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Continuity or Shift?  
A Multiple Streams Framework  
Analysis of the Family Policy in Turkey

AZIZE ASLIHAN NISANCI

In Turkey, the word “family” was used for the first time in the title of a ministry (state department) with the establishment of The Ministry (Department) of Family and Social Policies in July 2011. This article analyzes the process through which the new ministry came into being and discusses the elements of continuity and shift in the current government’s family policy. Kingdon’s (2002) multiple streams framework is used to analyze the policy making process. Thus, the article discusses how the problem, policy and political streams opened the window for the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. While the problem and policy streams are found useful for the analysis, the problem stream is insufficient to understand the unique context of Turkish politics.

Key words: Family policy, Turkey, multiple streams framework

In Turkey, the word "family" was used for the first time in the title of a ministry with the establishment of The Ministry of Family and Social Policies in July 2011. This was an important transformation in the area of social services because the new ministry gathered all other previously scattered state social service agencies, including the oldest child welfare agency (Social Services and Child Protection Agency/SHCEK) under its umbrella. There are six main areas of responsibility for the ministry: social relief; family and community services; child services; services for the disabled and the elderly; women's status; and services for the martyrs and veterans.

These areas are under the responsibilities of different directorates of the ministry. At first glance, there seem to be two implications of the ministry's organizational scheme. First, the title of the ministry makes one think that social policies in different areas of social welfare are seen as integral parts of...
the family policy. Second, the creation of a separate directorate for family and community services raises questions about what differentiates it from the other directorates, all of which coordinate services for the society. This separate directorate is called the Directorate General for Family and Community Services. As in the case of the other directorates, which had already been in service for years as separate organizations, this directorate was the continuation of the General Directorate of Family and Social Research, which operated under the Prime Minister's office since 1989 with different titles. Within the organization of the ministry, this unit was granted the status of a major social service directorate and its prominent role is reflected in the title of the ministry. Hence the activities of this directorate comprise an integral part of the agenda of the ministry, and its role should be explored carefully to fully understand the meaning of family and family policy for the current government.

Once the ministry was established, the first activity of the Directorate of Family and Social Policies became the implementation of a family life education program. The program is presented as "the family education of Turkey" and a wide-scale family life education campaign is currently being implemented. It is supposed to be disseminated by volunteer trainers, who will participate in educational seminars in different cities. The curriculum was prepared by the directorate and is publicly accessible at the ministry's website. The education is claimed to increase life quality of the families and teach the "secrets of living in a healthy and happy family life." The curriculum consists of modules on parenting skills, marriage and family life, communication skills, legal rights, budgeting, health, and media.

At first glance, one can have a sense that the policy actors that implement the current transformation in the state's social welfare arena put family at the center of their social policy planning and have agendas that prioritize family policies. The aim of this article is to explore why Turkish government attributes such a primacy to family today, what this implies for the family policy in general, what were the processes that led to the emergence of a family ministry. Finally, is this transformation a continuity or a shift?
Background: The History of Family Policy in Turkey

Family has always been a central component of Turkish state ideology. From the acceptance of the Turkish Civil Code in 1926 to the present, the nuclear family became the only legitimate form of intimate relationship between male and female individuals (Sirman, 2004). The replacement of the modern nuclear family by the traditional extended family has been the goal of the Turkish modernization project. The 1982 Constitution used the concept of "family institution" and defined it as legally binding marriage (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982). The duty of the protection of family was also counted among the responsibilities of Turkish state. Article 41 of the constitution states that the family is the foundation of Turkish society and asserts that the state shall take the necessary measures and establish the necessary organization to ensure the peace and welfare of the family, especially the protection of the mother and children, and for family planning education and application.

With this article, the Turkish state legitimizes the state's role in regulating family life and establishes the state as the primary responsible agent for the welfare of the family. This constitutional article reflects that the Turkish state regards family as sacred and gives the primary responsibility of protecting the integrity of family to the state.

Governments also put a special emphasis on family from 1980s to the present. In the program of the first civil government, which was established in 1983 after the military coup of 1980, family was mentioned as the essence of nation (Yolcuoglu, 2011). It was stressed that family was the first and most important unit of social welfare and had a vital role in the protection of moral, national, and religious values. In the 1987 program of the State Planning Organization, there is a clear expression of the connection between social welfare and family welfare, and the family unit is addressed as the primary target of economic development, employment, and social services.

