronically low-income, limited upward mobility, and susceptibility to expense shocks cause them to resort to Alternative Financial Services (AFS). As AFS product innovation has proceeded apace, an ensuing controversy about the relationship between poverty and AFS has led to reactive reform strategies, including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion. Proactive reforms that would provide constructive financial products to low-income households include Community-based financial services through community credit unions and...
the post office. Schools of social work have only recently begun to include financial services training in their curricula.

The expansion of Alternative Financial Services (AFS) reflects the consolidation of a Secondary Financial Services Market that serves workers in the secondary labor market. In the U.S., economic dualism has been examined extensively through analysis of the labor market. Michael Piore proposed a theory of dual labor markets in 1970, contrasting a primary labor market consisting of jobs that were salaried, paid well, included benefits, and were part of a career trajectory as opposed to a secondary labor market composed of hourly pay at low wages, with few, if any, benefits, which offered no career advancement and were often temporary or seasonal. Jobs in the secondary labor market, often high-turnover, include “the hourly staff of security-guard services and janitorial services and the floor staff of fast-food restaurants and some types of stores, such as supermarkets and low-priced department stores” (Bewley, 1995, p. 233). Wholesale, retail, and service sector firms typically justify low wages because of staff turnover, absenteeism, insubordination, as well as petty theft and pilferage. Because of the flat wage profile of employees in the secondary labor market, workers tend to move laterally from job to job as opposed to upwardly into the primary labor market (Wachter, 1974).

The psychological implications of the secondary labor market are profound with respect to upward mobility: “secondary jobs do not require and often discourage stable working habits, wages are low, turnover is high, and job ladders are few. Secondary jobs are mainly (though not exclusively) filled by minority workers, women, and youth” (Reich, Gordon & Edwards, 1973, pps. 359-360). Structural features of the secondary labor market impede ascent into the primary labor market, and:

dual labor theory focuses attention on structure that endures irrespective of changes in human capital or with effort. It also focuses on missing rungs on career ladders, gaps that prevent upward mobility and sticky jobs that hold some workers to lives spent toiling in unrewarding, insecure, low-wage jobs. (Hudson, 2008)
The stratification of financial markets has become part of the nation’s economic structure (Olen, 2012), as described by Mayer (2010):

Affluent households were served by the commercial and industrial banks. These institutions made loans in large sums at low rates of interest but only to salaried professionals with good credit and reliable co-signers. The credit unions served working people but were tied to places of business, usually the larger employers. While their rates were low, they asked a lot of questions about what the money was for and supervised borrowers more closely. They served the better risks in the middle strata of the workforce. Pawnshops, by contrast, dealt with a clientele that lived in straitened circumstances and could only get cash by mortgaging a piece of personal property at a big discount. (p. 84)

In response to the economic circumstances and needs of lower-income households, AFS thrived, evolving to become part of the cultural infrastructure of low-income communities. The relationship between financial services markets and labor markets is depicted in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Market</th>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Financial Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried with career track and benefits</td>
<td>Professionals, managers, unionized workers, business owners</td>
<td>Savings and checking accounts, retirement portfolios, mortgages and auto loans, tax and investment consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hourly wages without career track or benefits</td>
<td>Low-wage service workers, transient agricultural workers, day and seasonal laborers, contingent workers</td>
<td>Check-cashing, money orders, buy-here-pay-here auto sales, payday loans, rent-to-own, pawn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The American economy could provide a continuum of financial services, of course, products serving the range of economic groups while responding to their discrete preferences; however, the bifurcation of financial markets is evidence that structural factors, practices of mainstream financial
institutions, and the preferences of consumers contribute to the evolution of the Secondary Financial Services Market. Structural factors include dualism in the labor market, regional economic disparities, and cyclical downturns. In addition, immigrants competing for low-skilled jobs, declining union membership, and automation pushed wages lower (Appelbaum, Berhardt & Murname, 2003). Practices of mainstream financial institutions, primarily banks and credit unions, have effectively excluded lower-income households; for their part, the unbanked and underbanked have responded to minimal balance requirements, high fees for managing accounts, penalties for overdrafts, rigorous loan underwriting, and inaccessibility with respect to location, inconvenient hours of service, and lack of receptivity of staff by defecting from mainstream financial institutions to AFS.

Windfalls

Economically speaking, workers in the secondary labor market face constant impediments, their plight poignantly portrayed in Nickel and Dimed by Barbara Ehrenreich (2001) and The Working Poor by David Shipler (2004). Michael Weiss has disaggregated the secondary labor market according to consumption patterns, income, and location, describing such marketing clusters as “rural industria” (low-income blue collar families), “blue highways” (moderate/blue collar farm families), “back-country folks” (remote rural villages), and “hard scrabble” (older families in poor, isolated areas). Consumption patterns, such as preferences for country music, Mountain Dew, and pick-up trucks, complement regional labor markets where jobs at low-wage retailers, including Wal-Mart and McDonalds, predominate, evidence of reciprocity between commerce and labor (Weiss, 2000, p. 13).

In their efforts to reconcile low-wages with consumption demands, workers in such circumstances often make improvident decisions, maxing-out credit cards and incurring overdrafts. Olen (2012) coined the term “money scripts” to define the mind-set of consumers whose credit reach exceeds their economic grasp (p. 20). So, as Pew researchers found, of payday borrowers who had used a credit card, 59 percent had
maxed-out their limits, and 52 percent had over-drafted their checking accounts during the previous year, a problem that was exacerbated when payday lenders caused overdrafts for 27 percent of borrowers who bounced a check for repayment on a loan. Given the financial straits of many lower income families, the default payment option mandated by state law becomes important for payday borrowers:

When the default was a two-week repayment, the case in Washington state, 90 percent of borrowers failed to opt for an available, extended repayment plan, while the automatic default of a 180-day installment loan was the choice by 86 percent of borrowers in Colorado. (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, pp. 31-37)

Payday borrowers viewed loans not as a regular bill, even when they frequently resorted to such loans, but as a quick infusion of cash. Accordingly, many payday borrowers used windfalls, especially tax refunds, to close outstanding loans. One in six, or 17 percent, of payday borrowers used a tax refund to pay off a loan. “The large windfall provided by a tax refund enables borrowers to repay a loan principal that their regular paychecks are not sufficient to cover” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012, p. 27). In the boom-and-bust personal finances of workers of the secondary labor market, such a strategy may be considered rational.

Controversy

Political battles have erupted over AFS, lending an air of siege over the Secondary Financial Services Market. Biblical injunctions against usury have animated opponents of payday lending, especially in the “Bible belt.” After prohibiting payday lending in 2001, the North Carolina legislature is considering permitting such loans once again (Woolverton, 2013). Other jurisdictions have instituted interest rate caps that effectively prohibit payday loans; in 2008, Ohio limited interest to 28 percent, while the District of Columbia put in place a 24 percent interest rate cap in 2007. In its most recent survey of state regulations, the National Conference of State Legislatures reported that thirty-eight states permitted payday lending to
varying degrees (Morton, 2013).

The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) has served as a source of information for opponents of financial products and practices that it considers exploitive of low-income, disproportionately minority populations. Created in 2002 as a nonprofit, CRL has been supported by prominent foundations and has issued several reports focusing on “predatory lending.” In its advocacy, CRL analysts have argued that a majority of borrowers are victims of predatory lenders. In 2012, CRL received a MacArthur Foundation “Creative & Effective Institutions” award.

CRL has worked in tandem with the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), which was established as a nonprofit in the mid-1960s to represent consumers’ rights. Representing 300 advocacy organizations nationwide, CFA addresses a range of financial services, including payday and auto-title loans, focusing on abusive practices: “Cash-strapped consumers run the risk of becoming trapped in repeat borrowing due to triple-digit interest rates, unaffordable repayment terms, and coercive collection tactics made possible by check-holding” (Consumer Federation of America, 2013, p. 1, emphasis in original). For networking purposes, CFA maintains a listserv for advocates of regulating what it considers abusive lending practices. CFA was an advocate for the Military Lending Act (MLA) of 2007, which instituted a 36 percent limit on interest rates charged on loans to members of the military and dependents.

Short of prohibition, opponents of AFS have advocated a 36 percent interest rate limit on loans, which equates to prohibition, since lenders insist that interest rate is too low for their business model. A penultimate strategy of AFS opponents has been strict regulation. Thus, limiting fees and interest, restricting the number of loans annually, outlawing consecutive roll-over loans, and requiring “cooling-off” periods between loans are methods that have been advocated by opponents of payday loans to make them less harmful to consumers (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012, p. 20).

The controversy over AFS centers around habitual use, with opponents conceptualizing a “debt trap” when consumers resort to products repeatedly, incurring charges that exacerbate their already fragile finances. For example, CRL has argued that five or more payday loans per year constitute a
“debt trap” from which consumers have difficulty escaping. Evidence and logic dispute the debt trap concept, however. Using Oklahoma payday data, CRL analysts calculated that “90 percent of business is generated by borrowers with five or more loans per year, and over 60 percent of business is generated by borrowers with 12 or more loans per year” (King & Parrish, 2007); yet, subsequent analysis of the same data found that 43 percent took out fewer than 5 loans per year, and that 74 percent took out fewer than 12 (Veritec, 2007). Patterns of consumer usage, in other words, reveal a standard distribution, with more economically marginal households resorting to payday loans more often; however, they tend to repay promptly, especially if they anticipate the need for future loans. The logic of the debt trap has been disputed by economist Thomas Sowell, who notes that payday loans are short-term loans, and that computing a three digit APR is analogous “to the price of salmon as $15,000 a ton or say a hotel room rents for $36,000 a year, when no consumer buys a ton of salmon and few people stay in a hotel room all year” (Sowell, 2011, p. 2).

Other economists have put the matter in more pedestrian terms, calculating the implications of using payday loans to resolve hypothetical expense shocks: One involved $100 needed to avoid a $35 payment penalty for a utility bill. Assuming the loan was repaid promptly, a payday loan at $15 per $100 borrowed was $17.39 less costly than the late payment penalty fee. Another involved a $300 auto repair for a vehicle needed for work. Compared to the costs of alternative transportation, the payday loan at $15 per $100 borrowed was $14.55 less costly (Elliehausen, 2009, pp. 17-18). Significantly, neither of these scenarios factor in the more dire consequences of a utility shut-off or loss of employment, which would make the payday loan even less expensive than such draconian outcomes. Opponents of AFS had hoped that the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, would introduce federal regulations on an industry that had been the province of the states (Tomasky, 2013). In 2007, Elizabeth Warren had proposed creating a consumer financial protection watchdog, similar to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to regulate AFS. Subprime “financial products are dangerous, and any consumer who is not careful is
inviting trouble,” she argued, “And yet, dangerous or not, millions of Americans engage in billions of credit transactions, adding up to trillions of dollars every year.” As conceived by Warren, this entity,

would be charged with responsibility to establish guidelines for consumer disclosure, collect and report data about the uses of different financial products, review new financial products for safety, and require modification of dangerous products before they can be marketed to the public. (Warren, 2007, p. 4)

Subsequent jockeying around CFPB regulations of AFS have left its opponents disappointed, as lobbyists have convinced lawmakers to exempt their products, such as the carve-out of car loans, and obstructed the appointment of a permanent director (Weise, 2013).

Opponents of AFS have been fighting a rear-guard action insofar as the Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA) and Community Financial Services Association of America (CFSA) have not only been receptive to regulation but also encouraged installment loans as a default for delinquent borrowers. Moreover, mainstream banks and credit unions continue to offer small dollar loans (SDLs), similar to payday loans, as well as other financial products for lower income consumers. While the demand for AFS products is likely to be robust, attempts to regulate them are also likely to continue.

Product Innovations

The AFS market has become more established as a result of maturation of the industry, technological innovations, and the incursion of mainstream financial institutions. As noted above, “best practices” promoted by AFS trade associations include defaults for delinquent borrowers that convert payday loans to installment loans. This is not only in the best interests of borrowers, since installment loans extend the time for repayment, but also lenders, who stand to lose the principal if no payment is made.

The internet has altered AFS fundamentally by allowing vendors to evade state regulators. Because they enjoy sovereignty, Tribal Lending Entities (TLEs) have the opportunity
of competing in a global AFS market. Much of the growth in payday loans, for example, has been a result of online lending, which has grown from $5 billion in 2006 to $18.6 billion in 2012 (Hecht, 2013). Tribal sovereignty notwithstanding, the CFPB will probably attempt to clarify internet lending by TLEs (Miller, 2013).

The emergence of General Purpose Reloadable (GPR) debit cards is a growing market for unbanked consumers wanting an alternative to a conventional checking account. Major vendors of reloadable debit cards, such as AccountNow, Rush Card, Emerald, Green Dot, and NetSpend, have found consumers willing to pay nominal monthly fees for access to ATMs and card reloading. When cardholders’ employers make direct payroll deposits and cardholders access cash from ATMs, GPR cards are less expensive than conventional checking cards. Moreover, when consumers use GPR cards for bill payment and their cards report to credit bureaus, GPRs can contribute to a credit history. The inclusion of savings and loan options would make GPR cards even more functional for unbanked, low-income households (Rust, 2013).

Recognizing the expanding AFS market, mainstream financial institutions have offered payday loans and bank advance loans for account holders (Borne & Smith, 2013). In March 2013, American Express and Wal-Mart rolled-out the Bluebird card. Customers from the military, recipients of Social Security and other government benefits, and taxpayers expecting refunds will be able to deposit funds directly into Bluebird Accounts that will be insured by the FDIC. In addition, Bluebird will provide pre-authorized checks and allow account holders to check balances in real time ("American Express," 2013). Offered through Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest retailer, Bluebird promises to reach millions of unbanked and underbanked customers, providing direct access to low-income households (Morrison, 2013).

The consolidation of the secondary financial services market continues apace as banks, retailers, and marketers craft financial products for the working poor. The entry of Wal-Mart into the arena, which has been long suspected of considering a bank charter, reflects the viability of the Secondary Financial Services Market. The entrance of major retailers and mainstream banks into the Secondary Financial Services Market
through GPR cards may presage expanding GPR card functions to permit bill payment, savings, and possibly SDLs. All of this will be regulatory fodder for the CFPB (2013); and, while there is little doubt that regulations will be imposed on AFS, the likelihood is that any constraints will conform to the requirements of trade associations representing vendors of the Secondary Financial Services Market.

**Reactive Policy Options**

The sturm und drang of AFS opponents, directed at vendors and their trade associations, has not yet produced corresponding industry corrections as had been hoped via the CFPB. Regardless, chronic debt by low- and middle-income households, a prolonged recession, and the entry of mainstream financial institutions into the AFS sector, promise turbulence for the Secondary Financial Services Market, at least in the near future. In this context, three policy strategies have evolved with respect to the burgeoning AFS sector: prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.

Prohibition, or its equivalent through interest rate and fee caps, reflects an impulse that has been evident since the founding of the republic, making unlawful those activities that have been deemed morally offensive, including alcoholic beverages, lotteries, and abortion. Making activities for which there is significant demand illegal, however, not only drives them underground where providers tend to offer a product that is inferior, if not outright dangerous, compared to that available through legitimate purveyors, but also obligates government to the costs of oversight, prosecution, and incarceration. Currently, 15 states prohibit payday lending, compared to 28 that permit such loans (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012).

Regulation of various industries, by contrast, allows them to operate in the open, affording a measure of surveillance, permitting government to tax transactions as well as a means for penalizing noncompliant businesses. Regarding payday lending, 8 states have established rigorous regulatory schemes (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). CFPB may introduce national regulation of AFS, which has been largely the province of state regulators.
Inclusion encourages financial service providers to make products more available for those who are not in the economic mainstream, especially workers in the secondary labor market. Innovative financial products, such as a GPR card with a savings function, could not only be inclusionary but also propel the upward mobility of low-income households. In 2006, the FDIC established the Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion for this purpose. Primary obstacles of inclusion are the very structural and psychological factors that maintain the Secondary Financial Services Market.

While these strategies will consume the attention and resources of those concerned about AFS, a larger issue remains. The Secondary Financial Services Market, replete with high interest rates and fees affixed to financial products for low-income, high-risk consumers, provides access to credit that may stabilize their financial circumstances but at a price that jeopardizes their long-term prosperity.

Proactive Policy Options

Ultimately, the dual financial services market problem will be resolved in the same way it will be for the dual labor market problem, by constructing more rungs in the ladder of upward mobility. Two agendas have evolved around the American Dream: anti-poverty measures of the New Deal and War on Poverty located primarily in the federal Department of Health and Human Services, and a subsequent array of tax expenditures situated in the Treasury Department.

Public welfare consists largely of public assistance and social insurance that were created by the Social Security Act of 1935 and amplified during the 1960s with the War on Poverty. The intricacies of these programs are beyond the scope of this article, but it would be fair to conclude that they are embedded in American social policy due to their popularity, as in Social Security and Medicare, as well as their essentiality, as in Supplemental Security Income. The greatest controversy has been around the means-tested public assistance programs—the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children),
and Medicaid—which are targeted for the poor, who are disproportionately minorities.

The eligibility for public assistance programs, dictated by a means-test on income as well as assets, limits family resources from about $1,000 to $3,000, meaning that minimally prosperous families, such as those with a dependable automobile needed for work, are ineligible for benefits. TANF’s “work-first” strategy, through which recipients must take the first available job, discourages recipients from searching for optimal employment, and the practice of many states to disallow job training and education consigns many poor households to dead-end jobs. Noncompliant welfare recipients face benefit sanctions through which assistance is cut or terminated altogether. The federal five-year time limit and even shorter state-imposed time limits discontinue benefits for families transitioning from welfare to work, a poignant problem for those who need training and education to secure well-paying jobs and for the poorest families that require long-term support (Lawinski, 2010; Ridzi, 2009).

A decade after its inception, welfare reform achieved disparate outcomes: many welfare recipients were employed, yet eligible for other public assistance programs, such as SNAP and Medicaid; concurrently, the percentage of TANF-eligible families actually receiving benefits (“take-up rate”) dropped from 84 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 2003 (Department of Health and Human Services, 2007, p. 18). Put another way, in 1996, 68 families received TANF out of every 100 poor households; by 2010, only 27 families out of 100 poor households benefited from TANF (Trisi & Pavettti, 2012).

Most of those eligible for, but not receiving benefits were children, of course (Epstein, 2010), underscoring the urgency of their parents’ need for income. A Faustian bargain had evolved for low-income American families. Absent adequate income, workers in the secondary labor market were confronted with suboptimal institutions: public assistance through a non-responsive welfare apparatus or reliance on high-priced AFS products.

Tax expenditures were used to benefit low-income workers through public policy beginning in the 1970s with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). As a tax credit, the EITC added to a lengthy list of benefits by virtue of exclusion from taxation:
corporate pensions, health insurance coverage, and the interest on mortgages. Significantly, such tax credits enjoyed broad bi-partisan support, allowing Republicans and Democrats to show their allegiance to middle-class voters. As a refundable tax credit, however, the EITC paid a rebate to families whose income fell below a certain level (Holt, 2006). By the end of the 20th century, tax credits, several of which were also refundable, had been crafted to address specific concerns: the Welfare to Work Tax Credit, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and the Adoption Tax Credit, among others (House Ways and Means Committee, 2004). By 2005, 15 states complemented the federal EITC with state refundable tax credits for low-income families (Holt, 2006).

Refundable tax credits had several advantages. Foremost, the volume of revenues was significant: for example, the EITC benefited 22 million low-income families $41.2 billion in 2006, and the Child Tax Credit was projected to benefit 35 million families $52 billion in 2010 (Urban Institute, 2008). Moreover, tax credits were open-ended. Unlike TANF, which was capped at $16.5 billion annually, the amount refunded by tax credits was contingent on the number of eligible tax filers. Tax credits also avoided the welfare assets test: refunds were apportioned according to earned income, regardless of the tax filer’s wealth. In 1986, the EITC was indexed for inflation, thus the value of refunds increased automatically, a provision that had not been affixed to AFDC/TANF. Finally, tax credits avoided the stigma of welfare. Instead of repeated visits to an impersonal welfare department, tax credits were accessed by filing a W-1040 electronically or by mail. An important indicator of the value of the tax credit paradigm is the take-up rate, which approximated 75%, far above the 50% typical of public assistance programs. Thirty years after enactment of the EITC, $205 billion in tax expenditures have benefited low-income families (Cramer, Rourke, Cooper, & Luengo-Prado, 2009).

While tax credits have eclipsed TANF in the volume of benefits for poor families and the strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support, it has demerits. Accessed through the Internal Revenue Service in the spring, refunds are available at one time; although they can be spread over the year as a wage supplement, few tax filers take this option. Moreover, beneficiaries
must participate in the tax system in order to receive refunds; an unknown, but probably sizable number of the poor prefer the informal, underground economy to meet their economic needs. Almost certainly, a large portion of undocumented immigrants remains unbanked for fear of risking deportation.

Limited access to public assistance and the time restriction of tax expenditures, coupled with the growth of AFS, justify a new organizational strategy to address poverty: Community Based Financial Services (CBFS). Such financial services would offer an array of products, including checking, savings, small dollar loans, tax preparation, and financial literacy education. Account holders would have a personal advisor, an account manager, to help them maximize benefits from various sources in order to construct a plan to assure their upward mobility. CBFS organizations would be private, probably nonprofit, although Yunus (2010) has proposed a for-profit, social business model to address poverty. Significantly, consumers would be able to choose their CBFS organization, encouraging vendors to be responsive to service demand. Two candidates for CBFS have been proposed: Community Credit Unions and financial services at local post offices.

Following subsidies to establish credit unions in poor neighborhoods through Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, Stoesz (2000, 2013) has proposed Community Credit Unions (CCUs) as a means to provide financial services while building capital in low-income communities. CCUs would be licensed and regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and provide an array of traditional products, such as savings and checking, as well as innovative services, such as micro-finance and Individual Development Accounts, short-term loans, and tax preparation in order to maximize tax refunds for workers and employers. Assistance to consumers would be provided by an account manager who would not only help members maximize benefits, but also assist them with other financial objectives related to home ownership, business development, and higher education/vocational training. Community groups would be allowed to petition local government to provide public assistance through CCUs, effectively chartering welfare departments. By 2014, the National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions boasted 250 members in 46 states serving 2.5 million
members (National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions, 2014).

Another alternative would be to provide financial services at local Post Offices (POs), as has been the case in many European countries. In January 2014, the Inspector General of the United States Postal Service proposed expanding its financial products to unbanked consumers. This plan would expand money orders, already sold at POs, to include reloadable debit cards as well as international remittances. Currently 38 percent of the nation’s 35,000 POs operate in ZIP codes without a bank, so this plan would directly fill a vacuum left by mainstream banks that have abandoned poor neighborhoods. The PO projects that providing services to just ten percent of the unbanked would divert $8.9 billion to the postal service, a much needed revenue stream for the beleaguered institution (U.S. Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, 2014). Senator Elizabeth Warren, as well as Democratic Congressional leaders, endorsed the proposal, but it quickly encountered opposition by Republicans (Becker, 2014). AFS trade associations would likely oppose the PO proposal.

Staffing Community Based Financial Services

The deployment of an effective network of CBFS providers rests in large measure with the quality of its staffing. Most AFS personnel acquire their skills by on-the-job training according to employer priorities and industry “best practice” standards. Credit unions and the Post Office require a high school diploma for counter services with an undergraduate degree for supervisory responsibilities. Administrative positions in financial services are typically reserved for employees with graduate degrees in business or a related discipline. A handful of business schools now offer special programs in “social entrepreneurship” that promote economic justice through market principles (Bornstein & Davis, 2010).

Since the publication of Michael Sherraden’s Assets and the Poor (1991) and the emergence of a network of organizations advocating asset building, social work has expressed renewed interest in economic justice. Returning to a field that it had abandoned for a half-century, social work found other disciplines had assumed control (Stuart, 2013). Currently three
schools of social work offer curriculum in financial services: Arizona State University, the University of Maryland, and several forming a collaborative in New York City (Birkenmaier, Kennedy, Kunz, Sander, & Horwitz, 2013), a modest gesture given the scale of AFS. Bolstering social work’s presence in the Secondary Financial Services Market would require raising the visibility of financial capability in professional education.

Within social work, a standardization of the requirements of certification in financial capability would facilitate a coordinated approach in social work education and continuing education efforts. One way to progress toward standardization is an interprofessional commission that could study the financial capability field and research, make recommendations to the relevant professions about standardization and certifications, and consider next steps. (Collins & Birkenmaier, 2013, p. 318)

A late arrival to AFS, social work has much ground to regain compared to other academic disciplines that educate students in financial services, such as business, economics, and human ecology (formerly home economics). Educating students in financial services is problematic if a network of CBFS vendors has not evolved to employ them. CBFS could be capitalized through Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), financial instruments through which government pays investors according to their achieving predetermined social outcomes. If predetermined objectives are not met, investors lose their money. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, MDRC, and Goldman Sachs negotiated an SIB to reduce recidivism among older adolescents sentenced to Riker’s Island. As analysts explained,

In a SIB, investors provide financing to operate federal, state, or local-run programs that aim to achieve predetermined outcomes. Generally, these outcomes are expected to save government money, for example, by reducing the need for beds in prisons or homeless shelters. The government entity agrees in advance that, if the program meets its goals, it will use the savings to pay back the original investment, plus a return. (Butler, Bloom & Rudd, 2013, p. 1)
Goldman Sachs calculated its investment of $9.6 million would generate positive returns once recidivism dropped at least ten percent, outcomes determined by the Vera Institute of Justice (Loeser & Levine, 2012). Given the scale of the Secondary Financial Services Market, SIBs represent a logical candidate for financing a network of CBFS.

Conclusion

The Secondary Financial Services Market has expanded significantly in recent decades, driven by demand for AFS products. Carrying high fees and interest, AFS are harmful for many workers in the secondary labor market; however, in the absence of more constructive options, financially distressed households have little recourse other than resort to the Secondary Financial Services Market. The access to AFS products has been essential for millions of lower-income workers not only when routine expenses exceed income, but also when dealing with emergencies. Reactive policy options are unlikely to provide constructive financial services to lower-income families, compared to the deployment of Community Based Financial Services, such as through Community Credit Unions or Post Offices. Social Impact Bonds are an innovative means for capitalizing CBFS. Professional training in financial capability could provide lower-income families with services that would introduce them to an array of financial products designed to accelerate their upward mobility. Along with business, economics, and human ecology, social work could contribute to the professionalization of financial services, given its historic concern for economic justice.

References


Does institutional trust on the individual and on the country-level influence public attitudes to state social welfare expenditures in transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia? To answer this question, this study draws on a comparative survey conducted in 24 countries. Multilevel binomial logit regression was used to allow for the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual- and country-levels of analysis. Institutional trust is associated with positive attitudes to welfare expenditures on the individual level, but not on the country level. Women, older individuals, those who are less educated, and those of low-income are associated with more positive attitudes to social welfare investments. Ideology is another important factor influencing public attitudes to welfare expenditures. By contrast, no significant effect of country-level poverty, inequality, and gross domestic product was found.

Key words: public redistribution, social capital, poverty, inequality, public opinion

There has been a recent surge in interest the study of the beneficial effects of institutional trust on attitudes towards welfare state expenditures. This promising line of inquiry is guided by institutional theory (Edlund, 2006; March & Olsen, 1984; Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002). According to institutional theory, trust in institutions reflects the degree of trust in the political system (Baron-Epel, Weinstein, Haviv-Mesika, Garty-Sandalon, & Green, 2008). Institutional trust represents the level of confidence in members of the society that the system of institutions which exists in the society is able to deliver favorable outcomes, even in the absence of continuous scrutiny by individuals (Miller & Listhaug, 1990).
Sociologically, the concept of trust in institutions is closely related to Putnam’s notion of ‘cooperation norms’ which serve as a specific form of trust, and are related to the general functions of society (Voicu & Voicu, 2011). This concept stresses attitude of the individual to formal institutions within the society and highlights the quality of interaction between individuals and institutions (Rainer & Siedler, 2009). The concept of trust in institutions is also associated with Coleman’s (1988) understanding of social capital as an interplay of norms of behaviors of individuals in the society and their obligation to each other and to the society at large.

As such, institutional trust indicates a vertical dimension of social capital in society and it creates connections to its formal institutions (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). It also represents a dimension of bridging social capital, which reflects perceived levels of social justice, solidarity, and mutual support in society.

The positive effect of trust is well described in the literature. Thus, individuals in countries with higher levels of trust interact more effectively with their society’s formal institutions, have more power and control over their lives, and consequently have a better welfare status (Blakely, Kennedy, & Kawachi, 2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Similarly, higher levels of trust are associated with greater levels of political participation and enhanced opportunities for creating more generous policy and administration for individuals and communities in need (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). Consequently, Levi (1997) concluded that “the more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to contingently consent to its policies” (p. 21).

In addition to theoretical contributions, there is now empirical evidence suggesting that institutional trust could be a significant determinant of public attitudes toward welfare expenditures. Trust in institutions played a critical role in the development of the welfare state in Germany and Sweden (Edlund, 2006; Gabriel & Trüdinger, 2011), and was also instrumental in defining attitudes towards welfare expenditures in the U.S. (Rudolph, 2009). Trust is also an important factor in explaining differences in public attitudes to welfare spending between Europe and the U.S. (Edlund, 1999). Finally, drawing on the data from 18 OECD countries, Rothstein, Samanni, &
Teorell (2009) found that trustworthy institutions are a vital prerequisite for peoples’ willingness to support expenditure for social welfare.

