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employs very scant theory. The descriptions of the policy context and brief history of Philadelphia were enriching, and I found myself wanting more. Because of the thematic organization, the narrative of events and personal details are often repetitive; better editing would have helped. Still, the conclusions drawn by Goffman truly come from a grounded theory, and it never feels like she is stretching to make her well-supported points. Missing are methods details of how interviews were conducted with police and others who are not the primary research subjects, making the book feel less academic. This will be distracting for qualitative researchers. These are minor complaints given the contributions of the book.

This book will be valuable for policy, ethnography, and social work students in academic settings or for personal enrichment (it’s hard to put it down). It fills gaps that are invisible in policy analyses and programs addressed to “rescue” young black men, and it provides a counterpoint to well-meant programs and evidence-based interventions that are often not validated in urban communities, perhaps even working at cross purposes to their stated goals. Towards the end of the book, Goffman explains that despite the police brutality she has witnessed, she doesn’t blame individual police officers but instead the policy structures that play out in communities like 6th Street. This book is unusual, moving, and effective and targeted at criminal justice policy changes that are sorely needed.

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This edited volume with contributions by distinguished European and North American social scientists makes the case for a third stage of the welfare state that is neither the post-World War II Keynesian version committed to sustaining demand and compensating the casualties of the market economy nor the neo-liberal iteration that regarded social welfare as a cost and emphasized activation. The social investment welfare state is committed to “preparing”—instead
of “repairing”—workers for the “global learning economy in which global competition increases the need to constantly develop and renew skills and competences” (p. 25). Hence the need for increased public investment in early childhood care, education, and lifelong learning.

Actually, the editors of this volume discuss two early versions of the welfare state, one the Keynesian, and the other, the Nordic, initially Swedish, welfare state. The latter was developed to reverse declining fertility and featured economic support to families through cash transfers and services such as child care that undergird a dual breadwinner model. Contributors to this volume, however, overlook the full employment policy that was integral to the Nordic model and that, in Sweden, assured jobs to both women and men for nearly sixty years. Indeed, Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi maintained that “The full employment policy … has probably been the most important part of the policy package…. Social policies … have of course been valuable but would probably not have been sufficient” (1978). Moreover, in their cross-national research on benefit cutbacks, Korpi and Joakim Palme, an editor of this volume, wrote, in a 1978 article: “The return of unemployment on a mass scale … must be described as a basic regress of welfare states, a crushing of one of their central parts.”

The failure to consider the availability of employment is a serious omission in this work and in the social investment model. For example, in a chapter confusingly entitled, “Do Social Investment Strategies Produce More and Better Jobs,” (emphasis added), Moira Nelson and John D. Stephens report correlations between social investments and employment-to-populations ratios, generally, and knowledge intensive services (KIS), specifically, implying that such jobs are created by the investments. The correlations themselves are not as unequivocal as the authors suggest (table 8.7), but in any case, these correlations do not mean that employment-to-population ratios were high, merely higher in some nations with higher social investments. Interestingly, the U.S., with lower average expenditures in all of the measured social investments, not only compared favorably with the Nordic countries on the general employment-to-population ratio but higher than their KIS mean, though somewhat lower than Denmark and Sweden.
Social investments, it should be noted, may produce some good jobs in one respect: by hiring workers to provide services that create more learning skills, such as teachers.

What the authors fail to note is that unemployment was high in the reference year in some of the countries with high social investments: Sweden, 9.1%, Denmark, 7.2%, Finland 11.8%. Indeed, nowhere in this volume is any attention paid to the extent of unemployment or the relationship between social investments and the level of unemployment. There is no reference to job vacancy rates, including the extent to which they are related to a skill mismatch. This would have been helpful for U.S. readers in view of the oft-invoked but unproven assertion that unemployment is a result of a skills mismatch or, one would infer, a failure to invest sufficiently in the labor force. Social investment, particularly in education, is highly desirable in enriching the lives of people and in developing the capacity for critical thinking that help to develop a discerning citizenry in a democracy—irrespective of its role in improving employment and income outcomes.