In the program of the 1987 government, it was again indicated that family was the foundation of society and women were the most important element of the family institution. In line with these purposes, a specialty commission was
established by the State Planning Institution in 1987. Its aim was defined as the investigation of the problems of the family in Turkey. The commission prepared a report and stated that there was a need for further research in the area. In the same year, research on "Turkish Family Structure" was conducted. In 1989, The Department for the Protection of Family Integrity was established under the umbrella of the Social Services and Child Protection Agency (SHCEK). In the same year, the Family Research Institution was established.

The subsequent governments continued to mention the importance of family policies in their programs. In the program of the 1993 government, the importance of women's vocational training and employment was emphasized, and the family was defined as the basic unit of democratic life. In addition to the ideological emphasis on the family, the family unit has also been important in the provision of social services, and family status has been a factor in the determination of entitlements (Kilic, 2010). For example, women and children were granted health care benefits as dependents of a male breadwinner. Similarly, working women were paid compensation after getting married, with the justification that they would be dependent on their husbands. There were also some benefits for the extended family members.

The history of the Directorate General for Family and Community Services goes back to 1989, when the Family Research Institution was established under the umbrella of the Prime Minister's Office. During the administration of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002, this institution was transformed into the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Family and Social Research in 2004. It was this unit that became the Directorate General for Family and Community Services today. Considering the long-lasting history of the state and government emphasis on family in Turkey, one may ask "What is new today?" One of the aims of this article is to explore what differentiates AKP’s family policy from the policies of the previous governments. A multiple streams framework analysis will be used to analyze both continuities and ruptures.
Conceptual Framework

Kingdon (2002) proposes a multiple streams framework to analyze the processes of policy making by national governments. His framework is instrumental in making a detailed analysis of the processes through which the Ministry of Family and Social Services and the Directorate General for Family and Community Services came into being. Kingdon investigates how issues came to be recognized as issues in the first place and the processes by which agendas are set and alternatives are specified. According to Kingdon, agendas are set through three kinds of processes: problems, policies, and politics. These three streams, which flow through the system, join together and result in actual policies when the policy window is open. Policy windows provide policy entrepreneurs unique opportunities to turn their policy proposals into actual policies. Policy entrepreneurs are specialists such as bureaucrats, people in planning and evaluation, academics, interest groups and researchers. The policy window can open predictably or unpredictably and remains open for short periods of time.

The focus of this article is the processes which make the policy window open: the problem, policy, and problem streams. The three-level analysis allows us to answer the question of "Why now?" taking the entire system into consideration. As Zahariadis (2007) puts forward, the unit of analysis in Kingdon’s framework is the entire system, and the collective choice is formulated as the combined result of structural forces and cognitive and affective processes that are highly context dependent. Therefore, the analysis can be used to explore the factors which contribute into the policy making at multiple levels and to better understand the policy climate. It also is instrumental to understand the dynamics in different contexts, such as different localities or even different countries. However, the multiple streams framework has not been widely used to understand non-Western policy contexts. There is only one study which uses the framework to analyze the health policies in Burkino Faso (Ridde, 2009). This article is another such attempt and focuses on how the Ministry of Family and Social Policies came into being.
The Problem Stream

Kingdon (2002) states that certain problems capture the attention of government officials while others do not. Problems are defined through indicators and may become visible as a result of a prominent event or a crisis. However, routine monitoring or studies by government agencies or nongovernmental researchers can also reveal problems. Most of the time, problems are far from being obvious, and the determination of whether an indicator is a problem or not is a matter of interpretation. The values one brings to an observation play a substantial role in problem definition. If the observers see a discrepancy between the observed condition and the ideal condition in their minds, they start to believe that something should be done. The conceptualization of the problem stream requires asking if there is a crisis that triggers today’s family policies. If there is, the questions to ask are "who defines it as a problem?" "what are the values of the policy community?" and "what are the problem indicators?"