Important as they are, the above-mentioned studies have three main limitations. First, most of the previously-mentioned studies were conducted at the individual level. Hence, only individual-level indicators of institutional trust were considered, and no attempt was made to include contextual indicators. This approach assumes that the beneficial properties of institutional trust are associated with individuals and their social relationships, instead of being a collective attribute of communities or societies. However, the traditional concept of social capital is a societal construct rather than a specific characteristic of an individual. Social capital, including institutional trust, is a feature of the social organization of a society whereby civic participation, reciprocity, or trust in others assists in facilitating individual cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Hence, social capital would function as a resource for a group of individuals if they work together towards a collective goal which could not be achieved by each individual separately (Macinko & Starfield, 2001). As a resource for a group of people, social capital could belong both to the smaller and most basic level of a group, for instance, the family, and, at the same time, to the larger and broader group, such as the country (Fukuyama, 1995). The studies of individual levels of institutional trust do not explicitly take account of the possibility of institutional trust being a collective attribute of society, and thus may obscure its possible contextual effect.

To overcome the above-discussed limitation, this study explores institutional trust on both the individual and the country aggregated (contextual) levels at the same time. It makes the assumption that institutional trust at the individual and country-level may not necessarily be in conflict. Rather, institutional trust at the individual and contextual levels could simultaneously contribute to defining attitudes towards welfare state expenditures. Since the effect of institutional trust at the contextual level may be confounded with its effect at the individual level, this study employs multilevel regression modeling, which allows for the simultaneous examination of the two levels of effects.

Secondly, most of the previously-conducted studies have
analyzed the effects of institutional trust without explicitly taking into account well-documented alternative factors which may influence attitudes towards welfare expenditures. Among these alternative factors is the so-called self-interest hypothesis (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Svallfors, 1997). According to this hypothesis, the group of individuals who has been, or who is expected to be, the recipient of welfare programs tends to hold a more positive attitude to social welfare expenditures than are groups of individuals who are less likely to be recipients of social welfare. Testing the self-interest hypothesis on a sample of 14 transitional countries, Habibov (2012) found that wealthier individuals, as well as younger people with high levels of educational attainments, held negative attitudes to government expenditures on social welfare, while those who were less educated, women and older individuals held much more positive attitudes to social welfare.

The ideology hypothesis could provide another important explanation of differences in attitudes to welfare expenditures (Jæger, 2008; Lipset, 1963). According to this hypothesis, attitudes to welfare are determined by one’s view on the proper relationships between individuals and society (Derks, 2004; Jæger, 2006a, 2006b). People who support economic individualism believe that each person should be responsible for his or her own welfare through active participation in the market economy, and as such do not support high levels of government intervention. In contrast, people who support social equality expect basic rights for all citizens so that the full population can live according to prevailing standards, and they also defend welfare expenditures to a much greater degree than the previously mentioned group. Personal beliefs provide yet another important explanation (Osgood, 1960). Previous studies reported that a belief in the structural root of injustices in society is associated with increased support for welfare state expenditures (Blekesaune & Quandango, 2003; Voicu & Voicu, 2011).

Previous studies also suggest that public attitudes towards the redistribution of income and wealth are the result of a country’s economic and welfare conditions. Cutright (1965) has suggested that the creation of a welfare state is a government response to the intensity of social problems. Wilensky (1975) has argued that governments extend or curtail social
welfare programs in response to social risks associated with levels of poverty and inequality. High levels of poverty and inequality can thus lead to demands for greater levels of redistribution and hence a more positive attitude toward redistribution (Dallinger, 2010; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2011). In contrast, during times of economic prosperity associated with growth of gross domestic product, support for redistribution may fall, since the citizenship may feel less need for welfare state protection (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2011).

To overcome the above-discussed limitations, this study simultaneously explores the effects of institutional trust and self-interest, ideology, beliefs, and country-level economic conditions. In this way, we are able to estimate the impact of institutional trust vis-à-vis the above-described and well-documented explanations.

Finally, previous studies have focused primarily on developed countries. In contrast, this study examines the situations in 24 former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Having such a diverse sample of countries allows us to robustly test the effect of institutional trust on attitudes towards social welfare in transitional countries. In addition, this is one of the first studies to examine the under-researched regions of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. The transitional processes in these regions have been associated with civil unrest, ethnic clashes, and full-scale wars, and were set against a background of profound economic recession and political instability. The countries of these regions experienced longer periods of economic recession, which were more severe than those in high and middle income transitional countries (Habibov, 2011a, b).

In the light of the above-mentioned evidence, the main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between individual- and country-level institutional trust and public attitude to social welfare expenditures, while controlling for self-interest, ideology, personal beliefs, and economic and welfare conditions in 24 transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asia.
Data and Method

Data Source

This study uses micro data from the Life-in-Transition (LIT) survey, which was conducted by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 2006. Since the detailed description of the LIT’s methodology, including a report on observations and a discussion of the experiences with data collection is available elsewhere (EBRD, 2007; Synovate, 2006), we will limit ourselves

Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Individual-level of Institutional Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pro-social Welfare Expenditure (%)</th>
<th>Individual-level Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>27.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>26.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>33.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>31.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>23.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>31.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY Macedonia</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>23.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>30.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>27.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>31.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>28.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>27.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>26.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>26.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>29.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>27.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>27.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>25.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>24.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>37.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>31.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>23.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>36.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Country-level Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pro-Social Welfare Expenditure (%)(^1)</th>
<th>Poverty Rate (%)(^2)</th>
<th>Gini (%)(^{2,3})</th>
<th>GDP(^4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4496</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16548</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY Macedonia</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>13784</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11853</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: \(^1\)Synovate (2006, LITS) for share of population supporting pro-social welfare expenditure and measures of individual level of social capital; \(^2\)Alam et al. (2005) for poverty rate and Gini; \(^3\)Gini coefficient fluctuates between value of 0, that indicates perfect income equality in the country, and value of 1, that indicates perfect inequality. We converted Gini coefficient to Gini index in (%) to make it more comparable with other variables in the model; \(^4\)World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) for GDP per capita in international USD adjusted for Purchasing power parity (PPP).

Note: Figures are rounded up.

to a brief discussion of the data. The objective of the LIT was to gather directly comparable information about individuals’ and households’ experiences and attitudes in transitional countries. The LIT covered Central Europe (including the Balkans
and Turkey), Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (excluding Turkmenistan). The LIT is a cross-sectional survey, and its questionnaire incorporates a wide range of topics including: the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, household expenditures, and attitudes and values. In each participating country, 1,000 individuals were selected for face-to-face interviews with trained interviewers. Hence, our sample consisted of approximately 24,000 respondents in 24 countries. Because of its high levels of quality, the LIT has already been used for international comparative studies (Habibov, 2011a, 2012).

Outcome Variable

The outcome variable of interest is a respondent’s attitude towards prioritizing government expenditure in social welfare. This outcome variable is measured in the LIT by asking respondents the question “In your opinion, which of these fields should be the first priority for extra government investment?” A wide range of possible alternatives—from education and pensions to public infrastructure and price control—are provided for the respondent. For the purposes of our study, we recoded these responses to a new binary variable. The new variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent identified one of the major domains of social welfare such as: old-age pension, unemployment insurance, social assistance benefits, education, and healthcare, as the first priority for extra government investments. This variable takes the value of 0 if a respondent identified responses which are not in the major domain of social welfare, such as building factories, army, agriculture, corruption, and the like, as the first priority for extra government investments. Consequently, this variable is used to assess whether government social welfare is viewed by the population as the priority for extra government expenditures. The distribution of outcome variables by countries and across samples of countries under investigation is reported in the first column of Table 1.

Independent Variables - Individual Level

Institutional trust. As suggested by the recent article by Voicu & Voicu (2011), we measure multiple dimensions of
institutional trust at the individual level by computing an additive index. For the all countries included in this study, the LITS provides information about the population’s trust in: (1) the government; (2) the Parliament; (3) courts; (4) political parties; (5) armed forces; (6) the police; (7) the financial system; (8) foreign investors; (9) non-governmental organizations; and (10) trade-unions. The response for each question is provided in a Likert-type scale and coded as Complete distrust = 1, Some distrust = 2, Neither trust nor distrust = 3, Some trust = 4, Complete trust = 5. The additive index is computed by adding the scales for all ten dimensions. For instance, if a respondent answers ‘complete mistrust’ in all ten institutions, then the respondent’s index of trust is equal to 10. Conversely, if a respondent has complete trust in all ten institutions, then the respondent’s index of trust is equal to 50. The distribution of the index by countries and across the sample of countries under investigation is reported in the second, third, fourth, and fifth columns of Table 1.

Self-interest. Age, gender, education, and household expenditure level were selected, since the previous study by Habibov (2012) reported that these variables are strong predictors of self-interest in transitional countries. For the purposes of consistency, we used a recoding system similar to that used in Habibov (2012). Hence, age was coded into two categories: 17-39 years and 40-59 years, otherwise = 0. Gender was coded female = 1, otherwise = 0. Education was coded into a binary variable based on the highest level of academic qualification attained: bachelor level or higher = 1, otherwise = 0.

All households in each country of investigation were ranked into 5 quintiles based on the households’ total per capita expenditures. The first quintile represents the poorest 25 percent of the country’s population, while the fifth quintile represents the wealthiest 25 percent of the country’s population. The direct cross-country comparison of the households’ total per capita expenditures without using quintiles would not be valid, due to the high variation in expenditure between countries. For instance, expenditure of poorest households in Eastern Europe is equal to or higher than expenditure of middle strata households in Central Asia. By contrast, using quintiles allowed us to compare effects of the poorest 25
percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Overall, according to the self-interest theory, we expect that being younger, having a higher level of educational attainment, and living in a wealthier household will be associated with negative attitudes towards government expenditures to social welfare, while being a female will be associated with positive attitudes.

_Ideology._ To gauge the effect of ideology, as suggested by Habibov (2011a), two binomial variables, market economy and government involvement in reducing inequality, were created. A stated support of the market economy is expected to be associated with lower levels of support for welfare expenditures, while government involvement in reducing inequality is expected to have an opposite effect.

_Beliefs._ To gauge the effects of belief, a binomial variable, structural injustice, was created. This variable indicates whether an individual strongly believes that the main reason that people are currently in need is the result of societal injustice rather than bad luck or individual fault. We hypothesize that belief in structural injustice could be associated with support for social welfare expenditures.

The descriptive statistics for the above-described variables are presented in Table 2.

**Independent Variables—Country-Level**

_Institutional trust._ Country-level institutional trust was assessed by aggregating individual institutional trust at the country-level (Blekesaune, 2007; Blekesaune & Quandango, 2003; Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Poortinga, 2006a, b). The procedure for aggregating individual-level institutional trust to the country-level institutional trust detailed below. First of all, recall that institutional trust at individual level is represented by the additive index which varied from 10 to 50 for each individual. Hence, about 1000 respondents in each country under investigation has an additive index with values from 10 to 50. Next, we computed the mean of individual-level institutional trust by country. Consequently, for each participating country, the mean of the additive index of institutional trust was computed. Therefore, this mean represents the average level of trust for each of the participating countries.

_Economic conditions._ We used Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), since it is the most widely used indicator of economic development employed by the studies on attitude to social welfare (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2011). GDP data referred to the same period of 2005 for all countries, which means a lag by one year, as compared with the LIT data collected in 2006. This permits us to reveal the impact (if any) of variation in country GDP to subsequent public attitudes towards social welfare expenditures. GDP measures for each country were taken from the World Development Indicators database maintained by the World Bank (2013) and reflected country GDP per capita in international U.S. dollars adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-level Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 17-39</td>
<td>Respondent age 17-39 = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 40-59</td>
<td>Respondent age 40-59 = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Respondent is female = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>Bachelor education or higher = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households Expenditure</td>
<td>Quintiles of total household expenditure per capita</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Preferable</td>
<td>Market economy preferable = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>57.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Involvement</td>
<td>Strongly agree that the state should be actively involved in reducing inequality in society = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structural Injustice</td>
<td>The main reason for people in need today is injustice in society = 1, otherwise = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Synovate (2006, LITS). Note: Figures are rounded up.

Welfare conditions. Poverty and inequality are used to capture each country’s welfare conditions. Both measures are taken from the World Bank report (Alam et al., 2005).
The authors of the report used nationally-representative household surveys to estimate poverty and inequality levels in each of the participating countries. Poverty is measured by the international poverty line of 2.15 U.S. dollars per day, adjusted by Purchasing Poverty Parity, while inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient. The advantage of using the statistics from Alam et al. (2005) is that the poverty and inequality indices were created from nationally-representative data using the same methodology for each participating country, thus ensuring the validity and comparability of the statistics. Another advantage is that the indices referred to the same period of 2002-2003 for all countries. In addition, the poverty and inequality indices of 2002-2003 lag by 3-4 years as compared with the LIT data collected in 2006. This allows us to uncover the effect (if any) of variation in country-levels of poverty and inequality to subsequent public attitudes towards social welfare expenditures. Finally, poverty and inequality reflect ultimate outcome and raison d’être of welfare state institutions, while indicators such as GDP per capita represent economic output only (Habibov, 2011a). Even in the country with high GDP per capita, inequality in GDP distribution would lead to higher level of poverty, since a relatively smaller share of the resources are available to those at the bottom of the income distribution (Dagdeviren, Hoeven, & Weeks, 2004; Wodon & Yitzhaki, 2003).

Method

We estimate a two-level binomial logistic regression model, modeling individual and country variations in a respondent’s attitude towards government expenditures in social welfare. These tests were conducted using the GLLAMM module to the STATA 10 software package (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). The selected multilevel modeling strategy accounted for the hierarchical structure of the LIT data set, which includes individuals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). The selected multilevel model allows for the estimation of two important parameters: fixed and random effects. Fixed effect is defined as the overall relationships between individual-level independent variables and outcome variable across all countries under investigation. The random effect, in the form of correlation coefficients rho, is defined as the variation between countries in respondents’ attitudes towards the priority of government
expenditures in social welfare, which cannot be accounted for by the individual-level independent variables. The illustrations of such an unobserved variation between countries could be cultural differences, such as customs and traditions, historical experience, for example, ethnic conflicts and political instability, and different pace of transition, for instance, countries which were early reformers versus countries which were late reformers. A statistically significant rho signals that a considerable share of total variance in attitude originates from country-level differences. In addition, the higher the value of rho, the higher share of the total variance in attitude originates from community-level differences. Although the data set contains only 24 clusters (countries), the recent studies concur that having more than 10 clusters is enough to estimate a multilevel logistic regression (Austin 2010; Habibov, 2013; Snijders & Boskers, 1999).

Results

All together, a series of nine two-level logistic regression models was estimated sequentially (Snelgrove, Pikhart, & Stafford, 2009). The models report the likelihood of identifying expenditures for social welfare as a priority for government. Table 3 presents the results of the first four models (Models 1, 2, 3 and 4).

Model 1, the empty model with no predictors, provides a baseline estimate of the correlation coefficient rho. In this model, variation in the attitude is partitioned between individuals within countries and between countries. The purpose of this model is to estimate a benchmark for the size of country-level variation in all subsequent models. The value of the correlation coefficients rho in Model 1 indicates that 8.1% of total variance resides at the country-level.

Country-level aggregated institutional trust is added in Model 2. This model estimates the unadjusted contribution of trust at the country-level to the attitude towards social welfare expenditure. The purpose of this model is to reveal how much variance, on the country-level, can be explained by trust. Model 2 provides no evidence of an association between institutional trust at the country-level and the attitude towards priority of government expenditures for social welfare. However, the model does show that 8.1% percent of total variance in the attitude still resides at the country-level.
### Table 3. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>p-value</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<td>p-value</td>
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<td>p-value</td>
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<td>0.081</td>
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*Note:* Figures are rounded up.
Model 3 expands the second model by incorporating country-level poverty and inequality. Adjusting for country-level poverty and inequality levels did not substantially change the overall picture. All three country-level predictors are non-significant, although the percent of total variance in the attitude residing at the country-level slightly was reduced to 7.7%. Adjustment for GDP in Model 4 demonstrated similar results. In addition, we separately regressed country-level indicators, namely poverty, inequality, and GDP on the attitude toward social welfare expenditure. In all cases, our country-level indicators do not have statistically significant association with attitude towards social welfare expenditure. The results of these regressions are not shown here in order to conserve space, but are available from the authors upon request.

The results of estimations for Models 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are reported in Table 4. In contrast with previous models, Model 5 includes only individual-level trust variables to estimate the unadjusted contribution of respondents’ trust. Model 5 shows that an increase in social trust at the individual level is a significant predictor of attitudes towards social welfare expenditure. Model 6 expands the fifth model by including all the individual-level variables of the model. This model is designed to estimate the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent variables without taking into account country-level variations. The results demonstrate that an increase in trust at the individual level continues to be associated with positive attitudes to social welfare expenditure, after adjusting for the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent variables. In addition to trust, all other individual-level variables also have predicted directions. Being younger, having higher levels of educational attainment, living in wealthier households, and showing preferences for a market economy are associated with negative attitudes towards government expenditures on social welfare. In contrast, being female and strongly supporting the state involvement in reducing inequality in society is associated with positive attitudes towards government expenditures on social welfare. Finally, after controlling for the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent variables, approximately 7.6% of total variance in the attitude originates in country-level differences, which is fairly similar to the results obtained in the previous models.
Model 7 contains all of the independent variables on the individual- and country-levels, with the exception of trust at the individual level. This model allows us to begin answering the question of whether the contribution of country-level trust to the attitude towards social welfare expenditures is caused by compositional differences in the social-demographic
characteristics of individuals versus aggregated country social trust. As shown by Model 7, the country effects remain non-significant after controlling for the individual- and country-level differences, while the effects of social-demographic characteristics of individuals is similar to those in sixth model.

Table 4b. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 8</th>
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<th></th>
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<td>0.037</td>
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<td>Institutional trust aggregated</td>
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<td>-8208</td>
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Note: Figures are rounded up.
Model 8 only considers the contribution of trust variables, both at the individual level and at the country level. The aim of this model is to estimate and compare the effect of individual and aggregated country trust. Therefore, this model can further uncover the degree to which country-level differences in trust can be explained by individual-level trust versus country-level trust. By directly comparing the effects of the individual- and country-levels in Model 8, we can confirm that country-level differences in the attitude towards social welfare expenditure can better be explained by individual-level trust than by the country-level.

Finally, Model 9 contains all of the independent variables on the individual and community levels. This model serves to estimate whether trust has a contextual effect after controlling for all socio-demographic and trust variables at the individual level. After controlling for all individual-level independent variables in Model 9, the effects of all country-level variables, including aggregated institutional trust, continue to be non-significant. The effects of the individual-level independent variables, including institutional trust, remain about the same as in Models 6 and 7. At the same time, approximately 6.8% of total variance in the attitude was still found to originate from country-level differences.

Conclusion

The objective of the current study is to assess the importance of institutional trust on public attitudes towards government expenditure for social welfare in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Using comparable data from 24 countries, this study employed multilevel regression modeling, which allows for the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual and country levels of analysis. The empirical analysis presented in this paper provides several interesting insights.

First, with regard to the main aim of this study, the indicator of institutional trust was considered a predictor at both the individual and country-levels simultaneously. The findings suggest that the beneficial properties of institutional trust are attributable to the individual level only. Individual
level institutional trust is associated, although rather weakly, with positive attitudes to social welfare expenditure in all estimated models. Individuals with higher levels of trust were more likely to support social welfare as a priority for government expenditure. Therefore, the lack of institutional trust at the individual level has translated into strong anti-welfare sentiment. In contrast, country-level institutional trust is not associated with positive attitudes to social welfare according to all the estimated models. There seems to be no evidence that a lack of institutional trust at the country-level leads to the erosion of support for social welfare expenditure.

At the same time, between about 7 and 8 percent of total variance in attitude still resides at the country level. Taken together, these results seem to support the conclusion that institutional trust is not a key factor with regard to an understanding of differences in attitudes to social welfare expenditure between transitional countries. Rather than having a contextual influence on attitude, the beneficial properties of institutional trust can only be found at the individual level. It must be highlighted that relatively low levels of cross-country variation in the attitude to welfare institutions in transitional countries is in line with previous findings. The recent study of Habibov (2013) focused on multilevel analysis of factors affecting attitude to welfare state efforts to reduce inequality in 14 transitional countries of the Baltic, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Moldova and the Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union. The study reported significant but relatively low variance in the attitude at the country level. Only 10(?) to 0.3 percent of total variance in attitude to social welfare efforts to reduce income inequality originated at the country level, depending on the variables and regression model specification.

These findings imply that high levels of institutional trust within a country do not automatically lead to more positive attitudes towards redistribution. Even if a country has a large stock of institutional trust, not all citizens will benefit from it uniformly. Rather, the beneficial effects of institutional trust apply mainly to more trusting individuals. As such, the benefits of institutional trust seem to be generated through an interaction between individuals and their social environment. This finding also supports the conceptualization of institutional
trust as a social resource. Like a natural resource, institutional trust may primarily benefit only those individuals who are able to access it. Individuals who are not able access it do not seem to profit directly from the available resources.

This finding may also highlight a darker side of social capital. Putnam (2000) noted that tightly knit societies may be less tolerant towards certain groups of individuals based, for instance, on their ethnicity or religious beliefs. In this way, people belonging to these groups may be ignored or discriminated against by their fellow citizens. As a result, these individuals may experience much less support from government actions, including welfare expenditure. The recent study by Stern (2013) seems to support Putnam’s warning. The study found higher levels of social capital are associated with lower diversity, since high social capital helps to maintain racial homogeneity through the reduction in the costs of excluding minorities such as immigrants or non-dominant races. Higher trust and closer social networks assist community organizing aimed at promoting social exclusion based on racial, class, or immigration status criteria through various formal and informal mechanisms.

The evidence of the negative effect of social capital can also be found beyond the U.S. and other industrialized countries in developing and transitional countries. Roßteutscher (2010) studied a sample of 70 countries covered by the World Values Survey worldwide. The author reported that in non-democratic countries, social capital serves to cement authoritarian rule inasmuch as the higher level of social capital is negatively associated with countries’ prospects for democratic development. The negative effect of social trust, as a dimension of social capital, on democratic development is especially negative. Describing the mechanisms of negative effects of social trust on democratization, Roßteutscher (2010) stated that:

In nondemocratic contexts, … it [social trust] appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime-threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance. (p. 752)
The negative effect of social capital can be particularly strong in transitional countries (Kaminska, 2010). Considering the role of social capital in transitional countries, the author concludes that social capital hinders development of truly cooperative behavior, facilitates the growth in shadow economy, and is a significant factor preventing adaption of the market economy.

Second, this study found various significant relationships at the individual level. Most of these relationships have a predicted direction. Being women, in the older age category, less educated, and low-income is associated with a more positive attitude to social welfare investments. This finding supports the self-interest theory of attitudes to welfare investments in transitional countries. We found that positive attitudes towards the state’s involvement in reducing inequality are associated with positive attitudes towards social welfare expenditure. It seems that people in transitional countries consider social welfare to be a primary instrument for reducing the existing gap between poor and rich. This finding shows that ideology is an important factor in explaining variation in public attitude towards social welfare.

Third, while previous studies have reported significant effects regarding economic and welfare conditions (Blekesaune, 2007; Dallinger, 2010), no effects on country-level variations with regard to poverty, inequality, and GDP were found in this study. This finding may suggest that, in transitional countries, the subjective assessments that people make of their own situations may play a more important role in shaping their attitudes towards social welfare than country-level economic and welfare indicators. Indeed, consider the examples of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, three neighboring transitional countries in the Caucasus. Oil-rich Azerbaijan has the lowest absolute poverty rate – 4%, followed by Armenia – 50% and Georgia – 52%. Despite such a profound variation in country-wide economic indicators, the differences found in peoples’ self-assessments of their levels of welfare across the three countries was found to be negligible. About 14% of Azerbaijanis consider themselves very poor, which is close to 13% of Armenians and 15% of Georgians (Habibov & Afandi, 2009). Likewise, about 10% of Azerbaijanis consider themselves to be living in the
lowest strata of society, which is close to 12% of Georgians and 17% of Armenians (Habibov, 2011b). It appears that low-income individuals in Azerbaijan still consider themselves poor, even if they are relatively richer than Armenians or Georgians. This evidence may imply that individuals in transitional countries choose to support social welfare by comparing themselves with neighbors, friends, and co-workers, rather than making a cross-country comparison with regard to their relative levels of poverty and inequality. This conclusion is supported by the fact that all together, only about 7 - 8% of variation in attitudes to welfare can be explained at the country level.

An alternative explanation for the lack of the effect of country-level poverty, inequality, and GDP is that countries differ in their social welfare policies, and specific programs. As such, the peoples’ perceptions about the fairness and effectiveness of these programs may also impact public attitudes towards social welfare expenditure (Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Svalfors, 2007). Yet another possible explanation is that obtaining only single-year data on poverty and inequality is inadequate for revealing the true effects of country-level economic indicators.

Unfortunately, many transitional countries, especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, are currently lacking reliable longitudinal data in general and data about poverty and inequality in particular (Habibov, 2012). Lack of longitudinal data and cross-sectional design do not allow us to establish a cause-effect relationship between trust and attitudes to social welfare expenditures. This constitutes one of the limitations of this paper. Another limitation is that the data set used in the current study was not specifically designed for the purpose of examining institutional trust at the individual and country levels. The same items were used to measure individual- and country-level trust. Although it is common practice in the field of social capital research to aggregate individual measures to higher levels of analyses (Habibov & Afandi, 2011), we would be remiss if we automatically assumed that aggregated measures fully reflect institutional trust at the country-level. Using the additive index of institutional trust could also be considered a potential limitation, although it allows us to create a single aggregated measure of institutional trust at the country level. Future studies could overcome this limitation by
estimating and comparing the effect of trust to each institution on attitudes to social welfare expenditure. In spite of the above-mentioned limitations, this study provides valuable contributions with regard to institutional capital and attitudes towards social welfare expenditure in the transitional countries, and suggests an agenda for future studies on this topic.

References


Adequate sleep is essential for health, social participation, and well-being. We use 2010 and 2011 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data (N = 35,602) to examine differences in sleep adequacy between: non-veterans; non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or traumatic brain injury (TBI); combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI; and veterans (non-combat and combat combined) with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI. On average, respondents reported 9.28 days of inadequate sleep; veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI reported the most—12.25 days. Multivariate analyses indicated that veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI had significantly more days of inadequate sleep than all other groups. Findings contribute to a growing literature on the relevance of the military service–psychiatric diagnosis–TBI nexus for sleep problems by using population-representative data and non-veteran and healthy veteran comparison groups. This research underscores the importance of screening and treating veterans for sleep problems, and can be used by social workers and health professionals to advocate for increased education and research about sleep problems among veterans with mental health problems and/or TBI.

Key words: veterans, sleep, mental health, traumatic brain injury
Veterans are a large, diverse, policy-relevant subgroup of the American population that places specific demands on social work, public health, and health care professionals working at micro-, mezzo-, and macro-levels of practice (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) within and outside of the Veterans Administration (Franklin, 2009; Kaplan, Huguet, McFarland, & Newsom, 2007; Peppard & Reichmuth, 2013; Pigeon, Britton, Ilgen, Chapman, & Conner, 2012; Vasterling & Proctor, 2011; Wheeler & Bragin, 2007). In 2010, approximately 82.5% of the 22 million living veterans had served during war time (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), although not all of them had been exposed to combat or experienced negative consequences as a result of their service (Wilmoth & London, 2013a). The majority of veterans are men; however, in 2010, approximately 1.6 million veterans were women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

Individuals who enter the military are initially selected on good physical and mental health, but a growing body of comparative, social epidemiological and life course research documents heterogeneity in the health consequences of military service (MacLean, 2010, 2013; Teachman, 2011; Wilmoth, London, & Parker, 2010, 2011). Military service may negatively affect health directly through service-connected accidents, exposure to combat, promotion of unhealthy behaviors, and harm resulting from military sexual trauma, or indirectly by affecting subsequent health-related life course outcomes and trajectories through processes of cumulative inequality (Wilmoth & London, 2013a). Over the long term, military service may also be beneficial for health in some circumstances, such as when it leads to higher educational attainment relatively early in the life course, provides training that translates into better opportunities in the civilian labor market, improves access to health care, generates stress-related growth, and stimulates positive health behaviors, such as exercise.

Mental health is a central focus of the literature on the health consequences of military service (Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Milliken Auchterlonie, & Hoge, 2007; Vasterling et al., 2010; Vasterling & Proctor, 2011; Whyman, Lemmon, & Teachman, 2011). Depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are relatively common among veterans (MacLean, 2013; Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008). The etiology and symptoms of these mental disorders overlap considerably with
those of traumatic brain injury (TBI) (Maguen, Lau, Madden, & Seal, 2012), which is an injury of considerable importance among recent veterans (Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008). Poor-quality sleep, including disturbances and low sleep efficiency, are persistent and distressing symptoms of depression, PTSD, and TBI (Mathias & Alvaro, 2012; Mellman, Kumar, Kulick-Bell, Kumar, & Nolan, 1995; Wright, Britt, Bliese, Adler, Picchioni, & Moore, 2011). At the same time, there is growing evidence that sleep problems, including insomnia, may also link negative experiences during military service and the development of mental health problems (Picchioni et al., 2010; Wright et al., 2011). Studies have shown that individuals who already reported nightmares (van Liempt, van Zuiden, Westenberg, Super, & Vermetten, 2013) or other sleep problems prior to exposure to a traumatic event were more vulnerable to developing PTSD (Babson & Feldner, 2010; Gehrman et al., 2013; Germain, 2013), and others have shown that sleep mediates the association between TBI and the development of depression or PTSD (Macera, Aralis, Rauh, & MacGregor, 2013).

