Author

Chang

Date of Award

12-1996

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Dr. Alan C. Issak

Second Advisor

Dr. Murray Scot Tanner

Third Advisor

Dr. Neil Pinney

Access Setting

Masters Thesis-Open Access

Abstract

This study is dedicated to evaluating the capacity of game-theoretical models in analyzing and explaining international crises like mainland China-Taiwan relations. To highlight and reflect the nature of these complicated long-run relations, the author formulates a dynamic game model based on the combination of three well-known models, Deadlock, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken instead of occupying one dominant model.

The mainland China-Taiwan relations (1949-1995) are divided into three individual phases in accordance with the configuration of game models: (1) the military confrontation phase (1949-78); (2) the peaceful competition phase (1978-86); and (3) the premature cooperation phase (1987-95). By generating and suggesting hypotheses, e.g., Chicken is more suitable than Prisoner's Dilemma in explaining mainland China-Taiwan relations in the post-Cold War era., the author tries to identify the likely patterns of strategy-choosing behavior of mainland China and Taiwan in terms of analyzing how, when , and why both sides adopted and shifted the strategies from one period to another. Also, the author witnesses a couple of limitations for the applications of game models.

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