According to some social groups and some government officials, the family institution is in crisis in Western societies today. Before the Ministry of Family and Social Policies was established, a responsible minister from woman and family participated in a conference called "Family as a value within the context of religion, tradition and modernity" in November 2010. Her speech at the conference illustrates the AKP government’s conceptualization of family policy. The minister emphasized that globalization and social changes have weakened the family as an institution, and that the family institution was going through a crisis. The minister also addressed out-of-wedlock relationships and population declines in Western countries as contemporary evils for societies today. According to the minister, the unity of Turkish society in the face of the risks and threats is due to its "high values that are produced in families." She also stated that the AKP government would prioritize family-centered policies.

The strategic plan of the Directorate General for Family and Community Services (The Republic of Turkey, 2007) also illustrated how the AKP government defined its ideal family as compared to the family in crisis. The text presented a negative view of the transformation of family in modern society. It
argued that family bonds and values have been deformed due to the trends of modernization, globalization, and individualization in Western societies. It further indicated that the care of the older adults, children, and individuals with disabilities was undertaken by traditional extended families in the past, as opposed to today’s society, where these family members are taken care of by institutions.

The global indicators of family crisis identified by the text are the facts that young people are getting married at later ages, mothers are having their first child at later ages, couples are having fewer children, and the numbers of single parents and out-of-wedlock relationships are increasing. The strategic plan identifies the effects of globalization and media as negative influences on the family bonds in Turkey, especially after 1980s. The text claimed that the deformation in family values and structure became more visible in the 1990s. Statistical data were presented to identify major social problems as a decline in the population growth rate, a decline in the mean number of family members per family, a decline in the number of marriages, an increase in the number of divorces, and a decline in fertility rates. In the government documents and government officials' accounts, there is an apparent use of a conservative discourse in favor of preserving traditional family values.

It is not only the government that promotes the traditional extended family in Turkish society. Some NGOs share the government’s perspectives and even work in collaboration with the government. For instance, The Center for Social and Economic Research (SEKAM, n.d.) implemented a large scale field research project on the family in Turkey and published the results on its website as an online report and as a book, *Family in Turkey: Structural Characteristics, Functions and Change of Family* (SEKAM, 2011). The survey questions focused on issues such as marriage, relationships, divorce, sexuality, violence, and parent-child relationships. The research project was funded by the Statistics Institution of Turkey (TUIK). This funding source reveals the ideological alliance between current AKP government and SEKAM.

In addition to the research project, SEKAM organized a symposium on family in Istanbul, Turkey in April 2011. In the symposium, it was emphasized that Turkish family structure
was about to collapse unless urgent precautions were taken. According to the head of SEKAM, individuals are losing their humanistic values under the influence of secularism and Westernization. He holds the European Union (EU) responsible for the degeneration of Turkish society and claims that the EU is trying to change Turkish society through cultural funds. He especially blames the soap operas and serials on television channels and thinks that they are produced with a conscious purpose of ruining the values and traditions of the society.

The Association for the Preservation and Support of Family (Aileyi Koruma ve Destekleme Dernegi, AKODER) is another non-profit organization with a focus on family. It was established as an initiative of women in 2004, and the main activity area of the association has been to investigate the threatening effects of media, primarily of television programs, on families (AKODER website, 2011). The association implements campaigns about the television programs they perceive as threatening and generates safe programs lists to guide families. The association considers morality and religious values as the criteria of safe programs for families.

Another NGO that advocates conservative family policies is an umbrella organization called The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World (Islam Dunyasi STK’lari Birligi, IDSB). It is an international organization, and its center is in Istanbul. It was established after a conference on NGOs of the Islamic world in Istanbul in 2005. It is an umbrella organization that aims to provide coordination and cooperation between NGOs of the Islamic world. One hundred and fifty-two NGOs are members of the organization (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World [IDSB], 2008). IDSB organized an International Family Conference in Indonesia on May, 2011. NGOs, academics and bureaucrats from fifteen different countries participated in the conference. In the final declaration (Uluslararası aile konferansi sonuc bildirgesi, 2011), it was stressed that family was the most important institution for healthy individuals and society. They suggested the implementation of social policies which would support a family model based on the tenets of Islam and further claim that these kinds of policies will solve the problems caused by modern culture. They suggested the strengthening of the relations with relatives to solve the problems caused by the nuclear family structure. They also
suggested policies that encourage marriage and decrease divorce rates, and they want the women-focused policies implemented in such a way that they will not prevent women from fulfilling their basic duties within the family.