Sleep problems may thus be an important indicator of existing mental health disorders or increased risk for developing them (Macera et al., 2013) and are commonly reported by soldiers returning from combat (Wright et al., 2011). Given that sleep symptoms could help to identify veterans who are reluctant to seek medical attention for mental health concerns, recommendations have been made to increase screening for sleep disorders after deployment (Peppard & Reichmuth, 2013). Additionally, sleep problems are an important focus in their own right. Inadequate sleep has been linked with a greater risk of common health conditions, including diabetes (Knutson, Ryden, Mander, & van Cauter, 2006) and hypertension (Gangwisch et al., 2006), and is associated with a greater risk of accidents (Kling, McLeod, & Koehoorn, 2010) and suicide (Pigeon et al., 2012). Sleep problems may also affect neurobehavioral functioning (Banks & Dinges, 2007), which affects the ability to perform adult roles in ways that could have far-reaching consequences for individual and family well-being.

Adequate sleep is essential for health, social participation, and well-being. Much of the research on the sleep and mental health consequences of military service focuses on
veterans only, and often uses samples derived exclusively from the Veterans Administration health care system. Relatively few studies compare veterans to non-veterans, or veterans with different military service experiences. Thus, we know less than we should about how heterogeneity in military service experiences differentiates the sleep of veterans relative to non-veterans, or subsets of veterans from one another. In this study, we examine levels of and variation in inadequate sleep among non-veterans, non-combat and combat veterans, respectively, with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI, and veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI.

Methods

Data

Data for this study were obtained from the 2010 and 2011 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is an annual survey of all 50 states, Washington, D.C., Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, with each location fielding a standard core survey that can be supplemented with one or more optional topic modules. In 2011, both landlines and cell phones were included in the sampling frame; however, the optional, locality-specific topic modules were administered only to persons participating via landline. Prior population-representative research on sleep inadequacy has used BRFSS data (Chapman et al., 2012).

The sample includes respondents from Alaska (2011); Nebraska (2010); Nevada (2011); and Tennessee (2010 and 2011) because these were the only states for which data on veterans’ health and inadequate sleep were available. Prior to dropping respondents with missing data on analytic variables from the sample, the pooled sample included 35,602 respondents.

Dependent Variable

The question measuring inadequate sleep was identical in 2010 and 2011, although it was asked of all respondents in 2010, but only respondents in those localities that fielded the Inadequate Sleep module in 2011. In both years, the survey asked: “During the past 30 days, for about how many days have you felt that you did not get enough rest or sleep?” The
dependent variable for the analyses presented in this paper ranges from 0 - 30 days.

**Focal Independent Variable**

We used data from the core and Veterans’ Health module to derive the independent variable that is the primary focus of our analyses. In both 2010 and 2011, the core survey included a question about military service: “Have you ever served on active duty in the United States Armed Forces, either in the regular military or in a National Guard or military reserve unit? Active duty does not include training for the Reserves or National Guard, but DOES include activation, for example, for the Persian Gulf War.” In both years, those who answered yes to this question were asked the Veteran Health module, which included a yes/no question on combat exposure—“Did you ever serve in a combat or war zone?” The module also included a question that asked: “Has a doctor or other health professional ever told you that you have depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)?” Additionally, respondents were asked about whether they had been diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury (TBI). The question read: “A traumatic brain injury may result from a violent blow to the head or when an object pierces the skull and enters the brain tissue. Has a doctor or other health professional ever told you that you have suffered a traumatic brain injury (TBI)?” Using these four indicators, we derive a four-category focal independent variable that identifies: (1) non-veterans; (2) non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI; (2) combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI; and (4) veterans (non-combat and combat combined) with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI. We combine non-combat and combat veterans in this final category because of the relatively small number of respondents with at least one diagnosis.

**Control Variables**

The literature identifies numerous social and behavioral factors that can affect the adequacy of sleep (Ailshire & Burgard, 2012; Burgard, 2011; Burgard & Ailshire, 2009, 2013; Chapman et al., 2012). To adjust for other influences on sleep adequacy, we include four sets of control variables that are all
measured the same way in the 2010 and 2011 core surveys. The demographic controls measure exogenous characteristics, including: sex (female = 1); race (White, Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American/Alaskan, other race, and multiracial); Hispanic ethnicity (yes = 1); and age (18 - 29 years, 30 - 39 years, 40 - 49 years, 50 - 59 years, 60 - 69 years, and 70+ years).

The second set of control variables measures socio-economic attainment and family structure. We treat these as potentially mediating variables because they might be affected by military service, combat exposure, psychiatric diagnosis, and TBI, although with cross-sectional data we cannot be certain of the timing of these status attainments relative to military service. Education is measured as less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college or more. Employment status is measured as employed, unemployed, not in the labor force, and disabled and unable to work. Income indicates annual household income in categories of $25,000 or less, $25,001 to $75,000, and $75,001 or more. Because many respondents were missing on income, we include an “income missing” category. Marital status is recoded as married, partnered, separated or divorced, widowed, and never-married. Number of children in the household is categorized as 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more children.

The third set of control variables measure health behaviors that are thought to be related to sleep quality and may also be affected by military service. Thus, we conceptualize them as potentially mediating variables. Alcohol consumption is measured as the number of days in the past 30 days that the respondent drank alcohol; we recode it to 0, 1 - 7, and 8 or more days. Current smoking combines information from two separate questions. The first asks if the respondent had ever smoked 100 cigarettes (i.e., 5 packs) in their life time (yes/no), and those who had were asked whether they now smoke “every day, some days, or not at all.” Based on responses to these questions, we coded a three-category current smoking variable: no, some days, every day. Finally, the BRFSS public use data include a set of body mass index (BMI) categories that are derived from self-reported height and weight data. We combined underweight and normal weight, but kept overweight and obese as distinct categories.
The final set of variables serves as methodological controls. Since we pool data from four states and two years of the BRFSS, in all multivariate models, we control for state and survey year.

**Analytic Approach**

Overall, 4,609 respondents (12.95% un-weighted) were missing data on one or more analytic variables. Approximately 42% (un-weighted) of those missing on any variable were missing on the dependent variable. After dropping respondents with missing data, the sample for all of the analyses that follow includes 30,993 respondents.

We begin by describing the sample, estimating levels of inadequate sleep, and examining variation in inadequate sleep by veteran status and each of the control variables. We then estimate a set of hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses of variation in inadequate sleep: Model 1 includes the four-category veterans status variable that is the focus of our analysis, plus the methodological controls; Model 2 adds the exogenous demographic controls; Model 3 adds the potentially mediating socioeconomic attainment and family structure variables; and Model 4 adds the potentially mediating health behavior variables.

All analyses are weighted. To adjust the standard errors and statistical tests for the differential weighting and complex sample design, we use the SVY commands in Stata 12.1.

**Results**

**Sample Description**

Overall, approximately 11% are veterans: 5.46% are non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI; 3.65% are combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI; and 2.00% are veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI (Table 1). A table of descriptive statistics for the sample is available by request. Below, we summarize key characteristics of the sample.

About half of the sample is female, 81.30% is White, and approximately 5% report Hispanic ethnicity. The mean age is 47.06 years, with 57% between the ages of 18 and 49 years. Approximately 54% have some college or more education and
slightly more than half are employed. More than one-third have incomes in the $25,001 - $75,000 range; more have incomes of $25,000 or less than have incomes of $75,001 or more (29.01% versus 19.72%). Approximately 58% are married, 18.9% are never-married, and 14.1% are separated or divorced; the majority has no child in the household (61.61%). Most report that they have not consumed any alcohol in the past 30 days (62.10%) and don’t currently smoke (77.75%); 17.5% report smoking every day. About one-third are normal weight or less, overweight, and obese, respectively. Most live in Tennessee (71.66%). About half were surveyed in each year.

Table 1. Sample Description and Bivariate Associations with Mean Number of Days of Inadequate Sleep in the Past 30 Days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Weighted %</th>
<th>Un-Weighted N</th>
<th>Weighted Mean</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30,993</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Veteran</td>
<td>88.89</td>
<td>26,983</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Combat Veteran, No PTSD</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Veteran, No PTSD</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran with PTSD</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance Levels: * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001.

Levels of Inadequate Sleep

Table 1 also presents the mean number of days in the past 30 that respondents reported inadequate sleep overall and by veteran status. On average, respondents reported 9.28 days of inadequate sleep. The mean number of days of inadequate sleep varied significantly by veteran status, with more days reported by veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis or TBI (12.25 days on average) and fewer days reported by non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI (7.11 days on average) and combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI (6.95 days on average). On average, non-veterans reported 9.45 days of inadequate sleep. It is noteworthy that a substantial percentage of each group reported 15 or more days of inadequate sleep in the prior 30 days (not shown). Although the percentage reporting 15 or more days of inadequate sleep
was highest among veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis or TBI (39.41%), 30.14% of non-veterans, 22.06% of non-combat and 21.31% of combat veterans, respectively, with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI, reported 15 or more days of inadequate sleep.

Table 2. Multivariate Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis of Days of Inadequate Sleep in the Past 30 Days

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (Reference)</th>
<th>Model 1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 2&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 3&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Model 4&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
<td>(se)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran Status (Non-Veteran)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Combat Veteran, No PTSD</td>
<td>-2.432 ***</td>
<td>-0.201 (0.520)</td>
<td>0.188 (0.547)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Veteran, No PTSD</td>
<td>-2.586 ***</td>
<td>-0.305 (0.639)</td>
<td>0.376 (0.641)</td>
<td>0.292 (0.664)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran with PTSD</td>
<td>2.695 *</td>
<td>3.725 (1.286)</td>
<td>3.185 (1.203)</td>
<td>2.952 (1.241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>8.659 ***</td>
<td>8.297 (1.018)</td>
<td>11.535 (0.938)</td>
<td>9.786 (1.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>30,993</td>
<td>30,993</td>
<td>30,993</td>
<td>30,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: <sup>a</sup>Includes controls for state of residence and survey year. <sup>b</sup>Includes controls for state of residence, survey year, sex, age, race, and Hispanic ethnicity. <sup>c</sup>Includes controls for state of residence, survey year, sex, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, employment, income, marital status, and number of children under age 18 in the household. <sup>d</sup>Includes controls for state of residence, survey year, sex, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, employment, income, marital status, number of children under age 18 in the household, alcohol consumption in the past 30 days, current smoking status, and body mass index (BMI). Significance levels: * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001.

The mean number of days of inadequate sleep varied significantly by each of the other variables except race, Hispanic ethnicity, and alcohol consumption (table available upon request). Subgroups with notably high mean number of days of inadequate sleep (i.e., 2 days or more above the sample mean) include: Native Americans/Alaskans (11.6 days); multiracial persons (11.5 days); persons who have less than high school education (11.8 days); persons who are disabled and unable to work (15.3 days); persons who are partnered and separated/divorced (12.3 and 11.6 days, respectively); persons with three
or more children in the household (12.2 days); and persons who smoke every day (13.4 days). Subgroups with notably low mean number of days of inadequate sleep (i.e., 2 days or more below the sample mean) include: persons aged 60-69 (7.3 days) and 70+ years (5.2 days); persons who are out of the labor force (7.0 days); and the widowed (7.0 days).

Multivariate Analysis of Days of Inadequate Sleep

Table 2 presents the results of a multivariate OLS regression analysis of the number of days of inadequate sleep in the past 30 days by veteran status and controls; a table showing coefficients for control variables is available by request. Model 1, which includes veteran status, state of residence, and survey year, indicates that non-combat veterans and combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI, respectively, reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than non-veterans. By contrast, the difference between veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI and non-veterans is positive and also statistically significant in Model 1.

It is noteworthy that the pattern of results changes substantially once sex, age, race, and Hispanic ethnicity are included in Model 2. Model 2 indicates that the differences evident in Model 1 between non-veterans and veterans (both non-combat and combat) with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI are fully explained by demographic differences between the groups; however, the difference between veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI and non-veterans increases and remains statistically significant. Supplemental analyses (not shown) indicate that age, and to a lesser extent sex, are driving the observed changes. Thus, some of the documented group differences in levels of sleep inadequacy reflect compositional differences between the groups. Veterans tend to be older because of higher participation in the military among men in early- to mid-20th century birth cohorts relative to more recent birth cohorts (Wilmoth & London, 2011, 2013b), and older age is associated with fewer days of inadequate sleep. As a result, controlling statistically for age alone reduces some between-group differences to non-significance.

While adding the other, potentially mediating, socioeconomic attainment, family structure, and health behavior variables in Models 3 and 4 reduces the difference between
veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI and non-veterans, the difference remains statistically significant and positive in Model 4. Net of other variables in Model 4, veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis or TBI reported 2.95 days more inadequate sleep than non-veterans.

In supplemental analyses (not shown), we tested for differences in the coefficients for the three groups of veterans. In all four models, non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI were not significantly different from combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI. However, in all four models, non-combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI. Combat veterans with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI also reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI in Models 1-3; however, that difference became marginally non-significant in Model 4 (p = 0.0501).

In Model 4, a number of the control and potentially mediating variables were significantly associated with the number of days of inadequate sleep. Specifically, women reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep than men (b = 1.777, p < 0.001); persons aged 60-69 (b = -3.425, p < 0.001) and 70+ years (b = -4.182, p < 0.001), respectively, reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than persons aged 18-29; and African Americans reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than Whites (b = -1.534, p < 0.01).

Compared to persons with less than high school education, persons with high school education (b = -1.491, p < 0.01), some college (b = -1.347, p < 0.05), and college or more (b = -1.910, p < 0.01), respectively, reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep. Persons not in the labor force reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than employed persons (b = -0.801, p < 0.05), while disabled persons who were unable to work reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep (b = 4.899, p < 0.001). Persons who earned $75,001 or more (b = -1.054, p < 0.05) and persons who were missing on income (b = -1.701, p < 0.001), respectively, reported significantly fewer days of inadequate sleep than persons with incomes in the range of $1-$25,000.

Compared to the currently married, separated/divorced
persons reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep (b = 1.137, p < 0.05), as did persons with 2 (b = 1.306, p < 0.05) and 3 or more (b = 1.714, p < 0.05) children in the household, respectively, relative to persons with no child in the household. Those who currently smoke some days (b = 1.371, p < 0.05) and every day (b = 3.400, p < 0.001), respectively, reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep than non-smokers. Persons who were obese also reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep than persons with normal BMI or less (b = 1.755, p < 0.001). Respondents in 2011 reported significantly more days of inadequate sleep than respondents in 2010 (b = 1.826, p < 0.001). These results are consistent with findings of previous research documenting relationships between sleep and demographic characteristics, socioeconomic attainment, family structure, and health behaviors.

Discussion

Adequate sleep is critical for individual well-being and has implications for the ability to enact socially important roles and promote family well-being. Few well-controlled, population-based studies examine differences in sleep adequacy between non-veterans and veterans, or heterogeneity in sleep adequacy between veterans with different military service experiences. This study provides population-based estimates of levels of inadequate sleep and examines variation in sleep adequacy at the nexus of veteran status, combat exposure, psychiatric diagnosis, and TBI.

Overall, respondents reported 9.28 days of inadequate sleep in the past 30 days, and there was significant variation by veteran status, with the highest number of days of inadequate sleep reported by veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI (12.25 days on average). Multivariate analyses indicated that veteran status differences in sleep adequacy were substantially and substantively affected by the exogenous demographic variables. Controlling for sex, age, race, and Hispanic ethnicity reduced the difference between non-veterans and non-combat veterans and combat veterans, respectively, with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI. Additionally, controlling for those variables increased the size of the difference between non-veterans and veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI. This difference remained significant even when
additional, potentially mediating controls were introduced into the models. Supplemental analyses indicated that among those with no psychiatric diagnosis or TBI, sleep inadequacy was similar for non-combat and combat veterans, and that both of these groups of veterans differed significantly from veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI.

Taken together, these results demonstrate the importance of taking heterogeneity in military service experiences into account, and suggest that it is veterans with psychiatric diagnoses and/or TBI who experience particularly high levels of sleep inadequacy. Our population-based results add to a few existing studies based on smaller samples without non-veteran comparison groups. One prior study of 152 Australian Vietnam war veterans found very high levels of clinically-significant sleep disturbance among those with and without PTSD, but also showed that those with PTSD exhibited worse symptoms on some components of the overall sleep quality measure that was used (Lewis, Creamer, & Failla, 2009). Another study used sleep laboratory-based measures to compare 20 American veterans with PTSD to 8 with no mental illness and found worse sleep quality among those with PTSD (Mellman et al., 1995).

While using a large-scale study to examine the relationship between veteran status, psychiatric diagnosis, TBI, and sleep inadequacy extends the extant literature, this study has several limitations that warrant mention, at least in part because they point to directions for future research. First, the generalizability of the findings from this study is limited because data were collected in only four states, the response rates for the BRFSS are relatively low, and many respondents are missing data. Replication of these findings in other high-quality, population-representative samples is an important direction for future research.

Second, the measure of psychiatric diagnosis is limited because it is non-specific and does not allow us to identify veterans with a PTSD versus a depression diagnosis, for example. Nevertheless, researchers have noted the similarity in the symptoms of these disorders and TBI with regard to sleep consequences (Peppard & Reichmuth, 2013), making this a useful measure of mental health problems. Importantly, the measure is not available for non-veterans because the questions about psychiatric diagnosis and TBI are only asked in the Veterans’
Health module. Consequently, we are unable to identify psychiatric diagnoses and TBI in the non-veteran population. Thus, our estimate of the difference between non-veterans and veterans with a psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI must be considered conservative because non-veterans with psychiatric diagnoses are included in the comparison group. The fact that we find a large, statistically significant difference despite this bias toward the null, as well as the fact that military personnel are initially selected on good mental health, highlights the relevance of the military service–psychiatric diagnosis–TBI nexus for sleep problems. Additional research that uses specific measures of psychiatric disorder and measures psychiatric disorder and TBI among veterans and non-veterans would be valuable.

A third limitation is that we do not have more detailed and nuanced measures of sleep quality available, such as experience of nightmares, which are included in cutting-edge research on trauma and sleep. Such measures are rarely included in large-scale surveys that also include veteran status, military service experience, and psychiatric disorder variables. Efforts to add additional measures of sleep problems into future data collection initiatives are warranted and necessary for researchers to further elucidate how veteran status, military service experiences, psychiatric conditions, and TBI inter-relate.

Finally, the cross-sectional data do not allow us to ascertain the sequencing of psychiatric problems, TBI, and sleep inadequacy or the timing of psychiatric diagnosis and sleep inadequacy in relation to military service, despite the positive health selection that occurs at the point of entry into active-duty service. It is likely that much of the TBI observed in the veteran sample occurred during the active-duty period. However, the association between PTSD and sleep is complex, and even sleep lab studies have found it challenging to untangle causal associations (Germain, 2013; van Liempt et al., 2013). Longitudinal data that aims to document the timing of these occurrences in the life course and in relation to one another would be challenging to collect, but is nevertheless an important direction for future data collection and research. Despite these limitations, our results provide new and important evidence on the potential consequences of military
service for the health of veterans and the well-being of their families. Not only do we demonstrate that days of inadequate sleep are specifically elevated among veterans who have ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder or TBI, but we also document that more than 20% of veterans who have not ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder or TBI report 15 or more days of inadequate sleep in the past 30 days. A high level of inadequate sleep may be an indicator of an existing, undiagnosed mental health disorder or increase the risk for developing one (Macera et al., 2013). Given that veterans are often reluctant to seek medical attention for mental health problems, it may be that screening for sleep disorders is a mechanism for identifying and engaging veterans who could benefit from mental health care (Peppard & Reichmuth, 2013).

Given that screening for sleep problems may be important for enhancing the well-being of veterans and their families, the results provide information that can inform professional practice at the micro-, mezzo-, and macro-levels (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). At the micro-level, health care, public health, and social work professionals directly interacting with veterans and their family members to facilitate service access need to keep in mind the prevalence of sleep problems among the veteran population with psychiatric diagnosis and/or TBI. The findings of this research underscore the importance of screening and treating veterans for sleep problems, particularly but not exclusively those who already may be dealing with serious mental health issues and/or TBI. Encouragingly, treatment of poor quality sleep may also reduce the consequences of serious conditions like PTSD (Krakow et al., 2001). It may also contribute to the prevention of suicide among veterans (Pigeon et al., 2012).

Given this, professionals working at the mezzo-level of practice, who are coordinating services on the community level, should advocate for appropriate interventions for veterans experiencing sleep inadequacy and empower the veteran population to obtain the evaluations and interventions that they need to address their sleep problem and its consequences. At the macro-level of practice, more needs to be done to inform veterans, their families, and policy makers about sleep inadequacy, to evaluate programs aimed at improving sleep, and
to research the impact of sleep inadequacy. Ultimately, taking a comprehensive, multi-level approach to addressing the sleep problems of veterans has the potential to improve quality of life among former active-duty service members, as well as their family members.

Helping veterans obtain adequate sleep can improve functioning across a variety of domains, including employment, job performance, earnings, interpersonal relationships, family dynamics, and personal well-being. Social work, public health, and health care researchers and practitioners have been at the forefront of efforts to promote health and well-being among veterans. Practitioners in various locations intervene to modify unhealthy behaviors that are linked to their prior military service, such as smoking, drinking, and drug use, and to link veterans to appropriate, needed health care. They also make efforts to mitigate the negative consequences engendered by military service, such as military sexual trauma, mental health problems, disability, homelessness, and suicide. Addressing sleep inadequacy and its consequences among veterans is a critical component of such research, practice, and public policy initiatives.

References


Correlates of Job Burnout among Human Services Workers: Implications for Workforce Retention

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Job burnout has impacted workers and negatively transformed the social agency and its clients. This study examined the correlates of job burnout among human service workers in a non-urban setting in Central California. Using a convenience sample, researchers collected responses from 288 participants on a 13 item burnout scale. Findings indicated that workers experienced moderate to high levels of job burnout. Several scale items, including caseload size, age, gender, education, and experience, were significantly correlated with burnout. In addition, regression analyses revealed that caseload size was the most significant predictor of job burnout among human service workers. Implications for workforce retention and policy practice are discussed.

Key words: burnout, human service workers, caseload size, workforce retention, policy, practice

Job burnout rates have been steadily increasing among human service workers in response to their changing work landscape characterized by increasing caseloads, role...
ambiguities, declining wage rates, and limited opportunities for upward mobility, to name a few. Job burnout has been defined as and linked to lower rates of worker productivity, lack of job satisfaction, and attrition (Cahalane & Sites, 2008; Kirk-Brown & Wallace, 2004; Koeske & Koeske, 1989). Certain socio-demographic factors, such as age, gender, and marital status, interact with work conditions differentially and are even thought to predispose certain individuals to experiencing job burnout (Angerer, 2003; Maslach, Shaufeli, & Leiter, 2001; Sprang, Clark, & Whitt-Woosley, 2007).

Job burnout has been measured in terms of the physical and emotional exhaustion experienced by human service workers as the culmination of job-related stress over the duration of their employment (Rosenberg & Pace, 2006). In addition to person-specific characteristics, current research has pointed to the importance of conceptualizing job burnout as a selective and multidimensional process within an organizational culture that often neglects to promote healthy and supportive methods to cope with work-related stress (Gomez & Michaelis, 1995; Storey & Billingham, 2001). Conceptualizing job burnout as an organizational outcome shifts the action arenas for proper stress regulation away from the individual to the social support structure of an organization and the interaction of organizational features with individual-level variables (Anderson, 2000; Kirk-Brown & Wallace, 2004). Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on the burnout experienced by rural human service workers in the Central Valley of California, where there is a strong presence of socioeconomically-underrepresented minority populations, by exploring the socio-demographic and work-related variables that contribute to job burnout. In addition to identifying the correlates and predictive factors, the burnout measure in this study broadens the conceptual framework mostly from an emotional exhaustion and depersonalization perspective to include a person–environment interactive framework.

**Literature Review**

Burnout has been empirically tested among human service workers in child protection agencies (Anderson, 2000; Cahalane & Sites, 2008; Kim & Stoner, 2008; Poulin & Walter,
Job Burnout Among Human Services Workers

1993; Schwartz, Tiamiyu, & Dwyer, 2007), among marriage and family therapists (Rosenberg & Pace, 2006), and social service volunteers (Kulik, 2006), in metropolitan cities (Angerer, 2003; Gomez & Michaelis, 1995; Jenaro, Flores, & Arias, 2007; Sprang et al., 2007; Storey & Billingham, 2001), and in rural areas (Kee, Johnson, & Hunt, 2002; Landsman, 2002). Together, these studies indicate that job-related stress is a covariant of organizational structure, organizational supportive measures, and worker coping mechanisms. These studies find that social service workers who feel marginalized and disengaged from both their clients and the organization tend to be highly stressed. On the other hand, social service workers whose organizational structure promotes communication and provides some coping mechanisms tend to be less stressed and have greater rates of productivity.

The focus on individual–agency interactions has led researchers to look at organizational settings in rural and urban areas. Some studies have found that social service workers employed in rural areas are characterized by the same high rates of emotional exhaustion, compounded by low rates of individual achievement on a job burnout inventory scale, as their urban counterparts (Angerer, 2003; Gellis, Kim & Hwang, 2004; Poulin & Walter, 1993; Rohland, 2000). On the other hand, there is research suggesting that rural workers experience higher rates of job burnout compared to their urban counterparts. This association between rural workplace setting and worker burnout presumably stems from increased professional isolation, resource deficits, and environmental influences in rural areas compared to urban locales (Landsman, 2002). It deserves mention that the data for this research were collected from human service agencies in a relatively rural, non-urban setting for the purpose of developing a predictive model that isolates socio-demographic and work-related factors that contribute most to job burnout.

Burnout has often been examined as part of stress resulting from work. To many researchers, job burnout is a process that occurs as a result of continuous physical and emotional exhaustion. Oftentimes, it results in negative self-concept, negative job attitudes, and a loss of concern or feeling for clients (Rosenberg & Pace, 2006). The burnout process transforms not only the social agency, but also the client
(Anderson, 2000). According to Maslach et al. (2001), there are three dimensions of burnout, namely: exhaustion, depersonalization, and inefficacy. Exhaustion refers to the emotional pressure of the work environment, which often precludes the service provider’s capacity to interact with and address the needs of the client, whereas depersonalization is a conscious effort to create a degree of separation between oneself and the client by disregarding the characteristics that make them unique and engaging people. Similarly, inefficacy refers to a reduction in personal accomplishment from work-related activities, which leaves the worker with a sense of uselessness to the organization and client. Although there are several conceptualizations of job burnout, socio-demographic and work environment factors seem to provide an interactive framework for analyzing the literature on job burnout for the current study.

**Socio-Demographic Factors**

Socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, marital status, and ethnicity have been linked to increasing job burnout rate. The demographic characteristic with the most significant impact on job burnout is age. Younger service workers reported a higher rate of burnout compared to workers over the age of 40 years (Maslach et al., 2001). Part of the age effect can be attributed to reduced stress levels as workers become more familiar with role expectations. For example, with increased age and length of tenure, role ambiguity did not impact role performance, indicating that more mature workers who are familiar with workload expectations are less likely to experience burnout compared to their younger counterparts (Acker, 2003; Maslach & Jackson, 1981; Shirom, Toker, Berliner, & Shapira, 2008). Similarly, older workers report less absenteeism rates and a higher rate of job satisfaction in federal as well as social service agencies (Schwartz et al., 2007). However, some of the literature notes that older age and longer tenure are more likely to be associated with more burnout (Collings & Murray, 1996; Schulz, Greenley, & Brown, 1995).

The literature indicates that women social service providers overwhelmingly reported higher rates of job burnout, perhaps as a result of increased reports of exhaustion associated with “emotional labor” compared to men in the same line of work (Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Maslach et al., 2001; Sprang
et al., 2007). Women have also reported higher levels of compassion fatigue, which is also a predictor of job burnout. For example, among mental health service providers in a rural setting, females were associated with higher levels of burnout as a result of compassion fatigue which they experienced at a higher rate compared to males (Sprang et al., 2007). Women tend to experience higher rates of worker frustration as well. However, this rate is significantly reduced when structural workplace characteristics are controlled. In other words, gender, although a significant independent variable, also interacts in a statistically significant way with organizational-level variables and other demographic variables such as age and length of tenure in predicting burnout (Houkes, Winants, & Twellaar, 2008; Lewandowski, 2003; Rupert & Kent, 2007; Rupert, Pedja, & Holly, 2009; Shirom et al., 2008). In a similar vein, Kulik (2006) found that among unemployed volunteers in social service agencies, gender alone did not predict the likelihood of burnout, even though their study found gender differences in the employment status of these volunteers.