Aside from the failure to confront the critical problem of unemployment, there are some chapters in this volume that provide important information and insights to American readers. Particularly commendable is the inclusion in this volume on social policy of a chapter on climate policy. In it, Lena Sommestad, a professor of economic history and former Swedish minister for the environment, argues that “there is much to gain from better integration between climate policy and social investment policies in the EU” (p. 320). In her chapter on promoting social investments through work–family policies, political scientist Kimberly J. Morgan shows that, contrary to some assumptions about the trajectory of welfare-state development, a number of countries have engaged in major, path-shifting social investments in work–family policies. Jane Jenson, in a chapter on “Redesigning Citizenship Regimes after Neoliberalism,” points to differences among social-investment strategies, namely the Nordic, child-centered approach proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and colleagues, and the more supply-side and limited version of Anthony Giddens adopted by British New Labour. For a basically forward-looking strategy, population aging poses a dilemma that labor economist Thomas Lindh tackles in “Social Investment in the Ageing
Populations of Europe,” through investment in improving education and labour market entry for the young, hence providing an economic basis for intergenerational redistribution.

This volume provides the reader with a good understanding of the social investment welfare state.

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Sven Hort (formerly Sven Olsson and later Sven Olsson Hort) has documented extensively the components and transitions of the Swedish welfare state since 1990 when the first volume, later revised, was first published; in fact, the second volume is marketed with the previous volume, also a 3rd edition, *Social Policy, Welfare State and Civil Society in Sweden: History, Policies, and Institutions 1884-1988*. This book provides a thorough—and for those who hold Sweden up as an example of what a comprehensive welfare state can be, a depressing—analysis of developments in Sweden since the late 1980s.

In Chapter 1 Hort provides an overview of comparative welfare state research. Chapter 2, “The Social Welfare-Industrial Complex: Social Policy and Programmes 1990-2014,” and Chapter 3, “The Lost World of the Social Democratic Welfare Regime Type, 1988-2014,” focus on several inter-connected phenomena that have contributed to Sweden’s diminished welfare state, among them: an eclipsed Social Democratic Party, which had been closely allied with a highly unionized labor force, which has intermittently lost national elections to the Moderates who have pushed austerity programs; an economy now globalized, especially after the country joined the EU in 1994, with a consequent loss of high-paying manufacturing jobs (for example, the Volvo car division was sold to Ford in 1999); the ascendency of local government as the provider of social and health services (what in the U.S. has been called devolution); an income tax system where 1/3 is paid to local authorities, resulting in better and more comprehensive
services for those living in wealthy municipalities; publicly-financed privatization of some social services and healthcare; a partially privatized pension system that was formerly publicly run and generous; cutbacks in sickness and unemployment benefits; the collapse of a comprehensive housing policy; and demographic changes, including an aging population and new immigrants—over 1 million in the 20-year period beginning in 1990—towards whom there has been hostility and political backlash.

Hort refers several times to the Social Democrats as “Blue Labour,” modeled on Tony Blair’s example. Full employment—a hallmark of the former Sweden—is no longer the goal; instead, a “work first” strategy dominates. Though never fully explained, it appears to be a soft version of workfare (see Gertrude Goldberg’s review of *Towards a Social Investment Welfare State?* in this issue). The former pro-active Labour Market Board (AMS), which, in order to support full employment, did extensive studies of projected job growth while also providing sophisticated job retraining and job creation (see Helen Ginsburg, 1983), has been replaced by local Employment Service agencies that offer only stripped down job coaching and referral services. The goal of full employment has been replaced by price stability and low inflation (pp. 90-91).

Civil society, revised to include voluntarism, a reinvigorated church-affiliated sector, and privatization—including tax-supported for-profit service organizations—is the focus of Chapter 4. The chapter covers the growth of private schools and vouchers, cutbacks that have affected financial support for higher education students, and other semi-austerity measures. Only feminism that has promoted gender equality seems to have had a positive impact on Swedish society, and child care and parental leave benefits remain strong.

In the final two chapters, Hort evaluates the viability of the famous, comprehensive and universal Nordic welfare state model described by Esping-Andersen in 1995. Hort concludes that this unique model still holds, but in Sweden, it is a “slimmed down” version of its former self. Where once Sweden was the Scandinavian leader, it has fallen to fourth place, behind Finland, Norway and Denmark.

*Social Policy, Welfare State and Civil Society in Sweden*