AKP government's policies are not exempt from criticisms. Feminist groups have voiced criticisms of the state family policies, in general, and of AKP's family policies, in particular. The creation of a ministry with the word family in its title and leaving the word woman aside with the abolishment of the position of the "prime ministry responsible from woman and family" triggered hot debates in the media. Feminist groups argue that the government defines women's primary roles as preserving family unity and ignores women as individuals. They also criticize the government for promoting the traditional patriarchal family, which they identify as the root of women's problems, such as domestic violence and honor killings (Can, 2006).

The Policy Stream

Kingdon (2002) elaborates a second contributor to governmental agendas: the policy stream. Once the problem and a need for solutions are recognized, the policy community proposes solutions compatible with their values. A process of gradual accumulation of knowledge and perspectives among the specialists in a given policy area, and the generation of policy proposals by such specialists, constitute the policy stream. The proposed ideas come together and constitute the policy primeval soup. Technical feasibility and value acceptability determine the success of the ideas in the competition to win acceptance in the policy networks.

The main policy proposal mechanism for Turkish governments has been the national Family Councils. Five family councils have been organized since 1990 by the Family Research Institution. While feminist groups have been struggling for effective women-focused policies and addressing problems such as the violence against women and honor killings, they were excluded and marginalized from the public policy making processes. On the other hand, conservative groups, which mainly constituted religious and/or nationalist actors, were participants of these family councils, in part because governments in Turkey were conservative in the 1990s. The proposals of these
conservative groups won the attention of the government officials and resulted in the current organization of the Ministry of Family and Social Services.

The policies proposed at the family councils paved the way for the current organizational scheme of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. A quick look at the proposals proposed at the Family Councils is an inalienable part of the analysis. First of all, the necessity of establishing a family ministry was among the proposals in the first and third councils in 1990 (Birinci aile surasi, 1990) and 1998 (Ucuncu aile surasi, 1998). In the first council, it was stressed that family could not only consist of a man, a woman, and children, but had to include grandparents as well. The family was defined as a resilient unit with strong family bonds. The policy community proposed a family model that would embody love, affection and the democratic values of equal share of rights and responsibilities. Hierarchical relationships between men and women in family life were criticized. It was proposed that the departure point in the family policy had to be "our national culture" and "the care of children and the elderly within the family" had to be encouraged. The traditional Turkish home model was presented as an ideal design for Turkish families. The participants argued that day-care centers for children should be rearranged according to Turkish values.

As these points suggest, conservative values were held by the majority of the family council participants. On the other hand, there was some emphasis on the importance of the equality between men and women in family life and the value of democracy in the family unit. Traditional patriarchal hierarchies were presented as negative features that had to be overcome. The discourse used in the texts of the family councils reveals that the ideal family should both preserve strong family bonds of the traditional Turkish family (such as strong relations with extended family members) and practice modern democratic relations among the family members.

Another striking fact is that promoting family values and family well-being were handled together in the councils. Family welfare was regarded as an integral part of the family policy from the first council on. Issues of nutrition, health, housing, education, unemployment and employment were
counted as the basic areas to be addressed for family well-being. The main theme of the fourth council in 2004 was poverty and family \((\text{Dorduncu aile surasi}, 2004)\). The need for the scientific study of family and poverty to guide family policies was presented. There were different commissions discussing economic, cultural and psychosocial aspects of poverty, the social security system, and strategies for dealing with poverty. It was stressed that social welfare measures had to be implemented. There were proposals suggesting a family wage and universal health insurance. The importance of promoting strong family values and bonds was a continuously emphasized theme. The fifth council took place in 2008, and its main theme was family support services. It was in this council that the specificities of AKP’s family policies started to emerge. The last family council was organized by the new ministry in 2014 and various aspects of the government’s family policies were discussed. In order to understand these particular aspects, there is a need for further analysis of the political stream.

The Political Stream

The political stream is the general political climate created by combined forces, such as swings of national mood, vagaries of public opinion, election results, changes of administration, turnover in Congress, shifts in partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and interest group pressure campaigns. Kingdon (2002) defines the term political narrowly, related to the political environment of the United States. In this respect, Kingdon’s category of the political is not sufficient to fully analyze the political climate in Turkey, which is influenced by multilevel factors such as the long-lasting nation–state ideology, the party ideology, and the forces of the global markets.

