Abstract
In Moral Perception Robert Audi advocates for an intuitionist account of moral perception in which a moral agent of the proper disposition can use emotion and intuition as a means of supporting or justifying knowledge claims concerning certain moral truths or propositions. Since emotion and intuition can vary from agent to agent and neither agent would be better disposed to claim priority for their emotion or intuition over that of the other agent this opens Audi’s account up to possible instances of problematic disagreement. For this reason, I argue that agents in this intuitionist picture ought to remain epistemically agnostic towards any moral proposition that they and a relevant epistemic/moral peer actually disagree upon, at least until the disagreement has been resolved.
Recommended Citation
Sigsbee, Dustin Michael
(2014)
"Moral Disagreement and Audi's Account of Moral Intuitionism,"
The Hilltop Review: Vol. 7:
Iss.
1, Article 12.
Available at:
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol7/iss1/12