Some studies have shown that those within the helping professions who have higher levels of education are often charged with greater responsibilities. As a result, those with more years of education experienced higher levels of stress and burnout (Maslach et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 2007). Again, there is some inconsistency in the literature regarding the influence of educational attainment on burnout. For example, Schulz et al. (1995) found that social service workers with more education had considerably greater autonomy at the workplace and hence, reported greater job satisfaction, compared to their less educated co-workers. Similarly, a study of social service employees in a non-urban setting found that more educated workers reported higher levels of job satisfaction than did those who had not completed a college degree (Barth, Lloyd, Christ, Chapman, & Dickinson, 2008). The inconsistent results may be attributable to a direct versus indirect effect of education on burnout (Schulz et al., 1995).

Workplace Environment

Angerer (2003) reported that organizational structure of the workplace could contribute to employee job stress. Similarly, socio-emotional factors such as personal coping resources,
emotional exhaustion, and role ambiguity in the workplace have also been identified as factors related to job burnout. Issues outside of the worker’s sphere of control, such as downsizing, mergers, and budget control measures, have an adverse effect on marriages and families, and ultimately lead to job burnout (Angerer, 2003; Maslach et al., 2001). Jenaro, Flores and Arias (2007) found that coping strategies may be understood as personal resources and are highly important tools in the amelioration and prevention of stress associated with job burnout. This finding is consistent with a study of Child Protective Services that stated the intensity of the job contributes to the syndrome of emotional exhaustion, especially when a lack of coping strategies are in place on behalf of the individual or organization (Anderson, 2000). However, Rosenberg and Pace (2006) speculated that overall, marriage and family therapists have low-to-moderate levels of stress related to job burnout depending on the work setting; private practitioners had less burnout compared to therapists who worked in a community agency.

Burnout research also points to the importance of role ambiguity as a significant predictor of emotional exhaustion and burnout (Kirk-Brown & Wallace, 2004). On the other hand, however, the organization’s cultural responses to workers who experience stress resulting from role ambiguity greatly influence the likelihood of an employee adopting positive coping strategies for lowering or controlling stress-related burnout. Complete organizational acceptance of stress and stress-reducing methods is associated with lower rates of stress-related job burnout, whereas a rejection or suppression of stress coping methodology may result in lower productivity and inadequate services provided to the client.

Some researchers have focused their attention on the impact of caseload size. Koeske and Koeske (1989) found in their study on workload and burnout that, under certain conditions, demanding workloads were connected with employee burnout. These researchers argued that support within the organization between co-workers and their superior(s) could override the stress associated with a challenging workload, forestalling social worker burnout in a social service setting. Furthermore, studies among Title IV-E educated individuals
and public child welfare employees showed that after fulfilling their legal work commitment, some left their agency due to dissatisfaction with the job. These workers indicated that they perceived limited opportunities to utilize their skills and abilities, had minimal latitude to make their own judgment, and received little recognition for their efforts, especially when working with difficult caseloads (Cahalane & Sites, 2008).

Poulin and Walter (1993) also suggested that agency culture, client, and personal factors all contribute to burnout. Furthermore, Gomez and Michaelis (1995) found that merely shifting paperwork duties to clerical staff could result in all of the following: decrease in stress levels, enhanced organizational effectiveness, increase in worker personal accomplishment, and, potentially, lower job burnout rates. Storey and Billingham (2001) also suggested that team building communication fostered support for the social worker from upper level staff, decreased stress levels, and promoted job satisfaction.

Given prior research on the importance of job burnout among human service workers, the underlying influence of employee turnover and organizational stress, it is important to explore sociodemographic variations and factors that predict job burnout among rural human service workers. This study may be justified on several grounds. Literature review indicates that there is a dearth of studies on the burnout experienced by rural human service workers. Furthermore, most of the existing research in this area has focused on mental health workers. Additionally, most available instruments are long inventories on burnout with a heavy focus on factors related to emotional exhaustion and depersonalization. This study can be distinguished from other studies by its conceptualization of burnout as a broad construct that includes agency, work and client-related factors. Whereas previous scales measured burnout mostly from an emotional exhaustion and depersonalization perspective, this scale provides a person–environment interactive framework that includes organizational and client-related items. It is anticipated that the study and its findings will add to the existing knowledge by providing a more nuanced understanding and measurement of burnout.

In view of this, the current study identifies socio-demographic and work-related factors that contribute most to job burnout among human service workers, examines the
correlation between socio-demographic factors and job burnout rate, and identifies predictive factors of job burnout among human service workers. In particular, the study explores correlation between caseload size and several individual and work-related items. Similarly, absenteeism (days off from work) has also been correlated with individual and client-related items. The two main research questions addressed in the current study include: What are the demographic correlates of job burnout among human service workers? and How do agency-level variables impact the rate of job burnout? Specifically, the research addresses the following questions for rural human service providers: Is there any correlation between age, experience, income and the job burnout rate among human service workers? Do human service workers with higher caseloads experience higher rates of burnout at their jobs? Do male and female workers significantly differ in their job burnout rates? and, What are the predictive factors of job burnout?

Methodology

A convenience sampling method and the selection of the sample group was based on participants’ willingness to complete a two-page questionnaire, which resulted in two hundred eighty-eight human service workers from California’s Central Valley participating in this study. The research protocol was approved by the Human Subject Review Board of the university prior to the commencement of the data collection phase. Data were collected using a self-reported questionnaire. These questionnaires were distributed and collected by coordinators during March 2010. Participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent form, complete the questionnaire, place it in an envelope and return it to the coordinator.

The researchers examined several existing instruments and scales as part of the literature review. While several of the available scales were validated, we found that they did not adequately include several items in the current research, particularly related to various social, emotional, environmental, agency and work-related factors of job burnout among rural human service workers. For example, this scale has a few items that are not commonly found in other instruments, such as
"co-workers lack competence," "frequently encountering crisis situations," "lack of respect from clients and colleagues," "feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values," and "lack of on-the-job training." As mentioned earlier, this instrument broadens the conceptualization of burnout from emotional exhaustion to include a person–environment interactive framework. Additionally, we thought that a scale on this area would add to the diversity of existing instruments and thus advance the knowledge in this area. In this study, job burnout was measured by a 13-item composite scale created by the authors (see Table 1 for items). Each item in the scale reflected what had been identified in the literature as an independent variable influencing job burnout among human service workers. The reliability coefficient of the 13-item composite scale in this study was 0.88. Participants were asked to evaluate each item in terms of the extent to which that statement accurately contributed to their own job burnout. Responses to the statements were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “very low” (1), to “very high” (5). Also, data about demographic variables was gathered.

Results

Demographic Characteristics

The study participants’ age ranged from 20 to 69 years, with a mean age of 40.13 years (SD = 10.89). More than two-thirds (69.1%) of study participants were females and the rest were males (30.9%). With respect to their ethnicity, 45.1% were White, 23.3% Latino/Hispanic, 12.8% African Americans, 10.4% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.8% Native American, and 4.5% Others. In terms of their education, half of the respondents (50%) reported a bachelor’s degree, followed by master’s degree (21.9%), high school diploma/GED (13.2%), associate's degree (12.5%), and other (2.4%). While 54.5% were married, 30.9% were single, and 12.5% were divorced. Their years of experience ranged from under one year to 45 years, with a mean number of 11.98 years (SD = 9.24). While more than a third of the participants (38.9%) worked in a Social Services agency, about a quarter (23.2%) worked in a mental health agency and less than a fifth (16.5%) worked in health care settings. The remaining (11.4%) worked in various other agencies.
Table 1. Mean Score Analysis of Job Burnout Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of job burnout</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of time to complete job tasks and feeling pressured</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling physically and emotionally exhausted due to workload</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling frustrated and disappointed about the job</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently encountering crisis situations at work</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lack of recognition at work</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having no input in deciding on matters that affect my work</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers lack competence</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of respect from clients and colleagues</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of on the job training</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling trapped in my current job (e.g. Feel like I am stuck in my position)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling that I do not have a positive impact on the clients I work with</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of Job Burnout

Mean scores were calculated to determine the level of burnout experienced by the respondents (see Table 1). The overall rating for each item of the job burnout scale ranged from 1.0 to 4.5, with a mean rating of 2.61 (SD = 0.83). Among the burnout factors, the item rated as the most likely to contribute to burnout was, “Lack of time to complete job tasks and feeling pressured,” and the item rated as least likely to contribute to job burnout was, “Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values.” This may mean that many human service workers often find themselves caught up in a conflict between
what they believe to be good for their clients and the limiting program guidelines and policy regulations that constrain them from doing what is best for their clients. For example, families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are terminated from the program due to term limits, even though they do not have guaranteed employment income. Another example could be leaving a child in an abusive home because there are no foster alternatives. Such situations often lead to conflict between work duties and personal values. The item rated the 2nd highest was, “Feeling physically and emotionally exhausted due to workload” (Mean = 3.14, SD = 1.28). Similarly, the item rated the 2nd lowest was, “Feeling that I do not have a positive impact on the clients I work with” (Mean = 2.15, SD = 1.15).

There were gender variations in overall mean scores on the burnout scale. Female respondents showed a mean rating of 2.35 (SD = 0.84) while male respondents reported a mean rating of 2.75 (SD = 0.80), which indicated that males experienced significantly more job burnout compared to females (t = -2.011, df = 278, p < .05). This finding contradicts previous research (Maslach et al., 2001; Sprang et al., 2007) which reports that female social service workers are prone to higher levels of job burnout than male workers. This may be due to the unique experiences of male social workers in rural areas where there are limited possibilities for promotion and they may perhaps feel a sense of professional isolation. In particular, item analysis on the job burnout scale found that male respondents experienced more job burnout than female respondents with regard to “Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff” and “Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values” (see Table 2). Although “feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values” scored the lowest overall, it can be important to some groups under certain circumstances, as shown by the findings above.

Table 3 contains data on the type of agency setting and the overall job burnout composite variable. In terms of overall job burnout score, respondents who worked in Social Services agencies (Mean = 2.75, SD = 0.79) experienced the highest job burnout compared to those in Mental Health (Mean = 2.67, SD = 0.84) and Health Care agencies (Mean = 2.54, SD = 0.87). However, item analysis showed that respondents who
worked in Mental Health agencies (Mean = 3.13, SD = 1.27) experienced the most job burnout in terms of “Frequently encountering crisis situations at work,” as compared to those in Social Service (Mean = 2.99, SD = 1.37) and Health Care agencies (Mean = 2.48, SD = 1.12). In addition, respondents who worked in Health Care agencies (Mean = 2.91, SD = 1.27) experienced the most job burnout in terms of “Lack of recognition at work,” as compared to those in Social Service (Mean = 2.76, SD = 1.37) and Mental Health agencies (Mean = 2.77, SD = 1.12).

Table 2. Differences Between Male Respondents (n=89) and Female Respondents (n=199) in the Level of Job Burnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.547</td>
<td>.011*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.464</td>
<td>.014*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total mean score on job burnout</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.011</td>
<td>.045*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Correlations Between Demographic and Work-related Variables and Job Burnout

Table 4 contains data about the relationship between the level of burnout and some selected demographic and work-related variables such as age, years of experience, education, and caseload size. The data indicated that there is a statistically significant relationship between the overall job burnout score and education ($r = .119$, $p < .05$), and caseload size ($r = .169$, $p < .01$). The more educated respondents and those with larger caseloads experienced higher job burnout rates.
Table 3. Differences Among Social Service Agencies in the Level of Job Burnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of time to complete tasks and feeling pressured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.995</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Services/Social Services/Welfare agency</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health agency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care agency</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling frustrated and disappointed about the job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.176</td>
<td>.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Services/Social Services/Welfare agency</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health agency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care agency</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of recognition at work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.087</td>
<td>.026*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care agency</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health agency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Services/Social Services/Welfare agency</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently encountering crisis situations at work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.087</td>
<td>.026*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health agency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Services/Social Services/Welfare agency</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care agency</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total mean score on job burnout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.917</td>
<td>.043*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Services/Social Services/Welfare agency</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health agency</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care agency</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Difference is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).
Table 4. Correlations Between Demographic and Work Related Variables and Items of Job Burnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff</td>
<td>.134*</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff</td>
<td>.130*</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Days Off From Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values</td>
<td>.148*</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling that I do not have a positive impact on clients I work with</td>
<td>.131*</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling physically and emotionally exhausted due to workload</td>
<td>.161**</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently encountering crisis situations</td>
<td>.144*</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling frustrated and disappointed about the job</td>
<td>.143*</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of time to complete job tasks and feeling pressured</td>
<td>.137*</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling trapped in my current job</td>
<td>.134*</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling that I do not have a positive impact on clients I work with</td>
<td>.133*</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caseload Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling physically and emotionally exhausted due to workload</td>
<td>.286**</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of time to complete job tasks and feeling pressured</td>
<td>.273**</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently encountering crisis situations</td>
<td>.172**</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff</td>
<td>.146*</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values</td>
<td>.122*</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Furthermore, item analysis indicated that caseload was correlated with several scale items, such as lack of time to complete the job \((r = .273, p < .001)\), lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff \((r = .146, p < .05)\), feeling physically and emotionally exhausted \((r = .286, p < .001)\), frequently encountering crisis situations \((r = .172, p < .01)\) and feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values \((r = .122, p < .05)\). In addition, the number of days off from work is significantly correlated with “Lack of on the job training” \((r = .157, p < 0.05)\); “Feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values” \((r = .148, p < 0.05)\); and “Feeling that I do not have a positive impact on clients I work with” \((r = .131, p < 0.05)\).

**Predictors of Job Burnout**

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well job-related variables and some demographic variables predicted the level of job burnout (See Table 5). The regression matrix in our study included age, years of experience, education, and caseload size. The criterion variable was the level of job burnout. The linear combination of the predictor variables was significantly related to the job burnout, \(R^2 = .074\), adjusted \(R^2 = .060\), \(F(4, 275) = 5.489, p < .001\) (See Table 5). The simple multiple correlation coefficient was .27, indicating that approximately 7% of the variance of the criterion variable in the sample can be accounted for by the linear combination of the predictor variables. Among the four predictor variables, caseload size was found to be the most significant predictor in determining job burnout.

Table 5. Multiple Regression Results on Predictors of Job Burnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>(\beta)</th>
<th>(T)</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of Experience</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>-1.474</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.791</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>2.688</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseload size</td>
<td>3.554</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>3.429</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>2.317</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(F(4, 275) = 5.489, p < .001\), Multiple \(R = .272\); \(R^2 = .074\), adjusted \(R^2 = .060\)
Discussion

Rural human service workers experience several problems associated with job-related burnout in their workplace. The mean score analysis showed that workers in this predominantly rural area experienced moderate to high levels of burnout rates, although there were significant variations among certain individual items. Items that contributed most to burnout included “lack of time to complete job tasks and feeling pressured” and “feeling physically and emotionally exhausted due to workload.” These findings resonated with previous research that had similarly identified lack of time to complete job tasks (Baker, O’Brien, & Salahuddin, 2007; Lloyd & King, 2004), physical fatigue due to workload (Andersen, 2000; Angerer, 2003), and emotional exhaustion (Devereux, Hastings, & Noone, 2009) as significant factors contributing to job burnout. Undoubtedly, these findings imply that continuous emotional exhaustion results in emotional overload, which reduces vital emotional resources needed to effectively perform job-related tasks both independently and interactively.

Contrary to expectations, this study found that “feeling a conflict between work duties and personal values” is least likely to contribute to job burnout. Similarly, “feeling that I do not have a positive impact on clients I work with” also does not seem to have an impact on burnout. This finding is consistent with other research on social workers’ experiences in rural areas that suggests that in non-urban areas, burnout does not result from an absence of personal support factors (Kee et al., 2002; Landsman, 2002; Sullivan, 1993).

Consistent with the literature, this study also shows significant gender variations in terms of job burnout. While some researchers find that female social service workers are prone to higher levels of job burnout (Maslach et al., 2001; Sprang et al., 2007), our study reveals that male social service workers experienced a higher level of job burnout compared to their female counterparts. This may result from the unique experiences of non-urban social workers. It is likely that in these areas, social workers have limited opportunities for upward mobility and a greater degree of professional isolation, which may differentially impact men more than women, although this remains to
be verified by future studies. On the other hand, women may be buffered against burnout by the influence of more personal factors operating in rural areas, such as informal communication styles and a slower-paced lifestyle (Gumpert, Galtman, & Sauer-Jones, 2000). The literature suggests that in the presence of a supportive working environment, women experience reduced burnout rates compared to a workplace where there are no such support structures (Baker et al., 2007; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Rupert & Kent, 2007).

Respondents in this study reported differential levels of burnout based on agency type. Workers in social service agencies, including child protective services, reported the highest job burnout rate compared to workers in mental health and healthcare agencies. These workers consistently reported that they did not have the time they needed to complete the job and experienced more frustrations and disappointments compared to social workers in other agencies. This may have resulted from the emotional work component of child protective services, where workers handle cases of child abuse and neglect and have to manage this emotionally exhaustive work under conditions of increasing job demands.

In terms of item analysis of the burnout scale, this study found that older workers tend to experience lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff more than younger workers. This trend is also reflected in the length of their work experience: workers with more experience also report lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff. Perhaps with age and experience, many workers become jaded, indifferent and critical of supervisors, which may result in reduced support from management. Additionally, the management style in many of these agencies tends to be more bureaucratic, mechanistic and hierarchical in structure, which often does not promote a free flow of vertical and horizontal communication and support for workers.

Research also documents the relationship between absence from work (absenteeism) and job burnout (Maslach & Leiter, 2008; Schwartz et al., 2007). In this regard, this study identified several scale items related to frequent absence from work. For example, workers who take more time off from work are more likely to experience conflict between work duties and personal
values and feel that they do not make a positive impact on their clients. Additionally, unmanageable caseload was correlated with several scale items, such as lack of time to complete the job, lack of support from supervisory and managerial staff, feeling physically and emotionally exhausted, and feeling trapped in the current job. These findings are found to be consistent with the existing literature (Koeske & Koeske, 1989; Yamatani, Engel, & Spjeldnes, 2009).

Previous research has attempted to identify the predictive factors of job burnout. In this regard, role ambiguity was found to be a significant predictor of emotional exhaustion (Kirk-Brown & Wallace, 2004). Similarly, high levels of time pressure and low levels of self-efficacy were also identified as predictors of emotional exhaustion (Baker et al., 2007). In this study, results from regression analysis identified caseload size as the most significant predictor in determining the level of job burnout. Clearly, this points to the need for establishing manageable caseloads for rural human service workers. Realistic and manageable caseloads for human service workers are likely to contribute positively toward workforce retention, which has been a serious challenge for many human service agencies.

Limitations

Although the findings of this study added to the existing literature, there were some limitations. The study employed a convenience sample of human service workers employed in several agencies in the Central Valley in California. Such a sampling method did not assure random representation from the population of all human services workers, which in turn limited generalization beyond the study population. Furthermore, considering the nature and size of the human services sector, our sample size was relatively small, and was drawn from a broad array of human services organizations primarily consisting of social service agencies, child welfare agencies, mental health agencies, health care agencies, foster care agencies, probation services, etc. The source of burnout experienced by workers in these agencies may be different from program to program, limiting the study’s ability to draw conclusions about any one particular agency. Using the same instrument to collect information from various agencies may
not be the most ideal. Another concern is that most of the data for this study are collected from rural Central Valley areas in California, and therefore our findings may have limited applications to other areas. The demographic composition of the sampled area is quite unique and diverse, with a strong presence of Hispanics/Latinos. These factors serve as external threats to the generalizability of the study’s findings to other settings.

Implications and Conclusion

The findings of the study suggest several intervention strategies that can be used by managers, administrators, human service advocates and policy makers. This research indicates the need for administrators and policy makers in the human services sector to design creative ways of managing workload pressure, emotional exhaustion and frustrations on the job. During the recent economic downturn between 2007 and 2010, the welfare caseload in California grew 27%, compared to only 13% in the rest of the nation (Danielson, 2012; Social Work Policy Institute, 2010). These statistics underscore the need to advocate for policy changes and legislative actions that can establish manageable caseloads for human service workers in this area.

Our findings also revealed that a supportive workplace environment is extremely important in preventing burnout. To counter this threat, management may design and implement proactive intervention strategies which include team building activities, support groups, short breaks for relaxation, flexible work schedules, time management skills, resource gain activities, etc. In this regard, Conservation of Resources theory (COR) has the potential to provide a conceptual guide in maximizing resource gain (Vinokur-Kaplan, 2009, p. 228). This theory also suggests that managers must consider employees’ actual and perceived resources when developing and assigning job roles and tasks. If work assignments can be done based on the perceived types of resources available for workers, it may reduce job burnout. These findings and their implications will likely add to the increasing body of literature that highlights the importance of effectively handling job burnout among human service workers, particularly in non-urban, rural areas.
References


The Relationship between Empathy and Attitudes toward Government Intervention

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Throughout history, government policy and programs have played integral roles in shaping social services. This article reports the findings of a study that explored the relationship between interpersonal empathy and attitudes toward government intervention among college students. Findings suggest that increased levels of empathy are associated with more positive attitudes toward government intervention. This relationship is even stronger for participants from marginalized identity groups. Nurturing empathy among those engaged in social welfare policy-making may support government efforts that are in the best interest of communities they are intended to help.

Key words: empathy, government intervention, marginalized voices, social empathy, social well-being

Since the founding of this nation, government has been viewed as central to people’s social well-being. The pledge of government has been to uphold “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all” through a just form of governing that derives its power from the people. If such government fails to provide for safety and happiness, then it is the right of the people to decide the course of government (Declaration of Independence, 1776). Thus, the expectation that government will ensure social well-being, accompanied by the watchful eye of the governed, dates from the earliest history of the United States. Today’s discussions concerning the role of government...
follow in a long tradition, and reflect strong sentiments for and against government intervention in our lives, as well as varying definitions of what that intervention should look like.

For some, government has been the champion of human rights. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolished slavery and empowered Congress to enforce it. The Fifteenth Amendment established that “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of Servitude.” These Constitutional amendments are examples of federal government intervention over localities to ensure human rights.

For others, particularly in recent years, government has become the problem. Setting the modern tone for concern over government intervention was former President Ronald Reagan, who famously stated in his 1981 inaugural address that “government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.” During the presidential campaign of 2000, George W. Bush made famous the goal of serving as “compassionate conservatives” in response to social need. That ideology called for sympathetic responses by government through the efforts of nonpublic groups such as faith-based organizations and informal social supports with less reliance on government interventions (Olasky, 2000). More recently, former vice presidential candidate and federal Representative Paul D. Ryan, in his Roadmap for America, warned that:

the heavily government-centered ideology now prevailing in Washington, which pursues a relentless expansion of government, creates a growing culture of dependency, and in the process worsens a status quo that already threatens to overwhelm the budget and smother the economy. (2010, p. iii)

Attitudes of the public in the U.S. towards government intervention are mixed. In 2009, the National Constitution Center released data collected through an Associated Press poll indicating that the majority of Americans oppose government intervention in private enterprise, even if it is intended to benefit the economy, such as saving jobs (GfK Roper Public Affairs & Media, 2009). The Pew Research Center (2012) found
conflicting values. While 59% of adults believed it is the responsibility of government to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves, this was down from 69% in 2007; and 71% of adults felt that poor people are too dependent on government assistance programs. The data also revealed differences between generations in attitudes toward government intervention. Among young voters ages 18 to 29, 56% reported believing that government should have a more active role in addressing the country’s problems, compared to 35% of voters ages 65 and older who were supportive of greater government involvement.

As social workers, our roles in relation to government intervention are critical, as we are often part of government efforts or supported by government resources to secure people’s well-being and promote social justice. Our client groups are often those who rely on government support, and who represent diverse communities. Therefore, it is imperative that we consider what government intervention means to our profession, our clients and our communities.

Empathy and Its Relationship with the Role of Government

Given the important role of government intervention in forming the U.S. social welfare system, it is our position that it is important to identify and foster factors that contribute to positive attitudes toward government intervention. This exploratory study examined the relationship between empathy and attitudes toward government intervention. For the purposes of this study, the phrase government intervention is used to refer to government-initiated and/or-funded actions that are intended to support the welfare or well-being of the people who live within its bounds. Although there are several levels of government, this paper is primarily concerned with federal government intervention. The rationale for this is that major social welfare policies and funding originate from the federal government, and much of the role of state, tribal and local governments is as implementers and facilitators of federal policies and programs.

Empathy, the ability to mirror and interpret the actions of others (Iacoboni, 2008) has now been identified through
biophysical components found in our brains (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm, 2006). These components include affective or unconscious physiological responses coupled with cognitive processing (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007). Overall, empathy reflects “the processes whereby one person can come to know the internal state of another and be motivated to respond with sensitive care…” (Batson, 2011, p. 11). Thus, interpersonal empathy may contribute to a person’s support for collective action through government. Those who have higher levels of empathy have greater abilities to see and understand the circumstances of other people’s lives, and therefore may support public policies that address the social welfare and well-being of others. This relationship is the focus of this research.

Although no previous evidence exists to document that empathy is a specific predictor of a person’s feelings about the role of government, many of the key aspects of empathic abilities suggest a link. Stronger empathic insights into the experiences of others can lead to greater interest in and work towards improving the welfare of others (Morrell, 2010; Pinker, 2011). Those with higher levels of empathy are likely to consider the involvement of a larger governing body to ensure social well-being as worthwhile (Hoffman, 2011). These factors suggest there may be a relationship between empathy and support of government intervention. Thus, although empathy has been examined for its influence on interpersonal relationships and social interactions, its potential impact on the policymaking process has been largely overlooked. This research is a start towards examining that relationship.

Review of the Literature

Empathy and Social Relationships

The degree to which a person prefers collective social arrangements versus individualism may be related to empathic abilities. For example, individuals who are highly empathic prefer egalitarian social relations—that is relationships and policies that reduce group-based hierarchy and intergroup separation rather than hierarchal social relations (Chiao, 2010). Hierarchal social relations are held by high social dominance-oriented people. In research conducted by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle (1994),
high dominance-oriented people expressed less concern for others than did low dominance oriented people… [and] people who are highly empathic (specifically, concerned with others’ well-being) and to a lesser extent, those who feel interdependent or communal with others, tend to prefer egalitarian relationships among groups. (p. 757)

The relationship between high socially-dominant people and lower levels of empathy was recently measured through brain imaging technology:

Individuals who indicated a greater desire for social dominance hierarchy showed less response when perceiving pain in others within fronto-insular regions [of the brain] critical to the ability to share and feel concern for the emotional salience of another person’s misfortune. (Chiao, Mathur, Harada, & Lipke, 2009, p. 180)

Although those who favor hierarchical social relations may not be opposed to government intervention, they would be more likely to consider appropriate intervention to follow enforcement of the status quo rather than intervention that promotes equality (Cheon et al., 2011).

Empathy may also be a key variable in tolerance of social differences. For example, feeling empathy for a person who is a member of a stigmatized group can then be generalized to the group as a whole (Batson et al., 1997). This transference of empathic insight from individual cases to larger groups allows for greater understanding of commonalities and reduces preference or tolerance for social inequality (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Stephan & Finlay, 1999).

The social groups that one identifies with may also impact empathy. Research has shown that increases in feelings of power impact the brain’s ability to mirror responses of others (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2013). On the flip side, a sense of powerlessness was associated with a greater ability for the brain to mirror the responses of others, an important aspect of the physiological component of empathy. This may explain important differences found in polls of Americans’ attitudes
toward government intervention. For example, if a community has limited access to social power, could this increase its members’ ability to feel empathic toward groups needing access to assistance from the government? Might this outside status increase positive attitudes toward government intervention, because government has the power to reduce the perceived inequality?

*Empathy and Its Impact on Society*

Because empathy can lead to resonance with the experiences of others, “the ability to act on behalf of the greater good can not only improve our personal health and our relationships with others—it can practically or symbolically promote peace in our society and between cultures” (Keltner, Marsh, & Smith, 2010, p. 177). The result is that empathy can influence the making of laws that reflect social justice (Hoffman, 2011).

Government intervention has been at the forefront of making laws that promote social justice, or create a greater level of fairness. Fairness is not just a social goal and a potential outcome of greater empathy, but can have the effect of improving empathy. While we often turn to government to ensure fairness in society, and greater empathy leads to egalitarian or “fairness” policy orientations, there is also an inverse relationship. People tend to have more empathy for others if those others are viewed as behaving fairly in social interactions, while the perception of selfishness diminishes empathy for others (Singer et al., 2006).

Thus, empathy promotes social justice, and in turn, greater social justice improves empathy. This cyclical relationship reinforces the desirability of embedding empathy within our social policies and social institutions (Morrell, 2010). This research argues that by encouraging policies of fairness, empathy can be nourished. Who better to enact, enforce and ensure the continuation of social justice for all than our government? However, the debate and controversy over the role of government presents a challenge for the social work profession.

*Unpacking the Debate over Government Intervention: A Values Perspective*

As previously introduced, the debate over the role of the
U.S. government in the welfare of its citizenry is longstanding. It is important to tease out the underlying values within this debate in order to better understand why empathy may have value as a tool for enhancing the responsiveness of our social welfare state. Examination of government intervention in social welfare raises a number of questions. Who does government help and is that help fair? Does government support create dependency? And does government intervention protect people’s rights or impinge on civil liberties? These concerns often dominate debate on whether to support government involvement in social welfare and, in turn, question the role of social work.