The state ideology is an indispensible part of the analysis of family policy in Turkey. The ambivalence towards Westernization and Western values has always been part of the Turkish modernization experience, as is the case for many other Third World countries. On the one hand, Westernization has been the ethos of the nation–state ideology after the foundation of the republic in 1923. On the other hand, the authenticity and uniqueness of the nation’s values have been emphasized by the same state ideology. Hence, AKP’s ambivalent
stance towards Westernization is not unique to the party, but has been part of the society's Westernization experience. However, "Turkishness" and the "unique Turkish family values" are defined based upon the ideologies of the groups.

The secularization and Westernization project created tensions within Turkish society and encountered opposition from the segments of the society which perceived the Westernization project as a threat to their religious values and culture. This tension marginalized the people and excluded them from the center, where the state power was held. Some scholars described this as a tension between "center" and "periphery" (Mardin, 1973). The current AKP government presented itself as the representative of the people, or the periphery, which was claimed to have been socially and economically disadvantaged and non-privileged. The leading members of the AKP government, including the then Prime Minister Erdogan, also came from a former political party (Welfare Party) which explicitly advocated prioritizing Islamic values. However, the leading figures in AKP recently disassociated themselves from the path of their former political party, as they claimed to have changed and embraced the goal of EU membership as their primary foreign policy goal. This means that they were not against following the path of modernization/Westernization anymore. On the other hand, they defined their new party's (AKP) defining principle as "conservative democracy" when they first established the party in 2001. This label, in a way, was revealing the difficulties that the party would experience in its ambition of compromising the goals of modernization and Westernization on the one hand and conservatism on the other hand.

The political ideology of AKP is in favor of conservative family policies. As the strategic plan of the Directorate of the Family and Social Services (The Republic of Turkey, 2007) reveals, the effects of modernization and globalization are viewed negatively and the cure suggested for these negative influences is the protection of the strong, extended traditional family. The nuclear family is regarded as the source of many of the problems in modern life, such as youth behavior problems. Western countries are highly criticized for being too individualistic and not taking care of elderly family members. Yazici (2007) shared her observations in one of these family
councils and asserted that one recurring theme was that in the European countries, corpses of people were found in their homes days after their death because they were living alone. AKP officials say that they are proud of the ‘historically strong’ Turkish family and their goal is to prevent Turkish society from ending up where Western countries are today.

Related to this fear, AKP also feels the need to take precautions against the decline in the population growth rate in Turkey. Being afraid of experiencing the low fertility rates, negative population growth rates and an increasingly aging population that Western European countries have experienced since the 1960s (Hantrais, 2004), the then Prime Minister Erdogan stressed that every Turkish woman had to have at least three children.

The fear of population decline is not the only motivation behind AKP’s family policies. According to Yazici (2007), AKP’s focus on the traditional extended family simultaneously serves two political aims. First, it invokes an ideal societal order to define their distinctiveness from both secularist predecessors in Turkey and an imagined West. Second, the promotion of strong family constitutes the discursive justification for decreasing welfare state provisions. These arguments can easily be traced in the government documents and the accounts of AKP’s bureaucrats. In his speech in the fifth family council, Erdogan (Besinci aile surasi, 2008) emphasized the importance of the strong Turkish family as a protection in the face of the disruptive influences of poverty. AKP officials often mention the importance of a strong family to avoid the social upheavals against poverty that Argentina experienced in 2002 (Sirman, 2006).

The endeavor of replacing the support of the family institution with welfare state provisions is not peculiar to Turkey. Strong family has also been an important protection against the negative social consequences of shrinking welfare state provisions in the Southern European/Mediterranean states (Moreno, 2002). At this point, global neoliberal policies become a crucial force affecting the family policies of AKP. Reducing welfare spending and promoting strong family is not a hidden agenda for AKP. In the strategic plan of the Directorate of Family and Social Services (The Republic of Turkey, 2007), the
linkage between the decline of the welfare state and making the family unit an object of social welfare is explicitly stated. It is argued that providing social services via giving financial support to families reduces the cost of public social service expenditures significantly. It is also indicated that many states have developed social policies that support family and social networks to decrease the burden on the state budgets. In concert with this provision, AKP has implemented policies that weaken the welfare state provisions.