Who Does Government Help and is That Help Fair?

While public perception may suggest that only the “needy” get government help, the reality is that most Americans are beneficiaries of social welfare policies and programs. Mettler and Koch (2012) analyzed pollster data from the Cornell Survey Research Institute on the broad question: “Some people, when they think through their life experiences, report that they have at some point used a government social program.” The majority, 57 percent, responded that they had never used a government social program. Later in the survey, the same respondents were asked about their personal use of any of 21 specific government programs. In response to this question, 96 percent had used at least one program, with two thirds of the respondents having used four or more of these programs. Mettler (2011) argues that some of these programs are less visible to people and therefore submerged and not counted as government support. This perception often fuels the sense that government money is disproportionately spent.

Based on actual spending (Congressional Budget Office, 2012), 20 percent of the nation’s annual budget covers Social Security, another 20 percent is spent on national defense, Medicare spending is 13 percent, Medicaid is 8 percent, and the interest on the debt (which keeps the U.S. from defaulting on its loans) is 6 percent. Taken together, these five items cover two-thirds of government spending. The other third is left for everything else government does, including education, employment services, international affairs, science, space,
technology, veterans, agriculture, regulation, transportation, postal services, and the countless other programs and services that involve the federal government.

The cost of this “submerged state” is significant. In addition to the portions of the federal budget dedicated to these major programs is the lost revenue due to the more invisible government intervention policies. According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (2013), exclusions from taxable income—such as deductions for employer-sponsored health insurance, mortgage interest paid, and charitable contributions as well as tax credits and preferential tax rates on capital gains—cost more than $900 billion, or almost 6 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. This amount would pay for all of our national defense and interest on the public debt or wipe out ten percent of our overall cumulative national debt in any given year.

Not everything the government does can be quantified by the annual budget or tax revenue. The federal government covers homeland security, the safety of driving on the roads and flying in the air, and the enforcement of the Constitution, such as protection from racial discrimination and hate crimes. The federal government also monitors the safety of food coming into our country and regulates the information across the airwaves. In modern times, it is impossible to find much in our lives that is not touched by the federal government.

Does Government Support Create Dependency?

Once we acknowledge that we are all receiving government support, the question of dependency becomes less relevant. In a nation with so much diversity, government is one shared aspect of life. Through the election process, some voters win and some voters lose, but in the end after an election, everyone shares the outcome. When we hold government as a part of us, we can build a sense of community. And a sense of community can promote numerous prosocial behaviors, including finding solutions to social problems (Omoto, Snyder, & Hackett, 2010) and building trust among citizens (Putnam, 1995). In fact, greater collectivism in societies has been found to have a significant impact on individuals’ well-being, including lower levels of anxiety and depressive disorders (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010). By definition, collectivist cultures “endorse
thinking of people as highly interconnected to one another” (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010, p. 529).

Conversely, when we hold government as the problem and distance ourselves from it, we lack that shared sense of community. Research on childhood experience demonstrates that children who grow up in more communal societies and families are more inclined to invest in community social welfare than children who grow up in compartmentalized and separate communities (Perry, 2002).

**Does Government Intervention Protect People’s Rights or Impinge on Civil Liberties?**

One current perspective holds that government intervention, particularly in securing civil rights and protecting people from discrimination, leads to a loss of individual liberties, but this perspective is not borne out by history:

There is no record, however, of any oppressive regime having taken power by advancing on the social welfare front. Lenin and Stalin, Mussolini, Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Chile’s Pinochet did not consolidate power by gradually increasing social welfare programs, taxes, and regulation of the environment or workplace ... Hitler did not become the supreme ruler of the Nazi state by first taking over the health department. (Neiman, 2000, pp. 160-161)

In fact, countries that protect minority rights are more democratic and promote trust among their citizens. Research on 46 countries over 10 years demonstrates that governments that protect voting rights and maintain antidiscrimination policies “produce more trusting citizens” (Smith & Paxton, 2010, p. 211). Such government intervention facilitates trust between individuals from different groups (Tilly, 2004). Pinker (2010, 2011) argues that violence subsided and civilization came to be because of a confluence of several reasons, including the evolution of an organized state government; a realization that cooperation is more beneficial than killing; and growth in empathy. He also believes that our innate empathic tendencies, especially to those with whom we share characteristics or familiarity, has widened. Thus, Pinker draws together government and empathy as a path for greater civilization.
Social Work Practice and Government Intervention

Direct government employment of social workers numbers in the tens of thousands (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). For example, the Social Security Administration employs more than 26,000 social workers, while the Veterans Administration employs over 9,000 (NASW, 2011). The services of the Department of Health and Human Services are so varied that it is impossible to get a true count of the number of social workers employed under that federal agency. These numbers do not reflect those who work in NGO’s that receive federal government financial support for programs and local and state agencies. Given the significant involvement of social workers in government programs and in implementing government policies, it is surprising that little research exists on the connection between government and social work.

Social work is a pivot point between the economic market and the government. On one hand, as Ng (2010) points out, a professional conflict has been created for the social work profession promoting altruism in a capitalist system. Ng argues that social services do not fit well in a market system. On the other hand, it is only through government intervention that serious challenges to the profession can be addressed (Ng, 2010). Not only are social workers intricately connected to government intervention through their clients, but also through their own well-being. However, social workers are often hesitant to pursue policy change that may be perceived as self-serving or to engage in this larger debate overall. This may be due, in part, to the capitalist ideals of individualism, self-sufficiency, and minimizing government dependence.

To further complicate the role of social workers in advocating for government intervention, the profession has been characterized as serving as agents of social control. Government intervention has been seen as a means of controlling populations that have traditionally been marginalized in U.S. society (Abramovitz, 1998). From this perspective, government intervention is regarded as a form of surveillance and control, and social workers are the agents of the state who implement the will of those in political and economic power. This reflects a long-standing professional debate about whether the role of social workers is to challenge the status quo and work for
systemic change, or to provide support to help marginalized communities and populations learn how to adapt to and cope with the status quo (Abramovitz, 1998). For example, Stojkovic (2008), in an analysis of the U.S. Patriot Act, raised the issue that government policies risk involving social workers in practices that are antithetical to the profession. Some of these policies, such as detention of noncitizens and treatment of immigrants, can place social workers as agents of government control and not as advocates for social justice.

With globalization has come a rise in a climate that promotes individual responsibility. Alston (2002) argues that social workers have an obligation to promote and advocate for a collective responsibility that can be modeled by the government in a market that has repeatedly failed to ensure the health and well-being of individuals. Alston argues that it is important that social workers turn to professional values such as empowerment to engage in the social debate around government intervention.

Curiously, U.S. social work scholars rarely discuss these existing debates and conflicts around government intervention. In other parts of the world, research has been conducted on people’s attitudes toward government support for those in poverty. As Ng and Koh (2012) state, evidence should be collected so that policies can reflect the wishes and desires of the general public, rather than those holding the most political, social and/or financial power. Structurally, what further complicates the position of social workers in the debates around government intervention in the U.S. and beyond is the limited control that both service recipients and service providers have in dictating how social welfare policies are shaped and implemented, particularly with regard to spending cuts (Beresford, & Croft, 2004). The lack of engagement of those most directly impacted by social welfare policy decisions can have detrimental effects (Fawcett & Hanlon, 2009). The marginalization of both the profession and our clients underscores the necessity for investigation and analysis of attitudes towards the role of government in promoting social well-being.

Empathy and Social Work

There is no question that empathy plays a significant role in the social work profession. Social work educators train
students to become empathic professionals—in tune with their own emotional processes, and able to relate to and understand those of their clients. As existing research knowledge of empathy grows, it is clear that the components of empathy can be taught. Neural pathways have elasticity, and cognitive processes can be developed and enhanced (Long, 2006; Schwartz & Begley, 2003). Given the role that government intervention has played in the development of the U.S. social welfare system, it is appropriate that social workers are at the forefront of exploring the connection between empathy and the government policies and structures that increase the well-being of client groups and communities.

Current Study

This review of government intervention grew out of a larger study that focused on the development of an instrument to measure social empathy. Social empathy is a key contributor to the establishment of social welfare policies that promote social well-being and social justice. One key part of social empathy is the role of government as a facilitator and provider of civil rights and social services. This research analyzes whether interpersonal empathy is a significant predictor of people’s attitudes about social rights and the role of government. Further analysis considered whether support for government intervention differed by race, class and gender. More specifically, we hypothesized that:

H1: Higher levels of interpersonal empathy, as measured by the Empathy Assessment Index, are associated with more positive attitudes toward government intervention with regard to social welfare.

H2: Members of populations that face marginalization and exclusion, including women, people from poor or working class families, and people who identify as members of racial or ethnic groups other than those of Anglo/White descent, have more positive attitudes towards government intervention even after controlling for interpersonal empathy level.
Methods

Sample

A convenience sample of students from a large southwestern university were invited to participate in the study through eight Introduction to Social Work courses (5 in-person course sections and 3 online sections) in the spring semester of 2012. Students were recruited in a non-randomized fashion. Extra credit for participation was given to some students at the discretion of the instructor. Students were emailed a link to the survey, which was administered through Qualtrics, and were asked to complete the survey within a week. The study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board. The sample pool was selected for the larger study purpose of validating a measure of social empathy.

A total of 490 students participated. Seventeen students (3.5%) were eliminated due to missing data. The final sample for this study consisted of 473 participants ranging in age from 18 to 55 years (\(M = 21.8, SD = 5.1\)), 70% of whom were between the ages of 18 and 21. The sample was 59.3% female. Twenty-six percent were freshman (\(n = 121\)), 30.5% were sophomores (\(n = 142\)), 24.5% were juniors (\(n = 114\)), 18.5% were seniors (\(n = 86\)), and less than 1% were masters level students (\(n = 3\)). Participants identified more than 40 different academic areas of primary study, including 5.1% (\(n = 24\)) who reported an undecided major.

Of those who reported their race/ethnicity, 56.3% were Caucasian (\(n = 261\)), 14.9% were Latino (\(n = 69\)), 7.3% were Asian (\(n = 34\)), 6.3% were multiracial (\(n = 29\)), and 3.4% were African American (\(n = 16\)). Almost 11% of the participants (\(n = 50\)) identified “other” as their racial or ethnic identity. When asked to specify, the predominant groups reported included Arab and Middle Eastern (\(n = 39; 8.4\%\)). Twenty-five percent of the participants reported having lived outside of the United States at one point in their lives. Participants were asked to identify the class background for their families of origin. Answer options included poor (\(n = 16; 3.5\%\)), working class (\(n = 98; 21.3\%\)), middle class (\(n = 182; 39.5\%\)), upper middle class (\(n = 136; 29.5\%\)), and wealthy (\(n = 29; 6.3\%\)).
Measures: The Empathy Assessment Index (EAI) and Government Intervention Scale

The EAI is a validated self-report measure of interpersonal empathy that includes a total of 20 items on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = frequently, 5 = almost always, 6 = always) (Lietz et al., 2011). Total scores for the EAI range from 20 to 120 with higher scores indicating greater levels of interpersonal empathy ($\alpha = .84$). The EAI is made up of four components, each with 5 items. The four components include affective response, self-other awareness, perspective-taking, and emotion regulation, and are based on a neuroscience approach to understanding the dynamics of the human empathic response.

Affective response is the physiological response that is triggered in us when we view the emotional responses of others, and includes items such as, “Hearing laughter makes me smile.” Self-other awareness refers to the cognitive ability to separate another’s emotions from one’s own, and includes items such as “I can tell the difference between my friend’s feelings and my own.” Perspective-taking is the component of empathy most associated with our understanding of empathic responses and refers to an understanding of another’s experiences that may be causing or creating an individual to emotionally respond in a specific way. An example of a perspective-taking item is “I can imagine what it’s like to be in someone else’s shoes.” Finally, emotion regulation is the cognitive ability to regulate one’s affective responses to others’ emotions, and includes items such as “When I am upset or unhappy, I get over it quickly.” Taken together, the Empathy Assessment Index (EAI) items are a valid tool for measuring interpersonal empathy.

The government intervention scale consists of four, self-report items intended to measure attitudes toward the government intervening in issues around social welfare and well-being. The items (see Table 1) use the same 6-point Likert scale described above for the EAI, and as a scale have good internal consistency ($\alpha = .79$). Scale scores range from 4 to 24 with higher scores indicating a more positive attitude toward government intervention around issues of social welfare and civil rights.
Table 1. Descriptives for Government Intervention Items and Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think the government needs to be a part of leveling the playing</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field for people from different racial groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe government should protect the rights of minorities.</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is the right of all citizens to have their basic needs</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>met.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe the role of government is to act as a referee, making</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decisions that promote the quality of life and well-being of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government intervention scale ($\alpha = .79$)</td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic Variables

Because of the substantial number of participants who identified “other” as their racial or ethnic identity, and the small subsamples of racial/ethnic groups such as African American and American Indian, the participants were divided into dominant and non-dominant racial categories. Those identifying as white/Caucasian or of Anglo descent were categorized as dominant. Those identifying as a member of any of the other racial/ethnic groups, or who identified as “other” and specified as a member of an identity group other than white/Anglo, were categorized as non-dominant. A dummy variable was created with “dominant racial group identity” as the reference.

A small number of participants listed “other” as their family class background ($n = 4$). When asked to specify, the participants listed responses including; “single parent” and “working middle class.” For the purposes of this analysis, these responses were coded as missing in order to develop an ordinal scale for the control variable of family class background using the answer options provided ($1 = poor$, $2 = working class$, $3 = middle class$, $4 = upper middle class$, and $5 = wealthy$).

Analysis

Regression was used to analyze two models. The first model was a bivariate regression analysis with government
intervention scale score as the dependent variable, and the Empathy Assessment Index total score as the independent variable. A second model used multiple regression to analyze the predictive value of the EAI score and added control variables for gender, class background of family of origin, and racial identity regressed on government intervention score.

Table 2. Multiple Regression Model Summary for Predicting Attitudes Towards Government Intervention (N = 473)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R²(adj)</th>
<th>B (SE)</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>sr²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Empathy</td>
<td>.100 (.097)***</td>
<td>.124 (.018)</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Empathy w/controls</td>
<td>.193 (.185)***</td>
<td>.126 (.017)</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.100***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>1.21 (.368)</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of origin class</td>
<td>-.638 (.193)</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (dominant)</td>
<td>1.671 (.365)</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.039***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** = p ≤ .001; ** = p ≤ .01; * = p ≤ .05

Results
The dependent variable, attitudes toward government intervention, was correlated with the independent variable, interpersonal empathy (r² = .317, p < .01). As summarized in Table 2, interpersonal empathy alone accounted for 9% of the variance in attitudes toward government intervention. When the control variables for gender, race, and family of origin class background were added into the model, the total variance in government intervention attitudes that was accounted for increased to 18%. All three of the control variables had distinct contributions toward the overall model, as evidenced by the semi-partial correlations. Interpersonal empathy accounted for 10% of the variance in attitudes toward government intervention when controlling for gender, family class background, and racial identity. Each of the identity predictors contributed an additional 2% (gender and family class background) to just under 4% (race) over and above that of interpersonal empathy.

Because the control variables are statistically significant, the second model suggests that attitudes toward government
intervention are more positive for women, participants from lower class families, and people of color, even after controlling for empathy level. This suggests that these groups have some experience or perspective that has shaped their attitudes toward government intervention that does not solely draw on interpersonal empathy.

Discussion

The findings of this study suggest that interpersonal empathy plays a significant role in people’s attitudes toward government intervention. What is not known from this study is the directionality of the relationship. Does interpersonal empathy create more positive attitudes toward government intervention, or does a positive attitude about government intervention increase one’s empathy? Given that previous research has suggested a bi-directional relationship (Singer et al., 2006), future research should explore this as well as whether this relationship exists in other populations.

The relationship between empathy and attitudes toward government intervention suggest that empathic insight into the experiences of others may support peoples' attitudes toward making an effort to create policies that support the welfare and well-being of others. While this may seem obvious, it is important to reflect on the fact that empathy can be taught and enhanced. It is not a static characteristic. One way that empathy can be nurtured is through the cultivation of meaningful interactions and relationships between people from different aspects of society. Some may argue that policymakers will rarely sit and have a meaningful conversation with those for whom they are making important decisions. However, we can use our understanding of empathy to share empathy-building skills and strategies with not only policymakers but with community members across our nation. Empathic decision-making power lies not only in the hands of the elected, but also in the hands of those who vote or who are engaged at any level in making their communities better.

In addition to the relationship found between empathy and attitudes toward government intervention, most striking in the findings of this study is the fact that the variance explained doubled when the demographic variables were
included in the second model. Although previous studies suggest that powerlessness is associated with an increased ability for the brain to mirror the experiences of others—the physiological underpinnings of empathy—the findings of this study suggest that experiences of being in groups with less access to social power have important implications, even after holding empathy levels constant. This finding suggests that those who belong to marginalized groups may have unique experiences and knowledge that impacts their perceptions of government intervention. Much more research is needed to further explain this relationship, but given many non-dominant social groups’ negative histories with government intervention, it is important to understand and assess the favorable attitudes and to understand the kind of interventions that these groups would find beneficial. At a minimum, social workers and other human service providers can work to include the voices of people from marginalized communities at the tables of decision making bodies and to use their perspectives to help shape government intervention efforts.

Making these findings publicly known and allowing research such as this study to be entered into the public debate would benefit social workers as well as those the profession serves. Such research evidence supports the inclusion of voices in the dialogue about government intervention in ways that may support the development of more empathic policy-making. The findings also provide some direction for social workers, who often feel unsure about how to impact policy debates about government intervention. Building empathy, particularly self–other awareness and perspective taking, is something that social workers can do—among one another, in our constituent groups, and with elected officials. Supporting greater understanding across differences enhances the sense that “we are all in this together” and government is an extension of ourselves. It belongs to us all.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations of this exploratory study. The sample from which the data was collected is limited in its generalizability. It was a convenience sample of students taking social work courses at one institution in the southwestern United States. Future research should explore whether the
relationships found between variables exists in other, broader populations, as well as outside of a university setting.

In addition, due to the low numbers of participants within some of the racial and ethnic groups represented within the sample, the researchers made a decision to not eliminate those cases but rather to include them by collapsing the sample into a dichotomous group of dominant and non-dominant based on the racial structure that exists within U.S. society. The researchers acknowledge that this is problematic in some ways, and an oversimplification of the racial and ethnic experience in the U.S. However, the researchers were guided by previous research in the area of perceived racial and ethnic discrimination that ties the experiences of people to the social group with which they most identify (Hernandez, 2005; Michelson & Pallares, 2001). Future research should seek samples that include racial and ethnic groups of participants large enough to separate. Indeed, such research may find distinct differences in the relationships between variables as compared to other non-dominant racial groups.

Finally, a limitation of this study is the scale items that were used to assess people’s attitudes toward government intervention around issues of social welfare. These items have not been validated as a scale beyond the Cronbach’s alpha score that was identified for this sample. In addition, the response patterns for the items were skewed positively. This could be a reflection of the items, or of the sample. Future research should further validate the measure, including testing it in other populations.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the United States' social welfare system, government intervention has played a significant and pervasive role. Interpersonal empathy contributes to attitudes toward government intervention. In addition to empathy, identification as female, poor or working class family background, and as a member of a non-dominant racial or ethnic group have a positive relationship with people’s attitudes toward government intervention related to social well-being. Further research is needed to explore all of the factors that impact people’s attitudes and behaviors related to supporting government intervention, as well as the relationships between
factors. It is particularly important that social workers and human service providers understand both the dominant and non-dominant narratives that shape the attitudes of policy makers, voters and community members at large. One way to do this is to engage in efforts to increase empathic insight.

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Social Responsibility and Altruism in Small- and Medium-Sized Innovative Businesses

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Ramsi Bodine
San Juan College

This study examines the interview narratives of owners of 73 small and medium-sized businesses from a large metropolitan area located in the southwestern U.S. Our analysis focuses on owner discussions of their motivations and goals for starting and running their own businesses. Our findings reveal three central motivational narrative themes: (1) traditional business-centered success outcomes—a category we refer to as “Business is Business”; (2) owners’ personal and family well-being and fulfillment, labeled as “Business is Personal”; and (3) social responsibility concerns directed toward the betterment of other people and society more generally that we labeled as “Business is Doing Good.” Owner narratives typically referenced motives in more than one of these three realms. However, relatively, they expended considerably more time and energy discussing altruistic or social responsibility goals compared to strictly business or personal motives. Our study reveals the importance of norms of social responsibility in the discursive constructions of small and medium-sized businesses.

Key words: social responsibility, entrepreneurship, small business, narrative analysis, altruism, business motivations

Until recently, terms such as altruism and social responsibility have not been associated with successful commercial enterprises. Concerns for social welfare have been viewed as inconsistent with capitalist goals of efficiency and profit maximization (Lahdesmaki & Takala, 2012). Some
commentators posit that the primary objective of business owners and managers must be the pursuit of profit, not social concerns (Friedman, 1962; Sudaram & Inkpen, 2004). However, in the past decade, there has been more scrutiny of business ethics and there have been increasing calls for socially responsible business behavior. Such concerns have intensified since the 2008 lending crisis and banking and investment scandals.

Business social responsibility (SR) may be used to refer to activities undertaken by business to further social and/or environmental objectives beyond legal requirements (Fenwick, 2010). The "social" in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been related to “non-shareholding stakeholders that may include local or even global communities, government, customers, and trade groups” in large corporations (Fenwick, 2010, p.151; Lange & Fenwick, 2008). Growing public demands for responsible conduct suggest that sustainable firms of the future must incorporate social and environmental, as well as economic, considerations (Peterson & Jun, 2006).

Elkington (1997) has called this philosophy the “Triple Bottom Line.” When the concept of the triple bottom line was introduced, firms were reluctant to accept it because they feared it would cut profits. Such resistance among the business community endures, but some leaders and scholars have outlined ways in which socially responsible objectives not only can but must be a part of business (e.g., Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003; Jenkins, 2006; Kell, 2003). Amid increasing government paralysis, business deregulation, and diminishing support for state-funded social welfare functions, it is important to identify niches of support for business social responsibility.

Research on business SR typically has focused on corporations, but a growing body of research now addresses the commitment to and nature of SR in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Besser & Miller, 2001; Jenkins, 2006). SMEs are important in today’s economy, and research suggests that SME owners’ commitment to and definitions of SR vary significantly from that of corporate management (Essers & Benschop, 2007; Fenwick, 2010; Peterson & Jun, 2006). Research also suggests that combining social and commercial objectives requires both extensive commitment and innovation (e.g., Fenwick, 2010). Yet, social and commercial goals are not all that drive entrepreneurs in SME’s. Personal motivations, such as
autonomy, creativity, security, and family, also motivate SME owners (Watson, 2009).

This paper is drawn from a larger interview study of innovation in SMEs in a large southwestern metropolitan area. Our focus here is on 73 respondents’ constructions of the motivations and goals (past and present) that drive their business operations. These “driving force” narratives detail entrepreneurs’ positioning of themselves and their businesses with regard to: (1) traditional business-oriented objectives; (2) personal fulfillment motivations; and (3) social responsibility agendas (SRAs). They offer insight into the ways in which these driving force themes converge and conflict, and the extent to which they are external to or embedded within respondents’ views of their businesses. Since innovative SMEs are often identified as the hope for future economic prosperity and job creation, it is significant that our study focuses on driving force as constructed by the owner/operators of such firms.

After our literature review and methodology sections, we first describe three broad driving force themes within respondent narratives: business-centered; personal; and social. Next, we provide some broad quantitative indicators of respondent emphasis on driving force themes, followed by a qualitative content analysis of respondent narratives. In the final section of our analysis, we summarize the relative emphasis and qualitative narrative patterns across entrepreneur characteristics (i.e., gender, race, ethnicity, age), and across business characteristics (i.e., business sector, age, and stage). Our findings shed light on the ways in which SR figures into SMEs with community reputations for innovation. We argue that respondent narratives are not simply to be dismissed as symbolic references, but rather serve as a means for constructing entrepreneur and business identities. These identities may be multiple and changing, but they also can frame action and consciousness (Somers, 1994).

Social Responsibility in SMEs

Definitions of business SR vary considerably. A variety of practices have been associated with CSR, including respect for ethical values, intellectual property rights, customer privacy, transparent recordkeeping/reporting, improving quality of life in areas affected by the business, ethical employment
practices, preserving natural resources, and supporting local community. Also included are activities and practices associated with global justice causes (Berthoin & Sobcak, 2004; Crowther & Rayman-Bacchus, 2004, cited in Fenwick, 2010).

As researchers addressed the importance of moving SR studies beyond corporations to SMEs, they examined topics such as altruism, philanthropy, community involvement, and SR objectives in a variety of countries (e.g., Ahmad & Seet, 2010; Fenwick, 2010; Litz & Samu, 2008; Madden, Scaife, & Crissman, 2006). This research suggests that SMEs merit attention because they contribute to the economic output and employment opportunities of most national economies. Research suggests that SR values are prevalent among SME owners whose views and levels of commitment to SR differ markedly from those of corporate management.

A number of critics have argued that corporate SR goals may be little more than “window dressing” aiming to increase legitimacy and enhance the corporate bottom line (Gates, 2004; Livesey, 2002). Yet, research finds that SME owners are often highly critical of the instrumental orientation that they associate with larger corporate SR displays (Fenwick, 2010; Madden et al., 2006). Some argue that owners and managers of small businesses have more control over the operating values and activities of their companies than do managers of large corporations and that SME commitments may go well beyond the “enlightened self-interest” of hoping for profitable returns to doing social good (Lahdesmaki & Takala, 2012). Motives of SME owners for philanthropy and other SR goals are often characterized as a personal commitment and sense of moral obligation that endure even when not necessarily profitable for the business (Fenwick, 2010). Some common barriers to the incorporation of SRAs into SME practice include balancing SRAs with profit demands, overcoming resistance to SRAs that may arise from partners, financiers, employees, and customers, increased pressures for more commitments from community groups once labeled as an SR firm, and resolving competing ethical goals that may arise in implementing SRAs (Fenwick, 2010; Madden et al., 2006).

Differing definitions and magnitudes of commitment to SRAs have been associated with entrepreneur demographics.
and personal values. Based upon her analysis of entrepreneur interview narratives, Tara Fenwick suggests that enduring commitment to SR objectives requires innovative strategies to overcome the challenges to combining SR and financial goals. She and others (e.g., Litz & Samu, 2008) conclude that operating a SR business vision is an emergent process learned through association and experience. SRAs are “not developed a priori and imposed. Instead SR vision emerged through practice as the owners met new opportunities, challenges and resistances” (Fenwick, 2010, p. 165). Thus, we may observe greater SR commitments among maturing business owners.

On the other hand, younger business owners and newer businesses might exhibit more idealism than established and older business owners. Some researchers have hypothesized that SR commitment may be stronger among women entrepreneurs, because women’s business practices often exhibit an ethic of care (Brush, 1992), although tests of this hypothesis are equivocal (Ahmad & Seet, 2010; Peterson & Jun, 2006). Educational levels have been positively associated with SRAs in SMEs. The variations in support for SRAs across entrepreneur characteristics are not surprising because of the close association between an entrepreneur’s personality and values and the nature of the business (Lahdesmaki & Takala, 2012; Lange & Fenwick, 2008; Madden et al., 2006). Similarly, research suggests that definitions, barriers, and strategies for incorporating SRAs were closely tied to the context of the business, including business type, age and profitability (Fenwick, 2010; Peterson & Jun, 2006). For example, the growth of “green” business initiatives might encourage a new generation of business owners who are more concerned with sustainability and environmentally-friendly business policies (Berthoin & Sobcak, 2004).

Given the current emphasis on innovation within SMEs, it is important to consider the presence and nature of SRAs in innovative firms. In reviewing our interview data drawn from locally identified innovative firms, we were struck by the degree to which SRAs figure into entrepreneur narratives about the “driving force” for their businesses. We observed interesting ways in which SRAs interfaced with other motivational themes. We also wanted to consider possible variations in motivations across different entrepreneur demographic
and business characteristics that have been identified in past research.

Consistent with the work of Somers (1994) and others (e.g., Downing, 2005; Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010), we argue that respondent narratives are not simply symbolic references, fleeting performances, or reflections of experience. We regard the interview context as central to an understanding of respondent narratives (see Presser, 2004), and argue that the social constructions of entrepreneur and business identities that we observed in our interviews, although multiple and fluid, not only reflect but may also shape entrepreneur consciousness and activities. We detail the methodology of our study below.

Methodology

Our data were drawn from a larger study of business dynamics and innovation processes in owner-operated SMEs within a large metropolitan area in the southwestern United States (SWEMA). We employed a qualitative methodology that included techniques associated with in-depth interviewing, grounded theory, ethnographic content analysis, and narrative analysis (Altheide, 1987; Charmaz, 2006; Downing, 2005; Presser, 2004). The larger study focused on owner narratives about innovation in their firms. We also included questions about the firm history, entrepreneurs’ motivations, goals, experiences, and lastly, work–life balance issues.