Social welfare scholars observe this transformation and give examples of the ground level implications of it (Kilic, 2010; Yazici, 2007). It is stated that AKP has been replacing the welfare state with civil society organizations and municipalities and transferring welfare responsibilities to families. Kilic (2010) suggests that there seems to be a move towards individualism in the Turkish welfare system after the social welfare reforms of 2006. Some of the benefits that were granted to children and women on the basis of dependency are not granted anymore. Yazici (2007) points to IMF and World Bank pressures as one of the forces behind AKP's neoliberal welfare policies.

On the other hand, AKP still claims to be a social welfare state and have some policies in this direction. One of the most recent examples is a widows' pension enacted on November 2011. AKP's social policies are called an "eclectic social security regime" by Bugra and Candas (2011). Kilic (2010) also gives examples of the reemergence of a "family-centered social policy approach" with AKP. He gives examples of the recent family medicine system and the cash that is paid to mothers of children under the condition that the children will continue to go to school. On the basis of these examples, Kilic (2010) argues that the nature of the recent social policy reform process in Turkey is oscillating between the poles of familialism and individualism. AKP's ambivalent attitude towards a welfare state leads to an ambivalence in its family policies.

Discussion

The institution of family has always been at the center of the state ideology in Turkey. In a way, family was the smallest social unit that would embody the modernization project in its
norms and organization. However, the objective of secularization left religious values outside the organization of social life, including the family life. While the Turkish state promoted the secularization project, traditional values continued to be practiced in society to different extents. Various governments before AKP advocated conservative family policies, and the history of the Family Councils goes back to 1990. From the 1980s on, conservative governments held power. In the 1990s, most of these governments were coalition governments, and conservative/Islamist, nationalist and leftist governments held the government power together in different combinations.

After the coalition governments of the 1990s, for the first time, a conservative government, whose members had their roots in an Islamist party, came to power. Since its first days in power, the AKP government has been accused of promoting Islamic values in its policies, and the same argument is made for its family policies. Therefore, it is necessary to see the continuities and ruptures that characterize AKP’s family policies today. Kingdon’s multiple streams framework was used to analyze the process through which the Ministry of Family and Social Policies came into being. A detailed focus on the problem, policy, and political streams showed the commonalities and specificities of the current government’s family policies. The problem stream and policy stream analysis were instrumental in understanding the background of family policy in Turkey and in analyzing continuities and discontinuities in AKP’s family policy. Moreover, the debates for and against AKP’s family policies became part of the article thanks to the problem and policy streams frameworks.

On the other hand, the definition of the political stream was too narrow to contextualize the current family policy in Turkey. Kingdon’s framework does not leave much room for the global economic dynamics that are not often explicitly discussed. These dynamics determine social policies in general and family policies in particular. Kingdon’s model does not address the structural dynamics that should be part of the explanation.

In the light of the multiple streams analysis of AKP’s family policies, it can be argued that there are some elements of continuity and discontinuity in AKP’s family policies. AKP is not the first conservative government to advocate
conservative family policies in Turkey, which is why feminist critiques of conservative family policies do not start with AKP’s history and go back to 1990s. Another element of continuity is that AKP’s ambivalent attitude towards Westernization may be in higher degrees due to its members’ religious sentiments. While AKP has an intense fear of cultural Westernization, it continues to strive for Turkey’s EU membership. AKP supporters’ suspicion towards the EU adds further to the ambivalence.

There are also unique characteristics of AKP’s family policies. It was not until the current AKP government that the family unit became an object of social policy as part of the broader neoliberal current. An analysis of the documents of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies reveals that AKP government regards family policy as a holistic concept and includes all policies that affect family well-being and family welfare as family policy. This seems to be a positive development at first glance and demonstrates that the government does not solely focus on protecting traditional family values. This is important because enhancing family welfare cannot be restricted to promoting strong families. The boundaries of the family policy encompass all actions, directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, and affect the welfare of Turkish families (Butterfield, Rocha & Butterfield, 2010). However, AKP’s policies in the direction of declining welfare state expenditures can have deteriorating effects on the families and increase the burden of the families. There is a need for the investigation of the family welfare in Turkey within a structural social justice framework in order to see the effects of AKP’s social welfare policies on the well-being of Turkish families.

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