We adopted a non-random, purposive sampling design aiming first to identify firms that were recognized either by local chambers of commerce, business organizations, or business magazines as innovative firms. We generated lists of such locally owned and operated firms scattered around three of the largest cities within SWEMA. We contacted firms so as to vary our sample along several lines including firm size, age, and business sector. We selected firms from industry areas that provided significant employment in SWEMA. In order to understand the business dynamics across a variety of entrepreneur demographics, we varied our interview sample so that to the extent possible, we would obtain narratives from a diversity of owners across gender, race, ethnicity, owner age, and sexual orientation. Fifty percent of the owners approached agreed to participate in the approximately 45 - 75 minute interviews for
Interviews were conducted over a two-year period from late 2008 through the middle of 2010. Six interviews included more than one firm owner.

Interviews were topically oriented, but allowed for open-ended discussions between the interviewer and the entrepreneur(s) about entrepreneurship history, motivations, and innovations. Questions elicited a history and description of the business; entrepreneur background, motivations and goals; nature of business innovations; barriers and opportunities to business success; work–life balance; and future plans. Responses provided insights into entrepreneurs’ driving force and business experiences. Our original sample was 82 firms. In order to focus on SMEs, we eliminated cases in which the owners employed more than 100 people (full- or part-time). Our subsample for this analysis is comprised of 73 interviews.

We began data analysis by coding according to interview topics, examining areas most emphasized and identifying unanticipated themes. Respondents’ focus on socially-oriented objectives was an emergent theme. In order to identify the relative degree of stress on different motivation types, we examined the average number of words and references and the percentage of words that respondents devoted to each driving force thematic group. Additionally, we ran correlations and tests of significance between different respondent/business characteristics and each driving force theme. We view these quantitative measures as providing a rough overview of narrative emphases. After reporting these frequency measures, we provide a qualitative overview of respondents’ driving force narratives. Our approach was consistent with ethnographic content analysis techniques that include both numeric and narrative analyses (Altheide, 1987). In analyzing the significance of our findings, consistent with Presser (2004), we reflect upon the interview and societal context in which these narratives were presented and the importance of narratives for framing SME consciousness and behavior.

Sample Demographics

Table 1 lists the demographics of the respondents. Consistent with our sampling plan, respondents included 49 percent male and 43 percent female owners. Six interviews...
(8 percent) included multiple owner respondents. Respondents were mostly college educated; only 22 percent of interviews included owners that had less than a college degree. Despite considerable efforts to develop a racially diverse sample, respondents were primarily white (77 percent). Ten percent were Black; 10 percent were of Latino/a origins; 3 percent were Asian Americans. Most respondents fell in the 40-50 and 51

Table 1. Respondent Demographics n=73*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Categories</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple respondents of different genders in these interviews</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Race &amp; Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latina/o</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing/multiple respondents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School - Some College</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree - Post-Graduate</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 18-39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 40-50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 51 and older</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Primary Business Orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial Entrepreneur</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth-Oriented Entrepreneur</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-Style Entrepreneur</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overlapping/hard to categorize</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If more than one respondent present in a single interview, demographic was left blank where respondents differed or coded once if respondents shared same demographic category.
and older age categories. We asked respondents to describe their orientation to entrepreneurship. Twenty-two percent described themselves as serial entrepreneurs who moved from business to business, selling their businesses once they became profitable. A second group (31 percent) described their major focus as business growth or expansion. The third group (37 percent) focused on blending business with their lifestyle needs.

Table 2. Respondent Primary Business Characteristics*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Sector</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Tech/Biotech/Software</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative/Professional Services</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales/Distribution/Retail</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Age</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 years old</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years old</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-15 years old</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 15 years old</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Stage/ # Employees</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sole Proprietor (0 employees)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1 (1-9 employees)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2 (10-100 employees)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If respondent owned multiple businesses, they were asked to select their primary source of business income for this coding.

Table 2 presents respondent business characteristics. We drew on U.S. Census categories to classify business stages based upon the number of employees, and the largest percentage (44 percent) was in the first stage (1-9 employees). Most (41 percent) were service sector, followed by sales/retail businesses (19 percent) and high tech/bio-tech sectors (e.g., software engineering, biopsy processing) (16 percent); 12 percent offered professional or creative services, including businesses
such as language tutoring, personal makeovers, defensive training classes, or advertising design. Most respondents operated mature businesses. Our largest business age category was 6-15 years (40%) followed by 3-5 years (21%), and 16 percent of respondents fell in each of the youngest and oldest business age groups.

Findings: Emergent Themes

We asked respondents to describe their business history and primary motivations/goals for operation (past and present). For this analysis, we focused on respondents’ narratives about what some referred to as their “driving force” in the business. We reviewed the interview transcripts and coded all discussion of entrepreneur motivations and business goals. Because discussions about motivations and goals tended to blur in respondent stories, we selected the term “driving force” (DF) as the best overall descriptor for such narratives. Respondents made a total of 682 references and used a total of 139,084 words in these narratives.

We developed an emergent DF coding scheme and observed that the detailed references coalesced around the three general DF themes. First, Business is Business (BIB) narratives contain motivations and goals dealing with the success of the entrepreneurial enterprise in the marketplace (e.g., profitability, growth opportunities) and its product/service contributions to the market. Sixty-nine of the sample of 73 entrepreneurs (94 percent) spoke of BIB motivations (377 references and 48,860 words).

The next motivational grouping clustered under a category that we called Business is Personal (BIP). These emergent themes arise from the entrepreneurs’ expression of needs/desires to glean something personal for themselves or their family from their entrepreneurial endeavors. These motivations range from employing family members, to creating personal financial stability, to developing professional autonomy, and to expressing their creativity in their work. Sixty-one of the 73 respondents (84 percent) spoke of BIP motivations driving their efforts, making 216 references and using 53,864 words to describe these personal drivers.

The most elaborated of our three general DF groupings was
best encapsulated as Business is for the Greater Good (BIG). This BIG category was referenced by 62 of the 73 entrepreneurs (86 percent). Although the number of references to BIG themes (n = 290, or 43 percent of references) was smaller than that for BIB themes, the number of words devoted to discussing BIG themes (73,201 words) exceeds the numbers of words that referred to either BIB or BIP motivations. Moreover, these numbers reflect the uniform impression of interviewers that respondents became most impassioned when speaking about BIG themes. The BIG category includes socially-oriented DFs including contributing to a broader community (Community Building), creating a positive Company Culture, supporting social and charitable causes (General Altruism, Specific Causes), and dedicating their efforts to spiritual issues or a higher being (God/Spirituality). The emphasis on this BIG grouping is a significant finding with important implications about the role of SMEs in leading the way to more socially responsible businesses in the future. It is also consistent with prior research stressing the social responsibility of SMEs.

Because some respondents spoke more total words in their interviews than did others, we also computed a ratio of the number of words devoted to each DF theme and the total number of interview words spoken by each respondent. This analysis suggests that the differences just reported were not merely the manifestation of a few BIG-oriented respondents talking more than others. The mean percentage of BIB words spoken by our respondents was 7 percent and the median percentage was 4 percent of the total number of interview words. In contrast, the mean percentage of BIP words spoken was 12 percent of total interview words with a median percentage of 10 percent. The mean percentage of total words addressing BIG themes was the largest at 15 percent and with a median of 14 percent. Thus, even when controlling for the talkativeness of respondents, findings about the relative salience of BIG themes are robust.

Of course, specific passages of driving force narratives sometimes referenced more than one DF theme. For example, a single sentence may have included a reference to two or three DF themes. As a result, some driving force passages have been coded under more than one BIB, BIP, or BIG thematic category. For this reason, a tally of BIB, BIP, and BIG words...
(i.e., 175,925), as well as the words within each sub-theme category, exceeds the overall number of DF references and words listed in Table 3 (i.e., 139,084). The overlap among BIB, BIP and BIG

Table 3a. Phoenix Innovation Study Driving Force Analysis
Categories N = 73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driving Force Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th># References</th>
<th># Words</th>
<th>Node Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total for Driving Force</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>139,084</td>
<td>Mention by respondents as their motivations for business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References - DF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business is Business (BIB)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>48,860</td>
<td>Business is Business: Motivations focused on business objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit/Money</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>10,760</td>
<td>Making money or profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9,345</td>
<td>Growing business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Something New</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18,722</td>
<td>Contribute something new to marketplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality product</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15,520</td>
<td>Provide high quality products/services to customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fill Gap</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9,710</td>
<td>Fill a gap in marketplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionize</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10,310</td>
<td>Create dramatic change in their business sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27,242</td>
<td>Help, employ, or strengthen family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16,514</td>
<td>Be one’s own boss, have flexibility or freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13,828</td>
<td>Fulfill one’s creative potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Stability</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7,354</td>
<td>Create steady income for self or family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Challenge</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12,228</td>
<td>Challenge of building successful business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby/Interest</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11,341</td>
<td>Follow a personal hobby/interest through business or because business allows time to do so</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

references illustrates the interplay among the profit-driven needs of the business, entrepreneur concerns about their own sense of well-being, and overall contributions to social welfare.

Our DF analysis in Table 3 details sub-theme areas that comprise the more general BIB, BIP, and BIG thematic realms. Interview narratives indicate that both for-profit and
non-profit agendas are central to SME entrepreneurial identities. A few such sub-themes include environmentalism, global poverty, and more general altruism. In the next section, we provide narratives that illustrate the array of driving force motivations.

Table 3b. Phoenix Innovation Study Driving Force Analysis Categories N = 73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driving Force Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th># References</th>
<th># Words</th>
<th>Node Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business is Doing Good (BIG)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>73,201</td>
<td>Altruistic, Political or Community Centered Goals for Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Building</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>32,322</td>
<td>Strengthen local community of customers, businesses or geographic area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Culture</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>22,875</td>
<td>Create a positive work environment for employees and customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help Customers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19,098</td>
<td>Provide products services that help customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Altruism</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10,534</td>
<td>Give back, do good, promote nonprofits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Engagement</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9,477</td>
<td>Use business or position to effect positive political or social change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>Help environmental causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God/Spirituality</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9,373</td>
<td>Promote religious values or fulfillment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Causes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12,759</td>
<td>Via business promote specific cause not already mentioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings: Three Driving Force Themes

In order to better detail Driving Force narratives identified in our analysis, we present numerical summaries and quotations from the BIB, BIP, and BIG thematic areas. In the interest of space, we do not present the sub-theme details in tabular form but rather summarize overall thematic totals and percentages and provide qualitative quotations. The quotations from narratives provide a window into entrepreneur rationales for entering and remaining in business. We compared these percentages across BIB, BIP, and BIG thematic areas and also correlated these percentages with the various respondent or business characteristics using Pearson’s r correlations.
measures. These findings (not shown) were consistent with those reported in the table for average number of words.

The interview setting itself is important for analyzing respondent narratives. Interview responses were sometimes similar to the ways that entrepreneurs might portray their businesses to clients, employees, competitors, and investors in their professional networks. Some respondents said that they enjoyed the interviews as an opportunity to “pitch” their business. Some respondents remarked that the interview provided an opportunity to rethink some aspect of the business. Thus, many parts of our narrative reflect the respondents’ desire to construct their image in a positive light for researchers and perhaps the public at large, but they also suggest that the interview provides a forum for respondents to reflect upon their businesses. We argue later that regardless of whether or not respondent narratives are a 100 percent reflection of actual practices, these interview constructions reveal much about contemporary discourse in SMEs. These narratives help better describe entrepreneurial goals and how owners conceptualize their business identity, business plan, and place in the larger community (Downing, 2005).

**Business is Business (BIB)**

It is not surprising that entrepreneurs referenced motivations directly related to the utilitarian functions of their business—products, markets, profits, and growth. These comments focused on concern with business niche, competition, management, clients, employee costs and other elements they saw as integral to their enterprise. Issues of profitability or making money were the most frequently referenced BIB concerns. An information technology entrepreneur candidly captures the profit motivation as his main driving force: "[B]eing a numbers guy, ... really just the idea of the prosperity... it ultimately came down to being financially well off" (332). A second said, “My goal when I first started this business was $400,000 a year ... after expenses, and that goal is still the same" (311). Another said, “[W]hen there’s money flowing, things tend to be alright. You can pay your bills and you’re not so much worried about the little nitpick things that go on in your life ... [W]hen you have no money, those things tend to magnify” (329).

Yet, as they expressed concern about the bottom line, over
80 percent of those who stressed profit also cited less pecuniary motivations. A respondent said: “Luckily, we’re a profitable company, but what we’re really about is making sure that we’re making a difference in people’s lives” (308). Another respondent said, “I can be making money but I can also be building relationships with people and the community” (333).

Growing the business was the second most popular BIB sub-theme, with more references, although in fewer words, than the Money/Profit theme. One growth-oriented entrepreneur said that in the next five years, “either the company will be much, much, much larger, or I will have sold it” (102). Another respondent said, “There’s no reason why if we had 200,000 students this year, why in five years we can’t have a million” (113).

Others saw fast growth as problematic. One said that his company’s major weakness was “the incredible growth that we’re experiencing. It makes it all hard to keep up with” (114). Another said, “What we first thought was successful was to grow your business and have a lot of employees… [T]hat wasn’t the way we should grow in a healthy manner” (103).

Whether in addition to or apart from profit and growth concerns, many respondents stressed that they wanted to provide Quality Product/Service concerns. For example, the co-owner of a home building company said:

> We have a core set of values that we set, maybe 10 years ago, that really is a living document. And everybody is acutely aware of it, and it does govern our day-to-day operations. When we have to make tough decisions, it’s where we look for inspiration. And the dollar isn’t the bottom line in our company, it’s doing the right thing for the project…. It doesn’t pay off immediately… but ... we get it down the road. (115)

Some entrepreneurs went beyond tying their business identities to offering a product or service in the marketplace. Their BIB goals focused on developing a product or service that filled a gap in the market (i.e., Fill Gap), or developed a new type of product or service (i.e., Something New). Some respondents discussed creating a market revolution or transforming the nature of their business sector. These narratives led us to create a BIB sub-theme called, Revolutionize Sector.
The basic goal of our business is ... to fundamentally change the way education is done, so that we can blend technology with the good parts of traditional classroom and teachers ... But we also believe that it’s very important to give teachers the best possible tools, so that they can have ... more options for helping students achieve their goals. (113)

These quotations reveal a range of BIB concerns, and they begin to suggest how one DF theme might converge with another. However, as noted, a large majority of respondents went beyond strictly the business approach to stress personal and social responsibility goals.

Business is Personal (BIP)

Respondents devoted considerable numbers of words and references to what they personally gained from their business experiences. We coded these BIP responses into six sub-theme areas that are listed in Table 3. These DF sub-themes might also be thought of as consistent with Schumpeter’s (1982) hedonistic type of motivation for entrepreneurship.

Some respondents stressed the personal rewards associated with overcoming the challenges of entrepreneurship. For example, "I got my work ethic from people like Patton. With a model that you don’t back up, you just keep moving forward" (311). Others described the lure of autonomy, or of making a living with their creativity, or expanding on a hobby or interest.

I’m an MD, and a researcher of diabetes. But as a hobby, I started, sort of on the side, doing DNA sexing [on animals]. I started doing that because people were mailing samples to Florida; there were not many labs doing it. I thought it’d be a good idea for retirement ... I started to do tests; it kind of grew. Eventually I had to quit my job! (200)

Some entrepreneurs spoke about making money for personal income stability and what this implies. This motivation —Money/Stability—was not the most prevalent among BIP motivations, but it was important for 24 out of 73 respondents, and represents a slightly different take on typical BIB profit
motives. The following quotations describe money for stability concerns:

As far as my marriage and my husband, we're pretty free to enjoy life when we want to. ... Some people make more money and then buy more things. I think more about the comfort and stability. (112)

My goal was always to start my own business and nothing else matters. It was just a matter to convince [my wife] that we are secure. (202)

The most frequent BIP motivation among our respondents was the desire to use their business owner position to strengthen and/or employ members of their families. The Family BIP sub-theme combines personal and altruistic motivations for family. This driving force is exemplified by a home builder who was intent on integrating family life with business activities:

I do ... try to drag my kids along with me whenever it’s possible and whenever it’s appropriate. I remember I took my youngest daughter, the 14-year-old, to some event and this short, very enthusiastic, funny, little White guy walks up and shakes her hand; he walks on, and she says, “Daddy, who was that?” “Oh, that was the mayor.” (314)

The BIP grouping of entrepreneurial DF themes captures myriad personal returns to entrepreneurship for what is almost always a costly investment of time, energy, and capital.

*Business is Doing Good (BIG)*

As noted, the business community has come under pressure from government and the public to use their position as wealth and employment creators, to forward altruistic agendas and improve the well-being of society as a whole. This push resonated with our emergent finding of respondents’ strong emphasis on social responsibility and altruistic goals (BIG category). Overall, respondents devoted more words to discussing their BIG motivations (73,201 words) than they did to either utilitarian business BIB motivations (48,860 words) or the hedonistic personal BIP factors (53,864 words) driving their
business endeavors. Although fewer entrepreneurs referenced BIG themes (n = 62) (relative to the 69 referencing BIB themes), the numbers of words expressing BIG concerns are higher than those associated with BIB or BIP themes across different entrepreneur and business types. Even when we computed the number of BIG words for each respondent as a percentage of the total number of interview words (i.e., #BIG Words/#Total Interview Words), the prevalence of social responsibility and altruistic themes in the interviews remained.

Respondents detailed many examples of responsibilities that they assumed as members of the local business community. Such an ethos is exemplified by the owner of a tea house/restaurant who takes seriously her role as mentor of other business owners.

There are two women who are opening their own gelato shop; they came in and showed me their floor plans and talked to me about the direction they were going in to get my opinion … I’ve got to do that so they don’t make the same mistakes I made … That’s one of my favorite parts of the things that I do right now. (312)

When it came to dedicating their efforts to helping others through their business operations, respondents spoke of drawing on their life philosophies, religious beliefs, or value systems. While the specific ways in which they operationalized their human resource concerns varied widely and were rooted in the type of business they ran, more than half our sample proudly spoke about the positive work environment that they created for employees. Narratives about shaping the work environment were integrally linked to the type of business they operated. The following quotation is from the owner of a post-secondary holistic medicine trade school:

We have a unique … idea … that people can work 32 hours per week so that they can pursue their own goals and aspirations outside of here. We encourage entrepreneurship. …We have a real big value of being able to provide people with health insurance. We set it up that if you work over 25 hours per week, we pay your full health insurance. … In some companies, 25 hours would be considered part-time. … We encourage
holistic health coverage so they can really take care of themselves. And have a little creative outlet. Have some kind of little business, coaching or practice on the side. (308)

Although a focus on the care of clients and employees may not be purely altruistic, the tone of such discussions suggests that consistent with literature (e.g., Fenwick, 2010), our respondents had incorporated these agendas as principles of operation and moral imperatives in ways that transcended mere utilitarian objectives.

Of course, entrepreneurs also sought to impact the world outside their own companies and business networks. This more general altruism spirit espoused by respondents led to an array of specific social contributions. Such contributions were often closely connected to the for-profit core of the business.

In some cases, BIG themes were framed as integral to running the business, as seen in a janitorial service owner’s comments coded under Environment motivation:

We do commercial cleaning and we specialize in green products, everything from the chemicals we use are green certified, to the trash liners we use are recycled, to the vacuums that we use, the filters they have in them are used to reduce the pollen in the air, things like that. (336)

Some entrepreneurs focused on political engagement. The following respondent was a male architect who ran a consulting business focused on affordable housing:

I will continue designing and doing research…. I would like to grow my practice a little more ... We are very committed to increasing the quality and the quantity of affordable housing, healthier communities, sustainable communities, and that mission is one of the most important missions of my own personal beliefs. (328)

In addition to social change-oriented DFs, there were also narratives about using business position and resources to further owners’ particular altruistic causes. These
included a range of activities, from work with specific charities, to following a spiritual or religious mission such as promoting holistic healing or strengthening families through a Christian childcare service.

It is not surprising that entrepreneurs spoke about motivations to create successful businesses (BIB) by offering novel and/or quality products and services. It is also not surprising that they described motivations for personal fulfillment. Providing opportunities for their families and an income for themselves are obvious reasons to assume the risks of entrepreneurship. Yet, consistent with the growing literature on social responsibility and altruism in SME’s, our respondent narratives stressed BIG concerns. Our interview data indicate the prominence of SR goals in the discursive framing of selves and businesses by SME entrepreneurs, despite knowing that their statements would remain anonymous. Even if critics argue that these narratives are no more than a by-product of impression-management rhetoric, rather than a shaper of social practice, it is significant that SME owner discourse follows a socially conscious direction. This tendency bodes well for entrepreneurs who may be pressured by the discomfort of cognitive dissonance and do more to enact their socially responsible narratives. Previous research concludes that narratives help people revise and reconstruct identities during actual work role or career transitions (Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010).

Driving Force Narratives and Entrepreneur/Business Characteristics

After our initial assessment of the salience of driving force themes for our sample, we examined variation across selected entrepreneur and business characteristics that have been shown to affect altruistic and social responsibility orientations in previous research. In the interest of space, we provide only a brief summary of our findings as a guide for future research.

We first considered the correlations between respondent demographics of gender, race, education, and age with the proportions of interview words spoken about each of the BIB, BIP, and BIG themes. We treated gender (male = 0; female = 1) and education (college degree or higher = 1; high school and some college = 0) as dummy variables. Because of the small number
of Black and Latino/a respondents, we created a dummy variable for selected categories of race and ethnicity (e.g., Black/Latino/a = 1; White = 0), and because we only had three Asian and East Indian respondents, we excluded these groups from race comparisons.

We next considered the correlations and their significance for selected business characteristics with the proportion of total interview words devoted to BIB, BIP, and BIG themes. We created dummy variables for categories of business age, type, and business stage/size. These findings are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Pearson’s r Correlations between Percentage of Total Words Devoted to DF Themes by Selected Respondent Demographics and Business Characteristicsa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>% BIB Words</th>
<th>% BIP Words</th>
<th>% BIG Words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female = 1</td>
<td>-.254**</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>-.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Latina/a = 1</td>
<td>-.325**</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Age (numeric)</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s Degree+ = 1</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hi-Tech/Bio-Tech Type = 1</td>
<td>.303***</td>
<td>-.127</td>
<td>-.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales/Service Bus = 1</td>
<td>-.259**</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.194*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing = 1</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.081</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youngest Businesses = 1</td>
<td>-.151</td>
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<td>Oldest Businesses = 1</td>
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<td>.003</td>
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<td>Sole Proprietorship = 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 1 Businesses = 1</td>
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<td>.149</td>
<td>-.077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 2 Businesses = 1</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>-.205*</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. aSignificance tests are two-tailed. We include .10 level because sample was small, making it more difficult to attain statistical significance and we wished to include these borderline differences for further investigation.

*Kendall’s tau b significant at .10 level; **Kendall’s tau b significant at .05 level; ***Kendall’s tau b significant at .01 level

We utilized Pearson’s r and associated tests of statistical significance to examine the magnitude and significance of association between respondent demographics or business...
characteristics, with the ratio of words spoken about each thematic area to total interview words.

We found no significant differences across respondent educational or age groups. However, because the vast majority of our respondents had high levels of education (i.e., bachelor’s degrees or higher), this sample does not provide a satisfactory test of differences across educational groups. We were surprised not to see more differences across age groups, because we expected younger entrepreneurs to be more ideologically committed to SR causes. However, we did have such individuals in our sample. A respondent in her early 30s created a thriving local business and social networking website tailored to commerce surrounding the local gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgendered and allied communities:

As my partner and I have gotten older, our want for equality and fair and equal treatment under the law has definitely grown. We saw an opportunity to be activists through consumer activism … and it really heightens and empowers what we, as members of this community, are offered…. And the more choice we have, the better buying decisions we’re going to have. Not only that, but when a company does business with us, it’s much harder to vote against us because you get to know us. And so we’re not this big, scary group in any way, shape, or form. Many of us are kind of boring. (315)

However, there were an almost equal number of respondents in their sixties who had also incorporated SRAs into their businesses. The following quote is from an owner of a bookstore that had been in business for well over a decade:

[O]ur goals are to make a profit, and continue the business. Beyond that, to create a good working environment for our staff, to treat them fairly and to give them a living wage—and that’s a goal that has not been reached, but it’s always one we are shooting for. We like to support education and the arts. A number of us came from an education background. We know that teachers and schools are an essential part of our culture, and a part that’s in great need of support. We’re happy to do that. And we’re lovers of the arts, and we
are unashamedly politically to the left, and we don't mind supporting both speakers and authors who carry that message, which we think is a healthy message. But we also believe in diversity of opinion. (118)

Some research has suggested that women are more focused than are men on altruistic and social responsibility agendas (Ahmad & Seet, 2010). However, we found no significant gender differences in the proportion of total words allocated to BIG themes. We did find that men’s percentage of words about BIB themes was significantly higher than that of women. There were some women who exhibited considerable interest in BIB themes, but their discussion was usually linked back to BIG concerns. One woman in a computer software business described her goal as, “To be able to grow so that every city and school district and all four branches of the military use it” (their product) (100). Interestingly, her business product grew out of a history in work for nonprofit organizations, and she planned to return to the nonprofit sector after the sale of her business. This interweaving pattern occurred with men too, but again, men focused a greater proportion of words on BIB than did women.

African American and Latino/a respondents also devoted significantly smaller percentages of words to BIB themes than did White respondents, but there were no significant differences in the proportion of words devoted to BIG themes across racial groups. It is difficult to evaluate these patterns, however, because of the small size of our African American and Latino/a sample. Only one Latino/a respondent referenced BIB themes whereas six African American respondents spoke of BIB themes. Latino/a respondents spoke most often about BIG themes of community—contributing to it and building it—but such themes were not entirely absent from African American and White respondent narratives.

Turning to business characteristics, we observed that sales and service-type business owners (including professional and all other services) devoted a greater percentage of words to BIG themes and a lower percentage to BIB topics than did other types of business owners. In contrast, hi-tech/bio-tech business owners seemed more focused on BIB themes than were other businesses. Although this latter correlation was
only significant at the .10 level for a two-tailed test, we note it because our qualitative analysis suggested that hi-tech/bio-tech businesses were those generally most hopeful about significant expansion and profit opportunities. It was also the case that White women and people of color were significantly less likely to be located in hi-tech/bio-tech businesses. Thus, business sector may explain some of the variation in BIB words along gender and race and ethnic lines. Two White male respondents, one who was in his 20s and another in his mid-40s, focused on expanding their hi-tech/bio-tech businesses:

We need to continue developing our products, to keep improving our products, and what we need is … a couple of successes in the market, right? And then … one of two things will happen: either the value proposition we have is so great that somebody will buy us, or scenario two is that we believe we can create more value by staying where we are and just grow. (204)

Respondents in older businesses (5+ years) devoted a greater percentage of words to BIB themes when compared with the newer business age groups, although this correlation (p < .10) does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, and the older age category collapses a long business age span. Stage 1 business owners (1 - 9 employees) focused more than the other two business stage categories on BIB talk (p < .05 level), and sole proprietors focused a significantly smaller percentage of words on BIB themes on average when compared with the two other business stage groups. Interestingly, it was the Stage 2 business owners (10 - 100 employees) who devoted the greater percentage of words to BIP themes. This correlation was not significant but came close enough to make it worth mentioning for future research (p < .10). This is interesting and reflects a tendency that we noticed qualitatively: the most established businesses perceived more leeway and “earned right” to enjoy work. A woman with a Stage 2 toy manufacturing business illustrates a convergence of BIP, BIG and BIG motivations:
When you’re fully invested in your company, you’re working 24-7 on it. My mind is always thinking. I can look at a little girl playing on the beach, I think, oh this would be so cute if I drew a little girl doing this. So my mind is always thinking and creating, I don’t ever turn it off. It’s part of the way that I live … Where I’m at right now, I really want to make a difference in children’s lives, and create things that build positive self-image ... I think if we do this thing right, we’ll have enough money to last us the rest of our lives. (104)

Overall, we found few significant differences in the proportions of BIG words allocated across demographic and business characteristics, and this is likely the case, in at least part, because of the emphasis on BIG themes that ran through almost every interview.

Summary and Conclusions

Recent decades have seen declines in spending for social welfare programs, education, and infrastructure. There has been increasing pressure on the nonprofit sector as a source for charitable work and the development of social economy enterprises, functions that were formerly the domain of government (Giddens, 1988; Gonzales, 2007). Yet, the nonprofit sector is increasingly overburdened and operating beyond capacity in the face of diminishing governmental contributions (Bridgeland, McNaught, Reed, & Dunkelman, 2009). At the same time, we have also witnessed the decreasing regulation of business and increasing reports of corporate wrongdoing on a grand scale. The confluence of these trends is generating pressure on corporations to adopt more socially responsible objectives (Peterson & Jun, 2006). However, many question whether these corporate SRAs are anything more than window dressing designed to appease critics and capture socially-minded consumers (e.g., Gates, 2004).

Recent research on the business ethics and concerns of SMEs (e.g., Fenwick, 2010; Jenkins, 2006) has suggested that many owners adopt altruistic or socially responsible business goals. Researchers have argued that SME owners have more power to adopt and implement SRAs, and if strongly committed to such values, persist even when they are less profitable
than purely profit-oriented objectives (Lahdesmaki & Takala, 2012).

Our study contributes to this growing body of research by analyzing the driving force narratives of 73 owners of SMEs that have been defined as innovative and successful in a large southwestern metropolitan area. It is noteworthy that the setting for our research is a fiscally conservative community that is highly oriented to “free” and unregulated markets. It is also important to note that our interviews took place in a recessionary period, a time when many businesses might feel pressured to reduce SRAs.

It is not surprising that our findings revealed that respondents attended to traditional business is business (BIB) goals of profit, growth, and competitiveness. Respondents also spoke of the many personal motivations (BIP) they held for operating a business, which is not surprising given the attention that personal fulfillment has received in past literature about entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1982). What was impressive, however, was the strong emphasis that most respondents placed on goals of doing good (BIG) in ways that included improving the community, environment, and promoting positive political and social change. Consistently, across demographic and business type categories, respondents directed greater percentages of words on average to BIG topics than to BIB or BIP motivations. Although many offered examples of how concerns with profitability guided their operations, they typically devoted more time and energy to discussions of socially responsible objectives—objectives that in many cases, were a defining feature of the enterprise.

There were also numerous examples in which individuals expressed a willingness to forgo growth or profit objectives in order to maintain a commitment to workers, clients, and/or communities. Although we interviewed some younger respondents who had organized their businesses around SRAs, age was not significantly associated with the percentage of total words devoted to BIG themes. Indeed, there were several older respondents for whom social responsibility was a defining business goal. Men were significantly more attentive to BIB agendas than were women, but men and women both devoted more words to BIG themes than to the other two DF types, on average. High Tech/Bio-Tech businesses also appeared more
concerned with BIB motives than did other business types. Because of our small and non-representative sample, more research is needed to uncover further insights into the generalizability and bases of the differences observed here.

Although our study does not measure actual business practice, we regard it as significant that these SMEs identified as innovative firms in their communities so strongly stressed “doing good” as a driving force in their business (BIG). This was an emergent and unanticipated finding of our research on business innovation. Because we did not specifically ask about social responsibility in our interview schedule, it is all the more impressive that respondents spoke about it so much. It may be that part of their innovativeness and success is associated with a stronger commitment to SR than that of other firms. Nevertheless, we find these SME narratives offer a ray of hope in an otherwise dismal era of support for socially responsible agendas in government, business, and society more generally. Speaking and thinking positively about business social responsibility may be a vital first step to framing positive social change.

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References


Infantilization is a behavioral pattern in which a person of authority interacts with, responds to, or treats an elderly person in a child-like manner. This paper uses Erving Goffman’s theories as a framework from which to analyze the reasons for and the results of infantilization of elderly residents in partial and total institutions (i.e., adult day care centers and nursing homes). First, we review the literature on infantilization. Next, we offer a brief summary of Goffman’s work and delineate his major theoretical assumptions. Then, we analyze the process of infantilization through Goffman’s theories. Finally, we offer suggestions for advancing research using Goffman’s premises. This paper asks whether infantilization can produce symptoms of dementia in institutionalized elders. If Goffman is correct, the answer may be yes. Six researchable propositions are offered to test Goffman’s theoretical framework.

Key words: Infantilization, Goffman, Dramaturgical Model, Dementia, Institutional Living

Elder residents of partial institutions such as adult day care centers (see Salari, 2005) and total institutions (see Goffman, 1961) such as nursing homes experience many undeniable benefits. Adult day care centers and nursing homes provide much needed professional care that families are often ill equipped to provide. At the same time, elders also experience negative
effects in institutionalized settings, such as being infantilized. This practice has captured the attention of researchers over the past few decades (see Hockey & James, 1993; Marson, 2013a; Salari, 2005, 2013; Salari & Rich, 2001; Whitbourne, Culgin, & Cassidy, 1995). Infantilization is a behavioral pattern in which a person of authority (social workers, medical personnel, etc.) interacts with, responds to, or treats an elderly person as if he or she were a child. Using secondary baby talk when speaking to elders may be the most common form of infantilizing behavior. Secondary baby talk is a patronizing type of speech in which the speaker uses an exaggerated intonation, a higher pitched voice, and a child-like vocabulary while speaking slowly and loudly (Hockey & James, 1993; Whitbourne et al., 1995; Wood & Ryan, 1991). Other common infantilizing behaviors include using overly familiar forms of address, such as pet names, publicly disclosing the client’s personal and medical information, and using age inappropriate recreational activities (Salari & Rich, 2001).

Our interest in this topic was spawned by two anecdotal situations. The first was a situation the Director of Nursing (DON) of a local nursing home shared with the first author. When a well-liked, competent caregiver left the staff to pursue other opportunities and was replaced by a social worker who used a different approach with the residents, the DON noticed a marked improvement in the elderly patients’ verbal responses. The patients seemed more alert and less cognitively impaired in their interactions with staff and visitors. The DON noted that the only explanation she could offer was the difference in the caregivers’ communication styles, since both were competent and caring staff members. In her attempt to be nurturing and comforting, the first caregiver spoke to the residents in a slow, sing-song voice using a child-like vocabulary. The caregiver who replaced her spoke to the residents with the same adult speech patterns she used with staff. Much to the surprise of the DON, some residents who had previously spoken very little or who had seemed to show signs of dementia started speaking and interacting in more normal ways. This anecdote caused us to question whether infantilization can alter the responses of elders to their caretakers and, in turn, increase the risk of the residents being labeled as cognitively incompetent.

The second situation occurred during the second author’s
mother’s last hospital stay as she was dying from cancer. She was quite angry with the nurses and doctors who infantilized her and told them: “Just because I’m old and can’t hear you, don’t think I’m stupid. Stop talking baby-talk to me and treating me like I’m not smart enough to make my own health decisions.” This experience caused us to ask whether elders consider infantilization a form of mistreatment.

While we wish to question whether infantilization of elder residents may trigger responses that mimic cognitive impairment, we do not intend to minimize the very real and tragic effects of dementia. According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC, n.d.), the term dementia covers a multitude of cognitive disorders, including everything from mild cognitive impairment to advanced stage Alzheimer’s. Moreover, the older a person is, the higher their risk for various forms of dementia, with an estimated 25% to 50% of all persons over the age of 85 experiencing some form of cognitive impairment (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.; National Center on Elder Abuse, n.d.a). Since the 65 and older population is expected to increase by 36% to approximately 55 million by 2020 (National Center on Elder Abuse, n.d.a), the incidence of dementia is also likely to rise. Although only 4.1% of all persons 65 and older were living in nursing homes as of 2009, 14.3% of persons 85 years of age or older resided in nursing homes (National Center on Elder Abuse, n.d.b). The National Center on Elder Abuse (n.d.b) reports that elders with dementia experience higher levels of abuse from their caregivers than cognitively healthy elders. Based on these estimates, a large number of elders in nursing homes will experience some level of cognitive impairment and be at some risk for mistreatment.

Infantilization: Nurturing or Disrespectful?

Although many health professionals consider infantilizing speech patterns as nurturing and supportive, most elders view them as patronizing and disrespectful (Caporael, Lucaszewski, & Culbertson, 1983). While there is support for the benefits of talking slowly and loudly to dependent, institutionalized residents to accommodate real needs, the practice of infantilizing elders is viewed negatively by elderly residents (Caporael et al., 1983; Marson, 2013b; Ryan, Kennaley, Pratt, & Shumovich,
Although college students and caregivers who hold stereotypes about the elderly consider baby-talk the most appropriate way to communicate with elders (Caporael, 1981), most institutionalized elders view it as disrespectful and patronizing (Caporael et al., 1983; Whitbourne et al., 1995). Salari (2005) contends that the practice of infantilizing elders is a form of elder mistreatment because of the negative effects. The majority of elders believe they are infantilized not because of their individual conditions but because of age stereotypes about their mental and physical capabilities (Coupland, Coupland, Giles, & Henwood, 1988). To show their displeasure, some elderly institutionalized residents adopt defensive behaviors such as making sarcastic remarks, verbally attacking caregivers, and challenging punishments and reprimands, while others withdraw from social interactions with caregivers (Salari, 2005).

Language research shows that speakers tend to use accommodation strategies based on their assumptions of the listener’s capabilities (Giles, Fox, & Smith, 1993). Unfortunately, elders are often stereotyped as having diminished cognitive and physical abilities, which can lead caretakers to accommodate residents by assuming a stereotypical level of incompetence rather than accommodating the individual client’s communication needs (Wood & Ryan, 1991). Patronizing and infantilizing speech may be even more harmful to elders who passively accept being treated as confused or forgetful than to those who act defensively, since acceptance may actually create a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy by eliciting the expected behavior from the dependent elder (Wood & Ryan, 1991). Repeated use of patronizing speech with elders constrains them from being able to interact at their actual level of competence, which can result in lowered levels of capability (Nussbaum et al., 2005). Coupland et al. (1988) found that when caretakers use over-accommodating talk, some elders will accept the stereotypes and respond accordingly. Caregivers may believe that passive acceptance confirms their stereotypes of elderly incompetence (Ryan et al., 2000).

A common stereotype is that people become senile and cognitively impaired as they age (Cardinali & Gordon, 2002). Even doctors fall prey to ageist assumptions which can affect
their diagnoses (Lichtenberg, 2012). Most people, including doctors, have a tendency toward confirmation bias, which results in searching for supporting rather than contradictory evidence for their observations (Mendel et al., 2011). Thus, doctors who are not well versed in the various types of cognitive dysfunctions experienced by elders may be more prone to believe that all cognitive impairment in elders is a form of dementia, which increases the risk of misdiagnosis (Lichtenberg, 2012). However, a misdiagnosis of cognitive impairment can occur for a variety of reasons other than ageist assumptions. Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Jonker (2012) contend that failure to rule out other medical reasons and overreliance on brain imaging can increase the risk of misdiagnoses as well. They claim that various medications, as well as depression, can mimic cognitive impairment. Variability in cognitive ability over time also adds to the difficulty of accurate diagnoses. For example, in their five year study of elders diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment, Britt, Hansen, Bhaskerrao, Larsen, and Petersen (2011) found that some of the subjects returned to normal cognitive functioning by the end evaluation period, while others had fluctuations in their levels of cognitive impairment over the five year period. Cognitive ability does not necessarily remain static over time (Britt et al., 2011; Duffy & Healy, 2011).

Stolee, Hiller, Etkin, and McLeod (2012) claim that although much work has been done to identify best health care practices for the general population, very little has been done to help us identify elder neglect or abuse. If, as Salari (2005) claims, infantilization is a form of elder abuse, we need to develop better practices for the elderly. We argue that one place to begin this process is through gaining a theoretical understanding of the process. We contend that Erving Goffman’s theories (1959, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1986) can provide some illumination on the effects of infantilizing elderly institutionalized residents which, in turn, may help develop better practices.

Goffman's Dramaturgy and Frame Analysis Theories

Goffman developed two theories that, when combined, can help illuminate the impact that a caregiver’s presentation style has on the elderly: Dramaturgy and Frame Analysis. His
theory of Dramaturgy is based on Shakespeare’s observation in Act II, Scene 7 of As You Like It: “All the world’s a stage and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts.” Goffman (1959) built upon this idea by asserting that in our everyday lives, we are analogous to actors who try to manage the audience’s impressions on the front stage and then retreat back stage to recuperate, rest, and prepare ourselves for the next act. This theory outlines how we attempt to manage the impressions others have of us by using common cultural scripts as we act out our roles. However, taken alone, Goffman’s Dramaturgy theory does not explain where our cultural scripts come from. His Frame Analysis theory provides that answer. Goffman (1974) posits that we organize our experiences into basic cognitive schema that he calls frames. Primary frameworks are those widely shared culturally bound schemas that orient our attitudes and actions. So the scripts we select to manage impressions come from the primary frameworks of our culture.

Dramaturgy: A Theory of Impression Management

Goffman (1959) claims that, like actors, our lives are played out in front regions or back regions. Front regions are those spaces wherein we try to manage the impressions others form of us by giving a convincing performance. Since playing a successful role not only requires the actor to be a good actor but also requires the audience to accept the role the actor is playing as valid, impression management is a team effort. Part of the success of a play also depends on the actor being able to retreat to the back stage region of the theater out of view of the front stage audience to change costumes, to rest, and to prepare for the next scene. In other words, back stage regions are not impression management platforms, since it would be difficult to maintain impressions if the audience could see the mess, the errors, or the practices involved in giving a convincing front region performance. For example, caretakers who are expected to follow a script of caring in the front region may express dislike or anger toward the residents among colleagues in a back region. Occasionally, the audience does have a chance to view an error or the covering up of an error. Doctors or
supervisors may scold caregivers for mistakes within hearing of residents without realizing they can be heard, for instance. According to Goffman (1967), the actor may be able to recover if the audience is willing to overlook the error, but sometimes, the impression the actor is trying to convey is ruined.

Goffman (1959) describes two types of actors: the sincere actor and the cynical actor. Sincere actors believe in the impressions they are trying to convey. For example, caregivers who consider themselves competent will believe in their own performance as they strive to impress both staff and residents with their abilities. Cynical actors do not believe in their own performances. However, there are two types of cynical actors. One type deliberately tries to mislead their audience through presenting a misleading performance as illustrated by magicians or con artists. Caregivers who do not enjoy working with elders may try to “con” their patients by putting on a on a pleasant front because their jobs depend on certain performances. The second type of cynical actor is the person who does not fully believe in their performance because they lack the confidence to believe in the impression they are trying to make. For example, when people first begin a job, they often go through the motions until they feel confident in the position. Until they become confident that their impressions represent their actual skill levels, they are cynical actors (Goffman, 1959).

How do actors manage the impressions of their audiences? Goffman (1959) claims that the actor uses “sign vehicles” which the audience reads and either accepts or rejects. Sign vehicles include such things as the setting for the act and the actor’s personal front, which includes both appearance and mannerisms. He asserts that in addition to giving signs intentionally to help create an impression, actors also unconsciously give off signs that can alter the impression they are trying to make on the audience. A social worker may be unaware that her frustration or impatience with a client shows for a brief moment in her facial expression, for instance. The audience uses both the intentional signs and the unintentional signs to decide whether or not to accept the impression the actor is trying to convey.

Goffman (1986) also points out that actors and their audiences sometimes interpret signs through stereotypes which stigmatize entire groups and carry expectations that do not
match the reality of the signs that are presented. He contends that recipients of stereotyping face reduced opportunities to live up to their potential or to make the kinds of impressions they desire to make.

Goffman (1961) paid special attention to the setting of total institutions. Total institutions are places where residents are housed in an institutional setting controlled by staff members who set schedules. Residents are under constant surveillance and have little to no agency in determining their own care. Goffman’s (1961) research shows that residents come to orient themselves to the expectations of their caregivers for fear of being punished or losing care and privileges. However, actors cooperate in social interactions for multiple reasons in addition to fear (Goffman, 1983). Goffman (1983) posits that an actor’s status can sometimes make the cost of not cooperating higher than the cost of cooperating because they could be labeled or ostracized for not cooperating. Residents who rebel against caretakers can be labeled as uncooperative troublemakers, for example.

*Primary Frameworks and Social Scripts*

Goffman (1974) claims that actors rely on primary frameworks to select scripts appropriate for particular situations. Primary frameworks are culturally bound cognitive schemas that can be understood as a way of organizing and interpreting the situations around us into meaningful information. Frameworks differ in the amount of organization they provide, with some offering a complete interpretation and others offering only a guiding perspective (Goffman, 1974). For example, while the primary framework identifying something as a physical attack tends to be fully developed, the framework for identifying an insult relies more heavily on a perspective. In a culturally diverse country such as the U.S., we have multiple frameworks from which to choose for most situations, which makes it more difficult to frame some scenarios. If an elder person doesn’t answer when spoken to, it could mean they have poor hearing (especially presbycusis), they are depressed, they have cognitive impairment, or that they are purposely ignoring the speaker. Thus, actors and audiences usually rely on accompanying signs such as setting, appearance, and manner to help us determine which frame to use.
Unfortunately, we may also pick our framework from stereotypes (Goffman, 1986). This means that we can, and sometimes do, select a frame or script that resonates with us but does not necessarily work for our audience. Of particular interest in this paper are the frameworks used by social workers and other caregivers within partial and total institutions.

A Goffmanian Analysis of Infantilization

Previous research provides a clue as to why caregivers infantilize elderly residents by showing that the elderly are often viewed through negative, stereotypical frameworks (Montepare, Steinberg, & Rosenberg, 1992; Whitbourne et al., 1995). Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) find that the elderly are often treated with pity and infantilized because they are viewed as less competent. Elders are often treated as though they are helpless and spoken to in condescending, patronizing ways (Caporael, 1981; Cuddy et al., 2005). This kind of treatment can elicit responses from elders that mimic cognitive impairment. For example, when caregivers interact with residents based on stereotypical assumptions, it can create a vicious cycle where stereotypes seem to be confirmed because being infantilized constrains normal responses (Bonnesen & Hummert, 2002). Sabat, Johnson, Swarbrick, and Keady (2011) point out that when people are labeled, their actions and responses are interpreted through the label. Hence, when caregivers frame elderly residents through ageist assumptions of incompetence and cognitive impairment, they will use inappropriate infantilization scripts with the residents.

If, as Goffman (1974) claims, we pick our scripts from primary frameworks, why would caring, nurturing caregivers select a stereotypical frame that results in an inappropriate script rather than a frame based on the individual resident’s condition? Goffman (1974) asserts that both education and job training provide us with frames through which we understand our job tasks. Regrettably, researchers find a lack of focus on, or interest in, gerontology classes within the education system (Duffy & Healy, 2011). Moreover, Cherry, Allen, Jackson, Hawley, and Brigman (2010) found that social workers had gaps in their knowledge about memory aging, specifically, and could use further training. They claim that caregivers’ overall
knowledge of aging would be improved by more of a focus on the aging process throughout social science curriculums. Furthermore, Schiamberg, Barboza, Oehmke, Zhang, Griffore, Weatherill, VonHeydrich and Post (2012) assert that nursing home staff could benefit from training in how to minimize elder abuse because their personal prejudices and issues can and do affect their work. Supporting that claim, Dunworth and Kirwan (2012) found that workers trained in elderly care are more responsive to actual needs and less likely to make ageist assumptions.

If a majority of elders find infantilization demeaning and disrespectful, why do some of them passively accept this treatment? Goffman (1959) claims that successful performances require teamwork. Actors cannot create impressions without the cooperation of the audience and fellow actors. Goffman (1961) explains how residents in total institutions often respond in ways to accommodate caregivers’ expectations from fear of losing quality care or being punished. Elderly nursing home residents are dependent on their caregivers for their daily personal and medical needs. So as not to antagonize their caregivers, some may become what Goffman (1959) calls cynical actors by passively accepting infantilization because they fear that their dependent status puts them at risk if they do not cooperate. Thus, if nursing home staff use “baby-talk” with them, rather than responding as a sincere actor by withdrawing or refusing to cooperate, elders may succumb to the strategy taken by many residents of total institutions: acceptance of the situation (Goffman, 1961). For example, Coupland et al. (1988) found that elders use several types of what Goffman (1959) would call cynical actor strategies to deal with ageist stereotypes. Some selectively edit their responses to caregivers so as to hide their true feelings and opinions. Others use ageist stereotypes, such as poor memory or poor physical ability, to excuse themselves from activities in which they have no interest. At the same time, residents who get little social support for normal mental functioning often reframe their understanding of themselves to fit the frame of their caregivers and become sincere actors, over time (Goffman, 1961; Ryan et al., 2000).

Research suggests that treating residents in an adult-like manner has positive results (see Castelli, Zecchini, & Deamicis, 2005). Matusitz, Breen, Zhang, and Seblega (2013)
found that an important part of elder residents’ satisfaction in nursing homes is the preservation and maintenance of their individuality and integrity. According to the Administration on Aging (2014), the second most frequent complaint about nursing homes in 2011 was lack of respect for residents and poor attitudes among staff. The way caregivers treat elder residents in total institutions can either help or hinder an elder’s experience (Duffy & Healy, 2011). Because symptoms and diagnoses can change over time, caregivers who focus on elders’ weaknesses may impede chances for improvement (Duffy & Healy, 2011). As Dunworth and Kirwan assert (2012), training can help caregivers choose more appropriate scripts for dealing with nursing home residents. Giles et al. (1993) found that elders view a neutral style of speech as more affirming than patronizing speech. Nursing home residents want to be treated as individuals with specific characteristics and needs instead of as a stereotyped group (Hjaltadottir & Gustafsdottir, 2007).

If, as Salari (2005) claims, infantilization is a form of elder mistreatment, it befits us to think seriously about how to provide nurturing care without relying on infantilization. One of the standard behaviors designated as elder abuse is professional non-intentional verbal abuse. Infantilization of elders clearly falls into this category. Since the problem seems to stem from stereotypes and possible misinterpretations of cognitive impairment, we suggest that in a world of multivariate analysis in which we make Herculean efforts to control for alternative explanatory and spurious variables, the problem of infantilization is relatively simple. The key to resolving the problem of infantilization is in-service training. Medical staff, particularly in nursing homes, are required to attend in-service training. These federally mandated training sessions are the ideal venue for addressing infantilization. After such training, supervisory staff could include infantilization as an item for annual evaluation.

Advancing Research

If a theory cannot be tested, most social scientists would suggest that it lacks trustworthiness. Thus, in contemporary social science, it is vital that theories be tested. Following
are a series of propositions which are delineated from the body of this paper. These propositions need to be tested to determine whether Goffman’s theories are applicable. It is important to note that these propositions were constructed within the context of what Goffman calls the “total institution.” Thus, these propositions are only applicable to partial or total institutions such as adult day care centers or nursing facilities and not to elders who live in the community.

Qualitative behavioral differences exist for institutionalized elders between two types of social interaction: (a) elders’ social interaction with nursing home staff (front region); (b) elders’ social interaction with other institutionalized elders (back region).

Elderly patients in an institutionalized setting will act more lucid in the presence of other institutionalized elders (back region) than they will the staff (front region).

Elderly patients in an institutionalized setting who are treated in a non-adult manner will be less lucid (front region) than elderly patients in an institutionalized setting who are treated in an adult manner.

There is a quantitative difference in the amount of time that staff devotes to elders who rebel against their “dementia” label compared with those who comply with the label expectations.

The amount of time that staff will spend with elderly patients who rebel against their dementia label is filled with negative social sanctions, while the amount of time that staff spends with elderly patients who do not rebel against their dementia label is filled with neutral and some positive social sanctions.

When surveyed separately, caregivers and residents will provide different “impressions” of caregiving interactions.
Support for using Goffman’s theoretical models will be derived if research confirms these propositions.

**Conclusion**

We suggest that Goffman’s theories may improve our understanding of the practice and results of infantilization. A major strength of Goffman’s approach is his focus on specific behaviors within institutions. Goffman provides an excellent framework from which one can study specific service-provider/patient interactions. We contend that investigating whether or not caregiver practices can impact the cognitive and behavioral responses of elderly residents in such a way as to mimic cognitive decline can add to knowledge of “best practices.” Because Goffman offers both a macro theory that elucidates the cultural frames actors use to understand the world around them and a micro theory that explains how actors use various signs to create specific impressions, he provides an opportunity to understand both structure and interaction. Using these theories, researchers can begin to explain how the structure of total institutions for the elderly affects service-provider/resident interactions. We assert that the more we learn about how structural forces and personal interactions affect quality of care for elder residents of partial and total institutions, the better care we can provide.

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**References**


Exploring Factors Associated with Citizens’ Perception of Their Political Environment: Evidence from Palestine

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This study explores factors associated with citizens’ perception of their political environment in Palestine (N = 1270). Understanding these factors in this context has potential to enhance knowledge in relation to features that may be associated with dissatisfaction and civil unrest. This knowledge may help inform development of policies with greater potential to improve welfare. Overall, results of this study suggested that gender, government anti-corruption initiatives, and the country’s economic condition are important in explaining appraisal of the political environment as stable or unstable. Implications for welfare and scholarship are discussed.

Key words: Political environment, corruption, anti-corruption policies, economic conditions, Palestine

Political instability continues to characterize the landscape of many countries of the global South, compromising human development and well-being. Such instability creates an endless list of problems, including long-term food insecurity, displacement, health, poverty, reduced economic investment, and low growth (Szirmai, 2005; UNDP, 2005). There is also some evidence suggesting a feedback loop relationship—that poverty and civil unrest may contribute to dissatisfaction, in turn reducing the capacity of government to satisfy the needs of citizens (Szirmai, 2005; UNDP, 2005). Despite the perceived
correlation between political instability and welfare, little attention has been given to investigating factors that may influence citizens’ perceptions of their countries’ political climate as stable or unstable, even in environments that are characterized by civil unrest. This study attempts to rectify this gap in knowledge by examining factors that may influence perception of a country’s political climate as stable or unstable. We focus specifically on Palestinian territories. Examining this question within the context of Palestine has potential to inform perception of features that may be related to satisfaction/dissatisfaction and civil unrest, providing insight to help improve people’s welfare through responding effectively to citizens’ needs. It also has potential to influence understanding of factors that may lead to increased trust in a government.

Background of Palestine

Palestine has experienced a long history of occupation. In fact, it was only in 1994 that Palestine was granted limited self-rule in some parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Since then, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has become the major administration responsible for the welfare of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, providing social services including education, health, and social welfare (Oxfam International, 2007).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2011) the estimated number of Palestinians in the Palestinian territory was 4.2 million at the end of 2011 (2.6 million in West Bank, 1.6 million in Gaza Strip). These data indicate that about 44% of the population in Palestinian Territory are refugees (29.7% in the West Bank, 67.4% in Gaza Strip). The population is relatively young, with a median age of 18 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In terms of the territory’s economic situation, unemployment, at a rate of 25.4% (19.5% in the West Bank, 37% in Gaza Strip), is relatively high.¹ Further, generally, the rate of women’s participation in the labor force is very low; for example, it was 15% in 2009, compared to a rate of 66.9% for men. Moreover, the territory has high levels of poverty. For example, data indicates that one in three households live
under the poverty line; the rate of poverty was 34.5% (23.6% in the West Bank, 55.7%) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009a).

With regards to corruption, data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (2014) indicates that the majority of Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority (PA) institution is corrupt (80% in the West Bank, 64% in Gaza Strip). In fact, there is some data to suggest that the Corruption Crimes Court, which was established in September 2012, had tried about forty-one cases of corruption including “embezzlement, money laundering, fraud, and exploitation of position for personal gain” within a single year (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability-AMAN, 2013, p. 15). Most of these cases involved high-level employees. Factors associated with corruption include an environment that enables high-ranking officials to exploit their public position for personal gain. This is exemplified in the absence of strong policy to monitor conflict of interests, weak regulations against the transfer of interests from public to private, the absence of official punitive and preventive procedures, and the absence of a Legislative Council (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability-AMAN, 2013).

Review of the literature

Social-demographic and Political Stability

Scholars have attempted to establish factors that may be related to perception of political stability/instability. Higher per-capita income and higher levels of education have been positively connected to perceptions of political stability (Lee, 2011; McMahon, 2004). It could be that people with higher levels of education are more likely to have better income-earning opportunities compared to those who have lower levels of education and do not want to risk their current status and earnings (Lee, 2011; Urdal, 2007). In contrast, scholars also have argued that wealth and education may allow citizens to devote time and money which enable them to have better access to political information, and accordingly, increase their political participation. At the same time, poor and less educated people are hampered by illiteracy, poor political information and connections, and lack of time (Lee, 2011). Indeed, some
evidence showed that social status and education are generally associated with increased political participation and decreased civil unrest (Lee, 2011).

Gender and age have also been indicated as correlates of political stability/instability. For example, young males are said to be more likely to perceive political injustices, leading to instability and civil unrest (Urdal, 2006, 2007). An explanation for the age/gender observation is that people in this group are likely to connect instability to poverty and lack of opportunity to engage in income-earning activities. In fact, the link between poverty and deteriorating income with respect to instability has been made by others (see e.g., McMahon, 2004; Miguel, 2007; UNDP, 2005). In addition, unemployment has been linked to political instability. This could be because it is closely related to poverty and income. Furthermore, scholars (e.g., Azeng & Yogo, 2013; Urdal, 2006, 2007) suggested that political instability is likely to occur in a country where the unemployment rate is high, particularly among youth. Scholars argued that marital status is correlated with political stability. Results of research on this subject, however, are mixed. A number of scholars observed that being married decreased the possibility of participation in political violence due to family responsibilities (Berrebi, 2007; Krueger & Maleckova, 2013); in contrast, Lee (2011) found that married people (after controlling for age) were more likely to be involved in political violence.

**Economic Situation and Political Stability**

A country’s economic performance is said to play a role in shaping perceptions of political stability/instability. Scholars contend that deterioration in a country’s economic performance may negatively impact opportunities for citizens to generate income (Urdal, 2007). Further, it is argued that poor economic conditions within a country have potential to create fiscal crises for government, reducing its ability to satisfy the needs of its citizenry (Szirmai, 2005). In short, poor economic performance, characterized by low income, poor standard of living and unmet needs are connected to dissatisfaction; consequently, this leads to political protest/civil unrest (Szirmai, 1985; Urdal, 2007). On the other hand, political instability can severely hinder economic performance and limit the ability
of policy makers to develop progressive macroeconomic policies. For example, violence and/or civil unrest/strife are likely to disturb the operation of economic institutions, negatively influencing a country’s productive capacity (Aisen & Veiga, 2011). Also, frequent changes in government have the potential to create uncertainty about future macroeconomic policies, discouraging potential investors (Aisen & Veiga, 2011). Indeed, the evidence reviewed suggests that political instability may be associated with poor economic standing and vice versa (Aisen & Veiga, 2011; Feng, 1997; Qureshi, Ali, & Khan, 2010).

**Corruption/Anti-corruption Strategies and Political Stability**

Research has examined the relationship between corruption and citizens’ appraisal of a country’s socio-political environment. Specifically, citizens’ perception of the country as corrupt has been linked to political stability/instability (Peters, 2007; UNDP, 2010). The argument put forward is that corruption has the potential to influence stability by inducing mistrust in government (UNDP, 2010). Other investigators suggest that corruption leads to instability because it excludes substantial segments of citizens from material benefits and participation in governance. On the other hand, anti-corruption actions by the government are related to enhancing citizens’ confidence in government, consequently leading to political stability (Dix, Hussmann, & Walton, 2012; UNDP, 2010). Indeed, anti-corruption actions, such as accountability and transparency, may help governments establish mechanisms with the potential to promote performance, leading to provision of quality public services (Peters, 2007).

Within the Palestinian context, social commentators point to the association between conflict and human development. For example, evidence exists to suggest that political instability has distracted the labor market, creating sharp increases in unemployment, and consequently creating high levels of poverty (UNDP, 2005; World Bank, 2010). Such deterioration necessitates more attention to factors that may have major effects on the political climate (stable vs. unstable) and its impact on the welfare of citizens. Overall, the literature reviewed provides a background from which to explore the hypothesized relationship—perception of a country’s political environment is
influenced by its economic condition, corruption, government anti-corruption actions, and socio-demographic characteristics.

**Research Questions**

This study explores factors that may be related to appraisal of a country’s political climate as stable vs. unstable. More specifically, two research questions are explored:

1. Do individual level characteristics predict appraisal of political climate (stable vs. unstable)?

2. Do the following predict perception of political climate (stable vs. unstable): (a) a country’s economic situation; (b) household financial situation; (c) a country’s level of corruption; and (d) effectiveness of government anti-corruption policies?

**Method**

**Description of Data**

This study uses data from the first wave of the Arab-Barometer survey. The data were collected from 2006 to 2007, and included seven Arab countries: Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews with large and representative national samples of adults over the age of 18. All aspects of the interview were conducted in Arabic. The survey was administered by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, and examined citizen orientation, along with attitudes related to a county’s economic conditions, family financial conditions, corruption, government performance, politics, democracy, and reform (Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR], 2007). Palestine (N = 1270) was selected for the current investigation. Palestine has been deeply influenced by political and economic upheaval for a long time. These factors, for the most part, are related to the conflict between Jewish and Palestinian populations, and only in 1994 did Palestine obtain limited self-rule government. Within this context, this study attempts to understand factors beyond the external conflict that may impact citizens’ perceptions of their political environment.
Measures

**Dependent variable:** The main dependent variable utilized in this study is perception of political environment, which is measured by a single question: *How would you describe the political situation in your country?* The item is captured as a dichotomous variable, with 0 indicating negative appraisal of country’s political climate.

**Independent variables:** A number of independent variables are utilized. A brief overview of these is presented below. Perception of a country’s economic situation is measured by a single item asking respondents to rate the current economic condition of their country on a binary measure, with 0 indicating negative perception of the country’s current economic condition.

Household financial situation is captured by asking respondents to rate the financial situation of their household on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. Lower values indicated negative appraisal of a household’s financial situation. Level of corruption captures a respondent’s perception of the extent of corruption in her country. The variable was rated on a scale from 1 to 4; lower values indicated lower level of corruption.

Government anti-corruption action is employed to examine the extent to which the government is working to fight corruption. The question was rated on a scale from 1 to 4; lower values indicated negative appraisal of government anti-corruption action.

Individual-level characteristics, including age, gender (1 = male, 2 = female), marital status, employment status and level of education were used as control variables.

Data Analyses

A number of statistical procedures were used to investigate the relationships between key study variables. More specifically, univariate analyses were used to describe variables such as age, gender, level of education, employment, and marital status. Bivariate correlations and binary logistic regression were performed to explore factors that may be related to appraisal of a country’s political climate. A number of demographic variables were included in the models as controls.
Study Limitations

This study has two main limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the study relies on participants’ self-reports, limiting the accuracy of the data to the extent to which respondents were able to report their situation correctly. The second limitation is related to the measure of corruption used. This study only captured one aspect of corruption. Other features, such as embezzlement, abuse of function, and extortion were not included. Despite these limitations, this study has merit and provides insight that may help explain how respondents perceive factors related to the political environment in their respective countries.

Results

Characteristics of Study Participants

The sample demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1. Overall, about half of the respondents were females (51.9%). Age ranged from 18 to 87 years, with a mean age of 37.37 years (SD = 13.7). In terms of education, 6.4% of the respondents had no formal schooling, 14.7% had elementary level education, 24.3% had attained primary education, 32.3% had secondary level education, and 22% had college level education and above. The majority of respondents were married (75.7%), and over half were unemployed (67.6%).

Bivariate Correlations of Study Variables

Preliminary results obtained from correlation that examined the relationship between study variables are presented in Table 2. These showed a positive association between appraisal of a country’s political climate and gender (r = 0.11; p < 0.01); compared to men, women were more likely to have a positive appraisal of their country’s political climate. Also, being unemployed was associated with a positive appraisal of a country’s political climate (r = 0.06, p < 0.05). Additionally, family financial situation, government anti-corruption policies, and country’s economic conditions were each associated with positive appraisal of a country’s political climate. More specifically, respondents who had a positive evaluation of their household’s financial situation, positive expectations of government anti-corruption policies, and positive evaluations of
Table 1. Description of the Demographic Variables Used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Percent/Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Age (years)</strong></td>
<td>37.36 (SD = 13.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender (Female)</strong></td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College +</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Financial Situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of Corruption</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly anyone is involved</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a lot of officials are corrupt</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most officials are corrupt</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost everyone is corrupt</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Anti-corruption Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a small extent</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a medium extent</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a large extent</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of Current Economic Condition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Situation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their country’s economic conditions were more likely to report a positive evaluation of their country’s political climate (see Table 2).

**Regression Results**

Results of a binary logistic regression performed to examine factors that may influence the appraisal of a country’s political climate are presented in Table 3. Results of the first step, which included age, gender, marital and employment status, showed that the overall model of demographic variables was significant in distinguishing between positive and negative appraisal of a country’s political climate \[\chi^2 (df =5) 15.89 =, p < .007; (–2 \text{ log likelihood} = 1008.549]\]. The model correctly classified 82.8 percent of the cases. Wald statistics showed that only gender significantly predicted a country’s political climate as either negative or positive. Specifically, women were 1.7 times likely to have a positive evaluation of their country’s political climate compared to men.

Results of the second step, which added economic situation, household financial situation, corruption and anti-corruption policies, also indicated that the model was significant \[\chi^2 (df =9)97.242, p < .000; (–2 \text{ log likelihood} = 927.115]\] and correctly classified 83.1 percent of the cases. Wald statistics showed that gender, government anti-corruption policies and country’s economic conditions were significantly related to appraisal of a country’s political climate as either negative or positive. More specifically, women respondents who had positive expectations of the ability of governmental policies to combat corruption, and respondents who had positive assessments of a country’s economic conditions were more likely to perceive their country’s political climate as stable. The odds ratio revealed that women were more likely to have positive appraisals of a country’s political climate. Also, a unit change in the perception of government anti-corruption policies as effective increased the likelihood of appraising the country’s political climate as stable by about 1.6 times. Furthermore, a unit change in perception of the country’s economic conditions as positive increased the likelihood of appraising the country’s political climate as stable by about 3.3 times.
Table 2. Spearman Correlations for the Study Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family financial situation</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of corruption</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government anti-corruption actions</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of current economic situation</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Discussion

The study set out to explore factors that may be associated with perception of a country’s political climate (as stable vs. unstable). The findings indicated that only gender, among socio-demographic variables, was related to a country’s political climate; females were more likely to have positive appraisals of their country’s political climate. Similar to other studies, this result could be explained by the opportunities of men to engage in income-earning activities (see Urdal, 2006, 2007). Indeed, the percentage of unemployment among men is higher compared to women, and increases as soon as political unrest rises. For example, the unemployment rate among men increased from 22% in 2007 to 26.5% in 2008, while it increased from 19% in 2007 to 23.8% in 2008 among women (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009b). Whereas the observed rate appears to be similar for both males and females (4% across gender), it is problematic in that men, in Palestine, are generally responsible for households financial welfare. Another possible explanation for the observed relationship between gender and political climate (stable vs. unstable)
could be that women have limited information about the political situation and hence report limited level of participation in political activities.

Table 3. Logistic Regression in Prediction a Country’s Political Climate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Step one</th>
<th>Step Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Wald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>7.75**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family financial situation</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of corruption</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government anti-corruption actions</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>26.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of current eco. situation</td>
<td>1.197</td>
<td>33.377***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>1008.549</td>
<td>927.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (df = 5)</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall rate of correct classification</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Contrary to the argument made by Peters (2007) and UNDP (2010), evidence from this study revealed no relationship between corruption and political stability in the context of Palestine. It might be that Palestinians consider factors such as economic well-being and unemployment to be closely related to stability. This, in fact, has been indicated by others (see e.g., Dix, Hussmann, & Walton, 2012). Results of this study showed that government anti-corruption policies were significantly related to appraisal of a country’s political climate. This observation is in line with comments made by Peter (2007) and UNDP (2010) that government policies to combat corruption have potential to strengthen confidence in government, leading to political instability.
This study reported that respondents who reported positive evaluations of their country’s economic conditions were more likely to have positive appraisals of their country’s political stability. This finding reflects arguments advanced by Szimai (1985) and Urdal (2007) that good economic conditions create satisfaction, and accordingly, political stability.

Implications

Findings of this study draw attention to a number of implications for policy, practice, and scholarship. One area of attention may be addressing the causes of dissatisfaction among men. Addressing such dissatisfaction may include developing a clear understanding of causes of dissatisfaction, creating more opportunities for employment, and enhancing citizens’ participation in political activities. Another area of focus could be collection of rigorous data on the subject. This is important in that such data has potential to help government develop effective responses to the plight of males, reducing the potential for civil unrest. This observation may also be important for civil society organizations.

Results also highlight the importance of implementing effective anti-corruption strategies. Anti-corruption policies, such as those focusing on increased government transparency and improving accountability may be key in this regard. More specifically, effort could be devoted to ensure that the general public is aware of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Government could also ensure that implementation of such policies is transparent. Additionally, attention could be given to economic performance, as this factor influenced perception of a country’s political stability. Indeed, scholars have indicated a relationship between economic stability and improved welfare. In fact, this is also linked to decreased political unrest (Safadi & Lombe, 2013; Szimai, 1985; Urdal, 2007).

Finally, more research may be needed to examine the feedback loop type of relationship between political instability and the capacity of government to adequately provide quality social services. Collection of sound data may be useful in this regard. Additionally, comparative studies examining the noted relationships in stable and unstable political environments could provide important insight on similarities and
differences, as well on the features that may be associated with appraisal of political climate (stable vs. unstable).

References


Endnote:
¹Please note that we are looking at two different data points, so the unemployment rates may be different. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the rate of employment is influenced by a number of factors, including political stability. Hence, the data from 2011, a relatively stable period, may reflect this reality (World Bank, 2014).

Alice Goffman’s *On the Run* is a birds-eye view of the legacy of so-called “tough on crime” policies associated with the war on drugs on a poor, African American Philadelphia community. Goffman adopts the viewpoints of the community residents and notes her hope that “these perspectives will come to matter in the debate about criminal justice policy that now seems to be brewing” (p. xiv). They should. The strength of Goffman’s book is her fair, unsentimental, and non-ideological portrayal of the lives of her research subjects that serves to humanize them while emphasizing the dehumanizing tendencies of criminal justice policies.

Through a somewhat unlikely series of events (I am surely not the only reader whose need to understand the terms of Goffman’s access caused them to skip ahead to the very interesting methods section at book’s end), Goffman spent nearly 6 years, some during her undergraduate and graduate studies, living in an area in Philadelphia that she calls “6th Street” as a participant observer among a group of young African American men and their families. She witnessed phenomena, such as police raids, that are rarely described from the point of view of those “on the run.” The book is based on continuous field notes, some typed or recorded on her phone, and often presents actual exchanges and dialogue.

Along with one of the book’s chief protagonists, she conducted a survey of neighborhood households in 2007, finding that 144 of 308 men between the ages of 18-30 had a warrant issued for arrest because of delinquent court fines, fees, or failure to appear for a court date in the last 3 years, and 119 reported warrants for technical violations of their probation or parole (such as drinking or missing curfew). Goffman notes that these bench warrants (as opposed to “body” warrants that are issued for new criminal cases) comprise the vast...
majority of legal entanglements. Along with police quotas, new technologies to track violations, and increased numbers of “warrant units,” a structure of surveillance has been created that produces outcome data that show the “success” of criminal justice policy while deeply affecting the lives of those who are fugitives from this sort of tracking.

Goffman’s book is devoted to expanding themes (generally divided into separate chapters) related to the impact of surveillance on individuals, their relationships, and the community. For example, Chapter 1, “The Art of Running” describes how “everyday relations, localities, activities that others rely on for their basic needs become a net of entrapment” (p. 52). Here Goffman refers to how having a job, a known address (or that of a girlfriend) become resources for surveillance. Additionally, there are more nuanced implications—e.g., if someone is known to be avoiding the authorities s/he becomes “easy prey” since she or he is unlikely to report a crime. Chapter 2, “When the Police Knock Your Door In” describes the complex relations between men and women that result from the (often conflicting) tendencies to be loyal while also protecting children: the descriptions of how women turn from “rider” (the term used for those who protect their man) and “snitch” are particularly devastating. Chapter 3, “Turning Legal Troubles into Personal Resources” explains how people adapt to the dynamics of surveillance to use them to their own advantage. For example, women may use the “go to jail card” as a way to control men’s behavior, or men may turn themselves in and take a break in jail if they perceive that the streets have become too dangerous.

The final chapter, “Clean People” contrasts the lives of the 6th Street men with other African American men of the same age who work security and similar low wage service jobs, largely avoiding the traps of 6th Street. Towards the end of Goffman’s narrative another main character, a grandmother employed at the University of Pennsylvania cafeteria who initially introduced Goffman to 6th Street, is laid off just before reaching retirement and earning her pension. These references to the traps faced by “clean” people are both a contrast to the fugitive life described in the rest of the book and a reference to the labor market that shapes the prospects of the 6th Street community.

Though a sociology book, it is entirely jargon free and
employs very scant theory. The descriptions of the policy context and brief history of Philadelphia were enriching, and I found myself wanting more. Because of the thematic organization, the narrative of events and personal details are often repetitive; better editing would have helped. Still, the conclusions drawn by Goffman truly come from a grounded theory, and it never feels like she is stretching to make her well-supported points. Missing are methods details of how interviews were conducted with police and others who are not the primary research subjects, making the book feel less academic. This will be distracting for qualitative researchers. These are minor complaints given the contributions of the book.

This book will be valuable for policy, ethnography, and social work students in academic settings or for personal enrichment (it’s hard to put it down). It fills gaps that are invisible in policy analyses and programs addressed to “rescue” young black men, and it provides a counterpoint to well-meant programs and evidence-based interventions that are often not validated in urban communities, perhaps even working at cross purposes to their stated goals. Towards the end of the book, Goffman explains that despite the police brutality she has witnessed, she doesn’t blame individual police officers but instead the policy structures that play out in communities like 6th Street. This book is unusual, moving, and effective and targeted at criminal justice policy changes that are sorely needed.

Jennifer Zelnick
Touro College Graduate School of Social Work


This edited volume with contributions by distinguished European and North American social scientists makes the case for a third stage of the welfare state that is neither the post-World War II Keynesian version committed to sustaining demand and compensating the casualties of the market economy nor the neo-liberal iteration that regarded social welfare as a cost and emphasized activation. The social investment welfare state is committed to “preparing”—instead
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of “repairing”—workers for the “global learning economy in which global competition increases the need to constantly develop and renew skills and competences” (p. 25). Hence the need for increased public investment in early childhood care, education, and lifelong learning.

Actually, the editors of this volume discuss two early versions of the welfare state, one the Keynesian, and the other, the Nordic, initially Swedish, welfare state. The latter was developed to reverse declining fertility and featured economic support to families through cash transfers and services such as child care that undergird a dual breadwinner model. Contributors to this volume, however, overlook the full employment policy that was integral to the Nordic model and that, in Sweden, assured jobs to both women and men for nearly sixty years. Indeed, Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi maintained that “The full employment policy … has probably been the most important part of the policy package. Social policies … have of course been valuable but would probably not have been sufficient” (1978). Moreover, in their cross-national research on benefit cutbacks, Korpi and Joakim Palme, an editor of this volume, wrote, in a 1978 article: “The return of unemployment on a mass scale … must be described as a basic regress of welfare states, a crushing of one of their central parts.”

The failure to consider the availability of employment is a serious omission in this work and in the social investment model. For example, in a chapter confusingly entitled, “Do Social Investment Strategies Produce More and Better Jobs,” (emphasis added), Moira Nelson and John D. Stephens report correlations between social investments and employment-to-populations ratios, generally, and knowledge intensive services (KIS), specifically, implying that such jobs are created by the investments. The correlations themselves are not as unequivocal as the authors suggest (table 8.7), but in any case, these correlations do not mean that employment-to-population ratios were high, merely higher in some nations with higher social investments. Interestingly, the U.S., with lower average expenditures in all of the measured social investments, not only compared favorably with the Nordic countries on the general employment-to-population ratio but higher than their KIS mean, though somewhat lower than Denmark and Sweden.
Social investments, it should be noted, may produce some good jobs in one respect: by hiring workers to provide services that create more learning skills, such as teachers.

What the authors fail to note is that unemployment was high in the reference year in some of the countries with high social investments: Sweden, 9.1%, Denmark, 7.2%, Finland 11.8%. Indeed, nowhere in this volume is any attention paid to the extent of unemployment or the relationship between social investments and the level of unemployment. There is no reference to job vacancy rates, including the extent to which they are related to a skill mismatch. This would have been helpful for U.S. readers in view of the oft-invoked but unproven assertion that unemployment is a result of a skills mismatch or, one would infer, a failure to invest sufficiently in the labor force. Social investment, particularly in education, is highly desirable in enriching the lives of people and in developing the capacity for critical thinking that help to develop a discerning citizenry in a democracy—irrespective of its role in improving employment and income outcomes.

Aside from the failure to confront the critical problem of unemployment, there are some chapters in this volume that provide important information and insights to American readers. Particularly commendable is the inclusion in this volume on social policy of a chapter on climate policy. In it, Lena Sommestad, a professor of economic history and former Swedish minister for the environment, argues that “there is much to gain from better integration between climate policy and social investment policies in the EU” (p. 320). In her chapter on promoting social investments through work–family policies, political scientist Kimberly J. Morgan shows that, contrary to some assumptions about the trajectory of welfare-state development, a number of countries have engaged in major, path-shifting social investments in work–family policies. Jane Jenson, in a chapter on “Redesigning Citizenship Regimes after Neoliberalism,” points to differences among social-investment strategies, namely the Nordic, child-centered approach proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and colleagues, and the more supply-side and limited version of Anthony Giddens adopted by British New Labour. For a basically forward-looking strategy, population aging poses a dilemma that labor economist Thomas Lindh tackles in “Social Investment in the Ageing...
Populations of Europe,” through investment in improving education and labour market entry for the young, hence providing an economic basis for intergenerational redistribution.

This volume provides the reader with a good understanding of the social investment welfare state.

*Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg, Professor Emerita, School of Social Work, Adelphi University*


Sven Hort (formerly Sven Olsson and later Sven Olsson Hort) has documented extensively the components and transitions of the Swedish welfare state since 1990 when the first volume, later revised, was first published; in fact, the second volume is marketed with the previous volume, also a 3rd edition, *Social Policy, Welfare State and Civil Society in Sweden: History, Policies, and Institutions 1884-1988*. This book provides a thorough—and for those who hold Sweden up as an example of what a comprehensive welfare state can be, a depressing—analysis of developments in Sweden since the late 1980s.

In Chapter 1 Hort provides an overview of comparative welfare state research. Chapter 2, “The Social Welfare-Industrial Complex: Social Policy and Programmes 1990-2014,” and Chapter 3, “The Lost World of the Social Democratic Welfare Regime Type, 1988-2014,” focus on several inter-connected phenomena that have contributed to Sweden’s diminished welfare state, among them: an eclipsed Social Democratic Party, which had been closely allied with a highly unionized labor force, which has intermittently lost national elections to the Moderates who have pushed austerity programs; an economy now globalized, especially after the country joined the EU in 1994, with a consequent loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs (for example, the Volvo car division was sold to Ford in 1999); the ascendancy of local government as the provider of social and health services (what in the U.S. has been called devolution); an income tax system where 1/3 is paid to local authorities, resulting in better and more comprehensive
services for those living in wealthy municipalities; publicly-financed privatization of some social services and healthcare; a partially privatized pension system that was formerly publicly run and generous; cutbacks in sickness and unemployment benefits; the collapse of a comprehensive housing policy; and demographic changes, including an aging population and new immigrants—over 1 million in the 20-year period beginning in 1990—towards whom there has been hostility and political backlash.

Hort refers several times to the Social Democrats as “Blue Labour,” modeled on Tony Blair’s example. Full employment—a hallmark of the former Sweden—is no longer the goal; instead, a “work first” strategy dominates. Though never fully explained, it appears to be a soft version of workfare (see Gertrude Goldberg’s review of Towards a Social Investment Welfare State? in this issue). The former pro-active Labour Market Board (AMS), which, in order to support full employment, did extensive studies of projected job growth while also providing sophisticated job retraining and job creation (see Helen Ginsburg, 1983), has been replaced by local Employment Service agencies that offer only stripped down job coaching and referral services. The goal of full employment has been replaced by price stability and low inflation (pp. 90-91).

Civil society, revised to include voluntarism, a reinvigorated church-affiliated sector, and privatization—including tax-supported for-profit service organizations—is the focus of Chapter 4. The chapter covers the growth of private schools and vouchers, cutbacks that have affected financial support for higher education students, and other semi-austerity measures. Only feminism that has promoted gender equality seems to have had a positive impact on Swedish society, and child care and parental leave benefits remain strong.

In the final two chapters, Hort evaluates the viability of the famous, comprehensive and universal Nordic welfare state model described by Esping-Andersen in 1995. Hort concludes that this unique model still holds, but in Sweden, it is a “slimmed down” version of its former self. Where once Sweden was the Scandinavian leader, it has fallen to fourth place, behind Finland, Norway and Denmark.

Social Policy, Welfare State and Civil Society in Sweden
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Social Policy, Welfare State and Civil Society in Sweden
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*Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Prof. Emerita,*
*School of Social Work, Salem State University*


Political sociologists and others who study social movements typically question why and how people mobilize around causes that they care about. This, of course, was the focus of the work of Piven and Cloward in the 1960s, and research interest has continued. Less studied, however, has been the question of why some people do not take these actions and come together to advocate for their self-interests. This forms the context of Sandra Levitsky’s fascinating new book, *Caring for our Own: Why There is No Political Demand for new American Social Welfare Rights.*

Drawing upon her background as both a lawyer and a sociologist, Levitsky looks specifically at the issue of long term care in America. She notes how the landscape has drastically changed, with social policies and programs failing to keep up with the changes. The population is aging, and care needs are becoming more intense as hospitals discharge patients “quicker and sicker.” Add to this the huge shift of women into the labor force—women traditionally being the stay at home caregivers for their family—and one sees the issue quite clearly. What is not so clear for Levitsky is why more people
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do not mobilize politically around this new landscape and set of unmet needs. She sees the key role of family responsibility and the way this centuries’ old value has held fast, despite demographic changes. Americans have just grown up with the notion that they must care for their own and not turn to the state for assistance, as people in other countries typically do.

Levitsky puts her research hat on and undertakes an extremely thorough study of the dynamics at play, with an eye toward how one might shift toward a greater politicization of those most affected by these caregiving needs. She observes many support groups, she runs focus groups, she interviews individual caregivers themselves, and she interviews social workers and other organizational actors. The large number of observations and interviews, and their depth and intensity, are really quite impressive. Through this multi-method qualitative design, she powerfully gives voice to caregivers and to the challenges they face.

The author begins by looking at the “transformation of private needs into public issues”—the first step of politicization. The caregivers poignantly report the huge difficulties of taking care of their loved ones, all the while feeling it is their responsibility to do so. The small group of caregivers who begin to see the state as socially responsible for the care of their loved ones tended to be those who also took on a group identity as caregivers. This move from an individual to collective consciousness around caregiving was often facilitated by social workers, in the name of self-care and self-advocacy.

Once some caregivers have begun to consider asking for help, they begin to question what the state can do for them. Levitsky describes a process of “injustice framing,” which takes caregivers through the steps of naming an issue (need for help with care), blaming (usually themselves before the state), and claiming a course of action to help (typically around financial support, subsidized adult day care, respite care, and in-home care). This group of caregivers who expect some help still weaves this need together with the higher value of family responsibility, noting they turn elsewhere only when all else fails.

The third step in politicization is “communicating grievances” and organizing for action. Even in a group of caregivers
who have come to see their individual issues as social ones and who imagine a set of demands they can make of the state, very few individuals take this next step of political action. Levitsky looks to a more politicized time (the late 60s and early 70s) when many social service agencies—anti-poverty groups, legal aid clinics—were politically active themselves and encouraged political activism among their clients. She notes that times have changed and, in general, caregivers receiving social services are not encouraged to take the next step toward action; the focus remains more on their own individual needs, and whatever social action is taken tends to be by professional advocates, and not by the caregivers themselves.

Despite these obstacles to activism, Levitsky does note that her study has identified a certain group of caregivers that has become politicized over the issue of long-term care, and is hopeful that this issue can be nurtured into “full-fledged political demand” as time passes.

This is an extremely well-written and well-researched book. It is especially noteworthy for combining social policy analysis with qualitative method. We indeed learn a lot from hearing the voices of the caregivers themselves, and it is hoped this will move us to act.

Helen Glikman, School of Social Work, Salem State University


Higher education currently faces challenges that cause many to question the existing paradigm that colleges and universities have relied upon for many years. These concerns include rising costs, decreased college access, the financial stability of institutions, the role of the faculty, assessing teaching and learning, the emerging role of technology and the governance of the university (Baum, Kurose, & McPherson, 2013). Each of these questions potentially threatens the university system and the fate of many individual institutions.

One concern that is reflected in these many challenges is the adequacy of student loans and the corresponding
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Joel Best and Eric Best, *The Student Loan Mess: How Good
Intentions Created a Trillion-Dollar Problem*. University of

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es is the adequacy of student loans and the corresponding
challenge of student loan debt. This is a serious barrier to college access for many. It is also a problem that has been a long time in the making. *The Student Loan Mess* presents an informed and accessible treatment of the policies that have created the situation we face today.

Best and Best discuss four policy conflicts that decision makers dealt with in the period following the Second World War. They refer to these as the four student loan “messes” and argue that each set of policies is a response to problems created by previous policies.

The first mess was created by the United States’ need for more skilled brainpower to remain competitive. This created the necessity for access to higher education and gave rise to a series of higher education aid programs, including federally supported student loan programs. These policies resulted in expanded access to higher education. The new policies also resulted in the second crisis, concern about student loan defaults. Dealing with the possibility of “deadbeat” student debtors resulted in a series of additional policies to close the gaps created by earlier decisions. These policies made it difficult to discharge loans by declaring bankruptcy, created other incentives to encourage loan payment and created a desirable situation for potential private lenders, which accounted for a larger share of student lending. This led to the third crisis, characterized by massive or crushing student debt.

What followed was more emphasis on direct loans from the federal government, which eventually led to the revelations that the federal government was making substantial profits from student borrowers and that student loan interest rates were higher than on other types of credit. These additional policies, created to correct the consequences of earlier decisions, led to the forth crisis that the authors describe as the for-profit bubble. This final crisis refers to the potential of mass closings of for-profit universities, and the possible consequences for the American economy. The final part of the book lays out the considerations that will be needed to create a future for higher education that does not involve the creation of more problems. There are fifteen steps that the authors recommend as a way toward more productive policy making.

A theme throughout the book is the relationship between
the concurrent changes to society and the impact on higher education. The evolution of attitudes toward debt and borrowing are important here, and the authors do a nice job of putting this value change in context. They also explain how social change is reflected in the way universities have defined their strategies. These include the growing concerns about reputation and ranking, the explosion of administrative staff positions and student amenities.

The book has limitations. The economic dimension isn’t as well developed as it might be, and some of the expected content isn’t dealt with to any degree. Because the rising cost of higher education is important here, a notable omission is Baumol’s cost disease theory (see Baumol & Bowen, 1965). While they do discuss the economics of funding student loans, it does not appear to be a very deep analysis, and the discussion of how the economy evolved during the period in question seems too limited. The authors do not propose much that would bring substantial change to the university system. They are highly critical of for-profit institutions, but focus less on often similar behavior at traditional universities.

Nonetheless, this is a very useful book. It provides an intelligent and accessible treatment of a difficult policy issue that will involve many Americans. It is smart and well documented. This book will be useful to a wide range of readers including faculty, policy makers, parents, students and anyone concerned with the future of higher education.

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